PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LARAMIE STERLING HINKLE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

and 

JARROD HINKLE, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

BECKHAM COUNTY BOARD OF 

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; SCOTT 

JAY, in his individual capacity; STRIDER 

ESTEP, Deputy Sheriff, in his individual 

capacity, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 18-6202 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 5:15-CV-00497-SLP)

_________________________________ 

Brently C. Olsson (Mark S. Rains with him on the briefs), of Cheek Law Firm, PLLC, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant, Laramie Hinkle. 

Wellon B. Poe (Jamison C. Whitson with him on the brief), of Collins Zorn & Wagner, 

P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appellees, Scott Jay and Strider Estep. 

Carson C. Smith (Robert S. Lafferrandre with him on the brief), of Pierce Couch 

Hendrickson Baysinger & Green, L.L.P., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for DefendantAppellee, Beckham County Board of County Commissioners. 

 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 22, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. 

_________________________________ 

A series of coincidences and mistaken beliefs led to the arrest of Laramie 

Hinkle for possessing a stolen trailer that was not even stolen. And things got worse 

from there. Despite Hinkle’s recently having served as police chief in a nearby 

Oklahoma town and having voluntarily presented himself for booking, the sheriff’s 

office immediately subjected him to a body-cavity strip search. Soon after that, the 

sheriff published a press release on his office’s website chock full of incriminating 

allegations from the deputy’s arrest-warrant affidavit. After further investigation 

showed Hinkle innocent, he sued, alleging as unlawful his arrest, the press release, 

and the body-cavity strip search. We sympathize with Hinkle. But we conclude that 

the deputy sheriff had probable cause for the arrest, that the deputy arrested Hinkle 

based on that probable cause, and that the district court did not err in dismissing 

Hinkle’s claim that the sheriff issued the press release to retaliate against Hinkle. 

That said, we conclude that the body-cavity strip search was unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment. And because this unlawful search was based on the County’s 

indiscriminate strip-search policy, we hold that the County is directly liable. 

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
3 

BACKGROUND 

I. Factual Background 

A. The Investigation 

On November 6, 2012, Scott Jay defeated a challenger to win re-election as the 

Beckham County Sheriff. The next day, Laramie Hinkle resigned his office as the 

Chief of Police for Erick, Oklahoma, situated in Beckham County. Hinkle had 

supported Sheriff Jay’s opponent during the campaign.1

 

In May 2013, Rod and Lynne Smith reported to the Beckham County Sheriff’s 

Office that for the past two weeks someone had abandoned a trailer on their property. 

Mr. Smith told Deputy Strider Estep that Hinkle or Hinkle’s father-in-law, Vaughn 

Keown, might own the trailer. Keown had recently done some work for the Smiths on 

their property. 

Deputy Estep went to the Smiths’ property and viewed the trailer. He wrote 

down its vehicle identification number (VIN) and information from a trailerdealership decal. Deputy Estep accessed the National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) database, but that revealed nothing suggesting that the trailer had been stolen. 

Next, after seeing its name on the decal, Deputy Estep called T-N-J Trailers, a South 

Carolina trailer dealership. A dealership representative told him that the Carpenter’s 

Church in Anderson, South Carolina, had bought the trailer in 2001. 

1

 Though the timing of Hinkle’s resignation might suggest a connection 

between Hinkle’s leaving and Sheriff Jay’s victory, Hinkle testified that instead the 

mayor of Erick had forced him to resign because of a complaint. 
4 

Deputy Estep called the church and told its pastor that “a trailer was located in 

[the] county and that he was trying to discover the owner[.]” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 

at 391. Deputy Estep described the trailer and provided its VIN. The next day, after 

“check[ing] into the matter,” the pastor called Deputy Estep and confirmed that 

someone had stolen the trailer “from the church in 2003.” Id. The pastor also told 

Deputy Estep that the church’s insurer, the Palmetto Insurance Agency, had paid the 

church’s claim for the stolen trailer. Finally, the pastor “asked Deputy Estep if the 

trailer was in Erick[,] Oklahoma.” Id. When Deputy Estep confirmed that it was 

located “just outside Erick,” the pastor “informed Deputy Estep that the only persons 

he could think of that would be in that area who might be in possession of the trailer 

were Laramie Hinkle or Vaughn Keown”—former members of the Carpenter’s 

Church. Id.

With this information, Deputy Estep called the Anderson County Sheriff’s 

Department about the 2003 trailer theft. That office confirmed the theft of a trailer as 

described but advised that its investigative report did not list a VIN for the trailer 

stolen from the Carpenter’s Church. 

Finally, Deputy Estep called the church’s insurer, the Palmetto Insurance 

Agency. Its representative confirmed the pastor’s account of the stolen trailer and its 

having paid the church’s claim. Importantly, when Deputy Estep provided the 

Oklahoma trailer’s VIN, the insurer told him that it matched the VIN of the stolen 

trailer. 
5 

Armed with this incriminating information, Deputy Estep ran a covert 

operation. On May 10, 2013, using the name “John Larson,” Deputy Estep called 

Keown, who told him that Hinkle owned the trailer: 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, is this Vaughn? 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Yes 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey Vaughn, this is John Larson. I was out there on 

Lynne Smith’s property the other day . . . 

VAUGHN KEOWN: On whose? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Lynne Smith’s, just east of Erick over there. 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Yeah, hey there’s a little trailer out there, a little Vnose white trailer . . . 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, is that yours? 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Umm . . . Now who is this? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: This is John Larson. Can you hear me? 

VAUGHN KEOWN: . . . I don’t reckon I know you. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: I’m from over by Cordell, I just do some work for 

them, just kind of a salesman, but I saw that trailer out there, and they 

said, uh, you there? 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Yeah, I’m here. Are you interested in buying it or 

something? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: No, nah, I was just out there the other day, and they 

said they didn’t know whose it was, but they thought it might be yours, 

and I just was wondering if you were interested in selling that thing? 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Um, I don’t know. Actually, my son-in-law owns 

that. I can ask him. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Who’s your, is that, Laramie? They said it was 

either yours or Laramie’s. 

VAUGHN KEOWN: Really? Um, man you’re breaking up something 

fierce. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Alright, hey, let me get to a better spot and I’ll call 

you back. 

Appellee’s Suppl. App. vol. 1 at 00:10–00:12, 01:24–03:10. 

Again using the “John Larson” alias, Deputy Estep called Hinkle to ask about 

the trailer: 
6 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Hello? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Is this Laramie? 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, it is. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, Laramie, this is John Larson, I know ol’ Lynne 

Smith over there in Erick. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Hey, I was over there the other day and we were just 

kind of tooling around their property and saw a little V nose trailer out 

there, about a 16 footer. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Yeah, hey, they said it might be yours or your fatherin-law’s, I called your father-in-law, he said it was yours. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Right. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: And I was wondering if you would be willing to sell 

that thing. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Well, let me tell you something, Mark -- I mean, 

John, let me call you right back, can I get a number from you, I’m right 

in the middle of something here, and I need to try to take care of it, let 

me call you right back, okay, partner? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: You there? 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir. Can I call you right back? I’m right here 

in the middle something, I can’t really -- let me call you right back, okay, 

partner? 

Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1105–06. About an hour later, at Deputy Estep’s direction, 

Beckham County Deputy Brett Moore stopped Hinkle’s automobile. And about 

fifteen minutes after that, Deputy Estep arrived and identified himself to Hinkle as 

the phone caller, “John Larson.” Deputy Estep read Hinkle the Miranda warning, 

obtained Hinkle’s consent to record their conversation, and began questioning Hinkle 

about the trailer. 

Hinkle immediately told Deputy Estep that he had understood “John Larson” 

to be asking about a different trailer on someone else’s property: 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. All right. Here’s the deal, I called your father-inlaw. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes. 
7 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Is that Vaughn? 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. I described the trailer to him. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Right. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Down there on Lynne’s place. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Right, yes, sir. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. And he said you’re the one that owned that trailer, 

okay? 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. All right. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Because I’m the one that called and asked if somebody 

wanted to sell it. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Ok. Sure, sure, okay. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. I described the trailer to him. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Right. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: That that V nose trailer that’s down there. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Now, explain to me, you say V nose, explain to 

me what the -- 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Just a V. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: I know, but is it a cargo trailer or what is it? 

DEPUTY ESTEP: It’s an enclosed trailer. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Enclosed trailer, now, that’s the part I’m trying 

to get across. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: All right. All right. And I talked to him and described the 

trailer to him, he said you were the one that owned it. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Yes, sir. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Then I called you, you know, kind of described it 

to you, asked you if you were the one that owned it, and you said yeah. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: No, no, wait a minute now, I’m thinking you were 

talking about a flatbed trailer that I had over here. I misunderstood. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. Well, I told you the one over at Lynn’s house, I 

kind of described it to you on the -- I got it on recording. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. Well, that’s fine, if you got a recording, but I’m 

telling you, I don’t own an enclosed trailer, I own a flatbed trailer. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: Okay. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: I don’t even own that, I own one trailer in South 

Carolina and have a flatbed over here at Ms. Branson’s (ph) neighbors’. 

DEPUTY ESTEP: All right. Well, I’m going based off what you said to me 

and what your father-in-law said to me, okay. 

LARAMIE HINKLE: Okay. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1218–20. Later at his deposition, Hinkle explained that his 

uncovered, flatbed, V-nosed trailer was located “a little over a quarter of a mile 
8 

from” where the covered, V-nosed trailer was located, and that his trailer “looked 

similar to it.” Id. at 1080.2

 Further, Hinkle asserted that, in fact, he had only 

borrowed the flatbed trailer from one of his friends. 

 After Hinkle told his side of the story, Deputy Estep and Hinkle called Keown 

and asked that he come discuss the matter. This time, Keown said that the covered 

trailer was a “family trailer,” that “we all bought it kind of together” from the 

Carpenter’s Church, and that Hinkle “didn’t have anything to do with it.” Appellee’s 

Suppl. App. vol. 3 at 07:28–07:52. Keown said that he was thirty minutes away and 

would come meet with Deputy Estep and Hinkle. 

Over the next three hours, Deputy Estep called Keown at least three times, 

with Keown reporting each time that he remained lost in the “Breaks.” Appellant’s 

App. vol. 2 at 392, 477–78. Getting nowhere, Deputy Estep testified that he called 

Assistant District Attorney Gina Webb. After hearing Deputy Estep’s account, 

Prosecutor Webb advised him that he had probable cause to arrest Hinkle.3

 Without 

2

 Nothing in the record reveals whether Deputy Estep ever saw Hinkle’s 

flatbed trailer; apparently Deputy Estep knew about only one trailer. Appellant’s 

App. vol. 5 at 1041 (“Well, I told you the one over at Lynn[e]’s house . . . .” 

(emphasis added)). Because Hinkle testified that his trailer was a quarter of a mile 

away from the one on the Smiths’ property, it appears that Deputy Estep did not learn 

about the flatbed trailer until Hinkle said that Deputy Estep had the wrong trailer. 

Prosecutor Gina Webb testified that “there was only one trailer on [the Smiths’] 

property at that time.” Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 852. 

3

 Prosecutor Webb’s testimony varied. First, she stated that she had spoken 

with Sheriff Jay, not Deputy Estep. But she later said that she thought “it was Strider 

[Estep] that called me first” and that she and he had discussed “probable cause.” 

Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 609. Whenever Sheriff Jay and Prosecutor Webb spoke, 
9 

seeking or obtaining a warrant, Deputy Estep arrested Hinkle for three crimes—

knowingly receiving or concealing stolen property, transporting stolen property into 

Oklahoma, and conspiracy to commit a felony. 

In his opening brief, Hinkle asserts that Deputy Estep, in coordination with 

Sheriff Jay, framed and arrested him, solely for Hinkle’s having supported Sheriff 

Jay’s election opponent. Indeed, Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay himself made the 

“decision to arrest Hinkle.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 8. But the district court found 

that Sheriff Jay had played only a “passing role,” noting that Deputy Estep’s 

investigation had begun when the Smiths—and not Sheriff Jay—called him. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1412. The court stated that Hinkle had provided “nothing 

beyond [his own] suspicions” to show that Deputy Estep had framed him at Sheriff 

Jay’s prompting. Id. at 1412, 1415. 

Hinkle testified that, after the arrest, a different officer transported him to the 

Beckham County Detention Center (BCDC), but left him out front so the officer 

could respond to a report of a fleeing suspect.4

 After voluntarily entering the BCDC, 

some of the information Sheriff Jay gave her was incorrect. Prosecutor Webb 

testified that Sheriff Jay told her the trailer “came back stolen on the NCIC” hit, 

which is refuted by Deputy Estep’s probable-cause affidavit. Appellant’s App. vol. 5 

at 1148. 

4

 In contrast, Deputy Estep testified that he transported Hinkle to the BCDC 

and “walked him in and filled out the paperwork.” Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 825. In 

reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we credit Hinkle’s 

account. Genberg v. Porter, 882 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2018) (“On an appeal 

from a grant of summary judgment, we draw all reasonable factual inferences in 

favor of the non-moving party.” (citation omitted)). 
10 

Hinkle encountered Detention Officer Jason Atwood, who patted him down in the 

booking area. Immediately after that, Officer Atwood took Hinkle into a private 

dressing room for a body-cavity strip search. As mandated by the BCDC’s stripsearch policy5

 applying to all detainees, Officer Atwood directed Hinkle to lift his 

scrotum and, soon after, to “spread his buttocks, and squat and cough.” Id. at 1408. 

During this search, Officer Atwood visually inspected Hinkle’s anal cavity from “a 

couple [of] feet away.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 331. The body-cavity search lasted 

a minute or two. Then, wearing rubber gloves, Officer Atwood ran his fingers 

through Hinkle’s beard, again checking for contraband. Officer Atwood testified that 

the BCDC performed these searches on all incoming detainees before booking them 

or knowing where they would be housed. 

After the body-cavity strip search, Officer Atwood led Hinkle from the private 

dressing room and handcuffed him to a bench in the booking area. Captain Bilbo, 

who was “in charge of the jail,” testified that this meant that at this time, “they had 

not made a decision on where he was going to be housed.” Id. at 361, 367. About an 

hour later, “because [Hinkle] was the [former] police chief,” the sheriff’s office 

transported Hinkle to the Elk City jail to avoid placing him in the BCDC’s general 

population. Id. at 326.6 According to the Beckham County Board of County 

5

 The County describes the strip-search protocol as a policy. 

6

 The distance between the Elk City jail and the BCDC is 17.2 miles. See 

Oklahoma Atlas & Gazetteer 38–39 (6th ed., DeLorme 2019). We take judicial notice 

of this distance. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), (c); Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of 
11 

Commissioners (County), “the decision was made to transfer Plaintiff to Elk City to 

completely segregate him from the rest of the facility because he was a former law 

enforcement officer.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 7. 

Detention Officer Atwood testified that Captain Bilbo would have made the decision 

to transfer Hinkle, and that “[e]ither she knew ahead of time that he was coming in or 

one of us would have called her and discussed it with her.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 

327. Captain Bilbo, on the other hand, testified that she had no “recollection of 

the[se] events,” because she was “on medical leave” and “not doing any work at all.” 

Id. at 366. 

B. The Case Unravels 

On May 14, 2013, just four days after Hinkle’s arrest, an agent working for 

Palmetto Insurance drafted a letter addressed “[t]o whom it may concern.” 

Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1318 (capitalization removed). The letter began by 

verifying that on October 23, 2003, a trailer was stolen from the Carpenter’s Church. 

But what the letter said next undid Deputy Estep’s case. The letter advised that in 

2003 the church had owned two Haulmark trailers, and that Palmetto Insurance had 

now realized that it had mixed the two VINs in processing the stolen-trailer 

paperwork. The news was dire—Palmetto Insurance had “mistakenly reported the 

wrong VIN# as stolen” and would “be processing a correction.” Id. The letter 

Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1218 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Piggie, 

622 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir. 1980). 
12 

summed up “that the trailer currently in possession of Mr. Laramie Hinkle” in fact 

“was NOT stolen.” Id.

On May 21, 2013, the Carpenter’s Church drafted its own letter addressed 

“[t]o whom it may concern” “to verify that Vaughn Keown [i]s the rightful owner of 

the trailer [the trailer in Oklahoma that Deputy Estep had called about].” Appellant’s 

App. vol. 3 at 708. The church’s letter advised that Vaughn Keown had “purchased 

the trailer from The Carpenter’s Church in November, 2008.” Id.7

Deputy Estep testified that about “two to three weeks” after Hinkle’s arrest (so 

sometime between about May 24 to June 1, 2013), a Palmetto Insurance 

representative called him. Id. at 524. The representative told Deputy Estep that the 

VIN of the church’s stolen trailer did not match the VIN of the Oklahoma trailer. 

Deputy Estep testified that he “contacted the D.A.’s office immediately” after 

hearing about the “grave mistake.” Id. at 522. Prosecutor Webb testified to the 

contrary, saying that she never received a phone call from Deputy Estep informing 

her “that the trailer in question was not stolen[.]” Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1150. 

On May 31, 2013, Palmetto Insurance’s representative faxed to Deputy Estep a 

2013 supplemental report generated by the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office 

7

 We are uncertain of the date that the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office 

received either letter. We note that both letters have remnants of fax transmissions: 

both show “No. 5965,” the Palmetto Insurance letter shows “P. 2” and the 

Carpenter’s Church letter shows “P. 3,” and each shows transmission “May 21, 2013 

10:12 AM.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 707–08. On summary-judgment review, and 

considering the earlier communications between Deputy Estep and the two letter 

writers, we see a fair inference that the sheriff’s office had both letters on May 21, 

2013, and it faxed them elsewhere at 10:12 a.m. 
13 

concerning the stolen trailer’s VIN. As mentioned, the Anderson County Sheriff’s 

Office had no VIN listed in its 2003 incident report for the church’s stolen trailer. 

But in May 2013, after talking with the Palmetto Insurance representative, Deputy 

Nancy Hunt of the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office “went to the old NCIC files” 

and “obtain[ed] the vin # that was entered into NCIC” for the stolen trailer. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 382. As revealed in the supplemental report, Deputy Hunt 

saw that the VIN number the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office had entered differed 

from the VIN of the trailer in Oklahoma. Deputy Estep testified that he “believe[d] 

[he] would have” received the Palmetto Insurance’s representative’s May 31 fax. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 813. Nonetheless, Deputy Estep also testified that he could 

not “really remember receiving this.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 545.

Deputy Estep testified that “on his way out” of the Beckham County Sheriff’s 

Office (he resigned on July 8, 2013), he “explained to Sheriff Jay the situation[,] . . . 

told him where everything was,” and told him “that there was conclusive evidence” 

that Hinkle did not steal the trailer. See Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1139–40. Faced 

with Deputy Estep’s testimony that he had informed Sheriff Jay about Hinkle’s 

innocence “as he was getting ready to leave the department,” Sheriff Jay testified that 

he could not “recall [having] any conversation with him.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 

240–41. But Sheriff Jay also said that he was “not saying it didn’t happen.” Id. at 

240. 

Furthermore, Sheriff Jay testified that he did not “recall ever seeing” Palmetto 

Insurance’s letter before being deposed on August 14, 2017. Id. at 237. Similarly, he 
14 

claimed that he had “never laid eyes” on the Carpenter Church’s letter. Id. at 236–37. 

And Sheriff Jay said that he did not “recall ever seeing [the fax] before.” Id. at 238. 

Despite the exculpatory evidence from the church and its insurer, Prosecutor 

Webb and the district attorney’s office delayed dismissing the case. According to 

Prosecutor Webb, Sheriff Jay had told her that either the insurance commission or the 

attorney general’s office was investigating the Palmetto Insurance Agency for fraud. 

The specifics of any such fraud investigation are unclear. Prosecutor Webb 

testified that the investigation might have involved the Palmetto Insurance’s 

representative who had spoken with Deputy Estep: “I kind of think that’s the lady 

that they were investigating.” Appellant’s App. vol. 5 at 1156. Prosecutor Webb 

could not remember whether she called “the insurance commission or the attorney 

general’s office” in South Carolina about the investigation. Id. at 1160–62. But she 

recalled that a person from one of those offices told her that the investigation had run 

into “a dead end.” Id. at 1160. Soon after that conversation, the district attorney’s 

office moved to dismiss the charges against Hinkle. And on September 12, 2013, the 

state district judge dismissed the case. 

C. The Press Release 

Sometime after Hinkle’s arrest, the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office posted a 

press release on its website,8

 entitled “Former Police Officer Arrested for Possessing 

8

 Neither the district court nor the parties provide a date when the press release 

was first posted. A time stamp in the record indicates that the press release may first 

have appeared on the website on August 21, 2013. Because this date would have been 
15 

Stolen Property.” Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 710–11. The press release identified 

Hinkle’s charges and recounted the events leading to his arrest. It stated that the 

Beckham County Sheriff’s Office believed that Hinkle and Keown had “stole[n] a 

trailer from a church in South Carolina . . . and brought it to Western Oklahoma”; 

that Hinkle had been “arrested . . . for possession of stolen property, conspiracy to 

commit a felony, and bringing stolen property into the state”; and that “Hinkle 

previously served on the Erick Police Department.” Id. at 710. It claimed that Hinkle 

had “confirmed that he owned the trailer, according to the report from the Beckham 

County Sheriff[’s] Office.” Id. 

Sheriff Jay testified that he reviewed all press releases before authorizing them 

to be posted on the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office’s website. After posting the 

press release, Sheriff Jay left it on the website for almost two years after the court 

dismissed Hinkle’s charges. In fact, the sheriff never deleted the press release—it 

remained available to the public until a network crash destroyed all the office’s press 

releases. Nor did Sheriff Jay ever issue a press release about the dismissal of Hinkle’s 

charges. 

about two months after the Palmetto Insurance representative’s call to Deputy Estep 

exonerating Hinkle, Sheriff Jay may have known that Hinkle was innocent before 

authorizing posting the press release. But Hinkle does not point out this factual issue 

and advances no legal theory based on it. In fact, in his Amended Complaint, Hinkle 

alleges that the press release was posted on May 9, 2013. See Am. Compl. ¶ 61. 

Because “[i]t is not our role to sift through the record to find evidence not cited by 

the parties to support arguments they have not made,” Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 

1183, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Gross v. Burggraf Construction Co., 53 F.3d 

1531, 1546 (10th Cir.1995)), we stop here. 
16 

II. Procedural Background

Hinkle sued Sheriff Jay, Deputy Estep, and the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

for violating his First and Fourth Amendment rights. He also sued Sheriff Jay and 

Deputy Estep for defamation, for publicly placing him in a false light, and for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

 Hinkle alleged that Sheriff Jay, Deputy Estep, and the County had violated his 

First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for supporting the sheriff’s 

election opponent. As the retaliatory acts, Hinkle relied on the arrest, body-cavity 

strip search, and press release. In his Fourth Amendment claims, Hinkle asserted that 

he had been arrested without probable cause and body-cavity strip searched under an 

unlawful policy. Finally, Hinkle alleged that Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay had 

conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 

First, the district court dismissed the First Amendment claim on grounds that 

Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest Hinkle, that the County’s policy of bodycavity strip searching all detainees was lawful, and that the Beckham County 

Sheriff’s Office often released news releases about high-profile cases. 

Second, the district court dismissed Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment false-arrest 

claims against Sheriff Jay, Deputy Estep, and the County. As grounds, the district 

court relied on its earlier conclusion that Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest 

Hinkle. The district court relied on many factors, including these: (i) the Smiths had 

thought Hinkle or Keown owned the trailer, (ii) the church’s pastor had confirmed 

that the trailer was stolen and identified Hinkle and Keown as men who might have 
17 

the trailer, (iii) the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office had agreed that the stolen 

trailer matched the description of the trailer on the Smiths’ property, (iv) the church’s 

insurer had matched the VINs of the stolen trailer and the one on the Smiths’ 

property, and (v) Keown had said that Hinkle owned the trailer. Though the NCIC 

database did not identify the trailer as stolen, and though Deputy Estep learned before 

the arrest that Hinkle had earlier understood Deputy Estep to be asking about a 

different trailer (a flatbed, not a covered trailer), the district court concluded that 

these countervailing factors did “not vitiate the existence of probable cause.” 

Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1419–20. Accordingly, the district court dismissed 

Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment false-arrest claims. 

Third, the district court dismissed Hinkle’s claim that the County, through 

Sheriff Jay, had implemented an unconstitutional policy requiring body-cavity strip 

searches of all detainees. Because the BCDC “did not have a true segregation 

option,” the district court ruled that the policy was lawful under Florence v. Board of 

Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). Id. at 1425. The court also concluded that 

Officer Atwood did not violate Florence’s touching exception by touching Hinkle’s 

beard—an unclothed area of the body. 

Fourth, the district court dismissed Hinkle’s claim that Sheriff Jay and Deputy 

Estep had conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. The court stated that 

“[f]or allegations of conspiracy to successfully constitute a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff 

‘must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; 

pleading and proving one without the other will be insufficient.’” Id. at 1427 (citation 
18 

omitted). And because Hinkle had not shown an actual deprivation of any federally 

protected right, the court dismissed his civil-conspiracy claim. 

After dismissing Hinkle’s federal claims, the district court turned to Hinkle’s 

state-law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4), the court chose not to retain 

supplemental jurisdiction over these claims and dismissed them without prejudice, a 

decision Hinkle does not appeal. 

On appeal, Hinkle challenges only whether the district court properly 

dismissed his federal claims. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Qualified-Immunity Standard 

Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay successfully asserted qualified immunity against 

Hinkle’s § 1983 claims. We review de novo “the award of summary judgment based 

on qualified immunity.” Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 2020) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 F.3d 1109, 1113 

(10th Cir. 2019)). 

Qualified immunity insulates “officials from civil liability so long as their 

conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 

308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). 

When “a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff.” Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1212–13 (10th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001)). To meet that 
19 

burden, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the defendant’s actions violated a federal 

constitutional or statutory right, and, if so, (2) that the right was clearly established at 

the time of the defendant’s unlawful conduct.” Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1186 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 

460 (10th Cir. 2013)).

Even though a plaintiff bears the burden of meeting these two prongs, a 

defendant moving for summary judgment “must [still] ‘show[] that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014)). And as always, 

when deciding whether summary judgment is proper, we “may not weigh evidence 

and must resolve genuine disputes of material fact in favor of the nonmoving party.” 

Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 

572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (per curiam)). In Tolan, the Court emphasized “the 

importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant” for both prongs of the 

qualified-immunity analysis. 572 U.S. at 657. 

We can affirm the dismissal of Hinkle’s claims against Sheriff Jay and Deputy 

Estep under either prong or both. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Doe v. 

Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. I.B. v. 

Woodard, 139 S. Ct. 2616 (2019)). Here, we rule that Hinkle has not met his 

summary-judgment burden to show a constitutional violation by Sheriff Jay or 
20 

Deputy Estep. And because we conclude that Hinkle has not met prong one, he 

cannot have met his burden under prong two.9

II. Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment False-Arrest Claim 

Hinkle raises three primary arguments to support his claim that Deputy Estep 

arrested him without probable cause. First, he claims that Deputy Estep falsely 

claimed in his arrest affidavit that Hinkle had admitted owning the trailer suspected 

of being stolen, and he argues that this admission was necessary for probable cause. 

Second, Hinkle claims that even if Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle was 

involved with a stolen trailer, Deputy Estep would still have lacked probable cause to 

arrest, because Oklahoma law requires that the property be recently stolen. Third, 

Hinkle claims that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest because the statute 

of limitations had run on each of his charges. 

9

 Because the County is a governmental entity and not an individual, it is not 

entitled to the protections of qualified immunity. E.g., Owen v. City of Indep., 445 

U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[M]unicipalities have no immunity from damages liability 

flowing from their constitutional violations . . . .”); Seifert v. Unified Gov’t of 

Wyandotte Cty., 779 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Only individuals, not 

governmental entities, can assert qualified immunity.” (citing Beedle v. Wilson, 422 

F.3d 1059, 1069 (10th Cir. 2005)). Thus, we do not apply the qualified-immunity 

standard to Hinkle’s claims against the County. Rather, we will review de novo 

whether the County has shown the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, 

“drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all factual disputes in favor of 

[Hinkle].” Murphy v. City of Tulsa, 950 F.3d 641, 643 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yousuf v. Cohlmia, 741 F.3d 31, 37 (10th Cir. 

2014)) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (applying the de novo standard of review when 

reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Tulsa 

on a plaintiff’s municipal-liability claim). 
21 

A. Probable Cause 

Probable cause is a concept “incapable of [a] precise definition or 

quantification into percentages.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) 

(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Brinegar v. United States, 338 

U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). But an officer must have probable cause to obtain a warrant—

the Constitution states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. 

Const. amend. IV. Probable cause also remains important outside of the warrant 

context, because “[a] warrantless arrest is permissible when an officer ‘has probable 

cause to believe that a person committed a crime.’” E.g., Cortez v. McCauley, 478 

F.3d 1108, 1115 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1476 (10th 

Cir. 1995)). 

In reviewing “whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we examine 

the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, 

viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to 

probable cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371). Such facts amount to 

probable cause “when [they] . . . are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” 

Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 

Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004)). That belief must be anchored in a 

“substantial probability”—as opposed to “a bare suspicion”—that an offense took or 
22 

is taking place. Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d 970, 981 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1141). 

But probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 

338 (2014) (citations omitted). Officers need “only the kind of fair probability on 

which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 

244 (2013)). For that reason, in considering whether the government has shown 

probable cause to indict, grand juries need not hear the defendant’s side of an 

argument, id. (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992)), any crossexamination of the prosecution’s witnesses, id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 

103, 121–22 (1975)), or any exculpatory evidence, id. (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 

51)—a reasonably prudent person could find that the low bar of probable cause was 

met without technical analysis. Formulation of probable cause “does not require the 

fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a 

preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial 

in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt.” Gerstein, 420 

U.S. at 121 (citation omitted). An officer’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to 

the probable-cause calculus because the crux of the inquiry is whether “the 

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the arrest].” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 

U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whren v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996)). 
23 

Temporally, we judge probable cause to arrest by what facts the officer knew 

at arrest. Id. at 152 (citing Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371); see also United States v. Neal, 

500 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1974). Information learned after developing probable 

cause but before an arrest can dissipate probable cause. E.g., United States v. Dalton, 

918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[N]ew information can dissipate probable 

cause.” (citing Harte v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 864 F.3d 1154, 1182 (10th Cir. 2017) (per 

curiam) (opinion of Phillips, J.) (joined by Lucero, J.) (other citations omitted));10

United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567, 574 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A person may 

not be arrested, or must be released from arrest, if previously established probable 

cause has dissipated.”); Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (“As 

a corollary, moreover, of the rule that the police may rely on the totality of facts 

available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts 

tending to dissipate probable cause.” (footnote and citations omitted)). And in 

reviewing the dissipation question, courts impute officers “with knowledge of any 

readily available exculpatory evidence that they unreasonably fail to ascertain.” 

Maresca v. Bernalillo Cty., 804 F.3d 1301, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

Though officers may not ignore evidence that would dissipate probable cause, 

not all new evidence does so. For instance, a soon-to-be arrestee’s bare proclamations 

10 Whether reviewing a search or an arrest, the same probable-cause standard 

applies. See Stonecipher, 759 F.3d at 1141 (“Officers must have probable cause to 

initiate a search, arrest, and prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.”). 
24 

of innocence do not. Romero, 45 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted) (“Once Defendants 

concluded that the initially discovered facts established probable cause, they were 

under no obligation to forego arresting Plaintiff or release him merely because he 

said he was innocent.”). Even “a plausible explanation” does not require “the officer 

to forego arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered 

provide probable cause.” Id. at 1480 n.6 (quoting Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 

263 (6th Cir. 1988)). In the comparable context of whether an arresting officer must 

release an already-detained suspect to avoid a false-imprisonment claim, the First 

Circuit has reasoned that “having once determined that there is probable cause to 

arrest, an officer should not be required to reassess his probable cause conclusion at 

every turn, whether faced with the discovery of some new evidence or a suspect’s 

self-exonerating explanation from the back of the squad car.” Thompson v. Olson, 

798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1986). Instead, arresting officers must release a suspect 

only if the police discover that “the suspicion (probable cause) which forms the basis 

for the privilege to arrest is unfounded.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 

§ 134 cmt. f (Am. Law Inst. 1965)). 

B. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause to Believe that Hinkle Was 

Involved in Crimes Connected to a Stolen Trailer. 

Applying this framework, we agree with the district court that, at the time of 

Hinkle’s warrantless arrest, Deputy Estep had probable cause that Hinkle had 

committed a crime. An objectively reasonable officer standing in Deputy Estep’s 

place would have plentiful information from reputable sources to support a 
25 

substantial probability that Hinkle had stolen, helped steal, helped conceal, or 

wrongfully received the trailer left on the Smiths’ property. 

As mentioned, Deputy Estep investigated for two weeks, obtaining 

incriminating information along the way from neutral, credible sources—the Smiths, 

the Carpenter’s Church pastor, the Anderson County Sheriff’s Office, and Palmetto 

Insurance. The reported VIN match alone furnished probable cause that the trailer 

was stolen. 

Further, Deputy Estep had probable cause to attribute that crime to Hinkle. 

Both the Smiths and the pastor named Hinkle and Keown as men who might have the 

trailer, and Keown first stated that Hinkle owned the trailer. When Deputy Estep told 

Hinkle of Keown’s statement, Hinkle did not protest, but just followed along by 

uttering “right.” Finally, after Deputy Estep later confronted Keown about his initial 

statement, Keown still described the trailer as a “family trailer.” And Hinkle was 

family—he was Keown’s son-in-law.11 

These facts gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that Hinkle had 

committed a crime. Indeed, Hinkle was charged with “conspiring and agreeing with 

Vaughn Keown to” knowingly conceal stolen property. Appellant’s App. vol. 3 at 

697. A criminal conspiracy takes two or more people, United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 

11 Keown’s changing story also would have given Deputy Estep reason to 

question Keown’s veracity. Cf. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 34 (8th ed. Jan. 2020 

update) (“[T]he fact of the inconsistency gives the jury an insight into the witness’s 

state of mind; the inconsistency shows that the witness is either uncertain or 

untruthful. In either event, the inconsistency calls into question the witness’s 

believability.”). 
26 

789, 793 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 668 (10th Cir. 

1992)), and Deputy Estep had a reasonable basis to believe that Keown and Hinkle 

were coconspirators. They were family members, they both had attended the 

Carpenter’s Church in South Carolina, and they both were tied to the trailer by the 

Smiths and the pastor. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause to believe 

that a crime was being committed and that Hinkle was one of the people committing 

the crime. 

C. Deputy Estep Had Probable Cause Even Without Hinkle’s 

Confirmation of Ownership, and That Probable Cause Never 

Dissipated. 

Hinkle asserts that “Estep . . . mischaracterize[d] Hinkle’s statement of ‘Right’ 

to be an affirmative statement of ownership.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 27. He also 

claims that because “John Larson” did not clarify whether he was asking Hinkle 

about a covered trailer or a flatbed trailer, Hinkle’s responding “right” was not a 

claim of ownership. Hinkle argues that “[w]ithout the ‘Right’ there is nothing 

indicating Hinkle had any possession of the trailer.” Id. at 31. 

We disagree. Even without Hinkle’s utterance of “right,” the reported match of 

VINs gave Deputy Estep probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. 

And even without “right,” Deputy Estep still had probable cause to believe that 

Hinkle had committed that crime because the Smiths, the pastor, and Keown had 

connected him to the trailer. 
27 

Further, Hinkle’s later explanation that he had originally been referring to a 

different trailer—a flatbed one—did not dissipate probable cause. As discussed, even 

“a plausible explanation” does not oblige “the officer to forego arrest pending further 

investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.” Romero, 45 

F.3d at 1480 n.6 (quoting Criss, 867 F.2d at 263). Hinkle may have thought Deputy 

Estep was referring to a different trailer when Hinkle uttered “right,” but that would 

not diminish the other evidence Deputy Estep relied on in arresting Hinkle. 

D. Recently Stolen Property Is Not an Element of Any of Hinkle’s 

Charges. 

Next, Hinkle argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause to arrest him 

because his suspected crimes required that the trailer have been recently stolen. 

Further, Hinkle disputes that “Estep . . . objectively establish[ed] that Hinkle had 

knowledge the trailer in question was stolen.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26–27 

(citations omitted). He also claims that Deputy Estep made an unreasonable mistake 

of fact and that his mistake “cannot furnish probable cause.” Id. at 27 (citations 

omitted). We disagree. 

The Information charged Hinkle with knowingly concealing stolen property, in 

violation of title 21, section 1713 of the Oklahoma Statutes, conspiring to knowingly 

conceal stolen property, in violation of title 21, section 421 of the Oklahoma Statutes, 

and transporting stolen property into the state, in violation of title 21, section 1715 of 

the Oklahoma Statutes. We disagree with Hinkle that Deputy Estep would have 

lacked probable cause to arrest Hinkle for these crimes absent evidence that the 
28 

trailer had been recently stolen. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1713A (West 2003), states 

that: 

Every person who buys or receives, in any manner, upon any consideration, 

any personal property of any value whatsoever that has been stolen, 

embezzled, obtained by false pretense or robbery, knowing or having 

reasonable cause to believe the same to have been stolen, embezzled, 

obtained by false pretense, or robbery, or who conceals, withholds, or aids in 

concealing or withholding such property from the owner, shall be guilty of a 

felony. 

This statute does not require that the property be recently stolen. If Hinkle had 

received the trailer, believing that Keown had stolen it,12 or if Hinkle had aided 

Keown in concealing the trailer, he would have violated section 1713A. 

 In an attempt to write a recently-stolen element into the statute, Hinkle cites 

Jackson v. State, 508 P.2d 277, 279–80 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973), and Miller v. State, 

481 P.2d 175, 178 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969), for the proposition that under section 

1713A, “mere possession of property recently stolen alone is not sufficient to convict 

the possessor of knowingly concealing stolen property.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 26. 

12 Because receiving or concealing stolen property are accessory crimes, many 

courts reason that “[a] person cannot be convicted of receiving stolen property where 

the evidence shows that he acted as a principal in the underlying larceny.” Charles E. 

Torcia, 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 440 (15th ed. Sept. 2019 update) (collecting 

cases). So if Hinkle stole the trailer himself, these accessory crimes may not be 

applicable. But if that were the case, Hinkle could be charged with the underlying 

larceny crime. Because “the probable cause inquiry is not restricted to a particular 

offense, but rather requires merely that officers had reason to believe that a crime—

any crime—occurred,” United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1345 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153), we conclude that the ultimate probable-cause 

inquiry is not affected by whether Deputy Estep thought Hinkle or Keown stole the 

trailer. 
29 

That language comes from an aged13 jury instruction, for which Jackson and Miller 

reviewed challenges that it improperly placed the burden of producing evidence on 

defendants. Jackson, 508 P.2d at 280; Miller, 481 P.2d at 178. But neither case 

grafted a recently-stolen-property element into the statute. Nor will we. See tit. 21, § 

1713A; see also Eslinger v. State, 734 P.2d 830, 832 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (“The 

essential elements of the crime of Knowingly Concealing Stolen Property are 

knowledge that the property was stolen and the act of concealing the property in 

some manner from the rightful owner.” (citation omitted)); Brewer v. State, 554 P.2d 

18, 21 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976) (citations omitted) (listing the elements for receiving 

stolen property and concealing stolen property but omitting from both lists a 

requirement that the property be recently stolen). 

 Hinkle also argues that Deputy Estep lacked probable cause that Hinkle knew 

the trailer was stolen. We agree with Hinkle that Deputy Estep needed to develop 

probable cause for each element of the offense. See Donahue, 948 F.3d at 1188 n.14 

(“[A] court can ‘determin[e] whether an officer had probable cause to make an arrest 

for a violation of state law’ by ‘applying the Fourth Amendment standard’ to the 

‘identif[ied] . . . elements of a crime, based on state law.’” (omission and second and 

13 The current Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions do not include a recentlystolen element for the crime of receiving-stolen property. Vernon’s Okla. Forms 2d, 

OUJI-CR 5-111 (Nov. 2018 update) (emphasis removed). And why this language 

appeared in earlier jury instructions is unclear—the earlier versions of this statute did 

not include a recently-stolen-property element, either. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, 

§ 1713A (1988) (referencing a historical note that quotes a pre-1961 version, which, 

like the current version, includes no recently-stolen-property element). 
30 

third alterations in original) (quoting Ivan E. Bodensteiner and Rosalie Berger 

Levinson, 1 State and Local Gov’t Civ. Rights Liab. § 1:11 (Nov. 2019 update))).14

But for the reasons mentioned, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable cause 

that Hinkle knew that the trailer was stolen (even though it turned out that it was 

not). 

In this case, Deputy Estep relied on information he received from unbiased 

sources. That information led him to believe that Hinkle and his father-in-law had 

possessed the trailer. If that were true, Deputy Estep could reasonably have believed 

that Hinkle knew the trailer was stolen. And though the church and insurance 

14 The majority position among our sister circuits is that an arrest is supported 

by probable cause only if the arresting officer has probable cause for every element 

of the offense. Williams v. City of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(“For probable cause to exist, there must be probable cause for all elements of the 

crime, including mens rea.” (citing Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 

1999))); United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To make an 

arrest based on probable cause, the arresting officer must have probable cause for 

each element of the offense.” (citing Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 

602–03 (3d Cir. 2005))); Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 

2003) (“Thus, for probable cause to arrest Thacker to exist here, the officers would 

not have to have proof of each element of a domestic violence offense, but would 

have to believe that a probability existed that he committed the offense.”); see also 

Hall v. District of Columbia, 867 F.3d 138, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Probable cause to 

arrest requires at least some evidence supporting each element of the offense.”). But 

see Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 724 n.1 (7th Cir. 1999), as amended (Jan. 7, 

2000) (stating that officers need not “establish probable cause as to each and 

every element of a crime before they are authorized to make an arrest”); Gasho v. 

United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1428 (9th Cir. 1994) (announcing that officers must 

have probable cause of specific intent for specific-intent crimes but that they need not 

have probable cause for other elements (citing United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 

513, 515 (9th Cir. 1983); Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 

1989), overruled on other grounds by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 

872–73 (9th Cir. 1993))). 
31 

company later retracted their information as mistaken, Deputy Estep reasonably 

relied on it before the arrest. Thus, we conclude that Deputy Estep had probable 

cause to arrest Hinkle. 

E. Because the Charges Were for Continuing Crimes, the Statute of 

Limitations Had Not Run. 

Finally, Hinkle argues that a three-year statute of limitations applies to the 

suspected Oklahoma property and conspiracy crimes. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 

152G (West 2003) (“In all other cases a prosecution for a public offense must be 

commenced within three (3) years after its commission.”). Because the Carpenter’s 

Church reported the trailer stolen in 2003, and he was arrested in 2013, Hinkle claims 

that the statute of limitations had run on each charge. Thus, Hinkle asserts that 

Deputy Estep had no probable cause to arrest him. 

Hinkle’s argument rests on the mistaken position that the statute of limitations 

began to run when the Carpenter’s Church reported the trailer as stolen. As a general 

rule, criminal statutes of limitations begin to run, at the earliest, when a wrongful act 

is completed, not when the victim later recounts the wrongful act to others. United 

States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The limitations period 

will normally begin to run when a crime is ‘complete,’ thereby ‘encouraging law 

enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.’” (citation 

omitted)); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 596 (“[N]ormally 

a statute of limitation begins to run from the time the crime is complete . . . .”). 
32 

Courts, including the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, treat crimes such 

as receiving or concealing stolen property as continuing crimes, whose statutes of 

limitations do not commence until wrongful possession or concealment ends. See, 

e.g., United States v. Blizzard, 27 F.3d 100, 102 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he nature of the 

offense of knowingly concealing and retaining stolen government property, 

nevertheless, convinces us that Congress intended for that offense to be a continuing 

one.”); People v. Owen, 649 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (“‘Conceal,’ in 

particular, clearly implies continuing conduct, because in concealing something, one 

is continually keeping it hidden from others.”); State v. Lawrence, 312 N.W.2d 251, 

253 (Minn. 1981) (“We hold, therefore, that either concealing or possessing stolen 

goods is a continuing offense for the purpose of the statute of limitations.”); Hainey 

v. State, 740 P.2d 146, 149 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (“Concealing stolen property is a 

continuing offense.”).15 Because Hinkle was charged with continuing crimes, the 

statute of limitations did not commence until Deputy Estep seized the trailer on May 

15 Hinkle also argues that he was subjected to an unreasonable continuing 

seizure under the Fourth Amendment because his arrest led to his having to post a 

bond and attend court proceedings. But because Deputy Estep had probable cause to 

arrest Hinkle, we need not decide whether these pretrial inconveniences amount to 

seizures unsupported by probable cause. Cf. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 

919 (2017) (explaining that if the original arrest was “without probable cause,” a 

plaintiff’s subsequent detention is “constitutionally unreasonable” because both the 

detention and the original arrest were “unsupported by probable cause”). Indeed, 

under our precedent, posting a bond and attending court proceedings may not even 

constitute seizures. See Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(declining to adopt Justice Ginsburg’s concurring approach in Albright v. Oliver, 510 

U.S. 266 (1994), which suggested that the term seizure is broad enough to cover 

posting a bond or attending pretrial court proceedings). 
33 

10, 2013, terminating Hinkle’s alleged possession and concealment of the trailer. As 

a result, the three-year statute of limitations had not yet run when Deputy Estep 

arrested Hinkle on that day. So even if Deputy Estep had needed to consider the 

statute of limitations—a dubious proposition in and of itself, see Sands v. 

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007); Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 

1207–08 (11th Cir. 1995)—that would not have affected the probable-cause analysis. 

F. Because the False-Arrest Claim Against Deputy Estep Fails, 

Hinkle’s Derivative False-Arrest Claims Against Sheriff Jay and the 

County Fail. 

Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay, as the County’s “final policy maker” and 

Deputy Estep’s supervisor, can be held liable for ratifying Hinkle’s false arrest. 

Appellant’s Opening Br. 19. To establish liability against a supervisor under § 1983, 

Hinkle must show “a deliberate, intentional act by the supervisor to violate 

constitutional rights.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 

1399 (10th Cir. 1992)). He may do so by showing that Sheriff Jay “personally 

directed the violation or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its 

continuance.” Id. (citing Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1400). Because Deputy Estep 

committed no constitutional violation, Hinkle cannot show that Sheriff Jay directed 

Deputy Estep to commit a constitutional violation or that Sheriff Jay acquiesced in its 

continuation. Hinkle’s supervisory claim thus fails. 

As for the County, Hinkle admits that “municipal liability under Section 1983 

requires in the first instance, under Monell v. Dep’t Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 692 
34 

(1978), that the municipality’s policy caused a constitutional violation.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 41. Hinkle has failed to show that the County, through Sheriff Jay, had 

adopted a policy sanctioning unlawful warrantless arrests. But even if he had done 

so, Hinkle’s Monell claim would fail because he was arrested with probable cause. 

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held 

liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 

constitutional tort.”). 

III. Hinkle’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim 

We now turn to Hinkle’s argument that Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay retaliated 

against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by supporting Sheriff Jay’s 

opponent in the 2012 election. Hinkle must establish three elements to show First 

Amendment retaliation: 

(1) that [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that 

the defendant[s’] actions caused [him] to suffer an injury that would chill 

a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; 

and (3) that the defendant[s’] adverse action was substantially motivated 

as a response to [his] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. 

Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay concede that for purposes of 

summary judgment, “Hinkle’s allegations . . . involving political support/association 

and suffrage [are] sufficient for the first element of ‘constitutionally protected 

activity.’” Appellees Scott Jay and Strider Estep’s Response Br. 19. They also agree 

that “an arrest or the publication of a press release regarding that arrest could satisfy 
35 

the second prong.” Id. Thus, Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep limit their arguments to 

the third element. 

Hinkle’s First Amendment retaliation claim has two bases: (1) that Deputy 

Estep arrested him in retaliation for supporting Sheriff Jay’s election opponent, and 

(2) that Sheriff Jay posted a false press release and sanctioned criminal charges 

against Hinkle for the same reason.16 

A. Arrest 

In addition to the three Worrell elements, a First Amendment retaliation claim 

based on a false arrest requires a separate “threshold showing”—generally, a plaintiff 

must show a false arrest. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). Hinkle 

concedes that “[w]hen an unlawful arrest is at the heart of a First Amendment 

retaliation claim, such as here, a lack of probable cause must be shown.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 32 (citation omitted). And in Nieves, the Supreme Court recently 

explained that “[t]he plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove 

the absence of probable cause for the arrest.” 139 S. Ct. at 1724. The Nieves Court 

adopted this objective test of probable cause to avoid an unwelcome result of using 

an officer’s subjective state of mind: “[a]ny inartful turn of phrase or perceived slight 

during a legitimate arrest could land an officer in years of litigation.” Id. at 1725. A 

subjective-mindset test could subject officers to suit despite an arrestee’s legitimate 

16 Thus, on appeal Hinkle does not contend that he was strip searched in 

retaliation for his First Amendment activity. 
36 

arrest and despite the Fourth Amendment’s “objective standard[] of reasonableness.” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

We have already concluded that Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest 

Hinkle. So, under Nieves, Hinkle’s retaliatory-arrest claim must fail. And though 

Nieves carves out a narrow exception—that probable cause will not defeat a 

retaliatory-arrest claim if the plaintiff could show that officers would usually not 

arrest under similar circumstances, id. at 1727, Hinkle has not argued that officers 

would forego arrests under his circumstances.17 

B. Press Release 

Hinkle also alleges that “Jay amped up the retaliation against Hinkle by 

overseeing the publication and dissemination of . . . false information through a Press 

Release detailing Hinkle’s arrest.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 35. As mentioned, 

Sheriff Jay has conceded that Hinkle established the first two Worrell elements for 

purposes of summary judgment; thus, the sole question before us is whether Sheriff 

Jay’s “adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [Hinkle’s] exercise 

of constitutionally protected conduct.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

The district court concluded that Hinkle had failed to demonstrate this was so. 

It noted that Hinkle had “not provided anything except suspicions and a 

17 As an example, if officers have a practice of never arresting people for 

jaywalking but then do arrest a plaintiff for jaywalking after he or she has 

complained about the police, a possible retaliatory-arrest claim could survive, 

probable cause notwithstanding. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. 
37 

chronological connection (as opposed to a causal connection) between [Hinkle’s] 

support of [the opponent] and issuance of the news release regarding [Hinkle’s] 

arrest.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1413. It also credited Sheriff Jay’s testimony that 

“the news release [w]as ‘part and parcel of law enforcement activity’ and ‘common 

practice.’” Id. Finally, the court concluded that Hinkle had presented “no specific 

evidence of [Sheriff Jay]’s culpable state of mind.” Id. at 1415 (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And even if he had, the court 

reasoned that Hinkle had not cited “support for the proposition that there exists a 

constitutional or statutory right to prevent one’s arrest information from being 

disclosed publicly.” Id. 

On appeal, Hinkle does little to contest the district court’s analysis. Hinkle 

claims that Sheriff Jay must have been targeting him because an “alleged theft of a 

trailer going back 10 years is hardly a ‘high profile’ crime spree deserving of being 

blasted out on the internet by the Sheriff via his website or to media at his direction.” 

Appellant’s Opening Br. 38. He also asserts that “the Press Release and its impact 

cannot be construed in a vacuum. An inference of retaliation via the release is 

certainly stronger in this case where a false Press Release follows immediately on the 

heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. Finally, he argues that this court has 

“opened the door for consideration” of evidence regarding past instances where 

Sheriff Jay may have retaliated against other political opponents. Id. at 39. 

We agree with Hinkle that we must consider surrounding circumstances in 

evaluating his retaliation claim. But doing so here shows an absence of retaliation: 
38 

the press release followed an arrest that was based on probable cause.18 Therefore, 

this case is not one in which “a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels 

[of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. at 38. 

Second, Hinkle’s argument that this was not a high-profile matter fails to 

acknowledge his status as a former local police chief. Though the alleged crimes are 

not the most serious ones under Oklahoma law, an arrest of a former police chief is a 

high-profile arrest. 

Finally, Hinkle alleges that in Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th 

Cir. 1995), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 

916 (10th Cir. 2001), this court “opened the door” for Hinkle to show that Sheriff 

Jay’s alleged retaliation against others supports his claim that Sheriff Jay retaliated 

against him as part of a larger pattern of harassing political adversaries. Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 38–39. Gehl Group does not support that assertion. In Gehl Group, the 

plaintiffs—two chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police, their solicitation agent, and 

their regional manager—argued that certain law-enforcement officials and other local 

officials “filed baseless criminal charges against them and selectively and 

vindictively prosecuted them” because they were “soliciting charitable contributions 

18 As mentioned, Hinkle actually alleges that the press release was somehow 

posted on May 9, 2013—a day before his arrest. See supra note 8 and accompanying 

text. Because the press release is written in the past tense, we believe that the press 

release must have been posted sometime after his arrest. If it had been written and 

posted after Sheriff Jay knew that Hinkle had been exonerated—and after probable 

cause had dissipated—we would consider this some evidence that Sheriff Jay 

intended to retaliate against Hinkle. But Hinkle has not presented such a theory. 
39 

in the Boulder area.” 63 F.3d at 1530. We rejected that contention because the 

plaintiffs had not “identif[ied] a pattern of harassment from which we might be able 

to infer [the] [d]efendants’ retaliatory motivations.” Id. at 1537 (citing W.E.B. 

DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312–13 (1967) (per curiam)). That was 

because they had been “subject[ed] to only a single prosecution.” Id. And there, we 

concluded that the prosecution “was supported by probable cause.” Id. 

Likewise, here, Hinkle was arrested once, his arrest was supported by probable 

cause, and the press release merely reported the details of that lawful arrest. So Gehl 

Group does not support Hinkle’s argument—it undermines it. Nor does it support 

Hinkle’s argument that other instances of Sheriff Jay’s possible retaliation against 

others was evidence that he retaliated against Hinkle. See id. (considering whether 

the defendants had treated other groups “in a different manner” to determine if they 

had “singled [the plaintiffs] out for prosecution”). 

C. Monell Liability

The district court dismissed Hinkle’s First Amendment retaliation claim 

against the County because it had already ruled that Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep had 

not violated Hinkle’s First Amendment rights. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 

1150, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he City cannot be held liable where, as here, the 

officers did not commit a constitutional violation.”). Because neither Sheriff Jay nor 

Deputy Estep violated Hinkle’s First Amendment rights, the district court properly 

dismissed Hinkle’s First Amendment claim against the County. 
40 

IV. Hinkle’s Fourteenth Amendment Stigma-Plus Claim

Hinkle argues that he has also raised a “defamation plus” claim based on the 

press release and Sheriff Jay’s “sanction[ing] of criminal charges.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. at 35–36 (capitalization and emphasis removed). Hinkle alleges that, 

even though his “defamation plus claim was briefed, it was not analyzed by the 

district court.” Id. at 36. We do not fault the district court for not considering this 

claim, because Hinkle’s briefing—both here and in the district court—overlays his 

First Amendment retaliation analysis with his Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus 

analysis.19 But those analyzes are distinct. See, e.g., Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 

183 F.3d 515, 521 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that First Amendment retaliation 

cases differ from defamation cases under the Fourteenth Amendment). Unlike First 

Amendment retaliation claims, Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus claims require a 

plaintiff to prove “that the government has violated the Due Process Clause by 

damaging its reputation.” Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 

810 F.3d 1161, 1184 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, the stigma-plus doctrine exists within 

the procedural-due-process framework. See Al-Turki v. Tomsic, 926 F.3d 610, 614, 

617 (10th Cir. 2019). And courts “ask two questions” when considering procedural19 Moreover, Hinkle’s Amended Complaint does not clearly raise a proceduraldue-process claim. Nonetheless, “Count III” of Hinkle’s Amended Complaint is 

titled, “FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION . . . DUE PROCESS.” In 

addition, Hinkle alleges that the press release “exposed [him] to public hatred, 

contempt, ridicule, and disgrace.” Am. Compl. ¶ 106. We will assume that by using 

this language, Hinkle intended to raise a stigma-plus procedural-due-process claim. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). 
41 

due-process claims: “(1) Did the plaintiff possess a protected property or liberty 

interest to which due process protections apply? And if so, (2) was the plaintiff 

afforded an appropriate level of process?” Id. at 614 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

 In the stigma-plus context, we have recently provided guidance on what a 

plaintiff must show to satisfy the first element—i.e., a deprivation of a protected 

property or liberty interest. In Al-Turki, 926 F.3d at 617, we said that “[w]hat is 

needed in addition to stigma . . . is some change in legal status.” That “change in 

status must be ‘significant[].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 

U.S. 693, 711 (1976)). We ruled that to satisfy the first procedural-due-process 

element through stigma, plaintiffs must meet two sub-elements: “that (1) the 

government made a false statement about [the plaintiff] . . . that was sufficiently 

derogatory to injure his reputation, and that (2) [the plaintiff] experienced a 

governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of 

state law.” Id. at 618 (alterations and omission in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004)). As 

actions sufficient to satisfy the second sub-element, we have included “the state’s 

taking away the right to operate a vehicle or revoking parole.” Brown v. Montoya, 

662 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 711). And in Gwinn,

we concluded that a plaintiff had satisfied the “‘stigma-plus’ standard” by alleging 

that the government had falsely labeled him as a sex offender and further required 

him “to register as a sex offender.” 354 F.3d at 1224 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–
42 

11). Registration as a sex offender is “a governmentally imposed burden that 

‘significantly altered [his] . . . status as a matter of state law.’” Id. (alteration and 

omission in original) (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–11). 

Even if we were to conclude that Sheriff Jay defamed Hinkle, Hinkle would 

still need to satisfy the second sub-element: that he suffered a “governmentally 

imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of state law.” AlTurki, 926 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In his opening 

brief, Hinkle states that “the press release was false, and it was coupled with the 

imminent sanction of Hinkle being subjected to criminal charges.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 36 (some capitalization removed). Hinkle argues that the collateral 

hardships defendants face during criminal trials—“humiliation, damage to reputation 

and a concomitant harm to future employment practices”—are similar to those he 

faced from having the press release posted on the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office’s 

website. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, as we understand 

him, Hinkle argues that his “governmentally imposed burden” was humiliation, an 

injured reputation, and difficulty obtaining future employment.20 

20 Hinkle’s assertion that the press release “was coupled with the imminent 

sanction of Hinkle being subjected to criminal charges” is temporally inaccurate. 

Hinkle was, as we have concluded, lawfully arrested and charged before Sheriff Jay 

issued the press release. Further, as discussed, nothing in the record indicates that 

Sheriff Jay directed Deputy Estep to investigate and arrest Hinkle. Thus, as to the 

“plus” of Hinkle’s stigma-plus claim, we will consider only those alleged 

deprivations we have identified above—humiliation, an injured reputation, and 

difficulty obtaining future employment. 
43 

That is not enough. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 711 (“[T]he interest in 

reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action in federal court is 

quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ [right protected by the Fourteenth 

Amendment.]”); Martin Marietta Materials, 810 F.3d at 1184 (“Damage to 

reputation alone, however, is not sufficient.” (citing Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1216; Paul, 

424 U.S. at 711–12)); Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 971 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]llegations of ‘psychological trauma’ are not sufficient to 

satisfy Paul’s ‘stigma-plus’ test.” (citing Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 148 (2d 

Cir. 2008))); Jensen v. Redev. Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1559 (10th Cir. 

1993) (“Damage to prospective employment opportunities is too intangible to 

constitute deprivation of a liberty interest.” (citation omitted)); Phelps v. Wichita 

Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[E]ven if defendants’ actions 

made plaintiff less attractive to employers or clients, that is insufficient to state a 

deprivation of a liberty or property interest under Section 1983.” (citation omitted)). 

As discussed, Hinkle must show a significant, material change in a legal status—such 

as losing the right to drive a car or being wrongfully registered as a sex offender. He 

has failed to do so. 

V. Hinkle’s Civil-Conspiracy Claim 

Hinkle argues not only that his constitutional rights were violated, but that 

they were violated through a conspiracy. Specifically, Hinkle asserts that “Jay and 

Estep, acting in concert, accomplished the impermissible goal of unlawfully arresting 
44 

Hinkle without probable cause.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 39 (emphasis and 

capitalization removed). 

For a valid § 1983 conspiracy claim, plaintiffs “must plead and prove not only 

a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights; pleading and proof of one 

without the other will be insufficient.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701 (10th Cir. 

1990) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 

1449 (10th Cir. 1990)). We understand Hinkle to premise this conspiracy claim on 

his false-arrest allegations. As we have concluded, Hinkle has not shown a false 

arrest; therefore, the conspiracy claim was properly dismissed. 

VI. Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment Strip-Search Claim21

We next address whether Hinkle’s body-cavity strip search was reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment. To answer this question, the parties direct us primarily 

to Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012). So first, we begin 

by reviewing the scope of the Court’s ruling in Florence. Second, we analyze 

whether Florence sanctions Hinkle’s body-cavity strip search. Third, because we 

conclude that it does not, we will consider whether the body-cavity strip search was 

21 As mentioned, Hinkle has not raised on appeal a retaliation claim based on 

the strip search. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Further, the strip-search 

claim that Hinkle has raised on appeal is limited to the County. See Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 24 (“Accordingly, the trial court’s summary judgment regarding the 

strip search should be reversed and claim be allowed to proceed against the 

County.”). The district court explained in its summary-judgment order that Hinkle’s 

“unconstitutional-strip-search claim against [the] individual defendants” was not 

before the court at that time, because “it was previously dismissed by Judge MilesLaGrange prior to transfer of the case[.]” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1422. Hinkle has 

not appealed that earlier order or claimed that it was in error. 
45 

otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Fourth, after concluding that the 

strip search was unreasonable, we will analyze whether Hinkle can establish Monell

liability against the County. 

A. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders

In 2005, Albert Florence was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. Florence, 

566 U.S. at 323. During the stop, the trooper learned of an outstanding 2003 bench 

warrant. Unknown to the trooper, the warrant had mistakenly remained active in a 

law-enforcement database despite Florence’s having paid the underlying fine. Id. The 

trooper arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center, 

where “every arrestee” was required “to shower with a delousing agent.” Id. Per the 

jail’s policy, as arrestees showered, officers checked their bodies “for scars, marks, 

gang tattoos, and contraband[.]” Id. After being subjected to this procedure, Florence 

was “instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and 

lift his genitals.” Id. At Burlington, Florence “shared a cell with at least one other 

person and interacted with other inmates following his admission to the jail.” Id.

After six days in the Burlington County jail, Florence was transferred to the 

Essex County Correctional Facility, where “all arriving detainees passed through a 

metal detector and waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search.” Id. at 

324. During that second search, detention officers examined each detainee’s “ears, 

nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings.” Id. 

To search “other body openings,” the detention officers required Florence “to lift his 

genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process.” Id.
46 

The detention officers searched Florence’s clothes while he showered. Id. After all 

this was done, the detention officers placed Florence in the prison’s general 

population. See id. A day later, the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 324. 

 Florence sued under § 1983, claiming that “persons arrested for a minor 

offense could not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private 

areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake process.” 

Id. Rather, Florence argued, corrections officials needed reasonable suspicion that a 

detainee was smuggling contraband. Id. The Third Circuit rejected any need for a 

reasonable-suspicion showing, ruling that the procedure reasonably balanced inmate 

privacy and the two jails’ security requirements. Id. at 325 (citing Florence v. Bd. of 

Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010)). The 

Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the question whether 

officers need at least reasonable suspicion to strip search detainees. Id. at 325–36 

(citation omitted) (noting that seven circuit courts of appeals required reasonable 

suspicion, while three did not).22 

 The Supreme Court began its analysis by reciting the overarching principle 

that “[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough 

search as a standard part of the intake process.” Id. at 330. The Court derived this 

interest from at least four concerns: (1) the possibility that new detainees will bring 

22 The Tenth Circuit was one of the seven circuits that required reasonable 

suspicion. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008); 

Warner v. Grand Cty., 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 

391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984). 
47 

lice or diseases into the facility, (2) the possibility that new detainees will have 

wounds that need medical attention, (3) the growing number of gang members who 

are entering detention facilities and the need to identify who they may be, and (4) the 

need to detect contraband. Id. at 330–33. And the Court noted that these concerns are 

not just limited to large prisons: “Jails can be even more dangerous than prisons 

because officials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset.” Id. at 

336 (citation omitted). 

 In view of these concerns, the Court declared that “courts must defer to the 

judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence 

showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail 

security.” Id. at 332–33. In other words, because prison officials have certain 

expertise that judges lack, the Court stressed that the judiciary must give prison 

officials considerable discretion before disturbing their policies. Id. at 326. This 

means that “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be 

upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Only 

when plaintiffs show “substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials 

have exaggerated their response to [legitimate security interests]” should courts 

refuse to defer to prisons. Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting 

Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984); then quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 548 (1979)). 
48 

 Citing a need for “readily administrable rules,” the Court concluded that 

regardless of a detainee’s “suspected offense, criminal history, [or] other factors,” 

policies requiring strip searches of all incoming detainees who will be admitted into 

the general population pass constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 338–39 (citation omitted). 

Requiring that prison officials consider the individual characteristics of each detainee 

would be too onerous, the Court reasoned, because “[officials] would be required, in 

a few minutes, to determine whether any of [their] underlying offenses were serious 

enough to authorize the more invasive search protocol.” Id. at 337.23 This would 

negatively affect “[t]he laborious administration of prisons.” Id. 

Thus, the Court ruled against Florence and concluded that he had suffered no 

constitutional deprivation. Id. at 339–40. By sanctioning the policies at the 

Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility, the 

Court followed the course it set in Bell, 441 U.S. 520. In Bell, the Court upheld 

indiscriminate strip-search practices requiring all Metropolitan Correctional Center 

inmates to undergo body-cavity searches after their contact visits with outsiders, 

23 The Court rejected Florence’s reasonable-suspicion argument on this 

ground, concluding that “[t]he laborious administration of prisons would become less 

effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded, were the practical problems inevitable 

from the rules suggested by petitioner to be imposed as a constitutional mandate.” 

Florence, 566 U.S. at 337. If Florence does apply, Hinkle accepts that the 

reasonable-suspicion standard plays no role here. 
49 

despite the record reflecting only “one instance where an MCC inmate was 

discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution.” Id. at 558–60.24

 In applying Florence, we must remember (1) that Florence was arrested on a 

bench warrant, and (2) that the Court recognized that judicial deference to strip 

searches might well lessen in other circumstances.25 In light of these factors, the 

Court recognized that Florence extends only so far. For instance, in Part IV of the 

opinion (joined by three other Justices), Justice Kennedy identified possible future 

exceptions from the Court’s ruling. 566 U.S. at 338–39.26 First, he acknowledged that 

“[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be 

24 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Florence’s underlying 

principles in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). There, the Court ruled “that 

DNA identification [through cheek swabs] of arrestees is a reasonable search that can 

be considered part of a routine booking procedure.” Id. at 465. Relying on Florence, 

the King Court noted that routine prison procedures are needed to identify a detainee 

“when processing him for detention” and for protecting staff, other detainees, and the 

“new detainee.” Id. at 450, 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florence, 

566 U.S. at 330). 

25 We review the Court’s discussion of these exceptions and the concurring 

opinions’ elaborations on the exceptions only to provide a complete overview of 

Florence; we do not contend that these exceptions to Florence’s general rule apply 

here. Rather, because jail officials never decided that Hinkle would be housed in the 

BCDC’s general population, Florence’s general rule itself does not apply here—

meaning Hinkle has no need of an exception to it. See discussion infra Section VI.B. 

26 Justice Thomas did not join Part IV of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Florence, 

566 U.S. at 321 n.1. Because Justice Thomas did not write separately, it is unclear 

whether he objected to Justice Kennedy’s discussion of a possible exception from 

Florence under facts that were not before the Court, or whether he objected to the 

notion that Florence should have any exception whatsoever. 
50 

reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without 

assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other 

detainees.”27 Id. at 338–39. After doing so, he identified a possible two-part 

exception from Florence’s general rule concerning “whether an arrestee whose 

detention has not yet been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and who 

can be held in available facilities removed from the general population, may be 

subjected to the types of searches at issue here.” See id at 339. Second, he noted that 

“there also may be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of searches that 

involve the touching of detainees,” but he explained that Florence had raised no such 

issues. Id. at 325, 339.28 

27 Justice Kennedy described this situation as the one arising in Atwater v. City 

of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2001), which was not itself a strip-search case. 

See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39. In Atwater, a Texas police officer arrested a 

mother for operating a vehicle without having fastened her children’s seatbelts. 532 

U.S. at 323–24. Taken from her children, Ms. Atwater was booked and housed alone 

at the jail “for about one hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and 

released on $310 bond.” Id. at 324. The Court deemed her warrantless arrest 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 354. But in Florence, Justice 

Kennedy raised Atwater three separate times, noting that Ms. Atwater had been 

segregated and taken to a magistrate. See 566 U.S. at 329–30, 337–39 (citing 

Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324). He noted that “[t]he accommodations provided in these 

situations [referencing Atwater] may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of 

the searches at issue.” Id. at 339. 

28 Hinkle bases his beard-touching claim on this exception, and the district 

court dismissed the claim after concluding that Hinkle had not met this exception. 

But we liken Officer Atwood’s touching of Hinkle’s beard to check for contraband to 

a continuation of the initial pat-down frisk. Importantly, this frisk differs from the 

far-more-invasive touching of a detainee’s unclothed body as part of a strip search, 

especially as part of an inspection of body-cavities. Because Hinkle bases his beardtouching claim on an unconstitutional strip search—not an unconstitutional pat-
51 

 Two of the majority’s five Justices filed concurring opinions addressing the 

reach of the Court’s holding. First, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “it is important 

for me that the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it 

announces.” Id. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). He limited Florence to its 

circumstances—“the facts that Florence was detained not for a minor traffic offense 

but instead pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, and that there was apparently no 

alternative, if Florence were to be detained, to holding him in the general jail 

population.” Id. To avoid “embarrass[ing] the future,” Chief Justice Roberts noted 

that the Court was “wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions.” Id. 

 Second, Justice Alito considered it important “that the Court does not hold that 

it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention 

has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available 

facilities apart from the general population.” Id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). He 

then emphasized that “[t]he Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, 

without regard to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an arrestee 

before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer.” Id. at 342.29

down—we conclude that the district court properly dismissed this claim. See 

Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We have long 

said that we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it requires 

ruling on arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to us on 

appeal.” (citations omitted)). 

29 Joined by three other Justices, Justice Breyer dissented, reasoning that a 

body-cavity strip search “of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not 

involve drugs or violence . . . is an ‘unreasonable searc[h]’ forbidden by the Fourth 
52 

He singled out arrestees who are likely to be released by a magistrate on their own 

recognizance or on minimal bail, and declared that it might not be reasonable to 

admit them “to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip 

search,” “particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible.” Id. at 341–42. 

B. Florence Does Not Sanction the County’s Policy of Body-Cavity 

Strip Searching All Detainees Before Deciding Whether Particular 

Detainees “Will Be” Housed in the Jail’s General Population. 

Sheriff Jay testified that he was “the final policy maker for the sheriff’s 

department” and that the County’s policy was to body-cavity strip search every 

detainee arriving at its jail. Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 218–19; id. at 284 (“By policy, 

everyone that’s booked into the Beckham County Jail is strip searched.”).30 Sheriff 

Jay had authority to implement this policy because, as he explained, “everybody in 

Beckham County Sheriff’s Department answers to [him]” and “the buck stops with 

[him].” Id. at 218. And the record demonstrates that the jailers enforced the County’s 

policy. 

Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe that the 

individual possesses drugs or other contraband.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 343–44 

(Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). Because four Justices criticized the 

absence of reasonable suspicion from Florence’s general rule, it seems a fair surmise 

that these Justices would, at the very least, support robust exceptions in future cases. 

30 Even though Sheriff Jay explained that the jailers strip searched pre-trial 

detainees under the County’s “policy,” we conclude that his and the other witnesses’ 

testimony (as we discuss next) also suffice to establish that the County had a custom 

of performing indiscriminate strip searches. See Murphy, 950 F.3d at 644 (explaining 

that a custom is “a ‘widespread practice that, although not authorized by a written 

law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a 

custom or usage with the force of law’” (quoting Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 

627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010))). 
53 

For instance, Detention Officer Atwood testified that the “standard [intake] 

process” at the BCDC involved strip searching a detainee before booking. Id. at 339. 

He explained that “every inmate [who] comes into the jail gets [strip] searched” and 

that, after the strip search, detainees would be brought into the booking room to 

acquire “their basic information.” Id. at 332–34, 336. From his year’s employment as 

a jailer at the BCDC, Officer Atwood could never recall “a time where the strip 

search happened after the booking process had begun.” Id. at 320, 340. In fact, 

Officer Atwood stated that jailers strip searched detainees before receiving from the 

arresting officer a custody-authorization form, which describes the detainee’s 

“personal information and his charges.” Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 908–09. And 

because jailers strip searched detainees before knowing their personal information or 

charges, Officer Atwood confirmed that jailers postponed making housing decisions 

until the booking process after the strip search: when asked what he would know 

about “an inmate’s eventual cell placement at the time that [he was] strip searching 

an inmate,” Officer Atwood testified that he “wouldn’t know where that inmate’s 

going to be housed.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 341. In other words, until he had 

received “a chance to look at [the detainee’s] charges” and personal information 

during the booking process, Officer Atwood testified he “wouldn’t know exactly 
54 

where [the detainee is] going.” Id.31 Officer Atwood explained that this “standardized 

intake process” did not “vary according to inmates[.]” Id. at 340.32 

Further, Captain Diana Bilbo, “the captain in charge of the jail,” testified that 

she never had occasion to “discipline Jason Atwood for the way that he conducted a 

strip search[.]” Id. at 361, 370. When asked whether “the standard operating 

procedure was to strip search everybody [who] came in,” Captain Bilbo said, “Yes.”

Id. at 365.33 Corroborating Officer Atwood’s testimony that jailers would not know a 

detainee’s charges or personal information before the strip search (and by extension, 

would be unable to determine a detainee’s housing designation), Captain Bilbo noted 

that it was “consistent with [her] experience” that arresting officers would not 

provide to jailers a completed custody-authorization form until after the strip search. 

Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 912. 

31 In addition, Officer Atwood testified that he would “would not have begun 

to type in the information into the booking information category until after Hinkle 

had been strip searched.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 341. The “booking information 

category” is a heading on Hinkle’s booking-sheet form. Under that heading, the 

jailers typed in the word “SEGREGATION” after the strip search. Id. at 316. 

32 Officer Atwood did say that “if there’s another detention deputy in there,” 

one deputy “start[s] th[e] book-in process while the other one’s conducting the strip 

search.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 340. 

33 Deputy Brett Moore, who stopped Hinkle’s automobile before the arrest, 

testified that he was “aware that all the prisoners [he] brought in were strip 

searched,” agreeing that “[e]ven the ones that were going to be put in segregation” 

were strip searched. Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 172–73.
55 

In its briefing, the County acknowledges that by its policy “[j]ailers strip 

searched incoming inmates at the very beginning of the booking process, before 

sitting down at the desk to begin the booking paperwork and before knowing where 

the inmate would be housed in the facility.”34 Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. 

Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4–5. And it acknowledges that its policy was “to strip search all 

detainees.” Id. at 10 (emphasis and capitalization removed). 

In strip searching Hinkle, the BCDC’s jailers enforced this policy. Hinkle 

testified that on self-reporting to the jail, he was immediately strip searched, was 

booked, and was handcuffed to a bench in the booking area for about an hour until 

being transported to the Elk City jail. When questioned about why Hinkle was 

handcuffed to the bench and “what may have been taking place,” Captain Bilbo 

explained that as arising from their not yet having “made a decision on where he was 

going to be housed.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 367.35 The County confirms that “at 

the time [Hinkle] was strip searched, there had been no determination made regarding 

how [Hinkle] was going to be classified or where he would be housed.” Appellee 

Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4. 

34 The record contains a four-page 2006 strip-search policy, but the County 

neither discusses this policy, nor recites its requirements, nor mentions its relevancy. 

And the policy had succumbed to later legal developments and was not the same 

policy in force when Deputy Atwood body-cavity strip searched Hinkle. 

35 As discussed, Officer Atwood testified that Captain Bilbo made the decision 

to transfer Hinkle and that she may have known “ahead of time that he was coming 

in.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 327. But Captain Bilbo was then “on medical leave.” 

Id. at 366.
56 

Under Florence, the jail could (1) decide that Hinkle “will be” housed in the 

jail’s general population, and (2) then strip search him before placing him in the 

general population. See 566 U.S. at 322. Here, the County did not decide that Hinkle 

“will be” placed in the jail’s general population, in fact just the opposite. By acting as 

it did, the County set the cart before the horse—it strip searched Hinkle before 

committing itself to admit him into its jail’s general population. In Florence, the 

Court repeatedly stressed that the strip search comes after the facility determines that 

the detainee “will be” placed in general population. Id. (explaining that “the 

controversy [in Florence] concern[ed] whether every detainee who will be admitted 

to the general population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while 

undressed”); id. at 325–26 (explaining again that “[the] Court granted certiorari to 

address” “whether the Fourth Amendment requires correctional officials to exempt 

some detainees who will be admitted to a jail’s general population from the searches 

here at issue”); id. at 335 (“Reasonable correctional officials could conclude these 

uncertainties [about whether a particular detainee is dangerous] mean they must 

conduct the same thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their 

facilities.”); id. at 338 (accepting the jail officials’ argument that “the Constitution 

must not prevent [detention officials] from conducting [strip searches] on any 

suspected offender who will be admitted to the general population in their 

facilities”); id. at 338–39 (explaining the limits of Florence’s ruling and commenting 

that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would 

be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without 
57 

assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other 

detainees”).36 In other words, the “will be” condition precedes the strip search, which 

itself precedes placing the detainee in the jail’s general population.37 And the Court’s 

“will be” condition to strip searches makes perfect sense—absent admitting the 

detainee to the jail’s general population, the jail would have no need to protect the 

new detainee, the existing detainee population, and the detention staff from infectious 

diseases, rival gang members, weapons, or contraband. Id. at 330–33. These stripsearch justifications were absent here: when the jailers referenced a housing decision 

on the form, they notated segregation. 

We would reject any argument that the County—for administrative 

convenience—could treat all its incoming detainees as bound for its jail’s general 

population, thus allowing universal strip searches.38 Body-cavity strip searches are 

not so trivial. And had the County tried to claim that before the strip search it had 

36 One of the five majority Justices, Justice Alito, states the “will be” condition 

in slightly different language: “The Court holds that jail administrators may require 

all arrestees who are committed to the general population of a jail to undergo visual 

strip searches not involving physical contact by corrections officers.” Florence, 566 

U.S. at 340 (Alito, J., concurring). 

37 During the strip search, detention officers may learn things requiring the 

detainee be segregated and not placed in the facility’s general population—for 

instance, the presence of an infectious disease or tattoos with gang insignia. See 

Florence, 566 U.S. at 330–33. 

38 In Hill, we “agree[d]” that “[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely 

applied to detainees . . . cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of 

administrative ease.” 735 F.2d at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 

Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)). 
58 

strayed from its policy and determined that Hinkle “will be” housed with its jail’s 

general population—which to its credit it does not claim—that would have won it 

nothing. After all, jail officials segregated Hinkle from the jail’s general population 

after the strip search, because it declined to house a former local law-enforcement 

officer in its jail. That led the County to transport Hinkle to Elk City.39 

If we were to accept the County’s argument and conclude that Florence 

permits jail policies by which detainees are first strip searched and later sorted out for 

jail-housing placement, we would render Florence’s general-population condition 

meaningless. Florence does not sanction such a policy—strip searching detainees not 

destined for the jail’s general population, or even as here, for the jail itself. See 

Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee Cty., 823 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding 

that under Florence, two class-action plaintiffs “ha[d] good claims that their rights 

have been violated” if they had been “arrested, strip searched, and then immediately 

released”). We therefore conclude that Florence does not protect the County’s 

policy.40

39 Assuming that segregation truly was unavailable at the BCDC, we presume 

that this must mean that detainees were always transported to Elk City whenever they 

required segregation. 

40 Under Florence, the County could properly maintain a strip-search policy 

allowing strip searches after jailers have decided that a detainee “will be” admitted to 

general population. A facility’s safe course is to strip search the detainee as the last 

step before admitting him or her into the facility’s general population. 
59 

C. Hinkle’s Body-Cavity Strip Search Was Unreasonable Under the 

Fourth Amendment, and the County, by Its Policy, Is Responsible.

1. Hinkle’s strip search was unreasonable. 

Having concluded that Florence does not authorize the County’s strip-search 

policy, we must still decide whether Hinkle suffered an unreasonable search under 

the Fourth Amendment. The district court did not reach that issue, concluding that 

this case “fits within Florence.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1425. The County follows 

suit, largely resting its case on Florence. With Florence not sanctioning his bodycavity strip search, we must determine what legal standard governs Hinkle’s strip 

search. Hinkle argues that we should use our circuit’s pre-Florence strip-search cases 

to determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of his strip search. He contends 

that those cases bar “indiscriminate strip searches of pre-trial detainees.” Appellant’s 

Opening Br. 22. Indeed, those cases required reasonable suspicion of contraband, 

including weapons, before permitting a strip search. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Wagner, 

523 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hether a strip search is permissible is a 

separate inquiry based on whether a detainee will be placed in the general prison 

population and whether the officer has reasonable suspicion that a detainee has 

hidden drugs, contraband, or weapons.” (citations omitted)); Warner v. Grand 

County, 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (“On [January 24, 1991], it was clearly 

established in this circuit that a brief intermingling with the general jail population 

does not justify a strip search absent reasonable suspicion of drugs or contraband.” 

(citation omitted)); Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 732, 734–36 (10th Cir. 
60 

1993) (per curiam) (concluding that a body-cavity search of a detainee who was not 

“held with any other prisoners” was unreasonable when the arresting officer testified 

that “he did not suspect Ms. Cottrell of having drugs on her person” and “saw no 

indication she was carrying any weapons”); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 392, 394 

(10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a strip search of a traffic offender who “was briefly 

intermingled with the prison population” was unconstitutional because “[t]here were 

no circumstances . . . indicating that [he] might possess either a weapon or drugs”).41

 But because the jail officials never decided that Hinkle “will be” housed at the 

county jail, no one had any reason to fear that Hinkle might have secreted contraband 

that he could take into the jail’s general population. In this circumstance, even our 

pre-Florence cases do not apply—they too concerned the problem of detainees taking 

contraband into the general population. But for detainees like Hinkle who will not be 

housed in the jail’s general population, the County needs far more to justify a bodycavity strip search—probable cause that detainee is secreting evidence of a crime. See 

Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447–49 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that outside 

of the “jail context,” detainees “may only be subjected to [body-cavity searches] if 

41 Archuleta, Warner, and Hill were not body-cavity strip search cases.

Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1282; Warner, 57 F.3d at 963; Hill, 735 F.2d at 393–94. Thus, 

Hinkle’s search was more invasive. We view Hinkle’s search as comparable to the 

body-cavity search in Cottrell, during which the plaintiff was “required to take off all 

her clothes and bend over while the deputies inspected her.” 994 F.2d at 732. We 

have characterized such body-cavity searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, 

undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive[.]” 

Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
61 

there is probable cause to believe that [they] ha[ve] secreted the item sought in a 

body cavity”). The County has not argued that it ever had such probable cause.42

Thus, we conclude that Hinkle was subjected to an unlawful strip search. 

2. Monell Liability 

Before the County can be held liable for Hinkle’s unlawful strip search, Hinkle 

must show that by enforcing the County’s policy an employee caused the Fourth 

Amendment violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 

489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (noting that the policy or custom must be the “moving 

force [behind] the constitutional violation” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted)). Specifically, Hinkle “must prove ‘(1) official policy or 

custom[,] (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 

998 (10th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Schneider v. City of Grand 

Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)). 

We have recognized as policies meeting this standard those arising from “a 

formal regulation or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a 

widespread practice, decisions of municipal employees with final policymaking 

authority, ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to whom 

authority was delegated, and the deliberately indifferent failure to adequately train or 

supervise employees.” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing 

42 Nor has the County argued that Officer Atwood had reasonable suspicion 

that Hinkle—whose alleged wrong was possessing a stolen trailer—was secreting 

contraband. So even if our pre-Florence cases applied, the County could not prevail 

under them. 
62 

Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 

2010)). Here, the testimony from Sheriff Jay, Captain Bilbo, and Detention Officer 

Atwood, together with the County’s own description of its policy, demonstrate that 

the County had a policy of strip searching all detainees before making housing 

decisions. With this, Hinkle has sufficiently shown the County’s policy and, thus, has 

satisfied the first element.43 

For the causation and state-of-mind elements, Hinkle can satisfy his burden by 

demonstrating that the County’s policy is facially unlawful. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 

143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen an official municipal policy itself 

violates federal law, issues of culpability and causation are straightforward; simply 

proving the existence of the unlawful policy puts an end to the question.” (citation 

omitted)). The Court has explained that “[w]here a plaintiff claims that a particular 

municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving 

these issues of fault and causation is straightforward.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 

520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). A county’s sanctioning of a facially unlawful policy 

establishes that it “was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff 

complains.” Id. at 405; see also Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th 

Cir. 2003) (“Where an official policy or practice is unconstitutional on its face, it 

necessarily follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but 

was also aware that a constitutional violation will most likely occur.”). Further, 

43 The County does not protest that Sheriff Jay had final policymaking 

authority to formulate the BCDC’s strip-search procedures. 
63 

“proof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has 

intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes 

that the municipality acted culpably.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. 

Thus, the next issue is whether the County’s policy is facially unconstitutional. 

“A facial challenge is really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is 

unconstitutional in all its applications.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 

(2019).44 Apart from its failed Florence argument, the County advances no argument 

denying that the policy is unconstitutional in all its applications. Under Florence, jail 

officials must decide that a detainee “will be” housed in the general population 

before strip searching him or her. And here, the County’s strip-search policy permits 

strip searches before the key moment in which the jail official with authority decides 

that the detainee “will be” housed in the general population. So in enforcing the 

County’s strip-search policy, jail officials strip search all detainees before reaching 

the operative decision of whether the detainee will be housed in the general 

population. For these reasons, we conclude that the County’s strip-search policy is 

44 The “official policy” at issue in Monell is an example of a facially unlawful 

policy. The complaint there alleged that the policy “compelled pregnant employees to 

take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.” 

436 U.S. at 660–61; see also Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986) (“Monell involved an express municipal policy alleged to violate due 

process and equal protection limitations—a requirement that pregnant employees 

take unpaid leave from their city jobs while still willing and able to work.”). An 

“official policy of sexually harassing, assaulting, or discriminating against women 

prisoners” would be a second example of a facially unlawful policy. See Barney, 143 

F.3d at 1307. 
64 

unconstitutional on its face. And with this, Hinkle has satisfied the causation and 

state-of-mind elements. 

Moreover, even if the County’s policy were facially constitutional, Hinkle 

would still satisfy the causation and state-of-mind elements. For causation, we have 

explained that “the challenged policy or practice must be ‘closely related to the 

violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right.’” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 

(quoting Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses, § 7.12[B] 

(2013)). This requires “a direct causal link between the municipal action and the 

deprivation of federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. When a policy is facially 

constitutional, the burden of establishing causation (and culpability) is heavy. Id. at 

405 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an 

injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of 

culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held 

liable solely for the actions of its employee.” (citations omitted)). 

Hinkle meets that heavy burden. By the terms of the County’s policy, “[j]ailers 

strip searched incoming inmates at the very beginning of the booking process, before 

sitting down at the desk to begin the booking paperwork and before knowing where 

the inmate would be housed.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. 

Br. 4–5. Thus, the County’s policy directs jailers to immediately strip search the 

detainees. By enforcing the policy, Officer Atwood caused Hinkle’s unlawful strip 

search. Because the jail transported Hinkle to Elk City for detention, Hinkle 

obviously could not have smuggled contraband into the BCDC’s general population. 
65 

Thus, but for the County’s policy—specifically, the sequence of performing strip 

searches before making final housing decisions—Hinkle would never have been 

unlawfully strip searched. 

 Finally, “a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a 

facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights 

must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ 

as to its known or obvious consequences.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 (quoting City of 

Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). We have explained that “[t]he deliberate indifference 

standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that 

its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, 

and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Waller v. 

City & Cty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307). While typically notice is 

“established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct,” it can also be 

established “in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is 

a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or 

inaction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307–

08). 

For instance, in Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 845 (10th Cir. 1997), this 

court concluded that a plaintiff’s claim came “within the ‘narrow range of 

circumstances’ recognized by Canton and left intact by Brown, under which a single 

violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence [of a 
66 

municipality’s action or inaction].” There, the summary-judgment record 

“support[ed] an inference that the City trained its officers to leave cover and 

approach armed suicidal, emotionally disturbed persons and to try to disarm them[.]” 

Id. at 843. After participating in this training, police officers approached Terry 

Allen’s vehicle—where a suicidal and armed Allen sat with a leg out the window—

and attempted to wrestle his gun from him. Id. at 839. In the end, “shots were 

exchanged,” and Allen was hit four times and killed. Id. Because “officers will 

frequently have to deal with armed emotionally upset persons” and the City’s training 

amplified the possibility “of a violent response,” we concluded that “the City’s 

failure to properly train its officers reflected deliberate indifference to the obvious 

consequence of the City’s choice.” Id. at 845. 

Likewise, the County’s policy here reflects a deliberate indifference to the 

obvious consequences of its decision to strip search all detainees before making final 

housing assignments. Proceeding as if all inmates will be housed in the general 

population of the jail overlooks the reality that some detainees will not be placed in 

the jail’s general population—for example, former local police chiefs. Yet the County 

strip searches all detainees, ignoring that any number of reasons might necessitate 

that a particular detainee be segregated. Accordingly, even though Hinkle has not 

pointed out a pattern of tortious conduct, we conclude that this case falls within the 

“narrow range of circumstances” in which it was “plainly obvious” that the County’s 

policy of strip searching all detainees would result in a detainee being needlessly 

body-cavity strip searched. 
67 

In sum, we conclude that Hinkle was unlawfully strip searched because 

Florence does not authorize the County’s policy and the search was otherwise 

unsupported by probable cause. Moreover, we conclude that the County’s stripsearch policy is facially unconstitutional because it directs jail officials to strip search 

all detainees immediately upon arrival at the jail, before determining they “will be” 

housed in its jail, and in the absence of probable cause that the detainees are secreting 

evidence of a crime. And even if the County’s policy were facially constitutional, 

Hinkle could satisfy the causation and state-of-mind elements because the County’s 

policy directly caused Hinkle’s unlawful strip search and the County was deliberately 

indifferent as to the obvious effects of the policy. Before subjecting a detainee to the 

abject abasement of a body-cavity strip search, jail officials should first conclusively 

decide whether that detainee will be housed in their jail’s general population. 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Hinkle’s 

§ 1983 claims in all respects except its dismissal of Hinkle’s strip-search claim. We 

reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
18-6202, Hinkle v. Beckham County Board of Commissioners

TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, dissenting in part.

I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that a reasonably objective police

officer would believe that probable cause existed to make a warrantless arrest of Mr.

Hinkle. Even if probable cause arguably existed at some point during the investigation, I

would conclude it dissipated upon Deputy Estep’s pre-arrest exchanges with Mr. Hinkle

and Mr. Keown, which established the latter owned the suspect trailer. 

The majority opinion sets forth the series of compounding errors that gave rise to

the arrest. Had Deputy Estep arrested Mr. Hinkle immediately upon their first face-toface contact, it would have been a closer call. But Deputy Estep continued his

investigation after having Mr. Hinkle detained at a traffic stop. At that point, he began an

interview with Mr. Hinkle and, eventually, Mr. Keown. During these conversations, new

information came to light—information that, in my view, dissipated the factual basis for

Mr. Hinkle’s warrantless arrest and demanded additional investigation.

We have observed that “probable cause becomes stale when new information

received by the police nullifies information critical to the earlier probable cause

determination.” United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing

Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(a) at 822 (5th ed. 2012)); see also Bigford v.

Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988) (police “may not disregard facts tending to

dissipate probable cause” in making arrests). I conclude the discussions between Deputy

Estep, Mr. Hinkle, and Mr. Keown dissipated probable cause for Mr. Hinkle’s arrest and

compelled Deputy Estep to undertake further investigation.
During the course of their conversation, Mr. Hinkle informed Deputy Estep

that—when they had earlier spoken via phone—he misunderstood which trailer Deputy

Estep was referencing, and that he did not own the suspect trailer.1 As he explained, Mr.

Hinkle owned a different trailer that was parked elsewhere, and Mr. Keown owned the

suspect trailer. Indeed, Mr. Hinkle repeatedly denied ownership of that trailer and

affirmed that Mr. Keown had purchased it from the Carpenters Church in South Carolina. 

Deputy Estep, moreover, called Mr. Keown, who corroborated Mr. Hinkle’s account and

insisted the latter “had nothing to do with [the trailer].” Appellant’s Appx. vol. 4 at 932.2

At that point, even Deputy Estep acknowledged that an in-person interview with Mr.

Keown was appropriate and the matter was “still under investigation.” Id. at 934. Yet an

arrest ensued, leading to incarceration and a strip search in the local jail.

At the very least, I would conclude these developments undermined a reasonable

belief that probable cause existed, and created an obligation to investigate Mr. Hinkle’s

involvement more thoroughly before placing him under arrest. An objectively reasonable

officer would have interviewed Mr. Keown or sought information regarding title and

1

 It is worth noting that Mr. Hinkle never affirmatively stated that he owned the

suspect trailer. His vague response—“right”—to Deputy Estep’s suggestion he did in

their earlier phone call is a questionable basis for such a conclusion.

2

 Mr. Keown’s statement that the trailer was “family property” is hopelessly vague

in this context, given that Mr. Keown told Deputy Estep that Mr. Hinkle did not own the

trailer. Without more, the mere fact that Mr. Keown and Mr. Hinkle were related by

marriage does not support a reasonable belief that a conspiracy existed to conceal stolen

property.

-2-
registration.3

 That Mr. Keown failed to meet Mr. Hinkle and Deputy Estep that night to

resolve this misunderstanding does not undermine my conclusion. When coupled with

his repeated assurances to the contrary, this failure to appear may well have given rise to

renewed suspicions regarding Mr. Keown. But this behavior sheds no new light on the

involvement—or lack thereof—of Mr. Hinkle, whose facially plausible explanation of the

misunderstanding was corroborated by someone who stood to gain nothing by

volunteering his ownership of the trailer. 

I accordingly part ways with the majority opinion and conclude that Deputy Estep

violated Mr. Hinkle’s Fourth Amendment rights in deciding to arrest him subsequent to

this exchange. 

I also disagree with the majority’s reversal of the strip search claim. For the

reasons set forth by the district court I would affirm. The record shows that Mr. Hinkle

would be placed in close proximity with other detainees and jail employees during the

intake process, justifying a search for weapons or contraband.

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 

3

 Deputy Estep told Mr. Hinkle after these exchanges, “If [Mr. Keown] says,

comes up here and says it’s his trailer, okay, and he paid for it, or whatever, all right, he

wants to take the blame for it, that’s all on him, okay.” Appellant’s Appx. vol. 4 at 937.

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