ALD-184 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 24-1833

___________

HEON JONG YOO, agent of Hank Yoo,

Appellant

v.

BRIAN BARKER; ASMA NISSAR; CARRIER CLINIC PSYCHIATRISTS;

FBI NICS AGENTS; SOMERSET COUNTY CLERKS;

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

RWJ UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-22-cv-01656)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal due to a Jurisdictional Defect and Possible

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

September 19, 2024

Before: HARDIMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 4, 2024)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Heon Jong Yoo, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the District Court 

dismissing his complaint on statute of limitations grounds. For the reasons that follow, 

we will summarily affirm.

On March 15, 2022, Yoo filed a complaint against Brian Barker, an employee of 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Clerk of Somerset County, New Jersey, Rutgers 

University policemen, and other defendants pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1

 

Yoo alleged that the Rutgers University police transported him to Robert Wood Johnson 

University Hospital in 2013 and in 2015. Both times, he was transferred to a mental 

health facility and released before his scheduled hearing due to a lack of evidence. 

Yoo averred that hospital employees lied on their reports and that the Somerset 

County Clerk transferred his records to Barker, who fraudulently labeled him as

“adjudicated mentally defective/committed to a mental institution.” Complaint at 4; Ex. 

2 to Complaint at 6. As a result of this designation, Yoo was unable to buy firearms in 

2016 and enlist in the military in 2015 and 2016. He was convicted of a firearms offense

in 2018. Yoo sought money damages and the removal of the “adjudicated mentally 

defective” designation from the FBI’s database.

Several defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court 

determined that New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions

1 Yoo filed his complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Texas. The complaint was transferred to the New Jersey District Court.
3

applied and barred any claims that accrued before March 15, 2020. Because the acts 

identified in the complaint occurred before this date, the District Court dismissed Yoo’s 

complaint in its entirety without prejudice and granted him leave to file an amended 

complaint. The District Court stated that if Yoo did not file an amended complaint within 

30 days, the matter would be dismissed with prejudice. Before 30 days passed, Yoo filed 

a notice of appeal. He did not file an amended complaint.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although the District Court 

dismissed Yoo’s complaint without prejudice, its order is final for purposes of § 1291.

Yoo did not file an amended complaint within the 30-day period, and he thereby elected 

to stand on his complaint. Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 

1992).2 Our standard of review is plenary. Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 

598, 601 (3d Cir. 2015). We may summarily affirm the District Court’s decision if the 

appeal does not present a substantial question. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.

As the District Court stated, the state statute of limitations for a personal injury 

action applies to claims under Bivens and § 1983. Fisher v. Hollingsworth, -- F.4th --, 

2024 WL 3820969, at *7-8 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2024). A claim arising in New Jersey has a 

two-year statute of limitations. Id. at *8. We agree with the District Court that Yoo’s 

2 Yoo filed a motion for reconsideration after the 30-day period expired. This motion, 

which is pending, does not impact our jurisdiction because it was filed after the District 

Court’s order became final. See Batoff, 977 F.2d at 851 n.5. We do not consider this 

filing as it is not before us, although we note that Yoo does not seek to amend his 

complaint.
4

claims are time-barred. He alleges that he was admitted and discharged from the hospital 

and mental health facility, and designated “adjudicated mentally defective,” in 2013 and 

2015, well over two years before he filed his complaint in 2022. To the extent Yoo states

that he did not know that he was labeled “adjudicated mentally defective,” the court filing 

attached to his complaint reflects that he was aware of this designation on or before

December 6, 2018, as it was stamped received as of that date by the District Court in his 

criminal case.

3

Yoo appears to contend that his claims are not time-barred because there is a

continuing violation of his rights. He states that erroneous information about him

remains in the FBI’s database. As the District Court explained, the continuing-violation 

doctrine applies “when a defendant’s conduct is part of a continuing practice.” Randall v. 

City of Phila. Law Dep’t, 919 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and 

citation omitted) (emphasis added). Yoo does not allege in his complaint any conduct by 

a defendant on or after March 15, 2020. He has not shown that the continuing-violation 

doctrine applies.

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court as this 

appeal does not present a substantial question. The Appellees’ motions for summary 

affirmance are granted.

3 The record reflects that Mr. Barker works in West Virginia. Even if West Virginia law 

applies, Yoo’s claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See W. Va. Code 

§ 55-2-12(b).