# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-5198
  doi:10.3000/17255198.C_2009.158.mlt |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5211 ta' Lulju 2009 |

ISSN 1725-5198

doi:10.3000/17255198.C_2009.158.mlt

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5211 ta' Lulju 2009

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni

2009/C 158/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Każ COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 2 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Preżentazzjoni annotata tas-swieq irregolati u d-dispożizzjonijiet nazzjonali li jimplimentaw ir-rekwiżiti rilevanti tal-MiFID (Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 16(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1008/2008 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar regoli komuni għall-operat ta' servizzi tal-ajru fil-Komunità – Obbligi ta’ servizz pubbliku rigward servizzi tal-ajru bi skeda (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni

2009/C 158/02

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

2

INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

2009/C 158/03

Preżentazzjoni annotata tas-swieq irregolati u d-dispożizzjonijiet nazzjonali li jimplimentaw ir-rekwiżiti rilevanti tal-MiFID (Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill)

3

2009/C 158/04

Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 16(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1008/2008 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar regoli komuni għall-operat ta' servizzi tal-ajru fil-Komunità – Obbligi ta’ servizz pubbliku rigward servizzi tal-ajru bi skeda (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Sejħa għal proposti – EACEA/11/2009 – Appoġġ strutturali għall-organizzazzjonijiet ta’ riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika Ewropea u għal organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fuq livell Ewropew – Programm L-Ewropa għaċ-ċittadini, Azzjoni 2, Miżuri 1 u 2 – 2010 | 10 |
| | PROĊEDURI GĦALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Għajnuna Mill-istat – L-Olanda – Għajnuna Mill-lstat C 10/2009 (ex. N 138/2009) – ING – Stedina biex jiġu ppreżentati kummenti skont l-Artikolu 88(2) tat-Trattat tal-KE (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | ATTI OĦRAJN |
| | Il-Kummissjoni |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 8(2) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 509/2006 dwar il-prodotti agrikoli u l-affarijiet tal-ikel bħala speċjalitajiet tradizzjonali garantiti | 24 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni

2009/C 158/05

Sejħa għal proposti – EACEA/11/2009 – Appoġġ strutturali għall-organizzazzjonijiet ta’ riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika Ewropea u għal organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fuq livell Ewropew – Programm L-Ewropa għaċ-ċittadini, Azzjoni 2, Miżuri 1 u 2 – 2010

10

PROĊEDURI GĦALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni

2009/C 158/06

Għajnuna Mill-istat – L-Olanda – Għajnuna Mill-lstat C 10/2009 (ex. N 138/2009) – ING – Stedina biex jiġu ppreżentati kummenti skont l-Artikolu 88(2) tat-Trattat tal-KE (
  1
  )

1

13

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni

2009/C 158/07

Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 8(2) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 509/2006 dwar il-prodotti agrikoli u l-affarijiet tal-ikel bħala speċjalitajiet tradizzjonali garantiti

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE |

---

(1)   Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

---

II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/1

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Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Każ COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI)

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2009/C 158/01

Fl-14 ta’ Mejju 2009, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq komuni. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)b tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004. It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

Fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta' amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32009M5403. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32009M5403. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

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IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET U KORPI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/2

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

L-10 ta’ Lulju 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 128,21 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,5140 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 26,030 |
| EEK | Krona Estona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 277,50 |
| LTL | Litas Litwan | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lats Latvjan | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,3740 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 10,7736 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 2,0331 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 67,026 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 45,4005 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 47,382 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 19,0303 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 67,8230 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,3901

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

128,21

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4466

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,85800

SEK

Krona Żvediża

11,0022

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,5140

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

9,0840

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

26,030

EEK

Krona Estona

15,6466

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

277,50

LTL

Litas Litwan

3,4528

LVL

Lats Latvjan

0,6993

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,3740

RON

Leu Rumen

4,2160

TRY

Lira Turka

2,1636

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,7940

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,6212

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

10,7736

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

2,2250

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

2,0331

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 786,89

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

11,4023

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

9,4983

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,3315

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

14 174,11

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,9731

PHP

Peso Filippin

67,026

RUB

Rouble Russu

45,4005

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

47,382

BRL

Real Brażiljan

2,8084

MXN

Peso Messikan

19,0303

INR

Rupi Indjan

67,8230

---

(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/3

---

Preżentazzjoni annotata tas-swieq irregolati u d-dispożizzjonijiet nazzjonali li jimplimentaw ir-rekwiżiti rilevanti tal-MiFID (Direttiva 2004/39/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill)

2009/C 158/03

L-Artikolu 47 tad-Direttiva dwar l-Istrumenti Finanzjarji (id-Direttiva 2004/39/KE, ĠU L 145, 30.4.2004) lil kull Stat Membru jawtorizzah li jikkonferixxi l-istatus ta' “suq regolat” għal dawk is-swieq kostitwiti fit-territorju tiegħu u li jikkonformaw mar-regolamenti tiegħu.

L-Artikolu 4(1), il-punt 14, tad-Direttiva 2004/39/KE jiddefinixxi “suq regolat” bħala sistema multilaterali mħaddma u/jew immaniġġjata minn operatur tas-suq, li ġġib flimkien, jew tiffaċilita li ġġib flimkien l-interessi multipli tax-xiri u l-bejgħ ta’ partijiet terzi u l-interessi tal-bejgħ fi strumenti finanzjarji – fis-sistema u skont regoli mhux diskrezzjonali – f’manjiera li tirriżulta f’kuntratt, rigward l-istrumenti finanzjarji imdaħħla għall-kummerċ skont ir-regoli u/jew is-sistemi tagħha, u li hija awtorizzata u tiffunzjona b’mod regolari u skont id-dispożizzjonijiet tat-Titolu III tad-Direttiva 2004/39/KE.

L-Artikolu 47 tad-Direttiva 2004/39 jesiġi li kull Stat Membru jżomm lista aġġornata tas-swieq regolati awtorizzati minnu. Dan it-tagħrif għandu jiġi kkomunikat lill-Istati Membri l-oħra u lill-Kummissjoni Ewropea. Skont l-istess artikolu (l-Artikolu 47 tad-Direttiva 2004/39/KE), il-Kummissjoni għandha l-obbligu li kull sena tipubblika f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea lista tas-swieq regolati li tkun ġiet notifikata bihom. Il-lista preżenti nġabret f'konformità ma' dan ir-rekwiżit.

Il-lista annessa tindika t-titlu tas-swieq individwali li huma rikonoxxuti mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali kompetenti bħala li jikkonformaw mad-definizzjoni ta' “suq regolat”. Minbarra dan, tindika l-entità responsabbli għall-ġestjoni ta' dawn is-swieq u l-awtorità kompetenti responsabbli għall-ħruġ jew l-approvazzjoni tar-regoli tas-suq.

Bħala riżultat tat-tnaqqis fl-ostakoli għad-dħul u tal-ispeċjalizzazzjoni f'setturi ta' negozju, il-lista tas-“swieq regolati” ħija soġġetta għal aktar tibdil milli skont id-Direttiva 93/22/KEE dwar is-Servizzi ta' Investiment. L-Artikolu 47 tad-Direttiva dwar is-Swieq tal-Istrumenti Finanzjarji jesiġi wkoll li l-Kummissjoni Ewropea tippubblika l-lista ta' swieq regolati fil-websajt tagħha, u li taġġornaha regolarment. Għalhekk, il-Kummissjoni Ewropea, minbarra li kull sena tipubblika lista fil-ĠU, sejra żżomm verżjoni aġġornata ta' din il-lista fil-websajt uffiċjali tagħha: [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Din il-lista tiġi aġġornata regolarment abbażi tat-tagħrif ikkomunikat mill-awtoritajiet nazzjonali. Kull waħda minn dawn tal-aħħar hija mitluba tkompli tgħarraf lill-Kummissjoni dwar kwalunkwe żieda ma', jew tħassir minn, il-lista tas-swieq regolati li għalihom hija l-Istat Membru domestiku.

| Pajjiż | Titlu tas-Suq Regolat | Entità operattiva | Awtorità kompetenti għad-deżinjazzjoni u s-sorveljanza tas-suq |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| L-Awstrija | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (suq uffiċjali) |

Pajjiż

Titlu tas-Suq Regolat

Entità operattiva

Awtorità kompetenti għad-deżinjazzjoni u s-sorveljanza tas-suq

L-Awstrija

1.

Amtlicher Handel (suq uffiċjali)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (suq semi-uffiċjali) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (suq semi-uffiċjali)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA – Awtorità tas-Swieq Finanzjarji) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA – Awtorità tas-Swieq Finanzjarji)

Il-Belġju

| 1. | (a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt,

| (b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | (a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| (b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | (a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

(a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| (b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Il-Bulgarija

| 1. | Официален пазар (suq uffiċjali) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (suq uffiċjali)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (suq mhux uffiċjali) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (suq mhux uffiċjali)

Българска Фондова Борса — София АД (Il-Borża Bulgara — Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Il-Kummissjoni tas-Superviżjoni Finanzjarja)

Ċipru

Cyprus Stock Exchange

| 1. | Suq ewlieni |
| --- | --- |

1.

Suq ewlieni

| 2. | Suq parallel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Suq parallel

| 3. | Suq alternattiv |
| --- | --- |

3.

Suq alternattiv

| 4. | Suq tal-bonds |
| --- | --- |

4.

Suq tal-bonds

| 5. | Suq tal-Kumpaniji ta’ Investiment |
| --- | --- |

5.

Suq tal-Kumpaniji ta’ Investiment

| 6. | Suq tal-Proġetti Kbar |
| --- | --- |

6.

Suq tal-Proġetti Kbar

| 7. | Suq tat-Tbaħħir Oċeaniku |
| --- | --- |

7.

Suq tat-Tbaħħir Oċeaniku

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Stock Exchange |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Stock Exchange

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Securities and Exchange Authority |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Securities and Exchange Authority

Ir-Repubblika Ċeka

| 1. | Suq Prinċipali (Hlavni Trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Suq Prinċipali (Hlavni Trh)

| 2. | Suq Ħieles (Voln trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Suq Ħieles (Voln trh)

| 3. | Suq Uffiċjali |
| --- | --- |

3.

Suq Uffiċjali

| 4. | Suq tal-Futures |
| --- | --- |

4.

Suq tal-Futures

| 5. | Suq Spot |
| --- | --- |

5.

Suq Spot

| 1.-2. | Il-Borża ta’ Praga
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Il-Borża ta’ Praga

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM-SYSTEM, Il-Borża Ċeka
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM-SYSTEM, Il-Borża Ċeka

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5. | Il-Borża tal-Enerġija ta’ Praga
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5.

Il-Borża tal-Enerġija ta’ Praga

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5. | Il-Bank Nazzjonali tar-Repubblika Ċeka |
| --- | --- |

1.-5.

Il-Bank Nazzjonali tar-Repubblika Ċeka

Id-Danimarka

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | Suq tat-titoli; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

Suq tat-titoli;

| — | Suq tal-Bonds; |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq tal-Bonds;

| — | Suq tad-Derivattivi |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS

Finanstilsynet (L-Awtorità superviżorja finanzjarja tad-Danimarka)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [suq awtorizzat = negozju regolari f'titoli li ddaħħlu għan-negozju imma ma ġewx elenkati fil-borża] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [suq awtorizzat = negozju regolari f'titoli li ddaħħlu għan-negozju imma ma ġewx elenkati fil-borża]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

L-Estonja

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Il-Borża)






  — | Põhinimekiri (Elenku prinċipali) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Il-Borża)

—

Põhinimekiri (Elenku prinċipali)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (Elenku tal-Bonds ) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (Elenku tal-Bonds )

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (Elenku tal-Fondi) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (Elenku tal-Fondi)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(L-Awtorità Supervizorja Finanzjarja tal-Estonja)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Suq Regolat)






  — | Lisanimekiri (Elenku sekondarju) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Suq Regolat)

—

Lisanimekiri (Elenku sekondarju)

Il-Finlandja

Arvopaperipörssi (il-Borża);

| — | Pörssilista (Elenku uffiċjali); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (Elenku uffiċjali);

| — | Pre-lista (Pre-elenku); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (Pre-elenku);

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (Elenku tat-titoli oħra) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (Elenku tat-titoli oħra)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Deżinjazzjoni:

Ministeru tal-Finanzi.

Sorveljanza:

| — | Approvazzjoni ta' regoli: Ministeru tal-Finanzi |
| --- | --- |

—

Approvazzjoni ta' regoli: Ministeru tal-Finanzi

| — | Superviżjoni ta' konformità:
  Finansinspektionen (Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja tal-Finlandja) |
| --- | --- |

—

Superviżjoni ta' konformità:

Finansinspektionen (Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja tal-Finlandja)

Franza

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) (Proposta tal-Awtorità tas-swieq finanzjarji).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L. 421-1 du code monétaire et financier).(Għarfien mill-ministru responsabbli għall-ekonomija (c.f. l-Artikolu L. 421-1 tal-kodiċi monetarju u finanzjarju).

Il-Ġermanja

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (awtoritajiet superviżorji tal-istati federali) u l-Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

Awtoritajiet tal-Istati Federali:

| 1. | Börse Berlin-(Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin-(Suq Regolat)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Suq Regolat)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Suq Regolat); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Suq Regolat);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Suq Regolat, Suq Startup) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Suq Regolat, Suq Startup)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Suq Regolat)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München-(Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München-(Suq Regolat)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Suq Regolat)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Suq Regolat) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Suq Regolat)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | Il-Borża Ewropea tal-Enerġija |
| --- | --- |

10.

Il-Borża Ewropea tal-Enerġija

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | SächsischesStaatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

SächsischesStaatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Il-Greċja

| 1. | Il-Borża ta’ Ateni






  — | Suq tat-Titoli |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Il-Borża ta’ Ateni

—

Suq tat-Titoli

| — | Suq tad-Derivattivi |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi

| 1. | Il-Borża ta’ Ateni |
| --- | --- |

1.

Il-Borża ta’ Ateni

| 1. | Hellenic Capital market Commission (HCMC – Kummissjoni Ellenika tas-suq kapitali) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hellenic Capital market Commission (HCMC – Kummissjoni Ellenika tas-suq kapitali)

| 2. | Suq Elettroniku Sekondarju tat-Titoli (HDAT – Suq ta' Strumenti ta' Debitu) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Suq Elettroniku Sekondarju tat-Titoli (HDAT – Suq ta' Strumenti ta' Debitu)

| 2. | Il-Bank tal-Greċja |
| --- | --- |

2.

Il-Bank tal-Greċja

| 2. | Hellenic Capital market Commission (HCMC – Kummissjoni Ellenika tas-suq kapitali) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Hellenic Capital market Commission (HCMC – Kummissjoni Ellenika tas-suq kapitali)

L-Ungerija

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Il-Borża ta’ Budapest)

| — | Részvényszekció (Taqsima tal-Ekwitajiet) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Taqsima tal-Ekwitajiet)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (Taqsima tat-Titoli ta' Debitu) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (Taqsima tat-Titoli ta' Debitu)

| — | Származékos szekció (Taqsima tad-Derivattivi) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (Taqsima tad-Derivattivi)

| — | Áru szekció (Taqsima tal-Kommoditajiet) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Taqsima tal-Kommoditajiet)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Il-Borża ta’ Budapest)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (L-Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja tal-Ungerija)

L-Irlanda

Main Market of the Irish Stock Exchange (Is-Suq ewlieni tal-Borża tal-Irlanda)

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (L-Awtorità Regolatroja tal-Irlanda għas-Servizzi Finanzjarji “Regolatur Finanzjarju”) tawtorizza “swieq regolati” u (bl-esklużjoni ta’ kundizzjonijiet għall-kwotazzjoni fil-borża) tissorvelja l-konformità mar-rekwiżiti tal-MiFID min-naħa tal-Operatur tas-Suq.

L-Italja

| 1. | Suq elettroniku tat-Titoli (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Suq elettroniku tat-Titoli (MTA)

| 2. | Suq elettroniku tal-Bonds (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Suq elettroniku tal-Bonds (MOT)

| 3. | Suq elettroniku tal-Fondi miftuħa u ETCs |
| --- | --- |

3.

Suq elettroniku tal-Fondi miftuħa u ETCs

| 4. | Suq Elettroniku tad-Derivattivi Titolizzati (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Suq Elettroniku tad-Derivattivi Titolizzati (SeDeX)

| 5. | Suq ta’ wara l-ħinijiet tax-xogħol (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Suq ta’ wara l-ħinijiet tax-xogħol (TAH)

| 6. | Suq Taljan tad-Derivattivi għall-kummerċ fl-Istrumenti Finanzjarji msemmija fl-Artikoli 1(2)(f) u 1(2)(i) tal-Liġi Konsolidata dwar il-Finanzi (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Suq Taljan tad-Derivattivi għall-kummerċ fl-Istrumenti Finanzjarji msemmija fl-Artikoli 1(2)(f) u 1(2)(i) tal-Liġi Konsolidata dwar il-Finanzi (IDEM)

| 7. | Suq bl-Ingrossa tal-Bonds tal-Gvern Taljan u tal-Gvernijiet Barranin (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Suq bl-Ingrossa tal-Bonds tal-Gvern Taljan u tal-Gvernijiet Barranin (MTS)

| 8. | Kambju bl-ingrossa fit-Titoli u l-Bonds mhux Governattivi maħruġa minn Organizzazzjonijiet Internazzjonali bil-Parteċipazzjoni tal-Gvernijiet (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Kambju bl-ingrossa fit-Titoli u l-Bonds mhux Governattivi maħruġa minn Organizzazzjonijiet Internazzjonali bil-Parteċipazzjoni tal-Gvernijiet (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Kambju elettroniku fil-Bonds tal-Gvern (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Kambju elettroniku fil-Bonds tal-Gvern (BondVision)

| 10. | Suq TLX |
| --- | --- |

10.

Suq TLX

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

CONSOB jawtorizza kumpaniji li jamministraw is-swieq u japprova l-“by-laws” u r-regolamenti tagħhom.

Għal swieq bl-ingrossa għal titoli tal-Gvern, il-kumpanija li topera hija awtorizzata mill-Ministeru tal-Ekonomija u l-Finanzi wara li tikkunsidra l-opinjoni tal-CONSOB u l-Banca d'Italia.

Il-Latvja

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Elenku prinċipali |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku prinċipali

| — | Elenku tad-Debiti |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku tad-Debiti

| — | Elenku Sekondarju |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku Sekondarju

| — | Elenku tal-Fondi |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku tal-Fondi

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Kummissjoni għas-Suq Finanzjarju u tal-Kapital)

Il-Litwanja

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | Elenku prinċipali tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku prinċipali tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Elenku sekondarju tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku sekondarju tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Elenku tad-Debiti tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku tad-Debiti tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Elenku tal-Fondi tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Elenku tal-Fondi tan-Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Lithuanian Securities Commission (Il-Kummissjoni Litwana tat-Titoli)

Il-Lussemburgu

Bourse de Luxembourg (Borża tal-Lussemburgu)

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier (Kummissjoni ta' sorveljanza għas-Settur Finanzjarju)

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange (Il-Borża ta' Malta)

Malta Stock Exchange (Il-Borża ta' Malta)

Malta Financial Services Authority (L-Awtorità Maltija tas-Servizzi Finanzjarji)

L-Olanda

| 1. | (a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

(a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| (b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Liċenzja mill-Ministru tal-Finanzi wara l-parir tal-Awtorità tal-Olanda dwar is-Swieq Finanzjarji
  Superviżjoni mill-awtorità tal-Olanda dwar is-Swieq Finanzjarji u l-Ministeru tal- Finanzi Olandiż. |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Liċenzja mill-Ministru tal-Finanzi wara l-parir tal-Awtorità tal-Olanda dwar is-Swieq Finanzjarji

Superviżjoni mill-awtorità tal-Olanda dwar is-Swieq Finanzjarji u l-Ministeru tal- Finanzi Olandiż.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Il-Polonja

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Suq Prinċipali) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Suq Prinċipali)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Suq Parallel) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Suq Parallel)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Suq tat-Titoli CeTO suq regolat barra l-Borża) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Suq tat-Titoli CeTO suq regolat barra l-Borża)

| 1. u 2. | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (il-Borża ta' Warsaw) |
| --- | --- |

1. u 2.

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (il-Borża ta' Warsaw)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Il-Kummissjoni għas-Superviżjoni Finanzjarja)

Il-Portugall

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Suq ta' Elenkar Uffiċjali) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Suq ta' Elenkar Uffiċjali)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Suq tal-Futures u l-Options) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Suq tal-Futures u l-Options)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Suq Speċjali għad-Dejn Pubbliku) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Suq Speċjali għad-Dejn Pubbliku)

| 4. | MIBEL— Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi tal-MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL— Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi tal-MIBEL.

(Suq tal-enerġija)

| 1-2. | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Il-Ministeru tal-Finanzi jawtorizza swieq fuq il-bażi ta' proposta mill-Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM, responsabbli għar-regolament u s-superviżjoni tas-suq).

Ir-Rumanija

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Suq regolat Spot – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Suq regolat Spot – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată – (Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată – (Suq regolat tad-Derivattivi – BMFMS)

| 1. u 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.) |
| --- | --- |

1. u 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bucharest Stock Exchange S.A.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Il-Kummissjoni Nazzjonali Rumena tat-Titoli)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Il-Kummissjoni Nazzjonali Rumena tat-Titoli)

Ir-Repubblika Slovakka

| 1. | Suq ta' Titoli Kwotati






  — | Suq ta' Elenku Prinċipali |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Suq ta' Titoli Kwotati

—

Suq ta' Elenku Prinċipali

| — | Suq ta' Elenku Parallel |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq ta' Elenku Parallel

| 2. | Suq Ħieles Regolat |
| --- | --- |

2.

Suq Ħieles Regolat

Bratislava Stock Exchange

National Bank of Slovakia (Il-Bank Nazzjonali tas-Slovakkja)

Is-Slovenja

Il-Borża ta’ Ljubljana, suq uffiċjali (Borzni trg)

Ljubljana Stock Exchange (Ljubljanska borza)

Aġenzija tas-Swieq tat-Titoli

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spanja

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (kull borża tinkludi l-ewwel settur u t-tieni settur tas-suq) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (kull borża tinkludi l-ewwel settur u t-tieni settur tas-suq)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) (Kummissjoni Nazzjonali tas-Suq tat-Titoli)

Banco de España responsabbli għas-suq tad-dejn pubbliku.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Swieq Uffiċjai ta’ Prodotti Finanzjarji Derivattivi |
| --- | --- |

B.

Swieq Uffiċjai ta’ Prodotti Finanzjarji Derivattivi

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

L-Iżvezja

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | suq regolat għall-ishma u l-istrumenti finanzjarji ekwivalenti għall-ishma |
| --- | --- |

—

suq regolat għall-ishma u l-istrumenti finanzjarji ekwivalenti għall-ishma

| — | suq regolat tad-derivattivi |
| --- | --- |

—

suq regolat tad-derivattivi

| — | suq regolat għall-bonds u l-istrumenti finanzjarji ekwivalenti għall-bonds |
| --- | --- |

—

suq regolat għall-bonds u l-istrumenti finanzjarji ekwivalenti għall-bonds

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja)

Ir-Renju Unit

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority (L-Awtorità tas-Servizzi Finanzjarji) |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority (L-Awtorità tas-Servizzi Finanzjarji)

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group — PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group — PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange — Suq Regolat |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange — Suq Regolat

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

L-Iżlanda

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (suq regolat)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja)

Liechtenstein

Mhux applikabbli

Mhux applikabbli

Mhux applikabbli

In-Norveġja

| 1. | Oslo Stock Exchange (Elenkar uffiċjali)






  — | Suq tat-titoli |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Stock Exchange (Elenkar uffiċjali)

—

Suq tat-titoli

| — | Suq tad-Derivattivi (finanzjarji) |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi (finanzjarji)

| — | Suq tal-Bonds |
| --- | --- |

—

Suq tal-Bonds

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Awtorità Superviżorja Finanzjarja tan-Norveġja)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Suq tat-titoli |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Suq tat-titoli

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (Elenkar uffiċjali)






  — | Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (Elenkar uffiċjali)

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Suq tad-Derivattivi (kommoditajiet)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/9

---

Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 16(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1008/2008 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar regoli komuni għall-operat ta' servizzi tal-ajru fil-Komunità

Obbligi ta’ servizz pubbliku rigward servizzi tal-ajru bi skeda

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2009/C 158/04

| Stat Membru | L-Italja |
| --- | --- |
| Rotta konċernata | Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino u bil–maqlub |
| Data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-obbligi ta’ servizz pubbliku | L-1 ta’ Diċembru 2009 |
| Indirizz minn fejn jistgħu jinkisbu t-test u kwalunkwe tagħrif rilevanti u/jew dokumentazzjoni relatata mal-obbligu ta’ servizz pubbliku | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Stat Membru

L-Italja

Rotta konċernata

Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino u bil–maqlub

Data tad-dħul fis-seħħ tal-obbligi ta’ servizz pubbliku

L-1 ta’ Diċembru 2009

Indirizz minn fejn jistgħu jinkisbu t-test u kwalunkwe tagħrif rilevanti u/jew dokumentazzjoni relatata mal-obbligu ta’ servizz pubbliku

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/10

---

SEJĦA GĦAL PROPOSTI – EACEA/11/2009

Appoġġ strutturali għall-organizzazzjonijiet ta’ riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika Ewropea u għal organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fuq livell Ewropew

Programm “L-Ewropa għaċ-ċittadini”, Azzjoni 2, Miżuri 1 u 2 – 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   GĦANIJIET U DESKRIZZJONI

Din is-sejħa għal proposti EACEA/11/2009 hija bbażata fuq id-deċiżjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li tistabbilixxi l-programm “L-Ewropa għaċ-Ċittadini” li jippromwovi ċittadinanza attiva Ewropea għall-perjodu bejn l-2007 u l-2013 (1) (minn hawn ’il quddiem imsejjaħ il-“Programm”).

Il-Programm jikkostitwixxi l-bażi legali għal din is-sejħa għal proposti, u jirreferi speċifikament għall-azzjoni 2 “Soċjetà ċivili attiva fl-Ewropa”, miżuri 1 u 2 “Appoġġ strutturali għal organizzazzjonijiet tar-riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika Ewropea u għal organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fuq il-livell Ewropew”.

1.1.   Objettivi ġenerali tal-programm

Il-Programm huwa maħsub sabiex jikkontribwixxi għal dawn l-objettivi ġenerali li ġejjin:

| (a) | jagħti l-opportunità liċ-ċittadini biex jinteraġixxu u jieħdu sehem fil-bini ta’ Ewropa dejjem aktar fil-qrib, demokratika u b’orjentazzjoni dinjija, magħquda u mseddqa permezz tad-diversità kulturali tagħha, b’hekk tiġi żviluppata ċ-ċittadinanza tal-Unjoni; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

jagħti l-opportunità liċ-ċittadini biex jinteraġixxu u jieħdu sehem fil-bini ta’ Ewropa dejjem aktar fil-qrib, demokratika u b’orjentazzjoni dinjija, magħquda u mseddqa permezz tad-diversità kulturali tagħha, b’hekk tiġi żviluppata ċ-ċittadinanza tal-Unjoni;

| (b) | żvilupp ta’ sens ta’ identità Ewropea, mibni fuq valuri, storja u kultura komuni; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

żvilupp ta’ sens ta’ identità Ewropea, mibni fuq valuri, storja u kultura komuni;

| (c) | trawwim ta’ sens ta’ appartenenza għall-Unjoni Ewropea fost iċ-ċittadini tagħha; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

trawwim ta’ sens ta’ appartenenza għall-Unjoni Ewropea fost iċ-ċittadini tagħha;

| (d) | tisħiħ tal-ftehim reċiproku bejn ċittadini Ewropej billi jiġu mħarsa u promossi d-diversità kulturali u lingwistika, filwaqt li jikkontribwixxi għal djalogu interkulturali. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

tisħiħ tal-ftehim reċiproku bejn ċittadini Ewropej billi jiġu mħarsa u promossi d-diversità kulturali u lingwistika, filwaqt li jikkontribwixxi għal djalogu interkulturali.

1.2.   Miri speċifiċi tas-sejħa għal proposti

Il-miri speċifiċi għal din is-sejħa għal proposti huma:

| (a) | it-trawwim tal-azzjoni, tad-dibattiti u tar-riflessjoni marbuta maċ-ċittadinanza Ewropea u mad-demokrazija, mal-valuri, l-istorja u l-kultura kondiviżi permezz tal-attivitajiet u l-kooperazzjoni ta’ ‘think tanks’ (strutturi ta’ riflessjoni) u ta’ organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-livell Ewropew; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

it-trawwim tal-azzjoni, tad-dibattiti u tar-riflessjoni marbuta maċ-ċittadinanza Ewropea u mad-demokrazija, mal-valuri, l-istorja u l-kultura kondiviżi permezz tal-attivitajiet u l-kooperazzjoni ta’ ‘think tanks’ (strutturi ta’ riflessjoni) u ta’ organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-livell Ewropew;

| (b) | it-tħeġġiġ ta’ interazzjoni bejn ċittadini u organizzazzjonijiet fi ħdan is-soċjetà ċivili, permezz tal-kontribuzzjoni għal djalogu interkulturali u b’enfażi kemm fuq id-diversità kif ukoll fuq l-għaqda fl-Ewropa. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

it-tħeġġiġ ta’ interazzjoni bejn ċittadini u organizzazzjonijiet fi ħdan is-soċjetà ċivili, permezz tal-kontribuzzjoni għal djalogu interkulturali u b’enfażi kemm fuq id-diversità kif ukoll fuq l-għaqda fl-Ewropa.

1.3.   Prijoritajiet tematiċi

| — | Il-futur tal-Unjoni Ewropea u tal-valuri fundamentali tagħha, |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-futur tal-Unjoni Ewropea u tal-valuri fundamentali tagħha,

| — | Ċittadinanza Ewropea Attiva – parteċipazzjoni u demokrazija fl-Ewropa, |
| --- | --- |

—

Ċittadinanza Ewropea Attiva – parteċipazzjoni u demokrazija fl-Ewropa,

| — | Djalogu interkulturali: |
| --- | --- |

—

Djalogu interkulturali:

| — | Impatt tal-linji politiċi tal-UE fuq is-soċjetajiet, |
| --- | --- |

—

Impatt tal-linji politiċi tal-UE fuq is-soċjetajiet,

| — | Il-benesseri taċ-ċittadini Ewropej, impjieg, koeżjoni soċjali u żvilupp sostenibbli, |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-benesseri taċ-ċittadini Ewropej, impjieg, koeżjoni soċjali u żvilupp sostenibbli,

1.4.   Deskrizzjoni tas-sejħa għal proposti

Din is-sejħa għal proposti tikkonċerna l-appoġġ strutturali, imsejjaħ “għotjiet operattivi”, lil organizzazzjonijiet li jkunu qegħdin isegwu għan ta’ interess ġenerali Ewropew. L-għotjiet operattivi jagħtu appoġġ finanzjarju sabiex tkun koperta parti mill-ispejjeż operattivi meħtieġa għat-tmexxija xierqa tal-attivitajiet normali tal-organizzazzjoni magħżula.

Dan l-appoġġ jista’ jingħata, skont ċerti kriterji, taħt forma ta’ għotja annwali jew ta’ sħubija multiannwali. Is-sħubija multiannwali hija mekkaniżmu ta’ kooperazzjoni stabbilit bejn organizzazzjoni u l-Aġenzija Eżekuttiva tal-Edukazzjoni, l-Awdjoviżwali, u l-Kultura (minn hawn ’il quddiem l-Aġenzija eżekuttiva) li jagħti lok għal għotjiet speċifiċi. Fil-każ ta’ din is-sejħa, din l-isħubija tista’ tkun konkluża għal tliet snin.

2.   APPLIKANTI ELIĠIBBLI

2.1.   Organizzazzjonijiet

Sabiex tkun eliġibbli għal għotja operattiva, organizzazzjoni li jkollha għan ta’ interess ġenerali Ewropew għandha tkun:

| (a) | organizzazzjoni li ma tagħmilx profitt u li għandha personalità ġuridika; f’każ ta’ netwerk li m’għandux struttura operattiva separata bi stejtus proprju, l-applikazzjoni tista’ tinbagħat mill-organizzazzjoni membru responsabbli mill-koordinazzjoni tan-netwerk: |
| --- | --- |

(a)

organizzazzjoni li ma tagħmilx profitt u li għandha personalità ġuridika; f’każ ta’ netwerk li m’għandux struttura operattiva separata bi stejtus proprju, l-applikazzjoni tista’ tinbagħat mill-organizzazzjoni membru responsabbli mill-koordinazzjoni tan-netwerk:

| (b) | topera fil-qasam taċ-ċittadinanza Ewropea, kif spjegat fl-istatut tagħha jew fid-dikjarazzjoni tal-missjoni tagħha u tikkorrispondi ma’ waħda mill-kategoriji ta’ organizzazzjonijiet li ġejjin: | Miżura 1:






  A. | organizzazzjoniet Ewropej ta’ riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika (‘think tanks’ - strutturi ta’ riflessjoni). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

(b)

topera fil-qasam taċ-ċittadinanza Ewropea, kif spjegat fl-istatut tagħha jew fid-dikjarazzjoni tal-missjoni tagħha u tikkorrispondi ma’ waħda mill-kategoriji ta’ organizzazzjonijiet li ġejjin:

Miżura 1:

A.

organizzazzjoniet Ewropej ta’ riċerka u ta’ riflessjoni dwar il-politika pubblika (‘think tanks’ - strutturi ta’ riflessjoni).

| | Miżura 2:






  B. | Organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-livell Ewropew:






  — | Organizzazzjonijiet ċentrali (pjattaformi) Ewropej, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Miżura 2:

B.

Organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-livell Ewropew:

—

Organizzazzjonijiet ċentrali (pjattaformi) Ewropej,

| — | Netwerks Ewropej, |
| --- | --- |

—

Netwerks Ewropej,

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet li jiżviluppaw attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew, |
| --- | --- |

—

Organizzazzjonijiet li jiżviluppaw attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew,

| C. | Organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili marbuta mal-Memorja Ewropea |
| --- | --- |

C.

Organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili marbuta mal-Memorja Ewropea

| D. | Pjattaformi ta’ organizzazzjonijiet pan-Ewropej. |
| --- | --- |

D.

Pjattaformi ta’ organizzazzjonijiet pan-Ewropej.

| (c) | twettaq il-maġġoranza tal-attivitajiet tagħha f’pajjiżi eliġibbli (ara punt 2.2).

  Għal sħubija multiannwali, l-organizzazzjonijiet għandhom ikunu stabbiliti legalment u b’personalità ġuridika għal aktar minn erba’ (4) snin (fil-15 ta’ Ottubru 2009) f’wieħed mill-pajjiżi eliġibbli u jkollhom, għall-kategoriji li ġejjin, din il-kopertura ġeografika:






  — | għal organizzazzjoni ċentrali Ewropea jew għal netwerk Ewropew, ikollhom membri f’ta’ mill-inqas tnax (12)-il pajjiż eliġibbli, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(c)

twettaq il-maġġoranza tal-attivitajiet tagħha f’pajjiżi eliġibbli (ara punt 2.2).

Għal sħubija multiannwali, l-organizzazzjonijiet għandhom ikunu stabbiliti legalment u b’personalità ġuridika għal aktar minn erba’ (4) snin (fil-15 ta’ Ottubru 2009) f’wieħed mill-pajjiżi eliġibbli u jkollhom, għall-kategoriji li ġejjin, din il-kopertura ġeografika:

—

għal organizzazzjoni ċentrali Ewropea jew għal netwerk Ewropew, ikollhom membri f’ta’ mill-inqas tnax (12)-il pajjiż eliġibbli,

| — | għal organizzazzjoni li tiżviluppa attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew, tkun attiva f’ta’ mill-inqas tnax (12)-il pajjiż eliġibbli. |
| --- | --- |

—

għal organizzazzjoni li tiżviluppa attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew, tkun attiva f’ta’ mill-inqas tnax (12)-il pajjiż eliġibbli.

| — | għal Pjattaforma ta’ organizzazzjonijiet pan-Ewropea, ikollha mill-inqas sitt (6) organizzazzjonijiet ċentrali bħala membri u tiżgura, permezz ta’ dawn, preżenza fis-27 Stat Membru. |
| --- | --- |

—

għal Pjattaforma ta’ organizzazzjonijiet pan-Ewropea, ikollha mill-inqas sitt (6) organizzazzjonijiet ċentrali bħala membri u tiżgura, permezz ta’ dawn, preżenza fis-27 Stat Membru.

Għal għotja annwali, l-organizzazzjonijiet għandhom ikunu stabbiliti legalment u b’personalità ġuridika għal aktar minn sena (1) (fil-15 ta’ Ottubru 2009) f’wieħed mill-pajjiżi eliġibbli u jkollhom, għall-kategoriji li ġejjin, din il-kopertura ġeografika:

| — | għal organizzazzjoni ċentrali Ewropea jew netwerk Ewropew, ikollhom membri f’mill-inqas tmien (8) pajjiżi eliġibbli; |
| --- | --- |

—

għal organizzazzjoni ċentrali Ewropea jew netwerk Ewropew, ikollhom membri f’mill-inqas tmien (8) pajjiżi eliġibbli;

| — | għal organizzazzjoni li tiżviluppa attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew, tkun attiva f’mill-inqas tmien (8) pajjiżi eliġibbli. |
| --- | --- |

—

għal organizzazzjoni li tiżviluppa attivitajiet ta’ impatt wiesa’ fil-livell Ewropew, tkun attiva f’mill-inqas tmien (8) pajjiżi eliġibbli.

Il-pjattaformi ta’ organizzazzjonijiet pan-Ewropej jistgħu japplikaw biss fil-qafas ta’ sħubija multiannwali.

Individwi u organizzazzjonijiet pubbliċi m’humiex eliġibbli għal din is-sejħa.

2.2.   Pajjiżi eliġibbli

| (a) | l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea: il-Ġermanja, l-Awstrija, il-Belġju, il-Bulgarija, Ċipru, id-Danimarka, Spanja, l-Estonja, il-Finlandja, Franza, il-Greċja, l-Ungerija, l-Irlanda, l-Italja, il-Latvja, il-Litwanja, il-Lussemburgu, Malta, l-Olanda, il-Polonja, il-Portugall, ir-Repubblika Ċeka, ir-Rumanija, ir-Renju Unit, is-Slovakkja, is-Slovenja, l-Iżvezja. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

l-Istati Membri tal-Unjoni Ewropea: il-Ġermanja, l-Awstrija, il-Belġju, il-Bulgarija, Ċipru, id-Danimarka, Spanja, l-Estonja, il-Finlandja, Franza, il-Greċja, l-Ungerija, l-Irlanda, l-Italja, il-Latvja, il-Litwanja, il-Lussemburgu, Malta, l-Olanda, il-Polonja, il-Portugall, ir-Repubblika Ċeka, ir-Rumanija, ir-Renju Unit, is-Slovakkja, is-Slovenja, l-Iżvezja.

| (b) | il-Kroazja |
| --- | --- |

(b)

il-Kroazja

| (c) | dik li qabel kienet ir-Repubblika Jugożlava tal-Maċedonja |
| --- | --- |

(c)

dik li qabel kienet ir-Repubblika Jugożlava tal-Maċedonja

| (d) | l-Albanija |
| --- | --- |

(d)

l-Albanija

3.   AZZJONIJIET ELIĠIBBLI

L-attivitajiet tal-organizzazzjoni applikanti għandhom jikkontribwixxu b’mod tanġibbli għall-iżvilupp u għall-implimentazzjoni tal-objettivi speċifiċi u l-prijoritajiet tematiċi ta’ din is-sejħa għal proposti. Huma għandhom ikopru mill-inqas objettiv wieħed speċifiku u prijorità tematika fost dawk imsemmija fil-punt 1.

Il-programm ta’ ħidma tal-organizzazzjoni applikanti għall-2010 kif ukoll il-programm strateġiku ta’ tliet snin (f’każ ta’ sħubija multiannwali) għandhom ikopru l-attivitajiet statutorji tagħha, l-aktar il-konferenzi, is-seminars, il-laqgħat, l-azzjonijiet ta’ rappreżentazzjoni, komunikazzjoni u evalwazzjoni, kif ukoll l-attivitajiet l-oħrajn Ewropej rikorrenti tagħha.

Perjodu ta’ eliġibbiltà

Kemm fil-każ ta’ għotja annwali kif ukoll fil-każ ta' sħubija multiannwali, il-perjodu ta’ eliġibbiltà għandu jikkorrispondi mas-sena baġitarja tal-applikant, kif muri mill-kontijiet ivverifikati tal-organizzazzjoni. Jekk is-sena tal-baġit tal-applikant tikkorrispondi mas-sena kalendarja, il-perjodu ta’ eliġibbiltà għandu jkun mill-1 ta’ Jannar 2009 sal-31 ta’ Diċembru 2010.

Għall-applikanti b’sena ta’ baġit li tvarja mis-sena kalendarja, il-perjodu ta’ eliġibbiltà għandu jkun il-perjodu ta’ 12-il xahar mid-data tal-bidu tas-sena tal-baġit 2010.

4.   Kriterji ta’ aġġudikazzjoni

L-applikazzjonijiet konformi mal-kriterji ta’ eliġibbiltà u ta’ esklużjoni jiġu evalwati fuq il-bażi tal-kriterji ta’ aġġudikazzjoni minn kumitat ta’ evalwazzjoni sabiex jintagħżlu dawk li jistgħu jingħataw kofinanzjament.

Il-kriterji ta’ aġġudikazzjoni li ġejjin sejrin ikunu applikati. Il-kriterji kwalitattivi u kwantitattivi jammontaw rispettivament għal 80 u 20 % tal-marka attribwita. F’każ ta’ sħubija multiannwali, tingħata l-istess importanza lill-programm ta’ ħidma ta’ 12-il xahar u lill-programm strateġiku ta’ tliet snin.

4.1.   Kriterji kwalitattivi (80 %)

Il-fatturi li ġejjin sejrin jiġu vvalutati:

| (a) | Rilevanza għall-miri u l-prijoritajiet tal-programm “Ewropa għaċ-Ċittadini” (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

Rilevanza għall-miri u l-prijoritajiet tal-programm “Ewropa għaċ-Ċittadini” (30 %);

| (b) | Kemm il-programm ta’ ħidma huwa adegwat, koerenti u sħiħ (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Kemm il-programm ta’ ħidma huwa adegwat, koerenti u sħiħ (20 %);

| (c) | L-impatt tal-programm ta’ ħidma (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(c)

L-impatt tal-programm ta’ ħidma (10 %);

| (d) | Il-valur miżjud Ewropew (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Il-valur miżjud Ewropew (10 %);

| (e) | Il-viżibilità tal-attivitajiet u t-tixrid u l-użu tar-riżultati fir-rigward ta’ ċittadini Ewropej u partijiet oħrajn interessati (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Il-viżibilità tal-attivitajiet u t-tixrid u l-użu tar-riżultati fir-rigward ta’ ċittadini Ewropej u partijiet oħrajn interessati (10 %).

4.2.   Kriterji kwantitattivi (20 %)

Il-fatturi li ġejjin sejrin jiġu vvalutati:

| (a) | In-numru ta’ pajjiżi eliġibbli involuti fl-attivitajiet tal-programm ta’ ħidma (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

(a)

In-numru ta’ pajjiżi eliġibbli involuti fl-attivitajiet tal-programm ta’ ħidma (10 %);

| (b) | In-numru ta’ benefiċjarji diretti potenzjali (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

(b)

In-numru ta’ benefiċjarji diretti potenzjali (10 %).

5.   BAĠIT

Il-baġit previst għall-kofinanzjament tal-għotjiet operattivi huwa ta’ madwar 8,2 Miljun EURO fl-2010. L-Aġenzija Eżekuttiva bi ħsiebha tiffinanzja madwar 55 organizzazzjoni taħt din is-sejħa, iżda tirriżerva d-dritt, fuq il-bażi tal-kwalità tal-applikazzjonijiet, li ma tużax il-fondi kollha disponibbli.

Bħala indikazzjoni, l-għotjiet ta’ sħubijiet multiannwali ser jirrappreżentaw madwar 85 % tal-baġit disponibbli u l-għotjiet annwali madwar 15 %.

L-appoġġ strutturali ser jiġi aġġudikat skont il-parti 15.06.66 tal-Baġit Ġenerali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

6.   DATA TAL-GĦELUQ GĦAS-SOTTOMISSJONI

Id-data tal-għeluq għas-sottomissjoni tal-fajls ta’ applikazzjoni hija l-15 ta’ Ottubru 2009.

L-Aġenzija eżekuttiva bħalissa qiegħda taħdem sabiex timplimenta sistema ta’ sottomissjoni elettronika tal-applikazzjonijiet kollha.

Għal din is-sejħa għal proposti, l-applikanti għandhom jibagħtu t-talba tagħhom permezz ta’ formola elettronika disponibbli mill-15 ta’ Settembru 2009. Din il-verżjoni (inklużi l-annessi) hija kkunsidrata bħala l-verżjoni ewlenija. Qabel din id-data, l-Aġenzija eżekuttiva tipproponi verżjoni pdf tal-formola sabiex tagħti l-possibbiltà lill-applikanti li jibdew iħejju l-fajl tagħhom.

Barra minn hekk, verżjoni fuq karta tal-fajl tal-applikazzjoni għandha tintbagħat bil-posta fl-indirizz li ġej qabel id-data tal-għeluq:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Jiġu aċċettati biss dawk l-applikazzjonijiet ippreżentanti fil-forma xierqa, li jkunu mimlija kif suppost, datati, u ffirmati mill-persuna awtorizzata li tidħol f’impenn li għandu rabta legali.

7.   AKTAR TAGĦRIF

Il-linji gwida dettaljati għall-applikanti, kif ukoll il-formoli ta’ applikazzjoni, jinsabu f’dan l-indirizz: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Id-Deċiżjoni Nru. 1904/2006/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tat-12 ta’ Diċembru 2006, (ĠU L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 32), kif emendata mid-Deċiżjoni Nru. 1358/2008/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tas-16 ta’ Diċembru 2008 (ĠU L 350 tat-30.12.2008).

---

PROĊEDURI GĦALL-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/13

---

GĦAJNUNA MILL-ISTAT – L-OLANDA

Għajnuna Mill-lstat C 10/2009 (ex. N 138/2009) – ING

Stedina biex jiġu ppreżentati kummenti skont l-Artikolu 88(2) tat-Trattat tal-KE

(Test b’relevanza għaż-ŻEE)

2009/C 158/06

Permezz tal-ittra li ġġib id-data tal-31 ta' Marzu 2009 riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jiġu wara dan is-sommarju, il-Kummissjoni nnotifikat lill-Olanda bid-deċiżjoni tagħha li tagħti bidu għall-proċedura stabbilita fl-Artikolu 88(2) tat-Trattat tal-KE fir-rigward tal-miżura msemmija hawn fuq.

Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jippreżentaw l-osservazjonijiet tagħhom dwar il-miżura li dwarha l-Kummisjoni se tibda l-proċedura, fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan is-sommarju u tal-ittra li ssegwi, lil:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Dawn l-osservazzjonijiet se jiġu kkomunikati lill-Olanda. Il-parti interessata li tippreżenta l-kummenti tista' titlob bil-miktub biex l-identità tagħha tibqa’ kunfidenzjali, filwaqt li tagħti r-raġunijiet għat-talba.

TAQSIRA

PROĊEDURA

Fl-4 ta' Marzu 2009, l-awtoritajiet Olandiżi nnotifikaw lill-Kummissjoni b'Faċilità ta' sostenn ta' assi non-likwidi favur l-ING Support Holding (sussidjarja diretta tal-Grupp ING).

IL-FATTI

ING, bil-kwartieri ġenerali fl-Olanda, hija waħda mill-ikbar istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji fid-dinja, b'karta tal-bilanċ totali ta' EUR 1 332 biljun. F'Jannar 2009, l-Istat Olandiż u ING iffirmaw term sheet biex jittrasferixxu r-riskji u r-ritorn ta' parti mill-portafoll RMBS ta' ING ibbażat fl-Istati Uniti. Dan jikkonsisti prinċipalment minn titoli Alt-A. Il-bilanċ pendenti tal-portafoll ta' ING jammonta għal USD 39 biljun (valur ekwivalenti, EUR 30 biljun).

Il-miżura kkontemplata tikkonsisti minn tpartit ta' fluss ta' likwidità bejn l-Istat Olandiż u ING, li bih ING tittrasferixxi d-dħul ta' 80 % tal-valur ekwivalenti tal-portafoll (ħlasijiet mill-ġdid tal-kapital u l-interessi) kontra ħlasijiet iggarantiti mill-Istat ta' 72 % (jiġifieri 80 % ta' 90 %) tal-valur ekwivalenti tal-portafoll (il-kapital biss), ikkumplimentati minn dritt għall-finanzjament imħallsa mill-Istat lil ING li jammonta għal 3,50 % għall-proporzjoni tat-titoli b'rati fissi fil-portafoll u USD rata Libor ta' xahar + 50 bp għall-proporzjoni ta' titoli b'rata li tvarja fil-portafoll.

L-Istat Olandiż iħallas dritt ta' amministrazzjoni addizzjonali lill ING ta' 25 bp kull sena fuq l-ammont tal-kapital pendenti. Bi skambju għal din il-miżuri, ING tħallas lill-Istat Olandiż dritt ta' garanzija annwali ta' 55 bp fuq 80 % tal-ammont tal-portafoll pendenti.

VALUTAZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni vvalutat it-tranżazzjoni skont il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Assi Daneġġjati tal-Kummissjoni (IAC). Il-Kummissjoni, f'dan l-istadju, għandha dubbji dwar l-istima u b'mod partikolari il-metodoloġija tal-istima biex tivvaluta l-valur ekonomiku veru. Il-Kummissjoni għandha bżonn tinvestiga iktar fil-fond is-suppożizzjonijiet sottostanti pprovduti mill-Istat Olandiż, b'mod partikolari fir-rigward (i) tal-għażla tar-rata ta' skont, (ii) suppożizzjonijiet dwar il-prezzijiet tad-djar, (iii) il-livelli ta' appoġġ ta' kreditu, u (iv) kwestjonijiet oħra ta' stima.

B′konsegwenza, il-Kummissjoni għandha d-dubbji wkoll dwar il-qsim ġust tal-piż bejn l-Istat u ING. Il-Kummissjoni tiddubita jekk il-bank verament iġorrx id-differenza bejn il-valur nominali u l-valur ekonomiku reali tal-portafoll, meta wieħed jieħu f'konsiderazzjoni id-dubbji msemmija hawn fuq dwar il-valutazzjoni tal-istima. Il-Kummissjoni mhix ċerta lanqas jekk it-tpartit tal-fluss tal-likwidità hux verament benefiċjali għall-Istati, kif indikat. B'mod partikolari, rigward id-dritt ta' amminstrazzjoni tal-portafoll, il-Kummissjoni għandha xi dubbji dwar kemm hu xieraq billi jidher li mhemmx bżonn wisq attività.

Billi hija konformi ma' numru ta' kundizzjonijiet tal-IAC, u b'konsiderazzjoni xierqa għall-bżonn li tinżamm stabbiltà finanzjarja, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li tapprova l-miżura għal sitt xhur. Fl-istess ħin, fid-dawl tal-konsiderazzjonijiet ta' hawn fuq, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet ukoll li tibda l-proċedura stabbilita mill-Artikolu 88(2) tat-Trattat tal-KE biex tivverifika l-kundizzjonijiet tal-IAC fir-rigward tal-istima (inkluża l-metodoloġija tal-istima) u l-qsim tal-piż tal-miżura.

TEST TA' L-ITTRA

“The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
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(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
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(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
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(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

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Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
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(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
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(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
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(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
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(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
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(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
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(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
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(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
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(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
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(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

ATTI OĦRAJN

Il-Kummissjoni

| 11.7.2009 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 158/24

---

Pubblikazzjoni ta' applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 8(2) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 509/2006 dwar il-prodotti agrikoli u l-affarijiet tal-ikel bħala speċjalitajiet tradizzjonali garantiti

2009/C 158/07

Din il-pubblikazzjoni tikkonferixxi d-dritt għal oġġezzjoni għall-applikazzjoni skont l-Artikolu 9 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 509/2006. Id-dikjarazzjonijiet ta' oġġezzjoni għandhom jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni fi żmien sitt xhur mid-data ta' din il-pubblikazzjoni.

APPLIKAZZJONI GĦAR-REĠISTRAZZJONI TA' SPEĊJALITÀ TRADIZZJONALI GARANTITA (STG)

IR-REGOLAMENT TAL-KUNSILL (KE) Nru 509/2006

“KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA”

Nru KE: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Isem u indirizz tal-grupp applikant:

Isem: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Indirizz:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Feks +48 228301648

Posta elettronika: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Stat Membru jew pajjiż terz:

Il-Polonja

3.   Speċifiċità tal-prodott:

3.1.   Isem (jew ismijiet) għar-reġistrazzjoni (l-Artikolu 2 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

“Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

3.2.   Jekk l-isem

 huwa speċifiku fih innifsu

Image

L-isem “kiełbasa jałowcowa” jesprimi l-karattru speċifiku tal-prodott, li fuq kollox huwa marbut mat-togħma u r-riħa eċċezzjonali tiegħu. Dawn il-karatteristiċi jirriflettu l-użu tal-frott tal-ġnibru fil-proċess tal-produzzjoni, li jitkisser f'biċċiet żgħar ħafna eżatt qabel ma jiżdied mal-laħam, u l-użu tal-friegħi tal-ġnibru waqt il-proċess tal-affumikar.

3.3.   Jekk ir-riżerva tal-isem qiegħda tintalab skont l-Artikolu 13(2) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 509/2006:

 Reġistrazzjoni b'riżerva tal-isem

Image

3.4.   Tip ta' prodott:

| Klassi 1.2 — | Prodotti tal-laħam (imsajra, immellħa, affumikati, eċċ.) |
| --- | --- |

Klassi 1.2 —

Prodotti tal-laħam (imsajra, immellħa, affumikati, eċċ.)

3.5.   Deskrizzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew l-oġġett tal-ikel li għalih japplika l-isem indikat fil-punt 3.1 (l-Artikolu 3(1) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007):

Il-“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” jidher qiesu stikka kollha mkemxa fil-forma ta' girlanda. Għandu forma ċirkolari karatteristika, mingħajr liwi lonġitudinali estern. Il-girlanda taz-zalzett teżisti f'żewġ qisien:

| — | żgħira, f'kopertura naturali b'dijametru akbar minn 32 mm u tiżen madwar 0.5 kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

żgħira, f'kopertura naturali b'dijametru akbar minn 32 mm u tiżen madwar 0.5 kg;

| — | kbira, f'kopertura tal-proteina b'dijametru ta' 36 mm u tiżen madwar 0.8 kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

kbira, f'kopertura tal-proteina b'dijametru ta' 36 mm u tiżen madwar 0.8 kg;

Il-kulur tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” huwa kannella skur, mifrux b'mod uniformi matul il-wiċċ kollu, kif inhuwa tipiku għal zalzett affumikat ħafna.

Il-konsistenza u “s-sensazzjoni” tal-girlanda hija ta' wiċċ niexef, lixx u mkemmex b'mod uniformi, b'kopertura ssikkata mal-mili.

Il-karatteristiċi tat-togħma u kemm huwa tari l-prodott jirriżultaw mill-għażla tal-materja prima, il-ħwawar (partikolarment il-ġnibru) u l-affumikar naturali li jifforma parti mill-proċess ta' produzzjoni.

Kompożizzjoni kimika

| — | kontenut ta' proteina – mhux inqas minn 15,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta' proteina – mhux inqas minn 15,0 %

| — | kontenut ta' ilma – mhux iktar minn 60,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta' ilma – mhux iktar minn 60,0 %

| — | kontenut ta' xaħam – mhux iktar minn 35,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta' xaħam – mhux iktar minn 35,0 %

| — | kontenut ta' melħ – mhux iktar minn 3,5 % |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta' melħ – mhux iktar minn 3,5 %

| — | kontenut ta' nitrat (III) u nitrat (V) espressi bħala NaNO2 – mhux iktar minn 0,0125 % |
| --- | --- |

—

kontenut ta' nitrat (III) u nitrat (V) espressi bħala NaNO2 – mhux iktar minn 0,0125 %

Il-valuri tal-kompożizzjoni kimika ta' hawn fuq jiżguraw il-kwalità tradizzjonali tal-prodott. Ir-rendiment tal-prodott finali meta mqabbel mal-laħam użat bħala materja prima huwa ta' 75 % (+/–3 %).

3.6.   Deskrizzjoni tal-metodu tal-produzzjoni tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel li għalih japplika l-isem indikat fil-punt (3.1) (l-Artikolu 3(2) tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1216/2007)

Ingredjenti

| | Laħam (100 kg ta' materja prima):






  — | Majjal tal-Klassi I b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 15 % – 20 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Laħam (100 kg ta' materja prima):

—

Majjal tal-Klassi I b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 15 % – 20 kg

| — | Majjal tal-Klassi IIA b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 20 % – 50 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Majjal tal-Klassi IIA b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 20 % – 50 kg

| — | Majjal tal-Klassi III b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 25 % – 20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Majjal tal-Klassi III b'kontenut ta' xaħam sa 25 % – 20 kg

| — | xaħam iebes imqatta' irqiq – 10 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

xaħam iebes imqatta' irqiq – 10 kg

Sa 50 % tal-majjal tal-Klassi IIA u l-Klassi III jistgħa jinbidel b'ċanga.

| | Ħwawar (għal kull 100 kg ta' laħam):






  — | bżar naturali – 0.17 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Ħwawar (għal kull 100 kg ta' laħam):

—

bżar naturali – 0.17 kg

| — | ġnibru – 0.12 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

ġnibru – 0.12 kg

| — | zokkor – 0.20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

zokkor – 0.20 kg

| | Addittivi oħra:






  — | taħlita tat-trattament tat-tnixxif (ibbażata fuq taħlita ta' melħ tal-ikel (NaCL) u nitrit tas-sodju (NaNO2)) – madwar 2 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Addittivi oħra:

—

taħlita tat-trattament tat-tnixxif (ibbażata fuq taħlita ta' melħ tal-ikel (NaCL) u nitrit tas-sodju (NaNO2)) – madwar 2 kg

Għalf fil-kuntest tal-produzzjoni tal-majjal intenzjonat għall-użu tal-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa”

Għalf jirreferi għas-simna tal-laħam-xaħmi. Il-mira hija l-produzzjoni ta' ħnieżer li jiżnu sa 120 kg, ikkaratterizzati b'kontenut ogħla ta' xaħam fil-muskoli (iktar minn 3 %).

| — | Is-simna hija bbażata fuq razez li jdumu ma jimmaturaw, u amministrazzjoni xierqa ta' simna li tippermetti li jintlaħaq il-kontenut mixtieq ta' xaħam fil-muskoli. Ir-razez li jintużaw għas-simna ma għandomx il-ġene RN, u l-ġene RYR 1T hija preżenti f' 20 % tal-popolazzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

—

Is-simna hija bbażata fuq razez li jdumu ma jimmaturaw, u amministrazzjoni xierqa ta' simna li tippermetti li jintlaħaq il-kontenut mixtieq ta' xaħam fil-muskoli. Ir-razez li jintużaw għas-simna ma għandomx il-ġene RN, u l-ġene RYR 1T hija preżenti f' 20 % tal-popolazzjoni.

| — | Is-simna għandha ssir fi tliet fażijiet – fażi I sa madwar 60 kg, fażi II sa madwar 90 kg, u fażi III sa 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Is-simna għandha ssir fi tliet fażijiet – fażi I sa madwar 60 kg, fażi II sa madwar 90 kg, u fażi III sa 120 kg.

| — | Is-simna ta' annimali sa piż ta' madwar 90 kg issir bl-użu ta' żewġ tipi ta' taħlitiet ta' għalf. It-taħlitiet (dożi) tal-għalf fihom: |
| --- | --- |

—

Is-simna ta' annimali sa piż ta' madwar 90 kg issir bl-użu ta' żewġ tipi ta' taħlitiet ta' għalf. It-taħlitiet (dożi) tal-għalf fihom:

| — | bħala komponenti tal-enerġija: ġwież taċ-ċereali – qamħ, xgħir, segala, ħafur, triticale jew qamħirrum; ġwież tal-qamħirrum u ġwież ta' varjetajiet ta' ħafur għeri jagħmlu sa 30 % tat-taħlitiet; |
| --- | --- |

—

bħala komponenti tal-enerġija: ġwież taċ-ċereali – qamħ, xgħir, segala, ħafur, triticale jew qamħirrum; ġwież tal-qamħirrum u ġwież ta' varjetajiet ta' ħafur għeri jagħmlu sa 30 % tat-taħlitiet;

| — | bħala komponenti tal-proteina: lupin, fażola tal-għelieqi u ġwież tal-piżelli, għalf tas-soja ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf taż-żerriegħa tal-lift ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf tal-bhejjem magħmul miż-żerriegħa tal-lift, ħmira tal-magħlef jew magħlef aħdar niexef. |
| --- | --- |

—

bħala komponenti tal-proteina: lupin, fażola tal-għelieqi u ġwież tal-piżelli, għalf tas-soja ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf taż-żerriegħa tal-lift ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf tal-bhejjem magħmul miż-żerriegħa tal-lift, ħmira tal-magħlef jew magħlef aħdar niexef.

| — | It-taħlitiet tal-għalf (dożi) għall-annimali minn 90 sa 120 kg fihom: |
| --- | --- |

—

It-taħlitiet tal-għalf (dożi) għall-annimali minn 90 sa 120 kg fihom:

| — | bħala komponenti tal-enerġija: ġwież tal-qamħ, xgħir, segala u triticale. Ġwież tal-qamħirrum u ġwież ta' varjetajiet ta' ħafur għeri ma jistgħux jintużaw fit-taħlitiet (dożi); |
| --- | --- |

—

bħala komponenti tal-enerġija: ġwież tal-qamħ, xgħir, segala u triticale. Ġwież tal-qamħirrum u ġwież ta' varjetajiet ta' ħafur għeri ma jistgħux jintużaw fit-taħlitiet (dożi);

| — | bħala komponenti tal-proteina: ġwież mill-familja “Leguminosae” (lupin, fażola tal-għelieqi u piżelli), għalf tas-soja ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf tal-bhejjem magħmul miż-żerriegħa tal-lift jew għalf taż-żerriegħa tal-lift ta' wara l-estrazzjoni u magħlef niexef. |
| --- | --- |

—

bħala komponenti tal-proteina: ġwież mill-familja “Leguminosae” (lupin, fażola tal-għelieqi u piżelli), għalf tas-soja ta' wara l-estrazzjoni, għalf tal-bhejjem magħmul miż-żerriegħa tal-lift jew għalf taż-żerriegħa tal-lift ta' wara l-estrazzjoni u magħlef niexef.

| — | Fl-ebda punt fiċ-ċiklu tal-għalf ma għandhom jintużaw dawn li ġejjin: żjut veġetali, għalf li joriġina mill-annimali, eż. ħalib tat-trab, xorrox imnixxef, fdalijiet mill-ħut. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fl-ebda punt fiċ-ċiklu tal-għalf ma għandhom jintużaw dawn li ġejjin: żjut veġetali, għalf li joriġina mill-annimali, eż. ħalib tat-trab, xorrox imnixxef, fdalijiet mill-ħut.

| — | Il-kontenut metaboliku tal-enerġija fit-taħlitiet fil-fażijiet kollha tas-simna huwa ta' 12-13 MJ ta' ME/kg ta' taħlita. Il-kontenut tal-proteina fit-taħlitiet għandu jkun madwar 16-18 % fl-ewwel fażi tas-simna, 15-16 % fit-tieni fażi, u madwar 14 % fl-aħħar fażi. |
| --- | --- |

—

Il-kontenut metaboliku tal-enerġija fit-taħlitiet fil-fażijiet kollha tas-simna huwa ta' 12-13 MJ ta' ME/kg ta' taħlita. Il-kontenut tal-proteina fit-taħlitiet għandu jkun madwar 16-18 % fl-ewwel fażi tas-simna, 15-16 % fit-tieni fażi, u madwar 14 % fl-aħħar fażi.

| — | Id-dożi għas-simna jistgħu jkunu bbażati fuq taħlitiet nutrittivi waħdihom, jew taħlitiet nutrittivi u għalf bl-ingrossa, jiġifieri patata u magħlef aħdar. |
| --- | --- |

—

Id-dożi għas-simna jistgħu jkunu bbażati fuq taħlitiet nutrittivi waħdihom, jew taħlitiet nutrittivi u għalf bl-ingrossa, jiġifieri patata u magħlef aħdar.

Stadji fil-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa”

| Stadju 1 | Tqattigħ preliminari tal-ingredjenti kollha tal-laħam. L-iżgurar li l-biċċiet tal-laħam huma ta' daqs uniformi (madwar 5 cm fid-dijametru). |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 1

Tqattigħ preliminari tal-ingredjenti kollha tal-laħam. L-iżgurar li l-biċċiet tal-laħam huma ta' daqs uniformi (madwar 5 cm fid-dijametru).

| Stadju 2 | Trattament tat-tnixxif tradizzjonali (il-metodu niexef) għal madwar 48 siegħa, bl-użu ta' taħlita tat-trattament tat-tnixxif. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 2

Trattament tat-tnixxif tradizzjonali (il-metodu niexef) għal madwar 48 siegħa, bl-użu ta' taħlita tat-trattament tat-tnixxif.

| Stadju 3 | L-ipproċessar mekkaniku: Laħam tal-Klassi I jiġi mitħun għal madwar 20 mm fid-daqs, il-laħam tal-Klassi IIA għal madwar 8 mm fid-daqs, u l-laħam tal-Klassi III għal madwar 3 mm, u wara jiġu mitħuna flimkien ma' 5 kg ta' silġ. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 3

L-ipproċessar mekkaniku: Laħam tal-Klassi I jiġi mitħun għal madwar 20 mm fid-daqs, il-laħam tal-Klassi IIA għal madwar 8 mm fid-daqs, u l-laħam tal-Klassi III għal madwar 3 mm, u wara jiġu mitħuna flimkien ma' 5 kg ta' silġ.

| Stadju 4 | Taħlit tal-ingredjenti kollha tal-laħam u l-ħwawar: bżar , zokkor u ġnibru, li jiġi mitħun eżatt qabel ma jiżdied mat-taħlita. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 4

Taħlit tal-ingredjenti kollha tal-laħam u l-ħwawar: bżar , zokkor u ġnibru, li jiġi mitħun eżatt qabel ma jiżdied mat-taħlita.

| Stadju 5 | Il-proċess tal-mili f'intestini naturali tal-ħnieżer b'dijametru ta' aktar minn 32 mm jew f'koperturi tal-proteina b'dijametru ta' 36 mm, maqtugħa fi stikek u mqiegħda fil-forma ta' girlandi. Jistgħu jintużaw żewġ tipi ta' koperturi sabiex isir iz-zalzett:






  — | girlandi iżgħar f'intestini żgħar tal-ħnieżer li jiżnu 0.5 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Stadju 5

Il-proċess tal-mili f'intestini naturali tal-ħnieżer b'dijametru ta' aktar minn 32 mm jew f'koperturi tal-proteina b'dijametru ta' 36 mm, maqtugħa fi stikek u mqiegħda fil-forma ta' girlandi. Jistgħu jintużaw żewġ tipi ta' koperturi sabiex isir iz-zalzett:

—

girlandi iżgħar f'intestini żgħar tal-ħnieżer li jiżnu 0.5 kg

| — | girlandi ikbar f'koperturi tal-proteina li jiżnu 0.8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

girlandi ikbar f'koperturi tal-proteina li jiżnu 0.8 kg.

| Stadju 6 | Jitħallew joqogħdu f'temperatura li ma taqbiżx it-30 °C għal sagħtejn. Tnixxif preliminarju tal-wiċċ, sabiex “joqogħdu” l-ingredjenti ta' ġewwa l-istikek. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 6

Jitħallew joqogħdu f'temperatura li ma taqbiżx it-30 °C għal sagħtejn. Tnixxif preliminarju tal-wiċċ, sabiex “joqogħdu” l-ingredjenti ta' ġewwa l-istikek.

| Stadju 7 | Tnixxif tal-wiċċ, li warajh isir l-affumikar tradizzjonali jaħraq (għal madwar 120 minuta) u jinħmew sakemm it-temperatura ta' ġewwa l-istikek tilħaq madwar 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 7

Tnixxif tal-wiċċ, li warajh isir l-affumikar tradizzjonali jaħraq (għal madwar 120 minuta) u jinħmew sakemm it-temperatura ta' ġewwa l-istikek tilħaq madwar 70 °C.

| Stadju 8 | Tkessiħ għal 24 siegħa. |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 8

Tkessiħ għal 24 siegħa.

| Stadju 9 | Affumikar kiesaħ bl-użu tal-biċċiet tal-fagu u l-friegħi tal-ġnibru (għal madwar 120 minuta), u wara tnixxif f'temperatura ta' 14-18 °C għal 3-5 ijiem sakemm jinkiseb rendiment ta' 75 % (+/– 3 %). |
| --- | --- |

Stadju 9

Affumikar kiesaħ bl-użu tal-biċċiet tal-fagu u l-friegħi tal-ġnibru (għal madwar 120 minuta), u wara tnixxif f'temperatura ta' 14-18 °C għal 3-5 ijiem sakemm jinkiseb rendiment ta' 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.7.   Il-karattru speċifiku tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel (l-Artikolu 3(3) tar-Regolament tal-Kummissjoni (KE) Nru 1216/2007):

Il-“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” jieħu l-karattru tiegħu minn diversi kwalitajiet li huma tipiċi tal-prodott:

| — | laħam tari u l-propjetajiet speċifiċi tiegħu; |
| --- | --- |

—

laħam tari u l-propjetajiet speċifiċi tiegħu;

| — | togħma u r-riħa eċċezzjonali; |
| --- | --- |

—

togħma u r-riħa eċċezzjonali;

| — | forma uniformi. |
| --- | --- |

—

forma uniformi.

Il-laħam tari u s-sukkulenza u l-propjetajiet speċifiċi tiegħu

Il-majjal minn ħnieżer ta' razez li jdumu ma jimmaturaw imsemna għal piż ta' madwar 120 kg u li għandhom il-karatteristiċi ġenetiċi deskritti fil-punt 3.6 huwa ingredjent essenzjali tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” li jinfluwenza n-natura speċifika taz-zalzett. Il-konformità ma' dawn ir-rekwiżiti trendi kontenut tax-xaħam fil-muskoli ta' iżjed minn 3 %, u tiżgura li l-laħam fih il-propjetatjiet ta' togħma u teknoloġiċi x-xierqa li huma essenzjali għall-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa”. L-użu ta' materja prima bħal din u l-konformità mal-metodu tradizzjonali tal-produzzjoni, b'attenzjoni speċjali lejn l-istadji tat-tħin, it-trattament tat-tnixxif, u l-affumikar, jiżguraw li l-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” huwa eċċezzjonalment sukkulenti u tari.

It-togħma u r-riħa eċċezzjonali

Il-karattru speċifiku tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” huwa marbut primarjament mat-togħma u riħa unika, li huma riżultat tal-użu tal-frott tal-ġnibru fil-proċess tal-produzzjoni. It-tkissir tal-frott tal-ġnibru eżatt qabel il-bidu tal-proċess ta' produzzjoni jkompli jżid it-togħma karatteristika taz-zalzett u jikkontribwixxi għall-karattru speċifiku tiegħu, filwaqt li l-użu tal-ġnibru fil-proċess tal-affumikar iżid mat-togħma tiegħu u jtejjeb ir-riħa eċċezzjonali tiegħu.

Il-forma uniformi

Il-forma tiegħu hija l-fattur li jqiegħed lill-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” apparti miz-zalzett l-ieħor. Iz-zalzett jinbiegħ biss f'żewġ forom simili ħafna, li jagħmlu jingħaraf faċilment mill-konsumaturi. Il-“Kiełbasa jałowcowa” jidher qiesu stikka mkemxa b'mod uniformi fil-forma ta' girlanda. Għandu forma ċirkolari karatteristika, mingħajr liwi lonġitudinali estern.

3.8.   Il-karattru tradizzjonali tal-prodott agrikolu jew tal-oġġett tal-ikel (l-Artikolu 3(4) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007):

Il-materja prima tradizzjonali

| 1. | Il-ġnibru:
  Il-Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana tal-1903 (l-Enċiklopedija Universali l-Kbira Illustrata) tirreferi għal wieħed mill-użi utli ta' dan l-arbuxxell, li ilu pjuttost komuni fil-Polonja għal sekli sħaħ, primarjament li l-ġnibru jħalli riħa sabiħa meta jinħaraq. L-enċiklopedija tindika wkoll li l-friegħi tal-ġnibru, il-qxur jew il-frott jistgħu jintużaw fil-proċess tal-affumikar sabiex jagħtu togħma u riħa tajba ħafna lil-laħam. Dokumenti mit-tieni nofs tad-19-il seklu juru li l-ġnibru diġà kien jintuża biex iħawwar jew bħala ingredjent fil-platti u l-prodotti tal-laħam. L-“Encyklopedyja Powszechna”, li ġiet ppublikata f'Varsavja fl-1863, tgħid li l-frott tal-ġnibru għandhom togħma pikkanti u ħelwa/morra u riħa sabiħa u jintuża ħafna biex iħawwar. Metodu tal-produzzjoni standard għaz-zalzett bl-użu taż-żerriegħa tal-ġnibru u li jinvolvi d-duħħan b'togħma ta' ġniebru ġie stabbilit fil-Polonja sa mill-aħħar tal-1940 (ara l-artikolu fil-“Gospodarka Mięsna”, il-pubblikazzjoni tal-industrija tal-laħam (1954, edizjoni 3) intitolat “Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku”). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Il-ġnibru:

Il-Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana tal-1903 (l-Enċiklopedija Universali l-Kbira Illustrata) tirreferi għal wieħed mill-użi utli ta' dan l-arbuxxell, li ilu pjuttost komuni fil-Polonja għal sekli sħaħ, primarjament li l-ġnibru jħalli riħa sabiħa meta jinħaraq. L-enċiklopedija tindika wkoll li l-friegħi tal-ġnibru, il-qxur jew il-frott jistgħu jintużaw fil-proċess tal-affumikar sabiex jagħtu togħma u riħa tajba ħafna lil-laħam. Dokumenti mit-tieni nofs tad-19-il seklu juru li l-ġnibru diġà kien jintuża biex iħawwar jew bħala ingredjent fil-platti u l-prodotti tal-laħam. L-“Encyklopedyja Powszechna”, li ġiet ppublikata f'Varsavja fl-1863, tgħid li l-frott tal-ġnibru għandhom togħma pikkanti u ħelwa/morra u riħa sabiħa u jintuża ħafna biex iħawwar. Metodu tal-produzzjoni standard għaz-zalzett bl-użu taż-żerriegħa tal-ġnibru u li jinvolvi d-duħħan b'togħma ta' ġniebru ġie stabbilit fil-Polonja sa mill-aħħar tal-1940 (ara l-artikolu fil-“Gospodarka Mięsna”, il-pubblikazzjoni tal-industrija tal-laħam (1954, edizjoni 3) intitolat “Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku”).

| 2. | Il-majjal:
  Il-laħam tal-ħnieżer li jinżammu għall-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” irid ikollu kontenut ta' xaħam fil-muskoli ta' iktar minn 3 %. Dan huwa l-grass li jagħti lill-prodott is-sukkulenza u t-togħma eċċellenti u li jagħmlu tari kif mixtieq. L-użu ta' laħam bħal dan għandu influwenza deċisiva fuq il-kwalità tal-prodott finali u l-karattru speċifiku tiegħu, u huwa skont il-metodu tradizzjonali tal-produzzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Il-majjal:

Il-laħam tal-ħnieżer li jinżammu għall-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” irid ikollu kontenut ta' xaħam fil-muskoli ta' iktar minn 3 %. Dan huwa l-grass li jagħti lill-prodott is-sukkulenza u t-togħma eċċellenti u li jagħmlu tari kif mixtieq. L-użu ta' laħam bħal dan għandu influwenza deċisiva fuq il-kwalità tal-prodott finali u l-karattru speċifiku tiegħu, u huwa skont il-metodu tradizzjonali tal-produzzjoni.

Il-metodu tradizzjonali tal-produzzjoni u l-kompożizzjoni

L-affumikar huwa metodu ta' kif jiġi priżervat il-laħam u l-iżjed metodu komuni ta' affumikar kien il-ħruq tal-ġnibru. Dan qiegħed reġistrat fil-manuskritti l-qodma Pollakki, bħan-noti ta' maġġordom annonimu ta' villa fil-kampanja madwar l-1780, li fihom riċetti għall-ipproċessar tal-laħam (AGAD Warsaw, “Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego”, ref. 1249). Il-poeta nazzjonali tal-Polonja, Adam Mickiewicz, jirreferi għall-popolarita tal-affumikar tal-laħam bil-ġnibru f'deskrizzjoni tal-kolazzjon f'dar fil-kampanja fl-epika popolari tiegħu tal-1834 “Pan Tadeusz”. “qatgħat tal-ilsien u l-perżut – ilkoll tajbin u magħmulin id-dar, affumikati fuq il-ġnibru, u msajra fiċ-ċumnija.”

It-tradizzjoni tal-ħwawar u l-affumikar tal-laħam bil-ġnibru ġiet ikkultivata f'varjanti lokali u reġjonali fejn mhux biss intużaw teknoloġiji differenti imma xi kultant tipi ta' laħam differenti wkoll. Kif qal W. Łęg fid-dokument “Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin”, Gospodarka Mięsna (1953, edizzjoni 6), saru esperimenti li kienu jinvolvu l-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” li sar mill-annimali tal-kaċċa (fenek jew ħanżir salvaġġ miżjud bil-majjal). Dan iz-zalzett kellu togħma differenti, imma essenzjalment l-istess riċetta (imħallat u affumikat bil-ġnibru) intużat kullimkien. Speċjalist tal-industrija tal-laħam li kien qiegħed jivvjaġġa fir-reġjun ta' Kurpie kiteb in-noti li ġejjin, f'artikolu dwar l-ispeċjalitajiet reġjonali tal-laħam ipproċessat ippubblikata fil-Gospodarka Mięsna (1950, edizzjoni 7-8), dwar il-varjant lokali tal-kiełbasa jałowcowa: “Zalzett mill-Myszyniec, reġjun ta' Kurpie, affumikat fuq il-ġnibru u fih iż-żerriegħa tal-ġnibru. Niexef, b'togħma u riħa karatteristika eċċellenti.”

Wara l-1945, skont id-duttrina tal-ippjanar ċentrali, ġie deċiż li tinbena industrija tal-laħam ibbażata fuq impjanti tal-ipproċessar kbar. L-istandardizzazzjoni tal-prodotti u t-teknoloġija ibbażata fuq riċetti tradizzjonali ġiet introdotta bil-ħsieb li jitjibu l-kwalità u t-togħma. “Kiełbasa jałowcowa” bħala isem tal-prodott jidher fl-istandards tal-kummerċ tal-ikel fl-1947 u l-1948. Ġie stabbilit standard armonizzat għall-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” fl-1954; iktar tard żviluppa fl-istandard tal-1964 tal-Uffiċċju Ċentrali tal-Industrija tal-Laħam (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Warszawa 1964) li fuqu hija bbażata l-applikazzjoni preżenti.

Dawn l-istandards saru bl-iskop li jiżguraw l-għola kwalità possibbli tal-kiełbasa jałowcowa. Għalkemm l-istandard li fuqu hija ibbażata l-applikazzjoni ma għadux jorbot, xorta waħda għadu jirrapreżenta l-għola standards tal-produzzjoni għall-“kiełbasa jałowcowa”.

3.9.   Ir-Rekwiżiti minimi u l-proċeduri għal kontroll tal-karattru speċifiku (l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 1216/2007):

Fejn jikkonċerna l-karattru speċifiku tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa”, partikolarment dan li ġej għandu jkun soġġett għall-kontrolli:

| (1) | Il-kwalità tal-materja prima użata fil-produzzjoni (majjal, ħwawar), inkluż






  — | il-kwalità teknika tal-laħam, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(1)

Il-kwalità tal-materja prima użata fil-produzzjoni (majjal, ħwawar), inkluż

—

il-kwalità teknika tal-laħam,

| — | it-tip ta' simna, |
| --- | --- |

—

it-tip ta' simna,

| — | iż-żmien tat-trattament tat-tnixxif, |
| --- | --- |

—

iż-żmien tat-trattament tat-tnixxif,

| — | il-ħwawar użati fil-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” u l-proporzjonijiet li jintużaw fihom. |
| --- | --- |

—

il-ħwawar użati fil-produzzjoni tal-“kiełbasa jałowcowa” u l-proporzjonijiet li jintużaw fihom.

| (2) | Il-proċess tal-affumikar tal-“Kiełbasa jałowcowa”
  Waqt spezzjoni, għandhom jiġu ċċekkjati dawn li ġejjin:






  — | il-manteniment tat-temperatura meħtieġa għall-affumikar tradizzjonali fid-duħħan jaħraq u t-temperatura li jissaħħan fiha, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(2)

Il-proċess tal-affumikar tal-“Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

Waqt spezzjoni, għandhom jiġu ċċekkjati dawn li ġejjin:

—

il-manteniment tat-temperatura meħtieġa għall-affumikar tradizzjonali fid-duħħan jaħraq u t-temperatura li jissaħħan fiha,

| — | il-manteniment tat-tul ta' żmien u t-temperatura tal-affumikar ripetut fid-duħħan kiesaħ, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-manteniment tat-tul ta' żmien u t-temperatura tal-affumikar ripetut fid-duħħan kiesaħ,

| — | l-użu tal-biċċiet tal-fagu u l-friegħi tal-ġnibru fl-affumikar kiesaħ. |
| --- | --- |

—

l-użu tal-biċċiet tal-fagu u l-friegħi tal-ġnibru fl-affumikar kiesaħ.

| (3) | Il-kwalità tal-prodott finali:






  — | il-kontenut tal-proteina, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(3)

Il-kwalità tal-prodott finali:

—

il-kontenut tal-proteina,

| — | il-kontenut tal-ilma, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut tal-ilma,

| — | il-kontenut tax-xaħam, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut tax-xaħam,

| — | il-kontenut tal-melħ, |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut tal-melħ,

| — | il-kontenut tan-nitrat (III) u nitrat (V), |
| --- | --- |

—

il-kontenut tan-nitrat (III) u nitrat (V),

| — | it-togħma u r-riħa. |
| --- | --- |

—

it-togħma u r-riħa.

| (4) | Il-forma tal-prodott. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Il-forma tal-prodott.

Il-frekwenza tal-kontrolli

Il-kontrolli tal-istadji msemmija hawn fuq għandhom isiru darba kull xahrejn. Jekk dawn l-istadji kollha qed jipproċedu b'mod korrett, il-frekwenza tal-kontrolli tista' titnaqqas għal tnejn fis-sena.

Jekk jiġru xi irregolaritajiet fi kwalukwe stadju, il-frekwenza tal-kontrolli fuq dak l-istadju għandha tiżdied (għal darba kull xahrejn). Il-kontrolli fuq stadji oħra jistgħu isiru darba kull sitt xhur.

4.   L-awtoritajiet jew korpi li jivverifikaw il-konformità mal-ispeċifikazzjoni tal-prodott:

4.1.   Isem u Indirizz:

Isem: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Indirizz:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 226232901

Feks +48 226232099

Posta elettronika: —

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4.2.   Il-ħidmiet speċifiċi tal-awtorità jew korp:

L-awtorità tal-ispezzjoni msemmija hawn fuq hija responsabbli mill-kontrolli tal-ispeċifikazzjoni kollha.

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