Docket No. 89679–Agenda 21–March 2001.

ZACHARY DONALDSON et al., Appellees, v. CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY et al. (Central Illinois

								 Public Service Company, Appellant).

Oinpinion filed February 22, 2002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

	This is a toxic tort case. Plaintiffs are the parents of four

children suing, on their own behalf and on behalf of their children, inter alia, Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS), the owner of a former manufactured gas plant in Taylorville, Illinois

(Site). The plaintiffs alleged that certain acts or omissions by CIPS,

and three of its contractors, during the cleanup of the Site caused

their children to develop neuroblastoma, a rare form of cancer. The

litigation spanned six years and included the exchange of hundreds

of thousand of documents and more than 250 depositions of

numerous witnesses. After a four-month jury trial, at which 77

witnesses testified, a jury returned a $3.2 million verdict for

plaintiffs against CIPS. The appellate court affirmed the trial court

judgment (313 Ill. App. 3d 1061), and we granted CIPS’s petition

for leave to appeal (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 315). For the reasons

discussed below, we now affirm the judgment of the appellate

court.

BACKGROUND

	In this toxic tort case, plaintiffs allege that exposure to an

environmental condition caused their children to develop

neuroblastoma, a peripheral nervous system cancer. In most cases,

neuroblastoma develops in young children and infants. Statistics

show that 9 out of every 1 million children born develop

neuroblastoma.

	Taylorville, located in Christian County, is a town which

recorded 520 live births in 1988. Statistically, a case of

neuroblastoma occurs one time every 29 years in a community the

size of Taylorville. Between March 1989 and August 1991, during

approximately a two-year period, three infants and a teenager in

Taylorville were diagnosed with neuroblastoma. Zachary Donaldson was conceived in December 1987 and was born on

September 7, 1988. Six months later, in March 1989, Zachary was

diagnosed with neuroblastoma. At the time of trial, Zachary was in

remission from his illness. Chad Hryhorsysak was conceived in

April 1989 and was born January 12, 1990. Chad was diagnosed

with neuroblastoma six months after his birth, in March 1990. As

a result of his illness, Chad is paralyzed from the waist down. Erika

May was conceived in February 1989 and was born November 27,

1989. She was diagnosed with neuroblastoma two months later, in

January 1990. At the time of trial, she was in remission from her

illness. Lastly, Brandon Steele was born on March 17, 1978. On

August 9, 1991, at age 13, Brandon was diagnosed with

neuroblastoma. Brandon died on January 19, 1993.

	Plaintiffs claim that the statistical excess of neuroblastoma

cases in Taylorville was caused by their exposure to potent

chemical carcinogens released, in part, during the cleanup of the

Site. The Donaldsons lived one mile from the Site, the

Hryhorsysaks lived three miles from the Site, and between 1985

and 1989 the Mays lived in several locations near the Site, the

closest one-half mile away and the farthest eight miles away.

During his lifetime, Brandon Steele lived two miles from the Site.

We now turn to the Site.

	Prior to the widespread use of natural gas, the United States

relied upon gas produced from fossil fuels, generally coal, to

generate heat and light. In 1892, Taylorville Gas and Electric

Company constructed a gas plant on the southern edge of

Taylorville. CIPS purchased the Site in 1912 and continued plant

operations until 1932. During this 20-year period, CIPS produced

gas at the Site through a commonly used gasification process. This

process produced tar byproducts called coal tar. Coal tar was often

stored in underground tanks and later sold for use as roofing tar,

road oil, or weed killer. In 1939, CIPS decommissioned the Site.

This included the destruction and dismantling of above-ground

structures. However, large underground tanks and containers with

50,000 gallons of residual coal tar were left buried. CIPS used the

Site for storage until its sale in 1961, at which time the 50,000

gallons of residual coal tar buried underground was not disclosed.

	In 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental

Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.

§9601 et seq. (1982)) to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. CERCLA imposed retroactive liability for the disposal of

hazardous waste and ordered all companies that owned and

operated hazardous waste facilities to notify the federal

Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). 42 U.S.C. §9603(c)

(1982). An internal CIPS memorandum, dated May 1981, indicates

that CIPS understood this reporting provision, but determined that

because the notification requirement was not “mandatory,” there

was “no advantage to be gained in prematurely notifying ***

because of the potential consequences of such a disclosure.”

Therefore, CIPS did not disclose to the USEPA the existence of

the underground coal tar storage tanks at the Site.

	In the early 1980s, the carcinogenic potential of coal tar

gained increased publicity and concern in the utility and regulatory

industries. For example, one newspaper article, entitled “Coal

Gasification May Yield Cancer-Causing Chemicals,” discussed coal

tar and its cancer-causing potential. CIPS internally circulated this

article and noted that the issue was generating increased “concern

at the national and state level.” Additionally, a published study in

the Handbook on Manufactured Gas warned that some chemicals

in coal tar “are among the most powerful carcinogens known to

exist.” Aware of the risk, CIPS, through its environmental affairs

department, conducted an independent on-site investigation of its

manufactured gas plants and drafted a final report discussing the

condition of, and potential risk at, each of its abandoned gas-

manufacturing sites, including the Site. CIPS forwarded this report

to its insurer and applied for “Gradual Environmental Impairment”

insurance to cover “potential claims.” CIPS did not report the coal

tar sites to any state or federal agency or notify current owners of

the potential risk.

	In October 1985, contamination was discovered at the Site by

its then owner, Apple Contractors. A contractor for Apple

Contractors, while attempting to place a private septic line in the

ground for sewage disposal, noticed strong odors, discolored soil,

and a dark viscous material throughout the soil. Unaware that the

soil was hazardous, the contractor removed the surface soil and transported it to a farm in nearby Moweaqua, Illinois. At the same

time the surface soil was disturbed, Taylorville authorities recorded

complaints about strange odors near the Site and in the adjacent

public park. Notably, the Site is bordered by private residences to

the north, a wooded area to the south where some homes exist,

and Manners Park, a public recreation area to the east.

	Less than one month later, in November 1985, CIPS notified

the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) that the Site

contained buried contaminants. CIPS hired an independent

contractor, Hanson Engineering, Inc. (Hanson), to complete a

“remedial investigation/feasibility study” to assess the extent of soil

contamination at the Site and the area south of the Site. Monitoring

revealed extremely high concentrations of volatile chemicals on the

Site, in the area surrounding the Site, and in the adjacent public

park to the east. In some areas, monitoring detected soil

contamination at a depth of 95 feet. A Hanson employee

recommended “use of the lot south of the building be immediately

prohibited.” A second contractor, hired by CIPS to detect and

minimize emissions, observed that the presence of such high levels

of volatile agents, coupled with the Site’s close proximity to

residents living to the north, required “a strong effort to detect and

reduce these emissions.”

	Soon after, CIPS met with the IEPA. The IEPA notified CIPS

that it would review cleanup activities to ensure their adequate

completion. Before beginning soil excavation, CIPS assessed the

Site to determine the extent of contamination in the soil, tank, and

groundwater, and to identify potential off-site contamination. CIPS

called this assessment “Phase I.” Coal tar may contain up to 10,000

different chemicals; CIPS tested for approximately 190 different

compounds. This testing detected the presence of various

carcinogenic compounds, including polynuclear organic (aromatic)

hydrocarbons (PAHs) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

Although contained in initial drafts of the Phase I report, risk

assessment and health information was deleted from the final report

submitted to the IEPA.

	Approximately six months later, in July 1986, the IEPA issued

a notice under section 4(q) of the Illinois Environmental Protection

Act (hereinafter, 4(q) Notice) (415 ILCS 5/4(q) (West 2000)), a formal administrative order. The 4(q) Notice imposed deadlines

and reporting requirements and required that CIPS conduct an

“immediate removal action” to excavate the underground

structures and other contaminated material on the Site before April

1987. CIPS was required to submit cleanup plans, including air

monitoring, safety and quality assurance plans, and a feasibility

study for the immediate removal action. Cleanup plans were

developed by CIPS’s contractors, approved by CIPS, and

submitted to the IEPA to guarantee regulatory compliance. Five

months later, CIPS completed its assessment and submitted a

“Phase II” report to the IEPA. This final report detailed the

substances at the Site, discussed their impact upon the public and

the environment, and outlined procedures planned for the

immediate remedial action.

	As part of the immediate removal action, CIPS implemented

an air-monitoring plan to measure particulate emissions and

identify the ambient air quality during the excavation. Emissions

particles vary in size, such that matter may be small enough to be

easily respirable and undetectable to sensory perception such as

smell, taste, or sight. Particles, including coal tar chemicals, may

bond to soil particles. Moreover, wind speed and temperature

influence emissions. Therefore, CIPS approved the use of

stationary equipment placed in trailers to monitor emissions 24

hours a day, while technicians also performed spot testing several

times a day with portable hand-held instruments. If the ambient air

quality reached certain levels, defined within the remediation plan,

workers took safety precautions and the Site was shutdown.

	CIPS initiated air monitoring, in part, to “minimize liability

from ‘real’ or frivolous lawsuits.” Internal documents encouraged

“minimal data collection necessary to quantitatively document the

principal compounds of concern, thus providing a data base for use

in response to potential inquiries or claims from the nearby

residents or Manners Park users” because “without [emissions

data] they [CIPS] have no data if neighbors claim damages.” By

the time of discovery, the computer data base and original data had

disappeared. In its place, CIPS offered a summary of the data,

prepared internally, called the Air Monitoring Report, as its “best

evidence.” The report was offered during trial, and to government agencies during final remediation discussions, as a basis to show

that exposure did not occur.

	CIPS began the remediation on January 20, 1987. Workers

removed building debris, an above-ground gas holder, two

underground structures (separators), and 9,000 cubic yards of soil.

CIPS required the use of gas masks and protective clothing during

removal of the buried structures. Hanson and Parsons Engineering

Services, Inc. (Parsons), the on-site contractors, recommended

relocating residents during removal of the buried structure, but

CIPS declined to follow their suggestion. Excavated material and

soil were removed from the Site by truck, and soil that was not

trucked away at the end of the day was covered with plastic foam.

	Air monitoring detected emissions above the National Air

Quality Standards (NAAQS) primary health based standard for

particulate emissions on seven days during the first three months

of excavation. Additionally, on February 8, 1987, a Site security

guard reported that high winds blew dust “all over.” Two days

later, on February 10, 1987, an air-monitoring station reported a

NAAQS exceedance, and a local resident was hospitalized with an

intense headache, nausea, blurred vision, and convulsions. She was

diagnosed with an acute attack caused by some toxic cause. The

Site diary indicates that CIPS was advised of the incident. On

February 11, 1987, the Site project manager expressed “great

concern” about air emissions at the Site, and “wanted to be on

record as pushing for shutdown and resident relocation.” During

this same time, truck drivers removing the soil and waste

complained of nausea. As a result, the drivers were advised to wear

respirators once they crossed the railroad tracks near the Site.

However, residents living in this same area were not warned or

relocated. At trial, CIPS maintained that NAAQS exceedances

were the result of other sources, such as truck exhaust and burning

leaves, and not the excavated soil.

	The Site was shutdown, and the initial cleanup completed, on

March 2, 1987. CIPS did not backfill the excavation with soil.

CIPS and the IEPA disagreed about the scope of further

remediation and the proper depth of excavation; the IEPA believed

that further excavation and soil removal were necessary. Internal

CIPS documents state that the meetings were “adversarial (swearing, rolling of eyes, threats of bad communication).” The

IEPA attributed CIPS’s refusal to conduct further remediation to

“economic concerns rather than best judgment.” During this

conflict, with IEPA approval, CIPS covered the hole with

styrofoam and plywood sheets to reduce dust emissions and

volatilization.

	For two years, between March 1987 and spring 1989,

plywood and stryofoam covered the hole. CIPS and the IEPA

continued to disagree about further remediation measures. In July

1987, CIPS discontinued particulate testing and dismantled the air-

monitoring program and, instead, took weekly emission

measurements around the perimeter of the Site. CIPS discontinued

particulate matter testing because once excavation was completed,

CIPS felt that an increase in particulate matter was not likely. The

readings gathered from the weekly tests did not detect unusual

emissions or NAAQS violations. Eventually, in April 1989, the

IEPA granted CIPS approval to permanently backfill the hole.

 	The Illinois Department of Public Health (Department) examined the unusually high statistical incidence of neuroblastoma

cases in Taylorville. Initially, the Department studied the genetic

relatedness between families; scientific testing defeated this theory.

In June 1990, the Department prepared a final draft “Preliminary

Health Assessment” report for the Site. The report was available

to the public for review and made available to CIPS for comment.

The report concluded that the Taylorville “population had been

exposed to *** dust entrained contaminants *** largely as the

result of limited remedial action on the part of CIPS.” Further, the

report stated that the Site “is considered to be of potential public

health concern because of the risk to human health caused by the

possibility of exposure to hazardous substances. *** The

contaminants are present at the site in large quantities and the

presence of significant quantities of contaminated soils represents

a source of continuing release to the environment.”

	CIPS argued to the Department that its report was misleading,

stating that more recent CIPS air-monitoring data contradicted the

Department’s assessment and that the report “should be based on

current Site conditions.” CIPS maintained that this current data

was available in its Air Monitoring Report, the only available source of information regarding ambient air at the Site. Based upon

CIPS’s Air Monitoring Report, the Department’s report was

modified to state that “the lack of likely completed exposure

pathways makes the CIPS site an unlikely cause of the

neuroblastoma excess.” The Department’s report was finalized as

modified despite commentary from the USEPA that because “air

emissions occurred during the excavation and likely occurred while

the excavation was left open for two years, it appears to be likely

that some exposure occurred to residents surrounding the Site.”

	In 1991, the May and Hryhorsak families filed a complaint

against CIPS and Hanson in Christian County. This complaint

contained counts of negligence, nuisance, conspiracy, willful and

wanton conduct, and spoliation of evidence. Approximately four

years later, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this lawsuit, and refiled

a second action three months later in Sangamon County, adding

conspiracy and negligent remediation counts, as well as additional

plaintiffs, the Donaldson and Steele families, and additional

defendants, Haztech, Inc., and Parsons. In 1996, upon CIPS’s joint

motion to tranfer for forum non conveniens, the cause was transferred to Christian County.

	Prior to trial, Haztech, Inc., settled with plaintiffs, and the trial

court dismissed the Steeles’ claims against Hanson and Parsons.

Further, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ claims for punitive

damages. At trial, plaintiffs called three experts to connect the

neuroblastomas to the toxins at the Site. Plaintiffs called Dr. Shira

Kramer, an epidemiologist specializing in childhood cancers; Dr.

Harlee Sue Strauss, a toxicologist specializing in molecular

biology; and Dr. Thomas Winters, a physician specializing in

occupational and environmental medicine. CIPS responded with

numerous experts and plaintiffs’ own treating physicians, all of

whom testified that the cause of neuroblastoma is unknown, and

that they could not testify within a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that exposures from the Site caused the particular

neuroblastomas in this case.

	At the close of plaintiffs’ case, the trial court denied CIPS’s

motion to strike plaintiffs’ expert testimony and its motion for a

directed verdict. The jury returned a $3.2 million verdict in favor

of plaintiffs against CIPS alone, finding CIPS liable for negligence and public nuisance. The trial court entered judgment on the

verdict on March 27, 1998, and CIPS appealed.

	On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the

circuit court on both negligence and public nuisance. 313 Ill. App.

3d 1061. The appellate court concluded that “there was adequate

evidence of causation,” and that the verdict was not contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. This

appeal followed. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

I. The Admission of Expert Testimony

 	As an initial matter, CIPS suggests that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied CIPS’s motion for a

Frye evidentiary hearing to determine whether the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts, Drs. Kramer, Winters, and Strauss, was

admissible. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that any

error was harmless.

	CIPS filed its Frye motion two weeks before trial. On October 21, 1997, the trial court denied the motion. As observed by the

appellate court, on October 21 the trial court “dealt with 30

separate motions or issues and [the order] was nine pages in

length.” We also recognize, as did the appellate court, that CIPS’s

late effort played a part in the trial court’s ruling: “[a] Frye hearing would not only be extremely time consuming in light of the time

remaining until trial, but it would be a considerable expense to the

parties.”

	Furthermore, in effect, although informally, the trial judge

conducted a Frye hearing. The hearing transcripts from October 21 indicate that the issues subject to the Frye hearing were discussed during the hearing and previously addressed on numerous

occasions by the court in the months before the trial. CIPS

conceded during the hearing that it was motivated to seek a Frye hearing simply to “create a good articulable record that is zeroed

in on those very points [Frye issues].” In prior motions before the trial court, such as CIPS’s “Motion to Exclude Testimony of

Plaintiffs Expert Witnesses Kramer, Strauss, and Winters” and its “Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on Issue of Generic

Causation,” the trial court addressed the same issues subject to a Frye hearing. In ruling on these motions, the trial judge examined thousands of pages of deposition testimony, including four

depositions of Dr. Kramer, two depositions of Dr. Strauss, and

three depositions of Dr. Winters. As a result, the trial judge was

well versed in the experts’ methodologies, as his commentary

during the pretrial hearings show. Thus, although the trial court

denied CIPS’s request for a formal Frye hearing immediately before trial, we find that CIPS was not prejudiced and any error

was harmless.

	Second, CIPS maintains that, contrary to Frye, the “trial court failed in its role as ‘gatekeeper’ by permitting unfounded expert

opinion testimony.” We review Frye issues under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167, 187-88 (1996); People v. Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d 173, 211-12 (1989).

	Illinois law is unequivocal: the exclusive test for the admission

of expert testimony is governed by the standard first expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 187-88; People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500, 517 (1990); Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 211-12; People v. Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d 284, 293 (1989); People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 (1984); People v. Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d 225, 241 (1981). The Frye standard, commonly called the “general acceptance” test, dictates that scientific

evidence is only admissible at trial if the methodology or scientific

principle upon which the opinion is based is “sufficiently

established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field

in which it belongs.” Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

	First, “general acceptance” does not concern the ultimate

conclusion. Rather, the proper focus of the general acceptance test

is on the underlying methodology used to generate the conclusion.

If the underlying method used to generate an expert’s opinion are

reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field, the fact finder

may consider the opinion–despite the novelty of the conclusion

rendered by the expert. See generally People v. Basler, 193 Ill. 2d 545, 551 (2000); see also Mendes-Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“When the underlying basis or

methods of an expert’s opinion are of a type reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field, the court must allow the opinion to be

assessed by the factfinder–even if the opinion reaches a novel

conclusion”), citing Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1467-68 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing novel

methodologies from controversial or novel conclusions).

	Second, general acceptance of methodologies does not mean

“universal” acceptance of methodologies. The medical community

may entertain diverse opinions regarding causal relationships, but

this diversity of opinion does not preclude the admission of

testimony that a causal relationship exists if the expert used

generally accepted methodology to develop the conclusion. “In

determining whether a novel scientific procedure is ‘generally

accepted’ in the scientific community, the issue is consensus versus

controversy over a particular technique. *** Moreover, the mere

existence of a dispute does not preclude a finding that the

procedure is generally accepted.” People v. Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App. 3d 944, 957-58 (1966); see also Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535-36 (“[A] cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by

animal or epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that,

in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the basic

methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, ***

products liability law does not preclude recovery until a

‘statistically significant’ number of people have been injured or

until science has had the time and resources to complete

sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical”); Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (“[J]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the

line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult

to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of

the principle must be recognized”). Simply stated, general

acceptance does not require that the methodology be accepted by

unanimity, consensus, or even a majority of experts. A technique,

however, is not “generally accepted” if it is experimental or of

dubious validity. Thus, the Frye rule is meant to exclude methods new to science that undeservedly create a perception of certainty

when the basis for the evidence or opinion is actually invalid.

	Further, despite CIPS’s contention, Frye does not make the trial judge a “gatekeeper” of all expert opinion testimony. The trial judge’s role is more limited. The trial judge applies the Frye test only if the scientific principle, technique or test offered by the

expert to support his or her conclusion is “new” or “novel.” Basler, 193 Ill. 2d at 550-51. Only novelty requires that the trial court

conduct a Frye evidentiary hearing to consider general acceptance. We recognize that a “new” or “novel” scientific technique is not

always easy to identify, especially in light of constant scientific

advances in our modern era. Generally, however, a scientific

technique is “new” or “novel” if it is “original or striking” or does

“not resembl[e] something formerly known or used.” Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 1546 (1993).

	Once a principle, technique, or test has gained general

acceptance in the particular scientific community, its general

acceptance is presumed in subsequent litigation; the principle,

technique, or test is established as a matter of law. For example,

DNA analysis does not require a Frye hearing because the principle has been found to be generally accepted. See People v. Hickey, 178 Ill. 2d 256, 277 (1997); see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 187-88 (DNA analysis admissible in light of expert’s testimony and

appellate court decisions approving of the technique); Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d at 518 (the appellate court in a prior case held that

electrophoresis is generally accepted; thus, “[d]efendant’s

challenges to the process *** were held in the proper forum; that

is, in front of the jury by cross-examination of prosecution

witnesses and presentation of defendant’s own witnesses”); Eyler, 133 Ill. 2d at 211-12 (discussing the “superglue” technique to

enhance fingerprints and “electrophores” to identify blood traits

under the Frye standard); Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 955 (“[w]here the question of the general acceptance” is raised the

court often “establish[es] the law of the jurisdiction for future

cases”); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of Illinois

Evidence §702.4, at 627-28 (7th ed. 1999) (hereinafter Handbook

of Illinois Evidence).

	CIPS suggests that Illinois law follows a modified Frye standard called the “Frye-plus-reliability” standard. We observe that this modified standard has been adopted by some appellate

court panels. See Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d 364, 365 (1999); First Midwest Trust Co. v. Rogers, 296 Ill. App. 3d 416, 427 (1998); see also Handbook of Illinois Evidence §702.4,

at 626 (“Application of the Frye standard calls for a judicial determination *** that the test’s reliability is generally accepted in

the particular scientific field in which the test belongs”). Under the

“Frye-plus-reliability” standard, a court considers the following questions:

			“(1) Can the scientific technique or method employed be

empirically tested, and if so, has it been? (2) Has the

technique or method been subjected to peer review and

publication? (3) What is the technique or method’s known

or potential error rate? (4) Are its underlying data reliable?

(5) Is the witness proposing to testify about matters

growing naturally and directly out of research she has

conducted independently of the litigation, or has the

witness developed her opinion solely for the purpose of

testifying? and (6) Did the witness form her opinion and

then look for reasons to support it, rather than doing

research that led her to her conclusion?” Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 375, citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 482-83, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993).1

In other words, under the “Frye-plus-reliability” standard, after having determined that a technique or methodology is generally

accepted, the court must still consider whether the opinion is

reliable. See Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 374-76; First Midwest Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 427.

	Today, we clarify that this is not the standard in Illinois. The

trial court is not required to conduct a two-part inquiry into the

both the reliability of the methodology and its general acceptance.

The determination of the reliability of an expert’s methodology is

naturally subsumed by the inquiry into its general acceptance in the scientific community. Simply put, a principle or technique is not

generally accepted in the scientific community if it is by nature

unreliable. See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 293. Additionally, the Frye- plus-reliability test impermissibly examines the data from which the

opinion flows, while the technique remains generally accepted.

Questions concerning underlying data, and an expert’s application of generally accepted techniques, go to the weight of the evidence,

rather than its admissibility. See, e.g., People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702-03 (1996) (“ ‘ “any question concerning the specific

procedures used by the company or expert goes to the reliability of

the evidence and is properly considered by the jury in determining

what weight to give this evidence” ’ ” (emphasis omitted)), quoting

People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 565, 569 (1994), quoting People v. Lipscomb, 215 Ill. App. 3d 413, 432 (1991); People v. Dalcollo, 282 Ill. App. 3d 944, 957 (1996) (challenges to the application of a specific technique go to the reliability and weight

of the evidence); Ferebee, 736 F.3d at 1534 (“Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to resolve the complex

and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-level

exposure to toxic chemicals with human disease. On questions such

as these, which stand at the frontier of current medical

epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify that such a

link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such

testimony”); Handbook of Illinois Evidence §702.4, at 629

(questions raised with respect to the actual procedures employed

to conduct the particular scientific process, technique, or test are

properly considered by the trier of fact as going to the weight of

the evidence). Trial judges decide the general acceptance of the

technique; a jury decides whether it will accept the expert’s

conclusion which is based on that technique.

	With this background, we consider CIPS’s claim that the

expert testimony was inadmissible under the Frye standard. CIPS insists that testimony from plaintiffs’ experts is inadmissible under Frye because the experts’ conclusions are novel and are not supported by specific scientific research establishing a cause and

effect relationship between coal tar and neuroblastoma. Plaintiffs’ experts relied upon the technique of “extrapolation”2 to form the basis of their opinions. Essentially, CIPS argues that if a true cause

and effect relationship existed, scientific research could verify it.

Thus, according to CIPS, extrapolation by nature is inadmissible

because it is a method used only by experts who cannot support

their theories. Over CIPS’s objection, the trial court admitted

plaintiffs’ expert testimony. During pretrial hearings, the trial court

expressly relied upon Duran v. Cullinan, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1005 (1997). Duran discussed the scientific technique of extrapolation, which plaintiffs’ experts in the present case also utilized. The

appellate court, like the trial court, relied upon Duran and held that plaintiffs’ expert opinions were admissible because the experts

“utliz[ed] the accepted extrapolation method.” 313 Ill. App. 3d at

1075. The appellate court held the admission of scientific testimony

which is based on the method of extrapolation is routine or settled

in law, such that the trial court was not obligated to conduct a Frye evidentiary hearing. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 1075.

	 Therefore, our threshold question concerns whether Duran held that the scientific method of extrapolation is generally

accepted. Where the question of general acceptance of a scientific

technique is raised for the first time a court is generally asked to

establish the law for future cases. See Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 234-37; Dacallo, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 955; see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 204 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring) (“ ‘in attempting to establish

such general acceptance for purposes of the case at hand, the

proponent will also be asking the court to establish the law of the

jurisdiction for future cases’ ”), quoting Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. App. 1988).

	In Duran, plaintiffs’ expert relied on 43 epidemiological studies, and extrapolated from those studies to conclude that

plaintiff’s ingestion of Ovulen-21, a contraceptive, caused her child’s multiple birth defects. Defendant filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that the method of extrapolation used

by plaintiffs’ experts was not generally accepted. Plaintiffs opposed

the motion for summary judgment with, inter alia, an affidavit stating that the method of extrapolation used by their expert was

“generally accepted” in the relevant scientific community. The trial

court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of

defendant, and the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial

court abused its discretion “in finding that the plaintiffs’

extrapolation from the studies was not a technique sufficiently

established to have gained general acceptance in this particular

scientific field.” Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.

	At first glance, Duran appears to conclude that the method of extrapolation is generally accepted in the scientific community.

Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1011 (“the principal issue at stake here is the scientific community’s general acceptance of the

extrapolation technique employed by the plaintiffs’ experts”).

However, the appellate court only considered this issue in the

context of a summary judgment motion. Specifically, in granting

the defendant’s summary judgment motion the appellate court held,

“[t]aking as true the plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit asserting that the extrapolation method is commonly used by the scientific

community as well as various federal agencies *** we find that the

trial court abused its discretion ***.” (Emphasis added.) Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. As has been observed in the context of

Frye, “relying exclusively upon prior judicial decisions to establish general scientific acceptance can be a ‘ “hollow ritual” ’ if the

underlying issue of scientific acceptance has not been adequately

litigated.” Basler, 193 Ill. 2d at 554 (McMorrow, J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.), quoting People v. Kirk, 289 Ill. App. 3d 326, 333 (1997), quoting 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence

§203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed. 1992); see also Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 206-07 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring) (“to resolve the

general acceptance question, care must be taken so that the

practice is not abused *** [f]or ‘[u]nless the question *** has been

thoroughly litigated *** reliance *** is a hollow ritual’ ”), quoting

2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence §203, at 870 n.20 (4th ed.

1992). Neither the trial court, nor the appellate court in Duran, resolved the issue of the general acceptance of the extrapolation

technique. Thus, Duran does not stand for the proposition that extrapolation is generally accepted.

	However, we disagree with CIPS’s contention that plaintiffs’

expert testimony is inadmissible under Frye. Although not controlling, Duran does contain a helpful discussion of extrapolation, explaining that extrapolation is commonly used by

scientists in certain limited instances. Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1011-13. Specifically, extrapolation is utilized in the scientific

community when the medical inquiry is new or the opportunities to

examine a specific cause and effect relationship are limited. Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1012 (discussing Ferebee, 736 F.2d 1529, and the issue of frontier medical inquiries); but see Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 295 (holding that evidence of hypnotically induced recall is

inadmissible under Frye because it is not generally accepted and the scientific literature is “replete with articles imploring courts to

reject such evidence because of its many flaws”); Lynch v. Merrell- National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (plaintiff’s expert testimony based on extrapolation was not generally

accepted because the cause and effect relationship offered in the

opinion was the subject of extensive studies and no study showed

a cause and effect relationship). In some cases, medical science is

simply unable to establish the cause and origin of disease. In others,

medical science does not seek to establish the existence of a cause

and effect relationship–for example, in this instance, the small

number of neuroblastoma cases limits study of the disease. As a

result, extrapolation offers those with rare disease the opportunity

to seek a remedy for the wrong they have suffered. Thus, in these

limited instances, an expert may rely upon scientific literature

discussing similar, yet not identical, cause and effect relationships.

The fact that an expert must extrapolate, and is unable to produce

specific studies that show the exact cause and effect relationship to

support his conclusion, affects the weight of the testimony rather

than its admissibility. Duran, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1013.

	We also find instructive Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.3d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which considered the admission

of expert testimony when that testimony offered a new causal link.

In Ferebee, plaintiff’s experts testified that exposure to a toxic chemical caused the decedent’s illness and death. Defendant argued

that the opinion was inadmissible because no study ever suggested

a link between plaintiff’s injury and the toxic chemical. The federal

appeals court held:

		“As long as the basic methodology employed to reach

such a conclusion is sound, such as use of tissue samples,

standard tests, and patient examinations, products liability

law does not preclude recovery until a ‘statistically

significant’ number of people have been injured or until

science has had the time and resources to complete

sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a

courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a

tort suit of this type is not scientific certainty but legal

sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert testimony that [the chemical] paraquat more likely

than not caused Ferebee’s injury, the fact that another jury

might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would

require more evidence before conclusively considering the

causation question resolved is irrelevant. That Ferebee’s

case may have been the first of its exact type, or that his

doctors may have been the first alert enough to recognize

such a case, does not mean that the testimony of those

doctors, who are concededly well qualified in their fields,

should not have been admitted.” (Emphasis in original.)

Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535-36.

See also Mendes-Silva, 980 F.2d at 1487 (admitting expert testimony even though the epidemiological question “is on the

frontier of medical science in the sense that no clear answer has

been found”).

