J-A26044-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

THE MT. MORRIS SPORTSMEN’S 

ASSOCIATION

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

A. WILLIAM BOYERS, BARBARA E. 

STROSNIDER AND RUTH A. HAINES,

:

:

:

Appellants : No. 506 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order March 28, 20161

in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County,

Civil Division, No(s): A.D. 650 of 2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2016

A. William Boyers, Barbara E. Strosnider and Ruth A. Haines 

(collectively, “Defendants”) appeal from the Order granting summary 

judgment against them and in favor of The Mt. Morris Sportsmen’s 

Association (“the Association”) in this action to quiet title to surface, oil and 

gas rights as to a 101.5-acre tract of land in Perry Township, Greene 

 

1 We observe that on March 29, 2016, the trial court entered an Order 

resolving the claims of the parties, and stating that the Order would be 

made final upon the entry of a praecipe to enter judgment. Defendants filed 

a Praecipe that same date, but judgment was not entered on the docket. As 

the Praecipe rendered the March 29, 2016 Order final, we will address the 

merits of the claims raised.

 
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County, Pennsylvania (“the Property”).2 We reverse and remand with 

instructions.

Clara Boyers (the wife of William F. Boyers), James C. Mason, Cora B. 

Fox, William H. Mason and Sarah Mason (collectively, “the Mason Heirs”) 

each inherited an equal share of the Property upon the death of their 

mother. In 1924, the Mason Heirs recorded a deed (“the 1924 Deed”) 

conveying certain interests in the Property to William H. Mason and Sarah 

Mason. Thereafter, William H. Mason recorded a deed conveying certain 

interests in the Property to William F. Boyers and Clara Boyers (collectively, 

“the Boyerses”). 

As the trial court summarized in its Opinion,

[t]he Association and [] Defendants claim title [of the right to oil 

and gas underlying the Property] through a common source, 

William F. Boyers. [] Defendants assert that William F. Boyers 

severed and retained to himself the oil and gas rights underlying 

the [P]roperty through [a deed dated May 9, 1947 (“the 1947 

Deed”)]. The Association contends that those rights were 

transferred through the 1947 [D]eed [to John B. and Mary L. 

Maxon, husband and wife (collectively, “the Maxons”)], who, in 

turn[,] conveyed all of their rights to [the Association]. 

On July 10th, 201[4], the President of [the Association], 

Donley McCormick [“McCormick”], conveyed all the 

[Association’s] right, title, and interest in and to the oil and gas 

 

2 We note that “Pennsylvania recognizes three discrete estates in land: the 

surface estate, the mineral [or subsurface] estate, and the right to subjacent 

(surface) support. Because these estates are severable, different owners 

may hold title to separate and distinct estates in the same land.” 

Pennsylvania Servs. Corp. v. Texas E. Transmission, LP, 98 A.3d 624, 

629 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). 
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rights underlying the [Property, by means of a quit claim deed, 

(“the Quit Claim Deed”)] to [Defendants].

Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/16, at 1-2. 

In October 2014, the Association commenced the instant action 

against Defendants to quiet title to the right to oil and gas underlying the 

Property, and to void the Quit Claim Deed. Defendants filed an Answer and 

a Counterclaim to quiet title to the same right to oil and gas underlying the 

Property. At the close of discovery, the Association filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment, arguing that the Quit Claim Deed from McCormick to 

Defendants was void, as he lacked authority to convey the Association’s 

interest in the Property. Consequently, the Association claimed that it 

owned the surface of the Property, and an undivided 3/5 interest in the right 

to oil and gas underlying the Property. 

Defendants filed a Reply to the Association’s Motion, and a CounterMotion for Summary Judgment. By their Counter-Motion, Defendants 

argued that they own an undivided 2/5 interest in the right to oil and gas 

underlying the Property, and a 9/10 interest in the Property’s surface. 

Defendants further argued that James C. Mason owns an undivided 1/20 

fractional interest in the surface of the Property, and in the right to oil and 

gas underlying the Property. Finally, Defendants argued that the heirs of 

Cora B. Fox own an undivided 1/20 interest in the surface of the Property, 

and in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. 
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After oral argument, the trial court entered an Order and Opinion 

declaring the Quit Claim deed null and void, granting the Association’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing Defendants’ Counterclaim. 

Trial Court Order, 2/18/16. The trial court found that because McCormick 

lacked the authority to convey the Association’s oil and gas rights, the Quit 

Claim deed is void. Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/16, at 2-3 (unnumbered). 

Consequently, the Association retained ownership of the surface of the 

Property, and an undivided 3/5 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying 

the Property. Id. at 3 (unnumbered). 

Ultimately, on March 29, 2016, the trial court entered an Order 

granting the Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing 

Defendants’ Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment and Counterclaim, and 

stating that the Order would be made final upon entry of a Praecipe for final 

judgment. Trial Court Order, 3/28/16. On March 28, 2016, the Association 

filed a Praecipe to enter judgment. Thereafter, Defendants filed the instant 

appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of 

matters complained of on appeal.

Defendants present the following claims for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by dismissing Defendants’ 

Counterclaim and granting [the Association’s M]otion for 

summary judgment[,] and improperly interpreting the deeds in 

the chain of title to 101.5 acres of oil and gas rights underlying 

[the Property] ... and holding that [the Association] owns threefifths (3/5) of the oil and gas and Defendants have no ownership 

in said oil and gas rights[?]
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2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to consider the 

interest of Sarah Mason, which would have passed under 

intestacy laws to all of her four siblings and not just to her 

brother, William Mason[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by failing to properly interpret 

the 1947 deed from William [F.] Boyers to [the Maxons] 

whereby the Maxons received all of the surface and three-fifths 

(3/5) of the oil and gas[,] instead of nine-tenths (9/10) of the 

surface and one-tenth (1/10) of the oil and gas[?]

Brief for Appellants at 5-6. As all of Defendants’ claims implicate the 

interpretation of deeds in their chain of title, we will address the claims 

together.

Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is 

plenary. Gilbert v. Synagro Cent., LLC, 131 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2015). 

Our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order will be 

reversed only where it is established that the court committed 

an error of law or clearly abused its discretion. Summary 

judgment is appropriate only in those cases where the record 

clearly demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against 

the moving party. When the facts are so clear that reasonable 

minds cannot differ, a trial court may properly enter summary 

judgment. 

Id. (internal citation omitted). 

In their first claim, Defendants argue that the trial court improperly 

granted summary judgment in favor of the Association where the 1947 Deed 

(in their chain of title) excepted and reserved to William F. Boyers3an 

 

3 Defendants are the grandchildren of William F. Boyers. 
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undivided 2/5 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. 

Brief for Appellants at 17, 19. Defendants argue that if William F. Boyers 

had intended to reserve the same 2/5 interest in the right to oil and gas 

previously reserved by James C. Mason and Cora B. Fox in a 1934 deed 

(“the 1934 Deed”), he would have referred to that deed in his own exception 

and reservation. Id. at 20. 

In their second claim, Defendants assert that the trial court erred by 

failing to consider Sarah Mason’s interest in the Property, “which would have 

passed under intestacy laws to all of her four siblings and not just to her 

brother, William [H.] Mason.” Id. at 21. Defendants argue that upon Sarah 

Mason’s death, William H. Mason owned an undivided 17/20 interest in the 

surface, and 1/4 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. 

Id. at 22. According to Defendants, William H. Mason thereafter conveyed 

his interest in the Property to the Boyerses by means of the 1934 Deed. 

In their third claim, Defendants challenge the trial court’s 

interpretation of the 1947 Deed from William F. Boyers to the Maxons. Id.

at 25. Defendants argue that the 1947 Deed reserved to William F. Boyers 

his interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property, which 

subsequently passed to Defendants. Id. 

Defendants’ claims require us to construe the deeds in their chain of 

title to the Property. When construing a deed,

a court’s primary object must be to ascertain and effectuate 

what the parties themselves intended. Mackall v. Fleegle, 
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2002 PA Super 178, 801 A.2d 577, 581 (Pa.Super. 2002). The 

traditional rules of construction to determine that intention 

involve the following principles. First, the nature and quantity of 

the interest conveyed must be ascertained from the deed itself 

and cannot be orally shown in the absence of fraud, accident or 

mistake. [] We seek to ascertain not what the parties may have 

intended by the language but what is the meaning of the words 

they used. [] Effect must be given to all the language of the 

instrument, and no part shall be rejected if it can be given a 

meaning. [] If a doubt arises concerning the interpretation of 

the instrument, it will be resolved against the party who 

prepared it. [] ... To ascertain the intention of the parties, the 

language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of the 

subject matter, the apparent object or purpose of the parties 

and the conditions existing when it was executed.

Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318, 326-27 (Pa. Super. 

2005). 

[W]here there is any doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of 

the covenants in a contract or the terms of a grant, they should 

receive a reasonable construction, and one that will accord with 

the intention of the parties; and, in order to ascertain their 

intention, the court must look at the circumstances under which 

the grant was made. It is the intention of the parties which is 

the ultimate guide, and, in order to ascertain that intention, the 

court may take into consideration the surrounding 

circumstances, the situation of the parties, the objects they 

apparently have in view, and the nature of the subject-matter of 

the agreement.

In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d 471, 474-75 (Pa. 2006) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our review of the record discloses that, prior to 1924, the Property 

was owned by the Mason Heirs.4 By the 1924 Deed, Clara Boyers and her 

 

4 The Mason Heirs acquired title through their parents, Joshua and Mary 

Mason.
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husband, William F. Boyers, James C. Mason and his wife, Fannie Mason, 

and Cora B. Fox and her husband, Chas W. Fox (collectively, “the Mason 

Grantors”), conveyed their interests in the surface of the Property to William 

H. Mason and his sister, Sarah Mason (collectively, “the Mason Grantees”), 

“to hold as joint tenants and not as tenants in common.”5 1924 Deed 

at 1 (emphasis added). The Mason Grantees each continued to own an 

undivided 1/5 interest in the surface of the Property, which they inherited 

from their mother. The 1924 Deed, inter alia, included the following 

exception and reservation of oil and gas rights: 

Also excepting and reserving to the [Mason Grantors], their heirs 

and assigns, the [sic] three fifths (3/5) of all the oil and gas in 

and underlying above described tract of land together with the 

right to mine and operate for oil and gas and to lay pipe lines, to 

build tanks, stations and structures thereon and to take care of 

said products: the free use of sufficient water from the premises 

to run all necessary machinery and the right to remove at any 

time all machinery and fixtures placed on said premises by the 

said parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns for the 

purpose of operating oil and gas. 

1924 Deed at 2-3. As a result of the 1924 Deed, no Mason Grantor retained 

an interest in the surface of the Property. 

 

5

In a joint tenancy, each party holds an undivided share of the whole 

estate. General Credit Co. v. Cleck, 609 A.2d 553, 556 (Pa. 1992). Upon 

severance of the joint tenancy (by, for example, voluntary alienation), the 

realty becomes a tenancy in common. Id. “[A] joint tenancy with right of 

survivorship is severable by the action, voluntary or involuntary, of either of 

the parties.” Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d at 475. 
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In determining whether the 1924 Deed created a joint tenancy with 

right of survivorship as to the undivided 3/5 surface interest conveyed to the 

Mason Grantees, we are cognizant that, 

[a]t common law, the doctrine of survivorship was a recognized 

incident to a joint estate. The American doctrine, on the other 

hand, holds the creation of joint estates in disfavor and instead 

presumes that tenants hold as tenants in common, without the 

right of survivorship. This doctrine found expression in the 

legislature’s enactment of Acts 1812, March 31, P.L. 259, 5 

Sm.L. 395, § 1, which was later expressly saved from repeal by 

Acts 1972, June 30, P.L. 508, no. 164, § 3(b), effective July 1, 

1972, and transferred to 68 P.S. § 110 in 1974. 

...

Notwithstanding the legislative presumption against the 

right of survivorship in joint tenancies, the doctrine of 

survivorship has not been wholly abolished. This incident may 

still exist when expressly provided for by deed or will or 

when it arises by necessary implication. 

Riccelli v. Forcinito, 595 A.2d 1322, 1326 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations 

omitted, emphasis added). When two or more persons hold property as 

joint tenants with the right of survivorship, title to that property vests

equally in those persons during their lifetimes, with sole ownership passing 

to the survivor at the death of the other joint tenant. Estate of Quick, 905 

A.2d at 474. 

Here, the 1924 Deed expressly stated that the Mason Grantees would 

hold title to the conveyed 3/5 surface interest as “joint tenants and not as 

tenants in common.” 1924 Deed at 1. As a result, the 1924 Deed expressly 

created a joint tenancy between the Mason Grantees as to the undivided 3/5 
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surface interest conveyed by the 1924 Deed. See Riccelli, 595 A.2d at 

1326. Each Mason Grantee held an additional, undivided 1/5 interest in the 

surface of the Property, as tenants in common.

Our review further discloses that the 1924 Deed conveyed no oil and 

gas rights to the Mason Grantees. Prior to the 1924 Deed, each of the five 

Mason Heirs owned an undivided 1/5 share of the right to oil and gas 

underlying the Property. In the 1924 Deed, the Mason Grantors expressly 

excepted and reserved from the conveyance their 3/5 interest in the right to 

oil and gas underlying the Property. 1924 Deed at 2. As each Mason 

Grantee already owned an undivided 1/5 interest, as tenants in common 

with the Mason Grantors,6 no oil and gas interests were conveyed by means 

of the 1924 Deed. 

Sarah Mason died intestate and without issue on May 11, 1933. Upon 

her death, her jointly held 3/5 interest in the surface of the Property vested 

in William H. Mason. See Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d at 474. As Sarah 

Mason died intestate, the original interests inherited from her mother, i.e., 

her undivided 1/5 interest in the surface and the right to gas and oil 

underlying the surface of the Property, passed to her siblings by intestate 

succession. Consequently, upon Sarah Mason’s death, Clara Boyers, James 

C. Mason and Cora B. Fox each owned (a) an undivided 1/20 share in the 

 

6 The essence of a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship is the four 

unities: interest, title, time, and possession. Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d at 

474). The record reflects no deed creating a joint tenancy as to the 

undivided oil interests held by the Mason Heirs.
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surface of the Property, and (b) an undivided 1/4 share of the right to oil 

and gas underlying the Property. William H. Mason owned an undivided 

17/20 interest in the surface of the Property (a 3/5 interest through the 

1924 Deed, his original 1/5 interest, and the 1/20 interest inherited from 

Sarah Mason), and an undivided 1/4 interest in the right to oil and gas 

underlying the Property.

The record reflects that in 1934, William H. Mason executed the 1934 

Deed, transferring his interests in the Property to the Boyerses. The 1934 

Deed included the following exception and reservation of rights by William H. 

Mason:

Also excepting and reserving as recited in the previous deed 

of [the Mason Grantors,] dated September 27, 1924, the 

three-fifths (3/5) of all the oil and gas in and underlying 

the above described tract of land together with the right to 

operate for oil and gas and to lay pipe lines, to build tanks, 

stations and structures thereon to take care of said products, the 

free use of sufficient water from the premises to run all 

necessary machinery and the right to remove at any time all 

machinery and fixtures placed on said premises in keeping with 

said exceptions and reservations.

1934 Deed at 1 (emphasis added). By its language, the 1934 Deed 

conveyed William H. Mason’s 17/20 interest in the surface of the Property to 

the Boyerses. When combined with Clara Boyers’s 1/20 interest in the 

surface (inherited from Sarah Mason), the Boyerses owned an undivided 

9/10 interest in the surface of the Property.7 

 

7

James C. Mason and Cora B. Fox each continued to own an undivided 1/20 

interest in the surface of the Property, inherited from Sarah Mason.
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At the time of the 1934 Deed, William H. Mason owned an undivided 

1/4 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. The 1934 

Deed expressly excepted and reserved the 3/5 oil and gas interests 

originally excepted and reserved by the Mason Grantors in the 1924 Deed. 

The 1934 Deed did not except or reserve any additional oil and gas interests 

owned by William H. Mason. As a result, William H. Mason conveyed his 

undivided 1/4 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property to 

the Boyerses. When combined with the 1/5 interest Clara Boyers previously 

had excepted and reserved in the 1924 Deed, plus her 1/20 interest in the 

right to oil and gas inherited from Sarah Mason, the Boyerses owned, in 

total, an undivided 1/2 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the 

Property. 

In 1947, William F. Boyers8conveyed his interest in the Property to 

the Maxons. 1947 Deed at 1. The 1947 Deed included the following 

exception and reservation of rights: 

EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all the undivided two-fifths 

interest in all the oil and gas rights, together with all other 

minerals, in and underlying the [Property].

The title to the above described tract of land being in William H. 

Mason partly by descent from his father, Joshua Mason, and 

partly by conveyance from the heirs of the said Joshua M. 

Mason, his brothers and sisters.

 

8 Clara Boyers died prior to the execution of the 1947 Deed, leaving her 

estate to her husband, William F. Boyers. The Defendants claim title 

through William F. Boyers (their grandfather) and Albert A. Boyers (their 

father). 
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BEING the same tract of land conveyed by William H. Mason, 

Single, to William F. Boyers, by deed dated March 5, 1947 ....

Id. (emphasis added). Unlike prior conveyances, the 1947 Deed included no 

language referring to the exception and reservation of oil and gas rights set 

forth in the 1924 Deed (an undivided 3/5 interest), or any prior deed. 

Further, the 2/5 figure did not correspond to interests previously excepted or 

reserved.

At the time he executed the 1947 Deed, William F. Boyers owned an 

undivided 9/10 interest in the surface of the Property, and an undivided 1/2 

interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. He excepted and 

reserved “all the undivided two-fifths interest in all the oil and gas rights ... 

in and underlying the [Property.]” Id. As a result, the 1947 Deed expressly 

and unambiguously conveyed to the Maxons an undivided 9/10 interest in 

the surface of the Property, and a 1/10 interest in the right to oil and gas 

underlying the Property. William F. Boyers retained ownership of an 

undivided 2/5 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. 

In a deed recorded on February 11, 1957 (“the 1957 Deed”), the 

Maxons conveyed their interest in the Property to the Association. The 1957 

Deed included the following language:

ALSO EXCEPTING AND RESERVING all the undivided two-fifths 

interest in all the oil and gas rights, together with all other 

minerals in and underlying the [Property]. 

BEING the same tract of land conveyed by William H. Mason, 

Single, to William F. Boyer, by deed dated March 5, 1947 ....
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1957 Deed at 2 (emphasis added). 

The Maxons did not own an undivided 2/5 interest “in all the oil and 

gas rights.” Rather, they owned a 1/10 interest in the right to oil and gas 

underlying the Property. However, an undivided 2/5 of “all the oil and gas 

rights” had been excepted and reserved by William F. Boyers in the 1947 

Deed. Because the Maxons owned less than 2/5 of all oil and gas rights, we 

conclude that the exception and reservation set forth in the 1957 Deed 

clearly refers to the 2/5 interest excepted and reserved by William F. Boyers 

in the 1947 Deed. No other interpretation gives effect to the language of 

the 1957 Deed. 

Therefore, by the 1957 Deed, the Maxons conveyed to the Association 

their undivided 9/10 interest in the surface of the Property, and an undivided 

1/10 interest in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. William F. 

Boyers continued to own the undivided 2/5 interest in all rights to oil and 

gas underlying the Property, which he had previously excepted and reserved

in the 1947 Deed. 

On July 10, 2014, McCormick, as President of the Association, 

executed the Quit Claim Deed, purportedly conveying to Boyers, Strosnider 

and Haines, as tenants in common, 

ALL [the Association’s] right, title, and interest in and to the oil 

and gas rights within and underlying all [the Property] situate in 

Perry Township, Greene County, Pennsylvania ....

...
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BEING the same tract of land conveyed to [the Association], by 

Deed of John B. Maxon and Mary L. Maxon, dated January 15, 

1957 and recorded March 1, 1957 in the Office of the Recorder 

of Deeds for Greene County, Pennsylvania in Deed Book [Vol.] 

492, Page 285.

The purpose of this quitclaim deed is to relinquish any possible 

oil, gas and mineral interests held by Grantor in said property to 

[the Association] and is therefore exempt from transfer tax.

Quit Claim Deed at 1-2.

“[A] quit-claim deed is one which purports to convey, and is 

understood to convey, nothing more than the interest or estate of which the 

grantor is seised or possessed, if any, at the time.” Stewart v. Chernicky, 

266 A.2d 259, 267 (Pa. 1970) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In its 

Opinion, the trial court addressed the validity of the Quit Claim Deed as 

follows: 

Where a deed was given on behalf of the corporation, in the 

absence of requisite approval under the corporation’s 

organization documents, the transaction is void and the land 

must be reconveyed. Scientific Living, Inc. v. Hohensee, 270 

A.2d 216, 220-221 (Pa. 1970). Upon review of the oral 

arguments, Association Bylaws Section 5(d) and 15 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5506(a)[,] ... the [Quit Claim Deed] is not binding against the 

Association because it lacks proper approval by the Association’s 

board of directors and members. We therefore cancel the deed 

and declare it null and void.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/18/16, at 2-3 (unnumbered). We agree with and 

adopt the trial court’s reasoning and conclusion, with regard to the validity 

of the Quit Claim Deed. 
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Because the Quit Claim Deed is void, the Association continued to own 

an undivided 9/10 interest in the surface of the Property, and a 1/10 interest 

in the right to oil and gas underlying the Property. Defendants, as William F. 

Boyers’s heirs, own an undivided 2/5 interest in the oil and gas underlying 

the Property, which he had reserved and excepted in the 1947 Deed.9 

Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted 

the Association’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Defendants’ 

Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed Defendants’ 

Counterclaim. We therefore reverse the Order of the trial court. We remand 

for entry of an Order granting, in part, Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, and quieting title to (a) Defendants’ undivided 2/5 interest in the 

right to oil and gas underlying the Property; (b) James C. Mason’s (or his 

heirs’) undivided 1/20 interest in the surface of the Property; (c) Cora 

Mason Fox’s (or her heirs’) undivided 1/20 interest in the surface of the 

Property; (d) the Association’s undivided 9/10 interest in the surface of the 

Property, and (e) the Association’s undivided 1/20 interest in the right to oil 

and gas underlying the Property. 

Order reversed. Case remanded with instructions. Superior Court 

jurisdiction is relinquished.

 

9

James C. Mason and Cora B. Fox (or their respective heirs) each continued 

to own an undivided 1/20 interest in the surface of the Property, inherited 

from Sarah Mason.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2016