UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4226

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

AARON MARKEITH GERALD,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen, District Judge. (4:21-cr-00033-AWA-1)

Submitted: December 21, 2023 Decided: January 11, 2024

Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Dennis E. Jones, DENNIS E. JONES, PLC, Abingdon, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Jessica D. Aber, United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, Peter G. Osyf, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM: 

Aaron Markeith Gerald appeals the district court’s order imposing a 36-month 

sentence upon revocation of Gerald’s term of supervised release. On appeal, Gerald argues

that the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court 

failed to adequately address Gerald’s mitigation arguments and imposed a term greater 

than necessary to achieve the applicable sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Finding no error, we affirm. 

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of 

supervised release. We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 436 

(4th Cir. 2020). Before deciding “whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, 

[we] must first determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively 

unreasonable,” id., evaluating “the same procedural and substantive considerations that 

guide [this court’s] review of original sentences” but taking “a more deferential appellate 

posture than we do when reviewing original sentences,” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 

370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “Only if a sentence is either procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is 

plainly unreasonable—that is, whether the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” 

Patterson, 957 F.3d at 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately 

explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding 

Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United 

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States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) 

(listing § 3553(a) factors relevant to revocation sentences). Although the sentencing court 

“need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be 

when imposing a post-conviction sentence,” “it still must provide a statement of reasons 

for the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, a revocation sentence “need not always be accompanied by a fulsome explanation 

for [the court’s] acceptance or rejection of the parties’ arguments in favor of a particular 

sentence because, in many circumstances, a court’s acknowledgment of its consideration 

of the arguments will suffice.” Patterson, 957 F.3d at 438. 

“[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states 

a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” 

Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (cleaned up). Where, as here, a court imposes a sentence above 

the policy statement range, the court must explain why that sentence “better serves the 

relevant sentencing [factors].” Id. at 209 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] major 

departure from the Guidelines should be supported by a more significant justification than 

a minor one.” United States v. Gibbs, 897 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court committed no error 

when it imposed Gerald’s sentence. During the revocation hearing, the court listened to 

the parties’ arguments and allowed Gerald to allocute before imposing the sentence. The 

court thoroughly responded to each party’s arguments and explained why an upward 

variance from the Guidelines policy statement range was warranted in light of the relevant 

sentencing factors. The court also considered Gerald’s mitigating arguments, but found 

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that they did not support a shorter sentence. Finally, based on the factors identified by the 

court, we conclude that Gerald’s sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v. 

Coston, 964 F.3d 289, 298 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting that “[g]iven the district court’s care in 

explaining [defendant’s] sentence, and especially considering that court’s historic inability 

to prevent [defendant] from repeatedly violating supervised release conditions,” the 

sentence was not unreasonable.). 

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED 

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