# Europeiska unionens C 149/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2504
  doi:10.3000/17252504.C_2009.149.swe |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 149 |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 52 årgången1 juli 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2504

doi:10.3000/17252504.C_2009.149.swe

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 149

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

52 årgången1 juli 2009

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| Informationsnummer | Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutioner, rekommendationer och yttranden |
| | REKOMMENDATIONER |
| | Europeiska centralbanken |
| 2009/C 149/01 | Europeiska centralbankens rekommendation av den 25 juni 2009 till Europeiska unionens råd om externa revisorer för Národná banka Slovenska (ECB/2009/14) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

I   Resolutioner, rekommendationer och yttranden

REKOMMENDATIONER

Europeiska centralbanken

2009/C 149/01

Europeiska centralbankens rekommendation av den 25 juni 2009 till Europeiska unionens råd om externa revisorer för Národná banka Slovenska (ECB/2009/14)

1

| | II   Meddelanden |
| --- | --- |
| | MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 149/02 | Tillstånd till statligt stöd enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i EG-fördraget – Fall i vilka kommissionen inte gör några invändningar (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2009/C 149/03 | Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5541 – GE/NewsCorp/Disney/Hulu JV) (
  1
  ) | 4 |

II   Meddelanden

MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

2009/C 149/02

Tillstånd till statligt stöd enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i EG-fördraget – Fall i vilka kommissionen inte gör några invändningar (
  1
  )

1

2

2009/C 149/03

Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5541 – GE/NewsCorp/Disney/Hulu JV) (
  1
  )

1

4

| | IV   Upplysningar |
| --- | --- |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 149/04 | Eurons växelkurs | 5 |
| 2009/C 149/05 | Meddelande från kommissionen om de återkravsräntor och referens-/diskonteringsräntor för statligt stöd som gäller för de 27 medlemsstaterna från och med den 1 juli 2009(Offentliggjort i enlighet med artikel 10 i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 794/2004 av den 21 april 2004 (EUT L 140, 30.4.2004, s. 1)) | 6 |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA |
| 2009/C 149/06 | Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning) (
  1
  ) | 7 |
| 2009/C 149/07 | Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning) (
  1
  ) | 11 |

IV   Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

2009/C 149/04

Eurons växelkurs

5

2009/C 149/05

Meddelande från kommissionen om de återkravsräntor och referens-/diskonteringsräntor för statligt stöd som gäller för de 27 medlemsstaterna från och med den 1 juli 2009(Offentliggjort i enlighet med artikel 10 i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 794/2004 av den 21 april 2004 (EUT L 140, 30.4.2004, s. 1))

(Offentliggjort i enlighet med artikel 10 i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 794/2004 av den 21 april 2004 (EUT L 140, 30.4.2004, s. 1))

6

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA

2009/C 149/06

Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning) (
  1
  )

1

7

2009/C 149/07

Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning) (
  1
  )

1

11

| | V   Yttranden |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN |
| | Europeiska gemenskapernas byrå för uttagningsprov för rekrytering av personal (EPSO) |
| 2009/C 149/08 | Meddelande om allmänt uttagningsprov EPSO/AST/99/09 | 15 |
| | FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 149/09 | Statligt stöd – Förenade kungariket – Statligt stöd C 14/08 (f.d. NN 1/08) – Omstruktureringsstöd till förmån för Northern Rock – Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter (
  1
  ) | 16 |
| 2009/C 149/10 | Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5551 – F2i/Finavias/ERG) – Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  ) | 27 |

V   Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europeiska gemenskapernas byrå för uttagningsprov för rekrytering av personal (EPSO)

2009/C 149/08

Meddelande om allmänt uttagningsprov EPSO/AST/99/09

15

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Kommissionen

2009/C 149/09

Statligt stöd – Förenade kungariket – Statligt stöd C 14/08 (f.d. NN 1/08) – Omstruktureringsstöd till förmån för Northern Rock – Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter (
  1
  )

1

16

2009/C 149/10

Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5551 – F2i/Finavias/ERG) – Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande (
  1
  )

1

27

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text av betydelse för EES |

---

(1)   Text av betydelse för EES

1

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

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I Resolutioner, rekommendationer och yttranden

REKOMMENDATIONER

Europeiska centralbanken

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/1

---

EUROPEISKA CENTRALBANKENS REKOMMENDATION

av den 25 juni 2009

till Europeiska unionens råd om externa revisorer för Národná banka Slovenska

(ECB/2009/14)

2009/C 149/01

ECB-RÅDET HAR ANTAGIT DENNA REKOMMENDATION

med beaktande av stadgan för Europeiska centralbankssystemet och Europeiska centralbanken (nedan kallad ECBS-stadgan), särskilt artikel 27.1 i denna, och

av följande skäl:

| (1) | Räkenskaperna för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och de nationella centralbankerna granskas av oavhängiga externa revisorer som rekommenderats av ECB-rådet och godkänts av Europeiska unionens råd. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Räkenskaperna för Europeiska centralbanken (ECB) och de nationella centralbankerna granskas av oavhängiga externa revisorer som rekommenderats av ECB-rådet och godkänts av Europeiska unionens råd.

| (2) | Enligt artikel 1 i rådets beslut 2008/608/EG av den 8 juli 2008 i enlighet med artikel 122.2 i fördraget om Slovakiens införande av den gemensamma valutan den 1 januari 2009 (1), införde Slovakien den gemensamma valutan den 1 januari 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Enligt artikel 1 i rådets beslut 2008/608/EG av den 8 juli 2008 i enlighet med artikel 122.2 i fördraget om Slovakiens införande av den gemensamma valutan den 1 januari 2009 (1), införde Slovakien den gemensamma valutan den 1 januari 2009.

| (3) | Enligt artikel 38 i lagen om Národná banka Slovenska granskas Národná banka Slovenskas konton sedan den 1 januari 2009 i enlighet med artikel 27.1 i ECBS-stadgan. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Enligt artikel 38 i lagen om Národná banka Slovenska granskas Národná banka Slovenskas konton sedan den 1 januari 2009 i enlighet med artikel 27.1 i ECBS-stadgan.

| (4) | Národná banka Slovenska har utsett Deloitte Audit s.r.o. som sina externa revisorer för räkenskapsåret 2009. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Národná banka Slovenska har utsett Deloitte Audit s.r.o. som sina externa revisorer för räkenskapsåret 2009.

HÄRIGENOM REKOMMENDERAS FÖLJANDE.

Det rekommenderas att Deloitte Audit s.r.o. utses till externa revisorer för Národná banka Slovenska för räkenskapsåret 2009.

Utfärdad i Frankfurt am Main den 25 juni 2009.

Jean-Claude TRICHET

ECB:s ordförande

---

(1)  EUT L 195, 24.7.2008, s. 24.

1

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II Meddelanden

MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/2

---

Tillstånd till statligt stöd enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i EG-fördraget

Fall i vilka kommissionen inte gör några invändningar

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/02

| Datum för antagande av beslutet | 27.2.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | N 99/09 |
| Medlemsstat | Luxemburg |
| Region | — |
| Benämning (och/eller stödmottagarens namn) | Régime temporaire d'aides au redressement économique |
| Rättslig grund | L’article 32(4) de la Constitution constitue la base juridique du régime |
| Typ av stödåtgärd | Stödordning |
| Syfte | Stöd för att avhjälpa en allvarlig störning i ekonomin |
| Stödform | — |
| Budget | — |
| Stödnivå | — |
| Varaktighet | till den 31.12.2010 |
| Ekonomisk sektor | Alla sektorer |
| Den beviljande myndighetens namn och adress | — |
| Övriga upplysningar | — |

Datum för antagande av beslutet

27.2.2009

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

N 99/09

Medlemsstat

Luxemburg

Region

—

Benämning (och/eller stödmottagarens namn)

Régime temporaire d'aides au redressement économique

Rättslig grund

L’article 32(4) de la Constitution constitue la base juridique du régime

Typ av stödåtgärd

Stödordning

Syfte

Stöd för att avhjälpa en allvarlig störning i ekonomin

Stödform

—

Budget

—

Stödnivå

—

Varaktighet

till den 31.12.2010

Ekonomisk sektor

Alla sektorer

Den beviljande myndighetens namn och adress

—

Övriga upplysningar

—

Giltiga språkversioner av beslutstexten, med undantag av konfidentiella uppgifter, finns på följande webbplats:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/index.htm

| Datum för antagande av beslutet | 6.5.2009 |
| --- | --- |
| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | N 237/09 |
| Medlemsstat | Republiken Tjeckien |
| Region | — |
| Benämning (och/eller stödmottagarens namn) | Temporary aid scheme for granting aid in the form of loans with subsidised interest rate |
| Rättslig grund | Český přechodný rámec, Národní protikrizový plán vlády České republiky; Zákon č. 218/2000 Sb.,Zákon č. 47/2002 Sb., Zákon č. 659/2004 Sb., Směrnice MŽP č. 05/2008 Pravidla, kterými se stanovují podmínky pro poskytnutí dotace na projekty programu rozvoje venkova ČR; Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb.; Zákon č. 582/1991 Sb., Vyhláška MPSV č. 161/1998 Sb., Zákon č. 129/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 250/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 40/1964 Sb., občanský zákoník, ve znění pozdějších předpisů; Zákon č. 248/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 131/2000 Sb., Operační programy schválené pro ČR Evropskou komisí pro období 2007–2013. |
| Typ av stödåtgärd | Stödordning |
| Syfte | Stöd för att avhjälpa en allvarlig störning i ekonomin |
| Stödform | Räntestöd |
| Budget | Totalt planerat stödbelopp 2 600 miljoner CZK |
| Stödnivå | — |
| Varaktighet | 1.5.2009–31.12.2010 |
| Ekonomisk sektor | Alla sektorer |
| Den beviljande myndighetens namn och adress | — |
| Övriga upplysningar | — |

Datum för antagande av beslutet

6.5.2009

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

N 237/09

Medlemsstat

Republiken Tjeckien

Region

—

Benämning (och/eller stödmottagarens namn)

Temporary aid scheme for granting aid in the form of loans with subsidised interest rate

Rättslig grund

Český přechodný rámec, Národní protikrizový plán vlády České republiky; Zákon č. 218/2000 Sb.,Zákon č. 47/2002 Sb., Zákon č. 659/2004 Sb., Směrnice MŽP č. 05/2008 Pravidla, kterými se stanovují podmínky pro poskytnutí dotace na projekty programu rozvoje venkova ČR; Zákon č. 435/2004 Sb.; Zákon č. 582/1991 Sb., Vyhláška MPSV č. 161/1998 Sb., Zákon č. 129/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 250/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 40/1964 Sb., občanský zákoník, ve znění pozdějších předpisů; Zákon č. 248/2000 Sb., Zákon č. 131/2000 Sb., Operační programy schválené pro ČR Evropskou komisí pro období 2007–2013.

Typ av stödåtgärd

Stödordning

Syfte

Stöd för att avhjälpa en allvarlig störning i ekonomin

Stödform

Räntestöd

Budget

Totalt planerat stödbelopp 2 600 miljoner CZK

Stödnivå

—

Varaktighet

1.5.2009–31.12.2010

Ekonomisk sektor

Alla sektorer

Den beviljande myndighetens namn och adress

—

Övriga upplysningar

—

Giltiga språkversioner av beslutstexten, med undantag av konfidentiella uppgifter, finns på följande webbplats:

http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/index.htm

---

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/4

---

Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration

(Ärende COMP/M.5541 – GE/NewsCorp/Disney/Hulu JV)

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/03

Kommissionen beslutade den 24 juni 2009 att inte göra invändningar mot den anmälda koncentrationen ovan och att förklara den förenlig med den gemensamma marknaden. Beslutet grundar sig på artikel 6.1 b i rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004. Beslutet i sin helhet finns bara på engelska och kommer att offentliggöras efter det att eventuella affärshemligheter har tagits bort. Det kommer att finnas tillgängligt

| — | under rubriken koncentrationer på kommissionens webbplats för konkurrens (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Denna webbplats gör det möjligt att hitta enskilda beslut i koncentrationsärenden, även uppgifter om företag, ärendenummer, datum och sektorer, |
| --- | --- |

—

under rubriken koncentrationer på kommissionens webbplats för konkurrens (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Denna webbplats gör det möjligt att hitta enskilda beslut i koncentrationsärenden, även uppgifter om företag, ärendenummer, datum och sektorer,

| — | i elektronisk form på webbplatsen EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sv/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32009M5541. EUR-Lex ger tillgång till gemenskapslagstiftningen via Internet. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på webbplatsen EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sv/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32009M5541. EUR-Lex ger tillgång till gemenskapslagstiftningen via Internet.

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IV Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/5

---

Eurons växelkurs (1)

30 juni 2009

2009/C 149/04

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,4134 |
| JPY | japansk yen | 135,51 |
| DKK | dansk krona | 7,4470 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,85210 |
| SEK | svensk krona | 10,8125 |
| CHF | schweizisk franc | 1,5265 |
| ISK | isländsk krona | |
| NOK | norsk krona | 9,0180 |
| BGN | bulgarisk lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjeckisk koruna | 25,882 |
| EEK | estnisk krona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | ungersk forint | 271,55 |
| LTL | litauisk litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lettisk lats | 0,7036 |
| PLN | polsk zloty | 4,4520 |
| RON | rumänsk leu | 4,2072 |
| TRY | turkisk lira | 2,1614 |
| AUD | australisk dollar | 1,7359 |
| CAD | kanadensisk dollar | 1,6275 |
| HKD | Hongkongdollar | 10,9540 |
| NZD | nyzeeländsk dollar | 2,1656 |
| SGD | singaporiansk dollar | 2,0441 |
| KRW | sydkoreansk won | 1 802,43 |
| ZAR | sydafrikansk rand | 10,8853 |
| CNY | kinesisk yuan renminbi | 9,6545 |
| HRK | kroatisk kuna | 7,2730 |
| IDR | indonesisk rupiah | 14 427,58 |
| MYR | malaysisk ringgit | 4,9681 |
| PHP | filippinsk peso | 67,865 |
| RUB | rysk rubel | 43,8810 |
| THB | thailändsk baht | 48,140 |
| BRL | brasiliansk real | 2,7469 |
| MXN | mexikansk peso | 18,5537 |
| INR | indisk rupie | 67,5180 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

US-dollar

1,4134

JPY

japansk yen

135,51

DKK

dansk krona

7,4470

GBP

pund sterling

0,85210

SEK

svensk krona

10,8125

CHF

schweizisk franc

1,5265

ISK

isländsk krona

NOK

norsk krona

9,0180

BGN

bulgarisk lev

1,9558

CZK

tjeckisk koruna

25,882

EEK

estnisk krona

15,6466

HUF

ungersk forint

271,55

LTL

litauisk litas

3,4528

LVL

lettisk lats

0,7036

PLN

polsk zloty

4,4520

RON

rumänsk leu

4,2072

TRY

turkisk lira

2,1614

AUD

australisk dollar

1,7359

CAD

kanadensisk dollar

1,6275

HKD

Hongkongdollar

10,9540

NZD

nyzeeländsk dollar

2,1656

SGD

singaporiansk dollar

2,0441

KRW

sydkoreansk won

1 802,43

ZAR

sydafrikansk rand

10,8853

CNY

kinesisk yuan renminbi

9,6545

HRK

kroatisk kuna

7,2730

IDR

indonesisk rupiah

14 427,58

MYR

malaysisk ringgit

4,9681

PHP

filippinsk peso

67,865

RUB

rysk rubel

43,8810

THB

thailändsk baht

48,140

BRL

brasiliansk real

2,7469

MXN

mexikansk peso

18,5537

INR

indisk rupie

67,5180

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(1)  Källa: Referensväxelkurs offentliggjord av Europeiska centralbanken.

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| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/6

---

Meddelande från kommissionen om de återkravsräntor och referens-/diskonteringsräntor för statligt stöd som gäller för de 27 medlemsstaterna från och med den 1 juli 2009

(Offentliggjort i enlighet med artikel 10 i kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 794/2004 av den 21 april 2004 (EUT L 140, 30.4.2004, s. 1))

2009/C 149/05

Basräntor beräknade i enlighet med meddelandet från kommissionen om en översyn av metoden för att fastställa referens- och diskonteringsräntor (EUT C 14, 19.1.2008, s. 6). Referensräntan ska, beroende på hur den används, beräknas genom att till basräntan addera de marginaler som fastställs i detta meddelande. Det innebär att diskonteringsräntan ska beräknas genom att en marginal på 100 räntepunkter adderas till basräntan. I kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 271/2008 av den 30 januari 2008 om ändring av förordning (EG) nr 794/2004 föreskrivs att också återkravsräntan beräknas genom att 100 räntepunkter adderas till basräntan, om inte annat anges i ett särskilt beslut.

| Från | Till | AT | BE | BG | CY | CZ | DE | DK | EE | EL | ES | FI | FR | HU | IE | IT | LT | LU | LV | MT | NL | PL | PT | RO | SE | SI | SK | UK |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.7.2009 | ... | 1,77 | 1,77 | 6,41 | 1,77 | 2,96 | 1,77 | 3,44 | 7,34 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 10,01 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 9,53 | 1,77 | 13,20 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 4,53 | 1,77 | 13,76 | 1,49 | 1,77 | 1,77 | 2,20 |
| 1.6.2009 | 30.6.2009 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 6,41 | 2,22 | 2,96 | 2,22 | 3,44 | 7,34 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 10,01 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 9,53 | 2,22 | 13,20 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 4,53 | 2,22 | 17,29 | 1,49 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,20 |
| 1.5.2009 | 31.5.2009 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 7,63 | 2,22 | 2,96 | 2,22 | 4,57 | 7,34 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 10,01 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 9,53 | 2,22 | 13,20 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 5,62 | 2,22 | 17,29 | 1,81 | 2,22 | 2,22 | 2,84 |
| 1.4.2009 | 30.4.2009 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 7,63 | 2,74 | 2,96 | 2,74 | 4,57 | 7,34 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 10,01 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 9,53 | 2,74 | 13,20 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 5,62 | 2,74 | 17,29 | 2,30 | 2,74 | 2,74 | 2,84 |
| 1.3.2009 | 31.3.2009 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 7,63 | 3,47 | 3,74 | 3,47 | 6,00 | 7,34 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 10,01 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 9,53 | 3,47 | 13,20 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 6,78 | 3,47 | 17,29 | 3,31 | 3,47 | 3,47 | 3,58 |
| 1.2.2009 | 28.2.2009 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 7,63 | 4,99 | 4,53 | 4,99 | 6,00 | 7,34 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 10,01 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 7,81 | 4,99 | 13,20 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 6,78 | 4,99 | 17,29 | 4,31 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 4,81 |
| 1.1.2009 | 31.1.2009 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 7,63 | 4,99 | 4,53 | 4,99 | 6,00 | 7,34 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 10,01 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 7,81 | 4,99 | 11,05 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 6,78 | 4,99 | 17,29 | 5,18 | 4,99 | 4,99 | 5,70 |
| 1.12.2008 | 31.12.2008 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,70 | 5,36 | 4,20 | 5,36 | 5,55 | 6,43 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 8,58 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 7,10 | 5,36 | 9,44 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,42 | 5,36 | 15,87 | 5,49 | 5,36 | 5,00 | 5,66 |
| 1.11.2008 | 30.11.2008 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,70 | 5,36 | 4,20 | 5,36 | 5,55 | 6,43 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 8,58 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,10 | 5,36 | 9,44 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,42 | 5,36 | 11,02 | 5,49 | 5,36 | 5,00 | 5,66 |
| 1.10.2008 | 31.10.2008 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,70 | 5,36 | 4,20 | 5,36 | 5,55 | 6,43 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 8,58 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,10 | 5,36 | 9,44 | 5,36 | 5,36 | 6,42 | 5,36 | 11,02 | 5,49 | 5,36 | 4,34 | 5,66 |
| 1.9.2008 | 30.9.2008 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,70 | 4,59 | 4,20 | 4,59 | 5,55 | 6,43 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 8,58 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,10 | 4,59 | 9,44 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,42 | 4,59 | 11,02 | 5,49 | 4,59 | 4,34 | 5,66 |
| 1.7.2008 | 31.8.2008 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,70 | 4,59 | 4,20 | 4,59 | 4,81 | 6,43 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 8,58 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,10 | 4,59 | 9,44 | 4,59 | 4,59 | 6,42 | 4,59 | 11,02 | 4,75 | 4,59 | 4,34 | 5,66 |

Från

Till

AT

BE

BG

CY

CZ

DE

DK

EE

EL

ES

FI

FR

HU

IE

IT

LT

LU

LV

MT

NL

PL

PT

RO

SE

SI

SK

UK

1.7.2009

...

1,77

1,77

6,41

1,77

2,96

1,77

3,44

7,34

1,77

1,77

1,77

1,77

10,01

1,77

1,77

9,53

1,77

13,20

1,77

1,77

4,53

1,77

13,76

1,49

1,77

1,77

2,20

1.6.2009

30.6.2009

2,22

2,22

6,41

2,22

2,96

2,22

3,44

7,34

2,22

2,22

2,22

2,22

10,01

2,22

2,22

9,53

2,22

13,20

2,22

2,22

4,53

2,22

17,29

1,49

2,22

2,22

2,20

1.5.2009

31.5.2009

2,22

2,22

7,63

2,22

2,96

2,22

4,57

7,34

2,22

2,22

2,22

2,22

10,01

2,22

2,22

9,53

2,22

13,20

2,22

2,22

5,62

2,22

17,29

1,81

2,22

2,22

2,84

1.4.2009

30.4.2009

2,74

2,74

7,63

2,74

2,96

2,74

4,57

7,34

2,74

2,74

2,74

2,74

10,01

2,74

2,74

9,53

2,74

13,20

2,74

2,74

5,62

2,74

17,29

2,30

2,74

2,74

2,84

1.3.2009

31.3.2009

3,47

3,47

7,63

3,47

3,74

3,47

6,00

7,34

3,47

3,47

3,47

3,47

10,01

3,47

3,47

9,53

3,47

13,20

3,47

3,47

6,78

3,47

17,29

3,31

3,47

3,47

3,58

1.2.2009

28.2.2009

4,99

4,99

7,63

4,99

4,53

4,99

6,00

7,34

4,99

4,99

4,99

4,99

10,01

4,99

4,99

7,81

4,99

13,20

4,99

4,99

6,78

4,99

17,29

4,31

4,99

4,99

4,81

1.1.2009

31.1.2009

4,99

4,99

7,63

4,99

4,53

4,99

6,00

7,34

4,99

4,99

4,99

4,99

10,01

4,99

4,99

7,81

4,99

11,05

4,99

4,99

6,78

4,99

17,29

5,18

4,99

4,99

5,70

1.12.2008

31.12.2008

5,36

5,36

6,70

5,36

4,20

5,36

5,55

6,43

5,36

5,36

5,36

5,36

8,58

5,36

5,36

7,10

5,36

9,44

5,36

5,36

6,42

5,36

15,87

5,49

5,36

5,00

5,66

1.11.2008

30.11.2008

5,36

5,36

6,70

5,36

4,20

5,36

5,55

6,43

5,36

5,36

5,36

5,36

8,58

5,36

5,36

6,10

5,36

9,44

5,36

5,36

6,42

5,36

11,02

5,49

5,36

5,00

5,66

1.10.2008

31.10.2008

5,36

5,36

6,70

5,36

4,20

5,36

5,55

6,43

5,36

5,36

5,36

5,36

8,58

5,36

5,36

6,10

5,36

9,44

5,36

5,36

6,42

5,36

11,02

5,49

5,36

4,34

5,66

1.9.2008

30.9.2008

4,59

4,59

6,70

4,59

4,20

4,59

5,55

6,43

4,59

4,59

4,59

4,59

8,58

4,59

4,59

6,10

4,59

9,44

4,59

4,59

6,42

4,59

11,02

5,49

4,59

4,34

5,66

1.7.2008

31.8.2008

4,59

4,59

6,70

4,59

4,20

4,59

4,81

6,43

4,59

4,59

4,59

4,59

8,58

4,59

4,59

6,10

4,59

9,44

4,59

4,59

6,42

4,59

11,02

4,75

4,59

4,34

5,66

---

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/7

---

Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning)

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/06

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 24/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Regionens namn
  (NUTS
   (1))
  Delstaten Hessen, NUTS 1 | Regionens stödstatus (2)

  Blandat område |
| Stödbeviljande myndighet | Namn | Investitionsbank Hessen |
| Adress | Schumannstr. 4-6 |
| 60325 Frankfurt am Main |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 24/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Regionens namn

(NUTS
   (1))

Delstaten Hessen, NUTS 1

Regionens stödstatus (2)

Blandat område

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Namn

Investitionsbank Hessen

Adress

Schumannstr. 4-6

60325 Frankfurt am Main

DEUTSCHLAND

Webbplats

http://www.ibh-hessen.de/

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Gründungs- und Wachstumsfinanzierung Hessen (GuW Hessen)

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelseorgan)

Richtlinie Gründungs- und Wachstumsfinanzierung Hessen sowie Ergänzendes Merkblatt zur Gründungs- und Wachstumsfinanzierung Hessen

Keine Richtlinie des Landes, Fundstelle im Internet (s.u.)

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

http://www.ibh-hessen.de/Kredite_GUW.cfm

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

Ja

Ändring av en befintlig stödåtgärd

Kommissionens stödnummer

Förlängning

XS 24/02

Ändring

Ja

Varaktighet (3)

Stödordning

1.10.2008–31.12.2013

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Ja

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Ja

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (4)

Lånebeloppet cirka 140 miljoner EUR per år, räntesubventionen cirka 0,4 miljoner EUR per år

Stödinstrument (artikel 5)

Räntesubvention

Ja

Lån

Ja

Annat (precisera):

Lån med räntesubvention

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medelstora företag i %

Investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd till små och medelstora företag (artikel 15)

Ja Endast investeringsstöd beviljas.

10/20 %

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 27/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Region namn
  (NUTS
   (5))
  Delstaten Hessen, NUTS 1 | Regionens stödstatus (6)

  Områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd |
| Stödbeviljande myndighet | Namn | 1. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 27/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Region namn

(NUTS
   (5))

Delstaten Hessen, NUTS 1

Regionens stödstatus (6)

Områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Namn

1.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung

| 2. | Investitionsbank Hessen Niederlassung Kassel |
| --- | --- |

2.

Investitionsbank Hessen Niederlassung Kassel

Adress

| 1. | Kaiser-Friedrich-Ring 75 |
| --- | --- |
| 65185 Wiesbaden |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

1.

Kaiser-Friedrich-Ring 75

65185 Wiesbaden

DEUTSCHLAND

| 2. | Kurfürstenstr. 7 |
| --- | --- |
| 34117 Kassel |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

2.

Kurfürstenstr. 7

34117 Kassel

DEUTSCHLAND

Webbadress

| 1. | www.wirtschaft.hessen.de |
| --- | --- |

1.

www.wirtschaft.hessen.de

| 2. | www.ibh-hessen.de |
| --- | --- |

2.

www.ibh-hessen.de

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Förderung der regionalen Entwicklung

- betriebliche Investitionen -

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelseorgan)

Richtlinien des Landes Hessen zur Förderung der regionalen Entwicklung

(Staatsanzeiger 23/2008 vom 2. Juni 2008, S. 1450)

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

http://www.wirtschaft.hessen.de/irj/HMWVL_Internet?cid=46532f7c02f1b0545d1b707d83412db3

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

Ja

Ändring av en befintlig stödåtgärd

Kommissionens stödnummer

Ändring

XS 14/02

Varaktighet (7)

Stödordning

1.4.2008–31.12.2012

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Ja

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Ja

Stora företag

Nej

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (8)

20,9 miljoner EUR

Stödinstrument (artikel 5)

Bidrag

Ja

Lån

Ja

Annat (precisera):

Lån med räntesubvention

Vid medfinansiering från gemenskapsfonder

Hänvisning(ar) CCI2007 DE 16 2 PO 005

Belopp av gemenskapsfinansiering

5,0 miljoner EUR

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medelstora företag i %

Investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd till små och medelstora företag (artikel 15)

Ja. Endast investeringsstöd beviljas

10/20 %

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 127/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Regionens namn
  (NUTS
   (9))
  Bayern | Regionens stödstatus (10) |
| Stödbeviljande myndighet | Zentrum Bayern Familie und Soziales | |
| Hegelstraße 2 |
| 95447 Bayreuth |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 127/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Regionens namn

(NUTS
   (9))

Bayern

Regionens stödstatus (10)

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Zentrum Bayern Familie und Soziales

Hegelstraße 2

95447 Bayreuth

DEUTSCHLAND

http://www.zbfs.bayern.de/

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Die Einzelbeihilfen für Förderungen nach der anliegenden Maßnahmebeschreibung (Programmregelung) werden auf Grundlage von Zuwendungsbescheiden gewährt. In die Zuwendungsbescheide wird jeweils ein Hinweis auf die VO (EG) Nr. 800/2008 und die diesbezügliche Freistellung aufgenommen. Die Namen der Begünstigten stehen noch nicht fest.

Spezifisches Ziel A1 Erhöhung des Qualifikationsniveaus von Beschäftigten und Unternehmen

Aktion 1 Berufliche Weiterbildung von Beschäftigten insb. KMU, Unterstützung der Anpassung

Aktion 2 Berufliche Weiterbildung von Wirtschaftsclustern

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelseorgan)

Operationelles Programm: Zukunft in Bayern, Europäischer Sozialfonds, Regionale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und Beschäftigung, Bayern 2007-2013;

Haushaltsordnung des Freistaates Bayern – Bayerische Haushaltsordnung - BayHO - (BayRS 630-1-F), zuletzt geändert durch § 2 des Gesetzes vom 23. April 2008 (GVBl S. 139) Fundstelle: BayRS IV, S. 664

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

http://www.stmas.bayern.de/arbeit/esf2007-2013/programm07-13.pdf

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

Ja

Ändring av en befintlig stödåtgärd

Ändring

XT 102/08

Varaktighet (11)

Stödordning

1.1.2008–31.12.2013

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Ja

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Ja, i huvudsak

Stora företag

Ja

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (12)

0,3 miljoner EUR

Stödinstrument (artikel 5)

Bidrag

Ja

Vid medfinansiering från gemenskapsfonder

Hänvisning(ar): ESF - CCI:2007DE052PO002

Belopp av gemenskaps-finansiering

5 miljoner EUR per år

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medelstora företag i %

Stöd till utbildning (artiklarna 38–39)

Särskild utbildning (artikel 38.1) nej

0 %

Allmän utbildning (artikel 38.2) ja

45 %

---

(1)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(2)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(3)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(4)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

(5)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(6)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(7)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(8)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

(9)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(10)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(11)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(12)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

---

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/11

---

Uppgifter från medlemsstaterna om statligt stöd som beviljats enligt kommissionens förordning (EG) nr 800/2008 genom vilken vissa kategorier av stöd förklaras förenliga med den gemensamma marknaden enligt artiklarna 87 och 88 i fördraget (allmän gruppundantagsförordning)

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/07

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 20/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Regionens namn
  (NUTS
   (1)

  Delstaten Schleswig-Holstein med distrikten Herzogtum Lauenburg, Pinneberg (utom Helgoland), Segeberg och Stormarn | Regionens stödstatus (2)

  Område som inte är berättigat till regionalstöd |
| Stödbeviljande myndighet | Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein | |
| Fleethörn 29-31 |
| 24103 Kiel |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 20/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Regionens namn

(NUTS
   (1)

Delstaten Schleswig-Holstein med distrikten Herzogtum Lauenburg, Pinneberg (utom Helgoland), Segeberg och Stormarn

Regionens stödstatus (2)

Område som inte är berättigat till regionalstöd

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein

Fleethörn 29-31

24103 Kiel

DEUTSCHLAND

http://www.ib-sh.de

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Investitionsförderung im Hamburg-Rand-Raum

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelseorgan)

Richtlinie für die einzelbetriebliche Investitionsförderung im Rahmen des Zukunftsprogramms Wirtschaft aus Mitteln des Europäischen Fonds für Regionale Entwicklung für Vorhaben kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen im südlichen Schleswig-Holstein (”Investitionsförderung im Hamburg-Rand-Raum”);

Amtsblatt Schleswig-Holstein 2008, s. 849

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

www.ib-sh.de/hamburg-rand

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

Investeringsstöd till små och medelstora företag

Ändring av en befintlig stödåtgärd

Kommissionens stödnummer

Ändring

XS 62/07

Varaktighet (3)

Stödordning

30.6.2008–31.12.2013

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Alla ekonomiska sektorer inom vilka stöd till små och medelstora företag får beviljas

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Uteslutande

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (4)

Cirka 5 miljoner EUR per år

Stödinstrument

(artikel 5)

Bidrag

Ja

Vid medfinansiering från gemenskapsfonder

Hänvisning(ar):CCI Nr. 2007 DE 162 PO 003

Belopp av gemenskapsfinansiering

Cirka 5 miljoner EUR per år

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medelstora företag i %

Investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd till små och medelstora företag (artikel 15)

Att skapa eller bevara arbetstillfällen genom stöd till små och medelstora företag för etablering, utvidgning och modernisering av anläggningar

I enlighet med artikel 15 eller artikel 44.2 i den allmänna gruppundantagsförord-ningen

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 22/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Regionens namn
  (NUTS
   (5)

  Nordrhein-Westfalen | Regionens stödstatus (6)

  Artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget
  Blandade områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd |
| Stödbeviljande myndighet | Namn | NRW.BANK |
| Adress | Johanniterstraße 3 |
| 48145 Münster |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 22/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Regionens namn

(NUTS
   (5)

Nordrhein-Westfalen

Regionens stödstatus (6)

Artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget

Blandade områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Namn

NRW.BANK

Adress

Johanniterstraße 3

48145 Münster

DEUTSCHLAND

Webbplats

http://www.nrwbank.de

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Regionales Wirtschaftsförderungsprogramm NRW (RWP.NRW);

Richtlinie für die Gewährung von Finanzhilfen zur Förderung der gewerblichen Wirtschaft einschließlich des Tourismusgewerbes vom 12.9.2008

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelseorgan)

| 1. | 36. Rahmenplan der Bund/Länder-Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ”Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” (BAnz. vom 12. April 2007, Seite 4713), geändert durch den Beschluss des Koordinierungsausschusses vom 10.9.2008 (BAnz. vom 24. September 2008, Seite 3452). |
| --- | --- |

1.

36. Rahmenplan der Bund/Länder-Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ”Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” (BAnz. vom 12. April 2007, Seite 4713), geändert durch den Beschluss des Koordinierungsausschusses vom 10.9.2008 (BAnz. vom 24. September 2008, Seite 3452).

| 2. | Landeshaushaltsordnung NRW i. d. F. der Bekanntmachung vom 26. April 1999 (SGV.NRW 630). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Landeshaushaltsordnung NRW i. d. F. der Bekanntmachung vom 26. April 1999 (SGV.NRW 630).

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

http://www.nrwbank.de/pdf/dt/RWP_NRW/RWP_Richtlinie_12.09.08.pdf

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

X

Ändring av en befintlig stödåtgärd

Kommissionens stödnummer

Ändring

XS 26/07

Anpassning av det regionala näringslivsprogrammet NRW till förordning (EG) nr 800/2008

Varaktighet (7)

Stödordning

1.10.2008–31.12.2013

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Ja, utom de ekonomiska sektorer som anges i punkt 3.2 i det regionala näringslivsprogrammet NRW

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Ja

Stora företag

Ja, men endast i de regionalstödsområden som godkänts på grundval av artikel 87.3 c

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (8)

Cirka 50 miljoner EUR

Stödinstrument (artikel 5)

Bidrag

Ja

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medel-stora företag i %

Regionalt investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd (9) (artikel 13)

Stödordning

15 %

20/10 %

Investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd till små och medelstora företag (artikel 15)

20/10 %

Stöd till konsulttjänster till förmån för små och medelstora företag och till små och medelstora företags deltagande i mässor (artiklarna 26-27)

Stöd till konsulttjänster till förmån för små och medelstora företag (artikel 26)

50 %

| Referensnummer för Statligt stöd | X 23/08 |
| --- | --- |
| Medlemsstat | Tyskland |
| Medlemsstatens referensnummer | — |
| Region | Regionens namn
  (NUTS
   (10)

  Delstaten Schleswig-Holstein med






  1. | distrikten Herzogtum Lauenburg, delar av distriktet Steinburg, distriktet Plön, distriktet Rendsburg-Eckernförde, städerna Kiel och Neumünster, delar av städerna Lübeck och Flensburg |

Referensnummer för Statligt stöd

X 23/08

Medlemsstat

Tyskland

Medlemsstatens referensnummer

—

Region

Regionens namn

(NUTS
   (10)

Delstaten Schleswig-Holstein med

1.

distrikten Herzogtum Lauenburg, delar av distriktet Steinburg, distriktet Plön, distriktet Rendsburg-Eckernförde, städerna Kiel och Neumünster, delar av städerna Lübeck och Flensburg

| 2. | distrikten Dithmarschen, Nordfriesland, Schleswig-Flensburg, Ostholstein, delar av distrikten Steinburg, delar av städerna Lübeck och Flensburg, distriktet Pinneberg (endast Helgolands kommun) |
| --- | --- |

2.

distrikten Dithmarschen, Nordfriesland, Schleswig-Flensburg, Ostholstein, delar av distrikten Steinburg, delar av städerna Lübeck och Flensburg, distriktet Pinneberg (endast Helgolands kommun)

Regionens stödstatus (11)

Område som inte är berättigat till regionalstöd (s.k. GA-D-stödområde)

Regionalstödsområde enligt artikel 88.3 c i EG-fördraget

(s.k. GA-C-stödområde)

Stödbeviljande myndighet

Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein

| Fleethörn 29-31 |
| --- |
| 24103 Kiel |
| DEUTSCHLAND |

Fleethörn 29-31

24103 Kiel

DEUTSCHLAND

www.ib-sh.de

Stödåtgärdens beteckning

Einzelbetriebliche Investitionsförderung im Rahmen des Europäischen Fonds für Regionale Entwicklung

Nationell rättslig grund

(hänvisning till landets officiella kungörelse-organ)

Ergänzende Grundsätze für die einzelbetriebliche Investitionsförderung im Rahmen der Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ”Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur” und des Europäischen Fonds für Regionale Entwicklung;

Amtsblatt Schleswig-Holstein 2008, S. 883

Webblänk till den fullständiga texten till stödåtgärden

www.ib-sh.de/zuschuss-ga

Typ av åtgärd

Stödordning

Investeringsbidrag

Varaktighet (12)

Stödordning

1.10.2008–31.12.2013

Berörda ekonomiska sektorer

Alla stödberättigade ekonomiska sektorer

Ej sektorspecifikt

Typ av stödmottagare

Små och medelstora företag

Ja

Stora företag

Ja, om det är fråga om stöd inom ett regionalstödsområde

Budget

Årligt totalbelopp för den budget som planeras enligt ordningen (13)

Cirka 15 miljoner EUR per år

Stödinstrument (artikel 5)

Bidrag

Ja

Vid medfinansiering från gemenskapsfonder

Hänvisning(ar):CCI Nr. 2007 DE 162 PO 003

Belopp av gemenskaps-finansiering

Cirka 15 miljoner EUR per år

Allmänna mål (förteckning)

Mål (förteckning)

Högsta tillåtna stödnivå i % eller högsta tillåtna stödbelopp i nationell valuta

Bonus för små och medelstora företag i %

Regionalt investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd (14) (artikel 13)

Stödordning

Ja, om det är fråga om stöd inom det godkända regionalstödsområdet

(jfr rubriken ”Region”, punkt 2);; Att skapa eller bevara arbetstillfällen genom stöd till små, medelstora och stora företag för etablering, utvidgning och modernisering av anläggningar

Enligt artikel 9 i den allmänna gruppundantagsförord-ningen (i likhet med stöd Aid XR 31/07)

Investeringsstöd och sysselsättningsstöd till små och medelstora företag (artikel 15)

Ja, om det fråga om stöd utanför det godkända regionalstödsområdet (jfr rubriken ”Region”, punkt 1);

Att skapa eller bevara arbetstillfällen genom stöd till små och medelstora företag för etablering, utvidgning och modernisering av anläggningar

Enligt artikel 15 i den allmänna gruppundantagsförord-ningen

---

(1)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(2)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(3)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(4)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

(5)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(6)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(7)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(8)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

(9)  Om det rör sig om regionalt stöd för särskilda ändamål som beviljas enligt en stödordning, ange både den stödnivå som beviljas enligt stödordningen och stödnivån för stödet för särskilda ändamål.

(10)  NUTS: Nomenklaturen för statistiska och regionala enheter.

(11)  Artikel 87.3 a i EG-fördraget, artikel 87.3 c i EG-fördraget, blandade områden, områden som inte är berättigade till regionalstöd.

(12)  Den period under vilken den beviljande myndigheten kan åta sig att bevilja stödet.

(13)  Om det är fråga om en stödordning: Ange det sammanlagda stödbelopp som planeras enligt stödordningen per år eller den beräknade skatteförlusten per år för samtliga stödinstrument som ingår i stödordningen.

(14)  Om det rör sig om regionalt stöd för särskilda ändamål som beviljas enligt en stödordning, ange både den stödnivå som beviljas enligt stödordningen och stödnivån för stödet för särskilda ändamål.

---

V Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Europeiska gemenskapernas byrå för uttagningsprov för rekrytering av personal (EPSO)

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/15

---

MEDDELANDE OM ALLMÄNT UTTAGNINGSPROV EPSO/AST/99/09

2009/C 149/08

Europeiska rekryteringsbyrån (Epso) anordnar det allmänna uttagningsprovet EPSO/AST/99/09 för att rekrytera engelskspråkiga (EN) korrekturläsare i lönegrad AST 3.

Meddelandet om uttagningsprov offentliggörs enbart på engelska i Europeiska unionens officiella tidning C 149 A av den 1 juli 2009.

Ytterligare upplysningar finns på Epsos webbplats http://eu-careers.eu

---

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Kommissionen

| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/16

---

STATLIGT STÖD – FÖRENADE KUNGARIKET

Statligt stöd C 14/08 (f.d. NN 1/08) – Omstruktureringsstöd till förmån för Northern Rock

Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/09

Genom den skrivelse, daterad den 7 maj 2009, som återges på det giltiga språket på de sidor som följer på denna sammanfattning, underrättade kommissionen Förenade kungariket om sitt beslut att inleda det förfarande som anges i artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget avseende ovannämnda stöd.

Berörda parter kan inom en månad från dagen för offentliggörandet av denna sammanfattning och den därpå följande skrivelsen inkomma med sina synpunkter på det stöd avseende vilket kommissionen inleder förfarandet. Synpunkterna ska sändas till följande adress:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Synpunkterna kommer att meddelas Förenade kungariket. Den berörda part som inkommer med synpunkter kan skriftligen begära konfidentiell behandling av sin identitet, med angivande av skälen för begäran.

SAMMANFATTNING

I.   FÖRFARANDEN

| 1. | Den 2 april 2008 inledde kommissionen förfarandet enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget beträffande den plan för omstrukturering av Northern Rock som anmälts av de brittiska myndigheterna. Kommissionen tog emot synpunkter från Förenade kungariket den 2 maj 2008 och översände synpunkter från de övriga berörda parterna den 15 juli 2008. De brittiska myndigheterna besvarade dessa synpunkter den 28 augusti 2008. Kommissionen erhöll därefter upplysningar från de brittiska myndigheterna vid ett flertal tillfällen. I början av 2009 underrättade de brittiska myndigheterna kommissionen om att de önskade ändra omstruktureringsplanen. De översände upplysningar om den nya planen den 20 februari 2009, den 31 mars 2009 och den 2 april 2009. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 2 april 2008 inledde kommissionen förfarandet enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget beträffande den plan för omstrukturering av Northern Rock som anmälts av de brittiska myndigheterna. Kommissionen tog emot synpunkter från Förenade kungariket den 2 maj 2008 och översände synpunkter från de övriga berörda parterna den 15 juli 2008. De brittiska myndigheterna besvarade dessa synpunkter den 28 augusti 2008. Kommissionen erhöll därefter upplysningar från de brittiska myndigheterna vid ett flertal tillfällen. I början av 2009 underrättade de brittiska myndigheterna kommissionen om att de önskade ändra omstruktureringsplanen. De översände upplysningar om den nya planen den 20 februari 2009, den 31 mars 2009 och den 2 april 2009.

II.   SAKFÖRHÅLLANDEN

| 2. | Stödmottagare är Northern Rock, som var Förenade kungarikets femte största hypoteksbank med en balansomslutning på 101 miljarder brittiska pund (per den 31 december 2006). Northern Rocks kärnverksamhet är hypotekslånegivning för bostadsfastigheter. Northern Rocks andel av den brittiska hypoteksmarknaden har under de senaste åtta åren ungefär tredubblats. Northern Rocks har främst finansierat den växande utlåningen via kapitalmarknadsfinansiering (wholesale funding) och genom värdepapperisering av sina tillgångar. Det medförde problem när marknaden för värdepapperisering av tillgångar i stort sett stängde på grund av turbulensen på de internationella finansmarknaderna, samtidigt som det blev mycket svårt att anskaffa kapital på interbankmarknaden eftersom bankerna blev ovilliga att låna ut till varandra. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Stödmottagare är Northern Rock, som var Förenade kungarikets femte största hypoteksbank med en balansomslutning på 101 miljarder brittiska pund (per den 31 december 2006). Northern Rocks kärnverksamhet är hypotekslånegivning för bostadsfastigheter. Northern Rocks andel av den brittiska hypoteksmarknaden har under de senaste åtta åren ungefär tredubblats. Northern Rocks har främst finansierat den växande utlåningen via kapitalmarknadsfinansiering (wholesale funding) och genom värdepapperisering av sina tillgångar. Det medförde problem när marknaden för värdepapperisering av tillgångar i stort sett stängde på grund av turbulensen på de internationella finansmarknaderna, samtidigt som det blev mycket svårt att anskaffa kapital på interbankmarknaden eftersom bankerna blev ovilliga att låna ut till varandra.

| 3. | Efter att ha garanterat befintlig privatkundsinlåning (retail deposits) och inlåning från storföretagskunder (wholesale deposits), ny privatkundsinlåningen och ha gett Northern Rock med likviditetsfaciliteter nationaliserade de brittiska myndigheterna Northern Rock i februari 2008. Den 17 mars 2008 anmälde de brittiska myndigheterna en omstruktureringsplan till kommissionen med följande centrala beståndsdelar: i) minska balansomslutningen med ca [...] (1) % från 101 miljarder pund senast 2011, ii) stabilisera omsättningen genom att öka privatkundsinlåningsbasen och iii) ställa in aktiviteterna i Danmark och begränsa aktiviteterna i Irland och Guernsey. Planen skulle understödjas av ett omstruktureringsstöd, huvudsakligen bestående av en förlängning av undsättningsåtgärderna. Regeringen var beredd att vidta ett antal konkreta kompensationsåtgärder för att begränsa snedvridningen av konkurrensen, bl.a. a) minska balansomslutningen, b) nedskärning i antalet nya beviljade hypotekslån, c) inställande av Northern Rocks verksamhet i Danmark och begränsning av aktiviteterna i Irland och Guernsey och d) en ”konkurrensstadga” som anger på vad sätt Northern Rock ska delta på marknaderna. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Efter att ha garanterat befintlig privatkundsinlåning (retail deposits) och inlåning från storföretagskunder (wholesale deposits), ny privatkundsinlåningen och ha gett Northern Rock med likviditetsfaciliteter nationaliserade de brittiska myndigheterna Northern Rock i februari 2008. Den 17 mars 2008 anmälde de brittiska myndigheterna en omstruktureringsplan till kommissionen med följande centrala beståndsdelar: i) minska balansomslutningen med ca [...] (1) % från 101 miljarder pund senast 2011, ii) stabilisera omsättningen genom att öka privatkundsinlåningsbasen och iii) ställa in aktiviteterna i Danmark och begränsa aktiviteterna i Irland och Guernsey. Planen skulle understödjas av ett omstruktureringsstöd, huvudsakligen bestående av en förlängning av undsättningsåtgärderna. Regeringen var beredd att vidta ett antal konkreta kompensationsåtgärder för att begränsa snedvridningen av konkurrensen, bl.a. a) minska balansomslutningen, b) nedskärning i antalet nya beviljade hypotekslån, c) inställande av Northern Rocks verksamhet i Danmark och begränsning av aktiviteterna i Irland och Guernsey och d) en ”konkurrensstadga” som anger på vad sätt Northern Rock ska delta på marknaderna.

| 4. | Som ett resultat av den fördjupade finanskrisen och dess negativa effekt på Northern Rocks kapitalstruktur ändrade de brittiska myndigheterna, tillsammans med Northern Rock, omstruktureringsplanen. Enligt den nya planen skulle det ske en uppdelning av Northern Rock i två delar:






  i) | BankCo, till vilken följande av Northern Rocks tillgångar överförs: Privatkundsinlåningen (ca 19,5 miljarder pund), som täcks med ca [...] miljarder pund i likvida medel och ca [...] miljarder pund av sådana panträtter i Northern Rock som kan handlas fritt och inte löper risk för krav från fordringsägare [...]; inlåningen från storföretagskunder, som för närvarande uppgår till ca [...] miljarder pund, som täcks med likvida medel, Northern Rocks beviljade hypotekslån och serviceverksamhet, dess kontor, relevant personal, relevanta system och GIC-konton (2) som täcks med likvida medel till samma värde (ca [...] miljarder pund). |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Som ett resultat av den fördjupade finanskrisen och dess negativa effekt på Northern Rocks kapitalstruktur ändrade de brittiska myndigheterna, tillsammans med Northern Rock, omstruktureringsplanen. Enligt den nya planen skulle det ske en uppdelning av Northern Rock i två delar:

i)

BankCo, till vilken följande av Northern Rocks tillgångar överförs: Privatkundsinlåningen (ca 19,5 miljarder pund), som täcks med ca [...] miljarder pund i likvida medel och ca [...] miljarder pund av sådana panträtter i Northern Rock som kan handlas fritt och inte löper risk för krav från fordringsägare [...]; inlåningen från storföretagskunder, som för närvarande uppgår till ca [...] miljarder pund, som täcks med likvida medel, Northern Rocks beviljade hypotekslån och serviceverksamhet, dess kontor, relevant personal, relevanta system och GIC-konton (2) som täcks med likvida medel till samma värde (ca [...] miljarder pund).

| i) | AssetCo, som omfattar det befintliga företaget Northern Rock plc och får den återstående uppsättningen hypotekslån för bostadsfastigheter och Northern Rocks instrument för kapitalmarknadsfinansiering via finansiering i andra banker (dess andelar i värdepapperiseringsinstrumentet Granite och dess skulder enligt de täckta obligations- och EMTN-programmen, tillsammans med tillhörande hedging) tillsammans med därtill hänförliga skulder. AssetCo kommer även att behålla ansvaret för det befintliga statliga lånet till Northern Rock, som kommer att ökas med mellan [...] miljarder och [...] miljarder pund (beroende på tillgångarna eller skulderna vid tidpunkten för uppdelningen) för att möjliggöra omstruktureringen och kommer att få ett rörelsekapitalfacilitet på upp till [...] miljarder pund för att det ska ha tillräcklig likviditet under dess [...]. En marknadsmässig ränta kommer att tas ut för denna facilitet. |
| --- | --- |

i)

AssetCo, som omfattar det befintliga företaget Northern Rock plc och får den återstående uppsättningen hypotekslån för bostadsfastigheter och Northern Rocks instrument för kapitalmarknadsfinansiering via finansiering i andra banker (dess andelar i värdepapperiseringsinstrumentet Granite och dess skulder enligt de täckta obligations- och EMTN-programmen, tillsammans med tillhörande hedging) tillsammans med därtill hänförliga skulder. AssetCo kommer även att behålla ansvaret för det befintliga statliga lånet till Northern Rock, som kommer att ökas med mellan [...] miljarder och [...] miljarder pund (beroende på tillgångarna eller skulderna vid tidpunkten för uppdelningen) för att möjliggöra omstruktureringen och kommer att få ett rörelsekapitalfacilitet på upp till [...] miljarder pund för att det ska ha tillräcklig likviditet under dess [...]. En marknadsmässig ränta kommer att tas ut för denna facilitet.

| 5. | Den nya omstruktureringsplanen rymmer även kapitaltillskott till BankCo och AssetCo på [...] miljarder respektive [...] miljarder pund enligt ett grundscenario, en förändring i utlåningsstrategin, avbrytande av programmet för att aktivt försöka förmå kunderna att betala tillbaka sin lån och förändringar av konkurrensramen så att Northern Rock kan öka sin utlåning under 2009 och 2010 med totalt 14 miljarder euro. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Den nya omstruktureringsplanen rymmer även kapitaltillskott till BankCo och AssetCo på [...] miljarder respektive [...] miljarder pund enligt ett grundscenario, en förändring i utlåningsstrategin, avbrytande av programmet för att aktivt försöka förmå kunderna att betala tillbaka sin lån och förändringar av konkurrensramen så att Northern Rock kan öka sin utlåning under 2009 och 2010 med totalt 14 miljarder euro.

III.   BEDÖMNING

| 6. | När det gäller det omstruktureringsstöd som anmäldes den 31 mars 2009 har kommissionen beslutat att inleda ett detaljerat granskningsförfarande av följande orsaker:






  — | För det första konstaterar kommissionen att den nya omstruktureringsplanen innebär att BankCo slipper söka dyr finansiering på marknaden för att absorbera förlusterna av de osäkra fordringarna från Northern Rocks tidigare långivning. Detta tycks motsvara en form av räddningsprogram för osäkra tillgångar, eftersom Förenade kungariket väsentligen tar över stora delar av de osäkra tillgångarna i Northern Rocks verksamhet som förvaltas av BankCo. BankCo måste inte betala tillbaka det statliga lånet och får både Northern Rocks [...] tillgångar och en betydande mängd likvida medel. Som ett resultat av detta tycks BankCo bli en mycket konkurrenskraftig bank. Det är oklart om storleken på BankCo:s egna bidrag överensstämmer med riktlinjerna för undsättnings- omstruktureringsstöd Kommissionen betvivlar därför att stödet begränsas till ett minimum och att BankCo:s egna bidrag har varit tillräckligt. |
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6.

När det gäller det omstruktureringsstöd som anmäldes den 31 mars 2009 har kommissionen beslutat att inleda ett detaljerat granskningsförfarande av följande orsaker:

—

För det första konstaterar kommissionen att den nya omstruktureringsplanen innebär att BankCo slipper söka dyr finansiering på marknaden för att absorbera förlusterna av de osäkra fordringarna från Northern Rocks tidigare långivning. Detta tycks motsvara en form av räddningsprogram för osäkra tillgångar, eftersom Förenade kungariket väsentligen tar över stora delar av de osäkra tillgångarna i Northern Rocks verksamhet som förvaltas av BankCo. BankCo måste inte betala tillbaka det statliga lånet och får både Northern Rocks [...] tillgångar och en betydande mängd likvida medel. Som ett resultat av detta tycks BankCo bli en mycket konkurrenskraftig bank. Det är oklart om storleken på BankCo:s egna bidrag överensstämmer med riktlinjerna för undsättnings- omstruktureringsstöd Kommissionen betvivlar därför att stödet begränsas till ett minimum och att BankCo:s egna bidrag har varit tillräckligt.

| — | För det andra betvivlar kommissionen att stödåtgärdernas negativa spridningseffekter för konkurrenterna har begränsats till ett minimum. Såsom anges ovan tycks BankCo till följd av omstruktureringen ha blivit en mycket konkurrenskraftig bank med god kapitaltäckning. Stödet ger BankCo möjlighet att öka sin hypotekslånegivning och följaktligen öka sin andel av marknaden på bekostnad av övriga konkurrenter, eftersom BankCo till skillnad från konkurrenterna inte behöver axla bördan av förlusterna på sina tillgångar. Kommissionen konstaterar också att BankCo även fortsättningsvis kommer att förvalta AssetCo:s lån, vilket innebär ytterligare en fördel eftersom det då behåller kontakten med de befintliga kunderna. Med hänsyn tagen till stödets storlek hyser kommissionen tvivel om huruvida snedvridningen av konkurrensen i tillräckligt hög grad kan kompenseras med åtgärder som har till syfte att begränsa denna snedvridningen. |
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—

För det andra betvivlar kommissionen att stödåtgärdernas negativa spridningseffekter för konkurrenterna har begränsats till ett minimum. Såsom anges ovan tycks BankCo till följd av omstruktureringen ha blivit en mycket konkurrenskraftig bank med god kapitaltäckning. Stödet ger BankCo möjlighet att öka sin hypotekslånegivning och följaktligen öka sin andel av marknaden på bekostnad av övriga konkurrenter, eftersom BankCo till skillnad från konkurrenterna inte behöver axla bördan av förlusterna på sina tillgångar. Kommissionen konstaterar också att BankCo även fortsättningsvis kommer att förvalta AssetCo:s lån, vilket innebär ytterligare en fördel eftersom det då behåller kontakten med de befintliga kunderna. Med hänsyn tagen till stödets storlek hyser kommissionen tvivel om huruvida snedvridningen av konkurrensen i tillräckligt hög grad kan kompenseras med åtgärder som har till syfte att begränsa denna snedvridningen.

SJÄLVA SKRIVELSEN

”The Commission wishes to inform the United Kingdom that, having examined the revised restructuring plan such as notified by your authorities regarding the case referred to above, it has decided to extend the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty which was opened by decision C(2008)1210 final of 2 April 2008 (“the opening decision”).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 17 March 2008, the UK authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Northern Rock (“NR”) and notified the State aid measures which would accompany that plan to enable it to be implemented. On 2 April 2008, the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 88(2) EC Treaty regarding the restructuring aid planned to be granted to Northern Rock. By letter of 2 May 2008, the UK responded to the opening decision. |
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(1)

On 17 March 2008, the UK authorities submitted to the Commission a restructuring plan for Northern Rock (“NR”) and notified the State aid measures which would accompany that plan to enable it to be implemented. On 2 April 2008, the Commission opened a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Article 88(2) EC Treaty regarding the restructuring aid planned to be granted to Northern Rock. By letter of 2 May 2008, the UK responded to the opening decision.

| (2) | By letter of 25 April 2008, the Commission sent questions regarding the restructuring plan submitted on 31 March 2008, which was a slightly amended version of the plan notified on 17 March 2008. The UK provided answers by letter of 6 June 2008. On 30 June 2008, a meeting was held between the Commission services and the UK authorities. Following that meeting, the UK authorities provided additional information by letter of 13 August 2008. The UK authorities also provided information by letter of 8 July 2008. |
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(2)

By letter of 25 April 2008, the Commission sent questions regarding the restructuring plan submitted on 31 March 2008, which was a slightly amended version of the plan notified on 17 March 2008. The UK provided answers by letter of 6 June 2008. On 30 June 2008, a meeting was held between the Commission services and the UK authorities. Following that meeting, the UK authorities provided additional information by letter of 13 August 2008. The UK authorities also provided information by letter of 8 July 2008.

| (3) | The opening decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (3). The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the aid. The Commission has received comments from interested parties. By letter of 15 July 2008, received on 31 July 2008, it has forwarded them to the UK, which was given the opportunity to react; its comments were received by letter of 29 August 2008. |
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(3)

The opening decision was published in the Official Journal of the European Union
   (3). The Commission invited interested parties to submit their comments on the aid. The Commission has received comments from interested parties. By letter of 15 July 2008, received on 31 July 2008, it has forwarded them to the UK, which was given the opportunity to react; its comments were received by letter of 29 August 2008.

| (4) | On 5 August 2008, the UK government announced that it intended to convert up to 3 billion pounds of loans to Northern Rock into equity. |
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(4)

On 5 August 2008, the UK government announced that it intended to convert up to 3 billion pounds of loans to Northern Rock into equity.

| (5) | On 11 November 2008, 15 January 2009 and 4 February 2009, the UK authorities informed the Commission that it was considering plans for restructuring NR which significantly differed from the ones notified in March 2008 and outlined these plans. |
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(5)

On 11 November 2008, 15 January 2009 and 4 February 2009, the UK authorities informed the Commission that it was considering plans for restructuring NR which significantly differed from the ones notified in March 2008 and outlined these plans.

| (6) | On 20 February 2009, the UK authorities provided additional information on the intention to split the NR in two. A more detailed plan was notified by letter of 31 March 2009 and 2 April 2009. |
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(6)

On 20 February 2009, the UK authorities provided additional information on the intention to split the NR in two. A more detailed plan was notified by letter of 31 March 2009 and 2 April 2009.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The beneficiary and its difficulties

| (7) | Before the difficulties started in the second half of 2007, NR was the 5th biggest UK mortgage bank with a balance-sheet total of GBP 113,5 billion on 30 June 2007. In 2006, its interest income represented GBP 5 billion, with a profit of GBP 443 million. The bank had a staff of 6 000 persons. NR has 77 branches throughout the UK and was present in Ireland, Denmark and Guernsey. Residential mortgage lending was NR’s core activity. It represented more than 90 % of all outstanding loans to customers. In the first half of 2007, the bank had a market share of UK gross mortgage lending of 9,7 % and of net mortgage lending of 18,9 % (4). NR financed the majority of its long-term mortgage loans by issuing securitised notes. In March 2001 NR established a “master trust” securitisation structure known as “Granite” of which it has made extensive use. NR also funded itself through the issue of “covered bonds”. |
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(7)

Before the difficulties started in the second half of 2007, NR was the 5th biggest UK mortgage bank with a balance-sheet total of GBP 113,5 billion on 30 June 2007. In 2006, its interest income represented GBP 5 billion, with a profit of GBP 443 million. The bank had a staff of 6 000 persons. NR has 77 branches throughout the UK and was present in Ireland, Denmark and Guernsey. Residential mortgage lending was NR’s core activity. It represented more than 90 % of all outstanding loans to customers. In the first half of 2007, the bank had a market share of UK gross mortgage lending of 9,7 % and of net mortgage lending of 18,9 % (4). NR financed the majority of its long-term mortgage loans by issuing securitised notes. In March 2001 NR established a “master trust” securitisation structure known as “Granite” of which it has made extensive use. NR also funded itself through the issue of “covered bonds”.

| (8) | In section 2.1 of the first opening decision, the Commission provided more information on the beneficiary. Section 2.2 of the opening decision described the difficulties it encountered, which led the UK authorities to provide loans and guarantees, which were approved as rescue aid by the Commission Decision of 5 December 2007 (5). Some of the loans were initially granted by the Bank of England (“BoE”) and counter-guaranteed by the State. All the loans granted by BoE were novated on 28 August 2008 to HM Treasury. Section 2.3.1 of the opening decision described the circumstances which led the State to provide additional state guarantees on 18 December 2007. (In section 4.5.2 of the opening decision, the Commission concluded that these additional guarantees constituted compatible rescue aid.) Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the opening decision described respectively the attempts by NR and the UK authorities to find a private sector solution and the restructuring plans submitted to the government by Virgin and by NR’s management. Section 2.3.4 indicated that NR was nationalised on 22 February 2008 on the basis of legislation introduced the preceding days. |
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(8)

In section 2.1 of the first opening decision, the Commission provided more information on the beneficiary. Section 2.2 of the opening decision described the difficulties it encountered, which led the UK authorities to provide loans and guarantees, which were approved as rescue aid by the Commission Decision of 5 December 2007 (5). Some of the loans were initially granted by the Bank of England (“BoE”) and counter-guaranteed by the State. All the loans granted by BoE were novated on 28 August 2008 to HM Treasury. Section 2.3.1 of the opening decision described the circumstances which led the State to provide additional state guarantees on 18 December 2007. (In section 4.5.2 of the opening decision, the Commission concluded that these additional guarantees constituted compatible rescue aid.) Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 of the opening decision described respectively the attempts by NR and the UK authorities to find a private sector solution and the restructuring plans submitted to the government by Virgin and by NR’s management. Section 2.3.4 indicated that NR was nationalised on 22 February 2008 on the basis of legislation introduced the preceding days.

2.2.   The restructuring plan notified on 17 March 2008

| (9) | The restructuring plan notified on 17 March 2008 was described in section 2.3.5 of the first opening decision. The main elements of this plan are summarised once more here below, in order to facilitate the comparison with the new restructuring plan. |
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(9)

The restructuring plan notified on 17 March 2008 was described in section 2.3.5 of the first opening decision. The main elements of this plan are summarised once more here below, in order to facilitate the comparison with the new restructuring plan.

| (10) | As regards the size of the balance sheet, the plan notified on 17 March 2008 envisaged that the NR balance sheet would contract in the first five years of the plan from about GBP 107 billion in 2007 to about GBP 48-53 billion at the end of 2011. This would be achieved through an active retail mortgage redemption programme with the aim of encouraging at least 60 % of customers with maturing products (i.e. maturing from product deals) to remortgage with another lender; and exiting all new commercial lending and new standalone unsecured lending. NR would also continue to conduct limited levels of new lending over this period (in the base case about 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011 compared with more that GBP 30 billion in 2007). This new lending would be offered predominantly to high credit quality new customers. |
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(10)

As regards the size of the balance sheet, the plan notified on 17 March 2008 envisaged that the NR balance sheet would contract in the first five years of the plan from about GBP 107 billion in 2007 to about GBP 48-53 billion at the end of 2011. This would be achieved through an active retail mortgage redemption programme with the aim of encouraging at least 60 % of customers with maturing products (i.e. maturing from product deals) to remortgage with another lender; and exiting all new commercial lending and new standalone unsecured lending. NR would also continue to conduct limited levels of new lending over this period (in the base case about 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011 compared with more that GBP 30 billion in 2007). This new lending would be offered predominantly to high credit quality new customers.

| (11) | As to the structure of funding and limiting maturity mismatch, the plan envisaged that the proportion of retail funding to total funding would increase from 15-20 % in 2008 to about [...] (6) in 2011 and about [...] in 2012, re-balancing the balance sheet. This would be reflected in a decrease in total funding and an increase in retail deposits from GBP 10,5 billion at the end of 2007 (i.e. after the bank run) to about GBP [...] billion in 2011, which remains below the pre-crisis level of GBP 24 billion. The projected growth in the deposit base represented a moderate increase in the share of the total market compared to levels prevailing at the time (about 1,2-1,5 % compared to 0,8 %) and below the pre-crisis share of 1,9 % for the duration of the restructuring period. |
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(11)

As to the structure of funding and limiting maturity mismatch, the plan envisaged that the proportion of retail funding to total funding would increase from 15-20 % in 2008 to about [...] (6) in 2011 and about [...] in 2012, re-balancing the balance sheet. This would be reflected in a decrease in total funding and an increase in retail deposits from GBP 10,5 billion at the end of 2007 (i.e. after the bank run) to about GBP [...] billion in 2011, which remains below the pre-crisis level of GBP 24 billion. The projected growth in the deposit base represented a moderate increase in the share of the total market compared to levels prevailing at the time (about 1,2-1,5 % compared to 0,8 %) and below the pre-crisis share of 1,9 % for the duration of the restructuring period.

| (12) | As regards overseas activities, NR proposed that its Danish operations would be closed and a small capability would be retained in Ireland and Guernsey to maintain some diversification of the funding base. |
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(12)

As regards overseas activities, NR proposed that its Danish operations would be closed and a small capability would be retained in Ireland and Guernsey to maintain some diversification of the funding base.

| (13) | As regards the BoE facilities, the plan’s priority was their rapid repayment. The plan envisaged that these facilities would be fully repaid around [...] 2010 in the base case, although there would be a BoE/Treasury liquidity facility that might remain in place until about the end of [...]. |
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(13)

As regards the BoE facilities, the plan’s priority was their rapid repayment. The plan envisaged that these facilities would be fully repaid around [...] 2010 in the base case, although there would be a BoE/Treasury liquidity facility that might remain in place until about the end of [...].

| (14) | As regards the State guarantees, the plan envisaged, in the base case, the removal of all guarantees by the end of 2011. There would be a staggered release. As regards the retail funding guarantee arrangements (which cover all new and existing retail deposits) in the base case, the indicative earliest release date for new retail deposits would be [...]. The indicative earliest release date for existing retail deposits would be the [...]. For non-retail deposits, the indicative date for removal of the guarantees in the base case would be during [...]. Under the recession case scenario, the guarantee arrangements would be required until about 2013. The precise timing of the release of the guarantee arrangements would be driven by capital requirements and market conditions. |
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(14)

As regards the State guarantees, the plan envisaged, in the base case, the removal of all guarantees by the end of 2011. There would be a staggered release. As regards the retail funding guarantee arrangements (which cover all new and existing retail deposits) in the base case, the indicative earliest release date for new retail deposits would be [...]. The indicative earliest release date for existing retail deposits would be the [...]. For non-retail deposits, the indicative date for removal of the guarantees in the base case would be during [...]. Under the recession case scenario, the guarantee arrangements would be required until about 2013. The precise timing of the release of the guarantee arrangements would be driven by capital requirements and market conditions.

| (15) | As regards management, there was a significant change in the composition of the board with the appointment of a new executive Chairman, a new Chief Financial Officer, and three new non-executive directors appointed by the Government. |
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(15)

As regards management, there was a significant change in the composition of the board with the appointment of a new executive Chairman, a new Chief Financial Officer, and three new non-executive directors appointed by the Government.

| (16) | As regards compensatory measure, the Government was prepared to commit to the following specific measures:






  (i) | A targeted reduction in the balance sheet by over [...] % to about GBP 48-53 billion by 2011. |
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(16)

As regards compensatory measure, the Government was prepared to commit to the following specific measures:

(i)

A targeted reduction in the balance sheet by over [...] % to about GBP 48-53 billion by 2011.

| (ii) | A reduction of new residential mortgage origination from (in the base case) over GBP 30 billion in 2007 to about GBP 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011, and in any event within the limits of the market share cap on gross new lending. |
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(ii)

A reduction of new residential mortgage origination from (in the base case) over GBP 30 billion in 2007 to about GBP 18-23 billion in total for the four years from 2008 to 2011, and in any event within the limits of the market share cap on gross new lending.

| (iii) | A commitment to an aggressive redemption policy including the active encouragement of redeeming customers to move to competitors. |
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(iii)

A commitment to an aggressive redemption policy including the active encouragement of redeeming customers to move to competitors.

| (iv) | Closure and run-off of NR’s operations in Denmark in 2008 and a commitment not to expand in other EU markets before 2011. |
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(iv)

Closure and run-off of NR’s operations in Denmark in 2008 and a commitment not to expand in other EU markets before 2011.

| (v) | A commitment to a “Competitive Charter”, which would notably include commitments that:






  (i) | NR would not promote its Government backing in any market; |
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(v)

A commitment to a “Competitive Charter”, which would notably include commitments that:

(i)

NR would not promote its Government backing in any market;

| (ii) | NR would not allow its share of retail deposit balances to exceed 1,5 % in the UK and [0,8-1 %] in Ireland; |
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(ii)

NR would not allow its share of retail deposit balances to exceed 1,5 % in the UK and [0,8-1 %] in Ireland;

| (iii) | NR would limit its share of gross new mortgage origination to below 2,5 % in any calendar year; |
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(iii)

NR would limit its share of gross new mortgage origination to below 2,5 % in any calendar year;

| (iv) | NR would ensure that it would not rank within the top positions in the defined 15 Moneyfacts retail deposit categories for the remainder of 2008; |
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(iv)

NR would ensure that it would not rank within the top positions in the defined 15 Moneyfacts retail deposit categories for the remainder of 2008;

| (vi) | A commitment to withdraw from unsecured personal lending and commercial lending for the restructuring period. |
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(vi)

A commitment to withdraw from unsecured personal lending and commercial lending for the restructuring period.

| (vii) | A commitment not to increase the overall number of branches in the UK. |
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(vii)

A commitment not to increase the overall number of branches in the UK.

| (17) | The plan envisaged that these compensatory measures, unless otherwise specified above, would remain in place until such time as the BoE/Treasury financial assistance has been fully repaid (and the liquidity facility transferred to a third party provider) and the balance sheet guarantee arrangements have been released in full. |
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(17)

The plan envisaged that these compensatory measures, unless otherwise specified above, would remain in place until such time as the BoE/Treasury financial assistance has been fully repaid (and the liquidity facility transferred to a third party provider) and the balance sheet guarantee arrangements have been released in full.

2.3.   The new restructuring plan notified on 2 April 2009

| (18) | From December 2007 onwards, Northern Rock’s capital position has deteriorated significantly. By December 2008 Core Tier 1 capital had fallen to -GBP 17,1 million and total Tier 1 capital (after deductions) to -GBP 110,4 million due to severe losses incurred by Northern Rock as a result of the global financial crisis. (7) In addition the reduction in the company’s balance sheet in accordance with the original restructuring plan, combined with the effects of the financial crisis has led to an increase in the risk weighting of assets in the short to medium term as the credit quality of the remaining book decreased, leading to an effective increase in Tier 1 capital requirements. Revised projections now indicate that up to GBP [...] billion of additional capital would be required under the plan of March 2008 if the deterioration of the book continues. |
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(18)

From December 2007 onwards, Northern Rock’s capital position has deteriorated significantly. By December 2008 Core Tier 1 capital had fallen to -GBP 17,1 million and total Tier 1 capital (after deductions) to -GBP 110,4 million due to severe losses incurred by Northern Rock as a result of the global financial crisis. (7) In addition the reduction in the company’s balance sheet in accordance with the original restructuring plan, combined with the effects of the financial crisis has led to an increase in the risk weighting of assets in the short to medium term as the credit quality of the remaining book decreased, leading to an effective increase in Tier 1 capital requirements. Revised projections now indicate that up to GBP [...] billion of additional capital would be required under the plan of March 2008 if the deterioration of the book continues.

| (19) | Given the significant interest rate cuts as a result of the financial crisis and the consequential reduction of Northern Rock’s SVR (8), the company also anticipates a significant reduction in the rate of mortgage redemptions in 2009. In the restructuring plan that was notified in March 2008, it was expected that 60 % of customers maturing from product deals would redeem in 2009. This is now expected to reduce to around [30 %-40 %]. |
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(19)

Given the significant interest rate cuts as a result of the financial crisis and the consequential reduction of Northern Rock’s SVR (8), the company also anticipates a significant reduction in the rate of mortgage redemptions in 2009. In the restructuring plan that was notified in March 2008, it was expected that 60 % of customers maturing from product deals would redeem in 2009. This is now expected to reduce to around [30 %-40 %].

| (20) | In light of these concerns, the Government and Northern Rock have agreed a number of modifications to the restructuring plan as originally set out in March 2008 in order to recognise the significant change in market conditions over this period, address the capital position, and support the wider initiatives that the Government is taking to support the UK economy. |
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(20)

In light of these concerns, the Government and Northern Rock have agreed a number of modifications to the restructuring plan as originally set out in March 2008 in order to recognise the significant change in market conditions over this period, address the capital position, and support the wider initiatives that the Government is taking to support the UK economy.

2.3.1.   The split of the bank in a bad bank and a good bank

| (21) | The core proposal is that there will be a restructuring of the business so that the majority of the back book of mortgages, and Northern Rock’s existing wholesale funding arrangements, will be managed separately from its other businesses. Northern Rock will be divided into:






  (i) | “BankCo” which will be a new company authorised by the FSA as a deposit taker. Assets will be transferred from Northern Rock to BankCo by order under the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008. These are expected to include the retail deposit book, currently standing at approximately GBP 19,5 bn, matched with approximately GBP [...] billion of cash assets and approximately GBP [...] billion of Northern Rock’s [...] unencumbered mortgage assets. Wholesale deposits, currently totalling approximately GBP [...] billion, will also be transferred to BankCo, matched by cash assets of an equal value. (9) BankCo will also contain the Northern Rock mortgage origination and servicing platform, its branches (including the branch in Ireland and the Guernsey subsidiary), relevant staff and systems. In addition, the intention is that the GIC accounts (10) will be transferred to BankCo, matched by cash assets of an equal value (approximately GBP [...] billion); this is likely to be dependent on the company’s rating and the decision of Granite’s trustees. |
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(21)

The core proposal is that there will be a restructuring of the business so that the majority of the back book of mortgages, and Northern Rock’s existing wholesale funding arrangements, will be managed separately from its other businesses. Northern Rock will be divided into:

(i)

“BankCo” which will be a new company authorised by the FSA as a deposit taker. Assets will be transferred from Northern Rock to BankCo by order under the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008. These are expected to include the retail deposit book, currently standing at approximately GBP 19,5 bn, matched with approximately GBP [...] billion of cash assets and approximately GBP [...] billion of Northern Rock’s [...] unencumbered mortgage assets. Wholesale deposits, currently totalling approximately GBP [...] billion, will also be transferred to BankCo, matched by cash assets of an equal value. (9) BankCo will also contain the Northern Rock mortgage origination and servicing platform, its branches (including the branch in Ireland and the Guernsey subsidiary), relevant staff and systems. In addition, the intention is that the GIC accounts (10) will be transferred to BankCo, matched by cash assets of an equal value (approximately GBP [...] billion); this is likely to be dependent on the company’s rating and the decision of Granite’s trustees.

| (ii) | “AssetCo” which will be the existing company, Northern Rock plc. The intention is that AssetCo will be left with the remaining pool of residential mortgages and Northern Rock’s wholesale funding instruments (principally its interest in the Granite securitisation vehicle and its liabilities under the covered bond and EMTN programmes, together with associated hedging) together with the associated liabilities. AssetCo will also retain the liability for the existing Government loan to Northern Rock, which will be increased by between GBP [...] and GBP [...] billion (exact amount to be set depending on the assets and liabilities that exist at the time of the split) to enable the implementation of the restructuring. In addition, the Government will provide AssetCo with a working capital facility of up to GBP [...] billion to ensure that it has adequate liquidity during the course of its [...]. A commercial rate will be charged for this facility. |
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(ii)

“AssetCo” which will be the existing company, Northern Rock plc. The intention is that AssetCo will be left with the remaining pool of residential mortgages and Northern Rock’s wholesale funding instruments (principally its interest in the Granite securitisation vehicle and its liabilities under the covered bond and EMTN programmes, together with associated hedging) together with the associated liabilities. AssetCo will also retain the liability for the existing Government loan to Northern Rock, which will be increased by between GBP [...] and GBP [...] billion (exact amount to be set depending on the assets and liabilities that exist at the time of the split) to enable the implementation of the restructuring. In addition, the Government will provide AssetCo with a working capital facility of up to GBP [...] billion to ensure that it has adequate liquidity during the course of its [...]. A commercial rate will be charged for this facility.

| (22) | There will be a service agreement between the two companies under which BankCo is likely to manage AssetCo’s mortgage book and its other remaining assets and liabilities. It is envisaged that any regulated activities that AssetCo would otherwise need to perform will be carried out by BankCo under the service agreement. FSA approval of these arrangements will be required in order to enable the two entities to be capitalised separately. |
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(22)

There will be a service agreement between the two companies under which BankCo is likely to manage AssetCo’s mortgage book and its other remaining assets and liabilities. It is envisaged that any regulated activities that AssetCo would otherwise need to perform will be carried out by BankCo under the service agreement. FSA approval of these arrangements will be required in order to enable the two entities to be capitalised separately.

| (23) | The current assumption is that AssetCo will be wound down [...]. To the extent that AssetCo’s assets are not sufficient to fund repayment of its liabilities [...], further Government support may be required to permit a [...]. |
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(23)

The current assumption is that AssetCo will be wound down [...]. To the extent that AssetCo’s assets are not sufficient to fund repayment of its liabilities [...], further Government support may be required to permit a [...].

| (24) | In the immediate future both BankCo and AssetCo will remain wholly owned by the Government. However, it is intended that the implementation of this structure will also assist in facilitating a return of BankCo to the private sector, and to independent operation, at an earlier date than would otherwise be the case. |
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(24)

In the immediate future both BankCo and AssetCo will remain wholly owned by the Government. However, it is intended that the implementation of this structure will also assist in facilitating a return of BankCo to the private sector, and to independent operation, at an earlier date than would otherwise be the case.

2.3.2.   Capital structure

| (25) | In order to address the negative evolution of Northern Rock’s regulatory capital base the Government had previously agreed in August 2008 to convert GBP 400 million of preference shares, and up to GBP 3 billion of the loan from the Government into ordinary shares of the company. In light of the proposed restructuring these proposals will not be implemented in this form, but as follows:






  — | BankCo will need to be capitalised by the Government with equity and, potentially, subordinated or other forms of long term debt in order to meet its regulatory capital requirements in a central and stress case scenario. In a stress case scenario its total capital requirement is expected to be up to GBP [...] billion. |
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(25)

In order to address the negative evolution of Northern Rock’s regulatory capital base the Government had previously agreed in August 2008 to convert GBP 400 million of preference shares, and up to GBP 3 billion of the loan from the Government into ordinary shares of the company. In light of the proposed restructuring these proposals will not be implemented in this form, but as follows:

—

BankCo will need to be capitalised by the Government with equity and, potentially, subordinated or other forms of long term debt in order to meet its regulatory capital requirements in a central and stress case scenario. In a stress case scenario its total capital requirement is expected to be up to GBP [...] billion.

| — | AssetCo is currently expected to be subject to a regulatory capital requirement of 1 % in the medium term, reflecting its activities as a [...]. In the medium to long term, the intention is that AssetCo will reduce its activities such that it falls outside the scope of the FSA. However, in the short term, it will need to satisfy FSA requirements before its capital requirements are reduced. In a central case AssetCo is not expected to require any capital support from the Government. However, in a stress scenario (and based on a 1 % regulatory capital requirement) AssetCo could require support of around GBP [...] billion to cover a capital shortfall in 2010-11, although capital is forecast to recover to a positive position in [...]. The current intention of the Government is to ensure AssetCo is able to fund repayment of its liabilities as they fall due and its ongoing operations should its assets not be sufficient. |
| --- | --- |

—

AssetCo is currently expected to be subject to a regulatory capital requirement of 1 % in the medium term, reflecting its activities as a [...]. In the medium to long term, the intention is that AssetCo will reduce its activities such that it falls outside the scope of the FSA. However, in the short term, it will need to satisfy FSA requirements before its capital requirements are reduced. In a central case AssetCo is not expected to require any capital support from the Government. However, in a stress scenario (and based on a 1 % regulatory capital requirement) AssetCo could require support of around GBP [...] billion to cover a capital shortfall in 2010-11, although capital is forecast to recover to a positive position in [...]. The current intention of the Government is to ensure AssetCo is able to fund repayment of its liabilities as they fall due and its ongoing operations should its assets not be sufficient.

| (26) | The capital requirements in a stress scenario under the revised structure therefore total approximately GBP [...] billion (in line with the August 2008 proposals). The reason for the lower capital requirements is that under the revised structure the bulk of the assets that are the most capital-absorptive are held in run-off in an entity which, in the medium to long term, and subject to AssetCo falling outside the scope of the FSA’s remit, is expected to have no regulatory capital requirement. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The capital requirements in a stress scenario under the revised structure therefore total approximately GBP [...] billion (in line with the August 2008 proposals). The reason for the lower capital requirements is that under the revised structure the bulk of the assets that are the most capital-absorptive are held in run-off in an entity which, in the medium to long term, and subject to AssetCo falling outside the scope of the FSA’s remit, is expected to have no regulatory capital requirement.

| (27) | Northern Rock’s capital position has been addressed to date through a continuation of the interim arrangements that were set up at the same time as the August 2008 proposals. At the company’s request, the FSA agreed to waive the limits on use of Tier 2 capital that would otherwise have applied as a result of the reduction in the level of total Tier 1 resources. This means that all available Tier 2 capital can be included within the capital resources of the company for the purposes of meeting the Company’s minimum regulatory requirements. These arrangements were implemented on a temporary basis until the earlier of the recapitalisation of the Company or 31 December 2008. The arrangements were subsequently renewed [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Northern Rock’s capital position has been addressed to date through a continuation of the interim arrangements that were set up at the same time as the August 2008 proposals. At the company’s request, the FSA agreed to waive the limits on use of Tier 2 capital that would otherwise have applied as a result of the reduction in the level of total Tier 1 resources. This means that all available Tier 2 capital can be included within the capital resources of the company for the purposes of meeting the Company’s minimum regulatory requirements. These arrangements were implemented on a temporary basis until the earlier of the recapitalisation of the Company or 31 December 2008. The arrangements were subsequently renewed [...].

2.3.3.   Amendments to Government loan

| (28) | In addition to the increase, described above, in the existing loan to Northern Rock, there will also be an adjustment to the terms of the loan. This will extend final repayment of the loan to beyond [...] (or to the liquidation of AssetCo if earlier). The rate of interest will also be reviewed and a new future rate will be agreed between the Government and the company. Northern Rock plc currently pays interest at Bank of England base rate plus [...] bps. As set out in the loan agreement, this will revert to [...] plus [...] bps when state aid approval is granted, backdated to [...]. The future rate of interest to be charged on the loan is not yet fixed but will be at least [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition to the increase, described above, in the existing loan to Northern Rock, there will also be an adjustment to the terms of the loan. This will extend final repayment of the loan to beyond [...] (or to the liquidation of AssetCo if earlier). The rate of interest will also be reviewed and a new future rate will be agreed between the Government and the company. Northern Rock plc currently pays interest at Bank of England base rate plus [...] bps. As set out in the loan agreement, this will revert to [...] plus [...] bps when state aid approval is granted, backdated to [...]. The future rate of interest to be charged on the loan is not yet fixed but will be at least [...].

2.3.4.   Amendments to lending strategy

| (29) | On 19 January 2009 the Government announced a series of measures designed to reinforce the stability of the financial system, increase capacity and confidence to lend, and in turn to support the recovery of the UK economy. This included an announcement that Northern Rock would no longer actively pursue a policy of rapidly reducing its mortgage book. On 23 February 2009 a further press release confirmed that Northern Rock would be increasing mortgage lending by up to GBP 14 billion over the next two years (GBP 5 billion in 2009 and up to GBP 9 billion in 2010) on a range of products. Existing customers will also no longer be actively encouraged to leave Northern Rock when their mortgage arrangements become freely renewable. The new lending will be subject to market demand and will take place on commercial terms. The new lending will be funded from the opening cash transferred to the BankCo business, deposits with BankCo, and repayments on its loan book. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

On 19 January 2009 the Government announced a series of measures designed to reinforce the stability of the financial system, increase capacity and confidence to lend, and in turn to support the recovery of the UK economy. This included an announcement that Northern Rock would no longer actively pursue a policy of rapidly reducing its mortgage book. On 23 February 2009 a further press release confirmed that Northern Rock would be increasing mortgage lending by up to GBP 14 billion over the next two years (GBP 5 billion in 2009 and up to GBP 9 billion in 2010) on a range of products. Existing customers will also no longer be actively encouraged to leave Northern Rock when their mortgage arrangements become freely renewable. The new lending will be subject to market demand and will take place on commercial terms. The new lending will be funded from the opening cash transferred to the BankCo business, deposits with BankCo, and repayments on its loan book.

2.3.5.   [...] guarantee arrangements

| (30) | The March 2008 business plan envisaged the release of all guarantees by the end of 2011 (in the base case). This date was conditional on a number of factors, including repayment of the Government loan and a robust capital position ([...]). [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The March 2008 business plan envisaged the release of all guarantees by the end of 2011 (in the base case). This date was conditional on a number of factors, including repayment of the Government loan and a robust capital position ([...]). [...].

| (31) | [...]. All guarantee arrangements are subject to a minimum period of three months between the Government giving notice and guarantees being lifted. However, some products (such as fixed term bonds) are guaranteed for their term, so in these instances guarantees will roll off as the products expire. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

[...]. All guarantee arrangements are subject to a minimum period of three months between the Government giving notice and guarantees being lifted. However, some products (such as fixed term bonds) are guaranteed for their term, so in these instances guarantees will roll off as the products expire.

| (32) | [...]. It is likely that BankCo will need to achieve an A- long term rating from credit rating agencies in order to be able to access the wholesale markets. [...]. The wholesale guarantee arrangements for AssetCo are likely to remain in place until exit or liquidation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

[...]. It is likely that BankCo will need to achieve an A- long term rating from credit rating agencies in order to be able to access the wholesale markets. [...]. The wholesale guarantee arrangements for AssetCo are likely to remain in place until exit or liquidation.

2.3.6.   Revised Competitive Framework

| (33) | NR has operated within the terms of the Competitive Framework to date. It is proposed that the Competitive Framework will continue to restrict the activities of BankCo for 12 months [...], although there will be some adjustments required to accommodate the revised lending strategy. More specifically:






  — | BankCo will limit its new mortgage lending to GBP 5 billion in the UK in 2009 and GBP 4,5 billion in the first half of 2010. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(33)

NR has operated within the terms of the Competitive Framework to date. It is proposed that the Competitive Framework will continue to restrict the activities of BankCo for 12 months [...], although there will be some adjustments required to accommodate the revised lending strategy. More specifically:

—

BankCo will limit its new mortgage lending to GBP 5 billion in the UK in 2009 and GBP 4,5 billion in the first half of 2010.

| — | It will also restrict the level of total retail deposit balances to no more than GBP 21 billion at any stage prior to 30 June 2010 (current retail balances amount to GBP 19,5 billion). The effect of this will be an earlier increase in the level of retail deposits than forecasted in the original plan. The March 2008 plan envisaged retail deposits of GBP 15 billion in 2009 growing to approximately GBP 26 billion in 2013. These will now be approximately GBP [...] billion in 2009 [...] growing to an indicative figure of GBP 25 billion by 2013. |
| --- | --- |

—

It will also restrict the level of total retail deposit balances to no more than GBP 21 billion at any stage prior to 30 June 2010 (current retail balances amount to GBP 19,5 billion). The effect of this will be an earlier increase in the level of retail deposits than forecasted in the original plan. The March 2008 plan envisaged retail deposits of GBP 15 billion in 2009 growing to approximately GBP 26 billion in 2013. These will now be approximately GBP [...] billion in 2009 [...] growing to an indicative figure of GBP 25 billion by 2013.

| — | BankCo would also continue to follow the previous commitments to not promoting its Government backing. |
| --- | --- |

—

BankCo would also continue to follow the previous commitments to not promoting its Government backing.

| (34) | Modified commitments in the Competitive Charter have been framed in terms of absolute numbers, rather than market shares as this is more predictable and easier to assess given the volatility in the size and composition of the market. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Modified commitments in the Competitive Charter have been framed in terms of absolute numbers, rather than market shares as this is more predictable and easier to assess given the volatility in the size and composition of the market.

3.   POSITION OF THE UK

| (35) | The UK Government recalls that since the notification of the restructuring plan in March 2008, the situation of the world financial market and the UK economy has dramatically worsened. Several financial institutions which were present in the UK have withdrawn from the country and some of the largest UK banks are facing extreme difficulties which causes them to reduce their lending (and risk weighted assets) in order to reduce their capital requirements and improve their solvency ratios. As a consequence, the supply of mortgage loans has been severely reduced, especially for loans with high loan-to-value ratios (LTV). House prices in the UK have already declined by around 20 % compared to their highest level. Each additional decline is creating additional losses for banks, which further depletes their capital, and is increasing the risk weighting of their existing loans. Consequently, the banks further reduce new lending, which in turn contributes to reduce the demand for houses and increases downwards pressure on house prices, thus creating a downwards spiral. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The UK Government recalls that since the notification of the restructuring plan in March 2008, the situation of the world financial market and the UK economy has dramatically worsened. Several financial institutions which were present in the UK have withdrawn from the country and some of the largest UK banks are facing extreme difficulties which causes them to reduce their lending (and risk weighted assets) in order to reduce their capital requirements and improve their solvency ratios. As a consequence, the supply of mortgage loans has been severely reduced, especially for loans with high loan-to-value ratios (LTV). House prices in the UK have already declined by around 20 % compared to their highest level. Each additional decline is creating additional losses for banks, which further depletes their capital, and is increasing the risk weighting of their existing loans. Consequently, the banks further reduce new lending, which in turn contributes to reduce the demand for houses and increases downwards pressure on house prices, thus creating a downwards spiral.

| (36) | In response to this crisis, the Government has introduced new measures (11) and granted aid to several banks. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In response to this crisis, the Government has introduced new measures (11) and granted aid to several banks.

| (37) | The UK authorities recall that Northern Rock has made significant progress in repaying the Government loan to date, primarily as a result of its mortgage redemption programme under which it provides assistance to customers to access new products with alternative lenders. From a peak of approximately GBP 27 billion at the end of December 2007, Northern Rock had repaid GBP 12,5 billion on a gross basis by the end of March 2009 and remains ahead of schedule on its loan repayments. The company has also been successful in implementing other elements of the plan, including a significant reduction in its balance sheet from GBP 107 billion as at December 2007 to GBP 93 billion as at 31 December 2008 (excluding the fair value of derivatives) and an increase in its level of retail funding from 10 % (at year end 2007) to 20 % (at year end 2008), withdrawal from the Danish market and from its unsecured lending business, and full compliance with the market share caps and pricing restrictions set out in its Competitive Framework. This has required Northern Rock to forego significant commercial opportunities, including giving up a large number of high credit quality profitable customers through its active mortgage redemption programme. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The UK authorities recall that Northern Rock has made significant progress in repaying the Government loan to date, primarily as a result of its mortgage redemption programme under which it provides assistance to customers to access new products with alternative lenders. From a peak of approximately GBP 27 billion at the end of December 2007, Northern Rock had repaid GBP 12,5 billion on a gross basis by the end of March 2009 and remains ahead of schedule on its loan repayments. The company has also been successful in implementing other elements of the plan, including a significant reduction in its balance sheet from GBP 107 billion as at December 2007 to GBP 93 billion as at 31 December 2008 (excluding the fair value of derivatives) and an increase in its level of retail funding from 10 % (at year end 2007) to 20 % (at year end 2008), withdrawal from the Danish market and from its unsecured lending business, and full compliance with the market share caps and pricing restrictions set out in its Competitive Framework. This has required Northern Rock to forego significant commercial opportunities, including giving up a large number of high credit quality profitable customers through its active mortgage redemption programme.

| (38) | The Government takes the view that the amendments that are proposed to the Northern Rock plan do not materially change the analysis of these arrangements under the rescue and restructuring guidelines. In particular:






  — | The increase in mortgage lending is consistent with the strong progress that the company has made to redeem its existing mortgage book and repay Government lending. It should also be regarded as a measure in support of wider Government intervention to address concerns about the impact of the financial crisis on the wider economy. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(38)

The Government takes the view that the amendments that are proposed to the Northern Rock plan do not materially change the analysis of these arrangements under the rescue and restructuring guidelines. In particular:

—

The increase in mortgage lending is consistent with the strong progress that the company has made to redeem its existing mortgage book and repay Government lending. It should also be regarded as a measure in support of wider Government intervention to address concerns about the impact of the financial crisis on the wider economy.

| — | Although retail deposits will increase sooner than previously envisaged, they will remain within the limits set out in the revised Competitive Framework and by 2013 the level of deposits is forecast to be less than the March 2008 business plan. |
| --- | --- |

—

Although retail deposits will increase sooner than previously envisaged, they will remain within the limits set out in the revised Competitive Framework and by 2013 the level of deposits is forecast to be less than the March 2008 business plan.

| — | The restructuring proposals will assist in minimising the overall level of aid to Northern Rock by reducing the overall regulatory capital requirement of the two businesses. |
| --- | --- |

—

The restructuring proposals will assist in minimising the overall level of aid to Northern Rock by reducing the overall regulatory capital requirement of the two businesses.

| — | [...]. |
| --- | --- |

—

[...].

| — | The company has made a significant contribution to the costs of the restructuring in the form of the sale of the Herm portfolio and the accelerated monetisation of assets to date as described in the March 2008 plan as well as the closure of Northern Rock’s branch in Denmark in June 2008. |
| --- | --- |

—

The company has made a significant contribution to the costs of the restructuring in the form of the sale of the Herm portfolio and the accelerated monetisation of assets to date as described in the March 2008 plan as well as the closure of Northern Rock’s branch in Denmark in June 2008.

| — | The Competitive Framework will continue to restrict the activities of BankCo for 12 months [...], although there will be some adjustments required to accommodate the revised lending strategy. Distortions of competition as a result of the aid will therefore continue to be minimised, and in reality the competitive impact of the arrangements in relation to Northern Rock are in any event likely to be eclipsed by the wider dislocations in the market for some time. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Competitive Framework will continue to restrict the activities of BankCo for 12 months [...], although there will be some adjustments required to accommodate the revised lending strategy. Distortions of competition as a result of the aid will therefore continue to be minimised, and in reality the competitive impact of the arrangements in relation to Northern Rock are in any event likely to be eclipsed by the wider dislocations in the market for some time.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1.   Existence of aid

| (39) | The Commission must assess whether the measures introduced or modified by the new restructuring plan constitute State aid. Article 87(1) EC lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Commission must assess whether the measures introduced or modified by the new restructuring plan constitute State aid. Article 87(1) EC lays down that any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.

| (40) | The UK Government intends to introduce new measures and to amend existing ones in favour of AssetCo and BankCo. As such, all measures described below (increased amount of government loans, working capital facility, guarantees and capital injections in favour of AssetCo and asset relief measure in favour of BankCo, see paragraph (45)) are financed through State resources. Before individually describing these measures in more detail and assessing whether they confer a selective advantage on AssetCo and BankCo, the Commission will first assess whether State support is able to distort competition and affect trade between the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The UK Government intends to introduce new measures and to amend existing ones in favour of AssetCo and BankCo. As such, all measures described below (increased amount of government loans, working capital facility, guarantees and capital injections in favour of AssetCo and asset relief measure in favour of BankCo, see paragraph (45)) are financed through State resources. Before individually describing these measures in more detail and assessing whether they confer a selective advantage on AssetCo and BankCo, the Commission will first assess whether State support is able to distort competition and affect trade between the Member States.

| (41) | Under the new plan, AssetCo will presumably not carry out any economic activities on markets where it will be in competition with other banks. It will not collect any new deposits and will not make any new loans. Instead, it will, according to the UK authorities, only realise its assets as they mature and use the proceeds of these to repay its debts as they become due and fund its ongoing operational requirements as well as any retained historic liabilities. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Under the new plan, AssetCo will presumably not carry out any economic activities on markets where it will be in competition with other banks. It will not collect any new deposits and will not make any new loans. Instead, it will, according to the UK authorities, only realise its assets as they mature and use the proceeds of these to repay its debts as they become due and fund its ongoing operational requirements as well as any retained historic liabilities.

| (42) | The Commission considers that this fact does however not entail that the State measures in favour of AssetCo do not distort competition. Indeed, all the notified State measures in favour of AssetCo allow a [...] of the latter, meaning that the creditors of AssetCo will be repaid [...]. If the State were not to ensure the [...] of AssetCo, the creditors of AssetCo would not allow the transfer of the [...] assets and [...] liabilities to BankCo as it would reduce their chances of obtaining repayment of their claims by AssetCo. The notified State aids which are in favour of AssetCo are therefore necessary to facilitate the transfer to BankCo of AssetCo/NR’s retail deposits, mortgage writing platform and some of its good quality mortgages in order for it to continue to operate on the market (12). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission considers that this fact does however not entail that the State measures in favour of AssetCo do not distort competition. Indeed, all the notified State measures in favour of AssetCo allow a [...] of the latter, meaning that the creditors of AssetCo will be repaid [...]. If the State were not to ensure the [...] of AssetCo, the creditors of AssetCo would not allow the transfer of the [...] assets and [...] liabilities to BankCo as it would reduce their chances of obtaining repayment of their claims by AssetCo. The notified State aids which are in favour of AssetCo are therefore necessary to facilitate the transfer to BankCo of AssetCo/NR’s retail deposits, mortgage writing platform and some of its good quality mortgages in order for it to continue to operate on the market (12).

| (43) | The Commission therefore considers that the State measures ensuring a [...] of AssetCo are also directly benefiting BankCo, as it will be able to continue its activities relatively unburdened by possible impairments on the lower quality assets, since they would have been transferred to AssetCo. As a result, BankCo has an advantage over its competitors that are faced with impairments on lower quality assets, which they have to absorb, limiting the funds available for new lending. This leads to a distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Commission therefore considers that the State measures ensuring a [...] of AssetCo are also directly benefiting BankCo, as it will be able to continue its activities relatively unburdened by possible impairments on the lower quality assets, since they would have been transferred to AssetCo. As a result, BankCo has an advantage over its competitors that are faced with impairments on lower quality assets, which they have to absorb, limiting the funds available for new lending. This leads to a distortion of competition.

| (44) | It observes that BankCo will be a bank competing among others on the UK retail deposit market and on the UK mortgage lending market. In these two markets, some competitors are subsidiaries of foreign banks. The Commission concludes that since the State measures favouring AssetCo also directly favour BankCo, they distort competition and affect trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

It observes that BankCo will be a bank competing among others on the UK retail deposit market and on the UK mortgage lending market. In these two markets, some competitors are subsidiaries of foreign banks. The Commission concludes that since the State measures favouring AssetCo also directly favour BankCo, they distort competition and affect trade between Member States.

| (45) | The State measures which confer a selective advantage on AssetCo are the following ones:






  (i) | The State plans to inject up to GBP [...] billion in AssetCo (in a stress case scenario). The Commission considers that the private investor test is not applicable to this capital injection since this transaction follows several aid measures in favour of NR/AssetCo and is implemented in parallel with several additional aid measures (13). In addition, if it were applicable, this test would not be fulfilled since AssetCo’s assets will be made of NR’s [...] mortgage loans, unsecured personal loans and commercial loans, which are all likely to show a significant rate of default in this period of severe recession. It is therefore unlikely to be profitable for a private investor to provide capital to AssetCo. This measure favours AssetCo by allowing it to have sufficient capital to meet the FSA requirement. This allows a [...] of AssetCo and therefore favours also BankCo, as explained above. On that basis, the Commission concludes that this measure constitutes aid and invites the UK authorities to provide more information on the size of the capital injection and its terms. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

The State measures which confer a selective advantage on AssetCo are the following ones:

(i)

The State plans to inject up to GBP [...] billion in AssetCo (in a stress case scenario). The Commission considers that the private investor test is not applicable to this capital injection since this transaction follows several aid measures in favour of NR/AssetCo and is implemented in parallel with several additional aid measures (13). In addition, if it were applicable, this test would not be fulfilled since AssetCo’s assets will be made of NR’s [...] mortgage loans, unsecured personal loans and commercial loans, which are all likely to show a significant rate of default in this period of severe recession. It is therefore unlikely to be profitable for a private investor to provide capital to AssetCo. This measure favours AssetCo by allowing it to have sufficient capital to meet the FSA requirement. This allows a [...] of AssetCo and therefore favours also BankCo, as explained above. On that basis, the Commission concludes that this measure constitutes aid and invites the UK authorities to provide more information on the size of the capital injection and its terms.

| (ii) | The State guarantees covering the wholesale liabilities of AssetCo are likely to remain in place until State exit or liquidation. The Commission already concluded that these arrangements are State aid in the opening decision. The UK authorities are invited to provide details on the total exposures covered by these guarantee arrangements and their anticipated amortisation over time under the new plan. These State guarantees allow a [...] of AssetCo and therefore favour BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these measures constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

The State guarantees covering the wholesale liabilities of AssetCo are likely to remain in place until State exit or liquidation. The Commission already concluded that these arrangements are State aid in the opening decision. The UK authorities are invited to provide details on the total exposures covered by these guarantee arrangements and their anticipated amortisation over time under the new plan. These State guarantees allow a [...] of AssetCo and therefore favour BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these measures constitute aid.

| (iii) | Government will provide AssetCo with a working capital facility of up to GBP [...] billion to ensure that it has adequate liquidity during the course of its [...]. The Commission invites the UK authorities to provide it with more information on this facility. More generally, the UK authorities intend to ensure a [...] of AssetCo and therefore intend to commit to provide any additional support necessary to AssetCo to allow it to [...]. This working capital facility and this State commitment of providing further aid if necessary allows a [...] of AssetCo. As explained above, this favours BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these State measures constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

Government will provide AssetCo with a working capital facility of up to GBP [...] billion to ensure that it has adequate liquidity during the course of its [...]. The Commission invites the UK authorities to provide it with more information on this facility. More generally, the UK authorities intend to ensure a [...] of AssetCo and therefore intend to commit to provide any additional support necessary to AssetCo to allow it to [...]. This working capital facility and this State commitment of providing further aid if necessary allows a [...] of AssetCo. As explained above, this favours BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these State measures constitute aid.

| (iv) | The State will increase the overall level and duration of its lending to NR/AssetCo. It will increase by between GBP [...] and GBP [...] billion and ultimate repayment will be deferred to beyond [...]. The delayed reimbursement allows a [...] of AssetCo. The increased lending allows AssetCo to transfer billions of cash to BankCo. It is therefore clear that the new tenor and amount of the State lending favour also BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these State measures constitute aid and requests the UK authorities to submit more information on these measures. |
| --- | --- |

(iv)

The State will increase the overall level and duration of its lending to NR/AssetCo. It will increase by between GBP [...] and GBP [...] billion and ultimate repayment will be deferred to beyond [...]. The delayed reimbursement allows a [...] of AssetCo. The increased lending allows AssetCo to transfer billions of cash to BankCo. It is therefore clear that the new tenor and amount of the State lending favour also BankCo. On that basis, the Commission concludes that these State measures constitute aid and requests the UK authorities to submit more information on these measures.

| (46) | As indicated above, all the State measures ensuring a [...] of AssetCo allow the separation of AssetCo/NR branches, its mortgage writing platform, some of its [...] mortgage loans and the retail deposits into BankCo. Taking into account all the above considerations, the Commission considers that the effect of the measures in favour of AssetCo is equivalent, from an economic point of view, to a purchase of the assets of Northern Rock by the State for the following reasons. Firstly, a private operator would not have been able to structure such an operation. Indeed, it seems that the State had to make use of its prerogative powers to structure this operation. Indeed, any private operators placed in a similar situation as NR would not have been able to separate the good assets from the bad and to maintain NR economic activity without a significant capital increase. Secondly, the operation of the State [...] of AssetCo’s liabilities can be considered from an economic point of view to be equivalent to a purchase of non-performing assets of NR, which would allow BankCo to continue to pursue NR’s economic activities. Indeed, the Commission considers that, although BankCo is newly created, it continues NR’s economic activities since it provides services to the whole existing back book of NR before the operation. In particular, the customer relationship and the management of performing assets are all confined to BankCo. As confirmed by the reduced capital required by the FSA, the Commission considers that AssetCo could be seen as a State-owned vehicle whose aim is to reduce the capital requirements for BankCo pursuing NR’s economic activities. Finally, the Commission considers that the State aid in the present case is not aimed at liquidating a financial institution in difficulty and limiting the State exposure by auctioning the economic activity and/or financial institution’s assets on the market, but at reducing the capital injection that the State would have had to carry out otherwise as the unique shareholder of NR. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

As indicated above, all the State measures ensuring a [...] of AssetCo allow the separation of AssetCo/NR branches, its mortgage writing platform, some of its [...] mortgage loans and the retail deposits into BankCo. Taking into account all the above considerations, the Commission considers that the effect of the measures in favour of AssetCo is equivalent, from an economic point of view, to a purchase of the assets of Northern Rock by the State for the following reasons. Firstly, a private operator would not have been able to structure such an operation. Indeed, it seems that the State had to make use of its prerogative powers to structure this operation. Indeed, any private operators placed in a similar situation as NR would not have been able to separate the good assets from the bad and to maintain NR economic activity without a significant capital increase. Secondly, the operation of the State [...] of AssetCo’s liabilities can be considered from an economic point of view to be equivalent to a purchase of non-performing assets of NR, which would allow BankCo to continue to pursue NR’s economic activities. Indeed, the Commission considers that, although BankCo is newly created, it continues NR’s economic activities since it provides services to the whole existing back book of NR before the operation. In particular, the customer relationship and the management of performing assets are all confined to BankCo. As confirmed by the reduced capital required by the FSA, the Commission considers that AssetCo could be seen as a State-owned vehicle whose aim is to reduce the capital requirements for BankCo pursuing NR’s economic activities. Finally, the Commission considers that the State aid in the present case is not aimed at liquidating a financial institution in difficulty and limiting the State exposure by auctioning the economic activity and/or financial institution’s assets on the market, but at reducing the capital injection that the State would have had to carry out otherwise as the unique shareholder of NR.

Aid at the level of BankCo

| (47) | Taking into account the above considerations, BankCo is a “good bank” which will operate the healthy assets of NR and will be freed from all the bad assets of NR. Under the Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector
   (14) (‘the Impaired Assets Communication’), the aid element in such a transaction is the difference between the market value of the assets guaranteed or purchased by the State and the price at which these assets have been guaranteed or purchased. In the present case, the aid element to BankCo is therefore the difference between the market value of the assets remaining in AssetCo and their value in the books of AssetCo (15). The Commission therefore invites the UK authorities to provide this information. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Taking into account the above considerations, BankCo is a “good bank” which will operate the healthy assets of NR and will be freed from all the bad assets of NR. Under the Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector
   (14) (‘the Impaired Assets Communication’), the aid element in such a transaction is the difference between the market value of the assets guaranteed or purchased by the State and the price at which these assets have been guaranteed or purchased. In the present case, the aid element to BankCo is therefore the difference between the market value of the assets remaining in AssetCo and their value in the books of AssetCo (15). The Commission therefore invites the UK authorities to provide this information.

| (48) | In addition to the foregoing measures granted to AssetCo, the Government also intends to inject up to GBP [...] billion (in a stress case scenario) of capital in BankCo. It is not excluded that BankCo will be a profitable company, since it will have a portfolio of good quality mortgages and a lot of cash to make new lending. It is therefore possible that this investment will be profitable and that even a private investor could have done such investment. However, the Commission considers that the private investor test is not applicable to this capital injection since this transaction follows several aid measures in favour of NR (16) and is implemented in parallel with several additional aid measures. The measure can therefore not be assessed separately from the rest of the state interventions in favour of NR/AssetCo, which allows the transfer to BankCo of the good assets and liabilities of NR and a significant amount of cash. The selective measures in favour of BankCo therefore constitute aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In addition to the foregoing measures granted to AssetCo, the Government also intends to inject up to GBP [...] billion (in a stress case scenario) of capital in BankCo. It is not excluded that BankCo will be a profitable company, since it will have a portfolio of good quality mortgages and a lot of cash to make new lending. It is therefore possible that this investment will be profitable and that even a private investor could have done such investment. However, the Commission considers that the private investor test is not applicable to this capital injection since this transaction follows several aid measures in favour of NR (16) and is implemented in parallel with several additional aid measures. The measure can therefore not be assessed separately from the rest of the state interventions in favour of NR/AssetCo, which allows the transfer to BankCo of the good assets and liabilities of NR and a significant amount of cash. The selective measures in favour of BankCo therefore constitute aid.

| (49) | Finally, in order for the Commission to properly assess the aid measures, the UK authorities are invited to present, in addition to the information on the notified measures, a full list of the measures already granted or planned to be granted to Northern Rock under any existing aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Finally, in order for the Commission to properly assess the aid measures, the UK authorities are invited to present, in addition to the information on the notified measures, a full list of the measures already granted or planned to be granted to Northern Rock under any existing aid scheme.

4.2.   Compatibility of the aid

4.2.1.   The legal basis for the compatibility assessment of the aid

| (50) | In its first opening decision of 2 April 2008, the Commission’s position was that the measure could at that stage not be found compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, because the aid did not seem to tackle a disturbance in an entire Member State, but instead aimed to address individual problems specific to the situation of NR. (17) In particular, the Commission observed in the opening decision that, although a bankruptcy of NR would have had negative spill-over effects for other banks, the information provided by the UK had not convinced it at that point in time that these negative consequences could have reached a size constituting a serious disturbance in the economy of the UK within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

In its first opening decision of 2 April 2008, the Commission’s position was that the measure could at that stage not be found compatible with the common market pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, because the aid did not seem to tackle a disturbance in an entire Member State, but instead aimed to address individual problems specific to the situation of NR. (17) In particular, the Commission observed in the opening decision that, although a bankruptcy of NR would have had negative spill-over effects for other banks, the information provided by the UK had not convinced it at that point in time that these negative consequences could have reached a size constituting a serious disturbance in the economy of the UK within the meaning of Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | In the meantime, the Commission has acknowledged in its three Communications (18) and in its various approvals of the measures undertaken by the UK to combat the financial crisis (19), that there is serious disturbance in the UK economy and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy serious disturbance in the UK economy. Therefore the legal basis for the assessment of the aid measures shall be Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

In the meantime, the Commission has acknowledged in its three Communications (18) and in its various approvals of the measures undertaken by the UK to combat the financial crisis (19), that there is serious disturbance in the UK economy and that measures supporting banks are apt to remedy serious disturbance in the UK economy. Therefore the legal basis for the assessment of the aid measures shall be Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (52) | As the Commission has set out in the three Communications adopted in the context of the current financial crisis (20), aid measures granted to banks in the context of the ongoing financial crisis should be assessed in line with the principles of the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines, while taking into consideration the particular features of the systemic crisis in the financial markets (21). That means that the principles of the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines may have to be adapted when applied to the restructuring of Northern Rock in the present crisis, which is assessed on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC. Within this context attention should be given to the rules set out in the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines for own contribution. Given the fact that the external financing for Northern Rock has dried up and that the 50 % requirement set in rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines appears unfeasible in the current economic setting, the Commission accepts that during the crisis in the financial markets it may not be appropriate to request that the own contribution represents a predefined proportion of the costs of restructuring. Furthermore the design and implementation of measures to limit distortion of competition may also need to be reconsidered in so far as Northern Rock may need more time for their implementation due to the current market circumstances. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As the Commission has set out in the three Communications adopted in the context of the current financial crisis (20), aid measures granted to banks in the context of the ongoing financial crisis should be assessed in line with the principles of the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines, while taking into consideration the particular features of the systemic crisis in the financial markets (21). That means that the principles of the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines may have to be adapted when applied to the restructuring of Northern Rock in the present crisis, which is assessed on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC. Within this context attention should be given to the rules set out in the rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines for own contribution. Given the fact that the external financing for Northern Rock has dried up and that the 50 % requirement set in rescue and restructuring aid Guidelines appears unfeasible in the current economic setting, the Commission accepts that during the crisis in the financial markets it may not be appropriate to request that the own contribution represents a predefined proportion of the costs of restructuring. Furthermore the design and implementation of measures to limit distortion of competition may also need to be reconsidered in so far as Northern Rock may need more time for their implementation due to the current market circumstances.

| (53) | As the Commission has indicated in previous guidance, the depth of restructuring required to return to viability should at least be in direct proportion on the one hand to the scope and volume of the aid provided to NR and on the other to the fragility of its business model. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

As the Commission has indicated in previous guidance, the depth of restructuring required to return to viability should at least be in direct proportion on the one hand to the scope and volume of the aid provided to NR and on the other to the fragility of its business model.

4.2.2.   Compatibility assessment under Article 87(3)(b) EC

| (54) | In view of the above it follows that in order to assess the compatibility of the aid to NR on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC, the Commission has to assess (i) whether the restructuring plan is able to restore the long-term viability, (ii) whether the aid is limited to the minimum and (iii) whether the negative spill-over effects of the aid is limited. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

In view of the above it follows that in order to assess the compatibility of the aid to NR on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) EC, the Commission has to assess (i) whether the restructuring plan is able to restore the long-term viability, (ii) whether the aid is limited to the minimum and (iii) whether the negative spill-over effects of the aid is limited.

| (55) | More generally, and in line with paragraph (47) above, the Commission invites the UK authorities to present all the necessary information justifying that the measure is consistent with the guidance set out in the Impaired Assets Communication. In particular, the UK authorities are invited to present more information on the national legal basis of the measure, whether the assets retained in AssetCo fulfilled the eligibility conditions and whether the valuation and pricing of the measure is consistent with these requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

More generally, and in line with paragraph (47) above, the Commission invites the UK authorities to present all the necessary information justifying that the measure is consistent with the guidance set out in the Impaired Assets Communication. In particular, the UK authorities are invited to present more information on the national legal basis of the measure, whether the assets retained in AssetCo fulfilled the eligibility conditions and whether the valuation and pricing of the measure is consistent with these requirements.

(i)   Restoration of long-term viability

| (56) | With regard to the restoration of long term viability, the new restructuring plan seems to ensure the long term viability of BankCo. Indeed under the plan BankCo will not inherit the problems of NR. [...] loans of NR will remain with AssetCo. In addition, BankCo will initially have a very liquid balance sheet thanks to large amounts of cash received from AssetCo. Moreover, the about [...] % of the funding will come from retail deposits, thereby diversifying the sources of liquidity. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

With regard to the restoration of long term viability, the new restructuring plan seems to ensure the long term viability of BankCo. Indeed under the plan BankCo will not inherit the problems of NR. [...] loans of NR will remain with AssetCo. In addition, BankCo will initially have a very liquid balance sheet thanks to large amounts of cash received from AssetCo. Moreover, the about [...] % of the funding will come from retail deposits, thereby diversifying the sources of liquidity.

| (57) | It would seem therefore that BankCo, as a result of these measures, does not risk encountering the same liquidity problems as faced by NR due to its high dependence on wholesale funding combined with long term assets. Nevertheless, the Commission observes that the UK authorities have not provided a detailed business plan that explains how BankCo will become a viable entity on a sustainable basis over the medium to long term. At this stage, viability of BankCo therefore has not been demonstrated. The Commission therefore invites the UK authorities and third parties to comment on this issue. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

It would seem therefore that BankCo, as a result of these measures, does not risk encountering the same liquidity problems as faced by NR due to its high dependence on wholesale funding combined with long term assets. Nevertheless, the Commission observes that the UK authorities have not provided a detailed business plan that explains how BankCo will become a viable entity on a sustainable basis over the medium to long term. At this stage, viability of BankCo therefore has not been demonstrated. The Commission therefore invites the UK authorities and third parties to comment on this issue.

(ii)   Aid limited to the minimum/own contribution

| (58) | As regards the limitation of the aid to the minimum, the Commission observes that the aid is of such a type and quantity that it would allow BankCo to be freed of having to obtain expensive funding on the current market in order to absorb the losses on a large majority of high risk loans made by NR in the past. Therefore, it would not have to support the losses on these loans. Also, BankCo would be freed from having to pay back the government loans, as they would be transferred to AssetCo. BankCo would [...] receive the [...] assets of NR and will initially have a lot of cash. In other words, the aid seems to allow the creation of a very competitive new bank, instead of only restoring the long term viability of the existing bank. The Commission therefore strongly doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum. It seems that recapitalising NR would have requested less aid and of a much shorter duration. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

As regards the limitation of the aid to the minimum, the Commission observes that the aid is of such a type and quantity that it would allow BankCo to be freed of having to obtain expensive funding on the current market in order to absorb the losses on a large majority of high risk loans made by NR in the past. Therefore, it would not have to support the losses on these loans. Also, BankCo would be freed from having to pay back the government loans, as they would be transferred to AssetCo. BankCo would [...] receive the [...] assets of NR and will initially have a lot of cash. In other words, the aid seems to allow the creation of a very competitive new bank, instead of only restoring the long term viability of the existing bank. The Commission therefore strongly doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum. It seems that recapitalising NR would have requested less aid and of a much shorter duration.

| (59) | As regards the limitation of the aid to the minimum, the Commission also notes that according to the Impaired Assets Communication, the State should guarantee or purchase impaired assets at a value not exceeding their real economic value. In the present case, the State accepts to fully finance and support the losses of the assets of AssetCo, whereas their book value seems significantly higher than their real economic value, since this book value does not take into account future losses on these risky loans which will be caused by the current recession. This seems to be an additional indication that the aid is above the minimum necessary and that there is no adequate burden sharing as requested in paragraph 5.2 of the Impaired Assets Communication. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As regards the limitation of the aid to the minimum, the Commission also notes that according to the Impaired Assets Communication, the State should guarantee or purchase impaired assets at a value not exceeding their real economic value. In the present case, the State accepts to fully finance and support the losses of the assets of AssetCo, whereas their book value seems significantly higher than their real economic value, since this book value does not take into account future losses on these risky loans which will be caused by the current recession. This seems to be an additional indication that the aid is above the minimum necessary and that there is no adequate burden sharing as requested in paragraph 5.2 of the Impaired Assets Communication.

| (60) | Furthermore, the Commission’s doubts as regards the own contribution of NR to the restructuring have not been allayed by the UK authorities. The Commission observes that the restriction on new lending and the active redemption policy, which had allowed the accelerated redemption of the State loan in the last quarter, as planned in the original restructuring plan, has been abandoned and even reversed. Indeed, the AssetCo will draw additional resources under the loan facility. The Commission therefore doubts that the own contribution is sufficient and invites the UK authorities and third parties to comment on this issue. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Furthermore, the Commission’s doubts as regards the own contribution of NR to the restructuring have not been allayed by the UK authorities. The Commission observes that the restriction on new lending and the active redemption policy, which had allowed the accelerated redemption of the State loan in the last quarter, as planned in the original restructuring plan, has been abandoned and even reversed. Indeed, the AssetCo will draw additional resources under the loan facility. The Commission therefore doubts that the own contribution is sufficient and invites the UK authorities and third parties to comment on this issue.

(iii)   Limiting negative spill-over effects and undue distortion competition/measures which limit the distortion of competition

| (61) | The funding provided to BankCo for the mortgage lending through the split-up of NR into BankCo and AssetCo could have negative spill-over effects on competitors. As a result of the funding, BankCo could increase its mortgage lending and consequently potentially increase its presence on that market at the expense of other competitors. The limits imposed by the Competitive Framework, as mentioned above, could contribute to limiting these negative spill-over effects. The Commission is interested to receive comments regarding this issue. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The funding provided to BankCo for the mortgage lending through the split-up of NR into BankCo and AssetCo could have negative spill-over effects on competitors. As a result of the funding, BankCo could increase its mortgage lending and consequently potentially increase its presence on that market at the expense of other competitors. The limits imposed by the Competitive Framework, as mentioned above, could contribute to limiting these negative spill-over effects. The Commission is interested to receive comments regarding this issue.

| (62) | As regards the avoidance of undue distortions of competition, the Commission strongly doubts that sufficient measures are taken to offset the negative effects of the aid. Indeed, under the new plan, AssetCo will receive a very large amount of aid which will allow it to retain the large majority of NR’s assets on a solvent basis and to transfer to BankCo all the [...] assets and liabilities of NR. It will also transfer to it a large amount of cash. As a consequence of all this aid, it seems that BankCo will be a very competitive firm. This bank will not have to support the losses due to all the risky lending made by NR in the past. In addition, it will not have to finance these loans, which is difficult to do on a profitable basis due to increased borrowing costs on the financial markets. Conversely, under the service agreement with AssetCo, it will manage the loans of AssetCo. In other words, it will not have to support the disadvantages of the loans made by NR in the past, but will keep the advantages, namely the contacts with the existing clients. In this sense, it is doubtful that the fact that BankCo will have a small balance sheet is really a measure limiting its market presence and can be considered as a measure which limits the distortion of competition. The Commission would therefore also welcome comments on this point. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

As regards the avoidance of undue distortions of competition, the Commission strongly doubts that sufficient measures are taken to offset the negative effects of the aid. Indeed, under the new plan, AssetCo will receive a very large amount of aid which will allow it to retain the large majority of NR’s assets on a solvent basis and to transfer to BankCo all the [...] assets and liabilities of NR. It will also transfer to it a large amount of cash. As a consequence of all this aid, it seems that BankCo will be a very competitive firm. This bank will not have to support the losses due to all the risky lending made by NR in the past. In addition, it will not have to finance these loans, which is difficult to do on a profitable basis due to increased borrowing costs on the financial markets. Conversely, under the service agreement with AssetCo, it will manage the loans of AssetCo. In other words, it will not have to support the disadvantages of the loans made by NR in the past, but will keep the advantages, namely the contacts with the existing clients. In this sense, it is doubtful that the fact that BankCo will have a small balance sheet is really a measure limiting its market presence and can be considered as a measure which limits the distortion of competition. The Commission would therefore also welcome comments on this point.

| (63) | The Commission in this context also observes that the amount of aid received by NR is so large that it is not certain that sufficient measures [...] implemented to avoid undue distortion of competition, [...]. [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Commission in this context also observes that the amount of aid received by NR is so large that it is not certain that sufficient measures [...] implemented to avoid undue distortion of competition, [...]. [...].

| (64) | Furthermore, the Commission observes that some of the most relevant measures which aim to limit the distortion of competition proposed in the original restructuring plan have been amended. Under the new plan, aid is granted to allow the bank to make new loans of GBP 5 billion in 2009 and GBP 9 billion in 2010 (compared to GBP 5 billion each year in the original plan). In addition, NR has ceased the active redemption of maturing mortgages under its redemption programme. This programme, which has been operated by NR since 2008, has had the effect of further reducing the net supply of mortgage loans by NR. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Furthermore, the Commission observes that some of the most relevant measures which aim to limit the distortion of competition proposed in the original restructuring plan have been amended. Under the new plan, aid is granted to allow the bank to make new loans of GBP 5 billion in 2009 and GBP 9 billion in 2010 (compared to GBP 5 billion each year in the original plan). In addition, NR has ceased the active redemption of maturing mortgages under its redemption programme. This programme, which has been operated by NR since 2008, has had the effect of further reducing the net supply of mortgage loans by NR.

| (65) | The Commission acknowledges that in the context of the current financial crisis, a severe reduction of NR’s offer of new mortgage loans combined with its active retail mortgage redemption programme, in a period when there is already a general reduction of the supply of loans due to the other banks’ difficulties may increase a risk that NR contributes to worsen the situation. However, this does not release NR from the obligation to enact measures which aim to limit the distortion of competition to offset the distortions of competition. The Commission invites the interested parties to comment on this issue and to indicate to what extend a reduction in NR’s mortgage lending, taking into account its market share and presence, contributes to the problems on mortgage lending and until when they expect supply of mortgage loans to be constrained. Also, the Commission invites the UK to provide evidence concerning the problems regarding the supply of mortgages to the market. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Commission acknowledges that in the context of the current financial crisis, a severe reduction of NR’s offer of new mortgage loans combined with its active retail mortgage redemption programme, in a period when there is already a general reduction of the supply of loans due to the other banks’ difficulties may increase a risk that NR contributes to worsen the situation. However, this does not release NR from the obligation to enact measures which aim to limit the distortion of competition to offset the distortions of competition. The Commission invites the interested parties to comment on this issue and to indicate to what extend a reduction in NR’s mortgage lending, taking into account its market share and presence, contributes to the problems on mortgage lending and until when they expect supply of mortgage loans to be constrained. Also, the Commission invites the UK to provide evidence concerning the problems regarding the supply of mortgages to the market.

5.   CONCLUSION

| (66) | The Commission doubts at this stage that the aid measures included in the new restructuring plan are compatible with the common market. In particular, on the basis of the information available to it, the Commission cannot ascertain whether the notified aid is limited to the minimum necessary and the distortions of competition outweigh the positive effects of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission doubts at this stage that the aid measures included in the new restructuring plan are compatible with the common market. In particular, on the basis of the information available to it, the Commission cannot ascertain whether the notified aid is limited to the minimum necessary and the distortions of competition outweigh the positive effects of the aid.

DECISION

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has decided to extend the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty with respect to the measures notified on 2 April 2009. The Commission requires the UK, within one month of receipt of this letter, to provide in addition to all documents already received, all the relevant information and data needed for the assessment of these measures.

In particular, the Commission would wish to receive comments on the points on which it raised doubts. The UK is requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission wishes to remind the UK that Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns the UK that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

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(1)  Konfidentiella uppgifter, där sifferangivelser har ersatts med intervall inom hakparenteser.

1

(2)  Det rör sig om bankkonton inom ramen för Granites värdepapperiseringsstruktur som förvaltas av Northern Rock.

2

(3)  OJ C 135, 3.6.2008, p. 21.

3

(4)  Gross lending is total advances, and net lending is advances less redemptions and repayments.

4

(5)  OJ C 43, 16.2.2008.

5

(6)  Business secret, where possible, figures have been replaced by ranges in [brackets].

6

(7)  NR has registered a pre-tax loss of approximately GBP 1,4 billion over 2008 and the reserves decreased significantly if compared to the end of 2007 as stated in its 2008 annual accounts http://companyinfo.northernrock.co.uk/downloads/2008_annual_report.pdf

7

(8)  UK term for each lender’s standard variable mortgage lending rate.

8

(9)  The total cash transfer that is necessary to ensure that the value of the liabilities transferred to BankCo does not outweigh the value of the assets transferred will be funded principally through the extension of the current loan to Northern Rock (liability for which will rest with AssetCo).

9

(10)  These are bank accounts in the name of the Granite securitisation structure that are held with NR.

10

(11)  Aid to Bradford & Bingley in late September 2008, introduction of a recapitalisation scheme and a of a credit guarantee scheme in October 2008, announcement of an asset protection scheme on 19 July 2009.

11

(12)  This is consistent with the Commission’s analysis in the Bradford and Bingley decision, NN41/2008, Bradford and Bingley, OJ C 290 13.11.2008, p. 1.

12

Bradford and Bingley

(13)  Since AssetCo is the existing company Northern Rock plc, the Commission can at this stage not exclude that the injection of capital into AssetCo is the implementation of the commitment made by HM Treasury that it will ensure that NR will operate above the minimum capital requirements (this commitment was discussed in paragraph 91 of the opening decision). The Commission invites the UK authorities to provide their comments on that issue. If this capital injection is the implementation of the prior commitment, this would entail that the aid was granted already at that date but this would not affect the qualification of the measure as constituting aid or not.

13

(14)  OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1.

14

(15)  Indeed, AssetCo will be financed, capitalised and guaranteed by the State. In other words, any loss incurred on the assets of AssetCo compared to the current book value will be supported by the State. The Commission therefore considers the transfer value in the meaning of the Impaired Asset Communication to be the current book value of the assets of AssetCo.

15

(16)  It is recalled that BankCo will be created on the basis of the retail deposit balances and the mortgage lending platform of NR.

16

(17)  Paragraphs 100 and 101 of the first opening decision.

17

(18)  Banking Communication, OJ C 270, 25.10.2008 p. 8, Recapitalisation Communication, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009 p. 2, and Impaired Assets Communication (see footnote 7 above).

18

(19)  See amongst others Commission Decisions regarding: Financial support measures to banking sector in the UK (N 507/2008), OJ C 290 13.11.2008 p. 1 and the Working Capital Guarantee Scheme (N 111/2008) to be published in OJ.

19

(20)  Communication from the Commission — Application of the State Aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8. points 10, 32, 42; Communication from the Commission — Recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2, point 44. Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community banking sector, OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1, point 17 and 58 et seq.

20

(21)  See explicitly the Banking Communication — Application of the State Aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8. point 42.

21

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| 1.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 149/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 149/27

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Förhandsanmälan av en koncentration

(Ärende COMP/M.5551 – F2i/Finavias/ERG)

Ärendet kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 149/10

| 1. | Kommissionen mottog den 23 juni 2009 en anmälan om en föreslagen koncentration enligt artikel 4 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (1), genom vilken företagen F2i Fondi Italiani per le Infrastrutture S.G.R. S.p.A. (F2i, Italien) och Finavias S.à.r.l. (Finavias, Luxemburg), (ett företag som indirekt ägs av koncernen AXA Group), på det sätt som avses i artikel 3.1 b i förordningen förvärvar gemensam kontroll över majoriteten av bolagskapitalet i företaget ENEL Rete Gas S.p.A. (ERG, Italien) genom förvärv av aktier. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Kommissionen mottog den 23 juni 2009 en anmälan om en föreslagen koncentration enligt artikel 4 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (1), genom vilken företagen F2i Fondi Italiani per le Infrastrutture S.G.R. S.p.A. (F2i, Italien) och Finavias S.à.r.l. (Finavias, Luxemburg), (ett företag som indirekt ägs av koncernen AXA Group), på det sätt som avses i artikel 3.1 b i förordningen förvärvar gemensam kontroll över majoriteten av bolagskapitalet i företaget ENEL Rete Gas S.p.A. (ERG, Italien) genom förvärv av aktier.

| 2. | De berörda företagen bedriver följande affärsverksamhet:






  — | F2i: Värdepappersfond specialiserad på infrastruktursektorer, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

De berörda företagen bedriver följande affärsverksamhet:

—

F2i: Värdepappersfond specialiserad på infrastruktursektorer,

| — | Finavias: Riskkapital och kapitalförvaltning, |
| --- | --- |

—

Finavias: Riskkapital och kapitalförvaltning,

| — | ERG: Tillhandahåller gasdistribution via gasledningar med låg- och medeltryck. |
| --- | --- |

—

ERG: Tillhandahåller gasdistribution via gasledningar med låg- och medeltryck.

| 3. | Kommissionen har vid en preliminär granskning kommit fram till att den anmälda koncentrationen kan omfattas av förordning (EG) nr 139/2004, dock med det förbehållet att ett slutligt beslut i denna fråga fattas senare. Det bör noteras att detta ärende kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande, i enlighet med kommissionens tillkännagivande om ett förenklat förfarande för handläggning av vissa koncentrationer enligt rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Kommissionen har vid en preliminär granskning kommit fram till att den anmälda koncentrationen kan omfattas av förordning (EG) nr 139/2004, dock med det förbehållet att ett slutligt beslut i denna fråga fattas senare. Det bör noteras att detta ärende kan komma att handläggas enligt ett förenklat förfarande, i enlighet med kommissionens tillkännagivande om ett förenklat förfarande för handläggning av vissa koncentrationer enligt rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004 (2).

| 4. | Kommissionen uppmanar berörda tredje parter att till den lämna eventuella synpunkter på den föreslagna koncentrationen.
  Synpunkterna ska ha kommit in till kommissionen senast tio dagar efter detta offentliggörande. Synpunkterna kan sändas till kommissionen per fax (+32 2 2964301 eller 2967244) eller per post, med angivande av referens COMP/M.5551 – F2i/Finavias/ERG, till





  Europeiska kommissionen |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektoratet för konkurrens |
| Registreringsenheten för företagskoncentrationer |
| J-70 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Kommissionen uppmanar berörda tredje parter att till den lämna eventuella synpunkter på den föreslagna koncentrationen.

Synpunkterna ska ha kommit in till kommissionen senast tio dagar efter detta offentliggörande. Synpunkterna kan sändas till kommissionen per fax (+32 2 2964301 eller 2967244) eller per post, med angivande av referens COMP/M.5551 – F2i/Finavias/ERG, till

Europeiska kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet för konkurrens

Registreringsenheten för företagskoncentrationer

J-70

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  EUT L 24, 29.1.2004, s. 1.

(2)  EUT C 56, 5.3.2005, s. 32.

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