J-S61045-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARQUIS RAMEY 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 819 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order February 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001422-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and PANELLA, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2019

Marquis Ramey appeals pro se from the order dismissing his first petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546, without a hearing. We affirm. 

Following a non-jury trial in August of 2014, Appellant was convicted of 

loitering and prowling at night, possessing instruments of crime, receiving 

stolen property, unlawfully possessing a firearm, carrying a firearm without a 

license, and criminal conspiracy.1 The trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of nine to twenty years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal,

Appellant argued the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial suppression 

motion. A panel of this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence and 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5506, 907(a), 3925(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 

903(a)(1). 
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our Supreme Court denied allocatur. See Commonwealth v. Ramey 3513 

EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. filed, Jan. 13, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). 

On January 14, 2016, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.2 The 

PCRA court appointed counsel; however, Appellant filed several petitions to 

remove appointed counsel and proceed pro se. Following a Grazier3 hearing, 

the PCRA court granted Appellant’s request. Subsequently, based upon its 

review of the record, the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss. Despite 

Appellant’s response, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition without a 

hearing. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following questions for our review: 

I. Whether the PCRA court erred in not allowing [] Appellant 

to show the trial court’s error in the conviction of loitering 

and prowling at night[], possession of firearms, and criminal 

conspiracy; and will it ([the] PCRA [court]) accept the 

argument of a miscarriage of justice that the trial court 

performed at the suppression hearing and trial?

II. Whether the PCRA court erred in not reversing the 

conviction of loitering and prowling at night[]? Was there 

sufficient evidence to convict [] Appellant of this crime? 

III. Whether the PCRA court erred in not reversing the 

conviction[s] of possession of firearms, firearms carry 

without a license, possession of an instrument of crime, and 

receiving stolen property? Also whether the PCRA court 

erred [and] showed a miscarriage of justice in its decision 

to find him (Appellant) guilty?

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2 Appellant filed an amendment to his petition on October 19, 2017. 

3 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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IV. Whether the PCRA court erred in not reversing the

conviction of criminal conspiracy? Also, whether the 

prosecution produced any evidence that shows an “overt 

act” committed by [] Appellant? 

V. Whether the PCRA court erred in the sentencing of this 

Appellant? Did the PCRA court violate the Appellant’s [rights 

under the] United States Constitution’s Eighth [] 

Amendment[] cruel and unusual punishment [clause], and 

[the] United States Constitution’s Fourteenth [] 

Amendment[] due process clause? 

See Appellant’s Brief, at 3 (unnecessary capitalization and formatting

omitted)

Prior to reaching the merits of Appellant’s issues, we must first 

determine if he has properly preserved these issues for our review. As 

explained below, none of Appellant’s issues are properly before this court. 

Through his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court created a 

“miscarriage of justice” by failing to take “into consideration any of the 

evidence that was provided by the Appellant’s counsel.” Appellant’s Brief, at 

8. This is a challenge to the weight of the evidence underlying his convictions. 

Additionally, issues two through four attack the sufficiency of the evidence 

underlying his convictions. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-19. These are all 

claims of trial court error.4

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4 We recognize that sufficiency and weight claims raised as the underlying 

issue in a counsel ineffectiveness claim are distinct from claims of trial court 

error and, as such, cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. 

Natividad, 938 A.2d 310, 329 (Pa. 2007). However, in his appellate brief, 

Appellant specifically states that he is not raising any claims of counsel 

ineffectiveness. See Appellant’s Brief, at 10 (“In the instant case, this pro se 
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The PCRA, however, procedurally bars claims of trial court error, 

by requiring a petitioner to show the allegation of error is not 

previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3), 9544. 

At the PCRA stage, claims of trial court error are either previously 

litigated (if raised on direct appeal) or waived (if not). See 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, [] 18 A.3d 244, 260-61, 270 ([Pa.] 

2011) (rejecting claims of trial court error as either previously 

litigated where raised on direct appeal or waived where not raised 

[on] direct appeal). 

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 780 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(en banc). 

Appellant failed to raise any of these claims of error on direct appeal. As 

such, we find these issues waived and procedurally barred from review under 

the PCRA. 

Further, Appellant’s final issue is waived for his failure to develop this 

argument in his appellate brief. 

Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit. 

Accordingly, pro se litigants must comply with the procedural 

rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. This Court 

will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf

of an appellant.

Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). “It is Appellant’s obligation to 

sufficiently develop arguments in his brief by applying the relevant law to the 

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Appellant could not argue the trial counsel’s ineffectiveness where he 

believe[s] that the trial counsel was very effective in both suppression and 

trial”). Therefore, we have not reviewed these claims in the context of 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. 
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facts of the case, persuade this Court that there were errors below, and 

convince us relief is due because of those errors. If an appellant does not do 

so, we may find the argument waived.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 

274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009). Despite his inclusion of five issues on appeal, 

Appellant’s argument section of his appellate brief only addressed the first 

four issues. The brief completely fails to address his claim that the PCRA5 court 

erred in imposing sentence and by violating his eighth and fourteenth 

amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, he has 

waived this issue on appeal for failure to develop an argument. See 

Tchirkow, 160 A.3d at 804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is well-established that 

‘[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when the briefs 

are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not 

consider the merits thereof’”).

As Appellant is due no relief on any of his issues, we affirm the PCRA 

court’s order dismissing his petition. 

Order affirmed. 

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5 As Appellant did not develop this argument, we are unsure as to whether he 

intended to direct this claim of error in sentencing to the trial court or the 

PCRA court. If Appellant intended to direct this claim of error to the trial court, 

as the court that actually imposed his sentence, we would also find this 

argument waived as procedurally barred from review under the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d at 260-61, 270 (claims of trial court error 

are waived where not raised on direct appeal). 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/21/19