RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0339-18T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.A.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

B.O.,

Defendant.

___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF B.O., 

a Minor.

____________________________

Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 8, 2019
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A-0339-18T3

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FN-09-0145-18.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Mark Edward Kleiman, Designated Counsel, 

on the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Jessica Faustin, Deputy Attorney General, 

on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor (Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant P.A. appeals the trial court's February 27, 2018 finding that she 

abused or neglected her son when she chose to get into a vehicle with her 

boyfriend who had been drinking; proceeded to assault her boyfriend while her 

son was in the car; and got into an altercation with police while holding her son, 

causing her to drop her son onto the street. The police arrested P.A. and her

boyfriend and referred the matter to the New Jersey Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency (the Division). Division personnel instituted a Dodd Removal 

in accordance with N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.29 and filed a complaint seeking, in part, that 

the trial court determine that appellant abused or neglected her son. After trial, 

the court found that appellant abused or neglected her son within the meaning 
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of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4). After reviewing the record in light of the governing 

legal principles, we affirm. 

I.

We discern the following facts from the record.1 This matter arises from 

an incident that occurred on September 3, 2017. On that date, the Bogota Police 

Department received a complaint of a hit-and-run around 2:30 a.m. Later, the 

police responded to a complaint of a roadside domestic violence incident 

involving a car that matched the description of the car involved in the hit-andrun. At the scene, P.A. and her boyfriend were engaged in a physical altercation, 

during which P.A. hit her boyfriend. After the police arrived, P.A. picked up 

her one-year-old son and attempted to leave, exchanged words with the 

responding officers, and then dropped her son in the street, requiring his

transport to the hospital. 

After the incident, officers arrested both P.A. and her boyfriend, and 

P.A.'s son was sent to stay with his paternal grandparents. P.A. was charged 

with endangering the welfare of a child and assaulting a police officer, and her 

boyfriend was charged with driving while intoxicated. The Division arrived at 

 

1 Preliminarily, we note that B.O., the child's father, was not a party to this 

litigation because he was in jail for reasons unrelated to this case.
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the police station around 5 a.m. to interview P.A. and her boyfriend. The 

Division also visited the child, who sustained no marks or bruises and was 

medically cleared. 

On February 27, 2018, Judge Lois Lipton held a fact-finding hearing to 

determine whether P.A.'s actions on September 3, 2017 constituted abuse or 

neglect of her son. The Division called as its first witness Claudia Valencia, the 

Division Investigator who interviewed P.A. on September 6, 2017. Ms. 

Valencia testified as to her interview with P.A. concerning the events of 

September 3rd. According to P.A., she and her son had gone out to a restaurant 

with her parents, and her boyfriend later joined them. P.A. and her boyfriend 

had a few drinks prior to departing for a friend's apartment, but P.A. believed 

that her boyfriend was not intoxicated. On the way to her friend's apartment,

P.A.'s boyfriend hit a parked car and then drove away from the accident. P.A. 

claimed that she then asked her boyfriend several times to pull over, and when 

he finally stopped the car, P.A. went to take her son but got into a physical 

altercation with her boyfriend.2 P.A. explained that when police arrived, she 

 

2 According to Ms. Valencia's investigation summary, P.A. alleged that after 

pulling the car over, her boyfriend had "picked up [her son] and would not give 

him back."
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attempted to walk away, but the officers followed her and began to "tug" and 

"push" her, causing her son to fall.3 

Ms. Valencia testified on direct that P.A. was "substantiated for family 

violence" for this altercation, and the Division made this finding while 

considering both aggravating factors, including the child's removal and his

"tender age," and mitigating factors, including the negligible impact that the 

supposed abuse or neglect had on the child. 

The Division next attempted to call as a witness Sergeant Lynch of the 

Bogota Police Department, but he never appeared for the hearing despite being 

subpoenaed. The Division instead recalled Ms. Valencia to authenticate the 

Division's investigation and screening summaries, which Judge Lipton admitted

into evidence as Division business records, subject to applicable hearsay 

exceptions.4

Judge Lipton found that the uncontroverted evidence presented was 

sufficient to support a finding of abuse and neglect. The judge found that P.A. 

 

3 According to Ms. Valencia's investigation summary, P.A. expressed that "the 

police officer told her to stop however she ignored him and kept walking with 

[her son]."

4

Judge Lipton noted that because Sergeant Lynch failed to appear to provide 

testimony, any statements made by the police officers contained in the reports 

would be hearsay. 
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"had at least a margarita and a beer," and she "chose to get in a car with [a person 

who was drinking] . . . with . . . an infant." Judge Lipton further found that P.A. 

scuffled with "her friend who was driving after drinking and had hit a parked 

car and refused to pull over or stop the car when she requested it[,]" and that 

P.A. "[b]y her own admission . . . hit the driver." Judge Lipton also emphasized 

that P.A. was combative with police, stressing that "[n]o reasonable person with 

a thirteen-month-old infant would engage in a tugging session with police with 

a baby in her arms." Given that P.A. dropped her son onto the street as opposed 

to "a carpet in a house," the judge determined that the "child was at substantial 

risk of harm." 

Judge Lipton specifically stated that the "tussle in the car" may not have 

"rise[n] to the level of willful and wanton conduct," but P.A. should have 

immediately cooperated with police, regardless of whether the police touched 

her first, "for the safety of the baby," and further stated that her actions therefore 

were willful or wanton. The judge found that P.A.'s failure to cooperate with 

law enforcement evinced "that her judgment was so off and caused that baby to 

fall." She showed "reckless disregard at that moment for the safety of her baby

[because] she should have welcomed the police if she was afraid of the conduct 

of the driver." Judge Lipton concluded that P.A.'s own recitation of the facts 
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alone showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that P.A. neglected or abused 

her son on September 3, 2017. The judge entered an order memorializing those 

findings.

This appeal ensued. On appeal, P.A. argues that the testimony of Ms. 

Valencia, coupled with P.A.'s own statements, were insufficient to permit a

finding that P.A. abused or neglected her son as contemplated by N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.21(c)(4)(b). 

II.

The appellate standard of review of the "fact-findings of the Family Part 

judge" is strictly limited. N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 

N.J. Super. 551, 577 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 

411 (1998)). "[F]indings by the trial judge are considered binding on appeal 

when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." N.J. Div. of 

Youth and Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 433 (App. Div. 2002) 

(quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 

(1974)). "[A]n appellate court should not disturb the 'factual findings and legal 

conclusions of the trial judge unless [it is] convinced that they are so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably 

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412
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(second alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484). However, 

we need not defer to the trial court on questions of law. N.J. Div. of Youth and 

Family Servs. v. V.T., 423 N.J. Super. 320, 330 (App. Div. 2011). 

III.

P.A. contends her conduct resulted in no actual harm to her son, and the 

evidence presented in this case is insufficient to support a finding of abuse or

neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. P.A. explains that the only evidence 

available for Judge Lipton to consider was Ms. Valencia's testimony, which 

standing alone was insufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect.

P.A. also argues that Judge Lipton's opinion makes clear that there was 

insufficient evidence to conclude that P.A. knowingly chose to enter a vehicle 

with an intoxicated driver. P.A. claims, by Judge Lipton's own findings, her

request that her boyfriend pull over constituted "reasonable actions of a mother 

attempting to protect her child from harm," and her conduct was not willful or

wanton. P.A. explains that she attempted to remedy the situation once she 

realized that her boyfriend was not fit to drive. 

P.A. further maintains that the record contained insufficient evidence to 

support Judge Lipton's finding that her conduct with the police officers was 

unreasonable. P.A. stresses that the police initiated contact with her and acted 
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in an "inappropriate aggressive manner, and that [she] acted reasonably, fearing 

physical harm to herself and her child." P.A. argues that due to the lack of 

evidence concerning the officers' actions, Judge Lipton's determination that no 

reasonable person would have acted as P.A. had was not rooted in fact and 

constituted an improper inference. 

An "abused or neglected child" is

a child whose physical, mental, or emotional condition 

has been impaired or is in imminent danger of 

becoming impaired as the result of the failure of his 

parent or guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of 

care . . . in providing the child with proper supervision 

or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing 

to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, 

including the infliction of excessive corporal 

punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious 

nature requiring the aid of the court[.] 

[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).] 

"Whether a parent or guardian has failed to exercise a minimum degree of 

care is to be analyzed in light of the dangers and risks associated with the 

situation." G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 157 

N.J. 161, 181-82 (1999). Failure to exercise a "minimum degree of care" 

requires "conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily 

intentional." Dep't of Children and Families, Div. of Youth and Family Servs. 

v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294, 299-300 (2011) (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at 178). "[T]he 
10 A-0339-18T3

concept of willful and wanton misconduct implies that a person has acted with 

reckless disregard for the safety of others." G.S., 157 N.J. at 179 (citing Fielder 

v. Stonack, 141 N.J. 101, 124 (1995)).

New Jersey courts do not delineate all of the scenarios that would equate

to a failure to exercise a "minimum degree of care," but "the inquiry should 

focus on the harm to the child and whether that harm could have been prevented 

had the guardian performed some act to remedy the situation or remove the 

danger." Id. at 182. "[A] guardian fails to exercise a minimum degree of care 

when he or she is aware of the dangers inherent in a situation and fails 

adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a risk of serious injury to 

that child." Id. at 181 (citing Sellnow v. Perales, 158 A.D.2d 846, 847 (N.Y. 

1990)). In deciding whether a child has been abused or neglected, courts "must 

base [their] findings on the totality of the circumstances . . . ." V.T., 423 N.J. 

Super. at 329. 

The court should focus on the "parent's conduct at the time of the incident 

to determine if a parent created an imminent risk of harm to a child." Dep't of 

Children and Families, Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v. E.D.-O., 223 N.J. 

166, 189 (2015). A child need not be "actually irreparably impaired by parental 

inattention or neglect" for a court to find that a parent failed to exercise a 
11 A-0339-18T3

minimum degree of care. See In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 

(1999) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 616 

n.14 (1986)).

We conclude that Judge Lipton's finding that P.A. abused or neglected her 

son is supported by ample, substantial, and credible evidence. The judge found 

that, based on P.A.'s own statements, she failed to exercise a minimum degree 

of care based on the totality of the circumstances. See V.T., 423 N.J. Super at 

329. These statements confirmed that P.A. knowingly entered a vehicle with 

someone who was drinking, while she herself was drinking, and in the same 

sequence of events, assaulted the driver and became entangled with police prior 

to dropping her son. While P.A. may assert that Judge Lipton did not 

appropriately weigh the possibility that the police instigated the confrontation 

with her, Judge Lipton correctly found this point to be inconsequential, as she 

opined that "[P.A.] should have immediately cooperated" with the police and 

perhaps even welcomed police intervention if she was in a dispute with her 

boyfriend. In this respect, the potential for harm to the child could have been 

prevented if P.A. merely acquiesced to the requests of law enforcement. See

G.S., 157 N.J. at 182. We conclude that the trial judge's findings are supported 
12 A-0339-18T3

by the record and therefore her legal conclusions are unassailable. See Z.P.R., 

351 N.J. Super. at 433. 

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining arguments 

raised by the parties, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.