UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

TOZZI, CAMPANELLA, and CELTNIEKS 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Specialist MICHAEL J. MOODY 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20121083 

Headquarters, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg 

Tara A. Osborn and David H. Robertson, Military Judges 

Colonel Paul S. Wilson, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial) 

Colonel Michael O. Lacey, Staff Judge Advocate (recommendation) 

Lieutenant Colonel Jerrett W. Dunlap, Jr., Staff Judge Advocate (addendum) 

For Appellant: Mr. William E. Cassara, Esquire (argued); Captain Brian J. Sullivan, 

JA; Mr. William E. Cassara, Esquire (on brief). 

For Appellee: Captain Christopher A. Clausen, JA (argued); Major A.G Courie III, 

JA; Major Daniel D. Derner, JA; Captain Christopher A. Clausen, JA (on brief). 

29 October 2015 

---------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

----------------------------------

TOZZI, Senior Judge: 

 A general court-martial comprised of officer and enlisted members convicted 

appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of abusive sexual contact with a 

child, and one specification of indecent liberties with a child, in violation of Article 

120, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006) [hereinafter UCMJ]. 

The panel sentenced appellant to eight years confinement and a bad-conduct 

discharge. The convening authority approved the findings and sentence as adjudged. 

 This case is before us for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant 

raises four allegations of error, only one of which merits discussion and relief. 

Appellant asks this court to provide appropriate relief to remedy the dilatory posttrial processing of his case. We agree that relief is appropriate and grant thirty days 

confinement credit. 
MOODY—ARMY 20121083 

2

LAW AND DISCUSSION 

The convening authority took action 468 days after the sentence was 

adjudged, 430 of which are attributable to the government. The record in this case 

consists of seven volumes, and the trial transcript is 835 pages. Although we find no 

due process violation in the post-trial processing of appellant’s case, we must still 

review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustified dilatory posttrial processing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219, 224 

(C.A.A.F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to 

determine what findings and sentence ‘should be approved,’ based on all the facts 

and circumstances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and 

unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 

353, 362-63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney, 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Army Ct. 

Crim. App. 2010); United States v. Collazo, 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 

2000). 

It took 183 days to transcribe the record of trial in this case. It took over 113 

days from the date of receipt for one of the military judges to authenticate the record 

of trial. The government provided an explanation in its post-trial submissions for 

this delay, citing a backlog of cases, the government shutdown, and short staffing of 

court reporters. Further, as annotated in a memorandum, one of the military judges 

was on temporary duty away from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for a significant 

period of time after receipt of the record of trial for review and authentication, 

presiding over a complicated capital murder trial at Fort Hood, Texas. Despite this 

explanation, the delay between announcement of sentence and action could 

“adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of military 

justice system . . . .” Ney, 68 M.J. at 617. Thus, we find that relief is appropriate 

under the facts of this case. 

CONCLUSION 

Upon consideration of the entire record, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. Given the dilatory post-trial processing, however, we affirm only so 

much of the sentence as provides for confinement for seven years and eleven months 

and a bad-conduct discharge. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellant 

has been deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by this decision, 

are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58b(c), and 75(a). 
MOODY—ARMY 20121083 

3

Judge CAMPANELLA and Judge CELTNIEKS concur. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT: