NO.01-15-00152-CVIntheCourt ofAppealsFortheFirstJudicialDistrictofTexasatHoustonDONALDB.MULLINSandBLUESKY RIGHT OFWAY,LLCCross-Plaintiff(s)—AppellantsVS.MARTINEZR.O.W.,L.L.C.f/k/aMARTINEZINVESTMENTS,L.L.C.Cross—Defendant—AppelleeOnAppealfromthe149"‘DistrictCourtofBrazoriaCounty,Texas;TrialCourtCauseNo.79750—CVBRIEFOFAPPELLEEMARTINEZR.O.W.,LLCF/K/AMARTINEZINVESTMENTS,L.L.C.WRIGHT&GREENHILL,P.C.DavidP.BoyceStateBarNo.02759770dboyce@w—g.com221W.6"‘Street,Suite1800Austin,Texas 78701512-476-4600512-476-5382(Fax)ATTORNEYSFORAPPELLEEACCEPTED01-15-00152-cvFIRST COURT OF APPEALSHOUSTON, TEXAS8/26/2015 2:56:24 PMCHRISTOPHER PRINECLERKIDENTITYOFPARTIESANDCOUNSELCross-DonaldB.MullinsandBlueSkyRightofWay,L.L.C.‘PlaintiffsandAppellantsCounselforPatrickF.TimmonsCross-TimmonsLawFirmPlaintiffs8556KatyFreeway,Suite120andHouston,Texas77024-1806Appellant713/465-7638—Telephone713/465-9527-FacsimileCross-MartinezR.O.W.,L.L.C.f/k/aMartinezInvestments,L.L.C.DefendantandAppelleeCounselforDavidP.BoyceCross-Wright&Greenhill,P.C.Defendant221West6"‘Street,Suite1800andAustin,Texas78701Appellee512/476-4600—Telephone512/476-5382-Facsimile'BlueSkyRightofWay,L.L.C.(“BlueSky”)islistedasAppellantonAppellant’sBriefbutwasnotapartybeforethetrialcourtandwasnotgrantedleavetoappearasacross-plaintiffintheCourtbelow.iiTABLEOFCONTENTSIdentityofPartiesandCounsel..................................................................................TableofContents................................................................................IndexofAuthorities...................................................................................................StatementoftheCase.................................................................................................IssuesPresentedforReview......................................................................................StatementRegardingOralArgument.........................................................................CitationstotheRecord...............................................................................................StatementofFacts......................................................................................................ScopeandStandardofReview..................................................................................SummaryofArgument..............................................................................................Argument...................................................................................................................I.TheCourtwascorrectingrantingAppellee’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentunderTex.LaborCode§417.004becauseitnegatedthestatutoryexceptionandAppellantfailedtoproduceanyevidencetosatisfytheexception......................................II.ThetrialcourtcorrectlydeniedAppellant’sMotiontoVacateJudgmentandforNewTrialandforLeavetoFileAmendedPleadingandSupplementalMaterialinResponsetoCross-DefendantMartinezR.O.W.,L.L.C.’sMotionforSummaryJudgment...........................................................................ConclusionandPrayer...............................................................................................CertificateofCompliance..........................................................................................CertificateofService.................................................................................................iiiiiill1121303232AppendixTab1——Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.,Art.8306§3Tab2—Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.,Art.8306§3(d)Tab3—Tex.LaborCode§401.011Tab4—Tex.LaborCode§408.001Tab5—Tex.LaborCode§417.004ivINDEXOFAUTHORITIESCasesAutomaker,Inc.v.CCRTCompany,Ltd.,976S.W.2d744,746(Tex.App.—Houston[1"Dist]1998,nopet.).........................................................22BoardertoBoarderTruckingC0,,Inc.v.Mondi,Inc.,831S.W.2d495,498-99(Tex.App.—CorpusChristi1992,nowrit)...........................................22CityofBeaumontv.Graham,441S.W.2d829(Tex.1969)......................................12City0fElPasov.Collins,440S.W.3d879(Tex.App.—E1Paso2013,nopet.)29EnsearchCorp.v.Parker,794S.W.2d2(Tex.1990)..............................................13FairfieldInsuranceCompanyv.StephensMartinPaving,LL.C.,246S.W.3d653(Tex.2008)......................................................................................24GilbaneBuildingCo.v.KeystoneStructuralConcrete,263S.W.3d291(Tex.App.—Houston[151Dist.]2007,nopet.).........................................................14GraniteConstructionCo.v.BituminousInsuranceCos.,832S.W.2d427,430(Tex.App.—Amarillo1992,nowrit)Argument.......................................................16Henkelv.Norman,441S.W.2d925,927(Tex.1996)..............................................8Hillv.Milani,678S.W.2d203,205(Tex.App.—Austin1984)affd686S.W.2d610(Tex.1985).............................................................................22HoustonLighting&PowerCo.v.EllerOutdoorAdvertisingCompany,635S.W.2d133(Tex.App.~—Houston[1S'Dist.]1982,writref’dn.r.e.).................19Johnson&JohnsonMed,Inc.v.Sanchez,924S.W.2d925,927(Tex.1996).........8KoninklykeNederlandscheStoombootMaalschappy,N.Vv.RoyalNetherlandsSteamshipCompany,301F.2d741(5‘“Cir.1962)....................................................26Leinenv.Buflington'sBayouCityServiceCo.,824S.W.2d682,685(Tex.App.~Houston[14"'Dist]1992,nowrit)Argument.....................................22MonsantoCo.v.Owens-CorningFiberglasCorp.,764S.W.2d293,294(Tex.App.~Houston[1s'Dist.]1988)Argument.....................................................18,19~~Nallv.Plunkett,404S.W.3d552,555(Tex.2013)...................................................8PortRoyalDevelopmentCorp.v.BraseltonConstructionCo.,716S.W.2d630(Tex.App.—ColpusChristi1986,writrefusedn.r.e.)...................13Randall’sFoodMarkets,Inc.v.Johnson,891S.W.2d640,644(Tex.1995)..........8ScottsdaleInsuranceCo.v.Shahinpour,2006WL870642(S.W.2dTex)...............16TexasGeneralIndem.Co.v.Ellis,888S.W.2d830,831-32(Tex.App.—Tyler1994,nowrit)..............................................................................22ValenceOperatingCo.v.Dorsett,164S.W.3d656,661(Tex.2005)......................8Varelav.AmericanPetrofinaCo.o_/‘Texas,Inc.,658S.W.2d561(Tex.1983).......28WestTexasUtilitiesCo.v.Renner,32S.W.2d264(Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland1930,affd,53S.W.2d451(Tex.Comm’nApp.1932)............................................25,26Westfallv.LorenzoGinCompany,287S.W.2d551(Tex.Civ.App.~Eastland1956,nowrit).............................................................................................................25,26StatutesandRulesTex.LaborCode§401.011(18).................................................................................................14§408.001........................................................................................................14,30§408.001(a),(b)............................................................................................30§408.001(b),(c)30§4l7.004........................................................................................................33,37Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.Art.8306§3..................................................................................................I7,18,19Art.8306§3(d).........17,33Art.2212(a)(repealed)...................................................................................34viTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code§33.oo4(;)(1)(2)..35§33.oo4(1)(1).35§33.o11(3)....16§33.011(6).34§33.015..........................................................................................................34viiSTATEMENTOFTHECASEAnentityownedorcontrolledbyAppellantDonaldMullins(“Mullins”),BlueSkyRightofWay,L.L.C.(“BlueSky”)enteredintoacontractwithSouthernBrushS.W.,Inc.toperformcertainclearingoflandandtrimmingoftreesalongarightofway.(lCR:l92—195).BlueSkyinturnsubcontractedaportionoftheworktoMartinezRightofWay,L.L.C.f/k/aMartinezInvestments,L.L.C.(“Martinez”).(lCR:25).Inthecourseofperformingthatwork,oneofMartinez’semployees,BonifacioGomez,sufferedaninjuryinthecourseandscopeofhisemploymentandhelaterinitiatedanactionfordamagesagainstMullins,amongothers.(lCR:5—12).MullinsasserteddefensestoMr.Gomez’sallegationsandfiledacross-claimzagainstMartinez,arguingthatMartinezhadagreedtoindemnifyandholdharmlessBlueSky,aswellasMullinsindividually,foranyliabilityarisingfromMartinez’sworkpursuanttoitsagreementwithBlueSky,includingsupervisionofitsownemployeesatthejobsite.(lCR:5—12).Mullinssoughtindemnitybasedonthatallegedagreement,aswellascontributionunderChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code.(lCR:5—12).Martinez’sanswerincludedageneraldenial,aswellastheaffirmativedefensethatitwasaffordedprotectionundertheTexasWorkers’CompensationActbecauseitwascoveredforworkers’compensationinsuranceatthetimeoftheonthejobinjurysufferedbyitsemployee,BonifacioGomez.(2CR:7—9).MartinezthenmovedforanoevidenceandtraditionalsummaryjudgmentwithrespecttoMullins’claimsforindemnityandcontribution,under§417.004oftheTex.LaborCode.Thatprovisioninsulatesanemployerprotectedbyworkers’compensationfromanyclaimforreimbursementassertedbyathirdpartyinanactionfordamages2Whileincorrectlystyledasacross—claim,Mullinswasactuallyassertingathirdpartyaction.1broughtbytheinjuredemployeeagainstthatthirdparty,unlesstheemployerexecuted,priortothetimeoftheonthejobinjury,awrittenagreementtoassumethethirdparty’sliability.(lCR:l4-20).Martinezpresentedsummaryjudgmentevidencethatitwascoveredbyapolicyofworkers’compensationatthetimeofMr.Gomez’saccidentandthattherewasnowrittenagreementunderwhichMartinezassumedMullins’liability.(lCR:41-95).Mullinsfiledamotiontocontinuethesummaryjudgmenthearing(lCR:98-101)andaresponseinwhichheassertedthatacertificateofinsurance“authorized”byMartinezandtheexistenceofaliabilitypolicycoveringMartinezdemonstratedanintenttoindemnifyMullinsandthussatisfiedthestatutoryexceptionunderTex.LaborCode§417.004.(lCR:l08-176).ThetrialcourtdeniedMullins’motionforcontinuance(lCR:330)andgrantedtheMotionforSummaryJudgment(2CR:24)andMartinez’smotiontosevertheclaimsMullinshadassertedagainstitfromthemainaction(lCR:328—329).Mullinsfiledamotiontovacatethejudgmentandfornewtrial,forleavetofileanamendedpleading,andforleavetofilesupplementalmaterialsinresponsetoMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgment(2CR:366-372),reliefthatwasoverruledbyoperationoflawonFebruary9,215astotheMotiontoVacateandforNewTrial,anddeniedbytheCourtonFebruary10,2015(2CR:420)atthesametimetheCourtsustainedAppellee’sobjectionstoMullins’affidavit.Thisappealfollowed.ISSUEPRESENTEDFORREVIEWMullinspresentednosummaryjudgmentevidenceofanywrittenagreementexecutedbyMartinezpriortoBonifacioGornez’sonthejobinjuryofJune7,2010,arguinginsteadthatacertificateofinsuranceandtheexistenceofaliabilitypolicycoveringMartinezsufficedtosatisfythestatutoryexception.DidthedistrictcourtproperlygruntMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentunderTex.LaborCode§417.004absentevidencethatanypre-accidentwrittenagreementhadbeenexecutedbyMartinezunderwhichitassumedMullins’liability?STATEMENTREGARDINGORALARGUMENTOralargumentshouldnotbenecessary.Thestatuteinthiscaseisunambiguous,thelimitedandwelldefinedexceptionisinapplicablehereandthetwoadditionalexceptionsadvancedbyAppellanthavenobasisinlaw.CITATIONSTOTHERECORD“CR”referstothetwovolumeC1erk’sRecord,withvolumenumberlistedbefore“CR,”followedbyacolonandthenpagenumber.STATEMENTOFFACTSThefactsmaterialtoMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentarenotdisputed.AppellantunsuccessfullyattemptedtosupplementthesummaryjudgmentrecordwithdepositionexcerptsfromMr.GomezandhisownconclusorystatementsregardingallegedgrossnegligenceonthepartofMartinez.TheCourtdisallowedMullins’motionforleavetosupplementthesummaryjudgmentrecord.Inanyevent,testimonyallegedlyindicatinggrossnegligenceonthepartofMartinezisirrelevanttotheissuebeforetheCourt.AppellantMullinsownsBlueSkyRightofWay,L.L.C.(“BlueSky”),whosebusinessincludestheclearingofland,treetrimmingandrelatedwork(1CR:116).BlueSkycontractedwithSouthernBrushS.W.,Inc.toperformcertainclearanceandtreetrimmingworkalongaright—of—way(lCR:l92—195)andinturnenteredintoanagreementwithMartineztoprovidelaboratalocationinBrazoriaCounty,Texas.(1CR:116).BonifacioGomezwasanemployeeofMartinez,anemployercoveredbyworkers’compensationinsurance.(lCR:4l—92;lCR:l09).Mr.GomezwasinjuredatthejobsitewhileworkingforMartinezandperformingtheworkMartinezhadagreedtoundertakeforBlueSky.(1CR:116).TherewasnowrittenagreementbetweenMartinezandBlueSkyorMullinspertainingtoMartinez’sworkonthe“SouthernBrush”jobsiteinBrazoriaCounty,somethingMullinsacknowledgedunderoathinhisdepositionthatwastakenonJune5,2013,wellbeforeMartinez’sentiyintothelawsuit.(lCR:94).ItappearsthateitherpriortoorcontemporaneouswithMartinez’scommencementoftheworkMullinsreceivedacertificateofinsurancedatedJune7,2010,thatshowsastheinsuredMartinezInvestments,L.L.C.,andidentifiesthreeseparatepoliciesofinsuranceissuedbythreeinsurersforcomprehensivegeneralliability,automobileliabilityandworkers’compensation,respectively.Thecertificateidentifiesas“certificateholder”BlueSkyRightofWay,L.L.C.ItnowhereindicatesthatBlueSkyorMullinswouldbeshownasanadditionalinsuredunderanyofthethreepolicies.(lCR:l20).MullinscontendsthatMartinezagreedtoassumeBlueSky’sorhisliabilityforinjuriestoMartinez’semployeesonthejob,andtoprovideinsuranceforBlueSky,butthereisnowrittenprooftosupporteitherassertion.MartinezwasprotectedbyaninsurancepolicyissuedbytheTravelers’IndemnityCompanyofConnecticutthatcontainedcommercialgeneralliabilitycoverage,a(possiblyincomplete)copyofwhichwasattachedtoMullins’summaryjudgmentresponse,butthepolicynowherementionsBlueSkyorMullins,noristhereanyevidencethatitprovidedadditionalinsurancecoverageforeitheratthetimeoftheaccident.Mr.GomezinitiatedapersonalinjuryactionagainstMullinsandothers,inresponsetowhichMullinsassertedcertainaffirmativedefenses(lCR:5—l3).OnMarch27,2014,Mullinsincludedwithhissecondamendedanswerwhathetitledasa“crossclairn,”althoughitinitiatedactionsagainstpersonsandentitieswhowerenotpriorpartiestothecase(MartinezandHallmarkSpecialtyInsuranceCompany),andshouldhavebeenidentifiedasanoriginalthirdpartyaction.(lCR:5—l3).AstoMartinez,MullinssoughtcontractualindemnityaswellascontributionpursuanttoChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code,notinghejoinedinamotiontodesignateMartinezasaresponsiblethirdparty.MartinezfileditsoriginalansweronMay15,2014,assertingageneraldenialandasanaffinnativedefense,theprotectionsaffordedtoitundertheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,inViewofitspositionasacoveredemployer,asthosetermsaredefinedintheAct.(2CR:7~9).OnOctober17,2014,Martinezfileditsnoevidenceandtraditionalmotionforpartialsummaryjudgment.3Asabasisforitsmotion,MartinezreliedonTex.LaborCode§417.004,insulatingacoveredemployerundertheActfromareimbursementclaimbyathirdpartywhoispotentiallyliabletoaninjuredemployee,unlesstheemployerexecutedbeforetheonthejobinjuryawrittenagreementwiththatthirdpartytoassumeitsliability.(1CR:l4—20).Mullinsfiledamotiontocontinuethesummaryjudgmenthearing(lCR:98-101)andaresponsetoMartinez’ssummaryjudgmentmotion(lCR:l08-176),withexhibits.ThetrialcourtdeniedMullins’motionforcontinuanceandgrantedMartinez’ssummaryjudgmentmotion(2CR:24)anditsMotionforSeverance(1CR:328—329).Thereafter,Mullinsfiledamotiontovacatethejudgmentandfornewtrial,andforleavetofileanamendedpleadingandtosupplementthesummaryjudgmentevidence.(2CR:366-372).ThatmotionwasoverruledbyoperationoflawonFebruary9,2015anddeniedbytheCourtonFebruary10,2015,whichfurthersustainedMartinez’sobjectionstoMullins’supplementalaffidavit.(2CR:420).Thisappealfollowed.3Themotionsweredesignatedas“partial"becauseMullinshadcross-claimspendingagainstHallmarkand,ofcourse,PlaintiffBonifacioGomezhadassertedcausesofactionagainstanumberofparties,includingMullinsandSouthernBrush,S.W.,Inc.SCOPEANDSTANDARDOFREVIEWThisCourt’sreviewofthedistrictcourt’sOrdergrantingMartinez’snoevidenceandtraditionalmotionforsummaryjudgmentisdenovo.ValenceOperatingCo.v.Dorsett,164S.W.3d656,661(Tex.2005).Adefendantmaymoveforsummaryjudgmentonanaffirmativedefensethathasbeenpledorraisedinthemotionitself.Randall’sFoodMarkets,Inc.v.Johnson,891S.W.2d640,644(Tex.1995).Whenitdoesso,itmustproveeachelementofitsdefenseasamatteroflaw.Johnson&JohnsonMed,Inc.v.Sanchez,924S.W.2d925,927(Tex.1996).Adefendantmaymoveforsummaryjudgmentbydisprovingasamatteroflawanessentialelementoftheplaintiff’scauseofaction.Henkelv.Norman,441S.W.3d249,251(Tex.2014);Nallv.Plunkett,404S.W.3d552,555(Tex.2013).SUMMARYOFTHEARGUMENTThiscaseiscontrolledbystatute,specifically§417.004oftheTex.LaborCode,whicheffectivelyinsulatesacoveredemployer4fromanactionseekingcontributionandindemnitybroughtbypartieswhohavebeensuedbythesubscribingemployer’semployeeforinjuriesinthecourseandscopeofemployment.TheexclusiveremedyprovisionoftheWorkers’CompensationAct,Tex.LaborCode§408.001,protectsthecoveredemployerfromacommonlawcauseofactionassertedbyanemployeeorthelegalbeneficiariesofanemployeeinjuredorkilledinthecourseandscopeofemployment,withthesoleexceptionasuitforexemplarydamagesbroughtbythespouse4TheActdefines“Employer”as“apersonwhomakesacontractofhire,employsoneormoreemployees,andhasworkers‘compensationcoverage.”Tex.LaborCode§401.011(18).Bydefinition,anemployercarriesworkers’compensationcoverage.orheirsofthebodyofthedeceasedemployeeforintentionalorgrosslynegligentconductonthepartoftheemployer.Tex.LaborCode§417.004protectstheemployerfromhavingtoreimburseathirdpartythatissuedbytheemployeeorhisbeneficiariesfordamages,barringtheliablethirdparty’sclaimsforcontributionandindemnityunlesstheemployerhasexecuted,beforetheonthejobinjuryordeath,awrittenagreementwiththethirdpartytoassumeitsliability.Mullins’“cross—claim”againstMartinezwasclearlyanattemptbyathirdpartysuedbythecoveredemployee,BonifacioGomez,toobtainreimbursementfromMartinezintheformofcontractualindemnity,orcontributionunderChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac&RemCode.MartinezpromptlyassertedtheprotectionsoftheTexasWorkers’CompensationActinitsinitialpleading.Itssummaryjudgmentmotionestablisheditsstatusasanemployercoveredbyapolicyofworkers’compensationissuedbyTexasMutualInsuranceCompany.Itfurtherestablishedthelackofanypre—injurywrittenagreementexecutedbyMartineztoassumeMullins’potentialliabilitytoMar’tinez’semployeesinjuredonthejob.Martineznegatedasamatteroflawtheoneexceptiontothestatutoryprotectionaffordeditagainstthirdpartyclaimsforcontributionorindemnity,andindeed,producedsworntestimonyfromMullinsacknowledgingtheabsenceofanywrittenagreementbetweenMullins(orBlueSky)andMartinezrelevanttotheworkunderwayatthetimeofMr.Gomez’sinjuries.Atthatpoint,theburdenshiftedtoMullinstopresentevidenceofMartinez’sexecutionofawrittenagreementunderwhichitexpresslyassumedMullins’liabilitytoMartinez’semployees.Mullinspresentednoevidencetomeetthatburden,claiminginsteadthatthestatutoryexceptioncouldbesatisfiedwithcircumstantialproofthattherewasan“inten”onthepartofMartineztoassumeMullins’liability,namely,acertificateofinsurancedeliveredtoMullinsatorbeforeMartinez’scommencementofthework,aswellasacopyofMartinez’sgeneralliabilitypolicy.(lCR:l08-l76).However,acertificateofinsuranceisnottheequivalentofawrittenagreementtoindemnifyaparty,andthepolicysimplyshowsthatMartinezhadinsurancecoverageinplaceatthetimeoftheaccident.NeitherdocumentisevidencethatMartinezundertook,inwriting,onorbeforeJune7,2010,toassumeMullins’liability.InMullins’belatedmotiontovacate,amendhispleadingandsupplementthesummaryjudgmentrecord,headvancedforthefirsttimetheargumentthattherewasanotherexceptiontothestatutoryprotectionaffordedcoveredemployersfromthirdpartyclaims,thatbeingwhentheemployee’snon-fatalinjuriesallegedlyresultfromemployergrossnegligence.Tex.LaborCode§417.004doesnotmentionsuchanexception,nordoesanyotherLaborCodeprovisionorcasehandeddowninthelast50yearsevenhintatsuchanexception.Finally,Mullins’post—hearingmotionarguedthatbecauseMartinezhadbeendesignatedasaresponsiblethirdpartyunderChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code,itwassubjecttoaclaimforcontributionunderChapter33.Thatargumentisspecious.Chapter33permitsadefendantwhoisjointlyandseverallyliablefordamagestotheplaintifftoseekcontributionagainstanyother“liabledefendant,”atermthatisdefinedin§33.0ll(3)oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Codeinawaythatclearlydistinguishesitfrom“responsiblethirdparty.”Thefactthatapartyisdesignatedasa10responsiblethirdpartydoesnotmakeitaliabledefendant.BecauseMartinezcannotbeliabletoitsemployee,BonifacioGomez,forinjuriesinthecourseandscopeofemployment,duetotheexclusiveremedyprovisionsoftheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,itcannotbea“liabledefendant,”andaccordingly,thereisnoviablecontributionclaimagainstitunderChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac&Rem.Code.ARGUMENTI.TheCourtwascorrectingrantingAppellee’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentunderTex.LaborCode§417.004becauseitnegatedthestatutoryexceptionandAppellantfailedtoproduceanyevidencetosatisfytheexception.Mullinsreadilyadmitsthatthereisno“separatecontractofindemnity”thatwasexecutedbyMartinezpriortoMr.Gornez’sonthejobinjuryonJune7,2010.(Appellant’sBrief,p.8).HearguesinsteadthatMartinez“causedthedelivery”ofacertificateofinsurancereferencingaliabilitypolicy(Id.),thatitperformedworkpursuanttoanagreement(presumablyoral)withBlueSky,thatitwaslaterpaidforthatwork,andthatMartinez’sliabilitypolicy“coverstheactivitiesundertakenbyBlueSkyandMullins...”(AppellantBrief,p.15).Appellantnowhereexplainshowacertificateofinsuranceoraliabilityinsurancepolicyistheequivalentofawrittenagreementexecutedbytheemployertoassumetheliabilityofathirdparty.Thosetwodocuments,takensinglyortogether,donotconstituteanexplicitwrittenagreementtoindemnifyMullins,asevenacursoryreviewoftheapplicablecaselawmakesclear.CasesconstruingTex.LaborCode.§417.004,anditspredecessorunderthepriorWorkers’CompensationAct,Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.Art.8306§3(laterArticle8306,§3(d),haveheldthattosatisfythestatutoryexceptiontoacoveredemployer’sprotection11fromthirdparty“reimbursement”actions,theremustbeawritten,signed,pre—injuryindemnityagreementunderwhichtheemployerexplicitlyassumestheliabilityofthethirdpartythatseeksreimbursementorindemnity.TheTexasSupremeCourtconsideredthequestionofwhatsortofindemnitylanguagewouldsatisfytheexceptioninthepriorWorkers’CompensationAct,Art.8306,§3,inCity0fBeaumontv.Graham,441S.W.2d829(Tex.1969).Anemployeeofaworkers’compensationsubscriber,TexasTower&ConstructionCompany(TexasTower)wasfatallyinjuredwhileworkinginanelevatedstoragetankbelongingtotheCityofBeaumont.Id.at832.HisbeneficiariessuedtheCity,whichinturnfiledathirdpartyactionagainstTexasTowerseekingindemnityorcontribution.Id.TheTexasSupremeCourtnotedthatTexasTower,asaworkers’compensationsubscriber,wasprotectedagainstclaimsforindemnityandcontributionbyArt.8306,§3.Id.at837.TheCitycontendedthatitscontractwithTexasTowercontainedindemnitylanguagesufficienttosatisfythestatutoryexception.TheTexasSupremeCourtdisagreed,concludingthattheindemnityprovisionsshowedanintenttoindemnifytheCityonlyfordamagesorclaimsresultingsolelyfromtheactsorconductofTexasTower.Id.at838.TheTexasSupremeCourtagreedwiththeCourtbelowthatthelanguageintheCityofBeaumonUTexasTowercontractdidnot“evidenceanintentionofthepartiesthatTexasTowershouldindemnifytheCityfortheconsequencesofitsownnegligentconduct,orfortheconsequencesofthejointnegligenceoftheparties,orfortheconsequencesofthenegligentconductoftheCityandthenon—negligentconductofTexasTower.”Id.at838-839.TheCourtconcludedthattheCity’scontributionandindemnityclaimswerenotsustainable.12InPortRoyalDevelopmentCorp.V.BraseltonConstructionC0,,716S.W.2d630(Tex.App.—CorpusChristi1986,writrefusedn.r.e.),theCourtconsideredwhetheranindemnityagreementbetweenthegeneralcontractorforthework,PortRoyalDevelopmentCorporation,andtheinjuredperson’semployer,BraseltonConstructionCo.,satisfiedthestatutoryexceptiontotheworkers’compensationbartoPortRoyal’sreimbursementclaim.TheCourtreviewedtheindemnitylanguage,notingthatitspecificallyexcludedindemnityforinjuryarisingoutoftheactorneglectofPortRoyal.TheCourtconcludedthatinViewofthefacttheindemnityagreementdidnotindemnifyPortRoyalforitsownnegligence,itdidnotsatisfythestatutoryexceptionsetforthinthepriorWorkers’CompensationAct,Art.8306§3,Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.TheTexasSupremeCourtagainconsideredwhatlanguagewassufficienttosatisfythestatutoryexceptiontotheworkers’compensationbaragainstthirdpartyreimbursementactionsinEnsearchCorp.v.Parker,794S.W.2d2(Tex.1990).Inthatcase,theCourtheldthattheActdidnotbarapipelineowner’sclaimforindemnityfromanindependentcontractorwhoseemployeeswereasphyxiatedduringtheirwork.Undertheindemnityagreementinthatcase,theindependentcontractorassumed“entireresponsibilityandliabilityforanyclaimsoractionsbasedonorarisingoutofinjuries,includingdeath,topersons...sustainedorallegedtohavebeensustainedinconnectionwithortohavearisenoutoforincidentaltotheperformanceofthiscontractby[independentcontractor]...regardlessofwhethersuchclaimsoractionsarefoundedinwholeorinpartuponallegednegligenceof[pipelineowner]...Id.at6-7.13TheCourtconcludedthattheindemnitylanguageinquestionsufficedtoshowthattheemployerexpresslyassumedthirdpartyliabilityforinjuriestoitsownemployeesandthusmettheexceptiontotheworkers’compensationbar.Id.at8.Amorerecentdecisionthataddressesthecurrentstatutorybar,Tex.LaborCode§417.004,isGilbaneBuildingCo.v.KeystoneStructuralConcrete,263S.W.3d291(Tex.App.—Houston[151Dist.]2007,nopet.).Inthatcase,GilbaneBuildingCo.(“Gilbane”)andKeystoneStucturalConcrete,Ltd.(“Keystone”)contractedforKeystonetoactassubcontractoronaconstructionproject,duringwhichaKeystoneemployeesufferedinjuriesandsuedGilbane,resultinginasettlement.Id.at294.Gilbaneanditsliabilityinsurer,Zurich,suedKeystonefor,amongotherthings,contractualindemnity.Id.TheCourtfirstdeterminedthattheindemnitylanguageintheGilbane/Keystonecontractdidnotsatisfytheexpressnegligencetestandwasthusunenforceable,affirmingthetrialcourt’sgrantofsummaryjudgmentastoGilbane’scontractualindemnityclaim.However,GilbanealsoarguedthatKeystonehadbreachedcontractualobligationsrelatingtouseofequipmentthatwasinasafeconditionandincompliancewithapplicableregulations,codes,ordinances,etc.Id.at302.Inresponse,KeystoneassertedthatGilbane’sclaimforbreachofcontractwasmerelyareformulationofitsindemnityclaimandthatregardlessofhowGilbanecharacterizedthatreimbursementaction,itwasbarredbyTex.LaborCode§417.004.TheCourtofAppealsagreed,notingthatthestatuteprohibitedindemnityabsentanexpressagreementbytheemployertoindemnifythethirdpartyinwriting.Id.at303.TheCourtconcluded:Theindemnityagreementhereisunenforceablebecauseitfailstocomplywiththeexpressnegligencerule[citationomitted].Accordingly,weholdthat§417.004barsGilbane’sbreachofcontractclaimsagainstKeystone.14Id.Inshort,TexascourtsthathaveconsideredtheapplicabilityofTex.LaborCode§417.004anditspredecessorhaveconcludedthattheexceptiontothebaragainstthirdpartyreimbursementactionsrequiresanexp_l§i_twrittenagreementbytheemployertoassumetheliabilityofthethirdpartyintheformofenforceableindemnitylanguagethatsatisfiestheexpressnegligencetest.Inthiscase,byMullins’ownadmission,thereisQwrittenagreementrelatingtoMartinez’sworkforMullinsorBlueSky,muchlessaconspicuousindemnityprovisionthatmeetstheexpressnegligencetest.Mullinsdoesnotciteanycaseholdingthatthestatutoryexceptioncanbesatisfiedbysomethingotherthanawrittencontractofindemnityunderwhichtheemployerexpresslyassumesthethirdpa1'ty’sliability.Indeed,inthe“contractualindemnity”sectionofhisbrief(AppellantBrief,pp.15-16),hecitesnocaseatall.Rather,hearguesthattherewasinfactawrittenagreementtoindemnifyhimevidencedbythecertificateofinsurancehereceivedandbyMa1tinez’sliabilitypolicy,whichheattachedtohissummaryjudgmentresponse.(lCR:l23-176).5Theargumentisunsuppoitable,foranumberofreasons.First,thecertificateofinsurancethatisdatedJune7,2010specificallynotes,attheoutset:[THISCERTIFICATEISISSUEDASAMATTEROFINFORMATIONONLYANDCONFERSNORIGHTSUPONTHECERTIFICATEHOLDER.THISCERTIFICATEDOESNOTAFFIRMATIVELYORNEGATIVELYAMEND,EXTENDORALTERTHECOVERAGEAFFORDEDBYTHEPOLICIESBELOW.THISCERTIFICATEOFINSURANCEDOESNOTCONSTITUTEACONTRACTBETWEENTHEISSUINGINSUR_ER(S),AUTHORIZEDREPRESENTATIVEORPRODUCER,ANDTHECERTIFICATEHOLDER]5ThecopyoftheTravelerspolicyintherecordisincomplete(lCR:l23-176);whatappearstobeamorecompletecopyisattachedintheappendixtoAppellant’sBrief.15Thelawregardingcertificatesofinsuranceiswellestablished.Acertificateofinsuranceisnottheequivalentofaninsurancepolicy,itcannotalterthetermsofaninsurancepolicy,anditdoesnotestabishanycontractualrelationshipbetweentheentityissuingthecertificateandthecertificateholder.See,e.g.,ScottsdaleInsuranceCo.v.Shahinpour,2006WL870642(S.W.2dTex)(certificateofinsurancethatstatesitdoesnotamend,extendoraltercoverageaffordedbythepoliciesbelow,doesnotalterthetermsofanyinsurancepolicy,andcreatesnocontractforinsurancecoverage);GraniteConstructionCo.v.BituminousInsuranceCos.,832S.W.2d427,430(Tex.App.-Amarillo1992,nowrit)(anyinsuranceaffordedtoGraniteConstructionCo.,despitebeingshownasanadditionalinsuredinacertificateofinsurance,isaffordedbythepoliciesandnotthecertificateitself).Accordingly,thecertificateitselfisnotawritten“agreement”ofanykindbetweenMullinsorBlueSkyandthecertificateissuer(aninsuranceagencyisidentifiedastheproducer),oranyinsurerofMartinez.ItwasnotexecutedbyMartinez,anditcertainlycannotconstituteanexpressagreementbyMartineztoassumeBlueSky’sorMullins’liabilityforinjurytooneofMartinez’semployees.Second,settingasidethefactthattheMartinezliabilitypolicyMullinsalsoreliesonisnotcertifiedorprovenupthroughabusinessrecordsaffidavitofanykind,ithasnorelevancehere.TheaffidavitMullinsattachedtohissummaryjudgmentresponse,inparagraph6(lCR:ll6—ll7),offershisopinionthatthepolicyinquestion“providesliabilityinsurancecoveragefortheofficersandagentsofcoveredorganizations.”Needlesstosay,theinterpretationofaninsurancepolicypresentsanissueoflawfortheCourt,notsusceptibletoconstructionbyinterestedparties.l6Mullinsassertsinthesummaryjudgmentresponseitselfthat“Paragraphsl.aand2.b(2)oftheCoverageFormatpages2and3of16”providecoverageforBlueSkyandMullins.(1CR:l12).Mullins’effortsatinsurancepolicyconstructiondonotavailhimhere.Paragraphl.aoftheCommercialGeneralLiabilityCoverageForm(lCR:134)simplystatesthattheinsurer“willpaythosesumsthattheinsuredbecomeslegallyobligatedtopayasdamagesbecauseof“bodilyinjury”or“propertydamage”towhichthisinsuranceapplies...”Thatprovisiondoesnotdefinetheterm“insured,”butlanguageprecedingthatprovisiononthesamepageofthepolicyindicatesthatthewordinsured“meansanypersonororganizationqualifyingassuchunderSectionII—WhoIsAnInsured.”(ICR:134).TheSectionII—WhoIsAnInsuredprovisionoftheCommercialGeneralLiabilityCoverageForminthepolicyincludedintheappendixtoAppellant’sBrief,subpart(c),statesthatifthenamedinsuredisalimitedliabilitycompany(thecasehere),theentityitselfisaninsured,itsmembers,“butonlywithrespecttotheconductofyourbusiness,”andthenamedinsured’smanagers.ThatdefinitiondoesnotincludeeitherMullinsorBlueSky.MullinsalsoappearstociteExclusion2(b)(2)onpage2oftheCommercialGeneralLiabilityCoverageFormintheTravelerspolicy(intheappendixtoAppellant’sBrief),butthatprovisionmerelyexcludescoverageforbodilyinjuryforwhichtheinsured“isobligatedtopaydamagesbyreasonoftheassumptionofliabilityinacontractoragreement.”Thereisanexceptiontothecontractualliabilityexclusionfor,amongotherthings,an“insuredcontract,”butAppellantmakesnoargumentthattheexception17applieshere.6Ofcourse,thefactthatMartinez’sliabilitypolicymayincludecoverageforcertainofitsindemnityobligationsisnotevidencethatsuchanindemnityobligationexists.Onceagain,Mullinsappearstobelieve,mistakenly,thatproofofliabilitycoverageforMartinez,eitherintheformofacertificateofinsuranceortheliabilitypolicyitself,somehowequatestoanexplicitassumptionofMullins’orBlueSky’sliability.Proofofinsurancethatmightcoveranobligationisnotthesameasanexplicitassumptionofthatobligation.Inshort,afteracknowledginginsworntestimonythattherewasnowrittenagreementbetweenhimselforBlueSkyandMartinez,Mullins’onlyresponsetotheAppellee’ssummaryjudgmentmotionwastoproducedocumentsthatatmostevidenceinsurancecoverageforMartinez.Mullinscitesnocasethathasheldthatapartyseekingindemnityfromacoveredemployerneednotproduceanywritingactuallyexecutedbytheemployerexpresslyassumingsuchliability.Havingfailedtopresentanyevidencethatmeetsthestatutoryexceptiontotheemployer’sprotectionfromthirdpartysuits,Mullinshasnobasistochallengethecorrectnessofthesummaryjudgmentgrantedagainsthim.Mullinsarguesthatacontractofindemnity(andpresumablyonesufficienttosatisfytherequirementsofTex.LaborCode§417.004)maybeeitherexpressorimplied,citingMonsantoCo.v.0wens—ComingFiberglasCorp.,764S.W.2d293,294(Tex.App.—Houston[lS‘Dist.]1988),whichinturncitesHoustonLighting&PowerCo.v.°Thepolicyinquestiondefines“insuredcontract”toinclude(subpartt):“Thatpartofanyothercontractoragreementpertainingtoyourbusiness...underwhichyouassumethetortliabilityofanotherpartytopayfor‘bodilyinjury’or‘propertydamage’toathirdpersonororganization.Tortliabilitymeanstheliabilitythatwouldbeimposedbylawintheabsenceofanycontractoragreement.”Ineffect,the“insuredcontract”exceptionrestorescoverageforexplicitindemnityobligationsbywhichtheinsuredassumesthetortliabilityofanotherparty.18EllerOutdoorAdvertisingCompany,635S.W.2d133(Tex.App.~Houston[ls'Dist.]1982,writret’dn.r.e.).Neithercasesupportsthenotionthatanythingotherthana“writtenagreement”executedbytheemployerpre—injurysatisfiestheexceptiontothestatutoryprotectionaffordedemployersfromthirdpartyactions.Monsantoinvolvedanemployeeofasubcontractor,Owens~CorningFiberglasCorp.(“Owens-Corning”),whobroughtapersonalinjuryactionagainsttheMonsantoCompany(“Monsanto”).Id.at294.MonsantoassertedathirdpartyactionagainstOwens-Corningbasedontheindemnificationlanguagecontainedinawrittencontractbetweenthetwocompanies.Citingtheindemnityprovisionatlength,theCourtnotedthattheprovisionnowhereincludedtheword“negligence”oradequatelydefinedthescopeoftheprotectionthatwasprovidedand:“Becausetheintentofthepartiesisnotspecificallystatedwithinthefourcornersofthecontract,wefindthatthisindemnityprovisiondoesnotsatisfytheexpressnegligencetest.”Id.at295.TheCourtconcluded,ineffect,thatthefailureofthewrittenindemnityprovisiontosatisfytheexpressnegligencetestdidnotbringitwithintheexceptionofthestatutoryprotectionprovidedtheemployerundertheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct(albeitanearlierversionoftheAct).TheHoustonLighting&Powerdecisiondidnotinvolveawrittencontractofindemnity.Rather,anemployeeofEllerOutdoorAdvertisingCompanyofTexas(“Eller”)waselectrocutedaftercontactinganHL&Pline.HiswidowandchildrensuedHL&P,whichsettledthatactionandthensoughtindemnificationfromEllerpursuanttoasectionofthePublicUtilitiesActsettingforththedutiesofanypartyworkingwithinsixfeetofahighvoltageline,aviolationofwhichentitlestheutilitytoindemnification19underanapplicableprovisionofthePublicUtilitiesAct.EllerarguedthepredecessortotheTex.LaborCode§417.004barredtheindemnityaction,buttheCourtconcludedthatHL&P’sindemnityactionwasnot“onaccountof’injurytoordeathofEller’semployeebutratherwasanactionarisingfromabreachofthedutiesEllerowedundertheapplicableprovisionofthePublicUtilitiesAct.Id.at135.TheCourtacceptedHL&P’sreasoning,concludingthatthe“later,morespecificPublicUtilitiesActshouldbegivencontrollingeffectovertheolder,moregeneraltermsoftheWorkers’CompensationAct.”Id.TheHoustonLighting&Powerdecisionsimplyrecognizesthatthespecificindemnitygrantedtopublicutilitiesagainstentitieswhoviolatethe“sixfootrule”trumpsthestatutoryprotectionaffordedemployersundertheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct.ItdoesnotstandforthepropositionthatathirdpartynotentitledtostatutoryindemnitycandispensewiththerequirementsofTex.LaborCode§417.004ofawrittenagreement.Finally,Mullinsdisputestheapplicabilityoftheexpressnegligencerule.Whileasnotedabove,numerouscaseshaveheldthatwrittenindemnitylanguagethatdoesnotsatisfytheexpressnegligencetestdoesnotmeettherequirementsofthestatutoryexceptioninTex.LaborCode§417.004,thatisnotthedispositiveissuehere.Whileintheorytheremaybelanguageinawrittenagreementexecutedbytheemployerbywhichitexpresslyassumestheliabilityofthethirdpartythatfallsshortoftheexpressnegligencestandard,thatisnotthecasehere.Intheinstantmatter,theresimplyisQindemnityagreementofanykindexecutedbyMartinezandaccordingly,thequestionofwhetherornottheindemnitylanguagemustsatisfytheexpressnegligencetesttomeetthestatutoryexceptionismoot.20II.ThetrialcourtcorrectlydeniedAppellant’sMotiontoVacateJudgmentandforNewTrialandforLeavetoFileAmendedPleadingandSupplementalMaterialinResponsetoCross-DefendantMartinezR.O.W.,L.L.C.’sMotionforSummaryJudgment.ItappearsMullins’primarycomplaintwithrespecttotheCourt’sdenialofhismotiontovacate,etc.istherefusaltopermithimtoamendhispleadingtoaddanewpartyandtoassertanentirelynewbasistocircumventtheworkers’compensationbartohisthirdpartyaction,andtopresentadditionalsummaryjudgmentevidencetosupportsame.Thetrialcourtwascorrectindenyingthemotion,foranumberofreasons.First,theproposedfirstamendedcross—claimattemptedtoaddanentirelynewparty,BlueSky,forreasonsnowhereaddressedinthemotionforleaveitself.BlueSkywasnotadefendantintheactioninitiatedbyBonifacioGomezandaccordingly,therewouldbenolegalbasisunderanytheoryallegedbyMullins,orlaterbyBlueSky,forittoseekindemnityforliabilityitcouldnothavehadtoMr.Gomez,whohadneverassertedclaimsagainstBlueSky.BlueSkycouldnotseekindemnityorcontributionforliabilityitcouldnothavetoPlaintiffBonifacioGomez,whohadneversuedit.Second,theproposedamendedpleadingattemptedtoaddanentirelynewbasisforcontributionorindemnity,namelythatMartinezwasguiltyofgrossnegligencewithrespecttoMr.Gomez’sinjuries,andthatsomehowsupportedMullins’claimforcontributionorindemnity.Theassertionsofgrossnegligencehadneverbeenpleadedpreviously,andMullinsdidnotmakesuchcontentionsinanyamendedpleadingthathecouldhavefiled,withoutleaveofcourt,afterMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentwasfiledonOctober17,2014,andbeforeitwasheardonNovember25,2014.21Itiswellestablishedthatatrialcourtdoesnotabuseitsdiscretionbyrefusingtoallowanon-movanttoamenditspleadingsafterthesummaryjudgmenthearinghastakenplace.Leinenv.BujfngtonsBayouCityServiceCo.,824S.W.2d682,685(Tex.App.—Houston[14”'Dist.]1992,nowrit);Hillv.Milani,678S.W.2d203,205(Tex.App.—Austin1984)affld686S.W.2d610(Tex.1985).Furthermore,afterthetrialcourthasrenderedjudgmentonamotionforsummaryjudgment,itcannotgrantamotiontoamendthepleadings.Automaker,Inc.v.CCRTCompany,Ltd.,976S.W.2d744,746(Tex.App.—Houston[151Dist.]1998,nopet.);TexasGeneralIndem.Co.v.Ellis,888S.W.2d830,831-32(Tex.App.~Tyler1994,nowrit);BoardertoBoarderTruckingCo.,Inc.v.Mandi,Inc.,831S.W.2d495,498-99(Tex.App.—CorpusChristi1992,nowrit).Inthepresentaction,theCourtgrantedMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentanditsMotiontoSeverMullins’claimsagainstitonNovember25,2014.(2CR:24;1CR:328-329).Thesummaryjudgmentorder,combinedwiththeseverance,effectivelymadethesummaryjudgmentfinalandappealableforallpurposesandaccordingly,theCourtactedcorrectlyinrefusingMullins’effortstoamendhispleadingspost~summaryjudgmenthearingandpost-finaljudgment.TheCourtdidnoterrindenyingMullins’requesttosupplementthesummaryjudgmentrecordwithanewaffidavitfromMullins(2CR:393-394)7purportingtoaddress,forthefirsttime,thecircumstancesoftheaccident,aswellasexcerptsfromthedepositionofBonifacioGomeztakenonApril30,2013(morethan18monthsbeforethesummaryjudgmenthearinginthismatter).MullinsofferednobasisforseekingpermissiontosubmitsummaryjudgmentevidencefourweeksafterthesummaryjudgmenthearingandtheOrdergrantingsame,merelypointingoutthathehad7TheCourtsustainedMartinez’sobjectionstoMullins’supplementalaffidavit.(2CR:420).22previouslymovedforacontinuancetopermithim“tosubmitadditionalargumentandauthoritiesontheissueofMa1tinez’sindemnificationsofMullins,inordertothoroughlypresentthatissuetotheCourt.”(2CR:367).Inthatregard,itisimportanttonotethatinhisoriginalmotiontocontinuethesummaryjudgmenthearing,hecitedasabasisforsametheneedto“properlyrespond”tocaselaw,submitevidencetotheCourtofpaymentsmadebyMullinstoMartinez,andtopermitMullinstopreparea“detailedaffidavit”todiscuss“thefactsleadingtotheengagementofMartineztoprovidelabor,andtheconsiderationtherefore...”Noneofthe“supplemental”evidenceMullinssoughtleavetosubmitpost-hearingfitswithinanyofthecategoriesofferedinsupportofhispriormotiontocontinuethesummaryjudgmenthearing.SettingasidethefactMullinsofferednojustificationforhisbelatedefforttorevisethepleadings,addanewparty,assertnewbasestocircumventtheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,andtooffersummaryjudgmentevidencethatpresumablywasavailabletohimpreviously,neithertheproposedamendedpleadingnoranyofthe“supplemental”evidenceaffectstheoutcomehere.Mullinsadvancedasan“additionallegaltheory”(Appellant’sBrief,p.26)thenotionthatifMartinez’sconductsomehowconstitutedgrossnegligence,thatwouldcreateanexceptiontothestatutorybartothirdpartyactionsabsentapriorexplicitassumptionofthethirdparty’sliability.Theargumentiscompletelywithoutmerit,notsupportedbyanyprovisionintheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,andtheonlydecisionsMullinscitesinsupportaremorethan50yearsoldandpre~datethecurrentWorkers’CompensationActbydecades.23TheWorkers’CompensationActexclusiveremedyprovision,Tex.LaborCode§408.001,recognizesonlyoneexceptiontotheprotectionaffordedemployersforinjurytoordeathofemployees,thatis,the“survivingspouseorheirsofthebodyofadeceasedemployeewhosedeathwascausedbyanintentionalactoromissionoftheemployerorbytheemployer’sgrossnegligence”maybringanactionagainstanemployer.Tex.LaborCode§408.001(a),(b).NothingintheActindicatesthatinanon-fatalcase,athirdpartysuedbytheinjuredemployeemayseekcontributionorindemnityfromtheemployer,ifthereisevidencethatthelatterisguiltyofgrossnegligence.Presumably,ifsuchanexceptionexisted,itwouldbesetoutinTex.LaborCode§4l7.004,dealingspecificallywithanemployer’sliabilitytoathirdpartysuedbytheinjuredworker.MullinscitesnocasehandeddownsincetheeffectivedateofthenewTexasWorkers’CompensationActthatevensuggestssucha“grossnegligence”exceptiontotheprotectionoftheActexists.MullinsdoescitearecentTexasSupremeCourtdecision,FairfieldInsuranceCompanyv.StephensMartinPaving,L.L.C.,246S.W.3d653(Tex.2008).FairfieldinnowaysupportsAppellant’sargumentregardingthe“grossnegligenceexception.”Rather,thecasedealswiththeinsurabilityofexemplarydamagesunderaworkers’compensation/employerliabilitypolicy.AnemployeeofFairfield’sinsured,StephensMartinPaving,sufferedfatalinjuriesinthecourseandscopeofhisemploymentandhisspouseandchildrenbroughtasuitforexemplarydamagesaspermittedbyTex.LaborCode§408.001(b),(c).Inalengthyandwellreasonedopinion,theTexasSupremeCourtconcludedthattheFairfieldpolicy’semployerliabilityprovisionscoveredtheemployerforgrossnegligenceclaims(Id.at660),andthatsuchinsuranceprotectionwasnot24againstTexaspublicpolicy.NothinginthedecisionsuggeststhatthereisanyexceptiontotheexclusiveremedyprotectionaffordedemployersundertheAct,otherthanclaimsbroughtbythesurvivingspouseandheirsofthebodyofanemployeewhosuffersfatalinjuriesinthecourseandscopeofemployment,allegedlyasaresultoftheemployer’sgrossnegligence.NoissuewaspresentedtoordiscussedbytheCourtastowhethergrossnegligencebytheemployerinanon-fatalinjurycontextcreatesanadditionalexceptiontotheprotectionfromthirdpartyclaims.TheothertwocasescitedbyMullinsaresimplytooremotetohaveanyprecedentialValue.InWestfallv.LorenzoGinCompany,287S.W.2d551(Tex.Civ.App.—Eastlandl956,nowrit),thirdpartiesthatweresuedbyanemployeeofLorenzoGinCompanyarisingfromacollisonbetweentwotruckssoughtcontributionfromthegincompany,aTexasWorkers’CompensationActsubscriber,alleging,amongotherthings,thatthegincompanywasguiltyofgrossnegligence,contributingtotheaccident.TheCourtultimatelydeterminedthattheevidencethethirdpartieshadproducedinresponsetothegincompany’smotionforsummaryjudgmentwasinsufficienttoraiseanyfactquestionontheissueofgrossnegligence,butlanguageinthedecisionimpliedthathadtherebeensuchproofofgrossnegligence,acontributionorindemnityactionmighthavebeensustainable.Id.at554.Insupportofthatproposition,theCourtinWestfallcitedWestTexasUtilitiesCo.v.Renner,32S.W.2d264(Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland1930),aft’cl,53S.W.2d451(Tex.Comm’nApp.1932).InRermer,thethirdpartyutilitycompanysoughtcontributionandindemnityfromitscontractor,MosherSteel&MachineryCompany,foralawsuitbroughtagainstitbyaMosheremployeewhosustainedseriouselectricalinjuries.Amongotherthings,inaffirmingadirectedverdict25infavorofMosher,theCourtofAppealsnotedthattheutilityhadfailedtoestablishthatMosherwasguiltyof“activenegligence,”andthus,anycommonlawrighttocontributionwasunsustainable,evensettingasidetheprotectionsoftheWorkers’CompensationAct.TheCourtwentontosay,inwhatamountedtodicta,thatMosherhad“fullyprotectedhimselfagainsthisownnegligence(notamountingtogrossInegligence)byprovidingcompensationinsuranceforhisemployees,andcouldnotbecompelledtopayindirectlywhennoliabilityexistedtopaydirectly.”Id.at270.Needlesstosay,distinctionsbetweenactiveandpassivenegligenceasabasisforcommonlawcontributionhavenorelevancehere,giventhefactthatactionsforcontributionarecontrolledbyChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code,whichmakesnosuchdistinctions.TheothercasecitedbyMullins,KoninklykeNederlandscheStoombootMaalschappy,N.V.v.RoyalNetherlandsSteamshipCompany,301F.2d741(5“‘Cir.1962),effectivelyrecognizesthatawrittenstevedoringcontractinamaritimecontextenforceableunderfederallydevelopedmaritimelawprovidedabasisforathirdpartyshipownertosueastevedoringcompanycoveredbyTexasworkers’compensationforindemnity,inanactionbroughtbyalongshoremanemployee.TheCourtconcludedthatifalongshoreman’sactionagainsttheshippingcompanywaspermitted,“astatecompensationactcannotpreventanactionagainsttheemployerbythethirdpartybasedonafederallyjudiciallyestablishedmaritimecontractualwarranty.”Id.at746.IndiscussingWestfallandRermer,theCourtinterpretsthestateofTexaslawin1962,suggesting“thatTexasisa_sygtunwillingtotoruleoutanindemnitywherethereisashowingofgrossnegligenceonthepartoftheinjuredman’semployer,anditmight26evenbereadtomythatsuchanindemnityisnotbarredbyArt.8306.”Id.at646(emphasisadded).TheFifthCircuitdecisionfrommorethan50yearsagoindicatingTexaslaw(asreflectedintwoappellatedecisionsfrom1932and1956,respectively)wasstillunsettledastowhetherallegationsofgrossnegligenceonthepartoftheemployercreatedanexceptiontotheAct’sprotectionsfromthirdpartyliability,hasbeenechoedbynoTexasappellatecourtatanytimeintheensuingfivedecades,andnocaseciting§417.004ofthenewAct,whichhasbeenineffectsince1993,oranydecisionconstruingitspredecessor,Art.8306,§3(d),ofthepriorTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,datingallthewaybacktothe1970s,suggeststhatany“grossnegligence”exceptionactuallyexists.Inshort,thereisnothinginthecurrentstatutoryprovisionreliedonbyAppellee,anyotherprovisioninthecurrentTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,oranycaselawsincethenewActbecameeffectivetosupportMullins’belatedassertionofa“grossnegligence”exceptiontothestatutoryprotectionfromthirdpartyactionsforreimbursement.Accordingly,evenifthetrialcourthadpermittedapost-summaryjudgmentpleadingraisingthisoutdatedtheory,andpermittedthesupplementalsummaryjudgmentevidencethatMullinsarguesraisesafactquestionregardinggrossnegligence,theoutcomewouldnothavechanged.Finally,MullinsarguedinhisMotiontoVacatethatbecauseMartinezhadbeendesignatedasaresponsiblethirdpartyatsomepriorpoint,itistherefore“subjecttotherulesthatapplytoproportionateresponsibilityunlessanexceptiontheretoisapplicable.”(Appellant’sBrief,p.29).Theargumentisspecious,asasimplereadingofChapter33oftheTex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Codedemonstrates.Thedefinitionoftheterm27“responsiblethirdparty”inpertinentpartmeans“anypersonwhoisallegedtohavecausedorcontributedtocausinginanywaytheharmforwhichrecoveryofdamagesissought...”§33.0l1(6),Tex.Civ.Prac.&Rem.Code.Thatsamesectiondefinesa“liabledefendant”as“adefendantagainstwhomajudgmentcanbeenteredforatleastaportionofthedamagesawardedtotheclaimant.”§33.015,titled“Contribution,”states,undersubpart(a):Ifadefendantwhoisjointlyandseverallyliableunder§33.013paysapercentageofthedamagesforwhichthedefendantisjointlyandseverallyliablegreaterthanhispercentageofresponsibility,thatdefendanthastherightofcontributionfortheoverpaymentagainsteachotherliabledefendant...”Emphasisadded.Accordingly,contributionwouldexistinfavorofMullinsagainstMartinezonlyifthelattercouldconstitutea“liabledefendant,”asthetermisdefinedinChapter33.BecauseMartinezcannotbeliabletothe“claiman”(BonifacioGomez)foranyportionofthedamagesheisentitledtorecover,becauseoftheexclusiveremedyprovisionsoftheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct,thereexistsnorightofcontributionagainstMartinezunderChapter33.Caselawalsosupportsthenotionthattherecanbenocontributionclaimagainstacoveredemployer.InVarelav.AmericanPetrofinaC0.ofTexas,Imn,658S.W.2d561(Tex.1983),theCourtconstruedthepriorstatuterelatingtocontributionamongjointtortfeasors,Art.22l2(a),Tex.Civ.Stat.Ann.(repealed),holdingthattheprotectionsofthepriorTexasWorkers’CompensationActwereanexceptiontothestatutepermittingcontributionactionsbetweenjointtortfeasors.28ThedistinctionbetweenaliabledefendantandaresponsiblethirdpartyissetoutplainlyinthecaseofCityofElPasov.Collins,440S.W.3d879(Tex.App.—ElPaso2013,nopet).ThecaseinvolvedtheneardrowningofasixyearoldgirlwhileinthecareofChildren’sPlaceDaycare.Thechild’sparentsbroughtanactionagainstthedaycare,whichinturndesignatedtheCityofElPasoasaresponsiblethirdparty.TheplaintiffsthenamendedtheiractiontoincludetheCityasadefendant,incorporatingthemotiontodesignatetheCityasaresponsiblethirdpartyasabasisfortheiraffirmativeclaimsagainsttheCity.Id.at882.TheElPasoCourtofAppealsconcludedthattotheextenttheplaintiffsattemptedtoimposeliabilityontheCitybasedsolelyontheresponsiblethirdpartydesignation,withoutestablishingawaiveroftheCity’simmunity,itwaserrortodenytheCity’spleatothejurisdiction.Id.TheCourtnoted,citingTex.Civ.Prac&Rem.Code§33.004(i)(1)(2):“Thefilingorgrantingoramotionforleavetodesignateapersonasaresponsiblethirdpartydoesnotimposeliabilityagainstthatpersonandmaynotbeusedinanyotherproceeding,onthebasisofresjudicata,collateralestoppel,oranyotherlegaltheory,toimposeliabilityonthatperson.”TheCourtnotedapprovingtheCity’spositionthataresponsiblethirdpartydesignationcouldnotestablishliabilityagainstaparty,stating:“TheCityiscorrectthatthefilingorgrantingofamotionforleavetodesignateapersonasaresponsiblethirdpartyorafindingoffaultagainsttheperson“doesnotbyitselfimposeliabilityontheperson.”141.,citingTex.Civ.Prac&Rem.Code§33.004(i)(l).29Inshort,thelanguageofChapter33itself,andinparticularthedefinitionsofresponsiblethirdpartyandliabledefendant,makeitclearthataresponsiblethirdpartydesignationdoesnotestablishliabilityofthepartysodesignated,andthataclaimforcontributionunderChapter33canariseonlyagainstaliabledefendant.Accordingly,Mullins’argumentthatthemeredesignationofMartinez,acoveredemployer,subjectsittoacontributionclaimunderChapter33isentirelywithoutmerit.CONCLUSIONANDPRAYERThetrialcourtwascorrectingrantingMartinez’sMotionforSummaryJudgmentbasedontheprotectionsaffordeditasanemployerundertheWorkers’CompensationAct.OnceMartinezdemonstratedthatitwasacoveredemployerandthattherewasnowrittenagreementexecutedbyMartinezbeforetheGomezaccidentunderwhichitexpresslyassumedtheliabilityofMullinsand/orBlueSky,itestabishedacompletebartoMullins’claimsforindemnityorcontribution.Mullins’effortstocircumventtheliteralrequirementsofthestatutoryexceptionbyproducingacertificateofinsuranceidentifyingpoliciescoveringMartinez,aswellasacopyofMartinez’scommercialinsurancepolicy,establishmerelythatMartinezhadliabilitycoverageinplaceatthetimeoftheincident.NeitherdocumentconstitutesproofofanexplicitwrittenagreementexecutedbyMartinezpre—accidentunderwhichitassumedtheliabilityofMullinsand/orBlueSky.Mullins’belatedefforttorepleadtoincludegrossnegligenceallegations,ortosupplementthesummaryjudgmentevidencewithinformationpurportingtocreateafactquestionontheissueofgrossnegligenceisofnousetohimherebecausethereisno30recognizedexceptionto§417.004foranemployer’sallegedgrossnegligence.Grossnegligencebytheemployercanprovideabasisforrecoveryonlytothespouseandheirsofthebodyofanemployeewhosuffersfatalinjuriesinthecourseandscopeofemployment,notthecasehere.Finally,Mullins’argumentthatthedesignationofMartinezasaresponsiblethirdpartycreatesarightofcontributionunderChapter33iscontradictedbytheplainlanguageofthestatuteitself.WHEREFORE,PREMISESCONSIDERED,AppelleeMartinezR.O.W.,L.L.C.f/k/aMartinezInvestments,L.L.C.praysthatthisCourtaffirmthetrialcourt’sjudgmentandfurthergrantAppelleeallotherrelieftowhichitmayshowitselfjustlyentitled.31Respectfullysubmitted,WRIGHT&GREENHILL,P.C.221W.6thStreet,Suite1800Austin,Texas78701512/476-4600512/476-5382(Fax)By:/s/DavidP.BoyceDavidP.BoyceStateBarNo.02759770dboceFzD\_v_-g.comATTORNEYSFORAPPELLEECERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCEIherebycertifythattheaboveandforegoingBriefofAppelleecontains6,740wordsandthereforecomplieswiththemaximumlengthrequiredunderTex.R.App.P.9.4./s/DavidP.BovceDavidP.BoyceCERTIFICATEOFSERVICEIherebycertifythatatrueandcorrectcopyoftheaboveandforegoinghasbeenservedonthefollowingcounselofrecordinaccordancewiththeTexasRulesofCivilProcedure,onthis26"‘dayofAugust,2015:ViaECFandFacsimilePatrickF.Timmons,Jr.8556KatyFreeway,Suite120Houston,Texas77024-1806pftfcbtiininonslawfirm.coin/s/DavidP.BoyceDavidP.Boyce32APPENDIXTAB1=ici..436ssrn"LEGISLATURE-1-I'tEGULARSESSIONsuspended;andthatthisActshalltakee&‘ectandbeinforcefromandafteritspassage,anditissoenacted.‘PassedtheSenate,March12,1963:Yess25,Nays6;May23.1968,SenateconcurredinHouseamendmentby:1Vivavoeevote;passedtheHouse,May23,1963,withamendment,bysnon-recordvote.ApprovedJune10,1968.Efiective90daysafterMay24,1963,dateofadjournment.WORKMEN’SCOMPENSATION~—-LIABILITYOFASSOCIATIONCHAPTER437-S.B.No.223A"AC‘flmendlfli!‘haTEX“Workman’;CompensationlnuursneoLows12!thlcmm:byamendingSectlon3ofArticle3305,RevisedClvllstatutesof1025,soamended;providingnunvlnnuclause;anddeclaringanemer-Honey.BeitenactedbytheLegislatureoftheStateofTexas:Section1.Section3ofArticle8306,RevisedCivilStatutesofTexas,1925,asamended,“isamendedtoreadhercnfterasfollows:"Sec.3.Theemployeesofasubscriberandtheparentsofminorem-ployeesshallhavenorightofactionagainsttheiremployerorssuinstanyagent,servsntoremployeeofsaidemployerfordamagesforpersonalin-juries,andtherepresentativesandbeneficiariesofdeceasedemployeesshallhavenorightofactionagainstsuchsubscribingemployerorhisagent,servantoremployeefordamagesforinjuriesresultingindeath,butsuchemployeesandtheirrepresentativesandbeneficiariesshalllookforcompensationsolelytotheassociation,asthesameishereinafterpro-videdIor.Allcompensationmllowedunderthesucceedingsectionshereinshallbeexemptfromgarnishment,attachment,judgmentandallothersuitsorclaims,andnosuchrightofactionendnosuchcompensationandnopartthereoforofeithershallbeassignable,exceptasotherwisehereinprovided,andanyattempttoassignthesameshallbevoid.Ifanactionfordamagesonaccountofinjurytoordeathofanemployeeofssubscrib-erisbroughtbysuchemployee,orbytherepresentativesorbeneficiariesofsuchdeceasedemployee,orbytheassociationforthejointuseandbenefitofitselfandsuchemployeeorsuchrepresentativesorbeneficiuries,againstapersonotherthanthesubscriber,asprovidedinSection(is,Arti-cle'8307,RevisedCivilStatutesofTexas,1925,andifsuchactionresultsinajudgmentagainstsuchotherperson,orresultsinasettlementbysuchotherperson,thesubscriber,hisagent,servantoremployee,shallhavenoliabilitytoreimburseorholdsuchotherpersonharmlessonsuchjudgmentorsettlement,norshallthesubscriber,hisagent,servantorem-ployee,haveanytortorcontractliabilityfordamagestosuchotherpersonbecauseofsuchjudgmentorsettlement.inthesbsenceofawrittensgree—mentexpresslyassumingsuchliability,executedbythesubscriberpriortosuchinjuryordeath.NopartofthisSectionisintendedtolessenoraltertheemployeesexistingrightsorcauseofactioneitheragainsthisemployer,itssubscriber,oranythirdparty.65.Vex-non‘nAnn.Clv.St.art.8305,g3.1132LIBRARIESCh.438“TheAssociation.itsagent,servantoremployee,shallhavenolia-bilitywithrespecttoanyaccidentbasedontheallegationthatsuchacci-dentwascausedorcouldhavebeenpreventedbyaprogram,inspection,orotheractivityorserviceundertakenbytheassociationforthepreven-tionofaccidentsinconnectionwithoperationsofitssubscriber;provid-ed,however.thisimmunityshallnotaifecttheliabilityoftheassociationforcompensationorasotherwiseprovidedinthislaw,No‘partofthisSectionisintendedtolessenoraltertheemployeesexistingrightsorcauseofactioneitheragainsthisemployer,itssubscriber,oranythirdparty.”Sec.2.IfanySection,paragraphorprovisionofthisActhedeclaredunconstitutionalorinvalidforanyreason,suchholdingshallnotinanymanneraffecttheremainingSections,paragraphsorprovisionsofthisAct,butthesameshallremaininfullforceandeffect.Sec.8.TheimportanceofthislegislationandthecrowdedconditionofthecalendarinbothHousescreateanemergencyandanimperativepublicnecessitythattheConstitutionalRulerequiringbillstobereadonthreeseveraldaysineachHousebesuspended,andsaidRuleisherebysuspended;andthatthisActshalltakeatfectandbeinforcefromandafteritspassage.anditissoenacted.PassedtheSenate.March21,1963:Yeas30,Nays0;May20,1963,byauthorityofH.C.R.No.100billwasreturnedfromGovernor'sofiiceandcorrectionmade;passedtheHouse,May8,1963,byanon-recordvote;May20,1963,I-I.G.R~No.100was‘adopted.ApprovedJune10,1963.Effective90daysafterMay24,1963,dateofadjournment.LIBRARIES—DIS'I"RIBU'I‘IONOFSTATEDOCUMENTSCHAPTER4385‘S.B.No.266AnActtoestablishdepositorylibrarieswithnuihorityintheDirectorandLibrar-ianoftheTexasstateLibrary;requiringcertainact:tobeperformedtofacilitatedistributionofstatedocuments;anddeclaringanemergency.BeitenactedbytheLrgisloiicrcofilicStateofTexas:Section1.Theterm"statedocument”asusedinthisActmeansallpublicationsofstateagencieswhichtheTexasStateLibraryisauthorized'byRevisedCivilStatutes,1925,Article5442,toacquireanddistribute.Sec.2.Theterm“depositorylibraries”asusedinthisActmeanstheTexasStateLibrary,librariesofstateinstitutionsoi‘highereducation,andotherlibrariessodesignatedbytheTexasLibraryandHistoricalCom-missionupondeterminationthatsuchdesignationsarenecessarytopro-videadequaieaccesstostatedocuments.Sec.3.EachstateagencyshallfurnishtheTexasStateLibrarywithstatedocumentsinthequantityspecifiedintheRevisedCivilStatutes,1925,Article5442.See.4.Statedocumentsshallbemadeavailabletodepositoryli-brariesunderthedirectionoftheTexasStateLibrary.Sec.6.Tofacilitatedistributionofstatedocuments,eachstateagen-cyshallfurnishtheTexasStateLibrarywithalistofstatedocuments65.Vernon'sAnn.Ci\'.St.nrt.uuzn.H33APPENDIXTAB2BathLEGIl3LATURE—REGULARsmssxorqCh.131andthatthisActtaxi:affectandbeinfO!‘CIfromIndutteritsptluul,andit1:noInactld.1983‘l’g;,sx;dnE)l:‘e.r§;2;11§:juV‘;:tx;April21,1988:Yen31,Nxyn0:passedtheHouseonMny6,ApprovedMay17,1983.EffectiveAug.29,1983,90daysafterdateofadjournment.WORKERS‘COMPENSATION—BENEFITS—ASSIGNMEN’l1'0INSURANCECOMPANYCHAPTER131H.B.No.68AllAC1‘rantingtothenniqnmontofcox-tninvim-kart‘compunutionbnntfltltoAninnurlncucomplny.BEITENACTEDBYTHELBOXSLATUREOE‘‘DEESTATEOFTEXAS:SECTION1.sncczlon3,ArticloB306,RcviudBntutu,inunnndudsstorandnufollmu:Etc.3._(__:_lThuumpluyuuuorIuubucriborIndthuplrlntnofminoremployer:lhlllhavenurightofactionlqlinlttheiromploycroragainstanyIqont.nrvnntorumplaytoatIlidImpluyorfordunnqn{orpcrnannlsnjurhu,andthnrnpronntntivonandbnnuticluiuofdccmnadnnploycunhnllhnvnnorighta!nationnqninltsuchsubscribingampluyororhisaunt.urvnntorIwloyutardun:onforinjurhnrnlultinqindeath,butsuchcmplcyucluzétheirrupx-uuntntivcnandbununcuri-Inhnu.lookforcanpnnntlonIulclytotheunocintian,nuthyInn:1:hu-unntturprovidodInt._0_:_)_AllconspunutionnllowodundurU1:Iuccaodinquctionuhuruinshunbeoxnnpt{ramqlrninhacnt,nttnchnont,JudgmentInd:11othu:suit:orclntmn.IndnosuchrightatactionAndnosuchcampcnntionAndnoparttheme:orotnun:shall1::uuiqmhlo,cxcupf.ancthnrwiunh-rainprnvidnd,111:!anyattempttousual:the|u..¢shallbuvoid.55.Vernon'sAnn.Civ.SLart.8306.§3.Addition:intextlndicaudbymngnflm;dolationsby[Ma-ikoouu]613Ch.131eachLEGlSLAT‘URE—REGULARSESSION(c)Intheeventtheunacietinndeniesliabilityinnclaim$6anAccidentorhealthinnunncocongenxprovide:benefitstntheIglogeeformedicalaidhougitelux-vice:nurlingservice:ormedicine,thentherighttorecoverIuchamountmayheunsignedbytheemgleyeetothehealthornccidentinlurlnceCOEEIHE.lg)X:InnationfordenuquonaccountatinjurytoorduthofAnemployeeofenubncriberisbroughtbysuchemployee.orbytherepreeentntivenorbeneticilrielcfsuchdeceeeedemployee,orbythenseucietianforthejointuleendbenefitofitselfendsuchemployeeorluchreprenentetivexorbeneficiaries,against|personotherthentheIubscriber,IIprovidedinSection6:,Article8307.RevisedCivilStetutelofTexts,1925,endifsuchlctionreeultlinajudgmentngninutmuchdebt?person.atresult:inIsettlementbymuchotherperson,thesubscriber,hi:nqant,Ierventoremployee,shellhnvenoliabilitytoreimburseorholdmuchotherpersonhnrmlessonsuchjudgmentersettlement,norIhelltheIuhlcriber,hilluent.Iervnntoremployee,hIVllnytortorconttlctlinbilitytardamage:toIuchotherpersonbeceuneorIuchjudgmentorsettlement,inthenbuencec£:writtenAgreementexpuulyeuuminuIuchlid:-ility,executedbythesubscriberpriortomuchinjuryordeath.[Ne-pertai-ehh~Snet-.§an-Le-éntendebteiesuen-or-alter-the-employee:-extntin[-:§¢hte-er--eeuee--e£--actioneither--eye§nIt--h§I-empieyerr-its-euheeribs:r-er-eny-third-pertyw]131TheAlnocintion,itsnqent,Iervnntatemployee,shallhavenolinbilitywithrespecttomyaccidentbasedontheIlleqetionthntsuchAccidentwnlceueedorcouldhavebeenpreventedbyepraqrem,inlpection.orotherActivityoraerviceundertakenbythenslecinticnforthepreventionofAccident:inconnectionwithuperetioneoiitsIUDICXLDUI;provided,hcweventhinimmunityshallnot-sue:thelhbilityoftheeseocinticnforcompentntionorIIotherwisepravidedinthisluv.Lg)NapertofthisSectionisintendedtoXesuenorAlterthegggiggggig[empieyeeejexistingright:orclulea£Actioneithereqeinlthisemployer,itssubscriber.oranythirdpnrty.Additionsintextindicatedby_u[n_§Lg,r_I‘mg:deletionsbyletnikoouiel61468thLEGISLATURE-REGULARSESSIONCh.132station2.‘maimportancaatthislcqialationandthacrowdedconditionMthecalandarainbothhcuancraatoanemergencyandaninpcrativapublicnacaaaitythatthconatitutiunal2-uhx-aquix-incbillatoberaadcanthusaavnnl.dayaincashnounbaauapnndod,andthinruleinha:-obyauapandad,andthatthinActtakeafloatandbeintornfromandany:itapnnqa,anditinnoenacted.PassedbytheHouseonMarch90,1983:Yeas137,Nays0,1present,notvoting;passedbytheSenateonMay5.1983:Yeas31,Nays0,ApprovedMay17,1983.EffectiveMay17,1983.WORKERS’COMPENSATION——-DEATHBENEFITS-PBIORINCAPACITYCHAPTER132H.E.No.99ANAC1‘ralatinqtotanreductionofworkcrflcompanaationdeathbenafitabecauseatbanafitapaidforpriorpariod0!incapacity.BEITENACTEDBYIEIELEGISLATURE0!‘'1'!!!STATE0!‘TEXAS:SECTION1.sactionab,Article8305,RaviaodcivilStatute:ct‘Toxaa,1925,isamcndndsstoraadaatouovaxsec.ah.111incandaathaccu:-Iasaresultofthoinjuryafteraperiodoftotalorpartialincapacity.forwhichcompansationhaabeenpaid,thnperiodofincapacityshallbedeductedfrom(‘Juntotalpariodofcompensationandthobonufitapaidthnraundertronthemaximumalloucdforthedeath.(13)Suction8bdealnetagglgtolifatimadaathbonalitaaagrovidadbysectionBorthisarticlebutagglluonlytothanblnaficiariaaracaivin360vaokaofbanelita.~SECTION2.Itinuncartainandhasnotbunjudiciallydatormincduhuthatthaoifantpx-ovidcdbySactionBb,Article8306.Raviudcivilstatucaaoz’Taxaa,X925,appliaatothuutctimabanatitaproviaianaozsanction8orthatarticla.Thatactthatnudb.Vernon‘:Ann.Civ.St.art.8306,§Sb.Addition:intextindicatedby,un_d_g_r_l1n_g;deletionsby[ateikoeutsl615APPENDIXTAB3TITLE5.WORKERS’COMPENSATIONSUBTITLEA.TEXASWORKERS’COMPENSATIONACTCHAPTER401.GENERALPROVISIONSSUBCHAPTERA.SHORTTITLE;APPLICATIONOFSUNSETACTSec.401.001.SHORTTITLE.ThissubtitlemaybecitedastheTexasWorkers’CompensationAct.Sec.401.002.APPLICATIONOFSUNSETACT.Ed:RepealedbyActs2005,79thLeg.,H.B.7,eff.Sept.1,2005.Asadivisionwit1n'utheTexasDepartmentofInsurance(TDI),theDivsionofWorkers’CompensationisgovernedbythesunsetprovisonsregardingTDI.Sec.401.003.ACTIVITIESOFTHESTATEAUDITOR.(a)ThedivisionissubjecttoauditbythestateauditorinaccordancewithChapter321,GovernmentCode.Thestateauditormayaudit:(1)thestructureandinternalcontrolsofthedivision;(2)thelevelandqualityofserviceprovidedbythedivisiontoemployers,injuredemployees,insurancecarriers,sell‘-insuredgovernmentalentities,andotherparticipants;(3)theimplementationofstatutorymandatesbythedivision;(4)employeeturnover;(5)informationmanagementsystems,includingpublicaccesstononconfidentialinformation;(6)theadoptionandimplementationofadministrativerulesbythecommissioner;and(7)assessmentofadministrativeviolationsandthepenaltiesforthoseviolations.(b)NothinginthissectionlimitstheauthorityofthestateauditorunderChapter321,GovernmentCode.Ed:Thissectionwasaddedbythe2001Legislature.SUBCHAPTERB.DEFINITIONSSec.401.011.GENERALDEFINITIONS.Inthissubtitle:(1)“Adjuster”meansapersonlicensedunderChapter4101,InsuranceCode.Ed:Section4101.001oftheInsuranceCodedefines“adjuster”asanindividualwhoinvestigatesoradjustslossesonbehalfofaninsurerasanindependentcontractororasanemployeeofanadjustmentbureau,anassociation,ageneralpropertyandcasualtyagent,anindependentcontractor,aninsurer,oramanaginggeneralagent,orwhosupervisesthehandlingofclaims.However,Section4101.002providesthatthisdefinitiondoesnotapplyto,amongothers,clericalorsalariedpersonnelnotengagedregularlyinthenegotiationofcontestedclaims,attorneys,photographers,privatedetectives,estimators,andotherexperts.(2)“Administrativeviolation”meansaviolationofthissubtitle,aruleadoptedunderthissubtitle,oranorderordecisionofthecommissionerthatissubjecttopenaltiesandsanctionsasprovidedbythissubtitle.(3)“Agreement”meanstheresolutionbythepartiestoadisputeunderthissubtitleofoneormoreissuesregardinganinjury,death,coverage,compensability,orcompensation.Thetermdoesnotincludeasettlement.(4)“Alien”meansapersonwhoisnotacitizenoftheUnitedStates.16LaborCode~~~~~~Ed;Thistermdoesnotinclude“psychologist.”lag)“Employer”means,unlessotherwisespecified,apersonwhomakesacontractofhire,employsoneormoreemployees,andhasworkers’compensationinsurancecoverage.ThetermincludesagovernmentalentitythatscIf—insurcs,eitherindividuallyorcollectively./Ed:ThisdefinitionisnotstrictlyappliedthroughouttheAct.Forexample,SubchapterAofChapter406,dealingwithcoverage,doesnotexclusivelyapplytosubscribers.Tothatend,Section406.001provides:“Inthissubchapter,‘employer’Vmeansapersonwhoemploysoneorinoreemployees.”Othersections,too,usethetermlooselyduetosubsequentlegislativeamendments.Forexample,inSection408.042(c),dealingwiththeaverageweeklywageofemployeeswithmultipleemployment,theuseoftheword“employer”islikewisenotlimitedtosubscribers.(18-a)“Evidence-basedmedicine”meanstheuseofcurrentbestqualityscientificandmedicalevidenceformulatedfromcrediblescientificstudies,includingpeer-reviewedmedicalliteratureandothercurrentscientificallybasedtexts,andtreatmentandpracticeguidelinesinmakingdecisionsaboutthecareofindividualpatients.Ed:Thistennwasaddedbythe200SLegislatureandisusedinthedefinitionof“healthcarereasonablyrequired.”ItarguablyincorporatestheconceptsrequiredfortheadmissionofexpertevidenceunderE.1.DupontdeNemoursandCo.,Inc.v.Robinson,923S.W.2d594(Tex.1995)orforareviewofthesufficiencyoftheevidenceunderMerreIlDowPharmacezzticalsv.Havner,953S.W.2d706(Tex.1997).(19)“Healthcare”includesallreasonableandnecessarymedicalaid,medicalexaminations,medicaltreatments,medicaldiagnoses,medicalevaluations,andmedicalservices.Thetermdoesnotincludevocationalrehabilitation.Thetermincludes:(A)medical,surgical,chiropractic,podiatric,optornetric,dental,nursing,andphysicaltherapyservicesprovidedbyoratthedirectionofadoctor;(B)physicalrehabilitationservicesperformedbyalicensedoccupationaltherapistprovidedbyoratthedirectionofadoctor;(C)psychologicalservicesprescribedbyadoctor;(D)theservicesofahospitalorotherhealthcarefacility;(E)aprescriptiondrug,medicine,orotherremedy;and(F)amedicalorsurgicalsupply,appliance,brace,artificialmember,orprostheticororthoticdevice,includingthefittingof,changeorrepairto,ortrainingintheuseoftheappliance,brace,member,ordevice.Ed:Allhealthcaremustbeprovidedbyoratthedirectionofadoctor.VocationalrehabilitationisnotincludedinthisAct,butmaybeprovidedbytheTexasDepartmentofAssistiveandRehabilitativeServices(DARS)(SeeSection409.012).Subsection(l9)(F)wasamendedin2007bySB.458.TheSenateBillAnalysisstated:“Currently,artificiallimbsarenottreatedbyallworkers’compensationcarriersasaphysicalstructureofthebody.Therefore,anaccidentresultinginabrokenlegwouldbetreatableunderworkers’compensation,butthesameaccidentcausinginjurytoanartificiallegwouldnotcoverrepairorreplacementoftheartificialleg.‘Thegoaloftheworkers’compensationsystemistogetworkershealthyandbacktowork.SenateBill458ensuresworkers’compensationcarrierstreatartificiallimbsasnaturallimbs.”Tothatend,definitionsof“Oithoticdevice”and“Prostheticdevice”wereadded,aswellasredefining“healthcare”toincludethefittingof,changeto,orrepairto,thedevice.However,theamendmentsdonotachievethedesiredeffect,orforthatmatter,anychangetothelawatall.TheBilldidnotprovideachangetothedefinitionof“injury,”whichstillrequiresdamageorharmtothe“physicalstructureofthebody”asopposedtoanartificiallimb.Further,byonlyamendingthedefinitionof“healthcare,”theBillstilllinkstheentitlementtosuchdevicesonlytosituationswherethecarrierwouldotherwisebeliablefor“healthcare.”PursuanttoSection408.021,aclaimantisonlyentitledto“healthcare”ifhesustains“acompensableinjury.”Thus,thisamendmentinnoway“ensuresworkers’compensationcarrierstreatartificiallimbsasnaturallimbs.”Rather,itsimplyfurtherdefinescertaintermsandensuresthatthecarrierisliableforthereplacementorrepairofthedevice.AssuchtheAppealsPanel’sanalysisinTexasWorkers’CompensationComniissionAppealNo.91001,decidedJuly31,1991,isstillapplicable.LaborCode19EWOO.0.0.I11APPENDIXTAB4NotwithstandingSubsection(a),theguarantyfundisnotliableforthepaymentofanypenaltiesassessedforanyactoromissiononthepartofanypersonotherthantheguarantyfund.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~407A.461.POSSESSIONOFSECURITYBYGUARANTYFUND.theassumptionofobligationsonbehalfofaninsolventgroupbytheguarantyfundunderthecommissioner’srmination,theguarantyfundisentitledtoimmediatepossessionofanyassetsoftheinsolventgroupandanymydepositedortheproceedsofanysuretybonddepositedbytheinsolventgroup,alongwithallinterestonsecurity.Allassessmentsfrommembersoftheinsolventgroupshallbepaidtotheguarantyfund._l1407A.462.RELEASEOFCLAIMINFORMATIONTOGUARANTYFUND.Iftheguarantyfundhasassumedpensationobligationsonbehalfofaninsolventgroup,informationonaworkers’compensationclaimmaybeasedtotheguarantyfundasprovidedbySection402.084(a)..407A.463.GUARANTYFUNDASPARTYININTEREST.Theguarantyfundisapartyininterestinaproceedinginvolvingaworkers’compensationclaimagainstaninsolventgroupwhosecompensationobligationshavebeenpaidorassumedbytheguarantyfund.Theguarantyfundhasthesamerightsanddefensesastheinsolventgroup,includingtherightto:(1)appear,defend,orappealaclaim;7_(2)receivenoticeof,investigate,adjust,compromise,settle,orpayaclaim;and(3)investigate,handle,ordenyaclaim..407A.464.PREFERENCES.Benefitpaymentsmadebytheguarantyfundunderthissubchapterareentitledtothesamepreferenceover§otherdebtsofthcinsolventgroupasprovidedbylawtobenefitpaymentsowedbytheinsolventgrouptothepersonentitledtothebenefits.TheguarantyfundhastheprioritystatusprovidedbySection8,Article21.28,InsuranceCode._407A.465.SPECIALFUND.oniesadvancedbytheassociationunderthischapterdonotbecomeassetsoftheinsolventgroupbutconstitutespecialfundadvancedtothecommissioner,receiver,orotherstatutorysuccessoronlyforthepaymentofmpensationliabilities,includingthecostsofclaimadministrationandlegalcosts.CHAPTER408.WORKERS’COMPENSATIONBENEFITSUBCIIAPTERA.GENERALPROVISIONSSec.408.001.EXCLUSIVEREMEDY;EXEMPLARYDAMAGES.,Recoveryofworkers’compensationbenefitsistheexclusiveremedyofanemployeecoveredbyworkers’compensationinsurancecoverageoralegalbeneficiaryagainsttheemployeroranagentoremployeeoftheemployerforthedeathoforawork-relatedinjurysustainedbytheemployee.Thissectiondoesnotprohibittherecoveryofexemplarydamagesbythesurvivingspouseorheirsofthebodyofadeceasedemployeewhosedeathwascausedbyanintentionalactoromissionoftheemployerorbythe‘employer’sgrossnegligence.Inthissection,“grossnegligence”hasthemeaningassignedbySection41.001,CivilPracticeandRemediesCode.AdeterminationunderSection406.032,409.002,or409.004thataworli—relatedinjuryisnoneompensable‘/\doesnotadverselyaffecttheexclusiveremedyprovisionsunderSubsection(a)..TherightofrecoveryforacoveredemployeeorlegalbeneficiaryagainsttheemployeroragentoremployeeofemployerrestrictedsolelytocompensationbenefitsunlesstheemployeediesasaresultofanintentionalactorthegrossnegligenceborCode101|—..;>W,OWO,OUl'|'lLABORCODEoftheemployer.Inthatsituation,thespouseandchildrenofthedeceasedcanrecoverexemplary(punitive)damagefromtheemployer.ThisexceptiontothegeneralruleisrequiredbyArticle16,Section26oftheTexasConstitution.“Grossnegligence”isdefinedintheCivilPracticeandRemediesCodeas“morethanmomentarythoughtlessnesslinadvertence,orerrorofjudgment.Itmeanssuchanentirewantofcareastoestablishthattheactoromissionwastheresu[(ofactualconsciousindifferencetotherights,safety,orwelfareofthepersonaffected.”Additionally,despitetheexclusivitylanguage,Article1,Section13oftheTexasConstitutionpreservestherighttosuetheemployerforintentionalinjury.Unlesstheemployeeelectstotakethecompensationremedy,therighttosueforintentionalinjuryisnotdestroyedbyamerestatute.Further,theConstitutionfurtherprotectsthespouse’srighttosuetheemployerforlossofconsortiumduetointentionalinjury.ExceptfortheelectionagainstbenefitsallowedbyanemployeebySection406.034,anagreementtowaivebenefitsisvoid.Section406.035.SeeSection504.002regardingtheseissuesasrelatedtopoliticalsubdivisions.Subsection(d)wasaddedbythe2005LegislaturetoaddresspotentialprohlemsraisedintheSupremeCourtcases,WallsRegionalHospitalv.Bomar,9S.W.3d805(Tex.1999)andPaynev.GlaenHospitalHospitalCorp.,28S.W.3d15(Tex,2000).Sec.408.002.SURVIVALOFCAUSEOFACTION.Arightofactionsurvivesinacasebasedonacompensableinjurythatresultsintheemployec’sdeath.Ed:Thepurposeofthissectionisnotimmediatelyclearinlightofothersectionsinthe1989Act.ItisderivedfromArticle8306,§16ofthe“oldlaw.”Ithasbeenheldthattheformersectiondidnotrefertosuitsagainstacoveredemployerandgivesnorightofrecoveryagainsttheemployer;ratheritwas“intendedtopreservecausesofactionsarisingfromthoseaccidentstowhichthe[workers’compensation]insuranceisapplicable—i.e.,injuriessnstainedinthecourseofemployment,forwhichthirdpartiesareliable—andtopreventsuchcausesofactionagainstthirdpersonsnotinsured,fromabatementbydeath.”OrangeIce,Light&Waferv.TexasCompensationIns.Co.,278F.8(5"'Cir1922).Inotherwords,iftheemployeeisinjuredinthecourseandscopeofhisemploymentduetothenegligenceofathirdparty,andthatinjurysubsequentlyresultsindeath,thecauseofactionagainstthethirdpartysurvivestheemployee’sdeath.Thisensures,amongotherthings,thatthecarrier’ssubrogationinterestisnoteliminated.AlthoughthelanguageofthissectionisdifferentthanthatcontainedinArticle8306,§16,accordingtooneoftheauthorsofthe1989Act,thissectiondoesnotcreatea“substantivechangefromthepriorlawonsurvivalofacauseofaction.”1MONTFORD.Bzuznnn&DUNCAN,AGUIDEToTEXASWORKERS’Com.REFORM,§4.03,at4-39(1991).Section408.181(a)providesaderivative,butseparate,causeofactiontothebeneficiariesfordeathsthatresultfromacompensableinjury.Whenanemployeediesofcausesunrelatedtothecompensableinjury(exceptinthecaseofaspecificinjury),“theonlyclaimthatsurvive[s]hisdeath[is]oneforbenefitsaccruedandunpaidfromthedateofhisinjuryuntilthedateofhisdeath.“/lntwinev.Dallas1ndependentSchooIDistrict,698S.W.2d226,228(Tex.App.—Dallas1985,writref’dn.r.e.).SeeaIsoBaz'Ieyv.TravelersInsuranceCo.,383S.W.2d562(Tex.1964);Burris'Estatev.AssocialedEmplayersInsuranceCo.,374S.W.2d223(Tex.1963):Fitzhughv.AssociatedIndemnityCorp.,746S.W.Zd36l(Tex.App.—Eastlandl988,nowrit).TheAppealsPanelhasheldthatanestate’srighttoaccruedandunpaidbenefitssurvivesanon-compensabledeath.TexasWorkers’CompensationCommissionAppealNo.950310,decidedAprilll,1995.However,regardlessofthecompensabilityofthedeath,Section408.081(d)providesthat“[a]ninterestinfunu-2incomebenefitsdoesnotsurviveaftertheemployee’sdeath.”Althoughitmightbearguedthatimpairmentincomebenefitsaccrueonthedateofmaximummedicalimprovementiftheimpairmentratingisknown,pursuanttoSection408.l2l(a)(2),thedecedent’sentitlementtothesebenefitsendson“thedateoftheen1ployee’sdeath.”Sec.408.003.REIMBURSABLEEMPLOYERPAYMENTS;SALARYCONTINUATION;OFFSETAGAINSTINCOMEBENEFITS;LIMITS.(a)Afteraninjury,anemployermay:(1)initiatebenefitpayments,includingmedicalbenefits;or(2)onthewrittenrequestoragreementoftheemployee,supplementincomebenefitspaidbytheinsurancecarrierbyanamountthatdoesnotexceedtheamountcomputedbysubtractingtheamountofthcincomebenefitpaymentsfromtheemployce’snetpreinjurywages.(in)Ifaninjuryisfoundtobecompensableandaninsurancecarrierinitiatescompensation,theinsurancecarrier102LaborCodeAPPENDIXTAB5~~~~~rancecarrier.Intheabsenceofanagreement,thecourtshallawardtotheattorneypayableoutofthemacecarrier’srecovery:3reasonablefeeforrecoveryoftheinsuranceearrier’sinterestthatmaynotexceedone-thirdoftheinsurancecarrier’srecovery;and,.proportionateshareofexpenses.no;-neywhorepresentstheclaimantandisalsotorepresentthesubrogatedinsurancecarriershallmake“writtendisclosuretotheclaimantbeforeemploymentasanattorneybytheinsurancecarrier.Themantmustacknowledgethedisclosureandconsenttotherepresentation.Asignedcopyofthedisclosurebefurnishedtoallconcernedpartiesandmadeapartofthedivisionfile.Acopyofthedisclosurewith]aimant’sconsentshallbefiledwiththeclaimant’spleadingbeforeajudgmentisenteredandapprovedhecourt.Theclaimant’sattorneymaynotreceiveafeeunderthissectiontowhichtheattorneyisotherwisefledunderanagreementwiththeinsurancecarrierunlesstheattorneycomplieswiththerequirementshissubsection.nattorneyactivelyrepresentingtheinsurancecarrier’sinterestactivelyparticipatesinobtainingavery,thecourtshallawardandapportionbetweentheclaimant’sandtheinsurancecarrier’sattorneyspayableoutoftheinsurancecarrier’ssuhrogationrecovery.Inapportioningtheaward,thecourtshalliderthebenefitaccruingtotheinsurancecarrierasaresultofeachattorney’sservice.Thetotalrney’sfeesmaynotexceedone—thirdoftheinsurancecarrier’srecovery.purposesofdeterminingtheamountofanattorney’sfeeunderthissection,onlytheamountrecoveredbenefits,includingmedicalbenefits,thathavebeenpaidbytheinsurancecarriermaybeconsidered.ilethecarrierisstillrequiredtopayanattorney’sfeenottoexceedone-thirdofitssubrogationrecoverytoeithert’slawyer,thecarrier’slawyer,orboth,thefeeonlyappliestothepastsubrogationlienamount,ratherthananytureamounts.Ontheotherhand,carrierisnowresponsibleforitsproportionateshareofexpensesinrecoveringmonies,saidexpensestobepaidoutofthecarrier’spartoftherecovery.e*ernployee’sattorneyrepresentscarrierforsubrogationrecovery,fulldisclosureofdualrepresentationmustbernployec,furnishedtoallparties,ineludingthecommission,andfiledwiththecourtpriortoapprovalofjudgment.observethataclaimant’sattorneyrepresentingboththeclaimantandinsurancecompanyhasaninherentconflictparticularlywhenthirdpartyproceedsareinadequatetofundfullythesubrogationinterestandthedesiresofginiant.Carrier’sowncounselshouldbeemployedindependentlytoavoidconflictorviolationofTexasDisciplinary/WrofessionalConductoftheStateBarofTexas.04.EMPLOYERLIABILITYTOTHIRDPARTY.tionfordamagesbroughtbyaninjuredemployee,alegalbeneficiary,oraninsurancecarrieragainstartyliabletopaydamagesfortheinjuryordeathunderthischapterthatresultsinajudgmentagainsttheityorasettlementbythethirdparty,theemployerisnotliabletothethirdpartyforreimbursementorshasedonthcjudgnientorsettlementunlesstheemployerexecuted,beforetheinjuryordeathoccurred,Inagreementwiththethirdpartytoassumetheliability.mployee,beneficiaryorcarriersuesathirdpartyandrecoverseitherbyjudgmentorsettlement,theemployerhaveliabilitytothethirdpartyintheabsenceofanexpresswrittenindemnityagreementcreatingliabilityexecutedheaccident.Indemnityagreementsarewidespreadinindustry,andifdraftedproperly,validandenforceable.CHAPTER418.CRIMINALPENALTIES01.PENALTYFORFRAUDULENTLYOBTAININGORDENYINGBENEFITS.personcommitsanoffenseiftheperson,withtheintenttoobtainordenypaymentofbenelits,includingcdicalbenefits,underthissubtitleorSubtitleC,forhimselforanother,knowinglyorintentionally:makesafalseormisleadingstatement;'-misrepresentsorconcealsamaterialfact;orN162435WCPD0O.UI'll