J-A18005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: K.P.F.

APPEAL OF: K.F. AND D.F.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 310 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

No. 2021 Adoption 32

IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.T.B.

APPEAL OF: K.F. AND D. F.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 311 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered February 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Orphans' Court at No(s): 

No. 2021 Adoption 32A

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

Appellants, K.F. and D.F., appeal at docket number 310 WDA 2023 from 

the orphans’ court’s order denying their petition for involuntary termination of 

the parental rights of Appellee, A.B. (“Mother”), to minor, K.P.F., born in 
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September of 2014.

1

 In addition, Appellants appeal at docket number 311 

WDA 2023 from the orphans’ court’s order denying their petition for 

involuntary termination of the parental rights of Mother to minor, L.T.B., born 

in August of 2010.

2, 3

 Because it is unclear whether Children were appointed 

appropriate counsel to represent their legal interests during the involuntary 

termination proceedings, we are constrained to vacate the orphans’ court 

orders and remand for further proceedings. 

We need not delve deeply into the underlying facts given our disposition. 

Instead, we focus our attention on the procedural history of this matter, which 

the orphans’ court summarized as follows:

The interests of the [C]hildren were initially addressed by Blair 

County Children, Youth and Families. An application for 

emergency protective custody was filed on behalf of [L.T.B.] on

September 20, 2019. The petition alleged abuse and/or neglect[,]

and that the child was without proper care or control. An 

application for emergency protective custody was filed on behalf 

of [K.P.F.] on September 20, 2019. The petition alleged abuse 

and/or neglect[,] and that the child was without proper care or 

control. On September 20, 2019, shelter[]care applications were 

____________________________________________

1 As discussed infra, the orphans’ court also denied Appellants’ petition for 

involuntary termination of the parental rights to K.P.F. of Appellee, N.F.

(“K.P.F.’s Father”). K.P.F.’s Father had agreed to consent to the 

relinquishment of his parental rights to K.P.F., provided that Mother’s rights 

were terminated. N.T., 10/18/22, at 2-3. By way of background, Appellant, 

K.F., is K.P.F.’s Father’s father, i.e., K.P.F.’s grandfather. Appellant, D.F., is 

K.F.’s wife. 

2 The biological father of L.T.B. is unknown. Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO”), 

2/13/23, at 1. However, K.P.F.’s Father “was in the role of father for” L.T.B. 

Id. at 6. See also id. at 17 (noting that K.P.F.’s Father “has been the father 

role to [L.T.B.] since [L.T.B.] was four years old”). 

3 We collectively refer to L.T.B. and K.P.F. herein as “Children.”
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filed on behalf of the named [C]hildren. The applications stated 

that the [C]hildren were in the protective custody[,] as of 

September 18, 2019[,] of [Appellants] at [Appellants’ home 

address]. The shelter[]care order docket number CP7-DP-00017-

2019 provided that sufficient evidence was presented to prove 

that continuance or return of the [C]hildren to the home of 

[Mother], [K.P.F’s Father], and[/]or maternal grandmother, [M.B.

(“Maternal Grandmother”),] was not in the best interest[s] of the

[C]hildren.

By correspondence dated September 9, 2019, counsel for 

[Appellants] communicated with Blair County Children, Youth and 

Families and requested the placement of the subject [C]hildren 

with them in their home. A Permanency Review Order and 

Permanency Review Plan was entered on October 23, 2019[,] for 

the subject minor [C]hildren which provided that:

Reasonable efforts have been made by the county children 

and youth services agency to finalize the [C]hildren’s 

permanency plan in that the goal of return home has been 

ruled out, and [Children] have been placed with [Appellants] 

who are permanent legal custodians (relative) for the 

[C]hildren. Services have been offered to the parents, 

grandparents, and the children. The parties have agreed to 

a goal of permanent legal custodianship (relative) and a 

custody order is being entered consistent with the 

agreement of the parties. 

Orders for termination of court supervision were entered on 

October 23, 2019, which provided that [C]hildren had been placed 

in the custody of a permanent legal custodian. The [C]hildren had 

been placed in the physical and legal custody of a fit and willing 

relative[,] and services from the county agency were no longer 

needed. By Order of Court dated October 23, 2019, physical and 

legal custody of the [C]hildren ... were vested in [Appellants]. 

[Appellants] were identified as the paternal grandparents of 

[K.P.F]. The father of [L.T.B.] was reported as unknown. The 

custody order further provided that [Mother] was permitted to 

have fully supervised visits with [Children] as mutually arranged 

with [Appellants]. The periods of visitation were to occur in 

[Appellants’] home or another location approved by [Appellants]. 

[K.P.F.’s Father] was permitted to have fully supervised visits as 

mutually arranged with [Appellants]. The periods of visitation 

were to occur in [Appellants’] home or another location approved 

by [Appellants].
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The Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights in the 

above matters were filed [by Appellants] on November 18, 2021. 

A Consent to Accept Custody of [Children] was filed by [K.F.] on 

October 26, 2021. A Consent to Accept Custody of [Children] was 

filed by [D.F.] on October 26, 2021. On November 3, 2021, 

Maryann Joyce Bistline, Esquire was appointed as counsel for 

[Children].[4] A Report of Intention to Adopt was filed on behalf 

of [Appellants] on November 18, 2021. A preplacement 

investigation was conducted in connection with the permanency 

plan placement of the minor [C]hildren through Blair County 

Children and Youth docketed at CP7-DP-0016-2019. The matter 

was scheduled for a hearing on February 2, 2022[,] and 

subsequently continued on April 4, 2022[,] followed by a 

continuance to May 16, 2022. 

By Order of Court dated July 5, 2022, Mark. S. Zearfaus, 

Esquire[,] was appointed to represent [K.P.F.’s Father]. Traci L. 

Naugle, Esquire[,] was appointed to represent [Mother]. The 

hearing on the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental 

Rights was scheduled for August 9, 2022. The matter was 

continued to October 6, 2022[,] and subsequently rescheduled to 

October 18, 2022. 

A hearing on the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights was 

held on October 18, 2022. [K.F.] was subject to direct and cross 

examination. [D.F.] was subject to direct and cross examination. 

The [C]hildren were interviewed on December 14, 2022. The 

second day of the hearing was held on December 22, 2022. 

[Mother] was subject to direct and cross examination. [Maternal 

Grandmother] was subject t[o] direct and cross examination. 

[K.P.F.’s Father] was subject to direct examination. The third day 

of the hearing was held February 8, 2023. [K.P.F.’s Father] was 

subject to cross examination. [D.F.] was subject to continued 

direct and cross examination.

OCO at 1-6 (internal citations omitted). 

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4 There is no entry of a November 3, 2021 order on either orphans’ court 

docket. However, as will be discussed infra, the orphans’ court entered orders

on January 18, 2022, in which it appointed Attorney Bistline as guardian ad 

litem for Children. 
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As mentioned supra, on February 13, 2023, the orphans’ court entered 

an opinion and order at each orphans’ court’s docket, wherein it denied

Appellants’ petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother 

to K.P.F. and L.T.B., as well as K.P.F.’s Father to K.P.F. Appellants then filed 

timely notices of appeal and concise statements pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) at each orphans’ court’s docket.

5

 The orphans’ court did not file 

a Rule 1925(a) opinion, but instead issued a letter stating that it was relying 

on its February 13, 2023 opinion and order. 

Presently, Appellants raise six issues for our review:

I. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in finding that [Appellants] have failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that their petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights should be granted 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)[,] as the evidence of record 

supports termination.

II. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in finding that [Appellants] have failed to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that their petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights should be granted 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)[,] as the court failed to 

consider this section in [its] opinion and order, and the record 

supports termination.

III. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in both considering, and permitting evidence to be 

presented over objection, Mother’s efforts to remedy the 

conditions described in the petition for involuntary termination 

when they were initiated subsequent to the notice of filing the 

petition.

IV. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in finding that while Mother did not provide essential 

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5 We consolidated the appeals sua sponte. 
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parental care, control, or subsistence, the causes of incapacity can 

and will be remedied.

V. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in denying the petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother’s parental rights due to finding a bond between the 

[C]hildren and Mother but failing to then consider:

a. Whether the bond indicates a beneficial relationship that 

should be preserved;

b. Whether the bond with [Appellants] is stronger than the 

bond with Mother;

c. The substantial damage done to the [C]hildren by a 

prolonged, unhealthy, pathological bond with Mother as it 

affects [Appellants’] ability to provide the necessary love, 

care, and stability that the [C]hildren have needed;

d. Whether termination was still appropriate when a bond 

was found as termination provides the [C]hildren with 

permanency necessary for the fulfillment of their potential 

in a permanent, healthy, safe environment. 

VI. Whether the [orphans’] court erred and/or grossly abused its 

discretion in finding that a denial of the petition for involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights will allow the [C]hildren to 

remain in their home where they have formed a loving bond, and 

are provided a safe, stable, and structured environment when the 

denial prevents the same.

Appellants’ Brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

Before delving into the merits of Appellants’ issues, we must initially 

consider, sua sponte, whether Children were appointed legal counsel to 

represent their legal interests pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). Section 

2313(a) provides that:

(a) Child.--The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child 

in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is

being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may 

appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who 

has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other 
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proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of 

the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child 

and the adopting parent or parents.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). 

Our Supreme Court “has interpreted this section as requiring that the 

common pleas court appoint an attorney to represent the child’s legal 

interests, i.e., the child’s preferred outcome.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 

240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (cleaned up).6 The Court has further 

instructed that “a single attorney cannot represent a child’s best interests and 

legal interests if those interests conflict[,]” and “the orphans’ court must 

determine whether counsel can represent the dual interests before appointing 

an individual to serve as [guardian ad litem]/[c]ounsel for a child.” Id. at 

1236. In addition, “the failure to appoint a separate attorney to represent the 

child’s legal interests constitutes structural error, meaning it is not subject to 

a harmless-error analysis[,]” and the issue is “non-waivable, because the right 

belonged to the child who, given that he or she was unrepresented, could not 

have challenged the lack of counsel.” Id. at 1235 (cleaned up). Accordingly,

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6 A child’s legal interests are distinct from his or her best interests. See In 

re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1082 n.2 (Pa. 2018) (“‘Legal interests’ denotes that 

an attorney is to express the child’s wishes to the court regardless of whether 

the attorney agrees with the child’s recommendation. ‘Best interests’ denotes 

that a guardian ad litem is to express what the guardian ad litem believes is 

best for the child’s care, protection, safety, and wholesome physical and 

mental development regardless of whether the child agrees.”) (citations 

omitted); In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 174 (Pa. 2017) (“In cases 

involving children, the law acknowledges two separate and distinct categories 

of interest: a child’s legal interests, which are synonymous with the child’s 

preferred outcome, and a child’s best interests, which the trial court must 

determine.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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our Supreme Court has granted appellate courts sua sponte review to assess 

“(1) whether the orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent the legal 

interests of the children and (2) if the appointed counsel also serves as 

[guardian ad litem], whether the orphans’ court determined that the child’s 

best interests and legal interests did not conflict.” Id. at 1236. 

Here, it is unclear to us what role Attorney Bistline played in the 

proceedings below. On January 18, 2022, the orphans’ court entered an order 

pertaining to K.P.F., which stated in relevant part:

Maryann Bistline, Esquire is hereby appointed the Guardian Ad 

Litem for [K.P.F.] to represent his interest in the above captioned 

adoption action. Any fees due to the Guardian Ad Litem shall be 

paid at a rate of $ ___ per hour.

Order, 1/18/22 (blank space in original).

7

Similarly, with respect to L.T.B, the court filed the following order on 

January 18, 2022, which provided in relevant part:

Maryann Bistline, Esquire is hereby appointed the Guardian Ad 

Litem for [L.T.B.] to represent his interest in the above captioned 

adoption action. Any fees due to the Guardian Ad Litem shall be 

paid at a rate of $ ___ per hour.

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7 Though not filed until January 18, 2022, this order was dated November 23, 

2021, and pertains to the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

K.P.F. A nearly identical order — filed on January 18, 2022 and mistakenly 

dated January 10, 2021 — also appears in the record and pertains to the 

petition to terminate K.P.F.’s Father’s parental rights. It likewise appoints 

Attorney Bistline as K.P.F.’s guardian ad litem.
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Order, 1/18/22 (blank space in original).

8

 Thus, although the orders do not 

specify what interests Attorney Bistline is to represent, she is identified in the 

appointment orders as Children’s guardian ad litem, not specifically as their 

legal counsel. 

Our review of the transcripts also reveals that Attorney Bistline was 

identified as Children’s guardian ad litem during the proceedings. See N.T., 

10/18/22, at 1 (orphans’ court’s stating, “Present in the courtroom is Maryann 

Joyce Bistline. She is guardian ad litem for the minor [C]hildren.”); id. at 92 

(orphans’ court’s conveying, “Attorney Bistline has been appointed as 

guardian ad litem for the [C]hildren. So I would like her input on [whether 

the Children should be interviewed], if you don’t mind placing it. If you don’t 

have input[,] that’s fine[,] but I do ask for your input on the record as guardian 

ad litem for the [C]hildren and you may have to get near a microphone.”); id. 

at 93 (orphans’ court’s saying that, with respect to the Children’s interviews, 

“I would prefer that the attorneys are present and ... I am agreeable to the 

attorneys asking the questions or talking to the [C]hildren, unless that is not 

preferred. I’ll leave that to the guardian ad litem. Why don’t we do it this 

way. Why don’t we have the attorneys provide areas of discussion and I will 

handle the direct communications with the [C]hildren, with the attorneys 

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8 This order was also dated November 23, 2021, and pertains to the petition 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights to L.T.B. There is another order — dated 

November 23 ,2021, and entered on January 18, 2022 — which pertains to 

L.T.B.’s unknown father and states that “Maryann Joyce Bistline, Esquire, is 

hereby appointed to represent the child listed in paragraph 6 of the petition[, 

i.e., L.T.B.]”. Order, 1/18/22. 
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present but the attorneys can give me their areas that they would like me to 

address with the [C]hildren and they can be specific questions or areas, either 

way.”), but see N.T., 12/22/22, at 1 (“And Counsel for the minor [C]hildren, 

Maryann Joyce Bistline[,] is in the courtroom.”); N.T., 2/8/23, at 1 (orphans’ 

court’s stating, “Present in the courtroom, Maryanne Joyce Bistline, counsel 

for the minor [C]hildren.”). Separate interviews of K.P.F. and L.T.B. took place

on December 14, 2022, where both the orphans’ court and Attorney Bistline 

asked them questions. See generally N.T., 12/14/22. 

Based on the foregoing, we are unable to verify whether the orphans’ 

court appointed counsel to represent K.P.F. and L.T.B.’s respective legal 

interests, as it appears from the face of the record that Attorney Bistline was 

appointed to be their guardian ad litem. Further, if Attorney Bistline was 

appointed to be Children’s guardian ad litem and legal counsel, we are unable 

to find anything in the record showing that the orphans’ court determined that 

Children’s best interests and legal interests did not conflict. See In re 

Adoption of K.M.G., supra. 

As a result, we are compelled to vacate the orphans’ court’s orders and 

remand for further proceedings. On remand, the orphans’ court must 

determine whether, pursuant to Section 2313(a), Attorney Bistline is able to

represent, without conflict, both the best interests and legal interests of each 

child. If the orphans’ court ascertains that no conflict exists between each 

child’s best interests and legal interests, then the court shall re-enter its order

denying Appellants’ petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights at 
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each orphans’ court docket.

9, 10

 However, if the court concludes that there is 

a conflict between K.P.F.’s legal and best interests or L.T.B.’s legal and best 

interests, then the court shall appoint separate legal counsel for that child and 

conduct a new termination hearing so that legal counsel has an opportunity 

to advocate for that child’s legal interests. See Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 

A.3d at 571 (giving similar remand instructions). 

Orders vacated. Cases remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

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9 Such an order would constitute a new, final, appealable order to this Court. 

See Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 571 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing 

In re H.S.W.C.-B., 836 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003) (holding that “an order 

terminating or preserving parental rights ... shall be deemed final when 

entered”)).

10 We also ask the orphans’ court to ensure that it has adequately addressed

the errors raised by Appellants in their concise statements. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(1) (providing that “the judge who entered the order giving rise to the 

notice of appeal, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, 

shall within the period set forth in Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1) file of record at least 

a brief opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors 

complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such 

reasons may be found”); Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1158 

n.5 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“It is incumbent upon a trial court to provide this Court 

with its Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing an appellant’s issues, with citation to 

the record, to permit a meaningful and effective review of the issues raised 

and efficient use of judicial resources.”); see also Appellants’ Brief at 21-22 

(claiming that the orphans’ court did not analyze termination under Section 

2511(a)(2) in its February 13, 2023 opinion); Mother’s Brief at 7 

(acknowledging that the orphans’ court’s opinion “does not specifically state 

that the ... court found that there was not sufficient evidence to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights under [S]ection 2511(a)(2)”). 
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Date: 10/23/2023