Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1279 | October 10, 2018 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ralph J. Johnson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

October 10, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-1279

Appeal from the Vigo Superior 

Court

The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

84D03-1305-FB-1449

Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1279 | October 10, 2018 Page 2 of 10

Statement of the Case

[1] Ralph J. Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing 

that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to sufficiently 

specify the reasons for revoking his probation. Finding no due process 

violation, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court violated Johnson’s right to due process

when revoking his probation. 

Facts

[3] In 2013, the State charged Johnson with: Count 1, Class B felony unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon; Count 2, Class D felony 

resisting law enforcement; Count 3, Class D felony operating a vehicle as an

habitual traffic violator; and Count 4, Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. 

On June 19, 2014, the day of Johnson’s scheduled jury trial, he entered into a 

plea agreement with the State. He agreed to plead guilty to Class B felony 

unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Class D felony 

resisting law enforcement in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the remaining 

charges. The parties agreed that Johnson would receive an aggregate sentence 

of ten (10) years, with six (6) years executed in the Department of Correction 

and four (4) years suspended to probation. The plea agreement also included 

specific probation terms regarding abstaining from drug and alcohol use and 
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obtaining drug and alcohol treatment. The trial court accepted Johnson’s plea 

agreement and imposed concurrent sentences of ten (10) years for Johnson’s 

Class B felony conviction and three (3) years for his Class D felony conviction. 

For this aggregate ten (10) year sentence, the trial court ordered, pursuant to the 

plea agreement, that six (6) years were to be executed and four (4) years were 

suspended to probation.

[4] On November 20, 2017, the State filed a notice of probation violation, alleging 

that Johnson had violated probation by committing another criminal offense. 

Specifically, the State alleged that Johnson had been arrested on November 14, 

2017 and had been charged with operating a vehicle after being an habitual 

traffic offender and operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. 

Shortly thereafter, on December 7, 2017, the State filed an amended notice of 

probation violation, adding two additional violations. Specifically, the State 

alleged that Johnson: (1) had been arrested on December 5, 2017 and had been 

charged with public intoxication and disorderly conduct; and (2) had tested 

positive for alcohol on November 3, 2017 and November 29, 2017.

[5] The trial court held a probation revocation hearing on January 18, 2018. 

During the hearing, Johnson’s probation officer testified that Johnson had

violated probation because he: (1) had been arrested for and charged with 

operating a vehicle after being an habitual traffic violator and operating a 

vehicle while intoxicated on November 14, 2017; (2) had been arrested for and 

charged with public intoxication and disorderly conduct on December 5, 2017;

and (3) had tested positive for alcohol on November 3 and November 29, 2017. 
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[6] During the revocation hearing, Johnson admitted that had an alcohol problem. 

He also stated that he was taking antabuse. When Johnson’s counsel asked him

about the State’s allegations that he had “picked up a couple of new cases that 

[we]re pending[,]” Johnson responded, “[u]h, alcohol related, yes[.]” (Tr. Vol. 

2 at 15). On cross-examination, Johnson acknowledged that he had “had a 

relapse” and that he had not taken the antabuse daily. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 16). He 

also testified that he would be willing to go through a substance abuse program 

if the trial court were to order him to do so. 

[7] At the end of the hearing, the trial court confirmed that neither party had any 

further evidence and engaged in the following discussion with the parties:

THE COURT: And you’re asking me to find that he violated the 

(indiscernible) terms and conditions of his probation?

[THE STATE]: Yes your Honor.

THE COURT: And the -- [defense counsel].

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, we can’t argue he has the 

pending cases, so --

THE COURT: Okay. So I’m gonna find that you violated 

probation, Mr. Johnson. I’m gonna revoke you and send you to 

the Vigo County Jail and have Mr. Macke see you this afternoon. 

I may consider – I am not sure what the result will be and the 

disposition. I need some more information before I decide . . . 

and I’m gonna reset this for a hearing um, and I need an 

evaluation from Mr. Macke. I also need an alcohol and drug 

evaluation um, from Hamilton Center, um, and set this for 

disposition.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 20-21).
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[8] That same day, the trial court issued a written order, revoking Johnson’s 

probation. In relevant part, the trial court’s order provided: “Witnesses are 

sworn and this Cause comes before the Court for hearing on the Notice of 

Probation Violation filed herein. Evidence is presented. The Court having 

heard the same and being duly advised in the premises, now find [Johnson] has 

violated the terms of his probation in this matter.” (App. Vol. 2 at 124). The 

trial court also issued an order that Johnson be evaluated by various therapeutic 

programs, including Home of Hope, Freebirds Solution Center, Club Soda, and 

Odyssey House. The trial court also held four additional hearings on January 

22, 2018, February 15, 2018, March 15, 2018, and April 16, 2018, to determine 

the appropriate sanction and placement for Johnson.

[9] At the final disposition hearing on April 16, the State presented testimony from 

Johnson’s neighbor, Cecil Keller (“Keller”), who testified that he and his wife 

had had multiple problems with Johnson since he had moved next to them in 

August 2017. Keller testified that it had “been nothing but uh, drunkenness and 

uh, drugs and driving while suspended and running in and out and drug 

traffic.” (Tr. Vol. 6 at 6). Additionally, Keller testified that he had called the 

police on Johnson seventy-four times because Johnson frequently walked 

around the yard completely naked or naked with a sock on his penis. Keller 

also testified that he had gotten a protective order against Johnson because he 

had threatened to kill Keller’s wife and dogs and had threatened to commit a 

sexual act against Keller’s wife. 
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[10] When Johnson testified, he disputed Keller’s testimony that he had been

completely naked and that he had had drugs. Johnson, however, admitted that 

he had an alcohol problem, and he asked to be put into one of the substance 

abuse programs. When Johnson’s counsel asked him about his pending 

charges, Johnson acknowledged that he had some. He stated that “part of this 

revocation is the D.U.I. charges” and said that he had been evaluated for 

community corrections in that case. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 19). Johnson also admitted 

that he had been charged with four crimes in the prior twelve months: (1) an 

indecent exposure charge, which was dismissed; (2) a resisting law enforcement

charge, to which he pled guilty; (3) a “drunk and disorderly” charge; and (4) a 

D.U.I. charge, which was pending. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 20). He also acknowledged 

that his arrests were all related to his alcohol abuse. 

[11] At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated:

Well . . . my concern is that you were – you went to the Indiana 

Department of Corrections (sic.), you were given an executed 

sentence, placed on formal probation, ordered to do multiple 

things, including Hamilton Center, abstain from alcohol, receive 

treatment, and you may have stayed sober for a period of time 

but in a very short period of time you were arrested multiple 

times and didn’t abstain from alcohol until the Court, until the 

Court revoked your sentence. So I’m inclined to revoke the 

balance of your sentence and place you in Purposeful 

Incarceration. If you receive the treatment you need, then the 

Court will consider reducing that sentence. But it appears to me 

that Freebirds, Club Soda, that’s not enough for you Mr. 

Johnson. You need to address your alcohol issues, and then 

additionally, address your mental health treatment.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1279 | October 10, 2018 Page 7 of 10

(Tr. Vol. 6 at 32-33). That same day, the trial court issued an order, revoking 

Johnson’s probation and ordering him to serve his previously suspended four 

(4) year sentence in the Department of Correction. The trial court, as stated 

during the hearing, placed Johnson in purposeful incarceration and noted that it

would consider a sentence modification upon his completion of his therapeutic 

program. Johnson now appeals.

Decision

[12] Johnson contends that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing 

to specify the reasons for revoking his probation.

[13] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which 

a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 

2007). “A probation hearing is civil in nature[,]” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 

551 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied, and “probationers do not receive the same 

constitutional rights that defendants receive at trial.” Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

438, 440 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. “Although probationers are not entitled to 

the full array of constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial, ‘the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [does] impose [ ] procedural and 

substantive limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by 

probation.’” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Debro v. 

State, 821 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. 2005)). 

[14] One requirement of due process provided to a probationer at a revocation 

hearing includes a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1279 | October 10, 2018 Page 8 of 10

upon and reasons for revoking probation. Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1083, 

1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). 

The requirement for a written statement “is a procedural device aimed at 

promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation 

decisions.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 

(footnote omitted). See also Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1163, 1164 (Ind. 1996)

(“Due process requires that the reasons for revoking probation be clearly and 

plainly stated by the sentencing judge not merely to give appellant notice of the 

revocation, but also to facilitate meaningful appellate review.”). “[A] trial 

judge’s oral statement, if it contains the facts relied upon and reasons for 

revocation, and is reduced to writing in the transcript of the hearing, is 

sufficient to satisfy this requirement.” Wilson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 32, 33 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1999).

[15] Johnson contends that the trial court’s revocation of his probation did “not 

comport with due process” because the trial court “merely made a legal 

conclusion” that he had violated probation and did not specify whether the 

revocation was based on the allegation that he had committed a new offense or 

the allegation that he had used alcohol. (Johnson’s Br. 10). He contends that 

the probation officer’s testimony that he had been arrested and charged with 

new criminal offenses was not sufficient to show that he had committed the 

new offenses. He, however, concedes that the State presented sufficient 

evidence to show he had violated probation by using alcohol, and he 

acknowledges that the “violation of just one condition is sufficient to revoke [a 
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defendant’s] probation[.]” (Johnson’s Br. 13). Nonetheless, he asks us to 

remand to the trial court “for reconsideration of whether revocation was an 

appropriate sanction.” (Johnson’s Br. 13).

[16] Here, the State alleged that Johnson had violated probation by: (1) committing 

additional criminal offenses on two separate occasions; and (2) using alcohol. 

During the revocation hearing, the State presented one witness, Johnson’s

probation officer, who testified that Johnson had violated probation by being 

arrested and charged in two separate causes and by testing positive for alcohol 

on two different dates. When Johnson testified, he admitted that he had an 

alcohol problem and that he had relapsed. He also acknowledged that he had 

pending charges that were “alcohol related[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 15). At the end of 

the revocation hearing, when the trial court was determining whether to find 

that Johnson had violated the terms of his probation, Johnson’s counsel stated 

that acknowledged Johnson “c[ould]n’t argue he has the pending cases[.]” (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 20).1 Thereafter, the trial court revoked Johnson’s probation. The trial 

court’s oral statements at the hearing and its written order, along with the 

hearing transcript, indicate that the reasons for revoking Johnson’s probation 

were the allegations contained in the amended revocation petition. Because the 

trial court’s oral and written statements satisfy the written statement 

requirement and serve the requirement’s purpose of giving notice of the reasons 

 

1 The parties dispute the meaning of the statement of Johnson’s counsel. The State contends that Johnson’s 

counsel admitted that Johnson had committed the new offenses, while Johnson contends that the statement 

was merely an acknowledgment that Johnson had pending cases. 
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for the revocation—even reasons that may be improper2—and facilitating 

meaningful review, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Johnson’s 

due process rights. See, e.g., Hubbard, 683 N.E.2d at 621 (the trial court’s 

written revocation order, which provided the reasons for revocation, and the 

hearing transcript, which provided the evidence underlying the revocation, 

“provide[d] an adequate basis for appellate review” and were “adequate to 

satisfy the separate writing requirement”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s order revoking Johnson’s probation. 

[17] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

2 We agree with Johnson that, in this specific case, the trial court’s reliance on his new offenses was an 

improper reason for revoking his probation as the State’s evidence at the revocation hearing showed merely 

that Johnson was arrested and charged for new offenses, not that he had committed them. “When a 

probationer is accused of committing a criminal offense, an arrest alone does not warrant the revocation of 

probation.” Johnson v. State, 692 N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Likewise, the mere filing of a 

criminal charge against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of probation. Martin v. State, 813 N.E.2d 

388, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Instead, when the State alleges that the defendant violated probation by 

committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 

the defendant committed the offense. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 617 (Ind. 2013). Because the State did 

not present evidence to show that Johnson had committed the new offenses, the trial court’s reliance on this 

reason to revoke Johnson’s probation was improper. See, e.g., Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 617 (holding that to 

revoke a defendant’s probation based on the allegation that he committed a new criminal offense, the trial 

court must find that the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 

committed a new criminal offense). Nevertheless, we need not remand to the trial court because it is 

undisputed that Johnson’s alcohol use remains a valid basis for the trial court’s revocation of his probation. 

“Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s 

decision to revoke probation.” Hubbard, 683 N.E.2d at 622 (holding that any error in revoking a defendant’s 

probation based upon an improper reason was harmless where other valid reasons for the revocation exist).