United States Department of Labor

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

__________________________________________

T.B., Appellant

and

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, MAIN POST OFFICE, 

Cincinnati, OH, Employer

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Docket No. 17-1761

Issued: June 6, 2018

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se

Office of Solicitor, for the Director

DECISION AND ORDER

Before:

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge

JURISDICTION

On August 14, 2017 appellant filed a timely appeal from a June 29, 2017 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’

Compensation Act1(FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over 

the merits of the claim.

2

ISSUE

The issue is whether appellant has established that she was disabled during the period 

April 19, 1997 to June 9, 2016 causally related to her accepted November 6, 1995 employment 

injury. 

 

1 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2 The Board notes that appellant submitted additional evidence after OWCP rendered its June 29, 2017 decision. 

The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to evidence that was before OWCP at the time of its final decision. Therefore, the 

Board is precluded from reviewing this additional evidence for the first time on appeal. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1).
2

On appeal appellant alleges that the medical evidence supports her claim for disability 

compensation. 

FACTUAL HISTORY

On November 15, 1995 appellant, then a 38-year-old modified mail processor, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that on November 6, 1995 both her hands started 

to bother her and she noted discomfort in her right shoulder due to repetitive motions required 

while casing mail.

3

 At that time, she had an accepted claim for aggravation of chondromalacia of 

the right knee in OWCP File No. xxxxxx731, and she was working in a modified sedentary 

position. Appellant stopped work on November 9, 1995 and returned to work on 

November 25, 1995. On November 13, 1996 OWCP accepted appellant’s claim for bilateral 

sprain/strain of both hands and wrists and right shoulder. (RD 8/28/00) It paid medical benefits.

On April 25, 1997 appellant filed a traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on 

April 19, 1997, while she was sitting and throwing mail to her left, she injured her left shoulder, 

arm, and hands. She also noted that she used her left arm and hands because her right shoulder 

hurt. OWCP assigned this claim File No. xxxxxx601 and accepted the claim for left shoulder 

sprain and tendinitis of the left forearm. Appellant stopped work on the date of the incident and 

was paid wage-loss compensation benefits through November 17, 1999. However, on 

November 18, 1999 OWCP terminated appellant’s wage-loss compensation as she failed to accept 

an offer of suitable employment. Appellant’s requests that OWCP reconsider the termination were 

denied. Appellant filed appeals to the Board and, by decisions dated December 3, 2003 and 

October 2, 2012, the Board affirmed the denial of appellant’s reconsideration requests as they were 

untimely filed and failed to demonstrate clear evidence of error.4 Appellant’s last request for 

reconsideration regarding the suitable work termination was denied by OWCP on April 23, 2015.

On June 10, 2016 appellant filed a claim for compensation (Form CA-7) for the period 

April 19, 1997 to June 9, 2016 in the current claim. By letter dated August 16, 2016, she indicated 

that she was requesting payment of wage-loss compensation with regard to the claim she filed in 

1995. Appellant contended that she accepted the job offer of January 24, 1995 under duress, and 

that upon her return to work, following her November 6, 1995 employment injury, she was injured 

again. She alleged that she was never paid for this injury and has been unable to work.

Appellant saw Dr. Jennifer Massoud, an emergency medicine physician at the Good

Samaritan Hospital on November 7, 1995. At that time Dr. Massoud diagnosed tendinitis. She 

noted that appellant could return to work on that day with restrictions of no repetitive hand 

movements for three days.

In a November 17, 1995 report, Dr. David H. Gillis, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, 

related that he had seen appellant on November 8, 1995 and diagnosed sprain-strain injuries to the 

wrist or hand with accompanying tendinitis and acute right sprain-strain shoulder with bursitis. He 

noted that he had suggested some restrictions in work activities upon her return to work. In a 

 

3 OWCP assigned OWCP File No. xxxxxx340 to the present claim. 

4 Docket No. 03-1651 (issued December 3, 2003); Docket No. 12-0471 (issued October 2, 2012). 
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December 6, 1995 report, Dr. Gillis noted that appellant was able to return to work on 

November 26, 1995.

On November 15, 1996 OWCP referred appellant to Dr. Richard T. Sheridan, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion. In a December 2, 1996 report, Dr. Sheridan 

noted that appellant had complaints of pain in her neck, right shoulder, and upper extremity. He 

noted a normal examination of her cervical spine and upper extremities. Dr. Sheridan did not 

believe that appellant required further treatment. He opined that appellant’s complaints with 

regard to her neck and right shoulder and upper extremities caused her to be off work for three 

days and that the strain resolved in three days.

In an April 25, 1997 report, Dr. Gillis diagnosed chronic severe sprain strain left shoulder 

and forearm and tendinitis in the left shoulder and forearm. He noted that appellant’s prognosis 

was continued disability in her left shoulder and forearm, with flare-ups at frequent intervals such 

as in the past. Dr. Gillis anticipated good and bad days for appellant. In a May 12, 1997 attending 

physician’s supplemental statement, (Form CA-20), he indicated that appellant was disabled from 

her usual work due to impairment of the shoulders and hands. However, Dr. Gillis also 

recommended that appellant could return to work performing nonrepetitive activities. He related 

that appellant’s date of injury was April 19, 1997.

In a December 3, 1997 report, Dr. Errol J. Stern, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon,

diagnosed subacromial tenderness, and he noted an x-ray showed irritation of the greater tuberosity 

of the left shoulder. He diagnosed left shoulder tendinitis and left shoulder impingement. In a 

progress note of the same date, Dr. Stern noted that appellant was seen for a work injury that,

according to her record, occurred on November, 6, 1995. He reviewed Dr. Gillis records. 

Dr. Stern noted that apparently appellant had a strain to both wrists and hand and a strain of her 

right shoulder, and also complained of pain and weakness in her right wrist and inability to use her 

right wrist. He noted that appellant’s grip strength was only 40 to 50 percent where it should be. 

Dr. Stern stated that appellant was able to be actively employed in reference to these problems, 

limited light work-related activities that did not require repetitive motion.

On December 15, 1997 OWCP referred appellant to Dr. E. Gregory Fisher, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion examination. In a January 15, 1998 report,

Dr. Fisher indicated that from examination and history, appellant sustained bilateral strains of both 

wrists, hands, and right shoulder from the repetitive work she was performing at the employing 

establishment in November 1995. He noted that on his examination he could detect no objective 

findings over the upper extremities including the wrists, hands, forearms, or right shoulder. 

Dr. Fisher noted that his findings were strictly subjective and minimal. He noted that appellant

did not show any evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome, cubital syndrome, or any nerve entrapment 

syndrome over the upper extremities. Because of appellant’s lack of positive physical findings 

over the upper extremities, Dr. Fisher believed that appellant was able to perform her duties as a 

modified mail processor. He opined that appellant could work at least four hours a day and that if 

she did well, her hours could be increased.

In a March 25, 1998 report, Dr. Stern noted that appellant was having trouble with her 

bilateral hand, wrist, and right shoulder. He opined that appellant could do repetitive work 

activities moderately restricted. Dr. Stern did believe that appellant was employable. In a July 27, 
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1998 report, he noted that appellant may have right shoulder impingement syndrome, and could 

have a rotator cuff tear. In an October 29, 1998 report, Dr. Stern indicated that appellant was still 

having trouble with her right shoulder, but he did not place her off work.

In a February 16, 2000 progress report, Dr. John D. Wyrick, a Board-certified orthopedic 

surgeon, indicated that appellant’s magnetic resonance imaging scan on her right shoulder only 

showed some changes in the “AC [acromioclavicular] joint,” no rotator cuff pathology. He noted 

that they were still waiting approval to treat her right shoulder. On February 24, 2000, Dr. Wyrick 

indicated that appellant could not work until further notice. In a January 29, 2001 letter, he

indicated that appellant has not worked since April 19, 1997. Dr. Wyrick indicated that, in his 

letter of August 8, 2000, he stated that appellant could possibly return to work part time and 

sedentary and did not require frequent use of her upper extremities. He stated that, to his 

knowledge, a job was not provided to her within those restrictions. In an October 17, 2001 note,

Dr. Wyrick indicated that appellant had no significant changes on her left. He noted that appellant

was not interested in any surgery unless taken covered by workers’ compensation. By letter dated 

June 24, 2002, Dr. Wyrick terminated appellant’s care.

In a December 14, 2012 report, Dr. Michael Pordy, a rheumatologist, indicated that 

appellant was under his care for treatment of myopathy and osteoarthritis of her hands. He noted 

that appellant continued to experience muscle weakness as well as joint swelling and morning 

stiffness. Dr. Pordy noted significant osteoarthritis as well as myopathy. For these medical 

reasons, he opined that appellant was unable to perform even the limited-duty job offer of 

September 15, 1999. Dr. Pordy noted that she continued to be disabled. He explained that 

appellant had multiple injuries at work starting in 1990, including injuries on November 6, 1995 

and April 19, 1997. Dr. Pordy noted that appellant’s joint pain began following these injuries, and 

that she denied experiencing joint pain prior to these injuries. He concluded that her joint pain 

was precipitated by the employment-related injuries.

In a December 26, 2014 report, Dr. Robert P. Baughman, a Board-certified orthopedic 

surgeon, noted that last year appellant saw him and wanted a letter documenting that she was not 

able to work because of her employment-related injury in 1995?. He noted that he explained to 

her that her sarcoidosis had been present since 1994, but specific problems were based on a workrelated injury. Dr. Baughman noted that appellant had a problem with her shoulder, chest, and 

costochondritis in her hands. Appellant’s sarcoidosis was not caused by her employment-related 

injury, and that if she needed further evaluation, she should follow up with an orthopedic surgeon 

or Dr. Pordy. Dr. Baughman noted, “[appellant] is not able to work at this time according to her, 

and based on the information she is providing and Dr. Pordy is providing, it sounds like she is still 

totally disabled.” He noted that at this time appellant did not need specific therapy for her 

sarcoidosis.

By decision dated August 23, 2016, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss 

compensation from April 19, 1997 to June 9, 2016. It noted that appellant had not supported her 

claim for disability, since she returned to work on November 25, 1995 after her injury of 

November 6, 1995 and sustained a new injury on April 19, 1997 under File No. xxxxxx660.

In a medical report dated September 25, 2016, Dr. Pordy opined that appellant continued 

to be disabled. He noted that her last day of work was April 19, 1997. Dr. Pordy noted that 
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appellant had significant osteoarthritis of her hands as well as a myopathy which made her unable 

to return to work in even a limited capacity. He noted that appellant had bony swelling of the DIP

(distal interphalangeal) joints bilaterally making it difficult for her to perform any job requiring 

the use of her hands. Dr. Pordy noted that appellant required continued medical treatment 

including relief of pain with narcotic analgesics on a daily basis. He doubted that there would be 

any significant improvement in appellant’s future.

By letter dated September 19, 2016, appellant requested an oral hearing before an OWCP 

hearing representative. At the hearing held on April 14, 2017, she argued that OWCP improperly 

terminated her benefits and that she never received wage-loss compensation for her bilateral hand 

conditions. Appellant also alleged that appropriate treatment was never authorized for her 

November 6, 1995 employment injury. She contends that facts were improperly omitted, that the 

medical evidence was not properly developed, referral physicians were biased, and there were 

intentional delays in processing the claim. Appellant alleged that, as a result of returning to work 

on November 6, 1995, she injured herself.

By decision dated June 29, 2017, the hearing representative affirmed OWCP’s August 23, 

2016 decision. She determined that the evidence of record was insufficient to establish causal 

relationship between the claimed disability and the accepted work injury.

LEGAL PRECEDENT

An employee seeking benefits under FECA5 has the burden proof to establish the essential 

elements of his or her claim by the weight of the evidence.6 For each period of disability claimed,

the employee has the burden of establishing that he or she was disabled from work as a result of 

the accepted employment injury.7 Whether a particular injury caused an employee to become 

disabled from work and the duration of that disability, are medical issues that must be proved by 

a preponderance of probative and reliable medical opinion evidence.8

The claimant must submit medical evidence showing that the condition claimed is 

disabling.9 The evidence submitted must be reliable, probative, and substantial.10 The physician’s 

opinion must be based on the facts of the case and the complete medical background of the 

employee, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must include objective findings in 

support of its conclusions.11 Subjective complaints of pain are not sufficient, in and of themselves, 

 

5 Supra note 1. 

6 See Amelia S. Jefferson, 57 ECAB 183 (2005); see also Nathaniel Milton, 37 ECAB 712 (1986). 

7

Id.

8 See Edward H. Horton, 41 ECAB 301 (1989).

9 20 C.F.R. § 10.115(f).

10 Id. at § 10.115

11 Id. at § 10.501(a)(2).
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to support payment of continuing compensation.12 Likewise, medical limitations based solely on 

the fear of a possible future injury are also insufficient to support payment of continuing 

compensation.13

5 U.S.C. § 8106(c) provides that a partially disabled employee who refuses to seek suitable 

work, or refuses to or neglects to work after suitable work is offered to or arranged for him or her, 

is not entitled to compensation. 

OWCP’s implementing regulation interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 8106 further clarifies that 

OWCP will terminate the employee’s entitlement to further compensation on all claims where the 

injury occurred prior to the termination decision, as provided by 5 U.S.C. § 8106(c)(2). However, 

the employee remains entitled to medical benefits.14

ANALYSIS

The Board finds that appellant is not entitled to disability compensation for the period 

April 1997 to June 9, 2016 due to her accepted November 6, 1995 employment injury.

Appellant’s November 6, 1995 claim was accepted for bilateral sprain/strain of both hands 

and wrists and the right shoulder. Appellant had a separate claim for a traumatic injury of 

April 19, 1997. That claim was accepted for left shoulder sprain and tendinitis of the left forearm. 

Appellant received compensation and wage-loss benefits for the April 19, 1997 claim through 

November 17, 1999, but on November 18, 1999 OWCP terminated wage-loss compensation 

because appellant failed to accept suitable employment. 

On June 10, 2016 appellant filed a claim for compensation in the present claim for the 

period April 19, 1997 through June 9, 2016. 

When OWCP terminated appellant’s compensation benefits on November 18, 1999 for 

refusal of suitable work it was required to consider the employment-related conditions, as well as 

preexisting and subsequently acquired medical conditions to determine that the offered position 

was in fact suitable work.15 As previously noted, OWCP’s regulation clarifies that if OWCP has 

properly terminated compensation for refusal of suitable work, further compensation on all claims 

where the injury occurred prior to the termination decision is terminated.16 Therefore, pursuant to 

20 C.F.R. § 10.517(b), appellant is not entitled to further compensation for her November 6, 1995 

employment injury after November 18, 1999.

However, appellant’s claim also includes periods of alleged disability prior to 

November 18, 1999. The Board will, therefore, evaluate the relevant medical evidence to 

 

12 Id.

13 Id. 

14 20 C.F.R. § 10.517(b). 

15 Martha A. McConnell, 50 ECAB 129, 132 (1998).

16 Supra note 12. 
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determine whether appellant has established disability from April 19, 1997 to November 18, 1999 

arising from her November 6, 1995 employment injury. 

In a May 12, 1997 report, Dr. Gillis indicated that appellant could return to work as long 

as she did not perform repetitive work activity. However, he related that these restrictions were 

due to appellant’s previous April 19, 1997 injury. 

Dr. Fisher opined in his December 15, 1997 report that he could detect no objective 

findings in appellant’s upper extremities including her wrists, hands, forearms, or right shoulder. 

He indicated that appellant’s findings were strictly subjective and minimal. Because of appellant’s 

lack of positive findings in her upper extremities, Dr. Fisher believed that appellant was able to 

perform her work duties as a modified mail processor. Dr. Stern noted, in his October 19, 1998 

report, that appellant was still having trouble with her right shoulder, but that he did not place her 

off work. In his July 27, 1998 report, he related that appellant may have right shoulder 

impingement syndrome or a rotator cuff tear. Neither Dr. Fisher nor Dr. Stern opined that 

appellant was disabled for the period April 19, 1997 through June 9, 2016 due to objective findings 

of her accepted November 6, 1995 injury.17 As such these reports are of limited probative value. 

In a September 25, 2016 report, Dr. Pordy indicated that appellant continued to be disabled. 

He noted that her last day of work was April 19, 1997, and that she was unable to perform the job 

duties of a modified mail processor. Dr. Pordy’s opinion did not provide a well-rationalized 

opinion linking appellant’s disability to her November 6, 1995 injury. He did not explain the 

process by which appellant’s accepted November 6, 1995 injury would cause or contribute to her 

disability during the relevant period and why her inability to work after April 19, 1997 was not 

due to other factors, such as her subsequent 1997 work injury.18 

For each period of disability claimed, an employee must establish that he or she was 

disabled from work as a result of the accepted employment injury. The Board will not require 

OWCP to pay compensation for disability for which compensation is claimed. To do so would 

essentially allow an employee to self-certify his or her disability and entitlement to 

compensation.19

The Board, therefore, finds that, because the medical evidence of record does not establish 

disability for the period April 19, 1997 to November 18, 1999 causally related to her accepted 

employment injury of November 6, 1995 appellant has not met her burden of proof.

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for reconsideration 

to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

 

17 See S.H., Docket No. 16-1378 (October 16, 2017). 

18 See J.S., Docket No. 14-0818 (issued August 7, 2014). 

19 Amelia S. Jefferson, supra note 6.
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CONCLUSION

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she was 

disabled for the period April 19, 1997 to June 9, 2016 causally related to the accepted November 6, 

1995 employment injury. 

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation 

Programs dated June 29, 2017 is affirmed.

Issued: June 6, 2018

Washington, DC

Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board

Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board