# Gazzetta ufficiale C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2466
  doi:10.3000/17252466.C_2009.158.ita |
| --- | --- |
| Gazzetta ufficiale
  dell'Unione europea | C 158 |
| | |
| Edizione in lingua italiana | Comunicazioni e informazioni | 52o anno11 luglio 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2466

doi:10.3000/17252466.C_2009.158.ita

Gazzetta ufficiale

dell'Unione europea

C 158

Edizione in lingua italiana

Comunicazioni e informazioni

52o anno11 luglio 2009

---

| Numero d'informazione | Sommario | pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicazioni |
| | COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Numero d'informazione

Sommario

pagina

II   Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione

2009/C 158/01

Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informazioni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Tassi di cambio dell'euro | 2 |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Rassegna commentata dei mercati regolamentati e delle disposizioni nazionali che attuano i requisiti pertinenti della MiFID (direttiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Comunicazione della Commissione a norma dell’articolo 16, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1008/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio recante norme comuni per la prestazione di servizi aerei nella Comunità — Oneri di servizio pubblico in relazione a servizi aerei di linea (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione

2009/C 158/02

Tassi di cambio dell'euro

2

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI

2009/C 158/03

Rassegna commentata dei mercati regolamentati e delle disposizioni nazionali che attuano i requisiti pertinenti della MiFID (direttiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio)

3

2009/C 158/04

Comunicazione della Commissione a norma dell’articolo 16, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1008/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio recante norme comuni per la prestazione di servizi aerei nella Comunità — Oneri di servizio pubblico in relazione a servizi aerei di linea (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Avvisi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI |
| | Commissione |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Invito a presentare proposte — EACEA/11/2009 — Sostegno strutturale ai centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee e alle organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo — Programma Europa per i cittadini, azione 2, misure 1 e 2 — 2010 | 10 |
| | PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA |
| | Commissione |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Aiuti di Stato — Paesi Bassi — Aiuto di Stato C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invito a presentare osservazioni a norma dell'articolo 88, paragrafo 2, del trattato CE (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | ALTRI ATTI |
| | Commissione |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Pubblicazione della domanda di registrazione conformemente all'articolo 8 paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio, relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari | 24 |

V   Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione

2009/C 158/05

Invito a presentare proposte — EACEA/11/2009 — Sostegno strutturale ai centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee e alle organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo — Programma Europa per i cittadini, azione 2, misure 1 e 2 — 2010

10

PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione

2009/C 158/06

Aiuti di Stato — Paesi Bassi — Aiuto di Stato C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invito a presentare osservazioni a norma dell'articolo 88, paragrafo 2, del trattato CE (
  1
  )

1

13

ALTRI ATTI

Commissione

2009/C 158/07

Pubblicazione della domanda di registrazione conformemente all'articolo 8 paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio, relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE |

---

(1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE

1

| IT | |
| --- | --- |

IT

---

II Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/1

---

Non opposizione ad un'operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2009/C 158/01

In data 14 maggio 2009 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato comune. La presente decisione si basa sull'articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio. Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32009M5403. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/it/index.htm) con il numero di riferimento 32009M5403. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

---

IV Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI E DAGLI ORGANI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/2

---

Tassi di cambio dell'euro (1)

10 luglio 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Moneta | Tasso di cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollari USA | 1,3901 |
| JPY | yen giapponesi | 128,21 |
| DKK | corone danesi | 7,4466 |
| GBP | sterline inglesi | 0,85800 |
| SEK | corone svedesi | 11,0022 |
| CHF | franchi svizzeri | 1,5140 |
| ISK | corone islandesi | |
| NOK | corone norvegesi | 9,0840 |
| BGN | lev bulgari | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corone ceche | 26,030 |
| EEK | corone estoni | 15,6466 |
| HUF | fiorini ungheresi | 277,50 |
| LTL | litas lituani | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats lettoni | 0,6993 |
| PLN | zloty polacchi | 4,3740 |
| RON | leu rumeni | 4,2160 |
| TRY | lire turche | 2,1636 |
| AUD | dollari australiani | 1,7940 |
| CAD | dollari canadesi | 1,6212 |
| HKD | dollari di Hong Kong | 10,7736 |
| NZD | dollari neozelandesi | 2,2250 |
| SGD | dollari di Singapore | 2,0331 |
| KRW | won sudcoreani | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricani | 11,4023 |
| CNY | renminbi Yuan cinese | 9,4983 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,3315 |
| IDR | rupia indonesiana | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | ringgit malese | 4,9731 |
| PHP | peso filippino | 67,026 |
| RUB | rublo russo | 45,4005 |
| THB | baht thailandese | 47,382 |
| BRL | real brasiliano | 2,8084 |
| MXN | peso messicano | 19,0303 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 67,8230 |

Moneta

Tasso di cambio

USD

dollari USA

1,3901

JPY

yen giapponesi

128,21

DKK

corone danesi

7,4466

GBP

sterline inglesi

0,85800

SEK

corone svedesi

11,0022

CHF

franchi svizzeri

1,5140

ISK

corone islandesi

NOK

corone norvegesi

9,0840

BGN

lev bulgari

1,9558

CZK

corone ceche

26,030

EEK

corone estoni

15,6466

HUF

fiorini ungheresi

277,50

LTL

litas lituani

3,4528

LVL

lats lettoni

0,6993

PLN

zloty polacchi

4,3740

RON

leu rumeni

4,2160

TRY

lire turche

2,1636

AUD

dollari australiani

1,7940

CAD

dollari canadesi

1,6212

HKD

dollari di Hong Kong

10,7736

NZD

dollari neozelandesi

2,2250

SGD

dollari di Singapore

2,0331

KRW

won sudcoreani

1 786,89

ZAR

rand sudafricani

11,4023

CNY

renminbi Yuan cinese

9,4983

HRK

kuna croata

7,3315

IDR

rupia indonesiana

14 174,11

MYR

ringgit malese

4,9731

PHP

peso filippino

67,026

RUB

rublo russo

45,4005

THB

baht thailandese

47,382

BRL

real brasiliano

2,8084

MXN

peso messicano

19,0303

INR

rupia indiana

67,8230

---

(1)  Fonte: tassi di cambio di riferimento pubblicati dalla Banca centrale europea.

---

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/3

---

Rassegna commentata dei mercati regolamentati e delle disposizioni nazionali che attuano i requisiti pertinenti della MiFID (direttiva 2004/39/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio)

2009/C 158/03

L’articolo 47 della direttiva relativa ai mercati degli strumenti finanziari (direttiva 2004/39/CE, GU L 145 del 30.4.2004) autorizza ciascuno Stato membro a conferire lo status di «mercato regolamentato» ai mercati costituiti sul suo territorio e conformi alla sua regolamentazione.

Ai sensi dell’articolo 4, paragrafo 1, punto 14 della direttiva 2004/39/CE si intende per «mercato regolamentato» un sistema multilaterale, amministrato e/o gestito dal gestore del mercato, che consente o facilita l’incontro — al suo interno ed in base alle sue regole non discrezionali — di interessi multipli di acquisto e di vendita di terzi relativi a strumenti finanziari, in modo da dare luogo a contratti relativi a strumenti finanziari ammessi alla negoziazione conformemente alle sue regole e/o ai suoi sistemi, e che è autorizzato e funziona regolarmente e ai sensi delle disposizioni del titolo III della direttiva 2004/39/CE.

Sempre a norma dell’articolo 47 della direttiva 2004/39/CE, spetta a ciascuno Stato membro aggiornare l’elenco dei mercati regolamentati da esso autorizzati e comunicarlo per informazione agli altri Stati membri e alla Commissione europea. Lo stesso articolo (articolo 47 della direttiva 2004/39/CE) stabilisce che, una volta l’anno, la Commissione pubblichi nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea un elenco dei mercati regolamentati che le sono stati notificati. Il presente elenco è stato compilato a norma di tale disposizione.

L’elenco allegato riporta la denominazione dei singoli mercati riconosciuti dalle autorità nazionali competenti come conformi alla definizione di «mercato regolamentato», e indica l’ente responsabile della loro gestione e l’autorità competente a emanare e approvare le regole del mercato.

La riduzione delle barriere all’ingresso e la specializzazione dei segmenti di mercato determinano ritocchi più frequenti all’elenco dei «mercati regolamentati» di quanto accadesse con la direttiva sui servizi di investimento 93/22/CEE. L’articolo 47 della direttiva relativa ai mercati degli strumenti finanziari impone inoltre alla Commissione europea di pubblicare l’elenco dei mercati regolamentati sul suo sito Internet e di aggiornarlo periodicamente. La Commissione europea provvederà pertanto, oltre a pubblicare annualmente l’elenco nella Gazzetta ufficiale delle Comunità europee, a curarne una versione aggiornata sul suo sito Internet ufficiale [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Questa sarà modificata periodicamente sulla base delle informazioni comunicate dalle autorità degli Stati membri che, dal canto loro, sono invitati a comunicare alla Commissione ogni aggiunta o cancellazione nell’elenco dei mercati regolamentati di cui essi costituiscano lo Stato membro d’origine.

| Paese | Denominazione del mercato regolamentato | Società di gestione | Autorità competente a designare e sorvegliare i mercati |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Austria | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (mercato ufficiale) |

Paese

Denominazione del mercato regolamentato

Società di gestione

Autorità competente a designare e sorvegliare i mercati

Austria

1.

Amtlicher Handel (mercato ufficiale)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (mercato semiufficiale) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (mercato semiufficiale)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Autorità per i mercati finanziari -FMA) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (Autorità per i mercati finanziari -FMA)

Belgio

| 1. | a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt,

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d’Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d’Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten.

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgaria

| 1. | Официален пазар (mercato ufficiale) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (mercato ufficiale)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (mercato non ufficiale) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (mercato non ufficiale)

Българска Фондова Борса – София АД (Borsa valori bulgara - Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Commissione per la vigilanza finanziaria)

Cipro

Borsa valori di Cipro

| 1. | Mercato principale |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercato principale

| 2. | Mercato parallelo |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercato parallelo

| 3. | Mercato alternativo |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercato alternativo

| 4. | Mercato obbligazionario |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercato obbligazionario

| 5. | Mercati delle società di investimento |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercati delle società di investimento

| 6. | Mercato grandi progetti |
| --- | --- |

6.

Mercato grandi progetti

| 7. | Mercato spedizioni transoceaniche |
| --- | --- |

7.

Mercato spedizioni transoceaniche

| 1.-7. | Borsa valori di Cipro |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Borsa valori di Cipro

| 1.-7. | Commissione per i valori mobiliari e la borsa di Cipro |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Commissione per i valori mobiliari e la borsa di Cipro

Repubblica ceca

| 1. | Mercato principale (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercato principale (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Mercato libero (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercato libero (Volný trh)

| 3. | Mercato ufficiale |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercato ufficiale

| 4. | Mercato dei future |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercato dei future

| 5. | Mercato a pronti |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercato a pronti

| 1.-2. | Borsa valori di Praga
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Borsa valori di Praga

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | Borsa valori ceca RM-SYSTEM
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Borsa valori ceca RM-SYSTEM

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5. | Borsa energia Praga
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5.

Borsa energia Praga

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5. | Banca nazionale ceca |
| --- | --- |

1.-5.

Banca nazionale ceca

Danimarca

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | Mercato degli strumenti di equity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

Mercato degli strumenti di equity;

| — | Mercato obbligazionario; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato obbligazionario;

| — | Mercato derivati |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato derivati

| 1. | Borsa valori di Copenhagen AS |
| --- | --- |

1.

Borsa valori di Copenhagen AS

Finanstilsynet (autorità per la vigilanza finanziaria danese)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S [Mercato autorizzato danese Place Ltd. (DAMP)] [mercato autorizzato = scambi regolari di titoli ammessi alla negoziazione ma non quotati in borsa] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S [Mercato autorizzato danese Place Ltd. (DAMP)] [mercato autorizzato = scambi regolari di titoli ammessi alla negoziazione ma non quotati in borsa]

| 2. | Mercato autorizzato danese Ltd (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercato autorizzato danese Ltd (DAMP)

Estonia

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Borsa valori)






  — | Põhinimekiri (Listino principale) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Borsa valori)

—

Põhinimekiri (Listino principale)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (listino obbligazionario) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (listino obbligazionario)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (listino di fondi) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (listino di fondi)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Autorità di vigilanza finanziaria estone)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (Mercato regolamentato)






  — | Lisanimekiri (listino secondario) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(Mercato regolamentato)

—

Lisanimekiri (listino secondario)

Finlandia

Arvopaperipörssi (Borsa Valori);

| — | Pörssilista (Listino ufficiale); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (Listino ufficiale);

| — | Pre-lista (Prelistino); |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (Prelistino);

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (Altro listino titoli) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (Altro listino titoli)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Designazione:

Ministero delle Finanze.

Sorveglianza:

| — | Approvazione della regolamentazione: Ministero delle Finanze |
| --- | --- |

—

Approvazione della regolamentazione: Ministero delle Finanze

| — | Sorveglianza del rispetto della normativa:
  Finanssivalvonta, autorità di vigilanza finanziaria finlandese |
| --- | --- |

—

Sorveglianza del rispetto della normativa:

Finanssivalvonta, autorità di vigilanza finanziaria finlandese

Francia

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L.421-1 du code monétaire et financier).

Germania

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (autorità di vigilanza delle borse dei Länder) e la Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin).

Autorità statali:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse(Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grecia

| 1. | Borsa di Atene






  — | Mercato dei titoli |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Borsa di Atene

—

Mercato dei titoli

| — | Mercato dei derivati |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato dei derivati

| 1. | Borsa di Atene |
| --- | --- |

1.

Borsa di Atene

| 1. | Commissone ellenica per il mercato dei capitali (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Commissone ellenica per il mercato dei capitali (HCMC)

| 2. | Mercato secondario telematico (mercato strumenti di debito HDAT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercato secondario telematico (mercato strumenti di debito HDAT)

| 2. | Banca di Grecia |
| --- | --- |

2.

Banca di Grecia

| 2. | Commissone ellenica per il mercato dei capitali (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Commissone ellenica per il mercato dei capitali (HCMC)

Ungheria

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Borsa di Budapest)

| — | Részvényszekció (Sezione Equities) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Sezione Equities)

| — | Hitelpapír Szekció (Sezione titoli di debito) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír Szekció (Sezione titoli di debito)

| — | Származékos Szekció (Sezione derivati) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos Szekció (Sezione derivati)

| — | Áru szekció (Sezione prodotti di base) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Sezione prodotti di base)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Borsa di Budapest)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Autorità di vigilanza finanziaria ungherese)

Irlanda

Mercato principale della borsa valori irlandese

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

L’autorità irlandese per la regolamentazione dei servizi finanziari («autorità di regolamentazione finanziaria») autorizza i «mercati regolamentati» e (ad eccezione delle condizioni di quotazione) controlla il rispetto dei requisiti della MiFID da parte del gestore del mercato.

Italia

| 1. | Mercato telematico azionario (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Mercato telematico azionario (MTA)

| 2. | Mercato obbligazionario telematico (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercato obbligazionario telematico (MOT)

| 3. | Mercato ETF-Plus |
| --- | --- |

3.

Mercato ETF-Plus

| 4. | Mercato telematico dei Securitised derivatives (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Mercato telematico dei Securitised derivatives (SeDeX)

| 5. | Mercato After-Hours (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Mercato After-Hours (TAH)

| 6. | Mercato italiano degli strumenti derivati in cui vengono negoziati gli strumenti finanziari di cui all’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, lettera f) e lettera i) del Testo Unico della finanza (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Mercato italiano degli strumenti derivati in cui vengono negoziati gli strumenti finanziari di cui all’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, lettera f) e lettera i) del Testo Unico della finanza (IDEM)

| 7. | Mercato all’ingrosso dei titoli di Stato italiani ed esteri (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Mercato all’ingrosso dei titoli di Stato italiani ed esteri (MTS)

| 8. | Negoziazioni all’ingrosso di obbligazioni non statali e titoli emessi da organizzazioni internazionali con partecipazione governativa (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Negoziazioni all’ingrosso di obbligazioni non statali e titoli emessi da organizzazioni internazionali con partecipazione governativa (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Negoziazioni online all’ingrosso di titoli di stato (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Negoziazioni online all’ingrosso di titoli di stato (BondVision)

| 10. | Mercato TLX |
| --- | --- |

10.

Mercato TLX

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato — MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

La Consob autorizza le società che gestiscono i mercati e approva i loro regolamenti.

Per il mercato all’ingrosso dei titoli di Stato, la società di gestione viene autorizzata dal Ministero dell’economia e delle finanze, sentito il parere della CONSOB e della Banca d’Italia.

Lettonia

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Listino principale |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino principale

| — | Listino obbligazionario |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino obbligazionario

| — | Listino secondario |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino secondario

| — | Listino dei fondi |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino dei fondi

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Commissione per i mercati finanziari e dei capitali)

Lituania

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | Listino principale del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino principale del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Listino secondario del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino secondario del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Listino dei titoli di debito del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino dei titoli di debito del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Listino dei fondi del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Listino dei fondi del Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Commissione lituana per i valori mobiliari

Lussemburgo

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange

Malta Stock Exchange

Autorità per i servizi finanziari di Malta

Paesi Bassi

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Licenza da parte del ministro delle finanze su consulenza dell’autorità dei Paesi Bassi per i mercati finanziari
  Vigilanza dell’autorità dei Paesi Bassi per i mercati finanziari e il ministero olandese delle finanze. |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Licenza da parte del ministro delle finanze su consulenza dell’autorità dei Paesi Bassi per i mercati finanziari

Vigilanza dell’autorità dei Paesi Bassi per i mercati finanziari e il ministero olandese delle finanze.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Polonia

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Mercato principale) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Mercato principale)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Mercato parallelo) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Mercato parallelo)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Mercato dei titoli CeTO — Mercato regolamentato fuori borsa) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (Mercato dei titoli CeTO — Mercato regolamentato fuori borsa)

| 1 and 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Borsa di Varsavia) |
| --- | --- |

1 and 2

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Borsa di Varsavia)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Commissione per la vigilanza finanziaria)

Portogallo

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Mercato di quotazione ufficiale) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Mercato di quotazione ufficiale)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Mercato di future e opzioni) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Mercato di future e opzioni)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Mercato speciale per i titoli del debito pubblico) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Mercato speciale per i titoli del debito pubblico)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL. |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL.

(Mercato dell’energia)

| 1.-2.: | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.:

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Il ministero delle finanze autorizza i mercati su proposta della Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM, responsabile per la regolamentazione e la vigilanza dei mercati)

Romania

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Mercato regolamentato a pronti – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Mercato regolamentato a pronti – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Mercato regolamentato dei derivati – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Mercato regolamentato dei derivati – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată - (Mercato regolamentato dei derivati – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată - (Mercato regolamentato dei derivati – BMFMS)

| 1 and 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Borsa valori di Bucarest.) |
| --- | --- |

1 and 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Borsa valori di Bucarest.)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar – Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Borsa monetaria e finanziaria e dei prodotti di base S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar – Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Borsa monetaria e finanziaria e dei prodotti di base S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Commissione nazionale rumena per i valori mobiliari)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Commissione nazionale rumena per i valori mobiliari)

Repubblica slovacca

| 1. | Mercato dei titoli quotati






  — | Mercato quotato principale |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Mercato dei titoli quotati

—

Mercato quotato principale

| — | Mercato quotato parallelo |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato quotato parallelo

| 2. | Libero mercato regolamentato |
| --- | --- |

2.

Libero mercato regolamentato

Borsa valori di Bratislava

Banca nazionale di Slovacchia

Slovenia

Mercato ufficiale borsa valori di Lubiana (Borzni trg)

Borsa valori di Lubiana (Ljubljanska borza)

Agenzia per i mercati mobiliari

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spagna

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (tutte comprendono segmenti di mercato primari e secondari) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (tutte comprendono segmenti di mercato primari e secondari)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España responsabile per il mercato del debito pubblico.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1. | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1.

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable; |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable;

| B2. | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2.

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C. | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C.

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E. | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E.

Banco de España

Svezia

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | mercato regolamentato per le azioni e gli strumenti finanziari equivalenti ad azioni |
| --- | --- |

—

mercato regolamentato per le azioni e gli strumenti finanziari equivalenti ad azioni

| — | mercato regolamentato per i derivati |
| --- | --- |

—

mercato regolamentato per i derivati

| — | mercato regolamentato per le obbligazioni e gli strumenti finanziari equivalenti ad obbligazioni |
| --- | --- |

—

mercato regolamentato per le obbligazioni e gli strumenti finanziari equivalenti ad obbligazioni

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (autorità per la vigilanza finanziaria)

Regno Unito

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Islanda

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (mercato regolamentato)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Autorità di Vigilanza finanziaria)

Liechtenstein

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Norvegia

| 1. | Borsa valori di Oslo (quotazione ufficiale)






  — | Mercato degli strumenti di equity |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Borsa valori di Oslo (quotazione ufficiale)

—

Mercato degli strumenti di equity

| — | Mercato degli strumenti derivati (finanziario) |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato degli strumenti derivati (finanziario)

| — | Mercato obbligazionario |
| --- | --- |

—

Mercato obbligazionario

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Autorità di Vigilanza finanziaria della Norvegia)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Mercato degli strumenti di equity |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Mercato degli strumenti di equity

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (quotazione ufficiale)






  — | Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (quotazione ufficiale)

—

Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Mercato degli strumenti derivati (prodotti di base)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/9

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Comunicazione della Commissione a norma dell’articolo 16, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1008/2008 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio recante norme comuni per la prestazione di servizi aerei nella Comunità

Oneri di servizio pubblico in relazione a servizi aerei di linea

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2009/C 158/04

| Stato membro | Italia |
| --- | --- |
| Rotta interessata | Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino e viceversa |
| Data di entrata in vigore degli oneri di servizio pubblico | 1o dicembre 2009 |
| Indirizzo presso il quale è possibile ottenere il testo e qualsiasi informazione e/o documentazione pertinente correlata agli oneri di servizio pubblico | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Stato membro

Italia

Rotta interessata

Bolzano — Roma Fiumicino e viceversa

Data di entrata in vigore degli oneri di servizio pubblico

1o dicembre 2009

Indirizzo presso il quale è possibile ottenere il testo e qualsiasi informazione e/o documentazione pertinente correlata agli oneri di servizio pubblico

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

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V Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/10

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INVITO A PRESENTARE PROPOSTE — EACEA/11/2009

Sostegno strutturale ai centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee e alle organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo

Programma «Europa per i cittadini», azione 2, misure 1 e 2 — 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   OBIETTIVI E DESCRIZIONE

Il presente invito a presentare proposte EACEA/11/2009 si basa sulla decisione del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce il programma «Europa per i cittadini» volto a promuovere la cittadinanza attiva europea per il periodo 2007-2013 (1) (nel prosieguo il «programma»).

Il programma rappresenta la base giuridica di questo invito che si riferisce in modo specifico all’azione 2 «Una società civile attiva in Europa», misure 1 e 2 «sostegno strutturale ai centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee e alle organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo».

1.1.   Obiettivi generali del programma

Il programma intende contribuire ai seguenti obiettivi generali:

| a) | dare ai cittadini l’opportunità di interagire e partecipare alla costruzione di un’Europa sempre più vicina, democratica e aperta al mondo, unita nella sua diversità culturale e da questa arricchita, sviluppando in tal modo la cittadinanza dell’Unione europea; |
| --- | --- |

a)

dare ai cittadini l’opportunità di interagire e partecipare alla costruzione di un’Europa sempre più vicina, democratica e aperta al mondo, unita nella sua diversità culturale e da questa arricchita, sviluppando in tal modo la cittadinanza dell’Unione europea;

| b) | sviluppare un’identità europea, fondata su valori, una storia e una cultura comuni; |
| --- | --- |

b)

sviluppare un’identità europea, fondata su valori, una storia e una cultura comuni;

| c) | promuovere un senso di appartenenza all’Unione europea tra i cittadini; |
| --- | --- |

c)

promuovere un senso di appartenenza all’Unione europea tra i cittadini;

| d) | migliorare la comprensione reciproca dei cittadini europei rispettando e promuovendo la diversità culturale e linguistica, contribuendo al dialogo interculturale. |
| --- | --- |

d)

migliorare la comprensione reciproca dei cittadini europei rispettando e promuovendo la diversità culturale e linguistica, contribuendo al dialogo interculturale.

1.2.   Obiettivi specifici dell’invito

Gli obiettivi specifici di questo invito a presentare proposte sono:

| a) | promuovere iniziative, dibattiti e riflessioni in materia di cittadinanza europea e democrazia, di valori, di storia e cultura comuni, grazie alle attività e alla cooperazione di «think tank» (strutture di riflessione) e di organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo; |
| --- | --- |

a)

promuovere iniziative, dibattiti e riflessioni in materia di cittadinanza europea e democrazia, di valori, di storia e cultura comuni, grazie alle attività e alla cooperazione di «think tank» (strutture di riflessione) e di organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo;

| b) | incoraggiare l’interazione tra cittadini e organizzazioni della società civile, contribuendo al dialogo interculturale e mettendo in evidenza la diversità e l’unità dell’Europa. |
| --- | --- |

b)

incoraggiare l’interazione tra cittadini e organizzazioni della società civile, contribuendo al dialogo interculturale e mettendo in evidenza la diversità e l’unità dell’Europa.

1.3.   Temi prioritari

| — | Futuro dell’Unione europea e i suoi valori di base |
| --- | --- |

—

Futuro dell’Unione europea e i suoi valori di base

| — | Cittadinanza europea attiva, partecipazione e democrazia |
| --- | --- |

—

Cittadinanza europea attiva, partecipazione e democrazia

| — | Dialogo interculturale |
| --- | --- |

—

Dialogo interculturale

| — | Impatto delle politiche comunitarie nelle società |
| --- | --- |

—

Impatto delle politiche comunitarie nelle società

| — | Benessere dei cittadini in Europa, occupazione, coesione sociale e sviluppo sostenibile |
| --- | --- |

—

Benessere dei cittadini in Europa, occupazione, coesione sociale e sviluppo sostenibile

1.4.   Descrizione dell’invito

Il presente invito riguarda il sostegno strutturale, inteso come sovvenzioni operative, a organizzazioni che perseguono uno scopo di interesse generale europeo. Le sovvenzioni operative forniscono un sostegno finanziario a una parte delle spese amministrative necessarie per la conduzione delle attività ricorrenti dell’organizzazione selezionata.

Il sostegno può essere concesso, sulla base di determinati criteri, sotto forma di sovvenzione annuale o di partenariato pluriennale. Il partenariato pluriennale è un meccanismo di cooperazione stabilito tra un organismo e l’Agenzia esecutiva per l’istruzione, gli audiovisivi e la cultura (in prosieguo «l’Agenzia esecutiva») che comporta sovvenzioni specifiche. Nel quadro del presente invito, tale partenariato potrà essere concluso per una durata di tre anni.

2.   CANDIDATI AMMISSIBILI

2.1.   Organizzazioni

Per accedere a una sovvenzione operativa, un’organizzazione che persegue uno scopo di interesse generale europeo deve:

| a) | essere senza scopo di lucro e possedere una personalità giuridica; in caso di rete che non dispone di struttura amministrativa separata con proprio statuto, la candidatura può essere presentata dall’organizzazione membro incaricata del coordinamento della rete; |
| --- | --- |

a)

essere senza scopo di lucro e possedere una personalità giuridica; in caso di rete che non dispone di struttura amministrativa separata con proprio statuto, la candidatura può essere presentata dall’organizzazione membro incaricata del coordinamento della rete;

| b) | essere attiva nel settore della cittadinanza europea, secondo quanto definito nel proprio statuto o mandato e corrispondere a una delle seguenti categorie di organizzazioni: | Misura 1:






  A. | Centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee (think tank — strutture di riflessione). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

essere attiva nel settore della cittadinanza europea, secondo quanto definito nel proprio statuto o mandato e corrispondere a una delle seguenti categorie di organizzazioni:

Misura 1:

A.

Centri di ricerca e di riflessione sulle politiche europee (think tank — strutture di riflessione).

| | Misura 2:






  B. | Organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo






  — | Organizzazioni centrali (piattaforme) europee |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Misura 2:

B.

Organizzazioni della società civile a livello europeo

—

Organizzazioni centrali (piattaforme) europee

| — | Reti europee |
| --- | --- |

—

Reti europee

| — | Organizzazioni che realizzano attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo |
| --- | --- |

—

Organizzazioni che realizzano attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo

| C. | Organizzazioni della società civile legate alla Memoria europea |
| --- | --- |

C.

Organizzazioni della società civile legate alla Memoria europea

| D. | Piattaforme di organizzazioni paneuropee; |
| --- | --- |

D.

Piattaforme di organizzazioni paneuropee;

| c) | svolgere la maggior parte delle proprie attività in paesi ammissibili (cfr. punto 2.2).

  Per un partenariato pluriennale, le organizzazioni devono essere legalmente stabilite e dotate di personalità giuridica da più di quattro (4) anni (al 15 ottobre 2009) in uno dei paesi ammissibili e avere, per le categorie sotto riportate, la seguente copertura geografica:






  — | per un’organizzazione centrale europea o una rete europea, avere membri in almeno dodici (12) paesi ammissibili, |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

svolgere la maggior parte delle proprie attività in paesi ammissibili (cfr. punto 2.2).

Per un partenariato pluriennale, le organizzazioni devono essere legalmente stabilite e dotate di personalità giuridica da più di quattro (4) anni (al 15 ottobre 2009) in uno dei paesi ammissibili e avere, per le categorie sotto riportate, la seguente copertura geografica:

—

per un’organizzazione centrale europea o una rete europea, avere membri in almeno dodici (12) paesi ammissibili,

| — | per un’organizzazione che realizza attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo, essere attiva in almeno dodici (12) paesi ammissibili, |
| --- | --- |

—

per un’organizzazione che realizza attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo, essere attiva in almeno dodici (12) paesi ammissibili,

| — | per una piattaforma di organizzazioni paneuropee, avere un minimo di sei (6) organizzazioni centrali in qualità di membri e garantire, attraverso queste ultime, una presenza nei 27 Stati membri. |
| --- | --- |

—

per una piattaforma di organizzazioni paneuropee, avere un minimo di sei (6) organizzazioni centrali in qualità di membri e garantire, attraverso queste ultime, una presenza nei 27 Stati membri.

Per una sovvenzione annuale, le organizzazioni devono essere legalmente stabilite e dotate di personalità giuridica da più di un (1) anno (al 15 ottobre 2009) in uno dei paesi ammissibili e avere, per le categorie sotto riportate, la seguente copertura geografica:

| — | per un’organizzazione centrale europea o una rete europea, avere membri in almeno otto (8) paesi ammissibili, |
| --- | --- |

—

per un’organizzazione centrale europea o una rete europea, avere membri in almeno otto (8) paesi ammissibili,

| — | per un’organizzazione che realizza attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo, essere attiva in almeno otto (8) paesi ammissibili. |
| --- | --- |

—

per un’organizzazione che realizza attività ad elevato impatto a livello europeo, essere attiva in almeno otto (8) paesi ammissibili.

Le piattaforme di organizzazioni paneuropee possono presentare una candidatura soltanto nel quadro di un partenariato pluriennale.

Le persone fisiche e gli organismi pubblici non sono ammissibili al presente invito.

2.2.   Paesi ammissibili

| a) | Gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea: Austria, Belgio, Bulgaria, Cipro, Danimarca, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Lettonia, Lituania, Lussemburgo, Malta, Paesi Bassi, Polonia, Portogallo, Regno Unito, Repubblica ceca, Romania, Slovacchia, Slovenia, Spagna, Svezia, Ungheria; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Gli Stati membri dell’Unione europea: Austria, Belgio, Bulgaria, Cipro, Danimarca, Estonia, Finlandia, Francia, Germania, Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Lettonia, Lituania, Lussemburgo, Malta, Paesi Bassi, Polonia, Portogallo, Regno Unito, Repubblica ceca, Romania, Slovacchia, Slovenia, Spagna, Svezia, Ungheria;

| b) | la Croazia; |
| --- | --- |

b)

la Croazia;

| c) | l’ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia; |
| --- | --- |

c)

l’ex Repubblica jugoslava di Macedonia;

| d) | l’Albania. |
| --- | --- |

d)

l’Albania.

3.   AZIONI AMMISSIBILI

Le attività dell’organizzazione candidata devono contribuire in maniera tangibile allo sviluppo e alla realizzazione degli obiettivi specifici e dei temi prioritari del presente invito. Devono comprendere almeno un obiettivo specifico e un tema prioritario tra quelli menzionati al punto 1.

Il programma di lavoro dell’organizzazione candidata per il 2010 e il programma strategico di tre anni (in caso di partenariato pluriennale) devono comprendere le attività statutarie, in particolare conferenze, seminari, tavole rotonde, azioni di rappresentanza, comunicazione e valorizzazione, e altre attività europee ricorrenti.

Periodo di ammissibilità

Sia per una sovvenzione annuale sia per un partenariato pluriennale il periodo di ammissibilità deve corrispondere all’esercizio finanziario del candidato, quale risulta dai conti certificati dell’organizzazione. Se l’esercizio finanziario coincide con l’anno solare, il periodo di ammissibilità andrà dal 1o gennaio 2009 al 31 dicembre 2010.

Se l’esercizio finanziario del candidato è diverso dall’anno solare, il periodo di ammissibilità è di 12 mesi decorrenti dalla data in cui avrà inizio l’esercizio finanziario nel 2010.

4.   CRITERI DI ASSEGNAZIONE

Le candidature conformi ai criteri di ammissibilità e di esclusione saranno valutate sulla base di criteri di assegnazione da un comitato di valutazione al fine di selezionare quelle che possono essere cofinanziate.

Saranno applicati i criteri di assegnazione di seguito specificati. I criteri qualitativi e quantitativi rappresentano rispettivamente l’80 % e il 20 % del punteggio complessivo. Nel caso di un partenariato pluriennale, lo stesso peso sarà attribuito al programma di lavoro di 12 mesi e al programma strategico di tre anni.

4.1.   Criteri qualitativi (80 %)

Sono valutati i seguenti elementi:

| a) | rilevanza rispetto agli obiettivi e alle priorità del programma «Europa per i cittadini» (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

rilevanza rispetto agli obiettivi e alle priorità del programma «Europa per i cittadini» (30 %);

| b) | adeguatezza, coerenza e completezza del programma di lavoro (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

b)

adeguatezza, coerenza e completezza del programma di lavoro (20 %);

| c) | impatto del programma di lavoro (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

c)

impatto del programma di lavoro (10 %);

| d) | valore aggiunto europeo (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

d)

valore aggiunto europeo (10 %);

| e) | visibilità delle attività, divulgazione e valorizzazione dei risultati verso i cittadini europei e le altre parti interessate (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

visibilità delle attività, divulgazione e valorizzazione dei risultati verso i cittadini europei e le altre parti interessate (10 %).

4.2.   Criteri quantitativi (20 %)

Sono valutati i seguenti elementi:

| a) | numero dei paesi ammissibili coinvolti nelle attività del programma di lavoro (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

a)

numero dei paesi ammissibili coinvolti nelle attività del programma di lavoro (10 %).

| b) | numero di beneficiari diretti potenziali (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

numero di beneficiari diretti potenziali (10 %).

5.   BILANCIO

Il bilancio complessivo previsto per il cofinanziamento delle sovvenzioni operative è di 8,2 Mio EUR nel 2010. L’Agenzia esecutiva intende finanziare circa 55 organizzazioni nel quadro del presente invito, ma si riserva il diritto, sulla base della qualità delle candidature, di non utilizzare tutti i fondi disponibili.

A titolo indicativo, le sovvenzioni di partenariato pluriennale rappresentano circa l’85 % del bilancio disponibile e le sovvenzioni annuali circa il 15 %.

Il sostegno verrà imputato alla voce 15.06.66 del bilancio generale dell’Unione europea.

6.   TERMINE ULTIMO PER LA PRESENTAZIONE DELLE CANDIDATURE

Il termine ultimo per la presentazione dei fascicoli di candidatura è il 15 ottobre 2009.

L’Agenzia esecutiva sta attualmente lavorando alla creazione di un sistema di presentazione elettronica di tutte le candidature.

Per il presente invito, i candidati devono inviare la propria domanda tramite un modulo elettronico disponibile a partire dal 15 settembre 2009. Questa versione (allegati compresi) è considerata la versione principale. Prima di tale data, l’Agenzia esecutiva propone una versione pdf del modulo per consentire ai candidati di iniziare a preparate il proprio fascicolo.

Inoltre, una versione cartacea del fascicolo di candidatura deve essere inviata tramite posta entro il termine ultimo al seguente indirizzo:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Saranno accettate soltanto le candidature presentate utilizzando il modulo ufficiale, debitamente compilato, datato e firmato dalla persona autorizzata ad assumere impegni giuridicamente vincolanti a nome dell’offerente.

7.   INFORMAZIONI COMPLETE

Le linee guida dettagliate per i candidati e i moduli di candidatura sono disponibili al seguente indirizzo: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Decisione n. 1904/2006/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 12 dicembre 2006 (GU L 378 del 27.12.2006, pag. 32), modificata dalla decisione n. 1358/2008/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio del 16 dicembre 2008 (GU L 350 del 30.12.2008.).

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PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/13

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AIUTI DI STATO — PAESI BASSI

Aiuto di Stato C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING

Invito a presentare osservazioni a norma dell'articolo 88, paragrafo 2, del trattato CE

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

2009/C 158/06

Con la lettera del 31 marzo 2009, riprodotta nella lingua facente fede dopo la presente sintesi, la Commissione ha comunicato ai Paesi Bassi la propria decisione di avviare il procedimento di cui all'articolo 88, paragrafo 2, del trattato CE in relazione all'aiuto in oggetto.

La Commissione invita gli interessati a presentare osservazioni in merito alla misura riguardo alla quale viene avviato il procedimento entro un mese dalla data della presente pubblicazione, inviandole al seguente indirizzo:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Dette osservazioni saranno comunicate ai Paesi Bassi. Su richiesta scritta e motivata degli autori delle osservazioni, la loro identità non sarà rivelata.

SINTESI

PROCEDIMENTO

Il 4 marzo 2009, le autorità dei Paesi Bassi hanno notificato alla Commissione una misura di sostegno alle attività illiquide di ING Support Holding (una controllata diretta del gruppo ING).

I FATTI

ING, la cui sede principale è nei paesi Bassi, è una delle più grandi istituzioni finanziarie a livello mondiale, con un totale di bilancio di 1 332 miliardi di EUR. Nel gennaio 2009, lo Stato olandese e ING hanno firmato un accordo (term sheet) per il trasferimento dei rischi e dei rendimenti di una parte del portafoglio RMBS di ING basato negli USA. Quest'ultimo è composto prevalentemente da titoli Alt-A. Il saldo in essere del portafoglio di ING ammonta a 39 miliardi di USD (valore alla pari, 30 miliardi di EUR).

La misura in esame consiste in uno swap di flussi di cassa tra lo Stato olandese e ING, mediante il quale ING trasferisce i proventi dell'80 % del valore alla pari del portafoglio (interessi e rimborsi di capitale) in cambio di pagamenti statali garantiti sul 72 % (vale a dire 80 % del 90 %) del valore alla pari del portafoglio (solo capitale), integrato da una commissione di finanziamento pagata dallo Stato a ING pari al 3,50 % per la parte di titoli a tasso fisso del portafoglio e al tasso Libor a 1 mese USD + 50 pb per la parte di titoli a tasso variabile del portafoglio.

Lo Stato olandese paga a ING un'ulteriore commissione di gestione di 25 pb per anno sull'importo del capitale in essere. In cambio di questa misura, ING paga allo Stato olandese una commissione di garanzia annua di 55 pb sull'80 % dell'importo del portafoglio in essere.

VALUTAZIONE

La Commissione ha analizzato l'operazione alla luce della comunicazione sulle attività deteriorate. In questa fase, la Commissione nutre dubbi circa la valutazione e in particolare circa il metodo di valutazione con il quale è stato stimato il reale valore economico. La Commissione ritiene di dover esaminare ulteriormente le ipotesi di base fornite dallo Stato olandese, in particolare per quanto riguarda i) la scelta del tasso di attualizzazione, ii) le ipotesi relative ai prezzi delle abitazioni, iii) il livello di supporto del credito e iv) altre questioni relative alla valutazione.

La Commissione nutre di conseguenza dubbi anche sull'adeguatezza della condivisione degli oneri tra lo Stato e ING. La Commissione si chiede se realmente la banca si fa carico della differenza tra il valore nominale e il reale valore economico del portafoglio, in considerazione dei dubbi circa la stima del valore sopra esposti. La Commissione non è neanche certa che lo swap di flussi di cassa di cui sopra sia per lo Stato tanto vantaggioso quanto è stato indicato. In special modo, la Commissione nutre qualche dubbio circa l'adeguatezza della commissione di gestione del portafoglio, in quanto tale gestione non sembra essere particolarmente impegnativa.

Dal momento che la misura è conforme a molte delle condizioni stabilite nella comunicazione sulle attività deteriorate e in considerazione della necessità di preservare la stabilità finanziaria, la Commissione ha deciso di approvare la misura per un periodo di sei mesi. Allo stesso tempo, alla luce delle considerazioni di cui sopra, la Commissione ha anche deciso di avviare la procedura di cui all'articolo 88, paragrafo 2, del trattato CE al fine di verificare il rispetto da parte della misura delle condizioni fissate dalla comunicazione sulle attività deteriorate relativamente alla valutazione (compreso il metodo di valutazione) e alla condivisione degli oneri.

TESTO DELLA LETTERA

«The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
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(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
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(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
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(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
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(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
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(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
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(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
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(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
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(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
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(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
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(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
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(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
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(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
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(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
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(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
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(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
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(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
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(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
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(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
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(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
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(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
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—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
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(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
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(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
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(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
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(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
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(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.»

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

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ALTRI ATTI

Commissione

| 11.7.2009 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 158/24

---

Pubblicazione della domanda di registrazione conformemente all'articolo 8 paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio, relativo alle specialità tradizionali garantite dei prodotti agricoli e alimentari

2009/C 158/07

La presente pubblicazione conferisce il diritto di opporsi alla registrazione proposta conformemente all'articolo 9 del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006 del Consiglio. Le dichiarazioni di opposizione devono pervenire alla Commissione entro sei mesi dalla data della presente pubblicazione.

DOMANDA DI REGISTRAZIONE DI UNA STG

REGOLAMENTO (CE) N. 509/2006 DEL CONSIGLIO

«KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA»

N. CE: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Nome e indirizzo del richiedente:

Nome: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Indirizzo:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tel. +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

Indirizzo di posta elettronica: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Stato membro o paese terzo:

Polonia

3.   Disciplinare del prodotto:

3.1.   Nome (nomi) da registrare [articolo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007 della Commissione]:

«Kiełbasa jałowcowa»

3.2.   Si tratta di un nome:

 specifico in sé e per sé

Image

Il nome kiełbasa jałowcowa (salsiccia di ginepro) rispecchia la natura specifica del prodotto. Tali peculiarità sono dovute all'utilizzazione nel processo produttivo dei frutti dell'arbusto del ginepro (Juniperus), finemente triturati prima di essere aggiunti alla carne, e all'utilizzazione di rami di ginepro durante il processo di affumicazione.

3.3.   La domanda prevede l’uso riservato del nome ai sensi dell'articolo 13, paragrafo 2 del regolamento (CE) n. 509/2006:

 Registrazione con l’uso riservato del nome

Image

3.4.   Tipo di prodotto:

| Clase 1.2 — | Prodotti a base di carne (riscaldati, salati, affumicati, ecc.) |
| --- | --- |

Clase 1.2 —

Prodotti a base di carne (riscaldati, salati, affumicati, ecc.)

3.5.   Descrizione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare che reca il nome indicato al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 1, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]:

La kiełbasa jałowcowa ha l'aspetto di una salsiccia dalla superficie uniformemente rugosa a forma di corona. Ha una tipica conformazione circolare, senza pieghe longitudinali esterne profonde. Le corone di salsicce kiełbasa jałowcowa possono essere di due dimensioni:

| — | piccole, in budelli naturali del diametro superiore a 32 mm e del peso di circa 0,5 kg; |
| --- | --- |

—

piccole, in budelli naturali del diametro superiore a 32 mm e del peso di circa 0,5 kg;

| — | grandi, in budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi di proteine del diametro superiore a 36 mm e del peso di circa 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

grandi, in budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi di proteine del diametro superiore a 36 mm e del peso di circa 0,8 kg.

La kiełbasa jałowcowa ha un colore marrone scuro, uniforme su tutta la superficie, tipico dei prodotti molto affumicati.

La consistenza e «l'impressione al tatto» è quella di una superficie liscia, asciutta e rugosa con un budello che aderisce strettamente all'imbottitura.

Il gusto e la morbidezza particolari derivano dalla scelta delle materie prime, delle spezie (e segnatamente del ginepro) nonché dall'affumicatura naturale che è parte del processo di produzione.

Composizione chimica:

| — | contenuto di proteine non inferiore al 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di proteine non inferiore al 15,0 %,

| — | contenuto di acqua non superiore al 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di acqua non superiore al 60,0 %,

| — | contenuto di grassi non superiore al 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di grassi non superiore al 35,0 %,

| — | contenuto di sale non superiore al 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di sale non superiore al 3,5 %,

| — | contenuto di nitrati (III) e nitrati (V) espresso in NaNO2, non superiore allo 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di nitrati (III) e nitrati (V) espresso in NaNO2, non superiore allo 0,0125 %.

Tale composizione chimica garantisce la qualità tradizionale del prodotto. La quantità di prodotto finito ottenuta è pari al 75 % (+/–3 %) della quantità della carne utilizzata come materia prima.

3.6.   Descrizione del metodo di produzione del prodotto agricolo o alimentare che reca il nome indicato al punto 3.1 [articolo 3, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]:

Componenti

| | Carne (100 kg materia prima):






  — | carne suina di qualità I con un contenuto di grassi pari al 15 % — 20 Kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Carne (100 kg materia prima):

—

carne suina di qualità I con un contenuto di grassi pari al 15 % — 20 Kg

| — | carne suina di qualità IIA con un contenuto di grassi pari al 20 % — 50 Kg |
| --- | --- |

—

carne suina di qualità IIA con un contenuto di grassi pari al 20 % — 50 Kg

| — | carne suina di qualità III — carne tendinea con un contenuto di grassi pari al 25 % — 20 Kg |
| --- | --- |

—

carne suina di qualità III — carne tendinea con un contenuto di grassi pari al 25 % — 20 Kg

| — | grasso duro sminuzzato — 10 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

grasso duro sminuzzato — 10 kg

E' ammessa la sostituzione del 50 % della carne suina di classe IIA o III con carne bovina.

| | Aggiunte (per 100 kg di carne):






  — | pepe naturale 0,17 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Aggiunte (per 100 kg di carne):

—

pepe naturale 0,17 kg

| — | ginepro 0,12 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

ginepro 0,12 kg

| — | zucchero 0,20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

zucchero 0,20 kg

| | Altri:






  — | miscuglio di sale e salnitro [sulla base di sale da cucina (Na CL) e nitrito di sodio (NaNO2)]: circa 2 kg; |
| --- | --- | --- |

Altri:

—

miscuglio di sale e salnitro [sulla base di sale da cucina (Na CL) e nitrito di sodio (NaNO2)]: circa 2 kg;

L'alimentazione dei suini la cui carne è destinata alla produzione di kiełbasa jałowcowa

L'alimentazione mira all'ingrasso dei suini al fine di ottenere suini di un peso fino a 120 kg la cui carne abbia un tenore di grasso intramuscolare superiore al 3 %.

| — | Le razze scelte per l’ingrasso sono razze a crescita lenta, ciò che permette, quando l'operazione riesce, di ottenere il tenore di grasso intramuscolare richiesto. Le razze utilizzate per l'ingrasso non possiedono il gene RN- e la frequenza del gene RYR 1T si riscontra nel 20 % degli esemplari. |
| --- | --- |

—

Le razze scelte per l’ingrasso sono razze a crescita lenta, ciò che permette, quando l'operazione riesce, di ottenere il tenore di grasso intramuscolare richiesto. Le razze utilizzate per l'ingrasso non possiedono il gene RN- e la frequenza del gene RYR 1T si riscontra nel 20 % degli esemplari.

| — | L'ingrasso deve svolgersi in tre fasi: la prima fase fino ai 60 kg di peso, la seconda fino ai 90 e la terza fino ai 120. |
| --- | --- |

—

L'ingrasso deve svolgersi in tre fasi: la prima fase fino ai 60 kg di peso, la seconda fino ai 90 e la terza fino ai 120.

| — | L’ingrasso dei capi fino ai 90 kg circa di peso viene effettuato sulla base di due tipi di miscuglio. La composizione dei miscugli (dosi) è la seguente: |
| --- | --- |

—

L’ingrasso dei capi fino ai 90 kg circa di peso viene effettuato sulla base di due tipi di miscuglio. La composizione dei miscugli (dosi) è la seguente:

| — | componenti energetiche: semole di cereali — grano, orzo, segale, avena, triticale e mais; la semola di mais e la semola di avena possono costituire fino al 30 % del composto, |
| --- | --- |

—

componenti energetiche: semole di cereali — grano, orzo, segale, avena, triticale e mais; la semola di mais e la semola di avena possono costituire fino al 30 % del composto,

| — | componenti proteiche: semola di lupini, di fave, di piselli, di soia e di colza, panelli di colza, lieviti di foraggio, foraggio essiccato. |
| --- | --- |

—

componenti proteiche: semola di lupini, di fave, di piselli, di soia e di colza, panelli di colza, lieviti di foraggio, foraggio essiccato.

| — | La composizione dei miscugli (dosi) per i capi da 90 a 120 kg: |
| --- | --- |

—

La composizione dei miscugli (dosi) per i capi da 90 a 120 kg:

| — | componenti energetiche: semole di grano, orzo, segale, triticale. Non può essere utilizzata la semola di mais o di avena, |
| --- | --- |

—

componenti energetiche: semole di grano, orzo, segale, triticale. Non può essere utilizzata la semola di mais o di avena,

| — | componenti proteiche: semole di legumi (lupini, fave, piselli), semola di soia, panelli o semola di colza o foraggio essiccato. |
| --- | --- |

—

componenti proteiche: semole di legumi (lupini, fave, piselli), semola di soia, panelli o semola di colza o foraggio essiccato.

| — | Durante tutto il periodo dell'ingrasso, è vietato utilizzare nei miscugli e nelle dosi oli vegetali e alimenti di origine animale (latte in polvere, siero di latte secco, farina di pesce). |
| --- | --- |

—

Durante tutto il periodo dell'ingrasso, è vietato utilizzare nei miscugli e nelle dosi oli vegetali e alimenti di origine animale (latte in polvere, siero di latte secco, farina di pesce).

| — | La quantità di energia metabolica in tutte le fasi dell'ingrasso varia da 12 a 13 MJ EM/kg di miscuglio. Il contenuto di proteine dei miscugli nella prima fase di ingrasso si colloca tra il 16 e il 18 % circa della quantità del miscuglio, quella dei miscugli della seconda fase tra il 15 e il 16 % circa della quantità del miscuglio e quella della terza fase a circa il 14 % della quantità del miscuglio. |
| --- | --- |

—

La quantità di energia metabolica in tutte le fasi dell'ingrasso varia da 12 a 13 MJ EM/kg di miscuglio. Il contenuto di proteine dei miscugli nella prima fase di ingrasso si colloca tra il 16 e il 18 % circa della quantità del miscuglio, quella dei miscugli della seconda fase tra il 15 e il 16 % circa della quantità del miscuglio e quella della terza fase a circa il 14 % della quantità del miscuglio.

| — | Le razioni destinate ai suini per l'ingrasso possono essere costituite da miscugli nutritivi unicamente, oppure da miscugli nutritivi e da alimenti materie prime (patate e foraggio). |
| --- | --- |

—

Le razioni destinate ai suini per l'ingrasso possono essere costituite da miscugli nutritivi unicamente, oppure da miscugli nutritivi e da alimenti materie prime (patate e foraggio).

Fasi della produzione della kiełbasa jałowcowa

| Fase 1 | Sminuzzamento graduale di tutta la carne materia prima. I pezzi di carne devono avere dimensioni uniformi ( circa 5 cm di diametro). |
| --- | --- |

Fase 1

Sminuzzamento graduale di tutta la carne materia prima. I pezzi di carne devono avere dimensioni uniformi ( circa 5 cm di diametro).

| Fase 2 | Trattamento tradizionale con sale e salnitro (con il metodo a secco) della durata di circa 48 ore mediante applicazione del miscuglio di sale e salnitro. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 2

Trattamento tradizionale con sale e salnitro (con il metodo a secco) della durata di circa 48 ore mediante applicazione del miscuglio di sale e salnitro.

| Fase 3 | Lavorazione meccanica: sminuzzamento della carne di qualità I a dimensioni di circa 20 mm, sminuzzamento della carne di qualità IIA a dimensioni di circa 8 mm, sminuzzamento della carne di qualità III a dimensioni di circa 3 mm e successivamente sminuzzamento con l'aggiunta di 5 kg di ghiaccio. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 3

Lavorazione meccanica: sminuzzamento della carne di qualità I a dimensioni di circa 20 mm, sminuzzamento della carne di qualità IIA a dimensioni di circa 8 mm, sminuzzamento della carne di qualità III a dimensioni di circa 3 mm e successivamente sminuzzamento con l'aggiunta di 5 kg di ghiaccio.

| Fase 4 | Mescolare tutti i tipi di carne aggiungendo le seguenti spezie: pepe naturale, zucchero, ginepro triturato direttamente prima di aggiungerli al miscuglio. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 4

Mescolare tutti i tipi di carne aggiungendo le seguenti spezie: pepe naturale, zucchero, ginepro triturato direttamente prima di aggiungerli al miscuglio.

| Fase 5 | Inserimento in budelli naturali di suino del diametro superiore a 32 mm o in budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi di proteine del diametro di 36 mm, legatura delle salsicce e formazione della corona. I due tipi diversi di budello portano alla produzione di due tipi diversi di salsicce:






  — | le salsicce a corona più piccola, del peso di 0,5 kg, quando si utilizzano budelli sottili di suino; |
| --- | --- | --- |

Fase 5

Inserimento in budelli naturali di suino del diametro superiore a 32 mm o in budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi di proteine del diametro di 36 mm, legatura delle salsicce e formazione della corona. I due tipi diversi di budello portano alla produzione di due tipi diversi di salsicce:

—

le salsicce a corona più piccola, del peso di 0,5 kg, quando si utilizzano budelli sottili di suino;

| — | le salsicce a corona più grande, del peso di 0,8 kg, quando si utilizzano budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi proteica. |
| --- | --- |

—

le salsicce a corona più grande, del peso di 0,8 kg, quando si utilizzano budelli ottenuti dalla sintesi proteica.

| Fase 6 | Esposizione a una temperatura non superiore a 30o C per 2 ore. Successivamente, essiccazione della superficie, «sistemazione» degli ingredienti all'interno dei salamini. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 6

Esposizione a una temperatura non superiore a 30o C per 2 ore. Successivamente, essiccazione della superficie, «sistemazione» degli ingredienti all'interno dei salamini.

| Fase 7 | Essiccazione della superficie e affumicatura tradizionale con fumo caldo (per circa 120 minuti) poi cottura in forno fino a raggiungere all'interno delle salsicce una temperatura di almeno 70o C. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 7

Essiccazione della superficie e affumicatura tradizionale con fumo caldo (per circa 120 minuti) poi cottura in forno fino a raggiungere all'interno delle salsicce una temperatura di almeno 70o C.

| Fase 8 | Raffreddamento durante 24 ore |
| --- | --- |

Fase 8

Raffreddamento durante 24 ore

| Fase 9 | Affumicazione a freddo utilizzando trucioli di quercia e rami di ginepro (per circa 120 minuti) e successivamente asciugatura a una temperatura compresa tra i 14 e i 18o C per 3-5 giorni fino all'ottenimento del prodotto desiderato [75 % (+/–3 %)]. |
| --- | --- |

Fase 9

Affumicazione a freddo utilizzando trucioli di quercia e rami di ginepro (per circa 120 minuti) e successivamente asciugatura a una temperatura compresa tra i 14 e i 18o C per 3-5 giorni fino all'ottenimento del prodotto desiderato [75 % (+/–3 %)].

3.7.   Specificità del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 3, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]

Il carattere specifico della kiełbasa jałowcowa deriva da alcune caratteristiche tipiche del prodotto:

| — | la morbidezza e la specificità della carne, |
| --- | --- |

—

la morbidezza e la specificità della carne,

| — | l'eccezionalità del gusto e dell'odore, |
| --- | --- |

—

l'eccezionalità del gusto e dell'odore,

| — | l'unicità della forma. |
| --- | --- |

—

l'unicità della forma.

Morbidezza, succosità e specificità della carne

L'ingrediente essenziale che conferisce alla kiełbasa jałowcowa la sua specificità è la carne suina, proveniente da razze suine a crescita lenta, ingrassate fino a 120 kg, con le caratteristiche genetiche descritte al punto 3.6. Il rispetto di tali requisiti permette di ottenere un tenore di grasso intramuscolare superiore al 3 %, che garantisce al prodotto le qualità di gusto desiderate e la qualità tecnologica necessaria per la produzione della kiełbasa jałowcowa. L’utilizzazione di tale ingrediente di base e il rispetto del metodo tradizionale di preparazione in tutte la fasi, durante lo sminuzzamento, il trattamento con sale e salnitro e l'affumicatura, rendono il prodotto eccezionalmente tenero e succoso.

Eccezionalità del gusto e dell'odore

Il carattere specifico della kiełbasa jałowcowa consiste prima di tutto nell'eccezionalità del sapore e dell'odore che derivano dall'utilizzazione nel processo produttivo dei frutti dell'arbusto del ginepro (Juniperus). Lo spezzettamento del ginepro subito prima dell'inizio del processo produttivo intensifica il gusto tipico della salsiccia e influisce sul suo carattere specifico mentre l'affumicatura con fumo di rami di ginepro ne arricchisce il sapore e le conferisce l'odore eccezionale.

Forma unica, caratteristica

Una caratteristica distintiva della kiełbasa jałowcowa è la sua forma. La kiełbasa jałowcowa viene commercializzata esclusivamente in due forme, molto simili tra loro, ed è quindi facilmente riconoscibile dai consumatori. La kiełbasa jałowcowa ha l'aspetto di una salsiccia dalla superficie uniformemente rugosa a forma di corona. Ha una tipica conformazione circolare, senza pieghe longitudinali esterne profonde.

3.8.   Specificità del prodotto agricolo o alimentare [articolo 3, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]:

Materie prime tradizionali

| 1. | Ginepro (Juniperus):
  La Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Grande Enciclopedia Universale illustrata) del 1903 descrive tra le caratteristiche tipiche di questo arbusto, che cresce da secoli sul territorio della Polonia, la proprietà del ginepro di emettere un buon aroma quando lo si brucia. L'Enciclopedia aggiunge inoltre che i rami, i trucioli e le bacche di ginepro possono essere utilizzati nel processo di affumicatura come una sorta di incenso che conferisce alla carne un gusto e un aroma squisito. Vi sono documenti della seconda metà del secolo XIX che dimostrano che già allora il ginepro veniva utilizzato come aggiunta o ingrediente di pietanze e prodotti a base di carne. L'edizione del 1863 dell'Enciclopedia Universale pubblicata a Varsavia afferma: «Le bacche di ginepro hanno un gusto speziato, agrodolce e un odore piacevole; sono spezie (...) universalmente note.» Il metodo armonizzato di produzione della kiełbasa con bacche di ginepro e affumicatura con rami di ginepro è stato creato tra gli anni '40 e '50 del XX secolo in Polonia, come testimonia l'articolo «Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku», pubblicato sulla rivista del settore «Gospodarka Mięsna» (n. 3 del 1954). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Ginepro (Juniperus):

La Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Grande Enciclopedia Universale illustrata) del 1903 descrive tra le caratteristiche tipiche di questo arbusto, che cresce da secoli sul territorio della Polonia, la proprietà del ginepro di emettere un buon aroma quando lo si brucia. L'Enciclopedia aggiunge inoltre che i rami, i trucioli e le bacche di ginepro possono essere utilizzati nel processo di affumicatura come una sorta di incenso che conferisce alla carne un gusto e un aroma squisito. Vi sono documenti della seconda metà del secolo XIX che dimostrano che già allora il ginepro veniva utilizzato come aggiunta o ingrediente di pietanze e prodotti a base di carne. L'edizione del 1863 dell'Enciclopedia Universale pubblicata a Varsavia afferma: «Le bacche di ginepro hanno un gusto speziato, agrodolce e un odore piacevole; sono spezie (...) universalmente note.» Il metodo armonizzato di produzione della kiełbasa con bacche di ginepro e affumicatura con rami di ginepro è stato creato tra gli anni '40 e '50 del XX secolo in Polonia, come testimonia l'articolo «Regulacja asortymentów wędlin na zaopatrzenie rynku», pubblicato sulla rivista del settore «Gospodarka Mięsna» (n. 3 del 1954).

| 2. | Carne suina:
  La carne dei suini allevati per la produzione della kiełbasa jałowcowa deve avere un contenuto di grasso intramuscolare superiore al 3 %; è questa la «marmoreità» della carne che conferisce al prodotto la sua morbidezza, succosità e gusto straordinario. L'utilizzazione di tale tipo di carne influisce decisamente sulla qualità del prodotto finale, sul suo carattere specifico ed è compatibile con il metodo tradizionale di produzione. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Carne suina:

La carne dei suini allevati per la produzione della kiełbasa jałowcowa deve avere un contenuto di grasso intramuscolare superiore al 3 %; è questa la «marmoreità» della carne che conferisce al prodotto la sua morbidezza, succosità e gusto straordinario. L'utilizzazione di tale tipo di carne influisce decisamente sulla qualità del prodotto finale, sul suo carattere specifico ed è compatibile con il metodo tradizionale di produzione.

Metodo tradizionale di produzione e composizione

L'affumicatura è un modo per conservare la carne e il metodo più diffuso di affumicatura era con il ginepro. Se ne trovano testimonianze in antichi manoscritti polacchi, come gli appunti dell'anonimo amministratore di una tenuta nobiliare degli anni ' 80 del XVIII secolo in cui si trovano le ricette per la preparazione degli insaccati [Manoscritto — Archivio principale degli atti antichi (AGAD) Varsavia «Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego», n. 1249]. Il grande poeta nazionale, Adam Mickiewicz, offre una testimonianza della popolarità dell'affumicatura con ginepro nella descrizione di una colazione nobiliare nel poema «Pan Tadeusz» del 1834: «tutti salumi prelibati: salumi fatti in casa e affumicati nel camino con il ginepro».

La tradizione di condire e affumicare la carne con il ginepro era coltivata con varianti locali e regionali che si distinguevano per lievi differenze nelle tecniche di preparazione e , talvolta, per il diverso tipo di carni utilizzate. Come ricorda W. Łęg, autore di «Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin» (Gospodarka Mięsna, 1953, n. 6), erano stati fatti esperimenti di selvaggina (lepre o cinghiale con l'aggiunta di carne suina) con ginepro. I salumi così preparati avevano un sapore diverso ma sostanzialmente la ricetta utilizzata (farcitura e affumicatura con ginepro) era la stessa ovunque. Un esperto del settore delle carni, in viaggio nella regione di Kurpie, così scriveva in un articolo sulla variante locale della kiełbasa jałowcowa pubblicato su «Gospodarka Mięsna» (1950, n. 7-8): «Salame di Myszyniec, nella regione di Kurpie, affumicato con il ginepro e farcito di bacche di ginepro; secco, con un gusto e un aroma straordinariamente originali e squisiti»

Dopo il 1945, conformemente alla dottrina della pianificazione centralizzata, si è deciso di impiantare un'industria della carne basata su grandi stabilimenti di produzione. Con l'intento di migliorare la qualità ed il sapore dei salumi si è proceduto ad armonizzare la produzione e ad introdurre tecniche basate sulle ricette tradizionali. La denominazione «kiełbasa jałowcowa» fa la sua prima comparsa nelle normative in materia di alimenti tra il 1947 e il 1948. Nel 1954 sono state unificate le norme relative alla kiełbasa jałowcowa che successivamente sono entrate nella Norma della centrale dell’industria della carne del 1964. (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Varsavia 1964) che è alla base della presente richiesta.

Le norme sono state elaborate al fine di garantire la qualità più elevata possibile di kiełbasa jałowcowa. Benché al momento attuale le norme su cui si basa la presente domanda non sono vincolanti, in ogni caso esse rappresentano ancora gli standard più elevati per la produzione della «kiełbasa jałowcowa».

3.9.   Requisiti minimi e procedure di controllo della specificità del prodotto [articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 1216/2007]:

In considerazione delle caratteristiche specifiche della kiełbasa jałowcowa, occorre controllare, in particolare, quanto segue:

| 1. | Qualità della materia prima impiegata nella produzione (carne suina, spezie):






  — | controllo della qualità tecnica della carne, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Qualità della materia prima impiegata nella produzione (carne suina, spezie):

—

controllo della qualità tecnica della carne,

| — | tipo di grasso, |
| --- | --- |

—

tipo di grasso,

| — | durata del trattamento con sale e salnitro, |
| --- | --- |

—

durata del trattamento con sale e salnitro,

| — | le spezie utilizzate per la produzione e le loro dosi. |
| --- | --- |

—

le spezie utilizzate per la produzione e le loro dosi.

| 2. | Processo di affumicatura della kiełbasa jałowcowa
  Nel corso del controllo occorre verificare:






  — | il rispetto della temperatura tradizionale di affumicazione con fumo caldo e della temperatura di riscaldamento, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Processo di affumicatura della kiełbasa jałowcowa

Nel corso del controllo occorre verificare:

—

il rispetto della temperatura tradizionale di affumicazione con fumo caldo e della temperatura di riscaldamento,

| — | il rispetto dei tempi e della temperatura per quanto riguarda la successiva affumicazione con fumo freddo, |
| --- | --- |

—

il rispetto dei tempi e della temperatura per quanto riguarda la successiva affumicazione con fumo freddo,

| — | l'utilizzazione di trucioli di quercia e di rami di ginepro per l'affumicazione a freddo. |
| --- | --- |

—

l'utilizzazione di trucioli di quercia e di rami di ginepro per l'affumicazione a freddo.

| 3. | Qualità del prodotto finale:






  — | contenuto proteico, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Qualità del prodotto finale:

—

contenuto proteico,

| — | contenuto di acqua, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di acqua,

| — | contenuto di grassi, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di grassi,

| — | contenuto di cloruro di sodio, |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di cloruro di sodio,

| — | contenuto di nitrati (III) e di nitrati (V), |
| --- | --- |

—

contenuto di nitrati (III) e di nitrati (V),

| — | gusto e odore. |
| --- | --- |

—

gusto e odore.

| 4. | Forma del prodotto: |
| --- | --- |

4.

Forma del prodotto:

Intensità dei controlli

Il controllo in tutte le fasi deve avvenire una volta ogni due mesi. Quando tutte le fasi vengono effettuate correttamente, l'intensità del controllo può limitarsi a due volte all'anno.

Qualora in una fase vengano riscontrate irregolarità, occorre intensificare i controlli (una volta ogni due mesi). Le altre fasi possono essere controllate una volta ogni sei mesi.

4.   Organi o enti responsabili del controllo del disciplinare del prodotto:

4.1.   Nome e indirizzo:

Nome: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Indirizzo:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Telefono +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

Indirizzo di posta elettronica: —

Image Organo pubblico/ente pubblico  Organo privato/ente privato

4.2.   Compiti specifici dell'organo o ente:

L'organo superiore di controllo è responsabile del controllo del disciplinare del prodotto.

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