Filed 10/14/20 In re Hafsa L. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re HAFSA L., et al., Persons

Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

 B304719

 (Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Petitioner,

v.

FAISAL L.,

Objector and Appellant;

AIDA L.,

Respondent.

 Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP03991A-B)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Annabelle G. Cortez, Judge. Affirmed.

John L. Dodd & Associates and John L. Dodd, under 

appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
2

Shaylah Padgett-Weibel, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Respondent.

No appearance for Petitioner.

________________________________

Faisal L. (father) appeals from an order terminating 

jurisdiction over his two children, Hafsa (born Aug. 2015) and 

Aida (born Feb. 2018) with a custody order granting Aida M. 

(mother) sole legal and physical custody of the children. Father 

argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding 

mother sole legal custody. He requests that the portion of the 

order awarding mother sole legal custody be modified to an order 

of joint legal custody. We find that the evidence supported the 

juvenile court’s order, and no abuse of discretion occurred. 

Therefore, we affirm the order.

COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 

BACKGROUND

Family background and history of this matter

Father and mother married approximately six years ago. 

They are the parents of Hafsa and Aida. Mother has an older 

child, Ivo, from a prior relationship.1

The family’s first incident involving the children’s welfare 

occurred in March 2018, when it was reported that mother 

engaged in violent acts with father. The parents received 

therapy and counseling and the matter was closed as 

inconclusive. 

The incident that instigated this proceeding occurred on 

May 1, 2018. Mother called law enforcement claiming that father 

hit her as they argued about divorce. The Los Angeles County 

____________________________________________________________

1 Ivo is not a subject of this appeal.
3

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a 

petition on behalf of the children on June 25, 2018, alleging that 

mother and father had a history of domestic violence and the 

children were at substantial risk of harm under Welfare & 

Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).2 On June 

26, 2018, the juvenile court took jurisdiction over the children, 

but the children remained released to the parents with services 

in place. 

On May 7, 2019, DCFS filed a supplemental petition 

pursuant to section 387 following allegations of another incident 

of violence between the parents. Mother moved into a domestic 

violence shelter with the children. Mother later obtained a 

restraining order on behalf of herself and the children against 

father. 

After the adjudication of the section 387 petition on July 

16, 2019, the juvenile court permitted the children to remain in 

mother’s custody but detained them from father. Mother was 

granted family maintenance services and father was permitted 

monitored visitation with family enhancement services. Father 

appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of July 

16, 2019. In a prior nonpublished opinion, this court affirmed the 

juvenile court’s orders in full.3

Events following the previous appeal

DCFS tried to provide father with a visitation schedule that 

accommodated father’s work schedule. Visits were arranged once 

____________________________________________________________

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. 

3 In re Hafsa L. (Jan. 29, 2020, B299321) [nonpub. opn.].
4

a week at the Wateridge DCFS office, and father was offered 

additional visits at the West San Fernando Valley office. 

However, father declined the additional visits, insisting that 

DCFS was required to bring the children to him and that DCFS 

was failing to follow the order for visitation given by the court. 

Father attended four visits in October 2019. In November 

2019, father canceled two visits, attended one visit, and one visit 

was canceled due to father’s inappropriate behavior. During a 

November 2019 visit, father became aggressive and verbally 

abusive toward the visitation monitor in the presence of the 

children. Security was required to escort father from the 

building. December visitation was suspended pending a meeting 

with father to discuss his inappropriate behavior. However, 

father refused visits with a social worker to review the visitation 

concerns. During a conversation, father accused DCFS of 

discrimination against him due to his Muslim religion. He called 

the staff “good for nothing pieces of shit” and threatened lawsuits 

against DCFS. On December 9, 2019, the social worker again 

contacted father to attempt to discuss the issue of visitation, but 

father responded with profanity and the social worker ended the 

call. 

During the review period father largely failed to comply 

with his court-ordered services. However, he did provide DCFS 

with the contact information for his individual counselor. DCFS 

noted several concerns about father’s behavior, including using

abusive language to the visitation monitors during visits, 

discussing case matters in front of the children during visits, and 

using visitation time to conduct business. Father also violated 

the restraining order by attempting to contact mother using Ivo’s 

phone. 
5

A last-minute information for the court was filed on 

January 14, 2020, reporting that efforts to contact and meet with 

father had been unsuccessful. Father was noncompliant with the 

services ordered for domestic violence, anger management, and 

parenting. However, father’s individual therapist reported that 

he began counseling on September 18, 2019, and had participated 

in nine sessions. Father had made some progress in 

understanding the need to control his behavior. 

DCFS recommended termination of dependency jurisdiction

with joint legal custody to both parents and sole physical custody 

of the children to mother. DCFS recommended monitored 

visitation for father. 

On January 14, 2020, the juvenile court held a section 364 

hearing.4 Father and mother were both present with counsel. 

Father submitted three exhibits: (1) a document showing father’s

successful completion of a 52-week domestic violence course in 

2015; (2) a document showing father completed 26 sessions of a 

26-week parenting program in May 2019; and (3) a document 

showing father had enrolled in anger management in August 

2019, and had completed 9 out of 26 sessions. Counsel for DCFS 

____________________________________________________________

4 Section 364 applies when “an order is made placing a child 

under the supervision of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 

300 and in which the child is not removed from the physical 

custody of his or her parent . . . .” (§ 364, subd. (a).) Pursuant to 

section 364, after a hearing, the court “shall determine whether 

continued supervision is necessary,” and “shall terminate its 

jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department 

establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions 

still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction 

under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if

supervision is withdrawn.” (§ 364, subd. (c).)
6

objected to admitting father’s exhibits, noting that the domestic 

violence course had been completed many years before the 

current episode and that there was no verification of the 

programs father submitted for parenting and anger management. 

The juvenile court admitted the exhibits over DCFS’s objections. 

Mother’s counsel argued that mother should have sole legal 

and sole physical custody of the children because the evidence 

showed that father had not made any progress or shown any 

insight into the reasons behind the dependency. Counsel noted 

that father had violated the restraining order in place during the 

review period. 

Father testified at the hearing that mother had come to his 

house on multiple occasions and spent the night there. Father 

stated that mother brought the children over on at least five 

occasions over the last six months. The visits occurred in July, 

August, and maybe September of 2019. Father’s counsel argued 

that joint legal custody and unmonitored visits were appropriate 

for father. 

After consideration of the evidence in the record, the 

juvenile court made its findings, noting that father was 

noncompliant with court-ordered services for domestic violence, 

anger management, and parenting.5 The domestic violence 

course that father completed, occurred several years before the 

petition in this matter was sustained. The court found that 

father had made no progress on the issue that led to the 

sustaining of the petition. 

The court ordered sole legal and physical custody to 

mother, with visits for father a minimum of two times per week 

____________________________________________________________

5 The court observed that while father completed parenting

classes, continued participation was recommended. 
7

to be monitored by a monitor paid for by father and approved by 

mother. Visit exchanges were to take place at a police station

through a neutral third party with no direct contact between 

mother and father. Father left the courtroom before the court 

finished explaining its visitation orders. 

The court provided an attachment to the custody order 

captioned “Reasons for no or supervised visitation -- juvenile.” 

The attachment indicated that father had not completed or made 

substantial progress in court-ordered programs including 

domestic violence for offenders, anger management, parenting, 

and individual counseling.

At a January 17, 2020 nonappearance hearing, the juvenile 

custody order was received, signed and filed, and jurisdiction was 

terminated. 

On January 31, 2020, father filed his notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal standards

When making an initial child custody determination, a trial 

court has wide discretion guided by its determination of the best 

interest of the child. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 

25, 31-32).

Juvenile court custody orders are reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 

285, 300.) When a court has made a custody determination in a 

dependency proceeding, “‘“a reviewing court will not disturb that 

decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal 

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination [citations].”’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie M. 

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
8

II. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding mother sole legal custody

Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion 

in failing to follow DCFS’s recommendation that the parents be 

granted joint legal custody. He argues that no substantial 

evidence supported the court’s decision that joint legal custody 

was not in the children’s best interests.6 Father admits to being 

uncooperative with DCFS, but asserts that there was no evidence 

in the record that he would be uncooperative with mother 

concerning decisions about the children. 

The juvenile court considered father’s testimony, the 

reports submitted by DCFS, and exhibits, including those 

submitted by father, in making its custody determination. This 

evidence showed that father was noncompliant with courtordered services, and had not addressed the issues that led to the 

detention of the children. In addition, father’s behavior during 

the review period showed that he was uncooperative and difficult 

to work with. He continued to exhibit an inability to control his 

anger or comply with court mandates. The juvenile court noted 

that father made no progress in dealing with his anger issues and 

____________________________________________________________

6 Father argues that joint legal custody is generally in the 

children’s best interest unless parental conflict renders that 

unworkable. (Citing In re Marriage of McLoren (1988) 202 

Cal.App.3d 108, 115-116.) However, father admits that the 

presumptions of parental fitness existing in the Family Code may 

not apply in a juvenile court proceeding. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 

13 Cal.4th 196, 206 [“‘The presumption of parental fitness that 

underlies the custody law in the family court just does not apply to 

dependency cases’”].) Instead, the juvenile court, “‘which has been 

intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated 

to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the 

child without any preferences or presumptions.’” (Ibid.)
9

showed no insight into the reasons behind the dependency 

proceeding. The evidence was sufficient to show that father 

would not have the ability to work cooperatively with mother in 

making decisions regarding the children.

Father complains that there was no direct evidence that 

the parents were unable to make joint decisions concerning the 

children. He argues that because of this lack of evidence, the 

juvenile court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. However, the 

court was required to look at the totality of the circumstances in 

determining the best interests of the child. (In re Chantal S., 

supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206 [“‘the juvenile court has a special 

responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look at the 

totality of the child’s circumstances’”].) The evidence amply 

showed aggressive and difficult behavior on the part of father. 

This behavior supported the court’s determination that the 

children’s best interests were better served if mother could make 

decisions without involving father.

Father points out that he and mother engaged in mutual 

contact, with mother spending the night at his house and 

bringing the children there several times. Mother did not rebut 

this evidence. However, father presents no authority suggesting 

that this evidence supported a finding that joint custody was in 

the children’s best interests. Even if such evidence did support a 

finding of joint custody, we may not reweigh the evidence. (In re 

Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228 [“The judgment will 

be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, even though 

substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court 

might have reached a different result had it believed other 

evidence”].) The record contains ample evidence of father’s 
10

inability to behave in a cooperative manner. This evidence 

supported the grant of sole legal custody to mother.

A parent’s failure to make progress in overcoming the 

problems leading to the child’s removal is properly considered 

when making a decision regarding legal custody. (In re Jennifer 

R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704, 713.) In Jennifer R., the mother 

appealed a juvenile court decision awarding father sole legal 

custody of their daughter. The Jennifer R. court determined that 

the mother’s failure to address the problems leading to the child’s 

removal, and her inconsistency and inappropriateness in 

visitation, among other things, amply supported the juvenile 

court’s determination that the mother’s participation in making 

important decisions related to the child was not in the child’s best 

interests. (Ibid.) Similarly here, father’s failure to address the 

reasons for the dependency proceeding, inappropriate actions 

during visits and in dealing with the social workers, and 

uncooperative demeanor, support the finding that his 

participation in making decisions for the children was not in their 

best interests. No abuse of discretion occurred.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

__________________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST