AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED; Opinion Filed March 11, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-19-00177-CR

ROLI AROLDO LOPEZ, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-81302-2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Myers, Schenck, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Schenck

A jury convicted appellant Roli Aroldo Lopez of continuous sexual abuse of 

a child younger than fourteen years of age, and the trial judge assessed punishment 

at sixty years’ confinement. In two issues, he challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the conviction and requests the judgment be modified to correct 

the name of the “attorney for the defendant.” We affirm the trial court’s judgment 

as modified by this opinion. Because all issues are settled in the law, we issue this 

memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
–2–

BACKGROUND

A.M. was born in February 2006. In December 2016, she moved to Plano 

where she lived with her cousins, siblings, mother, and stepfather, appellant.1 

According to the trial testimony, when A.M. was in fifth grade, appellant touched 

her inappropriately and illegally and on at least one other occasion had sexual 

intercourse with her. After A.M. became visibly pregnant, appellant stopped 

touching her. 

On February 2, 2018, A.M.’s mother took A.M. to have the pregnancy 

terminated.2 Appellant and A.M.’s two younger siblings came to the appointment 

as well. At that appointment, a sonogram technician estimated A.M.’s pregnancy 

began in mid to late September 2017. The doctor’s staff suspected A.M. had been 

abused, called the police to report their suspicions, and delayed A.M., her family, 

and appellant until the police arrived. 

Appellant was charged by indictment for continuous sexual abuse of a child 

younger than fourteen. Appellant pleaded not guilty, and the case proceed to trial 

before a jury, which found appellant guilty as alleged in the indictment. The trial 

judge sentenced appellant to sixty years’ confinement. 

 

1 Although there is no evidence appellant was married to A.M.’s mother, A.M. referred to appellant as 

her “stepfather” throughout her testimony, so we refer to him as such as well. 

2 Following her sonogram, A.M.’s pregnancy was not terminated. 
–3–

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his second issue, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to establish 

he sexually assaulted A.M. at least twice over a duration of 30 or more days. 

A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if, during 

a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual 

abuse and, at the time of the commission of each act, he is seventeen years of age or 

older and the victim is a child younger than fourteen. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

21.02(b). Although the exact dates of the abuse need not be proven, the offense does 

require proof that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period of thirty 

days or more. Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no 

pet.); see PENAL § 21.02(d) (jury not required to unanimously agree on which 

specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by defendant or exact dates when those 

acts occurred, but jury must agree unanimously that defendant, during period of 

thirty or more days, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse).

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court considers 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 624–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 

The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to attach to witness 

testimony. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The testimony of a child 
–4–

victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a 

child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a); Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 

266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.). 

At trial, the evidence established A.M. was twelve years old when she 

delivered her baby. Appellant was thirty-seven at the time of trial. Appellant 

testified in his own defense and admitted to having intercourse with A.M. during the 

last week of September and the first week of October 2017. Thus, the evidence is 

sufficient to establish appellant committed at least two acts of sexual abuse and at 

the time he was older than seventeen and A.M. was younger than fourteen. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). The only element appellant challenges on appeal is 

whether he abused A.M. at least twice over a duration of 30 or more days. 

We conclude there is sufficient evidence that at least two acts of sexual abuse 

occurred between December 2016 and September 2017. A.M. testified she was born 

in February 2006, she moved to Plano when she was approximately ten years old, 

and that appellant first sexually abused her at or about the time she moved to Plano. 

Appellant testified that he met A.M. when she moved to Plano in December 2016, 

and the investigating detective testified A.M. began attending school in Plano in 

January 2017. A.M. testified regarding four separate instances of appellant sexually 

abusing her, which a reasonable juror could rationally infer took place over the 
–5–

period of time between December 2016 and September 2017.3 After A.M.’s baby 

was born, the investigating police detective obtained DNA samples from A.M., her 

baby, and appellant. At trial, an expert testified that, based on an analysis of the 

DNA collected, appellant could not be excluded as the father of A.M.’s baby, but at 

least 99.999999995 percent of the male population was excluded. Additionally, the 

sonogram technician testified A.M.’s pregnancy began in mid to late September 

2017. 

Appellant challenges A.M.’s testimony, noting inconsistencies in the number 

of times she stated appellant abused her and when the abuse occurred. However, as 

the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given 

their testimony, the jury had to resolve this conflicting testimony. McCay v. State, 

476 S.W.3d 640, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. ref’d). 

Deferring to the jury’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses and 

the weight to be given their testimony, based on the cumulative force of all the 

evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and considering the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, we conclude a rational trier 

of fact could have found more than one act of sexual abuse occurred over a duration 

of 30 or more days between December 2016 and September 2017; that these acts 

 

3 According to A.M., during some of the instances of abuse, it was cold outside and other times it was 

warm outside.
–6–

occurred while A.M. was younger than fourteen; and that appellant was older than 

seventeen beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

II. Modification of the Judgment

In his first issue, appellant requests this Court modify the judgment to reflect 

the name of the attorney who represented him at trial. The judgment reflects the 

“attorney for defendant” was Robert Herrington. However, the record reflects 

appellant was represented at trial by Servando J. McHazlett and that Mark 

Underwood assisted Mr. Hazlett as co-counsel. The State agrees with appellant’s 

request.

We have the authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to make the record 

speak the truth. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991). We sustain appellant’s first issue and modify the judgment to 

reflect the “attorney for defendant” was Servando J. McHazlett. 

CONCLUSION

We modify the judgment to reflect “attorney for defendant” was Servando J. 

McHazlett and affirm the judgment as modified.

DO NOT PUBLISH

TEX. R. APP. P. 47

190177F.U05

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE
–7–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

ROLI AROLDO LOPEZ, Appellant

No. 05-19-00177-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 199th Judicial 

District Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 199-81302-

2018.

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Schenck. Justices Myers and Carlyle 

participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is

MODIFIED as follows:

We sustain appellant’s first issue and modify the judgment to reflect 

the “attorney for defendant” was Servando J. McHazlett.

As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 11th day of March, 2020.