COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00438-CR

Devin Marquette Lynch

v.

The State of Texas

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From the 371st District Court

of Tarrant County (0785798D)

February 28, 2013

Opinion by Justice Dauphinot

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of 

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

By_________________________________

 Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot
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COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00438-CR

DEVIN MARQUETTE LYNCH APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Devin Marquette Lynch appeals from the trial court’s revocation 

of his community supervision for felony driving while intoxicated (DWI).2 In his 

sole issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a 

sentence, seven years’ confinement, that was grossly disproportionate to his 

community supervision violations. Because Appellant pled true to two violations, 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2012).
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his sentence was within the legislatively created range of confinement, two to ten

years,3for his offense, and there is no evidence that the sentence is grossly 

disproportionate to the offense, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by sentencing Appellant to seven years’ confinement. We affirm the 

trial court’s judgment.

On November 28, 2001, Appellant pled guilty to the third-degree felony 

offense of DWI. He was convicted and sentenced to ten years’ confinement and 

ordered to pay a fine of $1,250. Imposition of the confinement portion of his 

sentence was suspended, he was placed on community supervision for ten

years, and, as a condition of his community supervision, he was confined in the 

Tarrant County Jail for a period of 120 days, which was to be served through 

labor detail. Almost ten years later, on August 5, 2011, the State filed a petition 

to revoke Appellant’s community supervision, alleging that he had operated a 

motor vehicle without having a valid Texas driver’s license and that he had driven 

a vehicle without an end ignition interlock device on or about July 19, 2011.

Appellant pled true to the allegations contained in the State’s petition, and after a 

hearing on punishment, the trial court sentenced him to seven years’ 

confinement and gave him credit for the time he had served previously.

Appellant filed a motion for new trial raising the issue of disproportionality of the 

sentence in relation to the violations (as opposed to the offense for which he was 

 

3See id. § 12.34(a) (West 2011).
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sentenced),

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and the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial in a written 

order.

We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of 

discretion standard.5 In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms and 

conditions of community supervision.6 The trial court is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.7 If the 

State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in 

revoking the community supervision.8

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence of any one of the alleged 

violations of the conditions of community supervision is sufficient to support a 

 

4See McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.) (explaining that a 

grossly disproportionate sentence relative to the convicted offense violates the 

Eighth Amendment), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849 (1992).

5Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona v. 

State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

6Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

7Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. 

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981).

8Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493–94.
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revocation order.9 A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support the 

revocation of community supervision.10

In his motion for new trial, Appellant concedes that the trial court acted 

within its discretion in sentencing him and further appears to concede that any 

sentence within the statutory range of punishment lies within the trial court’s 

discretion. Specifically, he states,

The Court could have exercised its discretion and imposed a 

sentence that was more consistent with the fair and equal 

administration of justice. Society gains no benefit in incarcerating a 

Defendant that has been sober for many years because he drove a 

vehicle that did not have an installed guardian interlock device.

Appellant offered no evidence of disproportionality, either at the hearing on 

the State’s motion to revoke or in his motion for new trial. He does not complain 

that he was denied the opportunity to offer such evidence when the trial court 

overruled his motion without a hearing. His argument appears to be that it is 

simply unfair to sentence a person to seven years’ incarceration when he has 

stopped drinking and when he has come within months of completing a ten-year 

term of community supervision.

Because Appellant pled true to the State’s allegations, the sentence was 

within the statutory range of punishment, and Appellant has offered no evidence 

of disproportionality, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

 

9Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); 

Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

10Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979).
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imposing the seven-year sentence on Appellant. We overrule his sole point and 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT 

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: February 28, 2013