United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

D.K., Appellant

and

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, 

Jacksonville, FL, Employer

__________________________________________

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Docket No. 17-0115

Issued: June 1, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On October 25, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 6, 2016 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional or 

physical condition due to factors of her federal employment.

FACTUAL HISTORY

On May 1, 2015 appellant, then a 51-year-old claims examiner, filed an occupational 

disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she developed accelerated essential hypertension, anxiety, 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

headaches, and panic attacks due to factors of her federal employment. She attributed her 

conditions to major computer problems, as well as telephone headset problems, while performing 

both her job duties and those of her coworkers due to short-staffing.

In a development letter dated May 4, 2015, OWCP requested additional factual and

medical information from appellant. It afforded her 30 days to respond. 

Appellant submitted an April 24, 2015 memorandum addressed to her supervisor. She 

noted that, on March 18, 2015, she experienced headaches, dizziness, light-headedness, and panic 

attacks while trying to meet a deadline. Appellant left work to seek medical treatment. She 

informed her supervisor on March 19, 2015 that she was hospitalized due to high blood pressure, 

stress, and anxiety. Appellant attributed her conditions to her employment. She noted, “All of the 

computer problems/mouse problems/indexing mail problems/telephone headset problems, 

specially assigned job duties (TSA project and POWER case reviews) and being assigned other 

coworkers work caused me great stress and started to aggravate some of my physical conditions 

which caused me pain and further aggravated my stress levels.”

On March 12, 2015 Dr. Jason Schmotzer, a clinical psychologist, noted that he examined 

appellant on April 2, 2015 due to her severe anxiety with panic attacks and associated symptoms 

of high blood pressure, dizziness, headaches, and cognitive decline. He opined that work stressors 

caused and aggravated her conditions. In a report dated April 17, 2015, Dr. Schmotzer diagnosed 

adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood and anxiety disorder. He attributed 

appellant’s conditions to work stressors.

In an April 19, 2015 narrative statement, appellant’s supervisor asserted that appellant’s 

computer, indexing, and telephone headset problems were addressed immediately. Appellant was 

asked to call the help desk to report computer issues and was directed to leave her mail alone until 

the problem was resolved as “timeliness of mail indexing is no longer a part of her standards but 

a part of her duties.” Her supervisor noted that, while some actions were prompted by mail, 

appellant could work off her other reports and conduct a case file review. She noted, “When 

indexing mail, if the computer skipped a document or documents, it/they would remain unreviewed 

and merely change order in the rotation and she was still able to perform her expected duties. This 

did not create more work as [appellant] could index the documents once they reappeared in her 

unreviewed mail.” The supervisor reported that appellant’s headset problems were resolved by 

issuing her another headset. She denied any staffing shortages since 2013, or that appellant was 

singled out or subjected to special projects, tasks, or deadlines. The supervisor noted that extra 

tasks typically consist of reassigning work for coworkers using scheduled leave for periods from 

two to five days. For coworkers on scheduled leave, all tasks were equally distributed among the 

remaining team, which consists of nine claims examiners total on a rotational basis. She denied 

that appellant was assigned any extra work projects and that Protecting Our Workers and Ensuring 

Reemployment (POWER) cases and “TSA updates” were routine, normal duties. The supervisor

also denied that appellant was given more responsibilities than coworkers and asserted that 

workload requirements and deadlines were universal for all claims examiners.

On April 27, 2015 appellant again alleged computer and mail indexing problems as well 

as telephone headset problems. She also noted that computer issues caused her to repeat actions 
3

two or three times which made it harder to keep up with her work. Appellant asserted that her job

became increasingly stressful until she was mentally unable to perform it.

In a May 14, 2015 narrative statement, appellant advised that her condition developed from 

January through March 18, 2015 when she stopped work. She attributed her condition to 

technological problems with her telephone and computer. Appellant was unable to index mail and 

move around within individual documents in case files. This required extra work and took more 

time for completion. Appellant was required to repeat actions three or four times increasing the 

amount of time spent. She opined, “This made my review of cases more involved requiring me to 

do double work and my tasks started to back up on me. This was very stressful to me.” In e-mails 

dated January 29 and February 27, 2015, appellant sought technological aid from the help desk 

due to computer and headset issues. On March 10 and 11, 2015 she informed her supervisor of 

her technological issues. Appellant noted that she was stressed and that her mail was beyond five 

days. She also noted that personal identifiable information (PII) was impossible to complete 

accurately when her computer would not index properly. Appellant alleged that she was 

overwhelmed by copy requests.

Appellant also indicated that her telephone headset was not functioning properly and that 

she was required to use the handset resulting in increased pain in her left arm and neck from 

repetitive use. She asserted that more than half of the telephone bank unit was out of the office 

and that there were only three customer service representatives when there once were eight. 

Appellant submitted a list of unit assignments which indicated that customer service had five 

vacancies within nine positions. Vacancies in the telephone bank required her to fill-in and leave 

her duties for three and a half hours. Appellant was assigned to work on the telephone bank 

without a working headset on January 13, via a January 9, 2015 e-mail; January 29, 2015 via a 

January 22, 2015 e-mail; and February 12, 2015. She was assigned to the telephone bank on 

February 27, 2015, but spent time with the help desk. Appellant received a working headset on 

March 3, 2015 according to an e-mail of that date. Until that point she used her handset. Appellant 

noted that, as time went on, she received e-mails from her supervisor regarding the timeliness of 

her work and on March 18, 2015 she developed headaches, dizziness, light-headedness, and panic 

attacks while trying to meet a deadline.

Appellant alleged that her job was demanding and that she felt stress in completing her 

daily assigned tasks, which was increased by computer and telephone technical difficulties. She 

received specially assigned duties of TSA project and POWER case reviews and was required to 

perform the work of coworkers who were on leave, which made it difficult to complete her own 

assignments. Appellant submitted a January 22, 2015 e-mail from her supervisor regarding the 

TSA case requesting a plan of action and an update by the end of the day. On January 29, 2015 

her supervisor requested review of a case for high physical therapy costs to be completed by 

February 2, 2015. Appellant submitted February 11 and 24, 2015 e-mails regarding requests for

updates of POWER reports in four cases, which were due by the close of business on 

February 24, 2015. She noted that the employing establishment was short-staffed in January 2015 

and that coworkers were utilizing leave. Appellant listed the coworkers duties’ she was assigned

from January 30 through March 9, 2015. She asserted that these additional activities were very 

stressful given her difficulties with technology. On February 2, 2015 appellant received an 

assignment that had to be completed on that date which required her to “drop everything else I was 

doing in order to review” a case file. She found this stressful. Appellant received reminders of 
4

specific cases which had to be completed on January 15 and 22, 2015 as well as February 2 

and 24, 2015. She failed to complete a case by February 2, 2015 as required by her standards and 

on February 4, 2015 her supervisor indicated that it must be completed by the close of business. 

This deadline was stressful due to her computer problems. 

Appellant also explained that technological problems kept her from timely reviewing case 

records for copy requests which then had to be submitted to the fiscal office for duplication and 

then submission to the claimants. As her technological difficulties resulted in her failure to timely 

identify the copy requests in order to meet the deadlines, appellant, as the claims examiner, had to 

review case records for PII and ensure that each case record page was properly associated with the 

requesting claimant, rather than the fiscal officer performing this additional duty. Appellant 

alleged that this additional job requirement, caused by her computer problems, resulted in 

additional work and caused her stress. Furthermore, her computer difficulty added to the time and 

attention required to complete the PII identification. Appellant indicated that she performed PII 

review on January 21, February 5, 9, 11, and 27, and March 4 and 6, 2015.

Appellant alleged that there were general computer outages or slowing on January 28, 

February 27, March 10 and 11, 2015. She alleged that these periods of forced reduced productivity 

caused her stress as she was unable to work on the items that she knew she had to complete. To 

complete all assigned tasks, appellant had to work more than eight hours a day for 27 days between 

January 11 and March 17, 2015. She asserted that she had a “strict deadline” to complete a case 

involving an investigative memorandum on February 4, 2015, but due to her technological 

difficulties she had problems meeting this deadline. Appellant submitted an e-mail from her 

supervisor.

In February 27 and March 11, 2015 e-mails, appellant reported difficulties indexing mail. 

When she had multiple documents for indexing, every other document was skipped and the 

programming did not allow her to return to the same case. This caused double and triple work. 

Appellant’s computer required repetitive actions to complete an entry and she was repetitively 

required to pick up a telephone receiver. This caused pain in her wrists, neck, shoulders, arms,

and hands. 

Appellant responded to her supervisor’s statement on June 1, 2015. She noted that her 

telephone headset issue was not resolved from January 29 through March 3, 2015, while the 

computer and indexing mail problems were ongoing as of March 18, 2015 when she stopped work. 

Appellant again explained the consequence of an untimely identification of a copy request and 

noted how this impacted her workload. Due to her supervisor’s direction that she stop indexing 

mail as a result of computer problems, she had a large number of untimely copy requests that were 

very time consuming and stressful. Appellant also described other documents that she had to 

physically view, including return to work forms, requests for change of physicians, and requests 

to expand claims for additional medical conditions noting that these documents were not available 

through other reports. The inability to accurately access these documents and process mail as 

effectively as before her computer difficulties caused great stress. Appellant’s computer issues 

made every task more difficult and time consuming including reviewing all her cases, indexing 

mail, and copy requests. She never previously had this degree of technological difficulty,

including problems with her computer, mouse, and telephone headset from January 2015 through 

March 18, 2015. Appellant also asserted that she had increased telephone duties because of the 
5

staffing shortage in the telephone bank unit and that she had extra work due to her coworkers’

leave usage. She provided e-mails dated February 9, 2015 which showed that she was assigned 

two tasks from a coworker. On March 2, 2015 appellant was assigned to index a coworker’s mail 

on March 6, 2015 and her CA-110s on March 4, 2015. She also submitted her position description 

and her performance standards.

In a May 19, 2015 letter, OWCP requested that the employing establishment respond to 

appellant’s allegations. 

The employing establishment responded on June 17, 2015 and asserted that there were no 

staff shortages among the claims examiners and that appellant was not singled out to perform 

coworker’s duties while they were on scheduled leave. Regarding whether there were aspects of 

appellant’s job that could be perceived as stressful such as overtime, deadlines, quotas, or intense 

assignments, appellant’s supervisor noted that appellant was not given more responsibilities than 

her coworkers. She also asserted that there was a congenial work environment and that appellant 

was not required to work overtime, credit time, travel, or work with quotas imposed. The

supervisor denied that appellant had intense assignments or that she was subjected to special 

projects or tasks. She noted that deadlines were an inherent part of the job. The supervisor noted 

that appellant received a less than satisfactory performance appraisal in 2014, and for the first 

quarter review on February 13, 2015 appellant’s performance was at the needs to improve level 

for three critical elements. Regarding appellant’s allegations about copy requests, the supervisor

noted that appellant did not request assistance or inform her that she incurred a problem. She noted 

that, when indexing mail, if the computer skipped documents, these documents would remain 

unreviewed and merely change order in the rotation. The supervisor opined, “I sat with [appellant] 

at her desk while she indexed the mail and I observed that this did not create more work as 

[appellant] could index the documents once they reappeared in her unreviewed mail.” She advised

that appellant’s indexing problems were not specifically computer related, but instead due to the 

way appellant sorted columns which was unique and resulted in some unknown user error. 

Appellant’s supervisor indicated that appellant was assigned an investigative memorandum 

on January 21, 2015 rather than January 14, 2015 and it was due on February 5, 2015. She also 

asserted that the TSA and POWER cases were already in appellant’s assigned block and were not 

extra work projects. The supervisor indicated that appellant did not clear a case on February 2, 

2015 as directed and that the case was already 70 days old. By the follow up e-mail on February 4, 

2015, she advised appellant to take action on the case as it was 12 days over standard. Appellant 

could have acted on the case anytime on or after January 12, 2015, but she allowed the case to go 

over standard. The supervisor disagreed that appellant was required to work over eight hours a 

day, alleging that appellant chose to do so. She asserted that appellant was not organized and did 

not properly manage her time. In regard to appellant’s allegation that she worked more than eight

hours a day, her supervisor noted that appellant accumulated and used credit time or other leave 

during some of the days she listed, and that she worked long hours to accumulate leave. In regard 

to appellant’s duties in the telephone bank, her supervisor noted she had advance notice of her four 

telephone bank shifts and that she had less phone bank duty than her coworkers. She discounted 

appellant’s explanation of her telephone bank and headset issues, opining that appellant was not 

responsible for her telephone bank duties.
6

Appellant responded to the employing establishment’s contentions on August 4, 2015. She 

noted that she was not alleging error or abuse by the employing establishment in assigning work, 

but instead that computer and telephone problems overwhelmed her and made doing her work 

much more difficult. Appellant noted that she had informed her supervisor of her difficulties 

completing copy requests on March 11, 2015.

In an October 27, 2015 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s claim, finding that she had not 

established extra work assignments, increases in workload, excessive telephone headset trouble, 

or computer index trouble. It noted that the employing establishment quickly resolved the issues 

that appellant claimed. OWCP found that she had not established any compensable employment

factors.

On November 5, 2015 appellant requested an oral hearing with OWCP’s Branch of 

Hearings and Review, and on June 13, 2016, she submitted a narrative statement, noting that she 

was required to perform certain duties and that she provided proof that she performed these duties. 

She reiterated that she had documented computer and telephone problems which caused her to 

have more difficulties performing her everyday job duties. Appellant asserted that she was not 

required to establish that she had higher stress levels than other employees. She noted her 

difficulty in indexing and alleged that this made it very hard for her to meet the production 

standards. Appellant disagreed that her computer issues were self-generated and noted that her 

supervisor initially indicated that there were computer problems nationwide. She further noted 

that she believed that the customer service section was short-handed resulting in the requirement 

that she work more shifts in the telephone bank rather than her work unit which was understaffed. 

Appellant disputed that she worked without apparent difficulty and noted that the March 11, 2015 

e-mail requested help. She further asserted that her January 29, 2015 e-mail confirmed that a 

coworker attempted to help her and had the same computer difficulties. Appellant noted that she 

did not have computer issues prior to her holiday leave. She asserted that the problems occurred 

after January 12, 2015 and that her work methods did not change. Appellant noted that she was 

required to work on two TSA cases, that the employing establishment confirmed that she worked 

on these cases, and that under Board precedent this regular duty caused her to experience stress 

and anxiety in carrying out actions required to review these cases. 

Appellant testified during the July 14, 2016 oral hearing. She noted that she had worked 

as a claims examiner for 16 to 17 years. After appellant stopped work in March 2015, she returned 

on May 23, 2015 and stopped again on July 23, 2015. Appellant testified that the computer and 

telephone problems she experienced from January 12 to March 18, 2015 prevented her from 

performing some of her job duties within the severe time constraints set forth in her standards.

Appellant submitted an additional statement on July 19, 2016. She noted that she was 

assigned other coworkers’ tasks on six different occasions. Appellant had to perform PII reviews 

on case copy requests that she missed due to her computer problems seven times. She also noted 

that she was assigned to the telephone bank four times from January 12 to March 18, 2015. 

Appellant alleged that normally she would have to perform this duty once in three months. She 

documented computer issues seven times.
7

Appellant submitted an August 7, 2016 witness statement from V.P., a coworker. V.P. 

witnessed appellant’s computer issues beginning in January 2015. She noted that she personally 

had to review only one or two PII cases in the past several years.

By decision dated September 6, 2016, OWCP’s hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s 

October 27, 2015 decision. He found that appellant had not substantiated compensable work 

factors as causing or contributing to her physical or emotional conditions. The hearing 

representative determined that appellant had not established that she was overworked or forced to 

work outside of her regular hours.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative and substantial 

evidence, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the United States within the 

meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of 

FECA, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any disability 

or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment 

injury.3

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit: 

(1) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused or 

contributed to the claimed condition; (2) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an 

emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that 

the identified compensable employment factors are causally related to his or her emotional 

condition.

4

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

5

the Board explained 

that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition arising under FECA.6 There are situations where an injury or illness has some 

connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within coverage under FECA.7 

When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment duties and 

the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of 

employment. This is true when the employee’s disability results from her emotional reaction to a 

 

2

Id.

3 Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383, 388 (1994).

4 See L.H., Docket No. 17-1295 (issued November 22, 2017); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990).

5 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

6 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193.

7 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 136 (1999).
8

special assignment or other requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the nature 

of the work.8 In contrast, a disabling condition resulting from an employee’s feelings of job 

insecurity per se is not sufficient to constitute a personal injury sustained in the performance of 

duty within the meaning of FECA. Thus disability is not covered when it results from an 

employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force, nor is disability covered when it results from such factors 

as an employee’s frustration in not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold 

a particular position.9 

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.10 Where the evidence 

demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in discharging its 

administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable 

employment factor.11 A claimant must support his or her allegations with probative and reliable 

evidence. Personal perceptions alone are insufficient to establish an employment-related 

emotional condition.12

ANALYSIS

Appellant alleged that she sustained an emotional condition as a result of a number of 

incidents and conditions at work. The Board finds that she had established compensable factors

of employment. The Board has held that emotional reactions to situations in which an employee 

is trying to meet her regularly or specially assigned position requirements are compensable.13 The 

Board finds that appellant has established compensable employment factors with regard to her 

regular duties. Appellant alleged that she was required to meet deadlines as part of her regular 

duties. The employing establishment agreed that deadlines were part of her job. Appellant

asserted that she found these deadlines, from January 2015 through March 2015, to be stressful.14 

In K.H.,15 the Board found that the claimant was required to meet deadlines and was required to 

complete duties in a timely manner. The Board further found that these job duties were 

compensable factors of employment and that a supervisor’s efforts to aid an employee by 

 

8 Supra note 4.

9

Id.

10 Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004).

11 Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001). See Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 

566 (1991). 

12 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001).

13 See Tina D. Francis, 56 ECAB 180 (2004). See also Georgia F. Kennedy, 35 ECAB 1151, 1155 (1984); 

Joseph A. Antal, 34 ECAB 608, 612 (1983).

14 K.H., Docket No. 09-1651 (issued June 3, 2010); C.W., Docket No. 08-2557 (issued August 11, 2009) Karen A. 

Roulette, Docket No. 04-1007 (issued August 17, 2004) (finding that meeting deadlines when factually substantiated 

was a compensable factor of employment).

15 Id.
9

extending deadlines and assisting with the workload did not take the employee out of coverage 

under Cutler with regard to her regular and specially assigned duties.16 As in K.H., the Board finds 

that appellant has established a compensable factor of employment under Cutler in regard to her 

regularly assigned duty of meeting deadlines. 

Appellant also attributed her emotional condition to the requirement that, during the period 

January 2015 through March 2015, she was to review case records for PII prior to submitting the 

cases for copying. Appellant’s supervisor acknowledged that this was one of appellant’s duties. 

In C.S.,

17 the claimant, a nurse, attributed her emotional condition to specific job duties including 

supervising nurses, engaging in case management, reading reports, paying bills reviewing nursing 

care plans, and training, as well as insuring certification of contract nurses. The Board found that 

the claimant had alleged credible, specific aspects of her job duties that related to stress. The 

Board noted that conditions related to stress from situations in which an employee is trying to meet 

her position requirements are compensable.18 As in C.S., appellant has implicated specific job 

duties which caused her stress, reviewing case records for PII, and the Board finds that she has 

established a compensable factor of employment under Cutler.

Appellant alleged that she found working the telephone bank to be stressful. She further 

attributed her emotional condition to performing her coworker’s work when they used scheduled 

leave. Appellant’s supervisor did not dispute that appellant performed these tasks, but asserted 

either that appellant did not indicate difficulties in completing these tasks or that appellant was not 

treated differently in these assignments. In Beverly R. Jones,19 the claimant listed a series of 

employment activities and tasks which caused her emotional stress including feeling rushed, that 

she had no time to finish one thing before having to do three or four other things, that she had too 

many tasks to do at once and that she had difficulty concentrating on anything. Appellant claimed 

this was something she experienced every day. She claimed that handling business reply mail, 

when another worker was absent, was very hard for her to do because she was not given as much 

time to perform the work and she had to do other jobs as well. Appellant also claimed that it was 

very difficult for her to work the window, that it made her very nervous and that she had to work 

the window almost every day. The employing establishment indicated that the claimant in Jones

had no problems doing any of her assignments, and the Board noted in Jones that this can be taken 

to mean only that she did her assignments to her supervisor’s apparent satisfaction. The Board 

found that whether the claimant experienced stress or anxiety in trying to accomplish her regular 

and specially assigned duties was a different matter. The Board has held that conditions related to 

stress from situations in which an employee is trying to meet his or her position requirements are 

compensable.20 The Board further noted in Jones that the evidence was insufficient to establish 

that the claimant’s supervisor overworked her or pushed her too hard, but was sufficient to 

establish that she experienced stress or anxiety in performing her regular and specially assigned 

 

16 Id.

17 Docket No. 10-2266 (issued September 30, 2011).

18 Id.

19 55 ECAB 411 (2004).

20 Id.; L.D., Docket No. 15-1831 (issued September 21, 2016). 
10

duties. Under Cutler, the claimant established that her claimed injury arose from a compensable 

work factor.

In Karen A. Roulette,

21 the claimant alleged difficulty in performing her regular job duties 

as an OWCP claims examiner, including meeting deadlines, and performing back-up for a claims 

examiner on leave. The Board found in that case that it did not matter that other employees could 

effectively and successfully manage such tasks. When an employee experiences emotional stress 

in carrying out her employment duties, or has fear and anxiety regarding her ability to carry out 

her duties, and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from her emotional 

reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and 

in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability resulted from her 

emotional reaction to her regular or specially assigned work or requirement imposed by the 

employing establishment or by the nature of her work.22 The Board finds that like in Roulette, 

appellant has established that her regular or specially assigned duties of working the telephone 

bank and performing her coworkers’ work when they used scheduled leave are compensable 

factors of employment under Cutler.

Appellant’s supervisor disputed appellant’s allegations that she was required to work 

overtime, that her computer and telephone problems were not resolved in a timely manner, and 

that the employing establishment was short staffed. While the evidence in this case is insufficient 

to establish that appellant was overworked, the evidence is sufficient to establish that she related 

her stress or anxiety to performing her regular and specially assigned duties.23 Under Cutler,

appellant has established that her claimed injury arose from a compensable work factor. 

As the Board has found that appellant established compensable employment factors, 

namely the performance of her regular job duties of telephone bank, meeting deadlines, copy 

requests requiring PII review, and completing coworkers’ work when they were on leave, OWCP 

must base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence. OWCP found there were no 

compensable employment factors and did not analyze or develop the medical evidence. The case

is not in posture for decision and will be remanded to OWCP for this purpose.24 After such further 

development as deemed necessary, OWCP should issue a de novo decision on this claim.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for a decision.

 

21 Karen A. Roulette, supra note 14.

22 Phillip L. Barnes, 55 ECAB 426 (2004); Id.

23 See Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991) (conditions of employment encountered in performing 

regularly or specially assigned duties constitute employment factors under FECA); Lloyd C. Wiggs, 32 ECAB 

1023 (1981) (FECA does not require the showing of the occurrence of some unusual condition or event in the 

employment as a prerequisite for compensability). 

24 See Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496, 502-03 (1992).
11

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 6, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further development 

consistent with decision of the Board.

Issued: June 1, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board