59640 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 197 / Thursday, October 13, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model 

737–100, –200, –200C, –300, –400, and –500 

series airplanes, certificated in any category. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from twelve reports of 

severe corrosion on one or more of three 

components of the main landing gear (MLG). 

We are issuing this AD to prevent collapse 

of the MLG, or damage to hydraulic tubing 

or the aileron control cables, which could 

result in possible departure of the airplane 

from the runway and loss of control of the 

airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Service Bulletin Reference 

(f) The term ‘‘service bulletin,’’ as used in 

this AD, means the Accomplishment 

Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737–

32A1367, Revision 1, dated December 23, 

2004. 

Records Examination and Compliance Times 

(g) For all airplanes: Before the inspection 

required by paragraph (h) of this AD, 

examine the airplane records to determine if 

the MLG has been overhauled, and, for any 

overhauled MLG, if JC5A corrosion inhibiting 

compound (CIC) was used on the trunnion 

pin or other parts of the MLG. 

(1) For airplanes identified in the service 

bulletin as Group 2 and Group 4: If records 

indicate conclusively that the MLG has not 

been overhauled, no further action is 

required by this paragraph or paragraph (h) 

of this AD. 

(2) For airplanes identified in the service 

bulletin as Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and 

Group 4: If records indicate conclusively that 

the MLG has been overhauled and that CIC 

JC5A was not used on the trunnion pins or 

other parts of the MLG during the most 

recent overhaul, no further action is required 

by this paragraph or paragraph (h) of this AD. 

Inspection and Corrective Action 

(h) For all airplanes, except as provided by 

paragraph (g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD: At the 

applicable compliance time in paragraph 

(h)(1) or (h)(2) of this AD, do a detailed 

inspection for discrepancies of the applicable 

MLG components specified in the service 

bulletin. Do all applicable corrective actions 

before further flight after the inspection. Do 

all the actions in accordance with the service 

bulletin, except as required by paragraph (i) 

of this AD. 

(1) For airplanes identified in the service 

bulletin as Group 1 and Group 3 for which 

records indicate conclusively that the MLG 

has not been overhauled: Inspect at the later 

of the times in paragraph (h)(1)(i) and 

(h)(1)(ii) of this AD. 

(i) Within 48 months after the date of 

issuance of the original standard 

airworthiness certificate or the date of 

issuance of the original export certificate of 

airworthiness. 

(ii) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD. 

(2) For airplanes identified in the service 

bulletin as Group 1, Group 2, Group 3, and 

Group 4, for which records indicate 

conclusively that the MLG has been 

overhauled, and for which records indicate 

conclusively that CIC JC5A was used during 

the most recent overhaul; and for airplanes 

for which records do not show conclusively 

which CIC compound was used during the 

most recent overhaul: Inspect at the later of 

the times in paragraph (h)(2)(i) or (h)(2)(ii) of 

this AD. 

(i) Within 48 months after the landing gear 

was installed. 

(ii) Within 6 months after the effective date 

of this AD. 

Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a 

detailed inspection is: ‘‘An intensive 

examination of a specific item, installation, 

or assembly to detect damage, failure, or 

irregularity. Available lighting is normally 

supplemented with a direct source of good 

lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. 

Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying 

lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface 

cleaning and elaborate procedures may be 

required.’’

Contact Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO) or Delegation Option Authorization 

(DOA) Organization for Certain Corrective 

Actions 

(i) If any discrepancy is found during any 

inspection required by this AD, and the 

service bulletin specifies to contact Boeing 

for appropriate action: Before further flight, 

do the action using a method approved in 

accordance with paragraph (l) this AD. 

Use of JC5A Prohibited 

(j) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may use CIC JC5A on an MLG 

component on any airplane. 

Actions Done According to Previous 

Revision of Service Bulletin 

(k) Actions done before the effective date 

of this AD in accordance with Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 737–32A1367, dated August 

19, 2004, are considered acceptable for 

compliance with the corresponding action 

specified in this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle ACO, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested in accordance with the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD, if it is approved by an 

Authorized Representative for the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes DOA Organization 

who has been authorized by the Manager, 

Seattle ACO, to make those findings. For a 

repair method to be approved, the repair 

must meet the certification basis of the 

airplane, and the approval must specifically 

refer to this AD. 

(3) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify the 

appropriate principal inspector in the FAA 

Flight Standards Certificate Holding District 

Office. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(m) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 

737–32A1367, Revision 1, dated December 

23, 2004, to perform the actions that are 

required by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. The Director of the Federal 

Register approved the incorporation by 

reference of this document in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. 

Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207, 

for a copy of this service information. You 

may review copies at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

400 Seventh Street SW., room PL–401, Nassif 

Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet at 

http://dms.dot.gov; or at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the availability 

of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741–

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal _register/code_of_ 

federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 30, 2005. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–20262 Filed 10–12–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–20726; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–265–AD; Amendment 

39–14337; AD 2005–20–40] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 757–200, –200CB, and –200PF 

Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 757–200, –200CB, and 

–200PF series airplanes. This AD 

requires an inspection of each trailing 

edge flap transmission assembly to 

determine the part number and serial 

number, and related investigative and 

corrective actions and part marking if 

necessary. This AD results from a report 

indicating that cracked flap 

transmission output gears have been 

discovered during routine overhaul of 

the trailing edge flap transmission 

assemblies. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent an undetected flap skew, which 

could result in a flap loss, damage to 

adjacent airplane systems, and 

consequent reduced controllability of 

the airplane. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 197 / Thursday, October 13, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 59641 

DATES: Effective November 17, 2005. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of November 17, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 

SW., Nassif Building, room PL–401, 

Washington, DC. 

Contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207, for service 

information identified in this AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Douglas Tsuji, Aerospace Engineer, 

Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–

130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 

Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98055–4056; telephone 

(425) 917–6487; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the street 

address stated in the ADDRESSES section. 

Discussion 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to certain Boeing Model 757–200, 

–200CB, and –200PF series airplanes. 

That NPRM was published in the 

Federal Register on March 30, 2005 (70 

FR 16175). That NPRM proposed to 

require an inspection of each trailing 

edge flap transmission assembly to 

determine the part number and serial 

number, and related investigative and 

corrective actions and part marking if 

necessary. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments that have 

been received on the NPRM. 

Support for NPRM 

One commenter, the manufacturer, 

concurs with the content of the NPRM. 

Request To Allow Maintenance Records 

Check 

Two commenters request that we 

revise the NPRM to allow a maintenance 

records check to determine if any 

affected transmission assembly is 

installed upon an airplane. One 

commenter states that it tracks all its 

flap transmission assemblies by part 

number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) 

in order to record all time and cycle 

information for each of these units. The 

commenter asserts that since Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 

(SASB) 757–27–0150, dated December 

9, 2004, specifies all suspect flap 

transmission assemblies by P/N and S/ 

N, it should be allowed to use these data 

to demonstrate compliance with the 

NPRM. Another commenter states that it 

recently updated the P/N and S/N 

installation records for all transmission 

assembly positions affected by the 

NPRM and that these records show that 

none of the affected assemblies are 

installed on its airplanes. The second 

commenter states that the wording of 

the NPRM prevents it from using these 

data to demonstrate compliance with 

the NPRM and requires it to physically 

view all P/Ns on its airplanes. Since 

Boeing SASB 757–27–0150 specifies 75 

hours per airplane to gain access, 

inspect, and close access for the eight 

transmission assemblies, the second 

commenter asserts that this proposed 

requirement is excessively onerous. 

We agree with this request. If an 

operator can clearly demonstrate that 

the maintenance records for an airplane 

establish that no suspect transmission 

assembly is installed on that airplane, 

the records check is acceptable for 

compliance with the P/N and S/N 

inspection requirement of the NPRM. 

Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) 

in this AD to permit a maintenance 

records check instead of the required 

inspection. 

Request To Allow Replacement of 

Transmission Assembly 

One commenter requests that we 

revise the NPRM to allow replacing a 

transmission assembly having a 

defective output gear with a compliant 

transmission. The commenter states that 

it does not have the means to repair and 

test the transmission itself and 

anticipates sending any suspect 

transmission to a repair facility for 

inspection, test, and marking. 

We agree with this request. Since the 

intent of the AD is to remove defective 

transmission assembly output gears 

from service, this can be accomplished 

either by replacing the defective output 

gear with a compliant output gear or 

replacing the entire transmission 

assembly with a compliant transmission 

assembly. Therefore, we have revised 

paragraph (f) of this AD to permit 

‘‘replacing the entire transmission 

assembly with a new or serviceable flap 

transmission assembly.’’

Request To Increase Total Number of 

Affected Transmission Assemblies 

One commenter requests that we 

change the number of affected 

transmission assemblies shown in the 

NPRM. The commenter states that there 

are four different transmission 

configurations, each having S/Ns 1 

through 325 inclusive, which yields a 

total of 1,300 affected transmission 

assemblies rather than 325. 

We agree with this request for the 

reason stated by the commenter. 

Therefore, we have revised the number 

of suspect transmission assemblies from 

325 to 1,300 in this AD. 

Request To Revise Applicability 

One commenter requests that we 

revise the applicability of the NPRM to 

include only those airplanes with 

transmission assemblies installed that 

have the affected P/Ns and S/Ns. The 

commenter suggests that the 

applicability could be revised to read, 

instead of the current wording, ‘‘This 

AD applies to Boeing Model 757–200, 

–200CB, and –200PF series airplanes, 

with part number 251N4050–37, –38, 

–39, or –40 having S/Ns 1 through 325 

inclusive, or part number 251N4022–28, 

–29, –30 and –31 having S/Ns 1 through 

325 inclusive.’’

We do not agree with this request. We 

have no means of ensuring that every 

trailing edge flap transmission assembly 

with part numbers 251N4050–37, –38, 

–39, and –40; and 251N4022–28, –29, 

–30 and –31; each having S/Ns 1 

through 325 inclusive; can be located 

for inspection without canvassing all 

Model 757–200, –200CB, and –200PF 

series airplanes. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. However, as 

previously discussed, we have revised 

this AD to permit a maintenance records 

check to locate suspect transmission 

assemblies instead of the required 

inspection, which should greatly reduce 

the burden to operators. 

Requests To Revise Estimated Work 

Hours 

Two commenters request that we 

revise the Costs of Compliance section 

of the NPRM to increase the estimated 

number of work hours needed to 

accomplish the required actions. One 

commenter states that the 1 work hour 

specified to accomplish the inspection 

of eight trailing edge flap transmission 

assemblies is considerably less than the 

75 work hours to accomplish the task 

specified by Boeing SASB 757–27–0150. 

The commenter states that the NPRM 

does not accurately reflect the costs for 

59642 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 197 / Thursday, October 13, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

the amount of work required. A second 

commenter states that the NPRM does 

not assess the impact of the corrective 

action. The second commenter states 

that unscheduled maintenance in heavy 

maintenance facilities would be 

required to perform any needed repairs 

for some airplanes. The second 

commenter states that, in cases where 

repair is needed, the time required to 

gain and close up access and for returnto-service actions is considerably greater 

than the time specified by the NPRM 

and would result in unscheduled time 

out-of-service. Both commenters assert 

the cost to accomplish the requirements 

shown in the NPRM should more 

closely reflect the labor costs specified 

by Boeing SASB 757–27–0150 and 

assert that the discrepancy in the cost 

estimates places undue hardship on 

operators. 

In reply to the first commenter: We 

acknowledge that the amount of work 

estimated by the Boeing service bulletin 

to open and close the access ways is 

considerable. However, the cost 

information specified describes only the 

direct costs of the specific actions 

required by this AD. Based on the best 

data available, the manufacturer 

provided the number of work hours 

necessary to do the required inspection; 

one (1) work hour in this case. This 

number represents the time necessary to 

perform only the actions actually 

required by this AD. We recognize that, 

in doing the actions required by an AD, 

operators may incur additional costs in 

addition to the direct costs. The cost 

analysis in AD rulemaking actions, 

however, typically does not include 

additional costs such as the time 

required to gain access and close up, 

time necessary for planning, or time 

necessitated by other administrative 

actions. Those additional costs may be 

significant, but may also vary greatly 

among operators, which makes them 

almost impossible to calculate. 

In reply to the second commenter: 

The economic analysis of an AD is 

limited to the cost of actions that are 

actually required and does not consider 

the costs of conditional actions, such as 

repairing a crack detected during a 

required inspection (‘‘repair, if 

necessary’’). Such conditional repairs 

would be required—regardless of AD 

direction—to correct an unsafe 

condition identified in an airplane and 

to ensure that the airplane is operated 

in an airworthy condition, as required 

by the Federal Aviation Regulations. In 

this case, we included the 

manufacturer’s estimate of 20 work 

hours to remove a transmission 

assembly; remove, inspect, and 

reassemble the transmission output 

gear; and reinstall the transmission 

assembly, but we have no way of 

knowing how many transmission 

assemblies will require these actions or 

what additional actions will be needed 

to retrofit one transmission assembly. 

Therefore, we can’t provide any further 

assessment of the total cost impact of 

the corrective action. 

We have not changed this AD with 

regard to these comments. However, as 

previously discussed, we have revised 

paragraph (f) of this AD to specify that 

a maintenance records check is 

acceptable instead of the required 

inspection. A maintenance records 

check could greatly reduce the burden 

to operators. 

Request To Re-Evaluate Flap Skew 

Event 

One commenter requests that we reevaluate the probability of a flap skew 

event and the classification of this 

condition as an ‘‘unsafe condition.’’ The 

commenter states that it has surveyed its 

own data, which indicate that it has 252 

affected transmission assemblies, and 

that all of these units had new torque 

limiters installed because of the 

requirements of AD 2000–04–18, 

amendment 39–11601 (65 FR 10693). 

The commenter states that during this 

retrofit process, 221 of the 252 

transmission assemblies were 

overhauled and had their output gears 

checked for defects per the component 

maintenance manual (CMM). The 

commenter asserts that, since all 

operators of the affected airplanes are 

required to accomplish AD 2000–04–18, 

the commenter’s experience might be 

taken as typical of the industry’s 

experience, which could mean the 

quantity of defective output gears has 

been substantially reduced. The 

commenter asserts this could lead us to 

decide that no unsafe condition exists 

and, therefore, withdraw the NPRM. 

We do not agree with this request for 

the following reasons: 

• The commenter assumes that most 

affected airplanes are no longer subject 

to the unsafe condition due to industry 

compliance with AD 2000–04–18, 

which specifies Boeing Service Bulletin 

757–27A0127 as a source of service 

information. However, AD 2000–04–18 

is applicable only to airplanes having 

line numbers from 1 through 796 

inclusive, whereas this AD is applicable 

to airplanes having line numbers from 1 

through 979 inclusive. This leaves 183 

airplanes not covered by AD 2000–04–

18. 

• AD 2000–04–18 requires replacing 

the transmission assemblies with new 

assemblies incorporating new, improved 

torque limiters or replacing the torque 

limiters in the transmission assemblies 

with new, improved torque limiters, as 

provided in CMM Chapter 27–51–13. 

The commenter asserts that it is likely 

that all operators who accomplished 

this retrofit checked the transmission 

output gears for defects at the same 

time. We cannot assume that all 

operators checked the output gears 

during this retrofit, since checking the 

output gears was not specified by the 

CMM as a required part of the retrofit 

process. 

• AD 2000–04–18 requires that 

retrofitted transmission assemblies 

having P/N 251N4050–37, –38, –39, or 

–40 be reidentified as P/N 251N4022–

28, –29, –30 or –31, respectively. As 

already discussed, the commenter 

asserts that such retrofitted and reidentified transmission assemblies no 

longer are subject to the unsafe 

condition. However, Boeing Service 

Bulletin 757–27–0150 identifies the 

modified assemblies having those new 

P/Ns 251N4022–28, –29, –30 and –31, 

and having S/Ns 1 through 325 

inclusive, as possibly having suspect 

output gears. 

• The commenter suggests that its 

experience might be taken as typical for 

the industry and again assumes that 

most affected transmissions are no 

longer affected by the unsafe condition. 

As discussed earlier, we determined 

that, instead of 325 suspect transmission 

assemblies, there are actually 1,300 

suspect transmission assemblies. This 

larger number indicates the unsafe 

condition represented by the faulty 

transmission assemblies could be more 

extensive than represented in the 

NPRM. 

Our reasoning has led us to determine 

that the possibility of a flap skew event 

remains a significant unsafe condition 

for an unacceptable number of 

airplanes. We have not changed this AD 

in this regard. 

Clarification of Alternative Method of 

Compliance (AMOC) Paragraph 

We have revised this action to clarify 

the appropriate procedure for notifying 

the principal inspector before using any 

approved AMOC on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies. 

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data, including the comments 

that have been received, and determined 

that air safety and the public interest 

require adopting the AD with the 

changes described previously. We have 

determined that these changes will 

neither increase the economic burden 

on any operator nor increase the scope 

of the AD. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 197 / Thursday, October 13, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 59643 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 979 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

This AD will affect about 644 airplanes 

of U.S. registry. 

It will take approximately 1 work 

hour per airplane to accomplish the 

required inspection at an average labor 

rate of $65 per work hour. Based on this 

figure, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. 

operators is estimated to be $41,860, or 

$65 per airplane. 

Removal of a transmission assembly; 

removal, inspection, and reassembly of 

the transmission output gear; and 

reinstallation of the transmission 

assembly; if required; will take about 20 

work hours per transmission assembly, 

at an average labor rate of $65 per work 

hour. Required parts will cost about 

$325 per transmission output gear. 

Based on these figures, we estimate the 

cost of replacement is $1,625 per 

transmission output assembly (there are 

8 transmission output assemblies per 

airplane and 1,300 suspect assemblies). 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

See the ADDRESSES section for a location 

to examine the regulatory evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by adding the following new 

airworthiness directive (AD): 

2005–20–40 Boeing: Amendment 39–14337. 

Docket No. FAA–2005–20726; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–265–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective November 

17, 2005. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 757–

200, –200CB, and –200PF series airplanes, 

certificated in any category, as identified in 

Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 

757–27–0150, dated December 9, 2004. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD was prompted by a report 

indicating that cracked flap transmission 

output gears have been discovered during 

routine overhaul of the trailing edge flap 

transmission assemblies. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent an undetected flap skew, 

which could result in a flap loss, damage to 

adjacent airplane systems, and consequent 

reduced controllability of the airplane. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Inspection To Determine Part Number and 

Serial Number 

(f) Within 60 months after the effective 

date of this AD: Do an inspection of each 

trailing edge flap transmission assembly to 

determine the part number (P/N) and serial 

number (S/N) and any applicable related 

investigative and corrective actions and part 

marking, by accomplishing all of the 

applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–27–

0150, dated December 9, 2004. If, during any 

related investigative action, any transmission 

output gear is found with a defect or crack, 

before further flight, replace that 

transmission output gear or replace the entire 

flap transmission assembly with a new or 

serviceable flap transmission assembly. 

Operators should note that, instead of the P/ 

N and S/N inspection required by this AD, 

a review of airplane maintenance records for 

any trailing edge flap transmission assembly 

is considered acceptable if the P/N and S/N 

of that assembly can be conclusively 

determined from that review. 

Parts Installation 

(g) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install a trailing edge flap 

transmission assembly, P/N 251N4050–37, 

–38, –39, or –40 or P/N 251N4022–28, –29, 

–30, or –31; having any S/N 001 through 325 

inclusive; on any airplane; unless the 

transmission assembly has been inspected, 

and any applicable related investigative and 

corrective actions and part marking has been 

accomplished, in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing 

Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–27–

0150, dated December 9, 2004. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 

accordance with the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. 

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with 14 CFR 39.19 on any 

airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify 

the appropriate principal inspector in the 

FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding 

District Office. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Boeing Special Attention 

Service Bulletin 757–27–0150, dated 

December 9, 2004, to perform the actions that 

are required by this AD, unless the AD 

specifies otherwise. The Director of the 

Federal Register approved the incorporation 

by reference of this document in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. 

Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207, 

for a copy of this service information. You 

may review copies at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

400 Seventh Street SW., room PL–401, Nassif 

Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet at 

http://dms.dot.gov; or at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the availability 

of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741–

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html. 

59644 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 197 / Thursday, October 13, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 30, 2005. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–20265 Filed 10–12–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–20137; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–96–AD; Amendment 39–

14338; AD 2005–20–41] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 757–200, –200PF, and –300 

Series Airplanes, Powered by Pratt & 

Whitney PW2000 Series Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Boeing Model 757–200, –200PF, and 

–300 series airplanes, powered by Pratt 

& Whitney PW2000 series engines. This 

AD requires repetitive inspections for 

loose or damaged components of the 

support brackets and associated 

fasteners for the hydraulic lines located 

in the nacelle struts, and any related 

investigative and corrective actions. 

