United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-3300

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Daniel James Decker

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids

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Submitted: October 18, 2021

Filed: November 19, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Daniel James Decker pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute meth,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(A). The district court1 varied 

1

The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Iowa. 
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downward, sentencing him to 220 months in prison. He appeals. Having jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms. 

Decker believes the district court should have granted him a greater downward 

variance from his guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. This court reviews for 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Thigpen, 848 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2017). 

Where, as here, “a district court has sentenced a defendant below the advisory 

guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not 

varying downward still further.” United States v. Anwar, 880 F.3d 958, 973 (8th Cir. 

2018). 

Relying on United States v. Harry, 313 F. Supp. 3d 969, 974 (N.D. Iowa 

2018), Decker argues his base offense level of 38 “overstates the seriousness of the 

offense” because his “possession of a drug of certain purity (ice methamphetamine)

did not result in more harm than another variety of the same drug.” The district court 

rejected this argument:

With regard to the so-called Harry variance because of the 

methamphetamine, the way that the guidelines treat ice 

methamphetamine versus powder methamphetamine, I’m very familiar 

with the Harry variance and not only the judges in this district but in 

other districts who have varied downward from the advisory guidelines 

based on the purity level treatment by the guidelines of 

methamphetamine versus powder. I have repeatedly declined to find a 

policy disagreement with the guidelines.

The court did not err in rejecting the Harry reasoning. See United States v. Heim, 

941 F.3d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the argument that the district court 

erred in failing to grant a variance under Harry because a district court cannot be 

compelled to “disagree with a guidelines provision as a matter of sentencing policy 

because other sentencing judges have done so”); United States v. Velazquez, 726 

Fed. App’x 530, 531 (8th Cir. 2018) (rejecting same argument Decker asserts here). 
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In varying downward, the court fully considered Decker’s conduct:

[G]iven that the defendant’s involvement in this case was moving 

multiple pounds of methamphetamine very close to the source of supply 

and importing pounds of methamphetamine and distributing pounds of 

methamphetamine, I would find that the drug quantity calculation here 

is a good surrogate of the defendant’s relative criminal culpability of 

where he falls in the drug trade and why a sentence—why the 

guidelines calculation should result in the advisory guideline range that 

it does here.

The court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and exercised its “substantial 

latitude to determine how much weight to give” them. United States v. RuelasMendez, 556 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 2009).

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The judgment is affirmed. 

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