### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 09-30330 Summary Calendar

KYOMI POSTLEY, Plaintiff–Appellant
v. GENERAL MOTORS, Defendant–Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 5:08-CV-883

Before KING, JOLLY, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff–Appellant Ky o m i Postley brought this personal injury lawsuit against Defendant–Appellee General Motors, and the district court granted General Motors’ motion to dismiss Postley’s claims. Postley now appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). We AFFIRM the district court’s d e n i a l o f Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D May30 , 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Pursua nt to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion s houldnot * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

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On June 19, 2008, Kyomi Postley (“Postley”), pro c e e di n g pro se, filed a personal injury lawsuit in federal district court on behalf of herself and her two minor children. She alleged that, in June 2005, she and her children were in a
car accident invo lvi n g a 2005 Pontiac Grand Am manufactured by General Motors and rented from National Car Rental. She alleged that a defective air b a g in the car caused her injuries. General Motors was the only defendan t named in the caption of Postley’s complaint. However, in Postley’s application to proceed in forma pauperis , she listed General Motors and National Car Rental as defendants. On August 6, 2008, General Motors f i l e d a motion to dismiss Postley’s claims on two grounds: (1) that her action was prescribed pursuant to Louisiana law; and (2) that Postle y f ailed to comply with the requirements of Rules 8(a) and 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On September 17, 2008, in an order entitled “Judgment,” the district court granted General Motors’ m o t ion, dismissing Postley’s claims with prej u dice. Postley filed an untimely notice of

a p p eal from the district court’s judgment on October 31, 2008. We dism i s s e d Postley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On December 30, 20 0 8 , Postley filed a motion for relief from the district court’s judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Postley argued that she was under heavy medication as a result of the car accident, which constituted “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). On January 8, 2009, Postley filed an Affidavit of Service requesting the clerk to enter a default judgment ag a i n st National Car Rental for failure to

ans w e r . T h at same day, the clerk issued a notice of entry of default against National Car Rental. National Car Rental then filed a motion to set aside the entry of default and a motion to dismiss Postley’s claims. On March 6, 2009, the district court denied Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, concluding that s h e h a d n o t demonstrated any ground for relief. On March 9,

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2009, in an order entitled “Final Judgment,” the district court granted National C ar R ental’s motions, concluding that Postley’s suit, “in its entirety,” wa s dismissed with prejudice. In a footnote, the court noted that it had “intended the September 17, 2008 Judgment to dismiss all claims by [Postley] against any and all proposed defendan t s . ” Nevertheless, because Postley and the clerk of the court “did not construe the judgment as such,” the district court decided to rule

on and grant National C ar R e n t a l ’ s motions. Postley did not file a notice of appeal from the district court’s March 9, 2009 final judgment. On April 6, 2009, Postley appealed the district court’s denial of her Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 1 We must first decide whether we have jurisdiction ov e r this appeal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” General Motors argues that

we do not have jurisdiction under § 1291 because Postley “did not appeal from

a final judgment of the district court or any other order or judgment from which

a proper appeal could be taken.” General Motors contends th a t the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion “was not an appealable final judgment because National Car Rental remained a defendant” in the l a w s u it until the court entered its final judgment on March 9, 2009. We conclude that General Motors’ argument is without m e rit. In the instant case, the distric t court denied Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion on March 6, 2009. Three days later, on March 9, 2009, th e c ourt entered final judgment dismissing Postley’s suit in its entirety. Then, on April 6, 2009, Postley timely appealed the district court’s denial of her Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Because Postley appealed the denial of her Rule 60(b)(6) motion after the district court’s entry of final judgment, the court’s order denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion was a final,

On Mar ch 11, 2010, we grant ed Nat ional Car Rental ’s mo tio n to dis mi ss Po s t l e y ’s 1 app eal, but only as to N a t i o n a l C a r Rental

. Pos tle y’s app eal as to Ge nera l Mo tor s wa s not res olvedbe caus e o f a ba nk rup tcy st ay. Theban kr upt cy s tay wa s lif tedinFeb ruary 2012

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appealable order under § 1291. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (“The general rule is that ‘a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated.’”) (citation omitted); 15A C H AR L E S ALA N WR I G H T & AR T H U R R. M I L L E R , F E D E RAL PRA C T I C E A N D P R O C E D U R E § 3905.1 (2d ed.) (“When a district court enters its final order terminating a litigation, orders previously entered during the course of the action can be reviewed by [an appellate court] if so requested by an aggrieved party.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dickinson v. Auto Ct r . Mfg. Co. , 733 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Under the final judgment appealability rule, a p art y may obtain review of prejudicial adverse interlocutory rulin g s up o n hi s ap p e al from adverse final judgment, at which time the interlocutory rulings (nonreviewable until then) are regarded as merged into the final judgment terminating the action.”) (citations omitted). Therefore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over Postley’s appeal. We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Warfield v. Byron , 436 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), a court may reopen a judgment when

a party shows “any other reason that justifies relief.” We have stated that the “‘any other reason’ language refers to any other reason than those contained in the five enumerated grounds on which a court may grant a Rule 60(b) motion.” Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co. , 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 1995) (citati o n omitted). While we have recognized that “Rule 60(b)(6) is a gr a nd reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case,” we have also stated that Rule 60(b)(6) relief “will be granted only if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In her Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Postley contended that relief from the dismissal of her claims was warranted because she was under heavy medication

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as a result of the car accident, which prevented her from complying with Rules 8(a) and 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion, r e a s o n ing that “even if the [c]ourt were to find that [Postley’s] medication condition is an ‘ extr aor din ary circumstance’ excusing her failure to comply with Rules 8(a) and 10(a),” Postley’s claims prescribed two years prior to t h e commencement of the action. The court stated that “[r]eopening the case will not ‘turn back time’ and would only cause the parties undue expense and result in a waste of time.” We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying P o s t l e y’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The court was correct to note that, even assuming Postley’s medical condition was an “extraordinary circumstance” that excused her lack of compliance with Rules 8(a) and 10(a), her claims prescribed two years before the filing of her lawsuit. Under Louisiana law, delictual actions

are subject to a one-year prescriptive period, which begins to run from the date of injury. LA

. C IV
. C O D E AN N
. art. 3492. In her complaint, Postley alleged that the accident that caused her injuries occurred in June 2005. However, Postley did not file her complaint until June 2008, wh i ch was two years after the prescriptive period had ended. Thus, Postley’s claims h a d prescribed under 2 L o uisiana law, and Postley pointed to no “extraordinary circumstance” tha t warranted relief from the district court’s dismissal of her claims based on prescription. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. For the foregoing reas o n s , we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Postley’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

Pos tle y has not argued to the dis tri ct cour t or to this cour t that ther e is a bas is for 2 the inte rru pt ion or sus pens ion of the pr es cri pt ive period

. See Kli ng Rea lty Co. v. Chev ron USA, Inc. , 575 F.3d 510, 517 (5t h Cir. 2009) (s tat ing that wh ere plai ntif f’ s clai ms are fac ially pr es cribed , pla inti ff bear s the burd en of de mo nst rat ing that pr es cri pt ion w as int err upt ed or sus pend ed)

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