[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-15359

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cr-00086-JSM-TGW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KENNETH J. HUDSON, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(May 21, 2013)

Before CARNES, MARCUS, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Kenneth J. Hudson appeals the procedural and substantive reasonableness of 

his 210-month sentence, imposed following his convictions at trial for possession 

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of a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent 

to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Although the district court granted 

Hudson a 52-month downward variance from his sentencing guidelines range of 

262 to 327 months imprisonment that applied due to his undisputed status as an 

armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4, Hudson 

contends that any sentence above the 15-year statutory minimum would be 

unreasonable and greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing, and 

that the court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a sentence 

above the statutory minimum. In support of his claims of error, Hudson cites the 

age of his prior felony convictions; the small amounts of drugs involved in his past 

and current drug offenses; the support he has given to his minor daughters; his 

intellectual, psychological, and “emotional handicaps”; and the increased costs to 

the government of incarcerating him beyond the 15-year mandatory minimum. 

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of 

discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591 

(2007), and the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that 

it is unreasonable, United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). A 

sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to consider the 

sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) or fails to “adequately 

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the 

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Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. In explaining the 

chosen sentence, the district court should say enough to satisfy the reviewing court 

that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for making 

its decision, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007), 

though “nothing . . . requires the district court to state on the record that it has 

explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 

3553(a) factors,” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). 

The substantive reasonableness of a sentence is examined in light of the 

totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 

S.Ct. at 597. Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence that is 

sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, 

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal 

conduct, and protect the public from future crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a)(2). The court must also consider, among other factors, the nature and 

circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and

the applicable guidelines range. Id. § 3553(a). We will not vacate a sentence as 

substantively unreasonable unless “left with the definite and firm conviction that 

the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) 

factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences 

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dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

Hudson has not demonstrated that his sentence is procedurally or 

substantively unreasonable. The district court explained that it had considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors and the advisory guidelines range, and, in granting a 52-month 

downward variance, specifically cited the age of Hudson’s prior felony 

convictions, the small amount of crack cocaine involved in his career-criminal

predicate drug offenses, the fact that Hudson had “lived for substantial periods of 

time crime free,” and that his private life had “otherwise been reasonably 

conducted.” The court’s explanation for its chosen sentence, including the extent 

of the deviation from the guidelines range, was adequate. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 

356, 127 S.Ct. at 2468; Scott, 426 F.3d at 1329. The court was not required to 

specifically state why it did not further deviate from the guidelines range down to 

the statutory minimum. 

The sentence is also not unreasonably high. Because we ordinarily expect 

within-guidelines sentences to be substantively reasonable, United States v. 

Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008), it follows that we would certainly

expect a below-guidelines sentence, such as Hudson’s, not to be unreasonably 

severe. Hudson’s sentence is well below the applicable guidelines range and even 

further below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment, which itself is 

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indicative of a reasonable sentence. See id. It also adequately reflects his long 

history of criminal activity, which includes a 1994 conviction for possession of 

cocaine; 1995 convictions for aggravated assault with a firearm, possession of 

marijuana, and obstructing an officer without violence; 2001 convictions for the 

sale and possession of cocaine; a 2008 conviction for carrying a concealed 

weapon; and a 2011 conviction for obstructing or resisting an officer without 

violence. Hudson’s previous sentences of imprisonment, which totaled over 8 

years, have clearly failed to deter him from violating the law, which raises 

legitimate concerns about recidivism. We are far from convinced that his 

significantly below-guidelines sentence of 210 months imprisonment is 

unreasonably high in light of the § 3553(a) factors, particularly his history, 

characteristics, and the need to afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from 

his criminal conduct, and promote respect for the law. We therefore affirm his 

sentence of 210 months imprisonment. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. 

AFFIRMED.

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