NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

2020 IL App (3d) 190503-U

Order filed January 14, 2020 

____________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2020 

In re N.C., )

 ) 

 a Minor ) 

 ) 

(The People of the State of Illinois, ) 

 ) 

Petitioner-Appellee, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

R.S., ) 

 ) 

 Respondent-Appellant). ) 

)

Appeal from the Circuit Court

of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

Iroquois County, Illinois. 

Appeal No. 3-19-0503 

Circuit No. 17-JA-4 

The Honorable 

James Kinzer, 

Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment. 

 

____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court’s findings (1) that respondent was unfit parent of his minor 

daughter and (2) that it was in the best interest of the child that respondent’s 

parental right be terminated were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 Respondent, R.S., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court finding him to be 

an unfit parent of his minor child, N.C., and terminating his parental rights. Respondent does not 
2 

claim that the trial court erred in finding that that he failed to make reasonable progress toward 

the return home of his child within the relevant nine-month period. Instead, he argues that he had 

made reasonable progress outside of the nine-month and that the trial court failed to consider this 

progress in evaluating the child’s best interest. We affirm.

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 On April 26, 2017, Ashley C. gave birth to N.C., and tested positive at that time for 

cocaine, opiates, and THC. After her birth, N.C. was experiencing withdrawal symptoms, 

difficulty breathing, and had an enlarged heart. N.C. was taken into protective custody on April 

30, 2017, and the State subsequently filed a complaint seeking a temporary shelter order and an 

adjudication of neglect or abuse. The court considered the complaint and ordered temporary 

shelter care, placing N.C. in the custody of DCFS on May 2, 2017. 

¶ 5 On June 2, 2017, respondent and Ashley were interviewed by an Integrated Assessment 

Team. During the interview, the childhood experiences, drug history, criminal history, and 

mental health history of both parents were assessed and considered in creating objectives for 

which each parent was responsible in achieving the overall permanency goal with respect to N.C. 

The initial permanency goal was “return home in 12 months.” 

¶ 6 Respondent’s interview revealed a history of anger control problems, and the propensity 

to turn to substance abuse to cope with stress or pain. Additionally, the report indicated that 

respondent denied having a traumatic past but it noted that he was possibly not being completely 

open about his experiences. These findings, along with the circumstances that resulted in the 

removal of N.C. from his care, were considered and incorporated into three service plan 

objectives, which were:
3 

“Objective #1: [respondent] will achieve and maintain a drug-free level of 

personal functioning to provide a safe environment for his daughter, [N.C.].

Objective #2: [respondent] will engage in parenting education to be provided 

support services, linkage to community resources, positive parent-child 

relationship guidance and socialization, health, safety, and child development. 

Objective #3: [respondent] will secure/maintain stable housing and a legal 

source of income to provide for himself and his [child]. 

Visitation: ...twice per week for two hours each visit.” 

¶ 7 On July 14, 2017, the adjudicatory hearing was held where the court made findings of 

abuse or neglect on the basis that N.C. “as a newborn was exposed to illicit drugs as defined by 

705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(c) after [Ashley] admitted to ingesting non-prescribed Vicodin while 

pregnant with [N.C.].” The court granted the petition adjudicating N.C. neglected or abused. 

Importantly, the order admonished the parents that they must cooperate with DCFS and comply 

with the service plan or risk termination of parental rights. 

¶ 8 On July 31, 2017, Children’s Home and Aid filed the dispositional report with the court, 

and a dispositional hearing was held on August 4, 2017. The dispositional report recommended 

that custody and guardianship of N.C. be placed with DCFS, and that the permanency goal be set 

as “return home in 12 months.” In support of the recommendations, the report provided a 

thorough review of the progress made by both parents toward each of their respective service 

plan objectives. 

¶ 9 With respect to respondent’s progress, the July 31, 2017, report noted that he had not 

made satisfactory progress toward any of his assigned service plan objectives. Respondent was 

referred to substance abuse services and submitted to a random drug screening in which he tested 

positive for marijuana. He failed to appear for subsequent screening. Respondent was also 

referred for parenting classes but had not scheduled an intake appointment. Respondent was 
4 

unemployed but made money selling car parts on E-bay. Respondent lived with Ashley at her

grandmother’s house but made trips to Flint, Michigan, to make needed repairs to a home he 

owned there. The report also noted that during visitations with N.C., he engaged appropriately 

but he did not attend visitations where Ashley had canceled hers and was thus not taking proper 

advantage of the visitation opportunities that were available to him. At the August 4, 2017, 

dispositional hearing, the court found both respondent and Ashley to be unfit parents. 

¶ 10 On October 25, 2017, DCFS filed the Family Service Plan report based on evaluations 

made on September 19, 2017 regarding progress on the service plan objectives. With respect to 

respondent’s progress, the report noted that he still had not completed any substance abuse 

counseling or submitted any further screening and remained unemployed but earning income by 

selling used car parts on E-bay. The report also noted that respondent had attended an intake 

appointment for parenting classes, but “no showed” the remaining appointments and had not 

rescheduled. The report showed that respondent was now attending visitations one day per week 

for two hours rather than the prescribed twice a week. 

¶ 11 At a permanency hearing on February 16, 2018, the court indicated that after reviewing 

the service plan and the report, the appropriate permanency goal would remain “return home in 

12 months” because both respondent and Ashley had failed to make reasonable and substantial

progress toward returning N.C. to their home. Following this hearing, Ashley self-reported her 

use of marijuana and methamphetamine, as well as “things she sometimes don’t know what it is” 

to the DCFS worker, and that her drug use was the reason that she does not go in for her required 

drug screenings. 

¶ 12 DCFS filed an updated service plan report on April 27, 2018, based on evaluations made 

on April 2, 2018, presenting the progress on the service plan objectives. At the time of this filing, 
5 

the nine-month statutory period following adjudication of neglect had closed. The report 

indicated that the progress was still unsatisfactory and that DCFS now recommended changing 

the permanency goal from “return home” to “substitute care pending Court determination on 

termination of parental rights.” The report revealed that both parents had continued to engage in 

the same pattern of start-and-stop involvement with N.C. that had been evident in previous 

reports. At the time of this report, not only had neither parent completed any of the services 

required under their objectives, but Ashley’s whereabouts were now unknown, and respondent 

was currently incarcerated for outstanding criminal warrants in Michigan and Illinois. 

¶ 13 Following this report, the trial court called the case for a permanency hearing on 

September 18, 2018. The record does not contain a report of the proceedings of this hearing. But 

the docket sheet recounts that the court’s reasons for changing the goal to “substitute care

pending Court determination on termination of parental rights” were:

(1) “Services contained by the plan are appropriate to facilitate the achievement of the 

permanency goal;”

(2) “The selected goal is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the child;” 

and

(3) “Services required by the plan have been provided.” 

¶ 14 The trial court then ordered: “Guardianship of the minor to remain with DCFS with 

power to place and consent to medical treatment.” Both respondent and Ashley were ordered “to 

cooperate with the plan.” The court also set a permanency review for March 1, 2019. 

¶ 15 On February 8, 2019, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

The petition alleged respondent was unfit on the basis that: (1) he failed to protect N.C. from 

conditions within his environment injurious to N.C.’s welfare; (2) he failed to make reasonable 

efforts to correct the conditions that were the bases of the removal of N.C. from him within nine 
6 

months after the adjudication of neglect; or (3) he failed to make reasonable progress toward the 

return of N.C. to him during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period 

following the adjudication of neglect. 

¶ 16 On February 27, 2019, DCFS filed a final updated service plan report. The report noted 

that respondent had completed parenting education classes through Iroquois Mental Health, but 

the agency worker had “not received a progress report or completion certificate” as of the report 

date. The report also noted that respondent continued “to engage in individual counseling.” The 

agency, however, remained “concerned about [his] source of income and if he [had] the financial 

capacity to provide long-term care for” N.C. The report then noted that N.C. had “been involved 

in foster care system” for significant amount of time, which “should be considered.” It stated that 

N.C. had “been removed from her parents care since birth and has integrated and developed 

significant bonding with the caregivers and their family due to the inconsistency on both 

[Ashley] and [respondent’s] behalf.”

¶ 17 The termination hearing was held on August 20, 2019. The designated relevant ninemonth period was July 14, 2017, through April 14, 2018. During the fitness portion of the trial, 

the judge took judicial notice of the July 14, 2017, docket entry where it is noted: (1) that 

respondent and Ashley admitted the State’s petition for adjudication alleging abuse; (2) a 

caseworker’s testimony relating respondent lack of long-term stability; and (3) the permanency 

reports and service plans filed during the relevant nine-month period, which detail the lack of 

progress made by both parents. 

¶ 18 At trial, the State called Amanda Williams, an agent of DCFS, to testify to the objectives 

in place and the level of progress that had been made with respect to those objectives. She 

oversaw N.C.’s case. She stated that services were assigned to respondent during the period 
7 

spanning July 14, 2017, through April 14, 2018. He was assigned to parenting education classes, 

substance abuse classes and individual counseling. Williams stated that during the relevant 

period respondent did not “perform” any parenting class and, although he had a substance abuse 

treatment assessment completed, “he did not partake in the actual treatment.” Williams also 

stated that respondent did not complete his individual counseling requirement for the period, and 

only completed one drug test which returned a positive result for marijuana. 

¶ 19 Respondent testified on his own behalf. He stated that on July 8, 2017, his counselor at 

Iroquois Mental Health informed him about the parenting class requirement. He recalled that the 

classes were offered in sessions twice a year and he “signed up as soon as [he] could for the next 

available session.” Neither he nor his counselor realized that he “had to do a two-hour group 

class,” as well as the one-on-one session. Nonetheless, he eventually “pursued group 

counseling.” Regarding his drug testing requirement, respondent testified that he believed he had 

to provide “drug drops every time” he saw his “counselor at Iroquois Mental Health.” He stated 

that he did so. 

¶ 20 Respondent stated that he obtained a certificate of completion for his parenting classes 

outside the evaluation period, having not done so during the period because he had difficulty 

communicating with DCFS personnel. He accused the caseworker of being “rude” and barking 

“stuff” at him. He did visits with N.C. “about four [times] a month until they had changed the 

goal.” He found the visits very productive and stated he would play with N.C. as well as 

sometimes changing her diapers. He explained that several visits were cancelled because of 

problems from DCFS and changes with the assigned caseworkers. He stated that DCFS assigned 

three different caseworkers, changing one after the other. He admitted that the “first two 
8 

caseworkers were real understanding and *** helpful.” He recalled the third caseworker was 

assigned to the case around July or August 2017. 

¶ 21 Ashley also testified on her own behalf and on behalf of respondent. Relevant to 

respondent, she stated that she lived with him during the relevant time period—July 2017 

through April 2018. They did their visitations together and she had at least one opportunity to 

observe respondent with N.C. She stated that “he was very helpful” during the visitation, 

describing him as “happy” to be with N.C. Ashley agreed with respondent that the caseworker 

assigned the case at the time was not helpful and at times was “very unprofessional.” She 

however admitted that the caseworker was “diligent in contacting” her about reporting 

requirements up until she and respondent split up and she moved out. She thought respondent 

“went over and beyond what he had to do” under the permanency plan. 

¶ 22 Following the testimony, the trial court heard arguments from the parties, and returned its 

findings. The court found “that the State [had] proved by a clear and convincing evidence that 

each parent, [was] unfit.” It explained that “the parenting classes were designed to” ensure 

respondent was willing “to step up and protect [N.C.] from a mother who was clearly abusive 

toward [her] by taking drugs while she was pregnant.” The court noted that respondent was 

“defensive” regarding meeting his requirements. It stated that respondent did not raise his 

complaints about the caseworker at any of the previous hearings where he was present. The court 

concluded that “the State [had] met its burden of proof on the first prong of [the] termination 

hearing.” 

¶ 23 The trial court then called the case for a hearing to determine N.C.’s best interest. The 

State called Amanda A., the wife of N.C.’s great-uncle. Together they were N.C.’s registered 

foster parents. Amanda was not employed at the time of her testimony but was receiving 
9 

disability benefits on a regular basis. Her husband was a manager of a fertilizer company in 

Marco, Indiana, and earned a regular paycheck. With their combined income, they were able to 

care for N.C. and to provide her food, clothing, and a stable shelter. 

¶ 24 In their household, there were three children and two adults. N.C. had a room to herself

and had closely bonded with a younger daughter in the household. The family had lived in the 

same home for over two years and N.C., having been placed with the family shortly after her 

birth, had become familiar with the environment and had befriended children within her age 

group in their neighborhood. Amanda testified that N.C. had become a part of their family and 

that they would like to adopt her. 

¶ 25 With regard to respondent’s visits with N.C., Amanda testified that they had improved 

over time. She noted that N.C. “still want[ed] to play with her sisters and stuff when the 

[visitations were] going on,” requiring encouragement to stay with respondent. She reported that 

Ashley had not visited N.C. since February 2018. On cross-examination, Amanda stated that 

N.C. never asked or inquired about either respondent or Ashley, observing that N.C. “kind of 

sees” respondent “as another person to play with.” 

¶ 26 Respondent also testified at the best interest hearing. He stated that he attended all the 

visitations with N.C. at the foster parents’ home. He recalled interacting with N.C., holding and 

playing with her. Respondent stated that he had a three-bedroom home where he lived alone. His 

10-year old son would visit him every other weekend. Respondent also testified that he was the 

general manager at Westside Motors in Watseka, Illinois, where he had worked since September 

2008. He stated that this position was full-time. 

¶ 27 Respondent testified that he completed the basic parenting class as well as an advanced 

parenting class. He found the classes helpful, providing him “with a lot of point of views in 
10 

different ways.” He explained that if N.C. were to live with him, she would: (1) have her own 

bedroom; (2) be placed in a preschool program such as head start; and (3) would have 

transportation to and from the program. Respondent noted that Ashley was no longer in his life 

since February 2018. He wanted N.C. in his life along with his son and his 19-year old daughter 

who was attending college at the time. 

¶ 28 On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged a conviction for manufacturing 

cannabis in 2017-CF-68. He also admitted a 2005 DUI conviction that required him to complete 

an evaluation to reinstate his license. He was working on that and was relying on his “boss’ 

uncle” for transportation. Finally, respondent admitted that he had never had N.C. in his care for 

an overnight stay. 

¶ 29 After hearing arguments from the parties, the trial court found that, after two years of 

foster care, N.C. had bonded with her foster family. It expressed concerned regarding “the drug 

counseling progress of either parent,” and whether respondent would be able to handle his 

personal issues as well of those of Ashley while caring for N.C. The court did observe that since 

respondent “broke off with [Ashley], he was able to make some progress.” The trial court thus 

found that the State had met its burden with respect to best interest, stating: “*** the bonding, 

the adoptability, and the lack of consistent progress here by both parents indicates that it’s clearly 

in the best interest of the child that she be adopted, if possible, into the foster care home where 

she’s been placed and elsewhere if that adoption can’t go through.” 

¶ 30 Respondent now appeals. 

¶ 31 ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where (1) the State proves, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that a parent is unfit pursuant to grounds set forth in Section 1(D) of the 
11 

Adoption Act, and (2) the trial court finds that termination is in the child's best interests. 750 

ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2019); In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244 (2006). The State is not 

required to prove every ground it has alleged for finding a parent unfit. In re K.I., 2016 IL App 

(3d) 160010, ¶ 37 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349 (2005)). “A parent's rights may be 

terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing 

evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 349. 

¶ 33 Pursuant to the Adoption Act, a parent is unfit if he failed “to make reasonable progress 

toward the return of the child to the parent during any [nine]-month period following the 

adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2019). Reasonable 

progress under section 1(D)(m)(ii) requires “demonstrable movement toward the goal of 

reunification.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 211 (2001). On review, the trial court's fitness 

determination will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re 

K.I., 2016 IL App (3d) 160010, ¶ 38 (citing In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 354). A court's 

decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly 

apparent. Id.

¶ 34 Here, the State alleged that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the 

conditions that were the basis of the removal of N.C. from him within nine months after the 

adjudication of neglect from July 14, 2017, through April 14, 2018. Alternatively, the State 

alleged respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of N.C. to him during 

any of the nine-month periods after the end of the initial nine-month period following the 

adjudication of neglect.

¶ 35 At the fitness hearing, the evidence showed that N.C. was originally removed from 

respondent and Ashley at birth. After her birth, N.C. had withdrawal symptoms, difficulty
12 

breathing, and an enlarged heart. Ashley admitted ingesting non-prescribed Vicodin while 

pregnant with N.C. She also tested positive for cocaine opiate, and THC. Relevant to respondent, 

the evidence also showed that he had substance abuse problems. On August 4, 2017, the trial 

court had ordered respondent—as well as Ashley—to comply with DCFS’ service plan 

objectives. But a service plan report, from April 27, 2018, showed respondent had maintained a 

pattern of start-and-stop involvement with N.C. and had failed to meet any of the objectives. 

¶ 36 In terms of his progress during the initial period, Amanda Williams testified that 

respondent did not participate in any parenting class and “did not partake in the actual [drug] 

treatment” despite completing an assessment. Respondent also failed to participate in individual 

counseling during the relevant period and tested positive for marijuana on the only drug drop he 

submitted. Respondent admitted at the hearing that he made no effort during the initial 

evaluation period. He claimed that it was because he had difficulties communicating with DCFS 

personnel. 

¶ 37 We conclude that the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. First, we note that respondent admitted he made no effort 

during the initial nine-month period. The court rejected his claim against the caseworker as 

“defensive” and not credible. “We *** defer to the trial court's factual findings and credibility

assessments and will not reweigh the evidence anew on appeal.” In re Faith S., 2019 IL App 

(1st) 182290, ¶ 78. The court specifically noted that respondent had not raised his claims against 

the agency’s personnel until the termination hearing whereas he had no less than four prior 

opportunities at previous in-court permanency hearings, which he attended. 

¶ 38 But second, respondent’s individual feelings about the agency’s personnel are irrelevant 

vis-à-vis his obligation to abide with the service plan. On June 2, 2017, he participated in an 
13 

interview with an Integrated Assessment Team and the permanency goal was set with the aim at 

returning N.C. to her parents within twelve months. On July 14, 2017, the trial court granted the 

State’s petition, adjudicating N.C. as neglected or abused. At that hearing the court ordered both 

Ashley and respondent to comply with the service plan or risk termination of their parental 

rights. Despite this order occurring on the starting date of the initial nine-month period, 

respondent admitted that he made no effort to comply because of his personal animosity against 

the assigned caseworker. We agree with trial court’s conclusion that this attitude reflects an 

unwillingness to protect N.C. from the abuse and neglect to which she had been exposed. 

¶ 39 Respondent’s failure to participate in the actual drug treatment, despite completing the 

assessment, cuts at the core of the risk sought to be eliminated. The evidence showed that 

Ashley, like respondent, had a drug abuse problem. N.C. was exposed to this problem during the 

pregnancy and showed physical signs of its effects at and after birth. Without completion of the 

actual drug treatment, the trial court could not be assured that respondent was capable of 

eliminating future risks to N.C. Respondent instead failed to comply with the drug testing 

requirement of his plan, submitting only one drug drop with a positive testing result for 

marijuana. This violated his requirement to “achieve and maintain a drug-free[and] safe 

environment for his daughter.” Moreover, respondent remained in a relationship with Ashley

during the initial nine-period despite her self-reported use of known controlled substances and 

other unknown substances that may well be controlled. 

¶ 40 In addition, the plan required that respondent “engage in parenting education.” 

Respondent failed to do so. By July 31, 2017, respondent had not made any progress towards 

meeting this requirement, only participating in the intake assessment sometime before October 

25, 2017 and failing to complete a class during the initial nine-month period. On appeal, 
14 

respondent argues that we should consider his completion outside the nine-month period. We 

disagree. “A parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d at 349. The statute 

gives the State the right to choose the applicable nine-month period, see id., and here the State 

specifically alleged his failure to meet the objectives during the initial period as grounds for 

finding him unfit. 

¶ 41 But even if we were to consider his completion of the parenting class after the initial period, 

the evidence is still clear and convincing in support of finding respondent unfit. As the trial court 

noted, the initial finding of abuse or neglect related to N.C.’s exposure in utero to drugs. At the 

time of the termination hearing, respondent had not shown reasonable progress toward mitigating 

the risk of continued exposure to drugs with additional harmful consequences. Reasonable 

progress under section 1(D)(m)(ii) requires “demonstrable movement toward the goal of 

reunification.” In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 211. The court held two hearings after setting the initial 

evaluation period and before the fitness hearing. On September 18, 2018, after the initial period 

was closed, the court found that the services contained in the original plan were “appropriate to 

facilitate the achievement of the permanency goal.” The court again ordered both respondent and 

Ashley to cooperate with the plan.” By February 21, 2019, the agency noted that respondent 

continued “to engage in individual counseling,” but it had not received a progress report or 

completion certificate for respondent’s alleged participation in parenting classes. For these 

reasons, we hold the manifest weight of the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

respondent was an unfit parent to N.C. 

¶ 42 Once a finding of unfitness has been made, all considerations must yield to the best 

interest of the child. In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633 (3rd Dist. 2006). At this stage of the 
15 

proceedings, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of 

parental rights is in the child's best interest. In re D.T., 212 Ill.2d 347 (2004). The trial court's 

decision requires consideration of statutory factors, including, inter alia: (1) the child's physical 

safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's sense of attachment, 

including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships with parental figures; (4) the 

risks related to substitute care; and (5) the preferences of persons available to care for the child. 

705 ILCS 405/1–3(4.05) (West 2019). The trial court’s task requires the court to balance these 

factors, weighing them at the first instance, and places the court “in a better position to see the 

witnesses and judge their credibility.” In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71 (internal 

citations and quotations marks omitted). Thus, on review, we accord the trial court’s 

determination in a termination proceeding great deference and will not reverse it unless it is 

contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re O.S., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 633. 

¶ 43 Here, the trial court had to balance two competing set of facts regarding N.C.’s best 

interest. First, the evidence revealed that she had been placed in foster care with Amanda and her 

family shortly after birth, two-and-a-half years before the hearing. During those years, the family 

had lived in the same home and N.C. had become familiar with the environment, closely bonding 

with the family, and particularly with a younger daughter in the household, and befriending 

children within her age group in their neighborhood. 

¶ 44 On the other hand, the evidence also revealed that respondent currently had secured a 

home and had the ability to shelter N.C. Although the agency reports showed that his income 

was from selling used-auto parts on E-bay, respondent testified that he had maintained the same 

employment for at least eleven years, rising from a mechanic to general manager for an auto 

dealer. Moreover, Amanda reported that respondent’s visits with N.C. had improved over time. 
16 

¶ 45 At first blush, these facts seem to suggest that the scales are evenly balanced. However, 

in reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, we note that the trial court is “in a better 

position to see the witnesses and judge their credibility.” In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 

71 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). Respondent stated that he wants N.C. to be 

in his life along with his other children; Amanda testified that she and her husband—N.C.’s great 

uncle—want to continue providing N.C. with the care and stability they have been giving by 

adopting her. She also stated that N.C. required encouragement to spend time with respondent 

during his visits, explaining that N.C. seemed to view respondent just “as another person to play 

with.” The testimony regarding N.C.’s relationship with her foster family and her interaction 

with respondent raise issues of credibility and commitment which can only be resolved by 

assessing actual performance. We find nothing in the record that leads us to conclude that the 

trial court’s assessment that the facts favored termination of respondent’s parental rights was 

erroneous. 

¶ 46 We note, as the trial court did, that respondent had showed some progress towards 

reunification with N.C. after he ended his relationship with Ashley. However, he arrived tardily 

at that position. In the meantime, N.C. had spent virtually her entire life in the foster home and 

with the foster family. Her interaction with respondent had been inconsistent, only improving to 

one weekly two-hour visit—as opposed to the plan’s required two visits. Moreover, the trial 

court heard the testimony and presumably determined that Amanda was credible when she stated 

N.C. only considered respondent as just another playmate. The implicit corollary is that she did 

not view him as her father. We note that respondent did not contradict this statement. We find 

no reason not to defer to the trial court’s credibility assessment. For these reasons, we conclude 
17 

that the evidence confirms that the statutory best interest factors favored terminating

respondent’s parental rights and that the trial court’s decision based on that finding was correct. 

¶ 47 CONCLUSION

¶ 48 The judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County is affirmed. 

¶ 49 Affirmed.