### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT Ap ril 21 , 2 004 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 03- 1385 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Dock etNo. 9 9- 01 56 6- CV-UUB MIDRAS H SEPHARDI, INC., YOUNG ISRAEL OF BAL HA RBOR, INC .,Plaintiffs-CounterD ef en dants -Appe llants , ve rs us TOW N OF SURFSIDE, a Fl or ida Munic ipa l C or

por at ion , De fendant-CounterClaim ant-Appellee, PAU L N O V A CK , I ndi vid ua lly and in his capacity

as May or of the Town of S ur fs id e, etal., D ef en dants .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the S outhe rnD istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (A pr il 21, 200 4)Honora ble Richard W. Goldber g , J udg e, United States Court of International Trade , * sitti ngby desig nation. The plaintiffs a lso contend that the SZ O violates their r ights unde r the F irst and 1 Four teenth Amendme nts, as well as their r ights unde r the F lorida Relig ious Fre edom and Restoration Act. B eca

use we sustain the congreg ations’ RLUI PA challeng e to the ordina nce, w e need not r eac h these a dditional claims. 2 Before W IL SO N and KRA VI TC H, Circuit Judges, and GO LD BE RG , Judge. * W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge : Y oung I sr ae l of

Ba l H ar bour ( “ Y oung I sr ae l” ) an d M idr as h S ep hard i (“ Mi dr as h” ), tw o sy

na gogu es se rv ing the S ur fs ide -B al H ar bour -B ay H ar bor Is lands ar ea

of Mi am i- D ad e Co unty , F lor ida , appe al the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ntr y of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f

av or of the T ow n of

S ur fs ide ( “ Surf

sid e” ) on the sy na gogu es ’ c la im s c ha lle ngi ng the S ur fs ide Z oni ng O rd inanc e (“ SZ O ”) und er the Religious Land Use and Institutio nalized Per sons Ac t (“ RL UI PA ” or the “ Ac t”), 42 U. S. C. § 200 0cc et seq . W e fi rs t ho ld tha t the S Z O ’ s pr ovi sio n e xc lud ing 1 churches and synagogu es from locations where private c lubs andlodges are pe rm itt ed vio la te s th e equa l t er

m s pr ovi sio n of

RL U IP A . C onse que ntl y , w e m ust decide whether

RL UI PAis a constitut ional exercise of Congress’ s authorityunder the F ir st, T en th, and F ourte en th A m en dm en ts. F ind ing that i t i s, w e re ve rs e the de ci si on of t he di st ric t co ur t. Back ground3

Surf sid e, asm al l c oa sta l t ow n no rth of the Ci ty of Mi am i B ea chand s outh of Ba l H ar bour , F lor ida , c om

pr ise s r ough ly

one squ ar e m ile and h as appr oxi m at el y 4, 300 re sid en ts and an a ddi tio na l e sti m at ed touri st p opul at ionof

2, 030. Mi dr as h an d Y oung I sr ae l ( co lle ct ive ly the “ co ngr eg at ion s” ) ar e sm al l O rthodo x Je w ish synagogu es that serve the Surf side area. T ogether they

have over one hundred m em be rs w ho r es ide in or

aro und Surf

sid e; the ir a tte ndanc e tr ipl es dur ing the w int er touri st m onths. I n a ddi tio n to Mi dr as h and Y oung I sr ae l, tw o c hur ch es and two ot he r synag og ue s p res en tl y op erat e in Surfs id e. I. T he Challenged Ordinance Ch ap te r 90 of t he Co de of t he Town of S ur fs id e, Fl or id a, (h erei na fte r “ SZO § X ”) div ide s S ur fs ide int o e igh t z oni ng d istri ct s, ide nti fi ed in A rt ic le I II of

the SZ O . A rt ic le I V of

the S Z O se ts f

orth the spe ci fi c re gul at ion s go ve rn ing the applicable districts, and delineates perm itted uses as of right, and uses perm itted s ub je ct o n l y t o s p ec i al u s e p erm i to r p ri o r c o n d i t i o n al u s e ap p ro v al . S u rf s i d e’s zo ni ng sch em e is pe rm is si ve : an y us e n otsp eci fic al ly perm it te d i s p ro hi bi te d. See SZO § 9 0- 6( 1) . U nde r A rt ic le I V , c hur ch es and s yna gogu es are pr ohi bit ed in se ve n of

the ei ght z oni ng d istri ct s. S Z O pe rm its c hur ch es and s yna gogu es in the “ RD -1 tw ofam ily r es ide nti al dis tr ic t” ( “ RD -1 dis tr ic t” ) by w ay of c ondi tio na l us e pe rm itThe standa rds and pr ocedur es for

conditional use appr oval ar e set for th in SZO § 90-41, 2 wh ic h p ro vid e s th at c on dit ion a l us e a pp ro va l sh a ll o nly

be g ra nte d “ wh e re it h a s b e e n c le arl y shown that the public hea lth, safety , morals, and g ener al welf are will not be adver sely

aff ecte d . . . and that nec essar

y safe guards will be pr ovided for the protec tion of surroundingproper ty .” SZ O § 90 -4 1( b) . Se c tio n 9 0- 41 fu rt he r p ro vid e s th at “ [t]he pla nn ingand zon ingbo ard ’s re po rt

to the town commission may contain re commendations re g arding conditions which should be imposed by

the town commission in approvingthe conditional use,” and that “[t]he town commission may

establish these a

nd/or additional conditions for an a pproval.” SZO § 90-41(d) . The SZ O does not ar

ticulate any

other standa

rds g overningthe CUP procedur e. 4 (“ CU P” ) obt ai ne d a ft er

appr ova l by

the S ur fs ide T ow n C om

m iss ion . S Z O § 90 - 147(d). T he SZ O r equires a CU P because c ondi tional us es are “ generally of a publ ic or se m ipu bli c ch ar ac te r . . . but

be ca use of the natur e of

the use and poss ibl e im

pa ct on n ei ghbo ri ng p ro pe rt ie s, r equir e the e xe rc ise of planni ng j udgm ent. . . .” SZ O § 90-41(a). CU Ps are also required for e ducational ins tit uti ons an d m

use um s, of

f- str ee t park ing lot s and g ar ag es , pub lic and go ve rn m en ta l b ui ld in gs , andpubl ic ut il it ie s. See SZ O § 90-41(b)(1) - (5). 2 Surf sid e’ s bu sin es s di str ic t, w hic h e nc om pa sse s tw o bl oc ks w ith in the town, is defined by

SZ O § 90-152 “ to provid e for r etail shopp ing and p ersonal service ne ed s of the town’ s r es ide nts and t our ist s. ” S Z O § 90 -1 52( a) . S ec tio n 90 -1 52 furthe r state s th at

r eg ulatio ns g ove rn ing the bus ine ss d istri ct are “ int en de d to pr ev en t us es and a ct ivi tie s whic h m igh t be noi sy , of fe nsi ve , obn oxi ous, or inc ongr uous in be havio r, ton e or appe ar an ce and whic h m igh t be dif fi cu lt to police.” Id

. T he at er s and r es taur an ts are pe rm itt ed on the f ir st f loo r le ve l of

theAlthough othe r uses “ havingthe same g ener al cha rac teristics and of suc h nature that the 3 same would not lower

the standar ds of the ar ea” may be per mitted in the business dist rict by way of spec ial use exception, churc hes and sy nag ogues may

not apply for spe cial use e x ceptions beca use chur ches a

nd sy nag ogues ar e only

permitted “in a

ny district which they

are sp e c ifi c all

y allowed.” Com

pa reSZO § 90-152(e ) with SZO § 90-41(b) (empha sis added). 5 busi ne ss d istri ct , w hil e pr ivate c lub s and l odge ha lls , he al th c lub s, danc e stu dio s, m usi c ins tr uc tio n st udi os, m ode lin g sc hool s, langua ge sc hool s, and s ch ool s of at hl et ic in st ru ct io n a re o nl y pe rm it te d abo ve th e fi rs t fl oo r. See SZ O § 90 - 152(b)(8), ( 18). A lthou gh perm itted, Surf side does no t have private clubs, social cl ubs, lod ge s or

the at er s. C hur ch es and s yna gogu es are pr ohi bit ed in the bus ine ss dis tr ic t. 3 II . T he L iti gants Mi dr as h w as f

orm ed in 1995 and l ea se s th e se co nd f loo r of 959 2 H ar din g A ve nue f ro m O hio S av ing s B an k ( “ O SB ”) . T he H ar din g A ve nue loc at ionis within Surfside’ s busi ness dist rict, on the sou th side of the 96t h Street boundary betwee n the towns of Bal H arbour and Surfside, three blocks away from Bay H ar bor I slands. Mi dr as h dr aw s it s m em be rs hip f ro m a ll thr ee towns i n th e Su rfs id e-Ba l Har

bo ur -Bay Harbo r are a. Surfside denied a Midrash application for a special use per m it, and denied Mi dr as h’ s a

ppl ic at ionf

or az oni ng v ar ianc e to o pe rate in its c ur re nt l oc at ionW ri t t enp erm i s s i o nfr o mth e o wn er i s re qu i re d

fo r a l l ap p l i cat i o n s fo r r ez o n i n g, 4 including a

pplications for va

rianc es, conditional uses, a nd specia l uses. See SZO § 90-58(6) , (7). Section 90-91 provides that the town commission may g rant a pproval for

specia l 5 exceptions, special use pe rmits or varianc es “a fter ha ving r ece ived a r eport a

nd rec ommendation of the pla nn ingand zon ingbo ard .” SZ O § 90 -9 1( a ). “ Spe c ia l e xce pti on s o r v ari anc e s sh a ll o nly be grante d in case s of demonstrable and exceptional har dship as distinguished fr om purposes or rea sons of conve nience , profit or c apric e.” SZ O § 90-91(b) . Neither party argues that the sy nag ogues have shown, or indee d could show, the re quisite hardship in order to obtain special exceptions or varia

nces. 6 be ca use Mi dr as h f

ai le d to pr ovi de w ri tte n pe rm iss ionf ro m O SB . Mi dr as h di d no t

4 appeal either denial, nor did it seek OSB’ s perm issio n to re-apply for either a special use perm it or a variance . 5 InMarc h 19 99, Y oung I sr ae l be gan le as ing spa ce in the Co ro na do H ote l, located in Surfside’ s tourist d istrict, one block south of the 96th Street boundary betwee n the towns of Bal H arbour and Surfside and severa l blocks away from Bay H ar bor I slands. I n N ove m

be r 2000 , the Co ro na do H ote l w as sol d, and a s ar es ult , Y oung I sr ae l c ongr eg an ts j oin ed te m por ar ily w ithMi dr as h c ongr eg an ts i n Mi dr as h’ s H ar din g A ve nue loc at ion . L ike Mi dr as h, Y oung I sr ae l dr aw s it s m em be rs hi p fr om

all th ree t own s i n t he Su rfs id e-Ba l Har bo ur -Bay Harbo r are a. Y oung I sr ae l ha s ne ve r atte m pte d to obt ai n aCU P or

avari an ce . B oth congregations m aintain that any attem pt to relocate in the perm itted RD- 1 district wou ldbe fut il e b ecau se su it ab le lan d i s u na va il ab le .Surfside ar gues that Jewish law permits the elder ly and per sons with medical conditions 6 to use transportation to attend service s, and thus that walkingis not a pe r serequire ment of Or tho do x J ud a ism . It is wo rt h n oti ngat th is p oint th at “ [i]t is no t w ith in t he jud ic ia l ke n to question the ce ntrality

of par ticular be liefs or pra ctices to a faith, or the va lidity

of par ticular litigants’ inter

pretations of those cre eds.” Hernande z v. Commissioner , 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 7 The m em bers of Midrash and Young Israel a dhere to the strict observance of O rthodo x Ju da ism . S yna gogu e se rv ic es inc lud e re lig iou s pr ay er , w or shi p, son g, Torah readings, serm ons, group di scussio ns, re quired Sabbath and ho liday fe sti vit ie s, c el eb ratio ns o f re lig iou s e ve nts and r el igi ous stu dy . Ac en tr al te ne t of O rthodo x Je w ishf

ai th r equir es da ily

pr ay er s and the pr es en ce of a“ m iny an ” – a quor um of te n m al es ove r the a ge of thi rt ee n – f

or the r ea din g f

ro m the T or ahon the wee kly

Sabbath and religious h oliday s. A ccording to th e sy nagogu es, they have hos te d w ed din gs, Bar- Mi tz vahs, Br it- Mi lahs, c om m uni ty hol iday m ea ls and fe sti vit ie s, le ct

ur es and g ro up d isc uss ion s onsoc ia l and p oli tic al iss ue s, m ee tin gs on c om m uni ty w el fare and p ubl ic se rv ic e ac tiv iti es , and s ing le s e ve nts , a ll w ith in th e co nt ex t o f th ei r rel ig io us an d s pi rit ua l m is si on s. O rthodo x Ju da ism

f or bid s a dhe re nts to use c ar s or oth er m eans o f tr an spor ta tio n duri ng the w ee kly

S ab ba th and r el igi ous hol iday s; thus, a dhe re nts pr ef er to ga the r fo r w or shi p and r el igi ous stu dy in sy na gogu es c los e en oughto the ir hom es to al lowthe m

to w al k to se rv ic es . T o th is e nd, the c ongr eg at ion s 6 cl ai m that the RD -1 dis tr ic t i s ou t of the r equir ed

w al kin g r an ge f

or asig nif ic an tSurfside cites the 1995- 2000 Comprehensive Plan, a dopted pursuant to L ocal 7 Gover nment Comprehensive Planningand L and De velopment Regulation Act, F LA . S TAT . ANN . § 163.3161 et seq. Th e 19 95 -2 00 0 Pl an s tate s th at Surf sid e ’s pr ima

ry g oa l in dr a ft ingthe SZ O i s to “[e]ns ure that the char acte r and loc ation of future land uses dire cts g rowth in such a w ay so as to provide maxim um economic be nefit” to Surfside. T hus, under the 1995- 2000 Plan, Surfside encour ag es, inte r a lia , 1) re vitaliz ation of the e x isting Ha rdingAvenue business are a; 2) conce ntration of commer cial uses in and a round Ha rdingAvenue ; 3) deve lopment of commerc ial office space alongColli ns Avenue betwee n 93rd and 96th Stree ts to provide a greater population for r etail and se rvice shops alongHar ding Avenue; a nd 4) deve lopment of commerc ial uses along 94th, 95th, and 96th Streets betwee n Colli ns and Ha rdingAvenue s. The 2010 Comprehe nsive Plan states, inte r a lia , that Surfside’s objec tives are to 1) encour ag e private investment in the revitalization of the Ha rdingAvenue business district; 2) ma int a in a

nd imp ro ve zon ingre gulatio ns wh ic h p e rm it the c on c e ntr atio n o f c omm e rc ia l us e s in and ar ound the established Ha rdingAvenue business are a; and 3) maintain and improve zoning re gulatio ns wh ic h p e rm it c omm e rc ia l of fi c e sp a c e a lon gCol lin s A ve nu e a s p art of mixe d u se developments whic h provide c oncentr ations of worke rs and/or r esidents to support reta il and service uses alongHar ding Avenue. We have sa id that “Flor ida’s land use planningstatutes provide for the adoption of c omp re he ns ive pla

ns to c ontr ol a

nd dir e c t th e us e and

de ve lop me nt o f p ro pe rt

y wi thi n a c ounty or municipality . Once a compr ehensive plan for a n are a is adopted, a ll development appr oved by a g overnme ntal ag ency

must be consistent with the plan.” Ei dev . S aras ota Cou nty , 908 F.2d 716, 718-19 (11th Cir. 1990) (c itations omi tted). 8 num ber of their m em

bers, particularly

elderly ones, who reside on the no rthern si de of S ur fs id e an d i n t he ne ig hb or in g B al Harb ou r an d B ay Harb orco m

m un it ie s. Surf sid e cl ai m s th at

the S Z O w as de sig ne d inpart to inv igo rate the bus ine ss dis tr ic t and t o c re at e a str ong ta x ba se thr oughit s r et ai l di str ic t. T he e co nom ic 7 via bil ity of the bus ine ss d istri ct

– the onl y

r et ai l se rv ic e ar ea

in Surf sid e – is cr i t i ca l t o Su rf

s i d e’s t ax b as e, jo b b as e, an d s erv i ci n g th e n ee d s o f S u rf s i d e’s re sid en ts. A cc or din gly , S ur fs ide a ve rs that a llo w ing c hur ch es and s yna gogu es in the bus ine ss d istri ct

w oul d e ro de S ur fs ide ’ s tax ba se , on whic h S ur fs ide is de pe nd en t fo r rev en ue , andwou ldres ul t i n e co no m ic ha rd sh ip on th e res id en ts .9

Be ca use S ur fs ide ha s adif

fi cu lt tim e co m

pe tin g f or bus ine ss w iththe ne ar

by Sh ops at Ba l H ar bour – and r ec en tly

los t a m aj or r et ai l su pe rm ar ke t c ha in – Surf sid e cl ai m s th at

it c annot a ff or d to pla ce non -e co nom ic e sta bli shm en ts i n th e bu si ne ss di st ric t wi th ou t ri sk in g t he eco no m ic st ab il it y of S ur fs id e. Surf sid e al low s pr ivate c lub s and s im ilar pla ce s of a sse m bla ge in the busi ne ss d istri ct

be ca use it be lie ve s su chor ganiz at ion s are c om pa tib le w iththe retail char acter

of the business district. S urfside contends th at private clubs are en te rt ai nm en t c en te rs and ty pic al ly oc cu py r et ai l sp ac e in c om

m er ci al dis tr ic ts w he re r ev ita liz at ionis re qui re d. S ur fs ide arg ue s th at c hur ch es and s yna gogu es , on the oth er hand, c ontri but e little sy ne rg y to re ta il shop pin g are as and d isr upt the co nt in ui ty of ret ai l en vi ro nm en ts . III . Procedural H istory InMay 199 9, S ur fs ide ini tiate d tw o a ct ion s a ga ins t the c ongr eg at ion s and the ir r es pe ct ive le sso rs in state c ourt t o e nj ointhe use of the H ar din g A ve nue sit e and the Coronado Hotel as synagogu es and to im pose civil pen alties for alleged violatio ns of the SZO . The a ctions were rem oved to federal court and dism issed w ith out pr ej udi ce . I n Ju ly

199 9, the c ongr eg at ion s f ile d th e ins tant a ct ionse ek ingThe sy nag ogues’ or igina l complaint alleg ed a f acia l equal prote ction violation, which 8 was re place d in the second a mended c omplaint with an as-applied e qual protec tion claim. Upon revie wingthe re cord, w e find that the sy nag ogues aba

ndoned their f

acia l equal prote ction claim. The district cour

t was not prese nted with and did not resolve a n equal pr otection ar gument based on Sur fs ide ’s tr e atme nt o f p ri vate c lub s a nd lod g e s. Th e re fo re , w e wi ll n ot c on sid e r t his argument on appea l. See W alker v . Jones , 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 ( 11th Cir. 1994). To the extent that the ar gument overla

ps with the sy

nag ogues’ RLUI PA claim, we discuss that issue inf ra . 10 de cl ar at or

y and i nj unc tiv e re lie f unde r 42 U . S. C. § 19 83. S ur fs ide answ er ed and 8 filed a tw o-count coun terclaim seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief

, a s well a s ci vi l p en al ti es an d a tt orne y s’ fees . Both parties m oved for summ ary j udgm ent. S urfside subm itted evidence fr om land u se e xpe rt s onthe e co nom ic via bil ity of asm al l bu sin es s di str ic t, w ho as se rt ed that a llo w ing c hur ch es and s yna gogu es in the bus ine ss d istri ct w oul d er ode S ur fs ide ’ s tax ba se . T he c ongr eg at ion s atte m pte d to r eb ut this e vid en ce by subm itt ing a ff

idavit s f ro m r ab bis and c ongr eg an ts r el at ing to the use and i m pa ct of the sy na gogu es and the li ke ly

bur de n sh oul d th e sy

na gogu es be r equir ed

to re loc at e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t f

or S ur fs ide on f

ive of six co unt s of the c ongr eg at ion s’ c om

pla int and d en ie d sum

m ar y j udgm en t i n f

ull f or th e co ng reg at io ns . InN ove m

be r 2000 , the c ongr eg at ion s f ile d athi rd

a m en de d c om

pla int alleging an addit ional claim based on RLU IPA . The district court granted11

summ ary j udgm ent in favor of Surf side on all aspects of the congregants’ RLU IPA cl ai m an d s ub se qu en tl y

gra nt edSu rfs id e’s co un te rcl ai m foran in jun ct io n. W e is su eda st ay

of i nju nc ti on pe nd in g app eal . Purs ua ntto 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (a ), the U nit ed

S ta te s ha s in te rv en ed

to de fe nd the c onst itutio na lity of RLUIPA. Stand ard of R eview W e re vie wagr an t of

sum m ar y j udgm en t de novo , a

pply ing th e sam e legal st an da rd s t ha t b in d t he di st ric t co ur t. See Ca st S te el Prods . , I nc . v . A dm ira l I

ns. Co . , 348 F. 3d 12 98, 1301 (11t h Cir. 2003 ). T he c onstru ct ionand c onst itutio na lity of a st atut e are qu es ti on s o f la w th atwe rev ie w de novo . See R anch House, Inc. v. A m er son , 238 F. 3d 12 73, 1277 (11t h Cir. 2001 ). Am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t sh oul d be gr an te d whe n “ the ple ad ing s, de posi tio ns, answ er s to int er ro ga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe af fi davit s, if

any , sho wthat the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and th atth e m ov in g p art y

is en ti tl edto jud gm en t as a m at te r of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). “ [T ] he plain langu age of Rule 56(c) m andates the entry of sum m ary j udgm en t . . . a ga ins t a

party w ho f ai ls t o m ak e a show ing suf fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh the e xis te nc e of

an e le m en t e sse nti al to that party ’ s c as e, and o n whic h th at party will bear the burden of proof at trial. ” Ce lotexCo rp. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U . S. 317 , 32212

(1 986) ; se e als o M

ori sk y v. B row ard Co unt

y , 80 F.3d44 5, 4 47 (11 th Cir . 19 96 ). On a summ ary

j udgm ent m otion , the r ecord and all re asonable inferences that can be dr awn f

ro m it m ust be vie w ed

in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the non -m ovi ng pa rty. See Cast Steel , 348 F . 3d at 13 01. D isc us sio n I. Jus tic ia

bil ity A s an in iti al m atte r, w e m ust a ddr es s whe the r the c ongr eg at ion s have st an di ng to bri ng th ei r cl ai m s an d, wi th res pe ctto th ei r cl ai m ch al le ng in g t he CUP pr oc edur e, whe th er t ha t cl ai m is rip e. Bo th r ipe ne ss and s tandi ng are doc tr ine s r el at ing to the j ust ic ia bil ity of the congregations ’ claim s, which encom passes both constitu tional and p rudential co nc ern s. Se e H

allanda le Prof’l

F ireF igh te rs L oc al 2 238 v. Ci tyof H allanda le , 922 F. 2d 7 56, 759 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) . T he c onst itutio na l a spe ct of j ust ic ia bil ity focuses on whether the A rticle II I re quirem ents of actual “ case or c ontroversy ” ar e m et , w hil e the pr

ude nti al a spe ct

a sks w he the r it is a

ppr opr ia te f

or thi s c as e to b e li ti ga te d i n afed eral co ur t b y th es e p art ie s at th is ti m e. Se e id. at 7 59 -6 0. Article III of the U nited States Constitu tion lim its the power of f ederal co ur ts to ad

jud ic at in g a ctua l “ cas es ” an d “ co nt ro ve rs ie s.” U.S. C ON ST . art . III, § 2, c l. 1. “ T his c as e- or -c ontro ve rs y doc tr ine f

undam en ta lly

li m its the pow er

of13

federa l courts in ou r sy stem of governm ent, and helps to ‘ identify those dis putes which ar e appropriately

resolved throug h judicial process. ’ ” Ga. State Conference of N A A CP B ranc hes v . Cox , 183 F . 3d 1 259, 126 2 ( 11th C ir . 199 9) ( quot ing W hit m ore v . A rk

ansa s , 49 5 U.S. 1 49 , 15 5 (1 99 0) ). T he m ost sig nif ic an t do ctri ne of

c as e- or -c ontro ve rs y

is the r equir em en t of standi ng. Id . “ Ine sse nc e the que sti on o f standi ng i s whe the r the li tig an t i s entitled to h ave the court decide the m erits of the dispute or of particular issues.” W ar th v. Se ld in , 422 U.S . 490, 498 (1975). Aparty seeking to in voke federal j ur isd ic tio n m

ust de m onstrate : 1) an in

j ur y in fa ct or an in va sio n of

ale ga lly pr ote ct ed int er es t; 2) adir ec t c au sa l r el at ion shi p be tw ee n th e inj ur y and the ch al le ng edact io n; an d 3 ) a l ik el ih oo d o f red res sabi li ty. Lu jan v . D ef

en de rs o f W ild lif e , 504 U . S. 555 , 560 -6 1 ( 1992 ); se e als o P itt m an v . Co le , 267 F . 3d 1 269, 1282 -8 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 1) . I n e va luatin g whe the r a party ha s st an din g, w e m

ust

“ ac ce pt a s tr

ue a ll m at er ia l a lle ga tio ns o f the c om pla int , and m

ust c onstru e the com plaint in favor of the c om plainin g party .” W

arth , 422 U . S. a t 50 1. Su rfs id e arg ue s t ha t t he co ng reg at io ns lac k s ta nd in g t o a ss ertth atth e SZO violates their const itutio nal rights because neither Midrash nor Young Israel has attem pted to lo cate property

in the RD- 1 district, nor has either sy nagogu e applied fo r a CU P or

r ec ei ve d O SB ’ s pe rm iss ionto do s o. S ur fs ide ’ s arg um en t m iss es theHoweve r, we find that neither Midra sh nor YoungI srae l has standingto challeng e the 9 a pp lic atio n o f § 90 -1 51 , whic h d e fi ne s Surf sid e ’s tou ri st d istri c t and , li ke § 9 0- 15 2, pe rm its private c lubs but ex cludes c hurche s and sy nag ogues. See 90-151(b) (2). Ne ither par ty is located in the tourist dist rict, and ne ither par ty has conc rete and spec ific plans to locate in there. 14 poi nt o f the c ongr eg at ion s’ c ont en tio n: e ve n if a“ sui ta ble pr ope rty ” ex ist ed

in RD -1 dis tr ic t, the c ongr eg at ion s be lie ve the y have ale ga l r igh t t o r em ai n inthe bu si ne ss di st ric t. Surf sid e ha s a lr ea dy

sou ght to en fo rc e § 90 -1 52 a ga ins t the c ongr eg at ion s in ane ar lie r state c ourt a ct ion . I n th e ins tant a ct ion , S ur fs ide se ek s an in j unc tio n prohibi ting th e congregations from continu ing at their current location, as w ell as anim posi tio n of

c ivi l pe na lti es . A s ar es ult of S ur fs ide ’ s atte m

pts to en fo rc e the pr ovi sio ns o f § 90 -1 52 a ga ins t the m , the c ongr eg at ion s have suf fe re d th e re qui sit e inj ur y f or standi ng p ur

pose s. W e fi nd tha t the c ongr eg at ion s have standi ng t o ch al le nge the appl ic at ionof bus ine ss d istri ct

r eg ulatio ns o utl ine d inS Z O § 90 - 152. 9 T he c ongr eg at ion s a lso se ek to ch al le nge the CU P re qui re m en t and pr oc ed ur e fo und in S Z O § 90 -4 1. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at the sy na gogu es la ck ed

standi ng t o c ont es t the c onst itutio na lity of § 90 -4 1 be ca

use by fa ili ng t o f

oll owpr oc ed

ur es f or obt ai nin g aCU P, the c ongr eg at ion s ha d no t suf fe re d an in

j ur y be ca use of the appl ic at ionof

§ 90 -4 1. Mi dr as h ne ve rthe le ss15

contends that it has standi ng to challeng e the CU P because of the likeliho od that Surfside w ill enforce the provision agains t it in the future. S ection 90-41 requires a CU P fo r chur ch es and s yna gogu es “ in any dis tr ic t i n whic h th ey

are spe ci fi ca lly al low ed . ” Re ad ing § 90 -4 1 in p arim ate ra w ith§ 90 -1 52, the c ongr eg at ion s, if vi ct or io us , m

us t ap pl y fora CUP t o c on ti nu e o pe rat in g a t t he ir c urren t l oc at io n. A ssum ing the c or

re ctne ss o f the c ongr eg at ion s’ c ha lle nge to the va lid ity of § 90 - 152 unde r RL U IP A , the c ongr eg at ion s arg ue that any de cl ar at or

y or inj unc tiv e relief invalid ating § 90 -152 would be incom plete if their challenge to § 90-41 were no t co ns id eredas we ll . T he c ongr eg at ion s’ CU P ch al le nge im pli cate s th e doc tr ine of

r ipe ne ss, w hic h, li ke the standi ng d oc tr ine , inv olv es c onsi de ratio n of both c onst itutio na l and prud en ti al co nc ern s. Se e P itt m an , 267 F . 3d at 12 78. T he pur pose of the r ipe ne ss doc tr ine is “ to p re ve nt the c ourts, thr ougha voi danc e of pr em at ur e ad j udi catio n, from entangling them selves in abstract disagreem ents. . . .” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner , 387 U. S. 136, 148 (196 7), abr ogated on o the r gr ound

s , Califan o v. Sand er s , 430 U . S. 99 ( 1977 ). I n de ci din g whe the r a cl ai m is ri pe f or a dj udi catio n or r ev ie w , w e loo k pr im ar ily a t tw o c onsi de ratio ns: 1) the f itn es s of the iss ue s f

or j udicial decision , and 2) the hardship to the parties of w ithho lding court co ns id erat io n. Id

. at 1 49 .16

T he c ongr eg at ion s’ CU P ch al le nge f ai ls the pr ude nti al , or

“ fi tne ss, ” pr ong of the ripeness inqui ry . Beca use the congregation s have not received a f inal decision on a CU P application – ind eed, neither party has seriously

applied for a CU P – th e co ngr eg at ion s do not r ai se apur el y

le ga l i ssu e w hic h w e can de ci de in th e ab st ractwit ho utfur th er fa ctua l d ev el op m en t. Cf . id. I nst ea d, the congregations ’ allegations am ountto m ere speculation about conti ngent future ev en ts. W e cannot

de te rm ine f

ro m the r ec or d ho wthe CU P w ill be appl ie d and w he the r Surf

sid e w ill use the CU P pr oc es s to de ny the pla int if

fs pe rm its to ope rate th ei r s yna g o g u es . Th e r ec o rdco n t ai n s n o s i g n i fi ca n tev i d en ce o f S u rf s i d e’s havin g de nie d C U Ps in the pa st, and thus, the im pa ct of the CU P re qui re m en t i s not su fficiently

direct and im

m ediate as to render the issue approp riate f or j udicial review . Such inqui ry

is better postpo ned unti l the issues are presented in the m ore co nc re te c ir cum stanc e of ac ha lle nge to § 90 -4 1 a s a ppl ie d. W e tu rn to th e p la in ti ff’s ch al le ng e to SZO § 9 0- 15 2 u nd er RLUIPA. II. RL UI PA T w o op er at ive sub se ct ion s of RL U IP Aare a t i ssu e in this c as e: § ( a) ( the

“ s ub s t an t i al b u rd en p ro v i s i o n ”) , a n d§ (b )( 1 ) ( th e “equ al t erm s p ro v i s i o n ”) . We ad dr es s ea ch of t he se sec ti on s i n turn. A . Su bst an tia l B ur de n onRe lig iou s E xe rc ise17

Se ct ion( a) (1 ) of

RL U IP Apr ovi de s: N o go ve rn m en t sh al l i m

pose or im ple m en t a land u se r eg ulatio n ina m anne r that i m

pose s asub stanti al bur de n onthe r el igi ous ex er ci se of a pe rs on, inc lud ing ar el igi ous as se m bly or ins tit uti on, unl es s th e governm ent dem onstrates that im posit ion of the burden o n that pe rs on, a sse m

bly , or ins tit uti on– (A ) is i n f urthe ranc e of

ac om pe lli ng i nte re st; and (B ) is the le as t r es tr ic tiv e m eans o f furthe ri ng tha t c om pe lli ng gove rn m en ta l i nte re st. 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0c c(a) (1 ). Se ct ion( a) (1 ) ap pli es onl y if one of thr ee j ur isd ic tio na l t es ts i s f ir st m et : ei the r (A ) the bur de n is im pose d inaf

ed er al ly -f unde d pr ogr am

or a ct ivi ty ; ( B) the burden affec ts, or r em oval of the burden would affect, interstate com m erce ; or (C) the “bur de n is im

pose d inthe im

ple m en ta tio n of

aland u se r eg ulatio n or

sy ste m of land use regulation s, under which a governm ent m akes . . . indiv idualized as se ss m en ts of t he pro po se d u se s fo r th e p ro pe rty inv ol ve d.” 42 U.S.C. § 20 00 cc(a )(2 ). “ Lan d u se reg ul at io n” is de fin edas a“ zo ni ng or l an dm ark in g l aw, or the appl ic at ionof

suc h alaw , that l im its or r es tr ic ts a

c la im an t’ s us e or de ve lo pm en t o f la nd(in cl ud in g ast ru ctur e aff ix edto lan d) , if t he cla im an t h as . . . [a] leasehold . . . in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.” 42 U. S. C. § 200 0cc-5(5).18

Jurisdictio n in thi s case is appropriate under RL UI PA ’ s “ indiv idualized as se ss m en t” tes t. Se e id. a t § 2000 cc (a )( 2) (C ). T he S Z O r equir es e ac h c hur chand sy na gogu e to a

ppl y f or aCU P pr ior

to ope ratin g inS ur fs ide . T his a sse ssm en t pr oc ed ur e, w hic h r es ult s inac as e- by -c as e ev al ua tio n of the pr opos ed

a ct ivi ty of re lig iou s or ganiz at ion s, c ar ri es the c onc om itant r isk

of idi osy nc ratic appl ic at ionof SZ O standard s. S ur fs ide of fi ci al s m ay

use the ir auth or ity to ind ivi dua lly

e va luate an d e ith er appr ove or

dis ap pr ove of

c hur ch es and s yna gogu es in pot en tia lly dis cr im inator

y w ay s. T hus, S Z O is qui nte sse nti al ly an “ ind ivi dua l a sse ssm en t” reg im e v is -a-v is ch ur ch es an d s yna go gu es . T he ge ne ra l r

ule of RL U IP Ais that st at e ac tio n su bst an tia lly

bur de nin g

“ re lig iou s e xe rc ise ” m

ust be j ust if ie d a s th e le as t r es tr ic tiv e m eans o f furthe ri ng a co m pe ll in g g ov ern m en ta l i nt eres t. Id. at §§ 2 000c c( a) (1 ), 200 0c c- 1( a) . T o in voke the pr ote ct ionof

§ ( a) of RL U IP A , pla int if

fs be ar the bur de n of

f ir st d em onstratin g th atth e reg ul at io n s ub st an ti al ly bur de ns rel ig io us ex erci se . Se e id. at § 2000 cc -2 (b ). B ec au se the a lle ge d burd enis im pose d a s ar es ult

of S Z O , w e fi rs t co nsi de r w he the r “ re lig iou s e xe rc ise ” is i m pli cate d by

e ith er the S Z O or

it s im ple m en ta tio n.

1. Re lig iou s E xe rc ise19

Past cases have held that zonin g decisions do notgenerally im pose a su bs ta nt ia l b ur de n o n re li gi ou s ex erci se . See G rosz v. City of M iami B each , 721 F. 2d 7 29, 739 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ; se e als o C hri sti an G ospe l C

hurc h, I nc . v . Ci tyand County of Sa n Francisco , 896 F. 2d 12 21, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990 ); M es sia h B apt ist Ch urc h v . Co unt

y of J ef fe rso n , 859 F . 2d 8 20, 824 -2 5 ( 10th C ir . 198 8) ; La ke wo od, O hio Co ngre

gat ion of Je hov ah’

s W itn es ses, I nc . v . Ci tyof La ke wo od , 699 F . 2d 303, 306 -0 7 ( 6thCi r. 198 3) . T he se c as es a ll co nsi de re d whe the r the “ re lig iou s ex erci se ” im

pl ic at edby zon in g d eci si on s was in te gr al to a be li ev er’s fai th . RL U IP Aobv ia te s th e ne ed f or suc h ana ly sis by

pr ovi din g astatut or

y de fi nit ionof

“ rel ig io us ex erci se .” U nde r RL U IP A , “ re lig iou s e xe rc ise ” inc lud es the “ use , bui ldi ng, or co nv ers io n o f rea l p ro pe rty for t he pu rp os e o f rel ig io us ex erci se . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc - 5( 7) (B ). U nli ke the sug ge sti ons m ad e in the c as es c ite d a bove , “ re lig iou s ex er ci se ” doe s no t have to be “ co m pe lle d by , or

c en tr al to, asy ste m

of r el igi ous belief. ” Id

. at § 2000cc-5(7)(A ). In passing RLU IPA , C ongress recognized that pla ce s of a sse m bly are ne ed ed

to fa ci lit at e re lig iou s pr ac tic e, a s w el l a s th e poss ibi lity

that l oc al gov er

nm en ts m ay

use z oni ng r eg ulatio ns t o pr ev en t r el igi ous groups from

using land for such purpos es. Thus, c hallenges to zon ing ordin ances ar e expr es sly

c ont em plate d by the statut e, and the re is no d oubt that the20

co ngr eg at ion s’ c ha lle nge c onc er ns “ re lig iou s e xe rc ise ” w ith in the m eanin g of RL U IP A . T he re fo re , the que sti on the n be co m es w he the r the c ha lle nge d z oni ng re gul at ion s, or

the appl ic at ionthe re of

, e ff ec t a “ subs tanti al bur de n” on the congregations ’ use of rea l property for the purpose of religious exercise. W e turn to th is qu es ti on .

2. Substantial Burden A ny e xe rc ise of

statut or y int er pr et at ionbe gin s f

ir st w iththe langua ge of

the st atut e in qu es ti on . See Nat’l Coal A ss’n v. C hater , 81 F. 3d 10 77, 1081 (11t h Cir. 1996 ). Bec ause RL UI PAdoes not d efine “ subs tantial burden,” w e give the term it s o rd in ary orna tu ral m ean in g. Se e id. A lthou gh the legisl ative history of a statut e is r el ev an t t o th e pr oc es s of statut or y int er pr et at ion , “ w e do n ot r es ort t o legislative his tory

to cloud a statuto ry

text that is clear. ” Ratzlaf v. U nited Sta tes , 510 U.S . 135, 147-48 (1994). W e turn, ther efore, to other instances in which co ur ts ha ve de fin edor d is cu ss edth e te rm “ su bs ta nt ia l b ur de n.” The S uprem e Court’ s definition of “ subs tantial burden” within its free exercise c ases is instructive in d eterm ining what C ongress un derstood “ subs tantial bur de n” to m ean inRL U IP A . T he Co urt’ s art ic ulatio n of w ha t c onst itute s a

“ su bs ta nt ia l b ur de n” ha s v ari edov er t im e. Se e, e . g. , Ly ng v . No rth west I ndi an Cem etery Protective A ss’n , 485 U . S. 439 , 450 ( 1988 ) (i ndi catin g th at no21

subs tantial burden exist s where regulation do es not have “ a tendency to coerce ind ivi dua ls i nto a ct ing c ontrary to the ir r el igi ous be lie fs ”) ; Hobbie v. U ne m plo ym en t A ppe als Co m m ’n of F

la. , 480 U . S. 136 , 141 ( 1987 ) (f ind ing subs tanti al bur de n whe n go ve rn m en t put “ subs tanti al pr es sur e on an a dhe re nt t o m odi fy his be havio r an d to vio la te his be lie fs ”) ; Th om as v . R ev ie w B d. of In d. Em ployment Sec. Div . , 450 U . S. 707 , 718 ( 1981 ) (s am e) ; Sherbert v. V erner , 374 U. S. 398, 404 (196 3) (finding a subs tantial burden when an indiv idual is required to “ ch oose be tw ee n f

oll ow ing the pr ec ep ts o f he r re lig ionand f or fe iti ng b en ef

its , on the one hand, and a

bandon ing one of

the pr ec ep ts o f he r re lig ion. . . on the oth er ”) ; but

se e B ow en v . R oy , 476 U . S. 693 , 707 -0 8 ( 1986 ) (finding no subst antial burden where governm ent action interfere d with, but did not coerce, an ind ivi dua l’ s r el igi ous be lie fs ); Ly ng , 48 5 U.S. at45 2 (s am e). W e have he ld tha t an in div idu al ’ s e xe rc ise of r el igi on i s “ subs tanti al ly bur de ne d” if

ar eg ulatio n c om

ple te ly pr ev en ts the ind ivi dua l f ro m e nga gin g in religiousl y

m andated activity , or if the regulation requires participation in an act iv it y pro hi bi te d b y

rel ig io n. Se e Ch ef

fe r v . R en o , 55 F. 3d 15 17, 1522 (11t h Cir. 1995 ) (a pply ing th e Religious Freedom Restoration Act, we found no subst antial burden when religion didnot require particular m eans of expressing religiou s view and alternative m eans of re ligio us expression we re available); Ch urc h ofThe “ exclusions and lim its” provision provides that “[n] o g overnme nt shall impose or 10 imp le me nt a

land us e re gulatio n th at – ( A) tot a lly e xclu de s r e lig iou s a sse mbl ie s f ro m a jurisdiction; or (B) unrea sonably limit s relig ious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b) (3). 22 Scientolo gy Flag Serv. Org. , I nc. v . City of Clearwater , 2 F . 3d 1 514, 155 0 ( 11th Ci r. 199 3) ( fi ndi ng a

sub stanti al bur de n whe n r eg ulatio n ha d th e ef fe ct of m an da ti ng rel ig io us co nduc t). I ni n t e r p r e t i n g th e s a me p r o v i s i o no f R LU I P Aa s we h a v e b e f o r e u s t o d ay, the S ev en th C ir cu it re ce ntl y de cl ar ed : in th e co nt ex t o f RLUIPA’s b ro adde fin it io n o f rel ig io us ex erci se , a land- use r eg ulatio n th at

im pose s asub stanti al bur de n onr el igi ous exercise is one that necessar ily bears direc t, prim ary , and fundam ental re spon sib ili ty

f or r en de ri ng r el igi ous ex er ci se – i nc lud ing the use of re al pr ope rty

f or the pur pose the re of

w ith in the r eg ulate d j ur isd ic tio n generally – effe ctively

im practicable. Ci vi l L ibe rti es for

U rban B el ie ve rs v . Ci tyof Ch ic ago , 342 F. 3d 75 2, 761 (7th Cir. 2003 ) (her einafter “ CLUB ”) . Wh i l e w e d ec l i n e t o ad o p tth e S ev en th Ci rc u i t ’s de fi nit ion– whic h w oul d r en de r § b( 3) ’ s to ta l e xc lus ionpr ohi bit ionm eanin gle ss 10 – we agree that “ subs tantial burden” requires som ething m ore than an incidental effe cton rel ig io us ex erci se . T he c om bin ed im port of the se art ic ulatio ns l ea ds u s to the c onc lus ionthat a

“ subs tantial burden” m

ust place m ore than an inconvenience on religio us exercise; a “ subs tanti al bur de n” is ak in t o si gni fi cant p re ssure w hic h di re ct ly c oe rc es theIn addition to these burdens, the congreg ations sugg est that they will not be able to find 11 land or a fac ility siz able e noug h to acc ommodate their c ong reg ations in the permitted RD-1 district. That the congreg ations may be unable to find suitable alternative space does not cre ate a substantial burden within the mea ning of RLUI PA. As the Seventh Circuit noted, “whateve r specific difficulties [the plaintiff churc h] claims to have encounte red, the y are the same one s that fac e all [land users], not merely churc hes. The ha

rsh re ality of the mar

ketplace sometimes dictates that c erta in fac iliti es ar e not ava ilable to those who desire them.” Love Church v. City of Evanston , 896 F.2d 1082, 1086 ( 7th Cir. 1990). The c ong reg ations also contend that the bur den of r equiringthem to apply for a CUP c on sti tut e s a

su bs tanti a l bu

rd e n o n r e lig iou s e xer c ise . Re qu ir ingc hurc he s a nd sy na g ogue s to a pp ly fo r C UPs a llo ws the zon ingc omm iss ion to c on sid e r f

a c tor s su c h a s si ze, c on g ru ity wi th e xistin gus e s, and

ava ila bil ity of pa rk ing . We have fo un d th at su c h r e a so na ble “ ru n o f t he mil l” zoning consider ations do not constitute substantial burdens on relig ious ex erc ise. See Lady J . 23 religious adh erent to conform his or her behavior accordingly . Thus, a subst antial bur de n c anr es ult

f ro m pr es sur e that t en ds t o f

or ce a dhe re nts to fo re go r el igi ous pr ecep ts or f

ro m pre ss ur e th atm an da te s re li gi ou s co nduc t. T he c ongr eg at ion s arg ue that r equir ing the m to loc at e the ir

sy na gogu es in the RD -1 dis tr ic t c onst itute s asub stanti al bur de n f or tw o r el at ed

r ea sons . F ir st, th ey co nt en d t ha t re lo cat io n wo ul d re qu ire th ei r co ng reg an ts to walkfart he r. Specifica lly , they

suggestthat the additio nal blocks wouldgreatly burden co ngr eg an ts who are il l, y oung or ve ry old . T he inc onve nie nc e oc ca sio ne d on these congregants would cause them to stop attending services altogeth er, sig nif ic an tly im pa ir ing the sy

na gogu es ’ ope ratio n. A s ar es ult , the c ongr eg at ion s sugg es t tha t the sig nif

ic an t de cr ea se in atte ndanc e w oul d r equir e the m to ce as e ope ratio ns a lto ge the r, the re by c re at ing an ob vio us s ubst an tia l burd enon the ir religious exercise. 11Linge rie

, I nc . v . J ac k so nv ille , 176 F.3d 1358, 1362 ( 11th Cir. 1999). 24 V ie w ing the e vid en ce in a lig ht f av or ab le to the c ongr eg at ion s, w e fi rs t no te that they do notclaim

that their curre nt location has som e re ligio us sig nificance such that their faith requires a sy nagogu e at this particular site. A lthou gh they are not pe rm itt ed

to loc at e in the bus ine ss d istri ct , the c ongr eg at ion s have the al te rn at ive of

appl y ing f

or ape rm it to o pe rate onl y

af ewblo ck s f

ro m the ir c ur re nt location. For purposes of evaluating whether the SZ O e xacts a substanti al burden w ith in the m eanin g of

RL U IP A , the r el ev an t i nqui ry is w he the r an d to w ha t e xte nt th is pa rti cu la r req ui rem en t b ur de ns th e co ng reg at io ns ’ rel ig io us ex erci se . While walking m ay

be burdensom e and “ wa lking farther” m ay be even m ore so, w e cannot

say that w al kin g af

ewe xtr a blo ck s is “ subs tanti al , ” as the te rm is used in RLU IPA , and as sug gested by the Suprem e Court. T he perm itted RD- 1 dis tr ic t i s inthe ge ogr ap hic c en te r of ar el at ive ly

sm al l m uni ci pa lity , pr oxi m at e to the busin ess, tourist and residential districts. De posit ion testim ony indicated that congregants wishing to practice O rthodox Judaism custom arily

m ove where synagogu es are located and do not ty pically expect the synagogu es to m ove closer to th em . See Casper D ep. at 23-24. In any given cong regation, som e m em bers w ill ne ce ssari ly

w al k f ar the r than othe rs , and, ine vit ab ly , som e co ngr eg an ts w ill have gr eate r dif

fi cu lty w al kin g th anoth er s. Whil e w e ce rt ai nly sy m pa thi ze w ith25

tho se c ongr eg an ts who e ndur e Fl or idi anhe at and hum idi ty

to w al k to se rv ic es , the burden of walking a fewextra blocks, m ade greate r by Mother N ature’ s occasional in co rri gi bi li ty, is no t “ su bs ta nt ia l” wit hi n t he m ean in g o f RLUIPA. W er e w e to a dopt

the sy na gogu es ’ r ea soni ng, it

w oul d be vir

tua lly im poss ibl e fo r a m

uni ci pa lity

to en sur e that no ind ivi dua l w ill be bur de ne d by the w al k to ate m

ple of c hoi ce . Munic ipa lit ie s th at a llo wr el igi ous ex em

pti ons to al le viate e ve n th e sm al l burd enof w al kin g af

ewe xtr a blo ck s w oul d r

un the r isk

of im pe rm iss ibl y

f av or ing r el igi on o ve r oth er se cu lar ins tit

uti ons, or of f av or ing so m e rel ig io us fai th s o ve r ot he rs . Given the fa cts in this case, the SZ O does not exact a “ subs tantial” burden on th e co ng reg at io ns ’ rel ig io us ex erci se . Becau se we can no t s ay th atth e SZO im poses a sub stantial burden o n religious exerc ise, the c ongregation s have failed to establish a pri m a fa ci e c as e unde r § ( a) . W e ne ed not r ea chthe que sti on o f w he the r Surf

sid e can j ust if

y the bur de n c re at ed

by art ic ulatin g ac om

pe lli ng gove rn m en t i nte re st, nor

ne ed w e re ac h th e co nst itutio na lity of § ( a) . W e tur

n ne xt to the second argum ent advanced by the congregations u nder RL UI PA : whether Surf sid e’ s f av or ab le tr eatm en t of

pr ivate c lub s and l odge s r el at ive to chur ch es and synag og ue s v io la te s R LUIPA’s equ al term s p ro vi si on . B . E qu a l T e rms26

The c ongregation s argue that the SZ O violates § (b)(1) of RL UI PA , which pr ovi de s th at

“ [n ] o go ve rn m en t sh al l i m pose or im ple m en t a land u se r eg ulatio n in aman n e r th a ttr e at s ar e l i g i o u s a s s e mb l y o r i n s t i tu t i o no nl e s s th ane qu a l t e rms wit h ano nr el ig io us ass em bl y or i ns ti tu ti on .” 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0c c(b )(1 ). T he S ev en th C ir cu it ha s st at ed that “ the sub stanti al bur de n [ § ( a) ] and no nd is cri m in at io n p ro vi si on s [§ (b) ] are o pe rat iv el y in de pe nd en t o f on e an ot he r.” CLUB , 342 F. 3d at 762 . Indeed, the a pplication of § (b)(1) occasions difficulties of statut or y c onstru ct ionnot

e nc ount er ed

w he n a ddr es sin g § ( a) ’ s pr ohi bit ion against sub stantial burdens on religious exerc ise. F irst, § (b) (1) does not require the pla int if

f to m ee t a

thr es hol d j ur isd ic tio na l t es t si m ilar to t ha t art ic ulate d in§ (a )( 2) . S ec ond, w hil e § ( b) (1 ) ha s th e “ fe el ” of an e qua l pr ote ct ionlaw , it la ck s th e

“ si m il arl y si tu at ed ” req ui rem en t u su al ly fou ndinequa l p ro te ct io n a na lysis . See Ci tyof Cl eb urnev . Cleb urneL iv ing Ct r. , 473 U . S. 432 , 447 -5 0 ( 1985 ). T hir d, unl ike § ( a) , § ( b) (1 ) re nde rs am uni ci pa lity

str ic tly li ab le f or it s vi olatio n, re nde ri ng a

dis cr im inator

y land u se r eg ulatio n pe r seunl aw fu l w ith out r eg ar d to any j ust if ic at ion s su

ppl ie d by the z oni ng a

uth or ity . W e ad dr es s e ac h pr obl em in tu rn . 1. Jur isd ic tio na l N ex us27

The plain term s and structure of RL UI PAindicate that the j urisdictio nal p re re qu i s i t es i n cl u d edi n§ (a ) a n dd i s cu s s edab o v e d o n o tap p l y t o § (b )’s pr ohi bit ionon d isc ri m inatio n a ga ins t and e xc lus ionof r el igi ous ins tit

uti ons. F ir st, § (a)( 2) specifically

enum erate s three j urisdictio nal tests, at lea st one of which m ust be satis fi ed

pr ior to § ( a) (1 )’ s a

ppl ic at ion , w hil e § ( b) is sil en t a s to juri sd ic ti on al tes ts . Seco nd , § (a )(2 ), by its term s, ap pl ie s t o “ su bs ect io n” (a). See 42 U . S. C. § 20 00c c( a) (2 ) (“ T his subs ec tio n ap pli es in any c as e in whic h [ lis tin g j ur isd ic tio na l t es ts] . ”) ( em pha sis a dde d) . F ina lly , the j ur isd ic tio n li m its r el at e to bur de ns i m

pose d by agov er nm en t – langua ge w hic h is c onsi ste nt w ith§ ( a) (1 )’ s pr oh ib it io n o n i m

po si ng a su bs ta nt ia l b ur de n wi th ou t ju st ifi cat io n. Se e id. at § 2000 cc (a )( 1) ( “N o go ve rn m en t sh al l i m pose or im ple m en t a land u se r eg ulatio n in a m anne r that i m

pose s asub stanti al burden on th e rel ig io us ex erci se of ape rs on . . . .”) (em ph as is ad de d) . Co ng res s i nc lu de d t he th ree ju ris di ct io na l l im it at io ns in 42 U.S.C. § 2000 cc(a )(2) to satisfy

the Suprem e Court’ s concerns regar ding congression al au th or it y to en actleg is la ti on pro te ct in g t he free ex erci se of r el ig io n. Se e, e . g. , City of Boerne v . F

lores , 521 U . S. 507 , 534 ( 1997 ) (s tr iki ng d ow n th e Re lig iou s Fr ee dom Re sto ratio n A ct

be ca use it w as a“ co nsi de ra

ble c ongr es sio na l i ntr

usi on into th e State ’ s traditional prerogative and general authorityto regulate”). It w as28

Co ngr es s’ s be lie f that a

ppl y ing RL U IP Ain the se m or e lim ite d si tuatio ns w ill al le vi at e fed eral is m

co nc ern s ra is edby earli er re li gi ou s l ib ert y leg is la ti on . See 146 C ONG . R EC . S 7774 -0 1, *S 7775 ( 2000 ) (j oin t st at em en t of S en s. H at chand K enne dy on the Re lig iou s L an d U se and I nst itutio na liz ed P er son A ct

of 200 0) (h erei na fte r “ Jo in t St at em en t” ). As discussed above, the SZ O im poses a sy stem

of individ ualized assessm ents within the m eaning of 42 U.S .C. § 2000 cc(a )(2)( C), which re quires that the bur de n be “ im

pose d inthe im

ple m en ta tio n of

aland u se r eg ulatio n or syste m of l an d u se reg ul at io ns , un de r whi ch a go ve rn m en t m ak es . . . ind ivi dua liz ed

a sse ssm en ts o f the pr opos ed use s f or the pr ope rty

inv olv ed . ” 42 U.S .C . § 2 0 0 0 cc (a )( 2 ). RL UI PA ’s t ex tan ds tru ct u re s u g g es tth at § (a )( 2 )’s thr es hol d j ur isd ic tio na l t es t do es not appl y to § ( b) ’ s e qua l t er

m s pr ovi sio n. Whil e the application o f a j urisdictio nal test to § (b) claim s will provide fodder for future ex erci se s i n s ta tu to ry

in te rp ret at io n, we d o n otreac h t hi s q ue st io n. Be cau se we fi nd tha t the c ongr eg at ion s a lle ge c ondu ct satis fy ing the thi rd

j ur isd ic tio na l pr ong of § (a) (2), we do notrea ch the questio n of whether they are re qui re d to satisfy thi s j ur isd ic tio na l t es t.

2. “ Si m ilarl y

S itu at ed ”See W alz v . Ta xCom m’n o

f Ne w York

City , 3 9 7 U. S . 6 6 4 , 6 9 6 (H ar l an , J . , co n cu rr i n g) 12 (“In any particula r ca se the c ritical question is whether the circ umfere nce of

leg islation encircle s a c la ss s o b ro a d th at it

c an b e fa ir ly

c on c lud e d th at r e lig iou s in sti tut ion s c ou ld b e tho ught t o f a ll within the natural pe rimeter.” ). 29 The par ties assum e that § (b) applies to assem blies and ins titutio ns that are si m il arl y si tu at edin all rel ev an t re sp ect s. Se e, e . g. , Cl eb urne , 47 3 U.S. at43 9. Indeed, the district court adopted this fam iliar “ sim ilarly situated” test when ev al ua tin g th e co ngr eg at ion s’ c la im s. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that pr ivate cl ubs an d othe r se cu lar ins tit uti ons ar e not

sim ilarl y sit ua te d to c hur ch es and sy na gogu es be ca

use “pr ivate c lub s pr ovi d[ e] m or e of asoc ia l se tti ng [ an d] pr ovi de m or e synerg y

forth e sh op pi ng di st ric t i n k eep in g wi th th e p ur po se of § 90 -1 52 ,” th an ch ur ch es an d s yna go gu es . M idrash Se phardi v . Sur

fsi de , No. 9 9- 15 66 -CIVUngaro-B enages/Brown, at 17 (S. D. Fla. July 13, 2000) (order granting partial sum m ar y j udgm en t) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt a lso f ound that “ chur ch es , sy

na gogu es , ed uc at ion al or

phi lanth ro pic m

use um s ( inc lud ing m

use um s) , park ing lot s and garages, publi c and governm ental build ings andpubli c utility/pub lic services uses are all Conditio nal uses . . . [w hich] . . . fall w ithin Justice Har lan’ s natural perim eter te st, as this would applyto a group of secular and non-secular uses that 12

‘ are of a public or sem i-public character .’ ” Id . (citing SZ O § 90-41(a)) .Con dit ion a l us e s, wh ic h in c lud e c hurc he s, sy na g ogue s, e du c atio na l in sti tut ion s, 13 mus e ums , o ff

-s tr e e t pa rk inglot s and

g ara g e s, pu

bli c and g ov e rnme nta l bu ild ing s, and pu bli c uti lit ie s are “ g e ne ra lly

of a pu bli c or se mip ub lic c ha

ra c te r . . . but be c a

us e of the natur e of

the us e and possible impact on neighboringproper ties, require the exercise of planningjudgme nt . . . .” SZO § 90-41(a ). 30 Se ct ion( b) (1 ) m ak es it

c le ar that the r el ev an t “ na tur al pe ri m et er ” fo r consideration with respect to RLU IPA ’ s prohib ition is the category of “ assem

blies or institu tions .” T he district court erre d by not consi dering RLU IPA ’ s statuto ry cate gor iz at iona s th e re le vant “pe ri m et er . ” By a dopt ing S ur fs ide ’ s c ondi tio na l us e de fi nit ion a s th e re le vant “ na tur al pe ri m et er , ” the dis tr ic t c ourt ov er loo ke d th e

13 express provisi ons of RLU IPAwhich re quire a direct and narrow f ocus. U nder RL U IP A , w e m

ust f ir st e va luate w he the r ane nti ty qua lif ie s a s an “ as se m

bly or ins tit uti on, ” as that t er

m is use d inRL U IP A , be fo re c onsi de ri ng whe the r the gove rn m en ta l auth or ity

tr eats a r el igi ous as se m

bly or ins tit uti on d if fe re ntl y than a no nr el ig io us ass em

bl y or i ns ti tu ti on . See 42 U.S.C. 20 00 cc(b )(1 ). Be ca use RL U IP Adoe s no t de fi ne “ as se m bly ” or “ ins tit uti on, ” w e co nstru e th es e te rm s i n a cco rd an ce wi th th ei r or di na ry or n atur al m ean in gs . Se e Na t’ l C oal Ass’n , 81 F . 3d at 10 81. An “ assem

bly ” is “ a com

pany of persons collected together in one place [u sua lly ] and u sua lly

f or som e co m

m on p ur pose ( as de lib er at ionand l eg isl at ion , worship, or social e ntertainm ent),” W EBSTE R ’ S 3 D N E W I NT ’ L U NA BR I DG ED31

D I CT I ONARY 1 3 1 ( 1 9 9 3 ) ; o r “[ a ] g r o up o f

p e r s o n s o r g an i z e dan du n i t e df o r s o me com m on pu rpose.” B L ACK ’ S L A W D I CT I ONARY 111 (7 th e d. 199 9) . A n in sti tut ion is “ an established so ciety or corporation: an establishm ent or foundation esp. of a publ ic chara cter, ” W EBSTE R ’ S 3 D N E W I NT ’ L U NABRI DGE D D I CT I ONARY 1171 (1 99 3) ; o r “ [a]n es tabl is he d o rg an iz at io n, es p. o ne of apubl ic ch arac te r . . . .” B L ACK ’ S L A W D I CT I ONARY 801 (7 th ed . 19 99 ). The S ZO does not d efine the ter m s “ church” or “ synagogu e, ” but doe s gr oup them with “place[s] of assem

bly .” See SZ O § 90 -2 26( b) ( ad opt ing r eg ulatio ns re la te d to park ing spa ce s)
. A cc or din g to the S Z O , apr ivate c lub is “ a bui ldi ng and fa ci lit ie s or

pr em ise s, owne d and o pe rate d by ac or por at ion , a sso ci at ion , pe rs on o r pe rs ons for so cial, educational or recreation al pur

poses , but

not pr im ar ily f or pr of it an d no t pr im ar ily

to re nde r a se rv ic e w hic h is c ust om ar ily c ar ri ed on a s a bu si ne ss .” SZO § 9 0- 2( 20 ) (em ph as is ad de d) . The S ZO ’ s definition of private club com ports with a natural and ordinary unde rs tandi ng o f “ as se m

bly ” as agr oup ga the re d f or ac om m on p ur pose . L ike chur ch es and s yna gogu es , pr ivate c lub s are pla ce s inw hic h gr oups or ind ivi dua ls de dic at ed to sim ilar pur

pose s – whe the r soc ia l, e duc at ion al , r ec re at ion al , or otherwise – can m eet together to pursue their interests. W e conclude therefore that chur ch es and s yna gogu es , a s w el l a s pr ivate c lub s and l odge s, f al l w ith in theIndeed, the leg islative history indicates that § (b) (1) wa s intended to apply in pr e c ise ly 14 the situation presente d here . See J oint St atement, at *S7774 (“Z oning c odes fr equently exclude churc hes in place s where they permit theate rs, meetinghalls, and other pla ces where larg e groups of people assemble f

or sec ular purpose s.”). 32 na tur al pe ri m et er

of “ as se m bly or ins tit uti on. ” F ind ing that pr ivate c lub s and

14 lodg es are sim ilarly

situated to churches and synagogu es, w e turn to whether un de r RLUIPA, Su rfs id e m ay tre atth em

di ffer en tl y . 3. V iol at ionof

§ ( b) A s no te d a

bove , the te xt o f S Z O § 90 -1 52, w hic h pe rmits pr ivate c lub s and oth er se cu lar as se m

bli es , e xc lud es r el igi ous as se m bli es f ro m S ur fs ide ’ s bu sin es s district. Be cause w e have concluded that private clubs, churches and synagogu es fa ll unde r the um

br el laof “ as se m bly or ins tit uti on” a s th ose te rm s are use d in RLUIPA, th is di ffer en ti al tre at m en t co ns ti tu te s a v io la ti on of § (b) (1 ) of RLUIPA. 4. L ev el of

S cr uti ny T he int er es te d part ie s inthi s c as e dis ag re e as to the appl ic ab le le ve l of s c r u t i n y al awv i o l a t i n g § ( b ) mu s tu n d e r g o . S u r f s i d e a s s u mes th a ti tmay ju s t i f y a vio la tio n of

§ ( b) by de m onstratin g th at

the vary ing tr eatm en t of

dif fe re nt as se m bli es is ratio na lly

r el at ed to a le git im at e pur

pose a dvanc ed

by S ur fs ide – the so-called “ rational basis” review . The congregations argue that the ordinance m ust und er go s tr ic t sc rutiny : S ur fs ide m ust de m onstrate that i ts o rd inanc e is33

narrow ly tailored to advance a com pelling interest. Finally , the United States subm its that § (b )’ s pr ohi bit iondoe s no t a llo wade fe ndant t o e sc ap e lia bil ity by pr ovi din g a“ ratio na l ba sis ” or “ co m pe lli ng i nte re st” – i n e ff

ec t, hol din g go ve rn m en t s tri ct ly liab le a vi ol at io n o f § ( b) . To clarify our analy sis of a § (b) violation, we exam ine the j urisprudent ial fo un da ti on s fo r Co ng res s’s en act m en t o f § ( b) . Mi ndf ul o f the S upr em e Co urt’ s a dm oni tio n th at agov er nm en t w oul d inhib it free exerc ise rights “ if it sough t to ban such acts of abstentio ns onl y when they are engaged in for religious reasons,” E m plo ym en t D iv . , D ep t. of H

um an R es . v. Sm ith , 494 U . S. 872 , 877 ( 1990 ), Co ngr es s e nshr ine d si m ilar non- dis cr im inatio n pr inc ipl es in § ( b) ’ s r equir em en t tha t r el igi ous an d no nr el igi ous as se m bli es or in st itut io ns be tre at edequa ll y . See Joi nt S ta te m en t, a t *S 7776 ( “ Se ct ion s [ (b )( 1) an d ( 2) ] . . . e nf

or ce the F re e E xe rc ise Cl au se r ule a ga ins t l aw s th at

bur de n r el igi on an d a re n otne ut ral an d g en eral ly app li cab le .”); H.R. REP . N O . 10 6- 21 9, at 7 n .9 (1 99 9) . Pr ior to Sm ith , the S upr em e Co urt a ppl ie d stri ct

sc rutiny to ca se s inw hic h a go ve rn m en t d is cri m in at edag ai ns t re li gi on or r el ig io us ex erci se . Se e, e . g. , Th om as , 450 U . S. a t 71 8 ( “ T he state m ay j ust if y an inro ad

on r el igi ous lib er

ty by show ing that i t i s th e le as t r es tr ic tiv e m eans o f ac hie vin g so m e co m pe lli ng s ta te34

int er es t. ”) ; W

isconsi n v. Yo der , 406 U . S. 205 , 215 ( 1972 ) (“ [O ] nly tho se int er es ts of the hig he st o rd er

and those not

oth er w ise se rv ed

c anove rb al an ce le git im at e claim s to the free exercise of religion.”). While Sm ith abr ogate d th e ap pli catio n of str ic t sc rutiny

by e m pha siz ing that su chr ev ie ww oul d no t a ppl y to ne utr al law s of ge ne ral ap pl ic ab il it y

th atin ci de nt al ly bur de n re li gi ou s ex erci se , se e id. a t 87 9, the Co urt i ndi cate d th at

the he igh te ne d st an dard

of r ev ie ww oul d c ont inu e to a ppl y w he re alawf

ai ls t o si m ilarl y

r eg ulate se cu lar an d r el igi ous co nduc t i m pli catin g th e sa m e g ov ern m en t i nt eres ts . Se e id. at 886 n.3 (“ [W ] e strictly scrutinize governm ental classifications based on religio n.”) (citations om itted). A fter Sm ith , it re m ai ns tru e that a

lawthat i s no t ne utr al or ge ne ra lly appl ic ab le m

ust und er go st ric t s cru ti ny. Se e id. at 8 79 . Ch urc h of

theL uk um i B abalu A

ye, I nc . v . Ci tyof H

ial ea h presented an oppo rt uni ty f or the S upr em e Co urt t o e la bor at e uponw ha t w as m eant b y ne utr al ity and general applicability . In exam ining a serie s of ordinances which had the eff ect of pr osc ri bin g r itu al ist ic anim al sa cr if ic e by a dhe re nts of

the S an te ri a re lig ion , the Co urt c onf

irm ed that the gov er

nm en t vi olate s F re e E xe rc ise r igh ts whe n it se le ct ive ly

im pose s burd en s onr el igi ous co nduc t. 508 U . S. 520 ( 1993 ). A lth ough the Lu ku m i Court found th e city ’ s proscription fac ially neutral, the Court ne ve rthe le ss c onc lud ed

that the or din an ce s vi olate d pr inc ipl es of ne utr al ity

by35

im pr op erl y tar ge ti ng th e San te ria rel ig io n. Se e id. a t 53 4. R ec ogni zi ng tha t the ordinances wer e both un derinclusive and ov erbroad, the Court concluded that th ey we re not neutral, but rather “ had as their objec t the supp ression of religion.” Id. at 542. T he Co urt a lso f

ound that the or din an ce s w er e not ge ne ra lly appl ic ab le be ca use the y pur sue d th e ci ty ’ s in te re sts onl y a ga ins t c ondu ct

m oti va te d by rel ig io us be li ef. Id

. at 545. T he Court then subjected the ordinances to strict sc rutiny , str iki ng the m

down a ft er

de te rm ini ng tha t the y

w er e not narr ow ly ta ilo re d to a cc om

pli sh g ove rn m en t’ s in te re sts , nor w er e the gov er

nm en ta l i nte re sts co m pe ll in g. Se e id. at 5 46 . RL UI PA ’ s equal term s provisi on codifies the Sm ith -Lu ku m i lin e of pr ec ed en t. B y

r equir ing e qua l tre atm en t of se cu lar an d r el igi ous as se m bli es , RL U IP Aa llo w s c ourts t o de te rm ine w he the r a part ic ular sy ste m of c la ssi fi catio ns ad opt ed by ac ity sub tly or c ove rt ly de part s f ro m r equir em en ts o f ne utr al ity and ge ne ra l a ppl ic ab ili ty . Az oni ng l awis not ne utr al or

ge ne ra lly appl ic ab le if

it treats sim ilarly

situated secular and religious assem blies differently

because such une qua l tre atm en t i ndi cate s th e or din an ce im pr ope rl y targ et s th e re lig iou s ch ar ac te r of

an a sse m bly . T hus, avio la tio n of

§ ( b) ’ s e qua l tre atm en t pr ovi sio n, co nsi ste nt w iththe ana ly sis e m plo y ed inLu ku mi , m

us t u nd erg o s tri ctscrut in y . Id .36

Indeed, a closer look at § 90-15 2 reveals that Surf side im properly targeted re lig iou s a sse m

bli es and v iol at ed

F re e E xe rc ise r equir em en ts o f ne utr al ity and ge ne ra l a ppl ic ab ili ty . Whil e m er el y the m en tio n of

c hur chor

sy na gogu e in a zo nin g c ode doe s no t de str oy az oni ng c ode ’ s ne utr al ity , w e m ust ne ve rthe le ss b e m indful of the po tential for im perm issib le “ religious g erry m anders,” which m ay ren de r a zo ni ng co de op erat iv el y no n- ne ut ral . W

alz v . T axCo m m ’n of Ne w Yo rk Ci ty , 397 U. S. 664, 696 (Har lan, J. , c oncurring). A s we have noted, the text of § 90- 152 tr eats r el igi ous as se m bli es dif fe re ntl y than se cu lar as se m

bli es by e xc lud ing re lig iou s a sse m

bli es f ro m the bus ine ss d istri ct , af

ac tor that i s e noug h to c onst itute a violation of § (b) of RLU IPA , and, as w e discuss belo w, also indicates an infringem ent of the Sm ith pr inc ipl es of ne utr al ity

and g en er al appl ic ab ili ty . W ith respect to neutrality , the purpose and operation of the ordinance reveal an im pe rm is si bl e at te m

ptto tar ge t re li gi ou s as se m bl ie s. T he pur pose and o pe ratio n of

S ur fs ide ’ s bu sin es s di str ic t i s “ to p ro vid e fo r retail shoppin g and personal service needs of the town’ s residents and tou rists.” SZ O § 90 -1 52( a) . T he r eg ulatio ns g ove rn ing the bus ine ss d istri ct are “ int en de d to pr ev en t us es and a ct ivi tie s whic h m igh t be noi sy , of fe nsi ve , obn oxi ous, or inc ongr uous in be havio r, ton e or appe ar an ce and whic h m igh t be dif fi cu lt to police.” Id

.Surfside does not def ine “sy nergy” but the evide nce sug g ests that Surfside’s primar y 15 conce rn wa s encour ag ing a n incre ase in c onsumer tra ffic in its business and tourist districts. Whil e Surfside sug g ests that allowingchurc hes and sy nag ogues will erode its tax base a nd ult imate ly

re qu ir e a de c re a se in s e rv ic e s o ff

e re d b y Sur fs ide to i ts r e sid e nts , it do e s n ot d e vo te muc h ti me to t

his argume nt. As de sc ri be d b e low , § 90 -1 52 is b oth ov e r- and

un de ri nc lus ive wi th respe ct to Surfside’s g oal of sy nergy , no matter how that term is defined.

37 Re lig iou s in sti tut ion s, S ur fs ide arg ue s, are ope n on ly onc e a w ee k, usu al ly on a day or at a tim e that other are a businesses are closed. S urfside m aintains that the “ central use” of a re ligio us ins titutio n is as a “ singl e destination” where co ngr eg an ts f

ill a“ spi ri tua l ne ed ” an d th en , pr es um ab ly , va cate the are a. F or the se re as ons, S ur fs ide c ont en ds tha t c hur ch es and s yna gogu es do n ot c at er to or stim ulate the shop ping and retail needs of S urfside residents in a way that com ports with the objectives of the business di strict. Private c lubs, on the oth er hand, a lle ge dly

pr ovi de am or e “ soc ia l” se tti ng and p ro m ote “ sy ne rg y ” w iththe shop pin g di str ic t be ca

use the na tur e of

a ct ivi ty in a cl ub o r lod ge is en te rt ai nm en t. 15 T he c ongr eg at ion s pr ovi de e vid en ce that the y m ee t thr ough out

the w ee k f

or pur pose s othe r than r el igi ous se rv ic es , inc lud ing T or ahc la sse s and g ro up dis cu ssi on. T he y

a ve r that the y

hol d so ci al and e nte rt ai nm en t gathe ri ngs, a lbe it w ith in the c ont ex t of

the ir r el igi ous an d sp ir itu al m iss ion . T he c ongr eg at ion s subm it evidence sugg esting th at m em bers regularly

patronize are a shops b efore an d a ft er se rv ic es and m ee tin gs. T he e vid en ce a lso de m onstrate s th at the38

co ngr eg at ion s th em se lve s purc ha se f ood, pa pe r, and o the r supp lie s f

ro m the busi ne sse s inthe are a. T he pr es en ce of sy na gogu es ha s a lso le d to the ope nin g of kosh er f ood busi ne sse s inthe are a. T his e vid en ce ind ic at es that § 90- 152 is ove ri nc lus ive w ithr es pe ct to Surf sid e’ s ob j ec tiv es of

pr om oti ng r et ai l a ct ivi ty and sy ne rg y be ca use the sy na gogu es c ontri but e to the r et ai l and c om m er ci al a ct ivi ty

of th e b us in es s d is tri ct . O ur r ev ie wof

the r ec or d in dic at es that § 90- 152 is a lso und er inc lus ive f or the int er es ts S ur fs ide se ek s to a dvanc e. T he S Z O ’ s de fi nit ionof pr ivate c lub s belies Surfside’ s argum ent that private clubs are “ ty pical retail and service ac tiv iti es ” by

ind ic at ing that pr ivate c lub s are or ganiz at ion s e xis tin g “ fo r soc ia l, ed uc at ion al or

r ec re at ion al pur

pose s, but

not pr im ar ily f or pr of it an d no t pr im ar ily to ren de r a s erv ic e whi ch is cu st om ari ly carrie d o n a s a b us in es s.” S ZO § 9 0- 2( 20 ). M o r e o v e r , p e rmi t t e dp r i v a t e c l ub s i n c l u d e o r g an i z a t i o n s th a to f t e nmee twe e k l y, m onthly , or

bi- m onthly , and s om et im es dur ing non -b usi ne ss h our s – h our s of ope ratio n whic h f

ai l t o st im ulate an in cr ea se in co nsum er tr af fi c to the bus ine ss district. O ther than conclusory assertions that private clubs are m ore social than chur ch es – a sse rt ion s di sput ed by e vid en ce sub m itt ed

by the c ongr eg at ion s – and that the increased sociability lends itself to increased patronage of local establishm ents, Surf

side provid es no evidence that private clubs and lo dgesWe rejec t Surfside’s conte ntion that the SZO is neutr al bec ause the re is no evide nce of 16 selec tive and discriminatory intent ag ainst Orthodox J ews, a pattern of

hostili ty or discriminatory animus toward the sy

nag ogues, or e vidence that Surfside direc tly targ eted r elig ion in enactingthe SZO . Under Lukumi , it

is unn e c e ssa

ry to i de nti fy

an invid iou s inte nt i n e na c tin ga law – on ly J ustices Kenne dy

and Stevens attached significanc e to evidenc e of the lawmake rs’ subjec tive motivation. See id. at 54 0- 42 (K e nn e dy , J., c on c ur ri ng ); see also id. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurr ing in part and c oncurr ing in judg ment). 39 ac tua llycontribute to th e business d istrict in a way appreciably

differ ent than re lig iou s in sti tut ion s. S ur fs ide ’ s st at ed goa l of r et ai l sy ne rg y is pur sue d on ly ag ai nst r el igi ous as se m

bli es , but not oth er non -c om m er ci al a sse m

bli es , thu s devaluing the religious reasons for assem bling . Under Lu ku mi , this discrim inatory tre at m en t ex ti ng ui sh es an ord in an ce’s n eu tra li ty. Se e Lu ku mi , 50 8 U.S. at53 8. A s th e ev ide nc e sugg es ts, the sy na gogu es are not

inc ongr uous w iththe state d ob j ec tiv es and p ur

pose s of the bus ine ss d istri ct

a dvanc ed

by S ur fs ide thr oughthe S Z O . B y

pr ohi bit ing r el igi ous as se m bli es in Surf

sid e’ s bu sin es s dis tr ic t, § 90 -1 52 i m

pr ope rl y targ et ed r el igi ous as se m

bli es f or dis sim ilar tr eatm en t an d is the re fo re , not

ne utr al . 16 W e tur n to the se co nd F re e E xe rc ise r equir em en t tha t a lawbur de nin g rel ig io us pra ct ic e m

us t b e g en eral ly app li cab le . Lu ku mi , 508 U . S. a t 54 2. S ur fs ide ar gue s th at

the S Z O pla ce s r es tr ic tio ns n ot o nly on r el igi ous en tit ie s, but a lso on other organizations, includi ng education al institu tions and m useum s, off

-street pa rk in g l ot s an d g arag es , publ ic an d g ov ern m en ta l b ui ld in gs , andpubl ic ut il it ie s.40

Z oni ng l aw s inhe re ntl y

dis tin gui sh b etw ee n us es and n ec es sari ly inv olv e selection and categorization, often re stricting religiou s assem blies to desi gnated districts and frequently

requiring that religiou s assem blies com plete a condition al us e ap pl ic at io n p ro cedur e. Se e id. a t5 4 2 - 4 3 ( “A l l l aw s ar e s e l e c t i v e t o s o me extent . . . [but] inequalityresults when a le gislature decides that the gov ernm ental int er es ts i t se ek s to a dvanc e ar e w orthy of be ing pur sue d on ly

a ga ins t c ondu ct

w ith a rel ig io us m ot iv at io n.” ). Surfside’ s treatm ent of synagogu es as cate gorically differ ent because they have “ [n ] ev er

he ld a soc ia l, c om

m una l, pub lic se rv ic e or

oth er c om m uni ty a ff ai r ev en t whic h is unre lated

to [th ei r] re lig iou s an d sp iri tua l m iss ion or p urpo se ” cl earl y im pli cate s th e Su

pr em e Co urt’ s r equir em en t tha t go ve rn m en ts s houl d no t tre atsec ul ar m ot iv at io ns m or e fav or ab ly tha n re li gi ou s m ot iv at io ns . Se e ge ne ral ly id. ; se e als o Sm ith , 494 U . S. a t 87 7. T he ope ratio n of § 90 -1 52 t o e xc lud e religious assem

blies because of their spiritual m issio n is just one indication that Surf sid e im pr ope rl y e xc lud ed r el igi ous as se m

bli es be ca

use of the ir rel ig io si ty. Ano th er i nd ic at io n i s t he un de rin cl us iv en es s o f § 9 0- 15 2. Se e Lu ku mi , 508 U. S. at 542- 45 ( co nc lud ing that be ca use the c ity ’ s or din an ce s purs ed the c ity ’ s in te re sts onl y a ga ins t r el igi ous co nduc t, the or din an ce s w er e not ge ne ra lly appl ic ab le ). T he inc lus ionof

pr ivate c lub s inthe bus ine ss d istri ct , w hic h op er at e fo r “ soc ia l,41

ed uc at ion al or

r ec re at ion al pur

pose s, but

not pr im ar ily f or pr of it an d no t pr im ar ily to render a ser

vice which is custom arily car ried on as a business,” see SZ O § 90 - 2( 20) , is inc om

pa tib le w ithS ur fs ide ’ s a sse rt ed goa ls o f ac hie vin g m ax im um econom ic benefit and the concentration and develop m ent of com m ercia l uses al on g Har di ng Aven ue . See 199 5- 2000 Co m pr eh en siv e Pl an . B ec au se pr ivate cl ubs do n ot s er

ve S ur fs ide ’ s e co nom ic and c om m er ci al goa ls b ut are ne ve rthe le ss p erm i t t edi nth e b u s i n es s d i s tri ct i n d i ca t es th at § 9 0 -1 5 2 p u rs u es Su rf s i d e’s in te res ts on ly agai ns t co nduc t m ot iv at edby reli gi ou s b el ie f. In cl udi ng p ri va te c lub s and l odge s a s pe rm itt ed use s inS ur fs ide ’ s bu sin es s dis tr ic t, w hil e sim

ult an eo usl y

e xc lud ing r el igi ous as se m bli es , vio la te s th e principles of neutrality

and general applicability because private c lubs andlodges en dange r Surf

sid e’ s in te re st i n r et ai l sy ne rg y a s m uc h or m or e than c hur ch es and synagogu es. Surfside’ s failure to treat the analogou s groups equally indicates that Su rfs id e im

pr op erl y tar ge te d re li gi ou s as se m

bl ie s. A s de m onst

rate d a bove , avio la tio n of

§ ( b) ’ s e qua l tre atm en t pr ovi sio n indicates that the offending lawalso violates th e Sm ith r ule r equir ing ne utr al ity an d ge ne ra l a

ppl ic ab ili ty . C onsi ste nt w iththe ana ly sis e m plo y ed inLu ku mi , a

law vi ol at in g § (b) m

us t t he refo re u nd erg o t he m os t ri go ro us of s cru ti ny. Cf . F rat ernal O rde r of P oli ceNe wa rk

L odgeNo . 12 v . Ci tyof Ne wa rk, 170 F . 3d 3 59, 366 ( 3dTh is c on c lus ion do e s n ot i nh ibi t a

zon inga uth or ity ’s ri g ht t o a do pt o the r r e a so na ble 17 “ ru n o f t he mil l” zon ingre gulatio ns – s uc h a s th os e re late d to size , p ark ing , s a fe ty and he a lth conce rns – eve n though suc h regulations may have the eff

ect of distinguishing be tween assemblies or institutions. For example, Surfside may regulate the number

of par king spa ces require d for e ach f

acility , see SZO § 90-226, or r estrict the size of asse mblies or institutions, as the SZ O does by

prohibiting them on the f irst floor of building s in the business district. As long as re strictions or distinctions are unre lated to the re ligious cha rac terization, RL UI PA is not implicated. See also J oint St atement, at *S7776 (“This Act does not provide relig ious institutions with i mmunity from land use regulation, nor does it relieve relig ious insti tutions from applying f

or var iance s, special pe rmits or exceptions, hardship approva l, or other r elief provisions in land use regulations, where available without discrimination or unfair de lay .”). 42 Ci r. 199 9) ( ap ply ing str ic t sc rutiny to ove rt ur n r eg ulatio n th at

“ ind ic at [e d] that the [g ove rn m en t] m ad e a va lue j udgm en t tha t se cu lar (i . e. , m ed ic al ) m oti va tio ns f or w eari ng a be ar d [ w er e] im

portant e noug h to ove rc om e its ge ne ra l i nte re st i n un ifo rm it y

bu t t ha t re li gi ou s m ot iv at io ns [were] no t” ). W e tu rn to whet he r Su rfs id e, th ro ug h t he im pl em en ta ti on of t he SZO,

“ advanc e[ s] int er es ts o f the hig he st o rd er ” an d is narr ow ly ta ilo re d inpur sui t of th os e in te res ts . Lu ku mi , 508 U . S. a t 54 6. A s w e have dis cu sse d, S Z O § 90 -1 52 i s ove ri nc lus ive and unde ri nc lus ive in subs tanti al r es pe ct s. T he pr of fe re d in te re sts of r et ai l sy ne rg y are not pur sue d a ga ins t ana log ous nonr el igi ous co nduc t, and tho se int er es ts c oul d be a ch ie ve d by narr ow er or din an ce s th at

do n ot i m

pr ope rl y dis tin gui sh b etw ee n si m ilar se cu lar an d r el igi ous as se m bli es . B ec au se § 90 -1 52 tr eats r el igi ous ins tit

uti ons on l es s th ane qua l t er m s w ithnon re lig iou s in sti tut ion s, § 90 -1 52 i s in va lid

und er § ( b) (1 ) of

RL U IP A . F ind ing that S Z O § 90 -1 52 i s no t

1743

narr ow ly ta ilo re d to S ur fs ide ’ s in te re st, w e ne ed not a ddr es s whe the r thi s in te re st is of “ the high est order. ” Se e A rk ansa s W riter s’ Proj ec t, I

nc . v . R agland , 481 U. S. 22 1, 2 32 (19 87 ). III . Constitu tionalit y of RL UI PA Surf sid e ar gue s th at

if w e fi nd tha t the S Z O vio la te s RL U IP A , suc h a fi ndi ng i s no t di spos iti ve be ca use RL U IP Ais unc onst itutio na l f or thr ee r ea sons : 1) RL U IP Ae xc ee ds C ongr es s’ s po w er und er § 5 of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t; 2) RL U IP Ae sta

bli she s r el igi on i n vi olatio n of the F ir st Am en dm en t; an d 3) Co ngr es s la ck ed

auth or ity to pa ss RL U IP Abe ca

use RL U IP Ainf

ri nge s onstate sove re ign ty

und er the T en th A m en dm en t. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a ddr es s th e co nst itutio na lity

of RL U IP A , ins te ad

f ind ing that the c ongr eg at ion s di d no t a lle ge co n du ct th at wo u l di n v o k e i t s p ro t ec t i o n s . Af t era b ri ef re v i ew o f R LUI PA ’s statut or y and c as e lawpr ed ec es sor s, w e tur n to S ur fs ide ’ s c ont en tio ns, c onf ini ng our ana ly sis of

RL U IP A ’ s c onst itutio na lity to the pr ovi sio ns i m

pli cate d by Surf sid e’ s c ondu ct . W e co nc lud e that RL U IP Aw ith stands our sc rutiny and i s a pr op er ex erci se of C on gr es s’s § 5 p owe rs . A . RL U IP ABa ck gr ound In199 0, the S upr em e Co urt de ci de d Sm ith , which held th at the Fre e E xe rc ise Cl au se of

the F ir st A m en dm en t do es not e xe m pt an in div idu al f

ro m44

co m pli an ce w ithava lid

and n eu tr al lawof

ge ne ra l a ppl ic ab ili ty

m er el y be ca use th e la w in ci de nt al ly bur de ns rel ig io us co nduc t. Se e Sm ith , 494 U. S. at 879. In re spon se to Sm ith , C ongress enacted the Religious Fre edom Restoration Act (“ RF RA ”) , 107 S ta t. 148 8 ( co dif ie d a t 42 U . S. C. §§ 2 000b b et se q. ). RFR

A soug ht t o r es ci nd Sm ith and restore what som e re fer to as the pre- Sm ith standard : the “ co m pe lli ng i nte re st/ le as t r es tr ic tiv e m eans” te st f ound in She rbe rt , 374 U. S. at 407- 09, and Yo der , 40 6 U.S. at21 4- 15 . Fo ur y ears late r, the S upr em e Co urt stru ck down RFR

Aa s it r el at es to state an d lo ca l go ve rn m en ts i n City of Boerne v . F lores , 521 U . S. 507 ( 1997 ). C ongr es s m ay en fo rce c on st itut io na l ri gh ts pu rs ua ntto § 5 of t he Fo ur te en th Am en dm en t. H ow ev er , in B oe rne , the S upr em e Co urt he ld t ha t by e na ct ing RF RA , Co ngr es s h a de x c e e d e dth a tau th o r i ty b y de fin ing r i g h t s i n s t e a do f

s i mp l y en for ci ng th em . B oe rne , 521 U . S. a t 53 2. R L U IP Ais a re spon se to B oe rne , be co m ing the late st co ng res si on al effo rt t o o fferst atut ory pro te ct io n t o re li gi ou s l ib ert y . See H. R. R EP . N O . 106 -2 19, a t 4 (c om

m en tin g th at

“ H . R. 169 1 [ RL U IP A ’ s le gis la tiv e predecessor] wa s introdu ced, in part, in re spon se to the Suprem e Court’ s partial in va li da ti on of t he Rel ig io us Free do m Res to rat io n Act . . . .”). Co ngr es s so ught , thr oughRL U IP A , to pr ote ct r el igi ous land u se s f

ro m dis cr im inator

y pr oc es se s us ed

to ex cl ude or

oth er w ise li m it the loc at ionof45

ch ur ch es an d s yna go gu es in m un ic ip al it ie s ac ro ss th e co un try. See Joi nt St at em en t, a t *S 7774 -S 7775 . A s in dic at ed dur ing nin e he ar ing s he ld b ef or e both hous es of Co ngr es s, RL U IP Atarg et s z oni ng c ode s whic h us e ind ivi dua liz ed and discretionary

processes to exclude churches, e specially “ new, sm all or unfam iliar churches . . . [like] black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogu es.” Id. at *S7774 . The le gislativ e re cord contained statist ical, anecdotal and testim onial ev ide nc e sugg es tin g th at

dis cr im inatio n is w ide spr ea d and ty pic al ly r es ult s inthe ex cl usi on o f chur ch es and s yna gogu es e ve n inpla ce s whe re the at er s, m ee tin g ha lls an d o th er s ecu la r as se m

bl ie s ar e p erm it te d. Id

. a t *S 7774 . A cc or din g to R LU I P Ac o - s p o n s o r s S e n a t o r s Ha t c h an dKe n n e dy:

T he he ar ing r ec or d c om

pil ed m as siv e ev ide nc e that [ the r igh t to b uil d, buy , or

r en t sp ac e fo r chur ch es and s yna gogu es ] is fr eque ntl y

vio la te d. C hur ch es in ge ne ra l, and n ew , sm al l or unfam iliar churches in particular, are fre quentlydiscrim inated ag ai nst on the f ac e of z oni ng c ode s and a lso in the hig hly ind ivi dua liz ed

and d isc re tio nary

pr oc es se s of

land u se reg ul at io n. Id. at*S 77 74 . RL UI PAfeatures two prim ary m eans of addressing these perceived infringem ents on religio us liberty . RL UI PArevives RFR A’ s subs tantial burden te st, c onf ini ng the r ea chof

thi s te st t o land u se r eg ulatio ns tha t f ir st p as s j ur isd ic tio na l m

ust er . R L U IP Aa lso c ont ai ns § ( b) , aw hol ly ne wpr ovi sio n46

dir ec te d at z oni ng c ode s th at dis cr im inate a ga ins t, or

a m ong re lig iou s in sti tut ion s orun reas on ab ly lim itrel ig io us in st itut io ns in a juri sd ic ti on . See 42 U.S.C. § 20 00 cc(b ). As d is cu ss edab ov e, SZO § 9 0- 15 2 v io la te s § (b) (1 ) of RLUIPA. B. Fo urte en th A m en dm en t Surf sid e fi rs t arg ue s th at

by e na ct ing RL U IP A , Co ngr es s e xc ee de d it s pow er und er § 5 of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t “ to e nf or ce , by appr opr ia te legislation , the provisions o f this article. ” U .S . C ON ST . am en d. XIV, § 5. T he S upr em e Co urt ha s c hara ct er iz ed Co ngr es s’ s po w er

und er § 5 of the Fourteenth Am endm ent as “ rem edial.” Sout h Carolin a v. Katzenba ch , 383 U. S. 301, 326 ( 1966 ). A s th e Co urt no te d in B oe rne : T he de sig n of

the A m en dm en t and the te xt o f § 5 are inc onsi ste nt w iththe sug ge sti on tha t C ongr es s ha s th e pow er to de cr ee the su bs ta nc e o f th e Fo ur te en th Am en dm en t’s re st ric ti on s o n t he Sta te s . .

. . Congress does no t enforce a constituti onal right bychanging what the right is. It has been given the power “ to enforce, ” not the power to d et er m ine w ha t c onst itute s ac onst itutio na l vi olatio n. W er e it not so, w ha t C ongr es s w oul d be e nf or ci ng w oul d no lon ge r be , in any m eaningful sense, the “provisi ons of [the Fourteenth Am endm ent] .” Boe rn e, 521 U . S. a t 51 9. N ei the r party

dis put es , nor

is the re r ea son to d oubt , that RL U IP Apur ports to protect certain re ligio us liberties guaranteed by the First A m endm ent. I n determ ining whether

RL UI PAis an appropriate exerc ise of Congress’ s § 5 power,As discussed above , SZO § 90-152 violates § (b) of RLUI PA, which also indicate s that 18 § 90-152 is neither ne utral nor g ener ally applicable . Be cause § 90-152 fa ils these two Fr ee Ex erc ise requir ements, it has a “ signific ant likelihood of beingunconstitutional.” 47 w e m ust f ir st d et er m ine w he the r Co ngr es s ha s th e au tho ri ty to en ac t l eg isl at ionto en fo rce t he rig ht s g ua ran te edby the Fir stAm en dm en t. Se e B oe rne , 521 U. S. at 51 9. B oe rne an swe redth is qu es ti on in th e aff irmativ e. Se e id . ; se e als o C ant we ll v. Co nne ct ic ut , 310 U . S. 296 , 303 ( 1940 ) (h old ing that the “ fundam en ta l c onc ep t of liberty em bodi ed in [the Fourteenth Am endm ent’ s Due P rocess Clause] em br aces th e li be rti es gu aran te edby the Fir stAm en dm en t” ). The sec ond in quiry

under B oe rne is whether RLU IPA“ enforces” a co ns ti tu ti on al rig htwit ho utsubs ta nt iv el y alt eri ng th atrig ht . Se e id. O ne w ay in w hic h w e de te rm ine w he the r § 5 l eg isl at ione nf or ce s ar igh t i s by

e va luatin g whether the legislation is congruent and p roportion al to the injury to be prevented orrem ed ie d. Id

. at 520. Under B oe rne , pr ev en ta tiv e m ea sur es are m or e lik el y to w ith stand s cr

uti ny if the y pr ohi bit a ct ion s th at

the m se lve s have “ a sig nif ic an t likeliho od of being unconst itutio nal.” Id . a t 53 2. T hus, a cc or din g to B oe rne , if RL U IP Am er el y

c odi fi es e xis tin g c onst itutio na l pr inc ipl es , it is ana cc ep ta

ble use of Co ngr es s’ s § 5 r em ed ia l t ool . 18 Whe n c ondu ct ing thi s ana ly sis , w e ac co rd “ gr eat w ei ght

to the de ci sio ns o f Congress,” Co lu mbi a Br oa d. S ys ., Inc . v. Democ ra ti c Na t’l Co mm. , 412 U . S. 94,48

102 (1 973) , and g ive Co ngr es s “ w ide latit ude ” in en ac tin g pr ev enta tiv e or rem ed ia l m eas ur es . B oe rne , 521 U . S. a t 52 0. A s Ju sti ce F rankf urte r ha s no te d, courts m ust giv e “ due regard to the fac t that [they are ] not exercising a prim ary j udgm en t but [ ar e] sittin g inj udgm en t up on those w ho a lso have take n th e oa th t o obse rv e the Co nst itutio n and who h av e the r es pons ibi lity f or c ar ry ing on governm ent.” Jo int

A nti -F asc ist R ef uge e Co m m . v . M

cGrath , 341 U . S. 123 , 164 (1 951) ( Fr an kf

urte r, J. , c onc ur

ri ng) . T he c ust om ar

y de fe re nc e ac co rd ed

the j udgm ents of Congress is certainly appropriate w hen, as her e, Congress has sp eci fic al ly con si de redth e que st io n o f th e la w’ s co ns ti tu ti on al it y . See R otsker v. G old be rg , 45 3 U.S. 5 7, 6 4 (1 98 1) . T he U nit ed

S ta te s arg ue s th at

RL U IP Ais a re as ona

ble m eans o f pr ote ct ing the non -d isc ri m inatio n pr inc ipl es e m bodi ed in the F re e E xe rc ise and the E sta bli shm en t C lause s of

the F ir st Am en dm en t, a s w el l a s th e E qua l P ro te ct ion Cl au se of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t. A survey of Fr ee E xercise ca ses indicates that go vernm ent action that specifically

targets re ligio n or religious con duct for distinctiv e treatm ent can be an im pe rm is si bl e in tru si on on an in di vi du al ’s free e xe rci se rig ht s. Se e Lu ku mi , 508 U . S. a t 53 4 ( “ O ff

ic ia l a ct ionthat t ar ge ts r el igi ous co nduc t f or dis tin ct ive tr eatm en t can no t b e sh ie ld edby m ere c om pl ia nc e wit h t he requi rem en t o f fac ia l n eu tra li ty . .49

. . ‘ [W e] m

ust su rvey

m eticulousl y

the circum stances of governm ental categories to e lim inate , a s it

w er e, r el igi ous ge rr

ym an de rs . ’ ”) ( quot ing W alz , 397 U . S. a t 69 6 (H ar lan, J. , c onc ur

ri ng) ); M cD ani el v . P aty , 435 U. S. 618 (197 8) (invalidating law that disq ualified m em

bers of the cler gy

from holdi ng certain public offices); F ow le r v . R hodeI

sla nd , 345 U. S. 67, 69-70 (1953 ) (invalidating law w hich dis cr im inate d am ong re lig iou s se ct s) . I n Lu ku mi , the S uprem e Court re affir m ed the principle that free e xercise r ights m ust be protected against laws that se le ct iv el y

im po se bu rd en s o n c on du ctm ot iv at edby reli gi ou s b el ie f. Se e Lu ku mi , 508 U . S. a t 54 3; se e als o H obbi e , 480 U . S. a t 14 6 ( ove rt ur nin g st at e de ci sio n to withhold u nem

ploym ent com

pensation to an em

ploy ee who refused to work on her Sa bbath a s vi olativ e of

F re e E xe rc ise r igh ts) ; FOP , 170 F . 3d at 36 6- 67 ( hol din g that a police departm ent policy prohibit ing beards but allowing a m edical exem ption violated the no ndiscrim ination principles of the Free Exer cise Clause). The E stablish m ent Clause m andates equal treatm ent of religious and secular as se m bli es ba se d onthe c onve rs e the or y : the gov er

nm en t m ay

not f av or the religious o ver non-believers because such favoritism would am ountto an im pe rm is si bl e es tabl is hm en t o f rel ig io n. Se e, e . g. , Gillette v . U nited Sta tes , 401 U . S. 437 , 450 ( 1971 ) (“ [T ] he E sta bli shm ent C lause pr ohi bit s go ve rn m en t f ro m ab an doni ng s ec ular pur

pose s . . . to favor

a dhe re nts of

any se ct or r el igi ous50

organization.”). The S uprem e Court has consistentlydisapprov ed of unequal tre at m en t t ha t el ev at es rel ig io n o ve r se cu la r in te res ts . Se e ge ne ral lyT ex as Monthly, I

nc. v . B ullock , 489 U . S. 1 ( 1989 ) (s tr iki ng d ow n lawe xe m pti ng o nly re lig iou s pu

bli catio ns f

ro m ta xa tio n) ; Eng el

v. Vit al e, 370 U . S. 421 ( 1962 ) (s tr iki ng d ow n st at e- spon sor ed pr ay er s) ; see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. D ist. v. Grum et , 512 U. S. 687, 704 (199 4) (stating that “ civil power m ust be e xe rc ise d inam anne r ne utr al to re lig ion ”) ; Zo rac h v . Clauso n , 343 U. S. 306, 314 ( 1952 ) (s ta tin g th at G ove rn m en t m ay

not “pr ef er [] tho se w ho b el ie ve in no r el igi on o ve r tho se w ho d o be lie ve ”) . T his bar to une qua l tre atm en t i s a lso the fundam ental pointof Le m on v . Ku rtz m an , 403 U. S. 602 (197 1), which held th at the E sta bli shm en t C lause r equir es that the “pr inc ipa l or pr im ar y e ff ec t [ of governm ental action] m

ust be one that n either advances nor inhibits religion.” Id . at61 2. Insho rt , the e qua l tre atm en t r equir ed by the tw o R el igi on C lause s se rv es to pr ote ct ind ivi dua ls f

ro m e nc ro ac hm en ts o n th e ri ght to fr ee ly e nga ge in re lig iou s exercise, and offer s protection from governm ent action that im perm issib ly

favors rel ig io n. Fi na lly , the E qua l P ro te ct ionCl au se m an da te s th at no s ta te sha ll “ de ny

to any person within its jurisdiction th e equal protection of the laws, ” U .S . C ON ST .51

am en d. X IV , § 1, c l. 4, w hic h pr ovi de s su ppor t f or § ( b) by “ dir ec t[ ing ] that a ll persons sim ilarly

situated sho uld be treated alike. ” Cl eb urne , 47 3 U.S. at43 9. In Cl eb urne , the S uprem e Court re viewed a city ’ s land use regulation that dis tin gui she d be tw ee n ho m es f or pe rs ons w ithm en ta l di sa bil iti es f ro m m ult ipl e dw el lin gs, board ing and l odgi ng h ouse s, f rate rn ity or sor or ity hou se s, and do rm it or ie s. Cleburne he ld tha t the dif fe re nc e be tw ee n agr oup hom e an d th es e other uses was irr elevant unless th e group hom e and its occupants “ would threaten le git im at e int er es ts o f the c ity in a w ay that othe r pe rm itt ed

use s su cha s bo ar din g hous es and hosp itals would not .” Id . a t 44 8. B y

e m plo y ing an e qua l pr ote ct ion analy sis to exam ine whether a lawapplies equally to sim ilarly

situated assem

blies or ins tit uti ons, c ourts c anf

er re t out l aw s th at

are f ac ia lly ne utr al but

dis cr im inate in fact . Se e Lu ku mi , 508 U . S. a t 54 0. W e ag re e w ithJus tic e O ’ Co nnor ’ s ob se rv at ionthat “ the Re lig ionCl au se s – th e Fre e Exe rci se Cla us e, th e Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se , th e Rel ig io us TestCla us e, . . . and the Equal Protec tion Clause as applied to religion – all speak with one voi ce on this poi nt: Abse nt the m ost unu sua l c ir cum stanc es , one ’ s r el igi on o ught not affe ct one’ s legal rights or dut ies or benefits.” Kiryas Joel , 512 U . S. a t 71 5 (O ’ Co nnor , J. , c onc ur

ri ng) . O n th e fa ce of

RL U IP A ’ s e qua l t er

m s pr ovi sio n, the ec hoe s of the se c onst itutio na l pr inc ipl es are unm ist ak ab le . S im ply put , to de ny52

e qu a l tr e a t men tt o ac h u r c h o r as yn a g o g u e o nth e g r o u n d s th a ti tc o n v e ys re lig iou s id ea s is to pe na liz e it fo r be ing r el igi ous. S uc h un equa l tre atm en t i s im perm issib le based on the precepts of the Fre e E xercise, Establishm ent and Equal Pro te ct io n C laus es . Congress’ s power is ce rtainly not withoutlim its, but we f ind th at Co ngr es s’ s f

ind ing s r eg ar din g th e w ide spr ea d di sc ri m inatio n a ga ins t r el igi ous instit ution s are plausible and provid e a basis for c onclud ing th at RL UI PA rem ed ie s an d p rev en ts di sc riminat ory lan d u se reg ul at io ns . See U nited Sta tes v. Holm es , 838 F . 2d 1 175, 117 7 ( 11th C ir . 198 8) ( “ [W ] he re astatut e doe s no t dis cr im inate on r ac ia l gr ound s or a ga ins t a sus pe ct c la ss, Co ngr es s’ [s ] j udgm en t w ill be sus ta ine d inthe abse nc e of pe rs ua siv e ev ide nc e that C ongr es s ha d no re as ona ble ba sis f

or dr aw ing the li ne s th at

it did . ”) . R L U IP Ata ilo rs the nond isc ri m inatio n pr ohi bit ion s annun ci at ed a bove to land u se r eg ulatio ns b ec au se Co ngr es s id en tif

ie d asig nif

ic an t e nc ro ac hm en t on

the c or e Fi rs t and F ourte en th Am endm ent rights of religiou s observers. B ecause § (b)( 1) of RL UI PAcodifies ex ist ing F re e E xe rc ise , E sta bli shm en t C lause and E qua l P ro te ct ionr igh ts a ga ins t states and m

unicipalit ies that treat r eligiou s assem blies or insti tutio ns “ on less th an equa l t er m s” than se cu lar ins tit

uti ons, § ( b) is anappr opr ia te and c onst itutio na l us e of Co ngr es s’ s auth or ity

und er § 5 of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t.53

C. E sta

bli shm en t C lause W e turn to Surfside’ s contentio n that RLU IPAim perm issib ly

elevates rel ig io n i n am an ne r co nt rav en in g t he Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se . A t i ts c or e, S ur fs ide ’ s arg um en t i m pli cate s th e int er se ct ionof both r el igi ous lib er tie s pr inc ipl es f

ound in the F ir st Am en dm en t – the r igh t t o f re e ex er ci se of re lig ionand the pr ohi bit iona ga ins t e sta bli shm en t of

r el igi on. A s c ourts s tr ive f or a “ be ne vol en t ne utr al ity ” tow ar d r el igi on tha t a llo w s r el igi ous ex er ci se to ex ist w ith out e ith er e ndor se m en t or

int er fe re nc e, the y

do s o w iththe r ec ogni tio n th at the two Religion Clauses, “both of w hich are c ast in absolu te term s,” w ould , if taken to their logical extrem es, “ tend to clash with [each] other.” W alz , 397 U . S. a t 66 8- 69. Whe n de ci din g th es e ca se s, c ourts are som et im es f or ce d to e nte r the de ba te ab out w he the r the F re e E xe rc ise Cl au se a llo w s e xe m pti ons fr om

bur de nsom e law s, se e, e . g. , Co rp. of thePresiding B ish op o f the Ch urc h of

J es us C hri st o f L atterD aySai nts v . A m os , 483 U. S. 327, 336 (198 7) (uphold ing a law which granted re lig iou s e m

plo y er s an e xe m

pti on f ro m c om pli an ce w ithT itl e V II ’ s pr ote ct ion against religiou s discrim ination ), or w hether the E stablish m ent Clause proh ibi ts suc h e xe m

pti ons, e ith er

on the gr ound s th at

an e xe m pti on i m pe rm iss ibl y di sc riminat es ag ai ns t t he no nr el ig io us , se e e.g ., , Te xa s M onthly , 489 U . S. a t 9 (p lur al ity opi nio n) ( gove rn m en t “ m ay not pla ce it s pr es tig e, c oe rc ive auth or ity , orTh e Sup re me Court ha s a c kn ow le dg e d th at Lemon ’s sec ond and third prong s are often 19 int e rr e late d a

nd the sim ple st w ay of e va luatin gwh e the r a

statut e re su lts in i mpe rm iss ibl e entang lement is to assess it using the same fa ctors used to e x amine the “ eff ect” prong . See Agostini v. Felton , 5 2 1 U. S . 2 0 3 , 2 3 2 -3 3 (1 9 9 7 ). E v al u at i n g Lemon ’s s ec o n d an d th i rdp ro n gs toge ther or se parately

does not aff

ect our analy sis; for purposes of c larity , we e valuate e ach separ ately . 54 res ou rces be hi nda si ng le rel ig io us fai th or b eh in d re li gi ou s b el ie f in ge ne ral . . . co nve y ing the m es sa ge that those w ho d o no t c ontri but e gla dly are le ss than f

ull m em be rs of the c om m uni ty ”) , or

on the gr ound s th at

the e xe m pti on i m pe rm iss ibl y ad va nc es rel ig io n. Se e, e . g. , E dw ards v . A gui lla rd , 482 U . S. 578 , 593 ( 1987 ) (striking do wn L ouisi ana’ s Creationi sm Ac t because it im

perm issib ly

endorses rel ig io n) . Th e th r e e - p artt e s tp r o v i d e db y Le m on he lps de te rm ine w he the r a statut e ac hie ve s ne utr al ity

tow ar ds r el igi on b y

a voi din g “ spon sor shi p, f inanc ia l su

ppor t, an d a ct ive inv olv em en t of the sov er ei gn i n r el igi ous ac tiv ity . ” 403 U . S. a t 61 2 (quot ing W

alz , 397 U . S. a t 66 8) . Astatut e w ill sur viv e anE sta

bli shm en t C lause attack if 1) it has a

secular legislative purpose, 2) its prim ary eff ect neither advanc es nor

inh ibi ts r el igi on, and 3 ) it doe s no t f ost er e xc es siv e gove rn m en t en ta ng le m en t wi th rel ig io n. Id. at 612 -1 3. “ St at e ac tio n vi olate s th e

19 Establishm ent Clause if it fa ils to satis fy any of these prongs.” E

dw ards , 482 U. S. at 583 . 1. P ur

pose55

Le m on f ir st r equir es that the lawa t i ssu e se rv e a “ se cu lar le gis la tiv e pur pose . ” 403 U . S. a t 61 2. T he S upr em e Co urt ha s up he ld s ta tut es that “ al le viate sig nif ic an t go ve rn m en ta l i nte rf er en ce w iththe abil ity

of r el igi ous or ganiz at ion s to define and car

ry out their religious m issio ns.” A m os , 483 U . S. a t 33 5; se e als o H obbi e , 480 U. S. at 144-45 (noti ng that “ the governm ent m ay (and som etim es m ust ) ac co m

m odate r el igi ous pr ac tic es . . . w ith out vio la tin g th e E sta

bli shm en t Cl au se ”) . I n r equir ing ne utr al ity tow ar d r el igi on, the gov er nm en t ne ed

not be

“ obl ivi ous to i m

posi tio ns tha t l eg iti m at e ex er ci se s of state pow er

m ay pla ce on religious b elief and practice, ” Kiryas Joel , 512 U . S. a t 70 5, nor m ust the

“ governm ent show a ca llous indifference to religious groups.” Zorach , 343 U. S. at 314 . W he re , a s he re , alaw ’ s purp ose is to a lle viate sig nif ic an t go ve rn m en t int er fe re nc e w iththe e xe rc ise of r el igi on, that purp ose doe s no t vi olate the Est ab li sh m en t Cl au se . 2. E ff ec t The sec ond requirem ent under Le m on is that the law in question h ave a

“pr inc ipa l or

pr im ar y e ff ec t . . . that ne ith er

a dvanc es nor

inh ibi ts r el igi on. ” 403 U. S. at 612. T he Suprem e Court has said that “ [a] lawis not un constitu tional sim ply be ca use it allows c hur ch es to advanc e re lig ion. . . . F or alawto have forbidden ‘ effe cts’ under Le m on , it m ust be fair to say

that the gov ernm en t i tse lf56

has advanced religion th rough its own activities and influence.” A m os , 483 U. S. at 337. We f

i n du np er s u as i v e S u rf

s i d e’s ar g u m en tth at th e ap p l i ca t i o no f R LUI PA ’s equa l t er m s pr ovi sio n gi ve s an im pe rm iss ibl e spe ci al pr ef

er en ce to re lig iou s in te res ts . A m os m ak es it

c le ar that a lawdoe s no t vi olate the E sta bli shm en t C lause sim ply be ca use it li ft s burd en s im

pose d onr el igi ous ins tit

uti ons w ith out

a ff or din g sim ilar be ne fi ts t o se cu lar en tit ie s. 483 U . S. a t 33 8 ( “ [W ] e se e no r ea son to re qui re that the [ bur de n- al le viatin g] e xe m pti on c om es pa ck ag ed

w ithbe ne fi ts t o se cu lar en tit ie s. ”) . Mo re ove r, c ontrary to Surf sid e’ s a sse rt ion s, RL U IP Adoe s no t al lo w rel ig io us ass em

bl ie s t o a vo idth e ap pl ic at io n o f zo ni ng reg ul at io ns . RL U IP Adoe s no t i m

pose a ff irm at ive dut ie s onstate s th at w oul d r equir e the m

to fa ci lit at e or

sub sid iz e the e xe rc ise of r el igi on. R L U IP Ains te ad c al ls f or e xa ct ly the opp osi te – f

or bid din g st at es f

ro m im posi ng i m

pe rm iss ibl e bur de ns o n r el igi ous wor sh ip . For purposes of analy zing the second p rong of Le m on , ar el ev an t and m eanin gf ul d ist inc tio n e xis ts b etw ee n st at ute s whose e ff

ec t i s to a dvanc e re lig ion an d s ta tu te s wh os e eff

ectis to all ow re li gi ou s o rg an iz at io ns to ad va nc e rel ig io n. Se e A m os , 483 U . S. a t 33 6- 337; Kiryas Joel , 51 2 U.S. at71 9 (O’Co nn or , J., co nc ur ri ng) . R L U IP A , by

m an da tin g eq ual

a s op pose d to spe ci al

tr eatm en t f

or57

re lig iou s in sti tut ion s, doe s no t a dvanc e re lig ionby m ak ing it

e as ie r fo r re lig iou s or ga ni zat io ns th em se lv es to ad va nc e rel ig io n. 3. E ntangl em en t Under Le m on ’ s th ir d pr ong, astatut e m ust not r es ult in ex ce ssi ve en tangl em en t be tw ee n c hur chand s ta te . 403 U . S. a t 61 3. R L U IP Adoe s no t re qui re “pe rv as ive m oni tor ing ” to p re ve nt the gov er nm en t f ro m ind oc tr inatin g rel ig io n. Se e A gost ini , 521 U . S. a t 23 3. R L U IP Adoe s no t c al l onthe gov er nm en t to s upe rv ise land u se r eg ulatio ns t o m ak e sur e gove rn m en ta l f unds do n ot s pons or re lig iou s pr ac tic e, nor

doe s it r equir e state or

loc al of fi ci al s to de ve lop e xpe rt ise on re lig iou s w or shi p or

to ev al ua te the m er its of

dif fe re nt r el igi ous pr ac tic es or be lie fs . R L U IP Ar equir es onl y that st at es a voi d di sc ri m inatin g a ga ins t or a m ong religious in stitut ions. As such, RL UI PApasses m uster under Le m on ’s th irdpro ng . T ha t the Co nst itutio n’ s pr ohi bit ionof the “ es ta bli shm en t of

r el igi on” a lso al lo ws –an d s om et im es m an da te s –equa l t reat m en t o f rel ig io n s eem s o bv io us . E qua l tre atm en t m ai nta ins the se paratio n of c hur chand s ta te by

ke ep ing the governm ent separate f

rom people’ s decisions about religion , while ensuring that th e g o v ern m en td o es n o t“ m ak e [ ] ad h er en ce t o re l i g i o nre l ev an tt o a p er s o n ’s standin g in the po litical com m unity .” W

allace , 47 2 U.S. at69 (O’Con no r, J., co nc ur ri ng i n j udgm en t) ; see also Kiryas Joel , 51 2 U.S. at71 5 (O’Co nn or , J.,Surfside’s a rgument that RLUI PA violates the Establishment Clause echoe s J ustice 20 Stevens’ conc urringopinion in Boerne , which indicate d his belief that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause beca use the statute “ provided the Churc h with a leg al wea pon that no atheist or agnostic can obta in.” Boerne , 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., concurr ing) . Many circ uits have held that RFRA c ontinues to apply to the fede ral g overnme nt. See Kikum ura v. Hurley , 2 42 F .3 d 9 50 , 9 59 -6 0 ( 10 th C ir . 2 00 1) ; In re Young , 141 F.3d 854, 863 ( 8th Cir. 1998); Mock aitis v. Harcleroad, 1 04 F .3 d 1 52 2, 15 30 (9 th C ir . 1 99 7) ; Sasnett v. Sullivan , 91 F.3d 1018, 1022 (7th Cir. 1996), vacate d on other grounds , 5 21 U. S. 1 11 4 ( 19 97 ); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am. , 8 3 F .3 d 4 55 , 4 70 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) ; Flores v. City of Boerne , 7 3 F .3 d 1 35 2, 13 64 (5 th Cir.1996), rev’d on other grounds , 5 21 U. S. 5 07 (1 99 7) . Wh ile we have no t ha d o c c a sio n to decide this question for ourselves, the implication is t hat if RFRA we re c onstitut ionally infirm on Es ta bli shme nt C la

us e g ro un ds a s a

pp lie d to the state s, the re wo uld be no pr inc ipl e d w ay

to exempt the feder al g overnme nt from the same infirmity . Although w e ar e eva luating RLUI PA’s e qu a l te rm s p ro vis ion , whic h, un lik e the su bs tanti a l bu

rd e n p ro vis ion , d oe s n ot h ave ro ots in RFRA, we note that the Boerne majority declined to a dopt J ustice Stevens’ vie w of the Establishment Clause. 58 co nc ur ri ng i n part

and c onc ur

ri ng i n j udgm en t) ; County of Allegheny v. AC LU , 492 U . S. 573 , 626 ( 1989 ) (O ’ Co nnor , J. , c onc ur ri ng i n part

and c onc ur

ri ng i n j udgm en t) . B ec au se RL U IP Aa cc om m odate s r el igi on b y

r em edy ing and pr ev en tin g di sc ri m inator

y z oni ng i n a cc or danc e w ithpr inc ipl es e sta bli she d by

the Fi rs t and F ourte en th A m en dm en ts, RL U IP Adoe s no t vi olate the E sta bli shm en t Clause. 20 D . T en th A m en dm en t Finally , w e re

j ect the ar gum ent that in enacting RLU IPA , C ongress vio lated the T en th A m en dm en t, w hic h pr ovi de s th at “ [t ] he pow er s no t de le ga te d to the U nit ed S ta te s by the Co nst itutio n, nor

pr ohi bit ed

by it to the S ta te s, are r es er

ve d to the States re spectively , or to the peopl e. ” U .S . C ON ST . a m en d. X . A lth ough59

RL U IP Aintru de s to som e de gr ee on l oc al land u se de ci sio ns, RL U IP Adoe s no t vi ol at e p rin ci pl es of f

ed eral is m if i t i s o th erwi se gro un de d i n t he Co ns ti tu ti on . See New York v. United States , 505 U . S. 144 , 156 ( 1992 ). B ec au se RL U IP Ais a pr ope r ex er ci se of

Co ngr es s’ s po w er

und er § 5 of the F ourte en th A m en dm en t, th ere i s n o v io la ti on of t he Tent h Am en dm en t. Moreover, RL UI PAm

ust no t “ com

pel the States to enact or e nforce a federa l regulatory

program .” Printz v. United States , 521 U. S. 898, 935 (199 7); Ne w Yo rk, 505 U. S. at 175-77, 188. While RLU IPAm ay preem pt laws that discrim inate against or exclude religious institu tions entirely , it leaves indiv idual state s f re e to e lim inate the dis cr im inatio n inany w ay the y c hoos e, so l ong as the di sc riminat io n i s ac tu al ly elim in at ed . See F ed. E nergy Regulatory Comm ’n v. M iss iss ipp i , 456 U. S. 742, 759 (198 2) (“ [T ] he Feder al governm ent m ay displace state r eg ulatio n e ve n th oughthi s se rv es to ‘ curt ai l or pr ohi bit the S ta te s’ prerogatives to m ake legislative choices respecting sub j ects the States m ay co nsi de r im

portant. ”) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ); City of Rom e v. United States , 446 U. S. 156, 179 ( 1980 ) (c ont em

platin g F ourte en th A m en dm en t’ s in te rf er en ce w ithstate ri ght s) ; G re

goryv . A shc rof

t , 50 1 U.S. 4 52 , 46 8 (1 99 1) (sa m e). RL U IP A ’ s c or e pol ic y

is not to re gul at e the state s or

c om pe l the ir en fo rc em en t of

af ed er al r eg ulator

y pr ogr am , but

to pr ote ct

the e xe rc ise of60

re lig ion , ava lid

e xe rc ise of

Co ngr es s’ s § 5 pow er

und er the F ourte en th A m en dm en t, w hic h do es not r un a fo ul o f the T en th A m en dm en t’ s pr ote ct ionof th e p rin ci pl es of f

ed eral is m . C on cl us ion Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , w e fi nd tha t § 90- 152 of the S Z O vio la te s § (b)(1) of RL UI PA . W e REV ERS E the de ci sio n of the dis tr ic t c ourt, and REMAND forfur th er p ro ceed in gs co ns is te ntwit h t hi s o pi ni on .