United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

D.M., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Fayetteville, AR, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 16-1734 

Issued: January 27, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Alan J. Shapiro, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On August 30, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from an August 1, 

2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish a traumatic injury 

causally related to a September 29, 2015 employment incident, as alleged.

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On September 29, 2015 appellant, then a 37-year-old mail handler, filed a traumatic 

injury claim (Form CA-1) claiming that earlier that day, he reached into a wire container to grab 

a flat bundle and sustained a low back strain. Appellant’s supervisor confirmed that appellant 

was in the performance of duty. An employing establishment manager also completed an 

incident report on September 30, 2015 confirming appellant’s account of the September 29, 2015 

lifting incident. 

In an October 2, 2015 letter, OWCP advised appellant of the type of additional evidence 

needed to establish his claim, including factual corroboration of the September 29, 2015 incident, 

and medical evidence diagnosing an injury resulting from that event. It afforded him 30 days to 

submit such evidence. 

In response, appellant submitted October 9 and 16, 2015 chart notes from Community 

Physicians Group (CPG), diagnosing an acute low back strain and chronic sacroiliitis due to a 

September 29, 2015 lifting and twisting injury. He also provided October 9 and 12, 2015 duty 

status reports (Form CA-17) noting work restrictions. None of these forms bears a legible 

signature. The duty status reports note a practitioner’s specialty as “FP.” 

The employing establishment submitted an October 9, 2015 letter alleging that appellant 

did not sustain a new injury on September 29, 2015, but rather had experienced symptoms from a 

prior back injury accepted under File No. xxxxxx600.3 Appellant returned to work in a limitedduty capacity as of September 23, 2015. He underwent a “fusion surgery” related to the prior 

back injury and was awaiting authorization for a second fusion. 

By decision dated November 9, 2015, OWCP accepted that the September 29, 2015 

lifting incident occurred at the time, place, and in the manner alleged, but denied the claim as 

appellant did not submit probative medical evidence diagnosing an injury causally related to the 

accepted incident. 

On July 5, 2016 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. He submitted 

October 16 and 30, 2015 duty status reports, and an October 30, 2015 chart note from CPG 

diagnosing a low back strain due to a September 29, 2015 incident. None of these forms bear a 

legible signature. 

By decision dated August 1, 2016, OWCP denied modification, finding that none of the 

medical documents “had a legible signature denoting it was signed by a physician.” It noted that 

although the October 9 and 12, 2015 duty status reports contained the specialty designation “FP,” 

the signer did not describe him or herself as a medical doctor or doctor of osteopathy. Therefore, 

there was no indication that the forms were signed by a qualified physician under FECA. 

 3

 File No. xxxxxx600 is not before the Board on the present appeal. 
3

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an “employee of 

the United States” within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable 

time limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged, and that 

any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to 

the employment injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5

In order to determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the 

performance of duty, OWCP begins with an analysis of whether “fact of injury” has been 

established. Generally, fact of injury consists of two components that must be considered 

conjunctively. First, the employee must submit sufficient evidence to establish that he actually 

experienced the employment incident that is alleged to have occurred.6 An employee has not 

met his or her burden of proof to establish the occurrence of an injury when there are such 

inconsistencies in the evidence as to cast serious doubt upon the validity of the claim.7

 Second, 

the employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to 

establish that the employment incident caused a personal injury.8 

The medical evidence required to establish causal relationship is generally rationalized 

medical opinion evidence. Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which 

includes a physician’s rationalized opinion on the issue of whether there is a causal relationship 

between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the implicated employment factors. The 

opinion of the physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the 

claimant, must be one of reasonable medial certainty, and must be supported by medical 

rationale explaining the nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the 

specific employment factors identified by the claimant.9

Generally, medical evidence must be provided by a qualified physician.10 Section 

8101(2) of FECA provides that “physician” includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical 

psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their 

practice as defined by State law.11 If a document does not bear a legible signature identifying 

 4 Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989). 

5 See Irene St. John, 50 ECAB 521 (1999); Michael E. Smith, 50 ECAB 313 (1999). 

6 Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001). 

7 S.N., Docket No. 12-1222 (issued August 23, 2013); Tia L. Love, 40 ECAB 586, 590 (1989). 

8 Deborah L. Beatty, 54 ECAB 340 (2003).

9 Solomon Polen, 51 ECAB 341 (2000). 

10 Charley V.B. Harley, 2 ECAB 208, 211 (1949) (where the Board held that medical opinion, in general, can 

only be given by a qualified physician). 

11 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2). 
4

that it was authored or reviewed by a qualified physician, it does not constitute probative medical 

evidence.12

ANALYSIS 

Appellant alleges that he sustained a lumbar strain when reaching into a wire container to 

grab a mail bundle on September 29, 2015. OWCP accepted incident of injury, but denied the 

claim as he did not submit any probative medical evidence substantiating an injury as resulting 

from the work incident. 

In support of his claim, appellant submitted chart notes dated October 9, 16, and 30, 2015 

from CPG. He also provided October 9 and 12, 2015 duty status reports, noting the 

practitioner’s specialty as “FP.” However, none of these documents bear a legible signature. 

Because it cannot be determined that the person signing the report is a physician as defined in 

5 U.S.C. § 8101(2), the report lacks probative medical value.13 The Board has previously held 

that medical documents must be signed or reviewed by a qualified physician to constitute 

probative medical evidence.14 As the author or authors of the CPG and duty status reports 

remain unknown, these reports are not medical evidence for the purposes of this case. 

Consequently, appellant has provided insufficient medical evidence in support of his claim. 

OWCP advised appellant by October 2, 2015 letter of the type of evidence needed to 

establish his claim, including medical evidence from a qualified physician. As appellant did not 

submit probative medical evidence diagnosing an injury related to the accepted incident, OWCP 

properly denied the claim.15

On appeal, counsel contends that OWCP’s August 1, 2015 merit decision is “[c]ontrary 

to law and fact.” However, irrespective of counsel’s general arguments, appellant did not submit 

any probative medical evidence to support his claim. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish a traumatic 

injury causally related to a September 29, 2015 employment incident, as alleged.

 12 Merton J. Sills, 39 ECAB 572 (1983). 

13 See id.; R.M., 59 ECAB 690, 693 (2008). 

14 Charley V.B. Harley, supra note 10; Merton J. Sills, supra note 12. 

15 Deborah L. Beatty, supra note 8.
5

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs dated August 1, 2016 is affirmed. 

Issued: January 27, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board