alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 21.1



                                 JOINT VENTURES

Cyber Merchants Exchange, Inc. owns and operates the following joint ventures:

-------------------------------|--------------- -----------------|-------------|
|                              | Percentage of |  State/Province |   Date      |
|                              |   Ownership   |        of       |    of       |
|Name of Joint Venture         |    by C-Me    |   Incorporation |Incorporation|
|------------------------------|---------------| ----------------|-------------|
|Global Purchasing Dotcom, Inc.|      50%      |   Washington    | June 2000   |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
|E-SouthEast Asia, Inc.        |      47%      |   Delaware      | June 2000   |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
|C-Me Taiwan                   |      40%      |     Taiwan      |December 1999|
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
|C-Me Bangladesh               |      50%      |    Bangladesh   | May 2002    |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
|C-Me Korea                    |      50%      |      Korea      | July 2001   |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
|C-Me Hong Kong                |      50%      |     Hong Kong   | July 2001   |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-------------|
#### Norrene MCCALL v. WAL-MART STORES, INC.

No. 2003-C-1329.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Wal-Mart Stores Inc.; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers’, Dist 2, No. 01-06057; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 02-1343.

Denied.

KNOLL, J., would grant the writ.
STATE v. Christina Shea WALTERS

548A00-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 15, 2018

Shelagh R. Kenney, Attorney at Law, Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Attorney at Law, Durham, for Walters, Christina Shea.

Danielle Marquis Elder, Special Deputy Attorney General, Jonathan P. Babb, Special Counsel to Attorney General, William R. West, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

James E. Williams, Jr., Attorney at Law, Carrboro, for N.C. Advocates for Justice.

James E. Coleman, Jr., Attorney at Law, Dallas, TX, for Becton, Charles, et al.

Robert P. Mosteller, Attorney at Law, for Retired Members of NC Judiciary.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 13th of March 2018 by Defendant:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 15th of March 2018."
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 24, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 02-40415 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JUAN H. VILLARREAL, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-98-CR-743-ALL

-------------------- Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * The Federal Public Defender, appointed counsel for Juan Villarreal, has moved for leave to withdraw in this criminal appeal following a remand for resentencing and has filed a brief as required by Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In response, Villarreal has filed several motions relating to the appointment of an expert witness to review materials that were not introduced at trial. Villarreal’s motions are DENIED. Our independent review of the brief and the record discloses noNo. 02-40415 -2- nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
STATE v. Lonnie Bernard DAVIS

382P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

Lonnie Bernard Davis, for Davis, Lonnie Bernard.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, R. Andrew Murray, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 13th of November 2017 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6588

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ERIC MARIO BYERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief 

District Judge. (2:02-cr-00077-RBS-1; 2:15-cv-00072-RBS)

Submitted: August 27, 2015 Decided: September 1, 2015

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eric Mario Byers, Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Eric Mario Byers seeks to appeal the district court’s order 

denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order 

is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). 

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that

Byers has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability, deny the motion for 

clarification, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 
3

presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
---

EXHIBIT 31.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13a-14(A)/15d-14(A) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS AMENDED, AS ADOPTEDPURSUANT
TO SECTION 302 AND 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2003

I, William Dunavant, Chief Executive Officer of Intrepid Global
Imaging 3D Inc. certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of
Intrepid Global Imaging 3D Inc;

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
this annual report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all
material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows
of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual
report;

4. I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e) for the registrant and have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls
and procedures to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to me by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is
being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrant's disclosure controls and procedures as of a date within 90 days
prior to the filing date of this annual report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) Presented in this annual report my
conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures
based on my evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5. I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies in the
design or operation of internal controls which could adversely affect the
registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial data and
have identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
internal controls; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material,
that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the
registrant's internal controls; and

6. I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there
were significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could
significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of my most recent
evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.

/s/ William DunavantBy: William Dunavant, Chief
Executive Officer

April 15, 2008

---
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of THOMAS PROPERTIES
GROUP, INC. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                         |  |  |  |                        
|------------------------ |  |  |  | -----------------------
|                         |  | 
|Dated: November 11, 2005 |  |  |  | /s/ James A. Thomas    
|                         |  |  |  | James A. Thomas        
|                         |  |  |  | Chief Executive Officer



The foregoing
certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or incorporated by reference in any registration
statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          27,201
<SECURITIES>                                     2,991
<RECEIVABLES>                                    9,107
<ALLOWANCES>                                       714
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                43,237
<PP&E>                                          13,863
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,173
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 175,900
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           31,328
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            36
<OTHER-SE>                                     143,335
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   175,900
<SALES>                                         13,362
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                13,362
<CGS>                                           14,653
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   14,653
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                68,425
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 291
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (68,431)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (68,431)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (68,431)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.92)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.92)


</TABLE>
#### Celeata WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D02-3723.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 1, 2003.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Judith Ellis, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Helene S. Parnés, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

KELLY, Judge.

Celeata Williamson was convicted of fifty-seven counts of grand theft and one count of scheming to defraud and sentenced to concurrent terms of five years’ imprisonment on all charges. We agree with Williamson, and the State concedes, that convicting and sentencing her on both the scheming to defraud and the grand theft charges, which formed the basis of the scheming to defraud charge, constituted double jeopardy. *See Kipping v. State,*702 So.2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); *Cherry v. State,*592 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). We therefore vacate Williamson’s convictions and sentences for grand theft and affirm her conviction for scheming to defraud.

Williamson also challenges the sentence she received on the scheming to *881defraud conviction. Williamson contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced her under the Criminal Punishment Code. Because a scheme to defraud is a true continuing offense, Williamson’s sentence is controlled by section 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2000), which applies to felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998,1 and provides that felonies with continuing dates of enterprise are to be sentenced under the sentencing laws in effect on the beginning date of the criminal activity. Williamson began her scheme to defraud in 1995, at which time the 1994 guidelines were in effect. Therefore, Williamson should be resentenced under the 1994 guidelines. On remand, the trial court is precluded from scoring the grand theft offenses as convictions for purposes of resentencing. *See Wanner v. State,*667 So.2d 427 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resen-tencing with directions.

FULMER and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

1

. Because Williamson’s offense is a true continuing offense, the date of her last overt act is considered to be the date of offense. *Young v. Moore,*820 So.2d 901, 903 n. 4 (Fla.2002). That date is October 31, 2000, which is "on or after October 1, 1998.” Thus, section 921.0027 applies.
#### Otis Franklin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellee.

No. 1D02-1586.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

July 21, 2003.

Otis F. Williams, pro se.

Charlie Crist, Attorney General; Philip A. Fowler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges an order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus which among other things sought review of a disciplinary action resulting in loss of gain time. The circuit court dismissed appellant’s action for failure to comply with section 58.085(2), Florida Statutes, the Prisoner Indigency Statute, regarding waiver of prepayment of court costs and fees for indigent prisoners. After the trial court issued its order, the supreme court in *Schmidt v. Crusoe,*28 Fla. L. Weekly S367, — So.2d —, 2003 WL 1987971 (Fla. May 1, 2003), *motion for reh’g filed,*No. SC00-2512 (Fla. May 21, 2003), held that a prisoner who challenges loss of gain time as a result of a disciplinary action (a collateral criminal proceeding) is exempt from the requirements of the Prisoner In-digency Statute and is instead subject to the requirements of section 57.081(a), Florida Statutes (2001).

We, therefore, reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with the dictates of *Schmidt.*

WOLF, C.J., ERVIN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
STATE of North Carolina v. Lequan FOX

No. 72P17-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

October 24, 2018.

Lequan Fox, For Fox, Lequan.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 4th of October 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the Superior Court, Wake County, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court of that County:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 24th of October 2018."
CYBER MERCHANTS EXCHANGE, INC.

                CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDERS' DEFICIT
             PERIOD ENDED MAY 31, 2005 AND YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2004

Exhibit 31.1

I, Frank S. Yuan, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-KSB of Cyber Merchants Exchange,  Inc.
(the "Registrant");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial  condition,  results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report.

4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules  13a-15(e) and  15d-15(e))  for the  registrant  and have: a)
designed such  disclosure  controls and  procedures,  or caused such  disclosure
controls and  procedures to be designed  under our  supervision,  to ensure that
material  information  relating to the  registrant,  including its  consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,  particularly
during the period in which  this  report is being  prepared;  b)  evaluated  the
effectiveness  of  the  registrant's  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  and
presented  in  this  report  our  conclusions  about  the  effectiveness  of the
disclosure controls and procedures,  as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such  evaluation;  and c) disclosed in this report any change in
the registrant's  internal control over financial reporting that occurred during
the registrant's most recent two-month period that has materially  affected,  or
is reasonably likely to affect, the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent  evaluation of internal  control over  financial  reporting,  to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or  persons   performing  the  equivalent   functions):   a)  all   significant
deficiencies  and  material  weaknesses  in the design or  operation of internal
control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the  registrant's  ability to record,  process,  summarize and report  financial
information; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management
or other  employees who have a  significant  role in the  registrant's  internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: August 26, 2005

/s/ Frank S. Yuan
-----------------
Frank S. Yuan
Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive OfficeR)
Exhibit 4.1

 

AMENDMENT NO. 1

TO THE

ONCOSEC MEDICAL INCORPORATED

2011 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN

 

This Amendment No. 1 to the OncoSec Medical Incorporated 2011 Stock Incentive Plan is effective as of April 15, 2013.

 

The Plan is hereby amended by amending and restating Section 3(a) to read as follows:

 

Subject to the provisions of Section 10, below, the maximum aggregate number of Shares which may be issued pursuant to all Awards (including Incentive Stock Options) is Nine Million (9,000,000) Shares.  The Shares to be issued pursuant to Awards may be authorized, but unissued, or reacquired Common Stock.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 8, 2017

No. 04-17-00731-CV

IN RE Sam LAJZEROWICZ

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

ORDER

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

On November 8, 2017, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus. The court has 

considered the petition and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. 

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). The 

court’s opinion will issue at a later date.

It is so ORDERED on December 8, 2017.

_________________________________

Irene Rios, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 8th day of December, 2017.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2015-CI-20292, styled Sam Lajzerowicz v. Estelita O’Campo Lajzerowicz, 

pending in the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Stephani A. Walsh presiding.