SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1804-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AMADU KOROMA,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted February 16, 2022 – Decided March 31, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Accusation No. 14-06-0202.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief).

Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant 

Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Amadu Koroma appeals from a June 30, 2020 order denying 

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. 

Because the record indicates defendant may not have understood questions 

regarding the effects of a plea on his immigration status and the record does not 

show the substance of prior counsel's advice as to the possible immigration 

consequences of accepting the guilty plea, and whether she pressured defendant 

to plead guilty, we remand for an evidentiary hearing. 

In 2003, defendant was granted asylum as a refugee from Sierra Leone. 

At sixteen years old, he saw his father killed by people who worked for the 

government and are still in power. In 2011, he became a lawful permanent 

resident. 

On June 20, 2014, defendant waived indictment and trial by jury for thirddegree theft of a cell phone, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a), and pled guilty under Hudson 

County Accusation No. 14-06-0202-A. On the plea form, defendant answered 

the questions as follows: 

17. a. Are you a citizen of the United States? No. 

. . . .

b. Do you understand that if you are not a citizen of the 

United States, this guilty plea may result in your 

removal from the United States and/or stop you from 
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being able to legally enter or re-enter the United States?

Yes. 

c. Do you understand that you have the right to seek 

individualized advice from an attorney about the effect 

your guilty plea will have on your immigration status? 

Yes. 

d. Have you discussed with an attorney the potential 

immigration consequences of your plea? No. 

. . . .

e. Would you like the opportunity to do so? No. 

f. Having been advised of the possible immigration 

consequences and of your right to seek individualized 

legal advice on your immigration consequences, do you 

still wish to plead guilty? Yes. 

At the plea hearing, defendant stated he understood the plea agreement 

and he had time to discuss the case with his attorney before deciding to plead 

guilty. With respect to his immigration status, the court engaged in the 

following colloquy with defendant: 

[The court]: Do you understand that by pleading guilty 

to this offense, you are subject to deportation?

[Defendant]: Yes.

[The court]: You understand you have a [r]ight to 

consult with an attorney specializing in [i]mmigration

matters before entering this plea to determine what the

consequences of this plea would be on your status?
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[Defendant]: Yes.

[The court]: Have you done that?

[Defendant]: Yes.

[The court]: You have spoken with an [i]mmigration 

lawyer?

[Defendant]: Never spoke to [i]mmigration.

[The court]: Do you intend to speak to one?

[Defendant]: No.

[The court]: You are giving up that [r]ight?

[Defendant]: I never spoke to them.

[The court]: I know you haven't. Do you understand 

you have the [r]ight to do that?

[Defendant]: Yes, my Lord.

[The court]: Do you intend to give that [r]ight up?

[Defendant]: Yes.

. . . .

[The court]: So, you understand your [r]ights, sir?

[Defendant]: Yes, my Lord.

Defendant's counsel again raised his immigration issue with the court: 

[Defendant's counsel]: . . . I do want to bring to the 

[c]ourt's attention that[] I did speak quite a few times, 
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twice, to [defendant] about his [i]mmigration. He's 

listed as refugee, [Y]our Honor, not a particular 

classification I find often, but [defendant] has assured 

me that he doesn't believe he would suffer any 

[i]mmigration consequences.

Your Honor, I want to make sure you tell the 

[j]udge that's what you told me. 

[Defendant]: Yes, that's true. That's what I told her. 

[The court]: Well, I just need to make sure that you're 

aware of the fact that you have a [r]ight to consult with 

a lawyer about your [i]mmigration status before you 

enter the plea, and you advised me that you were giving 

that [r]ight up[.] [I]s that correct?

[Defendant]: Yes.

On August 1, 2014, defendant was sentenced to a two-year term of 

probation and did not appeal his sentence or conviction. As a result of his plea, 

the United States Department of Homeland Security ordered defendant's 

deportation, which he is currently appealing. 

On June 10, 2019, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. He claimed 

"[i]neffective counsel[,] advised to plead guilty without due consideration of 

facts and circumstances surrounding arrest and my immigration status –

including negative [e]ffects upon status." Defendant filed a certification stating 

the following facts applicable to this appeal: 
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My attorney convinced me that if I went to trial I would 

lose and spend more years in prison, so I should take 

the guilty plea that was offered and I would get out on 

probation. She coerced me into taking the plea even 

though I wanted to go to trial as I was sure I would not 

be convicted. . . .

My attorney did not provide me with a copy of 

the discovery so I could see what the evidence was 

against me. She also never reviewed the evidence with 

me. I was left in the dark and trusted my attorney to 

properly advise me since I had no choice. 

My attorney only met with me two times, and 

only seemed interested in having me plead guilty. She 

never seriously talked with me about my wanting to go 

to trial. 

. . . .

When the [c]ourt asked me if I wanted to speak 

with an immigration attorney before I entered the guilty 

plea, I at first did not understand but I said I did not 

want to. My attorney did not go into any real detail 

about this. I was a refugee and had a green card. . . . 

[I]f I had been given the opportunity to speak with an 

immigration attorney I would have had better 

information. 

On May 19, 2020, the PCR court heard oral argument. On June 30, 2020, 

the court entered an order and written decision denying defendant's PCR petition

because he failed to allege a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel requiring an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected defendant's 

argument that "the plea colloquy indicate[d] 'some lack of understanding on the 
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part of the defendant as to the [c]ourt's pertinent questions, at least initially, and 

his acknowledgment of the questions upon restating.'" The court was also not 

convinced defendant's use of the term "my Lord" when addressing the judge 

demonstrated that he did not fully understand the proceedings. 

The court noted that defendant did not allege that counsel advised him 

"one way or another" about the immigration consequences of his plea. He

answered on the plea form that he was advised of the right to consult with an 

immigration attorney, and he was advised of that right at the plea hearing. The 

court also noted that given defendant's unique immigration status, the law was 

not "succinct and straightforward," and defendant's counsel was not obligated to 

do more than advise defendant that "pending criminal charges may carry a risk 

of adverse immigration consequences, [Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369

(2010)]." 

Moreover, the court noted that the judge explained to defendant that he 

was subject to deportation. Additionally, the court noted that defendant's 

counsel explained she met with defendant multiple times and defendant was sure 

he would not be deported. Defendant did not explain what information he would 

have received that would have affected his decision to plead guilty. Thus, the 

court concluded that, based on the plea colloquy and plea form, defendant 
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understood his right to consult with an immigration attorney, and he was advised 

about the potential consequences of the plea. This appeal followed. 

Defendant raises the following issues: 

POINT ONE

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. 

KOROMA'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF WITHOUT GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY

HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM 

PRIOR COUNSEL REGARDING THE SUBSTANCE 

OF HER ADVICE AS TO THE IMMIGRATION 

CONSEQUENCES OF ACCEPTING THE GUILTY 

PLEA.

POINT TWO

THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. 

KOROMA'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 

RELIEF WITHOUT GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM 

PRIOR COUNSEL REGARDING WHY SHE 

PRESSURED MR. KOROMA TO PLEAD GUILTY.

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of 

habeas corpus." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. 

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). Post-conviction relief provides "a built-in 

'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted.'" State v. 

Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 

(1997)). "A petition for post-conviction relief is cognizable if based upon . . . 

[s]ubstantial denial in the conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the 
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Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New

Jersey . . . ." R. 3:22-2(a). "Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are 

particularly suited for post-conviction review because they often cannot 

reasonably be raised in a prior proceeding." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 460. 

A defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in 

support of post-conviction relief, a determination by the 

court that there are material issues of disputed fact that 

cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, 

and a determination that an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims for relief. To establish 

a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a 

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the 

facts alleged in the light most favorable to the 

defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.

[R. 3:22-10(b).]

An evidentiary hearing will not be granted:

(1) if an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's 

analysis of the defendant's entitlement to postconviction relief;

(2) if the defendant's allegations are too vague, 

conclusory or speculative; or

(3) for the purpose of permitting a defendant to 

investigate whether additional claims for relief exist for 

which defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable 

likelihood of success as required by [Rule] 3:22-10(b).

[R. 3:22-10(e).]
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Petitioners must demonstrate they meet the two-prong test in Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

The first prong is satisfied by a showing that 

counsel's acts or omissions fell "outside the wide range 

of professionally competent assistance" considered in 

light of all the circumstances of the case. "No particular 

set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can 

satisfactorily take account of the variety of 

circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 

legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a 

criminal defendant." Therefore, there is "a strong 

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance." To 

rebut that presumption, a defendant must establish that 

trial counsel's actions did not equate to "sound trial 

strategy." In evaluating a defendant's claim, the court 

"must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged 

conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of 

the time of the attorney's conduct."

The second prong is satisfied by a defendant 

showing "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different."

[State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 203-04 (2004) (citations 

omitted).]

In addition, "counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk 

of deportation," Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374, and "a petitioner must convince the 

court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under 

the circumstances." Id. at 372. 
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The United States Supreme Court considered, with respect to Strickland's

attorney-deficiency prong, whether counsel has a duty to inform non-citizen 

clients of the risk of deportation even if the law is not "succinct and 

straightforward," see id. at 369; id. at 381 (Alito, J., concurring). New Jersey's 

Supreme Court considered the same duty.

[E]ven if removal is not "mandated" in the sense that a 

state offense is not identified on published lists of 

offenses equating to aggravated felonies or like 

mandatorily removable offenses, counsel must 

highlight for noncitizen clients that entering a guilty 

plea will place them at risk of removal and that they 

may seek to obtain counseling on potential immigration 

consequences in order that their guilty plea be accepted 

as knowing and voluntary. We will look to transcripts 

of plea colloquies for evidence that these points were 

placed on the record with a noncitizen defendant prior 

to a court's acceptance, and entry, of a guilty plea.

[State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 381 (2012).]

In considering whether duties have been met, our "review is necessarily 

deferential to a PCR court's factual findings based on its review of live witness 

testimony." Nash, 212 N.J. at 540. We review the PCR court's interpretation of 

the law de novo. Id. at 540-41. 

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his PCR petition 

without an evidentiary hearing because testimony was needed to determine the 
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substance of prior counsel's advice regarding the immigration consequences of 

pleading guilty. We agree. 

The transcript shows that defendant may not have understood the 

questions he was asked. When asked if he understood his right to speak with an 

immigration attorney, and whether he had done so, he said "yes." However, 

when further questioned as to whether he had spoken with an immigration 

attorney, he responded, "Never spoke to immigration." When then asked 

whether he intended to speak with an immigration attorney, defendant answered, 

"I never spoke to them." When the court asked again whether defendant 

understood he had the right to speak with an immigration attorney, he answered, 

"Yes, my Lord." A plain reading of the transcript indicates that defendant may 

not have understood the classification difference between immigrants and 

refugees, and therefore did not understand the consequences, including 

deportation, that attached to his guilty plea. Further, defendant's colloquy fails 

to account for the two conversations he had with counsel.

Defendant met his burden of establishing a prime facie case as to require 

an evidentiary hearing. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. As to the first prong, 

based on his status as a refugee, defendant "assured [counsel that] he [did not]

believe he would suffer any immigration consequences." But the court did not 
13 A-1804-20

conduct further questioning of whether counsel adequately explained and 

defendant understood his classification as a refugee and the possible deportation 

consequences that could result from a guilty plea. Defendant established 

Strickland's second prong because, at the time of his guilty plea, defendant 

believed he would be in danger if he was forced to return to Sierra Leone; thus, 

he provided support that he would not have pled guilty if he had been properly 

informed by counsel of this potential consequence. If defendant had been fully 

informed of the possible deportation, we think the results of the proceedings 

would be different. Because defendant asserts he was not advised that he faced 

possible deportation, he subsequently waived his right to speak with an 

immigration attorney. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to 

investigate facts outside of the trial record, specifically the substance of his 

counsel's advice and whether she consulted him on possible deportation. See

Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462.

Defendant next argues that he was pressured to plead guilty by counsel, 

who convinced him that if he went to trial, "he would spend years in prison." 

The State counterargues that "a plain reading of the plea transcript shows that 

[defendant] entered a voluntary, knowing plea." We disagree with the State's 
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contention based on the colloquy we earlier recounted and concluded that 

defendant did not understand the questions he was asked. 

In accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must establish that the plea was 

made "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 

113, 122 (1988). A court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first 

determining that the plea is made voluntarily without any threats or promises of 

inducement, "and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the 

consequences of the plea." R. 3:9-2. Because defendant established a prima 

facie case of ineffective assistance, he raised "material issues of disputed fact 

that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record." R. 3:22-10(b). As 

a result, a remand for an evidentiary hearing is required. 

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. We offer no 

opinion on whether defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea.