NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except 

in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2023 IL App (3d) 220071-U

Order filed May 25, 2023

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

ILLINOIS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

DONNA L. MESSINA, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 18th Judicial Circuit, 

Du Page County, Illinois, 

Appeal No. 3-22-0071 

Circuit No. 19-CF-1512 

Honorable 

Michael W. Reidy, 

Judge, Presiding. 

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment. 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s pro se

posttrial allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 2 Defendant, Donna L. Messina, appeals her conviction for aggravated driving under the 

influence (DUI), arguing that the Du Page County circuit court failed to conduct an adequate 

inquiry into her posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand with instructions. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
2 

¶ 4 Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), 

(a)(1), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(B) (West 2018)). Prior to trial, the State observed that defendant had 

disclosed an expert witness, James Thomas O’Donnell, with his curriculum vitae, but had not 

disclosed the field in which O’Donnell would be qualified as an expert. The State asked for an 

order requiring defendant to disclose all statements, reports, notes, and memoranda of, or relied 

upon by O’Donnell regarding defendant, as well as direct results and data of all examinations and 

tests administered by or relied upon by O’Donnell. The week before trial, the State filed a motion 

in limine claiming that defendant had not asserted any affirmative defenses. Therefore, the State 

requested that defendant be prevented from presenting any evidence or undisclosed testimony, 

except for her own testimony. After argument, the court deferred ruling on the motion.

¶ 5 The case proceeded to trial before a six-person jury. Pertinent to this appeal, defendant 

called O’Donnell to testify on her behalf. He was qualified as an expert in toxicology, 

pharmacology, and nutrition. O’Donnell testified that he had reviewed the police reports, 

laboratory reports, defendant’s medical records, and the video of the arrest; had examined 

defendant; and had read literature on the absorption of alcohol in the body. He stated that, through 

this preparation, he had learned that defendant had ulcerative colitis. The State objected. After a 

discussion outside the presence of the jury, the court sustained the State’s objection to statements 

regarding yeast in the gut and the medical diagnosis that had been made by someone else because 

it was hearsay and because the doctor’s notes and the medical evidence relied on had not been 

tendered to the State. The jury ultimately found defendant guilty of both counts. 

¶ 6 Before sentencing, a presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared. The PSI included 

a statement from defendant, which stated, in part: 
3 

“I had been seen by three different doctors to diagnose my condition 

because the symptoms I was having were foreign to me. I informed each of 

doctors of the DUI, accident, how much I had to drink, as well as the gut 

yeast infection that I was taking antifungal supplements to kill the yeast, 

along with a no carbohydrate and no sugar diet. They decided to treat me 

for anxiety, but the symptoms I was having are what was causing me 

anxiety. The medication they were prescribing only made those symptoms 

worse and I stopped take them. I was finally diagnosed accurately by Dr. 

James O’Donnell Pharm.D, M.S, FCP, ABCP, FACN, R.PH. Dr. 

O’Donnell diagnosed me with Auto-brewery Syndrome. Unknow to me, the 

type of gut yeast that I had was producing alcohol. I was completely 

unaware that this could happen. 

Dr. O’Donnell appeared in court for my trial and had planned to 

testify on my behalf and discuss/explain the condition that I had, but the 

prosecution objected, and he was not allowed to speak of this during my 

trial because my lawyer did not meet the demand for disclosure that was 

requested. My lawyer referred to a previous case, concerning the lack of 

disclosure, which was from 1981, but the judge did not accept it. My lawyer, 

decided to move forward with my case without my doctor’s testimony and 

did not want to have the case continued to obtain documents. Reasons for 

this are not known to me. I am sure that if my doctor would have been able 

to present his diagnosis, findings, reports from previous doctor visits, and 
4 

explain the condition that I had at that time, the outcome of this would have 

been different.”

At the sentencing hearing, the State discussed the PSI and indicated that defendant was not taking 

responsibility for her actions, instead blaming her intoxication on her body’s production of alcohol. 

¶ 7 In reaching its decision, the court noted that it considered the PSI and discussed defendant’s 

alleged auto-brewery syndrome. The court did not mention defendant’s comments regarding her 

trial counsel. The two counts merged, and defendant was sentenced to 90 days in jail and 24 

months’ probation.

¶ 8 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 9 On appeal, defendant solely contends that the court erred by failing to conduct a 

preliminary inquiry into her posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as required by 

People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). Specifically, defendant points to her comments in the 

PSI mentioning trial counsel’s performance.

¶ 10 The need to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry is triggered when a defendant raises a 

pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, 

¶ 11. A pro se defendant is not required to do anything more than bring his or her ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim to the circuit court’s attention. Id. (a pro se defendant is not required 

to file a written motion but may raise the ineffective assistance claim orally or through a letter or 

a note to the circuit court). “[W]hen a defendant brings a clear claim asserting ineffective assistance 

of counsel, either orally or in writing, this is sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a 

Krankel inquiry.” Id. ¶ 18. “If the court fails to conduct the necessary preliminary examination as 

to the factual basis of the defendant’s allegations, the case must be remanded for the limited 

purpose of allowing the court to do so.” People v. Remsik-Miller, 2012 IL App (2d) 100921, ¶ 9. 
5 

We consider de novo a circuit court’s alleged failure to inquire into a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. People v. Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 14. 

¶ 11 Here, defendant’s statement in the PSI clearly referred “to counsel’s failure to do 

something.” See People v. Craig, 2020 IL App (2d) 170679, ¶ 17. Defendant stated, “my lawyer 

did not meet the demand for disclosure that was requested.” Further, defendant noted that, “My 

lawyer, decided to move forward with my case without my doctor’s testimony and did not want to 

have the case continued to obtain documents. Reasons for this are not known to me.” It is clear 

from these statements that defendant was complaining about counsel’s performance. It was not 

necessary for defendant to use the specific term “ineffective assistance” in order to raise this claim. 

See id.

¶ 12 Further, defendant’s claims were properly presented to the court for purposes of Krankel. 

The Second District considered this issue in Craig and stated: 

“To be sure, the PSI was prepared by court services, but the statements at 

issue were unquestionably those of defendant and, as noted, made a clear 

claim of ineffectiveness. Moreover, a PSI is prepared for the court, and the 

court is required to consider it. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(a)(2) (West 2016). The 

record makes clear that the trial court read the PSI. Given that the court read 

the allegations of ineffectiveness, which were made by defendant to a court 

employee for inclusion in a report prepared specifically for the court, an 

inquiry under Krankel was warranted. (Emphasis in original.)” Id. ¶ 18. 

We adopt this reasoning. Therefore, we find that the court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary 

Krankel inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
6 

¶ 13 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s contention that such an error was 

harmless as it is rebutted by the record. While the issue of O’Donnell’s testimony was considered 

prior to and during trial, it is not clear whether the court’s decision to bar the testimony was based 

in any way on trial counsel’s failures to disclose the evidence to the State prior to trial or whether 

any action on the part of counsel could have cured the defects barring O’Donnell’s testimony. 

¶ 14 Thus, we remand the cause for the limited purpose of allowing the circuit court to inquire 

into the factual basis of defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. If defendant’s allegations show 

possible incompetent representation of the case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue 

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance. However, if the court concludes that defendant’s claim 

lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, the court may deny the claim.

¶ 15 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16 The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is remanded with instructions. 

¶ 17 Remanded with instructions.