IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 141 / 06–0076 

Filed October 17, 2008 

HEIDI ANN ANFINSON, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

STATE OF IOWA, 

 Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. 

Rosenberg, Judge. 

 Further review of court of appeals decision affirming denial of 

postconviction relief. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

 Alfredo Parrish and Brandon Brown of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn 

Boles Gribble Cook Parrish and Gentry, Des Moines, for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen Douglass, Assistant 

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg, 

Assistant County Attorney, for appellee. 
2 

HECHT, Justice. 

Heidi Anfinson was convicted of second-degree murder for the 

drowning death of her infant son. In this postconviction relief action, we 

consider whether trial counsel rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance 

in failing to sufficiently inquire into and present evidence of Anfinson’s 

postpartum depression in furtherance of her defense theory that the 

child’s death was accidental. We conclude Anfinson’s trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance that resulted in prejudice. Accordingly, 

we reverse Anfinson’s conviction and remand this case to the district 

court for a new trial. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background. 

 Heidi Anfinson gave birth to a son, Jacob, on September 5, 1998. 

Fifteen days after his birth, Jacob went missing while in Anfinson’s care. 

Jacob’s father contacted the police, who began searching for the child. 

While officers were searching for Jacob, Anfinson and her husband were 

transported to the police station. Anfinson told the officers that while 

bathing Jacob, she left the room to use the telephone; and when she 

returned, she discovered Jacob had drowned. Anfinson led police to 

Saylorville Lake, where they discovered Jacob’s body submerged under 

rocks in shallow water. During a later interview with police, Anfinson 

stated she “freaked” when she found Jacob’s dead body in the bath 

water, put it in the car, took it to the lake, and placed it in the water. 

 The State charged Anfinson with first-degree murder and child 

endangerment. Iowa Code §§ 707.1, .2, 726.6(1), .6(2) (1997). Anfinson 

pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. The first trial resulted in 

a mistrial as the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision. In a 

second trial involving the same charges, the jury convicted Anfinson of 

second-degree murder. Id. § 707.3. On direct appeal, the court of 
3 

appeals affirmed the conviction. State v. Anfinson, No. 00-0511 (Iowa Ct. 

App. July 3, 2002). 

 Anfinson filed an application for postconviction relief alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel. She presented evidence tending to 

prove her trial counsel summarily dismissed the notion of raising 

insanity or diminished capacity defenses despite evidence she was 

suffering from severe postpartum depression at the time of Jacob’s 

death. She also asserted trial counsel, who chose to present the defense 

theory that Jacob died accidentally, was ineffective in failing to present 

evidence of her postpartum depression in furtherance of that theory. 

Anfinson further contended trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

object to the testimony of the investigating officers who described 

Anfinson’s lack of emotion shown during the interview at the police 

station when she denied knowledge of Jacob’s whereabouts.1

In a detailed ruling, the district court dismissed Anfinson’s 

application. The court concluded trial counsel breached an essential 

duty by failing to investigate Anfinson’s mental and physical condition, 

but reasoned Anfinson was not entitled to relief because she failed to 

prove the requisite prejudice resulting from the breach. The court also 

found Anfinson failed to prove prejudice resulting from the admission of 

the officers’ testimony describing Anfinson’s lack of emotion during 

questioning. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition, 

and we granted further review. 

 

1Before the district court and court of appeals Anfinson raised additional claims 

of ineffectiveness. Our opinion on further review is confined in this case to the grounds 

specifically asserted in her application for further review. 
4 

II. Scope of Review. 

 We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State 

v. Bearse, 748 N.W.2d 211, 214 (Iowa 2008). To establish ineffective 

assistance of counsel, a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance 

of the evidence “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, 

and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 

128, 133 (Iowa 2006); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687–88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064–65, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698 

(1984). We may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking. State v. Greene, 

592 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Iowa 1999). To establish prejudice, a claimant must 

demonstrate “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for the 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’ ” State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008) 

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 

698). The probability of a different result must be “ ‘sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id.

III. Discussion. 

 A. Failure to Investigate and Assert Defenses Based on 

Postpartum Depression. On our de novo review, we find that trial 

counsel was aware of the probability Anfinson suffered from postpartum 

depression after Jacob’s birth and categorically rejected any suggestion 

that this condition be explored in her defense. Anfinson’s sisters 

observed Anfinson behaving strangely soon after Jacob was born on 

September 5, 1998. While attending a baby shower, they observed 

numerous “sores” on Anfinson’s legs and perceived her to be 
5 

“exhausted,” “wooden,” and “unjoyful.”2 Anfinson appeared to be afraid 

to handle Jacob. 

 On September 22, 1998, after trial counsel undertook Anfinson’s 

defense, trial counsel and several of Anfinson’s family members were 

present when Anfinson was released on bail. As they left the jail, an 

unidentified woman approached. The woman disclosed she had 

experienced postpartum depression, claimed she knew what Anfinson 

was going through, and attempted to hand an envelope to one of 

Anfinson’s family members. Trial counsel snatched the envelope and 

proclaimed he “didn’t want to hear any talk of postpartum depression.” 

He was quoted in a newspaper article published the next day, suggesting 

postpartum depression was not a factor in the baby’s accidental death.3 

 Although Anfinson was hospitalized on September 26, 1998 and 

medicated for depression, suicidal ideation, and panic attacks, trial 

counsel failed to request or obtain copies of Anfinson’s medical records.4 

He also failed to conduct an investigation which would have divulged 

 

2Anfinson initially told her sisters the “sores” were caused by mosquito bites, but 

later disclosed they were caused by self-mutilation as she plucked hairs from her legs 

and pubic area. 

3Counsel made this public pronouncement without the benefit of a reasonable 

investigation of Anfinson’s mental health. He described himself in the postconviction 

proceeding as a “media lawyer” and characterized his comments quoted in the 

newspaper article as an effort to ethically “manage” and “balance” the news in 

furtherance of Anfinson’s accidental death defense. Counsel testified he “didn’t want 

the public to even think of postpartum depression, because postpartum depression 

means you deliberately killed the baby.” 

4The records disclose the hospital staff assigned to Anfinson a GAF (Global 

Assessment Functioning) of ten at the time she was admitted to the hospital. Although 

this rating is based on a medical professional’s subjective rating, it suggests Anfinson 

was functioning at a very low level at the time of admission. Trial counsel explained he 

did not request copies of the hospital records because Anfinson represented she was 

bonded with the baby, claimed she was a good mother, and denied she was depressed. 

He consulted no psychiatrist or psychologist on the subject of Anfinson’s mental state. 
6 

Anfinson experienced prior episodes of depression after she gave birth 

and consented to the adoption of her first child in 1980, and again 

following an abortion in 1985. 

 Additional evidence supports our finding trial counsel rejected from 

the outset the notion evidence of Anfinson’s mental condition might be 

relevant to her defense. After Anfinson’s discharge from the hospital, she 

was treated by a grief counselor for several months. When the counselor 

called to discuss Anfinson’s mental state, trial counsel was dismissive of 

her opinion that Anfinson had exhibited symptoms consistent with 

postpartum depression. 

Members of Anfinson’s family also attempted on several occasions 

to communicate to trial counsel their concerns about Anfinson’s mental 

state. Anfinson’s father, who paid trial counsel’s fees and litigation 

expenses, urged trial counsel to approve, and offered to pay for, a mental 

evaluation of Anfinson at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka, Kansas. 

Counsel rejected the idea, again affirming postpartum depression would 

play no part in the defense.5 When Anfinson’s sister and husband 

attempted to speak to trial counsel about their observations of Anfinson’s 

mental state, he cautioned them against making comments to the press 

about postpartum depression and reminded them the defenses of 

insanity and diminished capacity would not be pursued. 

 Anfinson contends the evidence of her severe depression was 

essential not only to prove potential insanity and diminished 

responsibility defenses which were summarily and improvidently rejected 

by her trial counsel, but also to support the accidental death defense 

counsel presented unsuccessfully to the jury. The State contends trial 

 

5Trial counsel told Anfinson’s family he opposed the request for a mental 

evaluation on the ground it would be “fuel for the prosecution.” 
7 

counsel breached no duty in rejecting insanity and diminished capacity 

defenses, and his assertion of the accidental death theory of defense was 

based on reasonable strategic considerations. 

Generally, “ineffective assistance is more likely to be established 

when the alleged actions or inactions of counsel are attributed to a lack 

of diligence as opposed to the exercise of judgment.” Ledezma v. State, 

626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). “[M]ere mistakes in judgment 

normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. 

at 143. 

[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or 

strategic decisions of counsel must be examined in light of 

all the circumstances to ascertain whether the actions were 

a product of tactics or inattention to the responsibilities of 

an attorney guaranteed a defendant under the Sixth 

Amendment. 

Id. However, not all tactical or strategic decisions shelter an attorney 

from a claim of ineffectiveness. Id. 

While strategic decisions made after “thorough investigation 

of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable,” strategic decisions made after a “less than 

complete investigation” must be based on reasonable 

professional judgments which support the particular level of 

investigation conducted. 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 

L. Ed. 2d at 695). 

Moreover, reasonable strategic considerations may justify the 

rejection of one theory of defense in favor of another theory reasonably 

perceived by counsel to be in the accused’s best interest. See Tollett v. 

Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 

244 (1973); State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1984) (counsel not 

ineffective in making sound tactical decision to emphasize self defense 

rather than diminished capacity, and staying that course in preparing 
8 

and presenting case to jury). The postconviction court must not “assume 

the role of Monday morning quarterback in condemning counsel’s 

judgment in choosing between what are frequently equally hazardous 

options available to him.” State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 788, 795 (Iowa 

1982). The real issue is not whether defense counsel’s actions were 

successful, but whether they were “justifiable.” Pettes v. State, 418 

N.W.2d 53, 56–57 (Iowa 1988). 

Keeping these principles in mind, we consider whether Anfinson 

met her burden to prove trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in 

failing to investigate and present evidence of her mental condition in 

furtherance of the potential defenses he rejected and the one defense he 

actually presented. 

 1. Insanity. The legal standard for an insanity defense in Iowa 

is codified at section 701.4 of the Iowa Code: 

A person shall not be convicted of a crime if at the time the 

crime is committed the person suffers from such a diseased 

or deranged condition of the mind as to render the person 

incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act the 

person is committing or incapable of distinguishing between 

right and wrong in relation to that act. Insanity need not 

exist for any specific length of time before or after the 

commission of the alleged criminal act. If the defense of 

insanity is raised, the defendant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant at the time 

of the crime suffered from such a deranged condition of the 

mind as to render the defendant incapable of knowing the 

nature and quality of the act the defendant was committing 

or was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong 

in relation to the act. 

We concur with the district court that Anfinson has failed to 

demonstrate a reasonable probability of the success, or even viability, of 

an insanity defense based on postpartum depression. Based on her 

responses to police questioning and a review of a report of a 

psychological evaluation conducted days after Jacob’s death, the State’s 
9 

mental health expert testified in the postconviction trial that at the time 

of Jacob’s death Anfinson was not suffering from a mental disease or 

defect of the nature that would have supported an insanity defense. 

Even the mental health expert retained by Anfinson in connection with 

this postconviction action did not opine Anfinson was insane at the time 

of the child’s death. We conclude Anfinson has failed to prove her trial 

counsel breached a duty in failing to investigate or present an insanity 

defense based on postpartum depression. 

 2. Diminished responsibility. In the alternative, Anfinson 

contends evidence of her postpartum depression would have supported a 

diminished responsibility defense. The doctrine of diminished 

responsibility has been recognized in Iowa as a matter of common law.6 

State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 138–42, 126 N.W.2d 285, 288–90 

(1964). “[D]iminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where 

an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a 

necessary criminal intent.” State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 

1981). The diminished responsibility defense allows a defendant to 

negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to 

some mental defect she did not have the capacity to form that specific 

intent. Id. at 437. 

Evidence of diminished responsibility may not, however, negate 

general criminal intent, and is therefore not a defense to crimes which do 

 

6We have alternatively described the common law concept of decreasing a legally 

sane individual’s criminal liability on the basis of a mental defect as a defense of 

“diminished capacity” and “diminished responsibility.” See, e.g., State v. Decker, 744 

N.W.2d 346, 350 (Iowa 2008) (diminished capacity); State v. Duncan, 710 N.W.2d 34, 36 

(Iowa 2006) (diminished responsibility). Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(11)(b), 

the defense notice requirement, refers to notice of intent to rely upon the defense of 

diminished responsibility. In the interest of remaining consistent with our rules of 

procedure, we will use the term “diminished responsibility” in this opinion. 
10 

not require proof of specific intent. State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 

586–87 (Iowa 1985) (evidence of mental unsoundness establishing lack of 

capacity to form the requisite criminal intent was not relevant in 

prosecution for theft perpetrated by exercising control over stolen 

property, a general intent crime); Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 449 

(Iowa 1982) (diminished capacity not a defense to felony murder 

accomplished by arson); Gramenz, 256 Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290 

(evidence of diminished capacity not relevant to issues of malice 

aforethought and general criminal intent). But see Hendershott v. People, 

653 P.2d 385, 393–94 (Colo. 1982) (holding reliable and relevant 

evidence of mental impairment may be presented to negate mens rea for 

crimes not involving a specific intent element). In McVey, we concluded 

the General Assembly, by statutorily recognizing the insanity defense, 

has limited the legal relevance of evidence of mental impairment to 

general intent crimes: 

 In formulating the insanity defense the legislature 

defined limits upon the effect of evidence of mental disease 

or defect relating to criminal culpability generally. This court 

earlier drew the same line at common law in the Gramenz

case. It would undercut the legislative policy inherent in the 

insanity defense for this court to extend the defense of 

diminished responsibility. 

 Insanity and mens rea are legal concepts without 

psychiatric counterparts. As legal concepts they are used to 

establish limits to legal culpability. The extent to which 

evidence of mental impairment will be permitted to affect 

criminal responsibility is therefore a legal question. The 

argument that evidence of mental impairment should be 

received because it bears on the mens rea of an offense 

presupposes that the mens rea requirement has a legal 

meaning which makes the evidence from the psychological 

model relevant. See, e.g., 1 P. Robinson, Criminal Law 

Defenses § 64(c) at 283 (1984) (“the issue . . . is a complex 

one that is tied to one’s theory of the nature of the mens rea 

requirements for criminal offenses”). 
11 

 . . . In practical terms a court’s refusal to recognize 

the relevancy of evidence of mental impairment short of legal 

insanity results from the court’s understanding of the 

legislative intention concerning the blameworthiness of the 

defendant’s conduct. To the extent evidence of mental 

impairment that does not meet the legal insanity standard 

permits an accused to avoid responsibility for otherwise 

culpable conduct, the policy inherent in the insanity defense 

is undermined. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, Handbook on 

Criminal Law § 42 at 331-32 (1972). 

McVey, 376 N.W.2d at 587–88. We therefore concluded the legislature 

intended to preclude evidence of mental impairment which falls short of 

insanity “in cases requiring proof only of guilty knowledge or general 

criminal intent accompanying a prohibited act.” Id. at 588. 

Although she was charged with first-degree murder, Anfinson was 

ultimately convicted of second-degree murder. To convict Anfinson of 

second-degree murder, the State was required to prove Anfinson 

drowned Jacob with malice aforethought. See Iowa Code § 707.3. The 

State was not required to prove Anfinson acted with a specific intent to 

kill Jacob. Iowa Code § 707.3; State v. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 531 

(Iowa 2000). As we explained in Gramenz, malice aforethought is not a 

specific intent mens rea: 

While malice aforethought is the specific state of mind 

necessary to convict of murder, it is far different from the 

specific intent which is a necessary element of murder in the 

first degree. It may be express or implied from the acts and 

conduct of defendant. 

. . . 

It appears . . . that testimony sufficient to establish 

defendant’s lack of mental capacity to have malice 

aforethought would also be sufficient to satisfy the 

requirements of the right and wrong test and entitle 

defendant to an acquittal on a plea of insanity rather than a 

reduction of the sentence . . . . 

Gramenz, 256 Iowa at 142, 126 N.W.2d at 290. Thus, in Iowa, a 

defendant may only attempt to negate malice aforethought with evidence 
12 

of insanity. Artzer, 609 N.W.2d at 531 (“The defense[] of . . . diminished 

capacity [is] not available to a defendant charged with second-degree 

murder. This is because . . . diminished capacity [is] only [a] defense[] to 

the specific intent element of a crime.” (Citations omitted.)). We 

conclude Anfinson has failed to prove prejudice resulting from counsel’s 

failure to present a diminished responsibility defense because she was 

not convicted of first-degree murder and evidence supporting such a 

defense was not relevant to any element of the second-degree murder 

charge of which she was convicted. 

 3. Accidental death. Although the evidence of Anfinson’s 

postpartum depression could not have constituted a defense to the 

second-degree murder charge under our case law, Anfinson alternatively 

contends her trial counsel was nonetheless ineffective in failing to offer 

such evidence in furtherance of her accidental death defense. We 

emphasize Anfinson’s contention here is not that counsel was ineffective 

for failing to offer evidence of depression to respond to the State’s 

evidence tending to prove criminal mens rea. As she did not give notice 

of her intent to claim insanity or diminished capacity, evidence of 

Anfinson’s compromised mental state was not admissible at trial to 

support those defenses. She asserts, instead, her accidental death 

defense was severely prejudiced by counsel’s failure to adduce and 

present expert testimony diagnosing her depression and placing three 

crucial and troublesome aspects of her conduct in a medical and 

noncriminal context. 

Anfinson claims evidence of her depression should have been 

developed and offered in the criminal trial for three purposes which were 

crucial to a successful outcome of the accidental death defense. If the 

defense was to have any chance of success, it had to supply for the fact-
13 

finder a plausible explanation of (1) why Anfinson was so distracted and 

inattentive on September 20, 1998 that she left her two-week-old baby 

unattended in bath water; (2) why she behaved irrationally in 

subsequently taking Jacob’s body to the lake, burying it under rocks, 

returning to her home, and going to sleep; and (3) why her affect was flat 

and emotionless later that same day when she was questioned by 

investigators about the child’s disappearance. There was ample evidence 

of Anfinson’s postpartum depression available to trial counsel if he had 

chosen to undertake the most rudimentary inquiry. He chose instead to 

rebuff all attempts made by Anfinson’s family members and her grief 

counselor to educate him. He closed not only his ears, but also his eyes 

as he neglected to obtain medical records evidencing Anfinson’s mental 

state. 

 The defense of “accidents happen” chosen and presented by trial 

counsel was highly unlikely to result in an acquittal if the three most 

troublesome aspects of Anfinson’s conduct suggesting criminal 

culpability were left unexplained. Expert and lay testimony presented by 

Anfinson at the postconviction trial clearly suggests trial counsel could 

have developed strong evidence detailing the nature and extent of 

Anfinson’s depression and provided an explanation for her bizarre 

behavior on the day of Jacob’s death.7 

The State asserts trial counsel’s decision to eschew a defense 

based on Anfinson’s mental state was a reasonable strategic choice. In 

 

7Anfinson’s mental health expert testified that the bizarre and unusual 

circumstances surrounding Jacob’s death “cried out” for a psychiatric evaluation. In 

particular, the expert noted an evaluation is indicated “in a situation where somebody 

for unexplained reasons is suspected of harming an infant.” Moreover, the expert 

opined Anfinson’s mental state could have provided an explanation of why she exhibited 

poor judgment, panicked, and put the child in the lake. 
14 

support of this proposition, we are reminded both trial counsel and the 

State’s expert witness viewed defenses based on Anfinson’s compromised 

mental state (insanity and diminished responsibility) as “defenses of last 

resort” and inconsistent with the accidental death theory presented to 

both juries. Even though insanity and diminished responsibility 

defenses may have been incompatible with Anfinson’s accidental death 

theory, evidence of the defendant’s mental state was not incompatible 

with the notion that Jacob’s death was accidental and, in fact, would 

have supported her claim that the drowning was due to her 

inattentiveness. Even if we were to accept as sound for purposes of our 

analysis trial counsel’s assessment that insanity and diminished 

responsibility defenses are rarely successful, the decision to ignore 

evidence of Anfinson’s compromised mental state was not a reasonable 

professional judgment excusing an investigation of the extent to which 

that mental state supported the defense theory of accidental death. 

The State further contends trial counsel’s failure to investigate 

Anfinson’s mental state and its relevance to the accidental death theory 

was reasonable given Anfinson’s representation to counsel in November 

1998 that she was experiencing “situational depression” or “something 

like that.” Any failure to investigate whether Anfinson experienced 

postpartum depression is further justified, the State claims, by 

Anfinson’s failure to tell trial counsel she had lost weight late in the 

pregnancy, and her failure to disclose the history of sleep disturbance 

and self-mutilation. Indeed, trial counsel claims when he met with 

Anfinson he found her to consistently exhibit appropriate judgment, the 

ability to communicate, and the capacity to assist in her defense. 

We conclude, as did the district court, that trial counsel’s strategic 

decision to renounce evidence of his client’s compromised mental state 
15 

after a less than complete investigation was not based on reasonable 

professional judgment. Furthermore, our confidence in the outcome of 

Anfinson’s criminal trial is shaken by trial counsel’s failure to reasonably 

investigate and prove his client’s mental condition in furtherance of the 

accidental death defense. We find a reasonable probability that if a 

reasonable investigation had been undertaken, evidence would have been 

developed and presented at trial tending to establish Anfinson’s conduct 

from the time of Jacob’s birth until his death was profoundly affected by 

postpartum depression. We find a reasonable probability of a different 

outcome if trial counsel had developed and presented expert testimony 

diagnosing Anfinson’s severe postpartum depression and connecting it 

with her bizarre behavior in furtherance of the accidental death defense. 

We are mindful of the deference owed by postconviction courts to 

counsel’s strategic choices. Deference for such choices is not unlimited, 

however, and it will not be stretched to deny Anfinson a new trial under 

the circumstances presented here. 

We reject the State’s assertion evidence tending to prove Anfinson 

suffered from postpartum depression on the day of Jacob’s death was not 

admissible for any purpose because she chose not to assert either an 

insanity or a diminished capacity defense. Although the State is correct 

that the law precludes a defendant from asserting those defenses if she 

fails to give timely notice of them consistent with Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.11(11)(b)(1), we are not persuaded evidence of the 

defendant’s mental condition is inadmissible for the limited purpose 

advanced by Anfinson. We conclude such a limited use of evidence of 

Anfinson’s mental state will not undercut the proper limits of mental 

defenses prescribed by the General Assembly and observed by this court 

in McVey. A proper limiting instruction would suffice to clarify that 
16 

Anfinson’s purpose in offering such evidence is not in furtherance of a 

claim she was insane or incapable of forming a specific intent at the time 

of Jacob’s death, but rather to support her theory Jacob’s death was 

accidental. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.105. 

IV. Conclusion. 

 Anfinson has met her burden to prove trial counsel rendered 

prejudicial ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present 

evidence of Anfinson’s depression in furtherance of the accidental death 

defense. As we conclude she is entitled to a new trial for this reason, we 

need not address the other issues raised on appeal. 

COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VACATED; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

 All justices concur except Wiggins and Baker, JJ., who take no 

part.