alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
H. R. 4386 

One Hundred Thirteenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE SECOND SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Friday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and fourteen 

An Act 

To allow the Secretary of the Treasury to rely on State examinations for certain 

financial institutions, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Money Remittances Improvement 

Act of 2014’’. 

SEC. 2. COMPLIANCE AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. 

(a) COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON MONETARY INSTRUMENT TRANSACTIONS.—Section 5318(a) of title 31, 

United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

(2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (7); and 

(3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the following: 

‘‘(6) rely on examinations conducted by a State supervisory 

agency of a category of financial institution, if the Secretary 

determines that— 

‘‘(A) the category of financial institution is required 

to comply with this subchapter and regulations prescribed 

under this subchapter; or 

‘‘(B) the State supervisory agency examines the category of financial institution for compliance with this subchapter and regulations prescribed under this subchapter; 

and’’. 

(b) COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—Section 128 of Public Law 91–508 (12 

U.S.C. 1958) is amended— 

(1) by striking ‘‘this title’’ and inserting ‘‘this chapter and 

section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 

1829b)’’; and 

(2) by inserting at the end the following: ‘‘The Secretary 

may rely on examinations conducted by a State supervisory 

agency of a category of financial institution, if the Secretary 

determines that the category of financial institution is required 

to comply with this chapter and section 21 of the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Act (and regulations prescribed under this 

chapter and section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), 

or the State supervisory agency examines the category of financial institution for compliance with this chapter and section 
H. R. 4386—2 

21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (and regulations prescribed under this chapter and section 21 of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Act).’’. 

(c) CONSULTATION WITH STATE AGENCIES.—In issuing rules 

to carry out section 5318(a)(6) of title 31, United States Code, 

and section 128 of Public Law 91–508 (12 U.S.C. 1958), the Secretary of the Treasury shall consult with State supervisory agencies. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT G. DAVID BROYLES; EMILY BROYLES; CITIZENS BANK OF MARYLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellees, No. 94-2584 v. ROGER SCHLOSSBERG, Trustee, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (CA-93-3921-AW, BK-92-1-120-SD) Argued: July 12, 1995 Decided: April 1, 1996 Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and NORTON, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Williams wrote the opinion, in which Judge Luttig and Judge Norton joined.

_________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Roger Schlossberg, SCHLOSSBERG & ASSOCIATES, Hagerstown, Maryland, for Appellant. John Sears Simcox, SIMCOX & BARCLAY, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________OPINION WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: After oral argument, we certified the following question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland: Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-611(d), what is the effect on the lien status of a confessed judgment when the state court "opens" the judgment for a hearing on the merits without affirmatively stating that the judgment lien is preserved[?] Agreeing with the well-reasoned opinion of the bankruptcy court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that opening a confessed judgment does not destroy the validity of the underlying judgment lien: We hold that opening a confessed judgment is a procedurethat allows the court to consider the merits of the defendant's defense to the action without destroying the judgment's validity. The judgment, and any judgment lien derived from it, remain in effect while the court considers the merits of the defense.

. . . . We reject the Trustee's contention that opening a confessed judgment destroys the validity of the underlyingjudgment lien unless the court order contains express affirmative language preserving the judgment. Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank of Md. , No. 25, slip op. at 8-9 (Md. Mar. 7, 1996). B ecause the priority status of the judgment lien is unaffected by its opening, we hold that the district court properly affirmed the bankruptcy court's lifting the automatic stay to permit the Circuit Court for Prince George's County to determine the validity and amount of the confessed judgment. The judgment of the district court, therefore, is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
#### ML Media Partners, L.P., Respondent, v Century Communications Corp. et al., Appellants.

[720 NYS2d 778]

Order *384and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered July 12, 2000, which granted plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on its fourth and fifth causes of action, declaring that neither defendant coventurer nor any of its affiliates may bid on or attempt to purchase the assets and business of the parties’ joint venture and granting plaintiff specific performance of section 12 of the parties’ joint venture agreement to the extent of directing defendant co-venturer to proceed diligently with plaintiff in locating one or more third parties to complete the sale, prohibiting defendants from interfering with the sale, and which dismissed the fourth counterclaim and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint except as to an accounting, and order, same court and Justice, entered July 26, 2000, which clarified the July 12, 2000 order and judgment to the extent of holding that pursuant to the parties’ joint venture agreement plaintiff was entitled to insist upon a sale of the joint venture’s interest rather than a sale of its assets, unanimously affirmed, with one bill of costs.

The motion court properly barred assertion of an option that defendant co-venturer does not have under the concededly unambiguous terms of the subject agreement. Since said agreement is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence should not be considered *(see, Rosalie Estates v Colonia Ins. Co.,*227 AD2d 335, 336). Defendants’ construction of the agreement would potentially deny force or effect to a key provision thereof *(see, Gemma Constr. Co. v City of New York,*246 AD2d 451, 454), or render such provision meaningless in the context of the agreement as a whole *(see, AIG Trading Corp. v Valero Gas Mktg.,*254 AD2d 117, 118). We also find that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the second order was both procedurally and substantively proper. We have considered defendants’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing. Concur — Williams, J. P., Andrias, Lerner, Saxe and Buckley, JJ.
**Exhibit      21.1**

**Subsidiaries**

| 1. | Infosmart                Group Limited, a British Virgin Islands company (“Infosmart BVI”) - wholly                owned subsidiary of the Company |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 2. | Portabello                Global Limited, a British Virgin Island company - wholly owned                subsidiary of Infosmart BVI |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 3. | Info                Smart International Enterprises Limited, a Hong Kong company (“Info Smart                International”) - wholly owned subsidiary of Infosmart                BVI |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 4. | Infoscience                Media Global Limited, a British Virgin Islands company - wholly owned                subsidiary of Infosmart BVI |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 5. | Info                Smart Technology Limited, a Hong Kong company (“Info Smart                Technology) - wholly owned subsidiary of Infosmart BVI |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 6. | Infoscience                Media Limited, a Hong Kong company (“Infoscience Media”) - wholly owned                subsidiary of Info Smart Technology |
|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 7. | Infoscience                Holdings Limited, a Hong Kong company - wholly owned subsidiary of                Infoscience Media |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |
|--------|--------|

| 8. | Discobra                Industria E Comercio de Eletro Eletronica Ltda, a Brazilian company                - 99.42% owned subsidiary of Infoscience Media |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

----
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4735 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that persons having seriously 

delinquent tax debts shall be ineligible for Federal employment. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 3, 2010 

Mr. CHAFFETZ (for himself, Mr. ISSA, Mr. PITTS, Mr. HENSARLING, Mr. 

BISHOP of Utah, Ms. FOXX, and Mr. ROONEY) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform 

A BILL 

To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that persons having seriously delinquent tax debts shall be ineligible for Federal employment. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INELIGIBILITY OF PERSONS HAVING SERI4 OUSLY DELINQUENT TAX DEBTS FOR FED5 ERAL EMPLOYMENT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 73 of title 5, United 

7 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol8 lowing: 


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2 

•HR 4735 IH

1 ‘‘SUBCHAPTER VIII—INELIGIBILITY OF PER2 SONS HAVING SERIOUSLY DELINQUENT 

3 TAX DEBTS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT 

4 ‘‘§ 7381. Ineligibility of persons having seriously de5 linquent tax debts for Federal employ6 ment 

7 ‘‘(a) DEFINITION.—For purposes of this section— 

8 ‘‘(1) the term ‘seriously delinquent tax debt’ 

9 means an outstanding debt under the Internal Rev10 enue Code of 1986 for which a notice of lien has 

11 been filed in public records pursuant to section 6323 

12 of such Code, except that such term does not in13 clude— 

14 ‘‘(A) a debt that is being paid in a timely 

15 manner pursuant to an agreement under sec16 tion 6159 or section 7122 of such Code; and 

17 ‘‘(B) a debt with respect to which a collec18 tion due process hearing under section 6330 of 

19 such Code, or relief under subsection (a), (b), 

20 or (f) of section 6015 of such Code, is re21 quested or pending; and 

22 ‘‘(2) the term ‘Federal employee’ means— 

23 ‘‘(A) an employee, as defined by section 

24 2105; and 


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3 

•HR 4735 IH

1 ‘‘(B) an employee of the United States 

2 Postal Service or of the Postal Regulatory Com3 mission. 

4 ‘‘(b) INELIGIBILITY FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT.— 

5 An individual who has a seriously delinquent tax debt shall 

6 be ineligible to be appointed, or to continue serving, as 

7 a Federal employee. 

8 ‘‘(c) REGULATIONS.—The Office of Personnel Man9 agement shall, for purposes of carrying out this section 

10 with respect to the executive branch, prescribe any regula11 tions which the Office considers necessary.’’. 

12 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chap13 ter 73 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by add14 ing at the end the following: 

‘‘SUBCHAPTER VIII—INELIGIBILITY OF PERSONS HAVING SERIOUSLY

DELINQUENT TAX DEBTS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT

‘‘7381. Ineligibility of persons having seriously delinquent tax debts for Federal 

employment.’’. 

Æ 


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1

IN THE SUPREME COUR T OF THE ST

AT E OF MONT

ANA OP - 24 - 0413

________________________________ GLACIER BEAR RETREA T, LLC; GAIL L . GOODWIN and DARR YL C. SLA TTENGREN, Plaintiffs, Counter Defendants, and Appellees, v. MA TT DUSEK; RACHEL

DUSEK, Defendants, Counter Claimants, and Appellants.

__________________________________

**ORDER** The Court has been advised that the parties to this matter have settled the issues giving rise to the certified question before this Court, and have stipulate d to the dismissal of this cause with prejudice. Pursuant to the parties ’ stipulation, this cause is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs and attorney ’ s fees. DA TED this _____ day of September , 2024.

_______________________ _____ Chief Justice

____________________________

____________________________ 09/13/2024 Case Number: OP 24-04132 __________________________________

____________________________

____________________________

____________________________ Justices

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 13 2024
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906

of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of THOMAS PROPERTIES GROUP, INC. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      |  |                        
|--------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 9, 2007 |  | /s/ Diana M. Laing     
|                      |  | Diana M. Laing         
|                      |  | Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350 and shall
not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or incorporated by reference in any registration statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
STATE of North Carolina v. David Michael COSTIN

No. 11P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

William D. Spence, Attorney at Law, Kinston, David Michael Costin, for Costin, David Michael.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Kristin Jo Uicker, Assistant Attorney General, Cathy H. Pope, Assistant Attorney General, Jon David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 8th of January 2018 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-10240

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Corey Shaquielle Johnson, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:22-CR-274-15

______________________________

Before Davis, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Corey Shaquielle Johnson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm 

after a felony conviction and was sentenced to 80 months of imprisonment. 

On appeal, he presents two unpreserved challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

First, he argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second 

Amendment based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 4, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-10240 Document: 90-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/04/2024
No. 23-10240

2

597 U.S. 1 (2022). Next, he asserts that the jurisdictional element of 

§ 922(g)(1) requires more than past interstate travel at an indeterminate 

time; but if it does not, he maintains that the statute exceeds Congress’s 

authority under the Commerce Clause. The Government has filed an 

unopposed motion for summary affirmance or, in the alternative, for an 

extension of time to file its brief. 

Johnson correctly concedes that his arguments are foreclosed. See 

United States v. Jones, 88 F.4th 571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 

S. Ct. 1081 (2024); United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 

2020). Therefore, summary affirmance is appropriate. See Groendyke 

Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). The motion for 

summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for an extension 

of time is DENIED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Case: 23-10240 Document: 90-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/04/2024
IB 

Union Calendar No. 369 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4619 

[Report No. 113–496] 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the rule 

allowing certain tax-free distributions from individual retirement accounts 

for charitable purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 8, 2014 

Mr. SCHOCK (for himself and Mr. BLUMENAUER) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

JUNE 26, 2014 

Additional sponsors: Mr. KELLY of Pennsylvania, Mr. YOUNG of Indiana, Mr. 

TIBERI, Mr. REICHERT, Mr. REED, Mr. PRICE of Georgia, Mr. STIVERS, 

and Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana 

JUNE 26, 2014 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 


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•HR 4619 RH

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make 

permanent the rule allowing certain tax-free distributions 

from individual retirement accounts for charitable purposes. 


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3 

•HR 4619 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. RULE ALLOWING CERTAIN TAX-FREE DIS4 TRIBUTIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL RETIRE5 MENTS ACCOUNTS FOR CHARITABLE PUR6 POSES MADE PERMANENT. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 408(d)(8) of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking subpara9 graph (F). 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 this section shall apply to distributions made in taxable 

12 years beginning after December 31, 2013. 

13 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

14 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Permanent IRA Chari15 table Contribution Act of 2014’’. 

16 SEC. 2. RULE ALLOWING CERTAIN TAX-FREE DISTRIBU17 TIONS FROM INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENTS AC18 COUNTS FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES MADE 

19 PERMANENT. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 408(d)(8) of the Internal 

21 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking subparagraph 

22 (F). 

23 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this 

24 section shall apply to distributions made in taxable years 

25 beginning after December 31, 2013. 


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Union Calendar No. 369 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4619 

[Report No. 113–496] 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 

counts for charitable purposes. free distributions from individual retirement acmake permanent the rule allowing certain taxJUNE 26, 2014 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


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_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

November 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 134536 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 134536 

 COA: 278767 

Washtenaw CC: 85-019976-FC 

EDWARD N. CARLTON, a/k/a THOMAS 

E. SETH, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 3, 2007 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant's motion for 

relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G). 

d1119 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

November 29, 2007 

 Clerk
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-50906

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RUBEN H. JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

-----------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. A-88-CR-104-ALL

-----------

July 27, 1998

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ruben H. Johnson appeals the denial of his motion pursuant to

Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 requesting a reduction in the amount of

restitution he was ordered to pay as part of his sentence for his

bank fraud convictions. Because Johnson’s motion was untimely, the

district court lacked jurisdiction to afford relief. See In re

United States, 900 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1990). 

AFFIRMED.