United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-60950

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Jeffery Benard Brown, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:17-CR-22-1

Before Wiener, Southwick, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Jeffery Benard Brown pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to a 

within-guidelines, 120-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, Brown

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 22, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 20-60950

2

argues that the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to move 

for a substantial assistance departure or reduction. The Government moves 

to dismiss based on the appeal waiver in Brown’s plea agreement or, 

alternatively, for summary affirmance. In response, Brown argues that he did 

not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement.

As part of a valid plea agreement, a defendant may waive his statutory 

right to appeal. United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2006). We

review the enforceability of an appeal waiver de novo. United States v. 

Winchel, 896 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2018). To determine whether the appeal 

waiver bars an appeal, we “conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the 

waiver was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether the waiver applies to the 

circumstances at hand, based on the plain language of the agreement.” 

United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 2005). For a waiver to be 

knowing and voluntary, the defendant must know that he has a right to appeal 

and that he is giving up that right. See United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 

744, 746 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2005). Brown’s contention that his waiver was not 

knowing and voluntary is belied by the record. Brown was fully advised of his 

right to appeal and he acknowledged that he understood what the waiver

connoted and its consequences. See id.

Brown asserts that the right to challenge a sentence should not be 

waivable and that appeal waivers are unfair contracts of adhesion. However, 

Brown has not identified any terms deemed unconscionable by this court. 

We have routinely upheld appeal waivers similar to Brown’s. See,e.g., United 

States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442, 443-44, 449-50 (5th Cir. 2005); Bond, 414 F.3d 

at 543-45. Moreover, it is well-settled that a defendant may waive his right 

to appeal as part of a valid plea agreement. See Story, 439 F.3d at 231; United 

States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992). Because Brown does 

not allege any other basis for attacking the appeal waiver, the waiver is valid 

and enforceable. See Bond, 414 F.3d at 544.

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An appeal waiver does not prevent a defendant from raising a claim 

that the Government breached the plea agreement. See United States v. 

Casillas, 853 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2017). We apply general principles of 

contract law in interpreting a plea agreement and consider “whether the 

[G]overnment’s conduct is consistent with the defendant’s reasonable 

understanding of the agreement.” United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407, 

413 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the 

language of a plea agreement is unambiguous, we “generally will not look 

beyond the four corners of the document” to determine the intention of the 

parties. United States v. Long, 722 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2013).

Here, the terms of the plea agreement are clear and unambiguous that 

the Government had sole discretion to determine if Brown provided 

substantial assistance, as well as sole discretion to request a downward 

departure or sentence reduction even if Brown had provided substantial 

assistance. Brown does not allege any unconstitutional motivation for the 

Government’s conduct. See United States v. Aderholt, 87 F.3d 740, 743 (5th 

Cir. 1996). Accordingly, Brown has failed to show that the Government 

breached the plea agreement. 

Because the appeal waiver is valid and enforceable and the 

Government has invoked the waiver, Brown’s appeal is barred. See Story, 

439 F.3d at 230 & n.5. The Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal is 

GRANTED, and its alternative motion for summary affirmance is 

DENIED. The appeal is DISMISSED.

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