### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 11, 200 5 ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN ’S S ER V IC ES v. F. S. B. Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Sul livan Cou nty No. J28,226 Jam es H. Beeler , Judge

No. E2004-01220-COA- R3-P T 0 FILED JANU ARY 28, 2005

The trial c ourt terminated the pare ntal rig hts of F.S.B . (“F ather ”) w ith respec t to his t wo minor c hil dre n, K. L .B . ( DO B : Se pte mbe r 1 9, 19 97 ) andS.L .B . ( DO B : July 21 , 1 99 9) . F a the r a

pp e a ls, arg uing, inte r a lia , that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s finding , stated to be by c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e , th a t g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n e xist. We a ff ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Aff irm ed; Case R em anded C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY and S HAR ON G. LEE , J J ., joined.
Mu rry C. Gro secl os e, K in gspo rt , T enn ess ee, f or t he ap pel lan t, F.S .B. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter , and J u an G. Vil laseñor, A ssistant Attorney Ge ne ra l, f or the app e lle e , St a te of

Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s. OP IN ION
I.
I n October , 2001, K.L .B. and S.L .B. (collectively “the children”) came into the custody of the Depa rtment of Children’s Ser vices (“ DCS”), following a finding that the childre n wer e re siding with their mother, S.S.B. (“ Mother”) , in a conde mned apa rtment with a vicious dog

. At the time of the re moval, Father wa s living in Virg inia; he testified at trial that he ha d left his wife and children to go to Vir g inia beca

use he and his wife “ke pt arg uing.”
On Fe bruary

10, 2003, DCS filed a pe t ition to t erminate the par ental rig hts of Father a nd Mo the r. Th e c a se wa s h e ardon Janu ary 14 , 200 4. On F e br ua ry 5, 20 04 , the tr ia l cou rt

e nte re d it s-2-

order , terminating the par ental rig hts of Father a nd Mother to the children. Fr om this order, F ather app e a le d. Mo the r d id n ot a pp e a l. Subsequently , DCS filed a motion before this court, seeking to vacate the trial c ourt’s final order as to Father a nd to remand the case to the trial court f or the purpose of ente ring an orde r that contained specific finding s of fac t and conclusions of law, pursuant to T enn. Co d e A n n . § 3 6 -1- 113(k) ( Supp. 2004). On October 12, 2004, this court granted DC S’s motion. One month later , the trial court e ntere d an ame nded orde r, finding , by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that grounds for terminati n g Fa t her’ s pare ntal rig hts ex isted and that termination wa s in the best interest of the c hil dr e n. Spe c if

ic a lly , th e c ou rt

ma de the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s: Her e, the Court conclude s that there is c lear and convincing evidenc e to su pp ort g ro un ds fo r te rm inatio n of [F a the r’ s] pa re nta l r ig hts to h is c h i l d r e n u n d e r

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( g ) ( 1 ) a n d ( g ) ( 3 ) ( A )

. In additio n , the Court conclude s, based on c lear and convinc ing e vid e nc e , th a t te rm inatio n o f [F a the r’ s] pa re nta l r ig hts is i n h is children’ s best interest. Ea ch g round is discussed in turn.
* * * [T]he Cou rt

c on c lud e s th a t [F a the r] wi llf ull y faile d to su pp ort a ndto visit hi s children in the f our-month period prec eding the filing of DC S ’s p et ition to t erminate his parenta l rig hts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36 -1 -1 02 (1 )( A) (i ). Th e e vid e nc e is u nd isp ute d, ba se d o n [F a the r’ s] own admissions, that he failed to support his children in the re levant four- month period, and since the childre n have b een in DCS ’s c usto dy

. Whil e [F a the r] w a s g a inf ull y e mpl oy e d d uring July

to October 2002, and continued working in odd jobs between N ovember 20 02 a ndF e br

uary 20 03 , h e faile d to pr ov ide a ny su pp ort f

or his chil d re n. Significa ntly , [Father] admitted that he ha d no rea son for not working in 2001 and 2002. [Fathe r] was not incarc erated during thi s p e ri odof

tim e . [Fath er’s ] onl y

re a so n f or faili ng to s up po rt

his children w as that i f he had provided support, his wife would have misused the funds. Althoug h this c ould be the case , [Father] did not prese nt any

proof to support his bare assertion.
I n a ny e ve nt, the Cou rt no te s that pa re nts ha ve a

du ty to s up po rt

the ir c hil dr e n. Te nn . Cod e An n. § 34 -1 -1 02 (a ). B e c a us e [F a the r] w ill fu lly faile d to fu lf

ill his du ty to su pp ort his c hil dr e n, c ho os ing in st ead to le a ve his wi fe a nd c hil dr e n in a c on de mne d a pa rt me nt b uil din g wi th a v i ci o us dog , [Father] committed abandonme nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(1)

.-3- * * *
Th e Cou rt a lso c on c lud e s th a t te rm inatio no f [F ath e r ’ s ] p are nta l r ig hts is supported by

cl ea r and convincing e vidence under Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(3) (A). T he childr en wer e re moved on Octobe r 10, 2001, beca

use they wer e without a proper guar dian and they have rema ined in DCS’s c ustody ever since. Further, the conditions which led to the childre n’s re moval still persist. The c hildren we re orig ina lly re mov e d b e c a us e [F a the r] a ba nd on ed hi s c hil dr e n d ue to marital problems. The undisputed proof at trial showed that [Fathe r] left for Virg inia and had previously left for Florida for similar rea sons. During these times, [Father] simply left his c hildren, fa iling t o p r o v i d e a n y s u p p o r to r t o s t a y i n c o n t a c tw i t h t h e m . N o t ab l y, [F a the r] i nit ia lly

le arn e d th a t D CS ha d c us tod y of his c hil dr e n inJuly 2002, when he returne d from Virg inia. Yet, [Fathe r’ s] dereliction continued and he failed to contact DCS until J anuary 2, 2003, when he fina lly met with the DCS case mana g er f or a pe rmane ncy

plan sta ff ing . F ollowi ng thi s me e tin g , h ow e ve r, [F a the r] a g a in dis app e are d, de sp ite nu me ro us , a lbe it u ns uc c e ssf ul, a tte mpt s b y

DC S to c on ta c t hi m. In li g ht o f thi s pr oo f, [F a the r’ s] la c k of int e re st i n h is c hil dr e n is pate ntl y

ob vio us . I n addition, there a

re othe r conditions which wou ld subject the c hil dr e n to fu rthe r a

bu se or ne g le c t. [F a the r] a dmi tte d to e ng a g ing in serious criminal acts for w hich he r ece ived a substantia l prison sentenc e of 11 months and 29 day s. On J anuary 12, 2003, [Father] was involved in an aut o m o bile acc ident in which he r ear -ende d another vehicle and fled t he sce ne of the acc ident. [Father] was convicted [of] four counts of a ss au l t , driving with a suspended license, le aving the scen e o f an a ccide nt, and eva ding a rre st. The Cou rt no te s th a t th e “ oth e r c on dit ion ” he re is n ot [F a the r’ s] inc arc e ratio n, b u t

h i s u nd e rl y ing c ri min a l a c ts, wh ic h w ou ld h a ve le ft , once a g ain, his children without a pr oper le g al g uardia n. Gi ve n [F a the r’ s] c on tin ue d d isi nte re st i n h is c hil dr e n, hi s fa ilu re to su pp ort th e m, andhis c ri min a l beh a vio r, the Cou rt c on c lud e s th a t it is unlikelythat, the conditions which led to re moval, or other c on dit ion s w hic h w ou ld s ub je c t th e c hil dr e n to f

urthe r a bu se , w ou ld be re medied at a n early date. F inally , the C ourt finds that the continuation of the pa

rent-c hild relat ionship gre atly diminis hes the children’ s chanc es o f i nteg rating into a safe , stable, and pe rmane nt home. As the undisputed proof show ed, the c hildren’s be havior ha s dr a matic a lly

imp ro ve d s inc e the ir

pla c e me nt w ith L isa L e wi s, the ir-4- foster mother

. Moreove r, L ewis manife sted a c lear wish to adopt the children, w ho have be come pa rt of her family and who a ddress he r as “mom.”
F or the se re a so ns , the Cou rt

c on c lud e s th a t te rm inatio n o f [F a the r’ s] pare ntal rig hts is war

rante d beca

use he f ailed to re medy

the per sistent conditions in his l ife that pre vented the c hildren’s re turn. The c ourt went on to make compre hensive finding s relate d to the best interest of the childre n, which finding s will be discussed later in this opi nion.
II.
Ou r r e vie w o f this no n-

jury c a se is de novo ; how ever , the re cord c omes to us acc ompanied by a pre sumption of corr ectne ss a s to the trial court’s fac tual finding s, a pre sumption we must honor unless the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13( d). No pre sumption of correc tness attache s to the lower c ourt’s conc lusions of law. Ja hn v . J ahn , 932 S.W .2d 939, 941 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
III

. The law is well-established that “ pare nts have a fundame ntal rig ht to the ca re, c ustody , and control of their

children.” In re Drinn on , 7 7 6 S

. W

. 2 d 9 6 , 9 7 (T en n . C t

. Ap p . 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Stan ley v . I llinoi s , 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. C t

. 1 2 0 8 , 3 1 L . Ed. 2d 551 (1972)) . This rig ht, however , is not absolute and i t m ay b e terminated if there is clear and convinc ing e vidence justify ing te rmination under the pertinent statute. Santosky v. Kram er , 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. C t. 1388, 71 L . Ed. 2d 599 ( 1 9 8 2 )

. Cl e ar

a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e is e v id e n c e w h ic h “ e li mi n a te s a n y s e r io u s o r

s u b stantial doubt conce rning the correc tness of t he conclusions to be drawn from the evidenc e.” O’Daniel v. Messier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g ) lists the gr ounds upon whi ch p ar en t al rig hts may be terminated, and “the e x istence of any one of the statutory bases will support a termination of par ental rig hts.” In re C.W.W., 37 S.W .3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The issues ra ised in the ple a din g s, a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s, c a us e us to f oc us on the fo llo wi ng statut ory pr ov isi on s: Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-147 ( 2001) (a) The juvenile court shall be authoriz ed to terminate the rig hts of a pare nt or g uardia n to a child upon the g roun d s an d pursuant to the proce dures se t forth in title 36, chapter 1, part 1.
* * *-5- Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 ( Supp. 2004) (a) The chanc ery and cir cuit courts shall have concur rent jurisdiction with the juvenile court to te rm inate pa re nta l or g ua

rd ia ns hip ri g hts to a child in a se parate proc eeding , . . . by utiliz ing an yg rounds for t er m i n ation of par ental or g uardia nship rights pe rmitted in this part or in title 37, chapter

1, part 1 a nd title 37, chapter 2, part 4.
* * * (c) Termination of pa

renta l or g uardia nship rights must be base d upon: (1) A f inding by the court by

clea r and convincing evidenc e that the g rounds for termination of pare ntal or g uardia nship rights ha ve bee n established; and (2 ) Th a t te rm inatio n of the pa re nt’ s or g ua

rd ia n’ s ri g hts is i n th e be st interests of the c hild.
* * * (g ) I nitiation of termination of pare ntal or g uardia nship rights may be ba se d u po n a ny

of the fo llo wi ng g ro un ds : (1) Abandonment by

the par ent or g uardia n, as def ined in [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 36-1-102, has oc curr ed;
* * * (3)( A) The child has bee n remove d fr o m t h e h ome of the pa rent or g uardia n by

order of a c ourt for a

period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions which led t o the child’s re moval or other c on dit ion s w hic h in a ll r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

wo uldc a us e the c hil d to be subjecte d to further abuse or neg lect an d wh i ch, therefor e, preve nt the child’s safe return t o t h e car e of the pare nt(s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at a n e arl y date so that the c hil d c a n be sa fe ly re turne d to the pa re nt( s) or g uardia n(s) in the ne ar f uture; and-6- (i ii) Th e c on tin uatio n of the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndc hil d r e la tio ns hip g reatly diminis hes the child’s chanc es of e arly integ ration into a saf

e, stable and pe rmane nt home.
* * *

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 ( Supp. 2004)
As us e d inthi s p art , u nle ss the c on te xt oth e rw ise re qu ir e s: (1) ( A ) “ A b a n d o n me n t” me a n s , f o r p u rp o s e s o f te r mi n a ti n g the pa re nta l or g ua rd ian rig hts of

pa re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) of

a c hil d to that c hil d inor de r t o ma

ke that c hil d a va ila

ble fo r a do pti on , th a t: (i) F or a pe riod of four

(4) c onsecutive months i mmediately prec eding the fi lin g of

a pr oc e e din g or

ple a din g to t e rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of the pa rent(s) or g uardia n(s) of the child who is the subject of the p et i t i on for termination of pare ntal rig hts or adoption, that the pare nt(s) or g uardia n(s) e ith er have w illfullyfailed to visit or have wi llf ull y faile d to su pp ort or ha ve wi llf ull y faile d to make re a so na

ble payments toward the support of the child;
* * * (D ) F or pu rp os e s o f thi s subd ivi sio n (1) , “ wi llf ull y faile d to su pp ort” or “w illfully failed to make rea sonable pa y ments toward suc h child’s support” mea ns the willful failure, f or a pe riod of four

(4) c onsecutive months, to provide moneta ry support or the willful fa ilure to provide more that token pay ments toward the support of the child; (E ) F or pu rp os e s o f this su bd ivi sio n ( 1) , “ wi llf ull y faile d to vis it” me a ns the wi llf

ul f a ilu re , f or a pe ri od of fo ur

(4 ) c on se c uti ve mon ths , to visit or eng ag e in more tha n token visitation;
I V.
Father raises three issues for our consideration: (1) whether the trial court erre d in admitting into evidence certain hear say testimony ; (2) whe ther F ather ’s due pr ocess rights we re violate d when he wa s not made a pa

rty to foster c are revie ws d u ri n g t h e childre n’s depe ndency and neg lect proce eding s; and (3) whether the trial court err ed in finding the exis tence of g rounds for te rminating Father’s pa

renta l rig hts. W e will addre ss eac h of these issues in turn.-7- A.
F a the r f ir st c on tends th at th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

a llo we d tw o w itn e sse s f or DC S to te sti fy abo ut s ta te me nts ma de to the m by Mo the r co nc e rn ing F a the r’ s all e g e d a c ts o f p hy sic a l a bu se tow ardbo th M oth e r a nd the c hil dr e n. At tr ia l, F a the r ob je c te d to the te sti mon y on the ba sis that it constituted inadmissible he arsay under Tenn. R. Evid. 801 & 802. The trial court o v er ru l ed t he objections and a llowed the witnesses to testify about what Mother had told them about the a lleg ed phy sical abuse

. Assuming, without dec iding, that it was e rror for the tr ial court to have admitted these out-of

court stateme nts into evidence, the re is absolutely nothing in the recor d to indicate that the tria l court relied on these s tatements when deciding to terminate Fathe r’s parental rights. I ndeed, the trial court terminated F ather ’s rig hts on the basis of aba ndonment and failure to reme dy persistent conditions – g ro un ds that ha ve no thi ng to d o w itha ny a ll egati ons o f a

bu se . A c c or din g ly , a ny

su c h e rr or

is harmless e rror . See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b)

. B.
F a the r n e xt as se rt s th a t hi s d ue pr oc e ss ri g hts we re vio la te d whe n DCS faile d to ma ke him a party to the foster c ar e re views that took place during the childre n’s depe ndency and neg lect proce eding s. Our re view of the rec ord re veals that at no time did Father raise this issue be fo re the trial court. The law is well-e stabli s hed that issues not raise d befor e the tria l court cannot be ra ised for the first time on appea l. State De p’t of Hum an Serv s. v. De friece , 9 37 S.W. 2d95 4, 96 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1996). How ever , assuming, for the sake of ar g ument, that the issue was pr operly raised be fore the trial court, this C ourt has held that an y v i o l at ion of due proc ess in depende ncy and neg lect proce eding s may

be cur ed by

a subseque nt valid termination of par ental rig hts pr ocee ding. See In re S. Y. , 121 S.W .3d 358, 366 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Moreover , a re view of the trial court’ s final order reve als that the court in no way relied upon any

evidenc e fr om the depende ncy and neg lect pr oc e e din g s in de c idi ng to t e rm inate F a the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts . T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t. C.
Father next contends that the trial court e rre d in finding that gr ounds exi sted for te rminating his parenta l rig hts. W e disag ree . I n addre ssing this i s s u e, F ather specific ally

arg ues that there was no c lear and convinc ing evidenc e that he a

bandoned his c hildren. I n support of t his arg ument, Father states that DCS did not g ive him an opportunity

to visit his children and that, because he did not hav e a job in the f our mon ths le a din g up to the fi lin g of the pet iti on to t e rm inate , h e ha d n o in c ome a ndthe re fo re c ou ld not possiblypay

child support. He a

rg ues that the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’ s holding that his fa ilure to support was intentional. With respe ct t o Father’s f ailure to visit, the trial-8-

court found – by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e – that Father had failed to visit his c hildren in the fo ur mon ths prec edi ng th e fi lin g of the pe tit ionto t e rm inate . Ind e e d, the tr ia l c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly found that F ather

had not vi s i t ed the children since O ctober , 2001. Whil e F ather met with the c hil dr e n’ s D CS c a se wo rk e r o n Jan ua ry 2, 20 03 , re g ard ing the c hil dr e n’ s p e rm a ne nc y plan, the c a se wo rk e r did no t hea

r fr om him a g a in, de sp ite nu me ro us a tte mpt s to c on ta c t hi m. Wh ile F a the r c la ims in his brief that he w as unemploy ed for the entire four- month p er iod prec eding the filing of the petition, he admitted at t rial t hat he was working “odd j obs” during those four months. However , he did not send any of the income e arne d from these “odd jobs” to support his children. In fac t, the on ly re a so n th a t F a the r g a ve a t tria l for fai li ng to sup po rt the c hil dr e n inthe pa st w a s d ue to h is conce rn that Mother w ould “misuse” the f unds.
The e vidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding , by clea r and c onvincing e vid e nc e , th a t F a the r a

ba nd on e d th e c hil dr e n. F urthe r, wh ile F a th er do es not r a ise a ny iss ue wi th re sp e c t to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that F a the r f a ile d to re me dy pe rs ist e nt c on dit ion s, we fi ndlik e wi se that the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court’s finding of this gr ound for te rm inatio n. Th e e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e s a patte rn of F a the r le a vin g his famil y du e to d isa g re e me nts with Mother and faili ng to show any interest in his children whe n he re turned to town, eve n upon le arn ing that the c hil dr e n w e re in s ta te c us tod y . In a dd iti on , F a the r c omm itt e d s e ri ou s c ri me s ju st one month afte r meeting with the DCS c ase worke r about his childre n. Be cause of his crimes, F ather was sentenced to serve two consec utive terms of 11 months, 29 day s in jail. Ba sed upon F ather ’s obvious la ck of interest in the children, as well as his criminal behavior, the trial court found that the evid e n c e s h o w e dc le ar ly a n dc o n v in c in g ly

th a t F a th e r

h a d f a il e d to r e me d y

th e s e p e rsistent conditions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (A). We hold th at t he evide nce doe s not preponde rate ag ainst these findin gs , and ac cording ly , we f ind that the trial court pr operly found g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g F a the r’ s p are nta l r ig hts

. V. Finally , we c onclude that the e vidence contained in the r ecor d s u p p o rt s the trial court’s finding that the t ermination of Father ’s par ental rig hts is in t he best intere st of the child. The tria l c ou rt su mma ri zedthe fa c tor s p e rt a ini ng to the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st: As to the best intere st prong , t h e C ourt conc ludes that sever al statut ory fa c tor s u nd e r T e nn . Co deAn n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( i) are pr e se nt i n this case, whic h DCS proved by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Ac c or din g ly , te rm inatio n is in the c hil dren’s be st i nte re st. F ir st, [Father] has not made any adjustment of circ umstance, c onduct or c on dit ion s a s e vid e nc e d b y hi s c omp le te no n- inv olv e me nt i n th is case . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 1). Even thoug h [ Father] learned in J uly

2002 that DCS had custody of hi s children, he did not m ee twi t h DC S o ff

i ci al s u n t i l J an u ar y 2 0 0 3

. Fo l l o wi n g t h i s m ee t i n g, [Father], howeve r, disappea red once a g ain and f

ailed to assume a ny responsibilityto reg ain custody of his children.-9- Secondly , the childre n have not se en or he ard f rom [Father ] si nce, at least, Oc tober 2001 – a

pproxi mately

three y ear s ag o. This, of cour se, if no t th e c hil dr e n’ s f

ault . T he pr oo f w a s c le ar that [F a the r] f a ile d to maintain reg ular visitation or contac t with the children a nd that he failed to e stablish a meaning ful relationship with them. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113( i)(3) & (4). I n addition, [Father] f ailed to pay

any child support since his children’s remova l. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 113(i)(9)

. Mo r e o v e r , th e e f

f e c t o f a c h a n g e in c ar e ta

k e r s a n d p h y s ical environment is likely

to ha ve a substantially

neg ative impact on the c hil dr e n. Te nn . Cod e An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( i) (5 ). Th e pr oo f s ho we d th a t, since re moval, the childre n have ne ver a sked abo u t their fathe r, nor have the y ever visited with him. L ewis, the foste r mother, pr ovided c re dib le , u nr e bu tte d te sti mon y that th e c hil dr e n h a ve su bs ta nti a lly imp ro ve d in the ir be ha vio r a ndsc ho ol p e rf orma nc e sin c e be ing wi th he r. L e wi s a lso e xpre sse d h e r w ishto a do pt bo th chil dr e n. At thi s jun c tur e , a ny c ha ng e in e nv ir on me nt f or the c hil dr e n w ou ld b e c le arl y d et ri m en t al t o t h ei r w el l -b ei n g. F or the se re a so ns , th e Cou rt c on c lud e s th a t te rm inatio n o f [F a the r’ s] pa re nta l r ig hts is c le arl y

in the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st. Th e e vid e nc e do e s n ot p re po nd e rate a g a ins t th e se fi nd ing s. V I. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed. This case is remande d to t h e t ri al court for e nf or c e me nt o f that c ou rt ’s jud g me nt andfo r the c oll e c tio n of c os ts a sse sse d b e low , a ll p ur su a nt t o app li cabl e la w. C os ts on app eal are t ax ed t o t he ap pel lan t, F.S .B.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE