J-S34020-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM MATTHEW BENNETT 

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 880 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-CR-0000746-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 17, 2022

William Matthew Bennett appeals the judgment of sentence following 

his convictions for Maximum Speed Limits and Driving Under the Influence of 

Alcohol or Controlled Substance - Marijuana (“DUI”).1 He challenges the denial 

of his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm. 

On January 12, 2020, Pennsylvania State Trooper Matthew Hartung 

arrested Bennett for the above charges. At Bennett’s preliminary hearing, 

Bennett argued that he was not impaired and that the corpus delicti rule 

prevented any of his statements coming into evidence because the 

Commonwealth failed to “show that a crime was committed,” specifically the 

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1 75 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3362(a)(3) and 3802(d)(2), respectively.
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crime of DUI. N.T., Preliminary Hearing, 06/11/20, at 34, 35. The court 

rejected his argument and bound him over for trial. 

Bennett then moved to suppress his statements and any evidence taken 

from the vehicle, arguing that Trooper Hartung did not Mirandize him.2 At 

the motion hearing, the Commonwealth and Bennett agreed to enter the 

preliminary hearing transcript as evidence. The following evidence was 

presented at the preliminary hearing.

Trooper Hartung testified that he is trained in field sobriety tests 

(“FSTs”) and in the Advanced Roadside Impairment Detection Enforcement 

(“ARIDE”), “which is more focused on drug DUIs than alcohol DUIs.” Id. at 9. 

He also testified that he had made hundreds of DUI arrests, “[p]robably half”

of which were “drug-related DUI arrests.” Id.

Trooper Hartung testified that on January 12, 2020, he observed 

Bennett driving at 71 mph in a 45-mph zone and proceeded to initiate a traffic 

stop. Id. at 4-5. Bennett complied and pulled his vehicle over. When Trooper 

Hartung approached Bennett’s vehicle, he observed Bennett in the driver’s

seat and four other people in the vehicle. Id. at 5. Trooper Hartung 

immediately smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from the 

vehicle. Id. He observed “that [Bennett] had symptoms of someone who 

recently smoked marijuana based on his bloodshot eyes, dilated pupils.” Id. 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Trooper Hartung asked all four occupants of the vehicle for identification and 

went to his patrol car where he radioed for back up. 

He then returned to Bennett’s vehicle, and without handing any of the 

identification cards back, asked Bennett to get out of the car and walked him

to the rear of Bennett’s vehicle. Id. at 6, 21, 23. Trooper Hartung told Bennett 

that he could smell marijuana coming from the vehicle and asked him if there 

was any marijuana in the car. Bennett replied, “[N]ot that [I’m] aware of.” 

Id. at 25. Trooper Hartung then asked Bennett “if he had smoked marijuana,” 

and Bennett responded that “he had smoked marijuana approximately three 

hours earlier.” Id. at 7, 26.

Trooper Hartung testified that he then asked Bennett to perform four 

FSTs. Id. at 7. Trooper Hartung said Bennett performed one – the horizontal 

gaze nystagmus and vertical gaze nystagmus test – without signs of 

intoxication. Id. at 8. However, three others produced signs that Bennett was 

intoxicated. During the lack of convergence test, which tests the ability to 

cross one’s eyes, he observed that Bennett’s eyes did not cross. The trooper

testified this is “a common indicator for marijuana usage.” Id. at 10. For the 

Romberg balance test, Bennett “estimated the passage of 30 seconds in 24 

seconds.” Id. According to Trooper Hartung, in performing the test, if the 

participant is not within a “5-second threshold above or below 30 seconds, it 

can be an indicator of impairment also.” Id. During the walk and turn test, 

Bennett “missed heel to toe on step four[,]” “stepped off the line on step five 

and missed heel to toe again[,]” “did not turn as instructed[,]” and “missed
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heel to toe on step seven.” Id. During the one leg stand test, “[Bennett] didn’t 

exhibit enough clues to conclude that he was impaired based on that test.” 

Id. at 12. 

Trooper Hartung also observed that Bennett “had an odor of marijuana 

coming about his person” and had eyelid and body tremors. Id. at 12, 25. He 

testified that body tremors are an indicator of marijuana usage. Id. at 25. 

However, the trooper conceded the weather was cold. Id.

After the FSTs, Trooper Hartung arrested Bennett for DUI. Id. at 13. 

Trooper Hartung also testified that one of the occupants of the vehicle said 

that “they were smoking while they were driving” but “[s]he didn’t clarify 

which persons out of the five of them were or were not smoking.” Id. at 14, 

33.

Following briefing, the trial court denied suppression. After a stipulated 

bench trial, and following sentencing, Bennett instituted this timely appeal. 

Bennett raises the following issues:

I. Did the trial court err in admitting into evidence 

incriminating statements made by [Bennett] at the 

time of his arrest where [Bennett] was not advised of 

his rights against self-incrimination under Miranda

prior to custodial interrogation by the Pennsylvania 

State Police Trooper?

II. Did the Commonwealth fail to establish a prima facie

case for Driving under the Influence of Controlled 

Substances where there was no evidence other than 

the inculpatory statements of [Bennett’s] himself that 

he had consumed controlled substances prior to 

operating his vehicle?
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Bennett’s Br. at 3. 

Bennett argues that the trial court erred by admitting incriminating 

statements he made without being given Miranda warnings. He alleges that 

he was under arrest at the time of the statements and was subjected to 

interrogation “designed to elicit a testimonial response.” Id. He acknowledges 

that questions regarding a driver’s license or car registration do not require a 

Miranda warning, but states that Miranda is required “once the trooper 

recognizes what he believes to be the smell of marijuana[.]” Id.

We review the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 451 (Pa.Super. 2018). An abuse 

of discretion is not a mere error of judgment, “but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by 

the evidence of record.” Id. (citation omitted). Pursuant to Miranda, “when 

an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the 

authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege 

against self-incrimination is jeopardized.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. When 

that privilege is violated, any statements given should be excluded from 

evidence. Id. at 479.

An individual is subjected to custody for purposes of Miranda if the 

individual’s “freedom of action” is “physically denied . . . in any significant 

way,” or a reasonable person in the same situation would reasonably believe 

that the individual’s “freedom of action or movement is restricted by the 
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interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 376 (Pa. 2015)

(cleaned up). Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances when 

considering whether an encounter was custodial. Id. Factors relevant to 

determining if a person was in custody include: “the basis for the detention; 

its length; its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her 

will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law 

enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative 

methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions.” Commonwealth v. 

Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 948 (Pa.Super. 2016).

Considering the evidence in its totality, the encounter between Trooper 

Hartung and Bennett did not rise to the level of custody. Miranda warnings 

were therefore not necessary. Trooper Hartung asked Bennett to get out of 

his vehicle based on the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the vehicle. He 

then asked Bennett walk to the back of Bennett’s vehicle and explained that 

he smelled marijuana. Trooper Hartung then asked if there was marijuana in 

the vehicle and if Bennett had smoked marijuana. 

No evidence here suggests that that Trooper Hartung restrained Bennett 

during this questioning or that he made a show of force or threatened to use 

force. Nor was there any evidence that he conducted the questioning in a 

forceful or threatening manner, or that he made Bennett get out of the vehicle 

and go to the back of his vehicle against his will. As for Bennett’s argument 

that Trooper Hartung arrested him based on the smell of burnt marijuana 

alone, this claim lacks foundation in the record. See Commonwealth v. Barr, 
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No. 28 MAP 2021, 2021 WL 6136363, *15 (Pa. Dec. 29, 2021) (holding 

troopers lacked probable cause based solely on smell of burning marijuana, 

after enactment of Medical Marijuana Act). The evidence is clear that Trooper 

Hartung arrested Bennett after the trooper not only smelled burnt marijuana 

from the car and Bennett’s person, but also observed Bennett’s bloodshot 

eyes, heard Bennett’s admission, and observed Bennett’s performance on 

FSTs evidencing marijuana intoxication. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when admitting Bennett’s statements. 

Bennett also argues that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden

to support the DUI conviction. He argues that “[t]here was no evidence that 

[Bennett] was incapable of driving safely.” Bennett’s Br. at 23. He maintains 

that there were no issues with his driving except his speeding and he 

“performed well on almost all” the FSTs. Id. at 22. Bennett also claims that 

even if his statements are admissible, “the corpus delicti rule dictates that his 

statements alone are insufficient to prove an offense.” Id. at 23.

The corpus delicti rule is both a limitation on the admission of the 

defendant’s inculpatory statement and a rule limiting the reliance on the 

defendant’s inculpatory statement to support a finding of guilt. See 

Commonwealth v. Cuevas, 61 A.3d 292, 295 (Pa.Super. 2013). We review 

the trial court’s application of the rule for an abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Dula, 262 A.3d 609, 637 (Pa.Super. 2021). 

Bennett’s argument goes to the second prong of the rule – the 

requirement that the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence for the fact 
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finder to consider the defendant’s statement in determining guilt. That prong 

of the rule provides that, in order for the fact finder to consider the defendant’s 

inculpatory statement, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt 

that a crime has been committed. See Cuevas, 61 A.3d at 295.

3 This part of 

the rule thus requires the Commonwealth to present evidence that: “(1) a loss 

has occurred; and (2) the loss occurred as a result of a criminal agency.” 

Dula, 262 A.3d at 637 (cleaned up). Only if it has done so can it “rely upon 

statements and declarations of the accused to prove that the accused was, in 

fact, the criminal agent responsible for the loss.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 587, 590 (Pa. 2003) (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). 

The statute at issue here – 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2) – provides that 

an individual is guilty of DUI when the “individual is under the influence of a 

drug or combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability 

to safely drive, operate, or be in actual physical control of the movement of 

the vehicle.” 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2). As applied to this case, then, in order 

to establish the corpus delicti, the Commonwealth needed to show that 

someone operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug or 

combination of drugs. See Commonwealth v. Zelosko, 686 A.2d 825, 826 

(Pa.Super. 1996).

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3 See also Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1118 (Pa.Super. 

2017).
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Here, Trooper Hartung testified that Bennett showed signs of 

impairment during portions of the FSTs; had bloodshot eyes; and smelled of 

burnt marijuana emanated from his person. The Commonwealth thus 

presented sufficient evidence for the fact finder to rely on Bennett’s 

statements in finding him guilty. Bennett’s further contention that there was 

no evidence to support a finding that he was incapable of driving safely also 

lacks merit. As to Bennett’s contention that he passed some of the FSTs, this

argument goes to the weight of the evidence, not the sufficiency. Bennett’s 

corpus delicti and sufficiency argument is meritless.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/17/2022