United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

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D.A., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Newark, NJ, Employer

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Docket No. 17-0392

Issued: June 26, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On December 12, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal of a November 18, 2016 merit

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury 

causally related to the accepted January 12, 2016 employment incident.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On April 7, 2016 appellant, then a 31-year-old postal inspector, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that, on January 12, 2016, she was in her employing establishment 

vehicle when she was struck by another vehicle running a red light while in the performance of 

duty. Appellant’s supervisor indicated on the reverse side of the claim form that appellant was in 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.-
2

the performance of duty at the time of the January 12, 2016 incident. Regarding continuation of 

pay, the supervisor noted that appellant did not report the injury within 30 days of the injury. 

Appellant did not initially stop work.

OWCP received January 12, 2016 discharge instructions, clinical summary and invoice

from St. Barnabas Medical Center Emergency Department and motor vehicle collision home 

care instructions. 

In a development letter dated April 14, 2016, OWCP informed appellant of the type of 

evidence needed to support her claim and requested that she submit such evidence within 30 

days. It noted that there was no medical diagnosis of any condition resulting from the injury. 

OWCP requested that appellant complete a questionnaire and provide detailed factual 

information concerning the accident, including where it occurred and whether she was in the 

performance of her official duties at the time. A similar development letter of the same date 

requested additional factual information from the employing establishment.

In an April 26, 2016 statement, appellant indicated that following her car accident on 

January 12, 2106 she drove herself to the emergency room for the purpose of being examined. 

She noted that, at the time, she was approximately 11 weeks pregnant and wanted to ensure that 

no harm had come to her unborn child. Appellant explained that the physician conducted an 

ultrasound and recommended a follow up with her personal obstetrician to confirm that no harm 

was done to the baby. She explained that the injury was not reported until April 7, 2016, as she 

believed that her medical bills would be paid by the insurance company for the driver who 

caused the accident. Appellant indicated that no other injuries were sustained. Regarding her 

work activities on the date of the injury, she explained that she was at the “Orange location” in 

Orange, New Jersey, where she retrieved a reported suspicious parcel. The distance between the 

accident and her last official duty was approximately 1.6 miles. Appellant noted that she was 

supposed to go to 2 Federal Square in Newark, New Jersey. She explained that when the 

accident occurred she was on the most direct route from the point of her last official duty to her 

next expected duty. Appellant named the location of the accident and indicated that she was 

operating a government-owned vehicle at the time. 

OWCP received a copy of a January 12, 2016 employing establishment accident report, 

accident investigation worksheets, diagrams, and a motor vehicle accident report of the same 

date. It also received a monthly vehicle log of appellant’s authorized vehicle usage and an 

authorization to disclose health information and bill from Saint Barnabas Medical Center.

In a January 14, 2016 statement, appellant indicated that at approximately 8:45 a.m. on 

January 12, 2016 she was traveling eastbound on Freeway Drive East, when another car ran the 

red light, entered the intersection, and slammed into her. 

In an April 4, 2016 statement, R.L., a postal inspector and team leader, confirmed

appellant’s details of her motor vehicle accident on January 12, 2016. 

In an April 22, 2016 report, Dr. Linda Silva-Karcz, Board-certified in obstetrics and 

gynecology, noted that appellant was seen in their office on January 13, 2016, the day after her 

car accident. She provided a copy of the ultrasound that was taken and indicated that her notes 
3

were on the bottom of the report. The attached January 13, 2016 ultrasound notes revealed that 

there was “no bleeding and no surgery.”

OWCP received part of an attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), dated April 25, 

2016 from a physician, whose signature is illegible and treated an unnamed individual for a left 

knee injury.

By decision dated May 18, 2016, OWCP accepted that the January 12, 2016 employment 

incident occurred as alleged. However, it denied appellant’s claim, finding that she had not 

submitted medical evidence containing a valid medical diagnosis of a medical condition from a 

qualified physician in connection with the accepted employment incident.

On June 14, 2016 appellant requested reconsideration. She indicated that the visit to the 

emergency room was for the purpose of checking out the status of her unborn child. Appellant

indicated that the ultrasound was performed and then she followed up with her physician. She

argued that the ultrasound was necessary, as noted by her physician, Dr. Silva-Karcz, who 

indicated it was done to determine the safety of the unborn child. Appellant noted that the 

document pertaining to a left knee injury was not related to her. 

OWCP received a neurological assessment and laboratory reports from St. Barnabas

Medical center and patient education notes dated January 12, 2016, some of which were signed 

by a nurse. Dr. Sarah Kuhlmann, an emergency medicine physician, who indicated that 

appellant was pregnant and in a motor vehicle collision. She also ordered the above-noted 

testing and recommended follow up with her physician. OWCP also received copies of the 

previously submitted reports and documents.

In a June 3, 2016 report, Dr. Silva-Karcz explained that she saw appellant on January 13,

2016, the day after her motor vehicle accident. She indicated that an ultrasound was performed 

and confirmed that the unborn baby was in good health.

By decision dated November 18, 2016, OWCP denied modification of its May 18, 2016 

decision, finding that the medical evidence of record did not contain a valid medical diagnosis

from a qualified physician in connection with the accepted employment incident.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

A claimant seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence, including that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that 

any specific condition or disability claimed is causally related to the employment injury.3

To determine if an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of duty, 

OWCP begins with an analysis of whether fact of injury has been established. Generally, fact of 

 

2

Id.

3 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(e), (f); see Jacquelyn L. Oliver, 48 ECAB 232, 235-36 (1996).
4

injury consists of two components that must be considered in conjunction with one another. The 

first component is whether the employee actually experienced the employment incident that 

allegedly occurred.4 The second component is whether the employment incident caused a 

personal injury.5 An employee may establish that an injury occurred in the performance of duty 

as alleged, but fail to establish that the disability or specific condition for which compensation is 

being claimed is causally related to the injury.6

Causal relationship is a medical question that generally requires rationalized medical 

opinion evidence to resolve the issue.7 A physician’s opinion on whether there is causal 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the accepted employment incident must be 

based on a complete factual and medical background.8 Additionally, the physician’s opinion 

must be expressed in terms of a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and must be supported 

by medical rationale, explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition 

and the specific employment incident.

9

Certain healthcare providers such as physician assistants, nurse practitioners, physical 

therapists, and social workers are not considered “physician[s]” as defined under FECA.10 

Consequently, their medical findings and/or opinions will not suffice for purposes of establishing 

entitlement to FECA benefits.11

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish a traumatic 

injury causally related to the accepted January 12, 2016 employment incident. The medical 

evidence, it is insufficiently rationalized to establish the second component of fact of injury, that 

the employment incident caused an injury. The medical evidence contains no reasoned no 

explanation of how the specific employment incident on January 12, 2016 caused or aggravated 

an injury or condition.

12

 

4 Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

5

John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989). 

6 Shirley A. Temple, 48 ECAB 404, 407 (1997).

7 Robert G. Morris, 48 ECAB 238 (1996).

8 Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989). 

9

Id.

10 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(t).

11 K.W., 59 ECAB 271, 279 (2007); David P. Sawchuk, 57 ECAB 316, 320 n.11 (2006). A report from a 

physician assistant or certified nurse practitioner will be considered medical evidence if countersigned by a qualified 

physician. Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Causal Relationship, Chapter 2.805.3a(1)

(January 2013).

12 See George Randolph Taylor, 6 ECAB 986, 988 (1954) (where the Board found that a medical opinion not 

fortified by medical rationale is of little probative value).
5

OWCP received a neurological assessment, laboratory reports from St. Barnabas Medical 

center. The Board had held that diagnostic test reports are not probative to the issue of causal 

relationship as they do not offer an opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition.13 

Appellant also submitted patient education notes dated January 12, 2016, signed by a nurse. The 

Board has held that nurses are not considered physicians under FECA and, thus, their reports are 

of no probative value.

14

In a January 12, 2016 report, Dr. Kuhlmann indicated that appellant was pregnant and in 

a motor vehicle collision. She also ordered the above-noted testing and recommended follow up 

with her physician. However, Dr. Kuhlmann did not provide a diagnosis.15

In an April 22, 2016 report, Dr. Silva-Karcz advised that appellant was seen in her office 

on January 13, 2016, the day after her car accident. She indicated that an ultrasound revealed 

that there was “no bleeding and no surgery.” Dr. Silva-Karcz provided diagnosis with regard to 

whether appellant had any condition related to the January 12, 2016 incident. Likewise, in a 

June 3, 2016 report, she reiterated that she saw appellant on January 13, 2016, the day after her 

motor vehicle accident. Dr. Silva-Karcz indicated that an ultrasound was performed to 

determine that the unborn child was safe. She did not provide a diagnosis and, as such, this 

report is insufficient to establish appellant’s claim.

16

 

Because the medical reports submitted by appellant do not address how the January 12, 

2016 incident at work caused or aggravated a diagnosed condition, these reports are of limited 

probative value17 and are insufficient to establish that the January 12, 2016 employment incident 

caused or aggravated a specific injury.

On appeal appellant argues that her ultrasound was necessary to check on the status of 

her unborn child. However, as found above, the medical reports do not address how the

January 12, 2016 incident at work caused or aggravated a diagnosed condition. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a)

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

 

13 S.S., Docket No. 16-1760 (issued January 23, 2018).

14 Supra note 11.

15 Ceferino L. Gonzales, 32 ECAB 1591 (1981).

16 See Charles H. Tomaszewski, 39 ECAB 461, 467-68 (1988) (finding that medical evidence which does not 

offer any opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue of causal 

relationship).

17 See Linda I. Sprague, 48 ECAB 386, 389-90 (1997).
6

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she 

sustained a traumatic injury causally related to the accepted January 12, 2016 employment 

incident.

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 18, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: June 26, 2018

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board