COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 23, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP2282 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV102

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN EX REL. KATHLEEN K. NAVIS,

TERRANCE BRANDNER, MARK MOEDE, HOLLY HEBEL,

WILLIAM SCHUTTE, DONNA SCHUTTE, DONALD R. JERVIS,

DANIEL J. MEUNIER, ANTOINETTE CHRISTENSON, GENE R. BADEAU,

EDMUND V. SCHMIDT AND THOMAS RONDEAU,

 PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS,

 V.

DOOR COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, CARY LAURITZEN 

AND CHERIE LAURITZEN,

 RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Door County: 

DAVID L. WEBER, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
No. 2019AP2282

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Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Kathleen Navis, Terrance Brandner, Mark Moede, 

Holly Hebel, William Schutte, Donna Schutte, Donald Jervis, Daniel Meunier, 

Antoinette Christenson, Gene Badeau, Edmund Schmidt and Thomas Rondeau

(collectively, Navis) appeal from a circuit order that affirmed the grant of a 

conditional use permit to Cary and Cherie Lauritzen by the Door County Board of 

Adjustment (the Board). We affirm upon the limited issues available under 

certiorari review.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The Lauritzens applied for a conditional use permit to develop and 

operate a recreational vehicle campground upon a vacant 21.2-acre parcel of 

farmland. The proposed development would have 130 campsites; a two-story 

check-in building containing a store, bathroom, shower and laundry facility; and 

another building with additional showers and bathrooms. 

¶3 The Door County Resource Planning Committee (the Committee) 

held a public hearing to consider the permit application. The Committee granted 

the permit subject to sixteen conditions. Over 100 area residents and property 

owners appealed the Committee’s decision to the Board. 

¶4 The Board held a hearing at which objectors raised concerns 

about: (1) adverse effects of the proposed development on property values; 

(2) conflict with nearby residential use from noise, dust, and campfire smoke; 

(3) groundwater contamination from the high-volume septic system; (4) traffic 

concerns relating to speed, visibility and congestion; (5) safety of pedestrians and 
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bicyclists traveling between the campground and town; and (6) changing the

character of the neighborhood from a quiet area to a tourist destination. The 

Board denied the appeal, but it modified the permit to include a total of 

twenty-three conditions.

¶5 Navis next filed an action in the circuit court, seeking review of the 

Board’s decision pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 59.694(10) (2019-20). The court 

remanded the matter to the Board to answer two questions relating to the traffic 

safety conditions in the permit. In response, the Board modified two of the permit 

conditions. The court then issued a final order affirming the Board’s approval of 

the modified permit. 

¶6 Navis now appeals the circuit court’s decision. She

contends: (1) DOOR COUNTY, WI, COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE

§ 11.04(5)(b) (Sept. 22, 2020) (the Ordinance),

1

establishes minimum criteria an 

applicant must demonstrate in order to obtain a conditional use permit;

(2) applicants carry the burden of proof on all of the criteria set forth in 

§ 11.04(5)(b); (3) the applicants here failed to show the proposed use would not 

adversely affect property values; (4) the applicants failed to show the proposed use 

is similar to, and comparable with, other uses in the area; (5) the applicants failed 

to show the proposed use is consistent with the Door County Comprehensive and 

Farmland Preservation Plan (the Farmland Preservation Plan); and (6) the 

applicants failed to show the proposed use provides safe pedestrian access. Rather 

than summarize the voluminous transcripts and materials submitted to the Board, 

 

1

 The Door County, WI, Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance is available at 

https://www.co.door.wi.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3239/CompZoningOrdinance-1.
No. 2019AP2282

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we will incorporate additional facts relevant to these specific issues in our 

discussion below.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Judicial review of administrative proceedings by statute is akin to 

common law certiorari review. See Williams v. Housing Auth. of the City of 

Milwaukee, 2010 WI App 14, ¶10, 323 Wis. 2d 179, 777 N.W.2d 185 (2009). We 

review the decision of the administrative body rather than that of the circuit court. 

Board of Regents v. Dane Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 2000 WI App 211, ¶10, 238 

Wis. 2d 810, 618 N.W.2d 537. The scope of our review is limited to considering 

whether the administrative body: (1) kept within its jurisdiction; (2) proceeded on 

a correct theory of law; (3) acted in a manner that was not arbitrary, oppressive, or 

unreasonable based upon its will rather than its judgment; and (4) reached a 

reasonable conclusion based upon evidence in the record. Id.

¶8 As to whether an administrative body proceeded on a correct theory 

of law, we will independently determine the proper interpretation of an ordinance. 

Id., ¶11. An administrative body proceeds on a correct theory of law when it 

relies on the applicable ordinances and cases and applies them properly. Edward 

Kraemer & Sons v. Sauk Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 183 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 515 

N.W.2d 256 (1994). As to the demonstration of a rational, nonarbitrary basis for 

judgment, the administrative body’s “reasoning need not be embodied in a written 

decision as long as it is reflected in a transcript of the proceedings.” Lamar Cent. 

Outdoor, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 117, ¶3, 284

Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 87. As to whether the administrative decision was based 

upon evidence in the record, we must examine the record for any substantial 

evidence that supports the administrative body’s determination. Currie v. 
No. 2019AP2282

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DILHR, 210 Wis. 2d 380, 387, 565 N.W.2d 253 (Ct. App. 1997). The substantial 

evidence test does not require a preponderance of the evidence, merely that 

“reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the [administrative 

body]” based on the record before it. Kitten v. DWD, 2002 WI 54, ¶5, 252 

Wis. 2d 561, 644 N.W.2d 649. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the 

administrative body as to the weight or credibility of the evidence on a finding of 

fact. Advance Die Casting Co. v. LIRC, 154 Wis. 2d 239, 249, 453 N.W.2d 487 

(Ct. App. 1989). 

¶9 We will structure our discussion of the six issues Navis raises on 

appeal around the limited questions this court may address on certiorari review. 

We treat Navis’s arguments regarding the minimum criteria and the burden of 

proof for obtaining a conditional use permit as a claim that the Board proceeded 

on an incorrect theory of law. We treat her arguments that four specific criteria 

were not met as a claim that there was not substantial evidence in the record to 

support the Board’s decision to grant the permit.

1. Applicable Law for Obtaining a Conditional Use Permit

¶10 We understand Navis to assert that the Board proceeded on an 

incorrect theory of law by failing to require the Lauritzens to carry the burden of 

proof on all of the specific criteria in the Ordinance for obtaining a conditional use 

permit. In particular, Navis contends the Lauritzens were required to demonstrate 

that the proposed project: (1) would not adversely affect nearby property values; 

(2) was similar to other uses in the area: (3) was consistent with the Farmland 

Preservation Plan; and (4) was safe for pedestrians and bicyclists.

¶11 The Ordinance requires the Committee (and ultimately the reviewing 

Board) to review each permit application for compliance with applicable
No. 2019AP2282

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procedural requirements and to “determine that the proposed use at the proposed 

location will not be contrary to the public interest and will not be detrimental or 

injurious to the public health, public safety and character of the surrounding area.” 

DOOR COUNTY, WI, COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE § 11.04(5)(a). The 

Ordinance continues, in relevant part:

(b) To aid in the review of the proposed project against the 

above criteria, the Resource Planning Committee shall 

evaluate the following specific criteria as applicable, but 

shall not be limited thereto:

1. Whether the proposed project will adversely 

affect property values in the area.

2. Whether the proposed use is similar to other uses 

in the area.

3. Whether the proposed project is consistent with 

the Door County Comprehensive and Farmland 

Preservation Plan or any officially adopted town 

plan.

 ....

8. Provision of safe vehicular and pedestrian 

access.

Id., § 11.04(5)(b). The burden of proof to demonstrate the specific criteria listed 

in subsec. (b) lies with the applicant, and an applicant’s failure to satisfy the 

criteria “may be deemed grounds to deny” the permit. Id., § 11.04(5)(c). In 

addition, the Committee “may, in approving an application for a conditional use 

permit, impose such restrictions and conditions that it determines are required to 

prevent or minimize adverse effects from the proposed use ....” Id., § 11.04(6).

¶12 Navis interprets these provisions as imposing mandatory minimum 

standards for granting a conditional use permit, on which the applicants bear the 

burden of proof. That is to say, Navis contends the provisions collectively require 
No. 2019AP2282

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the Board either to deny a permit application if the applicants fail to satisfy the 

burden of proof on any of the criteria listed in § 11.04(5)(b) of the Ordinance, or to 

at least impose sufficient conditions on the permit to fully satisfy each criterion. 

We agree that the applicants bear the burden of proof on each criterion, but we 

disagree that all of the criteria in subsec. (b) must be fully satisfied before the 

Board may issue a permit.

¶13 We apply the same rules of interpretation to ordinances as we do to 

statutes. Schwegel v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2015 WI 12, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 654, 859 

N.W.2d 78. If the meaning of an ordinance is clear from its plain language, our 

inquiry ends. Vilas Cnty. v. Bowler, 2019 WI App 43, ¶17, 388 Wis. 2d 395, 933 

N.W.2d 120. The language in an ordinance is to be “given its common, ordinary 

and accepted meaning, except that technical or specifically defined words or 

phrases are given those respective meanings.” Id. The language must also be 

interpreted in the context in which it is used, in relation to surrounding or closely 

related provisions, so as to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id.

¶14 In context, it is clear that the specific criteria set forth in 

§ 11.04(5)(b) of the Ordinance are not mandatory minimum requirements that 

must all be satisfied before the Board may issue a conditional use permit. The

Ordinance plainly sets forth two “determin[ations]” the Board must make before 

issuing a conditional use permit: (1) the proposed use at the proposed location 

will not be contrary to the public interest; and (2) the proposed use at the proposed 

location will not be detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety, and 

character of the surrounding area. The additional specific criteria set forth in 

§ 11.04(5)(b) are to “aid” the Board in “evaluat[ing]” whether to make the two 

required determinations.
No. 2019AP2282

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¶15 As a result, an applicant’s failure to carry the burden of proof on any 

particular criterion in § 11.04(5)(b) of the Ordinance is not dispositive of the 

required determinations the Board must make. Rather, such a failure “may” be 

deemed grounds to deny the permit. This language indicates the Board has 

discretion to determine the applicability and weight to give each of the specified 

criteria in making its overall assessments of the impact of the proposed use on the 

public interest and the public health, safety, and welfare of the surrounding area. 

We reject Navis’s contention that the word “may” should be interpreted as 

mandatory because the zoning ordinance explicitly defines it as permissive. DOOR 

COUNTY, WI, COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE § 13.01(5). 

¶16 The fact that the Board is authorized to make conditions to 

“minimize” adverse effects from the proposed use further supports our conclusion 

that the Ordinance does not require an applicant to prove that there would be no 

adverse effects related to any of the criteria before the Board can issue a permit. It 

would be meaningless to give the Board power to minimize adverse effects if an 

applicant were required to prove that there would be no adverse effects relating to 

any of the criteria in the first instance. Moreover, unlike the ordinance at issue in

Edward Kraemer & Sons, the Ordinance here did not limit the Board’s authority 

to attach conditions only to “approved applications” that had already satisfied 

applicable criteria. Cf. Edward Kraemer & Sons, 183 Wis. 2d at 16. Rather, the 

Board is authorized to impose restrictions or conditions “in approving an 

application,” meaning that the conditions may be considered as part of the 

determination as to whether to grant the permit.

¶17 We additionally reject Navis’s argument that any appeal of a 

conditional use permit would be meaningless if none of the criteria in 

§ 11.04(5)(b) of the Ordinance actually need to be satisfied. The Board’s decision 
No. 2019AP2282

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on a conditional use permit is still subject to the requirements that it not be 

arbitrary and that it be supported by substantial evidence in the record.

¶18 In sum, Navis does not dispute that the Board discussed and 

evaluated all of the criteria outlined in § 11.04(5)(b) of the Ordinance—including 

the four specific criteria challenged by Navis on this appeal. The Board then 

imposed twenty-three conditions pursuant to § 11.04(6) all of which it deemed 

necessary to mitigate any adverse effects related to those criteria. Finally, the 

Board determined, as required by § 11.04(5)(a), that the proposed use at the 

proposed location would not be contrary to the public interest and would not be 

detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety, and character of the 

surrounding area. We conclude the Board relied on the relevant ordinances and 

applied them properly, thus proceeding on a correct theory of law.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶19 We next consider whether the evidence before the Board was such 

that reasonable minds could reach the conclusions that the proposed 

campground—subject to the twenty-three conditions imposed by the Board—

would not be contrary to the public interest and would not be detrimental or 

injurious to the public health, safety, and character of the surrounding area. Navis 

does not directly address this question because her arguments are premised on the 

mistaken theory that there needed to be sufficient evidence presented by the 

Lauritzens to show that each and every criterion under § 11.04(5)(b) of the 

Ordinance had been individually and fully satisfied. We will reframe Navis’s 

arguments as a contention that the Board could not reasonably have reached its 

decision in light of evidence supporting her view that the proposed 

campground: (1) would adversely affect property values; (2) was dissimilar to and 
No. 2019AP2282

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incompatible with other uses in the area; (3) was inconsistent with the Farmland 

Preservation Plan; and (4) was unsafe for pedestrians and bicyclists.

A. Property Values

¶20 The Board was presented with conflicting opinions regarding the 

effect that the proposed campground would have on property values.2 On one 

hand, Phyllis Zatlin testified that her daughter, a realtor, had told her the project 

would lower property values. Craig Nelson testified about a study he read that 

found a high concentration of rental properties in an area (which he analogized to 

recreational vehicles renting campground space) decreased residential property 

values by fourteen percent. J.R. Jarosh testified that it was impossible to believe 

the value of adjacent properties would go up, although he did not think property 

values in Jacksonport would drop in the long term. Guy Pustaver testified that he 

could not imagine anyone wanting to purchase a home close to a development that 

can hold upward of 400 people, barking dogs, and vehicles for up to eight months 

of the year. Navis’s lawyer, Matthew Fleming, testified to his belief, based on 

involvement in past cases, that the increased concentration of people, along with 

the smoke and noise, would decrease nearby property values. 

¶21 On the other hand, Elizabeth LeClair testified that her own business, 

a lodge, had also brought increased visitors and traffic to the area, but it had 

resulted in increased property values in the area. Lisa Bley-Bieri, who served on 

the planning commission, testified that she had recently sold several area 

 

2

 The parties do not raise any objections to the hearsay nature of much of the testimony, 

or the lack of foundation or explanation as to the occupations of some of the people testifying or 

testified about. We therefore need not discuss whether the rules of evidence apply to public 

hearings of this nature.
No. 2019AP2282

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properties after disclosing plans for the campground. One of the properties was 

within 1,500 feet of the proposed campground, and a second property was within 

one mile. Bley-Bieri did not believe there had been an adverse effect from the 

proposed campground on her ability to sell the properties, and she noted that no 

one had a crystal ball to show how property values would be affected in the future. 

Randy Halstead testified that Troy Zachariason had told him that the proposed 

campground would absolutely not lower property values based upon the example 

of Monument Point Campground in Egg Harbor. After that campground was 

built, new home construction began all around it. 

¶22 The testimony of LeClair, Bley-Bieri, and Halstead constituted 

substantial evidence upon which the Board was entitled to rely in making its 

decision. Reasonable minds could conclude, based on that testimony, that 

concerns about decreased property values were too speculative to preclude 

determinations that the proposed campground would not be contrary to the public 

interest and would not be detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety, and 

character of the surrounding area.

B. Other Uses in the Area

¶23 The Board was presented with evidence that there were eight other 

campgrounds between four and eight miles from the Lauritzens’ proposed 

campground. Navis argues that the Board should not have considered any of those 

campgrounds as other uses in the area because they were not located in the 

immediate surrounding area of the proposed site. Consistent with the Ordinance, 

however, it was well within the Board’s discretion to determine how wide a 

geographical area to consider in evaluating comparable uses. In addition, the 

Board could appropriately consider the impact other campgrounds had in their 
No. 2019AP2282

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own immediate areas as analogous to how compatible the Lauritzens’ proposed 

campground would be with nearby residential properties.

¶24 Moreover, even if the Board had limited itself to considering the 

properties closest to the proposed site as the appropriate comparison area, it does 

not follow that the lack of other nearby campgrounds would preclude the 

conditional use permit. The fact that a particular use may be dissimilar to other 

uses in the area does not compel the conclusion that it would be incompatible with 

other uses in the area or—more to the point—that it would detrimental to the 

public interest. 

C. Farmland Preservation Plan

¶25 A staff report by Door County Land Use Services stated that the 

proposed site was located within the Town of Jacksonport “Core Area,” but it was 

also designated as “Rural/Agricultural” for future land use under the Farmland 

Preservation Plan. The Core Area designation in the Farmland Preservation Plan

is defined as an area of existing built-up communities and planned expansion areas 

for potential future development. The Farmland Preservation Plan states that areas 

designated as Rural/Agricultural for future land use are not planned for 

nonagricultural use within the next fifteen years. The staff report suggested that 

agricultural and related operations in these areas should be protected by ensuring 

development is at low-density levels.

¶26 It appears that the Farmland Preservation Plan may be internally 

inconsistent, to the extent it designates the property both as part of the Core Area 

and also Rural/Agricultural. That is, the proposed use may be consistent with the 

Plan with respect to appropriate uses for the Core Area, but inconsistent with the 

Plan with respect to appropriate uses for Residential/Agricultural areas. 
No. 2019AP2282

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¶27 We further note that the proposed site is zoned as “Mixed Use 

Commercial” under the Ordinance. See DOOR COUNTY, WI, COMPREHENSIVE 

ZONING ORDINANCE § 2.03(17). Campgrounds are identified as permissible 

conditional uses in Mixed Use Commercial zones. Id., § 2.05(3)(a). The only 

agricultural uses permissible in Mixed Use Commercial zones are farm markets 

and greenhouses. Id. No other agricultural uses, including farming, are allowed 

in Mixed Use Commercial zones. Id.

¶28 We again emphasize that the issue is not whether there was 

sufficient evidence to prove that the proposed campground was consistent with the 

Farmland Preservation Plan. Rather, the issue is whether reasonable minds could 

conclude the proposed campground was not against the public interest, 

notwithstanding evidence that it may have conflicted to some degree with the 

Farmland Preservation Plan. We are satisfied that reasonable minds could reach 

the conclusion that any conflict with the Farmland Preservation Plan was 

insignificant to the public interest, given the internal inconsistency in the Plan and, 

in any event, the fact that the land was not zoned for farming.

D. Safe Pedestrian Access

¶29 The permit application stated that vehicular access to the 

campground would be through an existing driveway connecting to Bagnall Road, 

and that no sidewalks, paths, or other means of pedestrian access would be 

provided. Multiple concerns were expressed during the administrative 

proceedings about the lack of safe pedestrian access to the proposed campground. 

Navis asserts it was “almost universally agreed” due to a variety of factors—

including the speed at which vehicles travel along Bagnall Road, a curve in the 

road reducing visibility near the entrance driveway, and narrow shoulders—that it 
No. 2019AP2282

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would not be safe for pedestrians to walk along Bagnall Road between the 

proposed campsite and downtown Jacksonport. 

¶30 As a result, the Board imposed two conditions relating to vehicular 

and pedestrian safety. First:

The applicants shall submit a written petition to the Town 

of Jacksonport, within 45 days of the issuance of the 

conditional use permit, requesting the Town enact an 

ordinance to enforce the prohibition on making a left turn 

onto Bagnall Road when exiting the campground property. 

If the applicants fail to timely submit the written petition to 

the Town of Jacksonport, the conditional use permit will 

not remain in effect. If the applicants timely submit the 

written petition to the Town of Jacksonport, but the Town 

fails to take substantive action within 12 months of the 

issuance of the conditional use permit, the conditional use 

permit will remain in effect. The applicants must provide 

proof to the Door County Land Use Services Department 

that the written petition was timely submitted.

Second:

The applicants shall submit a written request to the 

Wisconsin Department of Transportation (WisDOT), 

within 45 days of the issuance of the conditional use 

permit, asking the WisDOT to review the proposed 

development and determine whether any improvements 

should be made to increase safety of the Bagnall-Road and 

State Highway 57 intersection. If the applicants fail to 

timely submit the written request to the WisDOT or the 

WisDOT fails to provide a substantive written response 

within 12 months of the issuance of the conditional use 

permit, the conditional use permit will not remain in effect. 

The applicants must provide proof to the Door County 

Land Use Services Department that the written request was 

timely submitted and that the WisDOT timely acted on the 

request. If any improvements are recommended or 

required by the WisDOT, the applicants are responsible for 

implementation/installation of any improvements 

recommended or required by the WisDOT and the 

improvements shall be implemented/installed before the 

campground is open to the public.
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¶31 Reasonable minds could conclude that the access point to the 

campground would be reasonably safe for pedestrians, and not contrary to public 

interest, if it complied with those conditions, including following any directives 

the Wisconsin DOT eventually issued. We conclude that the Board’s decision to 

grant the conditional use permit was supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. Accordingly, we affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5. (2019-20).