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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

No. 2-17-0453 

Opinion filed August 18, 2020 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

SECOND DISTRICT 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) Nos. 10-CF-3 

) 13-CF-1031 

) 13-CF-1793 

) 

JOEL D. SHELTON, ) Honorable 

) Donna R. Honzel, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Hudson and Bridges concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Joel D. Shelton, contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file 

a motion to suppress, because a 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. 

Because the 911 caller reported that defendant was asleep at the wheel at an intersection, there was 

reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for driving under the influence. Thus, we affirm.1 

1 We note that this opinion was originally filed on January 17, 2020. Although defendant 

had requested oral argument, we mistakenly never entered a written order dispensing with oral 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Winnebago County with, among other things, 

one count of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), 

(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(E) (West 2010)). Defendant opted for a jury trial. 

¶ 4 Before trial, defendant moved in limine to bar admission of the arresting officer’s 

testimony that he was dispatched to investigate a 911 report of someone “asleep behind the wheel 

at a light or intersection.” The trial court ruled that the officer could testify that he was dispatched 

because someone was stopped at the intersection but not because the driver was asleep behind the 

wheel. The court explained that it was concerned about the implication that defendant was “drunk 

and sleeping behind the wheel like sometimes drunks do.” 

¶ 5 The following relevant facts were established at the trial. On January 1, 2010, at about 

9:55 p.m., Officer Stacey Beaman of the Rockford Police Department was dispatched to the 

argument. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing, 

contending, among other things, that we failed to enter a written order dispensing with his request 

for oral argument. We denied the petition for rehearing and again neglected to enter an order 

disposing of defendant’s request for oral argument. Defendant, in turn, filed a petition for leave 

to appeal to the supreme court. Our supreme court denied the petition for leave to appeal but 

entered a supervisory order directing this court to vacate its judgment and, before entering a new 

judgment, conduct oral argument. 

We have since conducted oral argument. We have also carefully reconsidered the 

arguments of the parties, both written and oral, the record, the applicable law, and our original 

opinion. We stand by our original opinion as modified herein. 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

intersection of North Main Street and Riverside Boulevard. According to Officer Beaman, the 

dispatch “was in reference to a welfare check.” The 911 caller stated that a vehicle was stopped 

at the intersection. As Officer Beaman drove to that location, the dispatcher advised her that the 

caller had reported that the vehicle was now moving and that the caller had followed it to a nearby 

Culver’s restaurant. The caller described the vehicle and its license plate number. 

¶ 6 When she arrived in the area, Officer Beaman saw the described vehicle in the Culver’s 

drive-through lane. The vehicle then exited onto Bennington Road. Officer Beaman followed the 

vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. After driving about 25 to 30 feet on Bennington Road, the 

vehicle pulled back into the Culver’s lot and parked. 

¶ 7 As she approached the vehicle, Officer Beaman saw defendant, the only occupant, in the 

driver’s seat. As she stood next to the driver’s window, Officer Beaman smelled a strong odor of 

an alcoholic beverage on defendant’s breath and burnt cannabis coming from the vehicle’s interior. 

¶ 8 Officer Beaman had defendant exit the vehicle and walk to the squad car. Defendant 

stumbled several times, requiring Officer Beaman to hold defendant’s right arm to steady him. 

Officer Beaman had defendant sit in the squad car. While defendant sat in the squad car, he offered 

that he had been at a bar but had not consumed any alcohol. Defendant later admitted to another 

officer that he had drunk 21⁄2 alcoholic beverages. Defendant refused to complete any field sobriety 

tests. 

¶ 9 Officer Beaman then requested that a traffic investigator come to the scene. Several 

officers arrived and assisted in searching defendant’s vehicle. Officer Beaman found a half-empty 

bottle of vodka next to the driver’s seat and two clear plastic bags containing cannabis, one on the 

dash and the other between the front seats. 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

¶ 10 After several other witnesses testified, including defendant, the jury found defendant guilty 

of, among other things, aggravated DUI. The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years’ 

imprisonment on the DUI conviction. Defendant, in turn, filed a timely notice of appeal. 

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to suppress. Specifically, defendant asserts that the 911 call, stating that defendant was 

asleep at the wheel at the intersection, was insufficient, standing alone, to provide reasonable 

suspicion to stop his vehicle. The State responds that the call provided reasonable suspicion to 

stop defendant for DUI. 

¶ 13 Before we address the merits of defendant’s contention, we note that defendant raises the 

ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, as opposed to in a postconviction proceeding. Most often, 

a postconviction proceeding is the more appropriate mechanism for challenging the effectiveness 

of trial counsel because the defendant would have the opportunity to develop a record specifically 

addressing the merits of a motion to suppress. People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 21-22. 

However, where there are sufficient record facts to resolve the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, 

we will address it on direct appeal. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 22, 24. 

¶ 14 Here, the parties agree that there are sufficient record facts to resolve defendant’s 

ineffectiveness claim. They also agree as to the scope of the relevant facts. Although the record 

does not show whether the 911 caller provided additional relevant information, the parties agree 

that the caller reported that defendant was asleep at the wheel while sitting in his vehicle at an 

intersection. Defendant relies exclusively on that fact in arguing that there was no reasonable 

suspicion to stop him. More importantly, the State does not suggest that there was any other 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

information provided by the caller that was relevant to whether there was reasonable suspicion to 

stop defendant.2 Thus, we will address the issue. 

¶ 15 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s 

performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, 

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People 

v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007). Decisions involving trial strategy generally will not 

support an ineffectiveness claim. People v. Lindsey, 324 Ill. App. 3d 193, 197 (2001). 

¶ 16 Whether to move to suppress evidence generally is a matter of trial strategy. People v. 

Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611 (2001). Courts will presume that trial counsel had a legitimate 

strategy for filing or not filing a motion to suppress. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 611. To overcome 

that presumption and prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to file a motion to suppress, 

a defendant must show that (1) the unargued motion to suppress would have succeeded and 

(2) there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the 

evidence been suppressed. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 611. If filing a motion to suppress would 

have been futile, then the failure to do so will not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010). 

2 We note that the State has not argued that there was some other basis for stopping 

defendant, such as community caretaking. See People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 268-75 

(2010). 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

¶ 17 Here, defendant relies solely on Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), for his 

argument that the 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The State, in 

turn, contends that Navarette supports the stop. Thus, we will focus on the import of that case. 

¶ 18 In Navarette, a 911 caller reported having recently been run off the road by another vehicle. 

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 395. After holding that the call was reliable, the United States Supreme 

Court addressed whether the information provided by the call constituted reasonable suspicion to 

stop the vehicle. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 400-01. In doing so, the Court noted that it must determine 

whether the 911 report created reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk driving, as 

opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 401. 

¶ 19 The Court emphasized that the commonsense approach of reasonable suspicion depends 

on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent 

people, not legal technicians, act. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 402. The Court distinguished certain 

driving behaviors that indicate drunk driving from other traffic infractions that are too tenuously 

connected to drunk driving to give rise, alone, to reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Navarette, 

572 U.S. at 402. The Court added that a report of driving behavior that suggests decreased 

vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those drunk-driving cues gives rise to 

reasonable suspicion that the driver is under the influence. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 401. Ultimately, 

the Court validated the stop. 

¶ 20 Applying the reasoning of Navarette, we conclude that the 911 report that defendant was 

asleep at the wheel at an intersection provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Clearly, a 

driver who falls asleep at an intersection is experiencing decreased vigilance and impaired 

judgment commonly associated with drunk driving. That is particularly so at 10 p.m., not an 

unusually late hour. Sleeping at the wheel at an intersection also creates several dangers associated 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

with drunk driving. For instance, a vehicle unexpectedly stopped at an intersection could cause 

other drivers to suddenly swerve to avoid the stopped vehicle, thereby colliding with other vehicles 

or leaving the roadway and striking a pedestrian or object. As defendant’s reported conduct was 

a significant indicator of DUI, the report gave Officer Beaman reasonable suspicion that defendant 

committed the offense. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. 

¶ 21 Although the reported behavior might have been explained by, for example, extreme 

tiredness or prescribed medication, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that reasonable 

suspicion need not rule out the possibility of an innocent explanation. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. 

Indeed, even the reported driving behavior in Navarette, running another motorist off the road, 

was subject to possible innocent explanations. For example, the offending driver might have 

suddenly swerved to avoid an animal or other hazardous object in the road, or carelessly lost 

control of his vehicle because of a momentary lapse of attention, such as changing radio stations, 

eating something, or looking at a cell phone. Nonetheless, as long as it was reasonable to infer 

that the driver ran the other motorist off the road because he was under the influence, the officer 

had a proper basis to stop the vehicle and investigate the cause. The same is true here. 

¶ 22 Nor did the absence of additional suspicious conduct before the stop dispel the reasonable 

suspicion of drunk driving. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. Indeed, an officer who already has 

reasonable suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious 

driving. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. Further, once reasonable suspicion of drunk driving exists, 

the reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop the suspect does not depend on the availability 

of less-intrusive investigative techniques. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403-04. Thus, because the 911 

call provided reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, Officer Beaman was justified in stopping 

defendant at the first opportunity. 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

¶ 23 Because the 911 call provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, a motion 

to suppress would not have succeeded. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file 

such a motion. 

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County. 

¶ 26 Affirmed. 

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2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

Cite as: 

Decision Under Review: 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellant: 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellee: 

No. 2-17-0453 

People v. Shelton, 2020 IL App (2d) 170453-B 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 10-

CF-3; the Hon. Donna R. Honzel, Judge, presiding. 

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Erin S. Johnson, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant. 

Marilyn Hite Ross, State’s Attorney, of Rockford (Patrick 

Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Ivan O. Taylor Jr., of State’s 

Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the 

People. 

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