alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2017239EN.01004701.xml

| 24.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 239/47 |
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24.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 239/47

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Action brought on 15 April 2017 — Mémora Servicios Funerarios v EUIPO — Chatenoud (MEMORAME)

(Case T-221/17)

(2017/C 239/59)

Language in which the application was lodged: Spanish

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Mémora Servicios Funerarios SLU (Zaragoza, Spain) (represented by: C. Marí Aguilar and J. Gallego Jiménez, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Georges Chatenoud (Thiviers, France)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal:

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Applicant for the trade mark at issue:

Trade mark at issue: European Union word mark ‘MEMORAME’ – Application for registration No 12 929 071

Trade mark at issue:

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Procedure before EUIPO

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 10/02/2017 in Case R 1308/2016-4

Contested decision

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the decision of EUIPO of 10 February 2017 in Case R 1308/2016-4 which in part granted the application for EU trade mark No 12929071 ‘MEMORAME’ and, consequently, reject in its entirety EU trade mark application No 12929071 ‘MEMORAME’; |
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annul the decision of EUIPO of 10 February 2017 in Case R 1308/2016-4 which in part granted the application for EU trade mark No 12929071 ‘MEMORAME’ and, consequently, reject in its entirety EU trade mark application No 12929071 ‘MEMORAME’;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in accordance with Article 87(2) and (3) of the Rules [of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991]. |
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order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred by the applicant in accordance with Article 87(2) and (3) of the Rules [of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991].

Pleas in law

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b and (5) of Regulation No 207/2009. |
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Infringement of Article 8(1)(b and (5) of Regulation No 207/2009.

| — | The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal of EUIPO did not properly take into account the high degree of recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark ‘MEMORA’ in the European Union. |
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The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal of EUIPO did not properly take into account the high degree of recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark ‘MEMORA’ in the European Union.

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I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4267 

To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to provide relief for end users 

who use physical contracts with volumetric optionality. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 14, 2014 

Mr. MCALLISTER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To amend the Commodity Exchange Act to provide relief 

for end users who use physical contracts with volumetric 

optionality. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Commodity Delivery 

5 Relief Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RELIEF FOR END USERS WHO USE PHYSICAL CON7 TRACTS WITH VOLUMETRIC OPTIONALITY. 

8 Section 1a(47)(B)(ii) of the Commodity Exchange 

9 Act (7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(B)(ii)) is amended to read as fol10 lows: 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4267 IH

1 ‘‘(ii) any purchase or sale of a non2 financial commodity or security for de3 ferred shipment or delivery, so long as the 

4 transaction is intended to be physically set5 tled, including any stand-alone or embed6 ded option for which exercise results in a 

7 physical delivery obligation;’’. 

Æ 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 12.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

 

I, Marcos Grodetsky, certify that: ******

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Tele Norte Leste Participações S.A.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

b) evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report (the “Evaluation Date”) based on such evaluation; 

 

c) presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures based on our evaluation as of the Evaluation Date; and 

 

d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (orpersons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

 

b) anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting. 

 

Date: June 24, 2004
STATE of North Carolina v. Grady Callaway FOGLEMAN

No. COA17-1358

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 17, 2018

NO ERROR.
Avery RIGGSBEE, Plaintiff, v. James R. TAYLOR, Employer; Interstate Insurance Services Group, Inc., Carrier, Defendants.

No. COA17-560

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 5, 2017

Avery Riggsbee, pro se, plaintiff-appellant

No brief filed for defendant-appellees.

STROUD, Judge.

Before we even attempt to address any underlying facts or issues, we note that the record on appeal is confusing and appears to lack even the order from which plaintiff now apparently claims to appeal; in addition, we do not even know for certain *what* order plaintiff is appealing, as there is neither a recent order nor a recognizable notice of appeal in this record. What follows is our brief attempt at laying out the underlying procedural facts, to the best of our ability with these limitations. The only thing we know for certain is that this appeal must be dismissed.

On or about 20 March 2002, the North Carolina Industrial Commission ("Commission") filed an order suspending payment of compensation to plaintiff continuing until he complied with the prescribed medical treatment. Plaintiff's appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals was apparently dismissed for failure to timely and properly file a record on appeal. On 21 January 2003, the Commission filed an order ruling that because the appeal was dismissed, its opinion and award filed on 17 June 20021 was final and binding. According to this Court's records, on 16 September 2003 plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking belated appellate review. This Court denied the petition on 22 December 2003.

On 30 May 2017, plaintiff filed a record on appeal in this Court. To appeal an opinion and award or order of the Commission, the aggrieved party must file notice of appeal within 30 days after receipt of the decision of the Commission in accordance with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-86 (2015). The 30-day period for an appeal in this matter has long passed. Rule 18(b)(2) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the notice of appeal must be filed and served within 30 days after receipt of the final order of an agency or commission. This rule further provides that the notice of appeal shall specify the party taking the appeal, designate the final agency determination from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken, and be signed by the party if not represented by counsel. N.C.R. App. P. 18(a)(2). Rule 18(c)(9) requires that a copy of the notice of appeal be included in the record on appeal. Failure to give timely notice of appeal will cause dismissal of the appeal. *Fisher v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours,*54 N.C. App. 176, 177, 282 S.E.2d 543, 543 (1981). Because the record on appeal contains no notice of appeal showing appeal was timely and properly given, the appeal is dismissed.

DISMISSED.

Report per Rule 30(e).

Chief Judge McGEE and Judge DILLON concur.

1

This order is nowhere to be found in the record on appeal; it is simply referenced in the Commission's 21 January 2003 order.
United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

E.D., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, PUGET 

SOUND NAVAL STATION, Bremerton, WA, 

Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 17-0110 

Issued: April 24, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

ORDER REMANDING CASE 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

On October 27, 2016 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 28, 2016 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

The Board has duly considered the matter and finds that the case is not in posture for a 

decision. In this regard, the Board notes that, in the present matter, File No. xxxxxx124, 

appellant filed a hearing loss claim on November 3, 2015. In a development letter to appellant 

dated December 4, 2015, OWCP reviewed a statement of accepted facts (SOAF) contained in 

appellant’s prior hearing loss claim, File No. xxxxxx732.1

 In the April 28, 2016 decision, it 

noted that the medical evidence submitted was from the previously accepted claim. As 

assembled, the case record now before the Board does not contain the case file for File No. 

xxxxxx732. 

The case will be remanded to OWCP to combine case File Nos. xxxxxx124 and 

xxxxxx732. Following this and such other development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue 

an appropriate merit decision on appellant’s claim. 

 1

 File No. xxxxxx732. 
2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the April 28, 2016 decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this order of the Board. 

Issued: April 24, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4100 

To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 to permit the 

collection of user fees by non-Federal entities in connection with the 

challenge cost-sharing program for management of recreation facilities, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 26, 2014 

Mr. COTTON (for himself, Mr. GRAVES of Missouri, Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas, Mr. WOMACK, Mr. BROUN of Georgia, Mr. BRIDENSTINE, and Mr. CRAWFORD) introduced the following 

bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend the Water Resources Development Act of 1992 

to permit the collection of user fees by non-Federal entities in connection with the challenge cost-sharing program for management of recreation facilities, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Local Organization 

5 Cooperative Agreement for Land and Facility Mainte6 nance Act of 2014’’ or the ‘‘LOCAL Act of 2014’’. 


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2 

•HR 4100 IH

1 SEC. 2. CHALLENGE COST-SHARING PROGRAM FOR MAN2 AGEMENT OF RECREATION FACILITIES. 

3 Section 225 of the Water Resources Development Act 

4 of 1992 (33 U.S.C. 2328) is amended— 

5 (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub6 section (d); and 

7 (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol8 lowing: 

9 ‘‘(c) USER FEES.— 

10 ‘‘(1) COLLECTION OF FEES.—The Secretary 

11 may permit a non-Federal public or private entity 

12 that has entered into an agreement pursuant to sub13 section (b) to collect user fees for the use of devel14 oped recreation sites and facilities, whether devel15 oped or constructed by such entity or the Depart16 ment of the Army. 

17 ‘‘(2) USE OF FEES.—A non-Federal public or 

18 private entity collecting user fees pursuant to para19 graph (1) may— 

20 ‘‘(A) retain up to 100 percent of the fees 

21 collected, as determined by the Secretary; and 

22 ‘‘(B) use that amount, as approved by the 

23 Secretary, for operation, maintenance, and 

24 management at the recreation site where col25 lected, notwithstanding section 210(b)(4) of the 


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3 

•HR 4100 IH

1 Flood Control Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 460d– 

2 3(b)(4)). 

3 ‘‘(3) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—The authority 

4 of a non-Federal public or private entity under this 

5 subsection shall be subject to such terms and condi6 tions as the Secretary determines necessary to pro7 tect the interests of the United States.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
In the MATTER OF Helen Mae Case Cooper Walls HOUSE, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program

In the Matter of Ruby Jacqueline Brown Davis, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program

In the Matter of Martin William, Zimmerman, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program

In the Matter of Geneva Moragne Ware, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program

In the Matter of Maxine Colvard, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program

Nos. 101P16 146P16 147P16 177P16 178P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 26, 2017

Bobby L. Bollinger, Jr., Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for House, Helen Mae Case Cooper Walls.

Marc X. Sneed, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

Karen A. Blum, Special Deputy Attorney General.

Leslie O. Wickham, Jr., Attorney at Law, Durham, for Davis, Ruby Jacqueline Brown.

*205*ORDER*

The petitions for discretionary review filed in cases 146P16, 147P16, 177P16, and 178P16 are allowed for the limited purpose of reversing the Court of Appeals' dismissal of claimants' constitutional claims. These cases are remanded to the Court of Appeals for expedited consideration of the constitutional claims on the merits. *See**In re Redmond* , 369 N.C. 490, 797 S.E.2d 275, 280 (2017) ("When an appeal lies directly to the Appellate Division from an administrative tribunal, ... a constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time in the Appellate Division as it is the first destination for the dispute in the General Court of Justice.").

To prevent manifest injustice, the petition for discretionary review filed in case 101P16 is allowed for the limited purpose of remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for expedited consideration of claimant's constitutional claim on the merits.

*206By order of the Court in Conference, this the *26th* day of September, 2017.
#### Stanley VORSTEG, Appellant, v. Edmund THOMAS and Patricia, his wife, individually, and Patricia Thomas, as parent and natural guardian of Giselle Thomas, a minor, Appellees.

No. 4D02-1952.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 27, 2003.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 2003.

*1103H. Mark Purdy of Purdy & Flynn, P.A., and Fred L. Fulmer of Law Offices of Fred Land Fulmer, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Patrice A. Talisman of Hersch & Talisman, P.A., Miami, and Silverstein, Silver-stein *&*Silverstein, Aventura, for appel-lees.

WARNER, J.

We affirm the final judgment awarding appellee damages. While appellant contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting speculative testimony regarding appellee’s future lost earning capacity, counsel did not object to the evidence. As to both future lost earning capacity and future medical expenses, appellant and appellee offered conflicting expert testimony. The jury returned a verdict favoring appellee’s experts’ view of the evidence.

A jury is free to determine the credibility of experts and, where there is conflicting evidence, the weight to attach to their opinions. *See Easkold v. Rhodes,*614 So.2d 495, 498 (Fla.1993). A damages award supported by competent, substantial evidence should be affirmed. *See Perma Builders, Inc. v. JBM Assocs.,*472 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); *see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. McKenna,*726 So.2d 361, 363-64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). We also conclude that the award in this case is not so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, given the severe injuries to appellee and the future care required. *See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shilling,*374 So.2d 611, 613 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).

Finally, appellant argues that the court erred by sending in to the jury during deliberations appellee’s rehabilitation expert’s report, when the appellant’s expert’s report was not also sent in. However, appellant’s expert’s report was not admitted into evidence, and appellant does not raise the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on the report as an issue on appeal. Moreover, appellant never objected to sending appellee’s admitted evidence to the jury on the grounds asserted on appeal. As such, the issue is not preserved. *See Steinhorst v. State,*412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982); *Lacey v. State,*831 So.2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Affirmed.

POLEN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
STATE of North Carolina v. Jamar Mexia DAVIS

No. COA 17-615

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 6, 2018

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.1

 

FIVE STAR QUALITY CARE, INC.

 

Summary of Director Compensation

 

The following is a summary of the currently effective compensation of the Directors of Five Star Quality Care, Inc. (the “Company”) for services as Directors, which is subject to modification at any time by the Board of Directors.

 

·                  Each Independent Director receives an annual fee of $35,000, plus a fee of $1,000 for each meeting attended.  Up to two $1,000 fees are payable if more than one board and board committee meetings are held on the same date.

 

·                  The chairpersons of our quality of care committee, audit committee, compensation committee and nominating and governance committee receive an additional annual fee of $17,500, $17,500, $7,500 and $7,500, respectively.

 

·                  Each Director receives a grant of 7,500 shares of the Company’s common stock on the date of the first board meeting following each annual meeting of stockholders (or, for Directors who are first elected or appointed at other times, on the day of the first board meeting attended).

 

·                  The Company generally reimburses all Directors for travel expenses incurred in connection with their duties as Directors and for out of pocket costs incurred from their attending certain continuing education programs.
Grier FLEISCHHAUER, Rex H. Frazier and Jennie Frazier, Robert Taylor and Barry Taylor, Jack V. Mackmull; Herbert Netherton and Dorothy L. Netherton, Ed Hartman and Kathy Hartman, Stephen J. Leary and Patti Leary, Barbara Sacchi, Jack Matthews and Serena Matthews, Jerry Toomes; Donald Lesage and Judy Lesage; Edward Mennona; Stanley M. Farrior and Julie E. Farrior; Bill Burns and Julie Burns; Lisa Beresnyak; Walter Starkey; Catherine Murphy; Randy Price ; Don Tisdale and Vicky Tisdale; James York and Diana York; Kim France ; Gwen Frazier and Jennie Frazier; Kevin Keim; Ben and Mary Thompson, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF TOPSAIL BEACH, North Carolina, Defendant.

No. COA17-915

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 6, 2018

AFFIRMED.
**Exhibit 32.1**

Inconnection with the Quarterly Report of Merisant Worldwide, Inc. (the “Company”)for the period ended June 30, 2007 (the “Report”),the undersigned, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certifies,pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) TheReport fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|        |   | /s/ Paul Block          |
|--------|--------|-------------------------|
|   |   | Paul Block              |
|   |   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   |   | August 10, 2007         |

 

1

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Cecelia W. PEOPLES and Ernest A. Robinson, Jr., Plaintiffs, v. Thomas H. TUCK, Defendant.

No. COA16-293-2

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: September 19, 2017

REVERSED.