Filed 5/22/14 Jones v. Su CA1/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE
PRISCILLA JONES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. JULIE A. SU, as Labor Commissioner, Defendant and Respondent. A137942 (Sonoma County Super. Ct. No. SCV251888)

INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Priscilla Jones appeals from a trial court order denying her petition for writ of mandate. Plaintiff had challenged a final agency decision by defendant Julie A. Su, Labor Commissioner of the State of Califo rnia and Director of the Department of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) that u pheld penalties and asse ssments. She asserts the penalties resulted from evidence impr operly obtained by a warrantless search
conducted in violation of her Four th Amendment rights. We affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A ND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff is the owner of Jones Rabbit Farm, a business located and conducted on the same property as her residence in Sant a Rosa. The business raises and butchers
rabbits that are then sold to restaurants. The farm is not open to the public. On March 26, 2012, Toresa Stikes, a deputy labor commissioner employed by the DLSE, and Richard Gage, a deputy labor commissioner employed by the Division of Wage Claims, entered onto plai ntiff’s property. After inte rviewing plaintiff and other persons who were present, Stikes issued an order stopping plaintiff from using any2 employees until she had secured workers’ compensation insura nce. A penalty of $4,500 was assessed against her. Stikes also issued citations stating that employees were paid wages without the required itemized wage stat ements, and that employees had been paid below the minimum wage or had received no wages for h ours worked. Penalties of $2,750 and $400, respectively, were assessed for these violations. Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of the citations. The appeal hearing was held on April 25, 2012. At the outset of th e hearing, plaintiff presented a motion to quash the citations. Among other grounds, the mo tion claimed the deputies’ entry on to her property constituted a warrantless search in violation of the Four th Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, sec tion 13 of the Califor nia Constitution. On May 1, 2012, plaintiff submitted a memorandum in support of the motion to
dismiss the citations. On May 8, 2012, the hearing officer rendered decisions regarding plaintiff’s appeal. The officer concluded plaintiff had violated Labor Code section 3700 by failing to provide workers’ compensation insuran ce for two employees engaged in processing rabbits. The officer also found plainti ff had failed to pay mi nimum wage to one employee, Tim Webb, on at leas t two occasions. Finally, the officer found plaintiff had failed to provide itemized deduction statem ents to Webb and another employee on at least 10 occasions. The penalty a ssessment was set at $5,700. On June 22, 2012, plaintiff filed a pe tition for writ of mandate in the superior court, challenging the administrative decision and penalty assessments. She asserted the decision was based upon information illega lly obtained from an unconstitutional
warrantless search. On December 17, 2012, th e trial court filed its order. As to the Fourth Amendment issue, the court found the facts su pported the conclusion that plaintiff and her employees had voluntarily consented to th e interviews with Stikes and Gage. The
court also concluded plaintiff’s business was exempt fro m the warrant requirement under3 the exception for administrative inspections of closely regulat ed industries. The court denied plaintiff’s petition for writ of manda te and dismissed the same. This appeal
followed. DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review We construe plaintiff’s appeal as one arising from the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence. “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substa ntial evidence and independently review whether the search wa s constitutionally reasonable. [Citations.]” ( People v. Potter (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 611, 617 ( Potter ).)
II. Fourth Amendment Protections Are Not Implicated
A. Facts Relating to the Officer’s Entry on to Plaintiff’s Property At the administrative hearing, Stikes tes tified that she conducted an inspection of Jones Rabbit Farm after a complaint was re ceived by the DLSE’s Bureau of Field Enforcement. She did not have a subpoe na or a warrant when she conducted the inspection. Prior to the even ts described below, she had gone to the property twice and
had knocked on the door but no one answered. The property where the bus iness is located has a personal residence in the front with a half-circle driveway. If one is faci ng the house from the street, there is a second driveway on the right that goes to the back of the property. Stikes and Gage entered the second driveway and parked in a small lot. Th ree other vehicles were parked in the lot. There was a shed or barn right next to the parking area. In front of the shed was a large
trash can that was almost full of fresh rabb it hides. Behind the first barn was another barn that had cages stack ed in front of it. Inside the first barn, Stikes saw three pe ople working at a table processing rabbits. They were all wearing long yellow aprons . She knocked on the screen door and identified herself. Plaintiff, one of the three people inside, indicated she was the owner.4 She did not have a business license available for Stikes to see, but gave her a business card and a sticker indicating the meat had been inspecte d for wholesomeness by the California Department of Agriculture. Stikes asked plaintiff which employees were working that day. Plaintiff said she has only one employee, Glenda Gibson, w ho makes $10 per hour. She said Gibson works three to four hours a day, four da ys a week. The rabbits are processed on Mondays, and Gibson helps with ot her tasks such as cleaning the cages and taking care of the animals during the rest of the week. She is paid by check and is not issued deduction
statements. The other worker was Webb, who plaintiff identified as a volunteer. Gage testified Webb declined to answer questions but did say that he had been helping plaintiff on an interm ittent basis for some months by performing such tasks as repairing rabbit cages and moving things that were too heavy fo r plaintiff. He said he did this as a volunteer for plaintiff, who attended th e same church as he did. Gage testified that the people on the property had stopped wo rking when he arrived with Stikes, but they all were wearing aprons with blood on them, so he presumed they had been processing rabbits. 1 Webb submitted a declaration stating th at he was sitting on a bench in the backyard when he saw a car w ith two people drive up. He told plaintiff someone had
arrived. He went to meet the visitors at th e door and the two people asked for plaintiff. The man wanted to ask Webb questions. Webb asked if he was required to talk. The man said no, so Webb told him that he did not want to speak to him. The man left Webb
alone. During her interview with plaintiff, Stikes observed a man leave the barn through
another door. He told Stikes th at she needed to leave because plaintiff needed to get back

1 The hearing officer conclude d Gibson was a residence em ployee, and wa s not engaged in the processing of rabbits for Jones Rabbit Farm.5 to work. He then drove off in his truck. Pl aintiff identified him as Gary Osman, a trainee who is learning how to process rabbits. Neither he nor Webb receive any wages or compensation for their work. Stikes asked plaintiff if she had workers’ compensation
insurance and she said she did not. She said she was covered for workers’ compensation under her homeowners policy. Stikes contacted plaintiff’s insurance company and asked if Jones Rabbit Farm was covered by the homeowners policy. Sh e was told that the homeowners policy did not cover the business, nor would it cover any of the employees working as rabbit processors. The policy states it covers employees who work in the residence, but excludes from coverage employees of for-profit businesses. 2
B. Trial Court’s Findings
Based on its review of the administ rative record, the tr ial court found the following facts: “In this case, the facts here indicated that [Stikes and Gage] entered [plaintiff’s] property without a warrant to enter and inspect th e property. Stikes and Gage are not uniformed police officers who did not ma ke any show of authority, force or threat toward [plaintiff] or the other individuals pr esent for the inspection. [Plaintiff’s] own witness, Gary Osman, felt free to walk away from the area during Stikes’ interview of [plaintiff], and, while doing so, challenged Stikes by telling her that she needed to leave [plaintiff] alone because [plain tiff] needed to get back to work. Osman th en got in his truck and drove off, without any resistance from the DLSE inspectors. Similarly, employee Tim Webb refused to complete a questionnaire with Deputy Gage, with absolutely no consequence fro m the DLSE inspectors.” (Record citations omitted.) Based on our review of the record, substan tial evidence supports th e court’s evidentiary findings.

2 Plaintiff obtained workers’ compensation insurance coverage on April 9, 2012.6 As to the Fourth Amendment issue, th e trial court concluded plaintiff and her employees had voluntarily consented to the in terviews with Stikes and Gage. The court observed plaintiff voluntarily showed Stikes her check register showing her personal check payment for Gibson’s wages. She also gave Stikes a business card and a Department of Agriculture sticker that she places on packaged rabb it meat. The record showed no facts supporting an y attempt by her to terminate the encounter, any coercion
for her to continue the encounte r, or any facts undermining her consent to the interview. C. No Search Occurred Plaintiff challenges the denial of her motion to exclude the evidence obtained by the DLSE deputies. She asserts her business is not open to the public, and claims the DSLE deputies did not have the right to enter and search her property without a subpoena or warrant. She complains th at the deputies “made their entry to [her] residence by driving, without permission, to the rear of her house.” She contends they “could not observe anything until they left their ve hicle and looked through a closed door.” 3 She
also asserts she was never advised that she had the right to refuse to speak with the deputies and was not shown any identification. We conclude what occurred here was simply a consensual interview. The Fourth Amendment provid es “[t]he right of the peop le to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” (U.S. Co nst., 4th Amend.) This guarante e has been incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendmen t to the federal Constitution and is applicable to the states. (See Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [federal excl usionary rule a pplicable to the states].) A similar guarantee against unreasonab le government searches is set forth in the state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.)

3 The closed door was a screen door, a llowing the interior to be visible.7 In deciding whether a search occurred, “[t]he ‘ultimate standa rd set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness’ . . . [a nd] we ask two threshold questions. First,
did the defendant exhibit a s ubjective expectation of priv acy? Second, is such an expectation objectively reasonable, that is, is the expectation that one society is willing to recognize as reasonable? [Citations.]” ( People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830- 831.) Here, we will assume plaintiff exhi bited a subjective expect ation of privacy, in that she did not expect DLSE deputies to en ter onto her private property without advance notice. We thus turn to address whether, un der all the facts, her expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable. In 1967, the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 ( Katz ), affirmed that constitutional limitations on police searches and seizures protect “people, not places.” ( Id . at p. 351.) Under the Katz standard as applied in California, the propriety of a warrantless governmental surveillance has come to encompass an assessment of the reasonableness of the indivi dual’s expectation of privacy in a particular situation, wherever he is, and whether or no t government agents trespassed physically on his property interests. (See, e.g., Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626, 638; People v. Edwards (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1096, 1103 ( Edwards ).) The inquiry is whether the government intruded unreasonably on an ex pectation of privac y which society is prepared to recognize as valid. ( People v. Chapman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 98, 106.) Here, plaintiff asserts the DLSE deputies ma de a “warrantless entry to her home” “by driving, without permission, to the rear of her house” and then looking through a “closed door.” We conclude the deputies’ condu ct did not amount to an unreasonable government search. “Though location is no longer the sine qua non of search-and- seizure analysis, it
remains relevant under the Katz test. The privacy one is entitled to expect in a particular place is governed primarily by common habits in the use of such property. [Citations.]” ( People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373, 379.) Thus, cour ts “guard with particular zeal an8 individual’s right to carry on private activities within the interior of a home or office, free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. [Citations.] We also recognize a high privacy interest in the ‘curtilage’ of a reside nce — that zone immediately surrounding the home where its private interior life can be expe cted to extend. [Cita tion.] For example, a government agent without a warrant may not peer through barriers reasonably calculated to shield one’s yard from public view, even if the officer is standing in a ‘public’ place. [Citations.]” ( Ibid. ) Assuming plaintiff’s driveway was part of the curtilage, the question before us is whether the DLSE deputies nevertheless acte d reasonably in approaching the residence from the driveway to make cont act with plaintiff and the ot her persons on the site. We note there is no evidence that a “private prope rty, no trespassing” sign was present at the beginning of the driveway to suggest the prop erty was cut off from in trusion. Even if such a sign had been present, as the United States Supreme Court has observed: “The existence of a physical trespass is only margina lly relevant to the question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated . . . .” ( United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 712-713.) It may be — we do not decide the i ssue — that the DLSE deputies committed some sort of technical trespass in venturing up plaintiff’s private dr iveway to the parking area behind the residence. We conclude, howeve r, that this factor is not determinative.
In People v. Thompson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 923 ( Thompson ), the appellate court noted “ ‘[the California] Supreme Court has made clear that a police officer who makes an uninvited entry onto private property does not per se violate the occupant’s Fourth Amendment right of privacy. The criterion to be applied is whether entry is made into an area where the public has been implicitly invi ted, such as the area furnishing normal access to the house. A reasonable expectation of privacy does not exis t in such areas. [Citation.]’ ” ( Id. at p. 942.) Even if the trespassing factor came into play at some point, moreover, it is not particularly significant. (See People v. Manderscheid (2002) 999 Cal.App.4th 355, 361.) Indeed, about the same time as our Supreme Court decided Edwards, it held in People v. Terry (1969) 70 Cal.2d 410 ( Terry ), a case involving police entry into and discovery of contraband in a common area of an apartment building (i.e., its garage) that “[e]ven if . . . the officers’ entry into the garage was a technical trespass,
their observations therein . . . did not constitute an unreasonable search.” ( Id . at p. 427.) Notwithstanding the remote nature of plai ntiff’s residence, others, such as United Parcel Service drivers, newspa per delivery people, or lost tr avelers, would normally be permitted to approach her residen ce to make a delivery or ask fo r help. “ ‘It is clear that police with legitimate business may enter areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open,
such as access routes to the house. In so doi ng they are free to keep their eyes open. [Citation.] An officer is permitted the same license to intrude as a reasonably respectful citizen. [Citation.]’ ” ( Thompson, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 943.) In the present matter, substantial evidence supports the co nclusion that the driveway to plaintiff’s business was not closed to public access and that, when the DLSE deputies approached the door to the barn, they did so for the purpose of making contact with the persons inside. Under these circumstances, the deput ies’ conduct was reasonable; hence, there
was no Fourth Amendment violation with re spect to their presence on plaintiff’s property. Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Stikes and Gage conducted
consensual interviews. It is settled that “[n]o Fourth Am endment privacy interests are
invaded when an officer seeks a consensual interv iew with a suspect.” ( People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 581, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior
Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.) “Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure.” ( People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 499; accord, Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 439-440.) In the present case, there was no show of authority and a reasonable person would have felt free to dec line to speak with th e deputies. Indeed, both Webb and Osman chose not to answer qu estions, and there is no evidence that10 plaintiff was coerced into cooperating wi th Stikes. Accordingly, as no Fourth Amendment interests were impl icated, the trial court did no t err in denying plaintiff’s writ petition. In light of our conclusions, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Dondero, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Margulies, Acting P.J.

_____________ ____________ Banke, J.