# Publicatieblad C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2474
  doi:10.3000/17252474.C_2009.158.nld |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 158 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 52e jaargang11 juli 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2474

doi:10.3000/17252474.C_2009.158.nld

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 158

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

52e jaargang11 juli 2009

---

| Nummer | Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mededelingen |
| | MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Commissie |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Nummer

Inhoud

Bladzijde

II   Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Commissie

2009/C 158/01

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informatie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Commissie |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Wisselkoersen van de euro | 2 |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Geannoteerd overzicht van de gereglementeerde markten en van de nationale bepalingen tot omzetting van de terzake geldende voorschriften van de MIFID (Richtlijn 2004/39/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Mededeling van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 16, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1008/2008 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake gemeenschappelijke regels voor de exploitatie van luchtdiensten in de Gemeenschap — Openbaredienstverplichtingen met betrekking tot geregelde luchtdiensten (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Commissie

2009/C 158/02

Wisselkoersen van de euro

2

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

2009/C 158/03

Geannoteerd overzicht van de gereglementeerde markten en van de nationale bepalingen tot omzetting van de terzake geldende voorschriften van de MIFID (Richtlijn 2004/39/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad)

3

2009/C 158/04

Mededeling van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 16, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1008/2008 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake gemeenschappelijke regels voor de exploitatie van luchtdiensten in de Gemeenschap — Openbaredienstverplichtingen met betrekking tot geregelde luchtdiensten (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Bekendmakingen |
| --- | --- |
| | BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES |
| | Commissie |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen — EACEA 11/2009 — Structurele steun voor Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid en voor maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau — Programma Europa voor de burger, Actie 2, Maatregelen 1 en 2 — 2010 | 10 |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID |
| | Commissie |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Nederland — Steunmaatregel C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Uitnodiging overeenkomstig artikel 88, lid 2, van het EG-Verdrag opmerkingen te maken (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | ANDERE BESLUITEN |
| | Commissie |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 8, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006 van de Raad inzake gegarandeerde traditionele specialiteiten voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen | 24 |

V   Bekendmakingen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Commissie

2009/C 158/05

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen — EACEA 11/2009 — Structurele steun voor Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid en voor maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau — Programma Europa voor de burger, Actie 2, Maatregelen 1 en 2 — 2010

10

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Commissie

2009/C 158/06

Steunmaatregelen van de staten — Nederland — Steunmaatregel C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Uitnodiging overeenkomstig artikel 88, lid 2, van het EG-Verdrag opmerkingen te maken (
  1
  )

1

13

ANDERE BESLUITEN

Commissie

2009/C 158/07

Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 8, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006 van de Raad inzake gegarandeerde traditionele specialiteiten voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst |

---

(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst

1

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

---

II Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Commissie

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/1

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2009/C 158/01

Op 14 mei 2009 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de gemeenschappelijke markt te verklaren. Deze beschikking is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004. De volledige tekst van de beschikking is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector; |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebeschikkingen op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector;

| — | in elektronische vorm op de Eur-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32009M5403. EUR-Lex biedt online-toegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de Eur-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) onder documentnummer 32009M5403. EUR-Lex biedt online-toegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

IV Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN EN ORGANEN VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Commissie

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/2

---

Wisselkoersen van de euro (1)

10 juli 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Munteenheid | Koers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Japanse yen | 128,21 |
| DKK | Deense kroon | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Pond sterling | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Zweedse kroon | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Zwitserse frank | 1,5140 |
| ISK | IJslandse kroon | |
| NOK | Noorse kroon | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Bulgaarse lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tsjechische koruna | 26,030 |
| EEK | Estlandse kroon | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Hongaarse forint | 277,50 |
| LTL | Litouwse litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Letlandse lat | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Poolse zloty | 4,3740 |
| RON | Roemeense leu | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Turkse lira | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Australische dollar | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Canadese dollar | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hongkongse dollar | 10,7736 |
| NZD | Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Singaporese dollar | 2,0331 |
| KRW | Zuid-Koreaanse won | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | Zuid-Afrikaanse rand | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Kroatische kuna | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Indonesische roepia | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Maleisische ringgit | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Filipijnse peso | 67,026 |
| RUB | Russische roebel | 45,4005 |
| THB | Thaise baht | 47,382 |
| BRL | Braziliaanse real | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Mexicaanse peso | 19,0303 |
| INR | Indiase roepie | 67,8230 |

Munteenheid

Koers

USD

US-dollar

1,3901

JPY

Japanse yen

128,21

DKK

Deense kroon

7,4466

GBP

Pond sterling

0,85800

SEK

Zweedse kroon

11,0022

CHF

Zwitserse frank

1,5140

ISK

IJslandse kroon

NOK

Noorse kroon

9,0840

BGN

Bulgaarse lev

1,9558

CZK

Tsjechische koruna

26,030

EEK

Estlandse kroon

15,6466

HUF

Hongaarse forint

277,50

LTL

Litouwse litas

3,4528

LVL

Letlandse lat

0,6993

PLN

Poolse zloty

4,3740

RON

Roemeense leu

4,2160

TRY

Turkse lira

2,1636

AUD

Australische dollar

1,7940

CAD

Canadese dollar

1,6212

HKD

Hongkongse dollar

10,7736

NZD

Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar

2,2250

SGD

Singaporese dollar

2,0331

KRW

Zuid-Koreaanse won

1 786,89

ZAR

Zuid-Afrikaanse rand

11,4023

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

9,4983

HRK

Kroatische kuna

7,3315

IDR

Indonesische roepia

14 174,11

MYR

Maleisische ringgit

4,9731

PHP

Filipijnse peso

67,026

RUB

Russische roebel

45,4005

THB

Thaise baht

47,382

BRL

Braziliaanse real

2,8084

MXN

Mexicaanse peso

19,0303

INR

Indiase roepie

67,8230

---

(1)  Bron: door de Europese Centrale Bank gepubliceerde referentiekoers.

---

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/3

---

Geannoteerd overzicht van de gereglementeerde markten en van de nationale bepalingen tot omzetting van de terzake geldende voorschriften van de MIFID (Richtlijn 2004/39/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad)

2009/C 158/03

Krachtens artikel 47 van de richtlijn betreffende markten voor financiële instrumenten (Richtlijn 2004/39/EG, PB L 145 van 30.4.2004) is het elke lidstaat toegestaan de status van „gereglementeerde markt” te verlenen aan de markten die op zijn grondgebied zijn gevestigd en aan zijn regelgeving voldoen.

In artikel 4, lid 1, punt 14, van Richtlijn 2004/39/EG wordt „gereglementeerde markt” omschreven als een door een marktexploitant geëxploiteerd en/of beheerd multilateraal systeem dat meerdere koop– en verkoopintenties van derden met betrekking tot financiële instrumenten — binnen dit systeem en volgens de niet–discretionaire regels van dit systeem — samenbrengt of het samenbrengen daarvan vergemakkelijkt op zodanige wijze dat er een overeenkomst uit voortvloeit met betrekking tot financiële instrumenten die volgens de regels en de systemen van de markt tot de handel zijn toegelaten, en waaraan vergunning is verleend en die regelmatig werkt, overeenkomstig het bepaalde in titel III van Richtlijn 2004/39/EG.

Artikel 47 van Richtlijn 2004/39/EG schrijft voor dat elke lidstaat een geactualiseerde lijst dient bij te houden van alle gereglementeerde markten waaraan hij vergunning heeft verleend. Deze informatie moet aan de overige lidstaten en de Europese Commissie worden medegedeeld. Krachtens hetzelfde artikel (artikel 47 van Richtlijn 2004/39/EG) is de Europese Commissie verplicht jaarlijks in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie een lijst bekend te maken van de gereglementeerde markten waarvan zij in kennis is gesteld. De onderhavige lijst is opgesteld om aan deze verplichting te voldoen.

Bijgaande lijst bevat de benaming van alle markten die volgens de nationale bevoegde autoriteiten aan de definitie van „gereglementeerde markt” voldoen. Voorts is in de lijst aangegeven welke entiteit verantwoordelijk is voor het beheer van deze markten en welke bevoegde autoriteit verantwoordelijk is voor de uitvaardiging of de goedkeuring van de marktvoorschriften.

Ten gevolge van lagere toegangsdrempels en de specialisatie in de handelssegmenten is de lijst van „gereglementeerde markten” aan veelvuldiger veranderingen onderhevig dan bij de Richtlijn Beleggingsdiensten (Richtlijn 93/22/EEG) het geval was. Overeenkomstig artikel 47 van de richtlijn betreffende markten voor financiële instrumenten is de Commissie tevens verplicht de lijst van „gereglementeerde markten” op haar website bekend te maken en bij te werken. Om die reden zal de Europese Commissie niet alleen jaarlijks een lijst in het PB bekendmaken, maar ook een geactualiseerde versie van deze lijst bijhouden op haar officiële website [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Het is de bedoeling dat laatstgenoemde lijst regelmatig wordt bijgewerkt aan de hand van de informatie die door de nationale autoriteiten wordt verstrekt. Deze autoriteiten wordt verzocht de Commissie voortdurend in kennis te stellen van eventuele toevoegingen aan of schrappingen van de lijst van gereglementeerde markten waarvoor hun lidstaat de lidstaat van herkomst is.

| Land | Benaming van de gereglementeerde markt | Exploiterende entiteit | Voor erkenning van en toezicht op de markt bevoegde autoriteit |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oostenrijk | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (officiële markt) |

Land

Benaming van de gereglementeerde markt

Exploiterende entiteit

Voor erkenning van en toezicht op de markt bevoegde autoriteit

Oostenrijk

1.

Amtlicher Handel (officiële markt)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (semi–officiële markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (semi–officiële markt)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichts-behörde (AFM — Autoriteit Financiële Markten) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichts-behörde (AFM — Autoriteit Financiële Markten)

België

| 1. | a) | De „Euronext Brussels” markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

De „Euronext Brussels” markt,

| b) | De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels NV

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Rentenfonds |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rentenfonds

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2, van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2, van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgarije

| 1. | Официален пазар (officiële markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (officiële markt)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (niet-officiële markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (niet-officiële markt)

Българска Фондова Борса — София АД (Beurs van Bulgarije — Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

Cyprus

Beurs van Cyprus

| 1. | Hoofdmarkt |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hoofdmarkt

| 2. | Parallelmarkt |
| --- | --- |

2.

Parallelmarkt

| 3. | Alternatieve markt |
| --- | --- |

3.

Alternatieve markt

| 4. | Obligatiemarkt |
| --- | --- |

4.

Obligatiemarkt

| 5. | Markt voor beleggingsmaatschappijen |
| --- | --- |

5.

Markt voor beleggingsmaatschappijen

| 6. | Markt voor grote projecten |
| --- | --- |

6.

Markt voor grote projecten

| 7. | Markt voor grote handelsvaart |
| --- | --- |

7.

Markt voor grote handelsvaart

| 1.-7. | Beurs van Cyprus |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Beurs van Cyprus

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (beurstoezichthouder) |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (beurstoezichthouder)

Tsjechië

| 1. | Hoofdmarkt (Hlavni Trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hoofdmarkt (Hlavni Trh)

| 2. | Vrije markt (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Vrije markt (Volný trh)

| 3. | Officiële markt |
| --- | --- |

3.

Officiële markt

| 4. | Futuresmarkt |
| --- | --- |

4.

Futuresmarkt

| 5. | Contante markt |
| --- | --- |

5.

Contante markt

| 1.-2. | Beurs van Praag
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Beurs van Praag

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM SYSTEM, Tsjechische beurs
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM SYSTEM, Tsjechische beurs

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5 | Energiebeurs van Praag
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5

Energiebeurs van Praag

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5 | Tsjechische nationale bank |
| --- | --- |

1.-5

Tsjechische nationale bank

Denemarken

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | aandelenmarkt |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

aandelenmarkt

| — | obligatiemarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

obligatiemarkt

| — | derivatenmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

derivatenmarkt

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Beurs van Kopenhagen NV) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Beurs van Kopenhagen NV)

Finanstilsynet (Deense financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [erkende markt = regelmatige handel in tot de handel toegelaten effecten die niet aan de beurs genoteerd zijn] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [erkende markt = regelmatige handel in tot de handel toegelaten effecten die niet aan de beurs genoteerd zijn]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

Estland

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (beurs)






  — | Põhinimekiri (hoofdmarkt) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (beurs)

—

Põhinimekiri (hoofdmarkt)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligatiemarkt) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligatiemarkt)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (fondsenmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (fondsenmarkt)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn NV)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Estlandse financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (gereglementeerde markt)






  — | Lisanimekiri (secundaire markt) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(gereglementeerde markt)

—

Lisanimekiri (secundaire markt)

Finland

Arvopaperipörssi (beurs):

| — | Pörssilista (officiële markt); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (officiële markt);

| — | Pre-lista (pre-list); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (pre-list);

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (markt voor andere effecten) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (markt voor andere effecten)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki NV)

Erkenning:

ministerie van Financiën

Toezicht:

| — | goedkeuring van regels: ministerie van Financiën |
| --- | --- |

—

goedkeuring van regels: ministerie van Financiën

| — | toezicht op naleving:
  Finanssivalvonta, Finse financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit |
| --- | --- |

—

toezicht op naleving:

Finanssivalvonta, Finse financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit

Frankrijk

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Voorstel van de Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF)

Erkenning door de minister belast met de economie (zie artikel L. 421–1 van de code monétaire et financier).

Duitsland

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (beurstoezichthouders van de deelstaten) en Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin)

Autoriteiten van de deelstaten:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium desLandes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium desLandes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München(Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München(Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Griekenland

| 1. | Beurs van Athene






  — | effectenmarkt |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Beurs van Athene

—

effectenmarkt

| — | derivatenmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

derivatenmarkt

| 1. | Beurs van Athene |
| --- | --- |

1.

Beurs van Athene

| 1. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

| 2. | Elektronische secundaire effectenmarkt (HDAT- markt voor schuldtitels) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronische secundaire effectenmarkt (HDAT- markt voor schuldtitels)

| 2. | Bank of Greece |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bank of Greece

| 2. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)

Hongarije

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (beurs van Boedapest)

| — | Részvényszekció (aandelenmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (aandelenmarkt)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (markt voor schuldtitels) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (markt voor schuldtitels)

| — | Származékos szekció (derivatenmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (derivatenmarkt)

| — | Áru szekció (grondstoffenmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (grondstoffenmarkt)

Budapesti Értéktõzsde Zrt. (Beurs van Boedapest)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Hongaarse financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

Ierland

Main market of the Irish Stock Exchange (hoofdmarkt)

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (financiële toezichthouder) verleent vergunning aan „gereglementeerde markten” en houdt toezicht op de naleving door de marktexploitant van de MiFID-bepalingen (met uitzondering van de noteringsvoorwaarden)

Italië

| 1. | Elektronische aandelenmarkt (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Elektronische aandelenmarkt (MTA)

| 2. | Elektronische obligatiemarkt (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronische obligatiemarkt (MOT)

| 3. | Elektronische markt voor fondsen van het open-endtype en ETC's (ETF-plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Elektronische markt voor fondsen van het open-endtype en ETC's (ETF-plus)

| 4. | Elektronische markt voor van effecten afgeleide instrumenten (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Elektronische markt voor van effecten afgeleide instrumenten (SeDeX)

| 5. | Nabeurs (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Nabeurs (TAH)

| 6. | Italiaanse derivatenmarkt voor de handel in financiële instrumenten als bedoeld in artikel 1, lid 2, onder f) en i), van de geconsolideerde financiële wet (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Italiaanse derivatenmarkt voor de handel in financiële instrumenten als bedoeld in artikel 1, lid 2, onder f) en i), van de geconsolideerde financiële wet (IDEM)

| 7. | Professionele markt voor Italiaanse en buitenlandse overheidsobligaties (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Professionele markt voor Italiaanse en buitenlandse overheidsobligaties (MTS)

| 8. | Professionele handel in niet door de overheid maar door internationale organisaties met overheidsparticipatie uitgegeven obligaties en effecten (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Professionele handel in niet door de overheid maar door internationale organisaties met overheidsparticipatie uitgegeven obligaties en effecten (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Professionele onlinehandel in overheidspapier (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Professionele onlinehandel in overheidspapier (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX-markt |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX-markt

| 1-6. | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6.

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9. | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9.

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX S.p.A.

Consob verleent vergunning aan entiteiten die de markten beheren en keurt de regels ervan goed

Wat de professionele markten voor overheidspapier betreft, wordt aan de exploiterende entiteit vergunning verleend door het ministerie van Economie en Financiën, op advies van Consob en de Banca d'Italia

Letland

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | hoofdmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

hoofdmarkt

| — | markt voor schuldtitels |
| --- | --- |

—

markt voor schuldtitels

| — | secundaire markt |
| --- | --- |

—

secundaire markt

| — | fondsenmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

fondsenmarkt

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (financiële en kapitaalmarktcommissie)

Litouwen

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | hoofdmarkt van Nasdaq OMX Vinius |
| --- | --- |

—

hoofdmarkt van Nasdaq OMX Vinius

| — | secundaire markt van Nasdaq OMX Vinius |
| --- | --- |

—

secundaire markt van Nasdaq OMX Vinius

| — | markt voor schuldtitels van Nasdaq OMX Vinius |
| --- | --- |

—

markt voor schuldtitels van Nasdaq OMX Vinius

| — | fondsenmarkt van Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

fondsenmarkt van Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Litouwse effectencommissie

Luxemburg

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange (beurs van Malta)

Malta Stock Exchange (Beurs van Malta)

Malta Financial Services Authority

Nederland

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Vergunningverlening door de minister van Financiën op advies van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten
  Het toezicht wordt uitgeoefend door de Autoriteit Financiële Markten en het ministerie van Financiën |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Vergunningverlening door de minister van Financiën op advies van de Autoriteit Financiële Markten

Het toezicht wordt uitgeoefend door de Autoriteit Financiële Markten en het ministerie van Financiën

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Polen

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (hoofdmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (hoofdmarkt)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (parallelmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (parallelmarkt)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO-effectenmarkt – gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO-effectenmarkt – gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt)

| 1-2. | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Beurs van Warschau) |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Beurs van Warschau)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (commissie voor financieel toezicht)

Portugal

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (officiële beursmarkt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (officiële beursmarkt)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Futures- en Optiemarkt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Futures- en Optiemarkt)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (speciale markt voor overheidsschuld) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (speciale markt voor overheidsschuld)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL

(energiemarkt)

| 1-2. | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Ministerie van Financiën verleent de markten vergunning op voorstel van de Comissão do mercado da valores mobiliários (CNVM), die verantwoordelijk is voor de regulering van en het toezicht op de markt

Roemenië

| 1. | Piața reglementată (gereglementeerde contante markt — BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (gereglementeerde contante markt — BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (gereglementeerde derivatenmarkt — BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (gereglementeerde derivatenmarkt — BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată - (gereglemen-teerde derivatenmarkt — BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată - (gereglemen-teerde derivatenmarkt — BMFMS)

| 1-2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Beurs van Boekarest NV) |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Beurs van Boekarest NV)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetaire, financiële en grondstoffenmarkt NV Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetaire, financiële en grondstoffenmarkt NV Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Roemeense nationale effectencommissie)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Roemeense nationale effectencommissie)

Slowakije

| 1. | Markt voor beursgenoteerde effecten:






  — | hoofdmarkt |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Markt voor beursgenoteerde effecten:

—

hoofdmarkt

| — | parallelmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

parallelmarkt

| 2. | Gereglementeerde vrije markt |
| --- | --- |

2.

Gereglementeerde vrije markt

Beurs van Bratislava

Nationale Bank van Slowakije

Slovenië

Officiële markt van de beurs van Ljubljana (Borzni trg)

Beurs van Ljubljana (Ljubljanaska borza)

Agentschap voor de effectenmarkten

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spanje

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (alle markten omvatten eerste- en tweedemarktsegmenten) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (alle markten omvatten eerste- en tweedemarktsegmenten)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España is verantwoordelijk voor de markt voor overheidsschuld

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de Valores de Valencia |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de Valores de Valencia

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Zweden

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | gereglementeerde markt voor aandelen en met aandelen gelijk te stellen financiële instrumenten |
| --- | --- |

—

gereglementeerde markt voor aandelen en met aandelen gelijk te stellen financiële instrumenten

| — | gereglementeerde derivatenmarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

gereglementeerde derivatenmarkt

| — | gereglementeerde markt voor obligaties en met obligaties gelijk te stellen financiële instrumenten |
| --- | --- |

—

gereglementeerde markt voor obligaties en met obligaties gelijk te stellen financiële instrumenten

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

Verenigd Koninkrijk

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange — ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange — Regulated Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange — Regulated Market

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

IJsland

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (gereglementeerde markt)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit)

Liechtenstein

N.B.

N.B.

N.B.

Noorwegen

| 1. | Beurs van Oslo (officiële markt)






  — | aandelenmarkt |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Beurs van Oslo (officiële markt)

—

aandelenmarkt

| — | derivatenmarkt (financieel) |
| --- | --- |

—

derivatenmarkt (financieel)

| — | obligatiemarkt |
| --- | --- |

—

obligatiemarkt

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (financiële toezichthoudende autoriteit van Noorwegen)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | aandelenmarkt |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

aandelenmarkt

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (officiële markt)






  — | derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (officiële markt)

—

derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

derivatenmarkt (grondstoffen)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/9

---

Mededeling van de Commissie overeenkomstig artikel 16, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1008/2008 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad inzake gemeenschappelijke regels voor de exploitatie van luchtdiensten in de Gemeenschap

Openbaredienstverplichtingen met betrekking tot geregelde luchtdiensten

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2009/C 158/04

| Lidstaat | Italië |
| --- | --- |
| Betrokken luchtroute | Bolzano — Rome Fiumicino en vice versa |
| Datum waarop de openbaredienstverplichtingen van kracht worden | 1 december 2009 |
| Adres waarop de tekst van en alle relevante informatie en/of documentatie over de openbaredienstverplichtingen kan worden verkregen | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Lidstaat

Italië

Betrokken luchtroute

Bolzano — Rome Fiumicino en vice versa

Datum waarop de openbaredienstverplichtingen van kracht worden

1 december 2009

Adres waarop de tekst van en alle relevante informatie en/of documentatie over de openbaredienstverplichtingen kan worden verkregen

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Bekendmakingen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Commissie

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/10

---

OPROEP TOT HET INDIENEN VAN VOORSTELLEN — EACEA 11/2009

Structurele steun voor Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid en voor maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau

Programma „Europa voor de burger”, Actie 2, Maatregelen 1 en 2 — 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   DOELSTELLINGEN EN BESCHRIJVING

Deze oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen EACEA 11/2009 is gebaseerd op het besluit van het Europees Parlement en de Raad tot vaststelling voor de periode 2007-2013 van het programma „Europa voor de burger” (1) ter bevordering van een actief Europees burgerschap (hierna het „Programma”).

Het Programma vormt de wettelijke basis van deze oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen onder specifieke verwijzing naar Actie 2, „Een actieve civiele samenleving in Europa”, maatregelen 1 en 2, structurele steun voor Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid en voor maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau.

1.1.   Algemene doelstellingen van het Programma

Het Programma beoogt bij te dragen tot de verwezenlijking van de volgende algemene doelstellingen:

| a) | de burgers laten samenwerken en deelnemen aan de opbouw van een steeds hechter, democratisch en wereldgericht Europa, verenigd in en verrijkt door zijn culturele diversiteit, om zo het burgerschap van de Europese Unie te ontwikkelen; |
| --- | --- |

a)

de burgers laten samenwerken en deelnemen aan de opbouw van een steeds hechter, democratisch en wereldgericht Europa, verenigd in en verrijkt door zijn culturele diversiteit, om zo het burgerschap van de Europese Unie te ontwikkelen;

| b) | een op gemeenschappelijke waarden, geschiedenis en cultuur gebaseerd besef van Europese identiteit ontwikkelen; |
| --- | --- |

b)

een op gemeenschappelijke waarden, geschiedenis en cultuur gebaseerd besef van Europese identiteit ontwikkelen;

| c) | burgers een gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid voor de Europese Unie bijbrengen; |
| --- | --- |

c)

burgers een gevoel van verantwoordelijkheid voor de Europese Unie bijbrengen;

| d) | wederzijds begrip bevorderen tussen de Europese burgers, met respect voor en met het oog op de ontwikkeling van de culturele en taaldiversiteit, en tevens bijdragen tot de interculturele dialoog. |
| --- | --- |

d)

wederzijds begrip bevorderen tussen de Europese burgers, met respect voor en met het oog op de ontwikkeling van de culturele en taaldiversiteit, en tevens bijdragen tot de interculturele dialoog.

1.2.   Specifieke doelstellingen van de oproep

De specifieke doelstellingen van deze oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen:

| a) | actie, debat en reflectie aanmoedigen over Europees burgerschap en democratie, over gedeelde waarden, over gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis en cultuur, door activiteiten en samenwerking binnen denktanks en maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau; |
| --- | --- |

a)

actie, debat en reflectie aanmoedigen over Europees burgerschap en democratie, over gedeelde waarden, over gemeenschappelijke geschiedenis en cultuur, door activiteiten en samenwerking binnen denktanks en maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau;

| b) | de wisselwerking stimuleren tussen de burgers en maatschappelijke organisaties, door de interculturele dialoog te bevorderen en zowel de diversiteit als de eenheid van Europa centraal te stellen. |
| --- | --- |

b)

de wisselwerking stimuleren tussen de burgers en maatschappelijke organisaties, door de interculturele dialoog te bevorderen en zowel de diversiteit als de eenheid van Europa centraal te stellen.

1.3.   Prioritaire thema’s

| — | De toekomst van de Europese Unie en haar fundamentele waarden, |
| --- | --- |

—

De toekomst van de Europese Unie en haar fundamentele waarden,

| — | Actief Europees burgerschap, participatie en democratie, |
| --- | --- |

—

Actief Europees burgerschap, participatie en democratie,

| — | Interculturele dialoog, |
| --- | --- |

—

Interculturele dialoog,

| — | Impact van het EU-beleid op de samenleving, |
| --- | --- |

—

Impact van het EU-beleid op de samenleving,

| — | Welzijn van de mens in Europa, werkgelegenheid, sociale cohesie en duurzame ontwikkeling. |
| --- | --- |

—

Welzijn van de mens in Europa, werkgelegenheid, sociale cohesie en duurzame ontwikkeling.

1.4.   Beschrijving van de oproep

Deze oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen betreft structurele steun, exploitatiesubsidie genoemd, aan organisaties die een doel van algemeen Europees belang nastreven. Exploitatiesubsidies bieden financiële steun ter dekking van een deel van de kosten die worden gemaakt voor de permanente activiteiten van een geselecteerde organisatie.

Er kan op grond van bepaalde criteria steun worden verleend in de vorm van een jaarlijkse subsidie of van een meerjarig partnerschap. Het meerjarig partnerschap is een samenwerkingsmechanisme tussen een organisatie en het Uitvoerend Agentschap Onderwijs, Audiovisuele Media en Cultuur (hierna het „Uitvoerend Agentschap”), waarbinnen specifieke subsidies worden verleend. In het kader van deze oproep kan een partnerschap worden gesloten voor de duur van drie jaar.

2.   SUBSIDIABELE KANDIDATEN

2.1.   Organisaties

Om voor een exploitatiesubsidie in aanmerking te komen, moet een organisatie die een doel van algemeen Europees belang nastreeft:

| a) | een zelfstandige non-profitorganisatie zijn met rechtspersoonlijkheid; betreft het een netwerk zonder aparte exploitatiestructuur met een eigen status, dan kan de aanvraag worden ingediend door de organisatie die binnen het netwerk is belast met de coördinatie; |
| --- | --- |

a)

een zelfstandige non-profitorganisatie zijn met rechtspersoonlijkheid; betreft het een netwerk zonder aparte exploitatiestructuur met een eigen status, dan kan de aanvraag worden ingediend door de organisatie die binnen het netwerk is belast met de coördinatie;

| b) | actief zijn op het gebied van Europees burgerschap zoals duidelijk in haar statuten of mission statement bepaald, en behoren tot de hierna genoemde categorieën organisaties: | Maatregel 1:






  A. | Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid (denktanks). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

actief zijn op het gebied van Europees burgerschap zoals duidelijk in haar statuten of mission statement bepaald, en behoren tot de hierna genoemde categorieën organisaties:

Maatregel 1:

A.

Europese organisaties die onderzoek doen naar overheidsbeleid (denktanks).

| | Maatregel 2:






  B. | Maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau:






  — | Europese centrale organisaties (platforms), |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Maatregel 2:

B.

Maatschappelijke organisaties op Europees niveau:

—

Europese centrale organisaties (platforms),

| — | Europese netwerken, |
| --- | --- |

—

Europese netwerken,

| — | Organisaties die activiteiten ontwikkelen met een grote impact op Europees niveau. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisaties die activiteiten ontwikkelen met een grote impact op Europees niveau.

| C. | Maatschappelijke organisaties die betrokken zijn bij het Europees gedenken. |
| --- | --- |

C.

Maatschappelijke organisaties die betrokken zijn bij het Europees gedenken.

| D. | Pan-Europese platforms van organisaties; |
| --- | --- |

D.

Pan-Europese platforms van organisaties;

| c) | haar activiteiten grotendeels uitoefenen in in aanmerking komende landen (zie punt 2.2).

  Voor een meerjarig partnerschap moeten organisaties (op 15 oktober 2009) sinds meer dan vier (4) jaar wettelijk gevestigd zijn en rechtspersoonlijkheid bezitten in een van de in aanmerking komende landen en voor de hierna genoemde categorieën de volgende geografische dekking hebben:






  — | voor een Europese centrale organisatie of een Europees netwerk: leden hebben in ten minste twaalf (12) in aanmerking komende landen; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

haar activiteiten grotendeels uitoefenen in in aanmerking komende landen (zie punt 2.2).

Voor een meerjarig partnerschap moeten organisaties (op 15 oktober 2009) sinds meer dan vier (4) jaar wettelijk gevestigd zijn en rechtspersoonlijkheid bezitten in een van de in aanmerking komende landen en voor de hierna genoemde categorieën de volgende geografische dekking hebben:

—

voor een Europese centrale organisatie of een Europees netwerk: leden hebben in ten minste twaalf (12) in aanmerking komende landen;

| — | voor een organisatie die activiteiten ontwikkelt met een grote impact op Europees niveau: actief zijn in ten minste twaalf (12) in aanmerking komende landen; |
| --- | --- |

—

voor een organisatie die activiteiten ontwikkelt met een grote impact op Europees niveau: actief zijn in ten minste twaalf (12) in aanmerking komende landen;

| — | voor een pan-Europees platform van organisaties: minimaal zes (6) aangesloten centrale organisaties tellen en via deze organisaties aanwezig zijn in de 27 lidstaten. |
| --- | --- |

—

voor een pan-Europees platform van organisaties: minimaal zes (6) aangesloten centrale organisaties tellen en via deze organisaties aanwezig zijn in de 27 lidstaten.

Voor een jaarlijkse subsidie moeten organisaties (op 15 oktober 2009) sinds meer dan één (1) jaar wettelijk gevestigd zijn en rechtspersoonlijkheid bezitten in een van de in aanmerking komende landen en voor de hierna genoemde categorieën de volgende geografische dekking hebben:

| — | voor een Europese centrale organisatie of een Europees netwerk: leden hebben in ten minste acht (8) in aanmerking komende landen; |
| --- | --- |

—

voor een Europese centrale organisatie of een Europees netwerk: leden hebben in ten minste acht (8) in aanmerking komende landen;

| — | voor een organisatie die activiteiten ontwikkelt met een grote impact op Europees niveau: actief zijn in ten minste acht (8) in aanmerking komende landen. |
| --- | --- |

—

voor een organisatie die activiteiten ontwikkelt met een grote impact op Europees niveau: actief zijn in ten minste acht (8) in aanmerking komende landen.

Pan-Europese platforms van organisaties kunnen zich uitsluitend aanmelden voor een meerjarig partnerschap.

Natuurlijke personen en openbare lichamen komen niet voor deze oproep in aanmerking.

2.2.   Subsidiabele landen

| a) | de lidstaten van de Europese Unie: België, Bulgarije, Cyprus, Denemarken, Duitsland, Estland, Finland, Frankrijk, Griekenland, Hongarije, Ierland, Italië, Letland, Litouwen, Luxemburg, Malta, Nederland, Oostenrijk, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië, Slowakije, Slovenië, Spanje, de Tsjechische Republiek, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zweden |
| --- | --- |

a)

de lidstaten van de Europese Unie: België, Bulgarije, Cyprus, Denemarken, Duitsland, Estland, Finland, Frankrijk, Griekenland, Hongarije, Ierland, Italië, Letland, Litouwen, Luxemburg, Malta, Nederland, Oostenrijk, Polen, Portugal, Roemenië, Slowakije, Slovenië, Spanje, de Tsjechische Republiek, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zweden

| b) | Kroatië |
| --- | --- |

b)

Kroatië

| c) | de Voormalige Joegoslavische Republiek Macedonië |
| --- | --- |

c)

de Voormalige Joegoslavische Republiek Macedonië

| d) | Albanië. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albanië.

3.   SUBSIDIABELE ACTIVITEITEN

De activiteiten van de aanvragende organisatie moeten tastbaar bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling en uitvoering van de specifieke doelstellingen en thematische prioriteiten van deze oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen. Ten minste één specifieke doelstelling en één thematische prioriteit (zie punt 1) moeten zijn opgenomen.

In het werkprogramma van de aanvragende organisatie voor 2010 en het driejarig strategisch programma (in geval van een meerjarig partnerschap) moeten de statutaire activiteiten, waaronder conferenties, seminars, rondetafelgesprekken, vertegenwoordiging, voorlichting en ontplooiing, alsmede de overige periodieke Europese activiteiten zijn opgenomen.

Subsidiabiliteitsperiode

Ongeacht of het een jaarlijkse subsidie of een meerjarig partnerschap betreft, moet de subsidiabiliteitsperiode overeenstemmen met het begrotingsjaar van de aanvrager zoals blijkt uit de geaudite rekeningen van de organisatie. Is het begrotingsjaar gelijk aan het kalenderjaar, dan loopt de subsidiabiliteitsperiode van 1 januari 2009 tot 31 december 2010.

Voor aanvragers met een begrotingsjaar dat van het kalenderjaar verschilt, vangt de subsidiabiliteitsperiode van 12 maanden aan op de begindatum van hun begrotingsjaar in 2010.

4.   GUNNINGSCRITERIA

Aanvragen die voldoen aan de subsidiabiliteits- en uitsluitingscriteria worden op basis van de gunningscriteria beoordeeld door een evaluatiecomité, dat de aanvragen selecteert die voor cofinanciering in aanmerking komen.

De onderstaande gunningscriteria worden toegepast. De kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve criteria wegen respectievelijk voor 80 en 20 procent mee in de toegekende score. Voor een meerjarig partnerschap wordt hetzelfde gewicht toegekend aan het werkprogramma van 12 maanden als aan het driejarig strategisch programma.

