[Cite as Cleveland v. St. Elizabeth Health Ctr., 2012-Ohio-1472.]

STATE OF OHIO, MAHONING COUNTY 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

SEVENTH DISTRICT 

ANTONIO CLEVELAND, 

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 

TELINA CLEVELAND, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, 

VS. 

ST. ELIZABETH HEALTH CENTER, ET 

AL., 

 DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES. 

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 CASE NO. 10-MA-151 

OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Court of Common 

Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 08CV1823 

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant Atty. Christopher M. Mellino 

Atty. Michael E. Lyford 

200 Public Square, Suite 2900 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

For Defendants-Appellees Atty. Matthew G. Vansuch 

Atty. Shirley J. Christian 

2235 E. Pershing St., Suite A 

Salem, Ohio 44460 

JUDGES: 

Hon. Gene Donofrio 

Hon. Cheryl L. Waite 

Hon. Mary DeGenaro 

 

 

 Dated: March 28, 2012 
[Cite as Cleveland v. St. Elizabeth Health Ctr., 2012-Ohio-1472.]

DONOFRIO, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Antonio Cleveland, the Administrator of the Estate of 

Telina Cleveland, appeals from a Mahoning County Common Pleas Court judgment 

in favor of defendants-appellees, Dr. B. David Collier and Ohio Imaging Associates, 

Inc., on appellant’s medical malpractice claim. 

{¶2} On November 13, 2007, 40-year-old Telina Cleveland went to the 

emergency department at St. Elizabeth Health Center with severe pain in her left leg. 

She reported to the emergency room doctor that the pain was in her left calf. Telina 

was sent to the radiology department for an ultrasound of her leg. An ultrasound 

technician performed the ultrasound examination. The ultrasound did not include 

Telina’s calf. The ultrasound images were then given to Dr. Collier, the on-duty 

radiologist, for interpretation. He reported that there was no deep vein thrombosis 

(DVT) in Telina’s leg. Telina was discharged from the hospital with a diagnosis of leg 

cramps. 

{¶3} Two days later, Telina suffered a fatal pulmonary embolism. An 

autopsy revealed extensive thrombus in the deep veins of Telina’s left leg, some of 

which had broken off, travelled to her lungs, and caused the pulmonary embolism 

that resulted in her death. 

{¶4} Appellant filed a complaint on April 30, 2008, against appellees, St. 

Elizabeth, and several other defendants alleging medical malpractice that resulted in 

Telina’s death. Dr. Collier is employed by Ohio Imaging Associates, Inc. 

{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial against appellees and St. Elizabeth. 

During the course of the trial, appellant reached a settlement with St. Elizabeth. The 

jury then returned a verdict in favor of appellees. Appellant filed a motion for new 

trial, which the trial court denied. 

{¶6} Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 21, 2010. 

{¶7} Appellant raises two assignments of error, the first of which states: 

{¶8} “THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL SHOWED 

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE B. DAVID COLLIER, M.D. WAS NEGLIGENT.” 
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{¶9} Appellant argues here that the evidence clearly established that Dr. 

Collier was negligent. He contends that Dr. Collier’s own expert testified that he was 

negligent for not knowing the hospital’s protocol regarding DVT ultrasound 

examinations. He further contends that the evidence was uncontroverted that Dr. 

Collier was responsible for supervising ultrasound technicians, that the ultrasound 

technician did not follow the hospital’s DVT ultrasound protocol, and that the 

ultrasound technician did not perform a complete ultrasound examination of Telina’s 

leg. 

{¶10} Appellant goes on to argue that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for a new trial because competent, credible evidence did not exist to support 

the verdict. The only evidence to support the verdict, appellant argues, was Dr. 

Collier’s own self-serving testimony. 

{¶11} Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to 

all the material elements of the case must not be reversed, as being against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. C .E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 

279, 376 N.E.2d 578, syllabus (1978). See, also, Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio 

St.3d 223, 226, 638 N.E.2d 533 (1994). Reviewing courts must oblige every 

reasonable presumption in favor of the lower court's judgment and finding of facts. 

Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226, (citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 

St.3d 77 [1984]). In the event the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

interpretation, we must construe it consistently with the lower court's judgment. Id. 

In addition, the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses 

are primarily for the trier of the facts. Kalain v. Smith, 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 162, 495 

N.E.2d 572 (1986). 

{¶12} “In order to establish medical malpractice, it must be shown by a 

preponderance of evidence that the injury complained of was caused by the doing of 

some particular thing or things that a physician or surgeon of ordinary skill, care and 

diligence would not have done under like or similar conditions or circumstances, or by 

the failure or omission to do some particular thing or things that such a physician or 
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surgeon would have done under like or similar conditions and circumstances, and 

that injury complained of was the direct and proximate result of such doing or failing 

to do some one or more of such particular things.” Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 

127, 346 N.E.2d 673, paragraph one of the syllabus (1976). 

{¶13} We must examine the evidence presented to determine if it supports 

the jury’s verdict. 

{¶14} Dr. Collier was appellant’s first witness. Dr. Collier admitted that he 

was previously convicted of making materially false statements to a federal 

investigator. (Tr. 76). Dr. Collier testified that he had no recollection of the day in 

question, of interpreting the images at issue, of reviewing the scan, or of discussing 

the study with Tracy Melfi, the ultrasound technician who performed the scan. (Tr. 

48-49). He further testified that at the time of Telina’s ultrasound, he was not aware 

that the hospital had a protocol for ruling out DVT. (Tr. 49-50). One of the four rules 

in the hospital protocol is to examine the area of pain to rule out thrombus or fluid 

collection. 

{¶15} Dr. Collier stated that as a radiologist, he does not see the patient when 

an ultrasound is performed. (Tr. 55). However, the ultrasound technician works 

under his supervision. (Tr. 55). He stated that his job is to review the images taken 

by the technician to make sure that the study is of good technical quality, to see that 

it is a complete examination, and to look for DVT. (Tr. 60). Dr. Collier stated that 

although the technician records her opinion, he performs his own review of the 

images and reaches his own conclusion. (Tr. 63). He testified that it was his job to 

make sure that Telina did not have a blood clot. (Tr. 66). 

{¶16} Dr. Collier testified that at the time of reviewing the scan, the 

information he had was that the emergency room doctor was looking for a DVT in the 

left leg and the patient had symptoms of DVT. (Tr. 58). He stated that had he known 

Telina had complained of calf pain, he would have instructed Melfi to scan Telina’s 

leg below her knee, including the calf veins. (Tr. 77). However, he had no 

knowledge at the time of the scan that Telina had complained of calf pain. (Tr. 78). 
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And Dr. Collier acknowledged that if Telina had a clot in her lower leg, and an 

ultrasound was done only of her upper leg, the clot would go unnoticed. (Tr. 85). 

{¶17} Dr. Collier acknowledged that the autopsy report stated that Telina had 

a blood clot in the popliteal vein. (Tr. 80). He stated, however, that he examined 

Telina’s popliteal vein on November 13, 2007, and it was normal. (Tr. 80). But he 

did not examine her calf. (Tr. 81). 

{¶18} Dr. Collier testified that Telina’s scan was complete and was not 

required to go below her knee. (Tr. 74). He disagreed that in order to rule out DVT in 

all cases the entire leg must be scanned. (Tr. 75). 

{¶19} Dr. David Jackson was the emergency room doctor who examined 

Telina and ordered her ultrasound. Dr. Jackson testified that upon arriving at the 

hospital, Telina was first seen by the triage nurse, then by the physician’s assistant, 

and then by him. (Tr. 98). Telina reported that she had pain in her left calf for 

several days. (Tr. 96). Dr. Jackson stated that in response to his concern that Telina 

might have DVT, he ordered an ultrasound from radiology of her left leg. (Tr. 103, 

105). The order sheet indicated an ultrasound of the lower, left extremity, to rule out 

DVT. (Tr. 106). Dr. Jackson expected that the ultrasound would be of Telina’s entire 

leg, including her calf. (Tr. 108, 112). 

{¶20} Dr. Jackson stated that if an ultrasound is positive for DVT, the patient 

is admitted and treated with anticoagulants. (Tr. 109). Specifically, Dr. Jackson 

testified that he would not have discharged Telina if he had known there were blood 

clots in her leg. (Tr. 109). Instead, he would have immediately given her Heparin. 

(Tr. 111). But he relied on the ultrasound report from Dr. Collier and discharged 

Telina. (Tr. 111). Dr. Jackson did not know that the ultrasound was not done on 

Telina’s calf. (Tr. 111). Had he known this, he would not have discharged her 

because the ultrasound was inadequate to rule out DVT. (Tr. 111, 112, 140). Dr. 

Jackson testified that 90 percent of DVTs originate in the calf. (Tr. 111). 

{¶21} Tracy Melfi was the ultrasound technician who performed Telina’s 

ultrasound. Melfi had no memory of Telina or of performing Telina’s ultrasound 
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examination. (Tr. 151). Melfi testified regarding the hospital’s four rules for 

ultrasounds to rule out DVT. (Tr. 153). The first rule is to do a compression study of 

the veins every centimeter along the vein. (Tr. 154). Melfi stated that she took all 19 

pictures in color, as opposed to gray scale, because she was unable to see the vein 

without the color. (Tr. 156). Melfi referred to the pictures she took of the four veins in 

Telina’s leg. She stated that three veins appeared straight, but the popliteal vein 

appeared “torturous.” (Tr. 160-61). However, she stated that this was not abnormal 

and that there was no blood flow missing in the popliteal vein. (Tr. 161). 

{¶22} Melfi stated that she did not examine Telina’s leg below the knee. (Tr. 

162). She stated that the popliteal vein ends right behind the knee and her exam 

ended with the end of the popliteal vein. (Tr. 162-63). She did not examine the veins 

in Telina’s calf. (Tr. 168). Melfi acknowledged that hospital rule number four requires 

that an ultrasound always be performed over the area of pain. (Tr. 169). However, 

she stated that she was unaware of Telina’s calf pain. (Tr. 170). Melfi stated that the 

requisition she received indicated “limb pain.” (Tr. 170). And while she 

acknowledged that the calf is part of the limb, Melfi testified that she was taught to 

stop the examination at the end of the popliteal vein when there is no complaint of 

calf pain. (Tr. 170). Melfi stated that had Telina told her that she had calf pain, Melfi 

would have scanned her calf too. (Tr. 171). But she admitted that she had no 

recollection of what Telina may have told her or if she asked Telina if she had calf 

pain. (Tr. 171-73). 

{¶23} Melfi also acknowledged that she had access to a sheet from the triage 

nurse indicating that Telina had pain in her calf muscle. (Tr. 174-75). In fact, Melfi 

even wrote her own notes on the same sheet. (Tr. 176). However, Melfi stated that 

she is not required to go through the medical history or the emergency room 

documents. (Tr. 176). She said that the only thing she was required to do was to 

check the order and indicate that the exam was done. (Tr. 176). 

{¶24} Dr. Paul Collier (Dr. Paul) is a vascular surgeon and appellant’s expert 

witness. Dr. Paul first read from the coroner’s findings. The coroner found Telina’s 
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cause of death was a pulmonary embolism. (Tr. 191). The source of the embolism 

was a DVT in the left leg in the popliteal region. (Tr. 192). Dr. Paul stated that this 

was near the knee. (Tr. 192). Dr. Paul opined that the clots that were found in 

Telina’s leg during her autopsy were present when she was in the hospital on 

November 13, 2007. (Tr. 192). He stated that the ultrasound did not go down far 

enough. (Tr. 193). Dr. Paul further noted that in the emergency room, Telina 

complained of pain and swelling in her calf. (Tr. 193-94). Furthermore, on the 

ultrasound, Dr. Paul stated that there was a “marked irregularity” of the vein’s wall 

making it appear more likely that there was a clot lining the wall. (Tr. 194). He 

opined that the irregularity was likely the tip of the iceberg, or a partially occlusive clot 

with more “downstream.” (Tr. 194). Dr. Paul also opined that the image of Telina’s 

popliteal vein showed an irregularity where it appeared “squiggly and all ratty.” (Tr. 

214). He stated that it should look the same as the other three veins. (Tr. 218). 

{¶25} Dr. Paul further testified that, in his opinion, Dr. Collier breached the 

standard of care required by a doctor who is reading and interpreting an ultrasound. 

(Tr. 216-17). As a basis for his opinion, Dr. Paul stated that Dr. Collier accepted an 

inadequate study and misinterpreted the study where there was an abnormality that 

was not explained. (Tr. 217). He stated that the study was not complete because 

Telina complained of calf pain and her calf was not scanned. (Tr. 216). He also 

stated that the vein compression was not done properly because there appeared to 

be a partially occluding clot in the popliteal vein. (Tr. 216, 219). In conclusion, he 

opined that Dr. Collier’s failure to meet the standard of care was a proximate cause of 

Telina’s pain and suffering and death. (Tr. 223). Dr. Paul testified that had the study 

been performed properly and interpreted properly, the clot would have been 

diagnosed in time to treat Telina and prevent her death. (Tr. 223). 

{¶26} As to how the compression study was done incorrectly, Dr. Paul stated 

that the compressions should have been done in black and white images so one 

would be able to tell where the vein walls collapsed. (Tr. 241). He stated that with 

the color images used, the color fills the walls of the vein and can almost bleed 
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through so that you do not get a clear picture of the wall. (Tr. 290). He further 

opined that the area on the popliteal vein that looked like a “shark bite” was most 

likely a clot and that the study should have been repeated to confirm this. (Tr. 247-

48). 

{¶27} Dr. John Cronan is a diagnostic radiologist and appellees’ expert. Dr. 

Cronan testified that one can view compressed veins in color or in black and white. 

(Tr. 366). He stated that when using color, you simply look for the color to go away 

when the vein is compressed. (Tr. 366, 369). Contrary to Dr. Paul’s opinion, Dr. 

Cronan opined that the “puckering” in Telina’s popliteal vein was not a clot. (Tr. 375). 

Dr. Paul also opined that Telina’s ultrasound study was a complete and normal exam. 

(Tr. 379, 384-85). He saw no evidence of a clot. (Tr. 383). 

{¶28} As to how Telina had a pulmonary embolism two days after her 

“normal” ultrasound, Dr. Cronan did not have a definitive explanation. (Tr. 379). He 

stated that this type of occurrence happens and that only about 30 to 40 percent of 

people who have a clot in their lungs have clots in their legs too. (Tr. 380). 

Additionally, Dr. Cronan stated that the ultrasound study is 95 percent accurate in 

finding clots in the legs, meaning that five percent of clots go undetected by the 

ultrasound. (Tr. 381). 

{¶29} On cross examination, Dr. Cronan stated that if the patient has calf 

pain, the calf should be evaluated. (Tr. 395). He stated that in cases where there is 

no complaint of calf pain, a complete exam includes the popliteal vein down to the 

point of bifurcation. (Tr. 397). But in cases where there is a complaint of calf pain, a 

complete exam includes the popliteal vein plus two calf veins. (Tr. 397-98, 416). Dr. 

Cronan agreed that without doing a complete scan, DVT cannot be ruled out. (Tr. 

398). 

{¶30} Dr. Cronan further testified that he assumed Dr. Collier knew the 

hospital’s protocol. (Tr. 411). He stated that if Dr. Collier did not know the hospital’s 

protocol for venous ultrasounds, this was below the standard of care. (Tr. 412). 
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However, he stated that because Dr. Collier’s requisition form stated “leg pain,” an 

exam that stopped at the end of the popliteal vein was a complete exam. (Tr. 415). 

{¶31} Finally, Dr. Collier testified in his defense as an expert witness. Dr. 

Collier testified that at the time he reviewed Telina’s studies, he had no clinical history 

that she had calf pain. (Tr. 427). He stated that if he had been told that Telina had 

pain in her calf, he would have scanned her calf. (Tr. 428, 457). Dr. Collier further 

testified that the scan of Telina’s popliteal vein was normal. (Tr. 435). Dr. Collier 

stated that he saw no evidence of a clot and was unsure what Dr. Paul was 

referencing when he testified that there was a “shark bite” indicative of a clot. (Tr. 

436). Dr. Collier testified, based on his knowledge, education, training, and 

experience, that Telina’s study did not show a clot. (Tr. 438). 

{¶32} Dr. Collier further testified that at the time of Telina’s ultrasound, he was 

not aware of the hospital protocol requiring him to scan the area of the pain. (Tr. 

440). However, he followed hospital policy when he read Telina’s ultrasound. (Tr. 

440). In other words, although he was not aware of the protocol, he followed it 

without knowing that he was following it. (Tr. 440). And although Dr. Collier had no 

memory of Telina or her ultrasound, he testified that he was not advised that she had 

pain below her knee. (Tr. 441). He stated that he knew this because if he had been 

advised that Telina had calf pain, he would have ordered Melfi to scan Telina’s calf. 

(Tr. 441-42). However, he also acknowledged that he was aware that Telina had 

“limb” pain and “leg” pain although he did not know where in her leg the pain was 

located. (Tr. 458). Dr. Collier stated that when a patient has calf pain, the reports he 

gets from the technician and the emergency room specifically state that the patient 

has “calf” pain. (Tr. 464-65). 

{¶33} The evidence presented makes this a very close case. There was 

substantial, credible evidence weighing on both sides. On one hand, Dr. Paul’s 

testimony was that Dr. Collier breached the standard of care in failing to do a 

complete ultrasound that included Telina’s calf and in failing to identify an area on her 

popliteal vein that he opined was likely a clot. On the other hand, Dr. Cronan’s and 
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Dr. Collier’s testimony was that Dr. Collier did not breach the standard of care 

because he reviewed a complete ultrasound given that he was unaware of Telina’s 

calf pain and that the area Dr. Paul opined was a possible clot was actually a normal 

part of Telina’s popliteal vein. 

{¶34} In this case, someone was clearly negligent. However, the jury could 

have found that the hospital was the negligent party and not Dr. Collier. St. Elizabeth 

was also a defendant in this case. During the trial, St. Elizabeth settled with 

appellant. It is possible the jury concluded that the negligence here was that Dr. 

Collier was never made aware of Telina’s complaint of calf pain. Telina told the 

emergency room doctor, Dr. Jackson, that she had pain in her calf. However, it is 

possible, based on Dr. Collier’s testimony, that he was never made aware of the calf 

pain. Dr. Collier testified that if he had known that Telina had calf pain, he would 

have instructed Melfi to scan Telina’s calf. And Melfi testified that if Telina had told 

her she was experiencing calf pain, she would have scanned Telina’s calf. 

Furthermore, based on Dr. Collier’s and Dr. Cronan’s testimony, if Dr. Collier was not 

specifically made aware of calf pain, it was proper procedure to stop the scan of 

Telina’s leg at the end of her popliteal vein, or right below her knee. 

{¶35} Given that there is some competent, credible evidence in support of the 

jury’s verdict, we cannot conclude that their verdict was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit. 

{¶36} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: 

{¶37} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT TO IMPEACH THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ONLY EXPERT TO 

CREATE A QUESTION OF FACT AS TO NEGLIGENCE WITH EVIDENCE 

SHOWING SEVERAL STATES HAD REVOKED HIS MEDICAL LICENSE AND 

WITH EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS 

CRIMINAL CONVICTION FOR LYING ABOUT HIS MEDICAL PRACTICE.” 

{¶38} Dr. Collier filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent appellant from 

referring to (1) his prior felony conviction for making false statements and 
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representations to the United States Department of Health and Human Services and 

(2) the suspension of his medical license by the California and Wisconsin medical 

boards. 

{¶39} The factual basis underlying these actions occurred while Dr. Collier 

was employed at the Medical College of Wisconsin. The allegation was that Dr. 

Collier falsely stated and represented to officials from the Department of Health and 

Human Services that he had personally signed all medical reports bearing his name 

that purported to reflect his view and interpretation of nuclear medicine scans when, 

in fact, a visiting professor whose temporary medical license had expired had actually 

performed a substantial portion of the reviews and interpretations at issue and had 

signed the reports using Dr. Collier’s name. However, Dr. Collier asserted that he 

reviewed and interpreted all nuclear medical studies signed by the other individual 

using his name. Dr. Collier was convicted of misleading investigators about a 

practice regarding the signing of the reports. He was not convicted of failing to 

interpret his own studies. 

{¶40} The trial court granted Dr. Collier’s motion in part. It ruled that appellant 

could use Dr. Collier’s conviction only for the purpose of credibility and veracity. It 

ruled that appellant could not use the alleged facts behind the conviction as an act 

similar to the doctor’s actions in this case. It also ruled that appellant could not 

introduce the suspensions of Dr. Collier’s medical license. 

{¶41} The decision to admit or exclude evidence rests in the trial court's 

sound discretion and we will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of that 

discretion. Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 437, 715 N.E.2d 

546 (1999). Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it 

implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶42} Appellant first argues that the circumstances surrounding Dr. Collier’s 

prior conviction and license revocation so closely track the situation in this case that 

the jury could not have meaningfully judged Dr. Collier’s credibility without hearing 
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more about those circumstances. He contends that the simple statement that Dr. 

Collier had a conviction for making false statements and representations to the U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services meant nothing to the jury and offered no 

real insight into Dr. Collier’s credibility. 

{¶43} Appellant further argues that the court should have allowed him to cross 

examine Dr. Collier regarding the circumstances surrounding his criminal conviction. 

He contends that Dr. Collier told lies directly related to his medical practice in a 

misplaced effort to protect his license and career. In this case too, appellant asserts, 

Dr. Collier’s professional conduct was once again at issue. Thus, he contends the 

circumstances regarding Dr. Collier’s prior conviction went directly to Dr. Collier’s 

credibility. 

{¶44} In 1999, Dr. Collier pleaded guilty to and was convicted of “making false 

statements and representations to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services.” (Motion in Limine, Ex. A). Appellant’s conviction was for falsely 

representing to federal investigators that he personally signed all medical reports 

bearing his name. (Motion in Limine, Ex. A). However, Dr. Collier steadfastly 

maintained that he personally reviewed and interpreted all nuclear medicine studies 

signed by the other individual using Dr. Collier’s name. (Motion in Limine, Ex. A). 

{¶45} Pursuant to Evid.R. 609(A)(3): “evidence that any witness, including an 

accused, has been convicted of a crime is admissible if the crime involved dishonesty 

or false statement, regardless of the punishment and whether based upon state or 

federal statute or local ordinance.” Thus, the evidence of Dr. Collier’s conviction was 

clearly admissible. But the Rule does not provide for admitting the factual allegations 

surrounding a conviction. Furthermore, the “facts” that appellant sought to introduce 

were never substantiated but were only the allegations of the federal agents who 

investigated Dr. Collier. 

{¶46} Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disallowing cross 

examination regarding the underlying facts of Dr. Collier’s criminal conviction. 
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{¶47} Second, appellant contends courts have repeatedly permitted cross 

examination as to the revocation of a professional license. He asserts that when 

evidence of a professional license has been introduced on direct examination, 

evidence that the witness’s license has been revoked is relevant to the issue of 

credibility. Appellant points out that Dr. Collier testified as an expert in his defense. 

He argues that by doing so, Dr. Collier put his professional credentials at issue and 

also made them a proper issue to rebut. 

{¶48} Evid.R. 601(D) requires a person giving expert medical testimony in a 

medical malpractice case to be licensed. Additionally, a witness may testify as an 

expert if, in addition to other requirements, he “is qualified as an expert by specialized 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of 

the testimony.” Evid.R. 702(B). 

{¶49} In this case, Dr. Collier testified as an expert witness in his own 

defense. Before getting into his testimony regarding Telina’s ultrasound, Dr. Collier 

testified at length regarding his education, experience, and training in the medical 

field. (Tr. 423-26). In other words, he spent some time building up his credentials in 

front of the jury so that, presumably, they would give more weight to his medical 

opinion regarding the ultrasound. Given that Dr. Collier put his professional 

credentials at issue, the trial court should have allowed appellant to cross examine 

him with the suspensions of his medical license in Wisconsin and California. Dr. 

Collier opened the door by testifying to his medical credentials. By not allowing cross 

examination with the suspensions, Dr. Collier was able to give the jury the impression 

that his professional credentials were untarnished when this was not the case. 

{¶50} Courts have found that a physician-witness’s licensure is a matter that 

affects the weight to be given to their testimony. See Ray v. Ramada Inn N., 181 

Ohio App.3d 350, 2009-Ohio-1278 (“If the fact that a testifying physician's medical 

license is suspended at the time of his testimony at trial does not cast sufficient doubt 

upon its reliability to preclude its admission in a criminal trial, we see no reason to 

employ a higher sensitivity to a similar doubt concerning its reliability in a civil trial. As 
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counsel for both parties agreed in oral argument, the fact of Moore's suspended 

license to practice medicine is a fact that could, and certainly would, be brought up in 

his cross-examination at trial, should he be permitted to testify.”); State v. Snodgrass, 

177 Ohio App.3d 556, 2008-Ohio-4019 (doctor whose license had been suspended 

for six months could still testify as an expert but his license suspension was a matter 

of the weight to be given to his testimony); In re Webb, 64 Ohio App.3d 28, 580 

N.E.2d 506 (1989) (the fact the doctor was not licensed at the time he administered 

the tests went to weight, not admissibility). 

{¶51} Dr. Paul testified that Dr. Collier breached the standard of care by 

failing to interpret a complete ultrasound and by failing to recognize that a certain 

area of the popliteal vein appeared to show evidence of a clot. On the other hand, 

Drs. Collier and Cronan testified that Dr. Collier did not breach the standard of care 

because the ultrasound examination was complete and it did not show any signs of 

clots. Thus, the jury was faced with determining which evidence was more credible. 

In the eyes of the jury, none of the doctors had a tarnished record and all set forth 

exemplary credentials. Had they known that Dr. Collier’s medical license had been 

suspended in two states, they may have given his expert medical opinion less weight. 

{¶52} Furthermore, Dr. Cronan testified that he assumed Dr. Collier knew the 

hospital’s protocol, which was not the case, and that if Dr. Collier did not know the 

hospital’s protocol for venous ultrasounds, this was below the standard of care. This 

testimony coupled with testimony regarding Dr. Collier’s suspended licenses, may 

have persuaded the jury to find Dr. Paul’s testimony to be more credible. 

{¶53} Given how close the evidence in this case was, had the trial court 

allowed appellant to use Dr. Collier’s suspensions on cross examination, this could 

have affected the weight the jury gave to Dr. Collier’s testimony, and likewise, the 

outcome of the case. As such, the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the 

cross examination. 

{¶54} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error has merit in part. 
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{¶55} For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial court is hereby 

reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to law and 

consistent with this opinion. 

Waite, P.J., concurs. 

DeGenaro, J., concurs.