2017 UT App 51

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee,

v.

DAVID ISAAC RICKETTS,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20150438-CA

Filed March 23, 2017

Eighth District Court, Duchesne Department

The Honorable Samuel P. Chiara

No. 001800104

David C. Cundick, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Kris C. Leonard, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE KATE A. TOOMEY authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

TOOMEY, Judge:

¶1 David Isaac Ricketts appeals the decision of the district 

court denying his motion to lower the degree of offense for his

previous conviction. We affirm.

¶2 In 2001, Ricketts pleaded guilty to the operation of a 

clandestine laboratory, a first degree felony. He was sentenced in 

2002 to an indeterminate prison term of five years to life, and he

was released from prison in 2005.

¶3 In 2014, Ricketts filed a motion to lower the degree of 

offense for that conviction. He argued that section 76-3-402 of the 

Utah Code allows a court, in certain circumstances, to reduce the 

level of offense for a conviction by one degree. He further 

argued that the version of the code in effect at the time of his 
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20150438-CA 2 2017 UT App 51

sentencing allowed a court, even after sentencing, to enter a 

judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense. The 

State agreed that the appropriate version of the code to consider 

was the version in effect at the time of sentencing in 2002. But 

the State argued that the applicable statute still did not allow the 

district court to enter Ricketts’s conviction at a lower degree

because its plain language allowed a reduction only before 

sentencing, not after.

¶4 The district court agreed with the State and determined 

the first subsection of section 402 “provide*d+ the sentencing 

court with authority to reduce the level of the conviction and 

then sentence the defendant accordingly” but did not provide 

the “authority to reduce the level of conviction at a later date.”

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (Lexis 1999). The court also 

determined that “the sections subsequent to section (1) 

provide[d] for reduction of the [level of offense] after sentencing 

has taken place” but “require[d] the stay of a prison sentence in 

order for a defendant to qualify for a reduction in [the level of 

offense].” See id. § 76-3-402(2). Because Ricketts’s sentence was 

not stayed, the court concluded he did not qualify for a 

reduction under section 402 and denied his motion.

¶5 Ricketts appeals, contending the district court erred in 

determining it lacked the authority to reduce the level of his 

offense. “We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to reduce 

the degree of a conviction for abuse of discretion.” State v. Salt, 

2015 UT App 72, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 414. But we “review the district 

court’s interpretation of a statute for correctness.” State v. Kropf, 

2015 UT App 223, ¶ 7, 360 P.3d 1.

¶6 When interpreting statutes, we first look to the plain 

language. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682. Section 

402(1) stated:

If the court, having regard to the nature and 

circumstances of the offense of which the 

defendant was found guilty and to the history and 
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20150438-CA 3 2017 UT App 51

character of the defendant, concludes it would be 

unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for 

that degree of offense established by statute and to 

sentence the defendant to an alternative normally 

applicable to that offense, the court may unless 

otherwise specifically provided by law enter a 

judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 

offense and impose sentence accordingly.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1).

¶7 We agree with the district court that Ricketts was not 

eligible for a reduction under this subsection. Section 402(1)

provided courts with authority to reduce a level of offense at the 

time of sentencing and did not give courts authority to reduce a

level of offense at a later date. The 2002 statute stated that a court 

may “enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 

offense and impose sentence accordingly” if it “concludes it would 

be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of 

offense established by statute.” Id. (emphases added). This 

language contemplated that a court has authority to enter a 

judgment of conviction at a lower degree before a sentence is 

imposed—at the time the judgment is entered and the conviction 

is recorded. The statute did not authorize a court to reduce the 

degree of offense at any other time. Additionally, in interpreting 

this version of section 76-3-402, our supreme court has stated, “If 

a sentencing judge is convinced that the penalty applicable to the 

charged offense is unduly harsh under the circumstances, the 

judge can reduce the degree of the offense when recording the 

conviction.” Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 31 (emphasis added). And once 

a court imposes a valid sentence and enters final judgment, it 

loses jurisdiction over the case. State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, 

¶ 13, 218 P.3d 610 (citing State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 

(Utah Ct. App. 1991)). We therefore see no error in the district 

court’s interpretation and application of section 402(1).

¶8 Ricketts also asks us to consider State v. Oseguera, 2011 UT 

App 417, 267 P.3d 302 (per curiam), where a defendant had 
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20150438-CA 4 2017 UT App 51

successfully obtained a reduction in the level of his offense and 

sought a retroactive reduction of his original sentence. Id. ¶ 1. 

Ricketts asserts that Oseguera demonstrates that “the time for 

bringing the motion *is+ irrelevant.” But reviewing Oseguera

reinforces our determination that the district court’s decision 

was correct.

¶9 The defendant in Oseguera pleaded guilty to a third 

degree felony in 2002. Id. ¶ 2. His sentence was stayed and he 

was placed on probation. Id. Seven years after successfully 

completing probation, the defendant petitioned the court to 

enter a judgment of conviction for a class A misdemeanor under 

section 76-3-402(2), and the court accordingly entered his 

conviction as a misdemeanor. Id. The district court did not, 

however, reduce the defendant’s original sentence, and he 

appealed. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. This court determined that section 402(2)

gave a district court authority to enter the conviction as a class A 

misdemeanor only “after the defendant has been successfully 

discharged from probation.” Id. ¶¶ 3–4 (citing Utah Code Ann. 

§ 76-3-402(2) (LexisNexis 2008)). To lower the degree of 

conviction, the statute also required a court to have stayed a 

defendant’s sentence and placed the defendant on probation.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2).1 But this court determined that 

section 402(2) did not give a court authority to reduce a sentence

that had already been entered. Oseguera, 2011 UT App 417, ¶ 5.

 

1. This court in State v. Oseguera, 2011 UT App 417, 267 P.3d 302 

(per curiam), applied the 2008 version of the statute. While the 

language in this version differs from the 2002 version, the 

relevant requirements were the same. To enter a conviction at 

the next lower degree of offense, both versions of the statute 

required a court to stay a defendant’s sentence and place him on 

probation, and both required the defendant to be discharged 

from probation. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(b) (Lexis 

1999), with id. § 76-3-402(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
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20150438-CA 5 2017 UT App 51

¶10 Likewise, the district court in this case determined that

subsection (2) of section 402 did not apply, because it only 

allowed for a reduction had the prison sentence been stayed. The 

2002 statute, applicable here, stated “[a] conviction . . . for a third 

degree felony . . . is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor” 

if, among other things, “the imposition of the sentence is stayed 

and the defendant is placed on probation,” and the defendant is 

discharged without violating his probation. Utah Code Ann. 

§ 76-3-402(2) (Lexis 1999).2 We agree with the district court that 

Ricketts did not qualify for a section 402 reduction in this case. 

The statute provided for third degree felonies to be reduced by 

one degree only under certain conditions—if the sentence is 

stayed and the defendant is placed on probation and later 

discharged without violating probation. Id. Ricketts was 

convicted of a first degree felony, not a third degree felony, and 

served his prison sentence. His prison sentence was not stayed 

and he was not placed on probation.

¶11 In sum, the district court was correct in its determination

that Ricketts did not qualify for a section 402 reduction. 

Subsection (1) did not give a court authority to enter a judgment 

of conviction at a lower degree of offense after a sentence had

already been entered. And Ricketts did not meet the 

requirements of subsection (2). We therefore affirm the district 

court’s decision.

 

2. While this version of the statute was the one in effect at the 

time of Ricketts’s sentencing, the legislature has since amended 

this language. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (LexisNexis 2012).