UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

) MICHELLE TOLS ON, ) ) P laintif f, )

) v. ) Civil No. 07-2181 (RM C) ) LINDA SP RING ER, Direc tor U .S. Of fi ce of P e r so nne l M ana ge m e nt , ) ) ) Defendan t. ) )
M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION Can an e mploy er be held liable for fosteringa hostile work e nvironment when a plaintiff was of

fende d by a cow orker ’s sporadic actions over the cour se of e leven year s: the
c ow or ke r c a lle d h e r a

“ bit c h” in 1 99 5, se nt a

thr e ate nin ge ma il i n 2 00 1, bumpe d h e r c ha ir in 20 04 , c omp la ine d at a

re tr e at in 20 05 that he did

no t li ke an unn ame d c oll e a g ue , a nd ro ug hly squeezed plaintiff’ s arm in 2006? The a nswer is no, a s a matter of law. The se incidents ar e insufficient to support a hostile envir onment claim under Title VI I , 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq . Mic he lle To lso n b ro ug ht t his a c tio n a g a ins t he r e mpl oye r, L ind a Spr ing e r, in h e r o ff

ic ia l c a pa c ity as Dire ctor of the U.S. Office of Personne l Manag ement (“ OPM”). Ms. Tolson alleg es ra ce a nd g ender discrimination in violation of Titl e VI Idue to har assment by a cow orker . The e vidence of hara ssment that Ms. Tolson point s to is ins ufficie ntly fre quent and se vere to impli cate Title VI I
. Fur ther, she f ails to cite any

evidenc e that the incide nts from 2001 forw ard oc curr ed becauseof her g ender

or ra ce. Ms. Tolson also a lleg es that OPM denied he r re quest for F amily Medica lPlaintiff’s Ex hibits, som e of which ar e labe led “Attac hments,” ar e filed at docket 1 numbers 31 and 32. Ms. Tolson also contends, base d on an af fidavit from a

former cowor ker, that Mr. 2 Sparrow r efe rre d to her a s a “bitch,” “re d fac ed,” or “re d dresse d down trash.” Pl.’s Ex . 6 (Miller Aff

. at 1). -2- L e ave in r e ta liatio n f

or he r c omp la int

of dis c ri min atio n. Th is c la im l a c ks me ri t be c a us e OPM in fac t gr anted the r equeste d leave . To the extent that OPM was slow to gr ant the re quest, this was
cause d by Ms. Tolson’s delay

in providing pr oper me dical docume ntation. Thus, summary jud g me nt w ill be g ra

nte d to OPM
. I. F AC TS Ms. Tolson is an Africa

n Americ an woman who has bee n employ ed as a prog ram analy st by OPM since 1989. She contends that a cowor ker, a n Afric an Amer ican man na med J ames Sparr ow, has subjec ted her to hara ssment pursuant to five sepa rate incidents since 1995, and that OPM has “tur

ned a blind [ey e]” toward the situation. P l.’s Opp’n [Dkt. #30] at 2. First, Ms. Tolson aver s that in 1995 when she wa s runningfor pr esident of L ocal 32 of the Ame rica

n Fe deration of Governme nt Employ ees ( the “Union” ), Mr. Sparr ow told her that the Union “wa s not a place for a black woma

n” and he called he r “a

dresse d up g arba g e ca

n out of Southeast.” De f.’s Notice of F iling Tolson Dep. [Dkt. # 29-2] (“Tolson Dep.” ) at 23 & 28. Ms. Tolson also alleg es that Mr. Sparr ow ca lled her a “‘r ed bone,’ which is a de rog atory term for a lig ht skinned Afric an Amer ican” and a “ red bitch.” Pl.’s Ex
. 9 (Tolson Aff . at 4) [here inafter 1

“ To lso n A ff

.” ]. Ms. To lso n a lso c la ims that Mr . Sp arr owthr e ate ne d “ to t ake [he r] o ut m a fi a 2 sty le.” Tolson De p. at 32. Ms. Tolson complained about this threat to the OPM security office
. Id
.Plaintiff’s Opposition errone ously cites Exhibi t 11 in support of her c laim reg ardingthe 3 e ma il. Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 12 . E xhibi t 11 is O PM’ s E EO Pol ic y State me nt. -3- Second, Ms. Tolson alleg es that on F ebrua ry 28, 2001, Mr. Sparrow

sent her a

n
e ma il s tatin gthat “ satan d oe sn ’t ne e d a ny pr ay e rs fr om you !! !! !” Pl. ’s Ex. 8 (e ma il)
. Th e e ma il 3
c ha in b e tw e e n M s. To lso n a nd Mr . Sp arr owre a ds a s f

oll ow s: T o l s o n : D E LIV E RY F O R A LL B A R G A IN IN G U

N IT EMPL OYEES: Attache d is the AFG E, L ocal 32 Ne wsletter f or the month of Fe bruar

y 2001. . . . Spa rr ow : I re a lly do n’ t th ink

y ou g uy s a re wo rt h th e $$ $$ $$ the se poor souls pay

y ou people! !!! !!! !!! Tolson: J ames, The g overnme nt pay s us people. God bless you. Stay informed. Sparrow: I ’m g lad to see your dumb ass is proof r eadingmessag es befor e you send me a

ny thing! ! To lso n: H i Jam e s, Th ank s f or the c omp lim e nt, Iho pe thi s e ma il i s not beingmonitored. God bless and you are still in my prayers. Luv U, Mic he lle Sparrow: “ satan” doesn’t nee d any prayers f rom y ou!!! !!! Id . Ms. Tolson viewed the e mail as intimi dating . Pl.’s Opp’n at 3.

Third, Ms. Sparrow a lleg es that she wa s assaulted whe n Mr. Sparrow bumped her chair in 2004. At that time, Mr. Sparrow ha d been tr ansfe rre d to the Manag ement Information B ra nc h whe re Ms. To lso n w a s a ssi g ne d. Ms. To lso n a sse rt s th at “ [a]t s ta ff me e tin g s h e wo uld deliberately

leave out, if Plainti ff wa s g iving spe aking[si c] or g iving a prese ntation.” Pl.’s at 12. On August 11, 2004, Mr. Sparrow w as seated next to M s. Tolson at a staff meeting . Tolson Aff.
at 2. Whe n s he be g an to sp e ak, Mr . Sp arr owa br up tly g ot u p f ro m hi s c ha ir

and bumpe d into M s.Plaintiff’s Complaint refer s to the office retre at as oc curr ing in 2006, Compl. ¶ 19, and 4 he r O pp os iti on

re fe rs to i t a s o c c ur

ri ngin e ith e r 2 00 4 o r 2 00 5. Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 15 & 20 . B e c a us e Ms. Tolson’s affida

vit refe rs to the eve nt as occ urring in 2005, and Mssrs. Fla ster and H ershe y also place the date in 2005, the Court pr esumes that 2005 is the cor rec t date. SeeTolson Aff. at 6; se e als o Def

.’s Notice of

Ex hibits [ Dkt. #28], R eport of I nvestig ation (“ROI ”) Ex. I(He rshey Aff. at 2); ROIEx . J (F laster Af f. at 4). -4- Tolson’s chair

“so har d that her c hair wa s pushed into the table ca using he r body

to fall into the ta ble .” Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 12 ; se e als o Tolson Aff. at 2. Ms. Tolson contends that Mr. Sparrowhad ample spac e to move ar ound and that his bumping he r cha ir was a n intentional ag g ressive a ct toward he r bec ause she is an Afr ican Ame rica n woman. Tolson Aff

. at 3. Ms. Tolson complained a

bout this t o her supe rvisor, Mar c F laster, who ha d attended the meetingwher e the incident occ urre d. When Mr. Flaste r later asked Mr . Sparrow why

he ac ted so suddenly , Mr. Sparrow indicated that he ha d a seve re c ramp a nd left the mee ting to rush to the bathroom. Pl.’s E x . 1 0 (F l as t er

Af f. at3 ). M r. S p arro w a l s o i n d i ca t edth ath e a n d M s . T o l s o nd i d

n o tgetal o n g, and he f ear ed that she c ould harm his car eer due to her

involvement in the Union. Id . at 3. Whil e Mr. F laster told Mr. Sparr ow to work out his issues with Ms. Tolson, he also made a “consc ious effor

t” not to assign the m to the same projec ts. Id . at 4. Four th, Ms. Tolson allege s that Mr. Sparrowhara ssed her at an Apr il 27, 2005, 4 OPM off-site re treat. The re treat was attende d by Ms. Tolson and Mr. Sparrow , amongothers. Duringthe re treat, Mr. Sparrow r epeatedly asked the fac ilitator what a pe rson should do if they worke d with someone they did not like. Tolson Dep. at 68. Ms. Tolson presumed that Mr. Sparrow w as talkingabout her and she f elt intimi dated. Tolson Af f. at 6. Ms. Tolson’s
c ow or ke r, Mo niq

ue Ke nn e dy , inte rp re te d M r. Spa rr ow ’s c omm e nts at th e re tr e at a s c omm e ntsStarting on Ma y 1, 2005, Mr. Her shey

beca me the super

visor of the OPM unit where 5 Ms. Tolson was employ ed. Mr. He rshey repor ted to Mr. Fla ster, the f

ormer supe rvisor of the un it. Mr. Her shey

saw Mr. Spar

row pa ss by

Ms. Tolson, but he did not see any thing other 6 than “incide ntal” phy sical conta ct betwe en them. Pl.’s Ex ., Att. 2 (Her shey Dep. at 25). For

the purp os e of

thi s O pin ion , th e Court

wi ll p re sume that Mr . Sp arr owsq ue e zed and br uis e d M s. To lso n’ s arm . Sho rt ly a ft e r t he inc ide nt i n th e ha llw ay , M s. To lso n o bta ine d a re str a ini ngor de r a g a ins t 7 Mr. Sparrow

from D.C. Superior Court. SeePl.’s Ex ., Att. 3 (Tolson email). The restra ining order is not in t he re cord. -5- either a bout herself

or about Ms. Tolson. Pl.’s Ex ., Att. 1 (Kenne dy Aff. at 3). Ms. Tolson complained to Sean H ershe y , her supe rvisor at the time. Tolson Aff. at 6. 5 Finally , Ms. Tolson alleg es that Mr. Sparr ow assaulted he r on Jul y 18, 2006. Id
. at 8. The inc ident occur

red a fter a

staff me etingwhen Mr. Spar row pa ssed betwe en Ms. Tolson and other employ ees in the ha llway
. Id . at 8-9. When Mr. Sparr ow passed Ms. Tolson, he alleg edly g rabbe d her a

rm roug hly

and pushed he r fr om the spot where she wa s standing, c ausing her to fa ll ag ainst the wall. Id
. After the incident, Ms. Tolson showed c oworke r Monique 6 Kenne dy a bruise on he r ar

m. Pl.’s Ex ., Att. 1 (Kenne dy Aff. at 4). Ms. Tolson reporte d the incident as a

n assault to OPM’s Center for Security and Emer g ency

Action (“ CSEA”). Tolson Aff. at 10. CSEA reported the alleg ations to the Fe dera l Protective Service (“F PS”). ROI , Ex . P

7 (F PS R eport). O n the day of the incide nt, Mr. Her shey place d Ms. Tolson and Mr. Sparrow on administrative leave , pendingfurther investigation. Id. , Ex . I(He rshey Aff. at 5 ). OPM’s Employ ee L abor Relations office unde rtook an a dminist rative investigation. At the end of the inve stigation, OPM advised Ms. Tolson that there would be no action take n ag ainst her a nd that the re port was c onfidential. Id. , E x. K ( Pe y ton Af f. at 2) . O PMOPM moved in the alternative to dismi ss due to failure to timely exhaust administ rative 8 reme dies. OPM withdrew this claim in its Reply , indicatingthat it had used the wr ongcale ndar in calculating the r eleva

nt deadlines. De f.’s Reply [Dkt. #34] at 1 n.1. Thus, the Court will deny the mot ion

to d ism iss a s mo ot. -6- found that disciplinary

action wa s not warr anted. Id . Wh e n M s. To lso n r e tur ne d to wo rk

in October of 2006, OPM moved Mr. Sparr ow’s desk to a differ ent floor. Ms. To lso n te le wo rk e d f

ro m July 22 , 2 00 6 thro ug h Augus t 4, 20 06 . O n Augus t 29, 2006, Ms. Tolson submi tted a re quest under the Family Medica l L eave Act. Id. , Ex . K (Pey ton Aff. at 3). On September 13, 2006, OPM requeste d further medical doc umentation. Id
. Subsequently , Ms. Tolson submi tted an Oc tober 25, 2006, re port from he r phy sician, Dr. Ma rk Br adley . Dr. B radle y

stated she ha d a muscle spa sm in her nec k and a br uised upper a

rm. Pl.’s Ex ., Att. 2 (Dr. B radle y ’s Memo at 1). D r. B radle y also repor

ted that re cords f

rom Ms. Tolson’s visit t o a psychiatrist indicated that she requir ed tre atment for a nx iety and an “ adjustment disorder.” Id . Thus, Dr. B radle y opined that Ms. Tolson was tempora rily disabled and
rec ommended that she be permitted to work f rom home fr om J uly

18 to October

4, 2006. Id . at 2. Af te r s he su bmi tte d th e pr op e r p a

pe r w or k, OPM g ra

nte d M s. To lso n’ s r e qu e st f or F amil y Medica l L eave . Tolson Dep. at 61.

OPM ha s mo ve d f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Ms. To lso n o pp os e s.

8 II. SUMMARYJUDG MENT STANDARD Un de r R ule 56 of the F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure , s umm ary jud g me nt m

us t be g rante d when “ the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and-7-

that the moving pa

rty is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 47 (1 98 6) ; se e als o Diamond v. Atwood , 43 F.3d 15 38 , 1 54 0 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 5) . M or e ov e r, summa ry jud g me nt i s p ro pe rl y

g ra nte d a g a ins t a

pa rt y wh o “ a ft e r a de qu ate tim e fo r d isc ov e ry and up on mot ion
. . . f a ils to m ake a

sh ow ingsu ff

ic ie nt t o
e sta bli shthe e xiste nc e of

an e le me nt e sse nti a l to that pa rt y ’s c a se , a

nd on wh ic h th at pa

rt y wi ll bear the burde n of proof

at trial.” Ce lote

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In r uli ngon a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, the c ourt

mus t dr aw a ll j us tif

ia ble infere nces in the nonmovingparty ’s favor and a cce pt the nonmoving pa rty ’s evidenc e as true . Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255. A nonmoving pa rty , howeve r, must establish more than “ the mere exis tence of a sc intill a of e vidence ” in support of its position. Id. at 252. In addition, the nonmoving pa

rty may not rely solely on alleg ations or conc lusory statements. Gree ne v. D alton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 ( D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, the nonmovingparty must present spec ific fa cts that would enable a re asonable jury to find in its favor. Id. at 67 5. I f t he e vid e nc e “ is m e re ly colora ble, or is not signific antly probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (c itations omi tted). III . A NA LY SIS

A. Discrimination B ased on A lleg ations of Hostile Work Environment Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 prohibits an employ er f rom dis c ri min atin gon

the ba sis of

ra c e , c olo r, re lig ion , s e x, or natio na l or ig in i n h ir ingde c isi on s, in compensation, terms and conditions of employ ment, and in classify

ing e mploy ees in a

way that would adver sely

aff ect their status as employ ees. 42 U .S.C. § 2000e-16. The Supreme Court has-8-

de te rm ine d th at “ [t]he phra se ‘t e rm s, c on dit ion s, or pr ivi le g e s o f e mpl oy

me nt’ e vin c e s a
c on g re ssi on a l inte nt t o s tr ike at th e e nti re sp e c tr um o f d isp arate tr e atme nt o f m e n a nd wo me n in employ ment, which includes r equiringpeople to wor k in a discriminatorily

hostile or abusive environment.” Ha rri

s v . F or k lif t Sy s. , 5 1 0 U. S
. 1 7 , 2 1 (1 9 9 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Meritor Sav. Bank , FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). The ref ore, Title VI Iis violated when a plaintiff demonstrate s that the “wor

kplace is permeated with discriminatory intimi dation, ridicule, a

nd insult” and that this behavior is “suff

iciently sever e or pe rvasive [as] to alter the conditions of the victim’s employ ment and cr eate an abusive workingenvironment.” Id. at 21 . T o e sta bli sha pr ima fa c ie hostile work environme nt claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is a member of a protec ted class, ( 2) that she wa s subject to unwelcome hara ssment, (3) that the ha rassment
occur red be cause of her

rac e or g ender , (4) that the ha rassment a ffe cted a

term, condition, or privileg e of e mploy

ment, and (5) that the employ er kne w or should have known of the hara ssment, and fa iled to act to pre vent it. Lester v. Natsios , 2 90 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 1, 22 (D .D .C. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Oncale v . Sundowner Offshore Servs., I nc. , 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)). In deter mining whe ther a

hostile work environme nt claim is substantiated, a cour t must look at all the circumstanc es of the pla intiff’s employ ment, specific ally

focusingon such fac tors as the fr equenc y

of the discr iminatory

conduct, its sever ity , whether it was threatening and humiliating or

was mer ely

offe nsive, and whe ther it unrea sonably interfe red w ith the employ ee’ s work per formanc e. Ha rri s , 5 10 U. S. at 23 . T he c on du c t mu st b e su ff ic ie ntl y extreme to constitute an alter ation in the conditions of employ ment, so that Title VI Idoes not evolve into a “ g ener al civility code.” Faragher v. Boc a Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).-9-

Consequently , “‘me re utter ance of an . . . e pithet which eng ender s offe nsive fee lings in an employ ee’ does not sufficie ntly aff ect the c onditions of employ ment to impli cate Title VI I .” Ha rri s , 5 1 0 U. S
. at2 1 (qu o t i n g Meritor , 477 U.S. at 91). F urther, “ simple teasing , offha nd comments, and isolated incide nts (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory chang es in the terms a

nd conditions of employ

ment.” Faragher , 524 U.S. at 778. A plaintiff must demonstrate that the a lleg ed eve nts leadingto the hostile work environme nt were
connec ted, since “ discrete acts c onstitut ing disc rimination or reta liation claims . . . are dif fer ent in kind from a hostile work e nvironment claim that must be base d on sever e and pe rvasive discriminatory

intimi dation or insult.” Lester , 2 9 0 F. S u p p . 2 d at3 3 (c i t i n g AMTRAK v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 115-16 (2002)) . “Workplace conduct is not measur ed in isolation.” Cla rk Cou nty Sch. Dist. v. Bre eden , 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).

For example, in Ge or

gev . Le av itt , 4 07 F .3 d 4 05 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 5) , th e D. C. C i rc u i th el d

th ats t at em en t s b y

th re e e mp l o y ee s o v er

a s i x -m o n thp er i o d

t el l i n g a p l ai n t i ff

t o “go back where she ca

me from,” separ ate a cts of y elling a nd hostili ty , and alleg ations that the pla int if f w a s n ot g ive n th e ty

pe of wo rk sh e de se rv e d, we re iso late d in sta nc e s th at di d n ot r ise to the level of

sever ity nece ssary

to find a hostile work e nvironment. Id . at 41 6- 17 . Si mil arl y , in Singh v. United States House of Re presentatives , 3 00 F . Su

pp . 2 d 4 8, 54 -5 7 ( D. D. C. 2 00 4) , th is Court fo un d th at a

pla int if f’ s a lle g atio ns that he r e mpl oye r h umi liate d h e r at im

po rt ant m e e tin g s,
scre amed at her in one instanc e, told her to “ shut up and sit down” in one instance , and wa s “c o n s t an t l y

h o s t i l e a n d

h y p er cr i t i ca l ” d i d

n o tam o un tt o a h o s t i l e w o rken v i ro n m en t , ev en th o u gh these a ctions may

have be en disrespe ctful and unf air. Acc ord Bryant v. Brownlee , 265 F. Supp.The ter m “bitch” is “not a lway s conclusive of sex di scrimination.” Ne ur e n v . A dd uc i, 9 Ma str ian i, M

e e k s &Sc hil l , 43 F. 3d 1507, 1513 ( D.C. Cir. 1995). In Neuren , the Circuit found that the term “ bitch” wa s used in a per formanc e eva luation in a g ender -neutra l way to refe r to the plaintiff’s re lations with other employ ees. Id . L ikewise, the te rm “re d bitch” may ref er to a -10- 2d 52, 64 (D.D.C. 2003) ( finding no hostile work environme nt where a cow orker ref err ed to the plaintiff as “ nigg er” and shouted at her a nd wher e anothe r cow orker stated that white men w ere first and blac k women we re “ at the bottom”; the plaintiff’s other alleg ations of har assment lacke d
rac e or a g e-ba sed over

tones and instead r evea led job-re lated tensions and pe rsonality conflicts). M s . T o l s o n ’s h ar as s m en tcl ai mmu s tb e d i s m i s s edb ec au s e s h e d o es n o tal l ege conduct suff

iciently sever e and pe rvasive to c onstitut e a hostile wor k environment. Ms. Tolson
a lle g e s th e fo llo wi ngfi ve inc ide nts of ha ra ssm e nt: (1) 1995 – Mr. Spar

row c alled Ms. Tolson a “r ed bone” and “bitch” a nd told her that the Union wa s “not a plac e for a blac k woman”; (2) 2001– Mr. Spar

row sent Ms. Tolson an e mail stating that “ satan doesn’t nee d [her] pray ers.” (3) 2004 – Mr. Spar

row bumped Ms. Tolson’s c hair; (4) 2005 – Mr. Spar

row re fer red to a n unnamed c olleague that he dislikes at an offic e re treat; and (5) 2006 – Mr. Spar

row g rabbe d and bruised Ms. Tolson’s a rm wh e n h e pa sse d h e r i n th e ha ll. Th e se inc ide nts are ins uf

fi c ie ntl y se ve re , p e rv a siv e , o r r a c e /g e nd e r- ba se d to c on sti tut e an h os til e
wo rk e nv ir onme nt. Whil e Ms. Tolson may

have be en g enuinely

offe nded in 1995 when Mr . Sparrow called he r a “ bitch”and a

“re d bone” a

nd said that the Union wa s not a place for a black woma

n, 9Communi st, inasmuch as Mr. Sparr ow was c riticizi ngMs. Tolson at the time she was r unning f or pr e sid e nt o f t

he Un ion . F or

the purp os e of

thi s O pin ion , h ow e ve r, the Court wi ll p re sume that in 1995 when Mr. Spar

row c alled Ms. Tolson a “bitch” and a “ red bone ” and stated that the Union wa s “ no t a

pla c e fo r a

bla c k w oma

n” that th e se we re se xua lly and ra c ia lly de ro g ator

y re mark s. I t is questionable whether Mr. Sparrow ’s questions at the re treat about how to handle a 10 cowor ker he did not like constitut e evide nce of hara ssment at all, as there is nothing to show that Mr . Sp arr ow ’s c omm e nts we re a bo ut M s. To lso n a

nd no t a bo ut s ome oth e r e mpl oye e . M s. To lso n me re ly

be lie ve d th at Mr . Sp arr ow ’s c omm e nts we re dir e c te d at he r. He r c oll e a g ue , M s. Kenne dy , believed the statements wer e either about Ms. Tolson or herse lf. Pl.’s Ex ., Att. 1 (Ke nnedy Aff. at 3). -11- the re is n oth ingin t

he re c or d to tie the se se xua lly and ra c ia lly de ro g ator

y re mark s w iththe e ma il, the cha ir bumping, the comments at the re treat, or the a rm-squee zing incident, which took plac e 10 six thro ug h e le ve n ye ars late r. No r i s th e re any e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to tie any

of the se sp or a dic events to one a

nother. The se ar e pre cisely the ty pe of isolated inc idents that do not amount to a discriminatory

chang e in the ter

ms and conditions of employ ment. Faragher , 524 U.S. at 778; see also Lester , 290 F. Supp. 2d at 33 (discr ete a cts do not constitute a hostile environment).

Mo re ov e r, the re is n o e vid e nc e re g ard ingthe inc ide nts fr om 2 00 1 f or wa rd to indicate that they

wer e re lated to Ms. Tolson’s rac e or g ender . And bec ause Ms. Tolson has not po int e d to e vid e nc e linkin gMr . Sp arr ow ’s c a lli nghe r a “ bit c h” wi th a

ny of the se oth e rw ise
rac e/g ender

neutra l incidents which occ urre d y ear s later, she has fa iled to show that the alleg ed hara ssment occur

red becauseof

her r ace or g ender
. See Leste r , 2 90 F . Su pp . 2 d at 22 (t o establish a prima f

acie case , a plaintiff must show that the har assment was ba sed on ra ce/g ender). There is no question but that Ms. Tol son and Mr. Sparr ow did not like one
an o th e r . M r . F l a s t e r

m a d e ane f

f o rtn o tt o a s s i g nth e mt o th e s am e p r o j e c t s . H o w e v e r , “ T i t l e V II is n ot a g e ne ra l c ivi lity

c od e fo r t

he Am e ri c an w or

kp la c e , n or

do e s it se rv e a s a

re me dy fo r a llOPM a lso a lle g e s th at it ha s a va lid a ff ir ma tiv e de fe ns e to M s. To lso n’ s h os til e 11 environment c laim beca

use it quickly

and appr opriately

responde d to Ms. Tolson’s complaint. Faragher , 524 U.S. at 807. Be cause the Court finds insufficient e vidence to raise a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t reg ardingMs. Tolson’s hostil e envir onment claim, it does not rea ch this issue. -12- instances of

verba l or phy sical har assment, for it does not purg e the wor kplace of vulg arity .” Stewart v. Evans , 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 ( D.C. Cir. (2002) (inter nal citations and quotation marks omitted). Ms. Tolson has failed to pre sent a prima f acie hostile environment claim bec ause she ha s n ot p ointe d to ra c e /g e nd e r- ba se d c on du c t th at w a s su ff ic ie ntl y pe rv a siv e and

e xtre me a s to
c on sti tut e a

c ha ng e in t he c on dit ion s o f h e r e mpl oy me nt. 11 Ms. Tolson also alleg es that OPM knew that Mr. Spar row wa s prone to violence and y et OPM did nothing. In support of this alleg ation, she points to a J uly 10, 2006, summary of CSEA rec ords indicatingthat various other OPM employ ees ha d suffe red a buse by Mr. Sparrow, inc luding r acia l slurs and expressions of nonverba l hostil ity . Pl.’s Ex . 1 (Psy cholog ist’s Me mo s umm ari zingCSE A r e c or ds ); se e als o Pl. ’s Ex. 3 (r e c or d o f C SEAe ma il f or wa rd e d to psy cholog ist). She also points to a memo from the CSEA Security Chief indicatingthat a 2003 parkingdispute betwee n Mr. Sparrow and other employ ees “ could esc alate into the phy sical
rea lm.” Pl.’s Ex . 2 (CSEA Chief’s Memo). This e vidence demonstrates that Mr. Sparrow ha d confr ontations with other OPM employ ees on more than one oc casion. How ever , it does not
su pp or t Ms . T ols on ’s c la im that she wa s su bje c t to a ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir onme nt. No r d oe s th is evidenc e demonstrate that Mr. Sparr ow har assed Ms. Tolson becauseof her r ace or g ender
. B. Reta liation Ms. Tolson also contends that OPM retaliate d ag ainst her a fter she complained of-13-

discrimination by

denying he r re quest for F amily Medica l L eave . Title VI Iprohibits an employ er from re taliating a g ainst an employ ee be cause she “ha s opposed any prac tice made an unlawf ul employ ment prac tice by

this ti tle, or bec ause [she] has made a char g e, testified, a ssisted, or pa rt ic ipate d in

any mann e r i n a

n inve sti g atio n, pr oc e e din g , o r h e ari ngun de r t his tit le .” 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-3( a). To e stablish a prima fa cie c ase of reta liation, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity ; 2) she suff ere d from a materially

adver se ac t; and 3) a c ausal
connec tion ex ists between the pr otected a ctivity and the e mploy er’ s act. See B urlington N . & Sa nta FeRy . v . W

hite , 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Ho lc om b v . P owe ll , 433 F.3d 889, 901- 02 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Retaliatory acts a re not limited “to those that ar e re lated to employ ment or occ ur at the wor kplace .” Burlington , 548 U.S. at 57 (2006). How ever , a plaintiff must show that the employ er’ s actions “would have bee n materia lly adver se to a re asonable employ ee.” Id . Fur ther,

“ an e mpl oye r’ s a c tio ns mus t be ha rm fu l to the po int

that th e y c ou ld w e ll d iss ua de a

re a so na ble worke r fr om making or

supporting a

char g e of discr imination.” Id . The Supreme Court has
e mph a size d th at th e e mpl oye r’ s a c tio n mu st b e “ mate ri a lly” a dv e rs e be c a us e the statut e pr ote c ts employ ees f

rom signif

icant har ms and does not protec t an employ ee f rom “those pe tty

slights or minor annoy ance s that often take place at work a nd that all employ ees e x perie nce.” Id . at 68. Fur ther, a n objective “ rea sonable pe rson” standa rd applies. Id . Employ ees a re not prote cted from “a ll retaliation, but from re taliation that produce s an injury or har m.” Id . at 67. “A
su pe rv iso r’ s r e fu sa l to inv ite an e mpl oye e to l un c h is no rm a lly tr ivi a l, a no na c tio na

ble pe tty slight. B ut to retaliate by excluding an e mploy ee f rom a we ekly

traininglunch that contributesThe Complaint alleg es additional incidents of r etaliation, i.e ., that OPM retaliated 12 ag ainst Ms. Tolson by

(1) de nying he r re quest for Worker s’ Compensation and (2) by reduc ing her pe rfor mance appra isal from “Excee ds Fully Successf ul” to “F ully

Successf ul” in April of 2006. Compl. ¶ 28. OPM contends that these incidents ca nnot constitute retaliation. SeeDef .’s Mem. at 37-38 ( Mr. Her shey g ave Ms. Tolson the lowe red pe rfor mance ratingbefor e Ms. Tolson complained to the EEO counselor; Ms. Tolson alleg es, without supporting e vidence , that Mr. He rs he y a lte re d h e r Wo rk e r’ s Co mpe ns atio n a pp lic atio n) . B e c a

us e Ms. To lso n f

a ils to a dd

re ss the se argume nts in h e r O pp os iti on , O PM’ s mo tio n f or summa ry jud g me nt o n th e se c la ims is deeme d to be conc eded. “ I t is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition t o a motion to dism iss addressingonly cer tain arguments raised by

the def endant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded.” Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div., Ge n. Bd. of Global Ministri es , 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D .C. 2002) (citing FDIC v. Be nder , 127 F.3d 58, 67- 68 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
-14- signific antly

to the employ ee’ s profe ssional development mig ht well deter a re asonable employ ee from complainingabout discrimination.” Id . at 69.

Ms. Tolson fails to present a pr ima fac ie ca se of r etaliation bec ause she has not shown a mate rially

adver se ac t. To prove a

reta liation claim, Ms. Taylor must show that she
su ff e re d f ro m a re ta liator y a c t th at “ wo uld

have be e n mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e to a

re a so na ble
em p l o y ee , ” a n d

th at“c o u l d

we l l d i s s u ad e are as o n ab l e w o rk er fr o mm ak i n g o r s u

p p o rt i n g a char g e of discr imination.” Id . at 57. OPM initi ally denied he r re quest for F amily Medica l L eave beca use she f ailed to submit adequate documentation. When she submitted such docume ntation, he r r e qu e st f

or F amil y Me dic a l L e ave wa s g ra

nte d. To the e xtent th at O PM d e lay e d g ra nti ngMs. To lso n’ s r e qu e st f

or F amil y Me dic a l L e ave , th e de lay wa s c a us e d b y Ms. To lso n’ s f

a ilure to
e arl ie r p ro vid e re qu ir e d me dic a l do c ume ntatio n. Ms. To lso n’ s r e ta liatio n c la im f a ils
. 12 IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons stated a

bove, De fenda

nt’s motion to di smiss or for summary-15-

judgme nt [ Dkt. # 27] wil l be g rante d in part and de nied in part. The motion to di smiss wil l be denied a s moot because OPM withdrew its claim based on f ailure to e x haust administrative
reme dies. The motion for summary judgme nt will be gr anted a nd this case will be dismissed. A memorializing orde r ac companies this Memora ndum Opinion.

Date : Ma y 13 , 2 00 9 /s/ ROSEMARY M. COL L YER Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge