United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

G.R., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Amherst, NY, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 18-0893

Issued: November 21, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On March 16, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 19, 2017 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).

1

 Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

 

1 Under the Board’s Rules of Procedure, an appeal must be filed within 180 days from the date of issuance of an 

OWCP decision. An appeal is considered filed upon receipt by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 501.3(e)-(f). One hundred and eighty days from September 19, 2017, the date of OWCP’s last merit decision, was 

March 19, 2018. Since using March 20, 2018, the date the appeal was received by the Clerk of the Appellate Boards, 

would result in the loss of appeal rights for this merit decision, the date of the postmark is considered the date of filing.

The date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark is March 16, 2018, rendering the appeal timely filed. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.3(f)(1).

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On February 3, 2017 appellant, then a 53-year-old city letter carrier, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that he sustained “psychic trauma” on January 28, 2017 while at work. 

In an attached statement, he related that at about 9:30 a.m. on January 28, 2017, C.K., a supervisor,

charged into his work area as he was sorting and loading parcels into his assigned postal truck. 

Appellant maintained that she was irate, infuriated, and out of control, telling him that she was 

writing him up for not following orders. He indicated that her tone and behavior were very

exaggerated and that she started to advance further into his work area in an extremely threatening 

manner. Appellant reported that he was trapped between two eight-foot tall vans and a concrete 

wall so that there was no way for him to escape the attack, but that he took a defensive position 

and thought through his options to fend off the assault. He indicated that she stopped the assault 

when she realized that a union steward, R.G., was nearby, so she turned away from him and 

stormed toward R.G. Appellant related that since that morning the image of being trapped 

continually played in his mind leaving him confused and unable to concentrate or to sleep. 

The employing establishment indicated on the claim form that it did not agree with 

appellant’s statements, noted that appellant and the supervisor provided conflicting statements and 

that discussion with the union steward R.G. did not support appellant’s perception of events. 

In a February 1, 2017 note, Dr. Joseph C. DiPirro, a Board-certified internist, requested 

that appellant be excused from work from February 1, 2017 for an indefinite amount of time due 

to illness/injury. 

In correspondence dated February 9, 2017, the employing establishment controverted the 

claim. 

Supervisor C.K. provided an undated statement in which she described the events of 

January 28, 2017. She related that at about 8:45 a.m. appellant came to her desk requesting 30 

minutes of aid for his route. C.K. informed him that it was not the proper time to request aid, but 

agreed for him to give her the last 30 minutes of his route. She noted that about 15 minutes later

appellant came in and pushed a hamper of mail to his case, and when she checked it, he had added 

more than the agreed upon 30 minutes. C.K. indicated that she then pushed the hamper to the 

garage where he was loading and went to get R.G. to come with her to speak to him. She related 

that R.G. questioned appellant who told her that the hamper was not the last 30 minutes of his 

delivery route, and C.K. informed them both that she would be conducting a post-delivery 

inspection (PDI) the following week for appellant’s failure to follow instructions. C.K. then 

instructed appellant to give her the correct amount of mail, instructed R.G. to leave for her route, 

and then returned to her desk. Appellant brought her the required mail. C.K. indicated that she 

had given appellant a previous PDI which led to a letter of warning due to unauthorized overtime. 
3

In a February 8, 2017 statement, R.G. indicated that as she was in the postal garage at 

approximately 9:00 a.m., C.K. came to get her to go and talk with appellant because she was going 

to charge him for expanding his office time. She indicated that there was a discussion about which 

half hour of mail appellant was to leave, and when she looked at appellant, he was emotionally 

upset. R.G. related that C.K. walked her half-way back to her truck.

In an undated statement, L.A., an employing establishment manager, indicated that 

appellant reported for work on January 31, 2017 and then left abruptly without giving a reason. 

Union representatives tried to contact appellant, but he did not respond. He called in the next day 

reporting an employment injury, and on Friday, February 3, 2017, the union president brought in 

appellant’s Form CA-1 and an injury statement with a request for sick leave. L.A. noted that 

appellant worked his full day on January 28, 2017, the date of the alleged incident, and the next 

day, and during that time he did not mention or report an incident or accident. 

By development letter dated February 16, 2017, OWCP informed appellant that the factual 

and medical evidence submitted was insufficient to support his claim and advised him of the 

evidence needed. It also provided appellant a questionnaire to complete. In a second February 16, 

2017 letter, OWCP asked the employing establishment to respond to appellant’s claim. It afforded 

30 days for submission of the additional evidence. 

In an emergency department report dated February 7, 2017, Dr. Michael A. Manka, Jr., 

Board-certified in emergency medicine, noted appellant’s complaint that he kept thinking of an 

incident at work when the supervisor “acted very aggressive,” which made him feel “very 

threatened” and unable to sleep or concentrate. He described physical examination findings and 

diagnosed anxious mood and stress at work. Dr. Manka discharged appellant to see a psychiatrist. 

Dr. Victoria L. Brooks, a Board-certified psychiatrist, provided an assessment on 

February 7, 2017. She noted that appellant brought a statement describing an incident that 

occurred at work when he felt threatened by a supervisor’s behavior, became very distressed and 

afraid, and since the incident had been having nightmares and would ruminate about it. Following 

a mental status examination, Dr. Brooks diagnosed anxiety disorder (acute stress disorder) with 

secondary diagnoses to rule-out cluster C personality traits, rule out adjustment disorder with 

anxiety, and rule out post-traumatic stress disorder. She recommended outpatient mental health 

treatment. 

In a February 17, 2017 statement, appellant indicated that he had reviewed C.K.’s 

statement. He maintained that when she arrived at his work area with the hamper, she committed 

the assault resulting in his injury because she was irate, infuriated, out of control, and started to 

advance further into his work area in an extremely violent manner, threatening physical violence

which caused him to be trapped with no way to escape the attack. Appellant also described an 

incident on October 27, 2016 when C.K. yelled at him, and that on January 25, 2017 he witnessed 

her yell at coworkers. 

In a February 23, 2017 statement, appellant repeated that on January 28, 2017 he was 

trapped in a situation where he was completely helpless and had no escape because he could not 

walk or run away from this threat of physical harm. He indicated that his mind remained trapped 

in the garage for over three weeks following the incident, that he continued to have no clear 
4

recollection of anything that happened during the next three days, and that he had limited 

recollection for the next several days. Appellant described ensuing medical treatment, noting that 

he was diagnosed with acute stress disorder triggered by the January 28, 2017 incident, and that 

his condition had improved. He also forwarded a grievance settlement dated November 30, 2016, 

finding that there would be mutual respect between appellant and C.K. It did not mention a specific 

incident. 

Medical evidence submitted included a February 15, 2017 report in which Dr. Brooks 

noted appellant’s complaints of visual hallucinations/flashbacks of a work incident he perceived 

as being traumatic. In a February 16, 2017 report, Dr. John M. Improta, a Board-certified 

psychiatrist, noted the history provided by appellant regarding the January 28, 2017 incident. He 

indicated that throughout the interview appellant was focused on getting a diagnosis and a cause 

so that he could move forward with his workers’ compensation claim and was now reporting that 

since this event he had been having attention problems because he would get intrusive images of 

this workplace incident and this resulted in having trouble functioning in his daily life. Dr. Improta 

noted that appellant specifically requested that he give him a written statement that his diagnosis, 

whatever it is, was attributable to the incident he experienced at work. He declined to provide 

such a report. Dr. Improta performed a mental status examination and diagnosed anxiety disorder 

(other), indicating that it should read as an acute stress disorder. He concluded that appellant had 

impairment in occupational functioning and in social settings and recommended outpatient mental 

health treatment. 

The employing establishment forwarded an undated statement from L.A. in which she 

disagreed with appellant’s statement regarding the January 28, 2017 incident. L.A. related a past 

incident where appellant filed a grievance regarding a letter of warning he was issued on 

November 19, 2016 for unauthorized overtime. She indicated that appellant and his union 

representative met with C.K. to discuss the removal of this discipline and that appellant later 

informed C.K. that he did not like her aggressive tone. L.A. noted that they agreed to show mutual 

respect going forward, but that the original grievance regarding the letter of warning was not 

resolved.

In a March 16, 2017 report, Erin S. Cornelius, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, advised that 

she was currently treating appellant for acute stress disorder. She opined that it was more probable 

than not that appellant developed symptoms of acute stress disorder as a result of the January 28, 

2017 employment incident. 

By decision dated March 27, 2017, OWCP denied appellant’s traumatic injury claim. It 

found that fact of injury had not been established because the statements submitted did not support 

that C.K. charged at him or was irate, infuriated, loud, or threatening. As such, appellant did not 

establish a compensable factor of employment. 

In an appeal form postmarked April 25, 2017, appellant requested a review of the written 

record by a representative of OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review. In a statement dated 

April 21, 2017, he claimed that C.K. did not follow proper procedure when she came into the 

garage on January 28, 2017 and acted aggressively toward him. Appellant maintained that his 

injury statement dated February 3, 2017 provided an accurate and true description of how he 

sustained psychic trauma on January 28, 2017. 
5

In an August 17, 2017 statement, L.A. asserted that C.K. did not violate procedures on 

January 28, 2017, noting that it was the supervisor’s responsibility to instruct the employee 

regarding the performance of his duties, and that C.K. had R.G, the union representative,

accompany her to speak with appellant about his failure to follow instructions. 

In a September 5, 2017 response to L.A.’s statement, appellant maintained that the 

employing establishment was a hostile work environment where C.K. mistreated many employees. 

He attached a Step B grievance decision dated May 22, 2017 on the issue of whether management 

violated any agreements by harassing appellant on January 28, 2017. The decision indicated that 

the dispute resolution team resolved the issue, finding that a minimal effort by both parties to 

communicate better would avoid this type of violation and that, in the future, they should treat 

each other with dignity and respect. The union’s request for relief regarding management’s 

attempt to intimidate appellant to perform work faster than he was capable and because he was 

threatened by the supervisor’s anger on January 28, 2016 was denied. Seven witness statements 

by coworkers were attached to the grievance decision. None of these indicated that the January 28, 

2017 incident had been witnessed. 

By decision dated September 19, 2017, an OWCP hearing representative affirmed the 

March 27, 2017 decision. She found no compensable work factors, noting that S.G. confirmed 

C.K.’s statement, but indicated that appellant was upset. The hearing representative also 

referenced the May 22, 2017 grievance decision which resolved appellant’s complaint and denied 

the union’s requested remedy. She found that appellant submitted no evidence to establish that 

the January 28, 2017 incident was not handled properly. In conclusion, the hearing representative 

noted that appellant had made reference to additional work factors, and if he felt “he sustained an 

injury or condition due to work factors occurring on more than one work shift, he should file the 

appropriate [occupational disease] claim form....”

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish his claim that he sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty, 

appellant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he has an emotional 

or stress-related disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged 

to have caused or contributed to his condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence 

establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally related to his stressrelated condition.3

 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then 

determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor.4 When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.5

 

3 Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000).

4 Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001).

5

Id.
6

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

6

the Board explained 

that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or illness has some 

connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within coverage under FECA.7 

When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment duties and 

the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of 

employment. This is true when the employee’s disability results from his or her emotional reaction 

to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the 

nature of the work.8 Allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for 

an emotional condition claim.9 Where the claimant alleges compensable factors of employment, 

he or she must substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable evidence.10 Personal 

perceptions alone are insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional condition.11

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.12 Where the evidence 

demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in discharging its 

administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable 

employment factor.13 

For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability, there must be 

evidence introduced which establishes that the acts alleged or implicated by the employee did, in 

fact, occur. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of 

whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. A claimant must establish a factual basis for 

his or her allegations that the harassment occurred with probative and reliable evidence.14 With 

regard to emotional claims arising under FECA, the term “harassment” as applied by the Board is 

not the equivalent of “harassment” as defined or implemented by other agencies, such as the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which is charged with statutory authority to 

investigate and evaluate such matters in the workplace. Rather, in evaluating claims for workers’

compensation under FECA, the term “harassment” is synonymous, as generally defined, with a 

 

6 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

7 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

8 Supra note 6.

9

J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008).

10 M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007).

11 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

12 Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004).

13 Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).

14 James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000).
7

persistent disturbance, torment or persecution, i.e., mistreatment by co-employees or coworkers. 

Mere perceptions and feelings of harassment will not support an award of compensation.15

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

Appellant alleged that he developed an emotional condition as a result of an incident at 

work on January 28, 2017 involving his supervisor. OWCP denied his emotional condition claim 

finding that he had not established any compensable employment factors. The Board must initially 

review whether the alleged incidents and conditions of employment as set forth by appellant are 

compensable employment factors under FECA. 

The Board notes that appellant’s allegations do not pertain to his regular or specially 

assigned duties under Lillian Cutler.

16

 Rather, he alleged that on January 28, 2017 C.K., a 

supervisor, charged into his work area as he was sorting and loading parcels into his assigned 

postal truck. Appellant maintained that she was irate, infuriated, and out of control, telling him 

that she was writing him up for not following orders. He indicated that her tone and behavior were 

very exaggerated and that she started to advance further into his work area in an extremely 

threatening manner. Appellant reported that he was trapped between two eight-foot tall vans and 

a concrete wall so there was no way for him to escape the attack. He indicated that she stopped 

the assault when she realized that a union steward, R.G. was nearby, so she turned away from him 

and stormed toward R.G. Appellant maintained that this caused his diagnosed acute stress 

disorder. 

As a general rule, a claimant’s reaction to administrative or personnel matters falls outside 

the scope of FECA.17 The Board has long held that disputes regarding assignment of work and 

discipline are administrative functions of the employer and, absent error or abuse, are not 

compensable. Although assignment of work and disciplinary actions are generally related to the 

employment, they are administrative functions of the employer and not duties of the employee.18 

The Board finds that the evidence of record establishes that the claimed incident of 

January 28, 2017 did not occur as alleged. C.K. submitted a statement contradicting appellant’s 

recitation of events. She indicated that at about 8:45 a.m. he asked for aid on his route. C.K.

agreed to let him give her the last 30 minutes of his route, but that when she checked the hamper 

of mail he had returned to his case, he had added more time than the agreed upon 30 minutes. She

related that she then pushed the hamper to the garage where he was loading his truck and got R.G. 

to come with her to speak to him. C.K. related that R.G. questioned appellant who admitted that 

 

15 Beverly R. Jones, 55 ECAB 411 (2004).

16 Supra note 6.

17 Carolyn S. Philpott, 51 ECAB 175 (1999).

18 Peter D. Butt, 56 ECAB 117 (2004).
8

the hamper was not the last 30 minutes of his route. C.K. informed them both that she would be 

conducting a PDI the following week for appellant’s failure to follow instructions. She then 

instructed appellant to give her the correct amount of mail, instructed R.G. to leave for her route, 

and returned to her desk. Appellant brought C.K. the required mail. C.K. indicated that she had

given appellant a previous PDI which led to a letter of warning for unauthorized overtime. 

The Board further finds that R.G. also did not agree with appellant’s recitation of the 

January 28, 2017 incident. In a February 8, 2017 statement, R.G. indicated that C.K. came to get 

her to go and talk with appellant because she was going to charge him for expanding his office 

time. She indicated that there was a discussion about which half hour of mail appellant was to 

leave, and noted that appellant appeared to be emotionally upset. R.G. did not indicate that C.K. 

acted inappropriately at any time during this discussion.

Mere disagreement or dislike of a supervisory or managerial action will not be

compensable, absent evidence of error or abuse.19 The above statements contradict appellant’s 

assertion regarding the events of January 28, 2017. Moreover, the record contains a Step B 

grievance decision dated May 22, 2017 on the issue of whether management violated any 

agreements by harassing appellant on January 28, 2016. The decision indicated that the dispute 

resolution team resolved the issue finding that with minimal effort both parties could communicate 

better and the parties should treat each other with dignity and respect. The union’s request for 

relief regarding appellant’s assertions regarding the January 28, 2017 incident was denied. 

The Board has recognized that a verbal threat when sufficiently detailed by the claimant 

and supported by evidence may constitute compensable employment factors.20 Appellant has not 

established with corroborating evidence that C.K. threatened him or acted aggressively on 

January 28, 2017. The factual aspects of a claimed threat must be established in order to show a 

compensable employment factor.21 Although appellant submitted statements from coworkers, 

these statements are of limited probative value as they do not address the events of 

January 28, 2017. He, thus, submitted no supportive evidence to establish that the discussion on 

January 28, 2017 constituted a verbal assault.22

Regarding appellant’s perception that the January 28, 2017 employment incident 

constituted harassment by C.K., generally, complaints about the manner in which a supervisor 

performs his or her duties or the manner in which a supervisor exercises his or her discretion fall, 

as a rule, outside the scope of coverage provided by FECA. This principle recognizes that a 

supervisor or manager in general must be allowed to perform his or her duties and employees will, 

at times, dislike the actions taken.23 Here again, the record contains no evidence that C.K.’s 

treatment of appellant on January 28, 2017 constituted error or abuse in discharging her 

 

19 Linda J. Edwards-Delgado, 55 ECAB 401 (2004).

20 T.G., 58 ECAB 189 (2006).

21 M.J., Docket No. 16-0695 (issued September 16, 2016).

22 Supra note 20.

23 See Donney T. Drennon-Gala, 56 ECAB 469 (2005).
9

management duties.24 As supported by R.G.’s statement, C.K. was discussing whether appellant 

had returned the agreed upon mail that day.

As noted, perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not compensable under FECA,25

and unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of whether 

such harassment or discrimination occurred. A claimant must establish a factual basis for his or 

her allegations with probative and reliable evidence.26 As discussed above, the grievance 

regarding the January 28, 2017 incident was resolved, and the union’s assertion that management 

was attempting to intimidate appellant to perform work faster than he was capable and that he was 

threatened by the supervisor’s anger was denied. Appellant submitted no evidence to show a 

persistent disturbance, torment or persecution, i.e., mistreatment by employing establishment 

management regarding the January 28, 2017 incident.

27

 He, therefore, did not establish a factual 

basis for his claim of harassment by probative and reliable evidence.28 

Thus, appellant has not established a compensable employment factor under FECA and, 

therefore, has not met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained an emotional or stressrelated condition in the performance of duty.29

 As he has not established a compensable 

employment factor, the Board need not consider the medical evidence of record.30 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

 

24 Id.

25 James E. Norris, supra note 14.

26 Id.

27 Beverly R. Jones, supra note 15.

28 See Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006).

29 See G.M., Docket No. 17-1469 (issued April 2, 2018).

30 Katherine A. Berg, 54 ECAB 262 (2002). 
10

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 19, 2017 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: November 21, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board