AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 21, 2015. 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05
- 14
- 00204
- CR JIMMY ALBERT JOHNSON , Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 044441 

### OPINION Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Bridges, and Justice Fillmore Opinion by Justice Fillmore Jimmy Albert Johnson appeals the trial court’ s denial of his motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Procedural History Johnson was arrested on May 8, 1997 1 and charged with aggr avated sexual assault of
M.W ., the fourteen

- year - old daughter of Johnson’s girlfri end . M.W. was pregnant and had reported Johnson was the father of the child. Jason Butscher was appointed to represent Johnson

. Johnson posted a $5,000 bond on May 23, 1997 and was released from jail. On June 4,

1 The record is not clear as to the date of Johnson’s arrest. Johnson relies on an order of the justice of the peace court set ting conditions of bail to argue he was arrested on November 15, 1996. The State relies on the trial court’s docket sheet to con tend Johnson was arrested on May 16, 1997. However, the trial court’s judgment gives Johnson credit for an incarceration period beginning May 8, 1997. Altho ugh we have relied on the May 8, 1997 date in this opinion, we note the analysis would not change if Johnson was arrested on November 15, 1996.– 2

– 1997, Johns on was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of a child

. T he trial court subsequently placed the case on the July 31, 1997 “first setting” docket

. Jack McGowen was appointed to represent Johnson on July 7, 1997

. 2 The State forwarded “all discoverable mat erial in the County Attorney’s file” to McGowen on July 14, 1997. At the first setting on July 31, 1997, Johnson pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was reset for announcements on August 28, 1997. Both Johnson and McGowen signed the “Notice of Agreed Setting.” On August 28, 1997, the case was reset for announcements on September 18, 1997. McGowen, but not Johnson, signed the “Notice of Agreed Setting.” A handwritten note on the notice states “need plea offer.” On Septemb er 18, 1997, the case was reset for announcements on October 23, 1997. Again, McGowen, but not Johnson, signed the “Notice of Agreed Setting.”
A

- American Bail Bond Company, the surety on Johnson’s bail bond, filed a motion on September 29, 1997 seeking to be released from the bond because Johnson had failed to pay the bond fee, failed to keep A

- American apprised of his whereabouts, and otherwise failed to abide by the bonding agreem ent. A

- American represented that Johnson’s last known address was in Houston, Texas and requeste d a warrant be issued for Johnson’s arrest. The trial court issue d the capias on October 1, 1997, and Johnson was arrested on January 30, 1998. The trial court signed a scheduling order on February 9, 1998, setting the case for a pretrial hearing on March 5, 1998 and for trial on April 6, 1998. On February 20, 1998, Johnson posted a $5,000 bond and was released from jail. The record does not reflect why the case was not tried on April 6, 1998 but, on June 3, 1998, the trial court signed a scheduling orde r setting the case for a pretrial hearing on July 2, 1998 and for trial on August 3, 1998.

2 Johnson testified during the punishment phase that he was told Butscher had accepted employment with the FBI and could no longer represent him.– 3

– City Hall Bail Bonds, the surety on Johnson’s second bail bond, filed an affidavit to surrender principal on June 10, 1998. The affidavit stated Johnson had failed to make contact on an agreed date to pay the bond or on any date for the requested “call in time” and had failed to respond to City Hall’s attempts to contact him. City Hall represented that Johnson’s last known address was in Houston and request ed a war rant be issued for his arrest. The trial c ourt issued a capias that day, and Johnson was arrested on April 26, 2001. On May 5, 2001, Johnson again posted a $5,000 bond and was released from jail. T he tria l court signed a scheduling order on June 6, 2001 setting the case for a pretrial hearing on July 12, 2001 and for trial on August 27,
2001. On July 25, 2001, Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court complaining about McGowen and requesting new counsel. McGowen filed a motion to withdraw from the repre sentation on August 15, 2001. On August 27, 2 001, the trial court granted McGowen’s motion, appointed Butscher to again represent Johnson, and set the case for trial on October 1, 2001. Although the record does not reflect why the case was not tried on O ctober 1, 2001, on December 12, 2001, the case was set for trial on February 25, 2002. Butscher filed a number of motions and an election of puni shment prior to the trial setting. However, Johnson did not appear for trial on February 25, 2002. On May 14 , 2002, Liberty Bail Bonds, the surety on Johnson’s third bail bond, filed a motion to be released from the bond because Johnson had failed to keep Liberty apprised of his whereabouts and had failed to otherwise abide by the bonding agreement. Liberty repr esented that Johnson’s last known address was in North Carolina and requested that a warrant be issued for his arrest. On May 14, 2002, the trial court issued a capias for Johnson’s arrest. In a June 7, 2002 scheduling order, the trial court set the case for trial on July 29, 2002.– 4

– The case was next set on the July 13, 2006 plea docket. However, the notice of the settin g m ailed to Johnson in North Carolina was returned as undelivered by the postal service because there was “no such number/street

. ” Joh nson did not appear at the July 13, 2006 plea docket. On July 21, 2006, the trial court issued a capias for Johnson’s arrest. Johnson was arrested on Febru ary 15, 2012 and, on February 21 , 2012, Mike Dunn wa s appointed to represent
him

. The State filed a motion for high bon d, citing to Johnson ’s repeated failures to appear in
court. On March 8, 2012, t he trial court granted the motion and set Johnson’s bond at $150,000. The trial court also appointed Joe Neal Smith to represent Johnson. The case was se t for arraignment on March 22, 2012. At the arraignment, both Johnson and his counsel signed a “Notice of Agreed Setting” placing the case on the April 26, 2012 plea docket. 3 On April 26, 2012, both Johnson and his counsel signed another “Notice of Agree d Setting” resetting the case for the May 24, 2012 plea docket. Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court on July 3, 2012 requesting that he be allowed to fire Smith. A note on the letter states “Def. has an atty. Should be filed through atty.” On Augus t 22, 2012, Johnson filed a pro se motion for speedy trial. On October 3, 2012, Johnson wrote to Smith statin g that Smith was fired and that Johnson no longer wanted Smith to represent him. M.W.’s child , A.W., died i n an automobile accident in 2000 . T he State obtained A.W.’s toothbrush and clothes from M.W. and , on November 13, 2012, submitted the items, along with DNA samples from Johnson , to a lab for testing

. T he lab was unable to obtain a DNA sample fo r A.W. from the items and, o n March 20, 2013, the State obtained a subpoena to exhume
A.W.’s body to obtain samples of her DNA

. A.W.’s body was exhumed on March 21, 2013.

3 Johnson disputes that he actually agreed to reset the case.– 5

– Also on March 21, 2013, the trial court granted Smith’s March 5, 2013 motion to withdraw and appointed Robert Earl Richardson, Jr . to represent Johnson. On May 9, 2013, the lab issued a forensic DNA report stating Johnson could not be excluded as A.W.’s father and that at least 99.995% of the male population was excluded from the possibility of being A.W.’s father. On May 28, 2013, Johnson wrote a letter to the trial court requesting that his case move forward. The trial court set the case on the June 20, 2013 plea docket. On June 20, 2013, Johnson’s counsel signed a “Notice of Agreed Setting,” placing the case on the June 27, 201 3 plea docket. On June 27, 2013, the case was set for trial on December 16, 2013. Johnson, through his counsel, filed a motion to dismiss on November 12, 2013 based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial

. In support of the motion, Johnson requeste d the trial court take judicial notice of the entire file and attached a register of the actions taken in the case, Johnson’s pro se motion for speedy trial filed in August 2012, portions of an investigative report relating to exhuming A.W.’s body, and th e forensic DNA report. Without conducting a hearing,
t he trial court denied the motion on December 11, 2013. Johnson pleaded guilty on December 16, 2013 , and the trial court subsequently sentenced him to forty years’ imprisonment. The trial court certif ied that Johnson had the right to appeal the denial of the motion to dismiss.
A nalysis Focusing on the time period between his February 15 , 2012 arrest and December 16, 2013 plea , Johnson argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss base d on a violation of his right to a speedy trial

. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution , made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the rig ht to a speedy and public trial[.] ” U.S. C ONST
. VI ; see also Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 222

– 23 (1967); Gonzales v. State , 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Courts determine a speedy trial claim on an “ad hoc basis” by– 6

– analyzing and weigh ing four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) t he State’s reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the length of delay. Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972 ); Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 808. The State has the burden of justifying the length of the delay, while the defendant has the burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice. Cantu v.
State , 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . T he defendant’s burden on the latter two factors “varies inversely” with the State’s degree of culpability for the delay. Id. “Thus, the greater the State’s bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant mu st show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial.” Id. at 280

– 81. In conducting the balancing test, no single factor is determinative, and the conduct of both the prosecutor and the defendant must be weighed. Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 533; State v. Munoz , 991 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To trigger a speedy trial analysis , the defendant must mak e an initial showing that “the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary f rom ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 808 (quoting Doggett v. United
States , 505 U.S. 647, 651

– 52 (1992)). Presu mptive prejudice “simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger [further] enq uiry.” Id. (quoting Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 821

– 22 ). If the State prosec uted the defendant with “cu stomary promptness,” the defendant has fail ed to meet the threshold burden. Id. If the defendant can make a threshold showing of presumptive prejudice, a court must then proceed to consider and weigh each of the remaining Barker factors. Id. (citing Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 821

– 22); see also State v. Jones , 168 S.W.3d 339, 347 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2005, pe t. ref’ d) (unless delay is “presumptively prejudicial,” courts need not inquire into other Barker factors).– 7

– If the right to a speedy trial has been violated, the remedy is dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice

. Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 281 . B ecause this is a radical remedy, “courts must apply the Barker balancing test with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’ s actual and asserted interest in a
sp eedy trial has been inf ringed.” Id. “The constitutional right is that of a speedy trial, not dismissal of the charges.” Id. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a speedy trial claim , we apply a bifurcated standard of review. Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 808. W e give almost total deference to historical findings of fact of the trial court that the record supports and draw reasonable inferences from those facts neces sary to support the trial court’ s findings. Id. at 808

– 09. As legal questions, w e review de novo whether there was sufficient presumptive prejudice to proceed to a Barker analysis and the weighing of the Barker fact ors. Id. at 809. We do not consider evidence that was not before the trial court when it made its ruling. Id. at 809. Because the tria l court denied Johnson’s motion to dismiss, we must presume the trial court resolved any disputed fact issues in the State’s favor, and we must defer to the implied fact findings that the record supports. Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 282 (citing Zamorano v. State , 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) )

. We must uphold the trial court’ s ruling if it is supported by the record and is correct under the applicable law. Shaw v. State , 117 S.W.3d 883 , 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003 )

. Length of the Delay The first Barke r factor, length of the delay , is measured from the time the accused is

ar

rested or formally accused. Gonzalez , 439 S.W.3d at 80 9 (citing United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)) . Joh n son was first arrested o n May 8, 1997 and pleaded guilty on December 16, 2013, resulting in a delay of over sixteen years. Although there is no “set time element,” in general, delay approaching one year is sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry.– 8

– Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 281; Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 889

. The delay in this case is sufficient to trigger analysis of the other the Barke r factors

. See Zamorano , 84 S.W.3d at 649 (four year delay between arrest and plea hearing clearly triggered analysis of other Ba rker factors). When , as in this case, the length of delay stretches well beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger a full Barke r analysis, the length of the delay weighs heavily against the State

. Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 889; Zamorano , 84 S.W.3d at 649. Further, because “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time , ” the longer the delay, the more the defendant’s prejudice is compounded. Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Zamorano , 84 S.W.3d at 649) ; see also Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652

. Accordingly, th is factor weighs heavily in favor of finding a speedy trial violation

. Reason for the Delay With respect to the second Barker factor, the reason for the delay, once it has been determined that a presumptively prejudicial delay has occurred, the State bears the initial burden of providing a justification for the delay. Emery v. State , 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Different reasons for the delay ar e assigned different weights: an intentional dela y for tactical reasons is weighed heavily against the State; a neutral reason , such as overcrowded courts or negligence , is weighed less heavily against the State; a valid reason is not weighed against the S tate at all; and delay attributable in whole or in part to the defendant may constitute a waiver of the speedy trial claim

. Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 822 (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 528

– 30 and Dickey v. Florida , 398 U.S. 30, 48 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) )

. In this case, the delay from May 8, 1997 through February 15 , 2012 was largely attributable to Johnson. See Cockrell v. State , 632 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d) (defendant not entitled to dismissal of case based on delays in w hich was a willing participant). He agreed to reset the case three times, requested to be allowed to fire his– 9

– attorney shortly before a t rial setting on August 27, 2001, failed to appear at a trial setting on Februar y 25, 2002, and absco nded three time s f or a total time of over fourt een yea rs. Ignoring this conduct , Johnson relies on the delay be tween his arrest on February 15, 2012 and his guilty plea on December 16, 2103 to argue his right to a speedy trial was violated

. Although much of
t his almost t wo - year delay was unexplained, the record reflects that, d uring this time period, the

case was se t for arraignment or on a plea docket five times. See Munoz , 991 S.W.2d at 824 (delay caused by good faith plea negotiation should not be weighed against Stat e). Further, during that time period, t he State , after unsuccessf ully attempting to obtain a DNA sample from A.W.’s toothbru sh and clothes , obtained a search warrant, exhumed A.W.’s body in order to obtain a DNA sample , and conducted forensic testing on those samples and samples of Johnson’s
DNA

. See Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 889

– 90 (reasonable period of time in which to develop its case is not held against State). There is, however, no explanation in the record of why this process

was no t started earlier or why it took so long. Although the unexplained time gaps in the almost
two

- year delay following Johnson’s final arrest weigh s against the State, we cannot conclude they excuse Johnson’s conduct during the previous fifteen years the cas e was pending. See
Burton v. State , 805 S.W .2d 564, 572 , 574 (Tex. App.

— Dall as 1991, pet. ref’d) (weighing unexplained eight

- month period of delay against State, but not finding it dispositive of speedy trial claim when defendant absconded for four years)

. Considering all the reasons for delay in this case, w e conclude t hey weigh again st a finding of a violation of Johnson’s right to a speedy trial. See Blaylock v. State , 259 S.W.3d 202, 209

– 10 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d) ( delay due to defenda nt absconding from supervision “is a valid reason for the delay, or in some circumstances a waiver of the speedy trial claim”) ; Burgett v. State , 865 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d) (denying speedy trial claim when defendant evaded justice– 10

– for nearly five years even though State took six months to bring case to trial after re

- arresting defendant) (citing Dickey , 398 U.S. at 48 (Brennan, J., concurring))

. Assertion of the Right Regarding the third Barker factor, the defendant bears th e responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 282

. Whether and how a defendant chooses to assert his right “is closely related to the other three factors because the strength of his efforts will be shaped by them.” Id. at 282

– 83. “The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.” Id. at 283 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 531) ; see also Shaw , 117 S.W.3d 890 (noting that the longer delay becomes, the more likely it is that defendant who really wanted speedy trial would take some action to obtain one)

. The defendant’ s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, or the failure to assert the right, “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of t he right.” Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 282.
A defendant’s failure to timely seek a speedy trial does not amoun t to a waiver of the right. Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 890 (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 532). However, a defendant’s failure to timely demand a speedy trial makes it difficult for the defendant to p revail on a speedy trial claim because the failure to timely demand a speedy trial indicates strongly that he did not really want a speedy trial and was not prejudiced by not having one. Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 890; s ee also Barker , 407 U.S. at 536 (“[B]arring extraordinary circumstances, we would be reluctant indeed to rule that a defendant was denied this constitutional right on a record that strongly indicates . . . that the defendant did not want a speedy trial.”); Harris v. State , 827 S.W.2d 949, 957 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[A]ppellant’s lack of a timely demand for a speedy trial indicates strongly that he did not really want a speedy trial.”). The longer the delay becomes, the more heavily a defendant’s inaction weighs against him. Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 890. Further , this– 11

– Barker factor is weighed against a defendant who knew of an indictment and fled the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution. See Doggett , 505 U.S. at 653; Burgett , 865 S.W.2d at 598. Johnson absconde d three different times throughout the course of this case and was absent for a total of over fourt een years. He also delayed the trial of this case by agreeing to have the case reset a number of times, successfully seeking to fire his attorney shortly before a trial setti n g on August 27 , 2001 , and failing to appear a t a trial setting on February 25 , 2002. He did not assert a right to a speedy trial until over six teen years after his initial arrest. At that point, he soug ht the dismissal of the claims against him, not a trial. 4 See Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 2 83 (“Filing for a dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy

- trial claim because it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy on e .”). Th e case went to trial one month after Johnson filed his motion to dismiss. See Kelly v. State , 163 S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (third factor did not weigh in defendant’s favor when defendant waited over a year to fil e a motion to dismiss based o n failure to receive speedy trial, made assertion onl y once, and tria l occurred within two months of motion being filed). Johnson ’s conduct throughout this

case indicates he did not really want this case to proceed to trial. See Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 890

. This factor weighs heavily in the State’ s favor. Prejudice We finally turn to the fourth Barker fa ctor , the prejudice to Johnson f r om the delay

. “Because ‘pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable,’” this factor “examines whether and to what extent the delay has prejudiced the defendant.” Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Doggett , 505 U.S. at 656). The prejudice must be assessed in light o f the interests that the speedy trial right is designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2)

4 Although Johnson filed a pro se motion for speedy trial in August 2012 , he was represented by an attorney, and the trial court was free to disregard that motion

. See Robinson v. State , 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (because defendant has n o right to hybrid representation, trial court is free to disregard any pro se motion presented by defendant who is represented by counsel).– 12

– minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense

w ill be impaired

. Id. ; see also Barker , 407 U.S. at 532). Of these three interests, the possibility the defense will be impaired by dimming memories and the loss of exculpatory evidence is the
most serious “ because the inability of a defendant ade quately to prepare his case skew s the fairness of the entire system.” Barker , 407 U.S. at 532; see also Doggett , 505 U.S. at 654; Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 812. Affirmative evidence of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim because excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or even identify. Dogget t , 505 U.S. at 655 ; Gonzales , 453 S.W.3d at
812 . Furthe r, the presumption of prejudice intensifies over time. Doggett , 505 U.S. at 656. However, the presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend himself can be “extenuated . . . by the de fendant’s acquiescence” in the delay. Id. at 658 ; see also Gonzales , 435 S.W.3d at 815

. In this case, prior to his final arrest in February 2012, Joh n son was incar cerated on three occasions for a total time of approximately six weeks

. After each of h is first three arrests, Johnson was released after posting a $5,000 bond. After his arrest in February 2012, Johnson was held on a $150,000 bond because he had repeatedly absconded when released on a lower bond

. Johnson failed to post the required bond and was incarcerated until he pleaded guilty on December 16, 2013. However, Johnson presented no evidence in connection with his motion to dismiss that the incarceration beginning in 2012 caused him any unusual anx iety or concern beyond the level normally associated with being char ged with aggravated sexual assault of a child

. See Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 286.
M ost importantly, Johnson presented no evidence in connection with the motion to dismiss that his defense wa s impaired or hampered due to the loss of exculpatory evidence or– 13

– dimming memories during the delay

. Rather, Johnson contends he was prejudiced because, before the State obtained the DNA test results, its case was based solely on M.W.’s testimony which he could have impeached by showing M.W. was addicted to crack cocaine when she was fourteen years old, was a ninth

- grade school dropout, had bad relationships with men and, although unmarried, had three children. However, the case was fifteen years’ old at the time of Johnson’s final arrest in February 2012 , and it was reasonable to provide the State with an opportunity to prepare for trial by obtaining the results of the DNA testing , particularly when that evidence could have been favorable to Johnson

. See Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 889

– 90. Further,

a llowing the State to obta in evidence to develop its case is not the type of prejudice , such as loss of exculpatory evidence and dimming memories, that the right to speedy trial is intended to protect. 5 Overall, we c onc lude this factor does not weigh in favor of finding a violation of Johnson’s right to a speedy trial. Balancing of Factors Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was not violated

. Although the length of the delay weighs in favor of finding a violation of Jo hnson’s right to a speedy trial, much of the delay was due to Johnson’ s conduct and there were valid reasons for other delays in trying the case. Further, Johnson failed to assert his right until over sixteen ye ars after he was first arrested; once he asserted his right, he sought a dismissal rather than a trial; the case proceeded to trial shortly aft er he filed his motion to dismiss; and he failed to demonstrate any prejudice that the right to a speedy trial is intended to prevent. The record in

5 See Rhone v. State , No. 05

- 07

- 00729

- CR, 2008 WL 2579681, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Dallas June 30, 2008, pet. ref’d) (not d esignated for publication) (delay in trial to allow State to obtain DNA evidence that incrimi nated defendant “is not the kind of impairment, such as loss of exculpatory evidence and dimming memories discussed in Barke r ” ); Aimufua v. State , No. 10

- 00

- 00223

- CR, 2003 WL 22996901, at *3 & n.1 (Tex. App.

— Waco De c . 19, 2003 , no pet.) ( mem. op., not designated for publication) ( Although State may not detain a defendant indefinitely without sufficient evidence to justify the detention, “w e expressly reject any cont ention that a defendant suffers actionable ‘prejudice’ for purposes of a speedy trial claim because the delay has permitted the State to obtain additional incriminating evidence.”).– 14

– this case supports a conclusion that Johnson did not really want a speedy trial; he wanted only a dismissal of the charges. See Cantu , 253 S.W.3d at 286; Shaw , 117 S.W.3d at 890

. We resolve Johnson’s sole issue against him and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47 140204F.U05 /Robert M. Fillmore/ ROBERT M. FILLMORE JUSTICE– 15

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JIMMY ALBERT JOHNSON, Appellant
No. 05

- 14

- 00204

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 59th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 044441. Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Chief Justice Wright and Justice Bridges participat ing. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 21st day of January, 2015.