# Europeiska unionens C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2504
  doi:10.3000/17252504.C_2009.158.swe |
| --- | --- |
| Europeiska unionens
  officiella tidning | C 158 |
| | |
| Svensk utgåva | Meddelanden och upplysningar | 52 årgången11 juli 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2504

doi:10.3000/17252504.C_2009.158.swe

Europeiska unionens

officiella tidning

C 158

Svensk utgåva

Meddelanden och upplysningar

52 årgången11 juli 2009

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| Informationsnummer | Innehållsförteckning | Sida |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelanden |
| | MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informationsnummer

Innehållsförteckning

Sida

II   Meddelanden

MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

2009/C 158/01

Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration (Ärende COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Upplysningar |
| --- | --- |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Eurons växelkurs | 2 |
| | UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Förteckning med kommentarer över reglerade marknader samt nationella bestämmelser för genomförande av relevanta krav i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument (Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/39/EG) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Meddelande från kommissionen i enlighet med artikel 16.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1008/2008 om gemensamma regler för tillhandahållande av lufttrafik i gemenskapen – Allmän trafikplikt för regelbunden lufttrafik (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

2009/C 158/02

Eurons växelkurs

2

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA

2009/C 158/03

Förteckning med kommentarer över reglerade marknader samt nationella bestämmelser för genomförande av relevanta krav i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument (Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/39/EG)

3

2009/C 158/04

Meddelande från kommissionen i enlighet med artikel 16.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1008/2008 om gemensamma regler för tillhandahållande av lufttrafik i gemenskapen – Allmän trafikplikt för regelbunden lufttrafik (
  1
  )

1

9

| | V   Yttranden |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Inbjudan att lämna förslag – EACEA/11/2009 – Strukturellt stöd till organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor) och till det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå – Programmet Ett Europa för medborgarna, insats 2, åtgärderna 1 och 2 – 2010 | 10 |
| | FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Statligt stöd – Nederländerna – Statligt stöd C 10/2009 (f.d. N 138/2009) – ING – Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | ANDRA AKTER |
| | Kommissionen |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Offentliggörande av en ansökan i enlighet med artikel 8.2 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 509/2006 om garanterade traditionella specialiteter av jordbruksprodukter och livsmedel | 24 |

V   Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Kommissionen

2009/C 158/05

Inbjudan att lämna förslag – EACEA/11/2009 – Strukturellt stöd till organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor) och till det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå – Programmet Ett Europa för medborgarna, insats 2, åtgärderna 1 och 2 – 2010

10

FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Kommissionen

2009/C 158/06

Statligt stöd – Nederländerna – Statligt stöd C 10/2009 (f.d. N 138/2009) – ING – Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter (
  1
  )

1

13

ANDRA AKTER

Kommissionen

2009/C 158/07

Offentliggörande av en ansökan i enlighet med artikel 8.2 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 509/2006 om garanterade traditionella specialiteter av jordbruksprodukter och livsmedel

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text av betydelse för EES |

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(1)   Text av betydelse för EES

1

| SV | |
| --- | --- |

SV

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II Meddelanden

MEDDELANDEN FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/1

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Beslut om att inte göra invändningar mot en anmäld koncentration

(Ärende COMP/M.5403 – Lufthansa/BMI)

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 158/01

Kommissionen beslutade den 14 maj 2009 att inte göra invändningar mot den anmälda koncentrationen ovan och att förklara den förenlig med den gemensamma marknaden. Beslutet grundar sig på artikel 6.1 b i rådets förordning (EG) nr 139/2004. Beslutet i sin helhet finns bara på engelska och kommer att offentliggöras efter det att eventuella affärshemligheter har tagits bort. Det kommer att finnas tillgängligt

| — | under rubriken koncentrationer på kommissionens webbplats för konkurrens (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Denna webbplats gör det möjligt att hitta enskilda beslut i koncentrationsärenden, även uppgifter om företag, ärendenummer, datum och sektorer, |
| --- | --- |

—

under rubriken koncentrationer på kommissionens webbplats för konkurrens (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Denna webbplats gör det möjligt att hitta enskilda beslut i koncentrationsärenden, även uppgifter om företag, ärendenummer, datum och sektorer,

| — | i elektronisk form på webbplatsen EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sv/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32009M5403. EUR-Lex ger tillgång till gemenskapslagstiftningen via Internet. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på webbplatsen EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/sv/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32009M5403. EUR-Lex ger tillgång till gemenskapslagstiftningen via Internet.

---

IV Upplysningar

UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN EUROPEISKA UNIONENS INSTITUTIONER OCH ORGAN

Kommissionen

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/2

---

Eurons växelkurs (1)

10 juli 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,3901 |
| JPY | japansk yen | 128,21 |
| DKK | dansk krona | 7,4466 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,85800 |
| SEK | svensk krona | 11,0022 |
| CHF | schweizisk franc | 1,5140 |
| ISK | isländsk krona | |
| NOK | norsk krona | 9,0840 |
| BGN | bulgarisk lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjeckisk koruna | 26,030 |
| EEK | estnisk krona | 15,6466 |
| HUF | ungersk forint | 277,50 |
| LTL | litauisk litas | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lettisk lats | 0,6993 |
| PLN | polsk zloty | 4,3740 |
| RON | rumänsk leu | 4,2160 |
| TRY | turkisk lira | 2,1636 |
| AUD | australisk dollar | 1,7940 |
| CAD | kanadensisk dollar | 1,6212 |
| HKD | Hongkongdollar | 10,7736 |
| NZD | nyzeeländsk dollar | 2,2250 |
| SGD | singaporiansk dollar | 2,0331 |
| KRW | sydkoreansk won | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | sydafrikansk rand | 11,4023 |
| CNY | kinesisk yuan renminbi | 9,4983 |
| HRK | kroatisk kuna | 7,3315 |
| IDR | indonesisk rupiah | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | malaysisk ringgit | 4,9731 |
| PHP | filippinsk peso | 67,026 |
| RUB | rysk rubel | 45,4005 |
| THB | thailändsk baht | 47,382 |
| BRL | brasiliansk real | 2,8084 |
| MXN | mexikansk peso | 19,0303 |
| INR | indisk rupie | 67,8230 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

US-dollar

1,3901

JPY

japansk yen

128,21

DKK

dansk krona

7,4466

GBP

pund sterling

0,85800

SEK

svensk krona

11,0022

CHF

schweizisk franc

1,5140

ISK

isländsk krona

NOK

norsk krona

9,0840

BGN

bulgarisk lev

1,9558

CZK

tjeckisk koruna

26,030

EEK

estnisk krona

15,6466

HUF

ungersk forint

277,50

LTL

litauisk litas

3,4528

LVL

lettisk lats

0,6993

PLN

polsk zloty

4,3740

RON

rumänsk leu

4,2160

TRY

turkisk lira

2,1636

AUD

australisk dollar

1,7940

CAD

kanadensisk dollar

1,6212

HKD

Hongkongdollar

10,7736

NZD

nyzeeländsk dollar

2,2250

SGD

singaporiansk dollar

2,0331

KRW

sydkoreansk won

1 786,89

ZAR

sydafrikansk rand

11,4023

CNY

kinesisk yuan renminbi

9,4983

HRK

kroatisk kuna

7,3315

IDR

indonesisk rupiah

14 174,11

MYR

malaysisk ringgit

4,9731

PHP

filippinsk peso

67,026

RUB

rysk rubel

45,4005

THB

thailändsk baht

47,382

BRL

brasiliansk real

2,8084

MXN

mexikansk peso

19,0303

INR

indisk rupie

67,8230

---

(1)  Källa: Referensväxelkurs offentliggjord av Europeiska centralbanken.

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UPPLYSNINGAR FRÅN MEDLEMSSTATERNA

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/3

---

Förteckning med kommentarer över reglerade marknader samt nationella bestämmelser för genomförande av relevanta krav i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument (Europaparlamentets och rådets direktiv 2004/39/EG)

2009/C 158/03

Enligt artikel 47 i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument (direktiv 2004/39/EG, EUT L 145, 30.4.2004) har varje medlemsstat rätt att ge de marknader som har upprättats på dess territorium och följer dess bestämmelser ställning som reglerad marknad.

I artikel 4.1.14 i direktiv 2004/39/EG definieras reglerad marknad som ett multilateralt system som drivs och/eller leds av en marknadsplatsoperatör, vilket sammanför eller möjliggör sammanförandet av flera köp- och säljintressen i finansiella instrument från tredje man – inom systemet och i enlighet med dess icke skönsmässiga regler –, så att detta leder till avslut i finansiella instrument upptagna till handel enligt dess regler och/eller system, samt är auktoriserat och är löpande verksamt och drivs i enlighet med bestämmelserna i avdelning III i direktiv 2004/39/EG.

I artikel 47 i direktiv 2004/39 föreskrivs att varje medlemsstat ska upprätta och uppdatera en förteckning över de reglerade marknader som medlemsstaten godkänt. Förteckningen ska överlämnas till övriga medlemsstater och till Europeiska kommissionen. Enligt samma artikel (artikel 47 i direktiv 2004/39/EG) ska kommissionen årligen i Europeiska unionens gemensamma tidning offentliggöra en förteckning över de reglerade marknader som anmälts till den. Föreliggande förteckning har sammanställts i enlighet med dessa krav.

I den bifogade förteckningen anges benämningarna på de enskilda marknader som de behöriga myndigheterna anser uppfylla villkoren för att definieras som reglerade marknader. I förteckningen anges också vilken enhet som ansvarar för driften av marknaden och vilken behörig myndighet som ansvarar för att utfärda och godkänna reglerna för marknaden.

Till följd av sänkta tillträdeshinder och specialisering på specifika handelssegment förändras förteckningen över reglerade marknader i snabbare takt än inom ramen för direktivet om investeringstjänster (93/22/EG). Enligt artikel 47 i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument ska Europeiska kommissionen också offentliggöra förteckningen över reglerade marknader på sin webbplats och uppdatera den regelbundet. Därför kommer kommissionen utöver det årliga offentliggörandet av en förteckning i EUT att tillhandahålla en uppdaterad version av denna förteckning på sin officiella webbplats [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/isd/mifid_en.htm]. Förteckningen kommer att uppdateras regelbundet på grundval av information från nationella myndigheter. Dessa uppmanas att även i fortsättningen meddela kommissionen om eventuella tillägg till eller strykningar från förteckningen över reglerade marknader för vilka de är hemland.

| Land | Namn på den reglerade marknaden | Driftsansvarig enhet | Myndighet som ansvarar för utnämning och tillsyn av marknaden |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Österrike | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (officiell marknad) |

Land

Namn på den reglerade marknaden

Driftsansvarig enhet

Myndighet som ansvarar för utnämning och tillsyn av marknaden

Österrike

1.

Amtlicher Handel (officiell marknad)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (halvofficiell marknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (halvofficiell marknad)

| 1.-2. | Wiener Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Wiener Börse AG

| 1.-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (finansmarknadsmyndighet) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (finansmarknadsmyndighet)

Belgien

| 1. | a) | Le marché ”Euronext Brussels ”/De ”Euronext Brussels” markt |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché ”Euronext Brussels ”/De ”Euronext Brussels” markt

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d'Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV.

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des Finances sur avis de la Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA.
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA.

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds.

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002). |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art.144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002).

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA

Bulgarien

| 1. | Официален пазар (officiell marknad) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (officiell marknad)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (inofficiell marknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (inofficiell marknad)

Българска Фондова Борса – София АД (Bulgariens Fondbörs – Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (Finansiell tillsynskommission)

Cypern

Cyperns fondbörs

| 1. | Huvudmarknad |
| --- | --- |

1.

Huvudmarknad

| 2. | Parallell marknad |
| --- | --- |

2.

Parallell marknad

| 3. | Alternativ marknad |
| --- | --- |

3.

Alternativ marknad

| 4. | Obligationsmarknad |
| --- | --- |

4.

Obligationsmarknad

| 5. | Marknader för investeringsbolag |
| --- | --- |

5.

Marknader för investeringsbolag

| 6. | Marknad för stora projekt |
| --- | --- |

6.

Marknad för stora projekt

| 7. | Marknad för oceangående fartyg |
| --- | --- |

7.

Marknad för oceangående fartyg

| 1.-7. | Cyperns fondbörs |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyperns fondbörs

| 1.-7. | Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (Cyperns värdepappers- och valutakommission) |
| --- | --- |

1.-7.

Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (Cyperns värdepappers- och valutakommission)

Tjeckien

| 1. | Huvudmarknad (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Huvudmarknad (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Fri marknad (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fri marknad (Volný trh)

| 3. | Officiell marknad |
| --- | --- |

3.

Officiell marknad

| 4. | Terminsmarknad |
| --- | --- |

4.

Terminsmarknad

| 5. | Spotmarknad |
| --- | --- |

5.

Spotmarknad

| 1.-2. | Prags fondbörs
  (Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1.-2.

Prags fondbörs

(Burza cenných papírů Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | RM-SYSTEM, Tjeckiens fondbörs
  (RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

RM-SYSTEM, Tjeckiens fondbörs

(RM-SYSTÉM, česká burza cenných papírů a.s.)

| 4.-5 | Prags energibörs
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4.-5

Prags energibörs

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1.-5 | Czech National Bank (Tjeckiens centralbank) |
| --- | --- |

1.-5

Czech National Bank (Tjeckiens centralbank)

Danmark

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S






  — | aktiemarknad |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copenhagen A/S

—

aktiemarknad

| — | obligationsmarknad |
| --- | --- |

—

obligationsmarknad

| — | derivatmarknad |
| --- | --- |

—

derivatmarknad

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Köpenhamns fondbörs) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS (Köpenhamns fondbörs)

Finanstilsynet

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S [= regelbunden handel med värdepapper godkända för handel, men som inte är noterade på fondbörsen] |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S [= regelbunden handel med värdepapper godkända för handel, men som inte är noterade på fondbörsen]

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

Estland

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (fondbörsen)






  — | Põhinimekiri (huvudlistan) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (fondbörsen)

—

Põhinimekiri (huvudlistan)

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligationslistan) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (obligationslistan)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (fondlistan) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (fondlistan)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Estlands finansinspektion)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (reglerad marknad)






  — | Lisanimekiri (andrahandslista) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(reglerad marknad)

—

Lisanimekiri (andrahandslista)

Finland

Arvopaperipörssi (fondbörsen)

| — | Pörssilista (officiell lista) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (officiell lista)

| — | Pre-lista (prelist) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (prelist)

| — | Muut arvopaperit -lista (lista för andra värdepapper) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit -lista (lista för andra värdepapper)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd.)

Godkännande:

Finansministeriet

Tillsyn:

| — | Godkännande av regler: Finansministeriet |
| --- | --- |

—

Godkännande av regler: Finansministeriet

| — | Övervakning av att lagstiftningen följs:
  Finanssivalvonta, den finska finansinspektionen. |
| --- | --- |

—

Övervakning av att lagstiftningen följs:

Finanssivalvonta, den finska finansinspektionen.

Frankrike

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF (standardiserad terminsmarknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF (standardiserad terminsmarknad)

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L. 421-1 du code monétaire et financier).

Tyskland

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (delstaternas tillsynsmyndigheter för fondbörserna) och Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin).

Delstatliga myndigheter:

| 1. | Börse Berlin-Bremen (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin-Bremen (reglerad marknad)

| 1. | Börse Berlin AG |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin AG

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (reglerad marknad)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (officiell handel, reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (officiell handel, reglerad marknad)

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (officiell handel, reglerad marknad, uppstartsmarknad) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (officiell handel, reglerad marknad, uppstartsmarknad)

| 5. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (reglerad marknad)

| 6. | BÖAG (Börsen AG) |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG (Börsen AG)

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover.

| 7. | Börse München (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (reglerad marknad)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (reglerad marknad)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (reglerad marknad) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (reglerad marknad)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover.

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grekland

| 1. | Atens fondbörs






  — | Värdepappersmarknader |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Atens fondbörs

—

Värdepappersmarknader

| — | Marknad för derivatinstrument |
| --- | --- |

—

Marknad för derivatinstrument

| 1. | Atens fondbörs |
| --- | --- |

1.

Atens fondbörs

| 1. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) (grekiska kapitalmarknadsinspektionen) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) (grekiska kapitalmarknadsinspektionen)

| 2. | Elektronisk andrahandsmarknad för värdepapper (HDAT-marknad för räntebärande instrument) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronisk andrahandsmarknad för värdepapper (HDAT-marknad för räntebärande instrument)

| 2. | Bank of Greece (Greklands centralbank) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bank of Greece (Greklands centralbank)

| 2. | Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) (grekiska kapitalmarknadsinspektionen) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) (grekiska kapitalmarknadsinspektionen)

Ungern

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapests fondbörs)

| — | Részvényszekció (aktieavdelningen) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (aktieavdelningen)

| — | Hitelpapír Szekció (avdelningen för räntebärande värdepapper) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír Szekció (avdelningen för räntebärande värdepapper)

| — | Származékos Szekció (avdelningen för derivatinstrument) |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos Szekció (avdelningen för derivatinstrument)

| — | Áru szekció (Avdelningen för handelsvaror) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Avdelningen för handelsvaror)

Budapesti Értéktőzsde Zrt. (Budapests fondbörs)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Ungerns finansiella tillsynsmyndighet)

Irland

Irländska fondbörsens officiella lista

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd. (Irländska fondbörsen)

Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (Irlands finanstillsynsmyndighet) auktoriserar reglerade marknader och (med undantag för börsnoteringsvillkoren) ser till att kraven i direktivet om marknader för finansiella instrument följs av marknadsoperatören.

Italien

| 1. | Elektronisk aktiehandel (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Elektronisk aktiehandel (MTA)

| 2. | Elektronisk obligationsmarknad (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Elektronisk obligationsmarknad (MOT)

| 3. | Elektronisk marknad för placeringsfonder (open-end) och ETC (ETF-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Elektronisk marknad för placeringsfonder (open-end) och ETC (ETF-Plus)

| 4. | Elektronisk marknad för värdepappersderivat (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Elektronisk marknad för värdepappersderivat (SeDeX)

| 5. | The Market After Hour (TAH) - efterbörs |
| --- | --- |

5.

The Market After Hour (TAH) - efterbörs

| 6. | Italiensk derivatmarknad för handel med de finansiella instrument som avses i artiklarna 1.2 f och 1.2 f i den konsoliderade finanslagen (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Italiensk derivatmarknad för handel med de finansiella instrument som avses i artiklarna 1.2 f och 1.2 f i den konsoliderade finanslagen (IDEM)

| 7. | Partimarknad för italienska och utländska statsobligationer (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Partimarknad för italienska och utländska statsobligationer (MTS)

| 8. | Partihandel med obligationer och värdepapper (ej utfärdade av staten) som utfärdats av internationella organisationer med statligt deltagande (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Partihandel med obligationer och värdepapper (ej utfärdade av staten) som utfärdats av internationella organisationer med statligt deltagande (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Partihandel online med statsobligationer (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Partihandel online med statsobligationer (BondVision)

| 10. | TLX Market |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX Market

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato - MTS S.p.A

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

Consob auktoriserar företag som ansvarar för drift av marknader och som godkänner deras stadgar och regelverk.

Finansministeriet auktoriserar driftsbolaget när det gäller de institutionella marknaderna för statspapper efter att ha inhämtat yttranden från Consob och Banca d'Italia.

Lettland

NASDAQ OMX Riga:

| — | Huvudlistan |
| --- | --- |

—

Huvudlistan

| — | Skuldlistan |
| --- | --- |

—

Skuldlistan

| — | Sekundärlistan |
| --- | --- |

—

Sekundärlistan

| — | Fondlistan |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondlistan

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Finans- och kapitalmarknadsinspektionen)

Litauen

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius:

| — | Huvudlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Huvudlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Sekundärlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Sekundärlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Skuldebrevslistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Skuldebrevslistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Fondlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondlistan på Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

Lithuanian Securities Commission (Litauens värdepapperskommission)

Luxemburg

Bourse de Luxembourg:

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du Secteur Financier (Luxemburgs finansinspektion)

Malta

Malta Stock Exchange (Maltas fondbörs)

Malta Stock Exchange (Maltas fondbörs)

Malta Financial Services Authority (Maltas myndighet för finansiella tjänster)

Nederländerna

| 1. | a) | Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Euronext Amsterdam Cash Market:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market |
| --- | --- |

b)

Euronext Amsterdam Derivatives Market

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV en Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1.-3. | Finansministeriet utfärdar licens efter samråd med nederländska finansinspektionen.
  Tillsyn av den nederländska finansinspektionen och Nederländernas finansministerium. |
| --- | --- |

1.-3.

Finansministeriet utfärdar licens efter samråd med nederländska finansinspektionen.

Tillsyn av den nederländska finansinspektionen och Nederländernas finansministerium.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V. |
| --- | --- |

2.

ENDEX European Energy Derivatives Exchange N.V.

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam N.V. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam N.V.

Polen

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Huvudmarknaden) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Huvudmarknaden)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (Parallell marknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (Parallell marknad)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO Securities Market Regulated Off-exchange market) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) (CeTO Securities Market Regulated Off-exchange market)

| 1 and 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warszawas fondbörs) |
| --- | --- |

1 and 2

Gielda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (Warszawas fondbörs)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Finanstillsynskommissionen)

Portugal

| 1. | Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Officiell noteringsmarknad) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist by Euronext Lisbon (Officiell noteringsmarknad)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (termins- och optionsmarknad) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (termins- och optionsmarknad)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (specialistmarknad för offentliga skuldinstrument) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (specialistmarknad för offentliga skuldinstrument)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do MIBEL

(energimarknad)

| Marknad 1.-2: | Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

Marknad 1.-2:

Euronext Lisbon — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia (Pólo Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado, SA (OMIP).

Finansministeriet auktoriserar på förslag från Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) som ansvarar för marknadsreglering och marknadstillsyn.

Rumänien

| 1. | Piața reglementată (Spot Regulated Market – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piața reglementată (Spot Regulated Market – BVB)

| 2. | Piața reglementată la termen (Derivatives Regulated Market – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piața reglementată la termen (Derivatives Regulated Market – BVB)

| 3. | Piața reglementată - (Derivatives Regulated Market – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piața reglementată - (Derivatives Regulated Market – BMFMS)

| 1 och 2. | S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bukarests fondbörs) |
| --- | --- |

1 och 2.

S.C. Bursa de Valori București S.A. (Bukarests fondbörs)

| 3. | S.C. Bursa Monetar - Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary - Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

S.C. Bursa Monetar - Financiară și de Mărfuri S.A. Sibiu (Monetary - Financial and Commodities Exchange S.A. Sibiu)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumäniens nationella värdepapperskommission)

Comisia Națională a Valorilor Mobiliare (Rumäniens nationella värdepapperskommission)

Slovakien

| 1. | Marknaden för börsnoterade värdepapper






  — | Huvudlistan |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Marknaden för börsnoterade värdepapper

—

Huvudlistan

| — | Parallell lista |
| --- | --- |

—

Parallell lista

| 2. | Reglerad fri marknad |
| --- | --- |

2.

Reglerad fri marknad

Bratislavas fondbörs

National Bank of Slovakia (Slovakiens centralbank)

Slovenien

Ljubljanas fondbörs Officiell marknad (Borzni trg)

Ljubljanas fondbörs (Ljubljanska borza)

Värdepappersmarknadsbyrån

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Spanien

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (alla fondbörser omfattar segmenten förstahandsmarknad och sekundärmarknad): |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (alla fondbörser omfattar segmenten förstahandsmarknad och sekundärmarknad):

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España ansvarar för marknaden för offentliga skuldinstrument.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona

| A1: | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1:

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao

| A2: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid

| A3: | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3:

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia

| A4: | Soc. Recotora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4:

Soc. Recotora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija

| B1: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable

| B2: | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2:

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C: | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C:

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D: | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D:

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E: | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E:

Banco de España

Sverige

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | Reglerad marknad för aktier och därmed jämställda finansiella instrument |
| --- | --- |

—

Reglerad marknad för aktier och därmed jämställda finansiella instrument

| — | Reglerad marknad för derivat |
| --- | --- |

—

Reglerad marknad för derivat

| — | Reglerad marknad för obligationer och därmed jämställda finansiella instrument |
| --- | --- |

—

Reglerad marknad för obligationer och därmed jämställda finansiella instrument

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen

Förenade kungariket

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Financial Services Authority (myndigheten för finansiella tjänster) |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Financial Services Authority (myndigheten för finansiella tjänster)

| 2. | PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS-Markets Group – PLUS-listed Market

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Intercontinental Exchange - ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange – Regulated Market

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Island

OMX Nordic Exchange á Islandi (reglerad marknad)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármálaeftirlitið (Finansinspektionen)

Liechtenstein

–

–

–

Norge

| 1. | Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslos fondbörs – officiell notering)






  — | Aktiemarknad |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslos fondbörs – officiell notering)

—

Aktiemarknad

| — | Derivatmarknad (finans) |
| --- | --- |

—

Derivatmarknad (finans)

| — | Obligationsmarknad |
| --- | --- |

—

Obligationsmarknad

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Norges finansinspektion)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Aktiemarknad |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Aktiemarknad

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (officiell notering)






  — | Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (officiell notering)

—

Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror)

| 3. | Nord Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Derivatmarknad (handelsvaror)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/9

---

Meddelande från kommissionen i enlighet med artikel 16.4 i Europaparlamentets och rådets förordning (EG) nr 1008/2008 om gemensamma regler för tillhandahållande av lufttrafik i gemenskapen

Allmän trafikplikt för regelbunden lufttrafik

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 158/04

| Medlemsstat | Italien |
| --- | --- |
| Berörda linjer | Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino och Roma Fiumicino – Bolzano |
| Datum då den allmänna trafikplikten träder i kraft | 1 december 2009 |
| Adress där texten och all annan relevant information och/eller dokumentation om den allmänna trafikplikten kan erhållas | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

Medlemsstat

Italien

Berörda linjer

Bolzano – Roma Fiumicino och Roma Fiumicino – Bolzano

Datum då den allmänna trafikplikten träder i kraft

1 december 2009

Adress där texten och all annan relevant information och/eller dokumentation om den allmänna trafikplikten kan erhållas

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

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V Yttranden

ADMINISTRATIVA FÖRFARANDEN

Kommissionen

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/10

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INBJUDAN ATT LÄMNA FÖRSLAG – EACEA/11/2009

Strukturellt stöd till organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor) och till det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå

Programmet ”Ett Europa för medborgarna”, insats 2, åtgärderna 1 och 2 – 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   MÅL OCH BESKRIVNING

Denna inbjudan att lämna förslag, EACEA/11/2009, är baserad på Europaparlamentets och rådets beslut om inrättande av programmet ”Ett Europa för medborgarna” för åren 2007–2013 i syfte att främja ett aktivt europeiskt medborgarskap (1) (nedan kallat programmet).

Programmet utgör den rättsliga ramen för denna inbjudan att lämna förslag, med särskild hänvisning till insats 2 ”Aktivt civilt samhälle i Europa”, åtgärderna 1 och 2, strukturellt stöd till organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor) och till det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå.

1.1   Allmänna mål för programmet

Programmet ska bidra till följande allmänna mål:

| a) | Att ge medborgarna möjlighet att samarbeta och delta i uppbyggandet av ett allt närmare Europa som är demokratiskt och öppet mot omvärlden och som enas och berikas genom sin kulturella mångfald, och därigenom utveckla unionsmedborgarskapet. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Att ge medborgarna möjlighet att samarbeta och delta i uppbyggandet av ett allt närmare Europa som är demokratiskt och öppet mot omvärlden och som enas och berikas genom sin kulturella mångfald, och därigenom utveckla unionsmedborgarskapet.

| b) | Att utveckla en känsla av europeisk identitet, grundad på gemensamma värderingar samt en gemensam kultur och historia. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Att utveckla en känsla av europeisk identitet, grundad på gemensamma värderingar samt en gemensam kultur och historia.

| c) | Att främja medborgarnas känsla av delaktighet i Europeiska unionen. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Att främja medborgarnas känsla av delaktighet i Europeiska unionen.

| d) | Att främja den ömsesidiga förståelsen mellan Europas medborgare samt respektera och främja den kulturella och språkliga mångfalden och samtidigt bidra till den interkulturella dialogen. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Att främja den ömsesidiga förståelsen mellan Europas medborgare samt respektera och främja den kulturella och språkliga mångfalden och samtidigt bidra till den interkulturella dialogen.

1.2   Särskilda mål för inbjudan att lämna förslag

Denna inbjudan att lämna förslag har följande särskilda mål:

| a) | Att genom verksamheter inom och samarbete mellan tankesmedjor (strukturer för reflektion) och det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå främja verksamhet, debatt och reflektion med koppling till det europeiska medborgarskapet, demokrati, gemensamma värderingar samt en gemensam historia och kultur. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Att genom verksamheter inom och samarbete mellan tankesmedjor (strukturer för reflektion) och det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå främja verksamhet, debatt och reflektion med koppling till det europeiska medborgarskapet, demokrati, gemensamma värderingar samt en gemensam historia och kultur.

| b) | Att uppmuntra samverkan mellan medborgare och det civila samhällets organisationer genom att bidra till den interkulturella dialogen och framhäva såväl Europas mångfald som dess enighet. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Att uppmuntra samverkan mellan medborgare och det civila samhällets organisationer genom att bidra till den interkulturella dialogen och framhäva såväl Europas mångfald som dess enighet.

1.3   Tematiska prioriteringar

| — | Framtiden för Europeiska unionen och dess grundläggande värderingar |
| --- | --- |

—

Framtiden för Europeiska unionen och dess grundläggande värderingar

| — | Ett aktivt europeiskt medborgarskap, deltagande och demokrati |
| --- | --- |

—

Ett aktivt europeiskt medborgarskap, deltagande och demokrati

| — | Interkulturell dialog |
| --- | --- |

—

Interkulturell dialog

| — | Gemenskapspolitikens effekter på samhället |
| --- | --- |

—

Gemenskapspolitikens effekter på samhället

| — | Människors välbefinnande i Europa, sysselsättning, social sammanhållning och hållbar utveckling |
| --- | --- |

—

Människors välbefinnande i Europa, sysselsättning, social sammanhållning och hållbar utveckling

1.4   Beskrivning av inbjudan att lämna förslag

Denna inbjudan att lämna förslag avser strukturellt stöd, så kallat driftsbidrag, till organisationer som eftersträvar ett mål av allmänt europeiskt intresse. Driftsbidrag utgör ett ekonomiskt stöd för kostnader som är nödvändiga för ett riktigt genomförande av den regelbundna verksamheten i en utvald organisation.

Detta stöd kan fås i form av ett årligt bidrag eller ett flerårigt partnerskap på bestämda villkor. Det fleråriga partnerskapet är en samarbetsmekanism som upprättats mellan en organisation och genomförandeorganet för utbildning, audiovisuella medier och kultur (nedan kallat genomförandeorganet) som medför särskilda bidrag. Partnerskapet kan ingås för en period på tre år inom ramen för denna inbjudan.

2.   SÖKANDE SOM KAN BEVILJAS BIDRAG

2.1   Organisationer

För att kunna beviljas driftsbidrag måste den sökande organisationen arbeta för ett mål av allmänt europeiskt intresse samt uppfylla följande krav:

| a) | Den ska vara en ideell organisation med status som juridisk person. Om det rör sig om ett nätverk som inte har någon egen verksamhetsstruktur med egen status kan ansökan inlämnas av den deltagande organisation som ansvarar för samordningen av nätverket. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Den ska vara en ideell organisation med status som juridisk person. Om det rör sig om ett nätverk som inte har någon egen verksamhetsstruktur med egen status kan ansökan inlämnas av den deltagande organisation som ansvarar för samordningen av nätverket.

| b) | Den ska vara aktiv inom området europeiskt medborgarskap i enlighet med vad som anges i dess stadgar eller uppdragsbeskrivning och höra till en av följande kategorier av organisationer: | Krav 1:






  A. | Organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor – strukturer för reflektion) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

Den ska vara aktiv inom området europeiskt medborgarskap i enlighet med vad som anges i dess stadgar eller uppdragsbeskrivning och höra till en av följande kategorier av organisationer:

Krav 1:

A.

Organisationer för forskning om europeisk offentlig politik (tankesmedjor – strukturer för reflektion)

| | Krav 2:






  B. | Det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå:






  — | Europeiska centrala organisationer (plattformar) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Krav 2:

B.

Det civila samhällets organisationer på europeisk nivå:

—

Europeiska centrala organisationer (plattformar)

| — | Europeiska nätverk |
| --- | --- |

—

Europeiska nätverk

| — | Organisationer som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisationer som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå

| C. | Civila samhällets organisationer med anknytning till det europeiska ihågkommandet |
| --- | --- |

C.

Civila samhällets organisationer med anknytning till det europeiska ihågkommandet

| D. | Plattformar med paneuropeiska organisationer |
| --- | --- |

D.

Plattformar med paneuropeiska organisationer

| c) | Den ska utöva sin huvudsakliga verksamhet i länder som kan få bidrag (se punkt 2.2).

  För ett flerårigt partnerskap: Organisationerna ska ha varit etablerade och haft status som juridisk person i över fyra (4) år (fram till den 15 oktober 2009) i ett av de länder som kan få bidrag och för kategorierna nedan ha följande geografiska täckning:






  — | En europeisk central organisation eller ett europeiskt nätverk ska ha medlemmar i minst tolv (12) länder som kan få bidrag. |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

Den ska utöva sin huvudsakliga verksamhet i länder som kan få bidrag (se punkt 2.2).

För ett flerårigt partnerskap: Organisationerna ska ha varit etablerade och haft status som juridisk person i över fyra (4) år (fram till den 15 oktober 2009) i ett av de länder som kan få bidrag och för kategorierna nedan ha följande geografiska täckning:

—

En europeisk central organisation eller ett europeiskt nätverk ska ha medlemmar i minst tolv (12) länder som kan få bidrag.

| — | En organisation som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå ska vara aktiv i minst tolv (12) länder som kan få bidrag. |
| --- | --- |

—

En organisation som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå ska vara aktiv i minst tolv (12) länder som kan få bidrag.

| — | En plattform med paneuropeiska organisationer ska ha minst sex (6) centrala organisationer som medlemmar och genom dessa garantera en närvaro i de 27 medlemsstaterna. |
| --- | --- |

—

En plattform med paneuropeiska organisationer ska ha minst sex (6) centrala organisationer som medlemmar och genom dessa garantera en närvaro i de 27 medlemsstaterna.

För ett årligt bidrag: Organisationerna ska ha varit etablerade och haft status som juridisk person i över ett (1) år (fram till den 15 oktober 2009) i ett av de länder som kan få bidrag och för kategorierna nedan ha följande geografiska täckning:

| — | En europeisk central organisation eller ett europeiskt nätverk ska ha medlemmar i minst åtta (8) länder som kan få bidrag. |
| --- | --- |

—

En europeisk central organisation eller ett europeiskt nätverk ska ha medlemmar i minst åtta (8) länder som kan få bidrag.

| — | En organisation som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå ska vara aktiv i minst åtta (8) länder som kan få bidrag. |
| --- | --- |

—

En organisation som bedriver verksamhet med betydande effekter på europeisk nivå ska vara aktiv i minst åtta (8) länder som kan få bidrag.

Plattformar med paneuropeiska organisationer kan bara lämna in ansökningar inom ramen för ett flerårigt partnerskap.

Fysiska personer och offentliga organisationer är inte behöriga för denna inbjudan.

2.2   Länder som kan få bidrag

| a) | Europeiska unionens medlemsstater: Belgien, Bulgarien, Cypern, Danmark, Estland, Finland, Frankrike, Grekland, Irland, Italien, Lettland, Litauen, Luxemburg, Malta, Nederländerna, Polen, Portugal, Rumänien, Slovakien, Slovenien, Spanien, Sverige, Storbritannien, Tjeckien, Tyskland, Ungern och Österrike. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Europeiska unionens medlemsstater: Belgien, Bulgarien, Cypern, Danmark, Estland, Finland, Frankrike, Grekland, Irland, Italien, Lettland, Litauen, Luxemburg, Malta, Nederländerna, Polen, Portugal, Rumänien, Slovakien, Slovenien, Spanien, Sverige, Storbritannien, Tjeckien, Tyskland, Ungern och Österrike.

| b) | Kroatien |
| --- | --- |

b)

Kroatien

| c) | f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien |
| --- | --- |

c)

f.d. jugoslaviska republiken Makedonien

| d) | Albanien |
| --- | --- |

d)

Albanien

3.   VERKSAMHET SOM KAN FÅ STÖD

Den sökande organisationens verksamhet ska på ett påtagligt sätt bidra till utvecklingen och genomförandet av de särskilda målen och tematiska prioriteringarna för denna inbjudan att lämna förslag. Verksamheten ska omfatta minst ett av de särskilda mål och en av tematiska prioriteringar som nämns i punkt 1.

Den sökande organisationens arbetsprogram för 2010 och det treåriga strategiska programmet (i händelse av flerårigt partnerskap) ska innefatta dess stadgeenliga verksamhet, särskilt konferenser, seminarier, rundabordskonferenser, representationsverksamhet, kommunikation och tillvaratagande av resultat samt annan löpande europeisk verksamhet.

Period för vilken bidrag kan beviljas

Oavsett om det rör sig om ett årligt bidrag eller ett flerårigt partnerskap ska den period för vilken bidrag kan beviljas sammanfalla med den sökandes budgetår, vilket framgår av organisationens reviderade räkenskaper. Om den sökandes budgetår sammanfaller med kalenderåret kommer den period för vilken bidrag kan beviljas att vara från den 1 januari 2009 till den 31 december 2010.

För sökande vars budgetår inte sammanfaller med kalenderåret kommer den period för vilken bidrag kan beviljas att vara en tolvmånadersperiod från och med det datum då deras budgetår inleds under 2010.

4.   KRITERIER FÖR BEVILJANDE

De ansökningar som uppfyller kriterierna för beviljande av bidrag eller för uteslutning kommer att utvärderas av en utvärderingskommitté för att välja ut de ansökningar som kan medfinansieras.

Följande tilldelningskriterier kommer att tillämpas. De kvalitativa och kvantitativa kriterierna motsvarar 80 respektive 20 procent av det betyg som tilldelas. Vid fleråriga partnerskap kommer samma viktning att tillämpas för det ettåriga arbetsprogrammet och det treåriga strategiska programmet.

4.1   Kvalitativa kriterier (80 %)

Följande faktorer kommer att bedömas:

| a) | Relevansen i förhållande till målen och prioriteringarna inom ramen för programmet ”Ett Europa för medborgarna” (30 %) |
| --- | --- |

a)

Relevansen i förhållande till målen och prioriteringarna inom ramen för programmet ”Ett Europa för medborgarna” (30 %)

| b) | Arbetsprogrammets tillräcklighet, sammanhang och fullständighet (20 %) |
| --- | --- |

b)

Arbetsprogrammets tillräcklighet, sammanhang och fullständighet (20 %)

| c) | Arbetsprogrammets väntade effekt (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

c)

Arbetsprogrammets väntade effekt (10 %)

| d) | Det europeiska mervärdet (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

d)

Det europeiska mervärdet (10 %)

| e) | Verksamhetens synlighet samt spridning och användning av resultat beträffande europeiska medborgare och andra intressenter (10 %) |
| --- | --- |

e)

Verksamhetens synlighet samt spridning och användning av resultat beträffande europeiska medborgare och andra intressenter (10 %)

4.2   Kvantitativa kriterier (20 %)

Följande faktorer kommer att bedömas:

| a) | Antal stödberättigade länder som deltar i arbetsprogrammet (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

a)

Antal stödberättigade länder som deltar i arbetsprogrammet (10 %).

| b) | Antal deltagare som direkt kan gynnas (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Antal deltagare som direkt kan gynnas (10 %).

5.   BUDGET

Den förutsedda budgeten för medfinansieringen av driftsbidrag är cirka 8,2 miljoner EUR för 2010. Genomförandeorganet har för avsikt att finansiera omkring 55 organisationer inom ramen för denna inbjudan, men förbehåller sig rätten att, beroende på ansökningarnas kvalitet, inte tilldela samtliga tillgängliga medel.

Upplysningsvis kan nämnas att bidragen för fleråriga partnerskap kommer att utgöra cirka 85 procent och de årliga bidragen cirka 15 procent av den tillgängliga budgeten.

Detta stöd kommer att ges under budgetpost 15.06.66 i Europeiska unionens allmänna budget.

6.   SISTA INLÄMNINGSDATUM

Sista datum för inlämning av ansökningarna är den 15 oktober 2009.

Genomförandeorganet arbetar för närvarande med att införa ett elektroniskt inlämningssystem för samtliga ansökningar.

För denna inbjudan att lämna förslag ska de sökande skicka ansökan med hjälp av ett elektroniskt formulär som finns tillgängligt från och med den 15 september 2009. Denna version (med bilagor) betraktas som originalhandling. Före detta datum kommer genomförandeorganet att erbjuda en PDF-version av formuläret för att de sökande ska kunna förbereda sina ansökningar.

En pappersversion av ansökan ska före det sista inlämningsdatumet skickas per post till följande adress:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Endast sådana ansökningar som gjorts på avsett formulär, som vederbörligen fyllts i, daterats och undertecknats av den person som är behörig att ingå juridiskt bindande åtaganden på den sökande organisationens vägnar kommer att godtas.

7.   YTTERLIGARE INFORMATION

Utförliga riktlinjer för de sökande och ansökningsformulär finns på följande adress: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Europaparlamentets och rådets beslut nr 1904/2006/EG av den 12 december 2006 (EUT L 378, 27.12.2006, s. 32), ändrat genom Europaparlamentets och rådets beslut nr 1358/2008/EG av den 16 december 2008 (EUT L 350, 30.12.2008).

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FÖRFARANDEN FÖR GENOMFÖRANDE AV KONKURRENSPOLITIKEN

Kommissionen

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/13

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STATLIGT STÖD – NEDERLÄNDERNA

Statligt stöd C 10/2009 (f.d. N 138/2009) – ING

Uppmaning enligt artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget att inkomma med synpunkter

(Text av betydelse för EES)

2009/C 158/06

Genom den skrivelse av den 31 mars 2009, som återges på det giltiga språket på de sidor som följer på denna sammanfattning, underrättade kommissionen Nederländerna om sitt beslut att inleda det förfarande som anges i artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget avseende ovannämnda stöd.

Berörda parter kan inom en månad från dagen för offentliggörandet av denna sammanfattning och den därpå följande skrivelsen inkomma med sina synpunkter på den åtgärd avseende vilken kommissionen inleder förfarandet. Synpunkterna ska sändas till följande adress:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Brussels |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Brussels

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Synpunkterna kommer att meddelas Nederländerna. Den berörda part som inkommer med synpunkter kan skriftligen begära konfidentiell behandling av sin identitet, med angivande av skälen för begäran.

SAMMANFATTNING

FÖRFARANDE

Den 4 mars 2009 anmälde de nederländska myndigheterna till kommissionen en kreditmöjlighet för illikvida tillgångar till förmån för ING Support Holding (ett direkt dotterbolag till ING Group).

SAKFÖRHÅLLANDEN

ING har sitt huvudkontor i Nederländerna och är ett av de största finansinstituten i världen, med en total balansräkning på 1 332 miljarder EUR. I januari 2009 undertecknade den nederländska staten och ING ett principavtal om överföring av riskerna och avkastningen från en del av ING:s RMBS-värdepapper som är baserade i Förenta staterna. De sistnämnda består främst av alternativ A-papper. De återstående medlen i ING:s värdepappersportfölj uppgår till 39 miljarder US-dollar (med ett nominellt värde av 30 miljarder euro).

Den planerade åtgärden består av en kassaflödesswap mellan den nederländska staten och ING, varvid ING överför avkastningen från 80 % av värdepappersportföljens nominella värde (ränta och amorteringar) mot garanterade betalningar från staten på 72 % (dvs. 80 % av 90 %) av värdepappersportföljens nominella värde (endast kapitaldelen), kompletterad av en finansieringsavgift som staten betalar till ING och som uppgår till 3,50 % för andelen värdepapper med fast ränta i värdepappersportföljen och till enmånads Liborränta (US-dollar) + 50 punkter för andelen värdepapper med variabel ränta i värdepappersportföljen.

Den nederländska staten betalar en ytterligare förvaltningsavgift till ING på 25 punkter per år på det återstående kapitalbeloppet. I utbyte för denna åtgärd betalar ING till den nederländska staten en årlig garantiavgift på 55 punkter på 80 % av det återstående beloppet av värdepappersportföljen.

BEDÖMNING

Kommissionen har bedömt transaktionen mot bakgrund av sitt meddelande om värdeminskade tillgångar. Den hyser i detta skede tvivel avseende värderingen och särskilt värderingsmetoden för att bedöma det reella ekonomiska värdet. Kommissionen måste närmare undersöka de underliggande antaganden som den nederländska staten angett, särskilt när det gäller i) val av diskonteringsränta, ii) antaganden om bostadspriser, iii) kreditförstärkningsnivåer och iv) övriga värderingsfrågor.

Således ställer sig kommissionen också tveksam till om bördan är lämpligt fördelad mellan staten och ING. Mot bakgrund av de ovannämnda tvivlen rörande bedömningen av värderingen ifrågasätter den om banken verkligen står för skillnaden mellan värdepappersportföljens nominella värde och dess reella ekonomiska värde. Kommissionen är också tveksam till om ovannämnda kassaflödesswap verkligen är så gynnsam för staten som det anges. I synnerhet hyser kommissionen vissa tvivel om huruvida avgiften för förvaltningen av värdepappersportföljen är lämplig då det förefaller som den inte kräver en alltför stor verksamhet i utbyte.

Åtgärden uppfyller ett antal av de villkor som anges i meddelandet om värdeminskade tillgångar, och med tanke på behovet av att bevara finansiell stabilitet har kommissionen därför beslutat att godkänna åtgärden för sex månader. Samtidigt och mot bakgrund av vad som anförts ovan har kommissionen också beslutat att inleda förfarandet i artikel 88.2 i EG-fördraget för att kontrollera villkoren i meddelandet om värdeminskade tillgångar avseende värdering (bl.a. värderingsmetoden) och fördelning av bördorna inom ramen för åtgärden.

SJÄLVA SKRIVELSEN

”The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
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(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
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(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
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(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
| --- | --- |

(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
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(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
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(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
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(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
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(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
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(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
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(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
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(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
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(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

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ANDRA AKTER

Kommissionen

| 11.7.2009 | SV | Europeiska unionens officiella tidning | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

SV

Europeiska unionens officiella tidning

C 158/24

---

Offentliggörande av en ansökan i enlighet med artikel 8.2 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 509/2006 om garanterade traditionella specialiteter av jordbruksprodukter och livsmedel

2009/C 158/07

Genom detta offentliggörande tillgodoses den rätt att göra invändningar som fastställs i artikel 9 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 509/2006. Invändningar måste komma in till kommissionen senast sex månader efter dagen för detta offentliggörande.

ANSÖKAN OM REGISTRERING AV EN GARANTERAD TRADITIONELL SPECIALITET

RÅDETS FÖRORDNING (EG) nr 509/2006

”KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA”

EG-nr: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Den ansökande gruppens namn och adress:

Namn: Związek „Polskie Mięso”

Adress:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tfn +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

E-post: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   Medlemsstat eller tredjeland:

Polen

3.   Specifika uppgifter om produkten:

3.1   Benämning(ar) som ska registreras (artikel 2 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007):

”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

3.2   Ange om benämningen:

 har en särart i sig

Image

Benämningen ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” uttrycker produktens särart, som framför allt beror på dess alldeles särskilda smak och arom. Särarten kommer av att man vid tillverkningen använder enbär, vilka finhackas just innan de blandas i köttet, och vid rökningen använder enris.

3.3   Ange om registrering med förbehåll önskas enligt artikel 13.2 i förordning (EG) nr 509/2006:

 Registrering av benämningen med förbehåll

Image

3.4   Produkttyp:

| Klass 1.2 – | Köttprodukter (värmebehandlade, saltade, rökta etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Klass 1.2 –

Köttprodukter (värmebehandlade, saltade, rökta etc.)

3.5   Beskrivning av den jordbruksprodukt eller det livsmedel som benämningen under punkt 3.1 avser (artikel 3.1 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007:)

”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ser ut som en jämnt rynkad pinne som bundit upp i en karaktäristisk ringform, utan yttre längsgående veck. Korven finns i två storlekar

| — | liten, i naturtarm med en diameter på minst 32 mm och med en vikt på ungefär 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

liten, i naturtarm med en diameter på minst 32 mm och med en vikt på ungefär 0,5 kg,

| — | stor, i konsttarm med en diameter på 36 mm och med en vikt på ungefär 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

stor, i konsttarm med en diameter på 36 mm och med en vikt på ungefär 0,8 kg.

”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” är jämnt mörkt brun över hela ytan, vilket är typiskt för kraftigt rökta korvar.

Korvens konsistens och känslan när man tar på den är en len, torr och jämnt skrynklad yta, med ett korvskinn som sitter tätt om fyllningen.

Produktens karakteristiska smak och mjukhet beror på valet av råvaror, kryddor (i synnerhet enbären) och den naturliga rökning som är en del av tillverkningsprocessen.

Kemisk sammansättning

| — | Proteininnehåll – minst 15,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Proteininnehåll – minst 15,0 %

| — | Vatteninnehåll – högst 60,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Vatteninnehåll – högst 60,0 %

| — | Fettinnehåll – högst 35,0 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Fettinnehåll – högst 35,0 %

| — | Saltinnehåll – högst 3,5 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Saltinnehåll – högst 3,5 %

| — | Nitrat(III)- och nitrat(V)-innehåll uttryckt som NaNO2 – högst 0,0125 % |
| --- | --- |

—

Nitrat(III)- och nitrat(V)-innehåll uttryckt som NaNO2 – högst 0,0125 %

Ovannämnda värden för den kemiska sammansättningen är en garant för produktens traditionella kvalitet. Avkastningen i slutprodukten i förhållande till det kött som använts som råvara är 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.6   Beskrivning av den produktionsmetod som används för att framställa jordbruksprodukt eller det livsmedel som benämningen under punkt 3.1 avser (artikel 3.2 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007)

Råvaror

| | Kött (100 kg råvara):






  — | Griskött i klass I med ett fettinnehåll på högst 15 % – 20 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Kött (100 kg råvara):

—

Griskött i klass I med ett fettinnehåll på högst 15 % – 20 kg

| — | Griskött i klass IIA med ett fettinnehåll på högst 20 % – 50 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Griskött i klass IIA med ett fettinnehåll på högst 20 % – 50 kg

| — | Griskött i klass III med ett fettinnehåll på högst 25 % – 20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Griskött i klass III med ett fettinnehåll på högst 25 % – 20 kg

| — | Fett från styckningen – 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fett från styckningen – 10 kg.

Upp till 50 % av grisköttet i klass IIA eller III kan bytas ut mot nötkött.

| | Kryddor (per 100 kg kött)






  — | Peppar – 0,17 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Kryddor (per 100 kg kött)

—

Peppar – 0,17 kg

| — | Enbär – 0,12 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Enbär – 0,12 kg

| — | Socker – 0,20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

Socker – 0,20 kg

| | Andra tillsatser:






  — | Saltblandning (baserad på en blandning av bordssalt (NaCl) och natriumnitrit (NaNO2)) – cirka 2 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Andra tillsatser:

—

Saltblandning (baserad på en blandning av bordssalt (NaCl) och natriumnitrit (NaNO2)) – cirka 2 kg

Utfordring vid produktion av griskött som är avsett att användas i tillverkningen av ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

Med utfordring avses gödning för att få fett kött. Syftet är att föda upp grisar med en kroppsvikt på upp till 120 kg och som har en högre andel intramuskulärt fett (över 3 %).

| — | För gödningen används raser som utvecklas sent och ett lämpligt gödningssystem gör det möjligt att uppnå det önskade intramuskulära fettinnehållet. De raser som används för gödning har inte RN-genen och RYR 1T-genen förekommer i 20 % av populationen. |
| --- | --- |

—

För gödningen används raser som utvecklas sent och ett lämpligt gödningssystem gör det möjligt att uppnå det önskade intramuskulära fettinnehållet. De raser som används för gödning har inte RN-genen och RYR 1T-genen förekommer i 20 % av populationen.

| — | Gödningen ska ske i tre faser – fas I upp till omkring 60 kg, fas II upp till omkring 90 kg och fas III upp till 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

Gödningen ska ske i tre faser – fas I upp till omkring 60 kg, fas II upp till omkring 90 kg och fas III upp till 120 kg.

| — | Vid gödning av djur upp till ungefär 90 kg kroppsvikt används två typer av foderblandningar. Foderblandningarna (givorna) har följande innehåll: |
| --- | --- |

—

Vid gödning av djur upp till ungefär 90 kg kroppsvikt används två typer av foderblandningar. Foderblandningarna (givorna) har följande innehåll:

| — | Energigivare: Sammalet spannmål – vete, korn, råg, havre, rågvete eller majs. Sammalen majs och sammalna sorter av nakenhavre står för upp till 30 % av blandningarna. |
| --- | --- |

—

Energigivare: Sammalet spannmål – vete, korn, råg, havre, rågvete eller majs. Sammalen majs och sammalna sorter av nakenhavre står för upp till 30 % av blandningarna.

| — | Proteingivare: Sammalen lupin, åkerböna och ärta, extraherat sojamjöl, extraherat rapsmjöl, rapskaka, foderjäst eller torkat grönfoder. |
| --- | --- |

—

Proteingivare: Sammalen lupin, åkerböna och ärta, extraherat sojamjöl, extraherat rapsmjöl, rapskaka, foderjäst eller torkat grönfoder.

| — | Foderblandningar (givor) för djur mellan 90 och 120 kg ska innehålla följande: |
| --- | --- |

—

Foderblandningar (givor) för djur mellan 90 och 120 kg ska innehålla följande:

| — | Energigivare: Sammalet vete, korn, råg och rågvete. Sammalen majs och sammalna sorter av nakenhavre får inte användas i blandningarna (givor). |
| --- | --- |

—

Energigivare: Sammalet vete, korn, råg och rågvete. Sammalen majs och sammalna sorter av nakenhavre får inte användas i blandningarna (givor).

| — | Proteingivare: Sammalna baljväxter (lupin, åkerböna och ärta), extraherat sojamjöl, rapskaka eller extraherat rapsmjöl samt torkat grönfoder. |
| --- | --- |

—

Proteingivare: Sammalna baljväxter (lupin, åkerböna och ärta), extraherat sojamjöl, rapskaka eller extraherat rapsmjöl samt torkat grönfoder.

| — | Följande ämnen får aldrig användas under utfordringscykeln: Vegetabiliska oljor, foder med animaliskt ursprung, t.ex. mjölkpulver, torkad vassle, fiskmjöl. |
| --- | --- |

—

Följande ämnen får aldrig användas under utfordringscykeln: Vegetabiliska oljor, foder med animaliskt ursprung, t.ex. mjölkpulver, torkad vassle, fiskmjöl.

| — | Blandningarnas energiinnehåll är 12–13 MJ i omsättbar energi per kg blandning. Proteininnehållet i blandningar bör ligga på 16–18 % i den första gödningsfasen, 15–16 % i den andra och omkring 14 % i den sista fasen. |
| --- | --- |

—

Blandningarnas energiinnehåll är 12–13 MJ i omsättbar energi per kg blandning. Proteininnehållet i blandningar bör ligga på 16–18 % i den första gödningsfasen, 15–16 % i den andra och omkring 14 % i den sista fasen.

| — | Givorna av gödningsfodret kan innehålla enbart näringsblandningar eller näringsblandningar och bulkfoder som potatis eller grönfoder. |
| --- | --- |

—

Givorna av gödningsfodret kan innehålla enbart näringsblandningar eller näringsblandningar och bulkfoder som potatis eller grönfoder.

Produktionssteg för att framställa ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”

| Steg 1 | Förberedande finfördelning av alla köttingredienser. Köttbitarna ska ha en enhetlig storlek (ungefär 5 cm i diameter). |
| --- | --- |

Steg 1

Förberedande finfördelning av alla köttingredienser. Köttbitarna ska ha en enhetlig storlek (ungefär 5 cm i diameter).

| Steg 2 | Traditionell insaltning (torrsaltning) i ungefär 48 timmar med en saltblandning. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 2

Traditionell insaltning (torrsaltning) i ungefär 48 timmar med en saltblandning.

| Steg 3 | Mekanisk beredning: Klass I-kött reduceras till omkring 20 mm i storlek, klass IIA-kött till omkring 8 mm i storlek och klass III-kött till omkring 3 mm. Därefter mals det tillsammans med 5 kg is. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 3

Mekanisk beredning: Klass I-kött reduceras till omkring 20 mm i storlek, klass IIA-kött till omkring 8 mm i storlek och klass III-kött till omkring 3 mm. Därefter mals det tillsammans med 5 kg is.

| Steg 4 | Blandning av alla köttingredienserna och kryddning: peppar, socker och enbär, som mals precis innan de blandas i mixern. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 4

Blandning av alla köttingredienserna och kryddning: peppar, socker och enbär, som mals precis innan de blandas i mixern.

| Steg 5 | Stoppning i naturtarm av gris minst 32 mm i diameter eller konsttarm på 36 mm i diameter, avsnörning av bitar och formning av girlander. Två sorters korvskinn kan användas för att tillverka korvarna






  — | små gristarmar för mindre korvar med en vikt av 0,5 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Steg 5

Stoppning i naturtarm av gris minst 32 mm i diameter eller konsttarm på 36 mm i diameter, avsnörning av bitar och formning av girlander. Två sorters korvskinn kan användas för att tillverka korvarna

—

små gristarmar för mindre korvar med en vikt av 0,5 kg,

| — | konsttarmar för större korvar med en vikt av 0,8 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

konsttarmar för större korvar med en vikt av 0,8 kg.

| Steg 6 | Vila vid en temperatur på högst 30 i två timmar. Preliminär torkning av ytan, ingredienserna inuti korven får sätta sig. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 6

Vila vid en temperatur på högst 30 i två timmar. Preliminär torkning av ytan, ingredienserna inuti korven får sätta sig.

| Steg 7 | Torkning av ytan följt av traditionell varmrökning (i ungefär 120 minuter) samt bakning tills temperaturen är minst 70 inuti korvarna. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 7

Torkning av ytan följt av traditionell varmrökning (i ungefär 120 minuter) samt bakning tills temperaturen är minst 70 inuti korvarna.

| Steg 8 | Avkylning i 24 timmar. |
| --- | --- |

Steg 8

Avkylning i 24 timmar.

| Steg 9 | Kallrökning med bokträspån och enris (i ungefär 120 minuter) följd av torkning vid 14–18 °C under 3–5 dagar tills en avkastning på 75 % uppnås (+/– 3 %). |
| --- | --- |

Steg 9

Kallrökning med bokträspån och enris (i ungefär 120 minuter) följd av torkning vid 14–18 °C under 3–5 dagar tills en avkastning på 75 % uppnås (+/– 3 %).

3.7   Ange särdrag hos jordbruksprodukten eller livsmedlet (artikel 3.3 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007):

Särdragen hos ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” kommer från flera egenskaper som är typiska för produkten:

| — | Köttets mörhet och särskilda egenskaper |
| --- | --- |

—

Köttets mörhet och särskilda egenskaper

| — | Exceptionell smak och arom |
| --- | --- |

—

Exceptionell smak och arom

| — | Enhetlig form |
| --- | --- |

—

Enhetlig form

Köttets mörhet, saftighet och särskilda egenskaper

Kött från grisar av raser som utvecklas sent och som har götts till en kroppsvikt på ungefär 120 kg och som har de genetiska egenskaper som beskrivs i punkt 3.6 är en nödvändig ingrediens i ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” och påverkar korvens särskilda egenskaper. I och med att dessa krav uppfylls får man ett intramuskulärt fettinnehåll på över 3 %, vilket innebär att köttet har de smakegenskaper och tekniska egenskaper som krävs för att framställa ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”. Genom att dessa råvaror används och den traditionella tillverkningsmetoden följs, med särskild hänsyn till stegen med finfördelning, saltning och rökning, kan man garantera att ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” är ovanligt möra och saftiga.

Exceptionell smak och arom

”Kiełbasa jałowcowas” särdrag är framför allt dess unika smak och arom, som kommer av användningen av enbär i tillverkningsprocessen. Korvens karakteristiska smak och särdrag framhävs ytterligare av att enbären mals precis innan tillverkningen påbörjas och genom att man använder enris i samband med rökningen.

Enhetlig form

Det är dess form som skiljer ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” från andra korvar. Korven säljs enbart i två mycket lika former, vilket gör den lätt att känna igen för konsumenterna. ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” ser ut som en jämnt rynkad pinne i form av en girland. Den har en karaktäristisk kransform, utan yttre längsgående veck.

3.8   Traditionella särdrag hos jordbruksprodukten eller livsmedlet (artikel 3.4 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007):

Traditionella råmaterial

| 1. | En:
  En avger en angenäm doft när den bränns. Enligt Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana från 1903 är detta en av denna buskes, som i århundraden har varit rätt vanligt förekommande i Polen, nyttiga egenskaper. I encyklopedin anges också att kvistar, spån och bär från en kan användas vid rökning för att ge kött en utsökt smak och arom. I dokument från andra halvan av 1800-talet framgår att enbär redan då användes som krydda eller ingrediens i kötträtter och köttprodukter. I ”Encyklopedyja Powszechna”, som publicerades i Warszawa 1863, fastställs att enbär har en kryddig, bittersöt smak och angenäm arom och att användningen av enbär som krydda är vittbekant. Enligt en artikel om regleringen av utbudet av korv på marknaden i ”Gospodarka Mięsna” (köttindustrins tidning, nr 3 1954) fastställdes en standardmetod för tillverkning av korv med enbär och rökning med envirke i Polen så tidigt som på 1940-talet. |
| --- | --- |

1.

En:

En avger en angenäm doft när den bränns. Enligt Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana från 1903 är detta en av denna buskes, som i århundraden har varit rätt vanligt förekommande i Polen, nyttiga egenskaper. I encyklopedin anges också att kvistar, spån och bär från en kan användas vid rökning för att ge kött en utsökt smak och arom. I dokument från andra halvan av 1800-talet framgår att enbär redan då användes som krydda eller ingrediens i kötträtter och köttprodukter. I ”Encyklopedyja Powszechna”, som publicerades i Warszawa 1863, fastställs att enbär har en kryddig, bittersöt smak och angenäm arom och att användningen av enbär som krydda är vittbekant. Enligt en artikel om regleringen av utbudet av korv på marknaden i ”Gospodarka Mięsna” (köttindustrins tidning, nr 3 1954) fastställdes en standardmetod för tillverkning av korv med enbär och rökning med envirke i Polen så tidigt som på 1940-talet.

| 2. | Griskött:
  Köttet från grisar som föds upp för framställning av ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” måste ha ett intramuskulärt fettinnehåll på mer än 3 % – detta är den marmorering som ger produkten den önskade mörheten, saftigheten och den utsökta smaken. Användningen av detta kött har en avgörande inverkan på slutproduktens kvalitet och dess särdrag och är förenlig med den traditionella tillverkningsmetoden. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Griskött:

Köttet från grisar som föds upp för framställning av ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” måste ha ett intramuskulärt fettinnehåll på mer än 3 % – detta är den marmorering som ger produkten den önskade mörheten, saftigheten och den utsökta smaken. Användningen av detta kött har en avgörande inverkan på slutproduktens kvalitet och dess särdrag och är förenlig med den traditionella tillverkningsmetoden.

Traditionell tillverkningsmetod och sammansättning

Rökning är ett sätt att konservera kött och oftast har man använt enris. Det framgår av gamla polska manuskript, t.ex. en okänd godsförvaltares anteckningar från 1780-talet som innehåller recept för beredning av kött (handskrift från Archiwum Gÿówne Akt Dawnych (AGAD) i Warszawa, arkivenhet: ”Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego”, nr. 1249). Följande beskrivning av frukosten på en herrgård i den polska nationalskalden Adam Mickiewiczs episka dikt ”Pan Tadeusz” (”Herr Tadeusz”) från 1834 visar att rökning med en var mycket populär: ”korvar och charkuterier – alla utsökta, hemgjorda och rökta i ugn över enevirke”.

Traditionen att krydda och röka kött med hjälp av en förfinades i lokala och regionala varianter. Dessa skilde sig åt genom att man dels använde olika teknik, dels olika typer av kött. W. Łęg visar i en artikel om ”Erfarenheterna av köttvaruproduktion” (Gospodarka Mięsna, 1953, nr 6) till exempel på försöken att göra ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” av vilt (hare eller vildsvin, blandat med griskött). Dessa korvar smakade annorlunda, men i grunden användes samma recept (späckning och rökning med enbär) överallt. En sakkunnig för köttbranschen som reste genom regionen Kurpie skrev i artikeln ”Regionala bondeköttvaruprodukter” (”Gospodarka Miÿsna” nr. 7–8, 1950) följande: ”Korv från Myszyniec i regionen Kurpie röks med enris och innehåller enbär. Den är torr och har en utsökt arom och smak.”

Efter 1945 beslutades i enlighet med planekonomiska principer att skapa en köttindustri på grundval av stora beredningsanläggningar. I syfte att förbättra kvalitet och smak infördes standardisering av produkter och teknik baserad på traditionella recept. ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” förekommer för första gången som produktnamn 1947 och 1948. En harmoniserad standard för ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” fastställdes 1954, som senare utvecklades till köttindustrins centralkontors standard från 1964 (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Warszawa 1964) på vilken denna ansökan grundar sig.

Dessa standarder utformades i syfte att garantera att ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” skulle vara av bästa möjliga kvalitet. Även om den standard på vilken denna ansökan grundar sig inte längre är bindande utgör den fortfarande den högsta produktionsstandarden för ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”.

3.9   Minimikrav och förfarande för kontroll av särarten (artikel 4 i förordning (EG) nr 1216/2007):

När det gäller särdragen hos ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” är det särskilt följande faktorer som ska kontrolleras:

| 1. | Kvaliteten på de råvaror som används i framställningen (griskött, kryddor), bl.a.






  — | köttets tekniska lämplighet, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Kvaliteten på de råvaror som används i framställningen (griskött, kryddor), bl.a.

—

köttets tekniska lämplighet,

| — | typ av gödning, |
| --- | --- |

—

typ av gödning,

| — | saltningstid, |
| --- | --- |

—

saltningstid,

| — | kryddor som används i framställningen av ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” och i vilka proportioner de används. |
| --- | --- |

—

kryddor som används i framställningen av ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa” och i vilka proportioner de används.

| 2. | Rökningsprocess för ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”.
  Under en kontroll ska följande kontrolleras:






  — | Att den temperatur som krävs för traditionell varmrökning och uppvärmningstemperaturen hålls. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Rökningsprocess för ”Kiełbasa jałowcowa”.

Under en kontroll ska följande kontrolleras:

—

Att den temperatur som krävs för traditionell varmrökning och uppvärmningstemperaturen hålls.

| — | Att den upprepade kallrökningen sker under tillräckligt lång tid och vid rätt temperatur. |
| --- | --- |

—

Att den upprepade kallrökningen sker under tillräckligt lång tid och vid rätt temperatur.

| — | Att bokspån och enris används vid kallrökning. |
| --- | --- |

—

Att bokspån och enris används vid kallrökning.

| 3. | Slutproduktens kvalitet:






  — | Proteininnehåll |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Slutproduktens kvalitet:

—

Proteininnehåll

| — | Vatteninnehåll |
| --- | --- |

—

Vatteninnehåll

| — | Fettinnehåll |
| --- | --- |

—

Fettinnehåll

| — | Natriumkloridinnehåll |
| --- | --- |

—

Natriumkloridinnehåll

| — | Nitrat(III)- och nitrat(V)-innehåll |
| --- | --- |

—

Nitrat(III)- och nitrat(V)-innehåll

| — | Smak och arom |
| --- | --- |

—

Smak och arom

| 4. | Produktens form |
| --- | --- |

4.

Produktens form

Kontrollfrekvens

De ovannämnda stegen ska kontrolleras varannan månad. Om samtliga steg utförs korrekt kan kontrollfrekvensen minskas till två gånger per år.

Om det förekommer oegentligheter i något steg ska kontrollfrekvensen för det steget ökas (till en gång varannan månad). Kontroller av övriga steg får göras en gång i halvåret.

4.   Myndigheter eller organ som kontrollerar efterlevnaden av produktspecifikationen:

4.1   Namn och adress:

Namn: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych

Adress:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tfn +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

E-post: —

Image Offentlig  Privat

4.2   Myndighetens eller organets särskilda uppgifter:

Den kontrollmyndighet som avses ovan är ansvarig för övervakningen av alla kriterier i specifikationen.

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