United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

K.B., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

CITIZEN & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 

Laguna Niguel, CA, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 17-0277

Issued: March 16, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Daniel M. Goodkin, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On November 18, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an 

August 19, 2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 

501.3, the Board has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.

 

1

In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for legal 

or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. § 501.9(e). 

No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An attorney or 

representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject to fine or 

imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation.

2 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained an 

emotional condition in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY

On February 27, 2015 appellant, then a 59-year-old intelligence research specialist, filed 

an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2), alleging that, since 2008, he was subjected to a pattern 

of harassment by managers which caused him to develop a cardiac condition. He asserted that 

these actions against him that were unlawful, created a hostile work environment, and were 

retaliatory. Appellant first became aware of his condition and its relation to his federal 

employment on July 9, 2014. He stopped work on July 14, 2014.

In an October 23, 2014 declaration, appellant alleged that, in August 2008, he had

requested leave without pay (LWOP) for military service to attend inactive duty for training during 

a workweek, but he was improperly charged for 24 hours of annual leave. In Spring 2009, he was 

required to attend a six-week training course at a time when his mother had serious health 

conditions. Appellant was her primary caregiver and he requested an excuse from the March 

training, which was granted. He registered for the next training in May and requested a second 

excuse, but this was improperly denied by supervisors T.B. and D.L. Appellant alleged that his

managers had not informed him of his Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) rights. He also 

alleged that, on January 12, 2010 Deputy Director B.G. improperly issued a memorandum

charging him with two counts of misconduct. The first count related to his e-mail to headquarters 

and the second charge was for failure to sign a proposed notice of suspension from work on 

April 26, 2013 and for filing an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint.

Appellant noted being on FMLA-protected leave for most of July through August 2009 to 

care for his terminally-ill mother. He was approached by T.B. and was told that management had

noticed that he was using a considerable amount of leave, and that he may want to reconsider his 

priorities. On November 30, 2009 T.B. presented appellant with his 2010 performance work plan 

(PWP), and his performance plan and appraisal (PPA) which he refused to sign. On December 2, 

2009, appellant was called to meet with T.B. and D.L. when T.B. read aloud a memorandum that 

instructed him to sign the 2010 PWP or risk disciplinary action that included possible removal 

from employment. He believed D.L. and T.B. were directing him to commit an unlawful act by 

signing the PWP. 

Appellant asserted that, on December 4, 2012, D.L. learned that appellant did not complete 

a task that was assigned to him in November 2011 and exclaimed in the presence of at least two 

other supervisors, “You just didn’t like what you were told to do!” On December13, 2012 

appellant’s first supervisor, E.F., informed him that he no longer needed to communicate with the 

FBI on a case due to a personnel change. Appellant replied in a classified e-mail to the FBI 

informing them that someone else would coordinate with them in the future, and notified E.F. by 

unclassified e-mail. He alleged that E.F. called him to the office, and exclaimed in an angry voice 

“You violated a directive!” Appellant indicated that he spoke with T.B. at his office later the same 

day to clarify what he was demanding of him and while he was standing at the doorway of his 

office, T.B. shouted at him, “Out, out, OUT!!!” He alleged that on January 31, 2013 E.F. instructed 
3

him to perform some very basic tasks pertaining to a case, but appellant believed the tasks were 

more appropriate for lower level employees. In the early summer of 2013, appellant alleged that 

there were several officers who were loud and disruptive in the work section and he asked P.K., a 

supervisor, if he and another employee could be relocated to another area, but his request was 

denied. In October 2013, a section reorganization was initiated which moved appellant closer to 

the disruptive officers. Appellant protested, but the plan was implemented. 

Appellant alleged that on May 21, 2014 he was preparing an Intelligence Information 

Report (IIR) as instructed by P.K. before she departed on leave. T.B. told him not to do this and 

advised that he should be working on an Intelligence Assessment (IA) instead. When P.K. returned 

on May 27, 2014, she instructed him to complete the IA within 10 days. On May 30, 2014 

appellant explained that he could not guarantee that he would be able to complete the IA in 10 

days, especially since the IA was supported with an open national security investigation by Special 

Agent M.P. He noted that his doctor ordered him to be on medical leave for stress from June 8

to 16, 2014. On June 19, 2014 P.K. e-mailed appellant to complete the IA by June 20, 2014, which 

appellant indicated was impossible. On January 20, 2010 appellant filed an EEO complaint based 

on discrimination of sex, age, and retaliation for EEO conduct. 

On July 8, 2014 appellant was called to a meeting with D.L, E.F., and P.K. and was notified 

that he was making an unnamed person feel threatened and unsafe. They asked him to modify his 

behavior. On July 9, 2014 appellant requested an official investigation with the Office of Security 

and Integrity of the July 8, 2014 allegations made against him. He informed D.L., E.F., and P.K. 

of this request by e-mail. On July 11, 2014 appellant was escorted to D.L.’s office and was met 

by personnel security specialist and another investigator. He asserted that the investigator 

threatened that if he heard any more unfavorable information about him that he would be back and 

proceed to investigate. Appellant was not questioned or asked to give a statement on the conduct 

issues he raised, but only asked to change his own conduct. On July14, 2014 in a meeting with 

D.L. and E.F. he was told that he would be under E.F.’s direct supervision and his workstation 

would be moved to a different room. Appellant felt this would be a problem as E.F. had falsely 

accused him of misconduct in April 2013. He believed that the forced reassignment and being 

moved to another location were retaliatory acts which increased his stress. Appellant advised that

Dr. Margaret L. Rasouli, a Board-certified cardiologist, took him off work for six months due to 

his heart condition and he began taking LWOP under the FMLA on August 6, 2014. On 

September12, 2014 he received a proposed letter of reprimand (LOR) from the Deputy Director, 

dated September 8, 2014, which required a response within 15 days of receipt. 

Appellant also submitted medical evidence. Dr. Popak Firooznam, a Board-certified

family practitioner, saw appellant on June 8, 2014 for anxiety. He took appellant off work from 

June 9 to 13, 2014. On August 28, 2014 Dr. James Garvey, Board-certified in emergency 

medicine, reported appellant’s maltreatment from management. August 7, 2014 to February 6, 

2015 reports from Dr. Rasouli noted appellant’s treatment for a cardiac condition. She indicated 

that appellant had significant stress at work that contributed to a cardiac abnormality on July 9, 

2014 and that he would be off work. Dr. Seth Bricklin, a psychologist, saw appellant on 

February 12, 2015. He diagnosed adjustment disorder with anxiety as a direct result of his job. 

Dr. Bricklin opined that appellant was unable to perform his work duties at the employing 

establishment.
4

On May 11, 2015 OWCP asked appellant to submit additional evidence that included a 

detailed description of the employment incidents that contributed to his claimed illness. 

In a June 8, 2015 statement, appellant responded to OWCP’s questionnaire and 

summarized his EEO complaint noting that his reassignment with significantly different 

responsibilities was an adverse action. He asserted that his work assignments were inappropriate 

for his job series and the work assigned was less complex than appropriate for his grade. Appellant 

further noted that his work was evaluated inappropriately using a generic annual performance work 

plan and he was prevented from engaging in the full range of activities expected of his job series. 

He indicated that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued a summary 

decision on November 1, 2013 without a hearing and determined that he failed to provide 

compelling evidence indicating discrimination as the basis of management’s actions.

Appellant also submitted documents pertaining to EEO and grievance matters. This 

included an April 26, 2013 notice of proposed suspension for two days for failure to follow 

supervisory instructions and disrespectful conduct. On May 21, 2013 appellant disputed the 

proposal because his supervisors assigned him tasks without due dates and he made progress on 

them within reasonable periods of time. He advised that his outburst at E.F. was provoked and 

was the product of an extended period in which he felt harassed. On August 8, 2013 D.C., a deputy 

director of the employing establishment, sustained the charges against appellant, but reduced the 

proposed suspension to an LOR. On September 20, 2013 appellant grieved the LOR. On 

October 8, 2013 K.B., the center director for the employing establishment, denied appellant’s 

grievance regarding his LOR. She noted that if his supervisor’s instructions were inappropriate he 

should have discussed it with the supervisor and, if not satisfactory, reported it to the chain of 

command. Regarding appellant’s allegations that his disrespectful conduct was provoked, the 

director asserted that, regardless, appellant’s statement was disrespectful. She noted that the 

reprimand was the lowest form of discipline and was not permanent. On April 18, 2014 K.B. 

reconsidered the matter and withdrew the LOR after having several meetings with appellant. She 

advised that she did not condone any behavior that involved disrespectful conduct or a failure to 

follow instructions.

Appellant submitted a January 12, 2010 EEO complaint, which alleged that the employing 

establishment discriminated against him based on age and sex. He submitted the November 1, 

2013 EEOC decision which granted the employing establishment’s motion for summary judgment

as appellant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the employing 

establishment discriminated against him on the basis of his age, sex, and/or EEO activity.3

By decision dated August 25, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that the 

evidence of record was insufficient to establish that his claimed condition was sustained in the

performance of duty.

 

3 On September 9, 2013 the U.S. Office of Special Counsel advised appellant that it made a preliminary 

determination to close its inquiry into appellant’s allegations of retaliatory conduct by the employing establishment.
5

On August 31, 2015 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. He contended

that appellant implicated activities that involved performing regular or specially assigned work 

duties. On November 20, 2015 OWCP denied modification of its August 25, 2015 decision.

On January 19, 2016 counsel requested reconsideration. He reiterated prior allegations and 

submitted additional evidence. Evidence submitted included several e-mails. On May 27, 2014 

P.K. wrote, “Please plan to complete the IA template conversion within two weeks, which would 

be by June 10, 2014. I want you to email me and Elliott halfway, 5 days in on June 3, 2014 to let 

us know your progress (as I will be on leave but will be checking my emails).... I want you to make 

it a goal to complete one LIR a week on the Fl schools, beginning June 10, 2014, ... if need be as 

J.M. can takeover during this time and assist with the FBI in working these cases for the time 

needed to complete the IA conversion....” Appellant responded on May 30, 2014, stating “There

is no way I can guarantee to you, or Elliott, that I will be able to complete an Intelligence 

Assessment (IA) in any period of time, especially less than two weeks.... I wish I could give you 

assurances on precise timelines for completing finished intelligence products, but that is neither 

possible, nor practical.”

Appellant submitted a notice from the employing establishment dated June 2, 2014, which 

indicated that he was due for reinvestigation for his continued employment with the employing 

establishment, which was required of all employees every five years. The notice indicated that 

appellant would need to complete the security paperwork and coordinate with his supervisor 

regarding the use of duty hours to comply with this requirement.

Appellant provided e-mails from his supervisor pertaining to the reinvestigation. On 

June 3, 2014 E.F. noted, “I am following up on [T.B.’s] email and want to reiterate that you are 

authorized a reasonable amount of time necessary to complete your SF-56 through e-OIP. Please 

note completing the e-QIP is not an excuse for missing mission deadlines previously received from 

PJ. These deadlines will not be moved again.” Appellant responded on June 4, 2014 “I’ll try my 

best, as always, but I make no guarantees about completing intelligence reports by artificial 

deadlines. The e-Qip will take several hours, probably a couple of days given my extensive 

USAFR history....” On June 19, 2014 P.K. indicated, “l am ordering that you complete the IA 

report by COB 6/20/2014, as the original deadline was for June 10, 2014.... Due to your 

background investigation and your request to take one day off to work on your background 

investigation, the deadline was then pushed back by one additional day, and then later the 

following week you were out sick the entire week of June 9 -- 13, 2014, and as such I gave you an 

additional 3 days setting the deadline to June 18, 2014. Shortly after returning to work on June 16, 

2014, you found new research material consisting of 601 pages and as such I gave you an additional 

day and set the deadline to complete this IA report on June 19, 2014. Your OPM investigator 

called you and interviewed you for six hours on 6/19/2014, and as such you missed the 6/19/2014 

deadline, so I am now requesting that you complete this report by COB 6/20/2014.” Appellant 

responded on June 20, 2014 stating, “I cannot do the impossible. If you feel that this report should 

be completed by COB today, then you or Elliott need to show me how to accomplish a finished 

intelligence report by a date certain. There is simply no factual basis for making this a 

requirement.... I will not compromise the quality of intelligence in a finished intelligence product 

simply to meet an arbitrary deadline that has no operational, or otherwise rational, requirement.”
6

Appellant submitted a June 4, 2010 affidavit from coworker S.K., who indicated that she 

heard from a lot of the intelligence research specialists that they were unhappy with their standards. 

With regard to the use of time-based quotas, she indicated that some other regions were using the 

same system. S.K. indicated that D.L. used the time-based quota system, but D.L. did not have 

any experience working with intelligence research work and set unrealistic standards for 

completing intelligence research.

By decision dated August 19, 2016, OWCP denied modification of its November 20, 2015 

decision.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit 

the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an emotional or psychiatric 

disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused 

or contributed to the condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that the 

identified compensable employment factors are causally related to the emotional condition.4

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

5

the Board explained 

that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or illness has some 

connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within coverage under FECA.6 

When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment duties and 

the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of 

employment. This is true when the employee’s disability results from his or her emotional reaction 

to a special assignment or other requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the 

nature of the work.7 Allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for 

an emotional condition claim.8 

Where the claimant alleges compensable factors of employment, he or she must 

substantiate such allegations with probative and reliable evidence.9 Personal perceptions alone are 

 

4 George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004).

5 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

6 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999). 

7 Lillian Cutler, supra note 5.

8

J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008). 

9 M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007). 
7

insufficient to establish an employment-related emotional condition.10 On the other hand, the 

disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force, or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment, or 

to hold a particular position.11

ANALYSIS

Appellant alleged that he sustained an emotional condition due to a number of employment 

interactions and conditions. OWCP denied his emotional condition claim because he failed to 

establish any compensable employment factors. The Board must initially review whether these 

alleged incidents and conditions of employment are covered employment factors under the terms 

of FECA. 

Appellant has attributed his emotional condition to performing his regular or specially 

assigned duties of his position. He alleged that his workload was excessive and he was required 

to perform work within unrealistic timeframes. Appellant alleged that on May 27, 2014 his 

supervisor instructed him to complete the IA report within 10 days. On May 30, 2014 he explained 

that he could not guarantee that he would complete the IA in 10 days, especially since the IA was 

supported with an open national security investigation by a special agent. Appellant asserted that 

he was ordered by his doctor to be on medical leave for a week due to stress at work from June 8

to 16, 2014. On June 19, 2014P.K. e-mailed appellant to complete the same IA by June 20, 2014 

and he responded that he could not do the impossible. However, appellant provided insufficient 

corroborating evidence to establish that he was overworked or sufficiently explain why his reaction 

was to his assigned duties instead of a disagreement with his supervisor over the assignment of 

duties.

12

 There is no evidence to support appellant’s general allegation of overwork. Appellant

submitted an affidavit from a coworker, S.K., who noted other regions used the time-based quota 

system. S.K. indicated that D.L. used the time-based quota system and set unrealistic standards 

for completing intelligence research. This general statement from a coworker is insufficient to 

establish that appellant was overworked and required to perform work within unrealistic 

timeframes. There is no evidence that the employing establishment directed him to work within 

unrealistic timeframes. Rather, the record reveals that P.K. accommodated appellant by granting

him several extensions to complete the IA report. In an e-mail dated June 19, 2014, P.K. advised 

that the original deadline was for June 10, 2014 and, due to a background investigation, appellant’s

request to take one day off to work on the background investigation, his use of sick leave from 

June 9 to 13, 2014, and an OPM investigator telephone interview for six hours June 19, 2014, the 

deadline was moved to June 20, 2014. Thus, to the extent that appellant alleged overwork,13 or 

 

10 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001). 

11 See Lillian Cutler, supra note 5.

12 See infra, notes 17, 18, and accompanying text, for discussion on administrative matters and work assignments.

13 The Board has held that overwork, as substantiated by sufficient factual information to support the claimant’s 

account of events, may be a compensable factor of employment. Bobbie D. Daly, 53 ECAB 691 (2002). 
8

unrealistic deadlines,14 this is not established by the evidence of record. Furthermore, he did not 

otherwise sufficiently attribute his emotional condition to performing a specific regular or 

specially assigned duty in his job. Therefore, appellant has not established a compensable factor 

under Cutler.

15

Appellant made several allegations related to administrative and personnel actions. In 

Thomas D. McEuen,

16 the Board held that an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative 

actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA as 

such matters pertain to procedures and requirements of the employer and do not bear a direct 

relation to the work required of the employee. The Board noted, however, that coverage under 

FECA would attach if the factual circumstances surrounding the administrative or personnel action 

established error or abuse by the employing establishment superiors in dealing with the claimant. 

Absent evidence of such error or abuse, the resulting emotional condition must be considered selfgenerated and not employment generated. In determining whether the employing establishment 

erred or acted abusively, the Board has examined whether the employing establishment acted 

reasonably.17

Appellant alleged that, in August 2008, he requested LWOP for military service for 

inactive duty training during a workweek, but he was improperly charged with 24 hours of annual 

leave. Similarly, in spring 2009, he requested to be excused from a six-week training course 

because his mother had serious health conditions and he was her primary caregiver. Appellant was 

excused from the March training, but his second request to be excused was denied. He further 

alleged that his employing establishment failed to inform him of his rights under FMLA. The 

Board notes that the handling of leave requests and attendance matters are generally related to the 

employment, they are administrative functions of the employing establishment and not duties of 

the employee.18 The Board finds that the employing establishment acted reasonably in this

administrative matter. The factual evidence does not substantiate that the employing establishment 

unreasonably denied appellant leave. Appellant did not provide any corroborating evidence to 

substantiate that the employing establishment acted unreasonably in this matter.

Appellant asserted that he was improperly disciplined by the employing establishment on 

January 12, 2010 for misconduct related to his e-mail communication to headquarters, for a

proposed suspension from work in 2013, which was later reduced to a proposed LOR on

September 8, 2014, which was later withdrawn. Allegations of improper discipline relate to 

 

14 The Board has held that emotional reactions to situations in which an employee is trying to meet his or her 

position requirements are compensable. The Board, citing the principles of Cutler, listed employment factors which 

would be covered under FECA, including an unusually heavy workload and imposition of unreasonable deadlines; 

see Georgia F. Kennedy, 35 ECAB 1151, 1155 (1984); Joseph A. Antal, 34 ECAB 608, 612 (1983). .

15 Supra note 5. 

16 See Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991).

17 See Richard J. Dube, 42 ECAB 916, 920 (1991).

18 See Judy Kahn, 53 ECAB 321 (2002).
9

administrative or personnel matters unrelated to his regular or specially assigned duties and does 

not fall within the coverage of FECA.19 Although the handling of disciplinary actions and 

evaluations are generally related to the employment, they are administrative functions of the 

employing establishment, and not duties of the employee.20 The record, as noted above, fails to 

establish that appellant was improperly disciplined. To the extent that appellant is complaining 

about the manner in which a supervisor performs his duties as a supervisor or the manner in which 

a supervisor exercises his supervisory discretion fall, as a rule, is outside the scope of coverage 

provided by FECA. As noted, a supervisor or manager in general must be allowed to perform his 

or her duties and mere disagreement or dislike of a supervisory or management’s action will not 

be actionable, absent evidence of error or abuse.21 The Board also notes that the fact that the

proposed suspension and the LOR, which were withdrawn does not establish error by the 

employing establishment.

22

 Here, appellant did not submit any evidence establishing that the 

employing establishment erred in these matters. The Board finds that appellant has not offered 

sufficient evidence to establish error or abuse and the evidence does not establish that the 

employing establishment acted unreasonably in these matters. 

Appellant alleged that on November 30, 2009 T.B. presented his 2010 PWP and PPA and 

instructed him to sign the 2010 PWP or risk disciplinary action. He felt that D.L. and T.B. were 

directing him to commit an unlawful act. However, it is not factually substantiated that the 

employing establishment forced appellant to sign a document on November 30, 2009. No further 

evidence was presented to corroborate these allegations. Furthermore, the handling of evaluations 

is an administrative function of the employing establishment and not a duty of the employee.23 

Appellant has not shown that the employing establishment erred in the matter and established a 

compensable employment factor in this matter.

Appellant alleged that assignment of work by his supervisors and unrealistic deadlines 

caused stress. On January 31, 2013 E.F. instructed him to perform very basic tasks that appellant 

believed were more appropriate for lower level employees. Appellant noted that on May 21, 2014 

he was working on an Intelligence Information Report, T.B. told him that he should be working 

on an IA. On May 27, 2014 P.K. instructed him to complete the IA within 10 days and then 

extended the deadline until June 20, 2014. The Board notes that the assignment of work is an 

administrative function17 and the manner in which a supervisor exercises his or her discretion falls 

outside the ambit of FECA. Absent evidence of error or abuse, appellant’s mere disagreement or 

dislike of a managerial action is not compensable. The Board has also held that an employee’s 

dissatisfaction with performing duties for which he or she feels overqualified or holding a position 

 

19 See Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996); Jimmy Gilbreath, 44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 

ECAB 581, 588 (1990); Joseph C. DeDonato, 39 ECAB 1260, 1266-67 (1988).

20 Id.

21 See Marguerite J. Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001). 

22 C.T., Docket No. 08-2160 (issued May 7, 2009) (the mere fact that personnel actions are later modified or 

rescinded does not, in and of itself, establish error or abuse). 

23 C.S., 58 ECAB 137 (2006).
10

which he or she feels to be unchallenging or uninteresting is not compensable under FECA.24 The 

Board finds that appellant has not offered sufficient evidence to establish error or abuse regarding 

his work assignments. The evidence does not establish that the employing establishment acted 

unreasonably. The record reveals that P.K. accommodated appellant granting him several 

extensions to complete the IA report, noting that the deadline was extended from June 10 

to 20, 2014. The employing establishment has either denied appellant’s allegations or explained 

the reasons for its actions in these administrative matters. Appellant has presented no 

corroborating evidence to support that the employing establishment acted unreasonably. 

Appellant also implicated the location of his worksite as a cause of his stress. In 2013, he

alleged loud and disruptive employees in his work section, but his request to be relocated to another 

was denied, and he was later relocated closer to the disruptive employees. On July 14, 2014 

appellant was called into a meeting with D.L. and E.F. and was informed that he would be under 

E.F.’s direct supervision and his workstation would be moved. He believed that working under 

E.F. would be a problem because he initiated prior false accusations of misconduct against him in 

April 2013. Appellant further indicated that forced reassignment of a supervisor and movement

to another work location away from his colleagues was retaliatory and added to his work-related 

stress. To the extent that appellant has alleged that the change in the location of his workstation

constituted punishment or was inconvenient this, would be analogous to emotional frustration in 

not being allowed to work in a particular environment. It is well established that when disability 

results from an employee’s frustration over not being permitted to work in a particular 

environment, to hold a particular position, or to secure a promotion, such disability does not arise 

in the performance of duty.25 Appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish that the 

administrative change in the location of his work location constituted administrative error or abuse 

by the employing establishment’s management.26 Thus, appellant has not established a 

compensable employment factor under FECA with respect to his work location. 

Appellant alleged that he was harassed, screamed at, and humiliated by his supervisors and 

threatened with an investigation. To the extent that incidents alleged as constituting harassment 

or a hostile environment by a supervisor are established as occurring and arising from appellant’s 

performance of his regular duties, these could constitute employment factors.27 However, for 

harassment to give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there must be evidence that 

harassment did in fact occur. Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.28 

Appellant alleged that on December 4, 2012 D.L. learned that appellant did not complete a task 

 

24 See Purvis Nettles, 44 ECAB 623, 628 (1993).

25 See C.O., Docket No. 09-0217 (issued October 21, 2009); see also Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004) 

(denials by an employing establishment of a request for a different job, promotion, or transfer are not compensable 

factors of employment under FECA, as they do not involve a claimant’s ability to perform his or her regular or 

specially assigned work duties, but rather constitute a desire to work in a different position). 

26 T.H., Docket No. 16-1164 (issued February 24, 2017).

27 David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991).

28 Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991). See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a 

claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence).
11

that was assigned to him in November 2011 and exclaimed in the presence of at least two other 

supervisors, “You just didn’t like what you were told to do!.” He alleged that on December13, 

2012 E.F. called him to the office, and angrily exclaimed, “You violated a directive!” Similarly, 

appellant alleged that later the same day and while he was standing at the doorway of his office, 

T.B. shouted at him, “Out, out, OUT!!!” On July 8, 2014 he was called to a meeting with D.L, 

E.F., and P.K. and was notified that he was making an unnamed person feel threatened and unsafe, 

and they asked him to modify his behavior. Appellant alleged that on July11, 2014 he was escorted 

to D.L.’s office and was met by personnel security specialist and another investigator who 

threatened that if he heard any more unfavorable information about him that he would be back and 

proceed to investigate. The evidence of record fails to support appellant’s claim for harassment as 

a cause for his emotional condition. General allegations of harassment are insufficient29 and in 

this case appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to establish disparate treatment by his 

supervisor.30 Although he alleged that his supervisor harassed and engaged in actions, which he 

believed constituted harassment, appellant provided no corroborating evidence to establish his 

allegations.31 The factual evidence fails to support appellant’s claim that he was harassed or 

discriminated against in these matters.

The record also indicates that appellant filed grievances and EEO complaints alleging 

discrimination and unfair treatment. However, grievances and EEO complaints, by themselves, 

do not establish that workplace harassment or unfair treatment occurred.32 In this case, the granted 

summary judgement finding that appellant had not established by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the employing establishment discriminated against him on the basis of his age, sex, and/or 

EEO activity in the present case. As noted, a grievance regarding a proposed suspension, later 

reduced to a LOR, resulted in eventual withdrawal of the LOR. However, the documents 

associated with this matter do not make a finding that the employing establishment erred.33 None

of the evidence from these matters establishes improper action by the employing establishment. 

Thus, the evidence regarding the EEO grievance matters does not establish compensable 

harassment by the employing establishment.

Appellant alleged that his supervisors threatened, yelled, and verbally abused him. The 

Board has recognized the compensability of verbal abuse and threats in certain circumstances. This 

does not imply, however, that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage 

under FECA.34 The Board finds that the evidence does not establish any specific incidents of 

compensable verbal abuse or threats. Appellant provided no corroborating evidence to establish 

 

29 See Paul Trotman-Hall, 45 ECAB 229 (1993).

30 See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a claimant must substantiate allegations of 

harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence).

31 See William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159 (1992).

32 James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000).

33 See supra note 22.

34 See Leroy Thomas, III, 46 ECAB 946, 954 (1995); Alton L. White, 42 ECAB 666, 669-70 (1991).
12

any specific incidents. As noted, he alleged that T.B. told him that he might want to reconsider 

his priorities in view of his leave use. Appellant also, as noted, asserted that D.L., E.F., and T.B. 

either shouted at him or spoke to him disparagingly. The Board finds that the facts of the case do 

not sufficiently support any specific incidents of verbal abuse. Appellant provided no 

corroborating evidence to establish any specific incidents.35 Thus, these allegations do not rise to 

the level of a compensable employment factor.36

Consequently, appellant has not established his claim for an emotional condition as he has 

not attributed his claimed condition to any compensable employment factors.37

On appeal appellant, through counsel, reiterates his allegations, asserting that he has 

established his emotional condition claim. As explained, the Board finds that appellant has not 

established his claim for an emotional condition as he has not established any compensable 

employment factors. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant failed to meet his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

 

35 See William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159, 1167 (1992) (claimed employment incidents not established where 

appellant did not submit evidence substantiating that such incidents actually occurred).

36 See Judy L. Kahn, supra note 18.

37 As appellant has not established any compensable employment factors, the Board need not consider the medical 

evidence of record. See Margaret S. Kryzcki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).
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ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 19, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: March 16, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board