UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4418

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

RANCES ULICES AMAYA, a/k/a Murder, a/k/a Blue,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, 

District Judge. (1:11-cr-00556-AJT-1)

Submitted: February 26, 2013 Decided: March 28, 2013

Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Arif, Melissa M. Sanchez, ARIF & ASSOCIATES, PC, 

Springfield, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United 

States Attorney, G. Zachery Terwilliger, Michael J. Frank, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Rances Ulices Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to 

commit sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), and 

three counts of sex trafficking of a child, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 

(2006). The charges related to Amaya’s participation in an 

organization that recruited and prostituted underage girls for 

profit. He received a within-Guidelines sentence of sixty 

months for conspiracy and 600 months on each of the three § 1591 

violations. The sentences run concurrently. Amaya now appeals, 

claiming that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm. 

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). We first examine the sentence for “significant 

procedural error.” Id. We then consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 

F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is within the 

properly calculated Guidelines range, we may presume that the 

sentence is reasonable. United States v. Go, 517 F.3d 216, 218 

(4th Cir. 2008).

Amaya claims that his sentence exceeded the purposes 

of sentencing and was greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) (2006). Specifically, he contends that the district 

court failed to consider what he maintains was his minimal role 
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in the conspiracy and the fact that other members of the 

organization received significantly lower sentences. 

We find Amaya’s claims to be without merit. The 

district court provided a lengthy, comprehensive explanation of 

the chosen sentence. The court found that Amaya’s role in the 

offense was “essential if not dominating.” Among other things, 

Amaya helped to recruit under-age girls for prostitution, had 

sex with the girls “to test them out,” assisted in recruiting 

their clients, supplied drugs, alcohol, and condoms to the 

girls, and shared in the proceeds of the operation. 

Additionally, Amaya served as the “muscle” in the conspiracy, 

using force and intimidation to ensure that the victims complied 

with the rules of the organization and carrying weapons in order 

to ensure that clients behaved appropriately. 

Among the factors to be considered when imposing 

sentence is “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been 

found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 

(2006). We reject Amaya’s contention that his sentence is 

unreasonable because it is disproportionate to the sentences of 

others in the prostitution ring. At sentencing, the court 

observed that Amaya was not comparable to Alonso Bruno Cornejo 
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and Alexander Rivas.* First, Amaya’s criminal history score

(category VI) was higher than that of both Cornejo (category I) 

and Rivas (category V). Second, Amaya was older than Cornejo 

and Rivas. Finally, while Amaya, Cornejo and Rivas performed 

some of the same roles within the organization, Amaya had the 

additional, unique and critical role of intimidating both 

customers and workers. The district court correctly concluded 

that Amaya was not similarly situated to Rivas and Cornejo. See

United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 342 (4th Cir.) 

(“comparing the sentences of other defendants with dissimilar 

offenses, circumstances, and criminal histories is unavailing”), 

cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 609 (2012). 

Our review of the record establishes that Amaya’s 

arguments on appeal are without merit and that his sentence is 

procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we 

affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

 * A third member of the organization, Henry Herrera, is not 

an appropriate comparator because he was sentenced in state 

court. See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (“Section 3553(a)(6) addresses unwarranted sentence 

disparities among federal defendants who are similarly situated 

instead of disparate federal and state sentences.”). 
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material before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED