# Diario Oficial C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-244X
  doi:10.3000/1725244X.C_2009.158.spa |
| --- | --- |
| Diario Oficial
  de la Unión Europea | C 158 |
| | |
| Edición en lengua española | Comunicaciones e informaciones | 52o año11 de julio de 2009 |

ISSN 1725-244X

doi:10.3000/1725244X.C_2009.158.spa

Diario Oficial

de la Unión Europea

C 158

Edición en lengua española

Comunicaciones e informaciones

52o año11 de julio de 2009

---

| Número de información | Sumario | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicaciones |
| | COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión |
| 2009/C 158/01 | No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Número de información

Sumario

Página

II   Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión

2009/C 158/01

No oposición a una concentración notificada (Asunto COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informaciones |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA |
| | Comisión |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Tipo de cambio del euro | 2 |
| | INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Exposición anotada de mercados regulados y disposiciones nacionales en aplicación de los requisitos de la Directiva de servicios de inversión DSI (Directiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Comunicación de la Comisión con arreglo al artículo 16, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1008/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre normas comunes para la explotación de servicios aéreos en la Comunidad — Obligaciones de servicio público respecto a servicios aéreos regulares (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informaciones

INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión

2009/C 158/02

Tipo de cambio del euro

2

INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS

2009/C 158/03

Exposición anotada de mercados regulados y disposiciones nacionales en aplicación de los requisitos de la Directiva de servicios de inversión DSI (Directiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo)

3

2009/C 158/04

Comunicación de la Comisión con arreglo al artículo 16, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1008/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre normas comunes para la explotación de servicios aéreos en la Comunidad — Obligaciones de servicio público respecto a servicios aéreos regulares (
  1
  )

o

1

9

| | V   Anuncios |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Comisión |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Convocatoria de propuestas — EACEA/11/2009 — Apoyo estructural a organizaciones europeas de investigación y reflexión sobre políticas públicas europeas y a organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea — Programa Europa con los ciudadanos, acción 2, medidas 1 y 2 — 2010 | 10 |
| | PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA |
| | Comisión |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Ayuda estatal — Países Bajos — Ayuda estatal C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 88, apartado 2, del Tratado CE (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | OTROS ACTOS |
| | Comisión |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Publicación de una solicitud de registro con arreglo al artículo 8, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006 sobre las especialidades tradicionales garantizadas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios | 24 |

V   Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comisión

2009/C 158/05

Convocatoria de propuestas — EACEA/11/2009 — Apoyo estructural a organizaciones europeas de investigación y reflexión sobre políticas públicas europeas y a organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea — Programa Europa con los ciudadanos, acción 2, medidas 1 y 2 — 2010

10

PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión

2009/C 158/06

Ayuda estatal — Países Bajos — Ayuda estatal C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 88, apartado 2, del Tratado CE (
  1
  )

1

13

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión

2009/C 158/07

Publicación de una solicitud de registro con arreglo al artículo 8, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006 sobre las especialidades tradicionales garantizadas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

o

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE |

---

(1)   Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE

1

| ES | |
| --- | --- |

ES

---

II Comunicaciones

COMUNICACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/1

---

No oposición a una concentración notificada

(Asunto COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI)

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2009/C 158/01

El 14 de mayo de 2009, la Comisión decidió no oponerse a la concentración notificada que se cita en el encabezamiento y declararla compatible con el mercado común. Esta decisión se basa en el artículo 6, apartado 1, letra b) del Reglamento (CE) no 139/2004 del Consejo. El texto íntegro de la decisión solo está disponible en inglés y se hará público una vez que se elimine cualquier secreto comercial que pueda contener. Estará disponible:

| — | en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad, |
| --- | --- |

—

en la sección de concentraciones del sitio web de competencia de la Comisión (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sitio web permite localizar las decisiones sobre concentraciones mediante criterios de búsqueda tales como el nombre de la empresa, el número de asunto, la fecha o el sector de actividad,

| — | en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) con el número de documento 32009M5403. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea. |
| --- | --- |

—

en formato electrónico en el sitio web EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) con el número de documento 32009M5403. EUR-Lex da acceso al Derecho comunitario en línea.

---

IV Informaciones

INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE INSTITUCIONES Y ÓRGANOS DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

Comisión

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/2

---

Tipo de cambio del euro (1)

10 de julio de 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Moneda | Tipo de cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar estadounidense | 1,3901 |
| JPY | yen japonés | 128,21 |
| DKK | corona danesa | 7,4466 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,85800 |
| SEK | corona sueca | 11,0022 |
| CHF | franco suizo | 1,5140 |
| ISK | corona islandesa | |
| NOK | corona noruega | 9,0840 |
| BGN | lev búlgaro | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corona checa | 26,030 |
| EEK | corona estonia | 15,6466 |
| HUF | forint húngaro | 277,50 |
| LTL | litas lituana | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letón | 0,6993 |
| PLN | zloty polaco | 4,3740 |
| RON | leu rumano | 4,2160 |
| TRY | lira turca | 2,1636 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,7940 |
| CAD | dólar canadiense | 1,6212 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 10,7736 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandés | 2,2250 |
| SGD | dólar de Singapur | 2,0331 |
| KRW | won de Corea del Sur | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricano | 11,4023 |
| CNY | yuan renminbi | 9,4983 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,3315 |
| IDR | rupia indonesia | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | ringgit malayo | 4,9731 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 67,026 |
| RUB | rublo ruso | 45,4005 |
| THB | baht tailandés | 47,382 |
| BRL | real brasileño | 2,8084 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 19,0303 |
| INR | rupia india | 67,8230 |

Moneda

Tipo de cambio

USD

dólar estadounidense

1,3901

JPY

yen japonés

128,21

DKK

corona danesa

7,4466

GBP

libra esterlina

0,85800

SEK

corona sueca

11,0022

CHF

franco suizo

1,5140

ISK

corona islandesa

NOK

corona noruega

9,0840

BGN

lev búlgaro

1,9558

CZK

corona checa

26,030

EEK

corona estonia

15,6466

HUF

forint húngaro

277,50

LTL

litas lituana

3,4528

LVL

lats letón

0,6993

PLN

zloty polaco

4,3740

RON

leu rumano

4,2160

TRY

lira turca

2,1636

AUD

dólar australiano

1,7940

CAD

dólar canadiense

1,6212

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

10,7736

NZD

dólar neozelandés

2,2250

SGD

dólar de Singapur

2,0331

KRW

won de Corea del Sur

1 786,89

ZAR

rand sudafricano

11,4023

CNY

yuan renminbi

9,4983

HRK

kuna croata

7,3315

IDR

rupia indonesia

14 174,11

MYR

ringgit malayo

4,9731

PHP

peso filipino

67,026

RUB

rublo ruso

45,4005

THB

baht tailandés

47,382

BRL

real brasileño

2,8084

MXN

peso mexicano

19,0303

INR

rupia india

67,8230

---

(1)  Fuente: tipo de cambio de referencia publicado por el Banco Central Europeo.

---

INFORMACIONES PROCEDENTES DE LOS ESTADOS MIEMBROS

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/3

---

Exposición anotada de mercados regulados y disposiciones nacionales en aplicación de los requisitos de la Directiva de servicios de inversión DSI (Directiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo)

2009/C 158/03

El artículo 47 de la Directiva relativa a los mercados de instrumentos financieros (Directiva 2004/39/CE, DO L 145 de 30.4.2004) autoriza a cada Estado miembro a otorgar la condición de «mercado regulado» a los mercados constituidos en su territorio que cumplan con su normativa.

De conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 4, apartado 1, inciso 14, de la Directiva 2004/39/CE, se entiende por «mercado regulado» un sistema multilateral, operado o gestionado por un gestor del mercado, que reúne o brinda la posibilidad de reunir — dentro del sistema y según sus normas no discrecionales — los diversos intereses de compra y de venta sobre instrumentos financieros de múltiples terceros para dar lugar a contratos con respecto a los instrumentos financieros admitidos a negociación conforme a sus normas o sistemas, y que está autorizado y funciona de forma regular de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el título III de esa misma Directiva.

El artículo 47 de la Directiva 2004/39/CE exige que cada Estado miembro mantenga una lista actualizada de los mercados regulados por él autorizados. La información contenida en dicha lista deberá comunicarse a los demás Estados miembros y a la Comisión Europea. En virtud del mismo artículo (artículo 47 de la Directiva 2004/39/CE), la Comisión deberá publicar anualmente en el Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea una lista de los mercados regulados que le hayan sido notificados. La presente lista ha sido elaborada en cumplimiento de esta obligación.

En la lista adjunta se indica la denominación de cada uno de los mercados que según las autoridades nacionales competentes se ajustan a la definición de «mercado regulado». Además, se indica la entidad gestora de dichos mercados, así como la autoridad competente responsable de elaborar o aprobar la normativa del mercado.

Como consecuencia de la disminución de las trabas al ejercicio de la actividad y de la especialización de los segmentos de negociación, la lista de «mercados regulados» está sujeta a mayores modificaciones que las previstas en la Directiva de Servicios de Inversión 93/22/CEE. El artículo 47 de la Directiva relativa a los mercados de instrumentos financieros exige además a la Comisión Europea que publique la lista de mercados regulados en su página de Internet y que la actualice regularmente. Por consiguiente, la Comisión, además de la publicación anual de la lista en el Diario Oficial de las Comunidades Europeas, mantendrá una versión actualizada en su página oficial [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Dicha lista se actualizará periódicamente con arreglo a la información comunicada por las autoridades nacionales. Se insta a estas últimas a que continúen informando a la Comisión de cualquier incorporación o supresión efectuada en la lista de mercados regulados de su Estado miembro.

| País | Denominación del mercado regulado | Entidad gestora | Autoridad competente para la designación y supervisión del mercado |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (Mercado oficial) |

País

Denominación del mercado regulado

Entidad gestora

Autoridad competente para la designación y supervisión del mercado

Austria

1.

Amtlicher Handel (Mercado oficial)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (Mercado semioficial) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (Mercado semioficial)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Autoridad de Supervisión de los Mercados financieros) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Autoridad de Supervisión de los Mercados financieros)

Bélgica

| 1. | a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt,

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA.

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgaria

| 1. | Официален пазар (Mercado oficial) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (Mercado oficial)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (Mercado no oficial) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (Mercado no oficial)

Българска Фондова Борса — София АД (Bolsa de Bulgaria — Sofía JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Comisión Financiera de Supervisión)

Chipre

Bolsa de Chipre

| 1. | Mercado principal |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercado principal

| 2. | Mercado paralelo |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado paralelo

| 3. | Mercado alternativo |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercado alternativo

| 4. | Mercado de obligaciones |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercado de obligaciones

| 5. | Mercados de las sociedades de inversión |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercados de las sociedades de inversión

| 6. | Mercado de grandes proyectos |
| --- | --- |

6.

Mercado de grandes proyectos

| 7. | Mercado de transporte transoceánico |
| --- | --- |

7.

Mercado de transporte transoceánico

| 1.-7. | Bolsa de Chipre |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Bolsa de Chipre

| 1.-7. | Comisión del Mercado de Valores de Chipre |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Comisión del Mercado de Valores de Chipre

República Checa

| 1. | Mercado principal (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercado principal (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Mercado libre (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado libre (Volný trh)

| 3. | Mercado oficial |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercado oficial

| 4. | Mercado de futuros |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercado de futuros

| 5. | Mercado de contado |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercado de contado

| 1.-2. | Bolsa de Praga
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Bolsa de Praga

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM–SYSTEM, bolsa checa
  (RM–SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM–SYSTEM, bolsa checa

(RM–SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5 | Bolsa de la energía de Praga
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5

Bolsa de la energía de Praga

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5 | Banco Nacional de Chequia |
| --- | --- |

1.-5

Banco Nacional de Chequia

Dinamarca

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | Mercado de acciones |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

Mercado de acciones

| — | Mercado de deuda |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de deuda

| — | Mercado de derivados |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de derivados

| 1. | Bolsa de Copenhague |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Copenhague

Finanstilsynet (Autoridad de Supervisión financiera de Dinamarca)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Mercado Danés Autorizado, SL (DAMP)) [mercado autorizado = negociación corriente de valores admitidos a negociación pero que no cotizan en bolsa] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Mercado Danés Autorizado, SL (DAMP)) [mercado autorizado = negociación corriente de valores admitidos a negociación pero que no cotizan en bolsa]

| 2. | Mercado Danés Autorizado (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado Danés Autorizado (DAMP)

Estonia

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Bolsa de valores)






  — | Põhinimekiri (Mercado principal) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Bolsa de valores)

—

Põhinimekiri (Mercado principal)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (Mercado de obligaciones) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (Mercado de obligaciones)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (Mercado de fondos) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (Mercado de fondos)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Autoridad de Supervisión Financiera de Estonia)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Mercado regulado)






  — | Lisanimekiri (Mercado secundario) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Mercado regulado)

—

Lisanimekiri (Mercado secundario)

Finlandia

Arvopaperipörssi (Bolsa de valores)

| — | Pörssilista (Mercado oficial) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (Mercado oficial)

| — | Pre-lista (Mercado previo) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (Mercado previo)

| — | Muut arvopaperit–lista (Mercado de otros valores) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit–lista (Mercado de otros valores)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy

Designación:

Ministerio de Finanzas.

Supervisión:

| — | Aprobación de las normas: Ministerio de Finanzas; |
| --- | --- |

—

Aprobación de las normas: Ministerio de Finanzas;

| — | Supervisión del cumplimiento:
  Finanssivalvonta (Autoridad de supervisión financiera de Finlandia) |
| --- | --- |

—

Supervisión del cumplimiento:

Finanssivalvonta (Autoridad de supervisión financiera de Finlandia)

Francia

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Propuesta de la Autorité des marchés financiers (Autoridad de los Mercados Financieros–AMF).

Reconocimiento por parte del Ministerio de Finanzas (véase el artículo L. 421-1 del Code monétaire et financier [Código monetario y financiero]).

Alemania

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (Autoridades de Supervisión Bursátil de los Estados Federados) y Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin).

Autoridades de los Estados Federados:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Mercado regulado)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Mercado regulado)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein–Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein–Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Mercado regulado)

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Mercado regulado, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Mercado regulado, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Mercado regulado)

| 6. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Mercado regulado)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden–Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden–Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Mercado regulado)

| 8. | Börse–Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse–Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden–Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden–Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Mercado regulado) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Mercado regulado)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grecia

| 1. | Bolsa de Atenas






  — | Mercado de valores |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Atenas

—

Mercado de valores

| — | Mercado de derivados |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de derivados

| 1. | Bolsa de Atenas |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Atenas

| 1. | Comisión del Mercado de Capitales de Grecia |
| --- | --- |

1.

Comisión del Mercado de Capitales de Grecia

| 2. | Mercado secundario de valores electrónico (HDAT–Mercado de deuda) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado secundario de valores electrónico (HDAT–Mercado de deuda)

| 2. | Banco de Grecia |
| --- | --- |

2.

Banco de Grecia

| 2. | Comisión del Mercado de Capitales de Grecia |
| --- | --- |

2.

Comisión del Mercado de Capitales de Grecia

Hungría

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Bolsa de Budapest)

| — | Részvényszekció (Sección de acciones) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Sección de acciones)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (Sección de deuda) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (Sección de deuda)

| — | Származékos szekció (Sección de derivados) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (Sección de derivados)

| — | Áru szekció (Sección de materias primas) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Sección de materias primas)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Bolsa de Budapest)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Autoridad de supervisión financiera de Hungría)

Irlanda

Mercado principal de la Bolsa de Irlanda

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

La Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority («Autoridad de Reglamentación Financiera») autoriza los mercados regulados y (a excepción de las condiciones de admisión a cotización) supervisa el cumplimiento de los requisitos de la MiFID por el gestor del mercado.

Italia

| 1. | Mercado electrónico de acciones (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercado electrónico de acciones (MTA)

| 2. | Mercado electrónico de deuda (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado electrónico de deuda (MOT)

| 3. | Mercado electrónico de fondos abiertos y ETC (ETF-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercado electrónico de fondos abiertos y ETC (ETF-Plus)

| 4. | Mercado electrónico de derivados titulizados (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercado electrónico de derivados titulizados (SeDeX)

| 5. | Mercado after hours (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercado after hours (TAH)

| 6. | Mercado italiano de derivados para la negociación de los instrumentos financieros previstos en el artículo 1, apartado 2, letras f) e i) de la Ley de Finanzas Consolidada (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Mercado italiano de derivados para la negociación de los instrumentos financieros previstos en el artículo 1, apartado 2, letras f) e i) de la Ley de Finanzas Consolidada (IDEM)

| 7. | Mercado mayorista de deuda pública italiana y extranjera (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Mercado mayorista de deuda pública italiana y extranjera (MTS)

| 8. | Negociación mayorista de renta fija y variable privada emitida por organizaciones internacionales con participación pública (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Negociación mayorista de renta fija y variable privada emitida por organizaciones internacionales con participación pública (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Negociación mayorista de deuda pública via Internet (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Negociación mayorista de deuda pública via Internet (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX Market |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX Market

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

Consob autoriza las sociedades que gestionan mercados y aprueba sus estatutos y reglamentos.

En los mercados mayoristas de deuda pública, la empresa gestora recibe la autorización del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas teniendo en cuenta el dictamen de CONSOB y del Banco de Italia.

Letonia

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Mercado principal |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado principal

| — | Mercado de deuda |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de deuda

| — | Mercado secundario |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado secundario

| — | Mercado de fondos |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de fondos

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Comisión del Mercado Financiero y de Capitales)

Lituania

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | Mercado principal de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado principal de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Mercado secundario de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado secundario de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Mercado de deuda de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de deuda de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Mercado de fondos de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de fondos de Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Comisión Lituana del Mercado de Valores

Luxemburgo

Bolsa de Luxemburgo

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Comission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (Comisión de Supervisión del Sector Financiero)

Malta

Bolsa de Malta

Bolsa de Malta

Autoridad Maltesa de Servicios Financieros

Países Bajos

| 1. | a) | Mercado de contado Euronext Amsterdam:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Mercado de contado Euronext Amsterdam:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Mercado de derivados Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

b)

Mercado de derivados Euronext Amsterdam

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Autorización del Ministerio de Finanzas previa consulta a la Autoridad competente para los Mercados Financieros de los Países Bajos.
  Supervisión por la Autoridad competente para los Mercados Financieros de los Países Bajos y el Ministerio de Finanzas de los Países Bajos. |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Autorización del Ministerio de Finanzas previa consulta a la Autoridad competente para los Mercados Financieros de los Países Bajos.

Supervisión por la Autoridad competente para los Mercados Financieros de los Países Bajos y el Ministerio de Finanzas de los Países Bajos.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Polonia

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Mercado principal) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Mercado principal)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Mercado paralelo) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Mercado paralelo)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Mercado regulado extrabursátil de valores CeTO) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Mercado regulado extrabursátil de valores CeTO)

| 1 y 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Bolsa de Varsovia) |
| --- | --- |

1 y 2

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Bolsa de Varsovia)

| 3. | MTS–CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS–CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Comisión de Supervisión Financiera)

Portugal

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Mercado oficial) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Mercado oficial)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Mercado de futuros y opciones) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Mercado de futuros y opciones)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Mercado especial de deuda pública) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Mercado especial de deuda pública)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(Mercado de la energía)

| 1-2.: | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-2.:

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

El Ministerio de Finanzas autoriza los mercados previa propuesta de la Comissao do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM), autoridad responsable de la regulación y supervisión de los mercados.

Rumanía

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Mercado regulado de contado – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Mercado regulado de contado – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Mercado regulado de derivados – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Mercado regulado de derivados – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată – (Mercado regulado de derivados – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată – (Mercado regulado de derivados – BMFMS)

| 1 y 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bolsa de Bucarest S.A.) |
| --- | --- |

1 y 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bolsa de Bucarest S.A.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar–Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Bolsa Monetaria, Financiera y de Materias Primas ) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar–Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Bolsa Monetaria, Financiera y de Materias Primas )

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Comisión Nacional de Valores de Rumanía)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Comisión Nacional de Valores de Rumanía)

Eslovaquia

| 1. | Mercado de valores cotizados






  — | Mercado principal |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Mercado de valores cotizados

—

Mercado principal

| — | Mercado paralelo |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado paralelo

| 2. | Mercado libre regulado |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado libre regulado

Bolsa de Bratislava

Banco Nacional de Eslovaquia

Eslovenia

Mercado oficial de la Bolsa de valores de Liubliana (Borzni trg)

Ljubljanska borza (Bolsa de Liubliana)

Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev

(Agencia de los mercados de valores)

España

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (todas incluyen un mercado primario y un mercado secundario) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (todas incluyen un mercado primario y un mercado secundario)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España, responsable del mercado de deuda pública.

| 1. | Bolsa de valores de Barcelona |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de valores de Barcelona

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de valores de Bilbao |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de valores de Bilbao

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de valores de Madrid |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de valores de Madrid

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad Rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad Rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Suecia

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | Mercado regulado de acciones e instrumentos financieros asimilados a acciones |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado regulado de acciones e instrumentos financieros asimilados a acciones

| — | Mercado regulado de derivados |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado regulado de derivados

| — | Mercado regulado de obligaciones e instrumentos financieros asimilados a obligaciones |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado regulado de obligaciones e instrumentos financieros asimilados a obligaciones

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Autoridad de Supervisión Financiera)

Reino Unido

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority (Autoridad de Servicios Financieros) |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority (Autoridad de Servicios Financieros)

| 2. | PLUS–Markets Group — PLUS–listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS–Markets Group — PLUS–listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | Mercado Internacional de Futuros y Opciones de Londres (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercado Internacional de Futuros y Opciones de Londres (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFE Administsration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFE Administsration and Management

| 4. | Bolsa de metales de Londres |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de metales de Londres

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | Bolsa de Londres — Mercado regulado |
| --- | --- |

6.

Bolsa de Londres — Mercado regulado

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Islandia

OMX Nordic Exchange á Íslandi (Mercado regulado)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Autoridad de Supervisión Financiera)

Liechtenstein

No disponible

No disponible

No disponible

Noruega

| 1. | Bolsa de Oslo (Mercado oficial)






  — | Mercado de acciones |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Oslo (Mercado oficial)

—

Mercado de acciones

| — | Mercado de derivados (financieros) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de derivados (financieros)

| — | Mercado de deuda |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercado de deuda

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Autoridad de Supervisión Financiera de Noruega)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Mercado de acciones |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Mercado de acciones

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (Mercado oficial)






  — | Mercado de derivados (materias primas) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (Mercado oficial)

—

Mercado de derivados (materias primas)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Mercado de derivados (materias primas) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Mercado de derivados (materias primas)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Mercado de derivados (materias primas) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Mercado de derivados (materias primas)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/9

---

Comunicación de la Comisión con arreglo al artículo 16, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1008/2008 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo sobre normas comunes para la explotación de servicios aéreos en la Comunidad

Obligaciones de servicio público respecto a servicios aéreos regulares

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2009/C 158/04

| Estado miembro | Italia |
| --- | --- |
| Ruta afectada | Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino y viceversa |
| Fecha de entrada en vigor de las obligaciones de servicio público | 1 de diciembre de 2009 |
| Dirección de la que puede obtenerse gratuitamente el texto y cualquier otra información o documentación relacionada con la obligación de servicio público | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Estado miembro

Italia

Ruta afectada

Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino y viceversa

Fecha de entrada en vigor de las obligaciones de servicio público

1 de diciembre de 2009

Dirección de la que puede obtenerse gratuitamente el texto y cualquier otra información o documentación relacionada con la obligación de servicio público

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

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V Anuncios

PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comisión

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/10

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CONVOCATORIA DE PROPUESTAS — EACEA/11/2009

Apoyo estructural a organizaciones europeas de investigación y reflexión sobre políticas públicas europeas y a organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea

Programa «Europa con los ciudadanos», acción 2, medidas 1 y 2 — 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   OBJETIVOS Y DESCRIPCIÓN

La presente convocatoria de propuestas EACEA/11/2009 está basada en la Decisión del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo por la que se establece el programa «Europa con los ciudadanos» a fin de promover la ciudadanía europea activa para el periodo comprendido entre 2007 y 2013 (1) (en lo sucesivo denominado el «Programa»).

El Programa constituye el fundamento jurídico de la presente convocatoria de propuestas que se refiere específicamente a la acción 2 «Una sociedad civil activa en Europa», medidas 1 y 2, «Apoyo estructural a organizaciones europeas de investigación y de reflexión sobre las políticas públicas europeas y a organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea».

1.1.   Objetivos generales del Programa

El programa pretende contribuir a los siguientes objetivos generales:

| a) | brindar a los ciudadanos la oportunidad de interactuar y participar en la construcción de una Europa cada vez más cercana, que sea democrática y abierta al mundo, unida y enriquecida por su diversidad cultural y, desarrollando así la ciudadanía de la Unión Europea; |
| --- | --- |

a)

brindar a los ciudadanos la oportunidad de interactuar y participar en la construcción de una Europa cada vez más cercana, que sea democrática y abierta al mundo, unida y enriquecida por su diversidad cultural y, desarrollando así la ciudadanía de la Unión Europea;

| b) | desarrollar un sentimiento de identidad europea, basada en unos valores, una historia y una cultura comunes; |
| --- | --- |

b)

desarrollar un sentimiento de identidad europea, basada en unos valores, una historia y una cultura comunes;

| c) | fomentar el sentimiento de pertenencia a la Unión Europea entre sus ciudadanos; |
| --- | --- |

c)

fomentar el sentimiento de pertenencia a la Unión Europea entre sus ciudadanos;

| d) | mejorar la tolerancia y la comprensión mutua entre los ciudadanos europeos, respetando y fomentando la diversidad cultural y lingüística y contribuyendo al diálogo intercultural. |
| --- | --- |

d)

mejorar la tolerancia y la comprensión mutua entre los ciudadanos europeos, respetando y fomentando la diversidad cultural y lingüística y contribuyendo al diálogo intercultural.

1.2.   Objetivos específicos de la convocatoria

Los objetivos específicos de la presente convocatoria de propuestas son los siguientes:

| a) | Promover la acción, el debate y la reflexión relacionados con la ciudadanía europea y la democracia, los valores, la historia y la cultura compartidos mediante las actuaciones y la cooperación en el marco de los foros de reflexión especializados («think tanks») y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Promover la acción, el debate y la reflexión relacionados con la ciudadanía europea y la democracia, los valores, la historia y la cultura compartidos mediante las actuaciones y la cooperación en el marco de los foros de reflexión especializados («think tanks») y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea;

| b) | impulsar la interacción entre los ciudadanos y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil de todos los países participantes, contribuyendo al diálogo intercultural y poniendo de relieve tanto la diversidad como la unidad europea. |
| --- | --- |

b)

impulsar la interacción entre los ciudadanos y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil de todos los países participantes, contribuyendo al diálogo intercultural y poniendo de relieve tanto la diversidad como la unidad europea.

1.3.   Temas prioritarios

| — | El futuro de la Unión Europea y sus valores básicos. |
| --- | --- |

—

El futuro de la Unión Europea y sus valores básicos.

| — | Ciudadanía europea activa: participación y democracia. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ciudadanía europea activa: participación y democracia.

| — | Diálogo intercultural. |
| --- | --- |

—

Diálogo intercultural.

| — | Impacto de las políticas comunitarias en las sociedades. |
| --- | --- |

—

Impacto de las políticas comunitarias en las sociedades.

| — | El bienestar de los ciudadanos europeos: empleo, cohesión social y desarrollo sostenible. |
| --- | --- |

—

El bienestar de los ciudadanos europeos: empleo, cohesión social y desarrollo sostenible.

1.4.   Descripción de la convocatoria de propuestas

La presente convocatoria de propuestas se refiere al apoyo estructural, denominado «subvenciones de funcionamiento», a organizaciones que persigan un objetivo de interés general europeo. Las subvenciones de funcionamiento garantizan un apoyo financiero para cubrir una parte de los gastos de funcionamiento necesarios para el buen desarrollo de las actividades regulares del organismo seleccionado.

Dicho apoyo puede concederse, en función de ciertos criterios, en forma de subvención anual o de asociación plurianual. La asociación plurianual es un mecanismo de cooperación establecido entre una organización y la Agencia Ejecutiva en el ámbito Educativo, Audiovisual y Cultural (en lo sucesivo denominada la Agencia Ejecutiva), que da lugar a subvenciones específicas. En el marco de la presente convocatoria, dicha asociación podrá establecerse para un periodo de tres años.

2.   CANDIDATOS ELEGIBLES

2.1.   Organizaciones

Para poder recibir una subvención de funcionamiento, una organización que tenga un objetivo de interés general europeo, deberá:

| a) | ser una organización sin ánimo de lucro y tener personalidad jurídica; en el caso de las redes que no dispongan de una estructura de funcionamiento separada y de un estatuto social propio, la candidatura podrá ser presentada por la organización miembro encargada de la coordinación de la red. |
| --- | --- |

a)

ser una organización sin ánimo de lucro y tener personalidad jurídica; en el caso de las redes que no dispongan de una estructura de funcionamiento separada y de un estatuto social propio, la candidatura podrá ser presentada por la organización miembro encargada de la coordinación de la red.

| b) | actuar en el ámbito de la ciudadanía europea, tal y como se define en sus estatutos sociales o en su mandato y corresponder a alguna de las categorías de organización que se indican a continuación: | Medida 1:






  A. | Organizaciones de investigación y de reflexión sobre las políticas públicas europeas [foros de reflexión (think tanks) — grupos de reflexión]. |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

actuar en el ámbito de la ciudadanía europea, tal y como se define en sus estatutos sociales o en su mandato y corresponder a alguna de las categorías de organización que se indican a continuación:

Medida 1:

A.

Organizaciones de investigación y de reflexión sobre las políticas públicas europeas [foros de reflexión (think tanks) — grupos de reflexión].

| | Medida 2:






  B. | Organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea:






  — | organizaciones centrales (plataformas) europeas, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Medida 2:

B.

Organizaciones de la sociedad civil a escala europea:

—

organizaciones centrales (plataformas) europeas,

| — | redes europeas, |
| --- | --- |

—

redes europeas,

| — | organizaciones que desarrollen actividades de gran impacto a escala europea. |
| --- | --- |

—

organizaciones que desarrollen actividades de gran impacto a escala europea.

| C. | Organizaciones de la sociedad civil vinculadas a la Memoria Europea. |
| --- | --- |

C.

Organizaciones de la sociedad civil vinculadas a la Memoria Europea.

| D. | Plataformas de organizaciones paneuropeas. |
| --- | --- |

D.

Plataformas de organizaciones paneuropeas.

| c) | realizar la mayor parte de sus actividades en países elegibles (véase punto 2.2).

  Para la asociación plurianual, las organizaciones deben contar con una base y una personalidad jurídica desde, como mínimo, cuatro (4) años (a 15 de octubre de 2009) en uno de los países elegibles y ofrecer, en función de las categorías mencionadas a continuación, la cobertura geográfica siguiente:






  — | Si se trata de una organización central europea o una red europea, debe estar formada por miembros de, como mínimo, doce (12) países elegibles; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

realizar la mayor parte de sus actividades en países elegibles (véase punto 2.2).

Para la asociación plurianual, las organizaciones deben contar con una base y una personalidad jurídica desde, como mínimo, cuatro (4) años (a 15 de octubre de 2009) en uno de los países elegibles y ofrecer, en función de las categorías mencionadas a continuación, la cobertura geográfica siguiente:

—

Si se trata de una organización central europea o una red europea, debe estar formada por miembros de, como mínimo, doce (12) países elegibles;

| — | Si se trata de una organización que desarrolla actividades de gran impacto a escala europea, debe actuar como mínimo en doce (12) países elegibles. |
| --- | --- |

—

Si se trata de una organización que desarrolla actividades de gran impacto a escala europea, debe actuar como mínimo en doce (12) países elegibles.

| — | Si se trata de una plataforma de organizaciones paneuropeas, debe tener un mínimo de seis (6) organizaciones centrales en calidad de miembros y estar presente, mediante éstos últimos, en los 27 Estados miembros. |
| --- | --- |

—

Si se trata de una plataforma de organizaciones paneuropeas, debe tener un mínimo de seis (6) organizaciones centrales en calidad de miembros y estar presente, mediante éstos últimos, en los 27 Estados miembros.

Para la subvención anual, las organizaciones deben ser legales y contar con una personalidad jurídica de como mínimo un (1) año (a 15 de octubre de 2009) en uno de los países elegibles y ofrecer, en función de las categorías mencionadas a continuación, la cobertura geográfica siguiente:

| — | si se trata de una organización central europea o de una red europea, debe estar formada por miembros de, como mínimo, ocho (8) países elegibles, |
| --- | --- |

—

si se trata de una organización central europea o de una red europea, debe estar formada por miembros de, como mínimo, ocho (8) países elegibles,

| — | si se trata de una organización que desarrolla actividades de gran impacto a escala europea, debe actuar como mínimo en ocho (8) países elegibles. |
| --- | --- |

—

si se trata de una organización que desarrolla actividades de gran impacto a escala europea, debe actuar como mínimo en ocho (8) países elegibles.

Las plataformas de organizaciones paneuropeas únicamente pueden presentar una candidatura en el marco de una asociación plurianual.

Las personas físicas y los organismos públicos no son elegibles en la presente convocatoria.

2.2.   Países elegibles

| a) | los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea: Alemania, Austria, Bélgica, Bulgaria, Chipre, Dinamarca, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, España, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Grecia, Hungría, Irlanda, Italia, Letonia, Lituania, Luxemburgo, Malta, Países Bajos, Polonia, Portugal, Reino Unido, República Checa, Rumanía, Suecia; |
| --- | --- |

a)

los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea: Alemania, Austria, Bélgica, Bulgaria, Chipre, Dinamarca, Eslovaquia, Eslovenia, España, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Grecia, Hungría, Irlanda, Italia, Letonia, Lituania, Luxemburgo, Malta, Países Bajos, Polonia, Portugal, Reino Unido, República Checa, Rumanía, Suecia;

| b) | Croacia; |
| --- | --- |

b)

Croacia;

| c) | la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia; |
| --- | --- |

c)

la Antigua República Yugoslava de Macedonia;

| d) | Albania. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albania.

3.   ACCIONES ELEGIBLES

Las actividades de la organización candidata deben contribuir de manera tangible al desarrollo y la consecución de los objetivos específicos y a la aplicación de los temas prioritarios de la presente convocatoria de propuestas. Las actividades deben cubrir como mínimo un objetivo específico y un tema prioritario, entre los mencionados en el punto 1.

El programa de trabajo de la organización candidata para 2010, así como el programa estratégico de tres años (en caso de asociación plurianual) deben cubrir sus actividades estatutarias, en particular las conferencias, seminarios, mesas redondas, actividades de representación, comunicación y evaluación, así como sus otras actividades europeas periódicas.

Periodo de admisibilidad

Tanto para la subvención anual como para la asociación plurianual, el periodo de admisibilidad debe corresponder al ejercicio presupuestario del solicitante, tal como figura en las cuentas verificadas de la organización. Si dicho ejercicio presupuestario se corresponde con el año natural, el periodo de admisibilidad se extenderá desde el 1 de enero 2009 al 31 de diciembre de 2010.

Para los solicitantes cuyo ejercicio presupuestario no se ajuste al año natural, el periodo de admisibilidad es de 12 meses a partir de la fecha de inicio de su ejercicio presupuestario en 2010.

4.   CRITERIOS DE ADJUDICACIÓN

Las candidaturas que cumplan los criterios de admisibilidad y exclusión serán evaluadas en función de los criterios de adjudicación por un comité de evaluación con el fin de seleccionar a aquéllas que puedan ser cofinanciadas.

Se aplicarán los criterios de adjudicación mencionados a continuación. Los criterios cualitativos y cuantitativos representan respectivamente el 80 y el 20 % de la puntuación atribuida. En el caso de asociación plurianual, se ponderará el programa de trabajo a 12 meses en los mismos términos que el programa estratégico de tres años.

4.1.   Criterios cualitativos (80 %)

Se evaluarán los siguientes factores:

| a) | la pertinencia de los objetivos y las prioridades del programa «Europa con los ciudadanos» (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

la pertinencia de los objetivos y las prioridades del programa «Europa con los ciudadanos» (30 %);

| b) | la adecuación, la coherencia y la exhaustividad del programa de trabajo (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

b)

la adecuación, la coherencia y la exhaustividad del programa de trabajo (20 %);

| c) | el impacto, los resultados esperados del programa de trabajo (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

c)

el impacto, los resultados esperados del programa de trabajo (10 %);

| d) | el valor añadido europeo (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

d)

el valor añadido europeo (10 %);

| e) | la trascendencia de las actividades y la divulgación y explotación de los resultados en relación con la ciudadanía europea y otras partes interesadas (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

la trascendencia de las actividades y la divulgación y explotación de los resultados en relación con la ciudadanía europea y otras partes interesadas (10 %).

4.2.   Criterios cuantitativos (20 %)

Serán objeto de evaluación los siguientes elementos:

| a) | número de países elegibles involucrados en las actividades del programa de trabajo (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

número de países elegibles involucrados en las actividades del programa de trabajo (10 %);

| b) | número de potenciales beneficiarios directos (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

número de potenciales beneficiarios directos (10 %).

5.   PRESUPUESTO

El presupuesto total previsto para la cofinanciación de las subvenciones de funcionamiento para 2010 es de 8 200 000 EUR aproximadamente. La Agencia Ejecutiva tiene previsto financiar en torno a 55 organizaciones en esta convocatoria pero, en función de la calidad de las candidaturas, se reserva el derecho de no adjudicar todos los fondos disponibles.

A título indicativo, las subvenciones de la asociación plurianual representarán aproximadamente un 85 % del presupuesto disponible y las subvenciones anuales alrededor de un 15 %.

El apoyo estructural se concederá con cargo a la partida 15.06.66 del Presupuesto general de la Unión Europea.

6.   FECHA LÍMITE DE PRESENTACIÓN

La fecha límite para la presentación de los expedientes de candidatura es el 15 de octubre de 2009.

La Agencia Ejecutiva trabaja actualmente en la puesta en funcionamiento de un sistema de presentación electrónica de todas las candidaturas.

Para la presente convocatoria de propuestas, los candidatos deben enviar su solicitud a través de un formulario electrónico disponible a partir del 15 de septiembre de 2009. Esta versión (anexos incluidos) se considerará la versión principal. Antes de la citada fecha, la Agencia Ejecutiva brinda una versión pdf del formulario a fin de que los candidatos puedan empezar a elaborar su candidatura.

Asimismo, se debe enviar por correo convencional, antes de la fecha límite especificada, una versión impresa de la candidatura a la siguiente dirección:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Sólo se aceptarán las solicitudes presentadas en el formulario correcto, debidamente rellenado, fechadas y firmadas por la persona autorizada para obligar legalmente a la organización solicitante.

7.   INFORMACIÓN COMPLEMENTARIA

Las orientaciones detalladas para los candidatos, así como los formularios de candidatura, están disponibles en la siguiente dirección: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Decisión no 1904/2006/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo de 12 de diciembre de 2006 (DO L 378 de 27.12.2006, p. 32), modificada por la Decisión no 1358/2008/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo de 16 de diciembre de 2008 (DO L 350 de 30.12.2008).

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PROCEDIMIENTOS RELATIVOS A LA APLICACIÓN DE LA POLÍTICA DE COMPETENCIA

Comisión

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/13

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AYUDA ESTATAL — PAÍSES BAJOS

Ayuda estatal C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING

Invitación a presentar observaciones en aplicación del artículo 88, apartado 2, del Tratado CE

(Texto pertinente a efectos del EEE)

2009/C 158/06

Mediante carta de 31 de marzo de 2009, reproducida en la versión lingüística auténtica en las páginas siguientes al presente resumen, la Comisión notificó a los Países Bajos su decisión de incoar el procedimiento previsto en el artículo 88, apartado 2, del Tratado CE en relación con la medida antes citada.

Las partes interesadas podrán presentar sus observaciones sobre la medida respecto de la cual la Comisión ha incoado el procedimiento, en un plazo de un mes a partir de la fecha de publicación del presente resumen y de la carta siguiente, enviándolas a:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Dichas observaciones se comunicarán a los Países Bajos. Los interesados que presenten observaciones podrán solicitar por escrito, exponiendo los motivos de su solicitud, que su identidad sea tratada de forma confidencial.

RESUMEN

PROCEDIMIENTO

El 4 de marzo de 2009, las autoridades neerlandesas notificaron a la Comisión un mecanismo de suscripción de reserva de activos no líquidos en favor de ING Support Holding (una filial directa del ING Group).

DATOS

ING, domiciliada en los Países Bajos, es una de las mayores entidades financieras del mundo, con un balance total de 1 332 billones EUR. En enero de 2009, el Estado neerlandés e ING firmaron una hoja de términos para el traspaso de riesgos y la devolución de parte de su cartera de bonos de titulización hipotecaria sobre inmuebles residenciales con base en los EE.UU. (compuesta principalmente por valores de tipo Alt-A). El saldo pendiente de esa cartera de ING asciende a 39 000 millones USD (valor nominal, 30 000 millones EUR).

La medida contemplada consiste en un canje de efectivo entre el Estado neerlandés e ING, en cuyo marco ING traspasa los productos del 80 % del valor nominal de la cartera (reembolsos de capital e intereses) por pagos garantizados por el Estado sobre el 72 % (es decir, el 80 % del 90 %) del valor nominal de la cartera (únicamente capital), a lo que se añade una comisión de financiación que abona el Estado a ING y que asciende al 3,5 % en cuanto a la parte de valores de tipo fijo de la cartera y al tipo libor de 1 mes (USD) más 50 puntos básicos en cuanto a los valores de tipo variable incluidos en ella.

El Estado neerlandés abona a ING una comisión adicional de gestión de 25 puntos básicos por año sobre el capital pendiente. A cambio de esta medida, ING abona al Estado neerlandés una comisión de garantía anual de 55 puntos básicos sobre el 80 % del montante pendiente de la cartera.

EVALUACIÓN

La Comisión ha evaluado la operación a la luz de su Comunicación sobre activos deteriorados y, por ahora, tiene dudas sobre la valoración, en concreto sobre el método de valoración empleado para calcular el valor económico real. La Comisión tiene que examinar con mayor detalle las hipótesis subyacentes realizadas por el Estado neerlandés, en particular por lo que respecta a: i) la elección del tipo de descuento; ii) las hipótesis sobre el precio de las viviendas; iii) los niveles de mejoramiento del crédito, iv) otros aspectos relacionados con la valoración.

Así pues, la Comisión tiene también dudas sobre la adecuación del reparto de cargas entre el Estado e ING. Se pregunta si esa entidad soporta realmente la diferencia entre el valor nominal y el valor económico real de la cartera, teniendo en cuenta las dudas mencionadas sobre el cálculo de la valoración. La Comisión tampoco tiene la certeza de que el canje de efectivo antes citado sea realmente tan beneficioso para el Estado como se indica. En particular, alberga algunas dudas sobre la adecuación de la comisión de gestión de la cartera, puesto que no parece exigir demasiada actividad.

Como respeta varias de las condiciones contempladas en la Comunicación sobre activos deteriorados y habida cuenta la necesidad de preservar la estabilidad financiera, la Comisión ha decidido aprobar la medida por un periodo de seis meses. Al mismo tiempo, a la luz de lo expuesto, la Comisión ha decidido asimismo iniciar el procedimiento previsto en el artículo 88, apartado 2, del Tratado CE con el fin de verificar las condiciones contempladas en la citada Comunicación en relación con la valoración (incluida la metodología de valoración) y el reparto de cargas de la medida.

TEXTO DE LA CARTA

«The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
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(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
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(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
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(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
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(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
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(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
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(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
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(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
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(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
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(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
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(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
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(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
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(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
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—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
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(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
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(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
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(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
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(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
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(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
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(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.»

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

OTROS ACTOS

Comisión

| 11.7.2009 | ES | Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

ES

Diario Oficial de la Unión Europea

C 158/24

---

Publicación de una solicitud de registro con arreglo al artículo 8, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006 sobre las especialidades tradicionales garantizadas de los productos agrícolas y alimenticios

2009/C 158/07

Esta publicación otorga un derecho de oposición con arreglo al artículo 9 del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006 del Consejo. Las declaraciones de oposición deberán remitirse a la Comisión en un plazo de seis meses a partir de la fecha de la presente publicación.

SOLICITUD DE REGISTRO DE UNA ETG

REGLAMENTO (CE) No 509/2006 del Consejo

«KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA»

No CE: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Nombre y dirección de la agrupación solicitante:

Nombre: Związek „Polskie Mięso” (Federación polaca de empresas del sector cárnico)

Dirección:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

Dirección electrónica: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Estado miembro o tercer país:

Polonia

3.   Pliego de condiciones:

3.1.   Nombre(s) que debe(n) registrarse [artículo 2 del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

«Kiełbasa jałowcowa»

3.2.   Indíquese si el nombre:

 es específico por sí mismo

Image

El nombre «kiełbasa jałowcowa» expresa el carácter específico del producto, que está íntimamente ligado a su sabor y olor irrepetibles. Estas características reflejan el uso, en el proceso de elaboración, de bayas de enebro (Juniperus), trituradas justo antes de ser añadidas a la carne, y de ramas de enebro, en el proceso de ahumado.

3.3.   Indíquese si se solicita la reserva del nombre de acuerdo con el artículo 13, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 509/2006:

 Registro con reserva de nombre

Image

3.4.   Tipo de producto:

| Categoría 1.2 — | Productos cárnicos (cocidos, en salazón, ahumados, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Categoría 1.2 —

Productos cárnicos (cocidos, en salazón, ahumados, etc.)

3.5.   Descripción del producto agrícola o alimenticio que lleva el nombre indicado en el punto 3.1 [artículo 3, apartado 1, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

La «kiełbasa jałowcowa» es una salchicha con una superficie uniformemente arrugada, en forma de guirnalda. Presenta una forma circular característica, sin pliegues profundos externos en sentido longitudinal. La salchicha existe en dos tamaños:

| — | pequeño, en envoltorios naturales de más de 32 mm de diámetro y un peso aproximado de 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

pequeño, en envoltorios naturales de más de 32 mm de diámetro y un peso aproximado de 0,5 kg,

| — | grande, en envoltorios proteínicos de 36 mm de diámetro y un peso aproximado de 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

grande, en envoltorios proteínicos de 36 mm de diámetro y un peso aproximado de 0,8 kg.

La «kiełbasa jałowcowa» presenta un color marrón oscuro, distribuido de forma uniforme en toda su superficie, como suele ser el caso de las salchichas muy ahumadas.

La consistencia y la sensación al tacto que presenta la guirnalda es la de una superficie seca, suave, uniformemente arrugada, con un envoltorio que se ajusta perfectamente al relleno.

Su sabor y ternura característicos se deben a la selección de los ingredientes, los condimentos (especialmente el enebro) y al ahumado natural, que forma parte del proceso de elaboración.

Composición química:

| — | contenido proteínico superior o igual al 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido proteínico superior o igual al 15,0 %,

| — | contenido en agua inferior o igual al 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en agua inferior o igual al 60,0 %,

| — | contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 35,0 %,

| — | contenido en sal inferior o igual al 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en sal inferior o igual al 3,5 %,

| — | contenido en nitratos (III) y en nitratos (V) en forma de NaNO2 inferior o igual al 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en nitratos (III) y en nitratos (V) en forma de NaNO2 inferior o igual al 0,0125 %.

Esta composición química garantiza la calidad tradicional del producto. La cantidad de producto acabado obtenida es del 75 % (+/- 3 %) de la cantidad de materia prima cárnica utilizada.

3.6.   Descripción del producto agrícola o alimenticio que lleva el nombre indicado en el punto 3.1 [artículo 3, apartado 2, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

Ingredientes

| | Carne (por 100 kg de materia prima):






  — | carne de cerdo, de categoría I, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 15 % (20 kg), |
| --- | --- | --- |

Carne (por 100 kg de materia prima):

—

carne de cerdo, de categoría I, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 15 % (20 kg),

| — | carne de cerdo, de categoría IIA, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 20 % (50 kg), |
| --- | --- |

—

carne de cerdo, de categoría IIA, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 20 % (50 kg),

| — | carne de cerdo, de categoría III — carne tendinosa, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 25 % (20 kg), |
| --- | --- |

—

carne de cerdo, de categoría III — carne tendinosa, con un contenido en materia grasa inferior o igual al 25 % (20 kg),

| — | materia grasa dura en pequeños trozos — 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

materia grasa dura en pequeños trozos — 10 kg.

La carne de cerdo de categoría IIA o la carne de cerdo de categoría III puede sustituirse hasta un 50 % por carne de buey.

| | Condimentos (por 100 kg de carne):






  — | pimienta natural — 0,17 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Condimentos (por 100 kg de carne):

—

pimienta natural — 0,17 kg,

| — | enebro — 0,12 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

enebro — 0,12 kg,

| — | azúcar — 0,20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

azúcar — 0,20 kg.

| | Otros:






  — | mezcla de componentes de salazón compuesta por sal de mesa (NaCL) y nitrito de sodio (NaNO2) (unos 2 kg). |
| --- | --- | --- |

Otros:

—

mezcla de componentes de salazón compuesta por sal de mesa (NaCL) y nitrito de sodio (NaNO2) (unos 2 kg).

Alimentación de los cerdos cuya carne será empleada para la elaboración de la salchicha «kiełbasa jałowcowa»

La alimentación está destinada a lograr por engorde cerdos grasos y para la obtención de carne. Se trata de cebar cerdos de un peso vivo que pueda llegar a los 120 kg, con un contenido en grasa intramuscular superior al 3 %.

| — | Las razas elegidas para el engorde son de crecimiento lento, lo que permite obtener el contenido en grasa intramuscular deseado, si el engorde se lleva a cabo correctamente. Estas razas no poseen el gen RN y la presencia del gen RYR 1T en la cabaña se eleva al 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Las razas elegidas para el engorde son de crecimiento lento, lo que permite obtener el contenido en grasa intramuscular deseado, si el engorde se lleva a cabo correctamente. Estas razas no poseen el gen RN y la presencia del gen RYR 1T en la cabaña se eleva al 20 %.

| — | El engorde se ha de llevar a cabo en tres fases, a saber, una primera fase de hasta unos 60 kg, una segunda de hasta unos 90 kg y una tercera de hasta 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

El engorde se ha de llevar a cabo en tres fases, a saber, una primera fase de hasta unos 60 kg, una segunda de hasta unos 90 kg y una tercera de hasta 120 kg.

| — | El engorde de los animales hasta un peso vivo de 90 kg se realiza con dos tipos de mezclas. En la composición de las mezclas (raciones) se incluye: |
| --- | --- |

—

El engorde de los animales hasta un peso vivo de 90 kg se realiza con dos tipos de mezclas. En la composición de las mezclas (raciones) se incluye:

| — | como componentes energéticos: granos triturados de cereales — trigo, cebada, centeno, avena, triticale y maíz; el maíz y la avena desnuda pueden utilizarse hasta un 30 % en las mezclas, |
| --- | --- |

—

como componentes energéticos: granos triturados de cereales — trigo, cebada, centeno, avena, triticale y maíz; el maíz y la avena desnuda pueden utilizarse hasta un 30 % en las mezclas,

| — | como componentes proteínicos: granos triturados de altramuz, de haba panosa y de guisantes molidos, moyuelos de soja y de colza, tortas de colza, levaduras forrajeras y forrajes verdes secos. |
| --- | --- |

—

como componentes proteínicos: granos triturados de altramuz, de haba panosa y de guisantes molidos, moyuelos de soja y de colza, tortas de colza, levaduras forrajeras y forrajes verdes secos.

| — | Composición de las mezclas (raciones) para animales de entre 90 y 120 kg: |
| --- | --- |

—

Composición de las mezclas (raciones) para animales de entre 90 y 120 kg:

| — | como componentes energéticos: granos triturados de trigo, cebada, centeno y triticale. Está prohibido utilizar en las mezclas (raciones) granos triturados de maíz y de avena desnuda, |
| --- | --- |

—

como componentes energéticos: granos triturados de trigo, cebada, centeno y triticale. Está prohibido utilizar en las mezclas (raciones) granos triturados de maíz y de avena desnuda,

| — | como componentes proteínicos: leguminosas trituradas (altramuz, haba panosa, guisantes), moyuelos de soja, tortas o moyuelos de colza y forrajes verdes secos. |
| --- | --- |

—

como componentes proteínicos: leguminosas trituradas (altramuz, haba panosa, guisantes), moyuelos de soja, tortas o moyuelos de colza y forrajes verdes secos.

| — | Durante todo el proceso de engorde, en las mezclas y raciones está prohibido el uso de: aceites vegetales y alimentos de origen animal (leche en polvo, suero de leche seco, harina de pescado). |
| --- | --- |

—

Durante todo el proceso de engorde, en las mezclas y raciones está prohibido el uso de: aceites vegetales y alimentos de origen animal (leche en polvo, suero de leche seco, harina de pescado).

| — | La cantidad de energía metabólica aportada por las mezclas en todas las fases del engorde oscila entre 12 y 13 MJ EM/kg de mezcla. El contenido en proteínas de las mezclas de la primera fase de engorde se sitúa aproximadamente entre el 16 y el 18 % de la mezcla; el de la segunda fase, entre el 15 y el 16 %, y el de la tercera, en torno al 14 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

La cantidad de energía metabólica aportada por las mezclas en todas las fases del engorde oscila entre 12 y 13 MJ EM/kg de mezcla. El contenido en proteínas de las mezclas de la primera fase de engorde se sitúa aproximadamente entre el 16 y el 18 % de la mezcla; el de la segunda fase, entre el 15 y el 16 %, y el de la tercera, en torno al 14 %.

| — | Las raciones destinadas a los cerdos de engorde pueden estar constituidas únicamente por mezclas nutritivas o por mezclas nutritivas y por alimentos groseros (patatas y forraje verde). |
| --- | --- |

—

Las raciones destinadas a los cerdos de engorde pueden estar constituidas únicamente por mezclas nutritivas o por mezclas nutritivas y por alimentos groseros (patatas y forraje verde).

Etapas de elaboración de la «kiełbasa jałowcowa»

| Etapa 1 | Se corta la carne en trozos. Hay que procurar que el tamaño de los trozos de carne sea homogéneo (unos 5 cm de diámetro). |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 1

Se corta la carne en trozos. Hay que procurar que el tamaño de los trozos de carne sea homogéneo (unos 5 cm de diámetro).

| Etapa 2 | Curado tradicional (en seco), durante unas 48 horas, por aplicación de la mezcla de salazón. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 2

Curado tradicional (en seco), durante unas 48 horas, por aplicación de la mezcla de salazón.

| Etapa 3 | Tratamiento mecánico: picado de la carne de categoría I en trozos de unos 20 mm, picado de la carne de categoría IIA en trozos de unos 8 mm, picado de la carne de categoría III en trozos de unos 3 mm, adición posterior de 5 kg de hielo. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 3

Tratamiento mecánico: picado de la carne de categoría I en trozos de unos 20 mm, picado de la carne de categoría IIA en trozos de unos 8 mm, picado de la carne de categoría III en trozos de unos 3 mm, adición posterior de 5 kg de hielo.

| Etapa 4 | Mezcla de todos los ingredientes con los condimentos añadidos: pimienta natural, azúcar, enebro triturado inmediatamente antes de añadírlo a la mezcla. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 4

Mezcla de todos los ingredientes con los condimentos añadidos: pimienta natural, azúcar, enebro triturado inmediatamente antes de añadírlo a la mezcla.

| Etapa 5 | Embutido en tripa natural de cerdo, de un diámetro superior a 32 mm o en envoltorios proteínicos de un diámetro de 36 mm; se ha de girar la tripa y darle forma de guirnalda. Para elaborar las salchichas pueden emplearse dos tipos de envoltorio:






  — | guirnaldas más pequeñas en tripas finas de cerdo, de un peso de 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Etapa 5

Embutido en tripa natural de cerdo, de un diámetro superior a 32 mm o en envoltorios proteínicos de un diámetro de 36 mm; se ha de girar la tripa y darle forma de guirnalda. Para elaborar las salchichas pueden emplearse dos tipos de envoltorio:

—

guirnaldas más pequeñas en tripas finas de cerdo, de un peso de 0,5 kg,

| — | guirnaldas de mayor tamaño en envoltorios proteínicos, de un peso de 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

guirnaldas de mayor tamaño en envoltorios proteínicos, de un peso de 0,8 kg.

| Etapa 6 | Reposo durante 2 horas a una temperatura que no supere los 30 °C. Secado preliminar de la superficie; los ingredientes se asientan en el interior. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 6

Reposo durante 2 horas a una temperatura que no supere los 30 °C. Secado preliminar de la superficie; los ingredientes se asientan en el interior.

| Etapa 7 | Secado de la superficie y ahumado tradicional con humo caliente (durante unos 120 minutos) y posterior cocción al horno hasta que en el interior de las salchichas se alcance una temperatura mínima de 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 7

Secado de la superficie y ahumado tradicional con humo caliente (durante unos 120 minutos) y posterior cocción al horno hasta que en el interior de las salchichas se alcance una temperatura mínima de 70 °C.

| Etapa 8 | Enfriado durante 24 horas. |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 8

Enfriado durante 24 horas.

| Etapa 9 | Ahumado en frío empleando virutas de haya y ramas de enebro (por espacio de unos 120 minutos), seguido de secado a una temperatura de entre 14 y 18 °C entre 3 y 5 días hasta alcanzar un rendimiento del 75 % (+/- 3 %). |
| --- | --- |

Etapa 9

Ahumado en frío empleando virutas de haya y ramas de enebro (por espacio de unos 120 minutos), seguido de secado a una temperatura de entre 14 y 18 °C entre 3 y 5 días hasta alcanzar un rendimiento del 75 % (+/- 3 %).

3.7.   Carácter específico del producto agrícola o alimenticio [artículo 3, apartado 3, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

El carácter específico de la salchicha «kiełbasa jałowcowa» se deriva de las siguientes propiedades:

| — | la ternura y las propiedades específicas de su carne, |
| --- | --- |

—

la ternura y las propiedades específicas de su carne,

| — | su sabor y aroma excepcionales, |
| --- | --- |

—

su sabor y aroma excepcionales,

| — | su forma única. |
| --- | --- |

—

su forma única.

La ternura, la jugosidad y las propiedades específicas de su carne

La carne de cerdo de animales de razas de crecimiento lento, cebados hasta alcanzar un peso de unos 120 kg y con las características genéticas descritas en el punto 3.6, es el ingrediente que más contribuye a la especificidad de la salchicha «kiełbasa jałowcowa». El cumplimiento de estos requisitos permite obtener un contenido en materia grasa intramuscular superior al 3 %, lo que garantiza al producto las cualidades gustativas deseadas y la calidad tecnológica necesaria para la elaboración de la salchicha «kiełbasa jałowcowa». La utilización de esta materia prima y el seguimiento del método de elaboración tradicional, y específicamente de las etapas de cortado, curación y ahumado, confieren al producto su ternura y jugosidad excepcionales.

Sabor y olor excepcionales

El carácter específico de la kiełbasa jałowcowa se debe sobre todo a su sabor y aroma irrepetibles, fruto de la utilización de bayas de enebro (Juniperus) en su proceso de elaboración. Al triturar las bayas de enebro inmediatamente antes de dar comienzo el proceso de elaboración se mejora el sabor característico de la salchicha y se le da su carácter específico. Simultáneamente, el empleo del enebro en el proceso de ahumado potencia su sabor y olor excepcionales.

Su forma única

El carácter específico de la salchicha kiełbasa jałowcową se debe ante todo a su forma particular. La salchicha se vende en dos formas muy similares lo que la hace muy reconocible para los consumidores. La «kiełbasa jałowcowa» es una salchicha con una superficie uniformemente arrugada y con forma de guirnalda. Presenta una forma circular característica, sin pliegues profundos externos en sentido longitudinal.

3.8.   Carácter específico del producto agrícola o alimenticio [artículo 3, apartado 4, del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

Ingredientes tradicionales

| 1) | Enebro (Juniperus):
  La Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Gran Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada) de 1903 hace referencia al hecho de que, cuando se quema, el enebro desprende un olor agradable. Se trata de una de las propiedades de este arbusto, que ha sido muy común en Polonia a lo largo de los siglos. La Enciclopedia indica también que se pueden emplear las ramas, la viruta y las bayas de enebro en el proceso de ahumado para darle a la carne un sabor y aroma exquisito. Existen documentos de la segunda mitad del XIX en los que se afirma que el enebro ya se empleaba como condimento o ingrediente de platos y productos cárnicos. La «Encyklopedyja Powszechna», publicada en Varsovia en 1863, afirma que las bayas de enebro poseen un sabor picante y agridulce y un olor agradable, gracias a lo cual se suelen emplear como condimento. Ya a principios de la década de los 40 del pasado siglo se consolidó en Polonia un método estándar de elaboración de esta salchicha utilizando bayas de enebro y humo con olor a enebro (véase el artículo aparecido en «Gospodarka Mięsna», la publicación sobre la industria cárnica (1954, número 3), titulado «Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku» (Regulación de los surtidos de embutidos para el abastecimiento del mercado). |
| --- | --- |

1)

Enebro (Juniperus):

La Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Gran Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada) de 1903 hace referencia al hecho de que, cuando se quema, el enebro desprende un olor agradable. Se trata de una de las propiedades de este arbusto, que ha sido muy común en Polonia a lo largo de los siglos. La Enciclopedia indica también que se pueden emplear las ramas, la viruta y las bayas de enebro en el proceso de ahumado para darle a la carne un sabor y aroma exquisito. Existen documentos de la segunda mitad del XIX en los que se afirma que el enebro ya se empleaba como condimento o ingrediente de platos y productos cárnicos. La «Encyklopedyja Powszechna», publicada en Varsovia en 1863, afirma que las bayas de enebro poseen un sabor picante y agridulce y un olor agradable, gracias a lo cual se suelen emplear como condimento. Ya a principios de la década de los 40 del pasado siglo se consolidó en Polonia un método estándar de elaboración de esta salchicha utilizando bayas de enebro y humo con olor a enebro (véase el artículo aparecido en «Gospodarka Mięsna», la publicación sobre la industria cárnica (1954, número 3), titulado «Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku» (Regulación de los surtidos de embutidos para el abastecimiento del mercado).

| 2) | Carne de la especie porcina:
  La carne de cerdos cebados para la elaboración de la salchicha kiełbasa jałowcowa ha de presentar un contenido en grasa intramuscular superior al 3 %, es decir, una especie de marmoleado que da al producto la ternura y jugosidad deseadas, así como su delicioso sabor. La utilización de esta carne determina, sin lugar a dudas, la calidad final del producto y su carácter específico y, además, se ajusta a los métodos tradicionales de elaboración. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Carne de la especie porcina:

La carne de cerdos cebados para la elaboración de la salchicha kiełbasa jałowcowa ha de presentar un contenido en grasa intramuscular superior al 3 %, es decir, una especie de marmoleado que da al producto la ternura y jugosidad deseadas, así como su delicioso sabor. La utilización de esta carne determina, sin lugar a dudas, la calidad final del producto y su carácter específico y, además, se ajusta a los métodos tradicionales de elaboración.

Método tradicional de elaboración y composición tradicional

El ahumado es un método empleado para conservar la carne y la quema de enebro era el más habitual. Así lo atestiguan antiguos manuscritos polacos, como las notas de un administrador anónimo de una hacienda nobiliaria, en torno a 1780, en las que se encuentran recetas de embutidos [Rękopis — Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD) de Varsovia], «Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego», ref. 1249). En el poema épico «Pan Tadeusz», escrito en 1834 por el poeta nacional polaco, Adam Mickiewicz, se menciona lo extendido que estaba ahumar la carne con enebro en su descripción de un desayuno en una casa de campo: «todo tipo de embutidos, todo muy sabroso y casero, ahumado al enebro, hecho a la brasa en la chimenea».

La tradición de condimentar y ahumar la carne con enebro se cultivaba en variantes locales y regionales en las que no solo se utilizaban tecnicas diferentes, sino también distintos tipos de carne. Como afirma W. Łęg en el ensayo «Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin» (De la experiencia en la elaboración de embutidos), publicado en Gospodarka Mięsna (1953, número 6), se probó a elaborar la kiełbasa jałowcowa a partir de carne de caza (liebre o jabalí, añadiéndo carne de cerdo). Si bien estas salchichas tenían un sabor distinto, por lo general se utilizó siempre la misma receta (mechada y ahumada con enebro). Un especialista del sector cárnico, estando de viaje por la región de Kurpie, redactó las notas siguientes sobre la variedad local de la kiełbasa jałowcowa en un artículo publicado en Gospodarka Mięsna (1950, número 7-8) a propósito de las especialidades regionales de carne procesada: «Salchicha de Myszyniec, región de Kurpie, ahumada con enebro y que contiene bayas de enebro. Seca, de excelente sabor y olor».

Después de 1945, y siguiendo la doctrina de la planificación centralizada, se decidió crear una industria cárnica basada en grandes plantas de transformación. Con el fin de mejorar la calidad y el sabor se introdujo la estandarización de los productos y la tecnología sobre la base de recetas tradicionales. La denominación «kiełbasa jałowcowa» aparece en 1947 y 1948 en las normas de comercialización de productos alimenticios. En 1954 se estableció una norma armonizada para la «kiełbasa jałowcowa», que se convirtió posteriormente, en 1964, en la norma de la Oficina Central de la Industria Cárnica (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Varsovia 1964), en la que se basa la presente solicitud.

Estas normas se concibieron para garantizar la máxima calidad posible para la kiełbasa jałowcowa. Aunque la norma en la que se basa esta solicitud ya no es de obligado cumplimiento, aún representa los estándares de elaboración más estrictos para la kiełbasa jałowcowa.

3.9.   Requisitos mínimos y procedimientos aplicables al control del carácter específico [artículo 4 del Reglamento (CE) no 1216/2007]:

Teniendo en cuenta el carácter específico de la kiełbasa jałowcowa, los aspectos siguientes deben ser objeto de especial atención:

| 1) | Calidad de la materia prima utilizada en su elaboración (carne de cerdo, condimentos):






  — | la calidad tecnológica de la carne, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1)

Calidad de la materia prima utilizada en su elaboración (carne de cerdo, condimentos):

—

la calidad tecnológica de la carne,

| — | el tipo de engorde, |
| --- | --- |

—

el tipo de engorde,

| — | el tiempo de curación, |
| --- | --- |

—

el tiempo de curación,

| — | los condimentos empleados para elaborar la salchicha kiełbasa jałowcowa y las proporciones utilizadas. |
| --- | --- |

—

los condimentos empleados para elaborar la salchicha kiełbasa jałowcowa y las proporciones utilizadas.

| 2) | Proceso de ahumado de la kiełbasa jałowcowa

  En el curso del control, se ha de verificar:






  — | el mantenimiento de la temperatura de ahumado tradicional con humo caliente y de la temperatura de calentamiento, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2)

Proceso de ahumado de la kiełbasa jałowcowa

En el curso del control, se ha de verificar:

—

el mantenimiento de la temperatura de ahumado tradicional con humo caliente y de la temperatura de calentamiento,

| — | la observancia del tiempo y de la temperatura de ahumado con humo frío, |
| --- | --- |

—

la observancia del tiempo y de la temperatura de ahumado con humo frío,

| — | la utilización de viruta de haya y de ramas de enebro para el ahumado en frío. |
| --- | --- |

—

la utilización de viruta de haya y de ramas de enebro para el ahumado en frío.

| 3) | Calidad del producto acabado






  — | contenido proteínico, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3)

Calidad del producto acabado

—

contenido proteínico,

| — | contenido en agua, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en agua,

| — | contenido en materia grasa, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en materia grasa,

| — | contenido en cloruro de sodio, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenido en cloruro de sodio,

| — | –contenido en nitratos (III) y nitratos (V), |
| --- | --- |

—

–contenido en nitratos (III) y nitratos (V),

| — | sabor y olor. |
| --- | --- |

—

sabor y olor.

| 4. | Forma del producto |
| --- | --- |

4.

Forma del producto

Intensidad de los controles

Las etapas antes mencionadas han de someterse a un control cada dos meses. En caso de que todas las etapas se lleven a cabo adecuadamente, podrán realizarse dos controles al año.

En caso de que se detecten irregularidades en una etapa determinada, se han de realizar controles más frecuentes (una vez cada dos meses). Las demás etapas se pueden seguir controlando una vez al semestre.

4.   Autoridades u organismos que verifican la observancia del pliego de condiciones del producto:

4.1.   Nombre y dirección:

Nombre: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych (Inspección general de la calidad de los productos agroalimentarios)

Dirección:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Teléfono +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

Dirección electrónica: —

Image Autoridad pública/Órgano público  Autoridad privada/Órgano privado

4.2.   Tareas específicas de la autoridad u organismo:

El órgano de control anterior es responsable de verificar la totalidad del pliego de condiciones.

---