alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Clarence WILLIAMS v. The STATE.

A18A1650

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 26, 2018

Clarence Williams, Gerald Ashland Griggs, for Appellant.

Paul L. Howard Jr., Atlanta, for Appellee.

Rickman, Judge.

In 2011, Clarence Williams was convicted of several child molestation offenses. Williams filed a timely motion for new trial, which he subsequently withdrew on March 19, 2018. That same day, he filed a notice of appeal.

"Before turning to the merits, we must first examine this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal. It is the duty of this Court on its own motion to inquire into its jurisdiction."

*716*Cooper v. Spotts* , 309 Ga. App. 361, 361 (1), 710 S.E.2d 159 (2011).

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the judgment being appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The timely filing of a motion for new trial extends the running of this 30-day clock until the trial court disposes of the motion. Id. Absent a court order resolving the motion, however, the appeal time is not extended. As our Supreme Court has ruled, " OCGA § 5-6-38 requires a *trial court order* granting, denying, or otherwise finally disposing of a party's motion for new trial in order to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal." *Heard v. State* , 274 Ga. 196, 197 (1), 552 S.E.2d 818 (2001). See also *Cooper* , 309 Ga. App. at 364, 710 S.E.2d 159. A unilaterally withdrawn motion for new trial, standing alone, does not toll the appeal time. *Heard* , 274 Ga. at 197, 552 S.E.2d 818.

In this case, Williams voluntarily withdrew his motion for new trial. The trial court neither ruled on the motion nor granted him permission to withdraw it. The time for filing his direct appeal, therefore, was not extended, and his notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after his conviction. *Heard* , 274 Ga. at 197 (1), 552 S.E.2d 818 ; see also *Simmons v. State* , 276 Ga. 525, 525 n.1, 579 S.E.2d 735 (2003). Accordingly, we cannot consider Williams' appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

We note, however, that Williams has been represented by counsel and may be entitled to pursue an out-of-time appeal. He is therefore informed of the following in accordance with *Rowland v. State* , 264 Ga. 872, 452 S.E.2d 756 (1995) : This appeal has been dismissed because your counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal. If you still wish to appeal, you may petition the trial court for leave to file an out-of-time appeal. If the trial court grants your request, you will have 30 days from the entry of that order to file a notice of appeal referencing your conviction. If the trial court denies your request, you will have 30 days from the entry of that order to file a notice of appeal referencing the denial of your request for an out-of-time appeal.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send a copy of this opinion to Williams and Williams's attorney, and the latter is also DIRECTED to send a copy to Williams.

*Appeal dismissed* .

McFadden, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
<PAGE>

Exhibit 32

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Dennis M. Terry, President and Chief Executive Officer, and Darlene F. McDonald,
Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer, of First Clover Leaf
Financial Corp. (Company) each certify in their capacity as an officer of the
Company that they have reviewed the Quarterly Report of the Company on Form
10-QSB for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 (Report) and that to the best of
their knowledge:

     1.   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
          the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     2.   the information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

The purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18, Chapter 63,
Section 1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.


                                       By: /s/ Dennis M. Terry
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Dennis M. Terry
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer



                                       By: /s/ Darlene F. McDonald
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Darlene F. McDonald
                                           Senior Vice-President and
                                           Chief Financial Officer


Date:  August 14, 2007
STATE of North Carolina v. Robert Lee THACKER

No. 351P04-6

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

Robert Lee Thacker, for Thacker, Robert Lee.

Derrick Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, J. Douglas Henderson, District Attorney, for State of NC.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 22nd of January 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."
STATE of North Carolina v. Duane AUSTIN, Jr.

No. COA17-920

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 17, 2018

VACATED. REMANDED.
#### Sara Eisig, Respondent, v Eli Weinstein, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[719 NYS2d 284]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Eli Weinstein appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Clemente, J.), dated August 4, 2000, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendant is severed.

To impose liability on an owner of real property when a plaintiff slips and falls on a patch of ice, a plaintiff must demonstrate either that the owner created the dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence *(see, Gor*
      *550
      *don v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836; *Marasia v Noyl Coram, Inc.,*260 AD2d 607; *Davis v City of New York,*255 AD2d 356; *Sellet v United Artists Theaters,*251 AD2d 488). In support of his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, the appellant established that he did not have actual or constructive notice of the existence of the ice on which the plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell, and had not created the icy condition. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in denying the appellant’s motion. S. Miller, J. P., McGinity, Luciano and Smith, JJ., concur.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Brasil Telecom
Participações S.A. (the "Company"), does hereby certify, to such officer's knowledge, that:

The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained
in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.

|Dated: 
June 14, 2005 | /s/ Humberto José Rocha Braz         
|--------------------- | -------------------------------------
|                      | Name: Humberto José Rocha Braz       
|                      | Title: 
  Chief Executive Officer    
|                      |                                      
|Dated: 
June 14, 2005 | /s/ Paulo Pedrão Rio Branco          
|                      | Name: Paulo Pedrão Rio Branco        
|                      | Title: 
  Financial Executive Officer
In the MATTER OF: T.T.

No. COA17-985

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: June 5, 2018

AFFIRMED. REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL ERROR.
STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffrey Robert PARISI

No. 65P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 8, 2017

John W. Congleton, Assistant Attorney General, Tom Horner, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Michele Goldman, Attorney at Law, for Parisi, Jeffrey Robert.

***ORDER***

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 24th of February 2017 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by State of NC on the 24th of February 2017 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 14th of March 2017 by State of NC in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."
EXHIBIT 32.1







CERTIFICATIONS





The undersigned certify that the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Valley Financial Corporation at the dates and for the periods indicated.  The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).





Date:  March 17, 2011

/s/ Ellis GutshallChief Executive Officer/s/ Kimberly B. SnyderChief Financial Officer
#### In the Matter of Mark E. STEINER.

No. 709 Disciplinary Docket No. 3.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 19, 2003.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2003, it appearing that Mark E. Steiner, a member of the Bar of this Commonwealth, has been suspended from the practice of law in the State of Delaware for a period of three years by Order of the Supreme Court of Delaware dated February 27, 2003; and the said Mark E. Steiner having stated that he has no objection to the imposition of reciprocal discipline in this Commonwealth in accordance with Rule 216, Pa. R.D.E., it is

ORDERED that Mark E. Steiner is suspended from the practice of law in this Commonwealth for a period of three years retroactive to August 1, 2002, and he shall comply with all the provisions of Rule 217, Pa.R.D.E.
In the MATTER OF the Foreclosure under the Powers Granted in Chapter 47f of the North Carolina General Statutes and in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Addison Reserve at the Park at Perry Creek Subdivision recorded at Book 9318, Page 369, et seq., Wake County Registry Concerning Gina A. ACKAH

No. 334A17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Filed April 6, 2018

No brief for petitioner-appellee Addison Reserve Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adams, Howell, Sizemore & Lenfestey, P.A., by Ryan J. Adams, Raleigh, for respondent-appellant Gina Ackah.

Law Office of Edward Dilone, PLLC, Durham, by Edward D. Dilone, for third-party appellee Jones Family Holdings, LLC.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit
32.1
  Certification
of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as Adopted
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





I,
William C. Bayless, Jr., Chief Executive Officer of American Campus Communities,
Inc. (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:





(i)The Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2008 (the
“Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and





(ii)The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated: 
       November 10, 2008
                      /s/
      William C. Bayless, Jr.William
      C. Bayless, Jr.President
      and Chief Executive Officer
# Official Journal C 192/28 J

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 192 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 4728 July 2004 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 192

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 4728 July 2004

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Information |
| | Commission |
| 2004/C 192/1 | Euro exchange rates | 1 |
| 2004/C 192/2 | State aid — Greece — State aid No C 11/04 (ex NN 4/03) — Olympic Airways — Restructuring and privatisation — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (1) | 2 |
| 2004/C 192/3 | Uniform Application of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) (Classification of goods) | 29 |
| 2004/C 192/4 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case No COMP/M.3526 — KKR/AUTO-TEILE-UNGER) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1) | 30 |
| 2004/C 192/5 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case No COMP/M.3529) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1) | 31 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Information

Commission

2004/C 192/1

Euro exchange rates

1

2004/C 192/2

State aid — Greece — State aid No C 11/04 (ex NN 4/03) — Olympic Airways — Restructuring and privatisation — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty (1)

2

2004/C 192/3

Uniform Application of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) (Classification of goods)

29

2004/C 192/4

Prior notification of a concentration (Case No COMP/M.3526 — KKR/AUTO-TEILE-UNGER) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1)

30

2004/C 192/5

Prior notification of a concentration (Case No COMP/M.3529) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (1)

31

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance |

---

(1)   Text with EEA relevance

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
#### Sister Carol FRANCIS, Individually, and on Behalf of Her Father, Jacob Francis, Sr. v. LAFON NURSING HOME OF THE HOLY FAMILY and Sisters of the Holy Family.

No. 2003-C-1373.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Lafon Nursing Home of the Holy Family et al.; Sisters of the Holy Family; — Defendant(s); Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 94-2064; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2002-CA-1868.

Denied.

TRAYLOR, J., would grant the writ.
#### Michael KAILING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 5D03-2203.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 22, 2003.

Michael Railing, Avon Park, pro se.

No Appearance for Respondent.

*411SHARP, W., J.

Railing filed a request that this court treat his petition for writ of habeas corpus for a belated appeal which asserts ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, as timely filed under the mailbox rule.1 We deny his petition without prejudice to file a petition for belated appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(c). Under the rule, Railing must provide, among other things, allegations entitling him to a belated appeal and executed by him under oath.

This is an unusual case in that if Railing’s allegations are correct, his petition challenging the effectiveness of appellate counsel was timely filed under the mailbox rule. Railing was convicted in a criminal case and his direct appeal to this court (5D99-3321) was affirmed on September 12, 2000. On September 29, 2002 (the date on which the mandate issued), the two-year time limit in which to file such a petition would have expired, absent exceptional circumstances. Fla. R.App. P. 9.141(c)(4).

In his current request, Railing claims he filed his petition on August 27, 2002, by delivering it to prison authorities, but for reasons unknown to all concerned, this court has no record of ever receiving such a document. In response to a letter of inquiry from Railing dated June 24, 2003, this court responded that our records “fail to reflect any pending or prior petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.”

DENIED without prejudice.

PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

1

. Fla. R.App. P. 9.420(a)(2).
Johnny R. EDWARDS, Employee, Plaintiff, v. PCC AIRFOILS, Employer, Self-insured (Underwriters Safety & Claims, Servicing Agent), Defendant.

No. COA16-951

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: May 16, 2017

AFFIRMED.
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCPW-12-0000799 09-OCT-2012 01:37 PM

NO. SCPW-12-0000799
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI ' I

MICHAEL C. TIERNEY, Petitioner,

vs. TED SAKAI, INTERIM DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, STATE OF HAWAI ' I; SHARI KIMOTO; and JEANETTE BALTERO, Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS ( By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, and Pollack, JJ., with Acoba, J. dissenting) Upon consideration of Michael C. Tierney’s September 19, 2012 petition for a writ of mandamus and the document submitted in support thereof and attached thereto, it appears that petitioner fails to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to return to Hawai ' i to serve the remainder of his sentence. See Malahoff v. Saito , 111 Hawai ' i 168, 191, 140 P.3d 401, 424 (2006) (the term “shall” in a statute may be construed as directory rather than mandatory); Jack Endo Elec., Inc. v. Lear Siegler, Inc. , 59 Haw. 612, 617, 585 P.2d 1265, 1269 (1978) (same). Petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to mandamus relief. See Kema v. Gaddis , 91 Hawai ' i 200, 204, 982 P.2d 334, 338 (1999) (A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will not issue unless the petitioner demonstrates a clear andindisputable right to relief and a lack of alternative means to redress adequately the alleged wrong or obtain the requested action). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai ' i, October 9, 2012. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack

DISSENT BY ACOBA, J. I dissent to the denial of Petitioner Michael C. Tierney’s petition for a writ of mandamus (Petition). I would require Respondents Ted Sakai, Director of the Department of Public Safety (DPS), Shari Kimoto, the mainland branch manager for DPS, and Jeanette Baltero, the contract monitor for DPS to file an answer to the Petition. /s/ Simeon R. Acoba, Jr.

-2­
Exhibit 31.2**CERTIFICATION**I, Stephen J. McDonnell, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Holly Logistic Services,L.L.C., the general partner of HEP Logistics Holdings, L.P., the general partner of Holly EnergyPartners, L.P., certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Holly Energy Partners, L.P;2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this quarterly report;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this quarterly report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the periodcovered by this quarterly report based on such evaluation; andc) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the period covered by this quarterly reporton Form 10-Q that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; andb) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.   Date: August 4, 2005 /s/ Stephen J. McDonnell     Stephen J. McDonnell  Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
The NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR v. Christopher W. LIVINGSTON, Attorney

No. 27P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 9, 2018

Mr. Christopher W. Livingston, Attorney at Law, for Livingston, Christopher W.

Mr. David R. Johnson, Deputy Counsel, for The NC State Bar

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant on the 22nd of January 2018 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question filed by the Plaintiff, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 22nd of January 2018 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 22nd of January 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

*854"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."