United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

R.P., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Capitol Heights, MD, Employer

__________________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Docket No. 18-1128

Issued: December 17, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On May 14, 2018 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 12, 2018 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of this case.2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish an emotional or 

physical condition due to a claimed January 11, 2018 employment incident.

 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2 The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence on appeal. However, the Board’s Rules of Procedure

provides: “The Board’s review of a case is limited to the evidence in the case record that was before OWCP at the 

time of its final decision. Evidence not before OWCP will not be considered by the Board for the first time on appeal.” 

20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). Thus, the Board is precluded from reviewing this evidence for the first time on appeal. Id.
2

FACTUAL HISTORY

On January 26, 2018 appellant, then a 60-year-old equal employment opportunity (EEO) 

specialist, filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that, on January 11, 2018, she 

sustained injury when N.G, an EEO manager, snatched a tub from her hands and dumped her 

personal belongings on the floor. She described her claimed employment-related injuries as 

“blood pressure,” “left arm,” and “anxiety.” Appellant stopped work on January 11, 2018.

Appellant submitted a January 11, 2018 statement in which she indicated that, on the same 

date, she was in possession of tubs which contained personal items she needed to move out of her 

worksite because it was undergoing renovation. She asserted that N.G asked about the items in 

the tubs and she advised N.G. that the tubs contained personal items. N.G. then claimed that she 

had a right to look through anything in the worksite and appellant asked her not to do so because 

the personal items in the tubsincluded notes she made about other jobs she held with the employing 

establishment. Appellant asserted that N.G. then looked through drawers in her worksite and 

indicated, after being asked what she was looking for, “Nothing, as the manager I am doing an 

office audit and I can look through anything I want.” N.G. then began to look through three tubs 

which contained appellant’s personal items and appellant reached out in order to pull the tubs near 

her. Appellant claimed that N.G. grabbed at the tubs and told her to “back up” in a menacing tone. 

N.G. then “snatched” a tub out of her hands and threw most of the items in the tub out on the floor, 

including a coffee mug that broke. Appellant asserted that N.G. stated, “Now pick it up” and then 

made the statement, “I said pick it up,” after she questioned the first statement. N.G. then 

“snatched up” a landline telephone that appellant was reaching for and appellant used her mobile 

telephone to call an employing establishment official who advised her to follow N.G.’s 

instructions. The record also contains another version of appellant’s January 11, 2018 statement,

which contains substantially the same information.

In a January 11, 2018 report, a postal police officer from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service 

indicated that appellant had provided a voluntary statement. It is unclear whether the officer was 

referring to either of the above-noted January 11, 2018 statements of appellant.

In a January 19, 2018 statement, A.G, a coworker, indicated that on January 11, 2018 she 

heard N.G. ask appellant what items were in her tubs and noted that, after appellant stated they 

contained personal items, N.G. advised that the office belonged to the employing establishment 

and that she was conducting an office audit. Appellant then pulled some tubs towards herself and, 

when N.G. grabbed the side of one of the tubs, appellant grabbed the other side of the tub, resulting 

in a “slight tug of war.” A.G. asserted that N.G. gave appellant a direct order to “let go” and then 

“flipped the tub over” such that the items in the tub fell onto the floor. N.G. then stated to appellant, 

“Now pick it up.”

In an undated statement, J.F., another coworker, noted that on January 11, 2018 he 

witnessed appellant and N.G. “arguing” about the contents of some tubs and about whether N.G. 

could look through them as part of an audit. He indicated that he walked away from where 

appellant and N.G were situated and then heard a loud noise, but he noted that he did not actually 

witness what had caused the noise.
3

Appellant submitted a February 13, 2018 report from Dr. Norman G. McKoy, an attending 

Board-certified family practitioner, who indicated that on January 11, 2018 he referred appellant 

for psychiatric treatment and noted that she was disabled from January 12 to March 4, 2018.

In a January 15, 2018 statement, N.G. asserted that on January 11, 2018 she appropriately 

conducted an office audit of appellant’s worksite and properly questioned her regarding items 

contained in several tubs. She noted that appellant asked her in a rude and unprofessional manner 

what she was looking for and she advised appellant that she was conducting an office audit and 

that the office belonged to the employing establishment. N.G. indicated that she bent down to pick 

up a tub and appellant pushed down on the tub such that she could not pick it up. She advised that 

appellant ignored her multiple requests to let go of the tub. N.G. asserted that appellant wrongly 

claimed that she threw items from the tub to the floor. Rather, the items fell to the floor when she 

let go of the tub because of appellant’s refusal to let go of it. N.G. indicated that she then told 

appellant to pick the items off the floor. N.G. offered to help appellant pick the items up after 

realizing that it was wrong to tell her to do so, but she refused her offer of assistance.

In a March 2, 2018 development letter, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional 

factual and medical evidence in support of her claim. In response, appellant submitted an April 5, 

2018 statement providing additional details regarding the events of January 11, 2018, which she 

believed caused the injury. She submitted an EEO official audit checklist, photocopies of 

photographs of her worksite, e-mails and other documents concerning the renovation of her 

worksite, and copies of previously submitted statements (other than her own) with her handwritten 

comments.

Appellant also submitted a February 8, 2018 report from Dominique Clark, an attending 

physician assistant, who discussed appellant’s treatment for psychiatric problems and provided a 

diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxiety. In a March 1, 2018 report, Gena Harmon, an 

attending licensed clinical professional counselor, detailed appellant’s psychiatric condition and, 

in a March 1, 2018 note, she found that appellant should be excused from work from March 5 

to 12, 2018. In a March 14, 2018 note, Dr. McKoy indicated that appellant was medically cleared 

to resume full-duty work.

In a March 9, 2018 statement, J.S., another EEO manager, asserted that N.G. acted 

appropriately in conducting an office audit of appellant’s worksite on January 11, 2018.

By decision dated April 12, 2018, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for employment-related 

emotional and physical conditions. It found that appellant had established that she was a federal 

civilian employee who filed a timely claim and that “the evidence supports that an incident you 

claimed occurred as described.” OWCP further found, however, that appellant’s claim was denied

because she had not established the medical component of fact of injury. Under the heading, 

“Accepted Event(s) That Are Factors of Employment,” in the “findings of fact” portion of the 

decision, it noted, “There are no accepted events that are factors of employment.” Under the 

heading, “Accepted Event(s) That Are Not Factors of Employment,” OWCP provided a summary 

of appellant’s account of the events of January 11, 2018 and a discussion, which purported to be 
4

its own account of the events of that date.3 Under the heading, “Incident(s) Alleged Which 

[OWCP] Finds Did Not Occur,” OWCP indicated, “There are no alleged incidents, which [OWCP] 

finds did not occur.” In the “legal analysis” portion of the decision, OWCP further noted, “Based 

on these findings, your claim is denied on the medical component of fact of injury because the 

medical evidence does not support that you have a medical condition in connection to the accepted 

factors of your employment. The requirement has not been met for establishing that you sustained

an injury as defined by FECA.”

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable 

time limitation period of FECA, that the injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as 

alleged, and that any disability or specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally 

related to the employment injury.4 To establish fact of injury, an employee must submit evidence 

sufficient to establish that he or she experienced a specific event, incident, or exposure occurring 

at the time, place, and in the manner alleged.5 An employee must also establish that such event, 

incident, or exposure caused an injury.6 These are the essential elements of each and every 

compensation claim regardless of whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an 

occupational disease.7

Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional reaction to his or her regular or 

specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability comes 

within the coverage of FECA.8 On the other hand, the disability is not covered where it results 

from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction in force or his or her frustration from not 

being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position.9 

When a claimant has alleged an employment-related emotional or physical condition, he 

or she has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused or adversely 

affected by employment factors.10 This burden includes the submission of a detailed description 

 

3 OWCP stated that N.G. had a right to view the contents of the tub as part of her audit inspection, and that appellant 

failed to follow the instructions of N.G. to release the tub.

 

4 5 U.S.C. § 8101(1); B.B., 59 ECAB 234 (2007); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143 (1989).

 

5

J.C., Docket No. 16-0057 (issued February 10, 2016); E.A., 58 ECAB 677 (2007). 

 

6

Id.

 

7 R.H., 59 ECAB 382 (2008); Ellen L. Noble, 55 ECAB 530 (2004).

 

8 Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976).

 

9 Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001).

 

10 Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987).
5

of the employment factors or conditions which he or she believes caused or adversely affected a 

condition for which compensation is claimed, and a rationalized medical opinion relating the 

claimed condition to compensable employment factors.11 If a claimant does implicate a factor of 

employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that 

factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of 

record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of 

the medical evidence.12

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.

Appellant claimed that she sustained emotional and physical injuries on January 11, 2018 

due to the actions of N.G., an EEO manager. She claimed that N.G. aggressively flipped over a 

tub she was holding, which contained personal items and ordered her to pick the items off the 

floor. OWCP denied appellant’s claim for emotional and physical conditions by decision dated

April 12, 2018, but the Board finds that there are deficiencies in this decision which require

appellant’s case to be remanded to OWCP for further development.

In deciding matters pertaining to a given claimant’s entitlement to compensation benefits, 

OWCP is required by statute and regulation to make findings of fact.13 The Federal (FECA) 

Procedure Manual further specifies that a final decision of OWCP “should be clear and detailed 

so that the reader understands the reason for the disallowance of the benefit and the evidence 

necessary to overcome the defect of the claim.”

14

 These requirements are supported by Board 

precedent.15

Given the above-described precedent, the Board finds that OWCP’s April 12, 2018 

decision does not contain adequate factual findings and/or recitation of the reason(s) for the denial 

of appellant’s claim. OWCP’s April 12, 2018 decision contains a number of inconsistencies which 

would prevent appellant from understanding the reason for the disallowance of the claim and the 

evidence necessary to overcome the defect of the claim.

16

In its April 12, 2018 decision, OWCP explained its denial of appellant’s claim by initially 

noting that appellant had established that she was a federal civilian employee who filed a timely 

 

 

11 Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993).

 

12 Id.

 

13 5 U.S.C. § 8124(a) provides that OWCP “shall determine and make a finding of facts and make an award for or 

against payment of compensation.” 20 C.F.R. § 10.126 provides in pertinent part that the final decision of OWCP 

“shall contain findings of fact and a statement of reasons.”

 

14 See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Disallowances, Chapter 2.1400.5c(3)(e) 

(February 2013).

15 See James D. Boller, Jr., 12 ECAB 45, 46 (1960).

16 See supra note 14.
6

claim and that “the evidence supports that an incident you claimed occurred as described.” OWCP 

then indicated, however, that appellant’s claim for compensation was denied because she had not 

established the medical component of fact of injury.

First, the Board notes that OWCP did not provide a clear explanation of what aspects of 

appellant’s assertions regarding the events of January 11, 2018 had been accepted as compensable 

employment factors. Second, other portions of the April 12, 2018 decision cast confusion over 

whether OWCP did, in fact, accept a compensable employment factor. For example, under the 

heading, “Accepted Event(s) That Are Factors of Employment,” in the “findings of fact” portion 

of the decision, OWCP noted, “There are no accepted events that are factors of employment.” 

However, it did not provide any further elaboration of its rationale for making this statement. 

Under the heading “Accepted Event(s) That Are Not Factors of Employment,” OWCP provided a 

summary of appellant’s account of the events of January 11, 2018 and a discussion which 

purported to be its own account of the events of that date. It did not, however, provide discussion 

of which aspects of these competing accounts of the events of January 11, 2018 were accepted as 

factual. Under the heading “Incident(s) Alleged Which [OWCP] Finds Did Not Occur,” OWCP 

indicated, “There are no alleged incidents which [OWCP] finds did not occur,” but it failed to 

provide an explanation for this statement. Given these above-noted statements, OWCP’s further 

discussion in the “legal analysis” portion of the decision does not provide meaningful clarification 

of its findings of facts or rationale(s) for denying appellant’s claim. It noted, “Based on these 

findings, your claim is denied on the medical component of fact of injury because the medical 

evidence does not support that you have a medical condition in connection to the accepted factors 

of your employment.”

For these reasons, the case must be remanded to OWCP for further development. Upon 

remand, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision regarding appellant’s claim for emotional and 

physical conditions, which contains adequate findings of fact and recitation of the reason(s) for its 

holdings. In producing this decision, OWCP shall describe in detail which aspects of appellant’s 

claimed employment factors it holds to be factual and which aspects of any factually established 

matters constitute employment factors within the meaning of FECA.

CONCLUSION

The Board finds that the case is not in posture for decision.
7

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the April 12, 2018 decision of the Office of Workers’

Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case is remanded to OWCP for further action 

consistent with this decision.

Issued: December 17, 2018

Washington, DC

Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board