# Úradný vestník C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-5236
  doi:10.3000/17255236.C_2009.158.slk |
| --- | --- |
| Úradný vestník
  Európskej únie | C 158 |
| | |
| Slovenské vydanie | Informácie a oznámenia | Zväzok 5211. júla 2009 |

ISSN 1725-5236

doi:10.3000/17255236.C_2009.158.slk

Úradný vestník

Európskej únie

C 158

Slovenské vydanie

Informácie a oznámenia

Zväzok 5211. júla 2009

---

| Číslo oznamu | Obsah | Strana |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Oznámenia |
| | OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Komisia |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Číslo oznamu

Obsah

Strana

II   Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Komisia

2009/C 158/01

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii (Vec COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informácie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE |
| | Komisia |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Výmenný kurz eura | 2 |
| | INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Komentovaná prezentácia regulovaných trhov a vnútroštátnych právnych predpisov, ktorými sa vykonávajú relevantné požiadavky smernice o trhoch finančných nástrojov (smernica Európskeho parlamentu a Rady 2004/39/ES) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Oznámenie Komisie podľa článku 16 ods. 4 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1008/2008 o spoločných pravidlách prevádzky leteckých dopravných služieb v Spoločenstve – Záväzky služby vo verejnom záujme v súvislosti so službami pravidelnej leteckej dopravy (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Komisia

2009/C 158/02

Výmenný kurz eura

2

INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV

2009/C 158/03

Komentovaná prezentácia regulovaných trhov a vnútroštátnych právnych predpisov, ktorými sa vykonávajú relevantné požiadavky smernice o trhoch finančných nástrojov (smernica Európskeho parlamentu a Rady 2004/39/ES)

3

2009/C 158/04

Oznámenie Komisie podľa článku 16 ods. 4 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1008/2008 o spoločných pravidlách prevádzky leteckých dopravných služieb v Spoločenstve – Záväzky služby vo verejnom záujme v súvislosti so službami pravidelnej leteckej dopravy (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Oznamy |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY |
| | Komisia |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Výzva na predkladanie návrhov – EACEA/11/2009 – Štrukturálna podpora organizáciám pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky a organizáciám občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni – Program Európa pre občanov, akcia 2, opatrenia 1 a 2 – 2010 | 10 |
| | KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE |
| | Komisia |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Štátna pomoc – Holandsko – Štátna pomoc C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | INÉ AKTY |
| | Komisia |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Uverejnenie žiadosti o zápis podľa článku 8 ods. 2 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 509/2006 o zaručených tradičných špecialitách z poľnohospodárskych výrobkov a potravín | 24 |

V   Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Komisia

2009/C 158/05

Výzva na predkladanie návrhov – EACEA/11/2009 – Štrukturálna podpora organizáciám pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky a organizáciám občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni – Program Európa pre občanov, akcia 2, opatrenia 1 a 2 – 2010

10

KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Komisia

2009/C 158/06

Štátna pomoc – Holandsko – Štátna pomoc C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING – Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES (
  1
  )

1

13

INÉ AKTY

Komisia

2009/C 158/07

Uverejnenie žiadosti o zápis podľa článku 8 ods. 2 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 509/2006 o zaručených tradičných špecialitách z poľnohospodárskych výrobkov a potravín

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text s významom pre EHP |

---

(1)   Text s významom pre EHP

1

| SK | |
| --- | --- |

SK

---

II Oznámenia

OZNÁMENIA INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Komisia

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/1

---

Nevznesenie námietky voči oznámenej koncentrácii

(Vec COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI)

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2009/C 158/01

Komisia bolo dňa 14. mája 2009 sa rozhodla nevzniesť námietku voči uvedenej oznámenej koncentrácii a vyhlásiť ju za zlučiteľnú so spoločným trhom. Toto rozhodnutie je založené na článku 6 ods. 1 písm. b) nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 139/2004. Úplné znenie rozhodnutia je dostupné iba v angličtine jazyku a bude zverejnené po odstránení akýchkoľvek obchodných tajomstiev. Bude dostupné:

| — | v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov, |
| --- | --- |

—

v časti webovej stránky Komisie o hospodárskej súťaži venovanej fúziám (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Táto webová stránka poskytuje rôzne možnosti na vyhľadávanie individuálnych rozhodnutí o fúziách podľa názvu spoločnosti, čísla prípadu, dátumu a sektorových indexov,

| — | v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod číslom dokumentu 32009M5403. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu. |
| --- | --- |

—

v elektronickej podobe na webovej stránke EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm) pod číslom dokumentu 32009M5403. EUR-Lex predstavuje online prístup k európskemu právu.

---

IV Informácie

INFORMÁCIE INŠTITÚCIÍ A ORGÁNOV EURÓPSKEJ ÚNIE

Komisia

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/2

---

Výmenný kurz eura (1)

10. júla 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Mena | Výmenný kurz |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Americký dolár | 1,3901 |
| JPY | Japonský jen | 128,21 |
| DKK | Dánska koruna | 7,4466 |
| GBP | Britská libra | 0,85800 |
| SEK | Švédska koruna | 11,0022 |
| CHF | Švajčiarsky frank | 1,5140 |
| ISK | Islandská koruna | |
| NOK | Nórska koruna | 9,0840 |
| BGN | Bulharský lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Česká koruna | 26,030 |
| EEK | Estónska koruna | 15,6466 |
| HUF | Maďarský forint | 277,50 |
| LTL | Litovský litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | Lotyšský lats | 0,6993 |
| PLN | Poľský zlotý | 4,3740 |
| RON | Rumunský lei | 4,2160 |
| TRY | Turecká líra | 2,1636 |
| AUD | Austrálsky dolár | 1,7940 |
| CAD | Kanadský dolár | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hongkongský dolár | 10,7736 |
| NZD | Novozélandský dolár | 2,2250 |
| SGD | Singapurský dolár | 2,0331 |
| KRW | Juhokórejský won | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | Juhoafrický rand | 11,4023 |
| CNY | Čínsky juan | 9,4983 |
| HRK | Chorvátska kuna | 7,3315 |
| IDR | Indonézska rupia | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | Malajzijský ringgit | 4,9731 |
| PHP | Filipínske peso | 67,026 |
| RUB | Ruský rubeľ | 45,4005 |
| THB | Thajský baht | 47,382 |
| BRL | Brazílsky real | 2,8084 |
| MXN | Mexické peso | 19,0303 |
| INR | Indická rupia | 67,8230 |

Mena

Výmenný kurz

USD

Americký dolár

1,3901

JPY

Japonský jen

128,21

DKK

Dánska koruna

7,4466

GBP

Britská libra

0,85800

SEK

Švédska koruna

11,0022

CHF

Švajčiarsky frank

1,5140

ISK

Islandská koruna

NOK

Nórska koruna

9,0840

BGN

Bulharský lev

1,9558

CZK

Česká koruna

26,030

EEK

Estónska koruna

15,6466

HUF

Maďarský forint

277,50

LTL

Litovský litas

3,4528

LVL

Lotyšský lats

0,6993

PLN

Poľský zlotý

4,3740

RON

Rumunský lei

4,2160

TRY

Turecká líra

2,1636

AUD

Austrálsky dolár

1,7940

CAD

Kanadský dolár

1,6212

HKD

Hongkongský dolár

10,7736

NZD

Novozélandský dolár

2,2250

SGD

Singapurský dolár

2,0331

KRW

Juhokórejský won

1 786,89

ZAR

Juhoafrický rand

11,4023

CNY

Čínsky juan

9,4983

HRK

Chorvátska kuna

7,3315

IDR

Indonézska rupia

14 174,11

MYR

Malajzijský ringgit

4,9731

PHP

Filipínske peso

67,026

RUB

Ruský rubeľ

45,4005

THB

Thajský baht

47,382

BRL

Brazílsky real

2,8084

MXN

Mexické peso

19,0303

INR

Indická rupia

67,8230

---

(1)  Zdroj: referenčný výmenný kurz publikovaný ECB.

---

INFORMÁCIE ČLENSKÝCH ŠTÁTOV

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/3

---

Komentovaná prezentácia regulovaných trhov a vnútroštátnych právnych predpisov, ktorými sa vykonávajú relevantné požiadavky smernice o trhoch finančných nástrojov (smernica Európskeho parlamentu a Rady 2004/39/ES)

2009/C 158/03

V článku 47 smernice o trhoch s finančnými nástrojmi (smernica 2004/39/ES, Ú. v. ES L 145, 30.4.2004) sa povoľuje, aby každý členský štát udelil štatút „regulovaného trhu“ tým trhom, ktoré sú zriadené na jeho území a sú v súlade s jeho predpismi.

V článku 4 ods. 1 bode 14 smernice 2004/39/ES sa pojem „regulovaný trh“ definuje ako multilaterálny systém prevádzkovaný a/alebo riadený organizátorom trhu, ktorý spája, alebo umožňuje spájanie záujmov viacerých tretích strán nakupovať a predávať finančné nástroje – v systéme a v súlade s nediskrečnými pravidlami – spôsobom, ktorého výsledkom je zmluva týkajúca sa finančných nástrojov prijatých na obchodovanie podľa jeho pravidiel a/alebo systémov a ktorý je povolený a funguje pravidelne a v súlade s ustanoveniami hlavy III smernice 2004/39/ES.

V článku 47 smernice 2004/39/ES sa vyžaduje, aby každý členský štát viedol aktualizovaný zoznam regulovaných trhov, ktorým udelil povolenie na činnosť. Tieto informácie treba oznamovať ostatným členským štátom a Európskej komisii. V tom istom článku (článok 47 smernice 2004/39/ES) sa od Komisie vyžaduje, aby v Úradnom vestníku Európskej únie každoročne uverejnila zoznam regulovaných trhov, ktoré sa jej oznámia. Tento zoznam je zostavený na základe uvedenej požiadavky.

Priložený zoznam obsahuje názvy jednotlivých trhov, ktoré príslušné vnútroštátne orgány uznávajú ako spĺňajúce definíciu „regulovaného trhu“. Okrem toho sa uvádzajú subjekty zodpovedné za riadenie týchto trhov a príslušné orgány zodpovedné za vydávanie alebo schvaľovanie pravidiel trhu.

Zníženie prekážok vstupu a špecializácia obchodných segmentov spôsobili, že zoznam „regulovaných trhov“ sa mení rýchlejšie než podľa smernice o investičných službách 93/22/EHS. V článku 47 smernice o trhoch s finančnými nástrojmi sa tiež vyžaduje, aby Európska komisia uverejnila zoznam regulovaných trhoch na svojej internetovej stránke a pravidelne ho aktualizovala. Európska komisia preto bude okrem ročného uverejňovania zoznamu v Úradnom vestníku EÚ udržiavať aktualizovanú verziu tohto zoznamu na svojej oficiálnej internetovej stránke [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Tento zoznam sa bude pravidelne aktualizovať na základe informácií oznámených vnútroštátnymi orgánmi. Od týchto orgánov sa žiada, aby priebežne informovali Komisiu o všetkých pridaných alebo odstránených položkách v zozname regulovaných trhov v ich domovskom členskom štáte.

| Krajina | Názov regulovaného trhu | Prevádzkujúci subjekt | Príslušný orgán pre ustanovenie trhu a dohľad nad trhom |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rakúsko | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (hlavný trh) |

Krajina

Názov regulovaného trhu

Prevádzkujúci subjekt

Príslušný orgán pre ustanovenie trhu a dohľad nad trhom

Rakúsko

1.

Amtlicher Handel (hlavný trh)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (polooficiálny trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (polooficiálny trh)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA – Úrad pre finančný trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA – Úrad pre finančný trh)

Belgicko

| 1. | a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De „Euronext Brussels“ markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De „Euronext Brussels“ markt,

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulharsko

| 1. | Официален пазар (oficiálny trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (oficiálny trh)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (neoficiálny trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (neoficiálny trh)

Българска Фондова Борса – София АД (Bulharská burza cenných papierov – Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Komisia pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

Cyprus

Cyprus Stock Exchange (Cyperská burza cenných papierov)

| 1. | Main market (Hlavný trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Main market (Hlavný trh)

| 2. | Parallel market (Paralelný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Parallel market (Paralelný trh)

| 3. | Alternative market (Alternatívny trh) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Alternative market (Alternatívny trh)

| 4. | Bond market (Trh s dlhopismi) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bond market (Trh s dlhopismi)

| 5. | Investment Companies markets (Trh investičných spoločností) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Investment Companies markets (Trh investičných spoločností)

| 6. | Large Project Market (Trh s veľkými projektmi) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Large Project Market (Trh s veľkými projektmi)

| 7. | Ocean-going shipping market (Trhpre námorný obchod) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Ocean-going shipping market (Trhpre námorný obchod)

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Stock Exchange (Cyperská burza cenných papierov) |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Stock Exchange (Cyperská burza cenných papierov)

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (Cyperská komisia pre reguláciu predaja cenných papierov) |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (Cyperská komisia pre reguláciu predaja cenných papierov)

Česká republika

| 1. | Main Market (Hlavný trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Main Market (Hlavný trh)

| 2. | Free Market (Voľný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Free Market (Voľný trh)

| 3. | Official Market (Oficiálny trh) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Official Market (Oficiálny trh)

| 4. | Futures Market (Trh s termínovanými obchodmi) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Futures Market (Trh s termínovanými obchodmi)

| 5. | Spot Market |
| --- | --- |

5.

Spot Market

| 1.-2. | Prague Stock Exchange
  (Burza cenných paperov v Prahe, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Prague Stock Exchange

(Burza cenných paperov v Prahe, a.s.)

| 3. | RM-SYSTEM, Czech stock exchange
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papierov a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM-SYSTEM, Czech stock exchange

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papierov a.s.)

| 4.-5. | Prague Energy Exchange
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5.

Prague Energy Exchange

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5. | Czech National Bank (Česká národná banka) |
| --- | --- |

1.-5.

Czech National Bank (Česká národná banka)

Dánsko

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | trh s akciami; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

trh s akciami;

| — | trh s dlhopismi; |
| --- | --- |

—

trh s dlhopismi;

| — | trh s derivátmi |
| --- | --- |

—

trh s derivátmi

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Burza cenných papierov v Kodani) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Burza cenných papierov v Kodani)

Finanstilsynet (Dánsky úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [schválený trh = pravidelné obchodovanie s cennými papiermi, ktoré spĺňajú podmienky na obchodovanie, ale nekótujú sa na burze cenných papierov] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [schválený trh = pravidelné obchodovanie s cennými papiermi, ktoré spĺňajú podmienky na obchodovanie, ale nekótujú sa na burze cenných papierov]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) (schválený dánsky trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) (schválený dánsky trh)

Estónsko

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Burza cenných papierov)






  — | Põhinimekiri (Hlavný zoznam) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Burza cenných papierov)

—

Põhinimekiri (Hlavný zoznam)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (Zoznam dlhopisov) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (Zoznam dlhopisov)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (Zoznam fondov) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (Zoznam fondov)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Estónsky úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Regulovaný trh)






  — | Lisanimekiri (Sekundrány zoznam) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Regulovaný trh)

—

Lisanimekiri (Sekundrány zoznam)

Fínsko

Arvopaperipörssi (Burza cenných papierov);

| — | Pörssilista (Oficiálny zoznam); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (Oficiálny zoznam);

| — | Pre-lista (Predbežný zoznam); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (Predbežný zoznam);

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (Zoznam pre ostatné cenné papiere) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (Zoznam pre ostatné cenné papiere)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Názov:

Ministerstvo financií.

Dohľad:

| — | Schvaľovanie pravidiel: Ministerstvo financií; |
| --- | --- |

—

Schvaľovanie pravidiel: Ministerstvo financií;

| — | Dohľad nad dodržiavaním pravidiel:
  Finanssivalvonta, Fínsky úrad finančného dozoru |
| --- | --- |

—

Dohľad nad dodržiavaním pravidiel:

Finanssivalvonta, Fínsky úrad finančného dozoru

Francúzsko

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Návrh orgánu Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Uznanie ministrom príslušným pre hospodárstvo (porovnaj článok L. 421-1 menového a finančného zákonníka).

Nemecko

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (úrady spolkových krajín pre dohľad nad burzami cenných papierov a Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

Krajinské úrady:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | Európska energetická burza |
| --- | --- |

10.

Európska energetická burza

| 10. | Európska energetická burza AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

Európska energetická burza AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grécko

| 1. | Burza cenných papierov v Aténach






  — | Trh s cennými papiermi |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Burza cenných papierov v Aténach

—

Trh s cennými papiermi

| — | Trh s derivátmi |
| --- | --- |

—

Trh s derivátmi

| 1. | Burza cenných papierov v Aténach |
| --- | --- |

1.

Burza cenných papierov v Aténach

| 1. | Helénska komisia pre kapitálové trhy (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Helénska komisia pre kapitálové trhy (HCMC)

| 2. | Elektronický vedľajší trh s cennými papiermi (HDAT – trh s dlhovými nástrojmi) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronický vedľajší trh s cennými papiermi (HDAT – trh s dlhovými nástrojmi)

| 2. | Bank of Greece (Grécka národná banka) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bank of Greece (Grécka národná banka)

| 2. | Helénska komisia pre kapitálové trhy (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Helénska komisia pre kapitálové trhy (HCMC)

Maďarsko

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Burza cenných papierov v Budapešti)

| — | Részvényszekció (Sekcia podielových cenných papierov) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Sekcia podielových cenných papierov)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (Sekcia dlhových cenných papierov) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (Sekcia dlhových cenných papierov)

| — | Származékos szekció (Sekcia derivátov) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (Sekcia derivátov)

| — | Áru szekció (Sekcia komodít) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Sekcia komodít)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Burza cenných papierov v Budapešti)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Maďarský úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

Írsko

Main Market of the Irish Stock Exchange (Hlavný trh Írskej burzy cenných papierov)

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd. (Írska burza cenných papierov)

The Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (Írsky úrad pre reguláciu finančných služieb) schvaľuje „regulované trhy“ a (okrem podmienok kótovania) dohliada na spĺňanie požiadaviek smernice o trhoch finančných nástrojov prevádzkovateľom trhu.

Taliansko

| 1. | Elektronický trh s akciami (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Elektronický trh s akciami (MTA)

| 2. | Elektronický trh s dlhopismi (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronický trh s dlhopismi (MOT)

| 3. | Electronický trh s otvorenými fondmi a ETC (ETF-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Electronický trh s otvorenými fondmi a ETC (ETF-Plus)

| 4. | Elektronický trh pre deriváty cenných papierov (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Elektronický trh pre deriváty cenných papierov (SeDeX)

| 5. | Nočný trh (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Nočný trh (TAH)

| 6. | Trh s talianskymi derivátmi na obchodovanie s finančnými nástrojmi podľa článku 1 ods. 2 písm. f) a i) konsolidovaného finančného zákona (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Trh s talianskymi derivátmi na obchodovanie s finančnými nástrojmi podľa článku 1 ods. 2 písm. f) a i) konsolidovaného finančného zákona (IDEM)

| 7. | Veľkoobchodný trh s talianskymi a zahraničnými štátnymi dlhopismi (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Veľkoobchodný trh s talianskymi a zahraničnými štátnymi dlhopismi (MTS)

| 8. | Veľkoobchodné obchodovanie s neštátnymi dlhopismi a cennými papiermi vydanými medzinárodnými organizáciami s účasťou štátu (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Veľkoobchodné obchodovanie s neštátnymi dlhopismi a cennými papiermi vydanými medzinárodnými organizáciami s účasťou štátu (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Veľkoobchodné obchodovanie so štátnymi dlhopismi cez internet (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Veľkoobchodné obchodovanie so štátnymi dlhopismi cez internet (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX Market |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX Market

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

CONSOB schvaľuje spoločnosti, ktoré riadia trhy a schvaľuje ich právne predpisy a nariadenia.

V prípade veľkoobchodných trhov pre štátne dlhopisy získava prevádzkujúca spoločnosť povolenie od Ministerstva financií s ohľadom na stanovisko CONSOB a Banca d’Italia.

Lotyšsko

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Hlavný zoznam; |
| --- | --- |

—

Hlavný zoznam;

| — | Zoznam dlhopisov; |
| --- | --- |

—

Zoznam dlhopisov;

| — | Sekundárny zoznam; |
| --- | --- |

—

Sekundárny zoznam;

| — | Zoznam fondov |
| --- | --- |

—

Zoznam fondov

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Komisia pre finančné a kapitálové trhy)

Litva

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | Hlavný zoznam Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Hlavný zoznam Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Sekundárny zoznam Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Sekundárny zoznam Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Zoznam dlhopisov Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Zoznam dlhopisov Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Zoznam fondov Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Zoznam fondov Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Lithuanian Securities Commission (Litovská komisia pre cenné papiere)

Luxembursko

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange (Burza cenných papierov Malty)

Malta Stock Exchange (Burza cenných papierov Malty)

Malta Financial Services Authority (Maltský úrad pre finančné služby)

Holandsko

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market (hotovostný trh):






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market (hotovostný trh):

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market (trh s derivátmi) |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market (trh s derivátmi)

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1. – 3. | Licencia Ministerstva financií po odporúčaní holandského úradu pre finančné trhy
  Dohľad vykonáva holandský úrad pre finančné trhy a Ministerstvo financií Holandska. |
| --- | --- |

1. – 3.

Licencia Ministerstva financií po odporúčaní holandského úradu pre finančné trhy

Dohľad vykonáva holandský úrad pre finančné trhy a Ministerstvo financií Holandska.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Poľsko

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Hlavný trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Hlavný trh)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Paralelný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Paralelný trh)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO regulovaný trh cenných papierov – mimoburzový trh) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO regulovaný trh cenných papierov – mimoburzový trh)

| 1 and 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Burza cenných papierov vo Varšave) |
| --- | --- |

1 and 2

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Burza cenných papierov vo Varšave)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Komisia pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

Portugalsko

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Hlavný kótovaný trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Hlavný kótovaný trh)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Trh s termínovanými obchodmi a opciami) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Trh s termínovanými obchodmi a opciami)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Zvláštny trh pre štátny dlh) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Zvláštny trh pre štátny dlh)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(energetický trh)

| 1 – 2. | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1 – 2.

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Ministerstvo financií povoľuje trhy na základe návrhu od Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários, úradu zodpovedného za reguláciu trhu a dohľad nad ním.

Rumunsko

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Spotový regulovaný trh – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Spotový regulovaný trh – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Regulovaný trh s derivátmi – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Regulovaný trh s derivátmi – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată - (Regulovaný trh s derivátmi – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată - (Regulovaný trh s derivátmi – BMFMS)

| 1 a 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Burza cenných papierov v Bukurešti S.A.) |
| --- | --- |

1 a 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Burza cenných papierov v Bukurešti S.A.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar – Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar – Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary – Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumunská národná komisia pre cenné papiere)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumunská národná komisia pre cenné papiere)

Slovenská republika

| 1. | Trh kótovaných cenných papierov






  — | Kótovaný hlavný trh |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Trh kótovaných cenných papierov

—

Kótovaný hlavný trh

| — | Kótovaný paralelný trh |
| --- | --- |

—

Kótovaný paralelný trh

| 2. | Regulovaný voľný trh |
| --- | --- |

2.

Regulovaný voľný trh

Burza cenných papierov v Bratislave

Slovenská národná banka

Slovinsko

Oficiálny trh burzy cenných papierov v Ľubľane (Borzni trg)

Burza cenných papierov v Ľubľane (Ljubljanska borza)

Agentúra pre trhy s cennými papiermi

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Španielsko

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (všetky zahŕňajú segmenty prvého a druhého trhu) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (všetky zahŕňajú segmenty prvého a druhého trhu)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España zodpovedá za trh pre štádny dlh

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Švédsko

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | Regulovaný trh s akciami a finančnými nástrojmi, ktoré sú ekvivalentné akciám |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulovaný trh s akciami a finančnými nástrojmi, ktoré sú ekvivalentné akciám

| — | Regulovaný trh s derivátmi |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulovaný trh s derivátmi

| — | Regulovaný trh s dlhopismi a finančnými nástrojmi, ktoré sú ekvivalentné dlhopisom |
| --- | --- |

—

Regulovaný trh s dlhopismi a finančnými nástrojmi, ktoré sú ekvivalentné dlhopisom

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

Spojené kráľovstvo

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1. – 6. | Financial Services Authority (Úrad pre finančné služby) |
| --- | --- |

1. – 6.

Financial Services Authority (Úrad pre finančné služby)

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) (Londýnska medzinárodná burza s termínovanými obchodmi a opciami) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) (Londýnska medzinárodná burza s termínovanými obchodmi a opciami)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange (Londýnska burza s kovmi) |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange (Londýnska burza s kovmi)

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market (regulovaný trh) |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market (regulovaný trh)

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Island

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (regulovaný trh)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

Lichtenštajnsko

Neuplatňuje sa

Neuplatňuje sa

Neuplatňuje sa

Nórsko

| 1. | Oslo Stock Exchange – Burza cenných papierov v Osle (oficiálny zoznam)






  — | Trh s akciami |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Stock Exchange – Burza cenných papierov v Osle (oficiálny zoznam)

—

Trh s akciami

| — | Trh s derivátmi (finančnými) |
| --- | --- |

—

Trh s derivátmi (finančnými)

| — | Trh s dlhopismi |
| --- | --- |

—

Trh s dlhopismi

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Nórsky úrad pre dohľad nad finančným trhom)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Trh s akciami |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Trh s akciami

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (oficiálny zoznam)






  — | Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (oficiálny zoznam)

—

Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Trh s derivátmi (komoditnými)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/9

---

Oznámenie Komisie podľa článku 16 ods. 4 nariadenia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady (ES) č. 1008/2008 o spoločných pravidlách prevádzky leteckých dopravných služieb v Spoločenstve

Záväzky služby vo verejnom záujme v súvislosti so službami pravidelnej leteckej dopravy

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2009/C 158/04

| Členský štát | Taliansko |
| --- | --- |
| Predmetná trasa | Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino a späť |
| Dátum nadobudnutia platnosti záväzkov služby vo verejnom záujme | 1. december 2009 |
| Adresa, na ktorej je možné získať znenie záväzku služby vo verejnom záujme a všetky relevantné informácie a/alebo dokumentáciu | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica.





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Členský štát

Taliansko

Predmetná trasa

Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino a späť

Dátum nadobudnutia platnosti záväzkov služby vo verejnom záujme

1. december 2009

Adresa, na ktorej je možné získať znenie záväzku služby vo verejnom záujme a všetky relevantné informácie a/alebo dokumentáciu

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica.

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

---

V Oznamy

ADMINISTRATÍVNE POSTUPY

Komisia

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/10

---

VÝZVA NA PREDKLADANIE NÁVRHOV – EACEA/11/2009

Štrukturálna podpora organizáciám pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky a organizáciám občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni

Program Európa pre občanov, akcia 2, opatrenia 1 a 2 – 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   CIELE A OPIS

Táto výzva na predkladanie návrhov EACEA/11/2009 vychádza z rozhodnutia Európskeho parlamentu a Rady, ktorým sa na obdobie rokov 2007 – 2013 ustanovuje program Európa pre občanov na podporu aktívneho európskeho občianstva (1) (ďalej len „program“).

Program predstavuje právny základ tejto výzvy na predkladanie návrhov, ktorá odkazuje konkrétne na akciu 2 nazvanú Aktívna občianska spoločnosť v Európe, opatrenia 1 a 2 pod názvom Štrukturálna podpora organizáciám pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky a organizáciám občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni.

1.1.   Všeobecné ciele programu

Zámerom programu je prispieť k týmto všeobecným cieľom:

| a) | poskytovať občanom príležitosť spolupodieľať sa a zúčastňovať sa na budovaní stále viac vzájomne prepojenej Európy, ktorá je demokratická a orientovaná na svet a ktorú spája a obohacuje jej kultúrna rozmanitosť, a rozvíjať tak občianstvo Európskej únie; |
| --- | --- |

a)

poskytovať občanom príležitosť spolupodieľať sa a zúčastňovať sa na budovaní stále viac vzájomne prepojenej Európy, ktorá je demokratická a orientovaná na svet a ktorú spája a obohacuje jej kultúrna rozmanitosť, a rozvíjať tak občianstvo Európskej únie;

| b) | rozvíjať zmysel pre európsku identitu založenú na spoločných hodnotách, histórii a kultúre; |
| --- | --- |

b)

rozvíjať zmysel pre európsku identitu založenú na spoločných hodnotách, histórii a kultúre;

| c) | podporovať u európskych občanov pocit spolupatričnosti k Európskej únii; |
| --- | --- |

c)

podporovať u európskych občanov pocit spolupatričnosti k Európskej únii;

| d) | upevňovať vzájomné porozumenie medzi občanmi Európy prostredníctvom rešpektovania a podpory kultúrnej a jazykovej rozmanitosti a zároveň prispievať k dialógu medzi kultúrami. |
| --- | --- |

d)

upevňovať vzájomné porozumenie medzi občanmi Európy prostredníctvom rešpektovania a podpory kultúrnej a jazykovej rozmanitosti a zároveň prispievať k dialógu medzi kultúrami.

1.2.   Osobitné ciele výzvy

Konkrétnymi cieľmi tejto výzvy na prekladanie návrhov sú:

| a) | podporovať činnosť, diskusie a úvahy týkajúce sa európskeho občianstva a demokracie, spoločných hodnôt, spoločnej histórie a kultúry prostredníctvom aktivít a spolupráce medzi analytickými expertnými štruktúrami (tzv. think tanky) a organizáciami občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni; |
| --- | --- |

a)

podporovať činnosť, diskusie a úvahy týkajúce sa európskeho občianstva a demokracie, spoločných hodnôt, spoločnej histórie a kultúry prostredníctvom aktivít a spolupráce medzi analytickými expertnými štruktúrami (tzv. think tanky) a organizáciami občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni;

| b) | podporovať interakciu medzi občanmi a organizáciami občianskej spoločnosti, prispievať k dialógu medzi kultúrami a zdôrazňovať európsku rozmanitosť a jednotu. |
| --- | --- |

b)

podporovať interakciu medzi občanmi a organizáciami občianskej spoločnosti, prispievať k dialógu medzi kultúrami a zdôrazňovať európsku rozmanitosť a jednotu.

1.3.   Tematické priority

| — | Budúcnosť Európskej únie a jej základné hodnoty |
| --- | --- |

—

Budúcnosť Európskej únie a jej základné hodnoty

| — | Aktívne európske občianstvo, spoluúčasť a demokracia |
| --- | --- |

—

Aktívne európske občianstvo, spoluúčasť a demokracia

| — | Dialóg medzi kultúrami |
| --- | --- |

—

Dialóg medzi kultúrami

| — | Vplyv politík EÚ na spoločnosť |
| --- | --- |

—

Vplyv politík EÚ na spoločnosť

| — | Prosperita občanov v Európe, zamestnanosť, sociálna súdržnosť a udržateľný rozvoj |
| --- | --- |

—

Prosperita občanov v Európe, zamestnanosť, sociálna súdržnosť a udržateľný rozvoj

1.4.   Opis výzvy

Táto výzva na predkladanie návrhov sa týka štrukturálnej podpory označenej ako prevádzkové granty a určenej pre organizácie sledujúce cieľ všeobecného európskeho záujmu. Prevádzkové granty poskytujú finančnú podporu na pokrytie časti prevádzkových nákladov potrebných na riadne vykonávanie pravidelných aktivít vybratej organizácie.

Táto podpora môže byť pridelená v závislosti od určitých kritérií vo forme ročného grantu alebo vo forme viacročného partnerstva. Viacročné partnerstvo je mechanizmus spolupráce medzi organizáciou a Výkonnou agentúrou pre vzdelávanie, audiovizuálny sektor a kultúru (ďalej len „výkonná agentúra“) zahŕňajúci osobitné granty. V rámci tejto výzvy sa takéto partnerstvo môže uzatvoriť na obdobie troch rokov.

2.   OPRÁVNENÍ ŽIADATELIA

2.1.   Organizácie

Na to, aby organizácia sledujúca cieľ všeobecného európskeho záujmu bola oprávnená na udelenie prevádzkového grantu, musí byť:

| a) | neziskovou organizáciou a právnickou osobou; v prípade siete bez osobitnej prevádzkovej štruktúry s vlastnými stanovami môže žiadosť predložiť členská organizácia zodpovedná za koordináciu siete; |
| --- | --- |

a)

neziskovou organizáciou a právnickou osobou; v prípade siete bez osobitnej prevádzkovej štruktúry s vlastnými stanovami môže žiadosť predložiť členská organizácia zodpovedná za koordináciu siete;

| b) | aktívna v oblasti európskeho občianstva v súlade so svojimi stanovami alebo programovým vyhlásením a musí zodpovedať jednej z týchto kategórií organizácií: | opatrenie 1:






  A. | Organizácie pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky (tzv. think tanky – analytické štruktúry). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

aktívna v oblasti európskeho občianstva v súlade so svojimi stanovami alebo programovým vyhlásením a musí zodpovedať jednej z týchto kategórií organizácií:

opatrenie 1:

A.

Organizácie pre výskum a analýzu európskej verejnej politiky (tzv. think tanky – analytické štruktúry).

| | opatrenie 2:






  B. | Organizácie občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni






  — | centrálne európske organizácie (platformy) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

opatrenie 2:

B.

Organizácie občianskej spoločnosti na európskej úrovni

—

centrálne európske organizácie (platformy)

| — | európske siete |
| --- | --- |

—

európske siete

| — | organizácie s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni |
| --- | --- |

—

organizácie s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni

| C. | Organizácie občianskej spoločnosti, ktoré sa zaoberajú tzv. európskou pamiatkou |
| --- | --- |

C.

Organizácie občianskej spoločnosti, ktoré sa zaoberajú tzv. európskou pamiatkou

| D. | Paneurópske platformy organizácií |
| --- | --- |

D.

Paneurópske platformy organizácií

| c) | vykonávať väčšinu svojich aktivít v oprávnených krajinách (pozri bod 2.2).

  Podmienkou viacročného partnerstva je, aby organizácie boli právne založené a boli právnickou osobou viac ako štyri (4) roky (k 15. októbru 2009) v niektorej z oprávnených krajín a aby mali pre kategórie uvedené ďalej takéto geografické pokrytie:






  — | centrálna európska organizácia alebo európska sieť musí mať členov najmenej v dvanástich (12) oprávnených krajinách; |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

vykonávať väčšinu svojich aktivít v oprávnených krajinách (pozri bod 2.2).

Podmienkou viacročného partnerstva je, aby organizácie boli právne založené a boli právnickou osobou viac ako štyri (4) roky (k 15. októbru 2009) v niektorej z oprávnených krajín a aby mali pre kategórie uvedené ďalej takéto geografické pokrytie:

—

centrálna európska organizácia alebo európska sieť musí mať členov najmenej v dvanástich (12) oprávnených krajinách;

| — | organizácia s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni musí byť aktívna najmenej v dvanástich (12) oprávnených krajinách; |
| --- | --- |

—

organizácia s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni musí byť aktívna najmenej v dvanástich (12) oprávnených krajinách;

| — | paneurópska platforma organizácií musí mať najmenej šesť (6) centrálnych organizácií v postavení člena a prostredníctvom týchto organizácií musí byť prítomná v 27 členských štátoch EÚ. |
| --- | --- |

—

paneurópska platforma organizácií musí mať najmenej šesť (6) centrálnych organizácií v postavení člena a prostredníctvom týchto organizácií musí byť prítomná v 27 členských štátoch EÚ.

Podmienkou udelenia ročného grantu je, aby organizácie boli právne založené a boli právnickou osobou viac ako jeden (1) rok (k 15. októbru 2009) v niektorej z oprávnených krajín a aby mali pre kategórie uvedené ďalej takéto geografické pokrytie:

| — | centrálna európska organizácia alebo európska sieť musí mať členov najmenej vo ôsmich (8) oprávnených krajinách; |
| --- | --- |

—

centrálna európska organizácia alebo európska sieť musí mať členov najmenej vo ôsmich (8) oprávnených krajinách;

| — | organizácia s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni musí byť aktívna najmenej vo ôsmich (8) oprávnených krajinách. |
| --- | --- |

—

organizácia s rozsiahlym vplyvom svojich činností na európskej úrovni musí byť aktívna najmenej vo ôsmich (8) oprávnených krajinách.

Paneurópske platformy organizácií môžu predkladať žiadosti iba v rámci viacročného partnerstva.

Fyzické osoby a verejné orgány nie sú oprávnené v rámci tejto výzvy.

2.2.   Oprávnené krajiny

| a) | členské štáty Európskej únie: Belgicko, Bulharsko, Cyprus, Česká republika, Dánsko, Estónsko, Fínsko, Francúzsko, Grécko, Holandsko, Írsko, Litva, Lotyšsko, Luxembursko, Maďarsko, Malta, Nemecko, Poľsko, Portugalsko, Rakúsko, Rumunsko, Slovensko, Slovinsko, Spojené kráľovstvo, Španielsko, Švédsko, Taliansko. |
| --- | --- |

a)

členské štáty Európskej únie: Belgicko, Bulharsko, Cyprus, Česká republika, Dánsko, Estónsko, Fínsko, Francúzsko, Grécko, Holandsko, Írsko, Litva, Lotyšsko, Luxembursko, Maďarsko, Malta, Nemecko, Poľsko, Portugalsko, Rakúsko, Rumunsko, Slovensko, Slovinsko, Spojené kráľovstvo, Španielsko, Švédsko, Taliansko.

| b) | Chorvátsko |
| --- | --- |

b)

Chorvátsko

| c) | Bývalá juhoslovanská republika Macedónsko |
| --- | --- |

c)

Bývalá juhoslovanská republika Macedónsko

| d) | Albánsko |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albánsko

3.   OPRÁVNENÉ ČINNOSTI

Činnosti žiadajúcich organizácií musia konkrétnym spôsobom prispievať k rozvoju a realizácii osobitných cieľov a tematických priorít tejto výzvy na predkladanie návrhov. Musia sa zameriavať najmenej na jeden z osobitných cieľov a najmenej na jednu z tematických priorít uvedených v bode 1.

Pracovný program žiadajúcej organizácie na rok 2010, ako aj strategický trojročný program (v prípade viacročného partnerstva), sa musia zameriavať na jej štatutárne činnosti, a to najmä na konferencie, semináre, okrúhle stoly, reprezentačné, komunikačné a valorizačné aktivity, ako aj ďalšie pravidelné európske činnosti.

Obdobie oprávnenosti

Nezávisle od toho, či ide o ročný grant alebo o viacročné partnerstvo, obdobie oprávnenosti musí zodpovedať obdobiu rozpočtového roka žiadateľa, ktoré je potvrdené overenými účtami organizácie. Ak obdobie rozpočtového roka žiadateľa zodpovedá kalendárnemu roku, obdobie oprávnenosti bude trvať od 1. januára 2009 do 31. decembra 2010.

V prípade žiadateľov, ktorých rozpočtový rok je iný ako kalendárny rok, bude obdobie oprávnenosti trvať 12 mesiacov od prvého dňa ich rozpočtového roka v roku 2010.

4.   KRITÉRIÁ UDEĽOVANIA GRANTOV

Hodnotiaci výbor bude na základe kritérií udeľovania grantov hodnotiť, či žiadosti zodpovedajú kritériám oprávnenosti resp. vylúčenia, s cieľom vybrať tie návrhy, ktoré môžu byť spolufinancované.

Uplatňovať sa budú nasledujúce kritéria udeľovania grantov. Kvalitatívne kritériá budú predstavovať 80 % a kvantitatívne 20 % z pridelenej známky. Pracovný program na obdobie dvanásť mesiacov a strategický trojročný program budú mať v prípade viacročného partnerstva rovnakú váhu.

4.1.   Kvalitatívne kritériá (80 %)

Posudzovať sa budú tieto hľadiská:

| a) | význam pre ciele a priority programu Európa pre občanov (30 %) |
| --- | --- |

a)

význam pre ciele a priority programu Európa pre občanov (30 %)

| b) | vhodnosť, súdržnosť a úplnosť pracovného programu (20 %) |
| --- | --- |

b)

vhodnosť, súdržnosť a úplnosť pracovného programu (20 %)

| c) | dosah pracovného programu (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

c)

dosah pracovného programu (10 %)

| d) | európska pridaná hodnota (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

d)

európska pridaná hodnota (10 %)

| e) | zviditeľnenie činností, rozširovanie a využívanie výsledkov vo vzťahu k európskym občanom a ďalším zúčastneným stranám (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

e)

zviditeľnenie činností, rozširovanie a využívanie výsledkov vo vzťahu k európskym občanom a ďalším zúčastneným stranám (10 %)

4.2.   Kvantitatívne kritériá (20 %)

Posudzovať sa budú tieto hľadiská:

| a) | Počet oprávnených krajín zapojených do činností pracovného programu (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

a)

Počet oprávnených krajín zapojených do činností pracovného programu (10 %)

| b) | Počet možných priamych príjemcov podpory (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

b)

Počet možných priamych príjemcov podpory (10 %)

5.   ROZPOČET

Plánovaný rozpočet na spolufinancovanie prevádzkových grantov v roku 2010 je okolo 8,2 mil. EUR. Zámerom výkonnej agentúry je v rámci tejto výzvy financovať približne 55 organizácií, agentúra si však v závislosti od kvality žiadostí vyhradzuje právo nepoužiť všetky finančné prostriedky, ktoré má k dispozícii.

Pre informáciu: granty viacročného partnerstva budú predstavovať približne 85 % a ročné granty približne 15 % z celkového rozpočtu.

Táto podpora bude pridelená v rámci položky 15.06.66 všeobecného rozpočtu Európskej únie.

6.   TERMÍN PODÁVANIA ŽIADOSTÍ

Konečný termín podávania žiadostí je stanovený na 15. októbra 2009.

Výkonná agentúra v súčasnosti pracuje na zavedení systému elektronického podávania všetkých žiadostí.

Žiadatelia musia v rámci tejto výzvy na predkladanie návrhov poslať svoju žiadosť prostredníctvom elektronického formulára, ktorý bude k dispozícii od 15. septembra 2009. Táto verzia (vrátane príloh) sa považuje za hlavnú verziu. Výkonná agentúra zatiaľ ponúka pdf verziu formulára, aby žiadatelia mohli začať s prípravou svojich žiadostí.

Okrem toho je potrebné pred uplynutím uvedeného termínu zaslať poštou tlačenú verziu žiadosti na túto adresu:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Zohľadnené budú len žiadosti podané na príslušnom formulári, riadne vyplnené, datované a podpísané osobou oprávnenou na prijímanie právnych záväzkov v mene žiadajúcej organizácie.

7.   ĎALŠIE INFORMÁCIE

Podrobné pokyny určené kandidátom a formuláre žiadostí sa nachádzajú na tejto adrese: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

---

(1)  Rozhodnutie Európskeho parlamentu a Rady č. 1904/2006/ES z 12. decembra 2006 (Ú. v. EÚ L 378, 27.12.2006, s. 32) zmenené a doplnené rozhodnutím Európskeho parlamentu a Rady č. 1358/2008/ES zo 16. decembra 2008 (Ú. v. EÚ L 350, 30.12.2008).

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KONANIA TÝKAJÚCE SA VYKONÁVANIA POLITIKY HOSPODÁRSKEJ SÚŤAŽE

Komisia

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/13

---

ŠTÁTNA POMOC – HOLANDSKO

Štátna pomoc C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) – ING

Výzva na predloženie pripomienok v súlade s článkom 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES

(Text s významom pre EHP)

2009/C 158/06

Listom z 31 marca 2009, ktorý je uvedený v autentickom jazyku za týmto zhrnutím, Komisia oznámila Holandsku svoje rozhodnutie začať konanie podľa článku 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES, pokiaľ ide o uvedené opatrenie.

Zainteresované strany môžu predložiť svoje pripomienky k opatreniu, vo veci ktorého Komisia začína konanie, v lehote jedného mesiaca odo dňa uverejnenia tohto zhrnutia a nasledujúceho listu. Kontaktné údaje:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Tieto pripomienky sa oznámia Holandsku. Zainteresované strany môžu písomne s uvedením dôvodov požiadať o dôverné zaobchádzanie s údajmi o ich totožnosti.

ZHRNUTIE

POSTUP

Dňa 4. marca 2009 holandské orgány oznámili Komisii poskytnutie podpory v podobe nelikvidných aktív podniku ING Support Holding (priama dcérska spoločnosť podniku ING Group).

SKUTOČNOSTI

Podnik ING so sídlom v Holandsku je jedným z najväčších svetových finančných inštitúcii s celkovou súvahou vo výške 1 332 miliárd EUR. V januári 2009 holandský štát podpísal termínovanú zmluvu na účel prenosu rizík a navrátenia časti amerického RMBS portfólia, ktoré patrí podniku ING. Uvedenú časť portfólia tvoria cenné papiere Alt-A. Nevyrovnané saldo portfólia podniku ING má výšku 39 miliárd USD (nominálna hodnota: 30 miliárd EUR).

Zamýšľané opatrenie pozostáva zo swapu hotovostného toku medzi holandským štátom a podnikom ING, pričom podnik ING prevedie výnos z 80 % nominálnej hodnoty portfólia (úrok a splátky istiny) za garantované platby od štátu vo výške 72 % (t. j. 80 % z 90 %) nominálnej hodnoty portfólia (len istina). Toto bude dopĺňať poplatok na financovanie vo výške 3,50 %, ktorý zaplatí štát podniku ING za časť cenných papierov s fixnou sadzbou v portfóliu a za mesačnú medzibankovú úrokovú mieru v USD a 50 bázických bodov za časť cenných papierov s pohyblivou sadzbou v portfóliu.

Holandský štát platí ročne podniku ING dodatočný spravovací poplatok vo výške 25 bázických bodov za nezaplatenú čiastku istiny. Výmenou za toto opatrenie zaplatí podnik ING ročne holandskému štátu garantovaný poplatok vo výške 55 bázických bodov za 80 % z nezaplatenej čiastky portfólia.

POSÚDENIE

Komisia posúdila prevod na základe oznámenia Komisie o aktívach so zníženou hodnotou. Komisia má v tejto fáze pochybnosti, ktoré sa týkajú oceňovania a najmä metodiky oceňovania na účely zhodnotenia reálnej ekonomickej hodnoty. Komisia potrebuje ďalej preskúmať základné predpoklady uvedené holandským štátom, najmä však tie, ktoré sa týkajú: i) zvolenej diskontnej sadzby, ii) odhadov cien nehnuteľností, iii) úrovne kreditného vzostupu a iv) ďalších otázok oceňovania.

Komisia má preto tiež pochybnosti, ktoré sa týkajú vhodného rozdelenia finančného zaťaženia medzi štátom a podnikom ING. Vzhľadom na uvedené pochybnosti, ktoré sa týkajú posúdenia ocenenia, si Komisia klade otázku, či banka naozaj znáša rozdiel medzi nominálnou hodnotou a reálnou ekonomickou hodnotou portfólia. Komisia si takisto nie je istá, či swap hotovostného toku je naozaj taký prospešný štátu, ako sa uvádza. Komisia má určité pochybnosti pokiaľ ide o vhodnosť spravovacieho poplatku pri portfóliu, keďže sa zdá, že spravovanie nebude vyžadovať značnú aktivitu.

V súlade s určitými podmienkami uvedenými v oznámení o aktívach so zníženou hodnotou a s náležitým prihliadnutím na potrebu zachovania finančnej stability sa Komisia rozhodla schváliť toho opatrenie na obdobie šiestich mesiacov. Vzhľadom na uvedené úvahy sa Komisia rozhodla začať konanie podľa článku 88 ods. 2 Zmluvy o ES s cieľom overiť si podmienky uvedené v oznámení o aktívach so zníženou hodnotou, ktoré sa týkajú oceňovania (vrátane metodiky oceňovania) a rozdelenia finančného zaťaženia vyplývajúce z tohto opatrenia.

TEXT LISTU

„The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
| --- | --- |

—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.“

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

---

INÉ AKTY

Komisia

| 11.7.2009 | SK | Úradný vestník Európskej únie | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SK

Úradný vestník Európskej únie

C 158/24

---

Uverejnenie žiadosti o zápis podľa článku 8 ods. 2 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 509/2006 o zaručených tradičných špecialitách z poľnohospodárskych výrobkov a potravín

2009/C 158/07

Týmto uverejnením sa poskytuje právo vzniesť námietky proti žiadosti o zápis podľa článku 9 nariadenia Rady (ES) č. 509/2006. Vznesené námietky sa musia Komisii doručiť do šiestich mesiacov po uverejnení tejto žiadosti.

ŽIADOSŤ O ZÁPIS DO REGISTRA ZTŠ

NARIADENIE RADY (ES) č. 509/2006

„KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA“

ES č.: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Názov a adresa skupiny žiadateľov:

Názov: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Adresa:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

E-mail: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Členský štát alebo tretia krajina:

Poľsko

3.   Špecifikácia výrobku:

3.1.   Názov na zápis do registra (článok 2 nariadenia (ES) č. 1216/2007):

„Kiełbasa jałowcowa“

3.2.   Uveďte, prosím, či názov:

 je špecifický sám o sebe

Image

Názov „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ vyjadruje špecifický charakter výrobku, ktorý je spojený najmä s jeho výnimočnou chuťou a vôňou. Tieto charakteristické črty vznikajú tým, že počas výrobného procesu sa používajú borievky, ktoré sa tesne pred pridaním k mäsu najemno nasekajú, a tým, že počas procesu údenia sa používajú borievkové vetvičky.

3.3.   Žiada sa výhrada názvu podľa článku 13 ods. 2 nariadenia (ES) č. 509/2006:

 zápis do registra s výhradou názvu

Image

3.4.   Druh výrobku:

| Trieda 1.2 – | Mäsové výrobky (tepelne spracované, solené, údené atď.) |
| --- | --- |

Trieda 1.2 –

Mäsové výrobky (tepelne spracované, solené, údené atď.)

3.5.   Opis poľnohospodárskeho výrobku alebo potraviny, na ktorú sa vzťahuje názov uvedený v bode 3.1. [článok 3 ods. 1 nariadenia (ES) č. 1216/2007]:

„Kiełbasa jałowcowa“ má vzhľad rovnomerne zvrásneného valčeka stočeného do tvaru venca. Má charakteristický tvar praslena bez pozdĺžnych preliačin na povrchu. Existuje v dvoch veľkostiach:

| — | malý veniec v prírodných črevách s priemerom viac ako 32 mm a hmotnosťou približne 0,5 kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

malý veniec v prírodných črevách s priemerom viac ako 32 mm a hmotnosťou približne 0,5 kg;

| — | veľký veniec v bielkovinových črevách s priemerom 36 mm a hmotnosťou približne 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

veľký veniec v bielkovinových črevách s priemerom 36 mm a hmotnosťou približne 0,8 kg.

Celý povrch klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ má tmavohnedú farbu, ktorá je typická pre intenzívne zaúdené klobásky.

Povrch venca je na dotyk suchý, hladký a rovnomerne zvrásnený, pričom črevá tesne priliehajú k plnke. Rovnako to platí aj pre konzistenciu venca.

Charakteristická chuť a jemnosť výrobku sú výsledkom výberu surovín, korenín (najmä borievok) a prírodného údenia, ktoré tvorí súčasť výrobného procesu.

Chemické zloženie:

| — | obsah bielkovín – minimálne 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah bielkovín – minimálne 15,0 %,

| — | obsah vody – maximálne 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah vody – maximálne 60,0 %,

| — | obsah tuku – maximálne 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah tuku – maximálne 35,0 %,

| — | obsah soli – maximálne 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah soli – maximálne 3,5 %,

| — | obsah dusičnanov (III) a dusičnanov (V) vyjadrený ako NaNO2 – maximálne 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah dusičnanov (III) a dusičnanov (V) vyjadrený ako NaNO2 – maximálne 0,0125 %.

Vyššie uvedené chemické zloženie zaručuje tradičnú kvalitu výrobku. Pomer výťažnosti hotových výrobkov k použitému množstvu surového mäsa je 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.6.   Opis výrobnej metódy poľnohospodárskeho výrobku alebo potraviny, na ktorú sa vzťahuje názov uvedený v bode 3.1. [článok 3 ods. 2 nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 1216/2007]:

Zloženie

| | Mäso (100 kg surového mäsa):






  — | bravčové mäso triedy I s obsahom tuku do 15 % – 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Mäso (100 kg surového mäsa):

—

bravčové mäso triedy I s obsahom tuku do 15 % – 20 kg,

| — | bravčové mäso triedy IIA s obsahom tuku do 20 % – 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

bravčové mäso triedy IIA s obsahom tuku do 20 % – 50 kg,

| — | bravčové mäso triedy III s obsahom tuku do 25 % – 20 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

bravčové mäso triedy III s obsahom tuku do 25 % – 20 kg,

| — | kúsky tuhého tuku – 10 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

kúsky tuhého tuku – 10 kg,

Až 50 % bravčového mäsa triedy IIA alebo III sa môže nahradiť hovädzím mäsom.

| | Koreniny (na 100 kg mäsa):






  — | čierne korenie – 0,17 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Koreniny (na 100 kg mäsa):

—

čierne korenie – 0,17 kg,

| — | borievky – 0,12 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

borievky – 0,12 kg,

| — | cukor – 0,20 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

cukor – 0,20 kg.

| | Iné:






  — | zmes na nasolenie [zmes kuchynskej soli (NaCl) a dusitanu sodného (NaNO2)] – približne 2 kg. |
| --- | --- | --- |

Iné:

—

zmes na nasolenie [zmes kuchynskej soli (NaCl) a dusitanu sodného (NaNO2)] – približne 2 kg.

Potrava ošípaných pri produkcii bravčového mäsa používaného na výrobu klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“

Potrava sa vzťahuje na výkrm na mäso a masť. Cieľom je produkcia ošípaných s telesnou hmotnosťou do 120 kg a zvýšeným podielom medzisvalového tuku (viac ako 3 %).

| — | Na výkrm sa nasadzujú pomaly rastúce plemená, pri ktorých je prostredníctvom príslušného kŕmneho režimu možné dosiahnuť požadovaný podiel medzisvalového tuku. Plemenám nasadzovaným na výkrm chýba gén RN a nositeľom génu RYR 1T je maximálne 20 % populácie. |
| --- | --- |

—

Na výkrm sa nasadzujú pomaly rastúce plemená, pri ktorých je prostredníctvom príslušného kŕmneho režimu možné dosiahnuť požadovaný podiel medzisvalového tuku. Plemenám nasadzovaným na výkrm chýba gén RN a nositeľom génu RYR 1T je maximálne 20 % populácie.

| — | Výkrm by sa mal realizovať v troch fázach – fáza I do približne 60 kg, fáza II do približne 90 kg a fáza III do 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Výkrm by sa mal realizovať v troch fázach – fáza I do približne 60 kg, fáza II do približne 90 kg a fáza III do 120 kg.

| — | Na výkrm zvierat do približne 90 kg telesnej váhy sa používajú dva druhy krmivových zmesí (dávok), ktoré obsahujú: |
| --- | --- |

—

Na výkrm zvierat do približne 90 kg telesnej váhy sa používajú dva druhy krmivových zmesí (dávok), ktoré obsahujú:

| — | ako energetické zložky: obilninový šrot – z pšenice, jačmeňa, raže, ovsa, triticale alebo kukurice. Kukuričný šrot a šrot z nahých odrôd ovsa predstavujú až 30 % krmivovej zmesi; |
| --- | --- |

—

ako energetické zložky: obilninový šrot – z pšenice, jačmeňa, raže, ovsa, triticale alebo kukurice. Kukuričný šrot a šrot z nahých odrôd ovsa predstavujú až 30 % krmivovej zmesi;

| — | ako bielkovinové zložky: šrot z lupiny, bôbu obyčajného a hrachu, extrahovaný sójový šrot, extrahovaný šrot z repky olejky, lisované semená repky olejky, krmivové droždie alebo sušené zelené krmivo. |
| --- | --- |

—

ako bielkovinové zložky: šrot z lupiny, bôbu obyčajného a hrachu, extrahovaný sójový šrot, extrahovaný šrot z repky olejky, lisované semená repky olejky, krmivové droždie alebo sušené zelené krmivo.

| — | Krmivové zmesi (dávky) pre zvieratá od 90 do 120 kg obsahujú: |
| --- | --- |

—

Krmivové zmesi (dávky) pre zvieratá od 90 do 120 kg obsahujú:

| — | ako energetické zložky: šrot z pšenice, jačmeňa, raže a triticale. Kukuričný šrot a šrot z nahých odrôd ovsa sa v zmesiach (dávkach) nesmú používať; |
| --- | --- |

—

ako energetické zložky: šrot z pšenice, jačmeňa, raže a triticale. Kukuričný šrot a šrot z nahých odrôd ovsa sa v zmesiach (dávkach) nesmú používať;

| — | ako bielkovinové zložky: šrot zo strukovín (lupina, bôb obyčajný a hrach) extrahovaný sójový šrot, lisované semená repky olejky alebo extrahovaný šrot z repky olejky a sušené zelené krmivo. |
| --- | --- |

—

ako bielkovinové zložky: šrot zo strukovín (lupina, bôb obyčajný a hrach) extrahovaný sójový šrot, lisované semená repky olejky alebo extrahovaný šrot z repky olejky a sušené zelené krmivo.

| — | Počas celého cyklu výkrmu však v krmivových zmesiach (dávkach) v žiadnom prípade nie je možné použiť: rastlinné oleje, krmivo živočíšneho pôvodu, napr. sušené mlieko, sušenú srvátku, rybiu múčku. |
| --- | --- |

—

Počas celého cyklu výkrmu však v krmivových zmesiach (dávkach) v žiadnom prípade nie je možné použiť: rastlinné oleje, krmivo živočíšneho pôvodu, napr. sušené mlieko, sušenú srvátku, rybiu múčku.

| — | Obsah využiteľnej energie (VE) v zmesiach je počas všetkých fáz výkrmu 12–13 MJ VE/kg zmesi. Obsah bielkovín v zmesiach by mal byť približne 16–18 % počas prvej fázy výkrmu, 15–16 % počas druhej fázy výkrmu a približne 14 % v záverečnej fáze. |
| --- | --- |

—

Obsah využiteľnej energie (VE) v zmesiach je počas všetkých fáz výkrmu 12–13 MJ VE/kg zmesi. Obsah bielkovín v zmesiach by mal byť približne 16–18 % počas prvej fázy výkrmu, 15–16 % počas druhej fázy výkrmu a približne 14 % v záverečnej fáze.

| — | Dávky na výkrm môžu pozostávať len zo zmesí jadrového krmiva ako takého, alebo zmesí jadrového krmiva a objemového krmiva, t.j. zemiakov a zeleného krmiva. |
| --- | --- |

—

Dávky na výkrm môžu pozostávať len zo zmesí jadrového krmiva ako takého, alebo zmesí jadrového krmiva a objemového krmiva, t.j. zemiakov a zeleného krmiva.

Fázy výroby klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“

| Fáza 1 | Prípravné nakrájanie všetkých mäsových zložiek. Zabezpečenie jednotnej veľkosti všetkých kúskov mäsa (priemer približne 5 cm). |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 1

Prípravné nakrájanie všetkých mäsových zložiek. Zabezpečenie jednotnej veľkosti všetkých kúskov mäsa (priemer približne 5 cm).

| Fáza 2 | Tradičné nasolenie (suchá metóda) na asi 48 hodín prostredníctvom použitia zmesi na nasolenie. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 2

Tradičné nasolenie (suchá metóda) na asi 48 hodín prostredníctvom použitia zmesi na nasolenie.

| Fáza 3 | Mechanické spracovanie: Nakrájanie mäsa triedy I na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 20 mm, mäsa triedy IIA na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 8 mm a mäsa triedy III na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 3 mm a následne zmiešanie s 5 kg ľadu. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 3

Mechanické spracovanie: Nakrájanie mäsa triedy I na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 20 mm, mäsa triedy IIA na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 8 mm a mäsa triedy III na kúsky s veľkosťou približne 3 mm a následne zmiešanie s 5 kg ľadu.

| Fáza 4 | Zmiešanie všetkých mäsových zložiek a korenín: čierneho korenia, cukru a borievok, ktoré sa podrvia bezprostredne pred pridaním do miešacieho stroja. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 4

Zmiešanie všetkých mäsových zložiek a korenín: čierneho korenia, cukru a borievok, ktoré sa podrvia bezprostredne pred pridaním do miešacieho stroja.

| Fáza 5 | Naplnenie do prírodných bravčových čriev s priemerom viac ako 32 mm alebo bielkovinových čriev s priemerom 36 mm, stočenie na valčeky a vytvarovanie do tvaru vencov. Na výrobu klobások sa môžu použiť dva druhy čriev:






  — | menšie vence v malých bravčových črevách s hmotnosťou 0,5 kg; |
| --- | --- | --- |

Fáza 5

Naplnenie do prírodných bravčových čriev s priemerom viac ako 32 mm alebo bielkovinových čriev s priemerom 36 mm, stočenie na valčeky a vytvarovanie do tvaru vencov. Na výrobu klobások sa môžu použiť dva druhy čriev:

—

menšie vence v malých bravčových črevách s hmotnosťou 0,5 kg;

| — | väčšie vence v bielkovinových črevách s hmotnosťou 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

väčšie vence v bielkovinových črevách s hmotnosťou 0,8 kg.

| Fáza 6 | Zavesenie pri teplote maximálne 30 °C na dve hodiny. Predsušenie povrchu, „rozloženie“ jednotlivých zložiek vo vnútri klobásky. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 6

Zavesenie pri teplote maximálne 30 °C na dve hodiny. Predsušenie povrchu, „rozloženie“ jednotlivých zložiek vo vnútri klobásky.

| Fáza 7 | Sušenie povrchu a tradičné zaúdenie horúcim dymom (asi 120 minút) a pečenie, pokiaľ teplota vo vnútri klobások nedosiahne aspoň 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 7

Sušenie povrchu a tradičné zaúdenie horúcim dymom (asi 120 minút) a pečenie, pokiaľ teplota vo vnútri klobások nedosiahne aspoň 70 °C.

| Fáza 8 | Klobásky sa nechajú 24 hodín chladiť. |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 8

Klobásky sa nechajú 24 hodín chladiť.

| Fáza 9 | Zaúdenie studeným dymom, pričom sa použijú bukové hobliny a borievkové vetvičky (približne 120 minút) a následné sušenie pri teplote 14–18 °C počas 3–5 dní, až pokiaľ sa nedosiahne požadovaná výťažnosť 75 % (+/– 3 %). |
| --- | --- |

Fáza 9

Zaúdenie studeným dymom, pričom sa použijú bukové hobliny a borievkové vetvičky (približne 120 minút) a následné sušenie pri teplote 14–18 °C počas 3–5 dní, až pokiaľ sa nedosiahne požadovaná výťažnosť 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.7.   Špecifický charakter poľnohospodárskeho výrobku alebo potraviny [článok 3 ods. 3 nariadenia Komisie (ES) č. 1216/2007]:

Špecifický charakter výrobku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ vyplýva z niekoľkých pre tento výrobok typických vlastností:

| — | jemnosti a špecifických vlastností mäsa; |
| --- | --- |

—

jemnosti a špecifických vlastností mäsa;

| — | výnimočnej chuti a vône; |
| --- | --- |

—

výnimočnej chuti a vône;

| — | jednotného tvaru. |
| --- | --- |

—

jednotného tvaru.

Jemnosť, šťavnatosť, ako aj špecifické vlastnosti mäsa

Bravčové mäso, ktoré pochádza z ošípaných pomaly rastúcich plemien vykŕmených na telesnú hmotnosť približne 120 kg, a ktoré vykazuje genetické vlastnosti popísané v bode 3.6., predstavuje podstatnú zložku výrobku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“, ktorá ovplyvňuje jeho špecifický charakter. Dodržanie týchto požiadaviek vedie k dosiahnutiu podielu medzisvalového tuku presahujúceho 3 %, ktorý zaručuje chuťové a technologické vlastnosti mäsa, ktoré sú nevyhnutné pre výrobu klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“. Použitie takýchto surovín a dodržiavanie tradičnej metódy výroby, hlavne v týchto fázach: nakrájanie, nasolenie a údenie, zaručuje, že klobáska „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ je výnimočne jemná a šťavnatá.

Výnimočná chuť a vôňa

Špecifický charakter výrobku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ je spojený najmä s jeho jedinečnou chuťou a vôňou, ktoré sú výsledkom použitia borievok počas výrobného procesu. Podrvenie borievok bezprostredne pred začatím výrobného procesu zvýrazňuje charakteristickú chuť klobásky a prispieva k jej špecifickému charakteru, zatiaľ čo použitie borievok počas procesu údenia pridáva klobáske na chuti a zvýrazňuje jej výnimočnú vôňu.

Jednotný tvar

Je to práve jej tvar, ktorý klobásku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ odlišuje od iných výrobkov tohto typu. Predáva sa len v dvoch veľmi podobných tvaroch, vďaka čomu ju môžu spotrebitelia ľahko rozpoznať. „Kiełbasa jałowcowa“ má vzhľad rovnomerne zvrásneného valčeka stočeného do tvaru venca. Má charakteristický tvar praslena bez pozdĺžnych preliačin na povrchu.

3.8.   Tradičný charakter poľnohospodárskeho výrobku alebo potraviny [článok 3 ods. 4 nariadenia (ES) č. 1216/2007]:

Tradičné suroviny

| 1. | Borievky
  „Z dreva borievky sa pri pálení šíri príjemná intenzívna vôňa“ – tak je jedna z ušľachtilých vlastností borievkových krov, ktoré sú na území Poľska rozšírené už niekoľko storočí, popísaná v publikácii „Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana“ (Veľká ilustrovaná všeobecná encyklopédia) z roku 1903. V encyklopédii sa ďalej uvádza, že vetvičky, hobliny a bobule borievok sa môžu použiť počas procesu údenia na to, aby mäso získalo vynikajúcu chuť a vôňu. Dokumenty z druhej polovice 19. stor. dokazujú, že borievky sa už vtedy používali ako korenie alebo prísada do mäsových pokrmov a výrobkov. V encyklopédii „Encyklopedyja Powszechna“, ktorá vyšla v roku 1863 vo Varšave, sa uvádza, že borievky majú korenistú, horko-sladkú chuť a príjemnú vôňu a že sa často používajú na dochucovanie. Štandardný výrobný postup klobások s použitím zrniek borievok a zahŕňajúc údenie borievkovým dymom bol v Poľsku zavedený už na prelome 40. a 50. rokov 20. storočia [pozri článok v odbornom časopise mäsového priemyslu „Gospodarka Mięsna“ (r. 1954 č. 3) s názvom „Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku“]. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Borievky

„Z dreva borievky sa pri pálení šíri príjemná intenzívna vôňa“ – tak je jedna z ušľachtilých vlastností borievkových krov, ktoré sú na území Poľska rozšírené už niekoľko storočí, popísaná v publikácii „Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana“ (Veľká ilustrovaná všeobecná encyklopédia) z roku 1903. V encyklopédii sa ďalej uvádza, že vetvičky, hobliny a bobule borievok sa môžu použiť počas procesu údenia na to, aby mäso získalo vynikajúcu chuť a vôňu. Dokumenty z druhej polovice 19. stor. dokazujú, že borievky sa už vtedy používali ako korenie alebo prísada do mäsových pokrmov a výrobkov. V encyklopédii „Encyklopedyja Powszechna“, ktorá vyšla v roku 1863 vo Varšave, sa uvádza, že borievky majú korenistú, horko-sladkú chuť a príjemnú vôňu a že sa často používajú na dochucovanie. Štandardný výrobný postup klobások s použitím zrniek borievok a zahŕňajúc údenie borievkovým dymom bol v Poľsku zavedený už na prelome 40. a 50. rokov 20. storočia [pozri článok v odbornom časopise mäsového priemyslu „Gospodarka Mięsna“ (r. 1954 č. 3) s názvom „Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku“].

| 2. | Bravčové mäso:
  Obsah medzisvalového tuku v mäse ošípaných chovaných na výrobu klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ musí byť viac ako 3 %, t.j. mäso musí byť „mramorované“, aby výrobok získal požadovanú jemnosť, šťavnatosť, ako aj svoju vynikajúcu chuť. Použitie takéhoto mäsa má rozhodujúci vplyv na kvalitu a špecifický charakter hotového výrobku a je v súlade s tradičnou metódou výroby. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bravčové mäso:

Obsah medzisvalového tuku v mäse ošípaných chovaných na výrobu klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ musí byť viac ako 3 %, t.j. mäso musí byť „mramorované“, aby výrobok získal požadovanú jemnosť, šťavnatosť, ako aj svoju vynikajúcu chuť. Použitie takéhoto mäsa má rozhodujúci vplyv na kvalitu a špecifický charakter hotového výrobku a je v súlade s tradičnou metódou výroby.

Tradičná metóda výroby a zloženie

Údenie je spôsob konzervácie mäsa a najrozšírenejšou metódou údenia bolo údenie borievkovým dymom, ktoré je zaznamenaná už v starých poľských rukopisoch, ako napr. poznámkach anonymného správcu šľachtického sídla z 80. rokov 18. stor., v ktorých sa nachádzajú recepty na spracovanie mäsa (AGAD Warsaw, „Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego“, signatúra 1249). O obľube údenia mäsa borievkovým dymom sa dočítame aj v diele poľského národného barda Adama Mickiewicza, ktorý v epose „Pán Tadeáš“ z roku 1834 opisuje raňajky v šľachtickom sídle takto: „nakrájaný jazyk a šunka – všetko vynikajúce, podomácky vyrobené, v komíne zaúdené borievkovým dymom.“

Tradícia dochucovania a údenia mäsa s použitím borievok sa pestovala v miestnych a regionálnych obmenách nielen odlišných technológií, ale niekedy aj s použitím iných druhov mäsa. Ako uvádza W. Łęg v spise „Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin“, [„Gospodarka Mięsna“ (r. 1953, č. 6)], pri výrobe klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ sa experimentovalo aj s divinou (zajačie alebo diviačie mäso s pridaním bravčového mäsa). Tieto klobásky mali inú chuť, ale receptúra (prešpikovanie a údenie borievkami) bola vo svojej podstate všade rovnaká. Odborník na mäsový priemysel, ktorý cestoval po regióne Kurpie, sa o regionálnej podobe klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ v článku o regionálnych špecialitách – mäsových výrobkoch, uverejnenom v časopise „Gospodarka Mięsna“ (r. 1950, č. 7 – 8), vyjadril nasledovne: „Klobáska z Myszyniec v regióne Kurpie zaúdená borievkovým dymom a obsahujúca zrnká borievok. Suchá, vynikajúca charakteristická vôňa a chuť.“

Po roku 1945 sa Poľsko v súlade s doktrínou centrálneho plánovania rozhodlo vybudovať mäsový priemysel založený na veľkých spracovateľských závodoch. S cieľom zlepšiť kvalitu a chuť bola zavedená štandardizácia výrobkov a technológií založených na tradičných receptúrach. „Kiełbasa jałowcowa“ sa ako názov výrobku prvýkrát objavuje v normách na reguláciu obchodu s potravinami z rokov 1947 a 1948. V roku 1954 bola pre klobásku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ vypracovaná jednotná norma, z ktorej sa neskôr vypracovala norma Centrály pre mäsový priemysel z roku 1964 (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Warszawa 1964), z ktorej vychádza predložená žiadosť.

Tieto normy boli vypracované s cieľom zaručiť najvyššiu možnú kvalitu výrobku „kiełbasa jałowcowa“. Hoci norma, z ktorej vychádza táto žiadosť, už nie je záväzná, ešte stále predstavuje najvyšší štandard pri výrobe klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“.

3.9.   Minimálne požiadavky a postupy kontroly špecifického charakteru [článok 4 nariadenia (ES) č. 1216/2007]

Vzhľadom na špecifický charakter klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ kontrolám podlieha najmä:

| 1. | Kvalita surovín použitých v rámci procesu výroby (bravčové mäso, koreniny) vrátane:






  — | technologickej vhodnosti mäsa, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Kvalita surovín použitých v rámci procesu výroby (bravčové mäso, koreniny) vrátane:

—

technologickej vhodnosti mäsa,

| — | druhu krmív použitých pri výkrme, |
| --- | --- |

—

druhu krmív použitých pri výkrme,

| — | doby nasolenia, |
| --- | --- |

—

doby nasolenia,

| — | korenín použitých počas procesu výroby klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ a pomeru, v ktorom sa používajú. |
| --- | --- |

—

korenín použitých počas procesu výroby klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“ a pomeru, v ktorom sa používajú.

| 2. | Proces údenia klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“
  Počas kontroly je potrebné preveriť:






  — | zachovanie teploty pri tradičnom údení horúcim dymom a teploty pri ďalšom tepelnom pôsobení, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Proces údenia klobásky „kiełbasa jałowcowa“

Počas kontroly je potrebné preveriť:

—

zachovanie teploty pri tradičnom údení horúcim dymom a teploty pri ďalšom tepelnom pôsobení,

| — | zachovanie doby a teploty pri opakovanom údení studeným dymom, |
| --- | --- |

—

zachovanie doby a teploty pri opakovanom údení studeným dymom,

| — | použitie bukových hoblín a borievkových vetvičiek pri údení studeným dymom. |
| --- | --- |

—

použitie bukových hoblín a borievkových vetvičiek pri údení studeným dymom.

| 3. | Kvalita hotového výrobku:






  — | obsah bielkovín, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Kvalita hotového výrobku:

—

obsah bielkovín,

| — | obsah vody, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah vody,

| — | obsah tuku, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah tuku,

| — | obsah chloridu sodného, |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah chloridu sodného,

| — | obsah dusičnanov (III) a (V), |
| --- | --- |

—

obsah dusičnanov (III) a (V),

| — | chuť a vôňa. |
| --- | --- |

—

chuť a vôňa.

| 4. | Tvar výrobku |
| --- | --- |

4.

Tvar výrobku

Frekvencia kontrol

Kontroly vo vyššie uvedených fázach výroby sa vykonávajú raz za dva mesiace. Pri riadnom priebehu všetkých fáz výroby sa môže frekvencia kontrol znížiť na dve kontroly ročne.

V prípade výskytu nezrovnalostí v rámci ktorejkoľvek fázy výroby sa frekvencia kontrol v rámci danej fázy zvýši (na jednu kontrolu za dva mesiace). Kontroly v rámci ostatných fáz výroby je naďalej možné vykonávať raz za šesť mesiacov.

4.   Úrady alebo orgány overujúce dodržiavanie špecifikácie výrobku:

4.1.   Názov a adresa:

Názov: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Adresa:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

E-mail: —

Imageverejný  súkromný

4.2.   Osobitné úlohy úradu alebo orgánu:

Vyššie uvedený orgán nesie zodpovednosť za kontroly celej špecifikácie.

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