United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 01-1065

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

GREGORY THOMAS MURRAY,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Lynch, Circuit Judge,

Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lipez, Circuit Judge.

Bruce Mallonee, Brent A. Singer and Rudman & Winchell, LLC,

on brief for appellant.

Margaret D. McGaughey, Appellate Chief, and Paula D. Silsby,

United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

November 20, 2001

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STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. Appellant Gregory T.

Murray appeals from his conviction for knowing possession of a

dangerous weapon in a federal facility, see 18 U.S.C. § 930(a)

(1994 and Supp. II 1996). Murray argues that the district court

erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant

to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We

affirm.

I.

On March 9, 2000, Murray entered the lobby of the

Margaret Chase Smith Federal Building in Bangor, Maine, carrying

a black powder pistol in a holster on his belt. Murray had been

a frequent visitor at the building for the past eight years and

had occasionally brought a Leatherman knife with him on these

visits. He had been allowed to check the knife with the

security personnel stationed at the x-ray machine and metal

detector. On this occasion, Murray advanced to the metal

detector, which was approximately six feet from the entrance to

the building, past a set of sliding doors, a vestibule and

another set of doors, and indicated that he wanted to check the

pistol with the armed officers on duty. He was informed that

civilians could not check guns and that he would have to leave

the building. Murray did not leave but instead became irate.

In the confrontation that ensued, Murray at one point put his
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hand on his weapon and did not comply with repeated instructions

to turn the pistol over to the officers. Finally, after one of

the officers managed to remove the pistol, Murray was restrained

and arrested.

Subsequently, Murray was charged with forcibly

assaulting, resisting, opposing, impeding, intimidating and

interfering with officers and employees of the United States in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Count I) and with possessing

or causing to be present a dangerous weapon in a Federal

facility in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 930(a) (Count II). With

respect to Count II, the defendant moved for judgment of

acquittal at the close of the government's case and again before

closing arguments. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). The court denied

the motion in both instances. On August 24, 2000, the jury

returned a verdict of not guilty on Count I, but found Murray

guilty as to Count II. On November 22, 2000, Murray was

sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three months. Murray

now appeals the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal

on Count II.

II.

Murray was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 930(a),

which reads as follows: "[W]hoever knowingly possesses or causes

to be present a firearm or other dangerous weapon in a Federal
1The statute excepts law enforcement officers, military

personnel, and those lawfully carrying weapons incident to

hunting or other lawful purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 930(d). Murray

does not fit any of the exceptions.

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facility . . . or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this

title or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both."1 The parties

stipulated that the Margaret Chase Smith Federal Building is a

"federal facility" within the meaning of the statute, see 18

U.S.C. § 930(g)(1), and there was no question at trial (and has

been no question on appeal) that the pistol Murray carried into

the building, although old, was a "dangerous weapon" within the

meaning of the statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 930(g)(2). 

However, in his motion for judgment of acquittal Murray

argued, and continues to argue on appeal, that section 930

prohibits only knowing violations of the statute and that he

could not reasonably have known that possessing a pistol in the

public lobby, before passing through the metal detector,

violated the prohibition on dangerous weapons in the building.

Murray's argument is essentially that he mistakenly believed

that the prohibition applied only past the metal detector and xray machines, the point at which he expected to be able to check

the pistol, and that no jury could have reasonably concluded

that he thus knowingly violated the statute.
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In support of the position that section 930 only

prohibits knowing violations of the statute, Murray points out

that the statute further requires that "[n]otice of the

provisions of subsection[] (a) . . . shall be posted

conspicuously at each public entrance to each Federal facility"

and that "no person shall be convicted of an offense under

subsection (a) . . . if such notice is not so posted at such

facility, unless such person had actual notice of subsection (a)

. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 930(h). Murray contends that the fact

that he had on previous occasions been allowed to check his

knife at the metal detector and proceed into the building led

him reasonably to believe that the same policy would apply to

the pistol. He argues that, although notices of the prohibition

were posted in the Margaret Chase Smith Federal Building, they

were posted in ways that reinforced the lobby's status as a

"neutral zone," because there were no signs outside the

building and the more eye-catching signs were posted past the

lobby. Finally, he points out that, had he simply left the

building after having been told that he was not allowed to check

the pistol, he would not have been charged with violating the

statute; therefore, he contends, it follows that possessing a

dangerous weapon in the lobby of the Margaret Chase Smith

Federal Building is not prohibited by section 930(a).
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We affirm a district court's denial of a motion for

acquittal unless the evidence, when "'viewed in the light most

favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any trier

of fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

United States v. Hernandez, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000),

(quoting United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.

1986)), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1103 (2001). We find that there

was sufficient evidence in this case for a jury to have found

that Murray violated the statute beyond a reasonable doubt.

Even if the appellant believed that he was not violating the

prohibition against possessing dangerous weapons in a federal

building when he entered the lobby of the Margaret Chase Smith

Federal Building, he was clearly and immediately informed of the

policy by the security personnel when he showed them the pistol.

A jury could reasonably conclude that his conduct from that

point forward was a knowing possession of a dangerous weapon in

a federal building. Given that there was a legitimate question

for the jury at least on this point, we need not consider

whether the jury could reasonably have found that Murray

violated the statute simply by bringing the pistol into the

lobby, before he was informed of the policy against it -- a

conclusion arguably supported because of the frequency with

which he visited the building and had previously encountered the
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notices announcing the prohibition. A judgment of acquittal was

thus properly denied and the question was correctly submitted to

the jury. 

Affirmed.