1 Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-20591 c/w No. 95-20804

Summary Calendar

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Plaintiff-Appellee

VERSUS

KARL DAHLSTROM ET AL

Defendants

KARL DAHLSTROM

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(92-CV-2992)

December 15, 1997

Before DUHÉ, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

Karl Dahlstrom has appealed the district court’s order denying

his motion for reconsi deration of the district court’s nunc pro

tunc order requiring disgorgement of funds received by Dahlstrom as2

a result of the sale of stock of two corporations in violation of

t he securities laws. Dahlstrom contends that his disgorgement

obligation was disc harged in bankruptcy. The resolution of this

issue involves the interpretation of statutory law and we therefore

review de novo. S ee In re Reading Co.

, 115 F.3d 1111, 1123-24 (3d

Cir. 1997) (stating that question whether corporation’s obligation

under CERCLA had been discharged in bankruptcy was subj ect to

plenary review); see also In re Bruner

, 55 F.3d 195, 197 (5th Cir.

1995) (district court’s interpretation of Bankruptcy Code on review

of bankruptcy court’s ruling on dischargeab ility complaint was

reviewed de novo.) Based upon a careful review of the applicable

law, the arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we hold

that Dahlstrom’s obligation under the securities laws to disgorge

the funds was not discharged in Dahlstrom’s bankruptcy.

The bankruptcy code provides for the discharge of all debts

that are the personal property of the debtor which arose before

debtor filed for bankruptcy. S ee 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 and 727(b).

Debt is defined as “liability on a claim,” 11 U.S.C. § 101(12), and

“claim” is described broadly to include a “right to payment”. 11

U.S.C. § 101(5); see In re Southmark, Inc.

, 88 F.3d 311, 317 (5th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 686 (1997). Since the

Bankruptcy Code does not define “right to payment”, when such

rights arise is determined by non-bankruptcy state or federal

substantive law. S ee Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp.

, 18 F.3d

1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1994). The federal securities laws make3

clear tha t the SEC’s “right to payment” for bankruptcy purposes

arose at the time Dahlstrom committed the acts which gave rise to

the claim for disgorgement.

Dahls t rom’s Chapter VII bankruptcy petition was filed on

August 1, 1990. The SEC’s statement of undisputed facts filed in

connection with the motion for summary judgment provides that the

stock offerings complained of in its complaint were made be tween

April 10, 1991, and December 5, 1991. These events occurred after

the filing of the bankruptcy.

Dahlstrom also argues that the district court erred in failing

to stay execution of its nunc pro tunc order pending appellate

review. Because Dahlstrom’s substantive appeal is without merit,

he cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in

refusing to stay enforcement of the disgorgement order.

AFFIRMED.