Appellant was indicted a nd char g ed in two sepa

rate cause numbers for

having cause d two 1 deaths. B y

ag ree ment, the ca

uses wer e tried tog ether
. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. §§ 19.02 ( murder) , 19. 0 4 (m an s l aug hter), 49.08 ( intox ication 2 manslaug hter) ( West 2003 & Supp. 2006). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00692- CR NO. 03-05-00693- CR

Edwin G le n Big on, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LAMP ASAS COUNTY , 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS . 7642 & 7643, H ONO RAB LE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Ed wi n G le n B ig on

a pp e a ls h is c on vic tio ns ari sin g fr om a f a ta l a uto mob ile a c c ide nt. I n three counts in eac h of two indictments, appellant w as i n d icted for murder, intoxication 1

mans la ug hte r, and mans la

ug hte r. Af

te r a one -d a

y be nc h tri a l, the tr ia l c ourt fo un d a pp e lla nt guil ty 2
on a ll c ounts and

se nte nc e d him to e ig hte e n y e ars ’ c on fi ne me nt on e a c h c ount w iththe se nte nc e s to
run conc urre ntly . In six issues, appellant challeng es the leg al and fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence to s up po rt his c on vic tio ns and the a dmi ssi on of e xpe rt te sti mony , me dic a l r e c or ds , a nd te st r e su lts
. We a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nts of c on vic tio n fo r fe lony mur de r. We r e ve rs e the jud g me nts2

of c on vic tio n fo r int oxic a tio n mans la ug hte r and mans la

ug hte r, and we dis mis s tho se c ounts of bo th ind ic tme nts
.
F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND

The ev i d en ce befor e the tria l court showed that on the night of Dec ember

4, 2004, appellant a

nd his eig ht-y ear -old son wer e traveling southbound i n h i s sport utili ty vehicle on Hig hway 183 near L ometa whe n he drove onto t h e shoulder of the roa d and then ba ck onto the highw ay , and then ve ere d into the northbound lane of oncoming tr aff ic. Appellant c ollided with a vehicle in the northbound lane, causing the death of its driver, Ramona Wallace- Pachec o, and her y oung daug hter, Mela

nie. JohnCa rr oll te sti fi e d th a t he wa s d ri vin g on Hi g hw ay 18 3 sh or tly be fo re 9:0 0 p .m. when he observe d appellant’ s vehicle tr avelingat a spe ed of f ifteen miles under

the spee d limit of 65 miles per hour. A s he conte mplated passing the vehicle , he “notice d [a p p el l an t ] was kind of
we a vin g on

the ro a d, ha d w e a ve d o ve r o n to the sh ou lde r a nd we a vin g ba ck. ” Car

ro ll s low e d h is
car and droppe d back to distanc e himself fr om appellant’s ve hicle. Appe llant’s vehicle c ontinued to cross over

onto the shoulder of the road and then veer back onto the road, crossing into oncoming traff ic in the northbound lane . Carroll testified that he observe d appellant’ s vehicle c ross the ce nter str ipe of the ro a d in to o nc omi nglane s o f t ra ff ic a t le a st t

wo tim e s:
Two fo r s u r e b e c a

u s e th e o n c o mi n g v e h ic le s h a d to a c tu a ll y p u ll o v e r o n to the shoulder to g et—well, wh en ev er Ifirst observe d that, the first time Idid that . . . I started flashing my lights and honking my horn and ever y thing. He was d ri ving perf ectly in onc oming traff

ic. They had to pull over onto the shoulder to ge t around him, and then he would whip ba ck over into our lane that we wer e driving in.3

Carrol l also observe d appellant g o off onto the shoulder of the roa d “numer ous times.” He explained, “[t] hat’s why

Ijust hung ba ck fr om him and didn’t try to pass.” As Carroll followe d the vehicle up an incline in the r oad, the taillig hts of appellant’ s vehicle “ disappea

red.” As Carroll cr ested the hill, he saw an explos ion. Carroll pulled his car of f the ro a d, tur

ne d on his br ig ht lig hts to illumin a te the a c c ide nt s c e ne , a nd a tte mpt e d to a id t

he vic tim s, two of whom he thoug ht were alre ady dece ased. Da vid Th or p, an inve sti g a tor

wi th t he L a mpa sa s Co un ty

She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt, testifie d th a t h e w a s o n p a tr o l d u ty o n th e e v e n in g o f D e c e mb e r 4 an d ar r iv e d a t th e s c e n e of the
c oll isi on a lon g wi th oth e r e me rg e nc y pe rs on ne l. Ap pe lla nt wa s pinne d in the ve hic le , a nd the c hil d in a ppellant’s vehicle w as injured. The ir vehicle was towing a small flatbed tr ailer c arr y ing afourwhee l ATV-ty

pe vehic le. Thorp testified t hat i t appea red from the gea

r i n the vehicle and the tra iler tha t app e lla

n tan d h i s s o nw e r e r e tu r

n i n g f r o m d e e r h u n t i n g . T h o r

p a s s i s t e d t h e p ar a m e d i c s in removing the child from the vehicle and l oading him into an ambulance. Appellant was removed from the ve hicle and transporte d by helicopter to a hospital e merg ency room wher e his blood was tested. B ased upon this blood sample, DPS chemist Charles Mott testified that appe llant’s blooda lc oh ol c on c e ntr a tio n w a s 0 .1 9 p e rc e nt.

Appellant was indicted separ ately for the fe lony murder, intoxication manslaug hter, and manslaug hter of Mr s. Wall ac e- P acheco a nd her da ug hter, two of the occupa nts in the other
ve hic le
. Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d him g uil ty of a ll c ounts and a sse sse d p un ish me nt at e ig hte e n y e a rs ’
c o n f i n e m e n to ne a c h c o u n tw i t h t h e s e n t e n c e s t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y.4 AN AL YSI S I n six po int s o f e rr or , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis motions t o quash the indictments, that the evide nce w as leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his c on vic tio ns fo r f

e lony mur de r an d man sla

ug hte r, and

that th e tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in admitting the testimony o f t h e DP S chemist, appellant’s medic al re cords, a nd the re sults of appellant’ s blood-alcohol test. For the reasons discussed below, we re ject appe llant’s contentions and over rule his poi n t s of er

ror. As a preliminary

matter, howe ver, w e first a ddress the issue of do ub le je op ard

y , w hic h w a s n ot r a ise d b y the pa rt ie s. Double Jeopardy

Our re view of the re cord disclose s unassig ned er ror that should be a ddresse d in the interest of justice. Se e W

rig ht v . S tat e , 981 S.W. 2d

19 7, 19 9 n .2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ) ( a pp e llate court may , in its di scre tion, consider unassig ned er ror) . I t is appare nt on the fac e of the re cord that appellant’ s convictions on all three counts of both indictments constit ute double jeopa rdy
. See Go nz ale z v . S tat e , 8 S.W .3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining whe n double jeopar dy may be ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l) ; Du v all

v . S tat e , 59 S.W .3d 773, 777 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. re f’d) (same)
.

The F ifth Amendment Double J eopar dy Clause protec ts ag ainst prosec ution for the
same of fe ns e a ft e r a

c on vi cti on or an a c qu itt a l, a nd a g a ins t mu lti ple punis hme nts fo r t he same offe nse. N

o r t h Ca rolina v. Pearce , 3 95 U. S. 7 11 , 7 17 (1 96 9) . T he Do ub le Jeop ard y Cla us e is enfor cea ble ag ainst the states throug h the Four teenth Amendme nt. Benton v. Mary land , 3 95 U. S. 784, 787 (1969). In this case, ther e is a multiple-punishments violation.5 The c ourt of cr iminal appeals’s de cision in Ex pa rteErv in , 9 9 1 S. W. 2 d 8 0 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1999), controls our res u l t h er e. I n Er v in , the cour

t of criminal appe als examined the int oxic a tio n ma

ns la ug hte r a nd mans la ug hte r s ta tut e s und e r a do ub le je op ard y ana ly sis . Purs ua

nt t o a plea ag ree ment, E rv i n pleade d g uilty and wa s convicted of

intox ication manslaughter a nd manslaug hter. B oth offense s arose ou t of a tra ffic a ccide nt involving a sing le victim. Ervin was convicted unde r both statutes and wa s g iven a se ntence for both convic tions. An al y z i n g the leg islative intent conce rning the doubl e jeopa rdy implications of the two statutes, the cour t held that “manslaug hter a

nd intox icatio n m an s l aughter are the same of

fense for double je opardy purposes when they

involve the same victim, a nd imposing convictions for both in this sit uation violates the Do u b l e J eo p ardy

clause .” Erv in , 9 9 1 S
. W
. 2 d a t8 1 7
. L i k e w i s e , b e c a

u s e t h e r e c o r d

i nt h i s c a se contains evide nce of

only one ac t in both indi ctments that can support a conviction under any of the three counts of the indictments, appellant cannot law fully be convic ted and punished f or all three counts. See id. Th e re me dy wh e n a de fe nd ant i s c on vi cte d in a s ing le c ri min a l a c tio n o f m ult ipl e of fe n s e s t h a tar e t h e “ s a m e ” f o r d o u b l e j e o p ar dy

p u r p o s e s i s t o v a c a t e t h e o f

f e n d i n g c o n v i c t ion s. Ball v. United States , 4 70 U. S. 8 56 , 8 64 -6 5 (198 5) ; Lan de rs v . S tat e , 9 5 7 S. W. 2 d

5 5 8 , 5 5 9 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1997). Following the “most serious off ense” test of Lan de rs in which we a ffirm the
more ser ious conviction and punishment, we re v erse the appe llant’s convictions for intoxi cation manslaug hter a

nd manslaug hter unde r counts two and thr ee of both indictments. Se e Lan de rs , 957 S.W. 2d a t 55 9- 61
. Gi ve n ou r dis po sit ion of the int oxic a tio n ma ns la ug hte r a nd mans la ug hte r c ounts of the ind ic tme nts , w e do no t a dd re ss a pp e lla nt’ s is su e s r e la tin g on ly

to t ho se c ounts
.6

Mo tio ns to Qua sh

I n his first point of error, appellant contends that the t rial court err ed in fa iling to g rant his moti on to quash t he indi ctments beca use hi s actions did not meet the re quirements to sustain a char g e of f

elony murder. O n appea l, he urg es that the indi ct m en t s i n ea ch ca use we re de ficient beca use the State fa iled to alleg e and pr ove a c ulpable mental state
.

A p e rs on c omm its the of

fe ns e of fe lony mur de r if he c omm its or a tte mpt s to c omm it a fe lony other than ma

nslaug hter a

nd, i n the cour se of a

nd in further ance of the c ommissi on or attempt, he commits o r at t em p t s to commit an act cle arly dang erous to human life that cause s the death of an individual. Tex. P en. Code An n . § 1 9
. 0 2(b)( 3) (West 2003). Appe llant was cha rg ed wi th c omm itt inga

fe lony wh e n h e dr ov e his c ar i n a pu bl ic pla c e wh ile int oxic a te d w itha c hil d passeng er w ho was y oung er tha n 15 y ear s of ag e. Se e id . § 49.0 45 (West Supp. 2006). The
s u fficie ncy

of an indictment is a que stion of law which we revie w de novo
. Sta te v . M off , 154 S.W .3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

A cha rg e of f elony murder doe s not itself require proof of mens rea ; rather , the
u n d e r ly in g f e lo n y s u p p li e s th e c u lp a

b le mental state. J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , 4 S. W. 3 d

2 5 4 , 2 5 5 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Ga rre tt v. Sta te , 5 73 S.W. 2d 54 3, 54 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ); Hi lli ar d v . S tat e , 513 S.W .2d 28, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (intent to kill is supplied by intent to commit underly ing felony that ultimatel y re s u l t s i n death) . I f any felony other than ma

nslaug hter c an ser

ve as the underlying f

elony , then any

mental culpability

from the underly

ing felony can suppor

t a conviction for f elony murder. I n this instance , felony DWI does not requir e proof of a c ulpable mental state
. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 4 9. 11 (a ) ( Wes t 20 03 ); Ex pa rteRo ss , 522 S.W .2d 21 4 , 2 1 7
- 1 8 ( T e x.7

Cr im. Ap p. 19 75 ); Me nd

oz a v . S tat e , No. 08-04-00369- CR, 2006 Tex . App. L EXI S 7086, at *12 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so Au g . 1 0, 20 06 , n o p e t.)
. Nor do e s th e fe lony c ha rg e of DWI wi th a c hil d passeng er r equire proof of a culpa ble mental state. Te x . Pen. Code Ann. § 49.045 (West Supp. 2006) (p e rs on c omm its fe lony of

fe ns e of DWI wi th a c hil d p a sse ng e r w he n th e pe rs on c omm its DWI

wi th a child y oung er tha

n 15 in vehicle) . We may

not limi t the application of the offe nse of f elony murder when the le g islature has not done so. Se e Ro dr igu e z v . S tat e , 9 5 3 S. W. 2 d 342, 354 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n1 9 9 7 , p e t. r e f

’ d )
. T h e tr ia l c o u rt d id

n o t e r r in d e c li n in g to qu a s h th e in d ic tm e n ts
. We
overr ule appe llant’s first point of err or. Legal and Factual S ufficiency

I n his thi rd and fo ur

th po int s of e rr or , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s that the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa ctually

insufficient to support the murde r convictions beca use t he evidence was insufficie nt to show (I ) that he acte d rec klessly and (ii) that the act of colliding with the victims’ vehicle “ was in further ance ” of the underlying f elony of DWIwith a child passeng er. The e vidence is leg ally

sufficie nt to support a criminal convic tion if a rational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime bey ond a reasonable doubt after viewing th e e v id e n c e in a li g h t mo s t f a v o r a b le to th e p r o s e c u tion. Dr ic ha s v . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 795, 798 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); se e als o Ja c k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U. S. 30 7, 31 8- 19 (1 97 9) ; So rto v . S tat e , 173 S.W .3d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. de nied , 126 S
. C t
. 2982 (June 30, 2006). I f, g iven all the evide nce, a rational jury

would n ec es s ar i l y

enter tain a re asonable doubt as to the defe ndant’s g u il t, th e d

u e p r o c e s s g u ar an te e r e qu ir e s th a t w e r e v e r s e an d o r d e r a ju d g me n t of acquittal. Swe ar inge n v . S tat e , 101 S.W .3d 89, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). I n a fa ctual suff iciency8

ana ly sis , w e re vie w the e vid e nc e in a ne utr a l lig ht, e xer c isi ng a pp ro pr ia te de fe re nc e in o rd e r t o avo id substitut ing our judgme nt f or that of the fac t f

inder, particula

rly in matters of cr edibility
. Drichas , 17 5 S.W.3 d at 7 99 ; se e als o Cl e wis v . S tat e , 9 2 2 S. W. 2 d

1 2 6 , 1 3 3

- 3 4 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 1 9 9 6 )
. We may find the evide nce to be fac tually insufficient if the evidenc e supporting the finding , considere d alone, is too wea

k to support the jury ’s finding b ey ond a re asonable doubt, or the contra vening evidenc e is so strongthat the State could not have met its burden of proof
. Drichas , 175 S.W .3d at 79 9; se e als o Zu nig

a v . S tat e , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484-85 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004). I n h is thir d p oint o f e rr or , a pp e lla nt c on te nd s th a t th e e vid e nc e that he re c kle ssl y committed an ac t clear ly

dang erous to human life by driving a heavily loaded ve hicle towing a tra iler was leg ally

and fa ctually

insufficient. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b)( 3). He contends that the State pr e se nte d n o e vid e nc e to sh owa pp e lla nt w a s awa

re of any ri sk tha t he mig ht c a

us e the de a th of the vic tim s. Th e Te xas P e na l Co de pr ov ide s th a t a pers on “ac ts r e c kle ssl y , o r i s r e c kle ss, wi th respe ct to circ umstances surr ounding his c onduct or the r esult of his conduct whe n he is aw are of but consciously

disreg ards a

substan t i al and unjustifiable risk that the c ircumstance s exi st or the result will occur .” Id. § 6 .0 3( c ) ( Wes t 20 03 ). Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t th e on ly e vid e nc e that c ou ld have e sta bli sh e d a pp e lla nt’ s p re -a c c ide nt m e nta l st a te or c on du c t w a s th e te sti mony of JohnCarr oll , who did not witness the exact moment of the collision. Bec ause a ppellant was not “ awa

re” of any
r is k , a t mo s t, h e ar g u e s , h e s h o u ld o n ly h a v e b e e n c h ar g e d w it h in to xic a ti o n ma

n s la u g h ter. W e disag ree . Carroll’s testimony alone that he followed a

ppellant’s vehic le weaving on and off the road a nd, befor e the c ollisi on, over the cente r stripe on two occa sions, can support the f act f inder’s9

c on c lus ion

that app e lla

nt ac te d re c kle ssl y . I n a dd iti on , D e pa rtme nt o f P ub lic Sa fe ty

tr oo pe r Jimm y Che stn ut inv e sti g a te d the a c c ide nt on the nig ht it oc c ur re d and te sti fi e d th a t hi s o bs e rv a tio ns le d h im to c on c lud e that the a c c ide nt w a s c a us e d b y an o ff se t he a d- on

c oll isi on be tw e e n th e tw o v e hic le s. He c oncluded that a

ppellant’s vehic le was tra

veling southbound in the northbound lane of oncoming traff ic at the point of impac t. Ba sed on this testimony , the fa ct finder could rationally have f

ound be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t a

pp e lla nt c omm itt e d a

n a c t c le arl y

da ngerou s to human li fe in h is
rec kless driving . The e vidence was leg ally sufficie nt to support appellant’s convic tions for felony murder. Mor eover , viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidenc e supporting the finding that he ac ted re cklessly in committi ng an ac t clear ly dang erous t o h u m an life wa s not too
weak to support the findi ng bey ond a reasonable doubt, nor was the contravening evidenc e so strong that the State could not have proved it be y ond a rea sonable doubt. We conclude that the e vidence was fa ctually

sufficie nt to support appellant’s convic tions for felony murder. I n his fourth point of err or, appellant contends that the evidence that he committed
an a c t in the c ours e of

and in furt

he ra nc e of the c omm iss ion of fe lony dr ivi ng wh ile int oxic a te d w ith a child passe ng er w as leg ally insufficient. For felony murder, Texas Penal C ode sec tion 19.02(b)(3) require s that a person commit or attempt to commit a felony , and “ in the course of and in furtherance of the c omm iss ion

or a tte mpt
. . . he c omm its or

a tte mpt s to c omm it a

n a c t c le arl y

da ng e ro us to human life that c auses the death of a n individual.” Id. § 19.02(b)( 3) (e mphasis added) . Appellant
argue s th a t th e State fa ile d to pr ov e that hi s a c t of dr ivi ngint o th e on c omi nglane of tr a ff ic wa s “ in further ance ” of the felony DWI with a child passeng er. The court of criminal appea ls has rejected appellant’s a rg ument. I n J

oh ns on v . S

tat e , the def endant wa s char g ed with f elony murder, and the indictment a lleg ed that he “c ommitt ed the10

fe lony of fe ns e of I nju ry to a Chi ld ‘ and

in t he c ours e of and fur th eranc e of c omm iss ion

of sa id of fe ns e , d id t

he n a nd the re c omm it an a c t c le arl y da ng e ro us to human lif

e , to -w it: hittin g [the vic tim ] with a deadly

wea pon, to-wit: a blunt object.’” Johnson , 4 S.W .3d at 254. The court reje cted the
same argume nt u

rg e d b y a pp e lla nt h e re and

c on c lud e d th a t th e de fe nd ant’ s a c t of hittin g the vic tim with a dea dly

wea pon was c ommitt ed in the cour se o f an d i n furtheranc e of the felony offe nse of injury to a child and, f

urther, that there w as no merg er of the of fe n s es, t he primar

y conce rn of the “cour se and f

urthera nce” require ment. Se e id . at 25 8; se e als o Lo ma xv . S tat e , N o. 10 -0 3- 00 15 6- CR, 2006 Tex. App. L EXI S 2527, at *13-14 (Te x . App.—Waco Mar. 29, 2006, pet. g rante d) (spe eding was in the c ourse of

and in furthe ranc e of f

elony DWI ). B ased on the rec o rd in this case, a f act fi nd e r c ou ld r a tio na lly

have fo un d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t that

a pp e lla nt c omm itt e d a

n a c t “ in the c ours e of

and in f ur the ra nc e of ” the fe lony

DWI wi th a c hil d p a sse ng e r b y

dr ivi nga he a vil y loaded ve hicle towing a l oaded tr ailer a cross the c enter stripe of a

roadw ay into oncoming tra ffic. We conclude the evidenc e wa s leg ally sufficie nt to support appellant’s convic tions for felony murder. We ove rrule a

ppellant’s third and f

ourth points of err or.
Te sti mony o f D PS C he mist I n h is f if th po int of e rr or , a

pp e lla nt c on te nd s that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a llo wi ngDPS
c h e m i s t C h a r l e s M o t t t o t e s t i f y c o n c e r n i n g a p p e l l an t ’ s b l o o d

- a l c o h o l c o n c e n t r a t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y, he complains that it wa s err or to a dmit Mott’s testimony conce rning the conver sion of appellant’ s
serum-a lcohol level to a blood-a lcohol level and r e tr og rade extrapolation beca use this testimony

was not reliable.11 “ I f s c ie nti fi c , te c hn ic a l, o r oth e r spe c ia lize d kno wl e dg e wi ll a ssi st the tr ie r o f f a c t to understand the evidenc e or to de termine a fac t in issue, a witness qualified a s an expert by knowledg e, skill, ex perie nce, training , or education may testify there to in the form of an opinion or oth e rw ise .” Te x. R. E vid . 7 02 . We re vie w a tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g on

the a dmi ssi bil ity

of sc ien ti fic expert testimony

under a n abuse of discretion standa

rd. Ru sse au v . S

tat e , 1 7 1 S. W. 3 d

8 7 1 , 8 8 1 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); W

e ath e rre d v . S

tat e , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The propone nt of scientific e vidence must demonstrate to the trial court, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that the scientific evidenc e is r eliable. The proponent of ‘ hard’ scientific k n o wl edg e must satisfy three criter ia to demonstrate r eliability : (1) the underlying sc ientific theory is valid; (2) the t ec h nique applying the theory is valid; and, (3) the technique was prope rly applied on the oc casion in question.
Russeau , 1 71 S.W. 3d

a t 88 1 ( int e rn a l f

oo tno te omi tte d) ; se e als o Ke lly v . S tat e , 824 S.W .2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

Mott, a chemist with 39 y ear s of experienc e at DPS, testified that he teste d appe ll ant’s blood collecte d afte r t he accident, converting the serum- blood test results to a blood-alcohol c ontent in acc ordanc e with ac cepte d scientific pr inciples. Mott also testified to the known fac t o rs t h at he too k i n t o a c c o u n ti nh i s r e t r o g r a d e e xtr a p o l a t i o n , w h i c h w e r e a l s o c o n s i s t e n tw i t h s c i e n tif ic sta nd ard s. Retrog ra d e ex trapolation is the computation bac k in time of the blood-alcohol le ve l—t hat is, the e sti ma tio n of the blo od -a lc oh ol l e ve l a t th e tim e of dr ivi ngba se d o n a

te st r e su lt from some later time. Ma ta v . S tat e , 46 S.W .3d 902, 908-09 (Tex
. Crim. App. 2001). I n Ma ta , the court of c riminal appea ls set out the various fa ct o rs a trial court should consider in e valuating the
r e l i a b i l i t y o f a r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a

p o l a t i o n . T o o b t a i n a d m i s s i o n o f r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a

p o l a t i o nt e s t i m o n y,12

the pr op on e nt o f t

he te sti mony

mus t pr ov e by

c le ar a nd c on vin c inge vid e nc e that th e te sti mony is rele vant and r eliable. State v. Me drano , 12 7 S. W.3 d 7 81 , 7 86 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); W eatherred , 15 S.W .3d at 542.

I n deter mining whe ther retrog rade extrapolation e vidence is reliable, the tr ial court should consider (a ) the le n gth of time betwee n the offe nse and the test(s) administere d; (b) the
numbe r o f t e sts g ive n a

nd the le ng th o f t ime be tw e e n e a c h te st; and (c ) wh e the r, and to w hat e xten t,
any ind ivi du a l c ha

ra c te ri sti c s o f t

he de fendan t were know n to the e xpe rt in p ro vid inghis extrapolation. Ma ta , 46 S.W .3d at 916. These char acte ristics and behavior s might include, but are not limi ted to, the per son’s weig ht and g ender , the person’ s ty pical drinking pattern a

nd toleranc e for a lcohol, how much the pe rson had to drink on the da y or nig ht in question, what the person dr ank, the duration of the period of drinking , the time of the last drink, a nd how much and w hat the per son had to eat. Id
. Appell an t co n tends that Mott knew some of the f actor s but not others and that the testimony was ther efor e unre liable. Our revie w of the rec ord re veals that Mott explained the use of retrog rade extrapolation in a clea r and unde rstandable matter. He testified that he h ad pra ctical
e xpe ri e nc e in c a lc ulatin g a lc oh ol c on c e nt r a tio n u sin g thi s ty

pe of ana ly sis , h e e xpla ine d th e sc ie nti fi c the or ie s und e rl y ingthe ana ly sis , an d he de mon str a te d an un de rs tand ing of the me tho do log ie s of i ts application. The Mata c ourt re c og nize d th a t “ no t e ve ry sin g le pe rs on a l fa c t a

bo ut t he de fe nd ant m

us t be known to the expert in or der to pr oduce an extrapolation w ith the appropr iate level of re liability .” Ma ta , 46 S
. W
. 3 d at 9 1 6 . The c ourt conc luded that more limited knowledg e of the fac tors might
su ff ic e wi th m or e tha

n a sin g le te st:13

I f the State ha d more than one test, eac h test a re asonable leng th of time apar t, and the first test wer e conducte d within a rea sonable time f rom the time of the off

ense, then an expert could pot entially cre ate a reliable estimate of the def endant’ s Blood Al c oh ol C on te nt w ithlim ite d k no wl e dg e of pe rs on a l c ha ra c te ri sti c s and

be havio rs . Id
. I n th is c a se , b loo d te sts we re pe rf or me d o n a pp e lla nt a t 9: 58 p. m. a

nd 11 :35 p. m. Mott testified t o his analy sis in establishing appe llant’s blood-alcohol c ontent based upon the blood draw s, and that the samples showed a blood-alcohol content of 0.227 and 0.19. Mott also testified that he has be en tra ined to conver t alcohol levels de rived from a serum sample to a blood-alcohol level that conf

orms to the leg al def

inition of blood-alcohol content. He testified that the alc ohol
conce ntration from a

serum sample is appr ox imately 1 8 p er ce n t highe r than the blood-a lcohol
conce ntration from a

whole-blood sample taken fr o m t h e s am e per son at the same time. He acknow ledg ed that ther e is some dispute in the scientific c ommunity about the ac cepte d value that should be used in the conversion. I n addition to the t ests, Mott also knew a ppellant’s ag e, we ight and heig ht, when appe llant last ate, and what appellant drank. Ba sed upon his review of appellant’ s response s rec orded in hospit al records showing appellant’s l ast consumption of food and dr ink and the two blood tests, Mott concluded that at the a pproxi mate time of the a cci d en t , appellant ha d a blood-alcohol c ontent of 0.25.

On cr o s s -ex amination, Mott ag ree d that he did not know appe llant’s “drinking pat te r n s , ” w h e n h e b e g an dr ink in g th a t d ay , o r w h a t h is to le r an c e f o r a lc o h o l w a s , and that information Mott took from medical recor ds that appellant last consumed food at 7 p.m . and had a few beer s prior to the acc ident might not pr ovide compre hensive information. Mott testified that appellant’ s blood-alcohol leve l far e x cee ded the leg al limit, t esting 0.227 on one test and 0.191 on14

a sec ond test. Ba sed upon his analy sis of t he information provided in the medic al re cords a nd the blo od -a lc oh ol t e sts , M ott

c on c lud e d th a t a

pp e lla nt w a s in the e lim inatio n, or

po st- a bs or pti on , p ha se of consumption at the time of the acc ident. Acc ording ly , Mott c oncluded that it would not have be en po ssi ble fo r a

pp e lla nt t o h a ve ha d a

blo od -a lc oh ol c on te nt b e low the le g a l li mit

of 0. 08 a t th e tim e of the a ccide nt. Given that t h e ch em i s t k n ew the r esults of the tests taken a rea sonable time af

ter appellant ex perie nced the acc ident and knew sever al of appellant’ s releva nt char acte ristics, the trial
c ourt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in ove rr uli ng a pp e lla nt’ s obje c tio n to th e e vid e nc e . We ov e rr ule appellant’ s fifth point of err or.
Me dic al R e c ords and

Blo od -A lc oho l T

est R esult s I n his six th point of error , appellant c ontends that the t ri al co u rt err ed in admitting
me dic a l r e c or ds fr om t

he ho sp ita l and

the re su lts of a

pp e lla nt’ s b loo d- a lc oh ol t e st b e c a us e the State failed to c onnect the r ecor ds and t he test results to appellant. A tria l court’s ruling in the admission of e vid e nc e is c omm itt e d to the c ourt ’s so un d d isc re tio n, and we wi ll n ot d ist

ur b th e ru lin g un le ss it falls o u t s i d e the zone of r easona ble disag ree ment. Ra nk

in v . S tat e , 9 7 4 S. W. 2 d

7 0 7 , 7 1 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1996).

Th e ob je c te d- to me dic a l re c or ds we re of fe re d int o e vid e nc e a lon g wi th a n a ff ida vit
aver ring that they wer e busi ness re cords. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(10). At trial, appellant objected that the re cords we re he arsa

y , not authentic, and the re w as no ch ai n of custody established for

the
re c ords. App ellan t r a ise d s imi lar o bje c tio ns to t he State ’s int

ro du c tio n o f t

he blo od -a lc oh ol t e st results. The tria l court over ruled the obje ct i o n s . On appea l, appellant asse rts that there was no evidenc e conne cting the re cords or the test results to appellant. Be cause appellant’ s objection to the15

trial court fa ils to comport with his argument on appea l, he has not pre serve d the issue. See Te x. R. App. P. 33.1(a). We ove rrule a ppellant’s six th point of error
. CO NC LU SION There are six judgme nts befo re us, one for e ach of the three counts in the two ind ic tme nts
. We a ff

ir m the tw o jud g me nts c on vic tin g a pp e lla nt of c ount on e fo r fe lony mur de r i n both indictments. W e re verse the four r emaining judgme nts convicting appellant of counts two and thr e e for in toxic a tio n ma ns la ug hte r a nd mans la ug hte r i n b oth

ind ic tme nts , a

nd we dis mis s th os e
c ounts
.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Dismissed in Part Filed: Oc tober 4, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh