J

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NON
- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION
- SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYWON D. BAKER

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 315 MDA 2019 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002036

- 2007, CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002041

- 2007, CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002053

- 2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYWON D. BAKER

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1140 MDA 2020 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002036

- 2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYWON D. BAKER

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1141 MDA 2020 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2019J

- A07040

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- 2

-

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002041

- 2007

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TYWON D. BAKER

Appellant :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1142 MDA 2020 Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 24, 2019 In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP

- 22

- CR

- 0002053

- 2007

BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2020
Tywon Baker has appealed pro se from the order entered January 24,
2019, denying his fifth petition filed pursuant to the Post

- Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541

- 9546, as untimely. We initially quashed this
appeal pursuant to Commonwealth v. Walker , 185 A.3d 969 , 971 (Pa.
2018) , because Baker had filed a single notice of appeal from an order
disposing of issues on multiple trial court dockets

. Baker sought reconsideration, and we entered an order granting him

leave to file the additional notices of appeal. Baker filed the additional appeals,
which we now consolidate, but we have determined that we nonetheless must
quash because we lacked the aut hority to treat the additional appeals as
timely. Baker indisputably initiated the additional appeals after the 30

- dayJ

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-

appeal period had expired, and we cannot extend that period. See Pa.R.A.P.
105(b) (prohibiting appellate courts from “ enlarg [ing] the tim e for filing a
notice of appeal ” ); G. Ronald Darlington et al. , 20 West’s Pa. Appellate Practice
§ 903:2 (“ In light of the fact that appeal periods are jurisdictional, and in light
of Pa.R.A.P. 105(b), an appellate court may not enlarge an appeal period. ”)

. 1
Because the additional appeals were filed late, and the original notice of appeal
was from an order disposing of issues on four separate trial court dockets , we
must quash these appeals. See Pa.R.A.P. 903; Walker , 185 A.3d at 971.
In any event, even if we did not quash, we would nonetheless affirm the
order dismissing Baker’s PCRA petition, as it was itself untimely. Baker filed
the instant petition, his fifth, on October 12, 2018

. He claimed to have met

the new constitutional right exception to the PCRA ’ s time

- bar , based on
McCoy v. Louisiana , 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018). He further claimed to have met

the new fact s exception , citing McCoy and a newspaper article mentioning the
resignation of the judge who presided at his guilty plea hearing

. On appeal,
he again raises these points.
“A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed
within one year of the date the petitioner ’ s judgment of sentence became final,
unless he pleads and proves ” one of the three statutory exceptio ns.

Commonwealth v. Jones , 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (citation and footnote

_________________ __________ ______ ____ _______

1 Cf. Reading Anthracite Co. v. Rich , 577 A.2d 881, 886 (Pa. 1990) (noting statutory and jurisdictional nature of appeal period and stating that trial courts lack authority to expand appeal period).J

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omitted). A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct
review, or at the expiration of time for seeking such review. See id. at 17.

Baker ’ s judgment of sentenc e became final on July 23, 2008, when his
time for seeking direct review with this Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3). The present petition, filed more than 10 years later, is patently
untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction unles s Baker
successfully plead ed and prove d at least one of the exceptions to the time

bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)

- (iii). The exceptions are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with t he presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertaine d by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (b)(1)(i)

- (iii).

Baker has not satisfied either the new fact exception or the new
constitutional right exception. McCoy does not satisfy the new fact exception

because a judicial decision is not a “fact , ” at least for this purpose. See

Commonwealth v. Watts , 23 A.3d 980, 986

- 87 (Pa. 2011). His claim to the
new constitutional right exception likewise fails, because the court that
announced the right, the United States Supreme Court , has not held thatJ

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McCoy applies retroactively on collateral review , as Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
requires

. Finally, we conclude that Baker cannot successfully avail himself of the

new fact exception through the newspaper article concerning the plea judge.

The article does no t relate to any allegation on which Baker has predicated
any claim. As the PCRA court reasoned, “[T] he newspaper article that
Petitioner seeks to rely on has no evidentiary impact on his decision to enter
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.” PCRA C ourt Opinion, 10/24/18, at

4. Although Baker ’ s Statement of Questions Involved includes a claim that
Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 244, 274 (1969) , exempts him from the

PCRA ’ s timeliness requirements, the Argument section of his brief contains
only a fe w sentences about Boykin , none o f which relate to the time

- bar.
Furthermore, he appears not to have raised this claim before the lower court

. He therefore waived the issue, and in any event, we have found nothing in
Boykin to support such a claim.

Cases co nsolidated. Appeals quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/12/2020