United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

T.V., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Bakersfield, CA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 17-0581 

Issued: June 13, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Sally F. LaMacchia, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On January 19, 2017 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a July 29, 

2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

 2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish a recurrence of 

her medical condition beginning in December 2015 causally related to her accepted employment 

injury. 

On appeal, counsel contends that OWCP improperly terminated appellant’s authorization 

for medical benefits without establishing that she no longer had residuals of her work injury. 

She asserts that its action in administratively closing cases was a method for terminating medical 

benefits. Counsel cites to Sandra Jones,

3

 and contends that OWCP erred in placing the burden 

of proof on appellant to file a notice of recurrence (Form CA-2a) to establish her entitlement to 

continuing medical treatment. She further cites to Samuel D. Harrell, Jr.,4 and contends that 

administrative closure of a case by OWCP does not shift the burden of proof to appellant. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On September 13, 1999 appellant, then a 62-year-old maintenance mechanic, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that on August 30, 1999 she first became 

aware of her knee pain and realized that her condition was caused or aggravated by factors of her 

federal employment. She stopped work on August 30, 1999. 

In an undated narrative statement, appellant attributed her claimed knee injury to entering 

and exiting a vehicle approximately 30 to 50 times a day at work. 

In an October 5, 1999 medical report, Dr. Vahdatyar Amirpour, an attending orthopedic 

surgeon, noted a history of the accepted work injury and discussed diagnostic test results. He 

provided an impression of recovering right knee sprain. Dr. Amirpour released appellant to 

return to work on October 11, 1999 and recommended that she wear a knee brace at work for 

another month. He instructed her to return as needed. In a physician’s statement dated 

October 11, 1999, Dr. Amirpour restated his opinion on appellant’s work capacity and her work 

restriction. 

On October 7, 1999 OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for right knee sprain. 

In an October 12, 1999 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), Dr. Amirpour 

indicated a date of injury as August 30, 1999 and reiterated his diagnosis of right knee sprain. 

He indicated by checking a box marked “yes” that the diagnosed condition was caused or 

aggravated by an employment activity. Dr. Amirpour further indicated that he advised appellant 

on October 5, 1999 to resume her regular work as of October 11, 1999. He noted that she must 

wear a knee brace for three weeks. 

Appellant returned to work on October 14, 1999. 

 3

 Docket No. 05-1562 (issued March 7, 2006). 

4

 Docket No. 01-1711 (issued March 21, 2002). 
3

Doctor’s supplemental reports dated September 5, 2000 bearing an unknown signature 

noted that appellant was seen on September 2 and 7, 1999. These reports discussed her right 

knee symptoms and provided a diagnosis of sprain versus torn meniscus of the right knee. 

The claim was essentially dormant until 2008 when counsel requested a copy of the claim 

file. OWCP provided the requested copy on March 2, 2009. Thereafter, the claim was inactive 

until late 2015. 

In a December 4, 2015 letter, counsel on behalf of appellant, requested that OWCP 

reopen appellant’s claim for medical care only to examine her right knee. She noted that the 

claim was retired on April 13, 2006 and requested an explanation for such action. 

In a December 21, 2015 response to Ms. Rivas’ December 4, 2015 letter, OWCP advised 

appellant to file a notice of recurrence (Form CA-2a) so that a claim may be formally reviewed 

for an additional request for medical treatment. 

In a letter dated January 28, 2016, Ms. Rivas refused to file a Form CA-2a. She cited 

Board precedent and OWCP regulations and contended that requiring appellant to file a claim for 

recurrence was contrary to law. By letter dated May 2, 2016, Ms. Rivas requested that the Civil 

Rights Center of the Department of Labor investigate OWCP’s denial of appellant’s access to 

FECA benefits. 

OWCP retrieved appellant’s case record from the Federal Records Center and by letter 

dated May 20, 2016, it informed her that a recurrence for medical treatment only was defined as 

a documented need for additional medical treatment after a release from treatment of the workrelated injury, or after not receiving care for a significant period of time including circumstances 

when there had been a significant gap in treatment for the work-related injury. It also informed 

appellant that to establish a recurrence she must provide evidence to support that her need for 

treatment was due to a worsening of the accepted work-related condition without intervening 

cause. OWCP noted that, based on the medical records on file, she was released from medical 

care for her work-related condition on October 5, 1999 by Dr. Amirpour. It advised appellant 

that the evidence submitted was insufficient to establish her claim and requested that she provide 

additional factual and medical evidence, including a physician’s rationalized medical opinion 

explaining how her current medical condition was due to a worsening of her accepted workrelated condition without intervening cause. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit the 

requested information. 

In letters dated May 27 and June 15, 2016, counsel reiterated that OWCP had improperly 

denied appellant access to FECA benefits. She noted that she did not receive the May 20, 2016 

development letter. Counsel requested a copy of this letter and Dr. Amirpour’s October 5, 1999 

report. 

On June 24, 2016 OWCP resent the May 20, 2016 recurrence development letter to 

appellant’s counsel. No additional medical evidence was subsequently received. 

In a July 29, 2016 decision, OWCP found that appellant had not established a recurrence 

of a medical condition commencing in December 2015. It noted that she last received medical 

treatment for her work injury on October 12, 1999. 
4

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

The United States shall furnish to an employee who is injured while in the performance 

of duty the services, appliances, and supplies prescribed or recommended by a qualified 

physician that the Secretary of Labor considers likely to cure, give relief, reduce the degree or 

the period of any disability, or aid in lessening the amount of any monthly compensation.5

A recurrence of a medical condition means a documented need for further medical 

treatment after release from treatment for the accepted condition or injury when there is no 

accompanying work stoppage. Continuous treatment for the original condition or injury is not 

considered a need for further medical treatment after release from treatment, nor is an 

examination without treatment.6

If a claim for recurrence of medical condition is made more than 90 days after release 

from medical care, a claimant is responsible for submitting a medical report supporting causal 

relationship between the employee’s current condition and the original injury in order to meet his 

or her burden of proof.7

ANALYSIS 

OWCP accepted that appellant sustained a right knee sprain causally related to factors of 

her federal employment. On October 12, 1999 in the most recent medical report of record, 

Dr. Amirpour diagnosed work-related right knee sprain and noted that on October 5, 1999 he 

released appellant to resume her regular work as of October 11, 1999 and required her to wear a 

right knee brace for three weeks. Appellant returned to work on October 14, 1999. 

On December 4, 2015 appellant requested that OWCP reopen her claim for medical 

examination of her right knee. In a May 20, 2016 development letter, OWCP requested that she 

file a notice of an employment-related recurrence of a medical condition (Form CA-2a) and 

submit supporting medical evidence within 30 days. As more than 90 days had passed since 

appellant’s release from medical care, she had the responsibility to submit an attending 

physician’s report containing a description of the objective findings and supporting causal 

relationship between her current condition and the previously accepted work injury.8

 Appellant 

has not submitted such evidence as requested and thus, the Board finds that she has not met her 

burden of proof to establish her claim.9

 5

 5 U.S.C. § 8103(a). 

6

 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(y). 

7

 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Recurrences, Chapter 2.1500.4(b) (June 2013); see also

J.M., Docket No. 09-2041 (issued May 6, 2010). 

8 Id. 

9 See J.F., 58 ECAB 124 (2006). 
5

On appeal, counsel contends that OWCP improperly terminated appellant’s authorization 

for medical benefits without establishing that she no longer had residuals of her work injury. 

She asserts that its action in administratively closing cases was a method for terminating medical 

benefits. The Board notes, however, that OWCP did not terminate medical benefits for the 

accepted work-related right knee sprain, but instead found that appellant was not entitled to 

medical benefits due to a recurrence of a medical condition. OWCP denied appellant’s request 

for medical coverage based on her failure to submit an attending physician’s report supporting a 

causal relationship between the need for further medical treatment commencing in 

December 2015 and the previously accepted work injury.10

Counsel maintains on appeal that the Board’s findings in Sandra Jones11 and Samuel D. 

Harrell, Jr.

12 Support her contention that OWCP erred in placing the burden of proof on 

appellant to establish her entitlement to continuing medical treatment. The issue in Jones, 

however, was whether OWCP abused its discretion in denying a request to change treating 

physicians without appellant establishing a recurrence of a medical condition. Further, the 

preliminary issue in Harrell was whether OWCP’s notice to administratively close appellant’s 

claim constituted a final adverse decision denying her claim for a greater schedule award for 

bilateral lower extremity impairment. The issue in the present case is whether appellant has 

established a need for further medical treatment due to a recurrence of her accepted work injury. 

The issue is medical in nature and can only be resolved through the submission of probative 

medical evidence from a physician.13 As discussed above, appellant has not submitted any 

medical evidence in support of her recurrence claim. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128 and 

20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish a 

recurrence of her medical condition beginning in December 2015 causally related to her accepted 

employment injury. 

 10 Id.

11 Supra note 3. 

12 Supra note 4. 

13 Gloria J. McPherson, 51 ECAB 441 (2000); L.G., Docket No. 09-1517 (issued March 3, 2010). 
6

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the July 29, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: June 13, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board