United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

G.S., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, RICHMOND 

PROCESSING & DISTRIBUTION CENTER, 

Sandston, VA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 16-1443 

Issued: February 23, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On July 5, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 22, 2016 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUES 

The issues are: (1) whether an OWCP hearing representative properly denied appellant’s 

request for subpoenas; and (2) whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish an 

emotional condition in the performance of duty. 

On appeal appellant alleges that his physician related that his mental disorder was due to 

abusive working conditions and that subpoenas were needed to demonstrate perjury by postal 

officials. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On May 30, 2013 appellant, then a 56-year-old supervisor of maintenance operations 

(SMO), filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that working alone on 

weekends and at night with an understaffed, unqualified, and untrained workforce caused workrelated stress and anxiety disorders. He first became aware of his condition on May 14, 2013 

and realized its relationship to his employment on May 28, 2013. Appellant’s regular work 

hours on Tour 1 were from 9:45 p.m. to 6:45 a.m. Sunday through Thursday. In an attached 

statement he related that over the period January 14 to February 24, 2013 he was the only 

supervisor on Tour 1 over the weekend when he averaged 10.5 hours daily, without a lunch 

break, and that he also worked long hours during the regular workweek. Appellant indicated that 

he had similar work-related stress in 2005. 

In June 28, 2013 correspondence, OWCP informed appellant of the evidence needed to 

support his claim. In a July 24, 2013 statement, appellant maintained that his facility was 

understaffed, especially on weekends. This caused an anxiety disorder, panic attacks, bipolar, 

and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) when he was the only maintenance manager on 

Tour 1. Appellant asserted that the type of radio he had to use for communication caused further 

stress. He noted that while other supervisors were assigned to Tour 1, they took leave on 

weekends, and he had to work alone when only untrained mechanics and technicians were 

scheduled. Appellant indicated that he first noticed his anxiety condition in February 2013 when 

he unintentionally skinned his knuckles on a toolbox by shadow boxing to demonstrate to an 

unqualified electronic technician that he was fighting to have him trained to troubleshoot/repair 

equipment. He described symptoms of nervousness, racing thoughts, rapid heart rate, insomnia, 

increased blood pressure, increased sweating, and depression, in addition to knee pain and 

headaches. These ailments began in March 2011 when appellant passed out at home and had to 

go to the emergency room. He advised that in 2005 he sought psychiatric help for work-related 

anxiety and PTSD, and was hospitalized from July 14 to 20, 2013 for a mental breakdown. 

Appellant attached correspondence from the employing establishment. This included a 

March 1, 2013 memorandum in which L.H., lead manager of distribution operations, notified 

appellant that the plant manager had been contacted regarding an investigation about an incident 

in which appellant threatened violence and punched a toolbox, causing his knuckles to bleed. 

Appellant was instructed not to come onto postal property until further notice, and was scheduled 

for psychological testing and a psychiatric fitness-for-duty evaluation. 

In a March 27, 2013 report, Edward A. Peck, III, Ph.D., noted performing psychological 

testing. Appellant had a history of service-related knee and head injuries. Following testing, 

Dr. Peck noted that there was a consistent pattern of reporting from others which indicated that 

there was an elevated probability that appellant displayed mental health and/or behavioral issues 

which could lead to an increased potential for disruption in the workplace. He advised that 

appellant should not return to work due to this threat potential. 

In May 2013, the employing establishment referred appellant to the District Reasonable 

Accommodation Committee (DRAC) to consider if accommodation of his medical condition was 

appropriate. The record also includes evidence about an investigation and his subsequent 

removal for the toolbox incident and other incidents when he allegedly threatened acts of 
3

violence and made comments about shooting or killing. This included a May 24, 2013 notice of 

enforced leave that described a postal inspector interview with appellant. The enforced leave 

was finalized on July 25, 2013. 

In a May 30, 2013 report, Dr. Shireesha Narla, a Board-certified internist, diagnosed 

hypertension, diabetes, hyperlipidemia, generalized anxiety disorder, and possible PTSD. She 

indicated that a mental health clinic should assess appellant’s needs for his psychiatric disorders, 

and that his medical diagnoses required monitoring and medication. 

In a report dated July 24, 2013, Dr. Lajuana M. Collins-Morgan, a Board-certified 

psychiatrist, noted that appellant was hospitalized from July 15 to 20, 2013. She diagnosed 

bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, PTSD (provisional), prescribed medication, and 

advised that he had been incapacitated since February 23, 2013.2

By letter dated August 8, 2013, OWCP asked the employing establishment to comment 

on appellant’s claim. In a response dated August 26, 2013, R.C., manager of maintenance 

operations, indicated that appellant claimed an anxiety disorder after being removed from service 

for egregious misconduct. He reported that a fitness-for-duty examination revealed that 

appellant was unable to supervisor employees and could no longer work at the employing 

establishment. R.C. further indicated that appellant had been investigated by the postal 

inspection service due to threats of violence. He continued that appellant had been offered 

reasonable accommodation and explained that his job duties did not vary from the official SMO 

job description, noting that the SMO was responsible for scheduling employees to work, 

including overtime, and was to follow-up when employees did not report for duty. A description 

of appellant’s job duties was attached. On August 15, 2013 R.C. noted that he had supervised 

appellant for less than one year. 

By decision dated December 4, 2013, OWCP denied the claim, finding that appellant had 

failed to establish a compensable factor of employment. Appellant timely requested a hearing 

before OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review. 

Appellant submitted evidence previously of record and an SMO position description.3

A report from the postal inspection service dated February 28, 2013 described the events 

that led to appellant’s removal. This included a February 24, 2013 interview with appellant and 

a number of reports of interviews with employing establishment staff regarding the toolbox 

incident and alleged threats made by him. 

In an undated report, Dr. Suresh Gharse, a psychiatrist, who provided a fitness-for-duty 

examination, noted appellant’s 2005 psychiatric history. He advised that appellant was stressed 

 2

 Appellant also submitted information regarding his 2005 psychiatric diagnosis. A claim filed on September 16, 

2005, adjudicated by OWCP under File No. xxxxxx809, was denied by decision dated July 20, 2006. The instant 

case was adjudicated under File No. xxxxxx865. 

3

 Appellant also submitted reports regarding his 2005 psychiatric condition, a Department of Veterans Affairs 

rating decision dated September 23, 1997 awarding appellant 10 percent disability for facial scars and 10 percent for 

hypertension, and his preemployment medical examination dated December 8, 1997. 
4

because he felt that he was always short-staffed and had to run around to get work done, which 

was beyond his capacity. Dr. Gharse maintained that appellant was losing control, which was 

compromising his ability to deal with work in a rational manner and needed to be transferred to 

another area with less stress. He diagnosed adjustment disorder with anxiety and possible mood 

or bipolar disorder. Dr. Gharse advised that appellant was not fit to work at the current location 

and that he did not pose a clear and direct threat to an identifiable target. The record also 

contained additional reports from Dr. Collins-Morgan. 

Appellant also submitted documentation of his clock rings from January 26 through 

September 4, 2013. 

At the hearing, held on August 12, 2014, appellant testified about work conditions. He 

stated that for most of the two years he worked as Tour 1 SMO. Appellant worked alone and had 

to handle mail processing equipment, supervise technicians, and perform administrative and 

disciplinary duties. He indicated that the facility was understaffed, noting that, in addition to 

Richmond area mail, Norfolk mail was added. Appellant maintained that his staff of 

approximately 20 was undertrained and not qualified to do the required work, which caused 

frustration and anger. He advised that he received treatment from the Veterans Health 

Administration for his psychiatric conditions. 

After the hearing, appellant submitted a publication regarding the closure of postal 

facilities, additional documentation of clock rings with personal comments, and corrections and 

additions to the hearing transcript. He also provided a statement reiterating that the employing 

establishment was short-staffed with untrained personnel, and that he had to work at times by 

himself. 

The employing establishment submitted a response prepared for a claim filed by 

appellant before the Merit Systems Protection Board.4

 

In a November 3, 2014 decision, an OWCP hearing representative found that the 

December 4, 2013 decision was correct when it was issued. She, however, set aside the decision 

based on appellant’s more thorough description of duties he believed led to his condition. The 

case was remanded for OWCP to obtain a response from the employing establishment about his 

description of his supervisory duties and staffing issues. 

On January 27, 2015 OWCP requested that the employing establishment comment 

regarding whether other supervisors were scheduled to assist appellant yet routinely left him to 

perform the job alone, whether there were there aspects of appellant’s job that could be perceived 

as stressful, whether the employing establishment made accommodations to reduce appellant’s 

stress, whether staffing shortages affected appellant’s workload, whether appellant was generally 

able to perform required duties in accordance with expectations, and whether there were any 

performance or conduct problems. 

 4

 This noted that appellant was paid administrative leave from the date of enforced leave on February 27, 2013 

until August 15, 2013, and that on May 14, 2013 he refused to return to work after he was offered a nonsupervisory 

position at another facility, based on the psychiatric fitness-for-duty evaluation. 
5

In a February 11, 2015 letter, J.Y., maintenance manager, advised that appellant 

transferred from a Norfolk, VA, to a Richmond, VA, facility on January 1, 2011. He indicated 

that the employing establishment had 55 primary pieces of equipment, and there was no 

regulation stating how many employees were needed on each tour, noting that there were 47 

maintenance positions: three for the building maintenance and 12 custodians to clean and 

maintain the facility. J.Y. surmised that on a normal night, 14 or 15 of the 47 positions would be 

off. He related that appellant was adamant about taking his lunch period because he needed to 

eat when he took medications. J.Y. related that he, not appellant, was responsible to answer for 

dispatch issues, and that he, not appellant, attended the meetings and responded to maintenance 

allegations. He maintained that appellant was not targeted by employing establishment 

management. J.Y. related that when appellant had a mental breakdown and was hospitalized in 

July 2013, he had not been at the employing establishment for six months. He advised that 

appellant was only required to do what the other supervisors did on a regular basis, and that the 

other SMOs on the other tours also faced the same situations as he experienced, noting that mail 

processing at the employing establishment was a seven-day-a-week operation. J.Y. related that, 

unless he utilized leave, a manager of maintenance operations worked Sunday nights with 

appellant. He indicated that Tour 1 maintenance staffing included three supervisors and one 

manager. J.Y. noted that there would be times when there were vacant supervisor positions on 

each tour, but that these would be filled with acting supervisors who were detailed there 

whenever possible. He admitted that, due to either scheduled or unscheduled leave, there were 

days when only one supervisor would be on duty, noting that the other SMOs worked under the 

same conditions. 

J.Y. acknowledged that being a supervisor or manager in a large facility carried a certain 

amount of stress by having to address multiple tasks simultaneously, needing a wealth of 

knowledge, having a good working relationship with peers and subordinates to be successful, 

and having to be ready to respond to all inquiries and to explanations for the performance issues 

immediately. He indicated that those who could not do this consistently could feel pressured or 

stressed. J.Y. advised that appellant never requested help, and noted that when DRAC offered 

him a different position, he turned it down. He related that appellant had multiple opportunities 

to take an SMO position on another tour with different nonscheduled days, but that he chose to 

stay on Tour 1. J.Y. admitted that the maintenance craft was understaffed on every tour and that 

each tour had the same conditions, including operational failures. He advised that SMOs were 

expected to perform their assigned duties, including monitoring employees and equipment 

maintenance and repairs, while accurately recording and reporting issues. 

J.Y. reported that appellant was able to perform his duties, but that he was issued a letter 

of warning in 2011 for not addressing attendance issues, and was provided a service talk after he 

found a large number of pornographic photographs on the maintenance copy machine. Appellant 

admitted that he had printed the pictures after surfing the internet on his lunch break. J.Y. 

continued that several complaints had been made against appellant regarding how he interacted 

with other employees and supervisors but that, to the best of his recollection, no one had 

provided a written statement about appellant’s behavior or actions. He acknowledged that at 

times appellant was the sole Tour 1 supervisor. J.Y. maintained that appellant was not required 

to work 10-hour days, noting that he was scheduled for a 9-hour period with a 1-hour lunch 

break. He advised that appellant only supervised maintenance personnel. These personnel were 

sent to training classes in Oklahoma. National service technicians were available to provide 
6

telephone support when a problem or issue was beyond local capability and, if necessary, the 

support center would dispatch a technician to provide on-site support. J.Y. reported that 

appellant had attended three formal training classes at the Oklahoma training center during the 

two years he had been at the employing establishment, in May, June, and November 2011. 

Appellant submitted additional clock ring reports with appended handwritten notes. 

In a May 4, 2015 decision, OWCP denied the claim finding that appellant had failed to 

establish a compensable factor of employment. 

On May 18, 2015 appellant requested a hearing. On June 5, 2015 he requested subpoenas 

for numerous employing establishment records and for personal testimony of named employing 

establishment personnel. Appellant maintained that the employing establishment was shortstaffed and that the electronics technicians that worked on the weekend were not sufficiently 

trained. 

At the hearing, held on January 4, 2016, appellant alleged that the employing 

establishment committed perjury, arguing that he was the sole supervisor most of the time, 

constantly missed lunch breaks, and that he was not violent. He maintained that J.Y.’s statement 

confirmed that he was working alone because other SMOs would go on three-week vacations or 

leave work to go to football games, stating that being the sole supervisor caused anxiety, mood 

swings, and paranoia. Appellant further indicated that, when machines broke down, there were 

not enough technicians who were well-trained, and he would be blamed. He admitted that he 

was having anxiety attacks and that his physicians advised that he not return to work. Appellant 

asserted that he did not threaten management and maintained that he needed the subpoenas 

because the employing establishment had fabricated the evidence related to his dismissal. 

By letter dated January 5, 2016, an OWCP hearing representative denied appellant’s 

subpoena requests. She noted that he had not explained the relevance of the documents 

requested or identified the steps taken to obtain them by other means, noting that he had not 

made a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request, and that some of the information requested was 

protected by the Privacy Act. The hearing representative also denied appellant’s request for 

issuance of a subpoena to compel attendance and testimony of employing establishment 

personnel, advising that he had not explained why a subpoena was the best method or 

opportunity to obtain such evidence. 

In an undated statement, appellant reiterated that he was the sole supervisor for much of 

the time during the past two years. He maintained that employees were incapable of keeping the 

machines running without calling for help, and that he moved employees to where they were 

better trained. Appellant reiterated that he had not made threats. He stressed that he was the sole 

supervisor on Tour 1 and included documentation of clock rings.5

By decision dated February 22, 2016, an OWCP hearing representative modified the 

May 4, 2014 decision, finding that appellant established as a compensable work factor that he 

 5

 Appellant also submitted evidence regarding applications for other positions, staffing at the Richmond facility, 

and corrections and additions to the January 4, 2016 hearing transcript. 
7

worked as the lone supervisor on some occasions. She reviewed the medical evidence of record 

and denied the claim because the medical evidence failed to establish that his diagnosed 

condition was caused by this one factor. The hearing representative also noted that appellant 

testified that subpoenas were needed to show that he was the only supervisor on duty, which had 

been accepted as factual. She advised that her decision also provided appeal rights for the denial 

of the requested subpoenas. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1 

Section 8126 of FECA provides that the Secretary of Labor, on any matter within his 

jurisdiction under this subchapter, may issue subpoenas for and compel the attendance of 

witnesses within a radius of 100 miles.6

 The implementing regulations provide that a claimant 

may request a subpoena, but the decision to grant or deny such a request is within the discretion 

of the hearing representative, who may issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of 

witnesses and for the production of books, records, correspondence, papers, or other relevant 

documents. Subpoenas are issued for documents only if they are relevant and cannot be obtained 

by other means and for witnesses only where oral testimony is the best way to ascertain the 

facts.7

 In requesting a subpoena, a claimant must explain why the testimony is relevant to the 

issues in the case and why a subpoena is the best method or opportunity to obtain such evidence 

because there is no other means by which the testimony could have been obtained.8 Section 

10.619(a) of the implementing regulations provides that a claimant may request a subpoena only 

as a part of the hearings process and no subpoena will be issued under any other part of the 

claims process. 

To request a subpoena, the requestor must submit the request in writing and send it to the 

hearing representative as early as possible, but no later than 60 days (as evidenced by postmark, 

electronic marker or other objective date mark) after the date of the original hearing request.9 

The hearing representative retains discretion on whether to issue a subpoena. The function of the 

Board on appeal is to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion.10 Abuse of 

discretion is generally shown through proof of manifest error, a clearly unreasonable exercise of 

judgment or actions taken which are clearly contrary to logic and probable deduction from 

established facts.11 

 6

 5 U.S.C. § 8126(a). 

7

 20 C.F.R. § 10.619; see Gregorio E. Condi, 52 ECAB 410 (2001). 

8 Id. 

9 Id. at § 10.619(a)(1). 

10 See Gregorio E. Condi, supra note 7. 

11 Claudio Vazquez, 52 ECAB 496 (2001). 
8

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1 

In the present case, appellant requested that the hearing representative subpoena a 

number of employing establishment personnel and documentation. She denied the request, 

finding that the subpoenas were not necessary to the adjudication of the case. 

A hearing representative has discretion with respect to the issuance of subpoenas for 

documents and testimony. Appellant argued that the subpoenas were crucial to establishing his 

emotional condition claim. He, however, did not provide a valid explanation as to why they 

were necessary. The hearing representative noted that appellant had not explained the relevance 

of the documents requested or identified the steps taken to obtain them by other means, noting 

that he had not made a FOIA request. She further noted that some of the information requested 

was protected by the Privacy Act. The hearing representative found that appellant had not 

explained why a subpoena was the best method or opportunity to obtain such evidence. As 

appellant presented no evidence to show that subpoenas were necessary with respect to the 

development of the relevant evidence in this case, the Board finds no abuse of discretion related 

to the denial of a subpoena request.12

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2 

To establish his claim that he sustained an emotional condition in the performance of 

duty, appellant must submit the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he has an 

emotional or stress-related disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or 

incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to his condition; and (3) rationalized medical 

opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally 

related to his stress-related condition.13 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, 

OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor.14 When 

the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes 

the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical 

evidence.15

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

16 the Board 

explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a 

compensable emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or 

illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within 

coverage under FECA.17 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or 

 12 D.O., Docket No. 15-1368 (issued October 22, 2015). 

13 Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000). 

14 Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001). 

15 Id.

16 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

17 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999). 
9

her employment duties and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an 

emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury 

arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability 

results from his or her emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed 

by the employing establishment or by the nature of the work.18 Allegations alone by a claimant 

are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional condition claim.19 Where the 

claimant alleges compensable factors of employment, he or she must substantiate such 

allegations with probative and reliable evidence.20 Personal perceptions alone are insufficient to 

establish an employment-related emotional condition.21

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employing establishment rather than the regular 

or specially assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.22 Where the 

evidence demonstrates that the employing establishment either erred or acted abusively in 

discharging its administrative or personnel responsibilities, such action will be considered a 

compensable employment factor.23 

For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability, there must be 

evidence introduced which establishes that the acts alleged or implicated by the employee did, in 

fact, occur. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of 

whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. A claimant must establish a factual basis 

for his or her allegations that the harassment occurred with probative and reliable evidence.24 

With regard to emotional claims arising under FECA, the term “harassment” as applied by the 

Board is not the equivalent of “harassment” as defined or implemented by other employing 

establishments, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is charged with 

statutory authority to investigate and evaluate such matters in the workplace. Rather, in 

evaluating claims for workers’ compensation under FECA, the term “harassment” is 

synonymous, as generally defined, with a persistent disturbance, torment or persecution, i.e., 

mistreatment by coemployees or coworkers. Mere perceptions and feelings of harassment will 

not support an award of compensation.25 

Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish a 

causal relationship is rationalized medical evidence.26 The opinion of the physician must be 

 18 Supra note 16. 

19 J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008). 

20 M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007). 

21 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001). 

22 Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004). 

23 Kim Nguyen, 53 ECAB 127 (2001). 

24 James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000). 

25 Beverly R. Jones, 55 ECAB 411 (2004). 

26 Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000). 
10

based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable 

medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by 

the employee.27 Neither the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period 

of employment nor the belief that the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by 

employment factors or incidents is sufficient to establish causal relationship.28

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2 

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision. Appellant attributes his 

emotional condition to several factors. First and foremost, he alleged that he frequently had to 

work as the sole SMO on busy Tour 1, from 9:45 p.m. to 6:45 a.m. OWCP accepted this as a 

compensable factor of employment, and the Board agrees. J.Y., maintenance manager, 

concurred that, due to other supervisors taking leave or other matters, at times appellant worked 

as the sole supervisor.29

Appellant also asserted that he would become stressed because Tour 1 was understaffed. 

The Board finds this, too, a compensable factor of employment. Again, J.Y. admitted that the 

maintenance craft was understaffed on every tour, noting that SMOs were expected to monitor 

employees and equipment maintenance and repairs while accurately recording and reporting 

issues. As supervising maintenance personnel was one of appellant’s regular assigned duties, 

this is a compensable factor of employment.30

As to appellant’s allegation regarding the radio he had to use, the Board has long held 

that the provision of equipment relates to administrative or personnel matters, unrelated to the 

employee’s regular or specially assigned work duties and does not fall within the coverage of 

FECA, absent error and abuse.31 Appellant presented no evidence that the radios he used were 

inoperable or other evidence to substantiate error and abuse in this administrative matter.32 

The record also contains no evidence that other supervisors took leave inappropriately. 

This would not be a compensable factor of employment. As to his allegation that the employees 

he supervised were not properly trained, J.Y. explained that all employees were sent for training 

as appropriate. This too would not be compensable. Where the claimant alleges compensable 

factor of employment, he or she must substantiate each allegation with probative and reliable 

evidence.33 Appellant did not do so regarding these claimed factors. 

 27 Supra note 13; Gary L. Fowler, 45 ECAB 365 (1994). 

28 Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997). 

29 Kimber A. Stokke, 48 ECAB 510 (1997). 

30 Supra note 16; see Edward J. Hilinski, Docket No. 00-0378 (issued February 13, 2001). 

31 See Brian H. Derrick, 51 ECAB 417 (2000). 

32 Id. 

33 Supra note 20. 
11

If an employee establishes a compensable factor of employment, OWCP must base its 

decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.34 In her February 22, 2016 decision, OWCP’s 

hearing representative found one compensable factor established, that at times appellant was the 

sole SMO on Tour 1 and analyzed the medical evidence on that basis. The Board has found a 

second compensable factor, that the maintenance craft that he supervised was understaffed on 

every tour. 

As appellant has established two compensable factors of employment, and the 

February 22, 2016 decision addressed only one, the Board will set aside OWCP’s February 22, 

2016 decision denying the claim. OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical 

evidence as it relates to these two factors. The case will therefore be remanded to OWCP to 

analyze and develop the medical evidence.35 After this and such further development deemed 

necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision on the merits of this claim. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that OWCP properly denied appellant’s subpoena request. With respect 

to the emotional condition issue, the case is not in posture for decision as the evidence 

establishes two compensable factors of employment. 

 34 See supra note 22. 

35 Tina D. Francis, 56 ECAB 180 (2004). 
12

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 22, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed with regard to the denial of appellant’s subpoena 

request. The decision is otherwise set aside and the case is remanded to OWCP for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion of the Board. 

Issued: February 23, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board