# FILED

January 13, 1998 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSE EASTERN SECTION AT KNOXVILLE

) ) KNOX JUVENILE STATE OF TENNESSEE ) DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ) NO. 03A01-9705-J V-00184 SERVICES, ) JOSHUA A. WILLIAMSON, ) ) HON. CAREY E. GARRETT Petitioner/Appellee, ) JUDGE ) v. ) ) CHRISTINA SANDERS, ) ) Respondent/Appella

nt ) AFFIRMED

Jean Brown Dyer,

Lenoir City, for

Appellant. John R. Rosson, Jr., Knoxville, for Appellee.

O P I N I O N INMAN, Senio r Judge An Order of Le

gitimation of the chil

d of Joshua Allen Wil

liamson and Christina Louise Sanders, born September 13, 1995 in West Germany, was entered on May 21, 19 96. By order entered September 24, 1996, pursuant to a petition to modify the Order of Le

gitimation, the Juven

ile Court held it to be

in the best interest o

f the child, formerly known as Alexander Baldwin Sanders, “to carry the name of his father . . . and hereafter to be known as Alexa

nder Baldwin Williamson.”

Mother appeals, in sisting that the fathe r failed to carry

the burden of2

proving that changing the surname of the child was in his bet interest. We affirm, for the

reasons following. The objection of the

mother to the change

of the name of her s on may be simply stated. Alexander is in her custody and lives in her home. She has another son who is ille

gitimate, and belie

ves that it would not be

appropriate for Alexander to have a different surname from his mother and half-brother. The father belie

ves that his son should bea r his surname so that the family name may be

carried on. He

testified that he ha

s established a bond with his son, and that

it is in the best inter

est of Alexander t

hat he share his father’s name. The guardian ad litem recommended the na me change as being in the best interest of Alexander; so did his paternal grandmother. Mother argues that T.C.A. § 68-3-305(b)(1) provides that a child’s surname shall be the surname of the mother when the mother was unmarried at the time of conception or birth. But a succeeding statute, T.C.A. § 68-3-305(c), provides that in any case where the paternity of a child is determined by a court of competent jurisdi

ction, the name of the father and surna me of the child shall be entered on the bir

th certificate in accordance with t he order of the Cour

t. The lack of clari

ty of the statutory sc

heme was allevia

ted by Barabas v. Rogers, 868 S.W.2d 283 (T enn. App. 1993), wherein we held: “The courts should not change a child’s surname un

less the change promotes the child’s best inte rests. Halloran v. Kostka, 778 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. 1988); see also In re Marriag e of Schiffman, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 921, 620 P.2d 579, 582 (1980); In re Cardinal, 611 A.2d at

517; Kristine C. Karnezi s, Annotation, Rights and Remedies of

Parents Inter Se With Respect to the Name of Their Children, 92 A.L.R.3d

66 § 8.5 (Supp. 1992). Among the criteri a for determin in g whether changing a child’s surname wi

ll be in the child’s best interests

are: (1) the child’s preference, (2) the change’s potential effect

o n the child’s relati

onship with each par

ent, (3) the lengthof time the child has had its present

surname , (4) the degree of community respect associated with the present and pro pose d surname, and (5) the difficu lty, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experienc e from bearing eit

her its present

or its3 proposed surname. I

n re Saxton, 308 N.W.2d 298, 30 1 (Minn. 1981); Bobo v. Jewell, 528 N.E. 2d at 185; Daves v. Nastros, 105 Wash.2d 24, 711 P.2d 31 4, 318 (1985). The parent seeking to change the child’s surname has the burd en of proving that the c

hange will further the

child’s best interests. In re Petition of Sch idlmeier, 344 Pa.Super. 562,

496 A.2d 1249, 1253 (1985); In re M.L.P., 621 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. Ct. App . 1981).” Our review of the

findings of fact ma

de by the trial court

is de novo upon the record of the tr

ial court, accom

panied by a presumptio

n of the correctne ss of the finding, unl ess the preponderan ce of the evidence is o therwise. T.C.A. § 50-6-225(e)(2). Stone v. City of McMinnv ille, 896 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tenn. 1995). No finding of the child’s preference can be made in view of his age, but the remaining criteria reasonably appear satisfied from the proof adduced at trial. Alexander knows his father, who provides for him; a bond has developed between them, he

has been legitimate

d and would obviously suff er community disrespect if he did not bear the surname of his father. W

e cannot find that the evidence preponder

ates against the judgm

ent, which is aff

irmed at the costs of the appellant.

__________________________ William H. Inma

n, Senior Judge CONCUR:

__________________________ Houston M. Goddard, Judge

__________________________ Herschel P. Fr

anks, Judge