This AD results from reports of damage 

and subsequent failure of the support 

brackets and associated fasteners for the 

hydraulic lines located internal to the 

upper fairing cavity of the nacelle struts. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent such 

failure, which, in conjunction with 

sparking of electrical wires, failure of 

seals that would allow flammable fluids 

to migrate to compartments with 

ignition sources, or overheating of the 

pneumatic ducts beyond auto-ignition 

temperatures, could result in an 

uncontained fire. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

November 17, 2005. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of November 17, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 

SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, 

Washington, DC. 

Contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207, for service 

information identified in this AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tom 

Thorson, Aerospace Engineer, 

Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98055–4056; telephone 

(425) 917–6508; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the street 

address stated in the ADDRESSES section. 

This docket number is FAA–2005–

20137; the directorate identifier for this 

docket is 2004–NM–96–AD. 

Discussion 

The FAA issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to certain Boeing Model 757 

series airplanes. That NPRM was 

published in the Federal Register on 

January 28, 2005 (70 FR 4052). That 

NPRM proposed to require repetitive 

inspections for loose or damaged 

components of the support brackets and 

associated fasteners for the hydraulic 

lines located in the nacelle struts, and 

any related investigative and corrective 

actions. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments on the NPRM 

that have been received. 

Support for Proposed AD 

Two commenters concur with the 

proposed AD as written. 

Requests To Extend Compliance Time 

Two commenters ask that the 

compliance time for the initial and 

repetitive inspections specified in the 

proposed AD be extended. 

One commenter asks that the 

compliance time for the initial and 

repetitive inspections be extended to 

6,000 flight hours or 24 months, 

whichever is first. The proposed AD 

specifies initial and repetitive 

inspections at intervals not to exceed 

6,000 flight hours or 18 months. The 

commenter adds that, based on access, 

labor hour requirements, and the nature 

of the detailed inspections, this type of 

work aligns with the airline’s heavy 

maintenance program, which is 

calendar-based and FAA-approved at 

24-month intervals. The commenter 

states that, because the proposed 

inspections are fatigue-related, an 

equivalent level of safety is maintained 

by extending the proposed calendar 

compliance time. 

A second commenter asks that the 

compliance time for the repetitive 

inspections be changed to 7,500 flight 

hours or 24 months. The commenter 

states that the proposed AD requires the 

initial inspection to be accomplished 

within 18 months or 6,000 flight hours, 

regardless of total flight cycles/hours on 

the airplane. The commenter adds that 

the safety concern addressed by the 

proposed AD appears to be age-related. 

Additionally, consideration should be 

given to whether or not, and when, the 

work described in Boeing Service 

Bulletin 757–29–0043, dated June 21, 

1990 (the concurrent service bulletin 

referenced in the proposed AD) was 

accomplished. The commenter also 

states that the initial and repetitive 

inspection interval in the proposed AD 

coincides with the published Material 

Review Board’s most conservative 

periodic check (PCK) interval; several 

operators, including the commenter, 

have escalated that PCK interval to 24 

months. The commenter concludes that 

attempting to accomplish the proposed 

actions within the proposed compliance 

time would be expensive; extending the 

compliance time would allow operators 

who have escalated the PCK interval to 

accomplish the inspections during 

maintenance checks. 

We agree to extend the compliance 

time for the initial and repetitive 

inspections to 6,000 flight hours or 24 

months, whichever is first. The fatiguerelated failures are a function of 

airplane flight hours and flight cycles, 

not a direct function of calendar time. 

Extending the compliance time will 

continue to provide an equivalent level 

of safety, as noted by the commenter. 

However, we do not agree to extend the 

compliance time to 7,500 flight hours or 

24 months; the 6,000-flight-hour 

compliance time was based on service 

history of part failures and an 

engineering fatigue analysis by the 

original equipment manufacturer 

(OEM). We have changed paragraph (f) 

of this AD to reflect the revised 

compliance time. 

Request To Change Costs of Compliance 

Section 

Two commenters ask for changes to 

the Costs of Compliance section. 

One commenter states that the 

estimate in the cost section in the 

proposed AD specifies that it would