PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 13-2266

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANTOINE CORTEZ-DUTRIEVILLE,

 Appellant 

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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00183-001)

District Judge: Hon. Terrence F. McVerry

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 11, 2014

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Before: CHAGARES, SHWARTZ, and ALDISERT, Circuit 

Judges.

(Filed: February 26, 2014)
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Lisa B. Freeland, Esq.

Renee Pietropaolo, Esq.

Office of the Federal Public Defender

1500 Liberty Center

1001 Liberty Avenue

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Appellant

David J. Hickton, Esq.

Michael Leo Ivory, Esq.

Rebecca R. Haywood, Esq.

United States Attorney’s Office

700 Grant Street, Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION

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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

Antoine Cortez-Dutrieville (“Dutrieville”) appeals the 

denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from the 

home of the mother of his child. The District Court denied 

the motion, holding that Dutrieville was prohibited from 

entering the home as a result of a protection order and thus

lacked standing to challenge the search. We will affirm.
3

I

On June 8, 2012, United States Customs and Border 

Protection officers at John F. Kennedy International Airport 

intercepted a UPS package containing heroin. The mailing 

address handwritten on the package was “Mrs. APARNA 

BEENA, NO. 18 Walnut St. Union Town PA 15401.” App.

210. The electronic manifest indicated that the address was 

“59 Millview Dr. Uniontown, PA 15401.” App. 211-12. 

When the handwritten address and the electronic address 

conflict, UPS delivers the package to the electronic address.

Law enforcement agents repackaged the heroin in a 

new box. The new box listed the Millview address instead of 

the Walnut address and contained a beeper that would 

indicate when the package was opened. On this information, 

the agents obtained an anticipatory search warrant for the 

Millview address, the residence of Portia Newell, the mother 

of Dutrieville’s child. The warrant extended to the contents 

of the package and a list of materials commonly associated 

with drug trafficking. The search warrant was to be executed 

once the package was accepted and taken inside the home.

On June 13, 2012, an undercover agent delivered the 

package to Dutrieville. Two minutes later the beeper 

activated. Agents approached the home, announced their 

presence, and, after receiving no response, entered the home. 

They took Dutrieville into custody and searched the home. 

In the rear bedroom, agents found the heroin 

underneath a blanket. In the master bedroom, they found the

empty package, the beeper, Dutrieville’s cell phone, and

Dutrieville’s overnight bag, which contained personal items 
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and 45 unused stamp bags (which are often used to package

heroin). The agents also found digital scales and other drug 

paraphernalia in the living room. 

Dutrieville eventually admitted that he had been 

staying at the home with Newell’s consent for three days. 

The District Court found that Dutrieville brought his 

overnight bag with him at the inception of his stay. He also 

admitted that he was the subject of a Protection From Abuse

Order (the “protection order”), which provided, among other 

things, that: (1) Dutrieville was not to contact Newell except 

to make child custody arrangements; (2) Dutrieville was 

“completely evicted and excluded from” Newell’s residence; 

(3) Dutrieville had “no right or privilege to enter or be present 

on the premises of [Newell]”; (4) the protection order would 

remain in effect until October 7, 2013; (5) Newell’s consent 

could not override the express terms of the order; and (6) 

Dutrieville could be arrested without a warrant for violating 

the terms of the order. App. 194-96.

Dutrieville was charged with one count of attempted 

possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a 

mixture or a substance containing a detectable amount of 

heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

Dutrieville filed a motion to suppress the evidence 

obtained during the search, arguing that the anticipatory 

search warrant was not supported by probable cause. 

Specifically, he argued that the agents manufactured probable 

cause by changing the address on the label from the Walnut 

address to the Millview address. The District Court held that 

Dutrieville did not have Fourth Amendment standing to bring 

this challenge since he was subject to a protection order that 
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barred him from the home, and thus he lacked a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in both the home and the overnight 

bag. Dutrieville entered a conditional guilty plea which 

allowed him to file an appeal of the suppression ruling. On 

appeal, he asserts that he has Fourth Amendment standing 

and that this Court should remand the case to the District 

Court for consideration of his probable cause argument.

II

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s denial of a 

motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying facts, 

but exercise plenary review of the application of the law to 

the facts. United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d 

Cir. 2005). Dutrieville bears the burden of establishing a 

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. 

Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2010). 

III

“A defendant must have standing to invoke the Fourth 

Amendment’s exclusionary rule.” United States v. Correa, 

653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011). A defendant has standing 

if he can establish that he had a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in the invaded place. Id.; see also United States v. 

Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 253 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The 

‘standing’ inquiry, in the Fourth Amendment context, is 

shorthand for the determination of whether a litigant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights have been implicated.”). An individual’s 

expectation of privacy is legitimate if: (1) the individual 

demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
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subject of the search and (2) this expectation of privacy is 

objectively reasonable. See United States v. Kennedy, 638 

F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2011). The subjective prong requires a 

court to determine whether the defendant, “by his conduct, 

has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy.” Bond v. 

United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (citation omitted). 

The objective prong requires a court to determine whether the

defendant’s “expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is 

prepared to recognize as reasonable.’” Correa, 653 F.3d at 

190 (quoting Bond, 529 U.S. at 338). 

The question here is whether Dutrieville had an 

objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and 

his overnight bag.1 

A

Dutrieville argues that he had an objectively 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the home since he was 

an overnight guest staying at the home with Newell’s consent. 

Generally, a person’s “status as an overnight guest is alone 

enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the 

home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” 

Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97 (1990). This is 

because a guest typically “seeks shelter in another’s home 

precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where 

he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone but his 

host and those his host allows inside.” Id. at 99. Moreover, 

 

1 Because Dutrieville lacked an objectively reasonable 

expectation of privacy in both the home and the bag, we need 

not consider the subjective prong. Correa, 653 F.3d at 190 

n.3.
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“hosts will more likely than not respect the privacy interests 

of their guests.” Id. Accordingly, acknowledging “that an 

overnight guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his 

host’s home merely recognizes the everyday expectations of 

privacy that we all share.” Id. at 98.

Though most overnight guests have an objectively 

reasonable expectation of privacy, Dutrieville was not like 

most overnight guests. The key distinction is that the

protection order prohibited Dutrieville from entering the 

home and from having any contact with Newell. Pursuant to 

Pennsylvania law, Dutrieville’s mere presence in the home

violated the order and exposed him to criminal liability. See

23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6114(a).2 Importantly, Newell’s consent 

could not override the terms of the protection order. 

Consequently, like a trespasser,

3

a squatter,4or any individual 

 

2 As Dutrieville notes, Pennsylvania courts have held 

that a de minimis violation of a protection order may not be 

sufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt. See

Commonwealth v. Haigh, 874 A.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Pa. 

Super. Ct. 2005). Here, Dutrieville admitted that he had been 

staying in the home for three days in violation of the order. 

This level of violation exceeds the level that Pennsylvania 

courts have found to be de minimis. See id. (holding that a 

defendant’s violation was de minimis when he briefly asked 

his wife about a health problem during a court proceeding). 

3 United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (noting that trespassers lack Fourth Amendment 

standing).

4 Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st 

Cir. 1975) (holding that squatters on government land lack 

Fourth Amendment standing).
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who “occup[ies] a piece of property unlawfully,”

5

Dutrieville’s presence in the home was “wrongful,” and 

therefore any expectation of privacy he may have had was not 

one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).

6

 

B

Dutrieville also argues that, even if he lacked a 

legitimate expectation of privacy in the home, he had one in 

his overnight bag. First, according to Dutrieville, the 

protection order did not extend to any of his belongings, and, 

therefore, while his presence in the home may have been 

unlawful despite Newell’s consent, his bag’s presence was 

not. Second, he attempts to analogize his case to cases 

holding that an individual retains a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in bags kept with a third party. See, e.g., United 

States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844-45 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that defendant had a legitimate expectation of 

privacy in luggage stored at friend’s residence); United States 

v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting 

that overnight bags “historically command a high degree of 

privacy”); United States v. Most, 876 F.2d 191, 197-98 (D.C. 

 

5 United States v. Curlin, 638 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 

2011) (collecting cases).

6 Our holding is consistent with the holdings of other 

courts to address the Fourth Amendment rights of an 

individual violating a protection order. See Washington v. St. 

Albans Police Dep’t, 30 F. Supp. 2d 455, 457-58 (D. Vt. 

1998); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 710 N.E.2d 584, 586 

(Mass. 1999); State v. Stephenson, 760 N.W.2d 22, 26-27 

(Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
9

Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in a bag entrusted to store clerks).

These arguments are unavailing. The standing 

question turns on whether his expectation of privacy was 

objectively reasonable. Correa, 653 F.3d at 190. Because 

Dutrieville’s mere presence in the home was unlawful, it 

follows that he lacked an objectively reasonable expectation 

of privacy in a bag that he brought with him during an 

unlawful visit. This is because a person legally prohibited 

from entering a particular place cannot reasonably expect to 

use that place as a “private repository for his personal 

effects.” United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 

1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). After all, if his 

personal effects are stored at the prohibited place, he cannot 

lawfully access them and therefore cannot reasonably expect 

that he will be able to exercise control over them or that they

“will remain undisturbed.” See United States v. Jackson, 585 

F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that a trespasser on 

another’s property or an individual on abandoned property 

lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

personal effects stored there); see also United States v. Baker, 

221 F.3d 438, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding, in a case 

concerning a person’s Fourth Amendment rights in a 

borrowed car, that standing depends on “the strength of [a 

person’s] interest” in the searched property and “the nature of 

his control over it”).

Unlike the cases he cites, Dutrieville asserts a privacy 

interest located in a place he is legally prohibited from 

entering. Dutrieville was prohibited from entering the home

when he brought the bag and was also prohibited from 

accessing the bag while it was in the home. Accordingly, he 
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lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the

bag.

IV

For these reasons, Dutrieville lacks standing to 

challenge the search of the home and his overnight bag. We 

will therefore affirm the District Court’s order denying his 

motion to suppress.