### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 30731

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus MILTON HENRY, Also Known as Milton James Henry, Also Known as Milton J. Henry, Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana

Before SMITH, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: Milton Henry appeals his convictions of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of mari h uana, contending that all of the evi dence should have been suppressed. He asserts that the officers who stopped his vehicle had no reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in any illegal activity. T he offi cers aver that they believed Henry was in violation of Louisiana law because his United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 10, 2017 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2017No. 16

- 30731

2 license- plate frame obstructed the expiration date on his registration sticker. Because the officers’ interpretation of the law was objec tively reasonable, we affirm.

I. While patrolling in Baton Rouge, police officers Carl Trosclair and Marty Freeman noticed that Henry’s license- plate frame obstructed the view of the expiration date on the plate’s registration sticker. Believing that the obstruct ion violated Louis ia na law, they pulled Henry over. Trosclair approached the vehicle and asked for Henry’s license. While talking to Henry, Trosclair notic ed a strong odor of mari h uana and instructed Henry and his passenger to exit the vehicle. Trosclair advised Henry of his Miranda rights and asked whether he had any mari h uana. Henry admitted that he had a mari h uana blunt in the ashtray; he also informed Trosclair that his wife’s gun was in the center console. Henry consented to a search of his vehicle, which produced two bags of mari h uana, a digital scale , and a loaded handgun . Henry acknowl edged that the mari h uana and scale belonged to him. After the officer s had detainedHenry in the back of their police car, Henry’s wife arrived. She denied ownership of anything in the car, including the gun, and consented to a search of her and Henry’s ho use , where officers discovered additional bags of mari h uana, a bag of cocaine, and drug paraphernalia

. Henry was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and for possession of mari huana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a ). He moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of t he traffic stop , but t he court denied the motion, concluding that the stop was not unreasona

b le, even if based on a mistake of law. After a bench trial, the court conv icted Henry on both counts. Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/10/2017No. 16

- 30731

3 II. Henry contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He maintains that the traffic stop was unlawful because Freeman and Tros

clair did not have reasonable suspicion that he had engaged in any illegal activity. The officers averred that they believed Henry’s o bstructed registra

tion sticker violated Louisiana Statutes Annotated § 32: 53(A)(3), which pro

vides that “[e]very permanent registration license plate .

. . shall be main

tained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible. ” 1 Henry counters t hat Section 32:53 does not apply to obstructed registration stickers and that the officers’ interpretation of the statute was unreasonable.
A. “In reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de

novo. In reviewing findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favor able to the party prevailing below, which in this case is the Government.” United States v. Andres , 703 F.3d 828, 832 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). When determining whether the facts provided reasonable suspicion, “we must

‘ give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” 2

B.

“ Traffic stops are deemed seizures for the purposes of the Fourth

1 At the time of the stop, the quoted language was located in Section 47:507(B) . In 2014, Section 47:507 (B) was repealed and its contents added to Section 32:53. We follow the parties’ practice of referring to the current statute.

2 United States v. L opez - Moreno , 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) ). Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/10/2017No. 16

- 30731

4 Amendment.” 3 We analyze the constitutionality of traffic stops under the two

- part inquiry of Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968) . First we determine whether the stop was justified at its ince ption. If the initial stop was justified, we determine whether the officer’s subsequent actions were rea sonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop of the vehi

cle in the first place. For a traffic stop to be justified at its i nception, an officer must have an objectively reason a ble suspicion that some sort of illegal activity, such as a traffic violation, occurred, or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. Andres , 703 F.3d at 832 (citations, heading, and paragraph break omitted). Reason able suspicion can rest on a mistake of law or fact if the mistake is objectively reasonable. 4
C. Henry contends that the initial stop was not justified. 5 He does not con

test the district court’s finding that his license -plate frame obstructed the view of the expiration date on his registration sticker. Instead, he asserts that Section 32:53(A)(3) does not cover obstructed registration stickers. He main

tains that the statute, which provides that “[e]very permanent registra tion license plate .

. . shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible ,” requires only that the letters and numbers on

3 Id. (citing United States v. Valadez , 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001) ).

4 United States v. Alvarado

- Zarza , 782 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2015 ) ( first citing Heien v. North Carolina , 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014); and then citing Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990)).

5 Henry does not contest the district court’s conclusion that, assuming the initial stop was justified, the officers’ subsequent actions were justified by Trosclair’s detection of a mar

ih uana odor. See United States v. Reed , 882 F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1 989) (“[T]he detec tion of the odor of marihuana justifie[s] a search of the entire vehicle, including the locked com

part ment that [ is ] a likely place to conceal contraband.”); United States v. Banuelos

- Romero , 597 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f ad ditional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the deten tion may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed.”)

. Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/10/2017No. 16

- 30731

5 the plate itself be clearly legible . The government disagrees, assert ing that Section 32:53 prohibits obstruction of attached registration stick ers by a license- plate frame, which the government categorizes as a “for eign material[ ].”
We need not opine on the proper interpretation of Section 32:53 , because Louisiana caselaw establishes that the officers’ interpretation , even if mis

taken, was objectively reasonable. 6 In State v. Pena , 988 So. 2d 841 , 844 (La. App. 2 Cir. 7/30/08 ) ; 988 So. 2d 841, 844 , the court considered whether an officer had reasonable sus pi cion to stop a vehicle based on , among other things, improper display of a license plate. “ The photographs introduced into evidence revealed that although the numbers and letters on the license plate were clearly visible, the top and bottom portions of the plate were partially ob scured by a license plate frame. ” Id. at 846. After citing Louisiana Statutes Anno

tated 47:507(B), the predecessor to Section 32:53(A)(3), 7 the court concluded that the officer “had reason a ble suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred” because, in part, “ the photographs introduced into evidence revealed that the license plate was partially obscured . . . .” Id. at 846

– 47. 8 Given Pena , Freeman and Trosclair’s belief that Section 32:53(A)(3) pro

hibited an obscured registration sticker was ob jectively rea sona ble. Pena directly rejects Henry’s position that Section 32:53 applies only to the lettering

6 See Heien , 135 S. Ct. at 540 (holding that an officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable because, in part, North Carolina appellate courts had not previously interpreted the state provision); Alvarado

- Zarza , 782 F.3d at 250 (holding that an officer’s mistake of law
was n ot objectively reasonable because, in part, the T exas Court of Criminal App eals had rejected the officer’s interpretation).

7 As explained above, Section 47:507 was repealed in 2014, and its contents were inserted verbatim into Section 32:53.

8 The court additionally held that the officer had reasonable suspicion of a window

tint violation. Pena , 988 So. 2d at 847. Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/10/2017No. 16

- 30731

6 and numbering on the plate itself. To the contrary, the court held that a license- plate frame that obscured part of the plate violated the statute, even though the lettering and numbering on the plate was “clearly visible.” Id. Though Pena does not specifically address obscured registration stickers, it s broad construction of the statute can reason a bly be construed to apply to them. 9 In sum, we take no position on the correct interpretation of Section 32:53(A)(3) . We conclude only that, given Pena , the officers’ belief that Henry’s obstructed registration sticker violated Section 32:53, even if mistaken, was objectively reasonable. Thus, they had reasonable suspicion , which justified the traffic stop.
The judgments of conviction are AFFIRMED.

9 Indeed, Pena states only that “the top and bottom portions of the plate were partially obscured by a license plate frame. ” Id. at 846. It does not indicate that any particular text was obscured. Pena ’s broad construction of the Louisiana statute distinguishes this case from United States v. Flores , 798 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015), in which the officer’s interpretation of a similar Illinois statute was unreasonable in light of state

- court decisions that had construed it narrowly. Case: 16-30731 Document: 00513945829 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/10/2017