1 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN SUPREME COURT 

A22-0163 

Hennepin County Moore, III, J. 

Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Thissen, Anderson, JJ. 

Took no part, Procaccini, J. 

State of Minnesota, 

 Respondent, 

vs. Filed: January 31, 2024 

Office of Appellate Courts 

Elsa E. Segura, 

 Appellant. 

________________________ 

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and 

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Adam E. Petras, Assistant County Attorney, 

Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent. 

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant 

Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant. 

________________________ 

S Y L L A B U S 

1. Although the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain 

defendant’s convictions for both first-degree felony murder while committing a kidnapping 

and kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, under an aiding-and-abetting 
2

theory of liability, it failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s convictions 

for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, 

under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. 

2. Defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on her unobjected-to claim of 

prosecutorial misconduct because the State proved that any error committed by the 

prosecutor did not affect defendant’s substantial rights. 

3. Although the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 

defendant’s proposed jury instructions, the district court abused its discretion by giving 

erroneous jury instructions on accomplice liability, and the error was not harmless because 

it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the 

verdict. 

4. The district court did not err by allowing the State to elicit testimony from 

defendant related to her proffer statements because defendant waived the evidentiary 

protections of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410, and the statements were properly admitted 

as impeachment evidence. 

Reversed and remanded. 

O P I N I O N 

MOORE, III, Justice. 

Appellant Elsa Segura appeals her convictions for first-degree premeditated murder, 

attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree intentional murder while 

committing a felony (kidnapping), and kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or 

terrorize, all premised on aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Segura argues 
3

that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions under aiding-andabetting theories of criminal liability. She further contends that the prosecutor committed 

reversible error during closing argument by urging the jury to find her guilty based on a 

theory that she believed she was aiding a drug business. Segura also challenges the district 

court’s jury instructions on several grounds. Finally, she argues that the district court

admitted evidence in violation of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410 by allowing the State 

to elicit testimony from her regarding her proffer statements. 

We conclude that although there is sufficient evidence to sustain Segura’s 

convictions for kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize and first-degree 

intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping) under aiding-and-abetting 

theories of liability, there is insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions for first-degree 

premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated murder under aiding-andabetting theories of liability. We also conclude that the State established that the alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct—which was unobjected to at trial—did not affect Segura’s 

substantial rights. We further conclude that the district court abused its discretion by giving 

erroneous jury instructions, and that these instructions were not harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Finally, we determine that the district court did not err in admitting 

evidence related to Segura’s proffer statements. Consequently, we reverse all of Segura’s 

convictions and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion on the 

kidnapping and felony murder charges. 
4

FACTS 

This case arises from the fatal shooting of Monique Baugh and the nonfatal shooting 

of her boyfriend, J.M.-M. On December 31, 2019, Segura, posing as an interested home 

buyer at the direction of her boyfriend Lyndon Wiggins, lured realtor Baugh to a sham 

house showing in Maple Grove. Using a fictitious name, Segura scheduled a showing of 

a home through multiple phone calls with Baugh as instructed by Wiggins. Segura never

appeared at the “showing,” but Wiggins’s accomplices Cedric Berry and Berry Davis did. 

After Baugh arrived at the home in Maple Grove, Berry and Davis bound Baugh’s hands 

and neck with duct tape and forced Baugh into the cargo area of a rented U-Haul van. After 

about 2 1⁄2 hours, the men eventually drove to Baugh’s home in Minneapolis, where J.M.-

M. was watching the couple’s two children, and shot J.M.-M. several times. Berry and 

Davis later shot Baugh in an alley in Minneapolis. J.M.-M. survived his injuries, but Baugh 

died from her gunshot wounds.1

 

The State’s theory was that Berry and Davis committed these crimes at the direction 

of Wiggins, a man who worked for a music company with which J.M.-M. had a recording 

contract. Wiggins was also a trafficker of illegal drugs and had connections to Berry and 

Davis. In early 2019, Wiggins and J.M.-M. had a falling-out over a dispute involving the 

1

 The details of the underlying crimes are discussed in more detail in Berry’s and 

Davis’s direct appeals. See State v. Berry, 982 N.W.2d 746, 750–54 (Minn. 2022); State 

v. Davis, 982 N.W.2d 716, 721–22 (Minn. 2022). Both Berry and Davis were found guilty

by the jury of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated 

murder, first-degree felony murder, and kidnapping. We affirmed their convictions for 

first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and 

kidnapping on direct appeal. Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 761; Davis, 982 N.W.2d at 729.
5

record label. Around that time, Wiggins texted a contact that he “damn near caught a 

murder case” after unexpectedly seeing J.M.-M. Later that year, Wiggins was arrested on 

drug charges, and he believed that J.M.-M. was a “snitch” for having provided information 

to the police and was therefore responsible for his arrest. Accordingly, the State theorized, 

Wiggins directed Berry and Davis to commit the kidnapping, murder, and attempted 

murder to take revenge on J.M.-M. 

The State also alleged that Segura, who had been in a romantic relationship with 

Wiggins for around 3 years and had admitted to scheduling the house showing from which 

Baugh was kidnapped, was liable for these crimes as an accomplice. A grand jury indicted

Segura with first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022); 

kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) 

(2022); and first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), Minn. 

Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022), for conduct involving Baugh. The grand jury also indicted 

Segura with attempted first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2022); see 

Minn. Stat. 609.185(a)(1) (2022), in connection with conduct involving J.M.-M. All of the 

counts alleged aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability. Minn. Stat. § 609.05 

(2022). Segura pleaded not guilty and demanded a jury trial. 

The evidence at trial showed that Segura began dating Wiggins in 2016 and that 

shortly after the beginning of their relationship, she researched Wiggins’s criminal history. 

Segura had access to such information through her job as a probation officer. She learned 

that Wiggins had been convicted of aggravated robbery and that he was required to register 

as a predatory offender because there was, as she described it, a “kidnapping component” 
6

to the robbery. In looking up the details of this aggravated robbery, Segura learned that 

Wiggins and accomplices had forced a victim into the trunk of a car.2

 

In 2017, Segura learned that Wiggins was involved in illicit drug manufacturing and 

distribution. Over the course of their relationship, she assisted Wiggins in many ways, 

including renting a condominium for him, leasing a truck for him, buying pill presses for 

his drug trafficking business, and booking flights, bus tickets, hotel rooms, and Uber and 

Lyft rides for him. Segura always used her own name, contact information, and financial 

information. 

Segura knew that J.M.-M. was a recording artist who worked for the same record 

label as Wiggins. J.M.-M. had been to Segura’s home—where Wiggins had set up a 

recording studio—several times, and both Segura and J.M.-M. had attended parties hosted 

by Wiggins. J.M.-M. testified that people who knew both him and Wiggins would know 

that he was dating Baugh. He also testified that there were two parties that both Segura 

and Baugh attended and that Segura followed him on Instagram, where he posted about 

Baugh and their children. Based on text messages sent to her from Wiggins, Segura knew 

that J.M.-M. and Wiggins had a falling-out related to the record label. And when Wiggins 

was arrested on drug charges in October 2019, he called Segura from jail and told her that 

J.M.-M. was a snitch. 

2

 On cross-examination, Segura conceded that aggravated robberies often involve 

violence and that as a probation officer, she had clients who had been convicted of 

aggravated robbery with a firearm. 
7

On December 29, 2019, 2 days before the kidnapping and shootings, Segura met 

Wiggins after work, and he showed her a real estate listing. He said that he wanted Segura 

to call the realtor and set up a house showing but told her to wait to make the call. Cellsite location information (CSLI) revealed that Berry, Davis, and Wiggins were in the 

vicinity of a cell phone store in North Minneapolis later that day.

3

 Video evidence from 

the store showed Berry entering to purchase and activate the phone with a number ending 

in 2101 that Segura later used to schedule the sham house showing with Baugh (the set-up 

phone). Berry initially gave the name “Lisa Prescott” for the account associated with the 

set-up phone. However, after a phone call with Davis, Berry changed the name associated 

with the set-up phone to “Lisa Pawloski.” While Berry was purchasing the set-up phone, 

Wiggins and Segura were in contact via a 19-second Facetime call. 

Cell-site location information (CSLI) showed that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis—

along with the newly purchased set-up phone—traveled from the cell phone store to the 

area of Segura’s home. All four phones remained in the area of Segura’s home for about 

half an hour. Segura testified that Wiggins entered her home and wrote down information 

related to the house listing he mentioned to her earlier. The information included the 

3

 “CSLI refers to the data collected as a cell phone connects to nearby 

towers. CSLI from towers can be used to approximate the cell phone’s location using 

triangulation—an analysis of the phone’s location based on the towers to which it 

connected.” Berry, 982 N.W.2d at 751 n.2 (citations omitted). 
8

address of the house, a phone number,4 and “Monique”5 as the name of the realtor she 

should call. Wiggins gave Segura the set-up phone to make the call, and he told her to use 

the name “Lisa Pawloski” and schedule a house showing for the next day. Wiggins also 

instructed her to call “Monique” from a place other than her house and to burn the piece of 

paper with the information and wash it down the sink once she was finished making the 

call. Segura admitted that this request from Wiggins was unlike anything else she had done 

for him in the past. 

A little after 5 p.m., Segura drove to a mall parking lot, where she used the set-up 

phone to call “Monique.” Segura left a voicemail introducing herself as “Lisa Pawloski” 

and asking to set up a house showing for the Maple Grove address Wiggins had given her. 

Five minutes later, Baugh called back and asked “Lisa Pawloski” to text her to schedule 

the house showing. While Segura was driving back to her home, she was in contact with 

Wiggins by phone. 

CSLI placed the phones of Segura, Berry, and Davis in the vicinity of Segura’s 

home from 5:53 to 5:58 p.m. Segura then drove back to the mall, where she used the setup phone to exchange text messages with “Monique” to set the time for the house showing 

the next day. Once the appointment was scheduled, Segura turned off the set-up phone and 

drove back to her home. Segura once again called Wiggins. 

4

 The phone number was Baugh’s cell phone number. 

5

 “Monique” was Monique Baugh. Segura testified that, at the time she made the 

calls, she was unaware that “Monique” was, in fact, Baugh. 
9

Later that night, Wiggins went to Segura’s home. He advised her to stay away from 

her home during the time of the house showing the next day and to leave her personal cell 

phone at home. Segura, who was aware of the significance of cell phone data mapping,

admitted that Wiggins likely instructed her to do this because of the possibility of law 

enforcement using cell phone data to determine her location. He told Segura to call 

“Monique” in the morning to confirm the appointment. Additionally, Wiggins instructed 

her to call “Monique” again at the time of the appointment, say that she was running late, 

and ask whether the stove in the house was gas or electric. 

Meanwhile, Berry and Davis met with another individual, K.W., and asked him to 

rent the smallest available U-Haul truck that same day. K.W. agreed to rent the U-Haul 

but explained that he could not rent it until December 30. Around 9:30 p.m. that night, 

CSLI placed Wiggins, Berry, and Davis together. Video evidence showed Davis 

purchasing bleach, ammonia, two-way radios, and a canvas tent from a store in the vicinity 

of the CSLI location associated with the three men. 

The next morning, Segura followed Wiggins’s instructions, confirming the house 

showing with “Monique” and then calling at the time of the appointment to say she was 

running late.6

 After making these calls, Segura returned home, where she saw missed calls 

6

 Baugh had arrived at the Maple Grove house at about 11 a.m., the scheduled time 

for the showing. Another real estate agent, who also had an appointment to show the house

at the same time, chatted with Baugh while they were waiting for their prospective clients 

to arrive. Baugh received the call from “Lisa Pawloski” in which she asked Baugh whether 

the stove was gas or electric. Baugh commented to the other agent that the call was odd 

and that she wondered how the prospective client had gotten her personal phone number. 

“Lisa Pawloski” never arrived at the house for the showing. 
10

on her personal phone from Wiggins. Wiggins later arrived at Segura’s home and 

instructed her to call “Monique” to reschedule the house showing for the next day. 

Once again, Segura left her home and called “Monique,” but the realtor did not 

answer the call. Segura then sent “Monique” text messages asking to reschedule the 

showing for the next day. After driving home and remaining there for a few hours, Segura 

left her home to check the set-up phone. The realtor had texted her back and suggested a 

3 p.m. appointment, which Segura accepted. Segura relayed this information to Wiggins 

when he was at her home later that night. K.W.’s wife rented the U-Haul truck at 8:12 p.m.

that night. 

The next morning, Segura left her home and texted “Monique” from the set-up 

phone to confirm the 3 p.m. house showing. At around 11:40 a.m., Davis and Berry picked 

up the U-Haul truck from the parking lot where K.W. left it. At that same time, Wiggins 

called Segura and spoke to her for over 2 minutes. At around 2 p.m., Wiggins came to 

Segura’s home and took the set-up phone. He stayed there for about half an hour. Phone 

records showed that while with Wiggins, Segura searched “Death Row Records,” a record 

label she acknowledged is known for representing artists who killed people and whose 

founder is in prison for murder. Shortly after 3 p.m., Berry and Davis kidnapped Baugh 

from the Maple Grove house where she was lured by Segura’s request for a sham showing

and forced into the cargo area of the U-Haul truck. After driving with Baugh bound by 

duct tape for nearly two hours, at about 5:16 p.m. the U-Haul truck was observed circling 

around the block near Baugh’s house. 
11

At about 5:40 p.m., Berry and Davis used Baugh’s key to enter her residence where 

they encountered and shot J.M.-M., leaving him bleeding on an upstairs bedroom floor. 

About an hour later, while still being held hostage by Berry and Davis, Baugh was fatally 

shot in the face and chest with the same handgun used to shoot J.M.-M. and her body was 

left in an alley. Baugh’s body was found with blood on it, one of her teeth had been broken, 

her hands and neck Had been bound with duct tape, and several of her acrylic nails had 

been ripped from her fingers. When K.W. and his wife returned the U-Haul truck, it 

smelled strongly of bleach and ammonia. Later forensic testing on an acrylic fingernail 

and blood found in the U-Haul truck revealed the presence of a major DNA profile that 

matched Baugh’s DNA. 

That evening, Segura worked a shift at the Juvenile Supervision Center from 6 p.m. 

to 10 p.m.7

 While at work, Segura searched the Hennepin County jail roster. Her phone 

records revealed that she made searches relating to stress and anxiety. After work, she and 

Wiggins spoke on the phone. Most other calls between the two in the days leading to 

Baugh’s kidnapping and the shootings were less than 5 minutes long, but this call lasted 

for more than 10 minutes. 

On January 1, 2020, the day after the kidnapping and shootings, Segura read local 

news articles about Baugh’s death. She and Wiggins exchanged multiple calls that day. 

During a FaceTime call with Wiggins, Segura saved a photo of Baugh to her phone. In the 

7

 In addition to her job as a probation officer, Segura also worked part time at the 

Juvenile Supervision Center. 
12

days that followed, Segura read more articles about Baugh’s death, including one article 

that reported the arrest of a suspect. She saved more photos of Baugh to her phone, 

exchanged calls with Wiggins, and again searched the Hennepin County jail roster. Her 

phone records revealed that in the days before she was arrested, Segura’s internet searches 

included the sacrament of confession, the topic of legal immunity, and the term 

“incinerator.” The set-up phone Segura used to lure Baugh to her abduction and eventual 

murder was never located by law enforcement. Investigators spoke to Segura as part of 

their investigation into the crimes. She was later charged, had a proffer meeting8

 with 

prosecutors, and proceeded to a jury trial. 

At trial, Segura testified in her own defense. Although she admitted to using the 

phone given to her by Wiggins to schedule the Maple Grove house showing, she denied 

having knowledge of any plan to kidnap Baugh and shoot Baugh and J.M.-M. According 

to Segura, she initially thought she was helping Wiggins with his drug business. On cross8

 As one federal circuit court has explained: 

A “proffer agreement” is generally understood to be an agreement between 

a defendant and the government in a criminal case that sets forth the terms 

under which the defendant will provide information to the government 

during an interview, commonly referred to as a “proffer session.” The proffer 

agreement defines the obligations of the parties and is intended to protect the 

defendant against the use of his or her statements, particularly in those 

situations in which the defendant has revealed incriminating information and 

the proffer session does not mature into a plea agreement or other form of 

cooperation agreement. 

United States v. Lopez, 219 F.3d 343, 345 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000). In this case, after Segura 

was charged, she met with law enforcement and prosecutors from the Hennepin County 

Attorney’s Office to provide information relating to the kidnapping and murder of Baugh 

and the attempted murder of J.M.-M. 
13

examination, the State impeached Segura’s testimony with statements she had made during 

the proffer meeting before trial. During this cross-examination, Segura admitted to lying 

to investigators when she claimed she was “just friends” with Wiggins in an effort to 

distance herself from him. Segura also admitted to lying to investigators that she was home 

when she made the phone calls to Baugh and also by initially telling officers that she did 

not know who Baugh was. Segura agreed when investigators asked if she knew something 

bad was going to happen to Baugh, but at trial continued to assert she believed they were 

only planning something “in relation to the drug business.” Segura never testified, 

however, that she thought Wiggins planned to rob Baugh. 

Following the close of evidence, the district court instructed the jury on the 

substantive offenses with which Segura was charged and provided accomplice liability 

instructions for each count. The district court rejected the accomplice liability instructions 

that Segura had proposed, and Segura objected to the instructions selected by the district 

court. During closing arguments, the parties focused on whether the State proved Segura’s 

liability as an accomplice who “intentionally aid[ed]” in the commission of the crimes 

committed by Berry and Davis. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1. 

The jury found Segura guilty as charged. The district court sentenced her to two 

concurrent sentences of 200 months in prison for kidnapping to commit great bodily harm 

or terrorize and attempted first-degree murder and a consecutive sentence of life in prison 
14

without the possibility of release for first-degree premeditated murder.9 On direct appeal, 

Segura makes several arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support her 

convictions, the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument, the jury instructions, and 

the use of her proffer statements at trial. We address each argument in turn. 

ANALYSIS 

I. 

Segura first argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain her 

convictions. The test we use to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence depends on whether 

the State relied on direct or circumstantial evidence at trial. When reviewing the 

sufficiency of direct evidence, “we painstakingly review the record to determine whether 

that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to permit the 

jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 639–40 (Minn. 

2022). 

But when a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, as Segura’s convictions 

are here, we use a heightened two-step process to review the sufficiency of the evidence. 

Id. at 640. The first step is to “identify the circumstances proved.” Id. In doing so, we 

winnow down the evidence presented at trial to a subset of facts that are consistent with 

the jury’s verdict, and we disregard all evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict. Id. 

The second step is to “identify the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 

9

 Although the jury convicted Segura of first-degree felony murder, the district court 

did not enter an adjudication nor sentence Segura for this offense because it is a lesser 

included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. 
15

circumstances proved when viewed ‘as a whole and not as discrete and isolated facts.’ ” 

Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016)). We give no deference to 

the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences. Id. “The State’s circumstantial evidence 

is sufficient when the reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis that the 

accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id.

Here, the jury found Segura guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.185(a)(1); kidnapping to commit great bodily harm or terrorize, Minn. Stat. § 609.25, 

subd. 1(3); first-degree intentional murder while committing a felony (kidnapping), Minn. 

Stat. § 609.185(a)(3); and attempted first-degree premeditated murder, Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.17; see Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1). The State alleged Segura was guilty of these 

crimes—all of which were indisputably committed by others—under aiding-and-abetting 

theories of liability. We begin by reviewing our law on aiding-and-abetting liability. 

A defendant may be held criminally liable for the acts of others under Minnesota’s 

aiding-and-abetting statute. Minn. Stat. § 609.05. “A person is criminally liable for a 

crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or 

conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.” Id., subd. 1. If a 

person is liable as an accomplice for a crime under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1, the person 

is “also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime If 

reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable consequence of committing or 
16

attempting to commit the crime intended.”10 Id., subd. 2. Aiding and abetting is not a 

separate substantive offense. State v. DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999). 

Rather, it is “a theory of criminal liability.” Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 729–30 

(Minn. 2010). Thus, “section 609.05 makes accomplices criminally liable as principals.” 

State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020). 

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that [her] alleged 

accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended [her] 

presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 

675, 682 (Minn. 2007); see Minn. Stat. § 609.05. The requisite state of mind for 

accomplice liability can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the 

“defendant[’]s presence at the scene of the crime, [a] close association with the principal 

before and after the crime, [a] lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and

defendant[’]s flight from the scene of the crime with the principal.” State v. Hawes, 801 

N.W.2d 659, 668 (Minn. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. 

Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 659 (Minn. 2006)). 

Segura concedes that the State “proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wiggins, 

Davis, and Berry conspired to commit kidnapping and murder and that Davis and Berry 

kidnapped and killed Baugh and tried to kill [J.M.-M.].” To be clear, Segura does not claim 

that Wiggins, Davis, and Berry conspired to rob Baugh, which is not surprising because 

10 “We commonly use the word ‘principal’ when referring to the person who 

committed the crime and the word ‘accomplice’ when referring to the person who 

intentionally aided the principal’s commission of the offense.” State v. Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 

393, 407 (Minn. 2020). 
17

unlike kidnapping, robberies of an individual do not typically require a U-Haul truck, 

ammonia, or bleach. Instead, her argument that the State presented insufficient evidence 

to convict her of aiding and abetting these offenses centers on the “intentionally aids” 

element of accomplice liability. She concedes that her communications with Baugh to 

schedule the sham house showing furthered the commission of the kidnapping and murder 

of Baugh and the attempted premeditated murder of J.M.-M. But she asserts that the State 

failed to prove that she knew of the kidnapping-murder plot or that she intended her actions 

to aid in the commission of those crimes. She contends that the circumstances proved do 

not exclude a rational hypothesis consistent with her innocence: specifically, that she 

believed she was helping Wiggins with his drug business. 

A. 

We begin our analysis by identifying the circumstances proved. Hassan, 977 

N.W.2d at 640. It is undisputed that on December 31, 2019, Segura lured Baugh to a sham 

house showing in Maple Grove, where the principals, Berry and Davis, kidnapped Baugh, 

transported Baugh to her home where they shot her boyfriend, and then drove Baugh to an 

alley in Minneapolis and fatally shot her. It is also undisputed that Berry and Davis planned 

and executed these crimes with the help of Wiggins, who had a falling-out with J.M.-M. 

and believed that J.M.-M. was responsible for Wiggins’s arrest on drug charges in October 

2019. 

The central issue is what Segura knew when she scheduled the house showing with 

Baugh. The circumstances proved include the following facts. Segura had been dating 

Wiggins for several years and knew his criminal history included an aggravated robbery 
18

that involved a kidnapping. She also knew he had a falling-out with J.M.-M. Segura 

followed J.M.-M. on social media and saw posts about Baugh. Moreover, people who 

knew Wiggins and J.M.-M. (such as Segura) would know that Baugh and J.M.-M. were 

dating. 

Two days before the kidnapping and shootings—shortly after purchasing the set-up 

phone—Wiggins, Berry, and Davis were in the area of Segura’s home. Later that day, the 

three men were again in the vicinity of Segura’s home before they purchased items used in 

the kidnapping-murder plot. Wiggins’s instructions to Segura to schedule a house showing 

were unlike other requests Wiggins had made of Segura in the past. He told Segura to call 

the realtor using a particular phone he provided, to use a fake name, to leave her house 

when calling the realtor, and then to burn the piece of paper with the information and wash 

it down the sink once she was finished making the call. Segura knew the realtor she was 

calling was named “Monique.” Segura followed J.M.-M. on Instagram, where he posted 

about Baugh and their children. Wiggins and Segura were in communication with each 

other at the key points in the kidnapping-murder conspiracy, including when the set-up 

phone was purchased, after each call Segura made to Baugh, and when Berry and Davis 

picked up the U-Haul truck. 

B. 

In identifying the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances 

proved, “we view the circumstances proved as a whole and not as discrete and isolated 

facts.” State v. Cox, 884 N.W.2d 400, 412 (Minn. 2016). The State’s circumstantial 

evidence is sufficient when the reasonable inferences are consistent with the hypothesis 
19

that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Id. 

Put differently, if the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with 

a reasonable inference of innocence, the State’s circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to 

support the conviction. State v. Alarcon, 932 N.W.2d 641, 649–50 (Minn. 2019); State v. 

Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 603 (Minn. 2017). 

We start by considering whether the circumstances proved support a reasonable 

inference that Segura knew that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis planned to kidnap Baugh and 

murder Baugh and J.M.-M. When the circumstances proved are viewed was a whole, they 

support the following reasonable inferences. Segura knew that Wiggins intended to 

commit some sort of illicit activity different from his past illegal drug-related business, and 

that her actions of calling and texting Baugh furthered that illicit activity. Segura knew of 

Wiggins’s motive to get back at J.M.-M. Segura knew Baugh and J.M.-M. were dating. 

Wiggins, Berry, and Davis were at Segura’s home two days before the crimes were 

committed. While in Segura’s presence, the three men made their plans to kidnap Baugh 

from a sham real estate showing using a U-Haul truck and force her to lead them to J.M.-

M. so they could kill him and then kill Baugh to conceal their crimes. 

When the circumstances proved are viewed a whole, one could reasonably infer that 

Segura knew of the plan to kidnap Baugh and murder Baugh and her boyfriend when 

Segura scheduled the sham house showing, and that Segura intended her contacts with 

Baugh to further this plan. Thus, the circumstances proved support a reasonable inference 

that Segura is guilty of the kidnapping and premeditated murder of Baugh and the 
20

attempted premeditated murder of J.M.-M. under aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal 

liability. 

Because the circumstances proved support the inference that Segura intentionally 

aided the kidnapping of Baugh, we conclude that the circumstances proved are also 

consistent with Segura’s guilt of felony murder while committing a kidnapping. A person 

is guilty of felony murder when they “cause[] the death of a human being with intent to 

effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit . . . 

kidnapping.” Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3). There is no dispute that Berry and Davis 

intentionally caused the death of Baugh while kidnapping her. Segura is liable for felony 

murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory if she “intentionally aid[ed]” the commission 

of a crime or if the commission of that crime was “reasonably foreseeable” to Segura “as 

a probable consequence of” another crime she intentionally aided—namely, the kidnapping 

of Baugh. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subds. 1–2. Murder can be a foreseeable consequence of 

kidnapping.11 See State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 1985). The 

foreseeability to Segura that the kidnapping in this case would lead to Baugh’s death is 

11 Other jurisdictions’ articulations of felony murder support the inference that murder 

is often a foreseeable consequence of kidnapping. See Commonwealth v. Bolish, 113 A.2d 

464, 475 (Pa. 1955) (explaining that, under the doctrine of felony murder, “[i]f the original 

malicious act was arson, rape, robbery, burglary or kidnapping, the original actor is guilty 

of murder in the first degree”), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth ex rel. 

Shadd v. Myers, 223 A.2d 296 (Pa. 1966); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 202(1) (2022) (stating 

that a person is guilty of felony murder if, after committing or attempting to commit 

kidnapping, the person “in fact causes the death of a human being, and the death is a 

reasonably foreseeable consequence of such commission, attempt or flight”); State v. 

Anderson, 409 A.2d 1290, 1306 (Me. 1979) (“The Legislature was aware that the crime of 

murder is, more often than not, committed in the course of robberies, burglaries, 

kidnappings, arsons, rapes and gross sexual misconduct cases . . . .”). 
21

supported by the fact that Segura knew of Wiggins’s past conviction of a violent crime. 

Thus, the circumstances proved are consistent with Segura’s guilt of felony murder. 

We turn to the next step of our circumstantial evidence standard, which requires us 

to consider whether the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, are consistent with 

“any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 890 (Minn. 

2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Peterson, 910 N.W.2d 1, 7 

(Minn. 2018)). The circumstances proved, as a whole, need not exclude all inferences 

other than guilt because “[t]he State’s obligation is to exclude all reasonable inferences 

other than guilt.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Minn. 2008). A defendant “may 

not rely on mere conjecture” to argue that the circumstances proved, as a whole, are 

consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of her innocence. Id. at 858. The defendant “must 

instead point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than 

guilt.” Id. The absence of evidence in the record regarding certain circumstances does not 

constitute a circumstance proved from which reasonable inferences may be drawn. 

McInnis, 962 N.W.2d at 891 n.6. 

Segura contends that it is reasonable to infer from the circumstances proved, as a

whole, that she believed she was assisting Wiggins’s illegal drug trafficking activities, as 

opposed to kidnapping-murder, by calling “Monique.” We disagree that it is reasonable to 

infer that Segura believed she was merely aiding Wiggins’s illicit drug activities when she 

called the realtor. The circumstances proved, as a whole, make it clear that Wiggins’s plans 

were different—and more serious—than the drug trafficking Segura knew Wiggins was 

involved in. Wiggins told Segura to call “Monique” using a fake name, whereas she had 
22

previously done things for Wiggins using her own name and her own financial information. 

Moreover, Segura followed Wiggins’s instruction to make the calls and texts from places 

other than her house, which shows she did not want the set-up phone being traced to her 

home. 

But we conclude that the circumstances proved, as a whole, support a reasonable 

inference that Segura believed the end goal of Wiggins’s plan was some crime less serious 

than the premeditated murder of Baugh and J.M.-M. Again, Segura knew of Wiggins’s 

animosity toward J.M.-M., his motivation for revenge, and his violent history. It is 

reasonable to infer that Wiggins’s plan could include murder. But it also could have 

included a kidnapping of Baugh followed by a serious assault on J.M.-M. Moreover, the 

circumstances proved in this case do not inescapably lead to the conclusion that Wiggins, 

Berry, and Davis originally planned to kill Baugh after kidnapping her and locating her 

boyfriend.12 If Baugh’s murder was not part of the original plan, then Segura could not 

have known of and intended to further a plan to murder Baugh when Segura set up the 

sham house showing. The circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole, do not rule out 

these reasonable possibilities. Therefore, we conclude that there is a reasonable hypothesis 

of Segura’s innocence of the premeditated murder of Baugh and the attempted 

premeditated murder of J.M.-M. 

12 The State itself appeared to concede this point at trial. In closing argument, while 

summarizing the State’s evidence, the prosecutor acknowledged that “[k]illing Monique 

Baugh probably wasn’t the original plan” and that “Monique Baugh was a means to an end, 

the end being locating and probably killing [J.M.-M.].” 
23

Nevertheless, we conclude that there is no reasonable hypothesis of Segura’s 

innocence of the kidnapping and felony murder of Baugh while committing a kidnapping. 

When she set up the house showing with Baugh, Segura knowingly carried out Wiggins’s 

instructions to isolate Baugh in an untraceable way—by using a set-up phone provided by 

Wiggins, scheduling the appointment with a fake name, and never making calls at or near 

her residence. These suspicious circumstances unquestionably lead to the conclusion that 

this was not a normal house showing. This scheme to isolate Baugh—along with Segura’s 

knowledge of Wiggins’s past criminal history—leads us to conclude that when viewed as 

a whole, the circumstances proved do not support a reasonable inference that Segura 

believed she was aiding a crime other than kidnapping. 

Moreover, considering this scheme, we conclude that it is unreasonable to infer that 

the possibility of murder was unforeseeable to Segura. See Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2. 

Therefore, the circumstances proved do not support an inference of innocence for the 

kidnapping and felony murder convictions. 

We disagree with the dissent that the circumstances proved, when viewed as a 

whole, support a reasonable inference that Segura believed Wiggins planned to rob, but not 

kidnap, the realtor she called. Segura concedes that the State proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Wiggins, Davis, and Berry conspired to kidnap Baugh. And there are two 

reasons to reject the dissent’s alternative theory that Segura believed the conspiracy’s goal 

was robbery. First, unlike a kidnapping, a robbery of someone’s person does not typically 
24

require the use of a U-Haul truck to conceal the victim,

13 or of ammonia or bleach.14 

Second, the grand jury indictments against Wiggins, Davis, and Berry do not allege a 

conspiracy to rob Baugh. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that during Wiggins’s 

communications with Segura at the key points in the kidnapping-murder conspiracy, 

Wiggins said or did anything to suggest he was conspiring with Davis and Berry to simply 

rob Baugh. Instead, the timing of those communications support a reasonable inference 

that Segura knew that as part of the preparation for the offense, a U-Haul truck and bleach 

were obtained. Because a jury’s verdict may not be set aside based on mere conjecture, 

see Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d at 858, we find the analysis of the dissent unpersuasive. 

In sum, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain 

Segura’s convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree 

premeditated murder, under an aiding-and-abetting theory of liability. Therefore, these 

convictions must be reversed. But because we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to 

13 The dissent’s theory is only that there is a reasonable inference that Wiggins, Davis, 

and Berry intended to rob Baugh personally, rather than rob the house Baugh was showing. 

A U-Haul is typically not needed to rob someone’s person. 

14 Bleach, for example, is commonly used to cover up DNA evidence left at the crime 

scene. See, e.g., Crain v. State, 894 So.2d 59, 73–76 (Fla. 2004) (finding sufficient 

evidence to show that defendant murdered victim during a kidnapping to facilitate an 

assault and observing that “the presence of bleach” in defendant’s bathroom made it 

“impossible to tell how much of the luminol ‘glow’—if any—was attributable to blood”); 

State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 220-21 (Tenn. 2016) (finding that bleach was sprayed 

into victim’s mouth in an attempt to destroy evidence of perpetrator’s DNA); Bates v. State, 

750 S.E.2d 323, 326 (Ga. 2013) (finding circumstantial evidence sufficient to support 

murder conviction without DNA evidence, in part, because a bottle of bleach and bucket 

of bleach water were found in defendant’s apartment, and forensic expert testified that 

“washing hands and cleaning with bleach destroys any DNA”). 
25

sustain, under an aiding-and-abetting theory, Segura’s convictions for kidnapping to 

commit great bodily harm or terrorize and felony murder while committing a kidnapping, 

we must consider Segura’s remaining arguments. 

II. 

Segura contends that she is entitled to a new trial because the State, in closing 

argument, improperly urged the jury to find her guilty on the theory that she aided a drug 

business—a crime for which Segura was not indicted. Segura did not object to the 

prosecutor’s statements at trial. 

“When a defendant fails to object at trial, the forfeiture doctrine generally precludes 

appellate relief.” State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 784–85 (Minn. 2017). The 

forfeiture doctrine plays a vital role in the criminal justice system because it encourages 

defendants to object while before the district court so that “any errors can be corrected 

before their full impact is realized.” State v. Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. 2015)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But because a rigid and undeviating 

application of the forfeiture doctrine would be out of harmony with the rules of 

fundamental justice, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 31.02 provides appellate courts “a limited 

power to correct errors that were forfeited.” Beaulieu, 859 N.W.2d at 279 (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This limited power is known as the plainerror doctrine. Id. 

Our application of the plain error doctrine is modified when we review unobjectedto claims of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Jackson, 773 N.W.2d 111, 121 (Minn. 

2009). First, “[t]he defendant must prove an error was made that was plain.” Id. An error 
26

is plain if it “contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 

N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Prosecutors err when they misstate the law in closing 

argument. State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689–90 (Minn. 2002). 

If the defendant establishes an error that is plain, then “the burden shifts to the 

prosecution to demonstrate that the error did not affect substantial rights.” Jackson, 773 

N.W.2d at 121. “An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights only if there is a 

reasonable probability that the error actually impacted the verdict.” Id. Thus, “the State 

must show that there is ‘no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in 

question would have had a significant effect on the verdict.’ ” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 

792, 803–04 (Minn. 2016) (quoting Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302). We may correct a plain 

error that affects a defendant’s substantial rights “only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 804 (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

While describing the legal standard to find Segura guilty of kidnapping, murder, and 

attempted murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability in closing 

argument, the prosecutor stated: 

Aiding and abetting can be a complicated legal concept. . . . Even if [Segura] 

didn’t physically participate in the kidnapping, murder, and attempted 

murder here, she is guilty if she knew another person was going to commit or 

was committing a crime, and if she acted to aid the other person, so if she 

knew there were criminal acts going on and she acted to help. Well, she 

admits that. Even if all you want to believe, even if we take her at face value, 

which you shouldn’t, she’s saying she thought this was related to the drug 

business and that’s what was fishy about it.
27

She’s also guilty of any other crime the other person commits if it was 

reasonably foreseeable. Well, again, let’s take her at face value, which, 

again, you shouldn’t. The drug business comes with violence. It comes with 

guns. The circumstances under which she’s being told to do this stuff and 

the things she’s being told to do suggests very strongly that this is a serious 

crime that she’s assisting in. 

Segura bears the burden to demonstrate that these remarks constitute an error that is plain. 

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. 

Minnesota Statutes section 609.05 addresses aiding-and-abetting liability. Under 

subdivision 1, a defendant “is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the 

[defendant] intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise 

procures the other to commit the crime.” Id., subd. 1. Subdivision 2, which describes the 

“[e]xpansive liability” doctrine, provides that a defendant “liable under subdivision 1 is 

also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably 

foreseeable by the [defendant] as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to 

commit the crime intended.” Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added). 

Segura contends that the State was required to charge her with a drug-related offense 

in order to argue accomplice liability under subdivision 2 for crimes that were the 

foreseeable consequence of a “drug business.” We have never required that a defendant 

be charged with a particular “target crime” to be found liable under Minn. Stat. § 609.05, 

subd. 2, for crimes committed in pursuance of that [target] crime that are “reasonably 

foreseeable . . . as a probable consequence” of committing the target crime. 

But even if the State was not required to charge Segura with a drug offense, the 

prosecutor’s remarks to the jury improperly expanded the doctrine of expansive liability. 
28

It would be improper for a jury to convict Segura for crimes that were reasonably 

foreseeable to her as a probable consequence of a “drug business.” Under the plain 

language of Minnesota Statutes section 609.05, expansive liability under subdivision 2 

does not apply unless the State first proves that a defendant is liable under subdivision 1. 

Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2 (“A person liable under subdivision 1 is also liable for any 

other crime committed . . . .”). Accordingly, the jury would have to determine that Segura 

was criminally liable for a “drug business” under the aiding-and-abetting theory articulated 

in subdivision 1. But the criminality of the “drug business” was not identified and 

discussed in any detail to allow the jurors to reasonably determine which other crimes, if 

any, were reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of the “drug business.” 

As the California Supreme Court has recognized in the context of its own expansive

liability doctrine, “a conviction may not be based on the jury’s generalized belief that the 

defendant intended to assist and/or encourage unspecified ‘nefarious’ conduct.” People v. 

Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1024 (Cal. 1996) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We believe that the prosecutor’s view of aiding-and-abetting law, embodied in 

the “drug business” remarks, encouraged the jury to do just that—find Segura guilty on the 

belief that she intended to aid some unspecified illicit drug activity.15 

15 The State counters that any reference to the “drug business” and liability for crimes 

reasonably foreseeable as a result of the “drug business” was merely the prosecutor’s 

attempt to respond to Segura’s anticipated defense, i.e., that she only believed that the 

phone calls she made were related to Wiggins’s drug business. We have held that 

statements made during a prosecutor’s closing argument do not constitute prejudicial 

misconduct when the prosecutor counters an anticipated defense argument. See State v. 

Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 927 (Minn. 1994); State v. Carter, 289 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Minn. 
29

Nevertheless, even if the prosecutor’s remarks constitute an error that is plain, we 

conclude that the State has proved that any error did not affect Segura’s substantial rights. 

In assessing whether the State has met its burden to demonstrate that there is no “reasonable 

probability that the error actually impacted the verdict,” we consider several factors. 

Jackson, 773 N.W.2d at 121. These factors include “the strength of the evidence against 

the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant 

had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 

735 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007). “The trial court’s instructions to the jury are also 

relevant in determining whether the jury was unduly influenced by the [prosecutor’s] 

improper comments.” State v. Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994). 

While we hesitate to characterize the State’s evidence of Segura’s guilt as strong, 

the balance of factors leads us to conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the 

prosecutor’s remarks actually impacted the verdict. As an initial matter, we note that the 

prosecutor’s arguments concerning Segura’s liability stemming from the “drug business” 

cannot reasonably be characterized as “pervasive.” These comments are present in just one 

page of the 28-page transcript of the State’s closing argument. See Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 

806 (concluding that a prosecutor’s improper remarks were “isolated” when they 

“compris[ed] approximately one page of a 39–page closing argument”); State v. Griese, 

1979). But here, the prosecutor did more than simply discredit Segura’s defense. The 

prosecutor told the jury that it could find Segura guilty of any crimes that were reasonably 

foreseeable to her as a result of a “drug business.” As discussed above, this statement 

misstated the law by improperly expanding aiding-and-abetting liability under Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.05, subd. 2. 
30

565 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 1997) (concluding that prosecutorial misconduct that “was 

limited to a little more than two pages in a more than 50–page closing argument” did not 

permeate the entire closing argument). 

Moreover, the “drug business” theory was not the primary theory upon which the 

State urged the jury to find Segura criminally liable under an aiding-and-abetting theory. 

Immediately following the “drug business” comments, the prosecutor said to the jury:

But don’t accept her claims that she thought this was nothing more than 

relating to [Wiggins’s] drug distribution business because these are the 

actions of people who know that they’re planning and preparing to commit a 

violent crime, specifically. And in order to carry out these violent crimes, in 

order to accomplish them at all, to make them possible, she made all these 

calls and texts and contacts. 

. . . [Segura] knew full well her acts were enabling the commission of a crime. 

She knew full well that the crimes planned were the kidnapping of Monique 

Baugh in order to get to [J.M.-M.]. 

Accordingly, to prove the kidnapping, murder, and attempted murder charges, the 

prosecutor explicitly (and primarily) argued that Segura knew that the goal was not a “drug 

business” but to kidnap Baugh. 

Segura also had an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s remarks about the drug 

business in her own closing argument. Segura contends that this opportunity was 

undermined because the district court sustained objections to her argument about the 

knowledge requirement. It is true that the district court sustained one objection on the 

ground that Segura’s counsel misstated the law. Nevertheless, counsel had other 

opportunities to address the significance of Segura’s knowledge of drug-related crimes. 

For instance, Segura’s counsel stated: 
31

You heard a lot of evidence about drugs in this case; although, the crimes 

Ms. Segura is facing here are not drug related. You do not need to decide if 

she is guilty of any drug crimes or any involvement in that. The State is not 

asserting that the intended crime here was a drug case, but the history and 

evidence you have seen shows that that is the knowledge that Ms. Segura had 

about Mr. Wiggins. 

Thus, Segura’s one sustained objection did not completely undermine her opportunity to 

rebut the prosecutor’s remarks about her involvement in a drug business. 

Next, we consider the district court’s jury instructions. The impact of a prosecutor’s 

improper remarks during closing argument may be lessened by the district court’s jury 

instructions. Washington, 521 N.W.2d at 40. Thus, in Washington, we concluded that a 

prosecutor’s improper reference to a defendant’s character in closing argument did not 

warrant reversal in part because the district court “instructed the jury that the arguments of 

an attorney are not evidence” and “also warned the jury that they should not permit 

sympathy, prejudice or emotion to influence their verdict.” Id. 

Here, the district court instructed the jurors that they must follow and apply the rules 

of law as given to them. Like the district court in Washington, the district court explained 

that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence and that the jury should disregard any 

statement of law from attorneys that differed from the jury instructions. Thus, if the jury 

were following the district court’s instructions on this point, it would not have convicted 

Segura based on her intent to aid a drug business. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the State proved that there is no reasonable 

possibility that any error on the part of the prosecutor in referencing Segura’s intent to aid 
32

a drug business affected the jury’s verdict. Consequently, a new trial is not warranted 

because of prosecutorial misconduct. 

III. 

We next turn to Segura’s argument that she is entitled to a new trial due to erroneous 

jury instructions. Segura raises several issues with the district court’s jury instructions, 

including that the district court abused its discretion by denying her proposed accomplice

liability instructions and that the instructions it issued were confusing and misleading. “We 

review a district court’s jury instructions for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Huber, 877 

N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 2016). “District courts are entitled to considerable latitude when 

selecting language for jury instructions, but an instruction that materially misstates the law 

is error.” State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 144 (Minn. 2012). While we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Segura’s proposed instructions, we 

agree with Segura that the district court’s instructions materially misstated the law. 

Because we are not convinced that this error was harmless, Segura is entitled to a new trial. 

We therefore reverse Segura’s remaining convictions and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.16 

16 Segura also challenges the district court’s transferred intent instruction. 

Specifically, she argues that it was error to include a transferred intent instruction when 

instructing the jury on first-degree premeditated murder because there was no evidence that 

either Baugh or J.M.-M. were unintended victims. Because we reverse Segura’s conviction 

for first-degree premeditated murder on evidentiary sufficiency grounds, we need not 

address Segura’s argument concerning the transferred intent instruction. Additionally, 

Segura argues that the cumulative effect of the district court’s instructional errors deprived 

her of a fair trial. We do not address the merits of this argument in light of our conclusion 

that the district court’s material misstatement of the law in its instructions requires reversal 

of Segura’s convictions for kidnapping and felony murder. 
33

A. 

Segura first contends that the district court committed reversable error by denying 

her proposed accomplice liability instruction. A district court’s “[d]enial of a requested 

jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 

302 (Minn. 2015). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision as to whether to give 

an instruction is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in 

the record.” State v. Thoresen, 921 N.W.2d 547, 553 (Minn. 2019) (citation omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

At trial, Segura requested that the district court add language drawn from Rosemond 

v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014), to the accomplice liability instruction recommended 

by the jury instruction guides. See 10 Minn. Dist. Judges Ass’n, Minnesota Practice—

Jury Instruction Guides, Criminal, CRIMJIG 4.01 (6th ed. 2022) (“CRIMJIG 4.01”). 

Specifically, she requested the addition of the following language: “The intent requirement 

is satisfied when a person actively participates in a criminal venture with advance 

knowledge of the circumstances constituting the elements of the charged offense. Intent 

must go to the specific and entire crime charged.” The district court denied Segura’s 

request because it concluded that Rosemond concerned accomplice liability under a federal 

statute and was therefore inapplicable to Segura’s case.

As Segura concedes, Rosemond is not binding precedent because it involves the 

interpretation of a federal statute. At issue in Rosemond was the propriety of a district 

court’s jury instructions for a charge alleging aiding-and-abetting liability for a violation 
34

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a two-pronged crime involving (1) the use of a firearm, (2) in 

connection with a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime. 572 U.S. at 67. 

The United States Supreme Court concluded that the district court’s jury instruction 

was erroneous because it permitted a finding of guilt based on the defendant’s knowledge 

of the presence of a firearm after his participation in the underlying trafficking offense. Id. 

at 81–82. Based on its review of the criminal statute, the Court concluded that a proper 

instruction should have “explain[ed] that [the defendant] needed advance knowledge of a 

firearm’s presence.” Id. at 81. More specifically, the erroneous instruction allowed the 

jury to convict based on an intent “to advance some different or lesser offense” (e.g., drug 

trafficking), but accomplice liability was predicated upon a finding of intent extending “to 

the specific and entire crime charged” (i.e., armed drug trafficking). Id. at 76. 

Segura’s proposed language relates to the intent requirement of aiding-and-abetting 

liability. We have previously stated that jury instructions must explain that the 

“intentionally aiding” element requires that “the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant knew his alleged accomplice was going to commit a crime and the 

defendant intended his presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” E.g., 

State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 808 (Minn. 2012). Nevertheless, “we afford the district 

courts ‘considerable latitude’ in choosing the language explaining that element.” Id. at 808 

n.12 (quoting State v. Ihle, 640 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 2002)). 

The State’s assertion that we have already rejected a Rosemond-like instruction for 

accomplice liability instructions is inaccurate. See State v. Onyelobi, 879 N.W.2d 334, 354 

(Minn. 2016) (declining to address whether Rosemond is “consistent with Minnesota’s 
35

accomplice liability law” because the Court’s holding did not help the defendant). 

Nevertheless, we have never required that accomplice liability instructions explain that the 

“intentionally aiding” element “go to the specific and entire crime” as Segura argues. 

Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion when it 

denied Segura’s requested instruction. 

B. 

Segura next argues that the district court committed reversible error by giving a 

hybrid instruction that incorporated both principal and accomplice liability concepts. 

Specifically, she points to the district court’s use of the language “the defendant or another 

(or others)” when describing the elements of the underlying crimes that Segura allegedly 

aided and abetted. Segura claims the addition of this language makes the jury instructions 

hybrid instructions, and that this language was confusing and misleading. 

We review the district court’s jury instructions for abuse of discretion. State v. 

Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 816 (Minn. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion if the 

challenged instruction confuses, misleads, or materially misstates the law.” Id. “We 

review the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately 

explain the law.” Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 522. However, “[a] mistaken jury instruction 

does not require a new trial if the error was harmless.” State v. Hall, 722 N.W.2d 472, 477 

(Minn. 2006). “An erroneous jury instruction is harmless only if it can be said that, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant impact on the verdict rendered.” Id.

Hybrid instructions are “instructions that combine accomplice liability and the 

underlying elements.” Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d at 408. The danger of such instructions is that 
36

“when the district court conflates the elements of accomplice liability and the underlying 

substantive offense, the instruction risks omitting the ‘intentionally aiding’ element of 

accomplice liability.” Huber, 877 N.W.2d at 524 n.3. As we stated in Ezeka, “[t]he era of 

hybrid instructions has ended,” and now “district courts must separately instruct the jury 

on accomplice liability and on the underlying elements of the substantive offenses.” 946 

N.W.2d at 408. 

We agree with Segura’s contention that the district court issued impermissible 

hybrid instructions in this case. Based strictly on form, the district court’s instructions 

comported with our case law. Consistent with our rule in Ezeka, the district court 

separately instructed the jury on the underlying elements of the four substantive offenses 

with which Segura was charged and on accomplice liability. Moreover, the district court 

gave a separate accomplice liability instruction after instructing the jury on the elements of 

each substantive offense, as recommended by the CRIMJIG on accomplice liability. See

CRIMJIG 4.01; see also Minn. Stat. § 609.05. 

However, the practical effect of the district court’s addition of the language “the 

Defendant or another” to the instructions was to “combine accomplice liability and the 

underlying elements”—the concern that led us to put an end to hybrid instructions. Ezeka, 

946 N.W.2d at 408. Not only did this additional language materially misstate the law, but 

it also made the instructions confusing and misleading. The district court added this 

disputed language to its instructions on the underlying elements of each substantive crime. 

Consider, for example, the instruction on kidnapping to commit great bodily harm 

or to terrorize. The district court’s instructions for the underlying elements provided: 
37

The elements of kidnapping to commit great bodily harm/terrorize are 

first, the defendant or another (or others) confined or removed Monique 

Baugh from one place to another without her consent. . . . 

Second, the defendant or other persons acted for the purpose of 

committing great bodily harm on the person of Monique Baugh or terrorizing 

Monique Baugh. . . . It is not necessary that the defendant or that other 

person(s) actually caused great bodily harm to Monique Baugh or have 

terrorized Monique Baugh so long as the defendant or that other person(s)

intended to do so. 

Third, some part of the defendant’s act took place on or about 

December 29th through 31st, 2019, in Hennepin County. 

(Emphasis added.) The district court then transitioned from the elements of the underlying 

crime to the accomplice liability instruction by telling the jurors: 

If you find that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt, the defendant is guilty of this charge; if you find that any element has 

not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty of 

this charge, unless you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant is liable for this crime committed by another person 

according to the instruction below. 

(Emphasis added.) When viewed together, these instructions materially misstate the law

because they—by their plain language—allow the jury to convict Segura of kidnapping for 

the actions of others without reaching the issue of her liability under an aiding-and-abetting 

theory.17 The jury could find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that 

(1) another person confined or removed Monique Baugh from one place to another without 

her consent, (2) the other person acted for the purpose of committing great bodily harm on 

the person of Monique Baugh or terrorizing Monique Baugh, and (3) that Segura took some 

17 This format of instructing on the elements of the underlying crime with the language 

“the defendant or another” and then instructing on accomplice liability is repeated for each 

count. The district court used this format for both its oral and written instructions. 
38

action on December 29–31 in Hennepin County. Under the plain language of the 

instructions, the jury could convict Segura of kidnapping based on these findings alone. 

Thus, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by providing hybrid 

instructions that materially misstated the law. 

But this conclusion does not end our analysis. Segura is entitled to a new trial only 

if these erroneous instructions were not harmless. “An erroneous jury instruction is 

harmless only if it can be said that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error had no significant 

impact on the verdict rendered.” Hall, 722 N.W.2d at 477. 

We presume that juries follow instructions given by the district court. State v. 

Gatson, 801 N.W.2d 134, 151 (Minn. 2011). Given that presumption, and based on the 

material misstatement of the law in the jury instructions and the overwhelming evidence 

that Berry and Davis kidnapped and murdered Baugh, we cannot say—beyond a reasonable 

doubt—that the erroneous instructions had no significant impact on the jury’s verdict. 

Therefore, we conclude that the erroneous jury instructions were not harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt and that Segura is entitled to a new trial. We reverse Segura’s convictions

for kidnapping and felony murder and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

IV. 

Finally, Segura argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence that she 

contends should have been excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 410. Specifically, Segura points 

to the testimony that the State elicited from her concerning statements she made during 

plea proffers. Segura filed a pretrial motion to prohibit the State from admitting her 

recorded proffer statement and transcript into evidence. However, she did not object at 
39

trial to the questions the State asked her on cross-examination related to her proffer 

statements. 

We review an unobjected-to admission of evidence for plain error affecting 

substantial rights. State v. Brown, 792 N.W.2d 815, 820–21 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly, 

we must first determine whether Segura has established that the admission of her proffer 

statements was an error that was plain. See Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 

(Minn. 2022). On the question of whether an error occurred, “[i]n determining whether 

admission of evidence violates Minn. R. Evid. 410, we review a district court’s findings of 

fact for clear error and review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Brown, 792 N.W.2d 

at 821. 

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 410 addresses the admissibility of a defendant’s proffer 

statements: 

Evidence of . . . an offer to plead guilty . . . to the crime charged or any other 

crime or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or 

offers, is not admissible in any civil, criminal, or administrative action, case, 

or proceeding whether offered for or against the person who made the plea 

or offer. 

“Rule 410 safeguards the confidentiality of plea negotiations in order to foster meaningful 

dialogue between the parties and to promote the disposition of criminal cases by 

compromise.” State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 620 (Minn. 2004). But “[t]he evidentiary 

safeguards provided for under Rule 410 for statements made in connection with a plea or 

plea offer . . . may be waived.” Id. at 617. “Waiver ‘is an intentional relinquishment of a 

known right or privilege, and its validity depends . . . upon the particular facts and 
40

circumstances surrounding the case.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 

264 (Minn. 1990)). 

We first address whether Segura validly waived the protections of Rule 410. Before 

the proffer meeting at which Segura made the statements at issue, she signed a written 

agreement. This agreement states in relevant part: 

If, during this meeting, Elsa Segura implicates herself in any crime, any 

statements Ms. Segura makes during the meeting will not be offered as 

evidence in the State’s case-in-chief against her. Statements made by Ms. 

Segura during the meeting may only be used to cross-examine . . . her should 

she testify at trial. 

Both Segura and her counsel signed the agreement, acknowledging that they had reviewed 

it together. Segura then attended the proffer meeting with her attorney. Based on this 

written agreement, as well as the other surrounding facts and circumstances, we conclude 

that Segura validly waived the evidentiary protections of Rule 410. 

We turn next to the issue of whether the State permissibly used Segura’s proffer 

statements as impeachment evidence on cross-examination.18 The Minnesota Rules of 

Evidence permit the State to impeach a witness’s testimony at trial with evidence of her 

bias and with her prior inconsistent statements. Minn. R. Evid. 613 (prior inconsistent 

statements); Minn. R. Evid. 616 (evidence of bias); State v. Larson, 787 N.W.2d 592, 598 

(Minn. 2010) (“Evidence of bias of a witness is admissible to attack the credibility of a 

18 If the protections of Rule 410 apply, “[t]here is no impeachment exception to the 

general rule that statements made in connection with plea negotiations are inadmissible.” 

State v. Robledo-Kinney, 615 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2000). Here, however, Segura validly 

waived her rights under Rule 410. Therefore, the admissibility of her statements for 

impeachment purposes are subject to other rules of evidence. 
41

witness.”); State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1976) (“It is well established that proper 

impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements.”). 

On direct examination, Segura testified that, after she became aware of Baugh’s 

death, she told investigators about the calls she had made to Baugh. On cross-examination, 

the State questioned Segura about her motive for speaking to law enforcement and 

statements she made during the proffer meeting that were inconsistent with her trial 

testimony.19 We conclude that Segura’s proffer statements were admissible as 

impeachment evidence as it pertained to her bias and her prior inconsistent statements. 

Accordingly, Segura has failed to establish an error. Segura’s argument that the district 

court committed reversible error by admitting evidence related to her proffer statements is 

without merit. 

* * * 

We reach our decisions in this difficult case with full recognition of the grievous 

loss suffered by Baugh’s family and the communities involved with this case, as well as 

the injuries inflicted on J.M.-M. We realize that our opinion may result in another trial 

involving these difficult facts and intensify the grief of those affected by the senseless acts 

of violence perpetrated on Baugh and her boyfriend. Nevertheless, we are duty-bound to 

ensure that a defendant in a criminal trial is not convicted based on insufficient evidence 

19 For instance, Segura acknowledged, in response to the State’s questioning, that she 

provided information to law enforcement “to get a plea deal.” After Segura testified on 

direct examination that J.M.-M. had been at her house “four to five times” and that she 

would not characterize him as a friend, the State impeached Segura with a statement she 

made during the proffer meeting in which she said she was friends with J.M.-M. 
42

or erroneous jury instructions that were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. On this 

record, we conclude that these standards were not met. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Segura’s convictions and remand for further 

proceedings on the kidnapping and felony murder charges consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded. 

PROCACCINI, J, not having been a member of this court at the time of submission, 

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
C/D-1 

C O N C U R R E N C E & D I S S E N T 

THISSEN, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part). 

 I concur in the court’s holdings in this case with one exception. I disagree with the 

court’s holding that there is sufficient evidence to sustain appellant Elsa Segura’s 

convictions for aiding and abetting kidnapping and first-degree felony murder during the 

commission of a kidnapping. 

Among other things, Segura challenges whether the State presented sufficient 

evidence to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, Elsa Segura’s four convictions under 

aiding-and-abetting theories of criminal liability: first-degree premeditated murder under 

Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(1) (2022); attempted murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.17 (2022); 

kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2022); and first-degree felony murder 

with a predicate act of kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2022). Segura is 

challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence on all four counts. 

The court concludes that insufficient evidence exists to support Segura’s 

convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and attempted first-degree premeditated 

murder under aiding-and-abetting theories of liability. I agree. 

The court also concludes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Segura’s 

convictions for aiding and abetting kidnapping and first-degree felony murder during the 

commission of a kidnapping. Both crimes require the State to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Segura knew that the principals in this crime would commit kidnapping and that 

Segura intended for her actions to further the commission of the crimes. To reach that 
C/D-2 

holding, the court states that the facts proved support only one reasonable inference—that 

Segura knew that the principals planned to kidnap the victim, Monique Baugh, and that she 

intended for her actions to further that crime. In fact, another reasonable inference 

exists—that Segura knew that the principals planned some criminal or illicit activity but 

not kidnapping and intended her actions to further that other crime or activity. And because 

that alternative reasonable inference exists, our precedent and the constitution compel the 

conclusion that the State did not demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura aided 

and abetted a kidnapping. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 

Kidnapping is defined in Minnesota statute as follows: 

Whoever, for any of the following purposes, confines or removes 

from one place to another, any person without the person’s consent . . . , is 

guilty of kidnapping and may be sentenced as provided in subdivision 2: 

(1) to hold for ransom or reward for release, or as shield or hostage; 

or 

(2) to facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or 

(3) to commit great bodily harm or to terrorize the victim or another; 

or 

(4) to hold in involuntary servitude. 

Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1 (2022). A person commits first-degree felony murder when 

she “causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person 

or another, while committing or attempting to commit . . . kidnapping.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.185(a)(3). Thus, to be convicted of kidnapping or felony murder with a predicate 

act of kidnapping, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

engaged in the conduct that qualifies as kidnapping under the statute. 

Segura is charged with aiding and abetting kidnapping and felony murder for which 

the kidnapping is the predicate crime. Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2022) (“A person is 
C/D-3 

criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, 

hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”). 

The “intentionally aids” element requires that the defendant “knew that [her] alleged 

accomplices were going to commit a crime” and that the defendant “intended [her] 

presence or actions to further the commission of that crime.” State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 

675, 682 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added). To convict Segura of aiding and abetting 

kidnapping and felony murder while committing a kidnapping, then, the State must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura knew that her accomplices were going to engage in 

the conduct described in the kidnapping statute and also “intended [her] presence or actions 

to further the commission of” the kidnapping. Id.1

 The question we must answer is 

whether the State presented sufficient evidence to meet that burden. 

It is not controversial to say that “[o]ur review of the sufficiency of the evidence 

proceeds against the fundamental background principle that a person in this country is 

innocent until proven guilty on all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State 

v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 157 (Minn. 2023) (Thissen, J., dissenting). For sufficiencyof-the-evidence cases, we use two different tests based on the evidence admitted at 

1 If a person is liable as an accomplice for a crime under subdivision 1 of Minnesota 

Statutes section 609.05, the person is “also liable for any other crime committed in 

pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by the person as a probable 

consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended.” Id., subd. 2 

(2022). The intentional death of a person may be a foreseeable consequence of a 

kidnapping. See, e.g., State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 1985). Because I 

conclude that the State did not sufficiently prove Segura knew that her accomplices were 

going to kidnap Baugh, I do not reach the question of the reasonable foreseeability of 

Baugh’s death. 
C/D-4 

trial—the direct-evidence test and the circumstantial-evidence test. When direct evidence 

establishes an element of the crime, we painstakingly review the record “to determine 

whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was 

sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” State v. Ortega, 

813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012) (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 

(Minn. 1989)). 

But when a jury must draw inferences from direct evidence to ascertain a fact—that 

is, when it uses circumstantial evidence2

—we apply a heightened two-step process. 

Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150; State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 474–75 (Minn. 2010) 

(stating that the heightened-scrutiny standard applies to any disputed element of the 

conviction that is based on circumstantial evidence). At the first step, we identify the facts 

proved by direct evidence that are uncontroverted or consistent with the jury’s verdict. 

State v. Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn. 2022). It is only at this stage that we defer 

to the jury. Id. We accept direct evidence that is consistent with the guilty verdict and 

reject any evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 

320, 329 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Stein, 217 N.W. 683, 684 (Minn. 1928)). The second 

step requires us to independently review the facts proved and assess whether the inference 

drawn by the jury from the facts proved is rational and whether any inferences contrary to 

2 See Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining circumstantial 

evidence as “[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation” 

and direct evidence as “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and 

that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption”); Bernhardt v. State, 

684 N.W.2d 465, 477 n.11 (Minn. 2004) (defining direct and circumstantial evidence). 
C/D-5 

the jury verdict are rational. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 473–74. Importantly, as the court 

states, we do not defer to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences at this stage. 

Here, everyone agrees that the circumstantial-evidence test applies. 

With that background, I analyze the sufficiency of the evidence to support Segura’s 

convictions for kidnapping and felony murder during the commission of a kidnapping 

under aiding-and-abetting theories of liability. No one disputes that the principals (Cedric 

Berry and Berry Davis) who committed these tragic crimes kidnapped Baugh, transported 

Baugh to her home where they shot her boyfriend, and then drove Baugh to an alley in 

Minneapolis and shot her. No one disputes that Lyndon Wiggins helped Berry and Davis 

plan and execute these crimes. And everyone agrees that Segura arranged for Baugh to 

come to the location where Baugh was kidnapped, but that Segura was not present when 

the kidnapping occurred. Rather, Segura is charged with aiding and abetting the crimes of 

kidnapping and felony murder with a predicate crime of kidnapping. The question here, as 

the court aptly points out, is “what Segura knew when she scheduled the house showing 

with Baugh.” Supra at 17. 

I start by identifying the facts that are not inconsistent with the jury’s verdict. The 

relevant facts proved are as follows: Wiggins had a falling-out with J.M.-M. Segura 

followed J.M.-M. on social media and saw posts about Baugh. Wiggins instructed Segura 

to call a realtor. Segura knew that she was scheduling a house viewing with a realtor and 

she called the realtor under suspect circumstances (she used a fake name, called from a 

phone that Wiggins provided, and left her house whenever she used the phone). Segura 
C/D-6 

had dated Wiggins for several years and she knew that Wiggins had previously committed 

an aggravated robbery during which he kidnapped a victim. 

I agree with the court that the facts proved support a reasonable inference that 

Segura is guilty of the kidnapping under an aiding-and-abetting theory of criminal liability. 

As the court appropriately reasons, the suspicious circumstances under which Segura made 

the house showing (using a different phone, arranging the house showing under a fake 

name, and making calls away from her house) in tandem with Segura’s knowledge that 

Wiggins’s criminal history included an aggravated robbery involving a kidnapping, lead to 

a rational inference (a very low bar) that Segura knew that Wiggins was planning to kidnap 

Baugh. Supra at 19, 22. 

I conclude, however, that the facts proved are also consistent with a reasonable 

hypothesis that Segura did not know that Wiggins was planning to kidnap Baugh. Rather, 

as Segura contends, a reasonable person could infer from the facts proved that she believed 

she was assisting Wiggins with some crime less serious than kidnapping. 

The court dismisses this alternative inference as unreasonable because Segura knew 

Wiggins had previously participated in an aggravated robbery with a “kidnapping 

component.” Supra at 5–6. But simply because Segura knew that Wiggins had previously 

participated in a crime where a victim was kidnapped does not inevitably mean that Segura 

knew that Wiggins planned a kidnapping in this case. Again, that is a reasonable inference 

but not the exclusive reasonable inference. That conclusion is apparent on the face of the 

assertion; another (but not the only alternative) reasonable inference from Wiggins’s prior 

conduct is that Segura thought Wiggins was going to commit robbery. The same facts 
C/D-7 

could support a more general conclusion that Wiggins was going to assault Baugh or 

commit some other crime that would get at J.M.-M. through Baugh. And all the other facts 

proved (Segura’s awareness of a relationship between Baugh and her boyfriend, Wiggins’s 

dispute with J.M.-M., the suspicious circumstances of Segura’s call to arrange a house 

showing where Baugh would be isolated) are also consistent with an alternative reasonable 

inference that her accomplices would commit a crime other than kidnapping. 

It is also important that the relevant circumstances proved are those that go to the 

disputed element; namely, what did Segura know when she scheduled the house showing 

with Baugh. There is no direct evidence that Segura knew that Wiggins, Berry, and Davis 

were using a U-Haul or that they had ammonia or bleach with them and so those “facts” 

cannot be considered circumstances proved concerning Baugh’s knowledge under 

the circumstantial-evidence test. The circumstances proved include only those facts 

established by direct evidence. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 n.4 (Minn. 2017); 

Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 159 (Thissen, J., dissenting). The court focuses on the fact that 

Wiggins called Segura around the time the U-Haul was rented, but that is not direct

evidence that Segura knew a U-Haul was rented. One reasonable inference is that Wiggins 

told Segura that he had just rented a U-Haul. But it is not an unreasonable inference that 

Wiggins was, for example, simply checking in on the status of Segura’s role in the crime 

with no mention of the U-Haul. And the court makes no effort to show Segura knew about 

the ammonia or bleach; it just asserts that fact. 

In short, based on all the facts proved, it is reasonable to infer that Segura knew that 

her accomplices would commit a different crime (such as robbery or assault) to get back at 
C/D-8 

J.M.-M. None of this reflects well on Segura, of course. Her conduct in this case was 

appalling and the outcome was tragic. But that is not the question before us. Based on 

how the State charged the case—and the facts the State proved by direct evidence at 

trial—the question is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura knew 

that her accomplices intended to kidnap Baugh. 

To convict Segura of aiding and abetting kidnapping and felony murder with a 

predicate crime of kidnapping, the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that Segura knew that her accomplices were going to commit kidnapping. Any reasonable 

hypothesis that Segura did not know about the kidnapping is thus a reasonable hypothesis 

of innocence. The court adopts a much too constricted view of what constitutes a rational 

inference; it is in essence deferring to the jury’s choice of inferences. Because it is 

reasonable to infer that Segura knew that she was aiding Wiggins in a crime other than 

kidnapping, it follows that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Segura 

intentionally aided in the kidnapping of Baugh. Therefore, under our case law and the 

constitution, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the 

crimes of kidnapping or felony murder with kidnapping as a predicate offense and her 

convictions must be reversed. 

ANDERSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part). 

 I join in the concurrence in part and dissent in part of Justice Thissen.