IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

August 9, 2022 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEFFREY LLOYD LOCKE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Warren County

No. 19-CR-2238 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

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No. M2021-01437-CCA-R3-CD

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The Defendant, Jeffrey Lloyd Locke, was convicted in the Warren County Circuit Court 

of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle and received a three-year sentence to be served 

as one hundred days in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant 

contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because the proof does 

not show that his attempted arrest was lawful and that he is entitled to a new trial due to 

prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s rebuttal closing argument. Based upon the oral 

arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.

HOLLOWAY,JR., AND JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Kendall Stivers Jones, Assistant Public Defender-Appellate Division (on appeal), Franklin, 

Tennessee, and John Partin and Rick Stacy (at trial), McMinnville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Jeffrey Lloyd Locke.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Lisa S. Zavogiannis, District Attorney General; and Felicia Walkup,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

In May 2019, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count 

of evading arrest in a motor vehicle while creating a risk of death or injury to innocent 

bystanders, a Class D felony. The Defendant proceeded to trial in April 2021.
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At trial, Lieutenant Paul Springer of the McMinnville Police Department testified 

that on the night of March 14, 2019, he was on patrol in a marked police car when he

learned about a be-on-the-lookout (“BOLO”) for a white Ford Ranger pickup truck. The 

BOLO specifically named the Defendant and said the truck was “probably headed toward 

the Rock Island area.” Lieutenant Springer hoped to find the truck before it left the city 

limits and “began to pick a path of travel” that would lead him to the vehicle. He ended 

up traveling “outbound” on Highway 70S, where he encountered a white Ford Ranger. He

began following the Ranger and radioed the truck’s license plate number to dispatch, which 

confirmed that the Ranger was registered to the Defendant. Lieutenant Springer activated 

his blue lights and siren to stop the vehicle. He said that by that time, he and the Ranger

were “not that far outside the city limits.” 

Lieutenant Springer testified that the Ranger’s yellow hazard lights began flashing

and that the vehicle accelerated. Lieutenant Springer pursued the truck, and their speeds 

reached more than one hundred miles per hour when the posted speed limit on Highway 

70S was fifty-five or sixty miles per hour. Other vehicles also were on the roadway, and 

one vehicle moved into the emergency lane. Lieutenant Springer said that it was “slightly 

raining” and that he tried to maintain visual contact with the truck without getting too close 

to the vehicle. When the truck got to the Rock Island area, it turned left onto Friendship 

Drive. At that point, Lieutenant Springer had been pursuing the Ranger for more than five 

minutes. 

Lieutenant Springer testified that Friendship Drive was a residential area and that 

he lost sight of the truck. He began looking for it, and several officers from the highway 

patrol and the Warren County Sheriff’s Department (“WCSD”) joined in the search. 

Lieutenant Springer later received a call that Sergeant Danny Farrell of the WCSD had 

located the truck behind a home on Friendship Drive, so Lieutenant Springer went to the 

residence. The Defendant came outside and admitted to driving the vehicle. The white 

Ford Ranger was parked behind the house, and Lieutenant Springer arrested the Defendant.

Lieutenant Springer acknowledged that his patrol car was equipped with a video 

camera and that his camera recorded his pursuit of the Defendant. The State played the 

video for the jury. Lieutenant Springer acknowledged that the date displayed on the video 

was March 14, 2000, which was the incorrect year.

On cross-examination, Lieutenant Springer acknowledged that he did not have a 

warrant for the Defendant’s arrest when he first encountered the white Ford Ranger. He 

also acknowledged that the truck’s hazard lights began flashing immediately before he 

activated his patrol car’s lights and siren and that he and the Defendant were outside the 

McMinnville city limits at that time. When the Defendant got to the Rock Island area, he 

turned off his hazard lights, gave a left turn signal, and turned left onto Friendship Drive. 
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Lieutenant Springer followed the Defendant but lost sight of the Ranger on Friendship

Drive. Lieutenant Springer learned Sergeant Farrell had found the Ranger behind a home 

on Friendship Drive, and Lieutenant Springer went to the residence. Other officers were 

present and were waiting for the Defendant to come outside. Lieutenant Springer

acknowledged that no charges were ever filed against the Defendant for anything that 

occurred prior to Lieutenant Springer’s initiating the stop.

Sergeant Danny Farrell of the WCSD testified that he was dispatched to assist with 

Lieutenant Springer’s pursuit of the white Ford Ranger but that Lieutenant Springer

“advised that he terminated the pursuit because he had lost the vehicle.” Sergeant Farrell 

turned onto Second Street near Friendship Drive and noticed a white Ford Ranger behind 

a house. The Ranger’s parking lights were on, so Sergeant Farrell pulled up behind the 

vehicle and confirmed that the license tag number on the Ranger matched the license tag

number on the Ranger in Lieutenant Springer’s pursuit. Sergeant Farrell approached the 

truck and noticed that the windshield wipers were “still going” and that the ignition was 

“still on.” A woman was staring at him from a window of the house and asked him, “‘How 

can I help you?’” Sergeant Farrell told her that he needed to speak with the driver of the 

vehicle, and she responded, “‘My son has had an accident. He’s messed himself. He’s in 

the bathroom. I will have him come out the bottom door, and he will meet you down 

there.’” Sergeant Farrell “walked down,” and the Defendant came outside. Sergeant 

Farrell asked the Defendant why he did not stop, and the Defendant said he did not see the 

blue lights. Lieutenant Springer, who had arrived on the scene, arrested the Defendant. At 

the conclusion of Sergeant Farrell’s testimony, the State rested its case-in-chief. 

Anita Mayfield testified for the Defendant that she was a deputy clerk for the circuit 

court clerk’s office and that she was responsible for keeping records in the general sessions, 

circuit, and juvenile courts. At defense counsel’s request, Ms. Mayfield searched for 

records related to any charges filed against the Defendant for incidents that occurred on 

March 14, 2019. Ms. Mayfield found two general sessions warrants charging the 

Defendant with evading arrest and reckless endangerment, and defense counsel introduced 

those warrants into evidence. Ms. Mayfield said that no other charges were filed against 

the Defendant and that the grand jury later indicted him for only one count of evading 

arrest. 

Lieutenant Springer testified on rebuttal for the State that while he was searching 

for the Defendant pursuant to the BOLO, a separate investigation involving the Defendant 

was occurring. That separate investigation related to an incident on Main Street and 

involved the reason for the BOLO. Lieutenant Springer did not participate in that 

investigation, and his only in involvement in that case was to try to intercept the 

Defendant’s Ranger. On cross-examination, Lieutenant Springer testified that he did not 

know what happened on Main Street. 
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At the conclusion of Lieutenant Springer’s testimony, the State rested its case. 

During defense counsel’s closing argument, he asserted that the Defendant’s attempted 

arrest was unlawful because Lieutenant Springer activated his blue lights “just outside” the 

McMinnville city limits and because Lieutenant Springer did not have probable cause to 

believe that the Defendant had committed an offense. Defense counsel then read to the 

jury the eleven situations set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-7-103(a) in 

which an officer can arrest a person without a warrant and argued that none of them applied 

in this case. During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded to 

defense counsel’s arguments by reading aloud Tennessee Code Annotated section 6-54-

301, which extends “[t]he police authority of all incorporated towns and cities” one mile 

beyond “the lawful corporate limits thereof,” and by asserting that the Defendant’s arrest 

was lawful because an ongoing investigation of the Defendant was occurring when 

Lieutenant Springer activated his blue lights.

During jury deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking, “‘Officer did not have a 

warrant. So we need to know why by law he was following him and doing a stop.”’ The 

trial court sent back a written response, stating, “‘The facts are to be determined by you 

according to what you heard and believe during the trial. I cannot expound on the facts or 

someone’s reasoning.’” Shortly thereafter, the jury sent out a second note, asking, “‘Can 

we get a copy of the exceptions presented by the closing statement of the defendant pulling 

over without a warrant?’” The trial court sent back a second written response, stating, 

“‘Both parties talked about other Tennessee laws during closing arguments. You may 

consider them, but I cannot give you a copy of them because they were not introduced into 

evidence.”’ About ten minutes later, the jury returned to the courtroom and found the 

Defendant guilty as charged in the indictment of evading arrest in a motor vehicle while 

creating a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders, a Class D felony. After a 

sentencing hearing, he received a three-year sentence to be served as one hundred days in 

jail followed by supervised probation.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction 

because no rational trier of fact could have concluded that his attempted arrest was lawful. 

In support of his claim, he notes that the jury did not hear any proof as to why the BOLO 

was broadcast, how much time elapsed between the BOLO and Lieutenant Springer’s 

encountering the white Ford Ranger, and whether Lieutenant Springer even had 

jurisdiction for the stop because the officer was outside the city limits when he activated 

his blue lights. The State argues that the evidence is sufficient. We agree with the State.
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When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the relevant question 

of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also

Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or 

jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of 

fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).

Therefore, on appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. See State v. Williams, 

657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, 

the weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the 

trier of fact. See State v. Pruett, 788 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990). “A jury conviction 

removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is initially cloaked and 

replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant has the burden of 

demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 

(Tenn. 1982).

The guilt of a defendant, including any fact required to be proven, may be predicated 

upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and 

circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1999). The standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same whether 

the conviction is based on direct or circumstantial evidence or a combination of the two. 

See State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011).

As charged in this case, Class D felony evading arrest occurs when any person, 

while operating a motor vehicle on any street, road, alley, or highway in this state, 

intentionally flees or attempts to elude any law enforcement officer, after having received 

any signal from the officer to stop the vehicle, and the flight or attempt to elude creates a 

risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders, pursuing law enforcement officers, or other 

third parties. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(1), (d)(2)(A). It is a statutory defense to 

prosecution for felony evading arrest that the attempted arrest was unlawful. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 39-16-603(b)(2). When a general defense is fairly raised by the proof, the trial court 

must submit the defense to the jury, and the burden shifts to the State to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 403 

(Tenn. 2017). In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that an unlawful arrest was a 

statutory defense to the charge of evading arrest. 

“Generally, challenges to the constitutional validity of a stop, based upon a lack of 

probable cause or reasonable suspicion, are made prior to trial by a motion to suppress.” 
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State v. Darrin Bonner, No. W2007-02409-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1905420, at *6 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. July 2, 2009) (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2)). The Defendant did not file 

such a motion in this case and is relying entirely upon the statutory defense provided by 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603(b)(2). See id.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 

7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. “These constitutional 

provisions are designed to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 

arbitrary invasions of government officials.’” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 

1998) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)). A search or seizure 

conducted without a warrant is presumed unreasonable, and evidence obtained as a result 

will be suppressed “unless the prosecution demonstrates by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant 

requirement.” Id. (citations omitted).

An exception to the warrant requirement exists when an officer has either probable 

cause or reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts that a criminal 

offense has been or is about to be committed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State 

v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tenn. 2000). “Whether probable cause is present depends 

upon whether the facts and circumstances and reliable information known to the police 

officer at the time of the arrest ‘were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that 

the [individual] had committed an offense.’” State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 

1997) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). “Reasonable suspicion” for a 

detention, which is less demanding than probable cause, is “a particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity.” State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 

215, 218 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). “The 

specific and articulable facts must be judged by an objective standard, not the subjective 

beliefs of the officer making the stop.” State v. Norword, 938 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1996) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).

The Defendant asserts that the facts in this case are “almost identical” to the facts in 

State v. Roy Ernest Russell, No. E2006-00410-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1559247 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. May 31, 2007). In that case, the defendant pled guilty to driving under the 

influence, fourth offense, but reserved a certified question of law as to whether his traffic 

stop was lawful. Roy Ernest Russell, 2007 WL 1559247, at *1. At the defendant’s 

suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that he received a BOLO for the 

defendant’s truck about 6:25 p.m. Id. Minutes later, the officer observed the truck, stopped 

the defendant, and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Id. About two and one-half 

hours prior to the issuance of the BOLO, the same officer had responded to a call at a 

residence and had talked with witnesses who claimed to have seen the defendant possibly 
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driving intoxicated at 10:30 a.m. Id. In determining whether the officer had reasonable 

suspicion to stop the defendant, this court stated that the BOLO was of “no value” in this 

court’s analysis because the officer’s testimony was “devoid of any information regarding 

the nature of the BOLO, the complaint behind the BOLO, the complaining party, or the 

location of the residence in relationship to the defendant’s location.” Id. at *2. This court 

also stated that the information the officer received about the defendant driving under the 

influence at 10:30 a.m. was “stale” by the time the officer stopped and arrested the 

defendant eight hours later. Id. Therefore, this court concluded that the officer did not 

have reasonable suspicion for the stop, reversed the defendant’s conviction, and dismissed 

his case. Id.

The State claims that this case is distinguishable from Roy Ernest Russell because

the issue in this case is sufficiency of the evidence, which employs a different standard of 

review than suppression of the evidence, and because the facts of this case are “markedly 

different” from the facts in Roy Ernest Russell. While we think this court’s analysis in Roy 

Ernest Russell is helpful to our review of the sufficiency issue in this case, we agree with 

the State that the facts in this case are distinguishable. 

Unlike the arresting officer in Roy Ernest Russell, Lieutenant Springer testified on 

direct examination that the BOLO included a description of the vehicle, the Defendant’s 

name, and the direction in which the vehicle was traveling. Lieutenant Springer said that 

he went to the area where he thought he might encounter the vehicle and that he spotted a

vehicle that matched the description of the vehicle in the BOLO. He then verified with

dispatch that the tag number on the vehicle he was following matched the tag number on

the vehicle in the BOLO. In his rebuttal testimony, Lieutenant Springer acknowledged that 

the BOLO related to an investigation on Main Street involving the Defendant and that the 

investigation was occurring while Lieutenant Springer was looking for the vehicle. 

Although Lieutenant Springer did not testify about the specific reason for the BOLO or the 

amount of time that elapsed between the issuance of the BOLO and his seeing the vehicle 

on Highway 70S, the Defendant introduced into evidence the general sessions warrants 

issued in this case, which included Lieutenant Springer’s affidavits of complaint. 

According to those affidavits, the BOLO related to a “physical domestic” that had occurred 

at Beersheba Towers about 8:53 p.m. The video from Lieutenant Springer’s patrol car, 

which the State played for the jury, showed that he turned on his emergency equipment to 

stop the Defendant just eleven minutes later at 9:04 p.m.

Moreover, Lieutenant Springer testified that “the onset of my blue lights happened 

somewhere . . . in between the city limits and VFW that’s Wild Bill’s now. So not that far 

outside the city limits.” On cross-examination, defense counsel replayed the video from 

Lieutenant Springer’s patrol car, and Lieutenant Springer pointed out the approximate 

location in the video where the city limits ended. The video showed that shortly thereafter, 
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Lieutenant Springer turned on his blue lights. Thus, we conclude that a reasonable jury 

could have determined that the officer had reasonable suspicion and jurisdiction to stop the 

Defendant and, therefore, that the jury could have rejected his statutory defense. 

Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of felony evading arrest. 

II. State’s Improper Closing Arguments

The Defendant claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor made 

an improper “golden rule argument” during the State’s rebuttal closing argument. The 

State argues that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. We agree with the State. 

During the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, she stated, “I asked you folks in 

jury selection if any of you traveled in front of the mall area out Highway 70 towards Rock 

Island. Every single one of you raised your hand. You’ve traveled that road. So this 

should be important to you.” Defense counsel objected and stated, “That’s Golden Rule 

argument. That’s very inappropriate.” The trial court sustained the objection and told the 

jury, “Please disregard the last statement.” 

It is well-established that closing argument is an important tool for both parties 

during a trial; thus, counsel is generally given wide latitude during closing argument, and 

the trial court is granted wide discretion in controlling closing arguments. See State v. 

Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 577-78 (Tenn. 2000) (appendix). “Notwithstanding such, 

arguments must be temperate, based upon the evidence introduced at trial, relevant to the 

issues being tried, and not otherwise improper under the facts or law.” State v. Goltz, 111 

S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003).

In Goltz, this court outlined “five general areas of prosecutorial misconduct” that 

can occur during closing argument: (1) intentionally misleading or misstating the 

evidence; (2) expressing a personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of the evidence 

or defendant’s guilt; (3) making statements calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices 

of the jury; (4) injecting broader issues than the guilt or innocence of the accused; and (5) 

intentionally referring to or arguing facts outside the record that are not matters of common 

public knowledge. Id. at 6.

“In determining whether statements made in closing argument constitute reversible 

error, it is necessary to determine whether the statements were improper and, if so, whether 

the impropriety affected the verdict.” State v. Pulliam, 950 S.W.2d 360, 367 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1996). This court has listed the following factors to be considered when determining 

whether the improper argument of a prosecutor affected the verdict to the prejudice of the 

defendant:
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1. The conduct complained of viewed in context and in light of the facts and 

circumstances of the case.

2. The curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution.

3. The intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement.

4. The cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the 

record.

5. The relative strength or weakness of the case.

Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).

The “golden rule argument” suggests to jurors that they place themselves in the 

position of the defendant or the victim. See Ashdji v. Yardley, No. 1188, 1988 WL 116498, 

at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1988). Such argument is “usually improper, and reversibly 

erroneous.” Id. The Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s comment that “this should 

be important to you” violated the golden rule argument because it implied that the jurors 

had a duty, as fellow drivers on Highway 70S, to ensure that reckless drivers were brought 

to justice and to make the road a safer place. The Defendant asserts that the improper 

comment must have swayed the jury to find him guilty because the jury’s two notes 

demonstrate that the jurors could not determine whether his attempted arrest was lawful.

The Defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s statement led the jury to convict him is 

pure speculation. We conclude the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to find 

that the Defendant’s attempted arrest was lawful. In any event, applying the Judge factors, 

the prosecutor did not specifically ask the jurors to place themselves in the position of the 

Defendant or any innocent bystanders. Defense counsel promptly objected, the trial court 

sustained the objection, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement. 

We generally presume that the jury follows the instructions of the trial court. See State v. 

Butler, 880 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Additionally, nothing indicates 

malicious intent by the prosecutor, we have not found any other errors in the record, and 

the State’s case against the Defendant was strong. Therefore, we agree with the State that 

the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

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JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JUDGE