United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

E.C., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Vienna, VA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 16-0900 

Issued: September 2, 2016 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Stephen Domenic Scavuzzo, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On March 26, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal of a September 30, 

2015 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty on February 2, 2015. 

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

On appeal, appellant’s counsel argues that the decision should be reversed or remanded 

as the hearing representative failed to address all of the medical evidence. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On February 5, 2015 appellant, then a 57-year-old sales and service associate, filed a 

traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on February 2, 2015 a mentally disabled young 

man, between 16 to 18 years old and six feet tall, came in the backside of the clerk’s window 

counter and hugged her. She alleged that as a result of this incident she suffered stress and that 

her “heart was pounding continually.” The employing establishment controverted appellant’s 

claim as she had not submitted adequate medical evidence in support of her claim. 

Appellant submitted a February 2, 2015 duty status report (Form CA-17) signed by a 

nurse practitioner indicating that appellant could not work due to a stress reaction, and that she 

would see her primary physician for work release. She also submitted a February 5, 2015 Form 

CA-17 and physician’s note signed by Dr. Wonsock Shin, a Board-certified internist, diagnosing 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and indicating that she was currently off work, but could 

return to work on February 9, 2015. 

By letter dated February 12, 2015, OWCP informed appellant that further evidence, 

including medical evidence, was necessary to support her claim. Appellant was afforded 30 days 

to submit additional evidence. 

In a February 12, 2015 progress report and accompanying notes, Dr. Shin noted that 

appellant had been having chest pains on and off, which was worse during her work. He 

diagnosed PTSD, palpitations, undiagnosed cardiac murmurs, and chest pain. Dr. Shin noted 

anxiety from appellant’s traumatic experience and noted that she was to be off work for two 

weeks for psychological counseling for PTSD. In a February 20, 2015 note, he reported that he 

saw appellant for an initial evaluation on February 5, 2015, that she suffered from an emotional 

disorder as a result of injury during her work, that she was seen in the Emergency Department 

for initial evaluation, and that she came to his office for further evaluation. Dr. Shin noted that 

she was emotionally unstable and in need of rest and medicine for her anxiety and stress, and that 

at the present time she was not able to go back to work. In a February 26, 2015 note, he placed 

appellant off work for one month. 

In a February 21, 2015 note, Gemma I. Sohn, a licensed clinical social worker, indicated 

that appellant was seen for an initial evaluation on that date and that she showed signs of PTSD 

as a result of an incident at the employing establishment on February 2, 2015. She noted that 

appellant’s physical symptoms included tension, anxiety, palpitation, flashbacks, and overall 

hypervigilance. Ms. Sohn also noted visible signs of psychological distress including anxiety, 

difficulty focusing, heightened irritability, and fear of being alone. She noted that appellant was 

seen by Dr. Shin, and attempted to return to work; but she experienced adverse reactions; and her 

accelerated return to work seemed to have added to her current difficulties. Ms. Sohn 

recommended that appellant continue psychotherapy and gradually increase her work hours. 

In a March 4, 2015 statement, appellant indicated that the young man who appeared to 

have a mental disability pushed the swing door and ran through the backside window to the clerk 
3

station, came to her station, hugged her and tried to put his face on her face. She noted that she 

tried to back up from him until there was no more space. Appellant stated that she felt trapped, 

attacked, and terrified. She noted a customer reacted and firmly told the young man to back 

away, which he did, but after a couple of minutes the young man again attempted to approach 

her and this time the customer was able to physically sustain him and pulled him back, at which 

point the young man ran out of the employing establishment. Appellant noted that, when she 

returned to work on February 9, 2015, the swing door was not secured and that when she 

submitted a written request, the officer in charge told her to either relocate to a different 

workstation, get new job training, or do window duty. She stated that his response made her 

nervous so she indicated she would do window duty, but that when she worked window, she kept 

an eye on the door and had an insecure and scared feeling. Appellant noted that she saw 

Dr. Shin who gave her new medication for chest pain and advised her to seek psychological 

counseling. 

In a March 17, 2015 report, Dr. Keith Chu, a Board-certified family practitioner, 

diagnosed appellant with chest pain, palpitations, anxiety, and hypothyroidism. He noted that 

the onset of pain was sudden about six weeks ago and was precipitated by stress and exertion. 

In a decision dated March 30, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as she had not 

submitted any medical evidence containing a medical diagnosis in connection with the incidents 

described. 

On April 19, 2015 appellant requested an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing 

representative. She described the incident when she was trapped by the young man who came in 

through the swinging doors where she worked, passed three other clerks, and then hugged her. 

Appellant described the stress she underwent when she returned to work. She also described her 

medical treatments. 

In a June 17, 2015 report, Dr. Edward S. Kim, a Board-certified physiatrist, noted that 

appellant has been off work from the employing establishment for four months for PTSD. He 

diagnosed lumbar radiculopathy -- unchanged. In a July 8, 2015 note, Dr. Kim indicated that 

appellant was excused from work from July 9 through August 1, 2014 due to medical reasons, 

but would be able to return to work on August 3, 2015. 

In a March 31, 2015 report, Dr. Shin noted PTSD, palpitations, and undiagnosed cardiac 

murmurs. 

In a July 31, 2015 report, Dr. Hei-Jung C. Kim, a Board-certified psychiatrist, noted 

appellant’s history and indicated that on February 2, 2015 she was approached by a teenager who 

came behind the counter through a swing door and tried to kiss her, and that since then she has 

been fearful of working for the employing establishment and does not feel safe. He 

recommended gradual return to work, and avoidance of working where she would deal with 

strangers. Dr. Kim noted that appellant was attempting to overcome her fears of going back to 

the site of the trauma. He listed Axis 1 diagnoses as major depression, recurrent, mild; 

generalized anxiety disorder, moderate; PTSD, mild; and panic disorder with agoraphobia, in 

remission. For Axis 2, Dr. Kim listed cervical disc disease, paresthesia to right ulnar nerve areas 

of right arm/hands; tinnitus, indigestion, bruxism, and constipation; lumbar disc disease; sciatica 
4

left leg; and paresthesia in left foot. For Axis 3, he listed stress, extreme; injury at work in 2013; 

traumatic incident at the employing establishment on February 2, 2015; son’s difficulties, 

financial worries, and workers’ compensation claim. 

In a July 31, 2015 report, Ms. Sohn, a social worker, indicated that she had seen appellant 

on multiple occasions between February 28 and June 27, 2015. She diagnosed major depression, 

recurrent, moderate; PTSD, moderate to severe; generalized anxiety disorder; and panic disorder. 

Ms. Sohn described appellant’s history of the employment incident. She noted that, at the time 

of the initial assessment, appellant showed moderate-to-severe psychosomatic symptoms of 

PTSD as a result of the reported incident, and noted that PTSD was characterized by her 

reexperiencing intense fear and anxiety, following exposure to a traumatic incident. Ms. Sohn 

noted appellant’s psychological distresses included anxiety, difficult in focusing, heightened 

irritability, fear of being alone, and overall hypervigilance. She noted that appellant’s financial 

status due to her not being able to work remains a contributing factor to the level of anxiety and 

depression. 

In an August 19, 2015 report, Dr. H. Kim noted that he reviewed the incident of 

February 2, 2015. He noted that based upon his discussions with appellant and evaluating 

appellant’s condition, it was his professional opinion that the workplace incident resulted in 

appellant’s current episode of PTSD as well as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, 

panic disorder and agoraphobia. 

In an August 29, 2015 report, Ms. Sohn again listed diagnoses of major depression, 

PTSD, generalized anxiety disorder; and panic disorder with agoraphobia. She noted that 

appellant was able to work part time and may increase her hours in the future. If all goes well, 

Ms. Sohn indicated that appellant should be able to return to her full-time work capacity by the 

end of the year without any notable residual effects. 

In a decision dated September 30, 2015, the hearing representative affirmed the 

March 30, 2015 decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking compensation under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence,3 including that he or she is an employee within the meaning of FECA and that he or 

she filed his or her claim within the applicable time limitation.4 The employee must also 

establish that she sustained an injury in the performance of duty as alleged and that her disability 

for work, if any, was causally related to the employment injury.5

 3 J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 57 (1968). 

4 R.C., 59 ECAB 427 (2008). 

5 Id., Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989). 
5

To determine whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the 

performance of duty, it first must be determined whether fact of injury has been established. 

There are two components involved in establishing fact of injury. First, the employee must 

submit sufficient evidence to establish that she actually experienced the employment incident at 

the time, place, and in the manner alleged. Second, the employee must submit medical evidence 

to establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.6

Rationalized medical opinion evidence is generally required to establish causal 

relationship. The opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical 

background, must be one of reasonable medical certainty, and must be supported by medical 

rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the 

specific employment factors identified by the claimant.7

ANALYSIS 

OWCP has accepted that the employment incident of February 2, 2015 occurred when a 

young mentally disabled man came into her work area and tried to hug her. The issue is whether 

appellant’s PTSD and other medical conditions resulted from the February 2, 2015 incident. The 

Board finds that appellant has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish a causal connection 

between the conditions for which compensation is claimed and the employment incident. 

Appellant has not submitted a well-rationalized report by a physician establishing that her 

accepted diagnosis of PTSD is causally related to the accepted February 2, 2015 incident. 

Dr. Shin’s reports did not contain a description of the February 2, 2015 incident nor any opinion 

addressing causal relationship. Medical evidence submitted to support a claim for compensation 

should reflect a correct history, and the physician should offer a medically sound explanation of 

how the claimed work event caused or aggravated the claimed condition.8

 Dr. E. Kim in his 

June 17, 2015 report also provided diagnoses and excused appellant from work, but offered no 

opinion regarding causal relationship. Similarly, Dr. Chu only gave diagnoses and did not 

address the employment incident. As such, lacking a rationalized medical opinion explain causal 

relationship, these reports are of limited probative value.9

 

Dr. H. Kim did address the incident when discussing appellant’s history, and also stated 

multiple factors caused her PTSD and generalized anxiety, including the February 2, 2015 

incident. In his August 19, 2015 report, he stated that he reviewed the incident of February 2, 

2015 and that based upon his discussions with appellant and medically evaluating appellant’s 

condition, it was his professional opinion that the workplace incident resulted in appellant’s 

current episode of PTSD as well as major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, panic 

disorder and agoraphobia. Although Dr. Kim’s report is generally supportive of causal 

relationship, he does not provide adequate medical rationale explaining the basis of his opinion 

 6 T.H., 59 ECAB 388 (2008). 

7 I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989). 

8 D.D., Docket No. 13-1517 (issued April 14, 2014). 

9 Id. 
6

regarding causal relationship. He did not explain the process by which appellant’s accepted 

employment incident caused the diagnosed condition and why the condition would not be due to 

the other multiple nonwork factors that he listed.10 A mere conclusion without the necessary 

rationale explaining how and why the physician believes that a claimant’s accepted exposure 

could result in a diagnosed condition is not sufficient to meet a claimant’s burden of proof.11 

The February 2, 2015 CA-17 form from a nurse practitioner indicated that appellant 

could not return to work due to a stress reaction. This evidence, however, has no probative value 

regarding causal relationship as nurse practitioners are not considered physicians as defined 

under FECA.1212

Ms. Sohn addressed appellant’s employment factors. However, she is not a physician but 

is a licensed social worker. It is well established that a social worker is not a physician under 

FECA and therefore her opinions are of no probative medical value.13

As appellant has not submitted any rationalized medical evidence to support her 

allegation that she sustained an emotional condition causally related to her accepted employment 

incident of February 2, 2015, she has failed to meet her burden of proof to establish a claim for 

compensation. 

The Board finds that counsel’s arguments that the hearing representative did not address 

the medical evidence submitted at and after the hearing is without merit, as these reports were 

noted in his decision. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty on February 2, 2015. 

 10 J.S., Docket No. 14-818 (issued August 7, 2014). 

11 G.M., Docket No. 14-2057 (issued May 12, 2015). 

12 N.F., Docket No. 16-741 (issued July 19, 2016). The term physician includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, 

clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as 

defined by State law. 5 U.S.C. § 8102(2); L.D., 59 ECAB 648 (2008) (a nurse practitioner is not considered a 

physician as defined under FECA). 

13 W.C., Docket No. 15-1280 (issued November 13, 2015); R.W., Docket No. 14-1890 (issued February 11, 2015). 
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ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs dated September 30, 2014 is affirmed. 

Issued: September 2, 2016 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board