T en n. C t

. A p p

. R

. 1 0 st ates: 1

T hi s C o urt , wi t h t he co ncurrence of al l judges pa rt i ci p at i ng i n t he case, m ay af firm , r e v e rs e o r m o d i f y t he
ac t i o ns o f

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s hal l not be ci t ed or r el i ed on f or a ny r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A pr il 12, 200 7 S es sio n
SMI TH COUNT Y, TENNESSE E, ET AL 

### . v. DAVE ENOCH
Appeal f rom the Chancer y Court for Sm ith Coun ty No. 6158 C. K . Sm ith, Chan cellor

No. M2006- 01007-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Ju ly 6, 2007

The ope rator of

an automobile junky ard in Smith Count y appea ls the per

manent injunction issued ag ainst him by

the Chancery C o u rt enjoining him fr om maintaining a n excessive number of ino pe ra ble ve hic le s w ith in o ne tho us and fe e t of a c ounty ro a d in vio la tio n o f the SmithCounty J unky ard Control Ac t, Chapter 97 of the Private Ac ts of 1987. The junky ard ope rator c ontends the evidenc e wa s insufficient to support the finding s and conc lusions of the trial court. F inding the evidenc e more than suffic ient, primarily due to admission s b y the oper ator of the junky ard, w e aff irm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.

Marc y E. Adcoc k, McMinnville, Tennesse e, and James B . Danc e, Cartha g e, Te nnessee , for the appellant, Da

ve Enoc h.

Jac k O . B e lla

r, Cart ha g e , T e nn e sse e , f

or the a pp e lle e s, Smit

h Coun ty , Te nn e sse e , an d SmithCounty Hi g hw ay De pa rtme nt.

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1

Smit h County

and the Sm i t h C o u nty

Hig hway Depa rtment (her einaf

ter c ollectively

the “County ”) f

iled a C omplaint for Temporar y and Perma

nent I njunction ag ainst Dave Enoch in 1997
se e kin g to e njo in h im f

ro m main ta ini ngan a

uto mob ile junky ard

and a uto mob ile g ra

ve y ard wi thi nAct of M ay 5, 1987, Ch. 97, 1987 T en n

. Pr i v
. Act s 192. 2

T he d ef i ni t i o n of “j unky ard” do es not s p eci f i cal l y m ent i o n a sp eci f i c num b er o f

ve hi cl es; how ever t he t erm 3

e n c o m p a sse s a n “a u to m o b ile g ra v e ya rd ,” w h ic h is d e fine d , in te r a lia , as the p rese nc e o f f i ve o r m o re ino p era b l e v eh i cles.

It is un d isp u te d tha t W a lter M o rr is R o a d is a c o u n ty ro a d in S m ith C o u n ty. 4

-2- on e tho us and

(1 ,0 00 ) f e e t of a c ounty ro a d in vio la tio n o f the Smit

h Coun ty Junk

y ard Con tr ol A c t, Chapter 97 of

the Private Ac ts of 1987 (the “ Act”)

. I n principal pa rt, the County

relied on Sec tion 2 4 of the Ac t which provides, “ No per son shall establish, operate, or maintain a junky ard, a

ny portion of wh ic h is wi thi n o ne tho us and fe e t ( 1, 00 0' ) o f the ne are st ed g e of the ri g ht- of -w ay of any

c ounty road de signated by

th e co u n ty

road de partment, . . .” The de finition of “junky ard” applies to an establishment keepingfive (5) or more inope rable vehicles. Enoch filed a n Answer

t o the 3 Complaint i n which he a dmitted that he owned the t hree parc els of l and that are the s ubject of the Complaint; howeve r, he de nied violating the Act.

The matter was first tried bef ore the Chance llor on J une 4, 1998, at the c onclusion of which the Cha nc e llo r h e ld the Ac t wa s unc on sti tut ion a lly va g ue and the County did no t hav e sta nd ingto enfor ce the Private Ac ts, from which a dverse ruling s the County appea led.

I n the first appe al, this Court concluded that the Act was not f acia lly unconstitutional a

nd that the County

had standing

. See Sm ith County v . Enoch , N o

. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 0 6 3

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 3 WL 535914 (Tenn. Ct. App. F eb. 26, 2003). A ccor dingly , the judg ment of the Chanc ery Court in the first appe al was r ever sed and r emande d for f urther pr ocee dings.

On re mand, the sole issue be fore the Chance ry Court was whe ther En o ch violated the Ac t by maintaining a

n impermissible number of inopera ble automobiles within the prohibited distance from a c ounty

road. D uring the sec ond trial of this matter, which hear ing was conducted on Februa ry 6, 2006, the County

introduced previous testimony and admissions made by

Enoch duringand prior to the first trial in 1998, wher ein Enoch admitted that ten or more disabled vehicles w ere located on his property

within one thousand (1 , 0 0 0 ) fe et of Walter Morr is Road, a county road. L ittle other 4 evidenc e wa s introduced at the second tria l, as the County prese nted no other e vidence of Enoch’ s violations, and Enoch did not introduce e vidence to contradic t his prior admission.

F o l l o w i n g t h e s e c o n d

tr i a l , t h e C h an c e l l o r

f o u n d t h a tt h e C o u n t y h a d

p r o v e d i t s c a s e b y a p r e p o n d e r an c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e an d g r an t e d t h e r e l i e f s o u g h t i n t h e c o mp l a i n t , s p e c i f i c a l l y a perma nent injunction ag ainst Enoch base d on his violation of the Act and the nuisa nce ste mming there from. This appe al followed.E n o c h a lso c o n te n d s: (1 ) h e sh o u ld ha v e b e e n a ff o rd e d a full h e a rin g a n d a n o p p o rtu n ity to a sse rt d e fen se s to 5 i n j u n ct i v e r el i ef

r el at ed t o ot h er pr oper t i es n ot a ddr es s ed i n t h e h ea r i n g h el d on Febr u ar y 6, 2006; a n d ( 2) t h e Cha n ce l l or faile d to fi n d the fac ts sp e c ia lly a n d to sta te se p a ra te ly i ts c o n c lus io n s o f l a w p rio r to e n te rin g the ju d g m e n t.
-3- Enoch c ontends that the C ounty failed to int roduce sufficie nt evidence at the sec ond trial, on F e bruar y 6 , 2 0 0 6 , to s u

p p o rt t h e f in d in g s o f

f a c t a n d c o n c lu s io n s ma d e b y

th e Ch an c e ll o r

. We 5 aff irm.

Th e sta nd ard of re vie w o f a

tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f

a c t is de novo and we presume that the fi nd ing s o f fa c t ar e c or

re c t unle ss the pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ); Rawlings v. John Hancoc k Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 7 8 S

. W

. 3 d 2 91, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). For the evidenc e to pre ponderate ag ainst a trial cour t’s finding of fa ct, it must su p p o rt another finding of fa ct with g reater c onvincing eff ect. W alk e r v . S idn e yGi lre ath & As so c s. , 40 S.W .3d 66, 71 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; The Realty Shop, Inc . v. R.R. W estminster Holding, Inc ., 7 S.W .3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Wher e the tria l court does not m ak e fi n d i n gs of fa ct, there is no pr e su mpt ion

of c or re c tne ss a nd we “ mus t c on duct our o wn ind e pe nd e nt r e vie w o f t

he re c or d to deter mine wher e the pr eponder ance of the e vidence lies.” Brooks v. Brook s , 992 S.W .2d 403, 405 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . We a lso g ive g re a t w e ig ht t o a tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio ns of c re dib ili ty

of wi tne sse s. Est a t e o f W a l t o n v. Y

oung , 9 50 S.W. 2d

95 6, 95 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; B &G C on str ., In c . v . P olk

, 37 S.W .3d 462, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I ssues of law a re r eviewe d de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness. Nelson v. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 8 S.W .3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999) . Mix ed questions of l aw and fa ct ar e subjec t to a differ ent standar d of re view. Bubis v. Black man , 435 S.W .2d 492, 498 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968).

On Fe bruar

y 6, 2006, the Chance ry

Court he ld a hear ing on the issue of whether Enoch wa s in v iol a tio n o f t

he Ac t w ithre g ard

to his ow ne rs hip of land c on ta ini ng imp ro pe rl y sto re d in op e ra ble
ve hic le s. Th e County

int ro du c e d in to evi den ce E no c h’ s 1 99 8 s ta te me nts c on c e rn inghis pr op e rt y loc a te d o n Wa lte r M or

ri s Ro a d. Th e tr ans c ri pt o f t he June 4, 19 98 e xch ang e is a s f oll ow s:
MR. DANCE: L et’s put in the re cord, do you ag ree y ou have g ot mor e than five inopera ble vehicle s 1,000 fee t of a c ounty road?
MR. ENOCH: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You have even g ot more than 10 inoper able ve hicles wit hin 1,000 fee t of a c ountry

road?
MR. ENOCH: Yes, sir.

Th e County

int ro du c e d n o a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e and En oc h did no t in tr od uc e any e vid e nc e to impeach or

contra dict the admission. Accor dingly , En o ch ’s owner ship and maintenanc e of a n automobile junky ard w ith more than 10 inopera ble vehicle s located w ithin 1,000 feet of a country road is undisputed.-4-

Section 4 of the Smit h County J unky ard Control Act provides, “N o person sha ll establish, operate, or maintain a

junky ard, a

ny portion of which is wit hin one thousand fe et (1,000' ) of the
near est edg e of the rig ht-of-w ay of any county road de signated by

the county

road de partment, . . .” The d e f in it io n o f “

ju n ky ar d ” in th e A c t a

p p li e s to an e s ta

b li s h me n t k e e p in g f

iv e ( 5 ) or more inopera ble vehicle s. Ba sed on the 1998 a dmissions by Enoch and the lack of

contra dictory

evidenc e, the Chance llor held:

The De fenda

nt previously

admitted that the conditi on of hi s proper ties violated the Pr ivate Ac ts a

nd oth e r a pp lic a bl e law s g ov e rn ingthe op e ratio n o f a uto mob ile junky ards within spec ific distance s o f county and state r oads. De fenda nt admitted his ow ne rs hip a nd

op erat io n o f t

he junky ard

and the vio la tio n o f t

he Pr ivate Ac ts beca use he had more than ten (10) junked automobiles within one thousand (1,000) fee t of a c ounty

road.

Ba sed on these f

indings, the Chanc ellor g rante d Smit h County the re lief it sought by or de ri ngthat:
Smit h County , Tenne ssee and the Smit h County Hig hway Depa rtment are g rante d a pe rm ane nt i nju

nc tio n a g a ins t t he defe nd ant f or any futur e vio la tio n o f t

he Pr ivate Acts. . . . De fenda

nt, Dave En o ch , is hereby perma nently enjoined and pr ohibited fr om es tablish ing , o pe ratin g or ma int a ini nga

jun ky ard , a

ny po rt ion of wh ic h is wi thi n o ne tho us and

(1 ,0 00 ) f e e t of ne are st e dg e of

the ri ght- of- wa

y of any c ounty road.

Smit h County , Tenne ssee, a nd the Smith C ounty Hig hway Depa rtment are g rante d
a perma nent injunction ag ainst the defe ndant to abate the nuisance stemming fr om the vio la tio n of the Pr ivate Ac ts.

. . . Purs ua nt t o s a id P ri vate Ac ts, the c ounty attorney and Smith C ounty

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment are authorized to assist the road commissioner in the enfor ceme nt of the Private Ac ts or any other a pplicable law

. The e vidence , which is u n co n t radic ted, fully supports the Chance llor’s finding s and conclusions that “De fenda nt by his ow n admission is in violation of the 1987 Private Ac ts, Chapters 95 a nd97

. . . g o v e r

n i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n o f a

u t o m o b i l e j u n ky ar d s

. ” H a v i n g f o u n d E n o c h t o be in violation of the Act, whe ther the violation per tains to one, two or thre e of the parc els of land he owned a nd upon which he ope rate d the junky ar d s , the Chance llor was author ized to enjoin future violations of the Act. “Acourt may enjoin violations of a statute whe re one violation has been found, if it a

ppear s that future violations be ar some rese mblance to the past violation or that a dang er of vio la tio ns in t

he futur e is t o b e anti c ipate d f ro m a c ours e of

c on du c t in th e pas t. ” 43 A C .J.S. Injunctions § 37 (2007); see N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co. , 312 U.S. 426, 436 (U.S. 1941) (holding the br eadt h of a

n in jun c tio n d e pe nd s u

po n “ the c ir c ums tanc e s o f e a c h c a se , th e purp os e be ingto preve nt violations, t he threat of which in the future is indicated because of t heir sim ilarity or re lation to those unlawful ac ts. . . .”).-5-

As fo r t he oth e r i ssu e s r a ise d, we fi nd the m to be wi tho ut m e ri t f or wh ic h o ur

ana ly sis is
u n n e c e s s ar

y.
The judgme nt of the trial court is a ffirme d, and this matter is r emande d with c osts of appea l assessed a g ainst Appellant, David Enoch.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CL EMENT, JR ., J UDGE