# Euroopan unionin C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2490
  doi:10.3000/17252490.C_2009.158.fin |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopan unionin
  virallinen lehti | C 158 |
| | |
| Suomenkielinen laitos | Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia | 52. vuosikerta11. heinäkuu 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2490

doi:10.3000/17252490.C_2009.158.fin

Euroopan unionin

virallinen lehti

C 158

Suomenkielinen laitos

Tiedonantoja ja ilmoituksia

52. vuosikerta11. heinäkuu 2009

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| Ilmoitusnumero | Sisältö | Sivu |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Tiedonannot |
| | EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDONANNOT |
| | Komissio |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Ilmoitetun keskittymän vastustamatta jättäminen (Asia COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Ilmoitusnumero

Sisältö

Sivu

II   Tiedonannot

EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDONANNOT

Komissio

2009/C 158/01

Ilmoitetun keskittymän vastustamatta jättäminen (Asia COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Tiedotteet |
| --- | --- |
| | EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET |
| | Komissio |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Euron kurssi | 2 |
| | JÄSENVALTIOIDEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Yhteenveto säännellyistä markkinoista ja sijoituspalveludirektiivin (Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 2004/39/EY) täytäntöönpanosta jäsenvaltioissa | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Lentoliikenteen harjoittamisen yhteisistä säännöistä yhteisössä annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 1008/2008 16 artiklan 4 kohdan mukainen komission ilmoitus – Säännöllistä lentoliikennettä koskevat julkisen palvelun velvoitteet (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Tiedotteet

EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET

Komissio

2009/C 158/02

Euron kurssi

2

JÄSENVALTIOIDEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET

2009/C 158/03

Yhteenveto säännellyistä markkinoista ja sijoituspalveludirektiivin (Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 2004/39/EY) täytäntöönpanosta jäsenvaltioissa

3

2009/C 158/04

Lentoliikenteen harjoittamisen yhteisistä säännöistä yhteisössä annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 1008/2008 16 artiklan 4 kohdan mukainen komission ilmoitus – Säännöllistä lentoliikennettä koskevat julkisen palvelun velvoitteet (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Ilmoitukset |
| --- | --- |
| | HALLINNOLLISET MENETTELYT |
| | Komissio |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Ehdotuspyyntö – EACEA/11/2009 – Rakennetuki EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatioille ja Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöille – Kansalaisten Eurooppa -ohjelma, toimi 2, toimenpiteet 1 ja 2 – 2010 | 10 |
| | KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOIMEENPANOON LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT |
| | Komissio |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Valtiontuki – Alankomaat – Valtiontuki C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen EY:n perustamissopimuksen 88 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | MUUT ILMOITUKSET |
| | Komissio |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Maataloustuotteiden ja elintarvikkeiden rekisteröimisestä aidoiksi perinteisiksi tuotteiksi annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 509/2006 8 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu rekisteröintihakemuksen julkaiseminen | 24 |

V   Ilmoitukset

HALLINNOLLISET MENETTELYT

Komissio

2009/C 158/05

Ehdotuspyyntö – EACEA/11/2009 – Rakennetuki EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatioille ja Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöille – Kansalaisten Eurooppa -ohjelma, toimi 2, toimenpiteet 1 ja 2 – 2010

10

KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOIMEENPANOON LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT

Komissio

2009/C 158/06

Valtiontuki – Alankomaat – Valtiontuki C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen EY:n perustamissopimuksen 88 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti (
  1
  )

1

13

MUUT ILMOITUKSET

Komissio

2009/C 158/07

Maataloustuotteiden ja elintarvikkeiden rekisteröimisestä aidoiksi perinteisiksi tuotteiksi annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 509/2006 8 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu rekisteröintihakemuksen julkaiseminen

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti |

---

(1)   ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti

1

| FI | |
| --- | --- |

FI

---

II Tiedonannot

EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDONANNOT

Komissio

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/1

---

Ilmoitetun keskittymän vastustamatta jättäminen

(Asia COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI)

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2009/C 158/01

Komissio päätti 14 päivänä toukokuuta 2009 olla vastustamatta edellä mainittua keskittymää ja todeta sen yhteismarkkinoille soveltuvaksi. Päätös perustuu neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 139/2004 6 artiklan 1 kohdan b alakohtaan. Päätöksen koko teksti on saatavilla vain englannin ja se julkistetaan sen jälkeen kun siitä on poistettu mahdolliset liikesalaisuudet. Päätös on saatavilla:

| — | komission kilpailun pääosaston verkkosivuilla (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/); sivuilla on monenlaisia hakukeinoja sulautumapäätösten löytämiseksi, muun muassa yritys-, asianumero-, päivämäärä- ja alakohtaiset hakemistot, |
| --- | --- |

—

komission kilpailun pääosaston verkkosivuilla (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/); sivuilla on monenlaisia hakukeinoja sulautumapäätösten löytämiseksi, muun muassa yritys-, asianumero-, päivämäärä- ja alakohtaiset hakemistot,

| — | sähköisessä muodossa EUR-Lex-sivustolta (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) asiakirjanumerolla 32009M5403. EUR-Lex on Euroopan yhteisön oikeuden online-tietokanta. |
| --- | --- |

—

sähköisessä muodossa EUR-Lex-sivustolta (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) asiakirjanumerolla 32009M5403. EUR-Lex on Euroopan yhteisön oikeuden online-tietokanta.

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IV Tiedotteet

EUROOPAN UNIONIN TOIMIELINTEN JA ELINTEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET

Komissio

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/2

---

Euron kurssi (1)

10. heinäkuuta 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Rahayksikkö | Kurssi |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Yhdysvaltain dollaria | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Japanin jeniä | 128,21 |
| DKK | Tanskan kruunua | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Englannin puntaa | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Ruotsin kruunua | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Sveitsin frangia | 1,5140 |
| ISK | Islannin kruunua | |
| NOK | Norjan kruunua | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Bulgarian leviä | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tšekin korunaa | 26,030 |
| EEK | Viron kruunua | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Unkarin forinttia | 277,50 |
| LTL | Liettuan litiä | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Latvian latia | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Puolan zlotya | 4,3740 |
| RON | Romanian leuta | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Turkin liiraa | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Australian dollaria | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Kanadan dollaria | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hongkongin dollaria | 10,7736 |
| NZD | Uuden-Seelannin dollaria | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Singaporin dollaria | 2,0331 |
| KRW | Etelä-Korean wonia | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | Etelä-Afrikan randia | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Kiinan juan renminbiä | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Kroatian kunaa | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiaa | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Malesian ringgitiä | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Filippiinien pesoa | 67,026 |
| RUB | Venäjän ruplaa | 45,4005 |
| THB | Thaimaan bahtia | 47,382 |
| BRL | Brasilian realia | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Meksikon pesoa | 19,0303 |
| INR | Intian rupiaa | 67,8230 |

Rahayksikkö

Kurssi

USD

Yhdysvaltain dollaria

1,3901

JPY

Japanin jeniä

128,21

DKK

Tanskan kruunua

7,4466

GBP

Englannin puntaa

0,85800

SEK

Ruotsin kruunua

11,0022

CHF

Sveitsin frangia

1,5140

ISK

Islannin kruunua

NOK

Norjan kruunua

9,0840

BGN

Bulgarian leviä

1,9558

CZK

Tšekin korunaa

26,030

EEK

Viron kruunua

15,6466

HUF

Unkarin forinttia

277,50

LTL

Liettuan litiä

3,4528

LVL

Latvian latia

0,6993

PLN

Puolan zlotya

4,3740

RON

Romanian leuta

4,2160

TRY

Turkin liiraa

2,1636

AUD

Australian dollaria

1,7940

CAD

Kanadan dollaria

1,6212

HKD

Hongkongin dollaria

10,7736

NZD

Uuden-Seelannin dollaria

2,2250

SGD

Singaporin dollaria

2,0331

KRW

Etelä-Korean wonia

1 786,89

ZAR

Etelä-Afrikan randia

11,4023

CNY

Kiinan juan renminbiä

9,4983

HRK

Kroatian kunaa

7,3315

IDR

Indonesian rupiaa

14 174,11

MYR

Malesian ringgitiä

4,9731

PHP

Filippiinien pesoa

67,026

RUB

Venäjän ruplaa

45,4005

THB

Thaimaan bahtia

47,382

BRL

Brasilian realia

2,8084

MXN

Meksikon pesoa

19,0303

INR

Intian rupiaa

67,8230

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(1)  Lähde: Euroopan keskuspankin ilmoittama viitekurssi.

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JÄSENVALTIOIDEN ANTAMAT TIEDOTTEET

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/3

---

Yhteenveto säännellyistä markkinoista ja sijoituspalveludirektiivin (Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston direktiivi 2004/39/EY) täytäntöönpanosta jäsenvaltioissa

2009/C 158/03

Rahoitusvälineiden markkinoista annetun direktiivin 2004/39/EY (EUVL L 145, 30.4.2004) 47 artiklassa säädetään, että jokainen jäsenvaltio voi antaa ”säänneltyjen markkinoiden” aseman sen alueella toimiville ja sen säännöksiä noudattaville markkinoille.

Direktiivin 2004/39/EY 4 artiklan 1 kohdan 14 alakohdassa määritellään ”säännellyt markkinat” markkinoiden ylläpitäjän ylläpitämäksi ja/tai hallinnoimaksi monenkeskiseksi järjestelmäksi, joka kyseisessä järjestelmässä ja järjestelmän ehdottomien sääntöjen mukaisesti kokoaa yhteen rahoitusvälineitä koskevat useiden kolmansien osapuolten osto- ja myynti-intressit tai helpottaa niiden yhteen kokoamista siten, että tuloksena on sopimus sellaisista rahoitusvälineistä, jotka on otettu kaupankäynnin kohteeksi näiden markkinoiden sääntöjen ja/tai järjestelmien mukaisesti, ja jolla on toimilupa ja joka toimii säännöllisesti ja direktiivin 2004/39/EY III osaston säännösten mukaisesti.

Direktiivin 2004/39/EY 47 artiklassa säädetään, että jokaisen jäsenvaltion on laadittava ajantasainen luettelo säännellyistä markkinoista, joille se on antanut toimiluvan. Kyseiset tiedot on toimitettava muille jäsenvaltioille ja Euroopan komissiolle. Kyseisen artiklan mukaan komissio julkaisee sille toimitetut säänneltyjä markkinoita koskevat ajantasaiset tiedot Euroopan unionin virallisessa lehdessä vähintään kerran vuodessa. Oheinen luettelo on laadittu tämän vaatimuksen mukaisesti.

Oheisesta luettelosta ilmenee toimivaltaisten kansallisten viranomaisten ”säännellyiksi markkinoiksi” vahvistamien markkinoiden nimet. Lisäksi siinä mainitaan markkinoiden toiminnasta vastaava yksikkö sekä toimivaltainen viranomainen, jonka tehtävänä on antaa tai hyväksyä markkinoita koskevat säännöt.

Markkinoille tulon esteiden madaltumisen ja kaupankäynnin erikoistumisen myötä ”säänneltyjen markkinoiden” luettelo muuttuu nopeammin kuin sijoituspalveludirektiivin 93/22/ETY nojalla. Rahoitusvälineiden markkinoista annetun direktiivin 47 artiklan mukaan Euroopan komission on myös julkaistava säänneltyjen markkinoiden luettelo internetsivuillaan ja päivitettävä sitä säännöllisesti. Sen lisäksi, että luettelo julkaistaan vuosittain EUVL:ssä, Euroopan komissio aikoo pitää ajantasaisen version luettelosta virallisilla internetsivuillaan [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Luetteloa päivitetään säännöllisesti kansallisten viranomaisten toimittamien tietojen perusteella. Viranomaisia pyydetään ilmoittamaan jatkossakin komissiolle kaikista muutoksista, jotka ne ovat tehneet kotijäsenvaltionsa säänneltyjen markkinoiden luetteloon.

| Jäsenvaltio | Säänneltyjen markkinoiden nimi | Toiminnanharjoittaja | Markkinoiden nimeämisestä ja valvonnasta vastaava viranomainen |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Itävalta | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (viralliset markkinat) |

Jäsenvaltio

Säänneltyjen markkinoiden nimi

Toiminnanharjoittaja

Markkinoiden nimeämisestä ja valvonnasta vastaava viranomainen

Itävalta

1.

Amtlicher Handel (viralliset markkinat)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (puoliviralliset markkinat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (puoliviralliset markkinat)

| 1.–2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.–2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.–2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomainen) |
| --- | --- |

1.–2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomainen)

Belgia

| 1. | a) | Le marché ”Euronext Brussels”/De ”Euronext Brussels” markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché ”Euronext Brussels”/De ”Euronext Brussels” markt,

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie-en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie-en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgaria

| 1. | Официален пазар (viralliset markkinat) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (viralliset markkinat)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (epäviralliset markkinat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (epäviralliset markkinat)

Българска Фондова Борса – София АД (Bulgarian arvopaperipörssi – Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Rahoitusalan valvontakomissio)

Kypros

Cyprus Stock Exchange (Kyproksen arvopaperipörssi)

| 1. | Päämarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

1.

Päämarkkinat

| 2. | Rinnakkaismarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rinnakkaismarkkinat

| 3. | Vaihtoehtoiset markkinat |
| --- | --- |

3.

Vaihtoehtoiset markkinat

| 4. | Joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

4.

Joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat

| 5. | Sijoitusyhtiömarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

5.

Sijoitusyhtiömarkkinat

| 6. | Suurten hankkeiden markkinat |
| --- | --- |

6.

Suurten hankkeiden markkinat

| 7. | Valtameriliikenteen markkinat |
| --- | --- |

7.

Valtameriliikenteen markkinat

| 1.–7. | Kyproksen arvopaperipörssi |
| --- | --- |

1.–7.

Kyproksen arvopaperipörssi

| 1.–7. | Kyproksen arvopaperi-ja valuuttakomissio (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission) |
| --- | --- |

1.–7.

Kyproksen arvopaperi-ja valuuttakomissio (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission)

Tšekki

| 1. | Päämarkkinat (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Päämarkkinat (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Vapaat markkinat (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Vapaat markkinat (Volný trh)

| 3. | Viralliset markkinat |
| --- | --- |

3.

Viralliset markkinat

| 4. | Futuurimarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

4.

Futuurimarkkinat

| 5. | Spotmarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

5.

Spotmarkkinat

| 1.–2. | Prahan arvopaperipörssi
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.–2.

Prahan arvopaperipörssi

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM-SYSTEM, Tšekin arvopaperipörssi
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM-SYSTEM, Tšekin arvopaperipörssi

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.–5. | Prahan energiapörssi
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.–5.

Prahan energiapörssi

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.–5. | Tšekin keskuspankki |
| --- | --- |

1.–5.

Tšekin keskuspankki

Tanska

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | osakemarkkinat |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

osakemarkkinat

| — | joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat

| — | johdannaismarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

johdannaismarkkinat

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Kööpenhaminan arvopaperipörssi Oy) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Kööpenhaminan arvopaperipörssi Oy)

Finanstilsynet (Tanskan rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [säännöllinen kauppa arvopapereilla, jotka on otettu kaupankäynnin kohteeksi mutta ei julkisesti noteerattu] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [säännöllinen kauppa arvopapereilla, jotka on otettu kaupankäynnin kohteeksi mutta ei julkisesti noteerattu]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

Viro

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Arvopaperipörssi)






  — | Põhinimekiri (päälista) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Arvopaperipörssi)

—

Põhinimekiri (päälista)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (joukkovelkakirjalista) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (joukkovelkakirjalista)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (rahastolista) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (rahastolista)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Oy)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Viron rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Säännellyt markkinat)






  — | Lisanimekiri (toissijainen lista) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Säännellyt markkinat)

—

Lisanimekiri (toissijainen lista)

Suomi

Arvopaperipörssi:

| — | Pörssilista |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista

| — | Pre-lista |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy

Nimeäminen:

valtiovarainministeriö

Valvonta:

| — | Sääntöjen hyväksyntä: valtiovarain-ministeriö |
| --- | --- |

—

Sääntöjen hyväksyntä: valtiovarain-ministeriö

| — | Noudattamisen valvonta:
  Finanssivalvonta |
| --- | --- |

—

Noudattamisen valvonta:

Finanssivalvonta

Ranska

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1–3)

Ehdotus: Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF)

Hyväksyntä: talousministeri (ks. code monétaire et financier, L. 421-1§)

Saksa

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (osavaltioiden pörssivalvontaviranomaiset) ja Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)

Osavaltioiden viranomaiset:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berliini |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berliini

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt)

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Kreikka

| 1. | Ateenan pörssi






  — | arvopaperimarkkinat |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Ateenan pörssi

—

arvopaperimarkkinat

| — | johdannaismarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

johdannaismarkkinat

| 1. | Ateenan pörssi |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ateenan pörssi

| 1. | Kreikan pääomamarkkinoiden valvontakomissio (Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Kreikan pääomamarkkinoiden valvontakomissio (Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC))

| 2. | Sähköiset arvopapereiden jälkimarkkinat (HDAT — velkainstrumenttimarkkinat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Sähköiset arvopapereiden jälkimarkkinat (HDAT — velkainstrumenttimarkkinat)

| 2. | Kreikan keskuspankki |
| --- | --- |

2.

Kreikan keskuspankki

| 2. | Kreikan pääomamarkkinoiden valvontakomissio |
| --- | --- |

2.

Kreikan pääomamarkkinoiden valvontakomissio

Unkari

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapestin arvopaperipörssi)

| — | Részvényszekció (osakejaosto) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (osakejaosto)

| — | Hitelpapír Szekció (velkainstrumenttijaosto) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír Szekció (velkainstrumenttijaosto)

| — | Származékos Szekció (johdannaisjaosto) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos Szekció (johdannaisjaosto)

| — | Áru szekció (hyödykejaosto) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (hyödykejaosto)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapestin arvopaperipörssi)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Unkarin rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

Irlanti

Main Market of the Irish Stock Exchange (Irlannin arvopaperipörssin päämarkkinat)

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd (Irlannin arvopaperipörssi Oy)

Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (Irlannin rahoituspalvelujen sääntelyviranomainen eli ”Financial Regulator”) hyväksyy ”säännellyt markkinat” (lukuun ottamatta listalleottoehtoja) ja valvoo, noudattavatko markkinatoimijat rahoitusmarkkinadirektiiviä

Italia

| 1. | Sähköiset osakemarkkinat (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Sähköiset osakemarkkinat (MTA)

| 2. | Sähköiset joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Sähköiset joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat (MOT)

| 3. | Sähköiset avoimet rahastot ja pörssinoteerattujen raaka-aineiden (ETC:t) markkinat (EFT-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Sähköiset avoimet rahastot ja pörssinoteerattujen raaka-aineiden (ETC:t) markkinat (EFT-Plus)

| 4. | Sähköiset arvopapereiden johdannaismarkkinat (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Sähköiset arvopapereiden johdannaismarkkinat (SeDeX)

| 5. | After Hours -markkinat (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

After Hours -markkinat (TAH)

| 6. | Italian johdannaismarkkinat, joilla käydään kauppaa konsolidoidun rahoituslain (IDEM) 1(2)(f) ja 1(2)(i) ykälissä tarkoitetuilla rahoitusvälineillä |
| --- | --- |

6.

Italian johdannaismarkkinat, joilla käydään kauppaa konsolidoidun rahoituslain (IDEM) 1(2)(f) ja 1(2)(i) ykälissä tarkoitetuilla rahoitusvälineillä

| 7. | Italian ja ulkomaisten hallitusten joukkolainojen tukkumarkkinat (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Italian ja ulkomaisten hallitusten joukkolainojen tukkumarkkinat (MTS)

| 8. | Sellaisten kansainvälisten organisaatioiden, joissa hallitukset ovat mukana, liikkeeseen laskemilla hallituksesta riippumattomilla joukkolainoilla ja arvopapereilla käytävä tukkukauppa (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Sellaisten kansainvälisten organisaatioiden, joissa hallitukset ovat mukana, liikkeeseen laskemilla hallituksesta riippumattomilla joukkolainoilla ja arvopapereilla käytävä tukkukauppa (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Valtion joukkolainojen internet-tukkukauppa (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Valtion joukkolainojen internet-tukkukauppa (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX-markkinat |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX-markkinat

| 1.–6. | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1.–6.

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7.–9. | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato – MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7.–9.

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato – MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

Consob hyväksyy pörssitoimintaa järjestävät yhtiöt ja niiden säännöt.

Valtiovarainministeriö hyväksyy Consobia ja Italian keskuspankkia (Banca d'Italia) kuultuaan valtion arvopapereita tukkumarkkinoilla hoitavan yhtiön.

Latvia

NASDAQ OMX Riga

| — | päälista |
| --- | --- |

—

päälista

| — | joukkovelkakirjalista |
| --- | --- |

—

joukkovelkakirjalista

| — | toissijainen lista |
| --- | --- |

—

toissijainen lista

| — | rahastolista |
| --- | --- |

—

rahastolista

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Rahoitus-ja pääomamarkkinoiden valvontakomissio)

Liettua

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin päälista |
| --- | --- |

—

Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin päälista

| — | Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin toissijainen lista |
| --- | --- |

—

Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin toissijainen lista

| — | Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin joukkovelkakirjalista |
| --- | --- |

—

Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin joukkovelkakirjalista

| — | Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin rahastolista |
| --- | --- |

—

Nasdaq OMX Vilniusin rahastolista

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Liettuan arvopaperialan valvontakomissio

Luxemburg

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier (Rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

Malta

Maltan arvopaperipörssi (Malta Stock Exchange)

Maltan arvopaperipörssi (Malta Stock Exchange)

Maltan rahoituspalvelu-viranomainen (Malta Financial Services Authority)

Alankomaat

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.–3. | Lupa: Alankomaiden valtiovarainministeri kuultuaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomaista.
  Valvonta: Rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomainen ja Alankomaiden valtiovarainministeriö |
| --- | --- |

1.–3.

Lupa: Alankomaiden valtiovarainministeri kuultuaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomaista.

Valvonta: Rahoitusmarkkinoiden valvontaviranomainen ja Alankomaiden valtiovarainministeriö

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Puola

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (päämarkkinat) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (päämarkkinat)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (rinnakkaismarkkinat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (rinnakkaismarkkinat)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO arvopaperimarkkinat – säännellyt pörssin ulkopuoliset markkinat) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO arvopaperimarkkinat – säännellyt pörssin ulkopuoliset markkinat)

| 1–2. | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Varsovan arvopaperipörssi) |
| --- | --- |

1–2.

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Varsovan arvopaperipörssi)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Puolan rahoitusalan valvontakomissio)

Portugali

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (viralliset markkinat) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (viralliset markkinat)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (futuuri-ja optiomarkkinat) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (futuuri-ja optiomarkkinat)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (julkisen sektorin lainamarkkinat) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (julkisen sektorin lainamarkkinat)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(energiamarkkinat)

| 1–2. | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1–2.

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Valtiovarainministeriö hyväksyy markkinat CMVM:n (Comissão do mercado da valores mobiliários) ehdotuksesta. CMVM vastaa markkinoiden sääntelystä ja valvonnasta.

Romania

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Säännellyt spotmarkkinat – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Säännellyt spotmarkkinat – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Säännellyt johdannaismarkkinat – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Säännellyt johdannaismarkkinat – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată – (Säännellyt johdannaismarkkinat – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată – (Säännellyt johdannaismarkkinat – BMFMS)

| 1–2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bukarestin arvopaperipörssi Oy) |
| --- | --- |

1–2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bukarestin arvopaperipörssi Oy)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar - Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary — Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar - Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary — Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Romanian arvopaperialan valvontakomissio)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Romanian arvopaperialan valvontakomissio)

Slovakia

| 1. | Noteerattujen arvopapereiden markkinat






  — | päälistan markkinat |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Noteerattujen arvopapereiden markkinat

—

päälistan markkinat

| — | rinnakkaislistan markkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

rinnakkaislistan markkinat

| 2. | Säännellyt vapaat markkinat |
| --- | --- |

2.

Säännellyt vapaat markkinat

Bratislavan arvopaperipörssi

Slovakian keskuspankki

Slovenia

Ljubljanan arvopaperipörssin viralliset markkinat (Borzni trg)

Ljubljanska borza (Ljubljanan arvopaperipörssi)

Arvopaperimarkkinoiden valvontaviranomainen

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Espanja

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (kaikissa on pää- ja rinnakkaisjaostot) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (kaikissa on pää- ja rinnakkaisjaostot)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Espanjan keskuspankki (Banco de España) vastaa julkisen sektorin lainamarkkinoista.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Ruotsi

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | osakkeiden ja niitä vastaavien rahoitusvälineiden säännellyt markkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

osakkeiden ja niitä vastaavien rahoitusvälineiden säännellyt markkinat

| — | johdannaisten säännellyt markkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

johdannaisten säännellyt markkinat

| — | joukkovelkakirjojen ja niitä vastaavien rahoitusvälineiden säännellyt markkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

joukkovelkakirjojen ja niitä vastaavien rahoitusvälineiden säännellyt markkinat

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Ruotsin rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.–6. | Financial Services Authority (Rahoituspalveluviranomainen) |
| --- | --- |

1.–6.

Financial Services Authority (Rahoituspalveluviranomainen)

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange – ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange – ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Islanti

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (säännellyt markkinat)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Islannin rahoitusalan valvontaviranomainen)

Liechtenstein

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Norway

| 1. | Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslon arvopaperipörssi) (virallinen lista)






  — | osakemarkkinat |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslon arvopaperipörssi) (virallinen lista)

—

osakemarkkinat

| — | johdannaismarkkinat (rahoitus) |
| --- | --- |

—

johdannaismarkkinat (rahoitus)

| — | joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat |
| --- | --- |

—

joukkovelkakirjamarkkinat

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Norjan rahoitusalan valvonta-viranomainen)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Osakemarkkinat |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Osakemarkkinat

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (virallinen lista)






  — | Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (virallinen lista)

—

Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Johdannaismarkkinat (hyödykkeet)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/9

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Lentoliikenteen harjoittamisen yhteisistä säännöistä yhteisössä annetun Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 1008/2008 16 artiklan 4 kohdan mukainen komission ilmoitus

Säännöllistä lentoliikennettä koskevat julkisen palvelun velvoitteet

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2009/C 158/04

| Jäsenvaltio | Italia |
| --- | --- |
| Reitti | Bolzano – Rooma Fiumicino ja päinvastaiseen suuntaan |
| Julkisen palvelun velvoitteiden voimaantulopäivä | 1. joulukuuta 2009 |
| Osoite, jossa mahdolliset julkisen palvelun velvoitteeseen liittyvät merkitykselliset tiedot ja/tai asiakirjat ovat saatavilla | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Jäsenvaltio

Italia

Reitti

Bolzano – Rooma Fiumicino ja päinvastaiseen suuntaan

Julkisen palvelun velvoitteiden voimaantulopäivä

1. joulukuuta 2009

Osoite, jossa mahdolliset julkisen palvelun velvoitteeseen liittyvät merkitykselliset tiedot ja/tai asiakirjat ovat saatavilla

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Ilmoitukset

HALLINNOLLISET MENETTELYT

Komissio

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/10

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EHDOTUSPYYNTÖ – EACEA/11/2009

Rakennetuki EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatioille ja Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöille

”Kansalaisten Eurooppa” -ohjelma, toimi 2, toimenpiteet 1 ja 2 – 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   TAVOITTEET JA KUVAUS

Ehdotuspyyntö EACEA/11/2009 perustuu aktiivisen Euroopan kansalaisuuden edistämiseksi vuosina 2007–2013 toteutettavasta ”Kansalaisten Eurooppa” -ohjelmasta tehtyyn Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston päätökseen (1) (jäljempänä ’ohjelma’).

Ohjelma muodostaa oikeusperustan tälle ehdotuspyynnölle, joka koskee varsinaisesti toimen 2, ”Aktiivinen kansalaisyhteiskunta Euroopassa”, toimenpiteitä 1 ja 2: Rakennetuki EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatioille ja Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöille.

1.1   Ohjelman yleiset tavoitteet

Ohjelman tarkoituksena on edistää seuraavia yleisiä tavoitteita:

| a) | kehittää Euroopan unionin kansalaisuutta tarjoamalla kansalaisille mahdollisuus olla vuorovaikutuksessa ja osallistua entistä tiiviimmän Euroopan rakentamiseen, joka on demokraattinen, kansainvälinen ja yhtenäinen ja samalla kulttuurisesti moninainen, |
| --- | --- |

a)

kehittää Euroopan unionin kansalaisuutta tarjoamalla kansalaisille mahdollisuus olla vuorovaikutuksessa ja osallistua entistä tiiviimmän Euroopan rakentamiseen, joka on demokraattinen, kansainvälinen ja yhtenäinen ja samalla kulttuurisesti moninainen,

| b) | kehittää yhteisiin arvoihin, historiaan ja kulttuuriin perustuvaa eurooppalaista identiteettiä, |
| --- | --- |

b)

kehittää yhteisiin arvoihin, historiaan ja kulttuuriin perustuvaa eurooppalaista identiteettiä,

| c) | myötävaikuttaa siihen, että kansalaiset tuntevat Euroopan unionin omakseen, |
| --- | --- |

c)

myötävaikuttaa siihen, että kansalaiset tuntevat Euroopan unionin omakseen,

| d) | lujittaa keskinäistä yhteisymmärrystä unionin kansalaisten välillä siten, että kulttuurista ja kielellistä monimuotoisuutta kunnioitetaan ja edistetään sekä osallistutaan kulttuurien väliseen vuoropuheluun. |
| --- | --- |

d)

lujittaa keskinäistä yhteisymmärrystä unionin kansalaisten välillä siten, että kulttuurista ja kielellistä monimuotoisuutta kunnioitetaan ja edistetään sekä osallistutaan kulttuurien väliseen vuoropuheluun.

1.2   Ehdotuspyynnön erityistavoitteet

Tämän ehdotuspyynnön erityistavoitteina on:

| a) | Edistää unionin kansalaisuuteen ja demokratiaan, yhteisiin arvoihin, historiaan ja kulttuuriin liittyvää toimintaa, keskustelua ja pohdintaa asiantuntijaryhmissä (pohdintarakenteissa) ja kansalaisjärjestöissä Euroopan tasolla, |
| --- | --- |

a)

Edistää unionin kansalaisuuteen ja demokratiaan, yhteisiin arvoihin, historiaan ja kulttuuriin liittyvää toimintaa, keskustelua ja pohdintaa asiantuntijaryhmissä (pohdintarakenteissa) ja kansalaisjärjestöissä Euroopan tasolla,

| b) | kannustaa kansalaisia ja kansalaisjärjestöjä vuorovaikutukseen tukemalla kulttuurien välistä vuoropuhelua sekä Euroopan monimuotoisuuden ja yhtenäisyyden esille tuomista. |
| --- | --- |

b)

kannustaa kansalaisia ja kansalaisjärjestöjä vuorovaikutukseen tukemalla kulttuurien välistä vuoropuhelua sekä Euroopan monimuotoisuuden ja yhtenäisyyden esille tuomista.

1.3   Ensisijaiset aiheet

| — | Euroopan unionin tulevaisuus ja perusarvot, |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopan unionin tulevaisuus ja perusarvot,

| — | Euroopan unionin aktiivinen kansalaisuus, osallistuminen ja demokratia, |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopan unionin aktiivinen kansalaisuus, osallistuminen ja demokratia,

| — | Kulttuurien välinen vuoropuhelu, |
| --- | --- |

—

Kulttuurien välinen vuoropuhelu,

| — | EU:n politiikan vaikutus yhteiskuntaan, |
| --- | --- |

—

EU:n politiikan vaikutus yhteiskuntaan,

| — | Kansalaisten hyvinvointi Euroopassa, työllisyys, sosiaalinen yhteenkuuluvuus ja kestävä kehitys. |
| --- | --- |

—

Kansalaisten hyvinvointi Euroopassa, työllisyys, sosiaalinen yhteenkuuluvuus ja kestävä kehitys.

1.4   Ehdotuspyynnön kuvaus

Tämä ehdotuspyyntö koskee toiminta-avustukseksi kutsuttua rakennetukea, jota myönnteään organisaatioille, joiden tavoite on Euroopan unionin yleisen edun mukainen. Toiminta-avustus tarjoaa taloudellista tukea, jolla katetaan osa valitun organisaation välttämättömistä toimintakustannuksista.

Tukea voidaan myöntää tiettyjen kriteerien täyttyessä vuotuisen avustuksen tai monivuotisen kumppanuuden muodossa. Monivuotinen kumppanuus on organisaation ja koulutuksen, audiovisuaalialan ja kulttuurin toimeenpanoviraston (jäljempänä toimeenpanovirasto) välille perustettu erityistukiin liittyvä yhteistyömekanismi. Tämän pyynnön osalta kumppanuus voidaan solmia kolmeksi vuodeksi.

2.   TUKIKELPOISET HAKIJAT

2.1   Organisaatiot

Toiminta-avustuksen saamikseksi Euroopan unionin yleisen edun mukaista tavoitetta edistävän organisaation on täytettävä seuraavat vaatimukset. Sen on:

| a) | oltava voittoa tavoittelematon, ja sillä on oltava oikeushenkilöllisyys. Kun kyseessä on verkosto, jolla ei ole erillistä toimintarakennetta ja oikeudellista asemaa, hakemuksen voi jättää verkoston koordinoinnista vastaava jäsenorganisaatio, |
| --- | --- |

a)

oltava voittoa tavoittelematon, ja sillä on oltava oikeushenkilöllisyys. Kun kyseessä on verkosto, jolla ei ole erillistä toimintarakennetta ja oikeudellista asemaa, hakemuksen voi jättää verkoston koordinoinnista vastaava jäsenorganisaatio,

| b) | toimittava aktiivisesti Euroopan unionin kansalaisuuteen liittyvien kysymysten parissa, mikä ilmenee sen säännöistä tai kirjatuista tavoitteista, sekä kuuluttava johonkin seuraavista ryhmistä: | Toimenpide 1:






  A. | EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatiot (ajatushautomot – pohdintaan keskittyvät rakenteet). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

toimittava aktiivisesti Euroopan unionin kansalaisuuteen liittyvien kysymysten parissa, mikä ilmenee sen säännöistä tai kirjatuista tavoitteista, sekä kuuluttava johonkin seuraavista ryhmistä:

Toimenpide 1:

A.

EU-politiikan tutkimusorganisaatiot (ajatushautomot – pohdintaan keskittyvät rakenteet).

| | Toimenpide 2:






  B. | Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöt






  — | eurooppalaiset keskusjärjestöt (foorumit), |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Toimenpide 2:

B.

Euroopan tason kansalaisjärjestöt

—

eurooppalaiset keskusjärjestöt (foorumit),

| — | eurooppalaiset verkot, |
| --- | --- |

—

eurooppalaiset verkot,

| — | järjestöt, joiden toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla. |
| --- | --- |

—

järjestöt, joiden toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla.

| C. | Euroopan muistiin liittyvät kansalaisjärjestöt. |
| --- | --- |

C.

Euroopan muistiin liittyvät kansalaisjärjestöt.

| D. | Yleiseurooppalaiset järjestöt. |
| --- | --- |

D.

Yleiseurooppalaiset järjestöt.

| c) | toteutettava suurin osa toiminnastaan tukikelpoisissa maissa (ks. kohta 2.2).

  Monivuotisen kumppanuuden osalta edellytetään, että järjestöt ovat yli neljän (4) vuoden ajan (15 päiväna lokakuuta 2009) toimineet lainmukaisesti rekisteröityneinä ja oikeushenkilöllisyyden omaavina järjestöinä jossakin tukikelpoisista maista, ja että niiden toiminnan maantieteellinen kattavuus on eri järjestöryhmien osalta seuraava:






  — | eurooppalaisella keskusjärjestöllä tai eurooppalaisella verkolla on oltava jäseniä vähintään 12 tukikelpoisessa maassa, |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

toteutettava suurin osa toiminnastaan tukikelpoisissa maissa (ks. kohta 2.2).

Monivuotisen kumppanuuden osalta edellytetään, että järjestöt ovat yli neljän (4) vuoden ajan (15 päiväna lokakuuta 2009) toimineet lainmukaisesti rekisteröityneinä ja oikeushenkilöllisyyden omaavina järjestöinä jossakin tukikelpoisista maista, ja että niiden toiminnan maantieteellinen kattavuus on eri järjestöryhmien osalta seuraava:

—

eurooppalaisella keskusjärjestöllä tai eurooppalaisella verkolla on oltava jäseniä vähintään 12 tukikelpoisessa maassa,

| — | järjestön, jonka toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla, on toimittava aktiivisesti ainakin 12 tukikelpoisessa maassa, |
| --- | --- |

—

järjestön, jonka toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla, on toimittava aktiivisesti ainakin 12 tukikelpoisessa maassa,

| — | yleiseurooppalaisten järjestöjen foorumiin on kuuluttava vähintään kuusi (6) keskusjärjestöä ja sen on toimittava viimeksi mainittujen kautta kaikissa 27 jäsenvaltiossa. |
| --- | --- |

—

yleiseurooppalaisten järjestöjen foorumiin on kuuluttava vähintään kuusi (6) keskusjärjestöä ja sen on toimittava viimeksi mainittujen kautta kaikissa 27 jäsenvaltiossa.

Vuotuisen avustuksen osalta edellytetään, että järjestöt ovat yli vuoden (1) vuoden ajan (15 päiväna lokakuuta 2009) toimineet lainmukaisesti rekisteröityneinä ja oikeushenkilöllisyyden omaavina järjestöinä jossakin tukikelpoisista maista, ja että niiden toiminnan maantieteellinen kattavuus on eri järjestöryhmien osalta seuraava:

| — | eurooppalaisella keskusjärjestöllä tai eurooppalaisella verkolla on oltava jäseniä vähintään kahdeksassa (8) tukikelpoisessa maassa, |
| --- | --- |

—

eurooppalaisella keskusjärjestöllä tai eurooppalaisella verkolla on oltava jäseniä vähintään kahdeksassa (8) tukikelpoisessa maassa,

| — | järjestön, jonka toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla, on toimittava aktiivisesti ainakin kahdeksassa (8) tukikelpoisessa maassa. |
| --- | --- |

—

järjestön, jonka toiminnalla on laajoja vaikutuksia Euroopan tasolla, on toimittava aktiivisesti ainakin kahdeksassa (8) tukikelpoisessa maassa.

Yleiseurooppalaisten järjestöjen foorumit voivat jättää hakemuksen vain monivuotisen kumppanuuden puitteissa.

Fyysiset henkilöt ja julkiset laitokset eivät voi saada tukea tämän ehdotuspyynnön nojalla.

2.2   Tukikelpoiset maat

| a) | Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioina 1 päiväna tammikuuta 2007 olleet maat (27): Alankomaat, Belgia, Bulgaria, Espanja, Irlanti, Italia, Itävalta, Kreikka, Kypros, Latvia, Liettua, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugali, Puola, Ranska, Romania, Ruotsi, Saksa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suomi, Tanska, Tšekki, Unkari, Viro, Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Euroopan unionin jäsenvaltioina 1 päiväna tammikuuta 2007 olleet maat (27): Alankomaat, Belgia, Bulgaria, Espanja, Irlanti, Italia, Itävalta, Kreikka, Kypros, Latvia, Liettua, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugali, Puola, Ranska, Romania, Ruotsi, Saksa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Suomi, Tanska, Tšekki, Unkari, Viro, Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta.

| b) | Kroatia |
| --- | --- |

b)

Kroatia

| c) | entinen Jugoslavian tasavalta Makedonia |
| --- | --- |

c)

entinen Jugoslavian tasavalta Makedonia

| d) | Albania |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albania

3.   TUKIKELPOISET TOIMET

Hakijajärjestön toiminnan on tuettava konkreettisesti tämän ehdotuspyynnön erityistavoitteiden ja ensisijaisten aiheiden kehittämistä ja täytäntöönpanoa. Toiminnan on katettava vähintään yksi kohdassa 1 mainittu erityistavoite ja yksi ensisijainen aihe.

Hakijan vuoden 2010 työohjelman sekä kolmivuotisen toimintasuunnitelman (monivuotisen kumppanuuden osalta) on katettava järjestön sääntömääräinen toiminta, erityisesti konferenssit, seminaarit, pyöreän pöydän neuvottelut, edustustoimet, tulosten levittäminen ja hyödyntäminen sekä järjestön muu säännöllinen eurooppalainen toiminta.

Tukikelpoisuusaika

Tukikelpoisuusajan on niin vuotuisen avustuksen kuin monivuotisen kumppanuuden osalta vastattava hakijan varainhoitovuotta, joka ilmenee organisaation tarkastetusta tilinpäätöksestä. Jos varainhoitovuosi on kalenterivuosi, tukikelpoisuusaika alkaa 1 päiväna tammikuuta 2009 ja päättyy 31 päiväna joulukuuta 2010.

Hakijoiden, joiden varainhoitovuosi on muu kuin kalenterivuosi, tukikelpoisuusaika on 12 kuukautta vuoteen 2010 ajoittuvasta varainhoitovuoden alkamisesta lähtien.

4.   MYÖNTÄMISPERUSTEET

Arviointikomitea arvioi tukikelpoisuus- ja osallistumiskriteerit täyttävät hakemukset myöntämisperusteita vasten niiden valitsemiseksi, jotka sopivat yhteisrahoitukseen.

Seuraavia myöntämisperusteita sovelletaan. Laadullisten perusteiden osuus kokonaispistemäärästä on 80 prosenttia ja määrällisten perusteiden osuus kokonaispistemäärästä on 20 prosenttia. Monivuotisen kumppanuuden osalta kahdentoista kuukauden työohjelmalle asetetaan sama painoarvo kuin kolmen vuoden toimintasuunnitelmalle.

4.1   Laadulliset perusteet (80 %)

Seuraavia tekijöitä arvioidaan:

| a) | merkitys ”Kansalaisten Eurooppa” -ohjelman tavoitteiden ja teemojen kannalta (30 %), |
| --- | --- |

a)

merkitys ”Kansalaisten Eurooppa” -ohjelman tavoitteiden ja teemojen kannalta (30 %),

| b) | työohjelman tarkoituksenmukaisuus, johdonmukaisuus ja täydellisyys (20 %), |
| --- | --- |

b)

työohjelman tarkoituksenmukaisuus, johdonmukaisuus ja täydellisyys (20 %),

| c) | työohjelman vaikutus (10 %), |
| --- | --- |

c)

työohjelman vaikutus (10 %),

| d) | Euroopan yhteisölle aiheutuva lisäarvo (10 %), |
| --- | --- |

d)

Euroopan yhteisölle aiheutuva lisäarvo (10 %),

| e) | toimien näkyvyys, tuloksien levittäminen ja hyödyntäminen Euroopan yhteisön kansalaisten ja sidosryhmien kannalta (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

toimien näkyvyys, tuloksien levittäminen ja hyödyntäminen Euroopan yhteisön kansalaisten ja sidosryhmien kannalta (10 %).

4.2   Määrälliset perusteet (20 %)

Seuraavia tekijöitä arvioidaan:

| a) | Työohjelmaan osallistuvien maiden määrä (10 %), |
| --- | --- |

a)

Työohjelmaan osallistuvien maiden määrä (10 %),

| b) | Mahdollisten suorien edunsaajien määrä (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Mahdollisten suorien edunsaajien määrä (10 %).

5.   TALOUSARVIO

Yhteisön talousarviossa on ennakoitu toiminta-avustusten yhteisrahoitukseen noin 8,2 miljoonaa EUR vuonna 2010. Tämän ehdotuspyynnön osalta toimeenpanovirasto on sopinut rahoittavansa noin 55 organisaatiota, mutta se varaa itselleen oikeuden hakemusten laadun perusteella olla käyttämättä kaikkia käytettävissä olevia varoja.

Monivuotisen kumppanuuden avustusten osuus käytettävässä olevasta talousarviosta on alustavasti noin 85 prosenttia ja vuotuisten avustusten noin 15 prosenttia.

Tämä tuki myönnetään Euroopan unionin yleisen talousarvion budjettikohdasta 15.06.66.

6.   HAKEMUSTEN VIIMEINEN JÄTTÖPÄIVÄ

Hakemusasiakirjat on jätettävä viimeistään 15 päiväna lokakuuta 2009.

Toimeenpanovirasto valmistelee parhaillaan kaikkien hakemusten jättämiseen tarkoitetun elektronisen järjestelmän käyttöönottoa.

Tämän ehdotuspyynnön osalta hakijoiden on lähetettävä hakemuksensa 15 päiväna syyskuuta 2009 alkaen käytettävissä olevan elektronisen lomakkeen välityksellä. Tätä versiota (mukaan lukien liitteet) pidetään pääasiallisena versiona. Toimeenpanovirasto tarjoaa kaavakkeesta pdf-version ennen kyseistä päivämäärää, jotta hakijat voivat aloittaa asiakirjojensa valmistelun.

Hakemusasiakirjojen paperiversion voi lähettää postitse seuraavaan osoitteeseen viimeiseen jättöpäivään mennessä:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Vain sellaiset hakemukset hyväksytään, jotka on laadittu tätä varten tarkoitetulle lomakkeelle asianmukaisesti täytettyinä, päivättyinä ja sen henkilön allekirjoittamana, jolla on valtuudet tehdä oikeudellisia sitoumuksia hakijan puolesta.

7.   LISÄTIETOJA

Yksityiskohtaiset ohjeet hakijoille ja hakulomakkeet ovat saatavilla seuraavasta osoitteesta: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston päätös N:o 1904/2006/CE 12. joulukuuta 2006 (EUVL L 378, 27.12.2006, s. 32), jota on muutettu Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston päätöksellä N:o 1358/2008/CE 16. joulukuuta 2008 (EUVL L 350, 30.12.2008).

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KILPAILUPOLITIIKAN TOIMEENPANOON LIITTYVÄT MENETTELYT

Komissio

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/13

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VALTIONTUKI – ALANKOMAAT

Valtiontuki C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING

Kehotus huomautusten esittämiseen EY:n perustamissopimuksen 88 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisesti

(ETA:n kannalta merkityksellinen teksti)

2009/C 158/06

Komissio on ilmoittanut 31 päivänä maaliskuuta 2009 päivätyllä, tätä tiivistelmää seuraavilla sivuilla todistusvoimaisella kielellä toistetulla kirjeellä Alankomaille päätöksestään aloittaa EY:n perustamissopimuksen 88 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu menettely, joka koskee mainittua toimenpidettä.

Asianomaiset voivat esittää huomautuksensa toimenpiteestä, jota koskevan menettelyn komissio aloittaa, kuukauden kuluessa tämän tiivistelmän ja sitä seuraavan kirjeen julkaisemisesta. Huomautukset on lähetettävä osoitteeseen:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Brussels |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Brussels

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Huomautukset toimitetaan Alankomaille. Huomautusten esittäjä voi pyytää kirjallisesti henkilöllisyytensä luottamuksellista käsittelyä. Tämä pyyntö on perusteltava.

TIIVISTELMÄ

MENETTELY

Alankomaiden viranomaiset ilmoittivat komissiolle 4 päivänä maaliskuuta 2009 ING Support Holding -yritykselle (ING Group -yhtymän suoraan omistama tytäryhtiö) myönnetystä epälikvidejä omaisuuseriä koskevasta tukijärjestelystä.

TAUSTATIEDOT

Alankomaissa pääkonttoriaan pitävä ING Group on yksi suurimmista kansainvälisistä rahoituslaitoksista, jonka taseen loppusumma on 1 332 miljardia euroa. Alankomaiden valtio ja ING tekivät tammikuussa 2009 sopimuksen, jonka mukaisesti osa ING:n Yhdysvalloissa olevaan asuntolainavakuudelliseen arvopaperisalkkuun liittyvistä riskeistä ja tuotoista siirretään valtiolle. Salkku koostuu pääasiassa Alt-A -luokan arvopapereista. ING:n lainasalkun nimellisarvo on 39 miljardia Yhdysvaltain dollaria (30 miljardia EUR).

Suunniteltu toimenpide muodostuu Alankomaiden valtion ja ING:n välisestä rahavirtojen vaihtosopimuksesta, jonka mukaisesti ING siirtää valtiolle 80 prosenttia arvopaperisalkun nimellisarvolle saatavasta tuotosta (korko ja takaisin maksettu pääoma), ja valtio takaa maksavansa ING:lle 72 prosenttia (eli 80 prosenttia 90 prosentista) arvopaperisalkun nimellisarvosta (vain pääomasta). Lisäksi valtio maksaa ING:lle rahoituspalkkiona 3,50 prosenttia salkussa olevien kiinteäkorkoisten arvopaperien arvosta ja dollarimääräisen kuukauden LIBOR-koron + 50 peruspisteen suuruisen palkkion salkussa olevista vaihtuvakorkoisista arvopapereista.

Alankomaiden valtio maksaa ING:lle myös vuosittain 25 peruspisteen suuruisen hallinnointipalkkion jäljellä olevasta pääomasta. ING maksaa vastineena Alankomaiden valtiolle vuosittain 55 peruspisteen suuruisen takauspalkkion 80 prosentin osuudesta lainasalkun jäljellä olevasta pääomasta.

ARVIOINTI

Komissio on arvioinut järjestelyn ongelmallisten omaisuuserien käsittelystä annetun tiedonannon mukaisesti. Komissiolla on menettelyn tässä vaiheessa epäilyksiä, jotka liittyvät arvostuskysymyksiin, erityisesti todellisen taloudellisen arvon määrittämisessä sovellettuun menetelmään. Komissio haluaa tutkia tarkemmin Alankomaiden viranomaisten esittämiä taustaoletuksia, erityisesti (i) valittua diskonttokorkoa, (ii) asuntojen hintakehitykseen liittyviä oletuksia, (iii) luottoriskin lieventämistä (credit enhancement) ja (iv) muita arvostuskysymyksiä.

Komissiolle on myös epäselvää, onko asiaan liittyvät rasitteet jaettu asianmukaisesti valtion ja ING:n kesken. Komissio ei ole varma siitä, ottaako pankki käytännössä vastuulleen arvopaperisalkun nimellisarvon ja todellisen taloudellisen arvon erotuksen, kun otetaan huomioon edellä esitetyt arvonmääritystä koskevat epäilykset. Komissio ei ole myöskään varma siitä, hyödyttääkö edellä mainittu rahavirtojen vaihtosopimus valtiota niin paljon kuin on annettu ymmärtää. Komissiolla ei etenkään ole varmuutta siitä, onko arvopaperisalkun hallinnointipalkkio asianmukainen, koska salkun hoitaminen ei ilmeisesti vaadi kovin paljon työtä.

Komissio on päättänyt hyväksyä tukijärjestelyn kuuden kuukauden ajaksi, koska se täyttää useat ongelmallisten omaisuuserien käsittelystä annetussa tiedonannossa asetetuista ehdoista ja koska rahoitusjärjestelmän vakaus on säilytettävä. Komissio on kuitenkin päättänyt edellä esitettyjen syiden vuoksi aloittaa EY:n perustamissopimuksen 88 artiklan 2 kohdan mukaisen menettelyn varmistaakseen, että ongelmallisten omaisuuserien käsittelystä annettuun tiedonantoon sisältyvät arvostusta koskevat ehdot (mukaan lukien arvostusmenetelmä) täyttyvät ja että tukijärjestelyyn liittyvät rasitteet on jaettu asianmukaisesti.

KIRJEEN TEKSTI

”The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
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(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
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(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
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(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
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(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
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(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
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(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
| --- | --- |

—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

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(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

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MUUT ILMOITUKSET

Komissio

| 11.7.2009 | FI | Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FI

Euroopan unionin virallinen lehti

C 158/24

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Maataloustuotteiden ja elintarvikkeiden rekisteröimisestä aidoiksi perinteisiksi tuotteiksi annetun neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 509/2006 8 artiklan 2 kohdassa tarkoitettu rekisteröintihakemuksen julkaiseminen

2009/C 158/07

Tämä julkaiseminen antaa oikeuden vastustaa hakemusta neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 509/2006 9 artiklassa tarkoitetulla tavalla. Vastaväitteet on toimitettava komissiolle kuuden kuukauden kuluessa tästä julkaisemisesta.

AITOA PERINTEISTÄ TUOTETTA KOSKEVA REKISTERÖINTIHAKEMUS

NEUVOSTON ASETUS (EY) N:o 509/2006

”KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA”

EY-N:o: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   hakijaryhmittymän nimi ja osoite:

Nimi: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Osoite:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Puhelin +48 228302657

Faksi +48 228301648

Sähköposti: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Jäsenvaltio tai kolmas maa:

Puola

3.   Tuote-eritelmä:

3.1   Rekisteröitävä nimi/rekisteröitävät nimet (komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 2 artikla):

”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

3.2   Nimi:

 on itsessään erityinen

Image

Nimitys ”kiełbasa jałowcowa” (katajanmarjamakkara) ilmaisee tuotteen erityisluonnetta, joka perustuu ennen muuta sen ainutlaatuiseen makuun ja tuoksuun. Nämä ominaisuudet johtuvat siitä, että valmistuksessa käytetään katajanmarjoja (Juniperus), jotka jauhetaan juuri ennen liharaaka-aineeseen lisäämistä. Lisäksi savustamisessa käytetään katajan oksia.

3.3   Asetuksen (EY) N:o 509/2006 13 artiklan 2 kohdan mukainen nimen varaaminen:

 Rekisteröintiin liittyy nimen varaaminen

Image

3.4   Tuotelaji:

| Luokka 1.2 – | Lihavalmisteet (kypsennetyt, suolatut, savustetut jne.) |
| --- | --- |

Luokka 1.2 –

Lihavalmisteet (kypsennetyt, suolatut, savustetut jne.)

3.5   Sen maataloustuotteen tai elintarvikkeen kuvaus, johon 3.1 kohdan mukaista nimeä sovelletaan (komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 3 artiklan 1 kohta):

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkarat ovat pinnaltaan tasaisesti rypistyneitä lenkkimakkaroita. Makkaroiden tyypillinen muoto on pyöreä, eikä niissä ole syviä pitkittäisiä uria. Lenkkimakkaroita on kahta kokoa:

| — | pienten, luonnonsuoleen tehtyjen lenkkien halkaisija on yli 32 mm ja paino noin 0,5 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

pienten, luonnonsuoleen tehtyjen lenkkien halkaisija on yli 32 mm ja paino noin 0,5 kg

| — | suurten, keinokuoreen tehtyjen lenkkien halkaisija on 36 mm ja paino noin 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

suurten, keinokuoreen tehtyjen lenkkien halkaisija on 36 mm ja paino noin 0,8 kg.

Makkarat ovat kauttaaltaan tasaisen tummanruskeita, mikä johtuu voimakkaasta savustuksesta.

Koostumus ja kosketustuntuma: makkaralenkin pinta on kuiva ja tasaisesti rypistynyt, mutta samalla sileä, koska lihamassa täyttää kuoren tiiviisti.

Tuotteelle ominainen maukkaus ja rapeus johtuu käytetystä raaka-aineesta, mausteista (erityisesti katajanmarjoista) ja valmistusprosessiin kuuluvasta luonnollisesta savustuksesta.

Kemiallinen koostumus:

| — | valkuaisainepitoisuus vähintään 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

valkuaisainepitoisuus vähintään 15,0 %,

| — | vesipitoisuus enintään 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

vesipitoisuus enintään 60,0 %,

| — | rasvapitoisuus enintään 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

rasvapitoisuus enintään 35,0 %,

| — | suolapitoisuus enintään 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

suolapitoisuus enintään 3,5 %,

| — | nitriitti- ja nitraattipitoisuus NaNO2: na ilmaistuna enintään 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

nitriitti- ja nitraattipitoisuus NaNO2: na ilmaistuna enintään 0,0125 %.

Tällainen kemiallinen koostumus takaa tuotteen perinteisen laadun. Valmiin tuotteen paino on 75 % (+/– 3 %) raaka-aineena käytetyn lihan painosta.

3.6   Sen maataloustuotteen tai elintarvikkeen tuotantomenetelmän kuvaus, johon 3.1 kohdan mukaista nimeä sovelletaan (komission asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 3 artiklan 2 kohta):

Raaka-aineet

| | Liha (100 kg raaka-ainetta):






  — | I luokan sianlihaa, jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 15 % – 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Liha (100 kg raaka-ainetta):

—

I luokan sianlihaa, jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 15 % – 20 kg,

| — | IIA luokan sianlihaa, jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 20 % – 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

IIA luokan sianlihaa, jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 20 % – 50 kg,

| — | III luokan sianlihaa, joka sisältää myös sidekudosta ja jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 25 % – 20 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

III luokan sianlihaa, joka sisältää myös sidekudosta ja jonka rasvapitoisuus on enintään 25 % – 20 kg,

| — | ihraa – 20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

ihraa – 20 kg.

IIA tai III luokkaan kuuluvasta sianlihasta voidaan enintään 50 % korvata naudanlihalla.

| | Muut aineet (100 kg lihaa kohti):






  — | pippuria – 0,17 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Muut aineet (100 kg lihaa kohti):

—

pippuria – 0,17 kg,

| — | katajanmarjoja – 0,12 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

katajanmarjoja – 0,12 kg,

| — | sokeria – 0,2 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

sokeria – 0,2 kg.

| | Lisäaineet:






  — | kuivasuolaussekoitus [ruokasuolan (NaCL) ja natriumnitriitin (NaNO2) sekoitus] – noin 2 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Lisäaineet:

—

kuivasuolaussekoitus [ruokasuolan (NaCL) ja natriumnitriitin (NaNO2) sekoitus] – noin 2 kg.

Sikojen ruokinta, kun tarkoituksena on tuottaa lihaa kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden valmistusta varten

Ruokinta vaikuttaa sianlihan rasvaisuuteen ja lihakkuuteen. Tavoitteena on tuottaa sikoja, joiden paino on enintään 120 kg ja joiden lihassa on lihaksensisäistä rasvaa yli 3 prosenttia.

| — | Lihotuksessa käytetään myöhään aikuistuvia sikarotuja, jolloin voidaan oikeanlaisella lihotuksella saavuttaa vaadittu lihaksensisäinen rasvapitoisuus. Lihotuksessa käytettävillä roduilla ei ole RN-geeniä, kun taas RYR 1T -geeni on 20 prosentilla populaatiosta. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lihotuksessa käytetään myöhään aikuistuvia sikarotuja, jolloin voidaan oikeanlaisella lihotuksella saavuttaa vaadittu lihaksensisäinen rasvapitoisuus. Lihotuksessa käytettävillä roduilla ei ole RN-geeniä, kun taas RYR 1T -geeni on 20 prosentilla populaatiosta.

| — | Kasvatus jakautuu kolmeen vaiheeseen: 1. vaihe < 60 kg, 2. vaihe < 90 kg ja 3. vaihe < 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Kasvatus jakautuu kolmeen vaiheeseen: 1. vaihe < 60 kg, 2. vaihe < 90 kg ja 3. vaihe < 120 kg.

| — | Eläimet lihotetaan noin 90-kiloisiksi kahden rehuseoksen avulla. Rehuseosten (annosten) koostumus on seuraava: |
| --- | --- |

—

Eläimet lihotetaan noin 90-kiloisiksi kahden rehuseoksen avulla. Rehuseosten (annosten) koostumus on seuraava:

| — | energianlähde: viljajauhoa – vehnä-, ohra-, ruis-, kaura-, ruisvehnä- tai maissijauhoa; maissijauhoa ja kuorettomista kauralajikkeista tehtyä jauhoa enintään 30 prosenttia sekoituksesta; |
| --- | --- |

—

energianlähde: viljajauhoa – vehnä-, ohra-, ruis-, kaura-, ruisvehnä- tai maissijauhoa; maissijauhoa ja kuorettomista kauralajikkeista tehtyä jauhoa enintään 30 prosenttia sekoituksesta;

| — | valkuaisainelähde: lupiini-, härkäpapu- ja hernerehujauhoa, soijarouhetta, rapsirouhetta, rapsipuristeita, rehuhiivaa tai kuivattua nurmirehua. |
| --- | --- |

—

valkuaisainelähde: lupiini-, härkäpapu- ja hernerehujauhoa, soijarouhetta, rapsirouhetta, rapsipuristeita, rehuhiivaa tai kuivattua nurmirehua.

| — | 90–120-kiloisille eläimille tarkoitetun rehuseoksen (annoksen) koostumus on seuraava: |
| --- | --- |

—

90–120-kiloisille eläimille tarkoitetun rehuseoksen (annoksen) koostumus on seuraava:

| — | energianlähde: vehnä-, ohra-, ruis- ja ruisvehnäjauhoa. Seokseen (annoksiin) ei saa käyttää maissijauhoa eikä kuorettomista kauralajikkeista tehtyä jauhoa. |
| --- | --- |

—

energianlähde: vehnä-, ohra-, ruis- ja ruisvehnäjauhoa. Seokseen (annoksiin) ei saa käyttää maissijauhoa eikä kuorettomista kauralajikkeista tehtyä jauhoa.

| — | valkuaisainelähde: hernekasveista (lupiini, härkäpapu, herne) tehtyä jauhoa, soijarouhetta, rapsipuristetta tai rapsirouhetta ja kuivattua nurmirehua. |
| --- | --- |

—

valkuaisainelähde: hernekasveista (lupiini, härkäpapu, herne) tehtyä jauhoa, soijarouhetta, rapsipuristetta tai rapsirouhetta ja kuivattua nurmirehua.

| — | Koko kasvatuksen aikana seoksiin ja annoksiin ei saa lisätä: kasviöljyjä, eläinperäisiä rehuja, esimerkiksi maitojauhetta, kuivattua heraa tai kalajauhoa. |
| --- | --- |

—

Koko kasvatuksen aikana seoksiin ja annoksiin ei saa lisätä: kasviöljyjä, eläinperäisiä rehuja, esimerkiksi maitojauhetta, kuivattua heraa tai kalajauhoa.

| — | Rehuseoksen metabolisen energian määrä on koko kasvatuksen ajan 12–13 MJ EM/kg. Valkuaisainetta seoksessa tulisi olla 1. kasvatusvaiheen aikana noin 16–18 prosenttia, 2. vaiheessa 15–16 prosenttia ja 3. vaiheessa noin 14 prosenttia. |
| --- | --- |

—

Rehuseoksen metabolisen energian määrä on koko kasvatuksen ajan 12–13 MJ EM/kg. Valkuaisainetta seoksessa tulisi olla 1. kasvatusvaiheen aikana noin 16–18 prosenttia, 2. vaiheessa 15–16 prosenttia ja 3. vaiheessa noin 14 prosenttia.

| — | Lihasikojen rehuannokset voivat sisältää joko pelkkää tiivisterehua tai ne voivat olla seoksia, jossa on tiivisterehun lisäksi perusrehua, esim. perunoita ja nurmirehua. |
| --- | --- |

—

Lihasikojen rehuannokset voivat sisältää joko pelkkää tiivisterehua tai ne voivat olla seoksia, jossa on tiivisterehun lisäksi perusrehua, esim. perunoita ja nurmirehua.

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden valmistusvaiheet

| 1. vaihe | Ensin kaikki liharaaka-aineet pilkotaan. Lihanpalojen on oltava samankokoisia (halkaisija noin 5 cm). |
| --- | --- |

1. vaihe

Ensin kaikki liharaaka-aineet pilkotaan. Lihanpalojen on oltava samankokoisia (halkaisija noin 5 cm).

| 2. vaihe | Perinteinen säilöntä (kuivasuolaus) noin kaksi vuorokautta tarvittavan suolasekoituksen kera. |
| --- | --- |

2. vaihe

Perinteinen säilöntä (kuivasuolaus) noin kaksi vuorokautta tarvittavan suolasekoituksen kera.

| 3. vaihe | Mekaaninen työstö: I luokan liha pilkotaan halkaisijaltaan noin 20 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi, IIA luokan liha noin 8 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi ja III luokan liha noin 3 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi, minkä jälkeen seokseen lisätään 5 kg jäätä ja jauhetaan se. |
| --- | --- |

3. vaihe

Mekaaninen työstö: I luokan liha pilkotaan halkaisijaltaan noin 20 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi, IIA luokan liha noin 8 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi ja III luokan liha noin 3 mm:n suuruisiksi paloiksi, minkä jälkeen seokseen lisätään 5 kg jäätä ja jauhetaan se.

| 4. vaihe | Liharaaka-aineet sekoitetaan keskenään ja niihin lisätään mausteet: pippuria, sokeria ja katajanmarjoja, jotka on jauhettu välittömästi ennen sekoitukseen lisäämistä. |
| --- | --- |

4. vaihe

Liharaaka-aineet sekoitetaan keskenään ja niihin lisätään mausteet: pippuria, sokeria ja katajanmarjoja, jotka on jauhettu välittömästi ennen sekoitukseen lisäämistä.

| 5. vaihe | Lihamassa pursotetaan siansuoleen, jonka läpimitta on yli 32 mm, tai keinokuoreen, jonka läpimitta on 36 mm, ja jaotellaan siitä makkarapötköjä, jotka taivutetaan lenkeiksi. Käytetystä kuorimateriaalista riippuen makkaroista tehdään joko:






  — | siansuoleen tehtyjä pienempiä ja ohuempia lenkkejä, jotka painavat 0,5 kg, tai |
| --- | --- | --- |

5. vaihe

Lihamassa pursotetaan siansuoleen, jonka läpimitta on yli 32 mm, tai keinokuoreen, jonka läpimitta on 36 mm, ja jaotellaan siitä makkarapötköjä, jotka taivutetaan lenkeiksi. Käytetystä kuorimateriaalista riippuen makkaroista tehdään joko:

—

siansuoleen tehtyjä pienempiä ja ohuempia lenkkejä, jotka painavat 0,5 kg, tai

| — | keinokuoreen tehtyjä suurempia lenkkejä, jotka painavat 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

keinokuoreen tehtyjä suurempia lenkkejä, jotka painavat 0,8 kg.

| 6. vaihe | Annetaan levätä kaksi tuntia enintään 30 °C: een lämpötilassa, jolloin makkaroiden pinta alkaa kuivua ja sisus ”asettuu”. |
| --- | --- |

6. vaihe

Annetaan levätä kaksi tuntia enintään 30 °C: een lämpötilassa, jolloin makkaroiden pinta alkaa kuivua ja sisus ”asettuu”.

| 7. vaihe | Pinnan kuivattaminen ja perinteinen lämminsavustus (noin 120 minuutin ajan), kunnes makkarat ovat halutun värisiä. Tämän jälkeen paistamista jatketaan, kunnes makkaroiden sisälämpötila on vähintään 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

7. vaihe

Pinnan kuivattaminen ja perinteinen lämminsavustus (noin 120 minuutin ajan), kunnes makkarat ovat halutun värisiä. Tämän jälkeen paistamista jatketaan, kunnes makkaroiden sisälämpötila on vähintään 70 °C.

| 8. vaihe | Makkaroiden annetaan jäähtyä 24 tuntia. |
| --- | --- |

8. vaihe

Makkaroiden annetaan jäähtyä 24 tuntia.

| 9. vaihe | Kylmäsavustus pyökkilastujen ja katajanoksien kanssa (noin 120 minuutin ajan) ja sen jälkeen kuivaus 14–18 °C: eessa 3–5 vuorokauden ajan, kunnes saavutetaan haluttu tuotos, eli lopputuotteen paino on 75 % (+/– 3 %) valmistukseen käytettyjen raaka-aineiden painosta. |
| --- | --- |

9. vaihe

Kylmäsavustus pyökkilastujen ja katajanoksien kanssa (noin 120 minuutin ajan) ja sen jälkeen kuivaus 14–18 °C: eessa 3–5 vuorokauden ajan, kunnes saavutetaan haluttu tuotos, eli lopputuotteen paino on 75 % (+/– 3 %) valmistukseen käytettyjen raaka-aineiden painosta.

3.7   Maataloustuotteen tai elintarvikkeen erityisluonne (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 3 artiklan 3 kohta):

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden erityisluonne johtuu tuotteen tietyistä ominaispiirteistä:

| — | lihan mureus ja muut erityisominaisuudet, |
| --- | --- |

—

lihan mureus ja muut erityisominaisuudet,

| — | poikkeuksellinen maku ja tuoksu, |
| --- | --- |

—

poikkeuksellinen maku ja tuoksu,

| — | ainutlaatuinen muoto. |
| --- | --- |

—

ainutlaatuinen muoto.

Rapeus, mehukkuus ja lihan erityisominaisuudet

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden ominaispiirteisiin olennaisesti vaikuttava ainesosa on sianliha, joka saadaan noin 120-kiloisiksi lihotetuista, myöhään aikuistuviin sikarotuihin kuuluvista sioista. Eläinten geneettiset ominaisuudet on kuvattu 3.6 kohdassa. Näitä vaatimuksia noudattamalla saavutetaan yli 3 prosentin lihaksensisäinen rasvapitoisuus, mikä takaa, että makkaroiden valmistukseen käytettävä liha on oikean makuista ja että sillä on vaaditut tekniset ominaisuudet. Oikeanlainen raaka-aine ja perinteinen valmistusmenetelmä, jonka olennaisia vaiheita ovat lihan jauhaminen, kuivasuolaus ja savustus, takaavat kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden poikkeuksellisen rapeuden ja mehukkuuden.

Poikkeuksellinen maku ja tuoksu

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden erityisluonne perustuu erityisesti niiden ainutlaatuiseen makuun ja tuoksuun, jotka johtuvat valmistuksessa käytettävistä katajanmarjoista (Juniperus). Se, että katajanmarjat jauhetaan vasta juuri ennen valmistuksen aloittamista, vahvistaa makkaroiden makua ja vaikuttaa niiden erityisluonteeseen. Katajanoksien avulla tapahtuva savustus vielä täydentää makua ja vahvistaa poikkeuksellista tuoksua.

Yhdenmukainen muoto

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkarat erottuvat muista makkaroista muotonsa vuoksi. Myynnissä olevat makkarat voidaan jakaa ainoastaan kahteen tyyppiin, jotka muistuttavat läheisesti toisiaan, minkä vuoksi kuluttajien on helppo tunnistaa ne. Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkarat ovat pinnaltaan tasaisesti rypistyneitä lenkkimakkaroita. Makkaroiden tyypillinen muoto on pyöreä, eikä niissä ole syviä pitkittäisiä uria.

3.8   Maataloustuotteen tai elintarvikkeen perinteinen luonne (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 3 artiklan 4 kohta):

Perinteiset raaka-aineet

| 1. | Kataja (Juniperus):
  ”Katajasta lähtee poltettaessa miellyttävä, aromaattinen tuoksu”, todetaan vuonna 1903 julkaistussa kuvitetussa tietosanakirjassa Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana. Sen mukaan tuoksu on yksi tämän Puolassa vuosisatojen ajan yleisesti esiintyneen pensaan ominaispiirre. Tietosanakirjassa kerrotaan myös, että ”erilaiset lastut, oksat ja marjat ovat lihaa savustettaessa arvostettu lisuke (eräänlainen suitsuke); erityisesti kataja antaa savulihalle hienostuneen maun ja tuoksun”. 1800-luvun jälkipuolelta peräisin olevat asiakirjat osoittavat, että katajaa käytettiin jo tuolloin liha-aterioiden ja -tuotteiden lisukkeena tai valmistusaineena. Varsovassa vuonna 1863 julkaistun Encyklopedyja Powszechnan mukaan ”katajanmarjoissa on mausteinen, makeankarvas maku ja miellyttävä tuoksu; (...) ne ovat yleisesti tunnettu mauste”. Katajanmarjoilla maustetun ja katajanoksien kanssa savustetun makkaran yhdenmukainen valmistusmenetelmä syntyi Puolassa jo 1940- ja 1950-luvun taitteessa. Asiasta kerrotaan artikkelissa ”Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku” (Markkinoille toimitettavia savulihatuotteita koskevat säännöt), joka julkaistiin Gospodarka Mięsna -nimisen liha-alan julkaisun numerossa 3/1954. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Kataja (Juniperus):

”Katajasta lähtee poltettaessa miellyttävä, aromaattinen tuoksu”, todetaan vuonna 1903 julkaistussa kuvitetussa tietosanakirjassa Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana. Sen mukaan tuoksu on yksi tämän Puolassa vuosisatojen ajan yleisesti esiintyneen pensaan ominaispiirre. Tietosanakirjassa kerrotaan myös, että ”erilaiset lastut, oksat ja marjat ovat lihaa savustettaessa arvostettu lisuke (eräänlainen suitsuke); erityisesti kataja antaa savulihalle hienostuneen maun ja tuoksun”. 1800-luvun jälkipuolelta peräisin olevat asiakirjat osoittavat, että katajaa käytettiin jo tuolloin liha-aterioiden ja -tuotteiden lisukkeena tai valmistusaineena. Varsovassa vuonna 1863 julkaistun Encyklopedyja Powszechnan mukaan ”katajanmarjoissa on mausteinen, makeankarvas maku ja miellyttävä tuoksu; (...) ne ovat yleisesti tunnettu mauste”. Katajanmarjoilla maustetun ja katajanoksien kanssa savustetun makkaran yhdenmukainen valmistusmenetelmä syntyi Puolassa jo 1940- ja 1950-luvun taitteessa. Asiasta kerrotaan artikkelissa ”Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku” (Markkinoille toimitettavia savulihatuotteita koskevat säännöt), joka julkaistiin Gospodarka Mięsna -nimisen liha-alan julkaisun numerossa 3/1954.

| 2. | Sianliha:
  Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden valmistusta varten kasvatettujen sikojen lihaksensisäisen rasvaprosentin on oltava yli 3 prosenttia. Tämä nk. marmorointi antaa tuotteelle vaaditun rapeuden, mehukkuuden ja erinomaisen maun. Tällaisen lihan käyttö vaikuttaa ratkaisevasti lopputuotteen laatuun ja sen erityisluonteeseen, ja se on perinteisen valmistusmenetelmän mukaista. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Sianliha:

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden valmistusta varten kasvatettujen sikojen lihaksensisäisen rasvaprosentin on oltava yli 3 prosenttia. Tämä nk. marmorointi antaa tuotteelle vaaditun rapeuden, mehukkuuden ja erinomaisen maun. Tällaisen lihan käyttö vaikuttaa ratkaisevasti lopputuotteen laatuun ja sen erityisluonteeseen, ja se on perinteisen valmistusmenetelmän mukaista.

Perinteinen valmistusmenetelmä ja koostumus

Savustaminen parantaa lihan säilyvyyttä, ja yleisimmin savustuksessa on käytetty katajaa. Tämä käy ilmi muun muassa vanhapuolalaisista käsikirjoituksista, kuten tuntemattoman aatelisen kartanonomistajan 1780-luvulla tekemistä muistiinpanoista, joissa on savustetun sianlihamakkaran resepti (käsikirjoitus – Varsovan vanhojen asiakirjojen pääarkisto Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD), kokoelma: ”Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego” (kansallismuseon kokoelmat), tunnus 1249). Katajan suosiosta savustamisessa kertoo myös Puolan kansallisrunoilijan Adam Mickiewiczin kuvaus aatelisseurueen aamiaisesta vuonna 1834 julkaistussa runoelmassa Pan Tadeusz: – ”Kaikki (savumakkarat) olivat erinomaisia, kaikki kotona tehtyjä, kamiinassa katajanoksilla savustettuja”.

Perinteitä, jotka liittyvät lihan maustamiseen ja savustamiseen katajalla, vaalittiin paikallisin ja alueellisin muunnelmin, jotka eroavat toisistaan teknisiltä piirteiltään ja joskus myös käytetyn lihan suhteen. W. Łęg esimerkiksi kertoo savumakkaroiden valmistusta koskevassa artikkelissaan ”Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin” (Gospodarka Mięsna, 6/1953), että katajanmarjamakkaraa on kokeeksi valmistettu myös riistasta (käyttäen sianlihan lisäksi jäniksen ja villisian lihaa). Näin valmistettujen makkaroiden maku oli erilainen, vaikka resepti oli periaatteessa sama (täytteessä ja savustuksessa käytettiin katajaa). Muuan Kurpien alueella matkustanut liha-alan ammattilainen kuvaa katajanmarjamakkaroiden alueellisia ominaispiirteitä artikkelissaan ”Wiejskie wędliny regionalne” (Gospodarka Mięsna 7-8/1950) näin: ”Kurpien alueella Myszyniecissä valmistetaan katajanoksilla savustettua makkaraa, jossa on myös katajanmarjoja mukana. Aromiltaan ja maultaan erinomaisen omaleimainen kuivamakkara.”

Vuoden 1945 jälkeen lihateollisuutta ryhdyttiin kehittämään keskitetyn suunnitelmatalouden periaatteiden mukaisesti suurten lihanjalostuslaitosten pohjalta. Savulihatuotteiden laadun ja maun turvaamiseksi otettiin käyttöön tuotteiden standardointi ja perinteisiin resepteihin perustuvat tekniset normit. ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” esiintyy tuotteen nimenä vuosina 1947 ja 1948 annetuissa elintarvikkeiden kauppaa säätelevissä säännöissä. Vuonna 1954 laadittiin katajanmarjamakkaroiden yhdenmukainen resepti, jota kehitettiin edelleen lihanjalostusteollisuuskeskuksen (Centrał Przemysłu Mięsnego) vuonna 1964 julkaisemalla ohjeella (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Varsova 1964), johon myös tämä hakemus perustuu.

Edellä mainittujen ohjeiden avulla pyrittiin turvaamaan katajanmarjamakkaroiden mahdollisimman korkea laatu. Vaikka ohje, johon tämä hakemus perustuu, ei nykyään ole velvoittava, se määrittää kuitenkin edelleen katajanmarjamakkaroiden valmistuksessa noudatettavat korkeimmat laatuvaatimukset.

3.9   Erityisluonnetta koskevat vähimmäisvaatimukset ja tarkastusmenettelyt (asetuksen (EY) N:o 1216/2007 4 artikla):

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden erityisominaisuuksien varmistamiseksi on valvottava erityisesti seuraavia seikkoja:

| 1. | tuotteen valmistamiseen käytetyn raaka-aineen (lihan ja mausteiden) laatu:






  — | lihan teknisen soveltuvuuden tarkastaminen, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

tuotteen valmistamiseen käytetyn raaka-aineen (lihan ja mausteiden) laatu:

—

lihan teknisen soveltuvuuden tarkastaminen,

| — | sikojen lihotusmenetelmä, |
| --- | --- |

—

sikojen lihotusmenetelmä,

| — | kuivasuolauksen kesto, |
| --- | --- |

—

kuivasuolauksen kesto,

| — | valmistukseen käytetyt mausteet ja niiden oikeat määrät. |
| --- | --- |

—

valmistukseen käytetyt mausteet ja niiden oikeat määrät.

| 2. | Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden savustaminen:
  Valvonnan yhteydessä on tarkistettava seuraavat seikat:






  — | oikea lämpötila perinteisen lämminsavustuksen ja kuumentamisen yhteydessä, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Kiełbasa jałowcowa -makkaroiden savustaminen:

Valvonnan yhteydessä on tarkistettava seuraavat seikat:

—

oikea lämpötila perinteisen lämminsavustuksen ja kuumentamisen yhteydessä,

| — | oikea kesto ja lämpötila kylmäsavustuksena tapahtuvan toisen savustamisen yhteydessä, |
| --- | --- |

—

oikea kesto ja lämpötila kylmäsavustuksena tapahtuvan toisen savustamisen yhteydessä,

| — | pyökkilastujen ja katajanoksien käyttö kylmäsavustuksessa. |
| --- | --- |

—

pyökkilastujen ja katajanoksien käyttö kylmäsavustuksessa.

| 3. | Lopputuotteen laatu:






  — | valkuaisainepitoisuus, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Lopputuotteen laatu:

—

valkuaisainepitoisuus,

| — | vesipitoisuus, |
| --- | --- |

—

vesipitoisuus,

| — | rasvapitoisuus, |
| --- | --- |

—

rasvapitoisuus,

| — | natriumkloridipitoisuus, |
| --- | --- |

—

natriumkloridipitoisuus,

| — | nitriitti- ja nitraattipitoisuus, |
| --- | --- |

—

nitriitti- ja nitraattipitoisuus,

| — | maku ja tuoksu. |
| --- | --- |

—

maku ja tuoksu.

| 4. | Tuotteen muoto |
| --- | --- |

4.

Tuotteen muoto

Tarkastusten intensiteetti

Edellä mainitut vaiheet on tarkastettava kahden kuukauden välein. Jos kaikki vaiheet on toteutettu asianmukaisesti, tarkastuksia voidaan harventaa kahteen kertaan vuodessa.

Jos jossakin vaiheessa ilmenee virheitä, kyseinen vaihe on tarkastettava tiheämmin (kahden kuukauden välein). Muut vaiheet voidaan edelleen tarkastaa puolivuosittain.

4.   Tuote-eritelmän noudattamisen tarkastamisesta vastaavat viranomaiset tai elimet:

4.1   Nimi ja osoite:

Nimi: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno – Spożywczych (Maatalouselintarvikkeiden kauppalaadun päätarkastusvirasto)

Osoite:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Puhelin +48 226232901

Faksi +48 226232099

Sähköposti: —

ImageJulkinen viranomainen/yksikkö  Yksityinen elin/yksikkö

4.2   Viranomaisen tai elimen erityistehtävät:

Edellä mainittu tarkastuselin vastaa koko eritelmän noudattamisen valvonnasta.

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