IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60620

Summary Calendar

YULIYA SEROVA,

Petitioner

v.

LORETTA LYNCH, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A055 672 376

Before SMITH, BENAVIDES and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Yuliya Serova, a native and citizen of Russia, petitions this court for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her

motion for reconsideration of its order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ)

decision dismissing her appeal.1 In her motion for reconsideration, Serova 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 We note that our review is limited to the BIA’s August 6, 2015, decision denying 

Serova’s motion for reconsideration. Serova had 30 days after the BIA’s denial of her petition 

to appeal that decision, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), and she failed to do so. Therefore, this court 

is without jurisdiction to consider Serova’s substantive claims for relief under the 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 2, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-60620 Document: 00513530667 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/02/2016
No. 15-60620

2

claimed that the IJ had failed to make certain factual findings that the BIA 

had required in a previous remand. The BIA denied her motion on the grounds 

that Serova, in her motion for reconsideration, raised largely the same 

arguments that the BIA had considered and rejected on appeal. Because the 

BIA found no error in the IJ’s fact finding, and her argument constituted a 

mere disagreement with the BIA’s prior holding on appeal, the BIA denied 

Serova’s motion for consideration.

On appeal, Serova argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying 

her motion for reconsideration. Serova avers that the BIA’s initial remand 

opinion “made it clear that more fact-finding was necessary.” Serova claims 

that the IJ’s decision after remand was virtually the same as the IJ’s first 

decision and merely consisted of “singular statements” that Serova was 

ineligible for relief. Thus, Serova contends that, because the IJ did not make 

the findings required by the BIA’s remand decision, the BIA committed error 

by failing to remand the proceedings a second time.

A motion to reconsider “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the 

previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 

301 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that a motion for reconsideration fails if it does not 

“identify a change in the law, a misapplication of the law, or an aspect of the 

case that the BIA overlooked”). We review a denial of a motion to reconsider 

under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. Singh v. Gonzales, 

436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we

must uphold the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider unless the denial is 

“capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or 

 

Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 1158 and 1231(b)(3), and the Convention Against 

Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. See Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 

2003).

 Case: 15-60620 Document: 00513530667 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/02/2016
No. 15-60620

3

otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any 

perceptible rational approach.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Serova’s 

motion to reconsider. We agree with the BIA that Serova’s motion to 

reconsider raised the same argument that she had previously raised on appeal 

to the BIA. Thus, Serova’s motion for reconsideration did not present any 

“errors of law or fact” in the BIA’s decision, as is required by § 1229a(c)(6)(C), 

that the BIA had not already considered and rejected. Because Serova’s motion 

to reconsider only recycled the argument that she raised on appeal concerning 

the IJ’s purported error, the BIA correctly found that her motion merely 

represented a disagreement with the BIA’s prior decision. Such a 

disagreement does not establish the requisite grounds for a motion to 

reconsider. See Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006) (holding 

that “a motion to reconsider is not a process by which a party may submit, in 

essence, the same brief presented on appeal and seek reconsideration by 

generally alleging error in the prior Board decision”); see also Omari v. Holder, 

562 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing O-S-G- approvingly). 

Because Serova’s motion merely recycles the same argument that she 

made on appeal, and there is nothing to indicate—and Serova does not even 

argue—that the BIA’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, racially invidious or 

otherwise discriminatory, Singh, 436 F.3d at 487, the BIA did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, Serova’s petition for review of 

the BIA’s decision is DENIED.

 Case: 15-60620 Document: 00513530667 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/02/2016