# FILED September 9, 1996 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk IN THE COU RT OF A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE WESTERN SECT ION A T JA CKSON ELDRED L. REID, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Lake Circu it No. 95- 7282 ) VS. ) A ppeal No. 02A 01-9601-CV-000 16 ) JERRY STO VER & CHA RLES NOLES, ) ) Defendants/Ap pellees. )
APPEAL FROM THE CI RCUI T COUR T OF LAK E COU NTY

AT TIPTONVILLE, TENNESSE E THE HONORABLE JOE G. RILEY , JR., JUD GE

ELDRED L. REID, pro se Tiptonvill e, Tennessee

CHA RLES W. BUR SON At torney General & R eporter LI SA T . K IR KH AM Assi stant A

ttorney General Nashvil le, Tennessee Attorneys for Appellees

AF FIRMED

ALAN E. HIGHERS , J.

CONCUR: DAVID R. FA RMER, J. HOLLY K IRBY LIL LA RD, J.

Plai ntiff, Eldred Reid, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Northwest2

Correction al Center in Tip tonville , Tennessee. Plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that various officials at the correctional center violated his constitutiona l rights.
The events prompting plaintif f to file the present case are as follows. On May 30, 1995, a gang-r

elated incident

occurred at

the correct ional center in w hich sever al inmates
were injured. In order to maint ain control of the situation, t he warden , Jerry Stover, ordered a loc kdown of the correcti onal center. On July 26, 1995, another gan g-related incidentoccurred that

resulted in injury

to inmates. Ag ain, the war den orde red a lockd own of the correcti onal center.
Plaintiff filed a compl aint, alleg ing that the l ockdownsviolated his rig hts under the Due Process Clause, the Eq ual Protecti on Clause, and t he Cruel and Unusual Puni shment Clause of the Constitution.

Defendants moved for dismi ssal or in the alternativ e, for summary j udgment, on grounds that the lockdo wn did not r estrain plai ntiff’s freedom to such a deg ree as to create a liberty interest afforded due process prot ection. Defendants further ar gued thatplaintiff’s complaintshould have been dismissed for f ailure to clearlyset forth in the complaint that he sued defenda nts in th eir indiv idual capacit ies, rather than in their capacities as state officials. Finally, defendants asserted th at they were entitled toqualified immunity because they had no reason to know that their actions viola ted some cle arly est ablished ri ght of plaintiff.
Without opinion, the trial court gr anted defendants’ motion for summary ju dgment on all three of theabove gr ounds. This appeal followed.

Althou gh plaintiff has rai sed a myri ad of issues on app eal, we are constrained t o review only those issues that were raised i n the trial cour t. Simpson v. F rontier Communi ty Credit Union , 810 S.W.2d 147, 153 (Tenn. 1991). Con sequen tly, t he sole issue for our3

rev iewis wh ether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to plain tiff’s constitutional claims.

On appe al, we review

a trial co urt’s judg ment granting summary judg ment de novo

. In evaluatin g a motion for summa ry judgment, thi s court must t ake the strong est legiti mate view of the evidence in favor of the nonmov ant, allow

all reasonabl e inferences in fav or of the nonmo va nt, and discar d all counter

vailing evidence. Byrd v. Hall , 847 S.W.2d 208, 210-211 (Tenn. 1993). Summar y jud gment is appropri ate when the pleadings, deposition s, and affidavits show

that there is

no genuine is sue of material fact a nd that, therefore, the moving party is

entitled to j udgmentas a m atte r of l aw. Id. at 211. The facts of the pr esent case are virtually undisputed, which makes this case partic ularly appropriatefor resolutio n by summary

judgment.

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the Un ited State Code affords a civi l remedy for violatio n of constitutional rights. This section provides:

Every person who , under color of any stat u te, ordinance, regu lation, c ustom, or usag e, of any State or Territory

or the District of Columbia, subj ects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other per son withi n the jurisdict ion thereof to the dep rivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutio n and l aws, shal l be liabl e to t he party i njured in an ac tion at law , suit in eq uity, or other property proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Acco rdin gly, the plaintiff must es tablish that t he defendants, whi le a cting unde r color of state law, depr ived the pl aintiff of some right , privi lege, or immunity secured by

either the Constitution or other law of the United St ates.

We will first address plaintiff’s content ion that the loc kdowns v iolated his du e process rights.

A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision aban doned the analysis that had previously been employed in determining whether a state has created a protected li berty interest for prisoners. Sandin v. C onner , 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). In Sandin , the C ourt set forth the4

current standard as follows:

[T]hese [liberty] interests will be generally limit e d to freedom from restraint which, while not exceedi ng the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to pr

otection by the Due Process Claus e of its own force, nonetheless impos es atypica l and significant

ha rds hip on the inmate i n relation to the ordinary incidents of pr ison life. Id. at 2295 (inter nal citations omitted).

In the case sub judice , plaintiff has si mply alleg ed in a conclus ory fashion t hat the lockdowns

deprived h im of his rig hts. He hasfailed to proffer any ev idence that the lock down was unusuallyharsh or was instituted for any reason other than safety and pr ison secu rity. We deem it to be clear that the restr icti ons imp osed as a result o f the ga ngrelated incidents di d not operate to pl ace any “at ypical and significant hardship” on t he plaintiff in rel ation to the ordi nary inci dents of prison l ife.

We therefore conclude th at the trial court properly gra nte d summary judgment in fa vor of the defendants wi th respect to p laintiff’s due pr ocess claims . An inmate has no liberty interest in remaining free of d isciplinaryor administr ative seg regation because such segregati on does not impose an atypical or significant hardship on the inmate. Sand in v. Conner , 115 S. Ct. at 23 00. In this c ase, the plainti ff has failed to demonstratethat the lock down imposed an aty pical or si gnificant har dship on him in relati on to the o rdinary incidents of pri son life.

Similarl y, plain tiff has adduced no ev idence in suppor t of his contentio n that the lock down constituted c ruel and unusual punis hment. In order for a prison offici al to viol ate the Cruel and U nusual PunishmentClause, the offici al must be “del iberately indifferent” to an inmate’s safety

or health. Farm er v. Brennan , 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977-78 (1994). The record evinces n o “deliberate indiffer ence” on the par t of defendants, nor is there any indication that plaintiff’s heal th or safety w as adversel y affected.

Fina lly, we find no meri t in plainti ff’s equal protec tion claim. Even assumingthat plai ntiff could demonstrate that t he defendants viol ated some rig ht afforded to him under5

the equal protec

tion clause, we would nevertheless have to find that the challeng ed actions were not reasonably related toa legiti mate penologica l interest in order to i mpose liabili ty upon defendan ts. Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). As t he court stated in the recentcase of Rawls v. Sundquist , N o . 3 - 9 6 - 0 1 0 7 , 1 9 9 6 WL 288622 (M.D. Tenn. May 23, 1996): Under

the equal pr

otection claus e, prison a dmin istrators are entitled to p lace restr ictions on theopportunities , rights and pr ivileg es accorded prot ective popul ations, prov ided that th os e restrictions are rational rather than arbitrary and capricious. Id. at *6.
Under the facts of this c ase, plaintiff canno t show that defendants’ act ions in imposing lockdowns lack any rational basis. It is uncont roverted t hat the two gang -related incidents nece ssitated speci al measures in order to cont rol the sit uation.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has con cluded that constitution al safeguards are relaxed w ith respect t o prison loc kdownswhen the welfare and securi ty of the prison are threatened. Hewi tt v. Helms , 4 59 U.S. 460 , 467 (1983). When evaluati ng the constitutional ity

of th e conduct of prison officials , the courts s hould afford them “w ideranging deference in the adopt ion and execut ion of policies and practi ces that in their judgmentare needed to pre serve int ernal order and dis cipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolf ish , 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979 ).

As an additional basis for af firming the trial court’s grant of summa ry judgm ent, we hold that the d efe nda nts we re en title d to qu alif ied im mun ity. Prison officials who perform discreti onaryfunctions are sh ielded from liabi lity for c ivil damag es when thei r “cond uc t does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutiona l rights

of which a reasonable person would have k nown .” Harlo w v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818(1982). In accordance with the foregoing discussion, it is o u r opinion that defen dants’ conduct satisfied this

standard under the facts of the case at bar.
Having concluded that

plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there ex ists a genui ne6

is sue of material fact for t rial, we affirm the judgment o f the court below in grantin g defendant s’ motion for summary judgment. C osts on appeal are taxed t o plaintiff fo r which
execu tion may is sue i f ne cess ary.

HIGHERS, J.

CONCUR:

FARMER, J.

LILLARD, J.