1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN H. PAGE, Plaintiff ,

v. GINA M. RAIMONDO, Defendant

. Case No. 1:22-cv-01416 (ACR)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff John H. Page, a D.C. resident proceeding pro se , hopes to vote in congressional elections but acknowledges that the District of Co lumbia has no right to any representation in the U.S. House of Representatives. To get around th is difficulty, he seeks an order compelling Defendant Gina M. Raimondo, the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, to list the population of “Columbia” in the census data she reports to the President for use in apportioning congressional seats. What is Columbia? According to Plaintiff, Columbia is a fifty-first state coextensive with the District that Congress admitted to the Union in 1801. Alternatively, if the Court declines to find that a state has existed fo r over 200 years without anyone notic ing, Plaintiff asks the Court to authorize him and other D.C. residents to vote in House elec tions in Maryland. Plaintiff’s plea for representation raises we ighty questions of fair ness and democratic legitimacy. But those policy questions are beyond the Cour t’s jurisdiction. And, given Plaintiff’s wholly insubstantial legal arguments, so too is this case, which the Court dismisses without prejudice. 1

1 The Court dismisses without prejudice because any jurisdictional dismissal must operate without prejudice. E.g. , Havens v. Mabus , 759 F.3d 91, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2014).2 I. BACKGROUND A. Legal and Historical Background The Constitution’s District Clause—Article I, section 8, clause 17—authorizes Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Case s whatsoever, over such Di strict . . . as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Accepta nce of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. This District—the modern District of Columbia—now comprises territor y ceded by Maryland shortly after the Founding. See Adams v. Clinton , 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51-53, 57-58 (D.D.C.) (t hree-judge panel) (per curiam), aff’d mem. sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta , 531 U.S. 940 (2000), and aff’d mem. 531 U.S. 941 (2000). It formerly also included areas ceded by Virginia, but Congress retroceded those areas to the state in 1846. Id. at 53. The District, whos e residents now number about 690,000, District of Columbia: 2020 Census , U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/ stories/state-by-state/district-of-columbia -population-change-between-census-decade.html [https://perma.cc/5FYL-DSS4], has ne ver had representation in Congress. 2 See, e.g. , Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 53. Litigants have repeatedly challenged this disenfranchisement in court. A few such cases foreshadow some of Plaintiff’s arguments and so are particularlyrelevant here. In 1964, an unsuccessful candidate for U.S. Senate in Ma ryland—apparently seeki ng to mix up the voter pool—sought a declaratory judgment that D.C. resi dents have a constitutional right to vote in U.S. Senate elections in Maryland. Albaugh v. Tawes , 233 F. Supp. 576, 576 (D. Md.) (three2 The District does have a congressional “deleg ate” whom the House has, at certain times (including the present), allowed to vote in some committees. See, e.g. , Rules of the House of Representatives , 118th Cong., R. 3 (2023), https://rules .house.gov/sites/rep ublicans.rules118. house.gov/files/documents/Rules%20and%20Res ources/118-House-Rules- Clerk.pdf [https:// perma.cc/6BWL-2YQ4]. See generally Michel v. Anderson , 14 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1994).3 judge panel) (per curiam), aff’d , 379 U.S. 27 (1964) (per curiam). A three-judge district court dismissed the suit for fail ure to state a claim, Albaugh , 233 F. Supp. at 578, and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed, 3 Albaugh , 379 U.S. at 27. In 2000, in Adams , a collection of D.C. residents and the District itself “challenge[d] as unc onstitutional the denial of their right to elect representatives to the Congress of the United States.” 90 F. Supp. 2d at 37. Concluding that Article I restricts representation in the House to “t rue states and not the District,” the three-judge district court dism issed their claims, id. at 48, and again the Suprem e Court summarily affirmed, Adams , 531 U.S. at 941; Alexander , 531 U.S. at 940. Finally, anot her collection of D.C. voters asserted that the District’s lack of congressional suffrage violates an assortment of constitutional provisions in Castañon v. United States , 444 F. Supp. 3d 118 (D.D.C. 2 020) (three-judge panel), aff’d mem. , 142 S. Ct. 56 (2021). See id. at 122. The lower court dismissed that case, too, id. at 149, and once more the Supreme Court su mmarily affirmed, 142 S. Ct. at 56. B. Plaintiff’s Litigation Campaign Plaintiff—a D.C. resident and taxpayer, Dkt. 22 (Am. Co mpl.) ¶ 38—is no stranger to litigation about D.C. voting rights. His first foray into the field was a pro se amicus brief before the district court in Castañon

. See Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae John H. Page in Support of Plaintiffs in Part and in Support of Defendants in Part, Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d 118 (No. 18-cv-2545). Perhaps surprisingly, his brief sided with the defendants, albeit on technical grounds: consistent with hi s arguments here, Plaint iff asserted that the Castañon plaintiffs should have sought congressional repres entation through the pur ported State of Columbia (which, recall,

3 Litigants may directly appeal de cisions of three-judge district c ourts to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253.4 Plaintiff contends is geographically coextensive with the District), rather thanthe District itself. Id. at 4. Plaintiff struck out on his own in Page v. Biden ( Page I ), No. 20-cv-104, 2021 WL 311002 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2021), aff’d , No. 21-5038, 2021 WL 4767945 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 1, 2021) (per curiam). Again previewing the theory on whic h he relies here, Plaintiff “[a]lleg[ed] that there is already a state—the State of Columbia—t hat overlaps geographically with the District,” and sought “an injunction requiring [President Jo seph R. Biden Jr.] to include Columbia’s residents in the congressional apportionment ca lculation following the decennial census.” Id. at *1. Concluding that it lacked juri sdiction to enter the requested in junction against the President, the court dismissed the ca se without prejudice, id. , and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, 2021 WL 4767945, at *1. Undaunted, Plaintiff filed this case ag ainst both President Biden and Secretary Raimondo—who is responsible fo r submitting to the Presiden t the census data used in apportioning House s eats among the states, see 13 U.S.C. § 141(b)—in May 2022, invoking the same state-within-the-District theory he presented in Page I . Dkt. 1. In an August 2023 Minute Order, the Court dismissed the claims agains t President Biden for the reasons stated in Page I and invited Plaintiff to file anamended pleading clarifying the relief he seeks from Secretary Raimondo. Min. Order of Aug. 10, 2023. Plaintiff then filed th e operative Amended Complaint against only Secretary Raimondo. Am. Compl. He seeks a declarator y judgment recognizing the existence of the State of Columbia and requiring Defendant to submit amended census apportionment data that includes Columbia as a state. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. A lternatively, he requests an order permitting him and other D.C. resident s to vote in House elections in Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 49-50. Defendant has moved to dismiss th e Amended Complaint. Dkt. 23 (Mot.).5 II. LEGAL STANDARD A district court ordinarily must refer a case, like this one, that “challenges the constitutionality of the apportio nment of congressional districts” to a three-judge court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). But a court must dismiss a compla int for lack of juri sdiction—and need not convene a three-judge court under § 2284—where the plaintiff’s clai ms are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” 4 Shapiro v. McManus , 577 U.S. 39, 45-46 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “‘[C]onstitutional insubstantiality’ for this purpose has been equated with such concepts as ‘essentially fictitious,’ ‘w holly insubstantial,’ ‘obviously frivolous,’ and ‘obviously without merit.’” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45-46 (cleaned up). These “adverbs [a]re no mere throwaways,” and “[c]onstitutional claims [should] not lightly be found insubstantial.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, the “determination of s ubstantiality . . . often demand s of the district judge an exceedingly close analysis of [a plaintiff’s] cons titutional claims vis-a-vis prior case law.” Feinberg v. FDIC , 522 F.2d 1335, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1975). A lthough a claim is not necessarily insubstantial simply because it contravenes existi ng Supreme Court precedent, to avoid dismissal of such a claim for want of jurisdiction, the pl aintiff must advance a nonfrivolous argument for reversing that precedent. See Holmes v. FEC , 823 F.3d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

4 Defendant styles her Motion as one to dismiss fo r failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mot. at 9-10. But she also repeatedly a sserts that Plaintiff’s claims are “frivolous” or “insubsta ntial” and asks the Court to dism iss the case without convening a threejudge court, e.g. , Mot. at 17-19—something the Court can do only if it finds that it lacks jurisdiction, see Shapiro v. McManus , 577 U.S. 39, 44-45 (2015). Since the parties have fully briefed the (in)substantiality of Plaintiff’s claims and the Court must, in any event, dismiss the case sua sponte if it lacks jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), it construes the Motion as one to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.6 The Court is mindful of its obligation to treat pro se litigants, such as Plaintiff, with “solicitude,” Kim v. United States , 840 F. Supp. 2d 180, 191 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d , 707 F.3d 335 (D.C. Cir. 2013), including by liberally construing their filings, Richardson v. United States , 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999). But “even a pro se pl aintiff must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Hedrick v. FBI , 216 F. Supp. 3d 84, 93 (D.D.C. 2016), and the Court cannot hear any case, even one brought by a pro se litigant, that falls outside its subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g. , Fontaine v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 43 F. Supp. 3d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2014).
III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff emphasizes that, to qualify for congressional suffrage, he must be a resident of a

state. E.g. , Dkt. 24 (Opp.) ¶¶ 2, 10, 30; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 35, 49. He also concedes that the District is not a state. E.g. , Dkt. 31 (Surreply) ¶ 5; Opp. ¶ 24(b); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 32, 46. To square this circle, Plaintiff argues that he is a resident of Columbia, 5 a fifty-first state coterminous with the District. He argues in the alternat ive that the Court s hould hold that he and other D.C. residents may vote for Congress in Maryland. After “close analysis,” Feinberg , 522

5 Before we had Lady Liberty and Uncl e Sam, we had Lady Columbia. In 1697, Chief Justice Samuel Sewall of the Massachusetts Bay Colony “suggested that the American colonies be called Columbina, a feminized version of Christopher Columbus’[s] last name.” Goddess of Liberty Figure , Smithsonian Nat’l Museum of Am. Hist., https://americanhistory.si.edu/ collections/nmah_693815 [https://perma.cc/5RH7-G9U4]. While that name did not stick for our nation, a female Columbia “bec ame a symbol for American id eals during . . . the American Revolution, the War of 1 812, and World War I.” Id. Thus, New York City’s early private college is named Columbia University; companies have names such as Columbia Records, Columbia Pictures, and the Columbia Broadcasti ng System; and our nation’ s capital is, natch, the District of Columbia. See id. ; Garance Franke-Ruta, When America Was Female , The Atlantic (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/p olitics/archive/2013/03/ when-america-wasfemale/273672 [https://perma.cc/746G-ZM84]. Unfo rtunately for Plaintiff, however, Columbia has never been used as the name of an American state.7 F.2d at 1339, the Court concludes th at these arguments are “wholly insubstantial” and dismisses them for lack of jurisdiction, 6 Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up). A. There Is No State of Columbia, and Pl aintiff’s Arguments to the Contrary Are Frivolous “New States [must] be admitted by the Congress . . . .” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. Plaintiff contends that Congress exercised this power to admit the State of Columbia in 1801. E.g. , Am. Compl. ¶ 5. The text of the statutes that Plaintiff c ites provides no support whatsoever for this theory. Nor do other rele vant interpretive tools. And Plaintiff’s counter arguments hold no water. The upshot is that Plaintiff has not presented a substant ial federal question. 1. Plaintiff’s arguments pl ainly lack any support in the statutory text The statute that Plaintiff id entifies as admitting Columbia into the Union unambiguously did no such thing. Plaintiff poi nts to the following language in the Organic Act of 1801, the statute in which Congress established the original government for the District: “[T]he laws of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be a nd continue in force in that part of the . . . [D]istrict, which was ceded by that state to the United States.” An Act Concerning the District of Columbia, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103, 104-05 (1801); see Am. Compl. ¶ 5; Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (describing the Organic Act). Nothing in that language at all suggests that Congress intended to admit a new state to the Union. Instead, as Adams explained, this section “did

6 One might expect that, if Plaintiff’s claims are “obviously without merit,” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 46 (cleaned up), the Court could conclude with out spilling much ink th at Defendant wins. However, the question the Court must answer is no t whether Plaintiff or Defendant has the better of the argument on the merits. Instead, the que stion is whether Plaint iff’s claims are so obviously defective that the Court must dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction. Answering that question requires “an exceedingly close analysis of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional claims.” Feinberg , 522 F.2d at 1339. The Court therefore review s Plaintiff’s (many) arguments in detail to assess whether there is any even arguable ba sis on which this case can proceed. The reader should not conclude that the lengthof this analysis correlates w ith the viability of Plaintiff’s theories.8 nothing more than fix [Maryland’s laws] (as they stood as of that date) as a part of the common law of the District ; without such a provision the new Di strict would have had no laws upon which to build.” 90 F. Supp. 2d at 60 n.46. Plaintif f’s alternative reading th at the statute created a new state is “obviously without merit.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 46 (cleaned up). Plaintiff argues that the 1791 Maryland state statute that ceded the land that became the District provides necessary c ontext for interpreting the 1801 Ac t. The purportedly relevant section of that statute declared: That all that part of the said territory, called Columbia, which lies within the limits of this state, shall be and the same is hereby acknowledged to be for ever ceded and relinquished to the congress and government of the Unit ed States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of persons residing, or to reside, thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of government of the United States; pr ovided . . . that the jurisdiction of the laws of this state, ove r the persons and property of individuals residing with in the limits of the cession aforesaid, shall not cease or determine until congre ss shall by law provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction, in manner provided by the article of the constitution before recited. 1791 Md. Laws ch. 45, § 2. Plaintiff makes tw o arguments based on this language; each is frivolous. The first takes some unpacking. As the Cour t understands it, Plai ntiff interprets the phrase “pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eight h section of the first ar ticle of the constitution of government of the United States” as a limiti ng clause, restricting C ongress’s jurisdiction over the ceded area to only thos e powers constitutionally delegated to Congress. Id. ; see Am. Compl. ¶ 4. He then argues that (1) only states—a nd not the federal government—can administer congressional elections, (2) author ity over congressional elections inthe District must therefore have passed to some authority other than Congres s, and thus (3) the Court should conclude that9 Congress impliedly admitted Columbia as a state to fill that gap. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4. That reading has at least two obvious problems. Firs t, far from seeking to withhold any authority from Congress, the statute unambiguously “ceded and relinquished [the District] to the congress and government of the United States, in full and ab solute right, and exclusive jurisdiction.” 1791 Md. Laws ch. 45, § 2. And rather than limiting Congress’s authority, the “pursuant to” language underscores the breadth of that concession, sinc e the cited constitutional provision—Article I, section 8—gives Congress authority to “exercise exclusive Legisl ation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the] District.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see, e.g. , Palmore v. United States , 411 U.S. 389, 397 (1973) (recognizing that Congress’s power over the District “is plenary”). Second, Plaintiff’s argument begs the que stion—it assumes that Plainti ff has a right to congressional representation, and that since it can not come through the District, it must come through a state. As discussed below, that assumption flouts settle d Supreme Court preceden t, and Plaintiff makes no nonfrivolous argument to overcome that precedent . Plaintiff’s notion th at a tortured reading of a centuries-old Maryland stat e statute requires the Court to recognize a fifty-first state is “essentially fictitious.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s other argument is only slightly less convoluted. It relies on the 1791 statute’s proviso that “the juri sdiction of the laws of [Maryland] , over the persons and property of individuals residing within the lim its of the [District], shall not cease or determin e until congress shall by law provide for the government thereof.” 1791 Md. Laws ch. 45, § 2; see, e.g. , Opp. ¶ 13(c) & n.1. Plaintiff r eads this language to require Congress to afford D.C. residents the same congressional suffrage they enjoyed while ci tizens of Maryland, which, he argues, Congress could do only by admitting Columbia as a state (or by allowing D.C. residents to continue to vote through Maryland—a theory the Co urt addresses below). Even setting aside the question10 whether remaining under “the jurisdiction of th e laws of [Maryland] ” implies a right to congressional suffrage, Plaintif f again plainly misreads the stat ute, which provides only that Maryland would retain jurisdiction over the Distri ct until “congress . . . by law provide[d] for the government thereof”—something it did well over 200 years ago. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (discussing Congress’s assumption of control over the District). Plaintiff’s interpretation is again “obviously without merit.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 46 (cleaned up). A comparison of the Organic Ac t to statutes by which Congress did admit new states reinforces this point. For inst ance, the nearly contemporaneous 1802 statute admitting Ohio as a state provided: That the inhabitants of the eas tern division of the territory northwest of the river Ohio, be, and they are hereby authorized to form for themselves a constitution and state government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper, and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union, upon the same footing with the original stat es, in all respects whatever. Act of Apr. 30, 1802, ch. 40, § 1, 2 Stat. 173, 173 (1802); see also, e.g. , An Act for the Admission of the State of Tennessee into the Union, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 491, 491-92 (1796) (unambiguously admitting “the State of Tenness ee”); An Act for the Admission of the State of Vermont into this Union, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 191, 191 ( 1791) (same for “[t]he State of Vermont”). In other words, Congress “does not . . . hide elepha nts in mouseholes” when admitting new states. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns , 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). 2. Other interpretive tools confirm th at Plaintiff’s theory is wholly insubstantial That Plaintiff’s theory rests on such a clear misreading of the releva nt statutes already puts this case in jurisdictionally frivolous territor y. At the risk of gilding the lily, however, the Court notes that various other interpretive sour ces—including constituti onal text and purpose,11 precedent, and settled historical practice—conf irm that Plaintiff’s argument is “wholly insubstantial.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up). Start with the constitutional text. The Di strict Clause empowers Congress “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso ever, over such District . . . as may, by Cession of particular States , and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). That language contemplates a District made up of territory ceded by states—not within a new stat e. Underlining this point, the same clause grants Congress “like Authority ove r all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be .” Id. (emphasis added). That is, when the Framers intended that te rritory under federal control remain part of a state, they said so explicitly. Plaintiff’s theory thus finds no support in the Const itution’s text, which contemplates a District outside of any state. That arrangement makes good sense in light of the Framers’ purpose in enacting the District Clause: “[E]nsuring that Congress woul d not have to depend upon another sovereign for its protection.” Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 50. As Adams explained: [T]he District Clause was adopted in response to an incident in Philadelphia in 1783, in which a crowd of disbanded Revolutionary War soldiers, a ngry at not having been paid, gathered to protest in front of th e building in which the Continental Congress was meeting under the Articles of Confederation. Despite requests from the C ongress, the Pennsylvania state government declined to call out its militia to respo nd to the threat, and the Congress had to adjourn abruptly to New Jersey. The episode, viewed as an affront to the weak national government, led to the widespread belief that ex clusive federal control over the national capital was necessary. Id. at 50 n.25 (cleaned up); see also Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe , 114 U.S. 525, 528-29 (1885) (discussing this history); Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton 180-83 (2004) (same). Or,12 as Madison put it: “[D]ependence of the me mbers of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of th e government for protection . . . might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other memb ers of the Confederacy.” The Federalist No. 43, at 272 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Accepting Plaintif f’s contention that the District wholly overlaps with a state would upe nd this const itutional purpose. 7 Precedent, too, conflicts with Plaintiff’s th eory. Most obviously, as detailed below, the Supreme Court has repeatedly summarily affirmed lower-court decisions holding that D.C. residents’ exclusion from the congres sional franchise is constitutional. See Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d at 122, aff’d mem. , 142 S. Ct. 56; Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 72, aff’d mem. sub nom. Alexander , 531 U.S. 940, and aff’d mem. 531 U.S. 941. Both that Court and the D.C. Circuit have confirmed in dicta that “[r]esidents of the District lack the [congressional] suffrage.” Heald v. District of Columbia , 259 U.S. 114, 124 (1922); accord Loughborough v. Blake , 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317, 324 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (obs erving that the Distri ct “has voluntarily relinquished the right of repr esentation, and has a dopted the whole body of Congress for its legitimate government”); Banner v. United States , 428 F.3d 303, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Constitution denies District residents voting re presentation in Congress.”). Those decisions would be mistaken—or, at least, correct only in the mo st technical of sens es—if D.C. residents

7 Plaintiff acknowledges that the Fr amers “did not want the U.S. gove rnment to be influenced . . . or . . . threatened by militia fro m a surrounding state” but asserts that “this is no objection to the case presented here” because “Defendant’s compliance with her administra tive duties would not result in the State of Columbia’s being able to raise a militia.” Am. Compl. ¶ 41. But when Congress admits a new state to the Union, it must do so on equal terms with all other states. See Coyle v. Smith , 221 U.S. 559, 567, 573 (1911). Congress either admitted Columbia as a coequal state or it did not; there is no su ch thing as a quasi-state that exists only for administrative convenience.13 also lived in a State of Columbia, since the Constitution guarantees e ach state “at Least one Representative.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. So too would be the Supreme Court’s holding in Hepburn v. Ellzey , 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.), that D.C. residents are not citizens of a “state” within th e meaning of Article III’s gran t of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 452- 53; see also Palmore , 411 U.S. at 395 (“The District of Co lumbia is constitutionally distinct from the States.” (cleaned up)). In fairness, Plaintiff is probably correct in responding that litigants in those cases did not think to pr esent his state-within-the-District theory. E.g. , Opp. ¶ 24(b). But that two centuries of litigants and jurist s did not think of it says much about the viability of Plaintiff’s position. Commentary from the time of the Framing and the District’s formation sends a similar message. Madison, for example, ob served in Federalist No. 43 that D.C. residents would “be allowed” a “municipal legislature for local purposes”; that phra sing contrasts with his adjacent reference to “the legislature of the State” that would cede the territo ry to form the District. The Federalist No. 43, supra , at 272-73. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story noted explicitly that “inhabitants [of the District] . . . are not indeed citizens of any stat e, entitled to the privileges of such.” 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1218 (1833). And, as other courts have obs erved, numerous historical sour ces “indicate[] a contemporary understanding that residents of the District would not have a vote in the national Congress.” 8

8 Plaintiff cites a failed cons titutional amendment proposed by Alexander Hamilton at the New York ratifying convention that would have required Congress to allow for “District representation” in Congress on ce the District reached some unspecified minimum population, Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (cleaned up), as evidence that the Framers did not intend to disenfranchise D.C. residents pe rmanently. Opp. ¶ 36(c). To the contrary, the proposal implies that Hamilton did not believe that the Constitution, as eventually adopted, granted D.C. residents a voice in Congress. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 51.14 Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 51; see id. at 51-53 (collecting sources). Again, such an understanding would be inexplicable were D.C. resident s also residents of a State of Columbia. Perhaps most damning for Plaintiff is more than 220 years’ unbroke n historical practice of utterly ignoring the suppos ed State of Columbia. Cf., e.g. , Chiafalo v. Washington , 591 U.S. 578, 592 (2020) (“Long settled and established pract ice may have great weight in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions.” (cleaned up)). Th ere has never been an elected Columbia government; indeed, for much of the la st two centuries, there has not even been an elected D.C. government. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 47 n.19. Columbia has never sent any Representatives or Senators to Congress. 9 Cf. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (guaranteeing each state “at Least one Representative”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (requiring two Senators per state). Nor has Columbia ever appointed any presidential electors—though the Dist rict has done so under the Twenty-Third Amendment, such that D. C. residents would be double-counted in the Electoral College if Columbia existed. See U.S. Const. amend. XXIII. This inaction has persisted despite longstanding act ivism and controversy concerni ng D.C. residents’ political voicelessness. See, e.g. , Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d at 139 n.8 (discussing political activity in this area). If there were a state hidden in the nation’s capital, someone would have noticed before now.

9 Plaintiff tries to explain this l ack of representation, at least early in the District’s history, as a product of the region’s small population. See Am. Compl. ¶ 20. But the Constitution would have entitled Columbia to at least one Repr esentative and two Senators regardless of its population; contrary to Plaintif f’s argument, a state need not achieve some minimum “sufficient population for apportionment.” Id. ; see U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. And, however small their number, D.C. residents were concerned about their lack of congressional representation from the first. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 51-53. Indeed, as Plaintiff acknowledges, residents of the portion of the Dist rict originally ceded by Virginia sought and obtained retrocession at leas t in part because of a desire for full suffrage. See id. at 53 & n.33; William Tindall, Origin and Government of the District of Columbia 108, 110 (1907); Opp. ¶ 36(d).15 Given the universal nonacknowledgment of Co lumbia’s existence, Plaintiff’s theory would raise a host of practical dilemmas. W ith no state government in place, who would administer Columbia’s congression al elections? And who would be eligible to vote in those elections? The Constitution requires that House voters “have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the Stat e Legislature,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1— what does that mean in a state with no legislat ure? In the same vein, the Constitution calls for a state’s “Executive Authority” to “issue Writs of El ection to fill [any] Vacancies” that might arise in its congressional delegation, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4—who fills th at role in a state with no governor? The Court has no idea (and doubts its ju risdiction to set up a new state government from scratch). In sum, whatever approach one takes, Plaint iff’s state-within-the-Dis trict claim is plainly frivolous. 3. Plaintiff’s remaining counterarg uments are obviously meritless Plaintiff offers a hodgepodge of other argumen ts in support of Columbia’s existence. None presents even an “a rguable” federal question. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t , 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). First, Plaintiff argues that he must be a resident of a state because he pays federal income taxes, which, he believes, the Sixteenth Ame ndment permits Congress to impose only on state residents. E.g. , Am. Compl. ¶ 32(a). That is an obvi ous misreading of that Amendment, which gives Congress “the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes . . . without apportionment among the several states.” U.S. Const. amend. XVI (e mphasis added). Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have held that C ongress may tax D.C. residents desp ite their lack of congressional representation. See Heald , 259 U.S. at 124; Breakefield v. District of Columbia , 442 F.2d 1227,16 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); see also Loughborough , 18 U.S. at 325 (holding, even before Sixteenth Amendment, that Congress could tax D.C. reside nts). Consistent with those decisions, another court in this District has he ld that a similar no-taxation-without-representation argument is “insubstantial.” 10 Hobson v. Tobriner , 255 F. Supp. 295, 299 (D.D.C. 1966). Plaintiff offers no nonfrivolous response to th ese precedents; indeed, other than dismissing Loughborough as predating the Sixteenth Amendment, Su rreply ¶ 7, he offers no response at all. Second, Plaintiff argues that, if the Organic Act (and the creation of the District) did not create a new state, then it would be unconsti tutional on various grounds, such that the Court should construe the Act as admitting Columb ia to avoid declaring it unconstitutional. E.g. , Opp. ¶ 20(a). That argument has two obvious shortcom ings. First, while a court “may interpret ambiguous statutory language to avoid seri ous constitutional doubts, . . . that canon of construction applies only when ambiguity exists,” and a court may “not rewrite a law to conform it to constitutional requirements.” Iancu v. Brunetti , 588 U.S. 388, 397 (2019) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s reading of the Organic Act is entirely baseless, and th e Court cannot rewrite the statute to align with his interpretati on. Second, Plaintiff has made no nonfrivolous argument showing that creation of the District without an overlapping State of Columbia is unconstitutional.

10 While the argument is “insubstantial” as a legal matter, it is a weighty on e in terms of fairness to the District’s residents. Not for nothing, th e motto on the District’s license plates is “End Taxation Without Repres entation.” John Kelly, The Story Behind the District’s “Taxation Without Representation” License Plates , Wash. Post (July 3, 2021, 6:18 PM), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-license-p lates/2021/07/03/2a 87418a-db64-11eb-9bbb37c30dcf9363_story.html [https://perma.cc/8XKU-XQZ A]. District resi dents pay more in federal taxes per person than do resi dents of any state, and more in total than do the residents of twenty-two states. Maya Efrati, DC Statehood Explained , Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Mar. 18 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/resear ch-reports/dc-statehood -explained [https:// perma.cc/5Y6S-4XJX].17 Much of Plaintiff’s briefing focuses on Article I, section 2, which provides (as relevant here) that “[t]he House of Repr esentatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States,” and that “Representa tives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their re spective Numbers.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2. Plaintiff agrees that, under this section, he must be a residentof a state to vote for Congress. E.g. , Opp. ¶¶ 2, 10, 30; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 35, 49. And he concedes that the District is not a

state. E.g. , Surreply ¶ 5; Opp. ¶¶ 21, 24(b); Am. Co mpl. ¶¶ 16, 32, 46. Notwithstanding those concessions, Plaintiff argues that this section in some wa y entitles him to congressional representation, such that the Court must infer that a State of Columb ia exists to fill the gap. All the evidence against Columbia statehood—constitutional text, pur pose, precedent, and settled practice—cuts against his theory. See supra Section III.A.2. The Supreme Court’s affirmances in Adams and Castañon , in particular, render Plaintiff’s claim “wholly insubstantial.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up). In both cases, three-judge district courts c oncluded that—far from guaranteei ng D.C. residents congressional suffrage—Article I, section 2 specifically deprives them of House representation. See Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d at 139, 145; Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 45-65, 71-72. In both cases, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, argui ng that Article I, section 2 at least permits congressional representation for D.C. residents. See Jurisdictional Statemen t and Appendix at 25-33,
Castañon , 142 S. Ct. 56 (No. 20-1279); Jurisdictional Statement at 14-28, Alexander , 531 U.S. 940 (No. 99-2062); 11 see also Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party , 440 U.S. 173,

11 Two separate groups of plaintiffs appealed the panel decision in Adams ; only one—the Alexander plaintiffs—focused on Article I, section 2. The other group—the Adams plaintiffs— concentrated on an equal protection argument. See Jurisdictional Statement, Adams , 531 U.S. 941 (No. 00-97). For convenience, since both appeals arose from the same underlying district court case, the Court refers to that litigation collectively as “ Adams .”18 182-83 (1979) (explaining that lower courts should review jurisdic tional statements to determine issues decided by summary affirmances). A nd in both cases, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Castañon , 142 S. Ct. at 56; Alexander , 531 U.S. at 940; see also Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (concluding that “the Supr eme Court must have affirmed the Adams holding that . . . Article I contemplates that only ‘resi dents of actual states’ ha ve and may exercise the House franchise”). While summary, t hose affirmances bind this Court. Hicks v. Miranda , 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975). Plaintiff’s attempt to disti nguish these decisions by observing that neither considered his state-within-the-District theory, e.g. , Opp. ¶ 24(b), does not solve the problem. Adams and
Castañon squarely considered whether D.C. reside nts’ lack of congres sional suffrage is permissible under Article I, section 2. Both c oncluded that it is. So Plaintiff cannot tenably argue that failure to interpret the Organic Act to create a State of Columbia would render the Act unconstitutional, at least without presenting so me nonfrivolous argumen t to distinguish or undermine those cases. Because he has failed to do so, his case obviously lacks merit. See Holmes , 823 F.3d at 74. Even without those decisions, Plaintiff’s cl aim would plainly fail as a matter of basic logic. At bottom, he essentially argues that Article I, section 2 some how guarantees him a right to live in a state. But while that provision give s every qualified U.S. citizen who resides in a state a right to vote in congressional elections, it does not mean that every U.S. citizen resides in

a state. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 66; Opp. ¶ 30 (“[A] citizen of the U.S. does not have rights of representa tion through that citizen ship, only through their citizenship of one of the several States.”). As Plaintiff acknowledges, many U.S. citizens are residents of territories and thus neither live in states nor have any right to vote for Congress. See19 Am. Compl. ¶ 15(c); Castañon , 444 F. Supp. 3d at 146-47; Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 45-46; Segovia v. United States , 880 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2018). Plaint iff points out that the District is not a “territory” as that term is used in the Constitution, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, but it is no less “constitutionally distinct from the States,” Palmore , 411 U.S. at 395. Plaintiff also asserts that, by creating and administering the Di strict without an underlying state, Congress would be acting beyond its constitutional authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States , are reserved to the St ates respectively, or to the people.”). Yet the congression al actions to which Plaintiff obj ects either did not happen or plainly fall within Congre ss’s authority under the District Clause . For example, Plaintiff asserts that “Congress lacks the power to extinguish a sovereign state or involuntarily take part of a State.” Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Congress did not “inv oluntarily take” the terr itory that became the District; Maryland ceded it. 1791 Md. Laws ch. 45, § 2. And Congress accepted it in precisely the manner contemplated by the Constitution. 12 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Plaintiff has not made any judicially cogni zable Tenth Amendment claim. Plaintiff also cites the Fourteenth Am endment’s Equal Protection Clause, though he provides little explicit discussion of its relevance. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30, 45. The Court infers that he means to rely on the S upreme Court’s decision in Evans v. Cornman , 398 U.S. 419 (1970).

12 Plaintiff also asserts that Congress cannot “depri ve[]” former state reside nts “of their right to representation through their state.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11. That power—in the context of creating the District—obviously follows from Congress’s au thority to “[a]ccept[]” an area ceded by a state to form the District. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. But, in a ny event, Congress has not “deprived” any current D.C. reside nt of state citizenshi p. The District has not been a part of Maryland for over two centuries. Any living D.C. resident was either born a citizen of the District—and so never lived in a state—or c hose to move here, volunt arily relinquishing state citizenship. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 61.20 There, the Court held that Maryland violated the Equal Protection Clause by not allowing residents of a federal enclave (the National Institutes of Health)—over which Congress may exercise the same exclusive authority as over the District, see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17— located in Maryland to vote in state elections. 398 U.S. at 419, 426. The Court observed that the enclave residents remained resi dents of Maryland, and that, a lthough Congress could in theory exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the area, in practice it ha d not done so, but had instead “permitted the State[] to extend important as pects of state powers over” the enclave. Id. at 421- 24. As a result, the area’s residents were “just as interested in and connected with electoral decisions as they were [before] . . . the area came under federal ju risdiction and as [were] their neighbors who live[d] off the enclave.” Id. at 426. The state therefore could not deny them the same voting rights it granted to other state residents. Id. Presumably, Plaintiff means to argue that, under Evans , it would be unconstitutional to deny him, as a resident of the federal District, representation in Congress while allowing it for residents of fede ral enclaves, and so the Court must infer the existence of a state in which he can vote. Even setting aside the many other problems with Plaintiff’s Columbia-statehood theory, Evans does not realistically help Plaintiff for at least two reasons. First, both the Adams and the Castañon plaintiffs argued before the Supreme Court that
Evans required providing D.C. residents with cong ressional representation. Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix at 11-12, 33-35, Castañon , 142 S. Ct. 56; Jurisdictional Statement at 7, 10, 15-18, Adams , 531 U.S. 941 (No. 00-97). Yet the Supr eme Court summarily affirmed both district courts’ dismissal of the pl aintiffs’ equal protection claims. Castañon , 142 S. Ct. at 56; Adams , 531 U.S. at 941. Plaintiff does not discuss, much less try to distinguish, these holdings.21 Cf. Holmes , 823 F.3d at 74. As a result, there is no po ssible constitutional problem for Columbia statehood to remedy. Second, Evans ’s conclusion that the Equal Prot ection Clause forbids providing differential voting rights to si milarly situated citizens within a state does not mean that residents of the states—or even of federal enclaves within the states—and of the District are entitled to the same congressional representation. On the c ontrary, as discussed above, the Constitution explicitly contemplates a District outside of any state. Unlike the enclave residents in Evans

— who, the Court emphasized, remained Maryland ci tizens and over whom C ongress had declined to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, 398 U.S. at 421-24—Plaintiff lives outside a state in a District over which Congress has exercised exclusive jurisdiction. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (providing for a District formed “by Cession of partic ular States” and enclaves located “in” “State[s]”). Plaintiff has rais ed no substantial equal protection claim—let alone one that could even arguably warrant creating a Stat e of Columbia out of whole cloth. 13 Finally, none of the other au thorities Plaintiff cites in any way justifies recognizing Columbia as a state. Plaintiff suggests that De fendant has violated the so-called equal-footing doctrine by treating Columbia une qually from other states. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47; Coyle v. Smith , 221 U.S. 559, 567, 573 (1911) (requiring that Congress admit any new states on equal terms with existing ones). That argument matters only if Columb ia is a state; it is not an

13 If Plaintiff instead means to cite Evans in support of his argument that, if Columbia is not a state, then he should be able to vote in Maryland, he runs into not only the more general flaws in that argument identified below, see infra Section III.B, but also Adams ’ discussion of Evans specifically. The Adams district court rejected the theory that Evans requires allowing D.C. residents to vote in Maryland, and, after the plaintiffs again cited Evans on appeal, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 62-65; Alexander , 531 U.S. at 940; Jurisdictional Stat ement at 7, 23-24, Alexander , 531 U.S. 940. So far as the Court can tell, Plaintiff makes no effort, let alone a nonfrivolous one, to distinguish that decision. Cf. Holmes , 823 F.3d at 74.22 independent reason to treat Columbia as such. If anything, recognizing Co lumbia as a state only for purposes of congressiona l elections and with most other traditional stat e functions assigned to Congress would create, not remedy, an equal-footing problem. Pl aintiff’s claim that Defendant has violated Columbia state law similarly assumes that there is such a state, Am. Compl. ¶ 45; since there obviously is not, the claim goes nowhere.
B. Plaintiff’s Alternativ e Argument that He May Vote in Maryland Is Also Wholly Insubstantial Plaintiff’s alternative theory—that, if the Di strict is not a state, the Constitution requires that he and other D.C. residents be allowed to vote in Maryland—fares no better. Multiple Supreme Court decisions preclude hi s position, and Plaintiff’s brief ef fort to distinguish them is “obviously without merit.” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 46 (cleaned up). Even absent these decisions, Plaintiff’s position makes no sense. Plaintiff’s argument runs head long into at least two Supreme Court decisions. First, in Albaugh , the district court rejected a claim that D.C. residents have a right to vote in Maryland’s congressional elections, concludi ng that, “[s]ince the Organic Ac t of 1801, it has been uniformly recognized . . . that residents of the District of Columbia are no longer citizens of the State of Maryland.” Id. at 577-78 (cleaned up). The plaintif f appealed, raising many of the same arguments advanced by Plaintiff here—including that “the Organic Act was not intended to ‘repeal the existing Maryland Congr essional election regulations wh ich defined the District of Columbia as a part of the State of Maryland,’ since it provided ‘that the laws of the State of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue in force.’” Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 57 n.36 (cleaned up) (quoting Juri sdictional Statement at 6, Albaugh , 379 U.S. 27 (No. 481)). The Supreme Court was having none of it and summarily affirmed. 379 U.S. at 27.23 The Adams plaintiffs similarly asserted that “resid ents of the Districtshould be permitted to vote in congressional elections through Maryland, based on a theory of ‘residual’ citizenship in that state.” 90 F. Supp. 2d at 56. The dist rict court rejected th is argument both because Albaugh precluded it and, independently, because “the Maryland citizenship of the District's inhabitants was extinguished upon th e completion of the transfer of the seat of the national government to the territory of the District.” Id. at 57. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs renewed their argum ent for the right to vote in Maryland, asserting—much like Plaintiff—that “the cession legislation that crea ted the national capital wa s and is incapable of taking away the constitutional ri ghts of District residents” and that “[a]lthough the cession legislation may take away Distri ct residents’ Maryla nd citizenship for most purposes,” it could not “strip them of their constitu tional right to vote in congressiona l elections, nor . . . of their state citizenship to the extent th at that citizenship is inextricably linked to rights of national citizenship.” Jurisdic tional Statement at 20, Alexander , 531 U.S. 940. Again the Supreme Court summarily affirmed. 531 U.S. at 940. Plaintiff makes no nonfrivolous effort to dist inguish these preceden ts. The closest he comes is asserting that Adams “did not take into account” the 1791 Maryland cession statute’s stipulation “that the jurisdiction of the laws of [Maryland], ov er the persons and property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession . . . shall not cease or determine until congress shall by law provide for the government thereof, under their jurisdiction, in manner provided by [Article I, 8].” Opp. ¶ 13(c) & n.1. As discussed above, however, by that statute’s clear terms, any residual jurisd iction Maryland exercised over the Di strict expired more than two centuries ago when Congress created a new govern ment under its District Clause powers. See Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 59. Plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute as creating an indestructible,24 indefeasible right to vote in Maryland elections is “essentially fictitious,” Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up), and does not get him around Adams and Albaugh , which plainly foreclose his voting-in-Maryland theory. Of course, Plaintiff’s theory would raise eyebrows even were this the first Court to encounter it. As Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1805, “[b]y the separation of the [D]istrict . . . from the state of Maryland, [D.C. residents] ceased to be . . . citizen[s] of that
state.” Reily v. Lamar , 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 344, 356-57 (1805); see also supra Section III.A.2 (discussing evidence that District is distinct from any st ate). Plaintiff rec ognizes as much. Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (acknowledging that, when Maryland ceded the territory that b ecame the District, its residents “ceased to be citizens of . . . Maryland”). The District now is no more a part of (and Plaintiff is no more a resident of) Ma ryland than of Alaska or Hawaii. As a result, Plaintiff’s requested relief w ould raise several novel constitutional problems. The Court understands Plaintiff to seek to vote in Maryland only in congressional elections; he claims that the Court should treat Maryland as hi s state only “with respect to [his] . . . right to representation in Congress.” Opp. ¶ 13(c). If he hopes to vote for Congress in Maryland, however, he must “have the Qualif ications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. And if he aspi res not just to vote but also to run for office himself, to represent Maryland in the House he must “be an Inhabitant of that
State.” Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; see Adams , 90 F. Supp. 2d at 60 n.47 (describing this requirement as an “important piece of evidence” against allowing D.C. residents to vote in Maryland). The Court cannot reconcile these requirements with Plaintiff’s proposal to become a limited-purpose Marylander. That proposal would have at l east teetered on the edge of frivolity before Adams25 and Albaugh ; after those decisions, it is obviously meritless. Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 46 (cleaned up).
* * * The Court’s “close analysis,” Feinberg , 522 F.2d at 1339, of Plaint iff’s case confirms what even a cursory glance sugge sted: both his primary theory th at there is a hitherto-unknown fifty-first state lurking in the District and his fallback position that the Court must unwind two centuries of history and allow D. C. residents to vote for Congress in Maryland are “essentially fictitious” and thus outside the Court’s jurisdiction, Shapiro , 577 U.S. at 45 (cleaned up). A final note: Defendant asks the Court to “w arn [Plaintiff] that fu rther [frivolous] suits could well . . . lead to the imposition” of a prefiling injunction barring him from filing other cases in this District without leave of court. Mot. at 18 (cleaned up). It is true that, were Plaintiff to file so many “frivol ous or harassing” cases as to “threaten[] the administration of justice,” such an injuncti on might be appropriate. Klayman v. Porter , 104 F.4th 298, 306-07 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But Plaintif f’s conduct thus far—fi ling an amicus brief in support of the government in Castañon , a complaint dismissed for failure to name the proper defendant in Page I , and now this case—does not approach that level. See id. at 306-11 (descr ibing prefiling injunction as “extreme remedy” and “tool of last resort” (cleaned up)). Indeed, while the Court has had to use some harsh language in analyzing Plaintiff’s arguments to assess its jurisdiction over this case, it nonetheless applau ds Plaintiff’s commitment to hi s ideals. Defendant’s labeling of Plaintiff as a “vexatious” litigant, Dkt. 26 at 7, is substantially premature.26 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The policy arguments against deprivi ng 690,000 D.C. residents of congressional representation are co mpelling. Plaintiff’s legal arguments are wholly frivolous. As a result, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear, a nd so must dismiss, this case. For these reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 23;
DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Dkt. 22, and this case without prejudice; and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close this case.
SO ORDERED. This is a final appealable Order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a).

Date: July 23, 2024

_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge