alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with  the  Quarterly  Report  of  Mondial  Ventures,  Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended  September 30, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  the
undersigned,  in the  capacities  and  on  the  dates  indicated  below,  hereby
certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his knowledge:

     1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
           15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.    The  information  contained  in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
           material respects,  the financial condition and results of operations
           of the Company.


Date:  June 21, 2006


/s/ Joe Alvaro
---------------------------------------
Joe Alvaro, Principal Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-7118

EDWARD LEON MULDROW,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WILLIE EAGLETON, Warden; MAJOR JOYNER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron M. Currie, District Judge.

(CA-02-3294-22BC-3)

Submitted: November 14, 2003 Decided: December 22, 2003

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Edward Leon Muldrow, Appellant Pro Se. Andrew Foster McLeod, HARRIS

& MCLEOD, Cheraw, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Edward Leon Muldrow appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the

grant of summary judgment for the reasons stated by the district

court. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion. Brown v.

French, 147 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1998). See Muldrow v. Eagleton,

No. CA-02-3294-22BC-3 (D.S.C. May 30, 2003; July 7, 2003). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, July 13, 2015. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, July 13, 2015 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A15D0452. RONALD CONNER v. THEODORA BECK et al.. Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 15A0308410
## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 17 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DURAND K. DICKERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEAVITT RENTALS, a Kansas business; PAUL LEAVITT; DEBORAH M. LEAVITT; G. RONALD BATES, JR.; PATRICK E. HENDERSON; PHILLIP LACEY; DAVID J. KING, in their official and personal capacities; DUNCAN, SENECAL LAW OFFICES, CHARTERED, a Kansas law firm; CROW, CLOTHIER & BATES, a Kansas law firm; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF LEAVENWORTH COUNTY, a municipal corporation; WAYNE ELDRIDGE; DONALD NAVINSKY; ROBERT ADAMS, in their official and personal capacities; JIM MURRY; SHIRLEY PENDERGRAFT; MICHAEL WAITE; HERBERT NYE, in their official and personal capacities, Defendants-Appellees, No. 98-3053 (D.C. No. 97-2584-EEO) (District of Kansas)* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. - 2 - ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. **See** Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Durand K. Dickerson appeals from the dismissal of his pro se civil rights complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Mr. Dickerson sought damages in the sum of $37.5 million alleging constitutional violations committed by the defendants in state court actions filed against Mr. Dickerson. In a lengthy and carefully analyzed memorandum and order, the district court thoroughly and correctly treated each of Mr. Dickerson’s claims. Our review of the record and the district court’s disposition and the briefs filed in this court lead us to conclude the district- 3 -

court did not err in any respect. Indeed, we find Mr. Dickerson’s claims and his arguments patently frivolous. Accordingly, for the reasons stated by the district court in its memorandum and order, the judgment is AFFIRMED

.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge
Exhibit 10.63

 

Stock Option Award Certificate

	
(INCENTIVE   STOCK OPTION)
    	
 
    	

    
	
 
    	
 
    	
ID: XXXXXXXX
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Connaught House
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
1 Burlington Road
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
Dublin 4, Ireland
    


 

	
«FIRST_NAME» «MIDDLE_NAME» «LAST_NAME»
    	
Option   Number:
    	
«NUM»
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_1»
    	
Plan:  «PLAN_NAME»
    	
 
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_2»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«ADDRESS_LINE_3»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«CITY», «STATE»   «ZIP_CODE»
    	
ID:
    	
«ID»
    


 

Effective «GRANT_DATE», you have been granted an Incentive Stock Option to buy «SHARES_GRANTED» shares of Alkermes plc (the “Company”) common stock at «OPTION_PRICE» per share.

 

The total option price of the shares granted is «TOTAL_OPTION_PRICE».

 

The right to acquire the shares subject to the Incentive Stock Option will become fully vested on the dates shown below. The Incentive Stock Option shall expire on the earlier to occur of: the 10th anniversary of the date of grant or three months after termination of your service relationship with the Company (unless otherwise provided below).

 

	
Shares
    	
 
    	
Vesting Date
    
	
«SHARES_PERIOD_1»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«SHARES_PERIOD_2»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«SHARES_PERIOD_3»
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
«SHARES_PERIOD_4»
    	
 
    	
 
    


 

In the event of the termination of your employment with the Company (but not the termination of a non-employment relationship with the Company) by reason of death or permanent disability, the Incentive Stock Option shall vest and be exercisable in full on such termination of employment and the period during which the Incentive Stock Option (to the extent that it is exercisable on the date of termination of employment) may be exercised shall be three (3) years following the date of termination of employment by reason of death or permanent disability, but not beyond the original term of the Incentive Stock Option. For the purpose of the terms of this Incentive Stock Option, you will be deemed to be employed by the Company so long as you remain employed by a company which continues to be a subsidiary of the Company.

 

The foregoing Incentive Stock Option has been granted under and is governed by the terms and conditions of this Certificate and the Alkermes plc 2011 Stock Option and Incentive Plan.

 

	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Alkermes plc.
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Date
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          11,139
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 6,650
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     58,939
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        147,676
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,700
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 233,113
<DEPOSITS>                                     203,301
<SHORT-TERM>                                     2,738
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              2,012
<LONG-TERM>                                      3,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,425
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,637
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 233,113
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,512
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                3,080
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   302
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                15,894
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               5,542
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,703
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           10,191
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      242
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                (27)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  9,169
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,843
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       2,843
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,143
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.01
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    5.28
<LOANS-NON>                                        408
<LOANS-PAST>                                        34
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                    81
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 2,750
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      366
<RECOVERIES>                                        74
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,700
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             2,700
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              4


</TABLE>
STATE v. Norfolk Junior BEST

300A93-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 8, 2018

Jonathan P. Babb, Special Counsel to Attorney General, Jon David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina

Michael L. Unti, Raleigh, Jay H. Ferguson, Durham, Erica W. Washington, Attorneys at Law, for Best, Norfolk Junior

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd of March 2018 by Defendant for Extension of Time to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari:

"Motion Allowed. Defendant shall have up to and including the 24th day of July, 2018 to file his/ her Writ of Certiorari with this Court. By order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of March 2018."

Ervin, J., recused
George BURNS, Mack McCann, and Charles Bartlett, Trustees of Park's Chapel Free Will Baptist Church, Plaintiffs, v. KINGDOM IMPACT GLOBAL MINISTRIES, INC., Defendant.

No. COA17-928

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 21, 2018

MODIFIED. AFFIRMED IN PART. VACATED. REMANDED IN PART.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of DSA Financial Corporation (the
"Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the period ended December 31, 2005, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date of this Certification (the
"Report"), I, Steven R. Doll, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

        1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

        2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
        the Company.


                                            /s/ Steven R. Doll
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Steven R. Doll
                                            Chief Financial Officer

Date: February 10, 2006

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to DSA Financial Corporation and will be retained by DSA Financial
Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
Sherif A. PHILIPS, M.D. v. PITT COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INCORPORATED; Paul Bolin, M.D.; Ralph Whatley, M.D.; Sanjay Patel, M.D.; and Cynthia Brown, M.D.

No. 368P12-5

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 20, 2018

C. David Creech, Attorney at Law, Jay C. Salsman, Attorney at Law, New Bern, for Pitt County Memorial Hospital Incorporated, et al.

Sherif A. Philips, for Philips, Sherif A. (M.D.)

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by Plaintiff on the 10th of July 2018 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30 (substantial constitutional question), the following order was entered and is hereby certified to *295the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the notice of appeal is

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of September 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 10th of July 2018 by Plaintiff in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of September 2018."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**RICHARD A. SPRAGUE, HON. RONALD**

**D. CASTILLE AND HON. STEPHEN**
**ZAPPALA, SR.,**

**Petitioners**

**v.**

**PEDRO A. CORTES, SECRETARY OF**

**THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN HIS OFFICIAL** 
**CAPACITY,**

**Respondent :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: 100 MM 2016** 

**Emergency Application for Extraordinary**

**Relief**

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, **this 27 th**  **day of July 2016, the Petitioners’ Emergency Applicat ion for** 

**Extraordinary Relief is** GRANTED **. The Secretary is directed to file an answer and any**

**new matter to the complaint by Wednesday, August 3, 2 016. Thereafter, an expedited** 

**briefing schedule will be established for the parties to provide full briefing on the legal** 

**issue raised by Petitioners’ complaint and/or any applica tions for summary relief filed in** 

**conjunction therewith. See Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b).**

**Petitioners’ Emergency Application to Strike the “Answe r” of Amicus Curiae is** 

DISMISSED **as moot.**

**Chief Justice Saylor did not participate in consideratio n or decision of this matter.**
STATE of North Carolina v. Raheem WEBBER, Defendant.

No. COA 17-1015

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 16, 2018

NO ERROR IN PART. REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERRORS.
#### Anthony L. WHITEHURST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D02-2644.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 8, 2003.

*903James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Heather M. Gray, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jenny Scavino Sieg, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.

DAVIS, Judge.

Anthony L. Whitehurst challenges his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of cannabis with intent to sell, and resisting arrest without violence. We find merit in only one of the issues Whitehurst raises on appeal and reverse on that basis alone.

Whitehurst committed his offenses on March 6, 2001. He argues that the law in effect at that time required the trial court to instruct the jury that the State was required to prove, as an element of the crime of possession, that the defendant knew of the illicit nature of the substance. *See Chicone v. State,*684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996). Whitehurst argues further that the trial court’s failure to give his requested instruction was reversible error. *See McMillon v. State,*813 So.2d 56 (Fla.2002). Pursuant to the law that was in effect at the time that Whitehurst committed his offenses, he is correct.

Subsequent to *Chicone,*the Florida Supreme Court took the *Chicone*analysis a step further and extended the requirement of giving the jury instruction regarding knowledge to even those cases in which the defendant does not deny having knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance. *See Scott v. State,*808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002). In response to *Scott*and *Chicone,*the legislature amended chapter 893, Florida Statutes, stating that those two cases were contrary to legislative intent.1 However, we are still required to apply a *Chicone*analysis to the instant case due to the timing of Whitehurst’s offenses.

At the time that Whitehurst committed his offenses in March 2001, *Chicone*was still good law. The superseding legislative amendment was not effective until May 13, 2002, and courts have determined that the amendments are not to be applied retroactively. *See Blunt v. State,*831 So.2d 770 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); *Norman v. State,*826 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), *review denied,*845 So.2d 892 (Fla.2003). Having concluded that the court committed reversible error in failing to give the *904
      *Chicone*instruction as requested, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

KELLY and CANADY, JJ., concur.

. § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002).
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4650 

To amend the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 to include several 

additions to the many forms of violations of the right to religious freedom. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 9, 2014 

Mr. STOCKMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 

to include several additions to the many forms of violations of the right to religious freedom. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘European Union Reli5 gious Freedom Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds as follows: 

8 (1) There is a growing assault on religious free9 dom in the European Union. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4650 IH

1 (2) The European Union member states of Bul2 garia, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, 

3 Malta, and Sweden prohibit homeschooling. This 

4 prohibition often infringes upon the traditional inter5 ests of parents regarding the religious upbringing of 

6 their children. This is especially true with regard to 

7 adherents of minority religions, such as small 

8 Protestant Christian denominations. 

9 (3) The European Union member states of 

10 Sweden and Denmark have banned religious meth11 ods of meat production, including the Jewish kosher 

12 method of shechitah and the Islamic halal method of 

13 dhabihah. This effectively prevents religiously ob14 servant Jews and Muslims from eating meat pro15 duced in those countries, and requires them to im16 port it at higher cost. Many other European Union 

17 member states are considering similar bans. 

18 (4) The European Union member state of Swe19 den has imposed restrictions on performing cir20 cumcision, and many European Union member 

21 states are considering banning this practice entirely. 

22 This would impose a substantial burden on the reli23 gious practices of Jews and Muslims, and would un24 doubtedly cause many to feel compelled to immigrate 

25 to countries with less offensive laws. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4650 IH

1 (5) The European Union member state of 

2 France has banned the wearing of religious garb in 

3 public schools. This imposes a substantial burden on 

4 the religious practices of many religions, including 

5 Sikhs, Jews, Muslims, and members of Catholic mo6 nastic orders, among others. 

7 SEC. 3. GENERAL AUTHORIZATION. 

8 Section 2(a)(4) of the International Religious Free9 dom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6401(a)(4)) is amended in 

10 the fourth sentence by inserting ‘‘, including 

11 homeschooling,’’ after ‘‘prohibitions against the pursuit of 

12 education’’, and inserting ‘‘prohibition of religious meth13 ods of meat production, prohibition of circumcision, prohi14 bition of wearing religious garb’’ after ‘‘or public office’’. 

15 SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

16 The provisions of this Act shall take effect imme17 diately following enactment. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-7131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

BILLY R. MCCULLERS, JR.,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith, 

Chief District Judge. (4:07-cr-00049-RBS-JEB-1)

Submitted: January 17, 2017 Decided: January 19, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Billy R. McCullers, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Melissa Elaine 

O’Boyle, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia; 

Howard Jacob Zlotnick, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport 

News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Billy R. McCullers, Jr., appeals from the district court’s 

margin order denying his motion filed in his criminal case under 

Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) to relate back a new claim to his 

previously adjudicated and denied 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible 

error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. 

United States v. McCullers, No. 4:07-cr-00049-RBS-JEB-1 (E.D. 

Va. Aug. 12, 2016). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED