alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jose Lopez, Appellant.

[719 NYS2d 571]

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lawrence Bernstein, J.), rendered July 25, 1997, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 7 Vs to 15 years, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to grant a nine-day adjournment, in an already lengthy trial, so that defendant could produce cumulative evidence concerning a description given to the police, and in refusing to give a missing witness charge. Defendant’s arguments are similar to arguments rejected by this Court on the codefendant’s appeal *(People v Caraballo,*279 AD2d 337), and there is no basis upon which to reach a different result. Defendant’s contentions concerning the stipulation to the absent detective’s testimony are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would reject them. Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Williams, Andrias, Wallach and Lerner, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4603 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4603

       To reauthorize chapter 40 of title 28, United States Code.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 7, 2014

  Mr. Turner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                       Committee on the Judiciary

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
       To reauthorize chapter 40 of title 28, United States Code.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Counsel Reauthorization 
Act of 2014''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF CHAPTER 40 OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE.

    Section 599 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking 
``This chapter shall cease to be effective five years after the date of 
the enactment of the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994'' 
and inserting ``This chapter shall have effect during the period 
beginning on the date of the enactment of the Independent Counsel 
Reauthorization Act of 2014 and ending on the day 5 years after such 
date''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32

Certification Pursuant to 18 USC Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned, the President and Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer of First State Financial Corporation (the Company), each certify that, to such officers knowledge on the date of this
certification:



| | (a) | The quarterly report of the Company for the period ending June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on this date fully complies with the requirements
of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                     |  |     |  |                                      
|-------------------- |  | --- |  | -------------------------------------
|                     |  |    
|Date: August 9, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Corey J. Coughlin                
|                     |  |     |  | Corey J. Coughlin                    
|                     |  |     |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                     |  |    
|Date: August 9, 2006 |  | By: |  | /s/ Dennis Grinsteiner               
|                     |  |     |  | Dennis Grinsteiner                   
|                     |  |     |  | Chief Financial Officer
STATE of North Carolina v. Robert Cannon HAYES, Jr.

No. COA17-679

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 20, 2018

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
Brandy Renee FLOWERS v. Pitt County District Court Judge Wendy HAZELTON

No. 129P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 7, 2018

Brandy Renee Flowers, for Flowers, Brandy Renee

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Petitioner on the 30th of April 2018 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Pitt County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of June 2018."
STATE of North Carolina, v. Jorge GUERRERO, Jr., Defendant.

No. COA16-1227

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 5, 2017

AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS.
Table of Contents
**EXHIBIT 4.23**

 **Exhibit 4.23 English Language Summary**

*Supply and Services Agreement for the Expansion of the WCDMA network of Telemig S.A.(the “Agreement”)*

**Parties**: Telemig Celular S.A. (“Telemig”), on the one side, and Ericsson Telecomunicações S.A., Ericsson Serviços de Telecomunicações Ltda., Ericsson Gestão e Serviços deTelecomunicações Ltda. (collectively, “Ericsson”), on the other side. 

**Date**: June 18, 2008. 

**Purpose**: Supply of equipment (hardware and software), materials and the rendering of services (engineering, installation, setup, integration, testing, activation, training, optimization and temporary operation of the installed networkcomponents), within the scope of providing Telemig with a WCDMA network which is installed, configured, documented, tested and operating according to the specifications detailed in the Agreement. 

**Amount**: R$128,512,839.16. 

**Payment**: The time of payment is determined according to each purchase order placed by Telemig. A certain amount is due upon delivery and the remaining portions of the price are due when the equipment or services are temporarily acceptedand/or deemed functional and when the equipment or services are accepted and/or deemed functional on a permanent basis. 

**Term**: From April 28, 2008 to December 31, 2011.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 7**  **317**
BILLY LEE LISENBY, JR., a/k/a Malik Al

- Shabazz , P etitioner

- Appell ant ,
v. CECILIA REYNOLDS, Warden KCI , Respondent

- Appell ee .

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Orangeburg
. David C. Norton , District Judge. ( 5 : 1 2

- c v - 0 2666

- DCN )

Submitted : December 17, 2013 Decided: December 20, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Billy Lee Lisenby, Jr. , Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James Anthony Mabry , Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina , for Appellee.
Unpubli shed opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Billy Lee Lisenby, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and d ismissing Lisenby’s 2 8 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition as untimely filed
. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a

con stitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional clai ms is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Lisenby has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly , we deny Lisenby’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We further deny Lisenby’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because3 the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
mate rials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Evelyn Breslaw, Respondent, v Doris L. Sassower, Appellant.

[720 NYS2d 359]

In an action, *inter alia,*to compel the issuance of a satisfaction of a money judgment, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Scancarelli, J.), entered December 1, 1999, which granted the plaintiffs application to discontinue the action without prejudice, and, after a hearing, denied her motion to impose a sanction upon the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted the plaintiffs application to discontinue the action without prejudice is dismissed, as no appeal lies as of right from that portion of the order *(see,*CPLR 5701 [a]), and we decline to grant leave; and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion to impose a sanction upon the plaintiff and the plaintiffs attorney pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 *et seq. (see, Bahamonde v State of New York,*269 AD2d 551; *County of Nassau v Schafani,*269 AD2d 417; *Musumeci v Musumeci,*267 AD2d 364).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal, or without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, McGinity and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
SILVER, et al. v. The HALIFAX COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

338A17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 22, 2017

Mark Dorosin, Attorney at Law, Elizabeth Haddix, Attorney at Law, Pittsboro, Eileen O'Connor, Attorney at Law, Allen Buansi, Attorney at Law, for Silver, LaTonya, et al.

Brent Ducharme, Attorney at Law.

Garris Neil Yarborough, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Glynn Rollins, Attorney at Law, Roanoke Rpds, for The Halifax County Board Of Commissioners.

K. Ricky Watson, Jr., Co-Director of Youth Justice Project, Peggy Nicholson, Attorney at Law, Jennifer Story, Attorney at Law, for Children's Law Clinic at Duke Law School, et al.

Seth Ascher.

George Hausen, Jr., Legal Aid.

Jennifer W. Marsh, Director of Research.

Jane Wettach, Attorney at Law, Celia Pistolis, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, Aisha Oni Forte, Attorney at Law, for Children's Law Clinic at Duke Law School, et al.

S. Luke Largess, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne Chambers, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for N.C. Advocates for Justice.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 21st of December 2017 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of December 2017."

Defendant shall have up to and including the 7th day of February 2018 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
Ronnie Edward MOORE v. Priscilla Ann MCKENZIE individually, and Priscilla Ann McKenzie, as Executor of the Estate of Bobby Jenkins Byrd

No. 343P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

Robert A. Buzzard, Lillington, Jason Phillip Kimble, Attorneys at Law, for Moore, Ronnie Edward

Cecil Bo Jones, Attorney at Law, Dunn, for McKenzie, Priscilla Ann (Ind. & Executor), et al.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 11th of October 2017 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."
STATE of North Carolina v. Rotonya RUSSELL

No. COA17-427

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 6, 2018

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
#### OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Lawrence T. FOTI, Respondent.

No. 835 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 24, 2003.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 24th day of July, 2003, upon consideration of the Report and Recommendations of the Disciplinary Board dated March 28, 2003, it is hereby

ORDERED that LAWRENCE T. FOTI be and he is SUSPENDED from the Bar of this Commonwealth for a period of three years, and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217 PaR.D.E.

It is further ORDERED that respondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to Rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 23-20127 

Summary Calendar 

____________ 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Matthew Steven Hackney, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 4:20-CR-219-1 

______________________________ 

Before King, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Matthew Steven Hackney pleaded guilty to four child pornography 

offenses and now appeals two of those convictions for production of child 

pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and possession of child pornography 

under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Relying on published and unpublished 

authority from this court, he concedes that relief on the issues he asserts is 

_____________________ 

*

 This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

September 8, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 23-20127 Document: 00516888751 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/08/2023
No. 23-20127 

2 

foreclosed, and he raises the issues to preserve them for further review. We 

dispense with further briefing and affirm. 

First, Hackney asserts that the factual basis supporting his guilty pleas 

to those two counts is insufficient under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11 because he did not admit facts establishing the interstate commerce 

elements of § 2251(a) and § 2252A(a)(5)(B) as he contends those statutes 

should be construed based on Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 

Alternatively, he raises a constitutional argument based on National 

Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). Reviewing 

only for plain error, see United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 

2010), Hackney’s arguments with respect to his convictions under both 

statutes are unavailing, see United States v. Bailey, 924 F.3d 1289, 1290 (5th 

Cir. 2019). 

In light of the foregoing, the Government’s motions for summary 

affirmance and, alternatively, for an extension of time to file an appellate brief 

are DENIED. See United States v. Coleman, 817 F.3d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 

2016). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 23-20127 Document: 00516888751 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/08/2023
IN RE: T.T.E.

238A18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 2, 2018

Michelle F. Lynch, Attorney at Law, for T.T.E.

Janelle Varley, Assistant Attorney General, Todd Williams, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 1st of August 2018 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 2nd of August 2018."
### FOR PUBLICATION


### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT



#  G ENE C ASHMAN ; A THENA S UTSOS , No. 03-15066

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.

v. CV-99-03641-SBA/ RS 

#  C ITY OF C OTATI , a municipal Northern District of corporation, California, Oakland

Defendant-Appellee. ORDER



# 

Filed July 15, 2005

Before: Arthur L. Alarc ón, Robert R. Beezer, and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

This court suspended consideration of appellee’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending the Supreme Court’s issuance of a decision in Lingle v. Chevron USA , 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005). The Supreme Court’s opinion in Lingle requires us to grant the City of Cotati’s petition for rehearing and to withdraw our opinion filed July 15, 2004.

We affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the City of Cotati. See, e.g., Lentini v. Center for the Arts , 370 F.3d 837, 850 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s judgment after trial on a different ground). Cashman’s takings claim, which alleges that the City of Cotati’s mobilehome park rent control ordinance effects an unconstitutional regulatory taking by failing to substantially advance a legitimate government interest, is foreclosed by Lingle. 125 S. Ct. at 2087 (holding

8249that the “substantially advances formula is not a valid takings
test ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The petition for rehearing is GRANTED. Our prior opinion filed July 15, 2004 is WITHDRAWN. The district court’s judgment in favor of the City of Cotati is AFFIRMED. 8250 C ASHMAN v. C ITY OF C OTATIPRINTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS BY THOMSON/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO

The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted © 2005 Thomson/West.
#### Frank Bosch et al., Appellants, v 229 West 97 Realty Associates et al., Defendants, and 229 Owners Corp. et al., Respondents.

[719 NYS2d 564]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Edward Lehner, J.), entered July 8, 1999, which, in an action under Labor Law § 240 (1), granted defendants-respondents’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants-respondents are the governing body of condominium association responsible for the maintenance of the common elements of the building in which plaintiffs were injured, and the cooperative corporation that owns the residential units in the building. Another defendant is the sponsor of the condominium conversion, who retained “unsold shares” in the particular apartment that plaintiffs were improving when they were injured, and who would be the party responsible under Labor Law § 240. The action was properly dismissed as against respondents on the basis of evidence establishing that the sponsor had the right to make improvements to the subject apartment without respondents’ consent; that it was the sponsor, acting on its own and not as respondents’ agent, who hired plaintiffs’ employer; and that the work that plaintiffs were doing at the time they were injured did not involve the building’s common elements *(see, Brown v Christopher St. Owners Corp.,*211 AD2d 441, *affd for other reasons*87 NY2d 938; *Ceballos v Kaufman,*249 AD2d 40), but rather a sheetrock ceiling in the bathroom of an apartment. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Rosenberger, Tom, Ellerin and Friedman, JJ.
STATE of North Carolina v. Sylvester Ray ANDREWS, Jr. and Trayvon Markel Powell Moody

No. 62P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 9, 2018

Mr. James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Andrews, Sylvester Ray (Jr.)

Mr. Jarvis John Edgerton, IV, Attorney at Law, for Moody, Trayvon Markel Powell

Mr. Amar Majmundar, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina

Ms. Olga Vysotskaya de Brito, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina

Mr. Robert A. Evans, Jr., District Attorney, for State *238***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 13th of March 2018 by Defendant (Trayvon Markel Powell Moody) in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."
#### THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICAH S. MATTHEWS, Defendant-Appellant.

Third District

No. 3—97—0732

Opinion filed July 9, 1998.

Barbara O’Brien, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Marshall E. Douglas, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Rita Kennedy Mertel, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

JUSTICE SLATER

delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Micah S. Matthews, entered an open plea of guilty to a charge of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18- — 1 (West 1996)). He was sentenced to five years in prison. The trial court further ordered the defendant to reimburse Rock Island County $350 for the cost of providing him with an attorney, saying, “That’s a standard ruling.” On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering reimbursement without conducting a hearing into his ability to pay. We agree. Thus, we reverse and remand.

Initially, we note that the defendant failed to raise this issue in a postsentencing motion and therefore has waived his claim of error. *People v. Reed,*177 Ill. 2d 389, 686 N.E.2d 584 (1997). However, when *773the alleged error is so fundamental that it has deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing, plain error may be found. *People v.*Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 687 N.E.2d 892 (1997).

Section 113 — 3.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) empowers the trial court to order a defendant to reimburse the county or the State for the cost of providing him with legal representation. 725 ILCS 5/113 — 3.1(a) (West 1996). This section further provides that “[i]n a hearing to determine the amount of the payment,” the court may consider a financial affidavit prepared by the defendant and any other information provided by the parties. 725 ILCS 5/113 — 3.1(a) (West 1996). In *People v. Love,*177 Ill. 2d 550, 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the trial court must conduct a hearing into the defendant’s financial circumstances before imposing a reimbursement order pursuant to section 113 — 3.1 of the Code.

In the instant case, the trial court imposed the reimbursement obligation upon the defendant without inquiring into the defendant’s financial status. In doing so, the court noted that imposing such an obligation was a “standard ruling.” This is not in keeping with the mandate of section 113 — 3.1 of the Code and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the local rule cited by the State provides a sufficient basis for the imposition of a reimbursement order. That rule is explicitly based upon section 113 — 3.1, and the *Love*decision makes clear that section 113 — 3.1 requires a hearing to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law.

Accordingly, we hold that the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County must be reversed and the matter remanded for a hearing on the defendant’s ability to reimburse the county for the cost of his legal representation.

Reversed and remanded.

HOMER, PJ., and HQLDRIDGE, J., concur.