Filed 9/19/23 In re J.M. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re J.M., a Person Coming Under the

Juvenile Court Law.

___________________________________

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

L.M. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants,

 D081937

 (Super. Ct. No. J521007)

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part. 

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant, L.M. 

Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant, C.M. 

Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy 

County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent. 
2

The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) 

filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, 

subdivision (c) on behalf of then 10-year-old J.M. based on J.M.’s aggressive 

behavior and the parents’ unwillingness to provide mental health treatment. 

Although court-appointed counsel represented Mother, she filed numerous 

motions in propria persona. In March 2023, Mother filed a request asking to 

represent herself. At a hearing on April 11, 2023, the juvenile court found 

J.M.’s proceedings would be significantly delayed if it granted Mother’s

request for self-representation. Mother appeals from this order and C.M. 

(Father) joins her arguments.2 We affirm. 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code. 

2 Mother filed three notices of appeal. The first, filed in propria persona, 

is from the March 16, 2023, order and several other orders made by the 

juvenile court. The second, filed by Mother’s trial counsel, challenged the 

order denying Mother’s request for self-representation and several other 

orders. Mother filed a third notice of appeal, in propria persona, also 

challenging the order denying her request for self-representation. Mother’s 

opening brief is limited to the order denying her request for selfrepresentation. Accordingly, we treat the appeal from the other orders listed 

in her notices of appeal as forfeited and do not consider them. (In re Adrian 

L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1 [although notice of appeal included 

appeal from order denying section 388 petition, parent forfeited any claim of 

error where opening brief presented no argument on that issue].) 

Father filed an opening brief joining Mother’s arguments. The Agency 

submits we lack jurisdiction to consider Father’s appeal because he did not 

include the April 11, 2023, hearing or the juvenile court’s order denying 

Mother’s request for self-representation in his notice of appeal. While we 

must liberally construe a notice of appeal (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 

70, 75; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3), this policy does not apply where 

the notice of appeal “ ‘is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment 

or order not mentioned at all.’ ” (In re J.F., at p. 76.) Here, Father’s notice of 

appeal does not mention the April 11, 2023, hearing or the juvenile court’s 

order denying Mother’s request for self-representation. We cannot liberally 
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

On March 28, 2022,4 Father called the police after J.M. assaulted him 

and Mother in the family vehicle. J.M. was hospitalized on a section 5150 

hold. After J.M.’s hospitalization, the Agency detained J.M. in a foster home 

because J.M. did not wish to have contact with either parent. On April 12, 

the Agency filed the petition on J.M.’s behalf and the detention hearing took 

place on April 13 and 14. On April 13, the juvenile court appointed counsel 

for the parents and J.M., took temporary emergency jurisdiction under the 

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and 

continued the matter for one day. 

The following day, Mother expressed her belief that Missouri was 

J.M.’s home state under the UCCJEA and both parents claimed Native 

American ancestry. The court continued emergency jurisdiction under the 

UCCJEA and endorsed a request by the Agency that the parents provide the 

Agency with information for relatives who may have information about their 

Native American heritage. It also ordered the parents to create a timeline 

from and after the time Missouri issued custody orders until the filing of 

J.M.’s petition. The court suspended visits between J.M. and the parents, 

ordered voluntary services for the parents, found J.M.’s petition met prima 

facie requirements, and ordered J.M. detained from parental custody. 

construe Father’s notice to apply to a different, omitted order. (Ibid.) 

Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s appeal. 

3 Because our discussion addresses Mother’s conduct during this 

dependency proceeding, in the interest of brevity, we omit mention of her 

conduct here and instead provide an outline of the proceedings leading to 

Mother’s request for self-representation. 

4 Undesignated date references are to 2022. 
4

At the May 5 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Mother claimed her 

father lived on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan and she was registered 

with the Chippewa and Choctaw tribes. The juvenile court again ordered the 

parents to provide a timeline addressing where the family lived during the 

six months preceding the dependency action. At the continued

jurisdiction/disposition hearing on May 23, Mother was not present. The 

Agency indicated it never received a timeline from the parents with Mother’s 

counsel representing that Mother had provided the information to the Agency 

on “numerous occasions.” Based on its inquiry with two other states, the 

juvenile court determined California was J.M.’s home state and retained 

exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 

At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on October 21, the 

juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent and scheduled a disposition hearing. 

At the contested disposition hearing on November 10, the court confirmed its 

receipt of Mother’s five motions and a motion from Mother’s counsel to 

appoint new counsel. The court conducted a hearing under People v. Marsden

(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, granted Mother’s motion to withdraw her counsel, and 

continued the hearing to appoint new counsel. The juvenile court appointed 

Mother new counsel at a special hearing on November 16. 

At a pretrial status conference in early February 2023, Mother’s new 

counsel asked to set aside the court’s true finding due to inadequate 

representation by Mother’s former counsel. She set several dispositional 

issues for trial, and asked the court to remove social worker Miller from the 

case. At a pretrial status conference in late February 2023, the juvenile court 

denied Mother’s requests to set aside the true finding and to remove Miller 

from the case. 
5

At the March 16, 2023, contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court 

removed J.M. from parental custody, ordered that J.M. be placed in a shortterm residential therapeutic program or foster home, found the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply without prejudice, and ordered 

reunification services for the parents. On March 27, 2023, Mother filed a 

request that the juvenile court relieve her appointed counsel and allow her to 

represent herself. On April 11, 2023, the court denied Mother’s request for 

self-representation finding while Mother was not disruptive, granting her 

request would cause significant delays. The court noted Mother “has not 

complied with all of the court’s orders since the outset of this case” and 

“repeatedly attempted to file her own motions with this court, which this 

court has then provided and turned over to counsel in order to allow counsel 

to determine how to legally proceed in this case and in order to prevent 

further delays.” 

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her request for 

self-representation, arguing her motions caused no delay, she displayed the 

ability to understand the proceedings, and her failure to follow court orders 

related to the ICWA and the UCCJEA were not solely her fault and did not 

impact the proceedings. She claims the juvenile court erroneously relied on 

In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914 and that the matter is more analogous 

to In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074 (Angel W.). As we will explain, 

substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, which in turn fully 

justifies the refusal to permit Mother to represent herself. 

While there is no constitutional right to self-representation in 

dependency proceedings, a parent has a statutory right to self-representation 
6

under section 317.5 (Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082–1084.) A 

parent’s right to self-representation, however, must be balanced against the 

rights of other parties, such as the child’s right to prompt resolution of his or 

her custody status. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) “[T]he 

juvenile court has discretion to deny the request for self-representation when 

it is reasonably probable that granting the request would impair the child’s 

right to a prompt resolution of custody status or unduly disrupt the 

proceedings. A parent’s disruptive behavior may be sufficient to deny a 

request for self-representation, but it is not necessary. If it is reasonably 

probable that granting a parent’s request for self-representation will lead to 

undue delay in the proceedings that would impair the child’s right to a 

prompt resolution of custody, the juvenile court has discretion to deny the 

request regardless whether the parent has ever behaved disruptively.” (Id. at 

pp. 925–926.) 

As a preliminary matter, we reject Mother’s argument that this matter 

is analogous to Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1074. In Angel W. the 

juvenile court denied the parent’s request to represent herself, citing 

concerns the parent might disrupt the courtroom proceedings. (Id. at 

p. 1084.) The appellate court acknowledged the validity of this concern but 

cautioned that “[t]he possibility of disruption or delay . . . exists to some 

degree with virtually all pro se litigants and the mere possibility alone is not 

a sufficient ground to deny self-representation.” (Id. at p. 1085.) In In re 

A.M., the reviewing court was not confronted with a disruptive parent but 

with a parent who had sought multiple continuances of a contested 

5 Section 317, subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an 

indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case “unless the court 

finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver 

of counsel as provided in this section.” 
7

jurisdiction/disposition hearing when he first sought to represent himself. (In 

re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) As the In re A.M. court explained, 

Angel W. considered the scope of a juvenile court’s discretion to deny a 

parent’s request for self-representation only in the context of a potentially 

disruptive parent. (In re A.M., at p. 924.) 

Unlike the parent in Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, the juvenile 

court found Mother did not disrupt the proceedings. Accordingly, Mother’s 

reliance on Angel W. is misplaced. Rather, the juvenile court anticipated that 

granting Mother’s request for self-representation would cause significant 

delays. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion. 

Mother filed her request for self-representation on March 27, 2023, 

nearly one year after initiation of the dependency proceedings. At that time, 

the 12-month review hearing was not scheduled until September 11, 2023, 

over seven months later. As the juvenile court impliedly recognized, even 

with counsel, Mother’s general behavior caused part of the delay in these 

proceedings. As we will detail, Mother’s conduct throughout the proceedings 

revealed she was not equipped to represent herself and allowing her to do so 

would likely result in undue delay in the proceedings. 

First, Mother failed to comply with the court’s orders related to 

resolving ICWA and UCCJEA issues. At the outset of this proceeding Mother 

claimed the State of Missouri had granted her custody of J.M., creating an 

issue whether the State of California had jurisdiction. Thus, at the April 14 

continued detention hearing, the court maintained emergency predicate 

jurisdiction and ordered the parents to create a timeline from and after the 

time Missouri issued custody orders until the filing of J.M.’s petition. The 

parents failed to do so which required the court at the May 5 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing to again ask them to provide a timeline 
8

addressing where the family lived during the six months preceding the

dependency action. This lack of information required the court to continue 

the hearing for UCCJEA and case plan purposes. 

At the continued jurisdiction/disposition hearing on May 23, Mother did 

not appear. Mother’s counsel expressed concern about proceeding “without 

the Court first providing us with the fact that we are able to actually proceed 

pursuant to the UCCJEA.” The court noted on the record its communications 

with judicial officers in other jurisdictions and expressed the belief it had 

jurisdiction. When counsel for the Agency reminded the court that it had 

twice ordered the parents to provide information about where the family 

resided during the six months preceding the filing of J.M.’s petition, Mother’s 

counsel replied, “According to the mother, she’s provided that to the Agency 

on numerous occasions.” The court stated it had reviewed all the emails 

Mother sent to the Agency and it did not locate an outline of where Mother 

had resided for the last six months. Two social workers informed counsel for 

the Agency that Mother never provided this information. After Father 

provided an address where J.M. had been living in Missouri before the 

dependency proceeding, the court made a finding that it had jurisdiction over 

the matter because it had already contacted a judicial officer from that 

location who denied jurisdiction over the child. Mother’s failure to comply 

with the court’s order to provide a timeline resulted in a one month delay in

resolving this jurisdictional issue. 

The court encountered similar problems obtaining information from 

Mother regarding the ICWA. At the April 14 continued detention hearing

Mother claimed Choctaw and Chippewa ancestry and the court ordered her to 

fill out the appropriate ICWA documents. At the May 5 hearing, Mother 

claimed she was registered with the Chippewa and Choctaw tribes and her 
9

father lived on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan and was on “the high 

council.” When the court attempted to conduct ICWA inquiry with her, 

Mother was nonresponsive and complained about “20 different people emailing me asking me for the same information over and over again.” The 

court ordered Mother to complete the ICWA-030 form. When the court asked 

Mother to stop interrupting, she hung up. 

At the May 23 hearing, the Agency represented it was working on 

converting the ICWA-030 form into plain text for Mother based on her visual 

impairment. At the July 18 hearing, Mother’s counsel stated Mother had not 

yet received the ICWA-030 form in an accessible format and Mother could not 

fill out the form until that occurred. Counsel for the Agency replied that

Mother was provided the ICWA-030 form in plain text format and informed 

her counsel that if further accommodation was necessary the Agency could 

review the form over the phone with Mother but Mother refused to speak to 

the social worker. When the court questioned whether plain text format

comported with the ADA, counsel for the Agency represented it did and noted 

“Mother receives emails in plain texts, including reports, and she responds to 

every email very quickly.”6 The court again ordered Mother to complete the 

ICWA-030 form and stated an Agency social worker was available to assist 

her. As of the writing of the July 18 addendum report, Mother had still not 

completed the ICWA-030 form. At the July 18, pretrial status conference the 

court ordered the parents’ counsel to assist with the ICWA inquiry and 

6 Mother’s ability to read documents in plain text format is documented 

in the record. For example, the social worker sent Mother responses received 

from the tribes in plain text format via email with Mother responding eight 

minutes later claiming, among other things, her identity had been changed in 

federal court, her registration with her tribe was sealed by the court, and her 

father was on the tribal high council but failing to provide his name or how to 

reach him. 
10

complete the ICWA-030 form. There is no ICWA-030 form in the record, 

suggesting even Mother’s counsel had no success in resolving this 

outstanding issue. Ultimately, the Agency received responses from 15 

Cherokee, Choctaw or Chippewa tribes denying any tribal affiliation. At the 

March 16, 2023, hearing the court found without prejudice the ICWA did not 

apply. 

Mother’s unwillingness to comply with court orders was not isolated to 

issues pertaining to the ICWA and the UCCJEA. On November 16, the 

juvenile court denied the parents’ request for unsupervised contact.

Although Mother did not appear for this hearing, she was aware of the denial 

because she filed a pro per motion the following day attempting to appeal it.

At a hearing on February 7, 2023, the juvenile court reminded Mother not to 

discuss the case or expansion of visitation with J.M. during their supervised 

visits because this caused behavioral issues and setbacks for J.M. However, 

in an email sent to the social worker, her counsel, and others the following 

week, Mother falsely told J.M. the court had ordered overnight and 60 day 

visits as part of the reunification plan. 

In addition to failing to comply with court orders, Mother proved to be 

an inaccurate historian. At the outset of the proceeding, a physician 

informed the Agency that Mother initially stated J.M. was born in Missouri 

but then said she moved back to California just before J.M. was born. Later 

in the proceeding, Mother informed J.M.’s case manager that J.M. had 

cardiac issues but the Agency previously had J.M. undergo two cardiology 

evaluations which ruled out any cardiac issues. Mother also reported that 

J.M. previously used insulin which J.M. denied. The social worker expressed 

concern that the parents have refused to provide J.M.’s full medical history or 

provide signed releases to ensure J.M.’s medical needs were met. 
11

Mother also consistently exhibited difficulty working with the Agency 

and the court. At the continued detention hearing on April 14, Mother 

appeared telephonically. Toward the end of the hearing, the juvenile court 

allowed her to make a brief statement. Mother did so, claiming the Agency 

was using the dependency proceeding “as a means of retaliation for a civil 

rights complaint and federal lawsuits that I have pending against the 

County.” She claimed discrimination, she was a professional social worker 

who did not need parenting classes, and had no history of violence or mental 

illness. When the court interrupted Mother, she responded, “You are 

preventing me from speaking. I feel like you are preventing me from having 

due process. I have nothing else to say. You interrupted me. I would like to 

finish my statement, but if you will not allow it, that’s fine. I will have 

judicial review in U.S. District Court.” Mother then hung up. 

From April 15 to May 5, Mother sent “at least” 50 emails, totaling 

approximately 200 pages, to social worker Miller. Among other things, her

emails accused the Agency of removing J.M. under false pretenses, expressed

her belief the Agency violated her rights, and informing Miller she had 

lawsuits pending against the Agency. For example, on April 22 Miller sent 

the parents an email requesting basic information, such as their current 

address, prior addresses, extended family information, whether they suffered 

from any disabilities, where they would like J.M. placed, and their 

willingness to participate in services. Mother responded about 90 minutes 

later, claiming she was advised by her federal attorney “ ‘not to answer most 

of those questions as they are an invasion of my privacy and the charges 

against me or unfounded I believe that the child protective services 

procedures are being used to conduct an investigation that San Diego 
12

[H]ealth and [H]uman [S]ervices would not otherwise be able to complete 

because I have a pending federal lawsuit against your agency.’ ” 

On May 12, Mother participated in a child and family team (CFT) 

meeting telephonically. She initially participated, but then expressed 

frustration and disconnected stating the meeting was taking too long and her 

phone was about to die. When the social worker asked Mother to participate 

in a subsequent meeting, she responded via email with anger and 

accusations. She declined to participate in another CFT meeting, stating, “I 

will not be participating in any more meetings with you I made that clear on 

[sic] the letter to you and your supervisor yesterday no more verbal 

communication in any form for any reason outside of court which is 

documented by a court reporter.” 

Finally, Mother filed numerous motions or ex parte requests in pro per 

despite being represented by counsel. On June 6, Mother filed a motion 

claiming violation of the UCCJEA and asking the court “to reverse its rulings 

on this matter and to reverse the change in custody jurisdiction and return 

her child immediately.” On November 9, Mother filed two motions in pro per 

“for injunction to stop Lynette Miller and San Diego Health & Human 

Services from imposing stipulations outside of the court order or using the 

child visitation to barter and force services on parents” and for appointment 

of new counsel and to appeal the court’s findings made on October 21. On 

November 10, Mother filed another motion in pro per for appointment of new 

counsel and to appeal the court’s findings made on October 21. Mother, 

either alone or with Father, then filed an additional 14 motions or ex parte 

requests from November 2022 to March 2023. 

Before denying Mother’s request for self-representation the court 

explained it turned over the motions Mother filed in pro per to Mother’s 
13

counsel to determine how to legally proceed and prevent further delays. Our 

review of these motions and Mother’s emails showed long and rambling 

communications addressing tangential issues or issues with institutions and 

agencies unrelated to the case. “A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of 

future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) Here, the 

juvenile court could have reasonably concluded Mother would continue to file 

motions and ex parte requests that lacked focused and cogent arguments and 

the absence of counsel to review future filings would result in delays while 

the court reviewed them. The court could have also reasonably concluded 

Mother’s general inability to work with the Agency would be amplified if 

Mother represented herself and lead to significant delays in resolving the 

dependency proceeding. Because the record contains substantial evidence 

that, to a reasonable probability, granting Mother’s request for selfrepresentation would impair J.M.’s right to a prompt resolution of custody 

status, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion when it 

denied Mother’s request. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925–926.) 
14

DISPOSITION

The April 11, 2023, order denying Mother’s request to represent herself is 

affirmed. Father’s appeal is dismissed. 

CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.