4.1.   Kwalitatieve criteria (80 %)

De volgende onderdelen worden beoordeeld:

| a) | de relevantie met betrekking tot de doelstellingen en prioriteiten van het programma „Europa voor de burger” (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

de relevantie met betrekking tot de doelstellingen en prioriteiten van het programma „Europa voor de burger” (30 %);

| b) | de geschiktheid, coherentie en volledigheid van het werkprogramma (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

b)

de geschiktheid, coherentie en volledigheid van het werkprogramma (20 %);

| c) | de impact van het werkprogramma (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

c)

de impact van het werkprogramma (10 %);

| d) | de Europese toegevoegde waarde (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

d)

de Europese toegevoegde waarde (10 %);

| e) | de zichtbaarheid van de activiteiten en de verspreiding en toepassing van de resultaten ten gunste van de Europese burgers en andere belanghebbenden (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

de zichtbaarheid van de activiteiten en de verspreiding en toepassing van de resultaten ten gunste van de Europese burgers en andere belanghebbenden (10 %).

4.2.   Kwantitatieve criteria (20 %)

De volgende onderdelen worden beoordeeld:

| a) | het aantal in aanmerking komende landen dat bij het werkprogramma betrokken is (10%); |
| --- | --- |

a)

het aantal in aanmerking komende landen dat bij het werkprogramma betrokken is (10%);

| b) | het aantal potentiële rechtstreeks begunstigden (10%). |
| --- | --- |

b)

het aantal potentiële rechtstreeks begunstigden (10%).

5.   BEGROTING

Het bedrag dat voor de cofinanciering van exploitatiesubsidies is begroot, bedraagt ongeveer EUR 8,2 miljoen voor 2010. In het kader van deze oproep beoogt het Uitvoerend Agentschap ongeveer 55 aanvragen te financieren, maar behoudt zich het recht voor om op grond van de kwaliteit van de aanvragen het beschikbare bedrag niet volledig te gebruiken.

Ter indicatie: de subsidies voor meerjarige partnerschappen maken ongeveer 85 % uit van de beschikbare begroting en de jaarlijkse subsidies ongeveer 15 %.

De steun wordt gefinancierd uit begrotingslijn 15.06.66 van de algemene begroting van de Europese Unie.

6.   TERMIJN

De uiterste datum voor de indiening van de aanvragen is 15 oktober 2009.

Het Uitvoerend Agentschap werkt momenteel aan de invoering van een elektronisch systeem voor het indienen van alle aanvragen.

Voor de onderhavige oproep moeten de aanvragers hun verzoek indienen via een elektronisch formulier dat vanaf 15 september 2009 beschikbaar is. Deze versie (inclusief bijlagen) wordt beschouwd als de hoofdversie. Tot die datum stelt het Uitvoerend Agentschap een pdf-versie van het formulier beschikbaar, aan de hand waarvan de aanvragers met de voorbereiding van hun dossier kunnen beginnen.

Daarnaast moet vóór de uiterste datum een versie van het aanvraagdossier op papier per post worden gericht aan het onderstaande adres:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Uitsluitend aanvragen die op het daartoe bestemde aanvraagformulier zijn ingediend en die naar behoren zijn ingevuld, gedateerd en ondertekend door de persoon die bevoegd is namens de aanvragende organisatie juridisch bindende overeenkomsten aan te gaan, worden in behandeling genomen.

7.   NADERE INFORMATIE

De gedetailleerde richtsnoeren voor de aanvragers, alsmede de aanvraagformulieren zijn te vinden op de volgende website: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Besluit nr. 1904/2006/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 12 december 2006 (PB L 378 van 27.12.2006, blz. 32), als gewijzigd bij Besluit nr. 1358/2008/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 16 december 2008 (PB L 350 van 30.12.2008).

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PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Commissie

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/13

---

STEUNMAATREGELEN VAN DE STATEN — NEDERLAND

Steunmaatregel C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING

Uitnodiging overeenkomstig artikel 88, lid 2, van het EG-Verdrag opmerkingen te maken

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

2009/C 158/06

De Commissie heeft Nederland bij schrijven van 31 maart 2009, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 88, lid 2, van het EG-Verdrag ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de betrokken steunmaatregel ten aanzien waarvan de Commissie de procedure inleidt, maken door deze binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking te zenden aan:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van Nederland worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

SAMENVATTING

PROCEDURE

Op 4 maart 2009 hebben de Nederlandse autoriteiten bij de Commissie aanmelding gedaan van een illiquid assets back-up facility voor ING Support Holding (een rechtstreekse dochteronderneming van ING Groep).

DE FEITEN

ING, met hoofdkantoor in Nederland, is een van de grootste internationale financiële instellingen met een balanstotaal van 1 332 miljard EUR. In januari 2009 hebben de Nederlandse Staat en ING een term sheet ondertekend voor de overdracht van de risico's van en het rendement op een deel van ING's Amerikaanse RMBS-portefeuille. Deze bestaat grotendeels uit Alt-A-effecten. De (nominale) waarde van het uitstaande saldo van ING's portefeuille beloopt 39 miljard USD (30 miljard EUR).

De voorgenomen maatregel bestaat uit een kasstroomruil tussen de Nederlandse Staat en ING, waarbij ING de opbrengsten van 80 % van de nominale waarde van de portefeuille (rente en hoofdsom) overdraagt in ruil voor gegarandeerde betalingen door de Staat ten belope van 72 % (zijnde 80 % van 90 %) van de nominale waarde van de portefeuille (alleen de hoofdsom), aangevuld met een door de Staat betaalde funding fee van 3,5 % voor het vaste gedeelte van de portefeuille en van de USD éénmaands LIBOR + 50 basispunten voor het gedeelte van de portefeuille met een variabele rente.

Daarnaast betaalt de Nederlandse Staat aan ING een management fee van 25 basispunten per jaar over de uitstaande hoofdsom. In ruil voor deze maatregel betaalt ING aan de Nederlandse Staat jaarlijks een garantie fee van 55 basispunten over 80 % van de uitstaande portefeuille.

BEOORDELING

De Commissie heeft de transactie beoordeeld in het licht van haar mededeling betreffende aan een bijzondere waardevermindering onderhavige activa (hierna „de mededeling” genoemd). In deze fase heeft de Commissie twijfel ten aanzien van de waardering en met name de waarderingsmethodiek die is gebruikt om de reële waarde in het economisch verkeer te bepalen. De Commissie moet de door de Nederlandse Staat meegedeelde onderliggende aannames verder onderzoeken, met name wat betreft: i) de gekozen discontovoet; ii) de aannames ten aanzien van de huizenprijzen; iii) de omvang van de kredietverbetering, en iv) andere aspecten van de waardering.

Daarom betwijfelt de Commissie ook dat de risicoverdeling tussen de Staat en ING correct is. De Commissie vraagt zich af of de bank wel echt het verschil tussen de nominale waarde van de portefeuille en de reële waarde ervan in het economisch verkeer draagt, rekening houdende met de reeds aangegeven twijfel wat betreft de beoordeling van de waardering. Evenmin is de Commissie er zeker van dat de genoemde ruil van kasstromen wel, zoals wordt aangegeven, daadwerkelijk gunstig is voor de Staat. Met name ten aanzien van de management fee voor de portefeuille heeft zij enige twijfel of die wel passend is, aangezien in ruil voor die fee niet al te veel activiteiten worden verlangd.

Aangezien de faciliteit voldoet aan een aantal van de voorwaarden uit de mededeling, en gelet op de noodzaak om de financiële stabiliteit veilig te stellen, heeft de Commissie besloten de maatregel goed te keuren voor een periode van zes maanden. Tegelijk heeft de Commissie, in het licht van de bovenstaande overwegingen, besloten de procedure van artikel 88, lid 2, van het EG-Verdrag in te leiden om zich ervan te vergewissen dat de voorwaarden uit de mededeling in acht worden genomen waar het gaat om de waardering (daaronder begrepen de voor de waardering gehanteerde methodiek) en de risicoverdeling van de maatregel.

TEKST VAN DE BRIEF

„The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
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(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
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(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
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(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
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(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
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(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
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(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
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(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
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(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
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(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
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(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
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(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
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(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
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(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
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(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
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(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
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(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

ANDERE BESLUITEN

Commissie

| 11.7.2009 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 158/24

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Bekendmaking van een aanvraag overeenkomstig artikel 8, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006 van de Raad inzake gegarandeerde traditionele specialiteiten voor landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen

2009/C 158/07

Deze bekendmaking verleent het recht om op grond van artikel 9 van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006 van de Raad bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen de aanvraag. Bezwaarschriften moeten de Commissie bereiken binnen zes maanden te rekenen vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking.

AANVRAAG TOT REGISTRATIE VAN EEN GTS

VERORDENING (EG) Nr. 509/2006 VAN DE RAAD

„KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA”

EG-nummer: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Naam en adres van de aanvragende groepering:

Naam: Związek „Polskie Mięso” (Vereniging van Poolse vleesproductenten)

Adres:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

E-mail: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Lidstaat of derde land:

Polen

3.   Productdossier:

3.1.   Benaming(en) waarvoor de registratie wordt aangevraagd (artikel 2 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie):

„Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

3.2.   De benaming:

 is zelf specifiek

Image

De benaming „kiełbasa jałowcowa” brengt de specificiteit van het product — met name zijn unieke smaak en aroma — tot uitdrukking. Deze eigenschappen moeten worden toegeschreven aan het gebruik van de vruchten van de jeneverbes (Juniperus), die versgemalen aan het vlees worden toegevoegd, en van jeneverbestakken tijdens het roken.

3.3.   Aanvraag tot registratie met of zonder reservering overeenkomstig artikel 13, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 509/2006:

 Registratie met reservering van de benaming

Image

3.4.   Productcategorie:

| Categorie 1.2 — | Vleesproducten (verhit, gepekeld, gerookt, enz.) |
| --- | --- |

Categorie 1.2 —

Vleesproducten (verhit, gepekeld, gerookt, enz.)

3.5.   Beschrijving van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel waarvoor de in punt 3.1 vermelde benaming geldt (artikel 3, lid 1, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie):

Kiełbasa jałowcowa is een gelijkmatig gerimpelde worst met de karakteristieke vorm van een krans. Aan de buitenkant zijn geen diepe vouwen in de lengterichting te zien. Deze kransvormige worst is in twee formaten verkrijgbaar:

| — | als kleine worst, afgevuld in een natuurlijke darm met een diameter van meer dan 32 mm en een gewicht van ca. 0,5 kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

als kleine worst, afgevuld in een natuurlijke darm met een diameter van meer dan 32 mm en een gewicht van ca. 0,5 kg;

| — | als grote worst, afgevuld in een collageendarm met een diameter van 36 mm en een gewicht van ca. 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

als grote worst, afgevuld in een collageendarm met een diameter van 36 mm en een gewicht van ca. 0,8 kg.

Kiełbasa jałowcowa heeft een egale donkerbruine kleur, die typerend is voor sterk gerookte producten.

Kenmerkend voor de consistentie en het gevoel bij aanraking is het droge, gelijkmatig gerimpelde, maar tegelijkertijd gladde vel dat nauw aan de vulling hecht.

De fijne smaak en het malse karakter zijn het resultaat van zorgvuldig geselecteerde grondstoffen en kruiden (in het bijzonder jeneverbessen) en van de natuurlijke wijze waarop de worsten tijdens het productieproces worden gerookt.

Chemische samenstelling:

| — | eiwitgehalte — niet minder dan 15 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

eiwitgehalte — niet minder dan 15 %,

| — | vochtgehalte — niet meer dan 60 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

vochtgehalte — niet meer dan 60 %,

| — | vetgehalte — niet meer dan 35 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

vetgehalte — niet meer dan 35 %,

| — | zoutgehalte — niet meer dan 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

zoutgehalte — niet meer dan 3,5 %,

| — | gehalte aan nitraten (III) en (V) in de vorm van NaNO2 — niet meer dan 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

gehalte aan nitraten (III) en (V) in de vorm van NaNO2 — niet meer dan 0,0125 %.

Deze uitgebalanceerde chemische samenstelling is een garantie voor de traditionele kwaliteit van het product. De hoeveelheid eindproduct bedraagt 75 % (+/– 3 %) van de verwerkte grondstof (vlees).

3.6.   Beschrijving van de methode waarmee het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel met de in punt 3.1 vermelde benaming wordt geproduceerd (artikel 3, lid 2, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie)

Ingrediënten

| | Vlees (100 kg grondstof):






  — | varkensvlees van categorie I met een vetgehalte van maximaal 15 % — 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Vlees (100 kg grondstof):

—

varkensvlees van categorie I met een vetgehalte van maximaal 15 % — 20 kg,

| — | varkensvlees van categorie IIA met een vetgehalte van maximaal 20 % — 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

varkensvlees van categorie IIA met een vetgehalte van maximaal 20 % — 50 kg,

| — | varkensvlees van categorie III — pezig vlees met een vetgehalte van maximaal 25 % — 20 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

varkensvlees van categorie III — pezig vlees met een vetgehalte van maximaal 25 % — 20 kg,

| — | kleine, harde stukjes vet — 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

kleine, harde stukjes vet — 10 kg.

Het varkensvlees van categorie IIA of III kan voor maximaal 50 % worden vervangen door rundvlees.

| | Kruiden (op 100 kg vlees):






  — | peper — 0,17 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Kruiden (op 100 kg vlees):

—

peper — 0,17 kg,

| — | jeneverbessen — 0,12 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

jeneverbessen — 0,12 kg,

| — | suiker — 0,20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

suiker — 0,20 kg.

| | Overige toevoegingen:






  — | zoutoplossing (op basis van een mengsel van keukenzout (NaCl) en natriumnitriet (NaNO2)) — ca. 2 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Overige toevoegingen:

—

zoutoplossing (op basis van een mengsel van keukenzout (NaCl) en natriumnitriet (NaNO2)) — ca. 2 kg.

Het voor de vervaardiging van kiełbasa jałowcowa gebruikte varkensvoer

Het voer moet ervoor zorgen dat de gemeste varkens vet en vlees aanzetten. Het doel is het produceren van varkens met een lichaamsgewicht van maximaal 120 kg en meer dan 3 % intramusculair vet.

| — | Het mesten gebeurt met langzaam groeiende rassen, zodat, mits er op de juiste manier wordt gemest, het gewenste gehalte intramusculair vet wordt verkregen. Deze rassen hebben niet het RN-gen, terwijl 20 % van de populatie drager is van het RYR1 T-gen. |
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—

Het mesten gebeurt met langzaam groeiende rassen, zodat, mits er op de juiste manier wordt gemest, het gewenste gehalte intramusculair vet wordt verkregen. Deze rassen hebben niet het RN-gen, terwijl 20 % van de populatie drager is van het RYR1 T-gen.

| — | Het mesten dient in drie fasen te gebeuren: fase I tot ca. 60 kg, fase II tot ca. 90 kg en fase III tot 120 kg. |
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Het mesten dient in drie fasen te gebeuren: fase I tot ca. 60 kg, fase II tot ca. 90 kg en fase III tot 120 kg.

| — | Het mesten van dieren tot een lichaamsgewicht van ca. 90 kg gebeurt met twee typen voedermengsels. Deze mengsels (doseringen) bestaan uit: |
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—

Het mesten van dieren tot een lichaamsgewicht van ca. 90 kg gebeurt met twee typen voedermengsels. Deze mengsels (doseringen) bestaan uit:

| — | energiebestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel — tarwe, gerst, rogge, haver, triticale of mais; de mengsels mogen voor 30 % uit maisvoermeel en voermeel van naakte haver bestaan; |
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energiebestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel — tarwe, gerst, rogge, haver, triticale of mais; de mengsels mogen voor 30 % uit maisvoermeel en voermeel van naakte haver bestaan;

| — | eiwitbestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel van lupinen, veldbonen en erwten, sojaschroot, koolzaadschroot, koolzaadkoeken, voedergist of gedroogd groenvoer. |
| --- | --- |

—

eiwitbestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel van lupinen, veldbonen en erwten, sojaschroot, koolzaadschroot, koolzaadkoeken, voedergist of gedroogd groenvoer.

| — | De mengsels (doseringen) voor dieren van 90 tot 120 kg bestaan uit: |
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—

De mengsels (doseringen) voor dieren van 90 tot 120 kg bestaan uit:

| — | energiebestanddelen in de vorm van tarwe-, gerst-, rogge- of triticalevoermeel; voor deze mengsels (doseringen) mag geen maisvoermeel of voermeel van naakte haver worden gebruikt; |
| --- | --- |

—

energiebestanddelen in de vorm van tarwe-, gerst-, rogge- of triticalevoermeel; voor deze mengsels (doseringen) mag geen maisvoermeel of voermeel van naakte haver worden gebruikt;

| — | eiwitbestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel van peulvruchten (lupinen, veldbonen, erwten), sojaschroot, koolzaadkoeken, koolzaadschroot of gedroogd groenvoer. |
| --- | --- |

—

eiwitbestanddelen in de vorm van voermeel van peulvruchten (lupinen, veldbonen, erwten), sojaschroot, koolzaadkoeken, koolzaadschroot of gedroogd groenvoer.

| — | Tijdens het mesten is het in geen geval toegestaan om plantaardige olie of voedingsstoffen van dierlijke herkomst (melkpoeder, gedroogde wei, vismeel) aan de mengsels en doseringen toe te voegen. |
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Tijdens het mesten is het in geen geval toegestaan om plantaardige olie of voedingsstoffen van dierlijke herkomst (melkpoeder, gedroogde wei, vismeel) aan de mengsels en doseringen toe te voegen.

| — | Tijdens het hele mesttraject zorgen de mengsels voor een metabole energie van 12 tot 13 MJ ME/kg mengsel. Het eiwitgehalte van de mengsels is in fase I ongeveer 16-18 %, in fase II 15-16 % en in fase III ongeveer 14 %. |
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Tijdens het hele mesttraject zorgen de mengsels voor een metabole energie van 12 tot 13 MJ ME/kg mengsel. Het eiwitgehalte van de mengsels is in fase I ongeveer 16-18 %, in fase II 15-16 % en in fase III ongeveer 14 %.

| — | De voor de mestvarkens bestemde doseringen kunnen bestaan uit louter geconcentreerde mengsels of uit geconcentreerde mengsels en bulkvoer (aardappelen en groenvoer). |
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De voor de mestvarkens bestemde doseringen kunnen bestaan uit louter geconcentreerde mengsels of uit geconcentreerde mengsels en bulkvoer (aardappelen en groenvoer).

Het productietraject van kiełbasa jałowcowa

| Stap 1 | Al het vlees wordt eerst fijngehakt. De stukken worden op gelijke grootte gebracht (ca. 5 cm doorsnede). |
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Stap 1

Al het vlees wordt eerst fijngehakt. De stukken worden op gelijke grootte gebracht (ca. 5 cm doorsnede).

| Stap 2 | Het vlees wordt op traditionele wijze (volgens de droge methode) met een zoutoplossing gedurende ca. 48 uur gepekeld. |
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Stap 2

Het vlees wordt op traditionele wijze (volgens de droge methode) met een zoutoplossing gedurende ca. 48 uur gepekeld.

| Stap 3 | Mechanische bewerking: het vlees van categorie I wordt fijngehakt tot stukken van ca. 20 mm, dat van categorie IIA tot stukken van ca. 8 mm, dat van categorie III tot stukken van ca. 3 mm. Na toevoeging van 5 kilo ijs wordt alles verder fijngehakt. |
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Stap 3

Mechanische bewerking: het vlees van categorie I wordt fijngehakt tot stukken van ca. 20 mm, dat van categorie IIA tot stukken van ca. 8 mm, dat van categorie III tot stukken van ca. 3 mm. Na toevoeging van 5 kilo ijs wordt alles verder fijngehakt.

| Stap 4 | Al het vlees wordt samen met de kruiden (peper, suiker en versgemalen jeneverbessen) gemengd. |
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Stap 4

Al het vlees wordt samen met de kruiden (peper, suiker en versgemalen jeneverbessen) gemengd.

| Stap 5 | Het vlees wordt afgevuld in een natuurlijke varkensdarm met een diameter van meer dan 32 mm of een collageendarm met een diameter van 36 mm. De worsten worden gedraaid en tot een kransvorm gebogen. Aangezien er twee verschillende soorten darmen worden gebruikt, kunnen er twee formaten worsten worden gemaakt:






  — | kleine worsten in een dunne varkensdarm en met een gewicht van 0,5 kg, |
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Stap 5

Het vlees wordt afgevuld in een natuurlijke varkensdarm met een diameter van meer dan 32 mm of een collageendarm met een diameter van 36 mm. De worsten worden gedraaid en tot een kransvorm gebogen. Aangezien er twee verschillende soorten darmen worden gebruikt, kunnen er twee formaten worsten worden gemaakt:

—

kleine worsten in een dunne varkensdarm en met een gewicht van 0,5 kg,

| — | grote worsten in een collageendarm en met een gewicht van 0,8 kg. |
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grote worsten in een collageendarm en met een gewicht van 0,8 kg.

| Stap 6 | De worsten worden gedurende 2 uur bij een temperatuur van maximaal 30 °C te rusten gehangen. De buitenkant droogt aan en de bestanddelen binnenin komen „op hun plaats”. |
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Stap 6

De worsten worden gedurende 2 uur bij een temperatuur van maximaal 30 °C te rusten gehangen. De buitenkant droogt aan en de bestanddelen binnenin komen „op hun plaats”.

| Stap 7 | De buitenkant droogt verder aan en de worsten worden in warme rook gerookt (gedurende ca. 120 minuten), totdat de gewenste kleur is verkregen. Vervolgens worden ze gebakken, totdat er binnenin een temperatuur van minimaal 70 °C is bereikt. |
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Stap 7

De buitenkant droogt verder aan en de worsten worden in warme rook gerookt (gedurende ca. 120 minuten), totdat de gewenste kleur is verkregen. Vervolgens worden ze gebakken, totdat er binnenin een temperatuur van minimaal 70 °C is bereikt.

| Stap 8 | De worsten koelen gedurende 24 uur af. |
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Stap 8

De worsten koelen gedurende 24 uur af.

| Stap 9 | De worsten worden gerookt met koude rook van beukenmot en jeneverbestakken (gedurende ca. 120 minuten) en vervolgens gedurende 3 tot 5 dagen bij een temperatuur van 14 tot 18 °C te drogen gehangen, totdat het gewenste resultaat (75 % van de totale hoeveelheid verwerkt vlees (+/– 3 %)) is bereikt. |
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Stap 9

De worsten worden gerookt met koude rook van beukenmot en jeneverbestakken (gedurende ca. 120 minuten) en vervolgens gedurende 3 tot 5 dagen bij een temperatuur van 14 tot 18 °C te drogen gehangen, totdat het gewenste resultaat (75 % van de totale hoeveelheid verwerkt vlees (+/– 3 %)) is bereikt.

3.7.   Specificiteit van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel (artikel 3, lid 3, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie)

De specificiteit van kiełbasa jałowcowa hangt samen met een aantal karakteristieke kenmerken van dit product, nl.:

| — | het malse, sappige en bijzondere karakter van het vlees, |
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het malse, sappige en bijzondere karakter van het vlees,

| — | de uitzonderlijke smaak en het bijzondere aroma, |
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de uitzonderlijke smaak en het bijzondere aroma,

| — | de unieke vorm. |
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—

de unieke vorm.

Het malse, sappige en bijzondere karakter van het vlees

Het ingrediënt dat bepalend is voor de specificiteit van kiełbasa jałowcowa, is het vlees van langzaam groeiende varkensrassen die tot een lichaamsgewicht van ca. 120 kg worden gemest en die over de in punt 3.6 beschreven genetische eigenschappen beschikken. Dankzij de naleving van deze eisen ontstaat er een intramusculair vetgehalte van meer dan 3 %, waarmee de juiste smaak en technologische eigenschappen kunnen worden verkregen die noodzakelijk zijn voor de productie van kiełbasa jałowcowa. Het is aan het gebruik van deze grondstof en de toepassing van de traditionele productiemethode — vooral met betrekking tot het hakken, pekelen en roken — dat de uitzonderlijke malsheid en sappigheid van kiełbasa jałowcowa moeten worden toegeschreven.

De uitzonderlijke smaak en het bijzondere aroma

De specificiteit van kiełbasa jałowcowa hangt vooral samen met zijn unieke smaak en aroma, die ontstaan dankzij het gebruik van de vruchten van de jeneverbes (Juniperus). Om de karakteristieke smaak van de worst te versterken en om zijn specifieke karakter nog meer te benadrukken, worden de jeneverbessen pas vlak voor het begin van het productieproces fijngemalen. Dankzij het gebruik van jeneverbestakken tijdens het roken wordt de smaak vervolmaakt en krijgt de worst zijn bijzondere aroma.

De unieke vorm

Kiełbasa jałowcowa onderscheidt zich van andere worsten door zijn vorm. Er bestaan slechts twee min of meer identieke varianten en daarom is de worst goed herkenbaar voor de consument. Kiełbasa jałowcowa is gelijkmatig gerimpeld en heeft de karakteristieke vorm van een krans. Aan de buitenkant zijn geen diepe vouwen in de lengterichting te zien.

3.8.   Traditioneel karakter van het landbouwproduct of het levensmiddel (artikel 3, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie):

Traditionele grondstoffen

| 1. | Jeneverbes (Juniperus):
  „Brandend jeneverbeshout geeft een aangename aromatische geur af.” Volgens de „Grote algemene geïllustreerde encyclopedie” uit 1903 is dit een van de nuttige eigenschappen van deze struik, die in Polen van oudsher tamelijk veel voorkomt. In dezelfde uitgave staat dat zijn „takken, spaanders en bessen geliefd zijn als mot voor het roken van vlees (en ook voor het maken van wierook); ze geven vleeswaren een geraffineerde smaak en aroma”. Uit documenten uit de tweede helft van de 19e eeuw blijkt dat jeneverbessen ook toen al als toevoeging of ingrediënt werden gebruikt voor bij de bereiding van vleesgerechten en -producten. De in 1863 in Warschau verschenen „Algemene encyclopedie” geeft de volgende omschrijving: „Jeneverbessen hebben een kruidige, bitterzoete smaak en een aangenaam aroma; als specerij (...) zijn ze algemeen bekend”. Volgens het artikel „Regulering van voor de markt bestemde assortimenten vleeswaren” in het branchetijdschrift „Gospodarka Mięsna” nr. 3 uit 1954 deed de standaardmethode voor het produceren van worst met jeneverbessen en het roken met jeneverbestakken reeds rond 1950 haar intrede in Polen. |
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1.

Jeneverbes (Juniperus):

„Brandend jeneverbeshout geeft een aangename aromatische geur af.” Volgens de „Grote algemene geïllustreerde encyclopedie” uit 1903 is dit een van de nuttige eigenschappen van deze struik, die in Polen van oudsher tamelijk veel voorkomt. In dezelfde uitgave staat dat zijn „takken, spaanders en bessen geliefd zijn als mot voor het roken van vlees (en ook voor het maken van wierook); ze geven vleeswaren een geraffineerde smaak en aroma”. Uit documenten uit de tweede helft van de 19e eeuw blijkt dat jeneverbessen ook toen al als toevoeging of ingrediënt werden gebruikt voor bij de bereiding van vleesgerechten en -producten. De in 1863 in Warschau verschenen „Algemene encyclopedie” geeft de volgende omschrijving: „Jeneverbessen hebben een kruidige, bitterzoete smaak en een aangenaam aroma; als specerij (...) zijn ze algemeen bekend”. Volgens het artikel „Regulering van voor de markt bestemde assortimenten vleeswaren” in het branchetijdschrift „Gospodarka Mięsna” nr. 3 uit 1954 deed de standaardmethode voor het produceren van worst met jeneverbessen en het roken met jeneverbestakken reeds rond 1950 haar intrede in Polen.

| 2. | Varkensvlees:
  Het vlees van varkens die speciaal voor kiełbasa jałowcowa worden gehouden, moet meer dan 3 % intramusculair vet bevatten. Deze zogeheten marmering geeft het product de gewenste malsheid en sappigheid en zijn voortreffelijke smaak. Het gebruik van dit soort vlees is bepalend voor de kwaliteit en specificiteit van het eindproduct en stemt overeen met de traditionele productiemethode. |
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2.

Varkensvlees:

Het vlees van varkens die speciaal voor kiełbasa jałowcowa worden gehouden, moet meer dan 3 % intramusculair vet bevatten. Deze zogeheten marmering geeft het product de gewenste malsheid en sappigheid en zijn voortreffelijke smaak. Het gebruik van dit soort vlees is bepalend voor de kwaliteit en specificiteit van het eindproduct en stemt overeen met de traditionele productiemethode.

Traditionele productiemethode en samenstelling

Roken is een manier om vlees te conserveren en in de meeste gevallen werd daarvoor jeneverbeshout gebruik. Dit blijkt onder meer uit Oudpoolse handschriften, zoals de aantekeningen van een anonieme rentmeester van een adellijke boerderij uit de jaren tachtig van de 18e eeuw, waarin een recept is opgenomen voor de bereiding van gerookte worst (handschrift uit het „Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych” („Centraal archief van historische documenten” — AGAD) in Warschau, archiefeenheid „Verzameling Nationaal museum”, inv. nr. 1249). De volgende beschrijving van het ontbijt van edellieden uit het epische gedicht „Pan Tadeusz” („Heer Tadeusz”) uit 1834 van de beroemde Poolse dichter Adam Mickiewicz bewijst dat het roken met jeneverbeshout zeer populair was: „Alle [vleeswaren] verrukkelijk, alles zelfgemaakt, In de schoorsteen gerookt met jeneverbesrook”.

De traditie van het kruiden en roken van vlees met jeneverbes kent allerlei lokale en regionale varianten. Zo zijn er verschillen in de gehanteerde technieken, maar soms ook in het soort vlees dat wordt gebruik. W. Łęg wijst in de studie „Uit de ervaringen met vleeswarenproductie” („Gospodarka Mięsna” nr. 6, 1953) bijvoorbeeld op de experimenten met „jałowcowa” van wild (haas of wild zwijn aangevuld met varkensvlees). Hoewel de worsten die op die manier werden vervaardigd, anders smaakten, bleef het eigenlijke recept (larderen en roken met jeneverbes) overal hetzelfde. Een deskundige van de vleesbranche die door de regio Kurpie reisde, schreef in het artikel „Regionale boerenvleeswaren” („Gospodarka Mięsna” nr. 7-8, 1950) het volgende: „De worst uit de buurt van Myszyniec in Kurpie wordt met jeneverbeshout gerookt en bevat jeneverbessen. De worst is droog en heeft een voortreffelijke en karakteristieke smaak en aroma”.

Na 1945 werd er, overeenkomstig de doctrine van de planeconomie, een vleesindustrie opgezet waarin de grote voedselfabrieken centraal stonden. Om de kwaliteit en de smaak van vleeswaren te kunnen waarborgen werden producten gestandaardiseerd en werden er technische voorschriften opgesteld op basis van de traditionele recepten. Als productnaam werd kiełbasa jałowcowa in 1947-1948 voor het eerst vermeld in de richtsnoeren voor de levensmiddelenverkoop. In 1954 kwam er een standaardnorm voor kiełbasa jałowcowa, die later werd uitgewerkt tot de norm van het hoofdkantoor voor de vleesindustrie uit 1964 (Uitgeverij van de lichte en voedselverwerkende industrie, Warschau, 1964). Deze laatste vormt de basis van onderhavige aanvraag.

Het doel van deze normen was het waarborgen van de bovengenoemde kwaliteit van kiełbasa jałowcowa. Hoewel de norm waarop deze aanvraag is gebaseerd, niet meer bindend is, zijn de onderliggende voorschriften nog altijd bepalend voor bovenstaande richtsnoeren voor de productie van kiełbasa jałowcowa.

3.9.   Minimumeisen en procedures voor de controle van de specificiteit (artikel 4 van Verordening (EG) nr. 1216/2007 van de Commissie):

Gezien de specificiteit van kiełbasa jałowcowa moet er bij de controles worden gelet op:

| 1. | de kwaliteit van de gebruikte grondstoffen (varkensvlees, kruiden) en meer in het bijzonder:






  — | de geschiktheid van het vlees vanuit technologisch opzicht, |
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1.

de kwaliteit van de gebruikte grondstoffen (varkensvlees, kruiden) en meer in het bijzonder:

—

de geschiktheid van het vlees vanuit technologisch opzicht,

| — | de mestwijze, |
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—

de mestwijze,

| — | de duur van het pekelen, |
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de duur van het pekelen,

| — | het soort en de hoeveelheid kruiden die voor de productie van kiełbasa jałowcowa zijn gebruikt. |
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—

het soort en de hoeveelheid kruiden die voor de productie van kiełbasa jałowcowa zijn gebruikt.

| 2. | het rookproces van kiełbasa jałowcowa
  tijdens de controle moet worden gelet op:






  — | de naleving van de voorgeschreven temperatuur voor de traditionele rookmethode met warme rook, en van de stooktemperatuur; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

het rookproces van kiełbasa jałowcowa

tijdens de controle moet worden gelet op:

—

de naleving van de voorgeschreven temperatuur voor de traditionele rookmethode met warme rook, en van de stooktemperatuur;

| — | de naleving van de voorgeschreven duur van de tweede rookfase en van de voorgeschreven temperatuur van de daarbij gebruikte koude rook; |
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de naleving van de voorgeschreven duur van de tweede rookfase en van de voorgeschreven temperatuur van de daarbij gebruikte koude rook;

| — | het gebruik van beukenmot en jeneverbestakken voor het koud roken. |
| --- | --- |

—

het gebruik van beukenmot en jeneverbestakken voor het koud roken.

| 3. | de kwaliteit van het eindproduct:






  — | eiwitgehalte, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

de kwaliteit van het eindproduct:

—

eiwitgehalte,

| — | vochtgehalte, |
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—

vochtgehalte,

| — | vetgehalte, |
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—

vetgehalte,

| — | gehalte aan natriumchloride, |
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—

gehalte aan natriumchloride,

| — | gehalte aan nitraten (III) en (V), |
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gehalte aan nitraten (III) en (V),

| — | smaak en aroma. |
| --- | --- |

—

smaak en aroma.

| 4. | de vorm van het product. |
| --- | --- |

4.

de vorm van het product.

Frequentie van de controles

Bovengenoemde stappen dienen één keer in de twee maanden te worden gecontroleerd. Indien alle stappen volgens de regels zijn uitgevoerd, kan de frequentie worden teruggebracht tot twee controles per jaar.

Indien er in een bepaalde stap onregelmatigheden worden geconstateerd, dient de controle daarvan te worden opgevoerd (tot één keer in de twee maanden). Voor de andere stappen kan in dat geval nog steeds worden volstaan met een halfjaarlijkse controle.

4.   Autoriteiten of organen die de naleving van het productdossier controleren:

4.1.   Naam en adres:

Naam: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych (Algemene inspectie van de handelskwaliteit van landbouwproducten en levensmiddelen)

Adres:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

E-mail: —

Image publiek  privaat

4.2.   Specifieke taken van de autoriteit of het orgaan:

Bovengenoemde controleautoriteit is belast met de controle van het volledige productdossier.

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