alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
STATE of North Carolina v. Frank Durand TOMLIN

No. 532P08-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 24, 2018

Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of NC.

Amanda S. Zimmer, Assistant Appellate Defender, Frank Durand Tomlin, for Tomlin, Frank Durand

***ORDER***

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 10th of July 2018 by Defendant for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 10th of July 2018 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 10th of July 2018 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision *381of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 10th of July 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."
#### In the Matter of Steven Aster, Petitioner, v Glenn S. Goord, as Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services, Respondent..

[719 NYS2d 619]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

As the result of two urinalysis tests, which were positive for opiates, petitioner was charged with using a controlled substance and, after a tier III hearing, he was found guilty of the charge. A review of the record reveals no support for petitioner’s claim that the Hearing Officer was biased and predisposed to finding him guilty *(see, Matter of Nicholas v Schriver,*259 AD2d 863). Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present his arguments *(see, Matter of Vadala v Selsky,*260 AD2d 866) and, at the conclusion of the hearing, he expressed his satisfaction with the manner in which the hearing was conducted, which he described as “pretty fair.” In any event, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the outcome of the hearing flowed from the alleged Hearing Officer bias and not from the substantial evidence of petitioner’s guilt *(see, Matter of Vicioso v Goord,*266 AD2d 655).

Petitioner’s argument that the determination lacks the support of substantial evidence is based upon his claim that he ingested poppy seeds which can cause false positive test results. Although the Hearing Officer apparently misapprehended the scope of this Court’s decision in *Matter of Smith v Coughlin*(191 AD2d 783, *lv denied*82 NY2d 653), his rejection of petitioner’s argument is also based on evidence in the record which contradicted petitioner’s claim that, at about the time of the urinalysis tests, he ate several muffins containing poppy seeds which he had received in a food package. The food package records revealed that petitioner did not receive any muffins during the relevant time period. Further, petitioner conceded in his testimony that food containing poppy seeds was not permitted into the facility and that the remaining muffins in the package, which he produced at the hearing, felt “awfully fresh” for having been received several weeks earlier as he *922claimed. This evidence presented a question of credibility properly resolved by the Hearing Officer *(see, Matter of Russo v Goord,*264 AD2d 889). Accordingly, there is no basis to disturb the determination.

Mercure, J. P., Peters, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4602 

To change the tax status of virtual currencies from property to foreign 

currency 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 7, 2014 

Mr. STOCKMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To change the tax status of virtual currencies from property 

to foreign currency 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Virtual Currency Tax 

5 Reform Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds that classifying virtual currencies as 

8 property subjects users to capital gains tax on any trans9 action using the virtual currency based on any gain or loss 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4602 IH

1 relative to the change in the virtual currency’s value from 

2 the time of purchase. 

3 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 

4 ‘‘Virtual currency’’ is a digital representation of value 

5 that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, 

6 and/or a store of value. 

7 SEC. 4. GENERAL AUTHORIZATION. 

8 The Internal Revenue Service shall treat virtual cur9 rencies as a foreign currency for Federal tax purposes. 

10 SEC. 5. MORATORIUM. 

11 (1) For a period of five years following the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Govern13 ment shall not impose, assess, collect, or attempt to 

14 collect capital gains tax on virtual currencies. 

15 (2) Nothing in this Act shall prevent, impair or 

16 impede the operation of any government agency, au17 thority, or instrumentality, whether of the Federal 

18 Government or of any State or political subdivision 

19 thereof, to enforce currently existing criminal, civil, 

20 or taxation statutes and regulations. 

21 SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

22 The provisions of this Act shall take effect at the be23 ginning of the fiscal year following enactment. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Converted by EDGARwiz


Exhibit 4.15
















CONSENT OF FRANCIS CHARTRAND







Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended February 28, 2013 (the “Annual Report”) of Virginia Mines Inc. (the “Company”), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.




I, Francis Chartrand, participated in the preparation of the following technical reports:




-

“Technical Report and Recommendations, Summer 2012 Exploration Program, Anatacau Property, Quebec” completed in March 2013; and




-

“Technical Report and Recommendations, Summer 2012 Exploration Program – Wabamisk Project” completed in January 2013;




concerning mineralized material in the Anatacau and Wabamisk properties for the Company (collectively the “Reports”). Portions of the Reports are summarized, for both properties, under headings “Item III – Description of the Business – 3.2.4 Geological Setting; 3.2.5 Exploration and Drilling; and 3.2.6 Mineralization” in the Annual Information Form of the Company for the year ended February 28, 2013 (included as Exhibit 1 of the Annual Report, which Exhibit is incorporated by reference herein). 




I hereby consent to the inclusion of the foregoing written disclosure and to the references to such disclosure and to my name under the foregoing heading and to all other references to such disclosure and to my name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report.







Very truly yours,













			
	/S/ Francis Chartrand

	 
	 

	Name:

Francis Chartrand, Ph.D. P.Geo.

	 
	 









May 13, 2013
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4588 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4588

  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to deny the right to grant 
retransmission consent to a television broadcast station if an AM or FM 
radio broadcast station licensed to the same licensee transmits a sound 
       recording without providing compensation for programming.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 7, 2014

  Mrs. Blackburn (for herself and Ms. Eshoo) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to deny the right to grant 
retransmission consent to a television broadcast station if an AM or FM 
radio broadcast station licensed to the same licensee transmits a sound 
       recording without providing compensation for programming.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting the Rights of Musicians 
Act''.

SEC. 2. EFFECT OF CERTAIN RADIO TRANSMISSIONS ON RIGHT TO GRANT 
              TELEVISION RETRANSMISSION CONSENT.

    Section 325(b)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 
325(b)(2)) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the following:
            ``(F) to retransmission of the signal of a television 
        broadcast station if the licensee of such station is also the 
        licensee of an AM or FM radio broadcast station and, during the 
        term of the license for such television broadcast station in 
        which such retransmission occurs, such licensee has transmitted 
        a sound recording over such radio station without providing 
        compensation for all programming carried over the signal.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-50816

(Summary Calendar)

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GUY EUGENE HARPER,

Defendant-Appellant

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(SA-98-CR-414-1-EP)

--------------------

September 1, 2000

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Guy Eugene Harper pleaded guilty to

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appeals his

sentence, which was calculated from a base offense level of 24

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) because the district court

determined that his prior Texas conviction for unauthorized use of

a motor vehicle was a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2(a).

The district court did not err in determining that Harper's

prior conviction was a crime of violence under the sentencing

guidelines. See United States v. Jackson, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir.
2

July 26, 2000, No. 99-10734), 2000 WL 1028991 at *5 (unauthorized

use of a motor vehicle is, as a categorical matter, a crime of

violence pursuant to § 4B1.2(a)'s residual clause, which applies to

a crime that "presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another").

AFFIRMED.
STATE v. Reginald Underwood FULLARD

309P15-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 9, 2018

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, James R. O'Neill, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Reginald Fullard, for Fullard, Reginald Underwood.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd of April 2018 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.20

8 February 2001


PC-EPhone, Inc.
885 West Georgia Street, Suite 1388
Vancouver, BC  V6C 3E8


Gentleman

Reference is made to the Distribution Agreement (the "Agreement") between
Cyberbank Corp., a Korean corporation ("we" or "us") and PC-EPhone, Inc., a
Nevada Corporation formerly known as Newlands Oil & Gas Inc. ("you") dated
November 6, 2000 pursuant to which we grant to you the right to distribute our
handheld device/terminal that can be used to perform multiple functions on a
CDMA, GSM or other wireless application protocol system (the "Product").

[                  *                  ]

This requirement of placing the Purchase Order constitutes a substantial
prerequisite to maintain the Agreement in effect and validity.  So far you did
not fulfill the requirement of making the Purchase Order.

In this regard, we hereby waive the requirement under the terms and conditions
as follows:

1.     PC-EPhone, Inc. shall place the Purchase Order [        *        ]
[               *              ] within fifteen (15) business days subsequent to
the date upon which Cyberbank receives final, written confirmation of the
approval of the Product by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission and
forwards a copy to PC-EPhone, Inc. of such confirmation and approval.

2.     PC-EPhone, Inc. acknowledges that Cyberbank is using PC-EPhone as the
brand name in the Korean market and agrees that Cyberbank is the legal owner of
the brand name in Korea.  PC-EPhone, Inc. shall allow Cyberbank Corp. to use the

* Confidential Treatment Requested
<PAGE>

trademark "PC-EPhone" as a co-owner of the brand name.  PC-EPhone, Inc. shall
immediately take all necessary legal steps to register Cyberbank Corp. as a
co-owner of the brand name.

3.     Cyberbank is considering to strengthen PC-EPhone, Inc.'s role in
marketing and R&D to support PC-EPhone, Inc.'s listing in NASDAQ.  For this
purpose and during the process of raising capital, PC-EPhone, Inc. agrees to
accept investors recommended by Cyberbank and cooperate closely with Cyberbank,
in advance, in the process of raising capital from other investors.


No waiver by us of any breach of any of your obligation shall be a waiver of any
subsequent breach of any other covenant, obligation or agreement, nor shall any
forbearance to seek a remedy for any breach be a waiver of any rights and
remedies with respect to such or any subsequent breach.

PC-EPhone, Inc. acknowledges that we reserve the right to terminate the
Agreement in such a case of non-fulfilling any one of the foregoing terms and
conditions.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Young Sun Cho
------------------------------------
Cho, Young Sun
President
CYBERBANK Corp.


Agreed and acknowledged on this 8th day of February, 2001.


/s/ Douglas Yee
------------------------------------
Douglas Yee
President
PC-EPhone, Inc.

* Confidential Treatment Requested
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without **

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Tena Campbell, Senior United States District Judge ***

for the District of Utah, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE SCHOBY, Jr.,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

A. HEDGPETH, Warden,

 Respondent - Appellee

No. 09-17870

D.C. No. 3:07-cv-05431-SI

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 14, 2011** 

San Francisco, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and Campbell, District ***

Judge. 

FILED

MAR 03 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
In 2006, California Penal Code § 667.61(e)(4) was replaced by the almost- 1

identical California Penal Code § 667.61(e)(3).

2

Petitioner Willie Schoby Jr. appeals the district court’s denial of his petition

for a writ of habeas corpus. A jury convicted Mr. Schoby of false imprisonment,

assault and two counts of rape. The jury also found that Mr. Schoby had

personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during the course of one of the

rapes in violation of California Penal Code § 667.61(e)(4) (the “One Strike” law).1

The district court issued a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Mr.

Schoby was denied due process by defects in the jury instructions and verdict form

that may have caused the jury to misunderstand the findings necessary for its

decision that Mr. Schoby had used a deadly or dangerous weapon. The facts need

not be repeated here because they are already known by the parties. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Mr. Schoby claims that the California Supreme Court’s decision was

unreasonable in light of Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). However, the

California Supreme Court could have concluded that even though the jury did not

believe that Mr. Schoby used a bat and a crowbar, the jury believed Mr. Schoby

used a bat during the rape. See People v. Schoby, No. A107821/A108061, 2006

WL 952648, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2006). Alternatively, the court could
3

have concluded that the jury considered a belt to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 

See People v. Nealis, 283 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 n.2 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1991)

(“deadly weapon” has been defined to include objects such as a pillow, a fingernail

file, and a rock). We conclude that Mr. Schoby has failed to show that there was

“no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington v. Richter, 131

S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s decision was

not “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, for the purposes of section 1350 of chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, in his capacity as an officer of Voyager Oil & Gas Inc., that, to his knowledge, the Quarterly Report of Voyager Oil & Gas, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2011, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Voyager Oil & Gas, Inc. This written statement is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to such Form 10-Q. A signed original of this statement has been provided to Voyager Oil & Gas, Inc. and will be retained by Voyager Oil & Gas, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
| Date: May 9, 2011 | /s/ *James   Russell (J.R.) Reger* |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                   | James Russell (J.R.) Reger         |
|                   | Chief Executive Officer            |
|                   |                               |
| Date: May 9, 2011 | /s/ *Mitchell   R. Thompson*       |
|                   | Mitchell R. Thompson               |
|                   | Chief Financial Officer            |

 

----
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Visual Management Systems, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2009, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Jason Gonzalez, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
my knowledge:

(1) the Report
fully complies with the requirements of §13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78m or 78o(d), and,

(2) the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

|                        |     |                          | 
|----------------------- | --- | ------------------------ | 
|Date: November 23, 2009 | By: | /s/ Jason
 Gonzalez      | 
|                        |     |                          | 
|                        |     | Jason
 Gonzalez         
|                        |     | Chief
 Executive Officer

24

---
#### Cornelius SHIVER, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ex rel., Miriam ARTHUR, Appellee.

No. 3D02-2295.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 6, 2003.

Cornelius Shiver, in proper person.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Toni C. Bernstein and William H. Branch, (Tallahassee), Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Before SHEVIN, and WELLS, JJ., and NESBITT, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM.

The trial court’s order dated July 25, 2002, is affirmed. This court is without jurisdiction to review the order of July 10, 2002, as no timely appeal of that order was filed. *See DeShone v. DeShone,*846 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); *Vining v. Flori*
      *289
      *da Unemployment Appeals Comm’n,*837 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED AU GUST 20, 2013

NO. 03

- 12

- 00178

- CR

Daniel Tovar, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, PE MBERTON AN D ROSE

AFFIRMED

-- OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in the district court’s

judgment: IT IS ORDE RED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the judgment

of the district court is in all things affirmed; and it appearing that the appellant is indigent and

unable to pay costs, that no adjudication as to costs is made; and that this decision be certified

below for observance.
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

July 16, 2009

Mr. Shawn Malcolm McCaskill

Godwin Ronquillo PC

Renaissance Tower

1201 Elm Street, Suite 1700

Dallas, TX 75270

Mr. Michael Howard Myers

Myers Wilson P.C.

16610 Dallas Parkway, Suite 2000

Dallas, TX 75248

RE:Case Number:  09-0483

Court of Appeals Number:  05-07-01023-CV

Trial Court Number:  

Style:BENJIE SMITH D/B/A OAK CLIFF METALS

v.

DASS, INC.

Dear Counsel:

Today the Supreme Court of Texas issued the enclosed abatement order in the above referenced-case.

Sincerely,

Blake A. Hawthorne, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

**Case No. 09-0483Page 1**
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 23.2

                         Consent of Independent Auditors


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form
S-3 No. 33-94782), the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-22211), the
Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-43267), the Registration Statement
(Form S-3 No. 333-39282), the Registration Statement (Form S-3 No. 333-65592) of
Liberty Property Trust and Liberty Property Limited Partnership and in the
related Prospectus of our report dated February 7, 2003, with respect to the
consolidated financial statements and schedule of Liberty Property Limited
Partnership included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended
December 31, 2002.


Philadelphia, Pennsylvania                           /s/ Ernst & Young LLP
March 7, 2003