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Appeals.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39546

CREIG BUTLER, 

Judgment Creditor-Appellee, 

v. 

MOTIVA PERFORMANCE 

ENGINEERING, LLC, 

Judgment Debtor,

and 

DEALERBANK FINANCAL SERVICES,

LTD; and ARMAGEDDON HIGH

PERFORMANCE SOLUTIONS, LLC;

Relief Defendants,

and

WILLIAM S. FERGUSON,

Relief Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

Victor S. Lopez, District Court Judge

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.

Spencer L. Edelman

Elizabeth A. Martinez

Laura M. Unklesbay

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee
Kennedy, Hernandez & Harrison, P.C. 

Paul J. Kennedy

Jessica M. Hernandez

Elizabeth A. Harrison

Esther C. Jamison

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} Appellant William S. Ferguson appeals the sanctions in the district court’s order 

of civil contempt. His argument on appeal is twofold. First, he argues that the sanctions 

imposed on him in paragraph C of the order of civil contempt are punitive as opposed to 

remedial and thus constitute procedurally defective criminal contempt sanctions. And 

second, that the district court lacked statutory authority to impose a $50,000 fine 

payable to a charity, a third party not involved in the case. We affirm the district court’s 

order, concluding that the sanctions in paragraph C of the order are appropriate under 

both Rule 1-011 NMRA and the court’s inherent judicial powers. 

BACKGROUND

{2} This appeal arises from Appellant’s attempts to avoid satisfying a judgment 

entered against Motiva Performance Engineering LLC, a company for which Appellant 

served as president, director, registered agent, and attorney in the underlying litigation. 

After the district court entered its judgment of $292,002, plus interest, costs, and 

attorney fees, Appellant’s shenanigans to avoid satisfying the judgment began. He shut 

down Motiva and transferred title of a 2012 Ferrari FF (the Ferrari) from Motiva to 

Dealerbank Financial Services, Ltd. (Dealerbank), another company owned by him. 

Appellant did not disclose the title transfer to the district court. Appellant then prevented 

the collection of Motiva’s inventory by claiming that one of his other companies, Avatar 

Recoveries, LLC, had a landlord’s lien against Motiva for unpaid rent.

{3} As a result, Appellee filed a motion for declaration of ownership, seeking a 

declaration that Motiva owned the Ferrari and the inventory in question, a motion to join 

Appellant’s other companies as relief defendants, and a verified writ of attachment or, in 

the alternative, a preliminary injunction, seeking an order to maintain the current state of 

title and possession of the Ferrari and inventory until a final determination of ownership 

could be made. The district court held a hearing on the application for a writ of 

attachment or preliminary injunction, and orally granted attachment on the Ferrari, and 

instructed the parties to draft a preliminary injunction reflecting the court’s intent to 

maintain the status quo of ownership until a full determination could be made. Before 

the hearing, the Ferrari was titled and owned by Dealerbank free of any lien. The day 

after the hearing—and before the parties presented their proposed draft of the 
preliminary injunction—Appellant applied for a $120,000 loan pledging the Ferrari as 

collateral. While the parties were still negotiating the preliminary injunction draft, the 

bank granted the loan to Appellant and noted its interest in the Ferrari by obtaining a 

new certificate of title. Appellant did not disclose that he had secured a loan, or its 

attachment to the Ferrari to the district court or to Appellee. 

{4} The district court then entered the preliminary injunction order, instructing 

Appellant to keep the Ferrari’s title in Dealerbank’s name and domicile the Ferrari in 

New Mexico pending the court’s decision on the motion for declaration of ownership. 

After entering the injunction, the district court held a bench trial on ownership. During 

the trial, Appellant did not mention the new bank lien on the Ferrari, instead Appellant 

introduced the outdated copy of the Ferrari’s title that did not reflect the new lien. In its 

order, the district court found that Appellant transferred the car’s title without 

consideration in order to avoid paying the jury verdict against Motiva. 

{5} The $120,000 loan and lien on the Ferrari became known only after it was listed 

in Motiva’s bankruptcy filings. Appellee then filed a motion for order to show cause 

arguing that the district court should hold Appellant in contempt for violation of the 

preliminary injunction, impose sanctions, and refer the matter to the district attorney’s 

office for possible prosecution. The district court entered an order to show cause, 

notified Appellant of the possible ramifications, and held an evidentiary hearing. After 

the hearing, the district court issued a contempt and sanction order. The district court 

held Appellant, Dealerbank, and Appellant’s law firm in civil contempt for violating the 

court’s oral ruling directing the parties to (1) maintain the status quo of the Ferrari’s 

ownership until the ownership motion could be heard, (2) for violating the preliminary 

injunction by pledging the Ferrari as collateral for a $120,000 loan from Main Bank, and 

(3) for willfully hiding and affirmatively misleading the court about the change in the 

Ferrari’s title. The civil contempt order entered by the court has two respective parts. 

The first, paragraph A is directed to Appellant, Dealerbank, and Appellant’s law firm and 

is unchallenged in this appeal. The second, paragraphs B, C, and D are directed to 

Appellant only. Appellant only challenges paragraph C of the order in this appeal, which 

states, “Ferguson may purge the civil contempt as to him by . . . [paying] the [j]udgment 

in full, including payment of all interest and attorney[] fees incurred” and “giv[ing] 

$50,000 to Roadrunner Food Bank.”

DISCUSSION

{6} Appellant makes two arguments on appeal, contending that the sanctions in 

effect imposed criminal contempt without satisfying due process. Next he asserts the 

district court lacked statutory authority to impose a $50,000 fine payable to a third party. 

We conclude that the sanctions were appropriate under Rule 1-011 and the court’s 

inherent powers even though Appellant failed to preserve these issues because the 

preservation exceptions could apply. See Rule 12-321(A) NMRA (“To preserve an issue 

for review, it must appear that a ruling or decision by the trial court was fairly invoked.”); 

see also Rule 12-321(B) (stating the exceptions). 
{7} “In order to preserve an issue for appeal, [an appellant] must have made a timely 

and specific objection that apprised the district court of the nature of the claimed error 

and that allows the district court to make an intelligent ruling thereon.” Sandoval v. 

Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56, 146 N.M. 853, 215 P.3d 

791. Appellant did not raise these issues below. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that 

there is a “general rule that appealable issues from a contempt order may be preserved 

by a timely notice of appeal and docketing statement.” Appellant’s only support for this 

“general rule” is a nonprecedential case, Tue Thi Tran v. Bennett, No. 32,677, mem. op. 

(N.M. Ct. App. May 28, 2014) (nonprecedential), rev’d, 2018-NMSC-009, 411 P.3d 345, 

and its corresponding amended notice of appeal, which do not directly address the 

preservation of the appellant’s arguments below. Although we may consider 

nonprecedential cases for persuasive value, Rule 12-405 NMRA, neither Bennett nor its 

subsequent appeal, Tue Thi Tran, 2018-NMSC-009, address preservation or support a 

general rule that allows preservation through a notice of appeal and docketing 

statement. See Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 115 

N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22 (stating that cases are not authority for issues not decided or 

addressed by the Court). Without further authority, we assume no authority for 

Appellant’s argument exists. See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 

764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that when a party fails to cite authority for an argument, we 

may assume none exists). Furthermore, Appellant had the opportunity to apprise the 

district court of these issues in his motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 1-059(E) 

NMRA, but failed to do so. See Rule 12-321(A) (asserting that “the absence of an 

objection does not thereafter prejudice the party” only “[i]f a party has no opportunity to 

object to a ruling or order at the time it is made” (emphasis added)).1 Consequently, we 

 

1The dissent correctly notes that Appellant did not have basis or opportunity to object to the sanction 

before the order was entered. The plain language of Rule 12-321(A), however, does not exempt from the 

preservation requirement issues that could not have been raised before a ruling or order. Instead, it only 

exempts issues if a party does not have an opportunity to contemporaneously object to a ruling or order. 

Rule 12-321(A). Here, Appellant had the opportunity to contemporaneously file a motion to reconsider 

objecting to the sanction. In fact, Appellant did file a motion to reconsider, but failed to invoke a ruling of 

the district court on the same grounds now argued on appeal. See Woolwine v. Furr’s, Inc., 1987-NMCA133, ¶ 20, 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that 

appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.”).

Furthermore, we disagree with the dissent’s reliance on Jones v. City of Albuquerque Police 

Department (Jones II), 2020-NMSC-013, ¶ 24, 470 P.3d 252. In Jones II, our Supreme Court “decline[d] 

to conclude that it was mandatory . . . to apply for discretionary remedies from a nonfinal, interlocutory,

ruling in order to preserve his argument.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the dissent in Jones v. City of 

Albuquerque Police Department (Jones I), premised its practical concerns on the application of requiring 

parties to “pursue discretionary remedies to a non[]final order.” A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. ¶ 22 (N.M. Ct. 

App. May 10, 2018) (Vargas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (nonprecedential). This Court’s analyses 

limited to nonfinal orders serve to distinguish Jones I from this Case. 

Here, the district court’s order was final and therefore any concerns about creating piecemeal 

appeals or uncertainty for litigants are inapplicable. Instead, requiring a party to object to a final order to 

preserve an issue furthers the purposes of the preservation rule. Sandoval, 2009-NMCA-095, ¶ 56 (“The 

primary purposes for the preservation rule are: (1) to specifically alert the district court to a claim of error 

so that any mistake can be corrected at that time, (2) to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to 

respond to the claim of error and to show why the court should rule against that claim, and (3) to create a 

record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the contested issue.”). 
may review the issues raised in this appeal only if an exception to the preservation rule 

applies. See Rule 12-321(B) (listing the preservation exceptions).

{8} In the reply brief, Appellant argues for the first time that the general public 

interest, fundamental error, and fundamental rights of a party exceptions apply.2

Although we agree that these exceptions could apply, we do not reach this argument 

because the challenged sanctions are proper under Rule 1-011(A) and the district 

court’s inherent powers. In the order of civil contempt and sanctions, the district court 

specifically invoked Rule 1-011(A) as an alternative basis to civil contempt for the 

sanctions imposed on Appellant. Furthermore, the district court repeatedly referenced 

its inherent powers throughout the order, indicating that the court intended those powers 

as another alternative basis for directly sanctioning Appellant. Accordingly, we consider 

whether the district court has the authority to impose the challenged sanctions, pursuant 

to Rule 1-011 and its inherent judicial powers. 

I. Standard of Review

{9} We review the district court’s imposition of sanctions under Rule 1-011(A) or the 

court’s inherent powers for an abuse of discretion. See Rivera v. Brazos Lodge Corp., 

1991-NMSC-030, ¶ 16, 111 N.M. 670, 808 P.2d 955 (“[A]n appellate court should apply 

an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Rule [1-0]11 

determination.”); Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 14, 

311 P.3d 1236 (“We generally review a district court’s imposition of sanctions under its 

inherent power for an abuse of discretion.”). Our review is generally deferential because 

“[t]he district court is in the best position to view the factual circumstances surrounding 

an alleged violation of Rule 1-011.” Bernier v. Bernier ex rel. Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, 

¶ 15, 305 P.3d 978 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Thus, an 

abuse of discretion in the context of sanctions is only found “when the trial court’s 

decision is clearly untenable . . . contrary to logic and reason,” Rivera, 1991-NMSC-030, 

¶ 16, or “the court bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Rangel v. Save 

Mart, Inc., 2006-NMCA-120, ¶ 12, 140 N.M. 395, 142 P.3d 983 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted).

{10} Nevertheless, “[a]lthough our [Rule 1-011] standard of review is generally very 

deferential, our deference wanes when the district court adopts verbatim the prevailing 

party’s extensive requested findings of fact and requested conclusions of law in 

complex cases.” Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, ¶ 15 (citation omitted). Appellant argues that 

the district court adopted “almost all of [Appellee]’s proposed findings and conclusions, 

most of which were adopted verbatim, and retained substantially the same language—

with only minor edits and additions—to findings that were not adopted verbatim.” In this 

 

2Although we do not normally entertain arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, we address 

these arguments here because they are a direct response to the assertion raised in the answer brief that 

Appellant failed to preserve the issues for appeal below. See Mitchell-Carr v. McLendon, 1999-NMSC025, ¶ 29, 127 N.M. 282, 980 P.2d 65 (explaining that Rule 12-213(C) NMRA (1999) (recompiled as Rule 

12-318(C) NMRA), allows the appellant to respond in his reply brief to arguments not raised in the brief in

chief if asserted in the answer brief).
case, the district court did not employ the “wholesale verbatim adoption” that requires us 

to relax our usual deferential review. Los Vigiles Land Grant v. Rebar Haygood Ranch, 

LLC, 2014-NMCA-017, ¶ 2, 317 P.3d 842. The district court adopted its own findings of 

fact and included conclusions of law not proffered by Appellee, demonstrating that it 

exercised its independent judgment in arriving at its decision. See Pollock v. Ramirez, 

1994-NMCA-011, ¶ 28, 117 N.M. 187, 870 P.2d 149 (stating that “the [district] court is 

required to exercise independent judgment in arriving at its decision and should 

generally avoid verbatim adoption of all of the findings and conclusions submitted by a 

party”). Accordingly, we review the district court’s Rule 1-011(A) sanction under the 

deferential standard of review.

II. Rule 1-011(A) Sanctions

{11} Rule 1-011(A) requires at least one attorney or the party to sign “[e]very pleading, 

motion, and other paper” filed in court. “The signature of an attorney or party constitutes 

a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; 

that to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground 

to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” Id. The rule was “designed to 

encourage honesty in the bar when bringing and defending actions,” and therefore a 

court may “impose sanctions for a willful violation of the rule.” Rivera, 1991-NMSC-030, 

¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because “[t]he trial judge is in the 

best position to view the factual circumstances surrounding an alleged violation . . . Rule 

[1-0]11 gives [the district] courts discretion to fashion sanctions to fit specific cases,” 

unrestrained by mechanical rules. Rivera, 1991-NMSC-030, ¶ 17. This includes the 

imposition of monetary sanctions. See Doña Ana Sav. & Loan Ass’n, F.A. v. Mitchell, 

1991-NMCA-054, ¶ 9, 113 N.M. 576, 829 P.2d 655 (stating that Rule 1-011 “permit[s] 

the imposition of a fine as a sanction in appropriate cases”). 

{12} In this case, the district court determined that the contempt and sanctions order 

“is also appropriate under . . . Rule 1-011 . . . because of [Appellant]’s direct 

involvement [and] . . . willful misstatements in documents filed with th[e district c]ourt, as 

well as his omissions and arguments and testimony presented to th[is C]ourt throughout 

this proceeding.” Appellant does not challenge the district court’s findings of fact or 

conclusions. Therefore, it is undisputed that Appellant knowingly violated the district 

court’s oral ruling and the preliminary injunction requiring Appellant to maintain the 

status quo of the Ferrari’s ownership. It is further undisputed that Appellant willfully hid 

the alteration to the Ferrari’s ownership from the district court and purposefully 

introduced into evidence “an old version of the Ferrari’s [c]ertificate of [t]itle . . . , which . 

. . was a continuation of a fraud upon the [district] court to deceive the [c]ourt into 

thinking the [p]reliminary [i]jnunction had been complied with.” This is a clear violation of 

Rule 1-011. The district court concluded that Appellant’s behavior “confirm[ed] th[e 

c]ourt’s finding that [he] has in the past and will continue to disregard the law, the 

[c]ourt’s orders, and the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct” unless the court 

imposed sanctions. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in imposing the sanctions pursuant to Rule 1-011(A) because the district court has 

broad authority to fashion sanctions that fit the specific violations and Appellant’s 
actions are “precisely the kind of activity Rule 1-011 is designed to deter and in which a 

court may impose sanctions in the exercise of its inherent powers.” Landess v. Gardner 

Turf Grass, Inc., 2008-NMCA-159, ¶ 18, 145 N.M. 372, 198 P.3d 871.3 Nevertheless, 

we further consider the sanctions propriety pursuant to the district court’s inherent 

powers because “if a party’s litigation abuses fall outside the sanction authority 

expressly set forth in our procedural rules, the court may rely on its inherent powers to 

impose sanctions.” Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ¶ 19, 416 P.3d 264 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. Inherent Powers

{13} Although the district court did not explicitly impose the sanctions under its 

inherent powers, the court repeatedly referenced those powers to impose sanctions in 

its conclusions of law and in the order. “Inherent judicial power is the power necessary 

to exercise the authority of the court.” In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058, ¶ 27, 130 N.M. 

687, 30 P.3d 376. Such authority extends to all conduct before this Court. See Khalsa 

Tr. of Yogi Bhajan Admin. Tr. v. Puri, 2023-NMCA-018, ¶ 30, 525 P.3d 394. “The 

rationale underlying the existence of [such] power . . . is that a court must be able to 

command the obedience of litigants and their attorneys if it is to perform its judicial 

functions.” Rest. Mgmt. Co. v. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., 1999-NMCA-101, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 

708, 986 P.2d 504 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As an exercise of its 

inherent power, the court “may sanction parties and attorneys to ensure compliance 

with the proceedings of the court.” In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058, ¶ 28. Such 

sanctions imposed “under the court’s inherent authority can be both compensatory and 

punitive in nature.” Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 19. Furthermore, the district court has 

broad discretion to impose sanctions pursuant to the court’s inherent authority and such 

power exists independent of statute. See State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. 

Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 120 N.M. 1, 896 P.2d 1148; see also Klein v. 

Harper, 777 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that “courts have broad inherent 

power to sanction misconduct and abuse of the judicial process”).

{14} Here, Appellant “engaged in conduct in direct defiance of the court’s authority,” 

see Khalsa Tr. of Yogi Bhajan Admin. Tr., 2023-NMCA-018, ¶ 31, by violating the 

district court’s oral orders, violating the preliminary injunction, filing outdated and

 

3In this case, the district court’s Rule 1-011(A) sanctions were based on Appellant’s “direct involvement, 

his supervisory and ownership control over the [l]aw [f]irm (and its attorneys), and Dealerbank, through 

willful misstatements in documents filed with th[e district c]ourt, as well as his omissions and arguments 

and testimony presented to th[e district c]ourt.” On these grounds, the sanctions furthered the primary 

goal of Rule 1-011, which is to “encourage honesty in the bar” and deter baseless filings. Rivera, 1991-

NMSC-030, ¶¶ 13-14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant’s outdated filings and 

misleading testimony abused the litigation process preventing the district court from deterring future 

litigation abuse without punishing Appellant. See id. ¶ 14. Although, the Advisory Committee Notes to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 explains that “if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court 

as a penalty.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c) (1993 amendment). This Court has recognized that the Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11 and Rule 1-011 are not identical, and rejected the invitation to incorporate provisions within 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 to its interpretation of Rule 1-011. Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, ¶ 24. Moreover, our 

Supreme Court has clarified that there are no mechanical rules regarding the sanctions district courts can 

impose pursuant to Rule 1-011. See Rivera, 1991-NMSC-030, ¶ 17.
deceptive documents as exhibits, and repeatedly misleading the district court. Such 

circumstances warrant the imposition of sanctions under the district court’s inherent 

powers. See In re Jade G., 2001-NMCA-058, ¶ 28; see also Rest. Mgmt. Co., 1999-

NMCA-101, ¶ 11.

{15} Moreover, the district court explicitly highlighted that it was aware of the 

restrictions on its civil contempt powers. The district court then explained that although 

the sanctions in paragraph C of the order “appear[] to be punitive” they are necessary, 

because “anything less will be ineffective at compelling [Appellant] to prospectively 

comply with his obligations as a party and as an attorney.” These statements by the 

district court in combination with the court’s clear understanding of the distinction 

between its civil and criminal contempt powers and the courts repeated references to 

the court’s inherent powers to sanction indicate that the court actually intended these 

sanctions to be imposed as an exercise of its inherent powers and not a misuse of its 

civil contempt powers. Accordingly, the district court did not err in exercising its inherent 

authority to impose the sanctions listed in paragraph C of the order to preserve the 

integrity of the judicial process.

IV. Sanctions Payable to Third Parties

{16} Appellant lastly argues that because it is not authorized by statute, the sanction 

payable to charity is statutorily unauthorized. Appellee responds that the district court’s 

authority to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 1-011 and its inherent powers is not 

bestowed by the Legislature, thus, statutory authorization was not required. We agree 

with Appellee—the Legislature lacks power to regulate sanctions under Rule 1-011 and 

the district court’s inherent authority. See In re Motion for a Subpoena Duces Tecum to 

Issue to Custodian of Records of Governor’s Organized Crime Prevention Comm’n, 

1980-NMSC-010, ¶ 5, 94 N.M. 1, 606 P.2d 539 (“This Court is vested with the exclusive 

right to prescribe and regulate pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, including 

lower courts.”). Similarly, the district court’s inherent judicial authority to impose 

sanctions exists independent of statute. State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. 

Dep’t, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11. Accordingly, the district court did not need statutory 

authorization to impose sanction payable to third parties under Rule 1-011 or its 

inherent judicial powers.

{17} Ultimately, although the language of the district court’s order framed the 

sanctions in paragraph C of the order as conditions to purge civil contempt, it also 

correctly asserted its authority to impose sanctions under Rule 1-011, and, from our 

review of the district court’s factual findings, conclusions of law, and order, it is apparent 

the court also intended to impose the sanctions listed in paragraph C of the order under 

its inherent judicial powers. Because such authority is sufficient on its own to allow the 

sanctions, we need not consider whether the district court’s actions might otherwise be 

procedurally defective criminal contempt. 

V. Jurisdiction
{18} Because we hold that the district court below imposed the sanctions in paragraph 

C of the order under Rule 1-011 and its inherent judicial powers instead of as an 

exercise of civil contempt, we recognize that this raises a question of finality. See 

Khalsa v. Levinson, 1998-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 125 N.M. 680, 964 P.2d 844 (“Whether an 

order is a ‘final order’ within the meaning of the statute is a jurisdictional question that 

an appellate court is required to raise on its own motion.”); see also Ferebee v. Hume, 

2021-NMCA-012, ¶ 27, 485 P.3d 778 (explaining that the court lacked appellate 

jurisdiction to review a nonfinal decision denying Rule 1-011 sanctions without a 

sufficient reason from the plaintiff and appropriate support as to how such a decision is 

final). The imposition or denial of Rule 1-011 sanctions are generally not considered 

final on their own. See Ferebee, 2021-NMCA-012, ¶ 27. Civil contempt orders, on the 

other hand, are deemed final for the purposes of appeal and can be appealed 

immediately. Kucel v. N.M. Med. Rev. Comm’n, 2000-NMCA-026, ¶ 13, 128 N.M. 691, 

997 P.2d 823 (emphasizing that the Legislature has explicitly provided the right to 

appeal from judgments in civil contempt proceedings in NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-15(A) 

(1966)). Moreover, “[f]inality for the purpose of an appeal is viewed in a practical rather 

than a technical context and by looking to the substance of the document.” Santa Fe 

Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2012-NMSC-028, ¶ 10, 285 P.3d 595. 

{19} This appeal arose as a challenge to the sanctions imposed in a civil contempt 

order. Moreover, the sanctions imposed are for the violation of the district court’s oral 

order and preliminary injunction to maintain the state of possession of certain items until 

the ownership of those items could be determined. Thus, review of whether the 

sanctions were a proper exercise of civil contempt powers or permissible as another 

form of sanctions is sufficiently final because reviewing the sanctions imposed in this 

case does not require a substantive evaluation of legal and factual issues involved in 

the overarching litigation. See Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n v. Khalsa, No. 32,979, mem. op. 

¶ 3 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2013) (nonprecedential) (holding that appellate review was 

not appropriate when review of an award of sanctions was solely based on Rule 1-011 

and reviewing the award would require a substantive evaluation of legal and factual 

issues critical to the case); see also State v. Ngo, 2001-NMCA-041, ¶ 7, 130 N.M. 515, 

27 P.3d 1002 (holding that an “order for sanctions, which was in part a contempt order 

and in part similar to a contempt order . . . [was] both final and appealable when 

entered”). Therefore, we have jurisdiction to determine that the district court 

appropriately imposed the sanctions listed in paragraph C of the order under Rule 1-011 

and its inherent powers in this case. 

CONCLUSION

{20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{21} IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

I CONCUR:
JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge (dissenting).

DUFFY, Judge (dissenting).

{22} I perceive a handful of issues with the analysis and disposition set forth in the 

majority opinion that prevent me from signing on to the result. I briefly summarize the 

points of disagreement in the order the issues are addressed in the opinion.

{23} First, it is unclear to me why the majority believes the issue of whether the 

$50,000 sanction amounted to criminal, rather than civil, contempt was not preserved. 

The matter simply wasn’t at issue before the district court entered its order, meaning 

there was no basis or opportunity for Ferguson to object to the sanction before the order 

was entered. See Rule 12-321(A) (“If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or 

order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice 

the party.”). After the order was entered, Ferguson was not required to file a motion to 

reconsider in order to preserve the issue for appeal. See Jones v. City of Albuquerque 

Police Dep’t, 2020-NMSC-013 (Jones II), ¶ 24, 470 P.3d 252 (holding that a party was 

not required to apply for discretionary remedies such as reconsideration in order to 

preserve an argument for appeal regarding the district court’s substantive ruling). 

Consequently, I do not see a preservation problem that would prevent this Court from 

reviewing the issue on the merits. Likewise, as with the dissent in Jones v. City of 

Albuquerque Police Department (Jones I), A-1-CA-35120, mem. op. ¶ 27 (N.M. Ct. App. 

May 10, 2018) (nonprecedential) (Vargas, J., dissenting), I worry about the practical 

implications of the majority’s holding and the uncertainty it creates for litigants as to 

what is necessary to preserve an issue for review.

{24} Notwithstanding this, it is ultimately unnecessary to review Ferguson’s criminal 

contempt arguments on the merits because the district court provided alternative 

grounds justifying the $50,000 sanction, and Ferguson only challenged one of them. 

Ferguson’s brief in chief focused entirely on the district court’s ruling that the $50,000 

sanction was authorized as a civil contempt punishment and failed to mention, much 

less challenge, the district court’s alternative ruling that the sanction was appropriate 

under Rule 1-011. Ferguson’s reply brief only summarily addresses this aspect of the 

district court’s order, arguing without authority that Ferguson was entitled to more due 

process than he received. See Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, ¶ 25 (“Due process requires 

that the attorney be given notice of the imposition of Rule 1-011 sanctions, may require 

specific notice of the reasons for the imposition of sanctions, and mandates that the 

accused be given an opportunity to respond.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 

citation omitted)). In light of this, I believe Ferguson has inadequately challenged the 

district court’s Rule 1-011 ruling, and the sanction is generally affirmable on that basis.

{25} While the majority opinion delves into Rule 1-011, I am troubled by what I 

perceive as overbreadth in the opinion’s discussion of why the sanction is affirmable 

under the rule. “The primary goal of Rule 1-011 is to deter baseless filings in district 
court.” Bernier, 2013-NMCA-074, ¶ 19 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation 

omitted). Thus, the district court’s finding that Ferguson made willful misstatements in 

documents filed with the court would be enough to justify the sanction it imposed. The 

majority opinion, however, relies on additional conduct that does not clearly seem to fall 

within the ambit of Rule 1-011, such as Ferguson’s arguments and testimony presented 

to the court, violation of the court’s oral ruling and preliminary injunction, hiding the 

alteration of the Ferrari’s ownership, and introducing into evidence an old version of the 

Ferrari’s certificate of title. The majority has not cited any authority to support its reliance 

on this conduct as a basis to affirm the sanctions award under Rule 1-011. Like the 

majority’s preservation conclusion, this discussion carries practical implications, one of 

which is, in my view, the creation of confusion about the circumstances in which 

sanctions are authorized under the rule.

{26} Given the majority’s Rule 1-011 analysis, the opinion’s further discussion of the 

district court’s inherent powers strikes me as unnecessary, particularly because the 

district court made no mention of inherent powers as a basis for the award. The district 

court expressly grounded the sanctions in civil contempt and Rule 1-011. I cannot agree 

that this Court can or should affirm a sanctions award on a ground not expressed in the 

district court’s order. 

{27} Finally, I do not believe the majority opinion gives due credit to the nuance and 

complexity of the issue Ferguson raises regarding the district court’s authority to direct 

payment of a sanctions award to third parties. The case law cited by Ferguson details 

the matter, and a version of this issue is presently pending in the New Mexico Supreme 

Court in In re Maestas, S-1-SC-39901, which addresses whether courts are prohibited 

from directing fines and fees to third parties under the New Mexico Constitution. The 

certification order in that case specifically noted that the Court’s decision has the 

potential to impact sanctions awards under Rule 1-011. Recognizing this, I would have 

certified this case to the New Mexico Supreme Court and refrained from summarily

deciding the issue. 

{28} For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge