In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-1441 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

KA’BA S. MUHAMMAD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:00-cr-197 — James T. Moody, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 15, 2022 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and JACKSONAKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. 

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. A district court vacated 

Ka’ba Muhammad’s sentence on collateral review, and he 

was resentenced. At resentencing, the parties incorrectly 

stated that Muhammad had not made any restitution 

payments. The court then reimposed the vacated, original 

restitution judgment of $10,421.66 without crediting the 

$433.32 Muhammad paid while incarcerated. Muhammad 
2 No. 21-1441 

appeals the new restitution judgment and argues that the 

district court plainly erred by relying on inaccurate 

information—that he had not made any restitution

payments—when it reimposed the original restitution 

judgment. Even if Muhammad could show that the district 

court erred, we decline to correct any such error on the facts 

of this case where Muhammad concedes that he originally 

owed $10,421.66 in restitution and where there is no 

disagreement among the parties and the district court that he 

should receive credit for his payments. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

I 

In 2001, a jury convicted Muhammad of being a felon in 

possession of a firearm and stealing firearms from a federally 

licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) 

and 922(u). The district court sentenced Muhammad as an 

armed career criminal and ordered him to pay $10,421.66 in 

restitution to the firearms dealer and its insurer under the 

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”). We affirmed 

the sentence. See Zambrella v. United States, 327 F.3d 634 (7th 

Cir. 2003).1

On collateral review, the United States District Court for 

the Central District of Illinois vacated Muhammad’s sentence 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after finding that he was improperly 

sentenced as an armed career criminal. Muhammad v. Entzel, 

No. 19-CV-1343-SLD, 2020 WL 7346027, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 

14, 2020). The court transferred the matter to the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, which 

1

Muhammad’s former name was Taurus Zambrella.
No. 21-1441 3

resentenced Muhammad to time served and one year of supervised release. Relying on the restitution amount in the U.S. 

Probation Office’s revised presentence report and the parties’ 

statements2 that Muhammad had not made any restitution 

payments, the court also ordered Muhammad to pay 

$10,421.66 in restitution. Muhammad timely appealed his 

new sentence.

While the matter was pending on appeal, the parties 

learned that Muhammad paid $433.32 toward his original 

restitution judgment while incarcerated and before 

resentencing. On Muhammad’s motion and the parties’ joint 

stipulation, the district court entered an order updating the 

record on appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 10(e) and Circuit Rule 10(b) to reflect that 

Muhammad now owes $7,993.63 in restitution. This $2,228.03 

reduction included $433.32 Muhammad paid while 

incarcerated, $200 his codefendant paid, and $1,794.71 from a 

U.S. Treasury Department offset. Meanwhile, Muhammad’s 

appeal continued to briefing. 

2

At resentencing, the following exchange took place: 

[THE COURT]: The defendant must make restitution to the 

following named victims in the amount indicated: Hamilton 

Mutual Insurance Company of Cincinnati, Ohio in the 

amount $9,421.66 and Albertson’s Sports Shop in Warsaw, Indiana in the amount of $1,000. Does that cover it? None of that 

has been paid, I take it?

[GOVERNMENT]: Correct, Your Honor.

[THE COURT]: Correct?

[DEFENSE]: Correct, Your Honor.
4 No. 21-1441 

II

In this appeal, Muhammad seeks a limited remand so that 

the district court can revisit the restitution judgment. He argues that the district court erred by relying on inaccurate information when it reimposed the $10,421.66 restitution judgment. Muhammad forfeited this argument by failing to object 

to the district court’s restitution decision at resentencing, so 

we review it for plain error. See United States v. Jones, 22 F.4th 

667 (7th Cir. 2022). To prevail on plain error review, Muhammad must show: “(1) an error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.” 

Id. at 675. Muhammad contends that all four prongs of plain 

error review are met here. 

To begin, Muhammad identifies the error as this: the district court relied on inaccurate information—that he had not 

made any restitution payments—to impose his restitution. 

Muhammad directs our attention to United States v. Oliver, 

where we stated that “[c]onvicted defendants have a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate and reliable 

information” and “a sentencing court commits a significant 

procedural error if it selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” 873 F.3d 601, 608 (7th Cir. 2017) (quotations and 

citations omitted). 

Second, Muhammad argues that the error was plain. He 

concedes that he owed $10,421.66 in restitution under the 

MVRA because that was the amount of loss he caused the victims. But he views the district court’s decision to reimpose 

that total amount as a clear or obvious error, see United States 

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993), because he paid $433.32 
No. 21-1441 5

before resentencing and the district court did not credit that 

amount. 

Third, Muhammad argues that the error affected his substantial rights. The third prong requires Muhammad to show 

that he was prejudiced and there was “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding 

would have been different.” United States v. Morrow, 5 F.4th 

808, 814 (7th Cir. 2021). Muhammad argues that the district 

court’s error affected his right to be sentenced based on correct information and, but for that misinformation, the district 

court would have credited Muhammad’s $433.22 payment 

and reduced Muhammad’s restitution obligation. 

Finally, Muhammad argues that the error impacted the 

fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. This fourth prong of the plain error analysis is where we 

must pause. Even when a litigant satisfies the first three 

prongs of the plain error analysis, we “should exercise [our] 

discretion at the fourth prong only if the error seriously affects 

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 395 (7th Cir. 

2021) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). This means “we 

“retain discretion to leave an error uncorrected.” Id. (quotation omitted). In particular, we have “broad discretion under 

prong four to leave even plain errors uncorrected where we 

have no doubt as to the ultimate result of further proceedings.” Id. at 395–96 (quotation omitted). 

Here, we need not address all of Muhammad’s arguments 

about plain error because, even if the first three prongs are 

met, on the facts of this case we will not exercise our “broad 

discretion” under the fourth prong to correct any error. The 

fourth prong “has been compared to a miscarriage of justice.” 
6 No. 21-1441 

United States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 2020), as 

amended (Sept. 8, 2020). We are not convinced that the district 

court’s error, if any, rises to that level. Muhammad concedes 

that he did owe $10,421.66 in restitution under the MVRA, so 

the restitution judgment noting Muhammad’s restitution obligation of $10,421.66 is not inaccurate. 

Further, as we see it, Muhammad’s complaints amount to 

a crediting issue, and to that, we have “no doubt as to the ultimate result of further proceedings.” Hammond, 996 F.3d at 

395–96 (quotation omitted). Muhammad’s payments while 

incarcerated may have escaped the parties’ attention before, 

but there is now no disagreement among the parties or the 

district court—or us—that he should receive full credit for all 

payments made toward his restitution obligation. The government acknowledged in its briefing and at oral argument 

that Muhammad should receive full credit for his payments. 

The district court signaled its willingness to credit Muhammad for his payments when it entered an order attempting to 

update the record on appeal.3

In sum, we are confronted with 

3

We say “attempt[ed]” because it was improper for the district court to 

use Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) to update the record on appeal to reflect Muhammad’s payments. Rule 10(e) allows petitioners to 

correct omissions or misstatements in the appellate record. Evidence of 

Muhammad’s restitution payments was absent from the district court record entirely. Rule 10(e) was not a proper vehicle to update the record on 

appeal with information that was never in the district court record to 

begin with. Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 

F.4th 1002, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Rule 10(e) is permissive, but as a general rule we will not consider evidence on appeal that was not before the 

district court.”). 
No. 21-1441 7

a crediting issue about which all involved agree, even if it requires some diligence by the district court and the government offices that track Muhammad’s restitution payments to 

ensure that Muhammad is properly and officially credited. 

On these facts, “there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice because the error here,” if any, “does not seriously harm the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Pulliam, 973 F.3d at 782. 

III 

For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court and decline to order a limited remand.4Because 

everyone involved agrees that Muhammad paid $433.32 towards his restitution, we are confident he has or will receive 

credit for that amount. 

4 At oral argument, Muhammad’s attorney requested for the first time a 

complete resentencing at which the district court could reconsider Muhammad’s term of supervised release. We deem the request waived, and 

decline to address it.