FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT J ULY 26, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Wm. Terre ll Hodge s, U. S. District J udg e for the Middle District of F lorida, * sitti ngby desig nation. [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1254 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 3- 00 10 7- CV-2 -WD O FERRELLGAS PARTNERS, L.P., FERRELLGAS, L.P, FERRELLGAS, INC., Pl ai nti ff s- Appe llants , ve rs us HOMER BARR OW , JANET W HITLEY, BARROW ENE RGIES, INC., D ef en dants -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (July 26, 2005) Before BL ACK

and HU LL , C ircuit Judg es, a nd HO DG ES , D istrict Judg e.

* PE R CU RIA M:2

T his is ana ct ionby

F er re llg as P ar

tne rs , L . P, F er

re llg as , L . P, a nd F er

re llg as , In c. (co ll ect iv el y

“ Ferr el lg as ”) p ur su an t t o § 43 (a) o f th e Lan ha m Act, 1 5 U.S.C. § 1125 (a ), a nd G eo rg ialawa ga ins t H om er Barr ow , Jane t Whit le y , a nd B ar ro w E ne rg ie s, I nc . ( he re ina ft er “ the D ef en dants ”)
. T he a ct iona ri se s ou t of the D ef en dants ’ use of

the na m e “ Barr owE ne rg ie s” in co nne ct ionw iththe ir pr opane busi ne ss b as ed

in Bu tle r, G eo rg ia
. F er

re llg as c ont en ds tha t “ Barr owE ne rg ie s” is
co nf usi ngl y sim ilar to the “ Barr owP ro pane G as ” nam e it use s inc onne ct ionw ith it s p ro pa ne bu si ne ss , whi ch als o o pe rat es in Bu tl er an d t he su rro un di ng area . Fe rr el lga s c la im s th at

it obt ai ne d th e ri ght

to ex cl usi ve use of

the “ Barr ow ” na m e in t h e p ro p an e b u s i n es s t h ro u g h a s er i es o f s t o cks al es b eg i n n i n g wi t h Mr . B ar ro w’s
sa le of B arro w Pro pa ne Gas, In c. in 19 99
. Fe rr el lga s a

ppe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r ef usa l t o pr el im inari ly

e nj ointhe D ef en dants f ro m usi ng the “ Barr ow ” na m e. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e inj unc tio n be ca use it f ound that F er re llg as ha d no t sh ow n asub stanti al li ke lih ood of pr ovi ng that it owned the “ Barr ow” m ark and because it concluded that m oney dam ages co u l dad eq u at el y co m

p en s at e F er re l l g as fo r a n y t ra d emarki n fr i n g emen t . We
re ve rs e an d r em an d f

or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o is sue apr el im inary inj unc tio n c onsi ste nt
w iththi s op ini on.3 I. H om er Barr owf ound ed Barr owP ro pane G as , I nc . ( vari ousl y “ Barr ow Pro pa ne ”) i n 1 96 9 i n B ut le r, Geo rg ia wit h ju st two pro pa ne de li ve ry tru ck s, a pic kup, a nd a

30, 000 ga llo n pr opane tank. E ve ntu al ly , Mr . Barr oww as able to ex pand h is b usi ne ss b y

w inn ing c ust om er s f

ro m c om pe tit or s and b y

pur ch as ing
com peting b usiness es and switching them over to “ Barr ow Pr opane Gas. ” Mr
. Barr ow ’ s da

ught er , Jane t B ar

ro wWhit le y , j oin ed

the c om pany in 1989
. B y

199 9, Barr owP ro pane ha d gr ow n f ro m it s hu m ble be gin nin gs i nto am aj or bus ine ss i n th e m id- G eo rg iaa re a, w ithf

our of fi ce s se rv ing c ust om er s inse ve nte enc ount ie s and ge ne rat in g app ro xi m at el y ten m il li on do ll ars in pro pa ne ga s s al es each y ear. Barr owP ro pane pr om ote d it se lf by dis play ing the na m e “ Barr owP ro pane G as ” or

“ Barr owP ro pane ” on i ts o ff ic e sig ns, de liv er

y tr uc ks, e qui pm en t, pr opane tanks, inv oic es , bil ls, e m

plo y ee uni fo rm s, ne w spa pe r adve rt ise m en ts, te le phon e dir ec tor ie s, a nd p ro m oti ona l m at er ia ls. A cc or din g to Mr . Barr ow , Barr owP ro pane ha d an ou tst an din g bu sin es s r ep uta tio n by the ti m e he de ci de d to se ll al l of his sh ares . In199 9, Mr . Barr ow , a s th e sol e share hol de r, put his sto ck up f or sa le a nd issued a prosp ectus, touting hi s com pany ’ s reputation. In D ecem ber of that y ear, Mr. Bar row sold all of his stock in Barrow P ropane Ga s, I nc. to a com pany called Pro A m Southeast, Inc. (here inafter “ Pro A m ”) f or $9.5 m illion
. Mr. Bar

row neverThe “ Ba rrow” name is most acc urate ly char acte rized as a “ service mark” or a “ trade 2 name,” rathe r than a

trade mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Howeve r, the distinction does not matter for purposes of this appe al, and we will refe r to either the “B arr ow” name or “ Ba rrow” mark. 4 dis cu sse d w ithP ro A m

a ny r es tr ic tio ns o n P ro A m ’ s us e of the “ Barr ow ” na m e, but he te sti fi ed

that he ins tr

uc te d hi s a tto rn ey

to te ll Pr o A m

that the na m e w as not

f or sa le
. P ro A m

vic e pr es ide nt, K enW el sh, te sti fi ed that P ro A m ’ s c ont inu ed use of th e n am e was ne ve r an is su e dur in g n eg ot ia ti on s an d t ha t i t was cle ar Pro Am intended to use the nam e w ithou t restriction. A ccording to Mr. W elsh, it w as im po rta nt forPro Am

to pe rp etua te th e “ Barr ow” na m e b ecau se he fel t t ha t Pr o Am
w oul d no t be suc ce ssf

ul i n th e ar ea

w ith out it
. 2 T he sto ck sa le a gr ee m en t be tw ee n M r. Barr owa nd P ro A m doe s no t sp eci fic al ly m en ti on an y

tra de m ark s o r tr ad e n am es th en in us e b y Barr ow Pr op an e. T he c ontra ct

c ont ai ns n o pr ovi sio ns r el at ing to ana ssi gnm en t, tr an sf er , or li ce nsi ng o f t h e “Ba rr o w” n ame t o Pr o Am . Ho we v er , i ti m p o s es n o re s t ri ct i o n s o n Pr o Am ’s use of the nam e and has no provis ions con tem plating the nam e’ s eventual discont inuance. T he agreem ent sim ply does not s ay , one w ay

or the other, whether the “ Barr ow ” na m e w as inc lud ed in the pur ch as e. I nde ed , the onl y r ef er en ce to int el le ct ua l pr ope rty

w hic h c anbe f

ound in the a gr ee m en t i s th e re pr es en ta tio n in§ 3. 9 th at : T he re a re no p at en ts, pa te nt a ppl ic at ion s, tr ad em ar

ks (whe the r re gis te re d or

not ), tr ad em ar

k a ppl ic at ion s, tr ad e na m es , c opy

ri ght s, pa te nt o r know -h owli ce nse s ( w he re in5 [Bar row P ropane Ga s, I nc.] is either licensee or licensor), use d inthe or din ar

y c our se of bus ine ss o f [B ar

ro w Pr opane G as , I nc . ] [ Barr owP ro pane G as , I nc . ] ha s no t re ce ive d any

w ri tte n no tic e or

c la im of a ny inf ri nge m en t, m isu se or m isa ppr opr ia tio n by

[ Barr owP ro pane G as , In c. ] of a ny pa te nt, tr ad em ar

k, tr ad e na m e, c opy

ri ght , intellectual property

rights license or sim ilar right owned b y an y th i r dp a rt y. A s ar es ult

of the sa le , P ro A m

be cam e the sol e share hol de r of Barr ow Pr opane G as , I nc . a nd M r. Barr owe xit ed the pr opane bus ine ss, a gr ee ing not to work in the field for four y ears. Bar row P ropane Ga s, I nc. w as eventually m erged in to Pro Am

an d c eas edto ex is t as a se pa rat e co rp or at e en ti ty, bu t Pr o Am
co nt in ue d t o o pe rat e th e en te rp ris e u nd er t he “ Barr ow Pr op an e Gas ” n am e. Pro Am
ev enstart ed

usi ng the “ Barr ow ” na m e at som e of it s P ro A m

of fi ce s ou tsi de of

the
or igi na l B ar

ro wte rr ito ry . P ro A m ’ s si gns, tr uc ks, e qui pm en t, tanks, inv oic es , bil ls, uni fo rm s, a nd a dve rt isi ng and p ro m oti ona l m at er ia ls c ont inu ed to pr om ine ntl y displ ay the “ Barr ow” nam e, except that on som e of these item s the words “ A P ro A m Co m pany ” w er e inc lud ed

in sm al le r le tte rs und er

ne ath. P ro A m

a lso pr om ote d M rs . Whit le y

to ge ne ra l m an ag er

a nd p la ce d he r in c harg e of the Barr ow Pr opane of

fi ce s. P ro A m

c ondu ct ed

bus ine ss i n th is w ay

f or thr ee y ears , w ith out objec tion from

Mr. Bar row or Mrs. Whitley

about its u se of the “ Barr ow” nam e. In la te 20 02 , Ferre ll ga s p ur ch as edall of P ro Am ’s st oc k fo r $4 2 m il li on , and Pro Am
was ev en tu al ly m erg edin to Ferre ll ga s.There is evidence in the rec ord that F err ellg as planne d to transition to “Fer rellg as,” a

nd 3 that this plan was ca

rried out in ar eas where Pro Am had extended the “ Ba rrow” name. Howeve r, it is undisput ed that F err ellg as continually used “B arr ow” in its identifying ma rk whe re B ar r o wP r o p an e G a s o p e r at e d o r i g i n a l l y. 6 Whe n F er

re llg as too k ov er

ope ratio ns o f Barr owP ro pane , it c ont inu ed

to use the “ Barr ow ” na m e on s ign s, de liv er y tr uc ks, e qui pm en t, pr opane tanks, inv oic es , bil ls, e m

plo y ee uni fo rm s, a nd a dve rt ise m en ts and p ro m oti ona l m at er ia ls, but of te n w iththe phr as e “ A D ivi sio n of F er re llg as . ” K enH ei nz , avic e pr es ide nt

3 of F er re llg as , te sti fi ed

that ob ta ini ng the “ Barr ow ” na m e w as a n im portant p ar

t of the de ci sio n to pur ch as e Pr o A m . Mr s. Whit le y w as pr es en t duri ng d isc uss ion s about Ferrellgas’ use of the nam e, but raised no ob j ection when Fer

rellgas
ex pr es se d it s in te nti on t o c ont inu e to u se the na m e. A cc or din g to Mr . H ei nz , Mr s. Whit le y a ct ua lly r eque ste d and e nc our ag ed F er re llg as to co nti nue usi ng the

“ Barr ow” na m e. Fo ur m onths a ft er

F er re llg as pur ch as ed

P ro A m , Mr s. Whit le y

qui t, c iti ng di ss at is fact io n wi th th e co m pa ny anda de si re t o s pe nd m or e ti m e wit h h er ch il dr en . O ne m onth late r, in May

of 200 3, Mr s. Whit le y

a nd o the rs , inc lud ing he r husb an d, T ony Whit le y , f

orm ed Barr owE ne rg ie s, I nc . a nd b eg anto se ll pr opane pr oduc ts and services in the geographic area a lso served by Bar row P ropane. Mrs. Whitley ch ose to inc lud e “ Barr ow ” in h er c om pany ’ s nam e ev entho ugh no o ne w ho w orks at the c om pany ha s th e sur

na m e Barr ow . B ar

ro wE ne rg ie s, I nc . ’ s c om pany log oTh e pa rt ie s d o n ot c ha lle ng e wh e the r t he c la ims un de r G e or g ia

law i nv olv e the same 4 dispositi ve issues as the c laims under the L anham Ac t. See J ellibeans, Inc. v . Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc
. , 7 16 F .2 d 8 33 , 8 39 (1 1th Cir . 1 98 3) (c on sid e ri ngon ly the L anh am A c t) ; Un iv e rsi ty of G e or gia At hle ticAs s’n v . La ite , 756 F.2d 1535, 1539 n.11 ( 11th Cir. 1985) (observingthat “ the sta nd ard s g ov e rn ingmos t of the c la ims un de r G e or g ia law a re sim ila r, if no t id e nti c a l, t o those under the L anham Ac t.”). The ref ore, w e will revie w the district cour t’s decision by

the sta nd ard s g ov e rn ingc la ims un de r t he L anh am A c t.

7 uses a blue and white color schem e w ith“ Barr ow” prom inentlydisplay ed in letters larg er than th ose use d f

or the “ E ne rg ie s, I nc . ” part

of the na m e. T he “ Barr ow E ne rg ie s” na m e is u se d ina dve rt ise m en ts and o n de liv er y tr uc ks, e qui pm en t, pr opane tanks, inv oic es , c om pany uni fo rm s, a nd c om

pany le tte rh ea d. B ar

ro w E ne rg ie s, I nc . ha s an of

fi ce in Bu tle r, G eo rg iale ss than on e m ile f ro m Barr ow Pr opane ’ s of

fi ce . I t hi re d f

ourte enof

Barr owP ro pane ’ s e m

plo y ee s, inc lud ing a ll of Barr owP ro pane ’ s dr ive rs in Bu tle r an d M ont ez um a, G eo rg ia
. B ar ro wE ne rg ie s, Inc. prom otes itself in the sam e w ay as Bar row P ropane, and even offered an ide nti ca l pr om oti ona l c al en dar, e xc ep t f or the c om pany na m e. A t on e poi nt, se parate a dve rt ise m en ts f or both B ar ro wE ne rg ie s and B ar

ro wP ro pane r anin a Ma co n C ounty

pa pe r, e ac h a d pr oc la im ing that the ir c om panie s w er e “ larg e en ough to s er ve y ou, sm al l e noug h to kno wy ou” - aslo gan pr ev iou sly use d by Barr ow Pro pa ne . Ferr el lg as fil edsu it in th e Mi dd le Dis tri ctof Ge or gi a ag ai ns t M r. Barr ow, Mr s. Whit le y , a nd B ar

ro wE ne rg ie s, I nc . f

or tr ad em ar k in fr ing em en t and unf

ai r co m pe tit ionund er

the L an ha m

A ct a nd G eo rg iastatut or

y a nd c om m on l aw . T he

4Specifica lly , the district court he ld with respec t to the likelihood of success on the 5 me ri ts: Plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of succe ss on the merits. I t is not clear f rom the re cord whether , when Def endant Home r B arr ow sold Ba rrow Propa

ne to Pro Am Southe a st i n 1 99 9, he tr ans fe rr e d a ll l e g a l and e qu ita ble int e re st i n the “ B arr ow ” name wi th t he sa le of the bu sin e ss. I f P ro Am

did not purcha se the name from Mr. B arr ow, it could not have sold the same to F err ellg as a year

later when F err ellg as purc hased se vera l of Pro Am’s subsidiary

companies, inc luding B arr ow Propane . Plaintiffs theref

ore ha ve not established a substantial likelihood of su c c e ss o n th e me ri ts. 8 district court held a two-day hearing on Ferr ellgas’ m otion for pre lim inary inj unc tio n. I n de ny ing the m oti on, the dis tr ic t c ourt he ld tha t F er re llg as ha d no t es ta bli she d asub stanti al li ke lih ood of suc ce ss o n th e m er its
. T he c ourt f ound it to be unc er ta in f ro m the r ec or d w he the r Mr . Barr owtr an sf er re d th e ri ght s to the

“ Barr ow” na m e to Pro Am in th e 1 99 9 s to cksal e o f Barro w Pro pa ne Gas, In c. Consequent ly , it w as not clear to the district court that Fer rellgas had acquired rights to the nam e w hen it bou ght Pro Am
. T he district court further concluded 5 tha t F er re llg as ha d f

ai le d to e sta

bli sh a sub stanti al thr eat of

ir re para ble inj ur y if the inj unc tio n w er e not

iss ue d. A ft er

e xc lud ing e vid en ce of

a ct ua l c onsu m er

c onf usi on as “ hearsay ,” the district court concluded th at Fer rellgas had presented no evidence tha t the D ef

en dants w er e ope ratin g th ei r busi ne ss i n aw ay that w oul d harm

the
re put at ionof

Barr owP ro pane . T he c ourt the n c onc lud ed that F er re llg as w oul dTh e po rt ion of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r r e latin gto i rr e pa ra ble ha rm re a ds : 6 Pla int if

fs have no t e sta

bli sh e d a su bs tanti a l thre at of

ir re pa ra ble injury if the injunction is not gra nted. Plaintiffs produce d no evidenc e that De fenda

nts were operating their

business in a way that w ou ld h arm

the re putatio n o f B arr owPr op ane , th e e nti ty owne d b y Pla int if fs . T he on ly

dama g e s Pla int if

fs may be a ble to pr ov e are in t

he fo rm of mon e tary dama g e s.

. . . The injuries Plaintiffs contend they will suffer, how ever substantial, in terms of money , time and energ y nece ssarily expended in the absenc e of a st ay , are not enoug h to constitute irrepa rable injury in this case. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corr ective r elief may b e av ail able late r, in the ordinar y course of litigation, weighs heavily ag ainst a cla im of irrepa

rable harm. 9 onlybe able to prove m onetary dam ages and that, there fore, irrepar able harm had not be ensho w n. 6 II. W e re view a district court’ s denial of a prelim inary injunction und er an ab us e o f di sc ret io n s ta nd ard
. Mitsubish i Int’l Corp. v. Cardina l Textile Sales, Inc. , 14 F
. 3d 1 507, 151 7 ( 11th C ir
. 199 4)
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s of

f ac t m ust be
acce pt edun le ss cle arl y

erro ne ou s. Lu ce ro v . O

pe rat ion R es cu e of B irm ing ham , 954 F. 2d 62 4, 627 (11th Cir. 1992). H owever , the district court’ s conclusio ns of law are rev ie wedde no vo . This That an d Other G ift and Tobacco, I

nc. v . C obb Cou nty, G a. , 28 5 F .3d 13 19 , 13 21 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). A district court should g rant injunctive re lief if the m ovin g party shows: (1) a subs tanti al li ke lih ood of

suc ce ss o n th e m er its ; ( 2) asub stanti al thr eat of ir re para ble inj ur y if the inj unc tio n is not

gr an te d; ( 3) that the thr eate ne d in j ur y to10

plaintiffs outweighs th e harm an injunction m ay

cause the defe ndant; and (4) that gr an ti ng th e in

jun ct io n wo ul d n ot di ss erv e th e p ub li c in te res t. Int’l Cosme tics Ex change, Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Be auty, Inc. , 303 F. 3d 12 42, 1246 (11t h Cir. 2002 ) (quot ing Le viStrauss & Co
. v . Sun ris e In t’ l T radi ng C o. , 51 F
. 3d 9 82, 985 (11th Cir. 1995)). III . A
. S ubst an tia l L ike lih ood of S uc ce ss o n th e Me ri ts To es tabl is h a pri m a fac ie cas e in an ord in ary tra de m arkin fri ng em en t s ui t, a pla int if f ne ed onl y de m onstrate “ (1 ) tha t i t ha s tr ad em ar k r igh ts i n th e m ar

k or
na m e at iss ue . . . a nd ( 2) that the de fe ndant a dopt ed am ar k or na m e tha t w as the
sa m e, or c onf usi ngl y sim ilar to the pla int if

f’ s m ar k, suc h th at

the re w as ali ke lih ood of c onf usi on f or c onsu m er s a s to the pr ope r or igi n of the goo ds [ or

se rv ic es ]
created by

the defendant’ s use of the . .
. nam e. . . . ” Co nagra, I nc . v . Sin gle ton , 743 F.2 d 1 50 8, 1 51 2 (1 1t h C ir. 1 98 4)
. Se e als o Su nA m er ic a C orp. v . Sun L ife A ssu r. Co
. of Ca nada , 77 F.3d 13 25 , 13 34 (11 th Cir . 19 96 ). 1. S ubstant ial Likelihood Pro Am Purchased the “ Barr ow” Mark T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rte x p r e s s l y c o n s i d e r e do n l y t h e f i r s te l e me n to f

t h e p r i ma faci e cas e, i.e. , w he the r Fe rr el lga s ha d de m onstrate d asub stanti al li ke lih ood of pr ovi ng tha t i t owne d th e “ Barr ow ” na m e, a nd u pon co nc lud ing that the li ke lih ood of suc ce ss w ithr es pe ct

to thi s e le m en t ha d no t be ensho w n, the c ourt de cl ine d toOur re view of the district court’s c ontrac t interpretation, including the de termination of 7 whether the contra ct is ambig uous, is plenary
. In re Stratford of Texas, Inc. , 635 F.2d 365, 368 (5th Cir. 1981) (“ A question of contr act inter pretation, including the de termination of whe ther a contra ct is ambig uous in order to pe rmit ex trinsic evidenc e of intent, is a que stion of law.”)
. 11 co nsi de r w he the r Fe rr el lga s ha d pr es en te d asub stanti al li ke lih ood of pr ovi ng the
se co nd e le m en t, li ke lih ood of c onf usi on. A lth oughthe dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t say so spe ci fi ca lly , it

is ne ve rthe le ss a

ppare nt tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt w as pe rs ua de d by the De fendants’ proffer ed interpretation of § 3.9 of the stock sale agree m ent betwee n Mr. Bar row and Pro Am

repre senting that “ [t] here are no . . . tr adem arks (w hether registered or not), tradem ark applications [or] tradenam es . . . used in the ordin ary co ur se of bus ine ss o f [B ar

ro wP ro pane , I nc . ]
. ” T he D ef en dants c ont en d th at

thi s p ro v i s i o n m ea n s t h at Pr o Am d i dn o tac qu i re an y ri g h t s t o t h e “Ba rr o w” m ar k . We conclude that the dis trict court m ade an er ror of lawin deny ing th e prelim inary inj unc tio n onthi s ba sis
. 7 T he a gr ee m en t be tw ee n M r. Barr owa nd P ro A m w as f or the sa le of

a ll of the sto ck in Barr owP ro pane G as , I nc . a nd w as not sim ply atr an sf er of a ll of the
co m p an y’ s as s et s . Th er ef

o re , M r. Ba rr o w d i dn o tm er el y s el l Ba rr o w P ro p an e’s property to Pro A m ; he sold Barrow Propane G as, I nc., a going concern which Pro Am continu ed to operate (and expand ) under the “ Barr ow” nam e. Where the e ntire stock of a busin ess is purchased and the bu siness cont inued un der its original
na m e, it m ust be pr es um ed

that the pur ch as er

a cquir ed the goo dw ill of

the bus ine ss12

tog ethe r w iththe c om

m er ci al sy

m bol s of that go odw ill , the bus ine ss’ tr ad em ar ks
an d t rad e n am es . D ov en m ue hle v . G ill dorn M ort gage M idw es t C orp. , 871 F . 2d 697, 700 ( 7thCi r. 198 9) ( “ Abse nt c ontrary e vid en ce , abus ine ss tra de na m e is pr es um ed to pa ss t o it s buy er . ”) ; Ok laho ma B everage Co. v. Dr. Pe pper Love B ott lin g C

o. , 565 F. 2d 62 9, 632 (10th Cir. 1977) (concluding that tradem ark tr an sf er re d w ithsa le of

e nti re bus ine ss e ve n th oughit w as not m en tio ne d inthe sa le
co ntr ac t and s ta tin g th at

“[ n] o part ic ular w or ds are ne ce ssary f or the a ssi gnm en t
w he n th e busi ne ss and the goo dw ill a re tr an sf er re d to a nothe r w ho c ont inu ed the ope ratio n un de r the sa m e tr ad em ar k. ”) ; H oll y H ill Ci tru s G row er

s’ A ss’ n v . H

oll y Hill F ruit Products , I

nc. , 75 F . 2d 1 3, 15 ( 5thCi r. 193 5) ( “ [T ra de m ar ks] a tta chto
an d pa ss w iththe goo d w ill of abus ine ss, and, a s a

ppur te nant t o it , the y

a re f re el y and easily

sold. No particular form of w ords is necessary

to transfer them ; they in he re i n a nd pa ss wit h g oo d wi ll .”); J. Th om as McC art hy, M cC arthyon Trade m ark

s an d U nfa ir C om pe tit ion § 18 :37 ( 4the d. 200 5) ( “ Whe n abus ine ss i s sold as a goin g concern, the intent to transfer good will and tradem arks to the buy er is p re sum ed
. G ood w ill a nd tra de m ar ks are tr an sf

er re d e ve n th oughnot spe ci fi ca lly

m en tio ne d inthe c ontra ct of sa le
. T ha t i s, tr ad em ar

ks and the goo d wil l t he y sym bo li ze ar e p res um edto pa ss wit h t he sal e o f a b us in es s.”)
. T he sto ck sa le a gr ee m en t be tw ee n M r. Barr owa nd P ro A m doe s no t expressly say that the “ Barr ow” m ark w as transfer red to Pro A m . C learly , how ever,13

Pr o A m pur ch as ed

the c or por at ion“ Barr owP ro pane G as , I nc . ” inc lud ing the “B a rr o w ” n a me g i v e n t o t h a tc o r p o r a t i o n b y i t s f

o u n d e r . I f

n o t , w h a tw a s t h e n a me of the corporation purchased by Pro A m ? The D efendants apparently persuaded t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rtt h a tP r o A m h a dn o ta c qu i r e dr i g h t s t o t h e “B a rr o w ” n a me be ca use of the pr ovi sio n inthe c ontra ct r ep re se nti ng tha t the re w er e no tra de m ar ks
or tr ad e na m es in use by

Barr owP ro pane a t the ti m e of the sa le
. T he pr ovi sio n re lie d up on b y

the D ef en dants is unam

big uous ; i t say s th at

the re w er e no tr ad em ar ks o r tr ad e na m es be ing use d by Barr owP ro pane pr ior

to the sa le , but

to co nstru e tha t pr ovi sio n a s e xc lud ing the tr an sf er of the c or por at e na m e its el f pr oduc es alud ic ro us r es ult not int en de d by

the part ie s a s c le ar ly

de m onstrate d by the ir pos t sa le be ha vio r - tha t i s, the unc ha lle nge d and c ont inu ous use of the Barr ow nam e by

Pro A m and then Ferre llgas after the sale
. If H om er B arrowhad int en de d to r es er

ve the c or por at e na m e he m igh t have don e so b y se lli ng the a sse ts of the corporation, not the corporation itself, thereby retaining his 10 0% stock in te res t i n t he fam il y

co rp or at io n a nd it s n am e. T he int er pr et at ionof

§ 3. 9 su gge ste d by

the D ef en dants is al so unr ea sona ble be cau se it pro vi de s n o s at is fact ory ex pl an at io n o f wha t h ap pe ne d t o t he “ Barr ow”
m ar k f oll ow ing the sa le
. T he part ie s c oul d no t have c ontra ct ed the m ar k ou t of existence because tra dem ark law , not contract law , dete rm ines the existence of a tradem ark, and tradem arks and trade nam es are not so easilydestroy ed. They canUnder the L anham Ac t, a mark or name is consider ed aba

ndoned if “ its use has bee n 8 discontinued with intent not to resume such use.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Mr. B arr ow testified that he dir ecte d his attorney to reser ve the mar

k afte r re viewingan 9 ear lier dra ft of the sa le contra ct. The dr aft of § 3.9 r equire d Mr. B arr ow to list all of the intellectual prope rty

used by Ba rrow Propa

ne and r epre sent that his company had the r ight to be us ingit. Th e re c or d d oe s n ot r e fl e c t th at th e “ B arr ow ” name wa s li ste d a s inte lle c tua l pr op e rt y on the dra ft. As explained above, the draf t version of § 3.9 wa s replac ed by the re prese ntation 14 be abandoned, but there is no evid ence that this occurred; the m ark has been used in c om m er ce c ont inu al ly

sin ce it s a dopt ion
. S o, if P ro A m did not a cquir e the 8
m ark and it wa s not aband oned, then the onlyother option s are that the m ark w as tr an sf er re d to Mr . Barr owor

w as m er el y

li ce nse d to P ro A m . T he re is nothin g in the r ec or d to sup port e ith er of the se opt ion s. Se ct ion3. 9 do es not

ha ve the im

port the D ef

en dants a sc ri be to it. Whe n th e tw o se nte nc es of

§ 3. 9 are r ea d to ge the r it is c le ar that, r athe r than de fe at ing or negating th e transfe r of the “ Barr ow” nam e to Pro A m , § 3. 9 m erely warrants that at the tim e of the sale B arrowPropane G as wa s not us ing any one else’ s intellectual pr ope rty a nd h ad not r ec ei ve d any

w ri tte n no tic e or

c la im by athi rd party that i t wa s unlawfully

doing so. E ven if the first sentence is re ad in isolatio n, § 3.9 does not have the m eaning sug gested by the De fendants. A t m ost, the first sentence sim ply states that the seller does not represent or w arrant that BarrowPropane G as ha s a cquir ed

apr ote ct ab le int er es t i n any int el le ct ua l pr ope rty . I t i s c le ar

that the pr ovi sio n w as int en de d to pr ote ct the se lle r fr om

the buy er

la te r cl ai m ing that the
se lle r m isr ep re se nte d th at Barr owP ro pane G as ha d su chpr ope rty . I nde ed , the 9that at th e tim e of the sa le B arr owPr op ane Ga s w a s n ot u sin ganyon e e lse ’s int e lle c tua l pr op e rt y and had not r ece ived any

written notice or

claim that it was unlawf

ully doing so. Mr . Ba

rrow’ s t es t i m o n y re l at i n g t o th e ge n es i s o f t h e d i s p u t edp ro v i s i o nca n n o tcr ea t e a nam b i gu i ty th ro u gh wh ic h a re se rv atio n o r o the r l imi tatio n o n Pr o A m’ s u se of the “ B arr ow ” name may

be re a d into the contra ct. Even if the c ontrac t could be construe d as ef fec ting a transfe r of the ma

rk to Mr. B arr ow, su b s ile nti o , such a tra

nsfer would be an inva lid transfer “in g ross.” “ [I ]tis well-settled law that ‘the tra nsfer of a tra demar

k or trade name without the attenda nt good- will of the business which it repre sents is, in ge nera l, an invalid, ‘in g ross’ tra nsfer of rig hts.’” Int’l Cosmetics Exc hange, Inc. v . Gapardis Health &Beauty, I nc. , 3 0 3 F. 3 d

1 2 4 2 , 1 2 4 6 (1 1 thC i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Berni v. Int’l Gourme t Rest. of Am. , 8 38 F .2 d 6 42 , 6 46 (2 d Ci r. 19 88 )) . A ft e r s e lli nga ll o f h is s toc k in Ba rrow Propa

ne Ga s, Inc., Mr. B arr ow exited the propane business with the understandingthat Pro Am would car

ry on his work. Without the appur tenant g oodwill, Mr. Ba

rrow c ould not leg ally hold the mark for

later e x ploitation. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Re ctanus Co. , 248 U.S. 90, 97, 39 S.C t. 48, 50, 63 L .Ed. 141 (1918) ( “The re is no such thingas prope rty in a trade
mark e x cept a s a rig ht appurtena nt to an established business or tra de in conne ction with which the mark is e mpl oye d. ” ); Planetary Motion, Inc . v. Techsplosion, Inc ., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 n.5 (11th Cir. 2001) (statingthat rig hts to a mark depe nd on bona fide use in commerc e that “w as not ma de me re ly

to r e se rv e a

mark fo r l ate r e xploi tatio n. ” (q uo tatio ns omi tte d) ); Ho lly Hi ll , 75 F.2d at 15 (“ [Trademar

ks] are incidents and a

ppurtena nces to businesses a

nd trade s. They

have no ind e pe nd e nt e xiste nc e ; th e y may no t be so ld i n g ro ss. Th e y atta c h to and

pa ss w iththe g oo d w ill of a business. . . .” ). McCarthy , su

pra § 18:32 (“When a business a nd g ood will are sold to another , the 10 trade marks of the business pass, eve n though the y may consist of the per sonal name of the 15 str uc tur e of the a gr ee m en t su

ppor ts the c onc lus ionthat § 3. 9 c ont ai ns o nly the
se lle r’ s r ep re se nta tio ns and w ar ranti es a nd d oe s no t l im it w ha t w as sol d inthe transaction. S ection 3.9 is found in the part of the sale contract entitled

“ Re pr es en ta tio ns and W ar ranti es of the S hare hol de r. ” I f it ha d th e ef fe ct of c ar vin g out the “ Barr ow ” na m e fr om the tr an sa ct ion , one w oul d e xpe ct it to be in the part

of th e sa le co nt ract en ti tl ed“ The Acqu is it io n,” whi ch , int er ali a, describes w hat was sold - nam ely , a ll of Mr. Bar row’ s stock in Bar

row P ropane Ga s, I nc. It f oll ow s th enthat the onl y

sui ta ble int er pr et at ionof

the sa le a gr ee m en t i s tha t the m ar

k r em ai ne d w iththe c or

por at ionw he n it

w as sol d to P ro A m . W ith out 10assig nor. I f a pe rson has sold a business whic h is identified by his personal name, the name is an asset which he has sold, and he c annot kee p commerc ial control of the na me and ke ep the purcha se price too.”). Th e De fe nd ants a lso argue d th at Pr o A m di d n ot s e ll the mark to F e rr e llg a s b e c a

us e the ir sale a g ree ment did not specifica lly list t he “B arr ow” name on its disclosure of intellec tual proper ty . This fac t does not cast suff icient doubt on Fe rre llga s’ ability to succe ed on the mer its. We do not reac h whether the Def endants a re e stopped from de nying that Fer rellg as 11 owns the “B arr ow” mar

k beca use of their

acquie scenc e in Pro Am’s and F err ellg as’ use of the mark. 16 evidence tending to rebut the presum ption that the m ark w as transfer red, it wa s error for the district court to conclude that Ferre llgas had failed to dem onstrate a subs tanti al li ke lih ood of

suc ce ed ing on the m er its
. 11 2. S ec ondary

Me an ing a nd L ike lih ood of Co nf usi on Beca use the “ Barr ow” m ark utilizes a surnam e, it is entitled to tradem ark protection on ly

to the extent it has acquired “ secondary m eaning.” Co nagra , 743 F. 2d a t 15 13. S im

ply state d, se co ndary

m eanin g is the c onne ct ionin the
co ns um er’s m in d b et ween th e m arkan d t he us er o f th e m ark
. U niv er sit y of F lor ida
v. KP B, Inc. , 89 F
. 3d 7 73, 776 n. 5 ( 11th C ir
. 199 6) ; Am Brit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc. , 812 F. 2d 1 531, 153 6 n. 14 ( 11th C ir
. 198 6)
. T he f ac tor s to c onsi de r in d et er m ini ng w he the r a na m e ha s a cquir ed se co ndary

m eanin g are : “ (1 ) the le ngth and m an ne r of its use ; ( 2) the na tur e an d e xte nt o f adve rt isi ng and p ro m oti on; ( 3) the e ff orts m ad e by [ the use r] to pr om ote ac onsc iou s c onne ct ionin the pub lic ’ s m ind be tw ee n th e na m e an d [ the use r’ s] pr oduc t or bus ine ss; a nd ( 4) the e xte nt t o w hic h th e publ ic17

actually identifies the nam e w ith the [user’ s] product or venture.” Co nagra , 743 F.2 d a t 1 51 3. Likelihood of confusi on is a factual question “ determ ined by analy sis of a
num be r of f ac tor s, inc lud ing : ( 1) the str en gthof the pla int if

f’ s m ar k; ( 2) the sim ilari tie s be tw ee n th e pla int if f’ s m ar k and the a lle ge dly

inf ri ngi ng m ar

k; ( 3) the sim ilari ty be tw ee n th e pr oduc ts and s er vic es of fe re d by the pla int if

f an d th e de fe ndant; ( 4) the sim ilari ty of the sa le s m ethods , i.e
. , r et ai l ou tle ts o r cu sto m er s; (5 ) th e si m il ari ty of ad ve rti si ng m et ho ds ; (6 ) th e d efen da nt ’s in te nt , e. g. , doe s th e de fe ndant h ope to ga in c om pe tit ive a dvanta ge by

a sso ci at ing his pr oduc t w iththe pla int if f’ s e sta bli she d m ar

k; and ( 7) the m ost

pe rs ua siv e fa ct or

on l ike ly c onf usi on is proof of actual confusion.” Id
. a t 15 14. W e conclude that the evidence presented dem onstrates a subst antial likeliho od that Ferrellgas can prove that its “ Barr ow” m ark ac quired secondary
m eanin g. T he m ar

k ha s be enin co nti nuou s us e in the r el ev an t are a fo r ove r 35 y ears, appearing on the com pany ’ s office signs, trucks, propane tanks, em ploy ee uni fo rm s, c ust om er

inv oic es , a nd a dve rt isi ng m at er ia ls. T he e vid en ce sup ports a fi ndi ng tha t the ow ne rs of the m ar k have e xpe nde d gr eat e ff ort i n e sta bli shi ng a co nne ct ionbe tw ee n th e “ Barr ow ” na m e an d th e pr opane bus ine ss and tha t the publ ic a ct ua lly ide nti fi es the na m e w ithBarr owP ro pane , notw ith standi ng i ts u se in ot he r bu si ne ss es sel li ng di ffer en t p ro du ct s an d s erv ic es in th e are a. Se e Saf ew ay18

Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc. , 675 F . 2d 1 160, 116 5 ( 11th C ir
. 198 2) (finding no significant thi rd-party use). W e also conclude that the evidence dem onstrates a subst antial likeliho od that Ferr ellgas will be successful in establishin g likelih ood o f confusion. First, several
w itn es se s, inc lud ing Mr . Barr ow , te sti fi ed that the “ Barr ow ” m ar

k is str ong an d th atBarr ow Pr op an e en

joy s a g oo d o r “ ou ts ta nd in g” rep ut at io n i n t he co m m un it y . Se co nd, the sim ilari ty

of the tw o m ar

ks i s a ppare nt and s tr ongl y

sug ge sts a lik el iho od o f co nf

usi on. B othinc or

por at e the “ Barr ow ” na m e as the pr om ine nt id en ti fy in g wo rd , and bo th ut il iz e a b lu e an d wh it e co lo r sc he m e. Thi rd , th e two co m panie s pr ovi de ide nti ca l se rv ic es w ith in the sa m e ge ogr ap hic a re a. I n f ac t, Barr owE ne rg ie s no we m plo y s a ll of

Barr owP ro pane ’ s f

orm er dr ive rs f ro m it s B u t l e r a n dM o n t e z u mao f

f i c e s . F o u rt h , t h e t w o c o mp a n i e s a d v e rt i s e i n t h e s a me way s. I ndeed, they

dissem inated identical prom otion al calendars and bo th ran adve rt ise m en ts i n th e sa m e iss ue of aMa co n C ounty

ne w spa pe r usi ng B ar

ro w Pr opane ’ s sl ogan: “ L ar ge e noug h to se rv e y ou, sm al l e noug h to kno wy ou. ” A nd fi fth, the re is ev ide nc e sugg es tin g th at the D ef en dants int en d to ga in a

c om pe tit ive advanta ge by

tr ad ing of

f of the goo dw ill a sso ci at ed

w iththe “ Barr ow ” na m e; no one a t B ar

ro wE ne rg ie s us es the Barr owsur na m e. W e fi nd this e vid en ce to be suf fi ci en t t o su sta in F er

re llg as ’ bur de n a t this pr el im inary sta ge , e ve n w ith out ev id en ce o f act ua l co nf

us io n, se e M

ont gom er y v. No ga , 168 F . 3d 1 282, 130 2 ( 11th19

Ci r. 199 9) ( ac tua l c onf

usi on i s no t r equir ed

to pr ove li ke lih ood of

c onf usi on) , a nd so, w e do n ot r ea chw he the r the dis tr ic t c ourt a buse d it s di sc re tio n ine xc lud ing
e v i d e n c e o f

a c tu a l c o n f

u s i o n a s h e a r s a y. B. Substantial Threat of I rrepar able Harm T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that F er re llg as f ai le d to e sta

bli sh the se co nd elem ent for prelim inary

injunctive relief

- the substantial threat of irrepar able harm if the injunction does no t issue. A ccording to th e district court, “ Plaintiffs produced no evidence that De fendants wer e operating their busin ess in a way that would harm

the reputation of Barr ow Pr opane. . . .” T herefor e, the court concluded th atan y da m ag es su ffer edby Ferrel lg as du e to th e App el le es ’ us e o f th e “ Barr ow”
m ar k c oul d be a de qua te ly

c om pe nsa te d w ithm one y

da m ag es , m ili ta tin g a ga ins t a co nc lu si on of i rrep arab le ha rm . H ow ev er , “ [g ] ro unds f

or ir re para ble inj ur y inc lud e los s of

c ontro l of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill. Ir repara ble injury can also be based upon the possi bilityof confusion.” Pap pa n En te rs . , Inc. v. Ha rd ee’s Foo d S

ys ., Inc. , 143 F . 3d 8 00, 805 ( 3d C ir
. 199 8) ( ci tin g O pti ci ans A ss’ n of

A m . v . I nde p. Opt ic ia ns of

Am. , 920 F . 2d 1 87, 196 ( 3d C ir
. 199 0) ( hol din g th at the la ck of c ontro l over one’ s m ark “ creates the pot en tia l f or da m ag e to . . . r ep uta tio n[ , w hic h]
co nst itu te s ir

re para ble inj ur y f or the pur pose of gr an tin g apr el im inary

inj unc tio n in
a tr ad em ar

k c as e. ”) ); Powe r Test P etroleum D istrib utors , I nc. v . C alcu Gas, I

nc. ,20

754 F. 2d 9 1, 95 ( 2d C ir
. 198 5) ( hol din g th at ir re para ble inj ur y “ ex ist s ina tr ad em ar k c as e w he n th e party

se ek ing the inj unc tio n sh ow s th at it w ill los e co ntr ol
ove r the r ep uta tio n of

it s tr ad em ar

k pe ndi ng tri al
. ”)
. “ [T ] he m ost c or ro siv e an d ir re para ble harm a ttr ibu ta ble to tr ad em ar

k in fr ing em en t i s th e ina

bil ity of the vic tim t o co n t ro l t h e n at u re an dqu al i t y o f t h e d ef en d an t s ’ go o d s . Ev en i f t h e i n fr i n g er ’s pr oduc ts are of

hig h qu al ity , the pla int if f can pr ope rl y

ins ist that i ts r ep uta tio n sh ou ld no t b e im

pe ril edby the act s o f an ot he r.” Int’l Ke nnel Club of Chicago, Inc.
v. Mighty Star, Inc. , 84 6 F .2d 10 79 , 10 92 (7t h C ir. 1 98 8) (ci ta ti on om it te d) . A pla int if f ne ed not sho wthat the inf

ri nge r ac te d insuc h aw ay a s to da m ag e the
re put at ionof

the pla int if

f. I t i s th e los s of

c ontro l of

one ’ s r ep uta tio n by

the ad opt ionof

ac onf usi ngl y sim ilar m ar

k th at sup pli es the sub stanti al thr eat of irr ep arab le ha rm . T his Ci rc uit

ha s he ld tha t “ a suf

fi ci en tly str ong show ing of

li ke lih ood of confusion [ca

used bytradem ark infringem ent] m ay by itself constitut e a showing of

. . . [a] subst antial threat of irr eparable har m .” M cD onal d’ s C orp. v . R obe rts on , 147 F. 3d 1 301, 131 0 ( 11th C ir
. 199 8) ( quot ing E
. R em y M art in &Co
. v . Sha w-R oss Int’l Im ports , I nc. , 756 F . 2d 1 525, 153 0 ( 11th C ir
. 198 5) ); see also Tally-Ho, Inc.
v. Co ast Co m m uni tyCo lle

ge D ist
. , 889 F . 2d 1 018, 102 9 ( 11th C ir
. 198 9) ( hol din g tha t a sub stanti al li ke lih ood of c onf usi on i s asub stanti al thr eat of ir re para bleOther c ircuits are in acc ord. See, e .g., So c ie teDe s Pro du its Nestle, S

.A . v . Ca sa 12 Helve tia, Inc. , 982 F.2d 633, 640 ( 1st Cir. 1992) (“irr epar able ha rm flows fr om an unlawf

ul tr a de mark

inf ri ng e me nt a s a

matte r o f l aw” ); Opticians Ass’n of Am., 920 F.2d a t 196 (“Potential damag e to re putation constitutes irrepar able injury for the pur

pose of grantinga pre liminary inj un c tio n in

a tr a de mark

c a se .” ); Int’l Kennel Club, Inc. , 846 F.2d at 1092 (holding that damag es c a us e d b y “ tr a de mark

inf ri ng e me nt a

re by the ir ve ry natur e ir re pa ra ble ” ); Gene ral Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co. , 8 24 F .2 d 6 22 , 6 25 (8 th C ir . 1 98 7) (“ Sin c e a tr a de mark

re pr e se nts int ang ibl e a sse ts such as r eputation and g ood-will, a showingof irre para ble injury can be satisfied if it appea rs that [pla int if f] c an d e mon str ate a

lik e lih oo d o f c on sume r c on fu sio n. ” ); Ro de o Co lle c tio n, Ltd . v . W est Se v e nth , 812 F.2d 1215, 1220 ( 9th Cir. 1987) (“Onc e the plaintiff in a n infring ement ac tion has established a likelihood of c onfusion, it is ordinarily presumed that the plaintiff will suffer ir re pa ra ble ha rm if inj un c tiv e re lie f d oe s n ot i ssu e .” ); Sta nd ar d &Po or ’s Cor

p. v . Co mm od

ity Exc hange, Inc
. , 683 F.2d 704, 708 ( 2d Cir. 1982) (“I n the pre liminary

injunction context , a sh ow ingof

lik e lih oo d o f c on fu sio n a s to so ur c e or sp on so rs hip e sta

bli sh e s th e re qu isi te likelihood of succe ss on the merits as we ll as risk of irre para ble har m.”). 21 inj ur y ). W e co nc lud e tha t F er re llg as ha s pr es en te d asuf fi ci en tly str ong show ing 12 of li ke ly con fu si on so th atirr ep arab le ha rm is est ab li sh ed
. C. O the r E le m en ts o f a Pr el im inary I nj unc tio n The rem ai ni ng ele m en ts fora pr el im in ary in jun ct io n h av e b een sat is fie d. T he ba lanc ing of

the hard shi ps t ips in favor of iss uin g th e inj unc tio n. B ar ro w E ne rg ie s ha s be enin busi ne ss f or asho rt pe ri od o f tim e (tw o y ears ), w hic h su gge sts tha t i t ha s li m ite d go odw ill of it s own. A ny

harm oc ca sio ne d by

e nj oin ing Barr ow Ener gies’ use of the “ Barr ow” m ark is theref ore outweighed by

the potential da m ag e to B ar

ro wP ro pane ’ s go odw ill by Barr owE ne rg ie s’ use of it s c onf usi ngl y sim ilar m ar

k. W e al so n ote that the part ie s have r ep re se nte d th at the c as e is r ea dy fo r dis posi tio n w ithdis co ve ry c onc lud ed

a nd m oti ons fo r sum

m ar y j udgm en t f

ull y br ie fe d. T he re fo re , if

F er re llg as is ult im at el y

uns uc ce ssf

ul o n th e m er its , theThe district cour t may elec t to ex clude Home r B arr ow from the pr eliminary injunction 13 beca use of a lack of evidenc e of his per sonal involvement in the formation or manag ement of Ba rrow E nerg ies, Inc. While there is evide nce that Mr. Ba rrow a ssisted his daughte r, De fenda nt Whit ley , in capitalizing the c orporation, there is no evidenc e that he is other wise involved in the owne rs hip , ma

na g e me nt, or

op e ratio n o f t

hat c or po ratio n o r t

hat he ha s o the rw ise pe rs on a lly eng ag ed in any

acts of inf

ring ement. F urthermor e, pursua nt to Rul e 65 of the Fe dera l Rules of Civ il Pr oc e dure , th e inj un c tiv e or de r w ill re a c h “ the pa rt ie s to the a c tio n, the ir

of fi c e rs , a g e nts , se rv ants , e mpl oye e s, and

atto rn e y s, and

. . . th os e pe rs on s in

a c tiv e c on c e rt

or pa rt ic ipatio n w ith them who re ceive actua l notice of the or der by persona l service or otherw ise” such that Mr. Ba rrow w ould be prohibited in any event f rom ac ting in conc ert with the other Def endants in any future a ct of infr inge ment while the pre liminary injunction is i n eff

ect. 22 pr el im inary

inj unc tio n w ill pr ev en t the D ef en dant’ s us e of

the na m e fo r a re la tiv el y br ie f pe rio d o f ti m e. Fi na lly , the pub lic int er es t w ill be se rv ed by the inj unc tio n by

a voi din g co nf us io n i n t he m ark etpl ace. D av ido ff & CI E , S. A
. v . P LD I nt’ l C orp. , 263 F . 3d 12 97 , 13 04 (11 th Cir . 20 01 ). A cc or din gly , the de ci sio n of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s R E V E RS E D a nd the c as e is RE MA N D E D f or the dis tr ic t c ourt t o is sue apr el im inary inj unc tio n c onsi ste nt w ith this op inion and Rule 65 of the Federa l Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 REV ERS ED AN D REMA ND ED .