No. 12162 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1972 

EVA MAE FINLAYSON, 

- ----- 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

-vs - 

DUNCAN FINLAY SON, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant : 

Goldman, McChesney and Datsopoulos, Missoula, Montana. 

H. L. McChesney argued, Missoula, Montana. 

For Respondents: 

Kenneth R. Wilson argued, Miles City, Montana. 

submitted: June 12, 1972 

Decided : AUG 1 1 1972 
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

This appeal is from a final judgment entered on June 30, 

1971, in a divorce action tried to the court without a jury in 

the district court of the sixteenth judicial district, county of 

Custer. In the district court, both parties were granted a divorce with real and personal property divided equally. Neither 

party has appealed the granting of the divorce, however, Eva Mae 

Finlayson, plaintiff, appeals from that portion of the judgment 

which divided the property equally. She contends that certain 

specified property, including the family residence, certificates 

of deposit, and a 1968 Pontiac automobile, are her sole and separate property. 

Eva and Duncan Finlayson were married on October 26, 1956. 

Duncan initially contributed approximately $5,693.84 to the marriage; 

Eva contributed a residence located in Miles City, Montana, obtained 

from a prior marriage and valued at approximately $15,000 to $18,000 

with an unpaid mortgage of $5,289.05. During the marriage Eva 

worked regularly as a waitress and Duncan worked regularly as a 

janitor. Both parties contributed their earnings to a joint checking 

account. In 1959, the home in Miles City was placed in joint tenancy 

by Eva to avoid probate and although she recorded the instrument, 

Duncan was not aware of the joint tenancy until 1969. 

During the course of the marriage Eva regularly purchased 

certificates of deposit with tips she received as a waitress. She 

also invested approximately $1,000 she received from her mother's 

estate in certificates of deposit. Both Eva and Duncan were shown 

as joint owners of the certificates of deposit until May 1970, 

the time of the filing of this action, when Eva consolidated the 

certificates into one certificate in her name and her sister's name, 

Leta L. Vick. 
The 1968 Pontiac automobile was obtained by Eva in her 

name by using an automobile also in her name as a down payment. 

The payments on the Pontiac and the trade-in automobile were 

made from the joint checking account with the final payment of 

$1,300 on the Pontiac being made from the joint savings account. 

Since Duncan did not drive and had never owned an automobile, 

he consented that the automobile be in Wags separate name and 

did not consider the automobile as one-half his until cornrnencement of the divorce action. 

Although other property was listed in the trial court's 

findings which divided the property, Eva has not questioned that 

division. 

There are two divergent philosophies of ownership urged 

by the parties. Appellant, Eva, who was given considerable latitude 

by Duncan in directing marital financial matters, asserts that her 

ownership is based on the specific contributions which she made 

to the acquisition of the individual classes of property. Respondent, 

Duncan, argues that the property acquired during the marriage, 

although held in various states of ownership by the parties, was 

the result of the total contribution of both parties. 

Recent decisions of this Court support the basic proposition 

that the district court may allocate property acquired during a 

and 

marriage on an equitable basis according to contributions,/unless 

a review of all the evidence on appeal reveals that there has been 

an inequitable distribution to a substantial degree, the decision 

of the district court will not be disturbed. Bloom v. Bloom, 150 

Mont. 511, 515, 437 P.2d 1; Hodgson v. Hodgson, 156 Mont. 469, 482 

P.2d 140; Libra v. Libra, 157 Mont. 252, 484 P.2d 748. 

In Bloom the Court said: 

"'Therefore, the court did not err in granting 

the divorce and dividing and adjusting the litigants' rights in property accumulated by the 

joint efforts of the parties. The propkrty acquired jointly during the marriage may be divided 
regardless of whether the title thereto is in 

either or both of the parties. 27B C.J.S. Divorce, 1 295 (5), p. 304 9 et.seq. "' (Emphasis 

added). 

When viewing the entire record of contributions to this 

marriage by both parties, we find the properties were paid for or 

acquired out of jointly accumulated funds and represent a comrningling of joint resources. Other than the earnings of the parties 

and the rents from the upstairs apartment in the house in Miles 

City, the only financial contribution to the marriage came from 

an inheritance in the approximate sum of $4,000 from Eva's mother. 

Some of the inheritance was used by Eva during the course of probate 

of her mother's estate to purchase from her two sisters their 

interest in the deceased mother's home in Billings. Duncan makes 

no claim against this home which, by an undisclosed arrangement, 

is held in the name of Eva's friend, L. G. Pence. 

Apart from the foregoing, joint funds were used to pay off 

the mortgage on the house in Miles City and to add improvements, 

including the addition of a garage in the fall of 1957 at a cost 

of $2,595.78. It appears that Eva and Duncan paid their living 

and miscellaneous expenses from their salaries and Eva purchased 

the certificates of deposit from tips. The certificates were held 

in the joint names of Eva and Duncan until she transferred them into 

a consolidated certificate of deposit in the joint names of Eva 

and her sister, prior to filing for divorce. 

In examining the joint income tax returns of the parties 

for the years 1959 to 1969, it appears that Duncan contributed 

approximately $1,000 per year more salary to the joint effort than 

did Eva. Over the period of years involved, this would equal the 

amount from tips that Eva placed in certificates of deposit which 

totaled $12,088.68. 
I4hen \ire consider this marriage of fifteen years duration, 

che economic gains demonstrated are the result of as equal a contribution by the parties as could be achieved in any marriage. 

Bound by the rule above recited, this Court finds no evidence of inequity in the distribution, much less to a substantial 

tegree. 

Judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

Associate Justice 

/ /chief Justice 

("J--zd&+&&-&- ----- 

Associate Ju dices