In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 07-2311

VILLAGE OF DEPUE, ILLINOIS, a

Municipal Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, also known

as MOBIL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, and

VIACOM INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 06 C 1266—Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

____________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 14, 2008—DECIDED AUGUST 11, 2008

____________

Before RIPPLE, SYKES and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. The Village of DePue (“the Village”) brought this action in Illinois state court against

Exxon Mobile Corp., Viacom International, Inc. and CBS

Broadcasting, Inc. (collectively, “Exxon”). Exxon removed
2 No. 07-2311

We shall discuss the district court’s jurisdiction to hear this 1

case in the course of this opinion.

We have subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 2

the case to the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The

district court determined that it had diversity jurisdiction and, upon Exxon’s motion, dismissed the Village’s 1

claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. The Village timely appealed the matter to this court. For the reasons stated in this opinion, 2

we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or “the

Superfund”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., was enacted in 1980.

It charges the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)

with monitoring and, in some instances, conducting

cleanups on sites that have sustained environmental

damage as a result of hazardous materials. CERCLA

authorizes the government to identify parties that are

potentially responsible for the damage and to require

them to clean up the site. Id. § 9606. It is often referred to

as the Superfund because it also established a large trust

fund to advance environmental cleanup goals, including

financing governmental response activities at sites where

no potentially responsible party can be identified
No. 07-2311 3

to finance the cleanup. Id. § 9611(a). CERCLA authorizes

the federal government to conduct cleanup activities, but

it also permits the federal government to enter into cooperative agreements with state agencies that then conduct the

cleanups using Superfund money. Id. § 9604.

CERCLA is connected to the National Priorities List

(“NPL”) and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”), 40 C.F.R. § 300.1

et seq. CERCLA requires the EPA to maintain the NPL,

which is intended primarily to guide the EPA in determining which sites warrant further investigation. A site’s

cleanup may not be financed by Superfund monies unless

the site is on the NPL. Placement on the list does not

mean, however, that any remedial or removal action

must be taken by the government. The NCP is a regulation

that was promulgated by the EPA in 1982 in order to

implement CERCLA. The NCP sets guidelines and procedures for responding under CERCLA to releases and

threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants

or contaminants. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(f).

The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

(“SARA”) was enacted in 1986. SARA was designed to

speed up CERCLA’s remedial processes at every phase

and to make CERCLA more effective. Among other

adjustments to CERCLA, SARA included restrictions

that, except in limited circumstances, bar judicial

review of the EPA’s choice of removal or remedial action

until after the action has been completed or enforced. Id.

§ 9613(h); 1 Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow, Superfund

Law and Procedure § 2:54, at 119-22 (updated by
4 No. 07-2311

Caroline Broun, 2007). Section 113(h) is the jurisdictional

limitation that was added to CERCLA by SARA; it states:

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal

law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating

to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under

State law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup

standards) to review any challenges to removal or

remedial action selected under section 9604 of this

title, or to review any order issued under section

9606(a) of this title . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Section 113(h) then lists five additional

limitations on this bar to jurisdiction, none of which are at

issue in this case. See id. § 9613(h)(1)-(5). 

B.

The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”)

was created by Illinois statute. 415 ILCS 5/4. Its mandate

includes investigating violations of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (“Illinois Act”), id. at 5/1 et seq.,

and undertaking actions in response to hazardous substances. Additionally, the IEPA is Illinois’ implementing

agency for federal environmental laws, including CERCLA.

Id. at 5/4(l). In that capacity, the IEPA is “authorized to take

all action necessary or appropriate to secure to the State the

benefits of [federal environmental laws].” Id. Illinois also

has the Illinois Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (“ICP”), 35 Ill. Adm. Code Pt. 750.101 et seq.

The ICP is a state-law corollary to the NCP that sets
No. 07-2311 5

The suit was filed under the Illinois Environmental Protection 3

Act, 415 ILCS 5/22.2 & 42(d), (e).

guidelines and procedures for responding to releases and

threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants

or contaminants.

C.

Inside the Village of DePue, Illinois, is an environmentally hazardous site. From 1903 to 1989, operations on

the 1500 acre site generated waste material that severely

contaminated the site and some areas around it. The EPA

took note of the site in 1980 and, over the next ten years,

conducted several preliminary environmental assessments and inspections on the site. The IEPA began investigating the site pursuant to its authority under state

law in March 1992. As a result of the IEPA’s expanded

analysis of the site, the EPA added the site to the NPL in

1999.

In 1995, at the request of the IEPA, the Illinois Attorney

General, alleging violations of Illinois law, filed suit

against Exxon’s corporate predecessors in Bureau County,

Illinois. The IEPA’s role in the lawsuit was conducted 3

“pursuant to its own authority under the [Illinois] Act,

and regulations promulgated thereunder.” R.1, Ex. 1 pt.1

at 28. As a result of that suit, the state court entered an

interim consent order (“Consent Order”) as a “partial

settlement of all issues” between the people of Illinois and

Exxon. Id. at 27.
6 No. 07-2311

The interim remedial actions include: designing, building 4

and operating a water treatment plant to remove contaminants from surface and ground water that was formerly

discharging into nearby DePue Lake; remediating a contaminated landfill by eliminating or closing the former effluent

ponds; installing a vegetative cover over the landfill; building an

engineered wetland to treat any effluent from the landfill;

cleaning out a drainage channel that connects the site to DePue

(continued...)

Under this Consent Order, Exxon must perform a

phased investigation of the site and implement certain

interim remedies. It also must propose final remedies to

the State of Illinois before completing final remedial

action for the site. The Consent Order requires Exxon to

perform its investigations and remedial actions in compliance with both the ICP and the NCP. The State of

Illinois, in consultation with the EPA, has “sole discretion”

to decide if the final remedies proposed by Exxon are

appropriate. Id. pt.2 at 1. The activities completed under

the Consent Order are subject to approval by the State of

Illinois. Id. at 4. The Consent Order binds, among other

parties, Exxon, the IEPA and the “People of the State of

Illinois.” Id. at 3.

Under the Consent Order, the “final remedial action”

phase has not yet been reached; Exxon still is investigating

and performing interim remedial actions. No party disputes that Exxon is fulfilling the requirements of the

Consent Order. Exxon has spent more than $30 million

to date on investigations and interim remedial actions at

the site. In addition, Exxon has begun investigating 4
No. 07-2311 7

(...continued) 4

Lake to prevent contaminants from that area from being

washed into DePue Lake in the future; conducting an initial

health evaluation of any short-term threats to public health;

preventing onsite trespass; preventing clean surface water

from contacting any contaminants; completing cleanup of the

former vanadium catalyst disposal area; and re-vegetating

portions of the site.

The notices did not define the terms “materials” or “contami- 5

nants” and provided no factual basis for the alleged nuisance.

contaminants in the soils within the Village, DePue Lake

and the surrounding wetland and flood plain areas. As

part of this investigation, Exxon has gathered information

for ecological and human health risk assessments. After

completing all phases of the remedial investigation, Exxon

then will conduct feasibility or design studies. Eventually,

it will make permanent remedial changes to the site.

In August 2006, while the investigation and remediation

process required by the Consent Order was ongoing, the

Village posted Notices to Abate Nuisance at the site. These

notices sought to impose immediate, site-wide cleanup

obligations on Exxon. The notices ordered Exxon to

have the materials removed and the site cleaned of all

contaminants to the satisfaction of the Village within ten

days. If Exxon failed to comply within ten days, the 5

notices required Exxon to pay a nuisance fine of $750 per

day until the site cleanup was complete and the site

was removed from the NPL.
8 No. 07-2311

The Village is a citizen of Illinois. Exxon Mobile Corp. is a 6

New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in

Texas. Viacom International, Inc., now called CBS Operations,

is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business

in New York. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. is a New York corporation

with its principal place of business in New York.

D.

The Village of DePue filed its complaint against Exxon

in Illinois state court. The complaint asserted that Exxon

had violated and continued to be in violation of the Village’s nuisance ordinance. It sought three forms of relief: a

judgment declaring that Exxon had violated the ordinance,

daily fines of up to $750 for that alleged violation and

injunctive relief requiring Exxon immediately to clean the

site and have it removed from the NPL.

Exxon removed the case to the district court under

28 U.S.C. § 1441. It asserted jurisdiction based upon

diversity of citizenship. The district court determined that

all the requirements of diversity jurisdiction had been met.6

The Village disputed jurisdiction on two grounds. First, it

filed a motion for remand on the ground that Younger

abstention precluded federal adjudication of the case, and

second, it contended that the Consent Order had a

jurisdiction-selection clause that required the district

court to remand the case. The district court held that it

was not precluded from hearing the case by Younger or

by the Consent Order.

Exxon then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It con-
No. 07-2311 9

tended that the causes of action stated in the complaint

were preempted by federal and state law. The district

court agreed; it concluded that section 113(h) of CERCLA

barred the Village’s legal challenges. Although noting

that CERCLA contains “savings” provisions that

preserve remedies under state and local law, the court

held that, if such a law conflicts with a CERCLA-mandated remedial action, the bar of section 113(h) applied

and deprived the court of jurisdiction until the

remedial work was completed. The district court held

that the relief sought by the Village conflicted squarely

with the detailed process mandated by the Consent

Order and concluded that section 113(h) of CERCLA

divested it of jurisdiction to hear the claims.

The district court also held that the Village’s claims

were preempted by Illinois law. It concluded that the

claims conflicted with the process required by the IEPA

and its implementing regulations because the Village

was seeking immediate and undefined completion of the

cleanup at the site. Such relief, held the district court,

would conflict with the considered and phased process

outlined in the ICP and implemented at the site via the

Consent Order. Such interference, reasoned the court,

was preempted by Illinois law. It therefore granted Exxon’s

motion to dismiss the Village’s claims with prejudice.

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a

complaint for failure to state a claim. Michalowicz v. Vill. of
10 No. 07-2311

Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008). In our

review, we must accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff. Id.

A.

Jurisdiction

We review de novo the question of subject matter

jurisdiction. Alexander v. Mount Sinai Hosp. Med. Ctr., 484

F.3d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 2007). Because determining the

propriety of removing to the district court an action filed

in state court necessarily requires that we determine the

authority of the district court to supplant the state court’s

jurisdiction with its own, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), we also

review de novo the denial of a motion to remand the

case to state court. Alexander, 484 F.3d at 891. Such a

decision amounts to a decision by the district court that

its assertion of jurisdiction over that of the state court

was legally permissible.

We also “review de novo a district court’s decision to

decline to abstain from exercising jurisdiction pursuant

to the Younger abstention doctrine.” FreeEats.com, Inc. v.

Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007).

1. Forum Selection Clause

We begin by noting that the district court properly

concluded that it possessed diversity jurisdiction over the

case. The parties concede, and we agree, that there is
No. 07-2311 11

complete diversity of citizenship and that the amount

in controversy requirement is met in this case. See 28

U.S.C. § 1332.

The Village contends, however, that the district court

erred in refusing to remand the case; in its view, a

forum selection clause in the Consent Order reserved

jurisdiction in the Circuit Court of Bureau County, Illinois.

Even assuming that the Village is in a position to enforce

the terms of the Consent Order between Exxon and

Illinois—a proposition for which the Village has

failed to offer any persuasive support—the Village has

failed to demonstrate that the Consent Order contains a

reservation of jurisdiction. The Village points only to a

provision in the Consent Order stating that “the venue of

any action commenced in [Illinois] Circuit Court for the

purposes of interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the terms and conditions of this Interim Consent

Order as provided herein shall be in Bureau County,

Illinois.” R.1, Ex. 1 pt.1 at 28. The Village contends, without

support, that this provision is a jurisdiction selection

clause. We cannot agree. On its face, the provision in

question does not purport to vest jurisdiction in any court.

Instead, it states which venue among the various Illinois

counties would be appropriate in the event that an action

was commenced in an Illinois Circuit Court “for the

purposes of interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the terms and conditions” of the Consent Order. Id.

The Village offers no support for its contention that the

provision is a jurisdiction selection clause and the plain

text of the Consent Order reads to the contrary. The district

court properly found that the Village was not entitled,
12 No. 07-2311

on the basis of this provision in the Consent Order, to

have its case remanded to the state court.

2. Younger Abstention

The Village next contends that the case should have

been remanded to the state court because the district court

was required by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to

abstain from hearing the case. As a general rule, Younger

abstention “requires federal courts to abstain from taking

jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve

or call into question ongoing state proceedings.”

FreeEats.com, 502 F.3d at 595. The rule in Younger “is

designed to permit state courts to try state cases free

from interference by the federal courts.” Id. Although

originally applied to prevent interference only with

criminal proceedings, today Younger applies to some civil

as well as criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue,

Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 595, 612 (1975) (applying Younger

abstention to prevent interference with a quasi-criminal

state nuisance suit). The rule in Younger protects the

principles of “equity, comity, and federalism,” which

“have little force in the absence of a pending state proceeding.” Id. at 602-03 (quotation omitted). It also is

concerned with preventing “duplicative legal proceedings,” “disruption of the state criminal justice system” and

the negative implication that state courts are unable “to

enforce constitutional principles.” Id. at 604, 608.

The Village contends that removing an action from

state court creates a pending state proceeding with which
No. 07-2311 13

the removed action, then in federal court, conflicts. We

cannot accept this argument. It is well established that

Younger’s concepts of comity and “Our Federalism” are

inapplicable “when no state proceeding was pending nor

any assertion of important state interests made.”

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (“Absent

any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore,

application by the lower courts of Younger abstention

was clearly erroneous.”). The mere fact that a case could

be heard in state court is insufficient to justify Younger

abstention. Cf. id. Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 simply

does not leave behind a pending state proceeding that

would permit Younger abstention. See In re Burns & Wilcox,

Ltd., 54 F.3d 475, 477 (8th Cir. 1995), limited on other grounds

by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996). Cf.

Kirkbride v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 933 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1991)

(refusing to abstain on the basis of the Colorado River

abstention doctrine from hearing a diversity suit merely

because it had been removed from state court); Noonan S.,

Inc. v. County of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380, 382 (11th Cir. 1988)

(same).

The Village’s reliance on Huffman to support this argument is misplaced. Huffman does not stand for the premise

that Younger abstention requires a district court to decline

to hear a case merely because the case had been removed

from state court. In Huffman, instead of appealing a state

court’s adverse decision, the plaintiff instituted a separate

federal proceeding in which he attempted to enjoin the

state court from carrying out its enforcement of its nuisance judgment. Had the federal court enjoined the ongoing state proceeding, that injunction would have been a
14 No. 07-2311

great interference and an affront to comity and federalism.

Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607. Here, by contrast, the Village has

failed to point to any ongoing state proceeding with which

the removed federal case conflicts.

 Neither is the Consent Order entered by a state court in

an earlier proceeding the sort of pending state proceeding

with which the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction could

be said to implicate the constraints of the Younger doctrine.

In the present action, the district court was not asked to

conduct a proceeding that would interfere with the state

proceeding that resulted in the consent decree. Nor was it

asked to enjoin a proceeding pending in state court. The

district court therefore properly refused to apply Younger

abstention principles.

3. Divestiture of Jurisdiction by CERCLA Section 113(h)

We next address the effect of CERCLA section 113(h).

The district court concluded that “the Village’s claim [was]

preempted by CERCLA Section 113(h) and as a result . . .

[that the court] lack[ed] jurisdiction over the Village’s

claim.” Vill. of Depue, Ill. v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 2007 WL

1438581, at *9 (C.D. Ill. May 15, 2007). We review de novo

questions of statutory interpretation. Olson v. Risk Mgmt.

Alternatives, Inc., 366 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2004). 

Section 113(h), titled “Timing of review,” states:

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal

law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to

diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law

which is applicable or relevant and appropriate under
No. 07-2311 15

section 9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards)

to review any challenges to removal or remedial action

selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review

any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). The provision then

lists five additional exceptions to the divestiture of jurisdiction, none of which are at issue in this case. See id.

Here, the sole question is whether the district court,

which had jurisdiction “under section 1332 of Title 28,”

nevertheless was divested of jurisdiction by section 113(h).

Id. Section 113(h) is a “blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction,” Pollack v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 507 F.3d 522, 525 (7th

Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted), but it is expressly limited by

its own terms: It does not apply to federal courts sitting in

diversity. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Thus, section 113(h) permits

a federal court to hear a challenge to a federal cleanup

initiated under CERCLA if the challenge arises as, for

instance, a state-law nuisance action. Pollack, 507 F.3d at

525. Section 113(h) is limited additionally in that, under the

express terms of the statute, it applies only to bar jurisdiction over challenges to certain cleanups authorized under

CERCLA, specifically to challenges to those “remedial

action[s] selected under section 9604 of this title, or to

review any order issued under section 9606(a) of this title.”

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). In effect, section 113(h) applies only

when the EPA has selected a remedial action under section

9604 or issued an order under section 9606(a), and only

then if the challenge arises under federal law. In that

limited circumstance, section 113(h) removes jurisdiction

over challenges to the EPA’s chosen remedial effort until
16 No. 07-2311

See 1 Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow, Superfund Law and 7

Procedure § 2:54, at 119-22 (updated by Caroline Broun, 2007);

see also Pollack, 507 F.3d at 524-25. 

after the cleanup has been completed. Pollack, 507 F.3d at

525.

This interpretation is consistent with the statutory

purpose of section 113(h), enacted as part of SARA to

ensure that, once the EPA chooses a removal or remedial

action for a particular site, litigation will not delay the

completion or enforcement of a cleanup action. In effect, 7

section 113(h) prevents federal-law challenges to the EPA’s

selected remedy from going forward until after the remedy

has been completed. Id. at 525.

The legislative history of SARA also lends support to this

holding. The Conference Report for SARA states that the

“[n]ew section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way

the rights of persons to bring nuisance actions under State

law.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).

Similarly, the Congressional Record of Senate Proceedings

indicates that unadopted bill language would have extinguished all federal review, but the language that was

adopted permitted expressly diversity jurisdiction. 132

Cong. Rec. S17212-03 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of

Sen. Mitchell), 132 Cong. Rec. S17136-01 (daily ed. Oct. 17,

1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford). The two Senators who

discussed the provision with regard to diversity jurisdiction both stated specifically that section 113(h) did not

preempt nuisance cases that arose under state law and that
No. 07-2311 17

Senator Mitchell said: “The conference language would permit 8

a suit to lie in either Federal court where jurisdiction could be

based on diversity of citizenship—or in State court, where

based on nuisance law. This construction is confirmed by the

statement of the managers that ‘New section 113(h) is not

intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to bring

nuisance actions under State law with respect to releases or

threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants or

contaminants.’” 132 Cong. Rec. S17212-03 (daily ed. Oct. 17,

1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). Senator Mitchell also

stated that 

[w]hether or not a challenge to a cleanup will lie under

nuisance law is determined by that body of law, not section

113. New subsection (h) governs only the suits filed under

the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (5)

for the review of “challenges to removal or remedial action

selected under section 104, or to review any order issued

under 106(a)”. There is no support whatsoever . . . for the

proposition that “any controversy over a response action

selected by the President, whether it arises under Federal

law or State law, may be heard only in Federal court and

only under circumstances provided” in section 113. That

statement is contrary to the express legislative language

and the statement of managers.

Id.

Senator Stafford also commented on section 113(h) and the

diversity jurisdiction provision. 132 Cong. Rec. S17136-01 (daily

ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (statement of Sen. Stafford). He elaborated on

(continued...)

federal courts were permitted to hear state-law nuisance

actions if those cases arose in diversity.8
18 No. 07-2311

(...continued) 8

the Conference Report language quoted above, stating that

“[n]ew section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way the

rights of persons to bring nuisance actions under State law with

respect to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants.” Id. He also commented

that the language in section 113(h) deliberately had been

changed to permit federal review of 

challenges based on State laws, such as nuisance. . . .

Clearly, . . . a complaint based on State nuisance law would

fall within the phrase “no court shall have jurisdiction to

review any challenge”. But equally clearly, such a claim

would not be barred by the conference language, which

would permit a suit to lie in either Federal court (where

jurisdiction could be based on diversity of citizenship) or in

State court. This construction is confirmed by the statement of managers explanation that—

New section 113(h) is not intended to affect in any way

the rights of persons to bring nuisance actions under

State law with respect to releases or threatened releases

of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants.

Id.

Senator Stafford also commented on the limits of section

113(h). He said: 

Whether or not a challenge to a cleanup will lie under

[n]uisance law is determined by that body of law, not

section 113, because section 113 of CERCLA governs only

claims arising under the act. . . . Similarly, new subsection

(h) governs only the suits filed under the circumstances

(continued...)
No. 07-2311 19

(...continued) 8

enumerated in paragraphs (1) through (5) for the review of

“challenges to removal or remedial action selected under

section 104, or to review any order issued under 106(a).” 

Id. He also stated that “[n]othing in this act shall affect or modify

in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under

other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect

to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or

contaminants.” Id.

The plain language of section 113(h) states that the bar to

jurisdiction does not apply to a federal court sitting in

diversity. This holding is supported by the plain language,

purpose and statutory history of the statute. Here, where

the district court sat in diversity, it was not divested of

jurisdiction by section 113(h).

B.

Preemption by CERCLA

Federal preemption is an affirmative defense upon which

the defendants bear the burden of proof, and we review de

novo a district court’s determination that federal law

preempts a state law or municipal ordinance. See Fifth Third

Bank v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741, 745 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although the district court seems to have concluded that

it was divested of jurisdiction by section 113(h), its opinion

might be read as holding that, more generally, CERCLA

preempted the Village’s claims. Even if we were to assume

that Exxon so contends, it has not met its burden of

proving that CERCLA preempted the Village’s claims.
20 No. 07-2311

CERCLA’s preemptive scope is not total. The statutory

text states expressly, in several provisions, that at least

some claims under state law are permitted to proceed.

Section 114(a) states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be

construed or interpreted as preempting any State from

imposing any additional liability or requirements with

respect to the release of hazardous substances within such

States.” 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a). Section 302(d) states

that “[n]othing in this chapter shall affect or modify in any

way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other

Federal or State law, including common law, with respect

to release of hazardous substances or other pollutants or

contaminants . . . .” Id. § 9652(d). CERCLA contemplates

“action[s] brought under State law for personal injury, or

property damages, which are caused or contributed to by

exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or

contaminant, released into the environment from

a facility.” Id. § 9658(a)(1). Section 310(h) states that “[t]his

chapter does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of

any person under Federal, State, or common law, except

with respect to the timing of review as provided in section

113(h) of this title or as otherwise provided in section 9658

of this title (relating to actions under State law).” Id.

§ 9659(h). Finally, section 113(h) itself applies to bar

jurisdiction only over federal-law challenges “to removal

or remedial action selected under section 9604” or “any

order issued under section 9606(a).” Id. § 9613(h).

The precise contours of CERCLA preemption over state

environmental cleanup actions or municipal ordinances

that affect federal removal or remedial actions are not easy
No. 07-2311 21

See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 9

928, 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a city ordinance is preempted by CERCLA if it “interfere[s] with the accomplishment

and execution of CERCLA’s full purpose and objectives” (second

alteration omitted)); United States v. City & County of Denver, 100

F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that CERCLA preempted a

local zoning ordinance that was in actual conflict with a remedial order of the EPA); 1 Allan J. Topol & Rebecca Snow,

Superfund Law and Procedure § 2:20, at 59 (updated by Caroline

Broun, 2007) (noting that some courts have held that, even

when the federal government has negotiated a remedy with a

potentially responsible party and it is approved by the court in

the form of a consent decree, the consent decree has no preemptive effect on the enforcement of a tougher state environmental law).

to discern. We need not address this area in any compre- 9

hensive way, however, because Exxon has not met its

burden of showing that there is any federal law or effort

with which the Village’s nuisance ordinance could conflict.

Exxon’s sole argument is that section 113(h) bars the

Village’s claims because those claims challenge a CERCLA

remedy—the Consent Order previously entered by the

state court. The Consent Order was instituted by the Illinois

EPA, however, not by the federal government, and the

IEPA’s role in the lawsuit and Consent Order was conducted “pursuant to its own authority under the [Illinois

Act].” R.1, Ex. 1 pt.1 at 28. Exxon has failed to point to “any

challenge[] to removal or remedial action selected under

section 9604 of this title,” or to “any order issued under

section 9606(a).” See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). In fact, Exxon has

failed to show that any CERCLA-authorized remediation
22 No. 07-2311

effort or, indeed, any federal involvement whatsoever is

implicated in this case with which the application of the

Village’s nuisance ordinance could conflict. Exxon therefore has failed to carry its burden of proving federal

preemption of the Village’s claims. See Fifth Third Bank, 415

F.3d at 745.

C.

Preemption by State Law

In Illinois, municipalities that are not home-rule units

have limited powers. Hawthorne v. Vill. of Olympia Fields,

790 N.E.2d 832, 840 (Ill. 2003). The Village, a non-home-rule

unit, may exercise only those powers enumerated in the

Illinois Constitution or conferred upon it, expressly or

impliedly, by state statute. Id. Because the Village is a nonhome-rule unit, any of its ordinances that “conflict with the

spirit and purpose of a state statute are preempted by

statute.” Id. at 842. “Where there is a conflict between a

statute and an ordinance, the ordinance must give way.”

Id. (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted).

The parties do not dispute that the Village had the power

to adopt the nuisance ordinance that it seeks to apply to

Exxon in this case. See 65 ILCS 5/11-60-2 (“The corporate

authorities of each municipality may define, prevent, and

abate nuisances.”); Vill. of Sugar Grove v. Rich, 808 N.E.2d

525, 531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“Historically, nuisance ordinances have been held to be invalid only when the municipality’s determination of what constitutes a nuisance is

clearly erroneous.”). The dispute here is whether

the Village’s nuisance ordinance, as applied, exceeds its
No. 07-2311 23

authority and is impermissible in light of the spirit of the

laws and policies of Illinois. See id.; Hawthorne, 790 N.E.2d

at 841.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has long held that, as a

result of the Illinois Act’s express purpose of

“establish[ing] a unified, state-wide program to protect the

environment, the Act was intended to preempt non-homerule regulations.” Vill. of Carpentersville v. Pollution Control

Bd., 553 N.E.2d 362, 364 (Ill. 1990) (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation

omitted). Because the Village is a non-home-rule unit, its

ordinances may not “conflict with the spirit and purpose

of a state statute.” Hawthorne, 790 N.E.2d at 842. The

Illinois Act was enacted in part because of the Illinois

General Assembly’s findings that, “because environmental

damage does not respect political boundaries, it is necessary to establish a unified state-wide program for environmental protection,” and that “environmental problems

are closely interrelated and must be dealt with as a unified

whole in order to safeguard the environment.” 415 ILCS

5/2(a)(ii), (iii). The purpose of the Illinois Act is “to establish a unified, state-wide program supplemented by

private remedies, to restore, protect and enhance the

quality of the environment, and to assure that

adverse effects upon the environment are fully considered

and borne by those who cause them.” Id. at 5/2(b). The

Illinois Act authorizes the Illinois Attorney General to

“institute a civil action for an injunction, prohibitory or

mandatory, to restrain violations of this Act, . . . or to

require such other actions as may be necessary to address

violations of this Act . . . .” Id. at 5/42(e).
24 No. 07-2311

Here, the Illinois Attorney General instituted a civil

action against Exxon in order to address violations of the

Illinois Act. See id. The result of that action was the Consent

Order, which details a phased and considered plan for

cleaning up the environmental hazard at the site that is

located in and near the Village. The Village’s application of

its nuisance ordinance seeks to address, in a heavy-handed

manner, a difficult environmental problem that certainly is

not only of local concern. See City of Des Plaines v. Chicago

& N.W.R.R. Co., 357 N.E.2d 433, 436 (Ill. 1976). If the Village

were permitted to apply its nuisance ordinance to force

Exxon to complete immediately the cleanup of the site, on

penalty of $750 per day for noncompliance, then it could

prevent compliance with the measured cleanup process

adopted by Illinois through the Consent Order under the

authority of Illinois law. Compare Hawthorne, 790 N.E.2d at

843. Such a result would frustrate the purpose of the

Illinois Act, which permits the Illinois Attorney General to

enter consent orders precisely like this one for the purpose

of removing and remediating environmental hazards. See

id.

The Village’s reliance on Carpentersville is without merit.

Carpentersville held that a village could impose zoning

requirements that directly conflict with Illinois’ uniform

program of environmental regulation if the Illinois Act

contained a specific provision permitting the local regulation of the issue in question. 553 N.E.2d at 367. There, a

village’s zoning ordinance limited smokestacks to 30 feet

in height, and the IEPA had issued a permit to a company

conditioned on the company raising its discharge smokestack to 100 feet. Id. at 363. Although the facility could not
No. 07-2311 25

comply with the requirements in its permit and with the

local zoning ordinance, the Illinois Act contains a provision

that conditioned the permit on compliance with local

zoning regulations. Id. (“[T]he granting of a permit under

this Act shall not relieve the applicant from meeting and

securing all necessary zoning approvals from the unit of

government having zoning jurisdiction over the proposed

facility.” (quotation omitted)).

In Carpentersville, the local zoning regulation did not

conflict with the state-issued permit because the statute

expressly conditioned the permit upon the facility’s

compliance with that very zoning regulation. Id. at 367. In

the present case, however, neither the Consent Order,

entered under the Illinois Act, nor the Illinois Act itself

contains language permitting a direct conflict between

the IEPA’s Consent Order with Exxon and the Village’s

application of its nuisance ordinance. Here, Exxon is

required to perform its work in compliance with the Illinois

Act, as directed by the Consent Order; the Village simply

is seeking to force it to act in a manner inconsistent with

those state requirements.

The Illinois legislature enacted the Illinois Act in order

to safeguard the environment and to restore contaminated

areas through a phased and carefully considered process.

Ignoring this process by conducting and concluding a

cleanup to the satisfaction of the Village is not a plan in

service to the goals of the Illinois Act. The Village’s application of its nuisance ordinance in this case is overreaching

because it attempts to regulate an environmental hazard

that is not local in nature and that already is subject to a

cleanup under the authorization and direction of the
26 No. 07-2311

state. Accordingly, we hold that the Village’s claims are

preempted by the Illinois Act.

Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the ground that the Village’s

claims are preempted by Illinois law.

AFFIRMED

8-11-08