J-S21016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF:

L.M., MINOR CHILD

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER

No. 2935 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000523-2015

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED July 1, 2016

C.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County involuntarily terminating her parental 

rights to her daughter, L.M., born March 2013, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2) (5), (8) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).1 Mother filed a pro se 

appeal and a pro se statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).2 The court appointed counsel for Mother, and counsel 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The court also terminated Father’s parental rights by order dated August 

26, 2015. Father did not file an appeal. 

2 Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement provides: 

Judge Irvine didn’t read any of my paperwork on the 9th month 

of the case for L.M. [H]e never asked my side of the story. He 

never lets me talk. James W. Martin never speaks. Beverly 

Muldrow gave up on L.M. and didn’t want to file for appeal. DHS 

worker stated that all of the DHS workers were dead and didn’t 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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filed an appellate brief. Counsel filed a brief on behalf of Mother, which did 

not comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111-2135. On April 21, 2016, we ordered counsel to file an 

appellate brief in accordance with our rules of court. Counsel has 

substantially complied with this order. After our review, we affirm.

On appeal, we address whether the Department of Human Services 

(DHS) met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the 

statutory grounds for termination, whether the trial court adequately 

examined the parent-child bond and whether termination was in L.M.’s best 

interests.3 

Our review is governed by the following principles:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

have anyone to bring in my child. CUA never showed me the 

paperwork proving they had custody of my child. ARC and DHS 

parenting classes and anger management didn’t give me credit 

for my classes. DHS didn’t investigate their case and came to 

my house eight hours after the doctor appointment. They didn’t 

let me read their paperwork. They lied and said my daughter lost 

weight when she weighed 13.5 pounds and ounces. I weighed 

my daughter before the doctor came in. Michael Joyce said I 

couldn’t be a mom without a job.

Mother’s Pro Se Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 9/11/15.

3 We adopt Appellee’s counter-statement of questions involved because 

Appellant’s Statement of Questions Presented is, in a word, inappropriate; it 

does not present an issue to be resolved but merely repeats Mother’s pro se 

Rule 1925(b) Statement. See note 2, supra. 
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termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. [T]here are clear reasons for 

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these 

cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are 

not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where 

the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in 

dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must 

resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its 

own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must 

defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not 

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of 

parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act,4 which requires a bifurcated analysis:

____________________________________________

4 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

L.M. entered foster care at the age of six months. Mother was 

restricting L.M.’s intake of formula, causing L.M. to lose weight. N.T. Goal 

Change/Termination Hearing, 8/26/15, at 8. Mother was diagnosed with 

severe schizophrenia, id. at 8, and was not compliant with mental health, 

drug and alcohol and visitation objectives. Id. at 15-16. 

At permanency review hearings in February and May of 2014, Mother 

was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). She did not comply with 

the court’s order for a CEU assessment; she did, however, receive mental 

health services and drug and alcohol services. 

At the October 15, 2014 permanency review hearing, Mother was 

unavailable as she was incarcerated, having been charged with aggravated 

assault and possessing an instrument of crime, as well as related charges. 

See Permanency Review Order, 1015/14, DHS exhibit 2. At the April 1, 

2015 permanency review hearing, which Mother attended, the court referred 

her again to the CEU for drug screenings and five random screens prior to 
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the next court date, which was listed for a goal change/termination 

proceeding. 

Mother did not attend the goal change/termination proceeding on 

August 26, 2015. At that hearing, DHS presented the testimony of 

Caseworker Nadiyah Beard, who testified Mother was not in mental health 

treatment or receiving any medication, that she refused to submit to the 

court ordered random drug screens, was not currently participating in drug 

and alcohol treatment, and had failed to comply with her visitation schedule. 

N.T. Goal Change/Termination Hearing, 826/15, at 8-10, 17-19. 

Caseworker Beard also testified to the following: Mother and L.M. are 

not bonded; Mother lacks the mental stability to care for L.M.; Mother’s 

mental instability has compromised L.M.’s wellbeing; and, L.M. is very 

bonded to her pre-adoptive foster parent, with whom she has lived for two 

years. Id. at 11, 18. Caseworker Beard testified that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would not adversely affect L.M. and that adoption 

was in L.M.’s best interests. Id. at 11-12, 20. 

Following the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b). “[W]e 

need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one subsection [of 

2511(a)] in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). 

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at 
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least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which 

reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

510 (Pa. Super. 2006). In addition, the court shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

The court concluded that Mother failed to perform parental duties for 

the child for the period of six months prior to the filing of the petition for 

termination, and that no bond had developed between Mother and L.M. 

The record confirms that Mother has not benefited from the treatment she 

has received, and that her mental health issues, her drug and alcohol issues, 

and her lack of parenting skills has rendered her incapable of parenting L.M. 

and has compromised L.M.’s health and well-being. We agree with the trial 

court that there are considerable uncertainties regarding Mother’s ability to 

care for L.M.’s basic needs. We conclude, therefore, that DHS has met its 

burden of establishing termination under section 2511(a)(1), and that 

termination would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). See In re K.M., 53 

A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). See also In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 

(Pa. 1993) (determination of child’s needs and welfare requires 
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consideration of emotional bonds between parent and child and “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning effect on child of permanently 

severing parental bond). Our review of the record reveals that the trial 

court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under sections 

2511(a)(1) and (b), is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., supra. 

The competent evidence in the record supports the court’s determination 

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights to L.M. is in L.M.’s best 

interests, and that L.M. would not suffer any harm from the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order termination Mother’s 

parental rights to L.M. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/1/2016