### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A PR IL 22, 200 9 S es sio n
FR ED EUG ENE BR OOKS, SR . v. MA RY ELIZA BETH HAIM ES BR OOKS

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Tip ton County No. 23207 Mar tha Brasfield, Chancellor

No. W2008-02349-C OA-R3-C V - Filed August 24, 2009

Th is c a se inv olv e s issu es ari si ngou t of the pa rt ie s’ div or c e . Pr ior

to t he pa rt ie s’ marr ia g e , b oth Husband a

nd Wife owned sepa

rate resi d ences. I n its property division, t he trial c ourt found that during the par

ties’ marr iag e, Husba

nd ’s h o m e i n cre ased in va lue by $61,700.00, and the c ourt
awa rd e d e a c h p art

y on e -h a lf of the a pp re c ia tio n, or

$3 0, 85 0. 00 . T he tr ia l court fo un d Wife ’s ho me t o b e h e r s o l e an d s e p ar a t e p r o p e rt y, a s t h e v a l u e o f h e r h o m e d e c r e a s e d

d u r i n g t h e m ar

r i a g e

. F i n a l l y, the trial cour

t awar ded Wife $3,000.00 in attorney fee s to be paid by Husband. On appea l, Husband contends that Wife wa s entitled only to $9,000.00 of the incre ased va lue of Husband’s home–onehalf of the value of

an addition m ade to the hom e during the marriag e. Husba nd further claims that the trial cour

t erre d in failing to offset Wife’s a war d for de bts paid on her home dur ing the marria g e, and in its a

war d of attorney fee s. We r ever se the trial court’s awa rd to Wife, a

nd we a ffirm both the trial court’ s awa

rd of attorney

fee s to Wife, and its findingthat Wife’s home did not increa se in value during the par

ties’ marr iag e such that Husband could re cover a shar e of suc h incre ase.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the C hancery Court Affir med in Part and Reverse d in Part

A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined. J. Thomas Caldwell, Ripley, TN, for A ppellant Julie D. Byrd, Memphis, TN, for A ppelleeT en n esse e C o d e A n n o t ated sec t i o n 3 6 -4 -1 2 9 p ro v i d es: 1

(a ) In a ll a c tio n s fo r d ivo rc e fro m the b o n d s o f m a trim o n y o r le g a l se p a ra tio n the p a rtie s m a y stip u la te as to gro un d s and / o r d efen ses. (b ) T h e c o u rt m a y, u p o n stip u la tio n to o r p ro o f o f an y gr o u n d o f d ivo rc e p u rs u a n t t o § 3 6

- 4

- 1 0 1 , grant
a d ivo rc e to the p a rty w h o w a s le ss a t f a u lt o r, if e ithe r o r b o th p a rtie s a re e n tit le d to a d ivo rc e o r if
a di v or ce i s t o be g r an t ed on t h e g r ou n ds of i r r ec on ci l abl e di f

f erences, dec l ar e t h e par t i es t o be di vor ced, r at her t han awa r di ng a di vor ce t o ei t her par t y al one.

T h e tri al c o u rt also d i v i d ed v ario u s it em s o f p erso n al p ro p erty , i n clu d i n g v eh i cles, soc i al secu rit y b en efit s, 2 in v e stm e n t ac c o u n ts, an d a 4 0 1 K re tire m e n t ac c o u n t, w h ic h a re n o t su b je c t t o th is a p p e a l.

A c c o rd in g to W ife , W ife ’s fo rm e r H u sb a n d h a d a li e n a g a in st W ife ’s h o m e
. 3

-2- OP IN ION

I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
Fr ed Eug ene B rooks, Sr. (“H usb and”) and Mar y Eliz abeth Ha imes Br ooks (“Wife” ) (collec tively , “the pa

rties”) wer e mar

ried in May

1996 and sepa

rate d in J une 2005. The parties we re divorce d on September 15, 2008. N o minor children we re bor n to the marria g e.
At the time of the mar

riag e, both par

ties owned sepa

rate homes

. Du ri n g t h e marriag e, the pa rt ie s live d in Hus ba

nd ’s ho me . H us ba

nd ’s so n f ro m a pr ior marr ia g e liv e d in

Wif e ’s ho me re ntfre e for “quite a f ew y ear s,” and the n the home re mained vac ant for a pproxi mately

six y ear s.
After a trial, the Chanc ellor ente red a Final De cre e of D ivorce i n wh i ch she declar ed the pa rt ie s d ivo rc e d p ur su ant t o T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno ta te d s e c tio n 3 6- 4- 12 9, and div ide d th e pa

rt ie s’ 1
re a l pr op e rt

y
. Con c e rn ingWif

e ’s ho me , th e c ourt

fo un d a s f

oll ow s: 2

Pr ior to t he marr ia g e , the Wif

e ow ne d a ho me a t 32 74 Mari o St ., in M e mph is, Shelby County , Tenne ssee. The re wa s n o p ro o f as to the va lue of the home at the tim e of the marr ia g e . Sc ott

Ta y lor , a re a l e state a

pp ra ise r, a

pp ra ise d th e pr op e rt

y in Aug ust 200 7 , an d v a lu e d it a t $ 4 3 , 5 0 0

. 0 0

. A f te r th e p arti e s ma

r r ie d , a d e b t of $1 4, 00 0 to Te mpl e -I

nla nd Mo rt g a g e Com

pa ny and a de bt o f $ 7, 07 5. 26 , p ay a

ble to the W ife’s former husband, wer e paid with marital funds. During the marr iag e, the 3 Husband’s son lived in th e W i fe’ s home and pa id no rent. The H usband acknow ledg ed that this residenc e was in terrible shape when his son moved from the residenc e. The Husband testified that he made improve ments to the home, such as
re pla c ingthe ro of

, w hic h th e Wif

e dis pu te d. Mr . T ay lor

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e ho me-3-

wa s n ot i n g oo d s ha

pe and that it was lo cat e d in

an a re a of Me mph is w he re ho me v al u es an d

n ei ghb o rh o o d s we re d ec l i n i n g.
The Court finds t h at t he re sidence did not increa se in value dur ing the marria g e; there fore , there is no incre ase in value to divide betwee n the Husband and the Wif e . T he Court

fi nd s th a t th e Mari o St . p ro pe rt y is the so le and se pa ra te proper ty of the Wife.
The c ourt also made f

indings re lated to Husband’ s home. The c ourt stated that
Prior to the marria g e, the Husband owned a residenc e at 1069 Walnut R oad, Br ighton, Te nnessee . This became the mar ital r esidenc e. There was no mortg ag e on the re siden ce wh en t h e parties marrie d. The va lue as of July 26, 1989, was $61,300.00. Scott Tay lor appra ised this proper ty at $123,000.00 as of Aug ust 2007. Sub sta nti a l im pr ov e me nts we re ma de to the ho me duri ngthe marr ia g e and we re pa id for with mar ital funds. The Wife wa s a home-mak er dur ing most of the ma rriag e. She te nd e d to the ho us e , k e pt i t c le an, and he lpe d ma int a in it. Th e Court fi nd s th a t, since the ma

rriag e, the mar ital reside n ce h as i n cre ased in va lue in the amount of $61,700.00. Eac h party

is entitled to 1/2 of the increa se in the value of the mar ital residenc e, or $30,850.00. Finally , in the Final Dec ree of Divorce, the trial court required Husband t o pay $3,000.00 of Wife’s
a tto rn e y fe e s. Hu sb and

a pp e a ls.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED
Husband ha s timely

filed his notice of a

ppeal and prese nts the following issues, a s restate d, for our revie w:
1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in awa rding Wife $30,850.00 as her share of the incr ease d value of Hu sb and ’s ho me ;
2. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to offse t Wi fe’s share of Husband’ s home for Husband’s pa

y ment of her

$21,075.26 debt; and

3. Whe the r t

he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in re qu ir ingHu sb and to p ay $3 ,0 00 .0 0 o f Wi fe ’s a tto rn e y fe e s.
F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m in pa rt and re ve rs e in p art

.-4- III
. D I S CUS S I ON
A
. W i f e ’ s S h a r eo f H u s b a n d ’ s H o me On appe al, Husband a sserts t hat t he trial court erre d when it awa rded Wife $30,850.00 a s her sh are of the inc re a se in t

he mark e t va lue of

Hu sb and ’s ho me duri ng the marr ia g e . H us ba nd c la ims that Wife is en tit le d only

to $ 9, 00 0– on e -h a lf

of the va lue of

an a dd iti on

ma de to H us ba

nd ’s ho me during t h e m ar riag e. Husba nd points to t he testimony of re al estate appra iser Scott Taylor, who testified at trial that the 399 square foot bedroom and attache d bathroom addition incre ased the value of Husband’ s home by

$18,000. Husband seems to argue that Wife’s shar e should be limited to oneh a lf o f th e a d d it io n ’ s v a lu e , a s ma r k e t c o n d it io n s a c c o u n t f

o r th e r e ma in in g in c r e a s e in v a lu e

. We
acc ord g reat weig ht to a trial court’s division of marital a ssets. He rre ra v . He rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Theref ore, suc h division wil l not be disturbed “unless [it] lacks prope r evidentiar y support or re sults from some err or of law or misapplication of st atutory require ments and proce dures.” Id. (c i t i n g W ade v. W ade , 897 S.W .2d 702, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994))

. Our Supreme Court rejec ted this arg ument in El lis v . E lli s , 748 S.W .2d 424 (Tenn. 1988)

. I n El lis , the wife inherited a home and thirty -nine acre s during the par ties’ marr iag e. Id. at 425. The parties then move d into that home until t heir sepa ration ten y ear s later. Id. a t 42 6. At the pa rt ie s’ divorce trial, evidenc e wa s introduced showingthat the h u s band had pa id $5,344 towards improvements to the home and $2,200 towa rds re pairs on other buildings on the pre mises, and that he had pa id for items such a s tax es, insuranc e, utilities, and far m equipment and supplies. Id. A c c o r d in g ly , th e tr ia l c o u rt f o u n d th a t a lt

h o u g h th e h o me w a s th e w if e ’ s s e p ar a te p r o p e rty , the
a pp re c ia tio n o f t

he ho me duri ngthe marr ia g e –$ 51 ,7 00 –w a s mar ita l pr op e rt y su bje c t to e qu ita

ble division. Id. The Court of Appe als re v er s ed t h e trial court, finding that only $7,455 of the appre ciation s h o u l d b e considere d marital prope rty , “that beingthe sum that the husband had expended on improvements and r epair s on the [home] du ri n g t h e marria g e.” Id. The other appre ciation, ac cordin g t o the Court of Appe als, was due to inflation. I n reve rsing the Court of Appea ls, our Supreme Court stated: T.C.A. § 36-4-121( b)(1) clea rly states that “a

ny incre ase in va lue during the marria g e” of

such prope rty

shall be included a s marital prope rty subject to division. The wor d “any” is all inclusive and does not a llow a n exception based on inflation

. . . . The only condition imposed in the statute for tre ating any incre ase in va lue duri ng the marr ia g e a s mari ta l pr op e rt y is the pr ov isi on , “ if

e a c h p art y su bs tanti a lly contributed to its preser

vation and appr eciation.”

Id. at 426-27. B ased upon H usband’s $5,544 c ontributions towards the home’s improveme nts, our Supreme Court stated that “ the husband wa s entitled to share f ull y i n the whole a

pprec iation and value of the [home] during the marr iag e.”T h e p rop ert y a t i s s ue i n H ar r i s on i n creased i n va l u e fr o m $7 , 0 0 0 at t h e t i m e o f t h e p art i es m arri ag e to 4 $ 1 ,3 6 1 ,7 5 0 a t t h e ti m e o f th e ir d iv o rc e
. Id. a t 125.
-5- I n Har r i s o n v. Har rison , 912 S.W .2d 124 (Tenn. 1995) reh’g de nied (Jan. 22, 1996), our Supreme Court affirmed the El lis holding. I n Harrison , the Court ref used to allow the wife to share in t he inc re a se d v a lue of

he r h us ba nd ’s se pa rate pr op e rt

y , n oti ngthat it w a s und isp ute d th a t th e so le
c a u s e o f th e la

n d ’ s in c r e a s e d v a lu e w a s th e c o n s tr u c ti o n o f I n te r s tate 24. I d. at 125. The Court 4 found t h at W i fe had not substantially contributed to the prope rty ’s pre servation and appre ciation; howeve r, it noted that Application of the r

ule stated El lis to the fa ct s of this case would require the
c on c lus ion

tha t if the e vid e nc e pr ov e d th a t th e wi fe ha d c on tr ibute d s ub sta nti a lly to the pre servation and appre ciation in value, the entire amount of the incre ase in va lue would be mar ital property ; but, since the eviden ce d o es n ot show that the wife substantially

contributed t o t he pre servation or appre ciation of the pr operty , the i n c r e a s e i ni t s v a l u e i s n o tm ar i t a l p r o p e rt y.
Id. at 127.

I n the instant case , the t rial court found that Wife “tende d to [ Husband’s] house, kept it clea n, and helpe d maintai n i t

. ” Ba s ed upon this statement and its awa rd to Wife of one ha lf of the inc re a se d v a lue of

Hu sb and ’s ho me , w e fi nd the tr ia l c ourt

imp lie dly fo un d that Wif e su bs tanti a lly contributed to the pre servation and appre ciation of Husban d ’s home. The e vidence does not pr e po nd e rate a g a ins t thi s fi nd ing

. Th e re fo re , a pp lyingthe ru le fr om El lis , w e fi nd that any inc re a se in the value of

Husband’s home during the marr iag e, as a whole, bec ame mar ital property subje ct to equitable division.

Ho we ve r, ba se d on

the la c k o f e vid e nc e in t

his c a se re g ard ingthe va lue of Hu sb and ’s ho me at the time of the ma

rriag e, we cannot de termine the inc rea sed value of his home

. Specifica lly , we find as er ror, the tr ial cour t ’s use of a 1989 appra isal to value Husband’ s home at the time of the 1996 marria g e. The parties “had the burden of bring ing f orth evidenc e re g ardingthe value of marital assets, and the y

are bound by

the evidenc e they prese nt, or in this case, did not prese nt.” Blevins v. Ble v ins , No. M2002-02583-COA- R3-CV, 2003 WL 23094162, at *3 (Te nn. Ct

. A p p

. D e c . 30, 2003) perm. app. de nied

(T e nn . Jun e 14 , 2 00 4) . Alth ou g h “ the tr ia l c ourt is f re e to a ssi g n ma

ri ta l pr op e rt

y a value that is ‘within the rang e of e vidence submitt ed[,] ’” Id. (q u o t i n g Koch v. Koch , 874 S.W .2d 5 7 1 , 5 7 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 )) , we fi n d t h at t h e tr i al co u rt ’s v al u at i o nwa s n o t“w i t h i nt h e r an ge of evide nce submitted.” Without e vidence that the value of Husband’ s home rema ined uncha ng ed fr om 1 98 9 to 19 96 , u sin g su c h a re mot e a pp ra isa l r is ks all owing a

wi nd fa ll t o Wife. Be cause the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the t rial court’s finding that Husband’s home incre ased in va lue by $6 1, 70 0. 00 duri ngthe marr ia g e , w e re ve rs e its awa rd of on e ha lf of sa id i nc re a se , o r $ 30 ,8 50 .0 0, to Wife.H us band cl ai m s t he t r i al c our t f ound he p a id $ 2 1 ,1 7 5 .2 6 to w a rd s W ife ’s d e b ts; h o w e v e r, th e tria l c o u rt, in 5 f ac t , f ound t hat s uch debt s w er e pai d w i t h m ar i t al f unds

. -6- B. O ff se t of Awa rd fo r D e bt P

aid Next, Husband contends that the tri al co u rt erred in fa iling to offse t Wi fe’ s awa rd for the $2 1, 07 5. 26 de bt H us ba

nd c la ims he pa id t o “ pa

y of f” Wif e ’s home. Al tho ug h h is a rgume nt i s 5 unclea r, Husband se ems to argue that his contri b u t i o n s conver ted Wife’s home, or at least any incre ased va lue i n s u ch , i n t o marital prope rty . The c lassification of pr operty as either marital or separ ate pr operty

is a question of fa ct. Ferguson v. Ferguson , No. M2005-02 468-COA-R3-CV, 2 0 0 8 W L 4 2 5 9 4 5 , at * 2 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. Fe b

. 1 3 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Mi tts v . M itt s , 39 S.W .3d 142, 144-45 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 )) . T hu s, our r e vie w o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s c la ssi fi c a tio n is de novo with a presumption of cor

rec tness. Tenn. R. App . P . 13(d) (2008)

. Tenne ssee is a “ dual prope rty ” state, as our divorce statutes distinguish betwee n marital and separ ate pr operty

. See Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 856 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). T he first step
a tr ia l c ourt

mus t ta ke in d ivi din g a

mari ta l e state is t o id e nti fy a ll o f t he pa rt ie s’ pr op e rt

y int e re sts

. Ow e ns v . O we ns , 2 41 S.W. 3d

47 8, 48 5 ( Te nn . Ct . App

. 20 07 ) (c iti ng19 W. Wa lto n G a rr e tt, Tennessee Practice: TennesseeDivorce , Alimony and Child Cust ody § 15:2, at 321 (re v. ed. 2004))

. Next, the trial co u rt m ust classify the identified prope rty

as either marital or se parate. Id. (citing Flan na ry v . F lan na ry , 1 21 S.W. 3d

64 7, 65 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Conley v. Conley , 181 S.W .3d 692, 700 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 5) ; Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W. 2d 67 5, 67 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 99 8) ). “ Th is classification is an important threshold matter b ec au s e co u rts do not have the a uthority to make a distribution of separ ate proper ty .” Sum m er v. Sum m er , N o

. E 2 0 0 7

- 0 1 0 0 3

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 8 WL 990454, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2008), perm. app. de nied (T en n

. Oc t

. 2 7 , 2 0 0 8 ) ( ci t i n g Keyt v. Key t , 2 44 S.W. 3d

32 1, 32 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 7) ; Flan na ry , 121 S.W .3d at 650).

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-4-121 g overns the c lassification of pr operty as m a r ita l
o r s e p ar a t e , an d

d e f i n e s “ m ar i t a l p r o p e rt y” t o i n c l u d e : ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A )

. . . a l l r e a l an d p e r s o n a l p r o p e rt y, b o t h t an gi b l e an d i n t an gi b l e, ac qu i re d b y ei t h er o r bo t h s p o u s es d u ri n g t h e co u rs e of t h e m a rr i age up to the date of

the final divorc e hea

ring and owne d by either or both spouse s as of the date of filing of a c omplaint for divorce

. . . .

(B ) “ Mari ta l pro pe rt

y ” inc lud e s in c ome fr om, and any inc re a se in
va lue duri ngthe marr ia g e of, pro per ty de te rm ine d to be se pa

ra te pr op e rt y in a c c or da

nc e with su

bd ivi sio n ( b) (2 ) i f e a c h p art y substantially

contributed to its preser

vation and appr eciation . . . .

. . . .-7- (D) . . . “ substantial contribution” may include, but not be limited to, t h e d i re ct o r i n d i re ct co n t ri b u t i o n o f a s p o u s e a s h o m em ak er , wa ge ear ner, pa rent or family financ ial manag er, toge ther with such other fac tors as the c ourt having jurisdiction thereof ma y deter mine.

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-4-121 furthe r def ines “sepa

rate proper

ty ” as (2)( A) All real an d p ersona l property owned by

a spouse be fore marria g e . . . ; (B ) Proper

ty acquir ed in exchang e fo r p roperty acquir ed bef

ore the marria g e; (C ) I nc ome fr om a

nd a pp re c ia tio n o f p roper

ty ow ne d b y

a sp ou se befor e mar

riag e except when char acte rized as marital pr operty under subdivision (b)(1)[.] Thus, our statutes provide that “[a]ny incre ase in value during the marria g e of pr operty deter mined to be sepa rate proper

ty will be classified as marital pr operty if ‘ea ch par

ty substantially

contributed to its preservation and appre ciation.’” Sum m er , 2008 WL 990454, at *5 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (1 )( B ); Keyt , 244 S.W .3d at 328-29).

I n consideringwhether

Husband is entitled to a shar e of Wife’ s h ome, we must dete rmine whether Husband’s pay

ment of W ife’s de bts caused “ any incre ase in va lue” of

Wife’s home, such that the incre ased va lue bec ame mar ital property

. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6

- 4

- 12 1( b) (1 )( B) (2005) . “Our

courts have consistently interpre ted the phrase ‘any incre ase in va lue’ a s all inclusive.” Cohen v. Coh en , 9 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 8 2 3 , 8 3 2 (T en n

. 1 9 9 6 ) ( c i t i n g El lis v . E lli s , 748 S.W .2d 424, 426 (Tenn. 1988) ) (f

inding that be cause husband substantially contributed to home’s pr eser vation and appre ciation by

making improvements and r epair s, in c r e a s e d value due to inflation was also included
as a ma rital asset).

Our c ourts have acknowle dg ed two wa y s in which separ ate pr operty may incre ase in va lue d u ri n g a m arri age

. T h e fa i r m ar k et v al u e o f t h e p ro p er t y , i t s el f, m ay i n cr ea s e, fo r e x am p l e, t h ro u gh marke t con d i t i o n s , renovations or additions, or debts on the proper ty may be paid, suc h that the equity in the proper

ty incre ases. See id. I n this case, ther e has be en no proof reg ardingthe value of Wif e ’s ho me a t th e tim e of the marr ia g e

. Wif e te sti fi e d th a t sh e be lie ve s h e r h ome ha s d e c lin e d in value since the par

ties’ marr iag e due to its deter iorated co n d i t i o n. The a ppraiser , Scott Tay lor, valued Wife’s home at $43,500.00 a s of Aug ust 2007, and ac knowledg ed that it was located in an
are a of Me mphis where home values a nd neig hborhoods wer e declining

. The trial court found that Wife’s home did not increa se in value during the par ties’ marr iag e, and the ref

ore, that Husband wa s entitled to no interest in her home . Husband doe s not arg ue that Wife’s home inc rea sed in value during the marria g e. Be cause the fa ir marke t value of Wife’ s home dec rea sed duringthe marr iag e, Husband is entitled to no share of an inc rea sed fa ir marke t value.-8-

Despite the de cre ased f

air mar ket value of

Wife’s home, Husband could nonethele ss rec over a shar e of a

ny incre ased e quity

in Wi fe’ s h o m e i f he proves he substantially contributed to such.

“ Un de r o ur

state law, e qu ity

in s e pa rate pr op e rt

y that a c c ru e s d

ur ingthe marr ia g e is s ub je c t to div isi on a s mar ita l pro pe rt

y if the no n- ow ne r spo us e ma ke s a subs tanti a l c on tr ibutio n to the inc re a se in value.” Id. (c iti ng Te nn Cod e Ann. § 3 6- 4- 12 1( b) (1 )( B ); Harrison v. Harrison , 912 S.W .2d 124, 12 7 (T e nn . 1 99 5) ; El lis , 748 S.W .2d at 427). “Put simply , equity in rea l property is acquire d as the debt is reduc ed.” Cohen , 937 S.W .2d at 833. As we noted above , the value of Wife’s home at the time of the marria g e has not be en proven. L ikewise, the equity in Wife’ s home at th e t i m e o f t he marria g e is unknown. Be cause the fair marke t va lue of Wife’s home a lleg edly declined dur ing the marria ge, t h e equit y

in the home did not nece ssarily incre ase a s pay

ments towards e ncumbra nces wer e made . There fore , we f ind that Husband failed t o prove the equity “incr ease [d] in value during the marr ia g e ,” su c h that it be c a me mari ta l pr op e rt y su bje c t to e qu ita

ble div isi on

. Th e tr ia l c ourt did not err in de clining to a

war d Husband a

share of any

incre ased va lue in Wife’s home.

C. Att orney Fees On appe al, Husband c halleng es the trial c ourt’s orde r re quiring him to pay $3 , 0 00.00 towards W i f e ’ s a t t o r n e y f e e s

. A naw ar d

o f a t t o r n e y f e e s i s c o n s i d e r e d

a l i m o n y in solido

. Koj

a v . Ko ja , 42 S

. W

. 3 d 9 4 , 9 8 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( ci t i n g He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W. 2d

37 9, 39 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1996)). The decision of whether to a war d attorney fee s is w ithin the sound discretion of the trial court a

nd “‘w ill not be disturbed upon a ppeal unless the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst such a dec ision.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Kin c aid v . Ki nc aid , 912 S.W .2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 199 5 ))

. To de te rm ine wh e the r a

n a wa rd of a tto rn e y fe e s is a

pp ro pr ia te , the tr ia l court sh ou ld co ns ide r the same statutory fac tors used to deter

mine the propriety of an alimony awa rd. Id. ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121. “A spouse w ith adequate proper ty and income is not entit led t o an aw ard of alimony to pay attorney s fee s and expenses.” Id. (c i t i n g Umstot v. Umstot , 968 S.W .2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19 97 ); Duncan v . Duncan , 6 8 6 S. W. 2 d 5 6 8 , 5 7 3 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 8 4 ) )

. “ Wh e r e a s p o use has proper ty and income a dequate for he r nee ds, it may not be prope r for

the trial c o urt to make a n additio n al award of a limony in solido for pay

ment of the wife ’s attorne y fee s.” Id. (citations omitt ed ). Aw ards of

attorney fee s are appropr iate “‘ only when the spouse seekingthem lacks sufficie nt f

unds to pay

his or her ow n leg al expenses,’” Id. (quoting Br own v . B ro wn , 913 S.W .2d 163, 170 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)) , or would be f orce d “‘to deplete hi s or her resour ces in order to pay these e x penses.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Ha rwe ll v . H ar we ll , 612 S.W .2d 182, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980))

. Howeve r, whe n one spouse “ has bee n awa rded a dditional funds for maintena nce and s u p p ort and such funds are intended to provide the party with a source of future income, the pa rty need not be require d to pay

leg al expenses by

using a ssets tha t will provide for f uture income .” Id. (citing Batson v. Batson , 769 S.W .2d 849, 862 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988))

. Husband c laims that the trial court e rre d in awar ding Wife he r attorne y fees “b ec au s e the Wife had substantial assets of he r own from which to pa y her attorney .” Husba

nd does not specif

y-9-

the source of these “substantial assets.” I n awa rding Wife her attorney

fee s, the trial cour

t found as fo llo ws :
Duri ngthe pe nd e nc y

of thi s h e ari ng , th e Wif

e re c e ive d $ 94 1. 00 in S oc ia l Se c ur ity benef its and $850.00 in alimony per month. At present, these a re the only

monies that sh e is r e c e ivi ngand , a c c or din g to h e r t e sti mony , th e y do no t me e t he r e xpe ns e s. Th e Wif e wi ll r e c e ive su

bs tanti a l f un ds in t his div or c e de c re e , b ut s he wi ll h a ve to us e the se fu

nd s to pay for a pl a c e to l ive and a ne w v e hic le . Co un tin g bo th h is separ ate pr operty

and the mar ital property , the Husband will have substantially more money than the Wife. This Court finds that the Husband should be r equire d to pay $3 ,0 00 .0 0 o f t

he Wif e ’s a tto rn e y

fe e s. Finding no err or by

the trial cour

t, we af firm the aw ard of

attorney fee s to W ife.

IV. C ONCL US I ON
For the af oreme ntioned rea sons, w e aff irm the awa

rd of attorney

fee s to W ife, we reve rse the chanc ery court’s a war d of $30,850.00 t o Wife as her share of Husband’ s home, and we aff irm the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing tha

t Wif e ’s ho me did

no t in c re a se in v a lue duri ngthe marr ia g e . Co sts of thi s a pp e a l are ta xed

e qu a lly to A pp e lla nt, F re d Eug e ne B ro ok s, Sr ., and his sure ty , a nd Mary El iza be th H a i m e s B r o o k s , f

o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL AN E. HI GH ERS , P. J. , W .S.