United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

E.G., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, VEHICLE 

MAINTENANCE FACILITY, Brooklyn, NY, 

Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 16-1536

Issued: October 12, 2017

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Paul Kalker, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On July 26, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a June 3, 2016

merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the 

Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board 

has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On August 5, 2014 appellant, then a 54-year-old tractor-trailer operator, filed a traumatic 

injury claim (Form CA-1) for both physical and emotional conditions that he attributed to 

workplace harassment, including alleged threats and racial slurs.3 He identified July 31, 2014 as 

the date of injury. Appellant also stopped work on that date.

In an August 2, 2014 report, Dr. Robert Malizia, Board-certified in emergency medicine, 

advised that appellant was experiencing anxiety and stress, which had been ongoing for the 

previous month. He noted that appellant currently had severe anxiety and felt as if he was about 

to have a panic attack. Dr. Malizia reported that he had been harassed by a coworker for the past 

month and that he had been unable to get his supervisor to do anything about it. Appellant 

contended it was a delicate situation involving racial matters. He reported to Dr. Malizia that he 

was very angry and concerned that his coworker might do him physical harm. Appellant also 

advised that the coworker had cut him off in his truck deliberately and made innuendos about 

owning a handgun. Dr. Malizia advised that he was unable to sleep, and had difficulty staying 

awake and concentrating behind the wheel of his tractor-trailer. He diagnosed post-traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD). 

In an August 26, 2014 report, Dr. Asher Pakier, a Ph.D in clinical psychology, diagnosed 

PTSD and advised that appellant was unable to resume his regular activities for the near future. 

He noted that he would be treating appellant on a weekly basis for psychotherapy.

By letter dated September 8, 2014, OWCP advised appellant that he needed additional 

information to support his claim. It asked appellant to describe in detail the employment-related 

conditions or incidents which he believed contributed to his emotional condition, and to provide 

specific descriptions of all practices, incidents, etc., which he believed affected his condition. 

In a September 21, 2014 statement, appellant alleged that he had been harassed and 

threatened on numerous occasions by coworker H.S. He alleged that he was continuously 

harassed on the job, which caused him considerable aggravation and irritation resulting in 

sleepless nights worrying that H.S might harm him or his coworkers. Appellant alleged that H.S. 

had threatened him with bodily harm on numerous occasions and called him “a white motherf--r.” He asserted that, although his supervisor, A.N, overheard this remark, he did not take any 

disciplinary action against H.S. Appellant expressed that he was being antagonized and “baited”

in an ongoing situation and feared he might react rashly.

 

3 Appellant claimed to have developed stress-related high blood pressure, headaches, stomach pain, including 

throwing up, an inability to sleep, and anxiety. Although he filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1), OWCP 

ultimately adjudicated the claim as an occupational disease because the alleged harassment occurred over a period of 

days.
3

Appellant made the following allegations regarding specific incidents involving H.S.:

(1) In June 2014, appellant entered the swing room, moved items off a chair and 

put them on the table so he could sit down. Soon afterwards H.S. entered the 

room screaming, “oh no you didn’t” and shouting obscenities at appellant for 

moving his computer off the chair. Appellant got up and told him he shouldn’t 

hold the chair if he was not in the room, which infuriated H.S. Appellant gave 

him the chair so he would stop shouting but he didn’t stop. Appellant contended

that H.S. continued to curse at him and repeatedly called him a “white mother-f---

er” and other racial epithets for five to ten minutes. Appellant responded in kind 

by verbally assaulting H.S with a racial slur of his own, after which supervisor 

A.N. entered the room to break up the confrontation. Appellant alleged that A.N 

refused to take disciplinary action against H.S., despite overhearing the racial slur 

he made toward appellant. He further alleged that H.S. triggered another verbal 

confrontation with him in the swing room two days later;

(2) In a witness statement dated July 28, 2014 D.W., a coworker, asserted that 

H.S. had told him on July 28, 2014 that appellant “doesn’t realize that I can snatch 

his life from him” and that a few other employees who had a problem with him 

“are all gone and he is still here.” D.W. also stated, “I’m afraid someone might 

get hurt and that is why I have come forward;”

(3) Sometime during July 2014, H.S. had an altercation with a new employee, 

G.G. Appellant alleged that H.S. told G.G. that he could not sit at a seat where 

H.S. always sat because he had no seniority. When the new employee tried to get 

appellant’s attention, H.S. told him repeatedly and aggressively that appellant

“was not gonna help him, don’t look at him;”

(4) Also during July 2014, H.S. on multiple occasions would mumble comments 

and tell appellant to watch his back, which caused him to have more feelings of 

irritability and anxiety. He would hide behind the building worksite with his 

tractor-trailer, entering the building only briefly when I had to, in order to avoid 

any further altercations with H.S. Appellant had trouble breathing, was sweating 

profusely, and felt his heart pound out of my chest;

(5) On July 24, 2014 H.S. made another verbal threat toward appellant by telling 

coworker V.C. “you will be here when things happen,” which according to V.C.

was directed toward appellant due to their earlier altercation;

(6) Appellant submitted sworn statements to postal inspector C.W., who agreed to 

look into the situation and investigate. On July 29, 2014 he contacted C.W to 

learn the outcome of her investigation; she concluded “there was no criminal act 

at this time” and indicated to appellant that his supervisor should take action on 

this matter. Appellant indicated that he was concerned that no action was taken in 

light of the threat posed by H.S.; 
4

(7) On several occasions appellant spoke to transportation manager A.A., and 

requested a transfer to Staten Island. On July 31, 2014 A.A told him he would 

look into it. Immediately after his conversation with A.A., on July 31, 2014 

appellant was directed to move a box from inbound to bay 52. As he was driving 

around to reach the outbound side, a tractor-trailer on his left was coming towards 

him. All of a sudden, the other tractor-trailer cut off appellant, causing him to jam 

on the brakes of his tractor-trailer. He claimed that the two vehicles were within 

inches of hitting each other. H.S. was the driver of the vehicle that had cut him 

off. Appellant related that H.S. thought it was funny and had a big smile on his 

face. Appellant immediately went to dispatch and asked them to take him to 

medical since he was experiencing shortness of breath, nausea, anxiety, stress, 

anger and heart palpitations. This incident was witnessed by coworker V.C., who 

provided an August 25, 2014 statement;

(8) Appellant asserted that anxiety sets in just before he leaves for work in the 

morning since he knows he might experience another altercation with H.S. He 

was concerned that H.S. might try to retaliate against him because he filed a 

complaint and because H.S. had threatened other employees. Appellant alleged 

that H.S. got away with this behavior because of management’s reluctance to take 

disciplinary action toward him. This inaction flew in the face of management’s 

policy of zero tolerance for any type of harassment or aggression in the 

workplace, verbal or otherwise.

In a July 31, 2014 report, received by OWCP on September 22, 2014, Dr. Manuel Ceja, a 

specialist in internal medicine, advised that appellant had been getting into multiple altercations 

with a coworker for the past month. Dr. Ceja related that appellant felt the urge to physically 

assault his coworker because the coworker was very provocative and was being a nuisance. 

Dr. Ceja noted that appellant was very angry and was using a lot of profanity to describe this

situation. He reported that his coworker cut him off with a tractor-trailer, an incident which 

occurred hours before his initial visit for his stress and anger issues. Dr. Ceja advised that 

appellant had informed his supervisor about the ongoing conflict he was having with his 

coworker and that they were conducting a thorough investigation. He indicated that the ongoing 

harassment resulted in an unspecified acute reaction to stress. 

In a September 21, 2014 report, Dr. Malizia advised that he had treated appellant on three

occasions since August 2, 2014 for evaluation and treatment of severe anxiety and anger issues 

related to an ongoing confrontational situation at work. He related that appellant felt he was 

being antagonized, baited, and threatened by a coworker because of his ethnicity, and 

management was not addressing the situation because of the potential consequences of taking 

corrective actions. Dr. Malizia reported that appellant was experiencing feelings of extreme 

anxiety, bordering on panic attacks, insomnia and resulting daytime somnolence and difficulty 

concentrating; this was extremely hazardous to public safety when operating a heavy vehicle.

Dr. Malizia opined that appellant should be removed from the current situation and 

reassigned to another location until the situation was resolved. He recommended that appellant 

be given a medical leave of absence to allow him to convalesce under the care of behavioral 
5

health professionals, and his mental and emotional state stabilized to allow him to safely operate 

heavy commercial vehicles.

In a September 15, 2014 report, received by OWCP on September 22, 2014, Dr. Pakier 

advised that he was treating appellant for psychotherapy on a weekly basis for symptoms 

consistent with PTSD due to appellant’s complaints of continuous harassment on the job by a 

coworker. He noted that appellant was experiencing nightmares, feelings of sadness and 

helplessness, loss of appetite, anhedonia, anxiety and extreme irritability. Dr. Pakier opined that 

appellant’s condition was precipitated by the continuous harassment on his job by another postal 

employee. He related that this coworker was not disciplined, and would continue to be a threat 

to appellant when he was able to return to his normal duties. 

In a statement received by OWCP on October 27, 2014, appellant’s supervisor, A.N., 

rebutted his allegations. He opined that appellant was a shrewd manipulator who employed 

bullying tactics to get his way and would go outside the chain of command and file official 

paperwork when it suited him; he alleged that appellant would bend the rules and lie when 

necessary. A.N. asserted that appellant’s witness statements were not credible because they were

obtained from close friends, employees he intimidated, or employees who also had animosity

toward H.S. He asserted that he treated all of his employees with respect and that his managing 

style was favorable with employees and his managers. With regard to the June 2014 verbal 

altercation over the chair in the swing room, A.N. stated that he did hear both employees utter 

disgusting words toward each other; he, however did tell each employee privately that this was 

unacceptable behavior and tried to end their ongoing dispute. A.N. alleged that it was appellant 

who refused to let go and try to coexist with H.S., despite his best efforts. He indicated that he 

was aware of other confrontations appellant had with H.S. and with other employees in which he 

was the instigator and the culpable party.

In a statement of accepted facts dated February 5, 2015, OWCP stipulated that it had 

accepted the following events as factors of employment: (1) On July 31, 2014 while driving and 

moving a trailer in bay 52, appellant was cut off by a tractor-trailer coming from his left, causing 

him to jam on the brakes of the vehicle to avoid colliding with the other vehicles, which were 

within inches of hitting each other. The driver of the other vehicle was H.S, who thought it was 

funny and had a big smile on his face, and caused appellant to believe that H.S. deliberately tried 

to cause an accident. Another coworker witnessed this event and stated that appellant had the 

right of way; and (2) On July 28, 2014 H.S. verbally threatened appellant’s life. A coworker 

witnessed a heated argument between appellant and H.S and heard H.S. state ‘he doesn’t realize I 

can snatch his life from him.” H.S. then motioned towards appellant. The witness stated that he 

was afraid someone might get hurt.

In order to determine whether appellant had an emotional disorder causally related to the 

accepted, compensable employment factors, OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Maryann Popiel, 

Board-certified in psychiatry and neurology, for a second opinion examination. In a report dated 

March 10, 2015, she noted findings on examination, reviewed the medical history and statement 

of accepted facts. Dr. Popiel opined that appellant did not meet the criteria for PTSD; at most, 

he had an anxiety disorder, not otherwise specified. She noted that he had ongoing interpersonal 

relationship issues and discord with a coworker, but opined that this was more of an anger 

management issue for appellant. Dr. Popiel reported that appellant was having difficulty 
6

focusing and performing at work when he was in the company of his coworker. She believed 

that working in his company aggravated his emotional distress. 

Dr. Popiel opined that appellant’s situation did not rise to the level of a diagnosed DSMIV condition, although she noted that it would be in his best interest if he were working at 

another site. 

In an April 2, 2015 treatment note, Dr. Nicole Arcentales, an osteopath, advised that 

appellant was being treated for anxiety caused by a stressful work incident. He excused 

appellant from work from March 31, 2015 until further evaluation, but he failed to relate the 

basis for the removal from work. 

By decision dated May 8, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an emotional 

condition. As noted above it accepted the following events as factors of employment: (1) On 

July 31, 2014 while driving and moving a trailer in bay 52, appellant was cut off by a tractortrailer coming from his left, causing him to jam on the brakes of the vehicle to avoid colliding 

with the other vehicles, which were within inches of hitting each other. The driver of the other 

vehicle was H.S., who thought it was funny and had a big smile on his face, and caused appellant 

to believe that H.S. deliberately tried to cause an accident. Another coworker witnessed this 

event and stated that appellant had the right of way; and (2) On July 28, 2014 H.S., verbally 

threatened appellant’s life. A coworker witnessed a heated argument between appellant and H.S.

and heard H.S. state ‘he doesn’t realize I can snatch his life from him,” who then motioned 

towards appellant. The witness stated he was afraid someone might get hurt. OWCP found, 

however, that the medical evidence of record failed to demonstrate that the claimed medical 

conditions were causally related to the established work-related events.

OWCP found that the medical reports from appellant’s treating physicians did not discuss 

detailed examples of the accepted incidents or provide any medical rationale to establish how 

these incidents were causally related to the claimed condition. It found Dr. Popiel’s psychiatric 

or psychological diagnoses insufficiently rationalized to represent the weight of the medical 

evidence. She noted that working in the company of H.S. aggravated appellant’s emotional 

distress, but did not rise to the diagnosis of a DSM-IV condition.

On August 31, 2015 appellant requested an oral hearing. The request was postmarked 

September 3, 2015. In an October 14, 2015 decision, the Branch of Hearings and Review denied 

the request as untimely. 

By letter dated February 29, 2016, appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. 

In a report dated October 14, 2015, received by OWCP on March 7, 2016, Dr. Robert 

Conciatori, a Board-certified psychiatrist, advised that he was treating appellant. He diagnosed 

PTSD and opined that this pathology began during the summer of 2014 while appellant was 

working as a truck driver for the employing establishment. Dr. Conciatori related that appellant 

alleged that he was continually threatened by an African-American coworker who cursed him, 

using racial epithets, that this coworker was aggressive and threatened to assault him and kill 

him, and that the coworker tried to collide with his truck on July 31, 2014, which was “the 

proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back.”
7

Appellant asserted that, despite a no tolerance policy, management did not take action on 

his complaints about this coworker. Dr. Conciatori advised that he began to experience 

depression, anxiety and fear of being assaulted or murdered and was unable to work from July 31 

to December 15, 2014; appellant returned to work but was subject to continued harassment and 

threats and went off work again as of March 2015. He opined that appellant clearly met the 

criteria for PTSD, which was the direct result of his coworker’s actions and behavior. 

Dr. Conciatori noted that appellant was taking antidepressants for his anxiety and insomnia and 

was totally disabled psychiatrically. He opined that appellant’s PTSD was causally related to the 

harassment suffered at the employing establishment.

In an October 31, 2015 report, Dr. Jeffrey H. Newton, Board-certified in psychiatry, 

advised that appellant was experiencing anxiety. He advised that he was subjected to a pattern of 

harassment at work and that management had failed to respond to his requests for relief and that

the harassment was perpetrated by a coworker, H.S., who was allegedly verbally aggressive and 

menacing toward him. Dr. Newton noted that there was a confrontation over control of a 

particular chair in the office which degenerated into an exchange of racial slurs and that similar 

incidents had occurred subsequently. He also recounted the July 31, 2014 incident involving 

tractor-trailers on postal grounds. Dr. Newton related that appellant became very anxious, had 

elevated blood pressure sought medical help, and was unable to return to work. He, however, 

did not see any indication of psychosis or organic mental dysfunction.

Dr. Newton concluded that appellant showed a significant level of constant anxiety and 

stress symptoms, with marked exacerbation when having to deal with anything regarding his 

work experience with the employing establishment. He advised that appellant required 

psychiatric counseling due to his PTSD and that this condition was a direct result of his 

experience at work of multiple and ongoing incidents of harassment from a coworker, along with 

the absence of an effective response from management. Dr. Newton further opined that, given 

these manifestations of PTSD, his condition was likely to persist, even with treatment. He

therefore recommended that appellant not make an attempt to return to work, which would likely 

result in an exacerbation of his symptoms with further deterioration in his personal functioning 

and physical well being.

By decision dated June 3, 2016, OWCP denied modification of the May 8, 2015 decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish a claim of an emotional condition in the performance of duty, an employee 

must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he has an emotional or 

psychiatric disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to 

have caused or contributed to his condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence 

establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally related to his 

emotional condition.

An occupational disease or illness means a condition produced by the work environment 

over a period longer than a single workday or shift.4 Workers’ compensation law does not apply 

 

4

20 C.F.R. § 10.5(q).
8

to each and every injury or illness that is somehow related to an employee’s employment.5 

There are situations where an injury or an illness has some connection with the employment but 

nevertheless does not come within the concept or coverage of workers’ compensation.6 Where 

the disability results from an employee’s emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially 

assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability comes within the 

coverage of FECA.7

If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, OWCP should then determine 

whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor.8 When the matter asserted is a 

compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the truth of the matter 

asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.9

Rationalized medical opinion evidence is generally required to establish causal 

relationship. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical 

background, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical 

rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the 

specific employment factors identified by the claimant.10 Appellant has the burden to submit 

rationalized medical evidence establishing that his claimed conditions were causally related to 

the accepted compensable employment factors.11

It is not necessary to provide a significant contribution of employment factors for the 

purpose of establishing causal relationship.12

Section 8123(a) provides that, if there is a disagreement between the physician making 

the examination for the United States and the physician of the employee the Secretary shall 

appoint a third physician who shall make an examination.13 It is well established that, when a 

case is referred to an impartial medical specialist for the purpose of resolving a conflict, the 

opinion of such specialist, if sufficiently well rationalized and based on a proper factual and 

medical background, must be given special weight.14

 

5

L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007).

6 A.K., 58 ECAB 119 (2006).

7

Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

8 David C. Lindsey, Jr., 56 ECAB 263 (2005).

9 Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006).

10 I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989).

11 See D.R., Docket No. 16-0605 (issued October 17, 2016); see also A.V., Docket No. 15-1394 (issued 

December 22, 2015).

12 See Richard E. Simpson, 55 ECAB 490 (2004).

13 Regina T. Pellecchia, 53 ECAB 155 (2001).

14 Jacqueline Brasch (Ronald Brasch), 52 ECAB 252 (2001).
9

ANALYSIS

Appellant alleged an emotional condition causally related to the accepted factors of his 

federal employment. In a SOAF dated February 5, 2015, OWCP accepted two compensable 

employment factors. By decision dated June 3, 2016, it denied his claim finding that he had 

failed to meet his burden of proof to establish an emotional condition causally related to the two 

accepted employment factors as he had failed to submit sufficient medical evidence in support of 

his claim. 

The Board finds the weight of the medical evidence rests with Dr. Popiel, the second 

opinion physician, who was provided a SOAF which set forth in detail the two accepted factors. 

The Board has carefully considered the opinion of Dr. Popiel and finds that it has reliability, 

probative value, and convincing quality with respect to its conclusions regarding the relevant 

issues of the present case.15 Dr. Popiel found that appellant has established no psychiatric or 

psychological diagnoses and did not meet the criteria for PTSD. She found that, at best, 

appellant had an anxiety disorder which she attributed to appellant’s ongoing interpersonal 

discord between appellant and a coworker which was in her opinion more of an anger 

management issue for appellant. Dr. Popiel found that appellant could return to work without

restrictions but that it would be in appellant’s best interest to work in another area away from the 

coworker. She did not attribute the anxiety disorder to the two accepted compensable factors of 

employment. The Board finds that OWCP properly relied on Dr. Popiel when it denied 

appellant’s emotional condition claim.

Appellant’s burden of proof is not discharged by the fact that compensable factors have 

been accepted which may give rise to a compensable disability under FECA. To establish his 

occupational disease claim for an emotional condition, appellant must also submit rationalized 

medical evidence establishing that she has an emotional or psychiatric disorder and that such 

disorder is causally related to an accepted compensable employment factor or factors.16 

The record of evidence contains reports from several treating physicians who examined or 

treated appellant and provided opinions as to whether he sustained a diagnosed psychological 

condition causally related to the incidents involving a coworker. The Board finds these reports of 

limited probative value in that they are not based on an accurate factual history and do not contain 

adequate medical rationale in support of their conclusions. The reports from Drs. Ceja, Malizia, 

Pakier, Arcentales, Conciatori, and Newton all note a diagnosis of either PTSD or an unspecified 

stress reaction. However, none of these physicians provide a rationalized and supportive opinion 

to support that appellant developed these conditions as a result of the two accepted factors of his 

federal employment. Instead, they each describe in their medical notes accounts of ongoing and 

pervasive harassment over time with varying factual complaints expressed by appellant that were 

never accepted as factual. Although several of the reports reference generally the two incidents 

which were accepted as compensable factors, their opinions did not relate appellant’s conditions to 

these specific incidents. In his report of October 14, 2015, Dr. Conciatori gives passing mention to 

the two accepted conditions. Couched in a recurring theme of harassment, he recounts threats of 

 

15 See Elizabeth W. Esnil, 46 ECAB 606 (1995).

16 See William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159 (1992).
10

assault and an instance where the coworker tried to collide with appellant’s truck. These instances 

are raised, however, there is no medical causation provided to link these specific instances to the 

claimed injury. Instead, they are superimposed on a larger history of interpersonal discord. The 

opinions on causation were based generally on pervasive harassment over an extended period of 

time. However, OWCP has not accepted such ongoing and pervasive harassment as factors of 

employment. Such generalized statements of “ongoing harassment” and “pervasive harassment”

merely repeat appellant’s allegations and are unsupported by the factual history. The medical 

evidence failed to adequately explain, with supportive rationale, how the two employment factors 

alone would have been sufficient to cause or aggravate the diagnosed conditions.

17

 

The record of evidence lacks rationalized medical evidence establishing a causal 

relationship between appellant’s accepted employment factors and the diagnosed PTSD or other 

psychological condition. The Board therefore finds that the medical evidence of record is 

insufficient for appellant to meet his burden of proof to establish his claim. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition causally related to the accepted factors of his federal employment.

 

17 See S.F., Docket No. 17-0463 (issued September 29, 2017); K.W., Docket No. 10-98 (issued September 10, 

2010); Victor J. Woodhams, supra note 10.
11

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the June 3, 2016 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is affirmed.

Issued: October 12, 2017

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board