United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3929

___________

Beverly Hinnenkamp, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

City of St. Cloud; *

St. Cloud Police Department, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: February 3, 2006

Filed: May 5, 2006 

___________

Before MURPHY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In her civil rights complaint against the City of St. Cloud and the St. Cloud

Police Department, Beverly Hinnenkamp alleged that three officers of the police

department, David Douvier, Ryan Manguson, and Michael Koeniguer, arrested her

without probable cause outside a house where she was serving a subpoena (allegedly

in retaliation for filing a civil rights suit against other police officers), that they used

excessive force during the arrest, and that they subsequently denied her medical
1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of Minnesota.

2

The district court observed that Hinnenkamp also referred to Sergeant Larry

Atkinson and Officer Kay Wethor in her submitted materials, but that “[n]either Mr.

Atkinson nor Ms. Wethor are actually named parties.” The district court, “out of an

abundance of caution,” stated its conclusion that “there is no supportable claim”

against Atkinson or Wethor. (R. Doc. 26, at 8-9 & n.2).

-2-

assistance. The district court1

 granted summary judgment to the defendants, and

Hinnenkamp appeals. Upon de novo review, see Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339 F.3d

622, 626 (8th Cir. 2003), we affirm.

The three individual police officers were not named as parties in Hinnenkamp’s

complaint, and they do not appear on the docket of the district court as defendants in

this action. Although the district court “liberally construed” Hinnenkamp’s pleadings

to add the police officers as defendants for purposes of the motion for summary

judgment, because her brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment

identified the officers as “defendants,” we affirm on the alternative ground that these

individual officers were never made parties to the action.2

 Counsel for the defendants

observed in a memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment that the

individual police officers were never specified as parties to the action, and argued that

the action was limited to claims of municipal liability. (R. Doc. 13, at 2, 7-8). There

is no showing that the officers ever were served with process in either their official

or individual capacities. Hinnenkamp never moved to amend her complaint to add

the officers as individual defendants. Cf. Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 755

(8th Cir. 1997) (complaint against state officials who were sued in their official

capacities was deemed amended to assert personal-capacity claims, where plaintiff

moved to amend complaint in response to motion for summary judgment). Under

these circumstances, we do not think the liberal construction of pleadings afforded

to pro se litigants is sufficient to add claims against parties who were never named
-3-

as defendants in a complaint or in a motion to amend the complaint, never served with

process, and never identified as defendants in the district court’s docket. 

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City of St.

Cloud and the St. Cloud Police Department. A claim against a municipality for an

alleged “failure to train” its officers cannot succeed unless an officer violated the

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Neal v. St. Louis County Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 217

F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 2000). Here, there was insufficient evidence to show that

Hinnenkamp’s arrest was retaliatory and not supported by probable cause, as the

record indicates Hinnenkamp was later convicted for the offenses for which she was

arrested. See Malady v. Crunk, 902 F.2d 10, 11-12 (8th Cir. 1990) (conviction for

offense for which officer arrested plaintiff bars 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging lack

of probable cause); Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1080-81 (8th

Cir. 1990) (where there was probable cause for arrest for an offense, plaintiff who

alleged that arrest was for engaging in protected activity had to present evidence

showing, among other things, that police normally did not make arrests for such

offenses). There also was no basis for Hinnenkamp’s claim that she was denied

medical assistance, because the claim was contradicted by her own testimony.

Whether or not any of the individual officers used excessive force against

Hinnenkamp, there was no showing that any such use of force was pursuant to a

policy of the municipality, or that the municipality acted with deliberate indifference

to the constitutional rights of arrestees such as Hinnenkamp. See City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1989). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________