[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11390

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANGEL FELICIANO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00020-TES-CHW-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11390

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Angel Feliciano appeals his conviction for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Feliciano argues that the district court abused its discretion at trial by admitting evidence of his 

2015 felony conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted 

felon. The government responds that the district court did not err, 

but even if it did, any error was harmless.

We review the admission of evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 

740, 747 (11th Cir. 2010). Evidence admitted in violation of Rule 

404(b) is considered to be harmless error where there is other substantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See United States v. 

Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the 

introduction of evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act to “prove 

a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion 

the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b)(1). It does, however, allow such evidence for other purposes, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, 

and . . . accordingly 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence, 

should not be lightly excluded when it is central to the 

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22-11390 Opinion of the Court 3

prosecution’s case.” United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 

1313 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted, alteration in original).

We utilize a three-part test to determine whether evidence 

is admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant 

to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there must be 

sufficient proof that a jury could find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by 

undue prejudice, as established in Rule 403. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Evid. 403. 

The risk of undue prejudice can be reduced by an appropriate limiting instruction. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 

(11th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 

1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that, where the district court 

issued a limiting instruction, “any unfair prejudice possibly caused 

by [the evidence’s] introduction was mitigated”).

The first prong of the Rule 404(b) test can be satisfied “where 

the state of mind required for the charged and extrinsic offenses is 

the same.” Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345. “[B]y pleading not guilty, [a 

defendant] place[s] th[e] [knowledge] element of the § 922(g) offense in issue.” United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1281 & n.7

(11th Cir. 2003). Further, a prior conviction in which the defendant 

possessed a gun provides a “logical connection between a convicted felon’s knowing possession of a firearm at one time and his 

knowledge that a firearm is present at a subsequent time (or, put 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11390

differently, that his possession at the subsequent time is not mistaken or accidental).” Id. at 1281 (stating that a defendant’s prior 

offenses that involved the knowing possession of a firearm “plainly 

bore” on the defendant’s knowledge that the gun was present in 

the charged instance).

Section 922(g) of Title 18 governs offenses for unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition and “entails three distinct elements: (1) that the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the 

defendant was in knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) that the 

firearm was in or affecting interstate commerce.” Jernigan, 

341 F.3d at 1279 (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that “in a prosecution under 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and § 924(a)(2), the Government must prove 

both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he 

knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from 

possessing a firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 

(2019).

“[T]he law is entirely well settled that the flight of the accused is competent evidence against him as having a tendency to 

establish his guilt.” United States v. Borders, 693 F.2d 1318, 1324 

(11th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, when a defendant testifies on his own behalf, he 

risks the jury concluding the opposite of his testimony is true. See 

United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). Statements made by a defendant may also be considered as substantive

evidence of his guilt if the jury disbelieves it. Id. If there is some 

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22-11390 Opinion of the Court 5

corroborative evidence of guilt for the charged offense, and the defendant testifies on his own behalf, his testimony denying guilt 

may, by itself, establish elements of the offense. Id. at 314–15. This 

is especially true where the offense includes highly subjective elements, such as intent or knowledge. Id. at 315.

Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion at trial when it admitted a prior felon in possession conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) The court properly 

determined that the evidence was sufficiently probative of Feliciano’s knowing possession of a firearm, which was an issue at trial, 

and that its probative value outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice, 

particularly given the district court’s limiting instructions. Further, 

we also conclude that even if the court should not have admitted

the evidence, any error in this respect was harmless. The other 

evidence of Feliciano’s refusal to pull over after an officer activated 

his blue lights, his attempt to outrun police vehicles in pursuit, his 

flight from the overturned vehicle, his post-arrest recorded statements while in jail, his trial testimony about a “driver” not observed by troopers, and his denial of driving the vehicle or knowing 

about the firearms inside all support his conviction independent of 

the 2015 conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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