*

 Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-60193

Summary Calendar

 

EDDIE L. WINNS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SHIRLEY S. CHATER,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:95-CV-18-L-N

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November 19, 1996

Before WISDOM, JOLLY, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eddie L. Winns appeals from the judgment of the district court affirming the denial of his

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Winns argues: (1)

that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) applied improper legal standards, (2) that the ALJ

erred by failing to accord proper weight to vocational expert testimony, and (3) that substantial
2

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991).

3 Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Luevenia Davis v.

Heckler, 759 F.2d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 1985).

2

evidence does not exist to support the ALJ’s finding that he was not disabled for a continuous

twelve-month period.

First, we find that the ALJ applied the appropriate legal standard. The ALJ conducts a

five-step sequential analysis in determining whether a claimant is disabled: 1) is the claimant is

presently working; 2) does the claimant have a severe impairment; 3) is the impairment listed, or

equivalent to an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations; 4) does the impairment

prevent the claimant from performing past relevant work; and 5) does the impairment prevent the

claimant from performing any other substantial gainful activity. 2 "A finding that a claimant is

disabled or is not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the

analysis." 3

At step one, the ALJ found that Winns had been working since August 5, 1992, when his

impairment allegedly began. The ALJ further found that Winns’ work activities had involved

significant physical or mental activities for pay or profit, that his work activity constituted

substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the regulations, and that his impairment had not

rendered him unable to engage in substantial gainful activity for any continuous period of at least

12 months. The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Winns was not under a disability as defined in the

Social Security Act. There is no legal error.

Second, we find that the ALJ did not fail to accord proper weight to the vocational

expert’s testimony. The vocational expert’s opinion is not appropriate until the fifth step of the
4

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.156(e), 416.966(e); Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616, 622

(5th Cir. 1983).

5 Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985).

6

Id.

7 Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991).

3

sequential analysis,4 but the ALJ found that Winns was not disabled in the first step of the

analysis; therefore, the ALJ need not accord weight to the vocational expert’s testimony.

Third, we conclude that the ALJ’s finding that Winns was not disabled is supported by

substantial evidence. As the claimant, Winns bears the burden of showing that he is disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 5 The Act defines disability as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve months”.6 To determine whether substantial evidence of disability exists, four

elements of proof must be weighed: 1) objective medical facts; 2) diagnoses and opinions of

treating and examining physicians; 3) claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and 4)

claimant's age, education, and work history. 7 

Reviewing the record in the light of these considerations, we find substantial evidence to

support the ALJ’s decision. Winns’s work history indicates that he had worked on the stack chair

line at Jansko from March 1993 until October 1993. The alleged onset of Winns’ disability was

August 5, 1992, and the hearing occurred on May 19, 1994. The ALJ thus concluded that “not

only has claimant been engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of

August 5, 1992, there has also been no continuous period of twelve months in which he has been
4

unable to engage in substantial gainful activity”. The ALJ further stated that because Winns

“resumed work in March 1993”, “his impairment did not render him continuously unable to

perform substantial gainful activity for a period of 12 months”. 

Winns bore the burden of showing that he was disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. There exists substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that Winns did

not carry this burden. Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.