Filed 11/26/14 Sumrall v. Winco Foods CA4/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

APRIL SUMRALL, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

WINCO FOODS, LLC, 

 Defendant and Respondent. 

 D066360 

 (Super. Ct. No. RIC504899) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, John G. 

Evans, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Biren/Katzman and Matthew B. F. Biren for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Nisson, Pincin & Hill, James W. Pincin and Duane H. Timmons for Defendant 

and Respondent. 

 Plaintiff April Sumrall appeals a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of 

defendant Winco Foods, LLC (Winco), in her personal injury action against it. On 

appeal, she contends the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding deposition testimony 
2 

of Winco's expert witness, who resided more than 150 miles from the trial location and 

was not called by Winco to testify at trial. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 At about 1:00 p.m. on February 22, 2008, Sumrall entered a Temecula grocery 

store operated by Winco. It had rained all morning that day. After apparently walking 

through a carpeted foyer/cart room, she stepped onto the painted concrete floor inside the 

store. She slipped, fell, and was injured. 

 Sumrall filed a personal injury action against Winco, alleging it was negligent by 

allowing rain water to accumulate on the store's concrete floor, making it slippery and 

dangerous. On December 13, 2011, Michael Stapleford, Winco's expert, was deposed in 

California. Counsel for Sumrall and Winco were present. At his deposition, Stapleford 

testified he lives in the State of Washington. On November 16, 2011, he went to the store 

and inspected its floor. Based on his inspection, he concluded the "floor offers adequate 

traction when it's dry. It is slippery when it's wet." As part of his inspection, he 

performed a coefficient of friction test, or "slip index," using a tribometer. His wet floor 

tests, performed with water completely covering the floor, showed the floor was "in the 

slippery range" with coefficients of friction ranging from 0.10 to 0.16.1 He believes the 

threshold for slipping is 0.43, meaning there would be no chance of anyone slipping. In 

 

1 He also tested the floor when it was only "damp," resulting in coefficients of 

friction of 0.19 and 0.32. 
3 

comparison, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) apparently uses a 

standard of 0.5. He believes that a floor becomes "slippery" in the range of 0.2 to 0.3. 

 At trial, Sumrall presented the testimony of Bethany Thompson, a Winco 

employee at the Temecula store. Thompson testified she had been taught that Winco's 

floors are slippery when wet. Winco presented the testimony of Rudy Morfin, the 

Temecula store's manager, who testified the store's maintenance department kept a 

"sweep log," to ensure the floors were clean, free of debris, and safe. The sweep log 

showed that on February 22, 2008, an inspection was performed at 12:43 p.m. and 

Sumrall fell at 1:01 p.m. that day. On cross-examination by Sumrall, Morfin testified he 

endeavored to keep the store's floors dry because he recognized that a wet floor was a slip 

hazard to customers. A videotape from the store's security camera showing Sumrall's fall 

was played for the jury. Sumrall also presented the testimony of Vojislav Banjac, a risk 

and safety scientist, regarding his opinion on the cause of her slip and fall. Based on his 

viewing of the videotape and inspection of the site, Banjac stated her fall was caused by a 

loss of traction followed by a loss of stability. He did not perform a slip resistance test on 

the store's floor. Banjac stated that water could cause a lack of traction on the floor. 

 During trial, Winco apparently informed Sumrall it did not intend to call 

Stapleford as one of its defense witnesses. Out of the jury's presence, Sumrall requested 

that the trial court allow her to read into evidence certain excerpts from Stapleford's 

deposition testimony because he resided out of state and was unavailable as a witness. 

Winco objected to admission of that evidence, arguing Stapleford was not unavailable. 
4 

The trial court asked Sumrall for authority for reading the deposition testimony. Sumrall 

replied that Stapleford testified at his deposition that he resided in the State of 

Washington and no longer had a business office in Huntington Beach. She also argued 

Stapleford was outside the subpoena power and was unavailable. Citing Code of Civil 

Procedure2 former section 2025, she argued she should be allowed to present Stapleford's 

sworn deposition testimony regarding his test results, which were favorable to her. The 

court stated: 

"This is something that just seems inherently unfair to me that, to 

allow this type of testimony to come in on the last day of trial when 

it might be difficult for [Winco] to get the person here in court to 

testify. And the reason for that is is that . . . it's not uncommon in 

civil cases that when the deposition of an expert is taken that the 

party who hires the expert will not cross-examine his own expert at 

the time of the deposition, and so even though . . . [Winco] would 

have been present at the time, this isn't a third party witness. This is 

really an expert witness. So my ruling's going to be that I'm not 

going to allow you to do that." 

Shortly thereafter, Sumrall rested her case in chief. 

 By a vote of 11 to 1, the jury returned a special verdict finding Winco was not 

negligent in the use or maintenance of its property. The trial court entered judgment for 

Winco. Sumrall filed a motion for new trial, arguing the court prejudicially erred by 

excluding Stapleton's deposition testimony, thereby precluding Banjac from relying on 

Stapleton's coefficient of friction test results to testify that the floor was extremely 

slippery, or "slippery as ice," when wet. Winco opposed the motion. At the hearing on 

 

2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise 

specified. 

 
5 

Sumrall's motion for new trial, the trial court concluded it had not erred by excluding 

Stapleton's deposition testimony and, even if it had erred, the error was harmless in the 

circumstances of this case. On August 15, 2012, the court entered an amended judgment 

in favor of Winco. Sumrall timely filed a notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I 

Admission of Deposition Testimony Generally 

 In general, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial. (Evid. Code, § 351.) 

"Relevant" evidence includes evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or 

disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." 

(Evid. Code, § 210.) Deposition testimony of witnesses, if relevant, may be admitted at 

trial in certain circumstances. (§ 2025.620.) Section 2025.620 provides: 

"At the trial or any other hearing in the action, any part or all of a 

deposition may be used against any party who was present or 

represented at the taking of the deposition . . . so far as admissible 

under the rules of evidence applied as though the deponent were then 

present and testifying as a witness, in accordance with the following 

provisions: 

"(a) Any party may use a deposition for the purpose of contradicting 

or impeaching the testimony of the deponent as a witness, or for any 

other purpose permitted by the Evidence Code. [¶] . . . [¶] 

"(c) Any party may use for any purpose the deposition of any person

or organization, including that of any party to the action, if the court 

finds any of the following: 

"(1) The deponent resides more than 150 miles from the place of the 

trial or other hearing. 
6 

"(2) The deponent, without the procurement or wrongdoing of the 

proponent of the deposition for the purpose of preventing testimony 

in open court, is any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] 

"(D) Absent from the trial or other hearing and the court is unable to 

compel the deponent's attendance by its process. 

"(E) Absent from the trial or other hearing and the proponent of the 

deposition has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to 

procure the deponent's attendance by the court's process. . . ." 

(Italics added.) 

II 

Exclusion of Stapleford's Deposition Testimony 

 Sumrall contends the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding Stapleford's 

deposition testimony. 

A 

 Sumrall asserts the trial court erred by denying her request to present Stapleford's 

deposition testimony at trial because the record shows Stapleford resided in the State of 

Washington, more than 150 miles from the place of trial (Riverside, California), and 

Winco was represented by counsel at Stapleford's deposition. Therefore, she argues 

section 2025.620's requirements for admission of Stapleford's deposition testimony were 

satisfied. 

Monroy v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248 (Monroy), at page 264, 

stated: 

"[S]ection 2025.620, subdivision (c)(1) permits the introduction of 

deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony if '[t]he deponent 

resides more than 150 miles from the place of trial or other hearing.' 

Unavailability need not be shown. Hearsay can be used to provide 
7 

the foundation to establish that a deponent resides 150 miles from 

the courthouse [citation]." 

In this case, Stapleford testified at his deposition that he resided in the State of 

Washington. We take judicial notice that the State of Washington is more than 150 miles 

from the courthouse in Riverside, California. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a), 452, subd. 

(h); Monroy, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [judicial notice that Puebla, Mexico, is 

more than 150 miles from Los Angeles, California, courthouse]; cf. Dept. of Social 

Welfare v. Gandy (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 209, 211 [judicial notice that Santa Monica is 

less than 100 miles from Los Angeles].) The parties do not cite, and we are unaware of, 

any evidence or other information in the record suggesting Stapleford did not reside in 

the State of Washington, or at least 150 miles from Riverside, California, at the time of 

the April 2012 trial in this case. Accordingly, the record clearly shows section 2025.620, 

subdivision (c)(1)'s requirement was satisfied. Furthermore, the record shows Winco was 

represented by counsel at Stapleford's deposition. Because both requirements for 

admissibility of Stapleford's deposition testimony under section 2025.620, subdivision 

(c)(1), were satisfied, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding that deposition 

testimony at trial. (Cf. Monroy, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 264-266.) The court's 

reason for excluding that testimony (i.e., it would be unfair to Winco because it could not 
8 

cross-examine Stapleford at trial) is not a valid reason under section 2025.620 to exclude 

that testimony.3

B 

 Sumrall asserts the trial court's error in excluding Stapleford's deposition 

testimony was prejudicial. She has the burden on appeal to show it is reasonably 

probable she would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred. 

(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) 

 Based on our review of the whole record, we conclude Sumrall has not carried her 

burden to show the trial court's error was prejudicial under the Watson standard. Had the 

court admitted Stapleford's deposition testimony, the jury would have heard evidence 

regarding Stapleford's coefficient of friction test results. It would have learned that 

Stapleford testified the store's floor is "slippery when it's wet" or, alternatively stated, is 

"in the slippery range." His testing of the floor when wet resulted in coefficients of 

friction ranging from 0.10 to 0.16, compared to his threshold for slipping of 0.43 (i.e., 

meaning there would be no chance of anyone slipping). He testified a floor becomes 

"slippery" in the range of 0.2 to 0.3. If Stapleford's deposition testimony had been 

admitted, the jury would have learned the store's floor was slippery when wet. However, 

as Winco asserts, the jury already heard the testimony of two store employees (i.e., 

Morfin and Thompson) that the floor was slippery when wet. Also, Banjac, Sumrall's 

 

3 Furthermore, the record does not show the trial court cited or relied on Evidence 

Code section 352 to exclude Stapleford's deposition testimony. Therefore, there is no 

reasonable ground on which the court could exclude that testimony. 
9 

expert, testified Sumrall slipped because of a loss of traction (i.e., because of water on the 

floor). Stapleford's test results simply confirmed the slippery condition of the store's 

floor when wet. Although his test results would have placed numerical values on the 

floor's slippery condition when wet, neither those results nor Stapleford's deposition 

testimony would have informed the jury that the floor was either extremely slippery or 

slippery as ice. 

 Nevertheless, Sumrall argues that had Stapleford's deposition testimony been 

admitted at trial, she could have then presented testimony by her own expert, Banjac, 

regarding his interpretation of Stapleford's test results and, in particular, how slippery the 

floor is when wet. However, the trial record does not contain any proof (e.g., offer of 

proof by Sumrall) regarding what Banjac's testimony would have been had Stapleford's 

test results been admitted at trial. Evidence Code section 354, subdivision (a), provides 

that a verdict generally may not be reversed on appeal by reason of erroneous exclusion 

of evidence unless "[t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was 

made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other 

means . . . ." An offer of proof "must set forth the actual evidence to be produced and not 

merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued [citation]. The trial court may 

reject a general or vague offer of proof that does not specify the testimony to be offered 

by the proposed witness." (People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 334.) An offer 

of proof generally must be made before or shortly after the trial court has made a ruling 

excluding evidence. (Bowman v. Wyatt (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 286, 329; Espinoza v. 
10 

Calva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398.) Here, Sumrall does not cite to, and we are 

unaware of, anything in the record showing she timely made an offer of proof to the trial 

court regarding what facts would have been proved had Stapleford's deposition testimony 

been admitted and Banjac been allowed to testify regarding Stapleford's test results. 

Absent any such offer of proof, Sumrall, in effect, waived her right to challenge on 

appeal the court's exclusion of that evidence. (Gutierrez v. Cassiar Mining Corp. (1998) 

64 Cal.App.4th 148, 161-162; cf. Caira v. Offner (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 12, 31.) 

 Assuming arguendo Sumrall made an adequate offer of proof or an exception 

applies to that requirement, we nevertheless conclude she has not carried her burden to 

show the admission of Stapleford's deposition testimony, and Banjac's testimony based 

on it, probably would have resulted in a more favorable verdict for her. In arguing her 

motion for a new trial, Sumrall asserted, for the first time, that had Stapleford's test 

results been admitted, Banjac could have testified those test results showed the store's 

floor was "slippery as ice" when wet. Sumrall repeats that argument in her appellate 

briefs. However, she does not show that had Banjac testified the store's floor was 

slippery as ice when wet, it is reasonably probable based on all of the other evidence in 

the record that she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. She does not show it is 

reasonably probable the jury would have found Winco negligent in the use or 

maintenance of its property had that evidence been admitted. The jury already had 

evidence showing the floor was slippery when wet. It also viewed a videotape showing 

the incident, including the conditions at the time and how Sumrall slipped and fell. 
11 

Based on all of the evidence, the addition of evidence that the floor was slippery as ice 

when wet would not likely have changed the jury's finding that Winco was not negligent. 

Accordingly, the trial court's error in excluding Stapleford's deposition testimony was not 

prejudicial under Watson. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Winco is entitled to costs on appeal. 

McDONALD, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

BENKE, Acting P. J. 

NARES, J.