1 By order of the Bank

ruptcy Appe llate Panel, the prec edential effec t of t his de c isi on is l im ite d to thec as e an d p ar tie s p ur su an t to 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8013-1(

b) . See also 6th Cir. BAP LBR 8010-1( c)

. F ile Nam e: 10b0012n.06
BA NK RU P TC Y A P P ELLA TE P AN EL OF THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

I n re: ROSS I

NI M. AL DA AND ) AMEL I A A. AL DA, ) No. 10-8037 ) De bto rs
. )

_____________________________________ )

Appea l from the United States B ankruptc y Court fo r t he Sou the rn

Di str ic t of

Oh io Case No. 08- 58713
Dec ided and F iled: Dece mber 2, 2010
B e fo re : B OSWE L L , F UL TO N, and Mc I VO R, B ank

ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l Judg e s.

____________________ CO UN SEL
ON BRIEF: Jose phM. Rom ano , T HE RO MA NO L AW F I RM, Hi lli ard , O hio , f or Ap pe lla nts

.

____________________ OP IN ION

____________________ G. HARVEY B OSWEL L , Ba nkruptcy Appellate Panel J udg e. I n this appea l, Rossi ni and Amelia Alda ( “De btors”) a ppeal the ba

nkruptcy court’s or der de ny ing the ir attorney ’s application for a llowance of attorne y

fee s and the c ourt’s orde r deny ing r econside ration of that order . For the

rea sons that follow, we a ffirm the or ders of the bankr uptcy court.2 I. ISSU ES ON AP P EAL The issues pre sented by

this a p p eal a

re w hether

the bankr

uptcy court a bused its discretion in denying the application f o r attorney

fee s of Debtor s’ counse l and in denying r econside ration there of.

II. JU RI SDI CT ION AND STANDARD OF RE VI EW
Th e B ank

ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l of

the Sixth C ir c uit ha s jur isd ic tio n to de c ide thi s a pp e a l. The United States District Cour t for the Southern District of Ohio has a uthorized appea ls to the Pane l, a nd the a pp e lla nts did no t e le c t to have thi s a

pp e a l he ard

by the di st ri ct c ourt . 2 8 U .S. C. §§ 15 8( b) (6 ), (c )( 1) . Afi na l or de r of the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt may be a pp e a le d a s o f r ig ht p ur su a nt t o 2 8 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) . For purposes of a

ppeal, a n order is final if it “ ‘ends the litigation on the merits and lea

ves nothing for the c ourt to do but ex ecute the judg ment.’ ” Midland Asphalt Cor p. v. United States , 489 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S. Ct . 1494, 1497 (1989) ( citations omitt ed). Abankruptc y court’s order reg arding attorney compensation is a final, appea lable orde r. In re Sc ar le t H ote ls, LLC , 3 9 2 B. R

. 6 9 8 , 7 0 1 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Boddy v . U.S. Bankr. Court , W .D., Ky. ( In re Boddy ), 95 0 F. 2d

33 4, 33 6 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 1) ). Th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s or de r d e nyingthe a pp e lla nts ’ motion for reconsider ation is also a final, appea lable orde r. Hamerly v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co. ( In re J &M Salupo Dev . Co. ), 388 B .R. 795, 800 (B.A .P. 6th C ir. 2008).
A bankr uptcy court’s awar d or denial of fees wil l not be reverse d unless there has bee n an abuse of discretion. In re Sc ar letHot e ls , 392 B.R. at 701. The bankruptc y court’s de nial of the motion to reconsider its orde r deny ing Romano’ s application for attorney fee s is also reviewe d for an abuse of discre tion. I

n r e J & M S

alupo Dev. Co. , 3 88 B .R. a t 80 1. An a bu se of dis c re tio n is established whe n the re viewing court is left with “ ‘ a def inite and firm convic tion that the court b el ow committed a cle ar e rror of judg ment.’ ” M

ic h

. D iv is io n -

M o n u m e n t B u il

d e r s o f N. A m . v. Mich. Ceme tery Ass’n , 524 F.3d 726, 739 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “An a buse of discr etion

oc c ur s o nly

wh e n th e [tr ia l] c ourt re lie s upo n cle arl y e rr on e ou s f

ind ing s o f f

a c t or wh e n it imp ro pe rl y applies the lawor uses a

n err oneous leg al standar d.” K a y e v
. A gr i p o o l , S RL ( In re M urray, Inc

. ), 3 9 2 B. R

. 2 8 8 , 2 9 6 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Volvo Commerc ial Fin. L LC t he Ame ricas v.3

Gasel Transp. Li nes, Inc

. ( In re Gase l Transp. L ines, Inc. ), 326 B.R. 683, 685 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2005)). “ The que stion is not how the re viewing court would h av e ru l ed, but rather whe ther a

re a so na ble pe rs on

c ou ld a g re e wi th the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s de c isi on ; if

re a so na ble pe rs on s c ou ld differ as to the issue, then there is no abuse of discr etion.” Barlow v. M.J. W aterman &Assocs., Inc

. ( In re M .J. W aterman &Assocs., Inc

. ), 227 F .3d 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2000).

III . F AC TS On September

11, 2008, Rossini and Amelia A lda (“ Debtors” ) filed a petition for relief unde r chapte r 13 of the B ankruptc y Code. On that same date, the De btors filed their pr oposed cha pter 13 plan. The D ebtors wer e repr esente d in the ir bankruptc y filing by J oseph M. Romano (“Romano” ).
The c hapter

13 trustee and the City of Columbus filed objec tions to confirmation on J anuar y 15 and 22, 2009, respe ctively

. The Ci ty of C olumbus objected on the grounds that the Debtors had not filed all tax returns a

nd tax reports due pre -petition. On Aug ust 11, 2009, a confir mation hear ing was h el d

. At t h e t ime of the he aring , the objection of the City of Columbus to confirmation

re ma ine d unr e so lve d. Th e ba nk ru ptc y c ourt the re fo re de nie d c on fi rm a tio n and dis mis se d th e c a se pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). In its dism issal order, the court orde red t h at ap p l i ca t i ons for allowanc e of administrative expenses, including attorney fee s, be filed within 10 day s of the orde r. On Septemb er 1, 2009, on behalf of the Debtor s, Romano filed a motion to reinstate the Debtors’ chapte r 13 case on the g rounds that they had resolved the objections to confirmation of the City of C olumbus and the cha pter 13 trustee . On Dec ember 14, 2009, the bankr

uptcy court e ntere d an ag ree d order

g ranting the Debtor s’ motion to reinstate their chapte r 13 case
. On J anuar y 25, 2010, the bankr uptcy court issued a

n order confirmingthe Debtor s’ cha pter 13 plan. That orde r included the following condition:

THE ATT ORNE Y F OR THE D EBTO R I S NO T A LLOW ED AN Y C OM P EN SAT ION IN THI S OR DE R, AN D SH AL L F ILE BY F EBR UA RY 12 , 2 01 0, AN ITEM IZ ED F EE A P P LIC AT ION F OR AL L S ER

VI CE S AN D E XP EN SES, AL ON GWI TH A M EM OR

AN DU M DE TA ILI NG

WH Y THI S CA SE P EN DE D F OR MORE THAN A YEAR WITHOUT CONF IRMATION.4

(B . Ct. Docket #64 at 2.)
OnF e b r u ar y 5 , 2 0 1 0 , th e D e b to r s f

il e d ano b je c ti o nto a

c la im o f A me r ic r e d it

F ina ncial Service s, I nc. On F ebrua

ry 18, 2010, Romano filed his Application for Allowance of Attorney Fe es in the amount of $5,427.50 and ex penses of $255.28. The a pplication included deta iled time entries from June 5, 2008 to J anuar y 21, 2010. I t did not, however, inc lude a memor andum detailing why the ca se pende d for more than one y ear without confirmation. On Marc h 26, 2010, the bankr uptcy court issued a

n order denying the application, with prejudice , beca use i t was not filed by

Fe bruar y 12, 2010, and did not inc lude a memorandum de tailing why the ca se pende d for more than one y ear without confirmation as re quired by the cour t’s J anuar y 25, 2010, order

. On Marc h 29, 2010, Romano filed a motion to rec onsider the or der denying the application for a llowance of attorne y fee s. The motio n fo r re consi deration asserted that, pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 60(b), it was “excusable neglec t” on the part of counsel to have not filed the fee appli ca t i o n within the time frame or dere d or to include the r equire d memorandum. Romano

e xpla ine d th a t: [N]ot

fi lin g the fe e a

pp lic a tio n w a s a

n o ve rs ig ht o n [Ro mano ’s ] part

. Rather, [Romano] examined the claims reg ister to deter mine whether an objecti o nto a n y

c la im s w o u ld

b e f il e d p r io r to f il in g an y f ee a pp lic a tio ns . O nly

a ft e r f ili ngan O bje c tio n to Cla im 2

. . . d id [R omano] file the fee application. Albeit, after this Court’s deadline. Fur the r , th is c a s e w a s o n ly p e n d in g f o r o n e y e ar s in c e it s f

il ing , on Septem b er 1 1, 2008, beca use the c ase ha d been dismissed fr om Au g us t 11 , 20 09 to D e c e mbe r 1 4, 20 09 du e to t he De bto rs ’ i na

bil ity to r e so lve the ob

jec tion o f t

he City of Col umb us . T he ina

bil ity to res o lv e s a id o b

je c ti o n to c o n f

ir mati o n w a s th e r e a s o n f

o r d e n ia l of confirmation and dismiss al of the case
. The objection was ba sed on the Debtor s’ not filing c erta in [ tax] returns. I n the i nterim dismissal period, the Debtors’ r esolved the pe nding obje ction by filing the a pp ro pr ia te ta x re tur

ns and , the n, mov e d fo r r e ins ta te me nt, wh ic h th is Court gr anted.5

(B . Ct. Docket # 77 at 1-2.) On May 13, 2010, the bankruptc y court denied the motion to reconsider beca use it determined that the motion did not asser t sufficie nt basis to g rant the reque st to rec onsider the or de r d e nyingthe re qu e st f or fe e s. On May 24, 2010, the Debtors filed a timely notice of a ppeal of the bankr uptcy court’s or der.
IV . D ISC USS ION
11 U. S.C. § 3 30 (a )( 1) (A ) p ro vid e s that prof e ssi on a ls m ay

be awa rd e d “ re a so na

ble compensation for ac tual, nece ssary service s rende red . . . .” Romano contends that the bankr uptcy court a bused its discretion by

denying his fe e applicat i o n based on his fa ilure to comply with the

c on fi rm a tio n o rd e r a

nd by no t c a lc ulatin g the lod e sta r a mou nt as mand a te d b y

the Sixth C ir c uit Court of Appea ls in Boddy . I n Boddy , th e Sixth C ir c uit he ld t hat th e ba nk ru ptc y cou rt a bu se d it s discretion becau s e i tap p l i edan i mp ro p er l ega l s t an d ar d , t h e “ n o rm al an d cu s t o m ary ” s t an d ar d , ra ther tha n c a lc ulating t he lo de sta

r a mou nt w hic h is c a lc ulate d b y

mul tip lyingthe a tto rn e y ’s re a so na ble hourly rate by the number of

hours re asonably

expended. In re W

illiams , 3 57 B .R. 43 4, 44 0 ( B .A .P. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Boddy , 950 F.2d at 337).
Fe dera l Rule of Ba

nkruptcy Procedur e 2016 require s an attorne y seekingcompensation from the estate to file an a

pplication st at i n g i n d et ail the servic es re ndere d, the time expended, and expense incurr ed as w ell as the amount reque sted. L ocal Bankr uptcy Rule for the Southern D istrict of Ohio 2016-1( b) and ( c) se ts forth the conte nt and form of the application required in the Southern District of Ohio. L ocal Rule 2016-1( b)(2) (B ) provides that such an a pplication mus t b e fi l ed “no later tha n six ty (60) da y s from the e ntry

date of the conf irmation order .”
Romano’s fee application complied with both Rule 2016 and L ocal Rul e 2016-1(b) and ( c). Howeve r, it did not comply with the lang uag e set forth in the bankruptc y court’s confirmation order. Roman o co n tends that bec ause the court did not rule on the r easona bleness of his fe es, but rathe r denied his entire fee application base d upon failure to comply with the confirmation order, the bankruptc y

court a bused its discretion. He argues t hat a rea sonable person would not have “ ag ree d with the decision of the ba nkruptcy court in deny ing the Application for Compensation in toto and with prejudice for the f

ailure to have filed the Application for Compe nsation within 17 day s ofSee Laurent W atch Co. v. United States , 539 F.2d 1231 ( 9th Cir. 1976) (cour t remande d 1 case for c onsideration of w hether nunc pro tunc order

appointing c ounsel for c hapter11 debtorin-possession should be enter ed whe re attorney ’s fe e application was improperly denied on g ro un ds that e arl ie r N int

h Ci rc uit c a se pr oh ibi te d s uc h a

n o rd e r) ; Cle-W

are Indus., Inc . v. Sokolsky (

In re Cle-W

are Indus., Inc

. ), 493 F .2d 863 (6th Cir. 1974) (in ca se whe re ba nkruptcy c ourt ha d a pp ro ve d s e pa

rate c ouns e l f

or c ha pte r 1 1 d e bto r a

nd de bto r- in- po sse ssi on , Si xth Circuit announce d g ener al rule that it would not approve pra ctice of appointing a

nd compensating se parate counse l for debtor -in-possession and simultaneously compensating debtor’s pr ivately

reta ined counse l for leg al servic es re ndere d afte r filing of petition; apply ing ru le pr os pe c tiv e ly

wh ile re c og nizi ngthat a

pp lic a tio n o f n e w r

ule to atto rn e y s in

c a se be fo re it would be unjust; remandingfor de termination of fe es to be a llowed for e ach se t of attorney s and se tti ngpa ra me te rs fo r s uc h d e te rm inatio n) ; Stolkin v. Nachman ( In re Sto lk

in ), 47 2 F .2 d 2 22 (7 th Cir. 1973) (finding failure of attorne y for c hapter

11 debtor to sec ure a

ppointment upon verified petition as require d by

rule did not prec lude awa rd of f ees w here , int e r a lia , all cre ditors were pa id i n f ull , s ub sta

nti a l amou

nt w a s le ft

fo r d e bto r, and

iss ue ra ise d f

or fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l) ; In re Franklin Savings Corp. , 169 B.R. 212 (B ankr. D . Kansa s 1994) (de ny ing r equest to appr ove application for

appointment as counse l to chapter 11 debtor nunc pro tunc whe re a pplication was not timely

filed). 6 Confirmation and without a Memora ndum expl aining why the case was pending for more than one y ear .” (A ppellant’s B r. at 3.) Romano cites a handful of case s which he a sserts support his position that no rea sonable pe rson could ag ree with the bankruptc y court’s de cision in this case beca use eve n in case s where err or wa s committed by cou n sel courts have found that the complete de nial of an application for

compensation would be inequitable. While Romano is cor rec t that some of the ca ses he c ite s r e je c te d c omp le te de nia l of fe e a pp lic a tio ns , th e c a se s he ci te s a re ne ve rt he le ss i na pp os ite

as not one of them deals with an attorney missing a de adline by

which to file his fe e application as the re sult of his own “oversig ht” and inadve rtent ac tions. I n fac t, eac h of the c ases c ited by Romano is a cha pter 11 c ase, no t a cha

pter 13 c ase, a

nd all deal with issues surroundingappointment of counsel for

the debtor- in-possession. 1
Whil e L ocal Rule 2016-1 sets an outside deadline for an attorney to f ile his application, the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt is n ot p ro hib ite d f

ro m se tti nga

n e arl ie r d e a dli ne purs ua

nt to i ts i nh e re nt a

uth or ity to set deadlines. See 11 U. S.C. § 1 05 (a ); see also e.g., Riverv iew Trenton R.R

. Co. v . DSC, Ltd. ( In re DSC, Ltd. ), 48 6 F .3 d 9 40 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) (B ank ru ptc y Cod e pr ov isi on

a llo wi ngc re dit or s to joi n in involuntary

petition up until “ca se is dismiss ed or r elief is orde red” only estab l i s hed outside7

de a dli ne by

wh ic h c re dit or s h a d to joi n in pe tit ion , a

nd did no t pr e ve nt b ank

ru ptc y c ourt , in

e xer c ise

o f i t s c a s e m an a g e m e n ta

u t h o r i t y, f r o m e s t a b l i s h i n g an d e n f

o r c i n g e ar l i e r d e a d l i n e )

. A d d i t i o n a l l y, in this P anel’ s opinion, the 18 day s which the c onfirmation orde r g av e R o m ano to file his fe e application wa s not unreaso n ab l e when one considers that Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)( 2)(B ) provides that g ener ally a motion for attorney fee s shall be filed within 14 da y s after entry of judg ment.
Moreove r, denia l of a fe e application on the gr ounds that it is unt imely , witho u t reviewof the rea sonablene ss of the fee s, is not without prec edent. See , e.g. , Clendenin v. Burks , No. C-1-07- 059, 2007 W L2029060 (S.D. Ohio J uly 10, 2007) (a ffirming bankruptc y court’s de nial of fe e application on the ba sis that it was u ntimely). The B ankruptc y Court for the Southern D istrict of Oh io a m e n d e d i t s L o c a l R u l e s e f f e c t i v e D e c e mb e r 1 , 2 0 0 9

. P r i o r t o t h a t a m e n d m e n t , L oc a l Ru le 2016-1 did not specify

the tim e fo r fi l i n g a post-conf irmation fee application. Howe ver, in In re Newman , 2 7 0 B

. R. 8 4 5 ( B an kr
. S. D

. O h io 2 0 0 1 ) , th e b an kr u p tc y c o u rt e s ta

b li s h e d a ti me bar, holding that f

ee a pplications should be submitt ed within 30 to 45 da y s following c ompletion of the l egal services r ender ed on a g iven issue. Id . at 848. Utiliz ing that time bar, the Newman court denied a n attorney ’s fee application insofar as it sought compe nsation for ser vices c ompleted outside that time bar. Id . at 849.

I n Cle nd e nin , the bankr

uptcy court a g ain applied the 30 to 45 da y time bar to deny

an attorney ’s fe e application on the gr ound that it was fi l ed u n t i mely . The district cour t affir med. Cle nd e nin , 2007 WL 2029060 at *3. While the fee ap p l i ca t i o ns in both Newman and Cle nd e nin

we re muc h tard ie r tha

n the a pp lic a tio n a t iss ue in the c a se be fo re us , th ese c ases nev e rt he le ss demonstrate that it is within the bankruptcy court’s a uthority to set a dea dline for f

ee a pplications

and to d e ny any fe e a pp lic a tio n fi le d a ft e r t

hat de a dli ne ru

ns wi tho ut a dd

re ssi ngthe re a so na

ble ne ss of the fe es. See , e.g , , In re W ilson , No. 04-65540, 2007 WL4248134 (B ankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2007) (a dopting 30- 45 day deadline a fter w ork complete d to f ile fee application while re ducing fee

re qu e ste d b y a tto rn e y by 50 % in larg e pa rt ba se d up on un tim e lin e ss o f a pp lic atio n) ; In re Ande rson , 253 B.R. 14 (B ankr. E.D . Mich. 2000) (de ny ing fee applications filed eig ht day s afte r dea dline set for suc h applications in show ca use orde r).8

Following the bankr

uptcy court’s or der de ny ing the fee application, R omano fil ed a motion fo r r e c on sid e rat i o n

p u r su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Pr oc e dure 60 (b ) a sse rt ingthat it wa s “ e xcu sa

ble neg lect” to have not filed t he fee application within the t ime frame ordered or to include the required memorandum. The bankruptc y court found that Romano had not asserte d a suff icient basis under Rule 60(b) for

rec onsideration of its orde r and de nied the motion.
Fe dera l Rule of Ci v i l P ro ce d u re 6 0 (b ), m ad e ap p l i cab l e t o b an kru p t cy p ro ce ed i n gs by

Fe dera l Rul e of B ank ru ptc y Pr oc e dure 90 24 , p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : (b) M is t a ke s ; I na dv e r t e nc e ; Ex c us a bl e N e g le ct; Newly Discovere d Evid ence; F raud, etc. On mot ion and up on su c h te rm s a s a

re jus t, the cour t may relieve a par

ty or his leg al re prese n t ative fr om a final judgme nt, order, or

proce edin g

for the f ollowing r easons: (1) mistake, inadver tence , surprise, or ex cusable neg lect; (2) ne wly discovere d ev i dence that, with rea sonable dilig ence , could not have be en discovere d in time to move for a ne w trial under Rule 59(e)

. . . . Re lie f f ro m a fi na l ju dg me nt u

nd e r R ule 60 (b ) i s an “ ‘e xtra or din ary re me dy and is g ra nte d o nly in exceptional circ umstances.’ ” McAlpin v. Lex ington 76 Auto T ruck Stop, Inc. , 229 F.3d 491, 502- 03 (6th Cir. 2000) (c itation omit ted).

I n his brief to this Panel, Romano now asser ts that new evi d en ce w as pre sented to the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt . H e e xpla ins :
I n the Motion to Reconsider , the Debtors’ state not only the r eason wh y the Ap pli c a tio n f

or Com pensa tio n w a s unti me ly

fi le d b ut a lso include all of the information re quested by t h e T ri al Court in the Confirmation Order

as to why

the ca s e wa s pending for more than on e y e ar
. I nt h e M o t i o nT o R e c o n s i d e r , c o u n s e l f o r t h e D e b t o rs ’ e xpla ine d that, wh ile he ina dv e rt e ntl y mis se d the require me nts o u t l i n edi nP ar agr ap h G, i twa s al s o b ec au s e a d d i t i o n al p l ea d i n gs we re re qu ir e d to be fi le d in a id of pr os e c uti on of the Deb to rs’ cas e befor e the Application could be f iled. I t was at that time that counse l filed the Application with the Trial Court. Notwithstanding the Conf irmatio n O rd e r, it w ou ld h a ve be e n a n a bund ant w a ste of

tim e and judicial ec onomy

for the D ebtors’ to have filed the initial Application on Fe bruar y 12 and then to file a Supplementa l Application for those additional service s on Fe bruar y 18.9 Ad dit ion a lly , th e De bto rs ’ o utl ine d f or the Tr ia l Co ur

t w hy the c a se ha d b e e np e n d in g f

o r o v e r o n e y e ar
. N a me ly , b e c a

u s e th e c a s e had been dismiss ed for 121 day s betwee n September 11, 2008, the filing date, a nd J anuar y 25, 2010, the date of C o n fi rmation. Ther e ar e no other re asons the Debtors could have provided - only the truth of the ma tte r - a s th e ba sis fo r t he 60 (b ) m oti on . F ina lly , th e Mo tio n to Reconsider

was the only

reme d y av ai lable to the De btors’ since the Trial Court, by

denying the Application for Compensation with prejudice , took away

any ability for the D ebtors’ t o p urg e the d e f i c i e n c y. (A pp e lla nts ’ B r. a t 6- 7. ) We m

us t r e je c t Ro mano ’s ne w e vid e nc e argume nt f or tw o r e a so ns . F ir st, he did not raise the argument in the bankruptcy court and theref ore it is waived. Moye r v. Dutkie wicz ( In re Dutk

iewicz ), 4 0 8 B. R

. 1 0 3 , 1 0 9 (B

. A. P

. 6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Elder , 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996)) (a rg ument not addre ssed is deeme d waived)

. Second, eve n if we w ere to consider the argument, it f ails. I n order to obta in r elief under Rule 60(b)(2) , a litiga nt must show, among other thing s, that the new evidenc e is materia l and li kely to chang e the outcome

. Cra wfo rd

v . TR W Au to. U. S. LLC , 560 F.3d 607, 615 (6th Cir. 2009). Romano’s “ne w evidenc e,” the filing of additional plea dings - an o b j ec t i o n t o confirmation - and the e x planation of why the ca se wa s pe nd ingfo r o ve r o ne y e ar, wa s n ot new or lik e ly to c ha ng e the ou tc ome . T he ob je c tio n to confirma tio nw a s f

il e d o nF e b r u ar y 5 , 2 0 1 0

. T h e f

e e a p p li c a ti o nw a s f

il e d o nF e b r u ar y 1 8 , 2 0 1 0. Th e ob je c tio n to c on fi rm a tio n w a s o n th e re c or d o f t he ba nk ru ptc y c ourt a t th e tim e it e nte re d it s order denying the fee application. The dismiss al of the case for 121 day s was also of rec ord at the time the court e ntere d its order. Ne ither of these are new e vidence as re quired by Rule 60(b)(2) and, beca use they wer e alre ady of rec ord at the time the bankruptc y court rule d, they

cer tainly would not have c hang ed the outcome

. Romano also has not shown excusable ne g lect in orde r t o obtain relief under Rule 60( b)(1)

. He a dmitted to the bankruptcy judge , and admi ts to thi s Panel, that the fa ilure to abide by the bankruptc y

court’s or der a

nd timely file his fee application wa s an “ove rsig ht on his part” and done

“ ina dv e rt e ntl y .” Whe n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r r e lie f s h o u l d b e a f f o r d e d und e r R

ule 60 (b )( 1) , “ ne g le c t” is giv en i t s ordinary

meaningwhich includes late filing s cause d by inadver tence , mistake or

car elessness. Jinks v . AlliedSignal, Inc. , 250 F.3d 381, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2001). The question is whether the ne g le c t is e xcu sa

ble . I n ad dr e ssi ng wh e the r ne g le c t is “ e xcu sa ble ,” the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me10

Court ha s s tate d , “ th e d e te r mi n a ti o nis a t b o tt o m a

ne qu it a b le o n e , ta

k in g a c c o u n t o f

a ll r e levant circ umstances surrounding the par ty ’s omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ sh ip , 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1498 (1993). The S upreme Court has i dentified seve ral fac tors to c onsider including the dang er of prejudice to the opposition party , the leng th of the dela y
and its po te nti a l imp a c t on the pr oc e e din g s, the re a so n fo r the de lay , a nd wh e the r t he mov ingpa

rt y acte d in good f

aith. Id

. The ba nkruptcy judge is aff

orded discretion when determining whether an attorne y ’s neg lect is e xcu sa ble fo r p ur

po se s o f Rul e 60 (b) (1) , a nd re vie w o f t

he c ourt ’s de c isi on

is “ ‘e xtre me ly defe rential.’ ” Harrington v. City of Chi cago , 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (c itation omit ted). We find no abuse of

discretion her e. The Supreme Court in Pioneer noted that “inadve rtenc e . . . does not usually

constitute ‘excusable’ ne g lect.” Pioneer , 507 U.S. at 392. Additionally , “routine

car elessness by

counsel lea ding to a

late filing is not enoug h to co n s t i t u t e ex cusable neg lect.” Negron v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc

. , 3 16 F .3 d 6 0, 62 (1 st C ir . 2 00 3) ; see also FH C Equities, L.L.C . v. MBL Life Assur. Corp. , 1 88 F .3 d 6 78 , 6 85 (6 th Cir . 199 9) (g ro ss ca re le ssn e ss is insu ff

ic ie nt b a sis fo r R ule 60 (b )( 1) re lie f) . “Put ano the r w ay , ‘ wh e n in a dv e rt e nt c on du c t le a ds to a jud g me nt, a

c la im of mistake or excusable neg lect will alway s fail if the fa cts demonstrate a lac k of dilige nce.’ ” B & D Pa rtn e rs v . P as tis , No. 05-5954, 2006 WL 1307480, at *3 (6th Cir. May 9, 2006) (unpub.) (quoting 12 MO OR E’ S F ED ERA LPRA CTI CE § 60 .4 1[1][c ] [ii] (3 d e d. 2005 )) (f ind ingno e xcu sa

ble

ne g le c t where la c k o f c omm un ic a tio n b e tw e e n c o- c ouns e l r e su lte d in fa ilure to t ime ly

re sp on d to motion for summary

judgme nt).
Whi le th e r e d o e s n o t a

p p e ar to b e an y p r e

ju d ic e to th e D e b to r s d

u e to th e d e la

y , an d the six day delay was re latively

short, Romano’s rea son for the de lay is simpl y

not cre dible. The bankruptc y

court set a deadline pursuant to its inhere nt pow ers to do so for c ounsel to submit a fee application. Throug h “over sight” a n d “ in a d v e r te n c e , ” counse l failed to abide by the cour t’s deadline. Romano’s explanation that it would have bee n a wa ste of t h e co u rt ’s t i me to file by the dea dline beca use an additional objection to c laim ne eded to be filed is simpl y disinge nuous. The objec tion to claim was filed on F ebrua ry 5, 2010, a we ek bef

ore the deadline f

or the fe e application. There w as
c le arl y tim e to i nc lud e the wo rk do ne in or de r to fi le the ob je c tio n in the fe e a pp lic a tio n a

nd tim e ly11

submit i t. Moreover , the time alleg edly spent revie wing the claims re g is t er an d p reparing the objection was not include d in the fee application which w as ultimately filed af ter the de adline.
V. CO NC LU SION
For the fore g oing rea sons, w e find no abuse of discretion and the order s of the bankr uptcy court a re, the ref ore, a ffirme d.