Filed 12/8/21 Moncibaez v. Stericycle, Inc. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ERIK MONCIBAEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STERICYCLE, INC. et al.,

Defendants and 

Appellants. 

 B304079

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19STCV25328)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.

Littler Mendelson, Monica Martelli Quinn, Sara Ashley 

Zimmerman, Charles Cannizzaro for Defendants and Appellants.

Reisner & King, Adam J. Reisner, Tessa M. King; Benedon 

& Serlin, Douglas G. Benedon and Kian Tamaddoni for Plaintiff

and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Erik Moncibaez sued his employer, Stericycle, Inc., and 

others alleging sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and 

retaliation. Stericycle moved to compel arbitration, and 

presented an arbitration agreement that Moncibaez purportedly 

signed electronically when he began working for Stericycle. 

Stericycle also submitted a declaration stating that Moncibaez 

and his supervisor accessed and signed the document through an 

online portal. Moncibaez opposed the motion, asserting that

although he “clicked through” several documents, he did not 

recall seeing or signing the arbitration agreement. He also noted 

that the signature line stated “Paul Moncibaez,” a version of 

Moncibaez’s name he did not typically use. The trial court denied 

the motion, finding that Stericycle failed to meet its burden to 

demonstrate an enforceable arbitration agreement. Stericycle 

appealed.

We affirm. Stericycle did not authenticate Moncibaez’s 

electronic signature as required by Civil Code, section 1633.9, 

subdivision (a). Moncibaez and his supervisor both had access to 

the arbitration agreement, and Stericycle did not meet its burden 

to prove the electronic signature was “the act of” Moncibaez. 

Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s ruling. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

Moncibaez filed a complaint against Stericycle, district 

sales manager Joshua Amaya, and territory sales manager 

Matthew Toner on July 19, 2019. Moncibaez asserted seven 

causes of action for sexual harassment, racial discrimination, 

retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Moncibaez alleged that he began working as a sales executive for 
3

Stericycle on July 10, 2017, and that he was still employed there. 

He alleged that Toner harassed him “by making graphic sexual, 

lewd, and crude comments to [Moncibaez] as a means of singling 

him out, for personal gratification and to demean and upset him.” 

Moncibaez complained to Amaya about Toner, but Amaya 

“pursued no remedial action,” harassed Moncibaez, and told 

Toner that Moncibaez had complained about him. Moncibaez 

further alleged that he spoke with Stericycle’s human resources 

department, but his concerns were “summarily disregarded.” In 

addition, Moncibaez alleged that although he was “generating 

more sales than all of the sales executives on his team,” he was 

written up for low performance and reassigned to a lowerproducing sales territory. He alleged that after returning to work 

following a short illness in February 2019, he discovered that he 

had been locked out of his office and denied access to the 

company’s remote work computer system. Thereafter, Stericycle 

refused Moncibaez’s requests to return to work. Moncibaez 

requested actual damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, 

punitive damages, and attorney fees. 

Stericycle and Amaya answered the complaint; Toner was 

not served with the complaint and did not appear below. 

Hereafter, we refer to Stericycle and Amaya collectively as 

“defendants.” 

B. Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration

Defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay the 

superior court proceedings. Defendants asserted that on July 10, 

2017, Moncibaez signed an arbitration agreement. The threepage arbitration agreement attached to the motion stated that 

“any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of the 

employment relationship between the parties or the termination 
4

of that relationship, shall be resolved by final and binding 

arbitration.” The arbitration agreement stated that it covered

any claims by an employee against Stericycle or Stericycle 

employees, and it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act 

(FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1. It also stated that an employee receiving the 

agreement had 30 days to opt out of arbitration, and if no opt-out 

notice was received, the arbitration agreement “will become fully 

effective and binding upon the date” the agreement was signed.

It further stated, “I acknowledge that I have carefully reviewed 

this agreement and that I understand that I have thirty (30) days 

to opt out of arbitration if I do not wish this agreement to apply 

to me.” The arbitration agreement had blank lines for the 

employee’s signature, a signature for Stericycle, and dates for 

each. The version attached to defendants’ motion to compel 

arbitration was blank; it had no dates or signatures. 

Defendants submitted the declaration of Amanda Beezley, 

Stericycle’s human resources compliance manager. She stated 

that she managed “Stericycle’s relations with its third-party 

vendor Red Carpet, the online portal utilized by Stericycle for 

maintenance and signature of employment-related documents.” 

Beezley stated that she had “administrative access to Red Carpet 

as it pertains to employees,” and therefore could “log on and view 

which documents have been signed. The only details I can see 

are things such as document title, date and time of access, and 

date and time of acknowledgement.” Regarding Moncibaez’s

documents, Beezley attached a “screenshot entitled ‘Version 

History’ show[ing] the date(s) and time(s) the Arbitration 

Agreement was accessed, and by whom.” The screenshot had a 

section titled “ARBITRATION AGREEMENT,” and it had what 

appeared to be links to the arbitration agreement in English and 
5

Spanish. Below the links, it stated, “I acknowledge that I have 

carefully reviewed this agreement and that I understand that I 

have thirty (30) days to opt out of arbitration if I do not wish this 

agreement to apply to me.” In the “Acknowledgement of Receipt” 

section, the employee signature line stated, “Paul Moncibaez 

(Electronically Signed),” with a date of July 11, 2017. The section 

for a Stericycle representative stated, “Chris Ramirez 

(Electronically Signed)” on the same date. Beezley explained that 

Ramirez was Moncibaez’s manager. 

A second portion of the screenshot page showed what 

Beezley described as “the date(s) and time(s) the Arbitration 

Agreement was accessed, and by whom.” The table included the

following information: 

Version Description Label Date Publisher Action

4 Record of 

published 

content

Published

07/11/2017

12:46:41

07/11/2017

12:46:41

Chris 

Ramirez

View 

Delete 

Rollback

3 Record of 

published 

content

Published

07/11/2017

12:46:41

07/11/2017

12:46:41

Chris 

Ramirez

View 

Delete 

Rollback

2 Record of 

published 

content

Published

07/11/2017

12:25:02

07/11/2017

12:25:02

Erik 

Moncibaez

View 

Delete 

Rollback

1 Record of 

published 

content

Published

07/10/2017

11:53:34

07/10/2017

11:53:33

Chris 

Ramirez

View 

Delete 

Rollback

Beezely explained that this version history shows Moncibaez 

“electronically acknowledged the Arbitration Agreement at 

approximately 12:25:02 on July 11, 2017. The Arbitration 

Agreement also required signature by . . . manager Chris 
6

Ramirez, which accounts for the additional entries on the Version 

History.” 

Defendants contended the arbitration agreement was valid 

and enforceable under the FAA and California law. They 

asserted that Moncibaez electronically signed the arbitration 

agreement, and defendants had properly authenticated his 

electronic signature. Defendants also argued that even if 

Moncibaez had not signed the arbitration agreement, “his 

continued employment constitutes an assent to be bound by the 

terms of the agreement.” 

Moncibaez opposed the motion, asserting that defendants 

failed to meet their burden to show that a valid arbitration 

agreement existed. Moncibaez submitted a declaration stating 

that he was not given the opportunity to review any documents 

before signing them, he did not recall signing the arbitration 

agreement, and he was not provided any opportunity to ask 

questions about the arbitration agreement. He stated that as his 

employment with Stericycle began, Ramirez asked Moncibaez “to 

complete some online forms at his desktop computer. I was asked 

to sit on a chair next to Supervisor Ramirez and use the computer 

at his desk to complete forms so that I could begin my training.” 

He continued, “I was not given the opportunity to review any of 

the documents before signing and have no recollection of ever 

seeing, much less agreeing to, the Arbitration Policy.” Moncibaez 

stated that he “felt rushed and forced to click through the online 

prompts,” while Ramirez “told me, ‘let’s get through this,’ urging 

me to hurry up and sign without reviewing the information.” 

Moncibaez further stated that although the arbitration 

agreement was purportedly signed by “Paul Moncibaez,” “I 

typically sign my name as ‘Erik Moncibaez’ and do not recall ever 
7

typing ‘Paul Moncibaez’ on any Stericycle document.” He stated 

that he “solely completed the electronic forms under fear of losing 

an employment opportunity. As such, I did not execute the 

alleged agreement.” (Emphasis in original.) 

Moncibaez argued that defendants failed to establish the 

existence of a valid arbitration agreement, because there was no 

meeting of the minds. He further argued that the arbitration 

agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. 

In their reply, defendants asserted that Moncibaez failed to 

refute the existence of a binding arbitration agreement. 

Defendants also argued that the arbitration agreement was not 

unconscionable. They did not submit any additional evidence. 

C. Hearing and ruling

At the hearing on the motion, the parties briefly argued 

their positions. The court stated that the arbitration agreement 

“does not, to the court, appear to be unconscionable. There’s no 

sort of stance of unconscionability, at best a small amount of 

procedural unconscionability.” The court continued, “[B]ut 

there’s a question there if there’s a contract at all. Therein lies 

the rub.” The court therefore stated that “the defendant fails to 

meet their burden and this motion is denied.” Defense counsel 

argued again that there was a valid agreement, and asserted that 

the electronic signature was valid. The court stated, “I thought 

there was a lot of hearsay from the defense’s argument, and that 

signed document, that’s questionable to the court.” The court 

also stated, “There wasn’t any testimony that the plaintiff was 

told about what he could or could not do also. This may just fall 

into that narrow trough of I still don’t think you’re carrying your 

burden. [¶] I know what the state of the law is, and in some 

circumstances, I would be willing to find for the defense in this 
8

regard, but in this instance, I’m uncomfortable doing that.” In its 

minute order, the court stated, “The Motion to Compel 

arbitration and to stay Judicial proceedings . . . is Denied. 

Defendant fails to meet the burden of proof.” 

Defendants timely appealed. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1294.)

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that “the only issue on appeal is the 

existence of an agreement to arbitrate.” They assert that

Moncibaez “admitted to signing the Agreement,” and “as a matter 

of law, a valid contract existed between [Moncibaez] and 

Stericycle.” Moncibaez contends that he did not sign the 

agreement, and asserts that defendants did not carry their 

burden to show the existence of an enforceable agreement. 

Where the trial court resolved contested issues of fact in deciding 

a motion to compel arbitration, such as whether an arbitration 

agreement existed, we review the court’s factual findings for 

substantial evidence. (See Luxor Cabs, Inc. v. Applied 

Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 

970, 977.)1

1 As Moncibaez points out, some courts hold that when a 

trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration is based 

on the court’s finding that the moving party failed to carry its 

burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether 

that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Fabian v. 

Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066 

(Fabian); Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th 736, 744.) We do not address this discrepancy in the 

case law; the outcome here would be the same under either 

standard. 
9

“[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and 

accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to 

arbitrate the controversy, the court . . . must determine whether 

the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is 

raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the 

agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the 

petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. 

Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; see also Engalla v. 

Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

Parties moving to compel arbitration “may meet their 

initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a 

copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the 

opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California 

Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 

(Espejo).) If the opposing party challenges the validity of that 

signature, however, the moving party must “establish by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.” 

(Ibid.)

Here, the court found the “signed document” to be

“questionable,” and held that defendants failed to carry their 

burden. Defendants say little on the issue of authentication in 

their opening brief, asserting instead that Moncibaez “admitted 

to signing the Agreement because he clicked through the online 

prompts and completed the electronic forms.” Moncibaez, 

however, notes that he stated in his declaration that he “did not 

execute” the arbitration agreement, he had no recollection of ever 

seeing the arbitration agreement, he typically signs his name 

“Erik Moncibaez,” and he did not recall typing the name “Paul 

Moncibaez” on any Stericycle documents. Moncibaez asserts that 
10

Beezley’s “conclusory statement” in her declaration that 

Moncibaez signed the agreement is insufficient to meet 

defendants’ burden to authenticate the signature. In their reply 

brief, defendants assert that Beezley’s declaration met the 

requirements to authenticate the electronic signature. 

Civil Code section 1633.9 governs the authentication of 

electronic signatures. It states, in full, “(a) An electronic record 

or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act 

of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any 

manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security 

procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic 

record or electronic signature was attributable. [¶] (b) The effect 

of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a 

person under subdivision (a) is determined from the context and 

surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution, 

or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and 

otherwise as provided by law.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9.)

Thus, to authenticate an electronic signature, the 

proponent of the evidence must show that the electronic 

signature “was the act of the person.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. 

(a).) Case law indicates that to meet this burden, the proponent 

of the evidence must show that the purported signatory—rather 

than another person—completed the act of electronically signing 

the document. 

Moncibaez compares this case to Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto 

Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz), in which an

employee, Ruiz, filed a wage and hour action against his 

employer, Moss Bros., which then moved to compel arbitration. 

(Id. at pp. 838-839.) The business manager of Moss Bros., Main, 

submitted a declaration in which she “summarily asserted that 
11

Ruiz ‘electronically signed’ the 2011 agreement ‘on or about 

September 21, 2011,’” but “Main did not explain how Moss Bros. 

verified that Ruiz . . . electronically signed the 2011 agreement.” 

(Id. at p. 839.) In his opposition to the motion, “Ruiz argued that 

Main’s ‘conclusory statement’ that he electronically signed the 

2011 agreement was ‘not enough to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence’ that he did, in fact, electronically sign the 

agreement. In his opposing declaration, Ruiz averred he did not 

recall signing any arbitration agreement on September 21, 2011, 

or at any other time, and if he had been presented with an 

agreement that limited his ability to sue Moss Bros. he would not 

have signed it.” (Id. at p. 840.) With the reply, Main submitted a 

second declaration, which explained, “Each employee is required 

to log into the Company’s HR system—each with his or her 

unique login ID and password—to review and electronically 

execute the Employee Acknowledgement form, which includes the 

arbitration agreement. While all employees are required to sign 

the form, they are free to review it at their leisure while logged 

into the HR system.” (Id. at pp. 840-841.) The Court of Appeal 

noted, “Still, Main did not indicate whether or if so how Moss 

Bros. ascertained that Ruiz electronically signed, or was the 

person who electronically signed, the employee acknowledgement 

form, including the 2011 agreement.” (Id. at p. 841.) The trial 

court held that Moss Bros. failed to establish that an agreement 

existed, and Moss Bros. appealed. (Ibid.) 

The Court of Appeal affirmed on the basis that “Moss Bros. 

did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the 

electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was the act of Ruiz.” 

(Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) The court discussed 

authentication under Civil Code section 1633.9, and found that 
12

Main’s declarations were insufficient to meet that standard. 

“Main summarily asserted in her initial declaration that Ruiz 

was the person who electronically signed the 2011 agreement . . . 

but she did not explain how she arrived at that conclusion or 

inferred Ruiz was the person who electronically signed the 2011 

agreement. . . . Main never explained how Ruiz’s printed 

electronic signature, or the date and time printed next to the 

signature, came to be placed on the 2011 agreement.” (Id. at pp. 

843-844.) Main explained that each employee logged into the 

company’s computer system “using his or her ‘unique login ID 

and password,’ to review and sign the employee acknowledgment 

form. Again, however, Main did not explain how, or upon what 

basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on the 2011 

agreement was ‘the act of’ Ruiz.” (Id. at p. 844.) The court 

continued, “In the face of Ruiz’s failure to recall electronically 

signing the 2011 agreement, the fact the 2011 agreement had an 

electronic signature on it in the name of Ruiz, and a date and 

time stamp for the signature, was insufficient to support a 

finding that the electronic signature was, in fact, ‘the act of’ 

Ruiz.” (Ibid.)

Moncibaez also relies on Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 

1062, in which a homeowner, Fabian, alleged problems with the

installation of solar panels in her home. The defendant, 

Renovate, sought to compel arbitration based on a purported 

contract with Fabian; it submitted a contract bearing electronic 

initials and an electronic signature. (Id. at p. 1064-1065.) 

Fabian stated in a declaration that she did not sign any contract, 

and all of her communications with Renovate had been completed 

by phone. (Id. at p. 1065.) The parties conducted discovery 

regarding whether Fabian signed a contract. (Id. at p. 1066.) 
13

Fabian maintained that she did not sign a contract, and Renovate 

stated that Fabian signed the document through DocuSign. 

(Ibid.) The trial court denied Renovate’s motion to compel 

arbitration. 

The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court rejected 

Renovate’s contention that “the Contract bearing Fabian’s 

electronic initials and signature is authenticated by DocuSign. 

Standing alone, that fact is not sufficient to compel a result in 

Renovate’s favor as a matter of law.” (Fabian, supra, 42 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1068.) The court noted that “Renovate offered 

no evidence about the process used to verify Fabian’s electronic 

signature via DocuSign,” including how the contract was 

provided to Fabian or “how Fabian’s identification was verified as 

the person who actually signed the Contract.” (Id. at p. 1069.) 

The declarations submitted by Anderson, a Renovate employee, 

did not fill the evidentiary gap; Anderson did not discuss how the 

contract was presented to Fabian, explain “the process used to 

obtain and verify Fabian’s ‘docusigned’ electronic initials and 

signature,” or state “how the electronic signature could have only 

been placed on the Contract by Fabian.” (Id. at pp. 1069-1070.) 

The court stated, “Most importantly, Anderson did not explain 

how Fabian’s electronic initials and signature were the ‘act of 

Fabian’ by offering evidence that DocuSign assigned Fabian a 

unique ‘identity verification code’ to initial and sign the 

Contract.” (Id. at p. 1070.) 

In another recent case, Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, 

LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541 (Bannister), the plaintiff, 

Bannister, was an employee of a skilled nursing facility that was 

purchased by the defendant, Marinidence. Bannister sued for 

employment-related claims, and Marinidence moved to compel 
14

arbitration, attaching an arbitration agreement Bannister 

purportedly signed during an onboarding process after 

Marinidence took over the facility. (Id. at p.544.) To 

authenticate the electronic signature, Marinidence presented 

evidence that “[t]o access the online onboarding portal, an 

individual must enter an employee’s first and last name and 

Social Security number, in addition to entering Marinidence’s 

‘Client ID’ and pin code (the same ‘Client ID’ and pin code for all 

employees). . . . Based on these requirements, according to 

Marinidence, the electronic signature on the arbitration 

agreement could only have been placed there by Bannister.” (Id. 

at p. 546.) Bannister, however, said that 20 or more employees 

were onboarded the same day by a Marinidence manager, who 

entered information into a laptop computer as employees 

answered questions. “No employee-specific user names or 

passwords were required to access the onboarding portal, and 

each employee’s Social Security number was available in the 

employee’s personnel file.” [The manager] did not inform 

Bannister or the other employees about an arbitration 

agreement. According to Bannister, she never saw the 

arbitration agreement and never clicked ‘I agree’ or otherwise 

signed the arbitration agreement during the onboarding process.” 

(Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546 .) The trial court 

denied Marinidence’s motion to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating, “Substantial 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Marinidence 

failed to authenticate the electronic signature on the arbitration 

agreement as Bannister’s. Marinidence’s evidence did not 

establish that Bannister was assigned a unique, private user 

name and password such that she is the only person who could 
15

have accessed the onboarding portal and signed the agreement; 

instead, the evidence showed that the requisite ‘Client ID’ and 

PIN code was not employee-specific, and [the manager] had 

access to the information necessary to access the onboarding 

portal via employee personnel records.” (Bannister, supra, 64 

Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) The appellate court stated that it would 

not disturb the trial court’s finding that Bannister’s version of 

events was more credible, and “[b]ecause Bannister’s evidence 

showed that she was not the only person who could have executed 

the arbitration agreement, we disagree that the trial court 

committed any legal error.” (Id. at p.548.)

By contrast, in Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, this 

court held that the defendant employer, SCPMG, did sufficiently 

authenticate the electronic signature of the plaintiff employee, 

Dr. Espejo. This court stated that SCPMG’s declarant, Tellez, 

“concluded that the ‘[plaintiff’s] name . . . could have only been 

placed on the signature pages of the employment agreement and 

the DRP [dispute resolution procedure] by someone using Dr. 

Espejo’s unique user name and password. . . . [¶] Given this 

process for signing documents and protecting the privacy of the 

information with unique and private user names and passwords, 

the electronic signature was made by Dr. Espejo’ on the 

employment agreement and the DRP at the date, time, and IP 

address listed on the documents. These details satisfactorily 

meet the requirements articulated in Ruiz and establish that the 

electronic signature on the DRP was ‘the act of’ Espejo (Civ.

Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)), and therefore provide the necessary 

factual details to properly authenticate the document.” (Espejo, 

supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.)
16

Here, the evidence shows Moncibaez was not the only 

person who had access to, and could have signed, the arbitration 

agreement. As Beezley stated in her declaration, Ramirez 

accessed the document three times on July 10 and 11, 2017. The 

notations about access do not state that a signature was entered 

or that any other changes were made; each entry simply states 

that the document was “published” at a certain time. Beezley 

stated that “in the ordinary and usual course of business, 

prospective talent and employees are prompted to create a unique 

password upon initial login [to Stericycle’s online portal] so as to 

maintain security of their electronic documents.” However, 

Beezley did not state that a unique username and password was 

the only way to access the arbitration agreement, thus 

demonstrating that the electronic signature was “the act of” 

Moncibaez alone. To the contrary, Ramirez also had access to the 

document: he accessed it once before Moncibaez, and twice 

afterward. Moreover, the signature on the arbitration agreement 

reads “Paul Moncibaez,” a name Monciabaez states that he does 

not typically use, suggesting that he may not have been the 

person to enter his name into the online form. Because two

people accessed the document, Moncibaez does not typically use 

the name entered on the form, and Moncibaez stated that he did 

not recall signing it, substantial evidence supports the court’s 

finding that defendants failed to meet their burden of 

authenticating the electronic signature as “the act of” Moncibaez.

Defendants argue Moncibaez “supplied a litany of facts and 

admissions indicating that he had signed the Arbitration 

Agreement.” They cite Moncibaez’s statements that he was not 

allowed to review any documents “before signing,” and that he 

felt rushed as he clicked through the documents with Ramirez 
17

looking on. However, it was defendants’ burden to prove the 

existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement by 

authenticating the purported electronic signature. We are not 

persuaded by defendants’ contentions that Moncibaez’s 

declaration was insufficient to contradict defendants’ evidence, or 

that the court should have afforded greater weight to certain 

statements in Moncibaez’s declaration. Under substantial 

evidence review, we neither judge the credibility of witnesses nor 

reweigh the evidence. (See Fabian, supra, 42 Cal. App.5th at p. 

1067.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s holding that 

defendants failed to authenticate the electronic signature, and 

therefore did not establish the existence of an enforceable 

arbitration agreement. We do not reach defendants’ remaining 

arguments about the enforceability of the agreement. 

DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion to 

compel arbitration is affirmed. Moncibaez is entitled to costs on 

appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

MANELLA, P. J.

CURREY, J.