	Furthermore, we observe that the method of extrapolation

does not concern a technique new to science that may instill a

sense of “false confidence” or carry a misleading sense of scientific

“infallibility.” See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 294 (observing that hypnotically induced evidence of recall intrudes upon the “proper

functioning of the jury by the admission of evidence which ‘is likely

to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient

oracle of Delphi’ ”), quoting Baynes, 88 Ill. 2d at 244. For example, in the case of “machines or procedures which analyze physical data *** [l]ay minds might easily, but erroneously, assume

that such procedures are objective and infallible.” People v. Stoll, 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 783 P.2d 698, 265 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1989) (a jury

may find that machines are objective and infallible, and may assume

testimony based upon procedures which analyze physical data

provides a definitive truth). By contrast, extrapolation by nature

admits its fallibility–the lack of specific support to establish the

existence of a known cause and effect relationship. The jury is left

to judge the veracity of the expert’s conclusion. See Zayas, 131 Ill. 2d at 295 (“modern evidence rules *** allow the jury to hear all

the evidence and draw its own conclusions, unless the trial judge

determined that certain evidence was excessively prejudicial”).

	In the instant case, plaintiffs’ experts offered opinions about

a new medical epidemiological inquiry. Medical research does not

specifically establish a cause and effect relationship between coal

tar and neuroblastoma. However, it is also true that medical

research does not specifically reject that a cause and effect

relationship exists. The relationship between coal tar and

neuroblastoma has simply not been the subject of extensive study

and research. One expert explained that because few people are

diagnosed with neuroblastoma, the disease is simply not the subject

of extensive funding and study. Further, plaintiffs’ experts testified

that few studies exist regarding the specific cause and effect

relationship at issue in this case because ethical considerations

prevent exposing the human population to coal tar for research

purposes. Moreover, plaintiffs’ experts explained that scientific

research is limited because the cases of environmental exposure are

often detected after the onset of illness, which prevents proper

controlled settings to study the effects of exposure. Therefore, all

of plaintiffs’ experts testified that they utilized the method of

extrapolation, and that the technique is generally accepted in their

fields. Like plaintiffs’ experts in Duran, however, plaintiffs’ experts in the instant case relied upon the only available source of

information to form the basis of their conclusions–similar, yet not

identical, scientific studies and theories. From these studies,

plaintiffs’ experts concluded that coal tar caused these plaintiffs’

neuroblastomas. CIPS offers no evidence to suggest that this

method, extrapolation, is not utilized or generally accepted among the scientific community. Instead, CIPS insists the conclusion is not generally accepted in the scientific community; therefore, the

methodology is not generally accepted. Again, in the interest of

clarity, an expert’s conclusion is subject to challenge by traditional

efforts such as cross-examination. The general acceptance test

should not replace the role of the advocate, who may expose shaky

but admissible evidence by vigorous cross-examination or the

presentation of contrary evidence.

	As the Frye standard does not demand unanimity, consensus, or even a majority to satisfy the general acceptance test, we find

that extrapolation is sufficiently established to have gained general

acceptance in these limited circumstances. Traditional methods,

such as cross-examination and rebuttal witnesses, offered CIPS the

opportunity to challenge the experts’ conclusions in the proper

forum, during trial in front of the jury. Accordingly, the trial court

did not err in admitting the testimony of plaintiffs’ experts.

II. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

a. The Standard of Review

	In its post-trial motion, CIPS sought a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied. Before

this court, CIPS argues that insufficient evidence of causation

required that the trial court grant its motion. CIPS maintains that

this error is subject to de novo review. Plaintiffs, however, argue that the denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict is reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial

court. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that this court must consider

whether “ ‘the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable

to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors movant that no

contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.’ ” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453 (1992), quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967).

	Although it appears the parties ask us to apply different

standards, in reality, the parties request the same standard. See

Gaffney v. City of Chicago, 302 Ill. App. 3d 41, 48 (1998). A denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict motion is

reviewed under the de novo standard. McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 (1999). In doing so, a reviewing court considers that: “ ‘[j]udgment notwithstanding the

verdict should not be entered unless the evidence, when viewed in

the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors

the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could

ever stand.’ ” McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 131-32, quoting Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 109 (1997); Thacker v. UNR Industries, Inc., 151 Ill. 2d 343, 353-54 (1992); Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453; Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 510 (1967). In making this assessment, a reviewing court must not

substitute its judgment for the jury’s, nor may a reviewing court

reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452-53; Gaffney, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 48.

b. Causation

	CIPS maintains that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their overall

burden to show causation. CIPS points to the record as support,

and argues that it shows only a “mere possibility” of causation,

rather than that causation is “more probably true than not.”

According to CIPS, a showing of causation includes both “generic

causation”–i.e., coal tar is capable of causing neuroblastoma–and “specific causation”–i.e., exposure to coal tar from the Site did in fact occur and actually caused the neuroblastomas. CIPS also

argues that in toxic tort litigation, causation also includes a

showing of “exposure,” which must be quantified with evidence of

the level or dose of exposure. CIPS asserts that a plaintiff may

establish this exposure requirement with evidence of biological

markers, such as trace fibers or particles found in the body,

proximity to the defendant’s product, or personal or environmental

monitoring.

	We disagree with defendant’s characterization of Illinois law

on causation. First, Illinois law does not define causation in terms

of “generic” or “specific” causation. Rather, our case law clearly

states that in negligence actions, the plaintiff must present evidence

of proximate causation, which includes both “cause in fact” and

“legal cause.” Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 354; Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 232 (1990). A plaintiff may show “cause in fact”

under the substantial factor test, showing that the defendant’s conduct was a material element and substantial factor in bringing

about the alleged injury. Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 354-55; Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 455 (1992). “Legal cause” examines the foreseeability of injury–whether the injury is

“ ‘of a type which a reasonable man would see as a likely result of

his conduct.’ ” Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456, quoting Masotti v. Console, 195 Ill. App. 3d 838, 845 (1990). Defendant does not allege that

plaintiffs failed to show legal cause.

	Turning to “cause in fact,” a plaintiff may meet his or her

burden of causation with circumstantial evidence–evidence from

which a “ ‘jury may infer other connected facts which usually and

reasonably follow according to *** common experience.’ ”

Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 357, quoting Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166, 179-80 (1916). This is to say, Illinois law does not require

unequivocal or unqualified evidence of causation. Dixon v. Industrial Comm’n, 60 Ill. 2d 126 (1975); National Castings Division of Midland-Ross Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 55 Ill. 2d 198, 204 (1973); see also Dominguez v. St. John’s Hospital, 260 Ill. App. 3d 591 (1993). To the contrary, we have held that where

“there exists limited medical knowledge of a malady *** medical

testimony pertaining to causation may not be unqualified and

unequivocal.” National Castings, 55 Ill. 2d at 204.

	Additionally, we reject CIPS’s assertion that causation

includes a showing of exposure, which must be quantified. A

plaintiff must establish that he or she came into contact with

chemicals produced by the defendant. See Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999). In this context, however, Illinois law does not require that plaintiffs quantify the level of

exposure. CIPS relies upon cases that address exposure to

asbestos-containing products in an occupational setting. See, e.g., Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 447 (1996) (plaintiffs alleged exposure while working for Union Asbestos and Rubber Company

and its successor company); Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d 343 (plaintiffs alleged exposure while working for Union Asbestos and Rubber

Company and its successor company); Johnson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 313 Ill. App. 3d 230 (2000) (plaintiffs alleged exposure during their tenure at Keystone Steel & Wire Company).

These cases hold that in order to show causation in an asbestos case, a plaintiff must “produce evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regular basis over some extended period of time in

proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked,” commonly called

the “frequency, regularity and proximity” test. Thacker, 151 Ill. 2d at 363 (adopting the “frequency, regularity and proximity” test as

the rule of law in Illinois asbestos cases). In this instance, we are

not compelled to adopt this rule and depart from traditional

concepts of causation. Environmental exposure cases, like the

instant case, do not afford litigants the opportunity to specify with

such certainty the exact level and dose of exposure. In most

instances, the details of exposure, including information of exactly

when or where exposure occurred, is not available. Here, plaintiffs

were not required to show the exact amount of exposure. See

La Salle National Bank v. Malik, 302 Ill. App. 3d 236 (1999) (the inability to show the level of exposure did not bar an expert’s

opinion); Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 371 (discussing causation testimony that did not calculate the concentration of exposure, but

instead reached the conclusion that exposure occurred based upon

their “generalized knowledge *** and firsthand experience with

and observations of the effects of exposure”).

	Accordingly, we review whether there was evidence from

which a jury could conclude that CIPS’s conduct was a material

element and substantial factor in bringing about the

neuroblastomas.

	Plaintiffs presented testimony from Dr. Winters, an expert in

occupational and environmental medicine. Dr. Winters testified that

in the case of environmental exposure, like the instant matter, it is

difficult to quantify exposure to individual community members.

However, his review of evidence in this case, including the IEPA

4(q) immediate removal action plans, Department reports, USEPA

reports, family medical histories and interviews, and Site reports

that discussed the level of soil contamination and methods of

removal, as well as the open and unmonitored status of the Site for

two years, led him to conclude that cumulative exposure occurred

here.

	Further, plaintiffs presented circumstantial evidence of

community exposure. The jury heard evidence regarding the

potential of particulate matter to travel undetected for several miles. The jury was advised of Taylorville weather conditions

during the period of remediation, including high wind and

unseasonably warm weather, which facilitate the travel of air-borne

contaminants. Plaintiffs offered evidence that during the period of

remediation, on-site workers complained of symptoms consistent

with exposure to toxic substances. At that same time, the record

shows that a local resident, who lived within several hundred feet

of the Site, was hospitalized with dizziness, headaches, vomiting,

and seizures, and later diagnosed with exposure to an unknown

toxic cause. This individual testified that “[e]verything just reeked

from it [coal tar]. It even penetrated into the homes.” She later

added the Site cast a “heavy mist over the whole area, like a fog”

and that workers at the Site dressed in protective gear.

	Additionally, air-monitoring results showed emissions above

the NAAQS primary health based standard for particulate

emissions on seven days during the first three months of

excavation. In 1987, preremediation soil monitoring revealed

extremely high concentrations of volatile chemicals on the Site, in

the area surrounding the Site, and in adjacent Manner’s Park.

Plaintiffs presented testimony that they frequented Manner’s Park,

as well as homes and businesses near the Site. Moreover, the

record shows that each plaintiff lived within four miles of the Site.

Plaintiffs lived within this radius during the remediation and

following the remediation when the Site was an open 10-foot hole

with unsupported side walls covered with plywood and styrofoam.

	Moreover, in 1990, the Department in its final “draft” health

assessment acknowledged human exposure to site contaminants by

dust-entrained contaminants. Although later revised at CIPS’s

request, the USEPA concurred with the Department’s original

draft and wrote that because “air emissions occurred during the

excavation and likely occurred while the excavation was left open

for two years, it appears to be likely that some exposure occurred

to residents surrounding the Site.”

	Plaintiffs presented testimony from Dr. Kramer, an expert

witness who testified regarding causation. Dr. Kramer received her

Ph.D. in epidemiology from Johns Hopkins University, a master’s

degree in human genetics from Johns Hopkins University, and a

bachelor’s degree in bio-chemistry from Johns Hopkins University. During her 20-year career as an epidemiologist, Dr. Kramer

published a textbook of epidemiology, studied the etiology of

childhood cancer at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, and

published studies on the etiology of neuroblastoma. Her field of

study, epidemiology, is the field of public health and medicine that

studies the incidence, distribution, and etiology of disease in human

populations. Scientists in this field assume that disease is not

distributed randomly in a group of individuals and that identifiable

subgroups, including those exposed to certain agents, are at

increased risk of contracting particular diseases. Dr. Kramer

explained that epidemiology concerns whether a particular agent is

capable of causing a disease or injury. Further, she testified that an

epidemiologist may conduct one of many studies to determine

whether an agent is related to the risk of disease or adverse health

affects. As she explained, study design varies depending upon the

circumstances, including resource limitations, time constraints, or

the subject of the study. Both parties agree that under the current scientific literature, several epidemiologic criteria are used to judge

the relation between an agent and the risk of disease, including the

temporal relationship between the disease and the exposure; the

statistical strength of association; the dose-response relationship;

the replication of findings; the biologic plausibility; alternative

causes; cessation of exposure; the association of exposure with a

single disease; and consistency with other knowledge. According

to Dr. Kramer, however, scientific literature also explains that the

science of epidemiology does not demand satisfaction of each

criteria, rather on occasion some may be irrelevant or impossible

to determine.

	Dr. Kramer testified that the carcinogens contained in coal tar

and coal tar related carcinogens from the Site were the most-likely

cause of the plaintiffs’ neuroblastomas. She later quantified this as

a “greater than 50 percent probability.” Dr. Kramer admitted that

no scientific consensus exists to support the theory that coal tar

causes neuroblastoma. However, in great detail she outlined the

methodology used to generate her conclusion, including her own

published studies on neuroblastoma, scientific literature on risk

factors for nervous system cancers, animal studies regarding

nervous system cancer, studies regarding the risks of expectant mothers and infants, and her Taylorville case-specific study that

was based upon family history questionnaires and Illinois Cancer

Registry data. Her research ruled out random variability as the

cause for the sudden increase of Taylorville neuroblastoma cases.

	Dr. Kramer discussed the temporal relationship between the

release of ambient air emissions from the Site and the onset of

neuroblastoma. However, Dr. Kramer did not rely solely on an

abstract temporal connection. Dr. Kramer also examined the

increased incidence of neuroblastoma through standard scientific

calculation, and calculated the probability that the onset of

neuroblastoma was due to random chance; she concluded that the

possibility of chance was one in 10,000. Further, Dr. Kramer

discussed that coal tar is a multipotential carcinogen that can cause

cancer at multiple sites in the body. Dr. Kramer addressed

alternative sources, and determined that although alternative

sources are potential causes of neuroblastoma, only the Site was a

common risk factor among all plaintiffs. Consistent with the

science of epidemiology, Dr. Kramer performed a cancer incidence

rate analysis to measure the rate of development of neuroblastoma

and adult cancers in Taylorville. The incidence rate examines

whether the sudden or dramatic increase in cases is more likely due

to chance. In order to complete this study, Dr. Kramer studied the

incidence of neuroblastoma in four different comparison groups

during the period 1986 through 1991, including: the National

Cancer Institute Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results

Program Rates (SEER, a national cancer registry), the State of

Illinois, demographically similar zip codes without manufactured

gas plant sites, and demographically similar zip codes with

manufactured gas sites. At the conclusion of her study, Dr. Kramer

testified that there was a one in 10,000 probability that chance

caused the nueroblastomas in this case. Further, Dr. Kramer

discussed fetal nervous system cancers and the increased sensitivity

of expectant mothers and young children to carcinogens. Based

upon medical research animal studies, she testified that the fetal

nervous system is 50 times more sensitive to carcinogens. Dr.

Kramer also testified that there is no safe level of exposure to

known sensitive populations, and argued that this was a “known

scientific fact” cited in the literature.

	Plaintiffs also presented Dr. Strauss, a molecular biologist and

toxicologist. Dr. Strauss received her Ph.D. in molecular biology

from the University of Wisconsin, completed a post-doctoral

fellowship on the study of toxic interactions at the cellular level

from the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences,

participated in graduate training at MIT in organic chemistry, and

received her bachelor’s degree in chemistry from Smith College.

Her field of study, toxicology, examines the adverse effects of

chemicals on living organisms, and is otherwise called the “science

of poisons.” Dr. Strauss explained that toxicological studies, by

themselves, rarely offer direct evidence that a disease in any one

individual was caused by a chemical exposure. However,

toxicology can rule out other risk factors known to cause a disease

and provide scientific information regarding the increased risk of

contracting a disease at any given dose.

	Dr. Strauss testified that coal tar and its general chemical

constituents were the cause of plaintiffs’ neuroblastomas. Dr.

Strauss based her conclusions upon animal studies and medical

research in the area of nervous system tumors, soil samples from

the Site, health and safety diaries from the Site, and air-monitoring

logs from the Site. Additionally, Dr. Strauss discussed the volatile

potential of coal tar compounds, using studies that discussed

manufactured gas plant sites with similar site histories and VOC

contamination profiles. From this data, she compiled the potential

toxicity of the Site and the cancer potency of the coal tar. Further,

Dr. Strauss discussed the complex chemical compounds contained

in coal tar, and the “synergistic” effect that occurs when these

compounds interact to form more potent compounds. She stated

that these same compounds are multipotential, affecting several

organ sites, and transplacental, meaning that the carcinogen may

pass from the placenta to a developing fetus.

	This case presents the classic “battle of the experts” frequently

seen in toxic tort litigation. Plaintiffs’ experts testified that the Site

was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs’

neuroblastomas, while defendants’ experts testified that medical

science does not associate coal tar with neuroblastoma. When

viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,

we do not find that the evidence so overwhelmingly favors CIPS that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.

Clearly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could

conclude that CIPS’s conduct was a material element and

substantial factor in bringing about the alleged injury.

C. Duty

	CIPS next claims that plaintiffs failed to satisfy its burden to

show CIPS violated any duty. CIPS does not deny the existence of

a duty; it argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that

it breached its duty. We find sufficient evidence of a breach.

	In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged a breach of duty beginning

in 1939 and ending in 1989. Jury instructions incorporated specific

acts and omissions alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint: (1) the

abandonment of coal tar in the underground tanks in 1938; (2)

failure to monitor the Site before contaminants migrated off-site

and were discovered by local authorities; (3) failure to warn local

authorities or residents after CIPS discovered contamination in

1985; (4) failure to control airborne pathways before beginning its

immediate removal action in 1987; (5) increasing volatile air and

dust emissions during the immediate removal action in 1987; (6)

failure to control the volatile air and dust emissions after the

immediate removal action between 1987 and 1989; (7) failure to

warn residents of any risk to human health resulting from exposure

to the Site while it remained open between 1987 and 1989; and (8)

failure to provide reliable air monitoring of emissions while the Site

remained open between 1987 and 1989.

	CIPS contends that there is no breach because it was the

industry standard to leave underground storage tanks and coal tar

in 1939. Plaintiffs, however, offered evidence that coal tar was a

concern as early as 1906. CIPS also argues that its failure to

backfill the Site for a period of two years does not establish a

breach of its duty because, according to CIPS, this act was at the

direction of the IEPA. Evidence in the record was also sufficient

for a jury to find otherwise. Plaintiffs offered an internal CIPS

memorandum, dated February 18, 1987, to show that CIPS was

not prohibited from backfilling the Site. This memorandum

described meetings between CIPS and the IEPA in 1987. The topic of these meetings included further soil excavation. The document

discusses CIPS’s objection to further soil excavation due to the

costs of additional remediation efforts, the lack of IEPA input, and

the impossible deadlines imposed by the IEPA. This same

document indicates that CIPS was advised that it could proceed

with backfilling “at its own risk,” suggesting that further

excavation may be required at a later date that would necessitate

reopening the hole. Therefore, the jury was presented evidence that

the Site remained open, not as a result of the IEPA’s direction, but

because CIPS refused to temporarily backfill to avoid additional

costs. We find that this evidence, although contradicted by

defendants’ own witnesses, was sufficient for a jury to conclude

that CIPS breached its duty of care. We do not find that the

evidence so overwhelmingly favors CIPS that no contrary verdict

based on that evidence could ever stand.

	As a final matter, CIPS also argues that the acquittal of the

contractors who performed the excavation, and the verdict against

it, are inconsistent, and that this inconsistency warrants judgment

notwithstanding the verdict.

	CIPS was sued for its own independent negligent acts or

omissions. Clearly, where the same set of facts shows one party

liable and the other not liable, they are not legally inconsistent

verdicts. For example, in this case the jury was offered evidence

that CIPS’s contractors disagreed with the remediation procedures.

In one instance, contractors expressed “great concern *** about air

emissions. *** [and] [w]anted to be ‘on record’ as pushing for

shutdown and resident relocation,” while CIPS refused to order

resident relocation, even temporarily. Thus, we find that the

verdicts are not inconsistent and are supported by evidence in the

record. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not err by

denying CIPS’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

III. Public Nuisance

	Last, CIPS claims that plaintiffs’ nuisance claims were

defective. First, CIPS argues that the public nuisance statute is

criminal in nature (see 720 ILCS 5/47–5 (West 2000)) and does

not authorize a private cause of action. Alternatively, CIPS argues that the mere existence of government oversight precludes

nuisance liability. These issues raise questions of law, which we

review de novo. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167.

	At the time plaintiffs’ filed their complaint, their cause of

action was authorized by section 221 of “An Act to revise the law

in relation to criminal jurisprudence” (the Public Nuisance Act) (Ill.

Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1001⁄2, par. 26)–a declaration of common law.

See Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661 (1994); see also Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 21-22 (1981). However, the Public Nuisance Act did not displace

common law rights: plaintiffs were free to plead and prove either

common law nuisance or statutory nuisance. People ex rel. Burris v. C.J.R. Processing, Inc., 269 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1019 (1995) (plaintiffs were free to plead either common law nuisance or

statutory nuisance); Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661 (“while the nuisance alleged by the plaintiffs is recognized by statute in Illinois,

they were free to plead common law public nuisance without

mention of the statute”); Village of Bensenville v. Botu, Inc., 39 Ill. App. 3d 634, 636 (1976) (“there exists a common law right of

action to abate public nuisance independent of any statutory

right”).

	Thus, in this case, in the same count of their complaint,

plaintiffs sought damages under both statutory law (see Ill. Rev.

Stat. 1989, ch. 1001⁄2, par. 26) and common law. However, after

plaintiffs filed their complaint, the legislature repealed section 221

(the Public Nuisance Act) and recodified its provisions as section

47–5 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (740 ILCS 5/221 (West

1996)). Pub. Act 89–234, eff. January 1, 1996.

	Importantly, however, the effect of this repeal is not necessary

to resolve this issue. Simply stated, whether or not plaintiffs’

statutory claim is defective is irrelevant: plaintiffs’ claim is proper

under common law. At the time plaintiffs’ filed their complaint,

plaintiffs had a common law right to claim damages for public

nuisance. People ex rel. Burris, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 1019; Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62; Village of Bensenville, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 636.

	At common law, a public nuisance included:

			“an unreasonable interference with a right common to

the general public. Earlier cases recognized that the public

had a right to clean, unpolluted air and that any

deprivation of that right was actionable as a private injury

and indictable as a public wrong. [Citation.] However, the

notion of pure air has come to mean clean air consistent

with the character of the locality and the attending

circumstances. Whether smoke, odors, dust or gaseous

fumes constitute a nuisance depends on the peculiar facts

presented by each case.” City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 631-32 (1974).

See also Village of Wilsonville, 86 Ill. 2d at 21-22 (a “ ‘ “public nuisance is the doing of or the failure to do something that

injuriously affects the safety, health or morals of the public, or

works some substantial annoyance, inconvenience or injury to the

public” ’ ”), quoting W. Prosser, Torts §88, at 583 n.29 (4th ed.

1971), quoting Commonwealth v. South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918). CIPS does not argue that plaintiffs failed to plead and prove the elements

of common law nuisance. We find, therefore, that plaintiffs’

nuisance claim was proper.

	The second issue presented for our review is whether IEPA

direction and supervision bar nuisance liability. CIPS maintains that

the extension of nuisance liability in this context will damage State

interests by discouraging the private sector from cooperating with

the IEPA. At the heart of CIPS albeit brief argument, is the

contention that it is “unfair” to reward cooperation with exposure

to liability. CIPS warns that if this court permits liability here, it

will slow down or reduce future clean-up efforts.

	First, we reject CIPS’s argument based upon the language of

the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. Section 45(a) of the

Illinois Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/45(a) (West

2000)) states that “[n]o existing civil or criminal remedy for any

wrongful action shall be excluded or impaired by this Act.” See

also City of Monmouth v. Pollution Control Board, 57 Ill. 2d 482 (1974) (The Environmental Protection Act provides remedies to

prevent or diminish pollution which are in addition to remedies recognized by common law). This clear unequivocal language

demonstrates that state law does not prevent nuisance claims.

	We are, however, compelled to respond further. CIPS was not

held liable for the mere release of toxins into the ambient air during

remediation. In an industrial society odors, film, dust, and smoke

may exist. See City of Chicago, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 632 (noting that “[t]hese conditions in an industrial area have generally not been

considered to be public nuisances”). This logic is equally true in the

case of an environmental remediation. In this instance, however,

plaintiffs’ allege a substantial injury different from the general

public, and claim that this injury is not based solely on ordinary

clean-up efforts, but rather negligent remedial conduct. See

Gilmore, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62 (a law “making a nuisance legal does not automatically destroy a common law nuisance action

where the defendant’s conduct was not in compliance with the law,

[or] where the defendant was otherwise negligent ***”). We need

only look to plaintiffs’ allegations: 

		CIPS is liable for, the “release

of ‘coal tar’ into the soil, groundwater and air in violation of the IEPA; [c]ontamination of public water supplies in violation of the IEPA; [r]elease of airborne carcinogens, clastogens, and mutagens from the Site before its ‘Immediate Removal Action;’ [r]elease of

airborne carcinogens, clastogens, and mutagens from the Site

during its ‘Immediate Removal Action;’ [r]elease of airborne

carcinogens, clastogens, and mutagens after its ‘Immediate

Removal Action;’ [m]aintaining an open pit resulting in erosion of

soil and collection of surface water which allowed the further

release of volatile air and fugitive dust emissions for two years after

its ‘Immediate Removal Action.” (Emphasis added.) We do not

find that liability in this case will frustrate future remedial efforts or

deter cooperation. To the contrary, it may encourage cooperation

with government agencies, and heighten care and concern for

public safety during remedial actions.

	As a final matter, we reject CIPS’s argument that it should not

be liable because the release of emissions was solely the result of

IEPA oversight. The record demonstrates otherwise. Plaintiffs

offered evidence that CIPS did not act solely at the direction of the

IEPA. For example, CIPS tested soil and evaluated the extent of

contamination before it contacted the IEPA; CIPS drafted the remediation and monitoring plans, which although subject to IEPA

review, were based upon CIPS’s own data and risk assessments;

and CIPS continually resisted and modified IEPA remedial

suggestions, and on some occasions did not notify the IEPA of

shutdowns or air emission problems until after the IEPA

discovered the problem. Moreover, CIPS’s own admissions rebut

the argument that CIPS was a forced participant in the

remediation. The record is replete with CIPS’s own reference to its

“voluntary” participation. In fact, the record shows that CIPS

sought voluntarily status to avoid strict federal superfund

guidelines and to maintain greater authority and control over the

remediation. Accordingly, we reject CIPS’s claim that IEPA

oversight was a defense to liability.

CONCLUSION

	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

appellate court affirming the trial court’s judgment in favor of

plaintiffs.

Affirmed.

	JUSTICE FREEMAN took no part in the consideration or

decision of this case.

	JUSTICE McMORROW, specially concurring:

	Although I agree that the appellate court judgment should be

affirmed, I write separately to reiterate the position I took in

People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d 167 (1996), that “the all-encompassing abuse of discretion standard” is inappropriate when reviewing “the

legal issues raised by trial court applications of the Frye standard.” Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 204 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring). I maintain, as I did in Miller, that the more appropriate standard for reviewing Frye “general acceptance” issues is de novo.

	Whenever a trial court is called upon to decide whether to

admit expert testimony, the court must decide whether the expert

is qualified to testify in the subject area and whether the proffered testimony will assist the jury in resolving the issues before it. These

determinations, like most evidentiary matters, are traditionally left

to the discretion of the trial court and its decision should not be

reversed unless it is found that the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484 (1996); People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192 (1984).

	Frye evidence is a particular form of expert testimony. As the majority correctly acknowledges, when an expert’s opinion is

derived from a scientific method or technique which is alleged to

be unconventional or novel, the admission of the expert’s

testimony depends on whether the trial court finds that the

scientific method employed by the expert meets the Frye “general acceptance” test. In my view, the “general acceptance” question

should not be subject to an abuse of discretion standard. As stated

in the specially concurring opinion in Miller:

			“There are good reasons why the determination of

general acceptance in the scientific community should not

be left to the discretion of the trial court. Foremost is the

fact that the general acceptance issue transcends any

particular dispute. As one court has put it, ‘[t]he question

of general acceptance of a scientific technique, while

referring to only one of the criteria for admissibility of

expert testimony, in another sense transcends that

particular inquiry, for, in attempting to establish such

general acceptance for purposes of the case at hand, the

proponent will also be asking the court to establish the law

of the jurisdiction for future cases.’ Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 40 (D.C. App. 1988). Application of less

than a de novo standard of review to an issue which transcends individual cases invariably leads to inconsistent

treatment of similarly situated claims.” People v. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 204 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).

	In addition, de novo review of the “general acceptance” issue allows the reviewing court to look beyond the expert evidence

presented in the trial court. It allows consideration of other judicial

opinions, including those from other jurisdictions, as well as

pertinent legal and scientific commentaries. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 205 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).

	The appropriateness of employing a de novo standard when reviewing decisions regarding “general acceptance” under Frye has been recognized by courts in other jurisdictions. In fact, the

supreme courts in three states, citing to my special concurrence in Miller, have adopted a de novo standard for reviewing the “general acceptance” issue. See Commonwealth v. Vao Sok, 425 Mass. 787, 796, 683 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1997); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 167, 699 A.2d 596, 619 (1997); Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 274 (Fla. 1997).

	On a whole, then, there is no single standard of review

appropriate when considering the admissibility of Frye evidence. Traditional evidentiary matters, such as the expert’s qualification

to testify and the relevancy of the testimony, should be left to the

discretion of the trial court. “General acceptance,” however, is

more appropriately a matter subject to a de novo standard of review.

	Adopting this dual standard of review is not unusual. This

court has recognized that the measure of deference to be afforded

any trial court determination depends on “the substantive and

procedural backdrop against which the appealed order or ruling

arose.” People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378 (1998). Further, it has been acknowledged that, at times, evidentiary issues can

present mixedboth questions of law and fact, requiring application of

different standards of review at different junctures in the inquiry.

See In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 47-48 (2000) (whether trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress his statements

based on a claim that they were involuntarily made is subject to de novo review, although any factual findings will be accorded great deference).

	In the present case, the majority, without discussion or

analysis, states: “We review Frye issues under an abuse of discretion standard.” Slip op. at 10. In so doing, the majority

appears to hold that the deferential “abuse of discretion” standard

should be applied to a trial court’s determination that a novel

scientific technique has gained general acceptance in the relevant

scientific community and that the trial court’s determination will

not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. At the same time,

however, the majority states, “[o]nce a principle, technique, or test has gained general acceptance in the particular scientific

community, its general acceptance is presumed in subsequent

litigation; the principle, technique, or test is established as a matter

of law.” Slip op. at 12. Later, citing to my special concurrence in Miller, the majority states:

		“Where the question of general acceptance of a scientific

technique is raised for the first time a court is generally

asked to establish the law for future cases.” Slip op. at 15.

	These statements are inconsistent. On the one hand, the

majority professes to be applying an abuse of discretion standard

when analyzing whether the trial court properly admitted expert

testimony under the Frye standard. On the other hand, the majority expressly acknowledges that “general acceptance” is a legal

issue–and legal issues are normally subject to de novo review. In my view, the bar and bench would be better served if the majority

took this opportunity to acknowledge that a mixed standard of review is the appropriate standard to be applied in these casesde novo standard of review is appropriate when reviewing issues of “"general

acceptance”" under Frye.

	JUSTICE GARMAN joins in this special concurrence.