United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

M.R., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, NATIONAL EQUAL 

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE OFFICE, 

Tampa, FL, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 18-0305

Issued: October 18, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Frederick M. Neiswender, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On November 27, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a June 2,

2017 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of the claim.

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition with consequential multiple sclerosis (MS) flare-up and immunological compromise in 

the performance of duty.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On September 5, 2012 appellant, then a 52-year-old Equal Employment Opportunity 

(EEO) service analyst, filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that a stressful, 

hostile work environment caused a flare-up of a preexisting anxiety condition and major 

depression, which resulted in a flare-up of preexisting MS, immunologic deterioration, and 

infections.

3

 She noted that she first became aware of her claimed conditions on March 6, 2008. 

She stopped work on July 12, 2012, and related her conditions to her federal employment on 

August 10, 2012.

In a supplemental statement to the Form CA-2, appellant indicated that her stress began on 

August 27, 2010 when she was promoted to her current position. She was concerned about her 

ability to complete time sensitive cases “the right way.” Appellant alleged that she worked up to 

19 hours a day, including nights and weekends, because she felt compelled to edit the work of 

other employees even though it had been approved by managers. She indicated that on her own 

initiative, she performed significant case research beyond what she characterized as an unethically 

minimal level directed by her supervisors. Appellant also asserted that supervisors demanded that 

she work overtime, including on August 18, 2011. Additionally, she alleged that, in 

September 2011, Acceptance and Dismissal Manager K.L. assigned her a new type of work at a 

higher volume than other analysts. Appellant noted stress related to a September 2011 assignment 

that she believed was a “conflict of interest” as it involved one of her former managers. She

contended that her division was short staffed following an analyst’s March 2012 retirement and 

that managers became “hostile” when she requested a reduction in workload. Appellant alleged 

that Investigative Division Manager V.B. came to appellant’s office at the end of the work day to 

remind her of deadlines. She also alleged that while she was hospitalized intermittently from May 

to July 2012, managers deliberately let her case deadlines expire then blamed her for not 

completing her work on time. Appellant characterized a supervisor’s tone of voice during a 

June 2012 meeting as harassment.

By development letter dated September 20, 2012, OWCP notified appellant of the type of 

additional evidence needed to establish her claim, including factual evidence of corroboration of 

the identified workplace incidents, and a report from her attending physician diagnosing a 

condition attributable to those incidents. It afforded her 30 days to submit the necessary evidence.

The employing establishment submitted two October 11, 2012 statements denying 

appellant’s allegations. A human resources analyst noted that appellant had filed a prior emotional 

 

3 OWCP assigned the present claim OWCP File No. xxxxxx454.
3

condition claim on July 21, 2005 under File No. xxxxxx7924and an EEO claim for similar 

allegations of overwork and harassment. Manager V.B. contended that appellant worked excessive 

hours due to disorganization, procrastination, preoccupation with case details, and issues “not 

relevant to her core duties,” unnecessary research, and failure to follow managerial directives. In 

September 2011, appellant refused to rely on approved templates for new work, and instead

unnecessarily created her own materials. As she viewed all supervisory input as “harassment,”

managers had reassigned many of her cases to other analysts to assure their completion. V.B. 

noted that most of the analysts in appellant’s division were able to meet case deadlines as the 

agency’s work volume had decreased 20 percent in fiscal year 2012.

A June 11, 2012 EEO initial management inquiry summary noted that unnamed analysts 

agreed that the workload was heavy. Fifty percent of the analysts who responded claimed to work 

40 to 42 hours a week, and 50 percent claimed to work more than 50 hours a week.

In response, appellant provided October 30, November 14, and December 12, 2012 letters 

contending that the employing establishment’s statements were misleading and inaccurate. She

provided a copy of her 2011 annual performance review. Appellant was rated as a 4 out of a 

possible 15. Appellant also provided medical evidence related to her MS diagnosis.

5

In a letter dated December 31, 2012, the employing establishment controverted appellant’s 

claim. 

By decision dated March 18, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an emotional 

condition with consequential MS flare-up and immunological compromise as the evidence 

submitted failed to establish that the events occurred as alleged.

On November 1, 2013 appellant requested reconsideration. She provided her April 8, 2011 

mid-year performance evaluation, in which her manager recommended speed reading training as 

appellant used a ruler while reading and would slide it down the page as she read. Appellant also 

provided an undated statement from Coworker C.N., who asserted that she and Coworker P.S. 

managed appellant’s incoming mail and other items while appellant was hospitalized in July 2012. 

C.N. noted that analysts often worked more than 40 hours a week. She also submitted an 

August 22, 2012 EEO response and June 21, 2013 EEO final agency decision finding that 

appellant had not established her allegations of harassment, discrimination, disparate treatment, or 

a hostile work environment. 

In a letter dated December 30, 2013, the employing establishment asserted that during 2012 

when the division workload had declined, it was still necessary to reassign “major portions” of 

 

4 An additional claim had been filed under OWCP File No. xxxxxx805, in which OWCP accepted that appellant 

sustained an “other acute reaction to stress, unspecified” on October 1, 2001. 

5 Appellant was first diagnosed with MS in March 2008. She was treated by Dr. Robert Wilson, an attending 

osteopathic physician specializing in neurology, from January 6, 2011 to August 10, 2012. Dr. Gillian Karatinos, a 

Board-certified psychiatrist, treated appellant from July 12 to August 22, 2012 for recurrent major depressive disorder, 

generalized anxiety disorder, rule out bipolar II disorder, and cognitive problems. Appellant also provided laboratory 

reports and imaging studies dated from March 2009 to July 2011, and records from her hospitalization from July 12 

to 16, 2012. 
4

appellant’s cases as she refused to comply with case processing procedures and supervisory 

instructions.

In response, appellant submitted several additional statements. She alleged that a 

supervisor humiliated her by giving her a copy of a book entitled, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to 

Speed Reading. Appellant also contended that in July 2012, a supervisor telephoned her at home 

to discuss a leave use issue and the contents of her outgoing voicemail message during extended 

leave. She contended that supervisors refused to provide reasonable accommodations following

her hospitalizations in 2012. 

Appellant provided May 18 and June 6, 2012 e-mails to and from Manager W.C., in which 

she reiterated her allegations of harassment. W.C. assured appellant that he was not mad at her 

and had never been. He asked appellant to “calm down” and allow the EEO investigator to 

complete her assessment.

Appellant also submitted an excerpt of a September 22, 2012 EEO affidavit by 

Manager K.L. noting that, generally, analysts left work at 4:00 p.m., but took work home, and that 

appellant was notified when she was hired to “expect to work long hours, weekends and Holidays

and to expect to take work home.” Appellant’s position was FLSA-exempt, with no preset limit 

to the number of hours worked in a given week.

By decision dated February 11, 2014, OWCP modified its prior decision to find that 

appellant had established as factual that she worked long hours, on weekends, and on holidays. It

denied the claim, however, finding that appellant worked those hours to complete self-assigned 

tasks in contravention of supervisory directives. OWCP therefore found that the overwork did not 

occur in the performance of duty. It further found that appellant had established as factual that a 

supervisor had given her a copy of a speedreading book, but there was no intent to harass appellant. 

Additionally, OWCP found that appellant had established that she received a call at home to 

discuss her FMLA status and was instructed about the contents of her outgoing voicemail message. 

It found, however, that these were administrative matters not considered to be within the 

performance of duty, and that no error or abuse was established. OWCP further found that 

appellant had not established as factual that she was denied appropriate reference materials to 

perform her job successfully, that she was told to perform unethical acts, that she was denied 

accommodations following a hospitalization, and that a manager’s tone of voice in a June 2012 

meeting constituted harassment.

On February 9, 2015 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. In additional 

statements, counsel contended that attached e-mails to appellant from K.L. and V.B. dated from 

October 2010 to May 2012, with questions or brief comments about appellant’s cases, were 

examples of managerial harassment. Counsel also provided employing establishment case 

tracking screen captures dated from February to July 2012, EEO complaint documents regarding 

procedural issues, and a January 12, 2015 EEO decision affirming the denial of appellant’s EEO 

claim.

Appellant submitted a February 9, 2015 statement from Coworker C.O. alleging that 

supervisors did not properly manage appellant’s caseload during her hospitalizations and that 
5

analysts often worked more than 40 hours a week. In a February 10, 2015 statement, her husband 

reiterated her allegations of overwork and harassment.

The employing establishment submitted statements dated March 20 and April 16, 2015, 

contending that appellant was assigned an equitable workload, but engaged in “time-wasting 

practices not central to her core duties,” failed to follow standard operating procedures, and 

rejected guidance from managers and successful peers. These habits prevented appellant from 

completing a reduced workload in early 2012, prior to her hospitalizations.

By decision dated September 21, 2015, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision, 

finding that the additional evidence submitted failed to establish a compensable factor of 

employment. It found that appellant failed to establish her allegations of harassment, 

discrimination, or disparate treatment. OWCP noted that the supervisory statements of record 

provided a thorough and credible rebuttal of appellant’s allegations.

On September 19, 2016 appellant requested reconsideration. She contended that the 

employing establishment’s settlement of her 2005 EEO claim, and a court’s denial of a motion to 

dismiss certain aspects of her current EEO claim, proved her allegations. Appellant submitted

copies of EEO documents, including a January 4, 2016 settlement agreement related to a 2005 

EEO claim.

6

 In exchange for a payment of $40,000.00, appellant released and discharged the 

employing establishment from all claims related to those events. The employing establishment 

stipulated that the settlement was not an admission of liability or fault.

In a letter dated October 17, 2016, the employing establishment noted that voluminous 

EEO investigative documents failed to establish appellant’s allegations of harassment, 

discrimination, disparate treatment, or overwork. 

Appellant submitted a January 29, 2017 rebuttal, alleging that she had established 

overwork as a compensable employment factor. The employing establishment responded by letter 

dated March 6, 2017, asserting that appellant had been assigned an equitable workload, but refused 

to comply with her supervisor’s instructions. 

By decision dated June 2, 2017, OWCP denied modification of its prior decision, finding 

that the additional evidence failed to establish a compensable factor of employment. It found that 

while the evidence of record established that appellant worked long hours, her supervisors’

statements confirmed that she did so due to disorganization and failure to follow directions. 

OWCP further found that appellant failed to establish her allegations of harassment, 

discrimination, retaliation, and disparate treatment.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, appellant must submit the 

following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an emotional or psychiatric 

 

6 An August 13, 2012 tracking form indicates that the EEO settlement pertained to a complaint filed on 

December 16, 2005. 
6

disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused 

or contributed to the condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that the 

identified compensable employment factors are causally related to the emotional condition.7

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

8

the Board explained 

that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or illness has some 

connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within coverage under FECA.9 

When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment duties, and 

the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of 

employment. This is true when the employee’s disability results from his or her emotional reaction 

to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the 

nature of the work.10 Allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis 

for an emotional condition claim.11 Where the claimant alleges compensable factors of 

employment, he or she must substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable evidence.12 

Personal perceptions alone are insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional 

condition.13 On the other hand the disability is not covered where it results from such factors as 

an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to 

work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position.14

For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, 

there must be probative and reliable evidence that harassment or discrimination did in fact occur.15 

Mere perceptions of harassment, retaliation or discrimination are not compensable under FECA.16 

 

7 George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004).

8 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

9 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999).

10 Supra note 8.

11 J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008).

12 M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007).

13 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

14 Supra note 8.

15 Marlon Vera, 54 ECAB 834 (2003).

16 Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001).
7

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition with consequential MS flare-up and immunological compromise in the performance of 

duty.

Appellant has attributed her emotional condition to performing her regular or specially 

assigned duties of her position. She alleged that she began to experience anxiety and to feel 

overwhelmed when she was promoted on August 27, 2010. Appellant contended that managers

assigned her an excessive workload with unreasonable deadlines, and that her division was short 

staffed following an analyst’s retirement in March 2012. She noted performing unassigned

research and editing tasks to complete cases “the right way.” In a supplemental statement to her 

Form CA-2, appellant contended that her supervisors required an unethically minimal amount of 

research and used erroneous case templates. She felt compelled to perform additional research,

alter the work of other employees, and create her own reference materials.

In support of her claim, appellant submitted a June 11, 2012 EEO management inquiry 

summary in which unspecified coworkers alleged that the unit workload was heavy and required 

more than 40 hours a week to complete. Coworkers C.N. and C.O. alleged that analysts worked 

more than 40 hours a week. In an excerpt from an undated statement, Manager K.L. noted that 

appellant was informed when she was hired to expect to work long hours. 

These general statements attesting that analysts worked long hours are insufficient to 

establish that appellant was overworked. There were no specific dates or times provided where 

appellant was required to work more than 40 hours a week and the employing establishment has 

denied that appellant’s regularly or specially assigned duties required overtime work.

17

 Rather, 

the employing establishment contended that appellant engaged in irrelevant, unassigned tasks and 

then claimed this time as work hours.

In an October 11, 2012 statement, Manager V.B. contended that appellant refused to 

complete her work in accordance with management directives. Instead, appellant spent many 

hours on unnecessary or irrelevant research that extended her case processing time and resulted in 

missed deadlines, despite 20 percent decrease in agency case volume in fiscal year 2012. In 

statements dated March 20 and April 16, 2015, the employing establishment reiterated that 

appellant was disorganized and engaged in irrelevant, time-wasting practices.

OWCP accepted that appellant worked more than 40 hours a week, but found that any 

overwork was related to appellant’s idiosyncratic case processing methods and irrelevant research. 

The managerial statements of record establish that appellant’s self-imposed research, editing, and 

template creation tasks were performed outside the scope of her assigned duties and in 

contravention of management directives. The Board therefore finds that these extraneous activities 

 

17 A.L., Docket No. 17-0368 (issued June 20, 2018); see Y.J., Docket No. 15-1137 (issued October 4, 2016) 

(claimant did not provide the requisite detail regarding specific dates and the duties she performed, which allegedly 

overwhelmed her, to establish that her assigned work caused her stress).
8

were not sufficiently related to appellant’s regular, day-to-day duties to constitute a compensable 

factor of employment under Cutler.

18

Appellant also made several allegations related to administrative and personnel actions. In 

Thomas D. McEuen,

19 the Board held that an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative 

actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA as 

such matters pertain to procedures and requirements of the employing establishment and do not 

bear a direct relation to the work required of the employee. The Board noted, however, that 

coverage under FECA would attach if the factual circumstances surrounding the administrative or 

personnel action established error or abuse by the employing establishment superiors in dealing 

with the claimant. Absent evidence of such error or abuse, the resulting emotional condition must 

be considered self-generated and not employment generated. In determining whether the 

employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has examined whether the employing 

establishment acted reasonably.20

Appellant alleged that a supervisor telephoned her at home to discuss a leave issue and 

provide guidance regarding appellant’s outgoing voicemail message during her extended leave. 

OWCP accepted this incident as factual, but found that these were administrative matters not 

within the performance of appellant’s assigned duties. The Board notes that while the handling of 

leave requests is generally related to the employment, they are administrative functions of the 

employer and not duties of the employee.21 The Board has also held that the actions supervisors 

must take during an employee’s extended absence are administrative matters not considered to be 

within the performance of duty.22 The Board finds that the employing establishment acted 

reasonably with regard to these administrative matters.

23

 There is no evidence that the employing 

establishment denied appellant’s leave request or acted unreasonably.24 The Board recognizes that 

a supervisor or manager must be allowed to perform his or her duties and that, in performing such 

duties, employees will at times dislike actions taken.25 Appellant has presented no corroborating 

evidence to support that the employing establishment acted unreasonably in this administrative 

matter.

 

18 R.A., Docket No. 14-1438 (issued September 16, 2015); O. Paul Gregg, 46 ECAB 624 (1995) (where the Board 

found that the tasks identified as elements of overwork must bear a sufficient relationship to the employee’s regular 

assigned duties to constitute a compensable factor of employment under Cutler).

19 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991).

20 David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96. 

21 A.L., supra note 17; see Judy Kahn, 53 ECAB 321 (2002).

22 M.H., Docket No. 12-0130 (issued December 4, 2012) (where the Board held that a supervisor reading and 

deleting work-related e-mails on the claimant’s computer during an extended work absence was a normal 

administrative function to assure an orderly work flow and that no error or abuse was shown).

23 A.L., supra note 17; M.H., id.

24 Id.

25 A.L., supra note 17, see Michael A. Dass, 53 ECAB 208 (2001).
9

Appellant also alleged that managers utilized erroneous, unethical case processing 

techniques, and allowed case deadlines to expire in July 2012 during her hospitalization. The 

Board has held that an employee’s dissatisfaction with perceived poor management constitutes 

frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular 

position and is not compensable under FECA.26 As such, appellant has not established a 

compensable employment factor with respect to these administrative matters.27

Appellant further attributed her condition to harassment, discrimination, and a hostile work 

environment. To the extent that incidents alleged as constituting harassment or a hostile 

environment by a manager are established as occurring and arising from appellant’s performance 

of her regular duties, these could constitute employment factors.28 However, for harassment to 

give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there must be evidence that harassment did in 

fact occur. Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.29

Appellant alleged that a supervisor’s recommendation for speed reading training, giving 

her The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Speed Reading in 2011, and e-mails dated from October 2010 

to May 2012 with feedback on her cases, constituted harassment. OWCP accepted that a 

supervisor had given appellant the book and acknowledged the feedback e-mails, but found no 

evidence of harassment. The Board notes that appellant’s April 8, 2011 performance review 

described her difficulties with reading text and of the need for additional training to improve her 

case processing speed. The evidence of record does not demonstrate that a supervisor or manager 

treated appellant in a disrespectful manner by providing performance feedback.

30

 Error or abuse 

in discharging management duties has not been established. Therefore, these allegations are not 

compensable.31

Appellant also contended that the May 18 and June 6, 2012 e-mails to and from Manager 

W.C. about her EEO complaint, a supervisor’s tone of voice during a June 2012 meeting, and an 

alleged failure to provide accommodations following a June 2012 hospitalization were all 

incidents of harassment and discrimination. The employing establishment submitted several 

statements denying appellant’s allegations regarding these administrative matters. Appellant has 

not established these allegations of harassment with probative and reliable evidence.32

With regard to appellant’s allegation that the supervisory e-mails about the EEO claim 

constituted harassment, the Board has long held that EEO complaints by themselves do not 

 

26 Michael Thomas Plante, 44 ECAB 510, 515 (1993).

27 R.A., supra note 18. 

28 David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).

29 Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991). See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a 

claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence).

30 G.M., Docket No. 17-1469 (issued April 2, 2018).

31 Id. 

32 Supra note 29. 
10

establish that workplace harassment or unfair treatment occurred.33 Additionally, Manager W.C. 

expressed that he was not angry with appellant and asked that she allow the investigation to 

proceed. The Board finds that the e-mails establish that the employing establishment acted 

reasonably in regard to these administrative matters.34 The evidence does not establish her 

allegations of harassment.35

Concerning appellant’s allegations that a supervisor spoke to her in an elevated tone of 

voice in a June 2012 meeting, and that managers failed to provide reasonable accommodations, 

she failed to submit any evidence to substantiate these assertions as factual. Also, the Board has 

held that not every verbal interaction in the workplace is compensable simply because a claimant 

takes issue with the tone of voice used by the speaker.36

Consequently, appellant has not established her claim for an emotional condition as she 

has not attributed her claimed condition to any compensable employment factors.37 The Board 

therefore needs not to consider the medical evidence of record.38

On appeal appellant contends that she has established her emotional condition claim, and 

that the employing establishment failed to investigate or address her allegations. As explained 

above, she has not established her claim for an emotional condition as she has not established a 

compensable employment factor.39

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty.

 

33 S.H., Docket No. 17-1942 (issued August 23, 2018). See Parley A. Clement, 48 ECAB 302 (1997). The Board 

noted that the EEO January 4, 2016 settlement agreement pertained to workplace events prior to August 28, 2010, and 

not to the events appellant alleged caused the claimed emotional condition in the current claim. 

34 R.A., supra note 18.

35 See Joel Parker, Sr., supra note 29.

36 D.J., Docket No. 16-1540 (issued August 21, 2018); T.G., 58 ECAB 189 (2006).

37 As appellant has failed to establish a compensable employment factor, the Board need not address the medical 

evidence of record. Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).

38 See Katherine A. Berg, 54 ECAB 262 (2002).

39 R.A., supra note 18. 
11

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs dated June 2, 2017 is affirmed.

Issued: October 18, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board