D L D

- 2 1 7 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APP EALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________ __

No s

. 2 1

- 1 1 7 1 & 2 1

- 1 1 7 2

_________ _

_

In re: MA C TRUONG,

Debtor

M AC T RUONG

v.

ROSEMARY I. MERGENTHALER; R. KENNETH BARNARD

M a c T r u o n g

, A p p e l l a n t i n N o

. 2 1

- 1 1 7 1

R o s e m a ry I

. Mergen thaler

, A p p e l l a n t i n N o

. 2 1

- 1 1 7 2

__________________ _______ ______ _

____

On A p peal from the United St ates District C ourt

fo r the District of New Jerse y

(D.C. Ci vil Action No. 2

- 2 0

- cv

- 0 0 0 7 4 )

District Judge: Honorable K e v i n M c N u l t y

_______________________ _____________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal D u e t o a J u r i s d i c t i o n a l D e f e c t or

P o s s i b l e S ummary Action Pursuan t to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

July 8, 2021

Bef ore: J O R D A N

, K R A U S E

, a n d P H I P P S

, Circuit Judges

(Opinion file d: August 5, 2021 )

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_2 OPINION *

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

PER CURIAM

B efore t h e C o u r t a r e c o n s o l i d a t e d a p p e a l s b r o u g h t b y p r o s e ap p e l l a n t s M ac

T ruong a n d R o s e m a r y I

. M e r g e n t h a l e r c h a l l e n g i n g an order of t he Dis t rict Court g r a n t i n g

a f i l i n g i n j u n c t i o n a n d affirming t h e B a n kr u p t c y C o u r t f o r t h e D i s t r i c t o f N e w J e r s e y ’ s

o r d er i n a n a d v e r s a ry p r o c e e d i n g

. T h a t o r d e r d e n i e d T r u o n g ’ s m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

a n d T r u o n g a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r ’ s j o i n t m o t i o n t o s a n c t i o n t h e B a n k r

u

p t c y T r u s t e e

, a n d

g r a n t e d t h e B a n kr u p t c y T r u s t e e ’ s m o t i o n f o r a f i l i n g i n j u n c t i o n

. For the following

r easons , we will summarily affirm

. S e e 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Ci r

. I.O.P. 10.6

.

T h i s i s t h e s e c o n d t i m e t h a t w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a n ap p e a l s t e m m i n g f r o m t h e

u n d e r l y i n g a d v e r s a r y p r o c e e d i n g

. W e p r e v i o u s l y a f f

i r m e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s o r d e r

a f f

i r m i n g t h e B a n kr u p t c y C o u r t ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f T r u o n g ’ s a d v e r s a ry p r o c e e d i n g

. S e e I n r e

T r u o n g

, 7 6 3 F

. A p p ’ x 1 5 0

, 1 5 4 ( 3 d C i r

. 2 0 1 9 )

. 1 W e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e a d v e r s a r y

* This di sposition is no t an o pini on of the ful l C ourt a nd pursuan t to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

const itute binding precedent.

1 A t t h a t t i m e

, w e s e t f o r t h t h e f a c t s a n d p r o c e d u r a l history u n d e r l y i n g t h e m a t t e r ; we

n e e d n o t r e p e a t them h e r e

. W e n o t e generally t h a t A p p e l l a n t s have sough t unsucces sfully

( in mu l t iple feder al courts) to obtain an order dir e c ti n g t he Tru st e e in M ergentha le r ’ s

Chapter 7 bankruptcy

, Kenneth Barnard, to return assets from the bankruptcy estate to

which they claim they a re e ntitled

. Also, Truong has been enjoin ed by the District Cour t

for the Ea stern District of New York and the Ba nkru pt cy Court from inter fe ri ng with

Merge n thaler ’ s ba n kruptcy proceedings

. See Truong , 763 F. App ’ x at 152 n.1 ; D

. N

. J

. B a n k r

. C t

. 1 6

- ap

- 0 1 6 1 8

, D o c

. N o

. 2 2 a t 4

- 5

.3 p r o c e e d i n g w a s n o t b a r r e d b y t h e R o o k e r

- F e l d m a n d o c t r i n e

, 2 b u t t h a t T r u o n g w a s b a rred

under the Barton doctrine 3 from institut i ng the ad vers ary pr oceedi ng against Barnar d

, a s

Trustee

, witho ut first obtaining leave from the B a nkruptc y Court for the Eastern District

of N e w Yo rk

. See i d

. a t 1 5 3

. A s w e e x p l a i n e d

, “the Barton doctrine is jurisdictional in

nature

, ” a n d

, t h e r e f o r e

, t h e Bankrupt cy C ourt lacked juris diction to c onsider the

a dversary proceeding

. I d

. a t 1 5 4 ( q u o t i n g Satterfi e l d v. Malloy , 700 F.3d 1231, 1234

( 1 0 th C ir. 2012) )

. W e a l s o a f f

i r m e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g a g a i n s t Mergenthaler

,

n o t i n g t h a t i t w a s v o i d i n l i g h t o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a y i n h e r b a n kr u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g s

. I d

.

( c i t i n g 1 1 U.S .C. § 362(a)(1) )

. F i n a l l y

, w e a g r e e d w i t h t h e B a n kr u p t c y C o u r t ’ s

c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the adversary proceeding is “precisely the type of vexatious and

destructive litigat ion that t he Barton doc trine was in tended to protect agai nst

, ” a n d

admon ished T r u o n g t h a t h e w o u l d b e s ub j e c t t o s a n c t i o n s i f h e c o n t i n u e d t o f i l e f r i v o l o u s

“ a p p e a l s f r o m m o t i o n s o r o t h e r p l e a d i n g s t h a t a r e d e s i g n e d t o c i r c u m v e n t t h e i n j u n c t i o ns

i m p o s e d b y o t h e r c o u r t s o r o t h e r a c t i o n s

. ” 4 I d

.

W i t h i n w e e k s o f t h e i s s u a n c e o f t h i s C o u r t ’ s ma n d a t e

, T r u o n g f i l e d a m o t i o n f o r

r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h t h e B a n kr u

p t c y C o u r t

, a s w e l l as a j o int “ C o n t e m p t M o t i on ” wi th

2 See D.C. Court of Appeal s v. Feldman

, 4 6 0 U.S. 46 2 (1983); R ooker v. Fid. Trust Co.

, 2 63 U .S. 413 (1923).

3 Th is c ommon law doctrine stems from Barton v. Barbour , i n which the Supreme Court

barred suit again st a receiver unle ss “le ave of court by which h e was appointed [was]

obt ained.” 104 U

. S . 126, 12 8 (1881). The B ar ton doctrine ex t end s to lawsuits against a

ban kr uptc y trust ee. In re Vis taCare Grp., LLC , 678 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 2012).4 M e r g e nt h a l er se e k i ng s a n c t i on s ag ai ns t B a rn a r d

, i n c l u d i n g h i s a rr e s t a n d i n c a r c e r a t i o n

.

T h e B a n kr u p t c y C o ur t d en ie d b ot h m o ti on s

, a nd

, n o ti ng t he p ar t i e s ’ l e n g t h y h istory o f

d

u

p l i c a t i v e and v e x a t i o u s l i t i g a ti o n

, g r a n t e d B a rn a r d ’ s c r o s s

- m o t i o n f o r a b r o a d f i l i n g

i n

j u n c t i o n

. T h e C ou r t e n j o i n e d T r u o n g a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r f r o m m a k i n g a n y f i l i n g s

a g a i n s t B a r n a r d o r h i s c o u n s e l

, o r a n y f i l i n g r e l a t e d t o t h e a d v e r s a r y p r o c e e d i n g o r t h e

M e r g e n t h a l e r b a n k r

u p t c y c a s e

, w itho ut p r i o r l e a v e o f t h e C o u r t

. T r u o n g ap p e a l e d t o t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t

. 5

O n ap p e a l

, T r u o n g f i l e d a m o t i o n

, p u r p o r t e d l y b r o u g h t pursuant t o F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

.

5 6

, s e e k i n g t h e r e t u rn o f o v e r $ 3 m i l l i o n i n a s s e t s w h i c h h a d b e e n d i s t r i b u t e d t h r o u g h

M e r g e n t h a l e r ’ s b a n k r u p t c y

. H e a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r f i l e d a l e n g t h y j o i n t c e r t i f i c a t i o n i n

s u p p o r t o f t h e m o t i o n

. B a r n a r d f i l e d a c r o s s

- m o t i o n f o r a f i l i n g i n j u n c t i o n

, a n d T r u o n g

c r o s s

- m o v e d f o r s a n c t i o n s

, a t t a c h i n g a j o i n t c e r t i f i c a t i o n f r o m h i m a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r

.

T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a f f

i r m e d t he B a n k r

u

p t c y C o ur t ’ s o r d e r a n d d e n i e d t h e R u l e 5 6 m o t i o n

a n d t h e m o t i o n f o r s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t B a rn a r d

. I n th e s a m e o r d e r

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

g r a n t e d B a r n a r d ’ s m o t i o n f o r a f i l i n g i n j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t T r u o n g a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r

. 6

4 Truong ’ s subsequent petition s for p anel rehearing and reh e aring en banc w ere de nied

.

5 The Bankr u pt cy Cour t ’ s injuncti on also p roh ibited Truo n g and Mergenthaler fro m filin g

a n appeal without prior l eav e of th at Court

. Along with his n otice of appeal, T ruong f i l e d

a m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o a p p e a l

. Although t h e B a n k r

u

p t c y C o u r t di d n o t r u l e o n t h e m o t i o n

,

t h e C l e r k o f t h e B a n kr u p t c y C o u r t t r a n s m i t t e d t h e ap p e a l t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

.

6 Th e District Cou rt ’ s o rder granted Barnard ’ s request to “ e njoin Truong and

Mergenthaler from filing an y comp laint, motion or pleadi ng s eeking reli ef against the

Trustee o r any of his cou nsel or relating to the Merg e nthaler bankruptcy case in [th e

District ] Court

, without prior leave of [ th at ] Court made by separate a pplication

. ” D .N.J.5 T r u o n g a n d M e r g e n t h a l e r ap p e a l f r o m t h a t o r d e r

. 7

T he Dis trict Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankr uptcy Court ’ s fi nal order

unde r 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1 ). We have j ur isdiction under 28 U.S. C. §§ 158(d) a nd 1291.

“ Because the District Court acted as a n app ella te court, we review its determinations de

novo.” Shearer v. Titus (In re Titus) , 916 F.3d 293, 299 (3d Cir. 2019)

.

W e a g r e e w i t h b o t h t h e B a n kr u

p t c y a n d D i s t r i c t C o u r t s t h a t t h e m o t i o n f o r

r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n w a s u n t i m e l y

, w h ethe r c o nst r u e d a s a mo t ion to a lter or amend a

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (incorporating Rule 59),

or a m ot ion for rel ief from jud gment unde r Fed. R. Civ

. P. 60, see Fed. R. Bank r. P. 9024

(ma king Rule 6 0 applicable to bankruptcy cases)

. 8 U nder the Bankruptcy Rules, a par ty

has only 14 days to file a Rule 59(e) motion, not the 28 days permit ted by the Federal

Rules of Ci vil Procedur e

. Compar e Fed. R. Ban kr . P. 9023 (14 days)

, wi th Fed. R. Civ

.

Civ. No. 2

- 20

- cv

- 00 074, E CF No. 8

- 1 at 8.

7 A lthough Appella nt s filed separate appea l s from the same District Court order, Truong

appeal s from the order in its e ntire ty, while Mergent hal er ’ s appeal is limited to the extent

that she is ag g rieved by the order

. See In re Co mbusti on Engineering, Inc.

, 3 91 F.3d 1 90,

2 1 5 (3d Ci r. 2004) ( c iting In re Fondiller , 70 2 F.2d 441, 443 ( 9th Cir. 1983) ( recognizing

that “ [e] f fi cient judicial administra tion requires that appellate review [in bankruptcy

proceedings] be limited to those persons whose interests are dir ectly affected ” ) )

. Ther efore, b ecause s he did not appeal to the District Court from the Ba nkrupt cy Court ’ s

order

, w e c onsider on ly her argum ents that relate to the Distric t Court ’ s injun ction against

her

. W e nevertheless believe th e appeals present simil ar issues of fa ct and law , and

therefor e have consolidated th e m for all purpose s

. See Fed. R

. App. P. 3(b)(2).

8 T he Ban krup tcy C ourt p rop erly const rued t he basis for the motion for reconsideration as

“ mistake or possibl y f rau d

, ” which brought it wi thin the ambit of F ed. R

. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)

a nd (3).6 P. 59(e) (28 days)

. A n d

, a s ap p l i c a b l e h e r e

, t h e R u l e 6 0 ( b ) m o t i o n w a s r e qui r e d t o b e

f

i le d wi th i n a y e ar o f t h e B a nkr u

p t c y C o u r t ’ s j u dg m ent

. S e e F e d

. R

. C i v

. P

. 6 0 ( c ) ( 1 )

.

T h e m o t i on f o r r e c on s id er a t i on w a s f i l e d o n J u n e 2 5

, 2 01 9

, m o r e t h a n t w o a n d a h a l f

y e a r s a f t e r t he D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 6 o r d e r

. C o n t r a ry t o T r u o ng ’ s a r g u m e n t

,

t h a t o r d e r w a s f i n a l u p o n e n t r y

, a n d i t s f i n a l i t y w a s u n a f f

e c t e d b y h i s p r i o r ap p e a l

. S e e I n

r e L o u i s i a n a W o r l d E x p o s i t i on

, I n c

. , 8 3 2 F

. 2 d 1 3 9 1

, 1 3 9 5

- 9 6 ( 5 t h C i r

. 1 9 8 7 ) ( h o l di ng that

a n o r d e r d is m i s s i n g a n advers a ry p r o c e e d i n g i s a f in a l o r d e r ) ; I n r e P o r t e r

, 9 6 1 F

. 2 d 1 0 6 6

,

1 0 7 2 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t “when th e bankruptcy court issues what is indisput ably a

fin al order, and t he district court issue s an order aff irming or r eversing, the district court ’ s

order i s al so a final order ” ) ( c i t a t i on o m i t t e d ) ; s e e a l s o Res tatement (Second) of

Judgments § 13 ( f ) (1982) ( n o t i n g t h a t “ a judgm ent otherwi se final rem ains so de spite the

tak in g of an appeal unless w hat is called an appeal a ctually consists of a trial de novo ” )

.

W e a l s o f i n d f r i v o l o u s T r u o ng ’ s a r g u m e n t t h a t t h i s C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n r e v e r s e d t h e

B a n k r

u

p t c y C o u r t ’ s j u d g m e n t a g a i n s t B a rn a r d b e c a u s e w e d i s a g r e e d t h a t R o o k e r

F e l d m a n a p p l i e d

. O u r d e c i s i o n d i d n o t f i n d m e r i t w i t h t h e c l a i m s against B a r n a r d

, a s

T r u o n g m a i n t a i n s i t d i d

. R a t h e r

, a s the Bankruptcy Court noted, w e upheld the dismissal

of the adversary procee ding a g a i n s t B a rn a r d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e B a r t o n d o c t r i n e

.

A c c o r d i n g l y

, w e w i l l s u m m a r i l y a f f

i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s o r d e r t o t h e e x t e n t i t a f f

i r m e d

t h e d e n i a l o f t h e m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

. 9

9 T h e B a n k r u p t c y C o u r t a l s o c o rr e c t l y n o t e d t h a t T r u o n g present ed t h e s a m e a r g u m e n t s i n

su pport of h i s m o t i o n f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n that h e presented i n h i s p e t i t i o n s f o r r e h e a r i n g7 W e a l s o a f f

i r m t h e d e n i a l o f A p p e l l a n t T r u o n g ’ s “ R u l e 5 6 m o t i on

, ” w h i c h l a r g e l y

s o u g h t t h e s a m e r e l i e f a g a i n s t B a r n a r d t h a t w a s s o u g h t b y t h e c o m p l a i n t in the a d v e r s a ry

p r o c e e d i n g

. A s s u c h

, i t w as o u t s i d e t h e l i m i t e d s c o p e o f t h e ap p e a l fro m the B an kruptcy

C ourt

. See 28 U .S.C. § 158(a)(1)

. I n a n y e v e n t

, w e a g r e e t h a t t h e m o ti o n wa s b a r r e d b y

t h e B a r t o n d o c t r i n e

, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t M e r g e n t h a l e r ’ s bankruptcy e s t a t e w a s

b y t h e n f u l l y ad m i n i s t e r e d

. S e e 5 Will iam L. Norton, III, Norton Bankruptcy Law and

Practice § 9 9 : 2 3 (3d ed. 20 2 1 ) ( n o t in g t h a t “ an a ction against a tru stee is a ‘ core ’

p roceeding, e ven if the estat e has bee n fully administ ered ” ) ; c f

. In re Lowenbr aun , 453

F.3d 314, 321 (6 th Cir. 2006 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t “ t h e r e i s n o b r i g h t

- l i n e r u l e d i c t a t i n g th a t o nc e

a n e s t a t e h a s b e e n f u l l y a d m i n i s t e r e d a t r u s t e e c a n n o t a v a i l h i m s e l f o f t h e f e d e r a l c o ur t ’s

b a n kr u

p t c y j u r i s d i c t i o n ” ) ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d )

.

F i n a l l y

, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n a f f

i r m i n g t h e i m p o s i t i on o f a f i l i n g

i n

j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t T r u o n g

, a n d i t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n i m p o s i n g a f i l i n g

i n

j u n c t i o n a g a i n s t b o t h A p p e l l a n t s

. S ee Ab dul

– Akbar v. Watso n , 901 F.2d 329, 331 (3d

Cir. 1990 )

. Th e y h a v e p e r s i s t e d w i t h c l a i m s a g a i n s t B a rn a r d w h i c h v a r i o u s f e d e r a l c o ur t s

h a v e f o u n d t o b e m e r i t l e s s

, v i o l a t i v e o f a n i n j u n c t i o n

, a n d / o r b a rr e d b y t h e B a r t o n

d o c t r i n e

. A l t h o u g h a n i n j u n c t i o n i s a n e x t r e m e m e a s u r e

, i t w a s ap p r o p r i a t e h e r e

,

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n l i g h t o f A p p e l l a n t s ’ i n c r e a s i ng l y a b u s i v e a n d v e x a t i o u s f i l i n g s

. 10 S e e In re

wit h this Court

. S e e D.N. J. Bankr. Ct. N o. 16

- ap

- 01618, E C F N o

. 5 4 a t 6

- 8

.

10 I n th eir filings

, App ellants have alle ged that Barnard commi t t ed numerous cri mes

, inclu ding grand larc en y , extortion, blackmail

, an d felony m urder

, as part of a “ Judicia l

O r ganize d Crime ( “ J O C) unit

, ” a c ting in concer t w ith various judg es w h o issue “ fake8 Packer Ave. Assoc. , 884 F.2d 7 4 5

, 747 ( 3 d C i r

. 1 9 8 9 )

. M o r e o v e r

, t h e i n j u n c t i o n s

c o m p o r t e d w i t h d u e p r o c e s s ; A p p e l l a n t s w e r e p u t o n n otice b y B a rn a r d ’ s m o t i o n s f o r a n

i n

j u n c t i o n a n d w e r e p r o v i d e d a n o p p o r tu n i t y t o r e s p o n d

, s e e Sc hlaifer Nance & Co. v.

Estate of Warhol , 194 F.3d 323, 334 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a motio n describing the

sa nctionable conduct and the source of authority for the sanction provide d notice );

cf. Gagliardi v. McWilliams , 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Ci r . 19 87) (concluding that a motion

with a more general request was insufficient to give notice)

, a n d e a c h C o u r t n a r r o w l y

t a i l o r e d t h e i n j u n c t i o n t o f i t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s c a s e

. S e e Brow v. Farrelly , 994

F.2d 102 7, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993 )

.

B as e d o n t he f o r e g o i n g

, w e c o n c l u d e t h at t h i s c o n s o l i d a t e d ap p e a l p r e s e n t s n o

subs tantial q uestion

. See 3d Cir. I.O .P. 10.6

. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t T r u o n g m a k e s f r i v o l o u s

a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t o f h i s ap p e a l f r o m t h e d e n i a l o f h i s c l e a r l y untimely m o t i o n f o r

r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

, h e d i s r e g a r d s t h i s C o u r t ’ s l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s a n d i t s p r i o r a d m o n i s h m e n t

.

A c c o r d i n g l y

, n o t i c e i s h e r e b y g i v e n o f t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h i s C o u r t t o i m p o s e s a n c t i o n s

a g a i n s t T r u o n g

, a n d h e i s d i r e c t e d t o s h o w c a u s e

, w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s f r o m t h e d a t e o f e n t ry

o f t h i s j u d g m e n t

, w h y a w r i t o f i n j u n c t i o n s h o u l d n o t i s s u e e n j o i n i n g h i m f r o m filing any

appeal

, o r i g i n a l a c t i o n

, p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g

, or m o t i o n t o r e o p e n in this Court r e l a t e d t o

t h e a s s e t s i n M e r g e n t h a l e r ’ s b a n k r u p t c y e s t a t e o r i s s u e s r e s o l v e d i n t h e a d v e r s a ry

p r o c e e d i n g u n d e r l y i n g t h i s ap p e a l w ithout first obtain ing prior approval

. M e r g e n t h a l e r is

orders. ” D .N.J. Civ. No. 2:20

- cv

- 00074

, ECF No. 7; D.N.J. Ba nkr. Ct. No. 16

- a p

- 01618,

E CF No. 41 ; see also Appellants ’ “ Motion fo r Summary Judgment under FRCvP 56

. ”9 advised that s he wil l be subject to sanctions by this Court if s he co ntinues to file a ppeal s

from motions or other p leadings that are designed to circumv e nt t he i njunctions i m p o s e d

b y o t h e r c o u r t s o r o t h e r a c t i o n s t h a t t h i s C o u r t d e e m s f r i v o l o u s

. 11 T h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i l l b e s u m m a r i l y a f f

i r m e d

.

11 Appella nts ’ “ Motion for Summ ary Jud gment u nder FRC vP 56 ” and m otion s to fi l e a

“ reply certification ” in excess of the applicabl e pa ge limitation s are denied. Appellant

Mergent haler ’ s motion for a “ [t] hree

- [m] onth [a] dj ournment ” or altern atively to vacate

the May 13, 2 0 21 order conso lidatin g these appeals is de nied

. R uediger Al b recht ’ s

motion for leave to intervene is denied.