# Journal officiel C 158/2009

| | ISSN 1725-2431
  doi:10.3000/17252431.C_2009.158.fra |
| --- | --- |
| Journal officiel
  de l'Union européenne | C 158 |
| | |
| Édition de langue française | Communications et informations | 52e année11 juillet 2009 |

ISSN 1725-2431

doi:10.3000/17252431.C_2009.158.fra

Journal officiel

de l'Union européenne

C 158

Édition de langue française

Communications et informations

52e année11 juillet 2009

---

| Numéro d'information | Sommaire | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Communications |
| | COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/01 | Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée (Affaire COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Numéro d'information

Sommaire

page

II   Communications

COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission

2009/C 158/01

Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée (Affaire COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI) (
  1
  )

1

1

| | IV   Informations |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/02 | Taux de change de l'euro | 2 |
| | INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES |
| 2009/C 158/03 | Présentation annotée des marchés réglementés et dispositions nationales mettant en oeuvre les exigences de la DSI (directive 2004/39/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil) | 3 |
| 2009/C 158/04 | Communication de la Commission conformément à l'article 16, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) no 1008/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant des règles communes pour l'exploitation de services aériens dans la Communauté — Obligations de service public portant sur des services aériens réguliers (
  1
  ) | 9 |

IV   Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission

2009/C 158/02

Taux de change de l'euro

2

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES

2009/C 158/03

Présentation annotée des marchés réglementés et dispositions nationales mettant en oeuvre les exigences de la DSI (directive 2004/39/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil)

3

2009/C 158/04

Communication de la Commission conformément à l'article 16, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) no 1008/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant des règles communes pour l'exploitation de services aériens dans la Communauté — Obligations de service public portant sur des services aériens réguliers (
  1
  )

o

1

9

| | V   Avis |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/05 | Appel à propositions — EACEA/11/2009 — Soutien structurel aux organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes et aux organisations de la société civile au niveau européen — Programme L’Europe pour les citoyens, Action 2, Mesures 1 et 2 — 2010 | 10 |
| | PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/06 | Aide d'État — Pays-Bas — Aide d'État C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE (
  1
  ) | 13 |
| | AUTRES ACTES |
| | Commission |
| 2009/C 158/07 | Publication d’une demande d’enregistrement au sens de l’article 8, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 509/2006 du Conseil relatif aux spécialités traditionnelles garanties des produits agricoles et des denrées alimentaires | 24 |

V   Avis

PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES

Commission

2009/C 158/05

Appel à propositions — EACEA/11/2009 — Soutien structurel aux organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes et aux organisations de la société civile au niveau européen — Programme L’Europe pour les citoyens, Action 2, Mesures 1 et 2 — 2010

10

PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE

Commission

2009/C 158/06

Aide d'État — Pays-Bas — Aide d'État C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING — Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE (
  1
  )

1

13

AUTRES ACTES

Commission

2009/C 158/07

Publication d’une demande d’enregistrement au sens de l’article 8, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 509/2006 du Conseil relatif aux spécialités traditionnelles garanties des produits agricoles et des denrées alimentaires

o

24

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE |

---

(1)   Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE

1

| FR | |
| --- | --- |

FR

---

II Communications

COMMUNICATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/1

---

Non-opposition à une concentration notifiée

(Affaire COMP/M.5403 — Lufthansa/BMI)

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2009/C 158/01

Le 14 mai 2009, la Commission a décidé de ne pas s'opposer à la concentration notifiée susmentionnée et de la déclarer compatible avec le marché commun. Cette décision se fonde sur l'article 6, paragraphe 1, point b) du règlement (CE) no 139/2004 du Conseil. Le texte intégral de la décision n'est disponible qu'en anglais et sera rendu public après suppression des secrets d'affaires qu'il pourrait contenir. Il pourra être consulté:

| — | dans la section consacrée aux concentrations, sur le site Internet de la DG concurrence de la Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ce site permet de rechercher des décisions concernant des opérations de concentration à partir du nom de l'entreprise, du numéro de l'affaire, de la date ou du secteur d'activité, |
| --- | --- |

—

dans la section consacrée aux concentrations, sur le site Internet de la DG concurrence de la Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Ce site permet de rechercher des décisions concernant des opérations de concentration à partir du nom de l'entreprise, du numéro de l'affaire, de la date ou du secteur d'activité,

| — | sur le site Internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/index.htm), qui offre un accès en ligne au droit communautaire, sous le numéro de document 32009M5403. |
| --- | --- |

—

sur le site Internet EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/fr/index.htm), qui offre un accès en ligne au droit communautaire, sous le numéro de document 32009M5403.

---

IV Informations

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES INSTITUTIONS ET ORGANES DE L’UNION EUROPÉENNE

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/2

---

Taux de change de l'euro (1)

10 juillet 2009

2009/C 158/02

1 euro =

| | Monnaie | Taux de change |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollar des États-Unis | 1,3901 |
| JPY | yen japonais | 128,21 |
| DKK | couronne danoise | 7,4466 |
| GBP | livre sterling | 0,85800 |
| SEK | couronne suédoise | 11,0022 |
| CHF | franc suisse | 1,5140 |
| ISK | couronne islandaise | |
| NOK | couronne norvégienne | 9,0840 |
| BGN | lev bulgare | 1,9558 |
| CZK | couronne tchèque | 26,030 |
| EEK | couronne estonienne | 15,6466 |
| HUF | forint hongrois | 277,50 |
| LTL | litas lituanien | 3,4528 |
| LVL | lats letton | 0,6993 |
| PLN | zloty polonais | 4,3740 |
| RON | leu roumain | 4,2160 |
| TRY | lire turque | 2,1636 |
| AUD | dollar australien | 1,7940 |
| CAD | dollar canadien | 1,6212 |
| HKD | dollar de Hong Kong | 10,7736 |
| NZD | dollar néo-zélandais | 2,2250 |
| SGD | dollar de Singapour | 2,0331 |
| KRW | won sud-coréen | 1 786,89 |
| ZAR | rand sud-africain | 11,4023 |
| CNY | yuan ren-min-bi chinois | 9,4983 |
| HRK | kuna croate | 7,3315 |
| IDR | rupiah indonésien | 14 174,11 |
| MYR | ringgit malais | 4,9731 |
| PHP | peso philippin | 67,026 |
| RUB | rouble russe | 45,4005 |
| THB | baht thaïlandais | 47,382 |
| BRL | real brésilien | 2,8084 |
| MXN | peso mexicain | 19,0303 |
| INR | roupie indienne | 67,8230 |

Monnaie

Taux de change

USD

dollar des États-Unis

1,3901

JPY

yen japonais

128,21

DKK

couronne danoise

7,4466

GBP

livre sterling

0,85800

SEK

couronne suédoise

11,0022

CHF

franc suisse

1,5140

ISK

couronne islandaise

NOK

couronne norvégienne

9,0840

BGN

lev bulgare

1,9558

CZK

couronne tchèque

26,030

EEK

couronne estonienne

15,6466

HUF

forint hongrois

277,50

LTL

litas lituanien

3,4528

LVL

lats letton

0,6993

PLN

zloty polonais

4,3740

RON

leu roumain

4,2160

TRY

lire turque

2,1636

AUD

dollar australien

1,7940

CAD

dollar canadien

1,6212

HKD

dollar de Hong Kong

10,7736

NZD

dollar néo-zélandais

2,2250

SGD

dollar de Singapour

2,0331

KRW

won sud-coréen

1 786,89

ZAR

rand sud-africain

11,4023

CNY

yuan ren-min-bi chinois

9,4983

HRK

kuna croate

7,3315

IDR

rupiah indonésien

14 174,11

MYR

ringgit malais

4,9731

PHP

peso philippin

67,026

RUB

rouble russe

45,4005

THB

baht thaïlandais

47,382

BRL

real brésilien

2,8084

MXN

peso mexicain

19,0303

INR

roupie indienne

67,8230

---

(1)  Source: taux de change de référence publié par la Banque centrale européenne.

---

INFORMATIONS PROVENANT DES ÉTATS MEMBRES

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/3

---

Présentation annotée des marchés réglementés et dispositions nationales mettant en oeuvre les exigences de la DSI (directive 2004/39/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil)

2009/C 158/03

L’article 47 de la directive concernant les marchés d’instruments financiers (directive 2004/39/CE, JO L 145 du 30.4.2004) autorise chaque État membre à conférer le statut de «marché réglementé» aux marchés établis sur son territoire qui se conforment à sa réglementation nationale.

L’article 4, paragraphe 1, point 14, de la directive 2004/39/CE définit le «marché réglementé» comme un système multilatéral, exploité et/ou géré par un opérateur de marché, qui assure ou facilite la rencontre — en son sein même et selon ses règles non discrétionnaires – de multiples intérêts acheteurs et vendeurs exprimés par des tiers pour des instruments financiers, d’une manière qui aboutisse à la conclusion de contrats portant sur des instruments financiers admis à la négociation dans le cadre de ses règles et/ou de ses systèmes, et qui est agréé et fonctionne régulièrement conformément aux dispositions du titre III de la directive.

L’article 47 de la directive 2004/39/CE impose à tout État membre d’établir et de tenir à jour une liste des marchés réglementés qu’il a agréés. Cette information doit être communiquée aux autres États membres et à la Commission européenne. En vertu du même article, la Commission est tenue de publier annuellement au Journal officiel une liste des marchés réglementés qui lui ont été notifiés. La présente liste a été établie conformément à cette obligation.

La liste ci-jointe donne la dénomination des différents marchés que les autorités compétentes de chaque État membre considèrent comme conformes à la définition du «marché réglementé». Elle mentionne, en outre, l’entité responsable de la gestion de ces marchés ainsi que les autorités compétentes chargées de l’établissement ou de l’approbation de leurs règles de fonctionnement.

Sous l’effet de la diminution des barrières à l’entrée et de la spécialisation croissante par segments de négociation, la liste des «marchés réglementés» est plus susceptible de modifications que celle qui relève de la directive 93/22/CEE concernant les services d’investissement. L’article 47 de la directive concernant les marchés d’instruments financiers impose également à la Commission européenne de publier la liste des marchés réglementés sur son site internet et de la mettre à jour régulièrement. En conséquence, la Commission européenne a décidé qu’outre la publication annuelle d’une liste dans le JO, elle mettrait en ligne une version actualisée de la même liste sur son site web officiel [http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/fr/securities/isd/mifid_fr.htm]. Cette dernière liste sera mise à jour régulièrement, sur la base des informations communiquées par les autorités nationales des États membres. Ceux-ci sont invités à continuer de notifier à la Commission tout ajout ou retrait de la liste des marchés réglementés dont ils sont l’État membre d’origine.

| Pays | Dénomination du marché réglementé | Entité chargée de la gestion | Autorité compétente pour la reconnaissance et la surveillance du marché |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Autriche | 1. | Amtlicher Handel (marché officiel) |

Pays

Dénomination du marché réglementé

Entité chargée de la gestion

Autorité compétente pour la reconnaissance et la surveillance du marché

Autriche

1.

Amtlicher Handel (marché officiel)

| 2. | Geregelter Freiverkehr (marché semi-réglementé) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Geregelter Freiverkehr (marché semi-réglementé)

| 1-2. | Wiener Börse AG (1-2) |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Wiener Börse AG (1-2)

| 1-2. | Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA — autorité de surveillance des marchés financiers) |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA — autorité de surveillance des marchés financiers)

Belgique

| 1. | a) | Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Le marché «Euronext Brussels»/De «Euronext Brussels» markt.

| b) | Le marché des instruments dérivés d’Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Le marché des instruments dérivés d’Euronext Brussels/De markt voor afgeleide producten van Euronext Brussels.

| 1. | Euronext Brussels SA/NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Brussels SA/NV

| 1. | a) | Reconnaissance: Ministre des finances, sur avis de la commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).
  Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurentiewezen (CBFA) |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Reconnaissance: Ministre des finances, sur avis de la commission bancaire, financière et des assurances (CBFA).

Erkenning: Minister van Financiën op advies van de Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurentiewezen (CBFA)

| b) | Surveillance: CBFA
  Toezicht: CBFA |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: CBFA

Toezicht: CBFA

| 2. | Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le marché réglementé hors bourse des obligations linéaires, des titres scindés et des certificats de trésorerie/De gereglementeerde buitenbeursmarkt van de lineaire obligaties, de gesplitste effecten en de schatkistcertificaten

| 2. | Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds |
| --- | --- |

2.

Fonds des rentes/Rentenfonds

| 2. | a) | Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).
  Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

a)

Reconnaissance: Législateur (art. 144, §2 de la loi du 2.8.2002).

Erkenning: Regelgever (art. 144, §2 van de wet van 2.8.2002)

| b) | Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.
  Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Surveillance: Comité du Fonds des rentes, pour compte de la CBFA.

Toezicht: Comité van het Rentenfonds, voor rekening van de CBFA.

Bulgarie

| 1. | Официален пазар (marché réglementé) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Официален пазар (marché réglementé)

| 2. | Неофициален пазар (marché non réglementé) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Неофициален пазар (marché non réglementé)

Българска Фондова Борса — София АД (Bourse bulgare — Sofia JSCo)

Комисия за финансов надзор (commission de surveillance financière)

Chypre

Bourse de Chypre

| 1. | Marché principal |
| --- | --- |

1.

Marché principal

| 2. | Marché parallèle |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marché parallèle

| 3. | Marché alternatif |
| --- | --- |

3.

Marché alternatif

| 4. | Marché des obligations |
| --- | --- |

4.

Marché des obligations

| 5. | Marchés des sociétés d’investissement |
| --- | --- |

5.

Marchés des sociétés d’investissement

| 6. | Marché des grands projets |
| --- | --- |

6.

Marché des grands projets

| 7. | Marché des transports maritimes |
| --- | --- |

7.

Marché des transports maritimes

| 1-7. | Bourse de Chypre |
| --- | --- |

1-7.

Bourse de Chypre

| 1-7. | Commission de surveillance financière de Chypre |
| --- | --- |

1-7.

Commission de surveillance financière de Chypre

République tchèque

| 1. | Premier marché (Hlavní trh) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Premier marché (Hlavní trh)

| 2. | Marché libre (Volný trh) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marché libre (Volný trh)

| 3. | Marché officiel |
| --- | --- |

3.

Marché officiel

| 4. | Marché à terme |
| --- | --- |

4.

Marché à terme

| 5. | Marché au comptant |
| --- | --- |

5.

Marché au comptant

| 1-2. | Bourse de Prague
  (Burza cenných papíru Praha, a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Bourse de Prague

(Burza cenných papíru Praha, a.s.)

| 3. | Système RM, Bourse tchèque
  (RM-SYSTÉM česká burza cenných papirů a.s.) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Système RM, Bourse tchèque

(RM-SYSTÉM česká burza cenných papirů a.s.)

| 4-5. | Bourse de l’énergie de Prague
  (Energetická burza Praha) |
| --- | --- |

4-5.

Bourse de l’énergie de Prague

(Energetická burza Praha)

| 1-5. | Banque nationale de la république tchèque |
| --- | --- |

1-5.

Banque nationale de la république tchèque

Danemark

| 1. | NASDAQ OMX Copehnhague A/S






  — | Marché des actions |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

NASDAQ OMX Copehnhague A/S

—

Marché des actions

| — | Marché des obligations |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des obligations

| — | Marché des instruments dérivés |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des instruments dérivés

| 1. | Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS |
| --- | --- |

1.

Copenhagen Stock Exchange AS

Finanstilsynet (Autorité danoise de surveillance financière)

| 2. | Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [marché autorisé = opérations régulières sur valeurs mobilières admises à la négociation mais pas à la cote) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dansk Autoriseret Markedsplads A/S (Danish Authorised Market Place Ltd. (DAMP)) [marché autorisé = opérations régulières sur valeurs mobilières admises à la négociation mais pas à la cote)

| 2. | Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Danish Authorised Market Place AS (DAMP)

Estonie

| 1. | Väärtpaberibörs (Bourse)






  — | Põhinimekiri (premier marché); |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Väärtpaberibörs (Bourse)

—

Põhinimekiri (premier marché);

| — | Võlakirjade nimekiri (marché des obligations) |
| --- | --- |

—

Võlakirjade nimekiri (marché des obligations)

| — | Fondiosakute nimekri (marché des fonds de placement) |
| --- | --- |

—

Fondiosakute nimekri (marché des fonds de placement)

NASDAQ OMX Tallinn AS

(NASDAQ OMX Tallinn Ltd.)

Finantsinspektsioon

(Autorité estonienne de surveillance financière)

| 2. | Reguleeritud turg
  (marché réglementé)






  — | Lisanimekeri (marché secondaire) |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Reguleeritud turg

(marché réglementé)

—

Lisanimekeri (marché secondaire)

Finlande

Arvopaperipörssi (Bourse);

| — | Pörssilista (marché officiel) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pörssilista (marché officiel)

| — | Pre-lista (pré-marché) |
| --- | --- |

—

Pre-lista (pré-marché)

| — | Muut arvopaperit-lista (autre marché des valeurs mobilières) |
| --- | --- |

—

Muut arvopaperit-lista (autre marché des valeurs mobilières)

NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Oy (NASDAQ OMX Helsinki Ltd)

Désignation:

Ministère des finances.

Surveillance:

| — | Approbation des règles: Ministère des finances; |
| --- | --- |

—

Approbation des règles: Ministère des finances;

| — | Contrôle de leur application:
  Finanssivalvonta, Autorité finlandaise de surveillance financière. |
| --- | --- |

—

Contrôle de leur application:

Finanssivalvonta, Autorité finlandaise de surveillance financière.

France

| 1. | Euronext Paris |
| --- | --- |

1.

Euronext Paris

| 2. | MATIF |
| --- | --- |

2.

MATIF

| 3. | MONEP |
| --- | --- |

3.

MONEP

Euronext Paris (1-3)

Proposition de l’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF).

Reconnaissance par le ministre chargé de l’économie (cf. article L. 421-1 du code monétaire et financier).

Allemagne

Börsenaufsichtsbehörden der Länder (Autorités de surveillance boursières des Länder) et Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).

Auotrités des Länder:

| 1. | Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Börse Berlin (Regulierter Markt)

| 1. | Berliner Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Berliner Börse AG.

| 1. | Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Frauen, Berlin.

| 2. | Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Düsseldorfer Börse (Regulierter Markt)

| 2. | Börse Düsseldorf AG. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Börse Düsseldorf AG.

| 2. | Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf.

| 3. | Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt); |
| --- | --- |

3.

Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt);

| 3. | Deutsche Börse AG. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Deutsche Börse AG.

| 3 & 4. | Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden. |
| --- | --- |

3 & 4.

Hessisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und Landesentwicklung, Wiesbaden.

| 4. | Eurex Deutschland |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Deutschland

| 4. | Eurex Frankfurt AG |
| --- | --- |

4.

Eurex Frankfurt AG

| 5. | Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Hanseatische Wertpapierbörse Hamburg (Regulierter Markt, Startup market)

| 5. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

5.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 5. | Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit; |
| --- | --- |

5.

Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde für Wirtschaft und Arbeit;

| 6. | Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsische Börse zu Hannover (Regulierter Markt)

| 6. | BÖAG Börsen AG |
| --- | --- |

6.

BÖAG Börsen AG

| 6. | Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Verkehr, Hannover; |
| --- | --- |

6.

Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Verkehr, Hannover;

| 7. | Börse München (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Börse München (Regulierter Markt)

| 7. | Bayerische Börse AG |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerische Börse AG

| 7. | Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München; |
| --- | --- |

7.

Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft, Infrastruktur, Verkehr und Technologie, München;

| 8. | Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Baden-Württembergische Wertpapierbörse (Regulierter Markt)

| 8. | Börse-Stuttgart AG |
| --- | --- |

8.

Börse-Stuttgart AG

| 8. | Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Wirtschaftsministerium Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart.

| 9. | Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Mark) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Risk Management Exchange Hannover (Regulierter Mark)

| 9. | RMX Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

RMX Hannover

| 9. | Niedersächsiches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover |
| --- | --- |

9.

Niedersächsiches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr, Hannover

| 10. | European Energy Exchange |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange

| 10. | European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig |
| --- | --- |

10.

European Energy Exchange AG, Leipzig

| 10. | Sächsiches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden |
| --- | --- |

10.

Sächsiches Staatsministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit, Dresden

Grèce

| 1. | Bourse d’ Athènes (Entité gestionnaire)






  — | Marché des valeurs mobilières |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Bourse d’ Athènes (Entité gestionnaire)

—

Marché des valeurs mobilières

| — | Marché des instruments dérivés |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des instruments dérivés

| 1. | Bourse d’Athènes |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bourse d’Athènes

| 1. | Commission hellénique des marchés des capitaux (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Commission hellénique des marchés des capitaux (HCMC)

| 2. | Marché secondaire des valeurs mobilières électroniques (Titres de créance HDAT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marché secondaire des valeurs mobilières électroniques (Titres de créance HDAT)

| 2. | Banque de Grèce |
| --- | --- |

2.

Banque de Grèce

| 2. | Commission hellénique des marchés des capitaux (HCMC) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Commission hellénique des marchés des capitaux (HCMC)

Hongrie

Budapesti Értéktÿzsde Zrt. (Bourse de Budapest)

| — | Részvényszekció (Marché des actions) |
| --- | --- |

—

Részvényszekció (Marché des actions)

| — | Hitelpapír szekció (Marché des obligations) |
| --- | --- |

—

Hitelpapír szekció (Marché des obligations)

| — | Származékos szekció (Marché des instruments dérivés |
| --- | --- |

—

Származékos szekció (Marché des instruments dérivés

| — | Áru szekció (Marché des matières premières) |
| --- | --- |

—

Áru szekció (Marché des matières premières)

Budapesti Értéktÿzsde Zrt. (Bourse de Budapest)

Pénzügyi Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete (Autorité hongroise de surveillance financière)

Irlande

Marché principal de la Bourse irlandaise

Irish Stock Exchange Ltd.

La Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (“l’autorité de réglementation”) agrée les “marchés réglementés” et (à l’exception des conditions d’admission à la cote) surveillance l’application des prescriptions de la directive MIFID par l’opérateur du marché.

Italie

| 1. | Marché électronique des actions (MTA) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Marché électronique des actions (MTA)

| 2. | Marché électronique des obligations (MOT) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marché électronique des obligations (MOT)

| 3. | Marché électronique des fonds communs de placement à capital variable et des ETC (ETF-Plus) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Marché électronique des fonds communs de placement à capital variable et des ETC (ETF-Plus)

| 4. | Marché électronique des instruments dérivés titrisés (SeDeX) |
| --- | --- |

4.

Marché électronique des instruments dérivés titrisés (SeDeX)

| 5. | Marché après heures d’ouverture (TAH) |
| --- | --- |

5.

Marché après heures d’ouverture (TAH)

| 6. | Marché des instruments dérivés italiens pour la négociation des instruments financiers visés aux articles 1(2)(f) et 1(2)(i) de la Loi consolidée sur les finances (IDEM) |
| --- | --- |

6.

Marché des instruments dérivés italiens pour la négociation des instruments financiers visés aux articles 1(2)(f) et 1(2)(i) de la Loi consolidée sur les finances (IDEM)

| 7. | Marché de gros des obligations italiennes et étrangères (MTS) |
| --- | --- |

7.

Marché de gros des obligations italiennes et étrangères (MTS)

| 8. | Négociation de gros d’obligations et de titres qui ne sont pas émis par l’Etat mais par des organisations internationales avec une participation publique (MTS Corporate) |
| --- | --- |

8.

Négociation de gros d’obligations et de titres qui ne sont pas émis par l’Etat mais par des organisations internationales avec une participation publique (MTS Corporate)

| 9. | Négociation de gros en ligne d’obligations d’Etat (BondVision) |
| --- | --- |

9.

Négociation de gros en ligne d’obligations d’Etat (BondVision)

| 10. | Marché TLX |
| --- | --- |

10.

Marché TLX

| 1-6 | Borsa Italiana S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-6

Borsa Italiana S.p.A.

| 7-9 | Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato – MTS S.p.A. |
| --- | --- |

7-9

Società per il Mercato dei Titoli di Stato – MTS S.p.A.

| 10. | TLX s.p.a. |
| --- | --- |

10.

TLX s.p.a.

Consob agrée les sociétés qui gèrent les marchés et approuve leurs statuts et leurs règles.

Pour les marchés de gros des titres publics, la société d’exploitation est agréée par le Ministère de l’économie et des finances, sur avis de la Consob et de la Banca d’Italia.

Lettonie

NASDAQ OMX Riga

| — | Premier marché |
| --- | --- |

—

Premier marché

| — | Marché obligataire |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché obligataire

| — | Marché secondaire |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché secondaire

| — | Marché des fonds de placement |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des fonds de placement

JSC NASDAQ OMX Riga

Finanšu un kapitāla tirgus komisija (Commission du marché financier et des capitaux)

Lituanie

NASDAQ OMX Vilnius

| — | Premier marché du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Premier marché du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Marché secondaire du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché secondaire du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Marché des obligations du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des obligations du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

| — | Marché des fonds de placement du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des fonds de placement du Nasdaq OMX Vilnius

ISC NASDAQ OMX Vilnius

Commission lituanienne des valeurs mobilières

Luxembourg

Bourse de Luxembourg

Société de la Bourse de Luxembourg S.A.

Commission de surveillance du secteur financier

Malte

Bourse de Malte

Bourse de Malte

Autorité maltaise des services financiers

Pays-Bas

| 1. | a) | Marché au comptant Euronext Amsterdam:






  — | Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.

a)

Marché au comptant Euronext Amsterdam:

—

Euronext Amsterdam

| b) | Marché des instruments dérivés Euronext Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

b)

Marché des instruments dérivés Euronext Amsterdam

| 1. | NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV et Euronext Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

1.

NYSE Euronext (International) BV, NYSE Euronext (Holding) BV, Euronext NV, Euronext (Holdings) NV et Euronext Amsterdam NV

| 1-3. | Agréation par le Ministre des finances, sur avis de l’Autorité néerlandaise des marchés financiers et du Ministère néerlandais des finances.
  Supervision par l’Autorité néerlandaise des marchés financiers et du Ministère néerlandais des finances et par le Ministère néerlandais des finances. |
| --- | --- |

1-3.

Agréation par le Ministre des finances, sur avis de l’Autorité néerlandaise des marchés financiers et du Ministère néerlandais des finances.

Supervision par l’Autorité néerlandaise des marchés financiers et du Ministère néerlandais des finances et par le Ministère néerlandais des finances.

| 2. | Endex |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex

| 2. | Endex European Energy Derivatives Exchange NV |
| --- | --- |

2.

Endex European Energy Derivatives Exchange NV

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam

| 3. | MTS Amsterdam NV |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Amsterdam NV

Pologne

| 1. | Rynek podstawowy (Premier marché) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Rynek podstawowy (Premier marché)

| 2. | Rynek równolegly (marché parallèle) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Rynek równolegly (marché parallèle)

| 3. | Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) ( Marché réglementé hors bourse de valeurs mobilières CeTO) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Rynek Papierów Wartosciowych CeTO (regulowany rynek pozagieldowy) ( Marché réglementé hors bourse de valeurs mobilières CeTO)

| 1 et 2 | Gielda Papierów Wartoÿciowych w Warszawie (Bourse de Varsovie) |
| --- | --- |

1 et 2

Gielda Papierów Wartoÿciowych w Warszawie (Bourse de Varsovie)

| 3. | MTS-CeTO S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS-CeTO S.A.

Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego (Commission de surveillance financière)

Portugal

| 1. | Eurolist par Euronext Lisbon (Marché officiel) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Eurolist par Euronext Lisbon (Marché officiel)

| 2. | Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Marché des contrats à terme et des options) |
| --- | --- |

2.

Mercado de Futuros e Opções (Marché des contrats à terme et des options)

| 3. | MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Marché spécial de la dette publique) |
| --- | --- |

3.

MEDIP — Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública (Marché spécial de la dette publique)

| 4. | MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do Mibel |
| --- | --- |

4.

MIBEL — Mercado Regulamentado de Derivados do Mibel

(marché de l’énergie)

| 1-2. | Euronext Lisbonne — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

1-2.

Euronext Lisbonne — Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.

| 3. | MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

3.

MTS Portugal — Sociedade Gestora do Mercado Especial de Dívida Pública, SGMR, S.A.

| 4. | OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energie (Póló Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado SA (OMIP). |
| --- | --- |

4.

OMIP — Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energie (Póló Português), Sociedade Gestora de Mercado Regulamentado SA (OMIP).

Le Ministère de finances agrée les marchés sur proposition de la Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM, chargé de la réglementation et de la surveillance des marchés).

Roumanie

| 1. | Piata reglementata (Marché réglementé au comptant – BVB) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Piata reglementata (Marché réglementé au comptant – BVB)

| 2. | Piata reglementata la termen (Marché réglementé des instruments dérivés. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Piata reglementata la termen (Marché réglementé des instruments dérivés.

| 3. | Piata relementata (Marché réglementé des instruments dérivés – BMFMS) |
| --- | --- |

3.

Piata relementata (Marché réglementé des instruments dérivés – BMFMS)

| 1 et 2. | SC Bursa de Valori Bucurseti SA (Bourse de Bucarest SA) |
| --- | --- |

1 et 2.

SC Bursa de Valori Bucurseti SA (Bourse de Bucarest SA)

| 3. | SC Bursa Monetar-Financiara si de Marfuri SA Sibiu (Bourse monétaire-financière et des valeurs SA Sibiu) |
| --- | --- |

3.

SC Bursa Monetar-Financiara si de Marfuri SA Sibiu (Bourse monétaire-financière et des valeurs SA Sibiu)

Comisia Nationala a Valorilor Mobiliare (Commission nationale roumaine des valeurs mobilières)

Comisia Nationala a Valorilor Mobiliare (Commission nationale roumaine des valeurs mobilières)

République slovaque

| 1. | Marché des valeurs mobilières cotées






  — | Premier marché |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Marché des valeurs mobilières cotées

—

Premier marché

| — | Marché parallèle |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché parallèle

| 2. | Marché réglementé libre |
| --- | --- |

2.

Marché réglementé libre

Bourse de Bratislava

Banque nationale de Slovaquie

Slovénie

Bourse de Ljubljana, marché officiel (Borzni trg)

Bourse de Ljubljana (Ljubljanska borza)

Agence des marchés des valeurs mobilières

(Agencija za trg vrednostnih papirjev)

Espagne

| A. | Bolsas de Valores (toutes ces bourses comprennent un premier marché et un second marché) |
| --- | --- |

A.

Bolsas de Valores (toutes ces bourses comprennent un premier marché et un second marché)

CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores)

Banco de España, chargée du marché de la dette publique.

| 1. | Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona;

| A1. | Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A1.

Sociedad Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Barcelona S.A.

| 2. | Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao;

| A2. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A2.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Bilbao S.A.

| 3. | Bolsa de Valores de Madrid; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Bolsa de Valores de Madrid;

| A3. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A3.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Madrid S.A.

| 4. | Bolsa de valores de Valencia. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bolsa de valores de Valencia.

| A4. | Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A. |
| --- | --- |

A4.

Soc. Rectora de la Bolsa de Valores de Valencia. S.A.

| B. | Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados |
| --- | --- |

B.

Mercados oficiales de Productos Financieros Derivados

| 1. | MEFF Renta Fija; |
| --- | --- |

1.

MEFF Renta Fija;

| B1. | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B1.

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de RENTA Fija S.A.

| 2. | MEFF Renta Variable. |
| --- | --- |

2.

MEFF Renta Variable.

| B2. | Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A. |
| --- | --- |

B2.

Soc. Rectora de Productos Financieros Derivados de Renta Variable S.A.

| C. | Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva |
| --- | --- |

C.

Mercado MFAO de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva

| C. | (MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A. |
| --- | --- |

C.

(MFAO) Sociedad rectora del Mercado de Futuros del Aceite de Oliva, S.A.

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| D. | AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija |
| --- | --- |

D.

AIAF Mercado de Renta Fija

| E. | Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones |
| --- | --- |

E.

Mercados de Deuda Pública en Anotaciones

| E. | Banco de España |
| --- | --- |

E.

Banco de España

Suède

Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB

| — | marché réglementé pour les actions et les instruments financiers équivalant à des actions |
| --- | --- |

—

marché réglementé pour les actions et les instruments financiers équivalant à des actions

| — | marché réglementé pour les instruments dérivés |
| --- | --- |

—

marché réglementé pour les instruments dérivés

| — | marché réglementé pour les obligations et les instruments financiers équivalant à des obligations |
| --- | --- |

—

marché réglementé pour les obligations et les instruments financiers équivalant à des obligations

OMX Nordic Exchange Stockholm AB

Finansinspektionen (Autorité de surveillance financière)

Royaume-Uni

| 1. | EDX |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX

| 1. | EDX London Limited |
| --- | --- |

1.

EDX London Limited

| 1.-6. | Autorité des services financiers |
| --- | --- |

1.-6.

Autorité des services financiers

| 2. | Plus-Markets Group - Marché des valeurs mobilières cotées en Bourse PLUS |
| --- | --- |

2.

Plus-Markets Group - Marché des valeurs mobilières cotées en Bourse PLUS

| 2. | PLUS Markets plc |
| --- | --- |

2.

PLUS Markets plc

| 3. | The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE) |
| --- | --- |

3.

The London International Financial Futures and Options Exchanges (LIFFE)

| 3. | LIFFE Administration and Management |
| --- | --- |

3.

LIFFE Administration and Management

| 4. | Bourse des métaux de Londres |
| --- | --- |

4.

Bourse des métaux de Londres

| 4. | The London Metal Exchange Limited |
| --- | --- |

4.

The London Metal Exchange Limited

| 5. | Bourse intercontinentale — ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

Bourse intercontinentale — ICE Futures Europe

| 5. | ICE Futures Europe |
| --- | --- |

5.

ICE Futures Europe

| 6. | Bourse de Londres — Marché réglementé |
| --- | --- |

6.

Bourse de Londres — Marché réglementé

| 6. | London Stock Exchange plc |
| --- | --- |

6.

London Stock Exchange plc

Islande

OMX Nordic Exchange á Íslandi (marché réglementé)

OMX Nordic Exchange

Fjármála-eftirlitið (Autorité de surveillance financière)

Liechtenstein

néant

néant

néant

Norvège

| 1. | Bourse d’Oslo (marché officiel)






  — | Marché des actions |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Bourse d’Oslo (marché officiel)

—

Marché des actions

| — | Marché des instruments dérivés (financiers) |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des instruments dérivés (financiers)

| — | Marché des obligations |
| --- | --- |

—

Marché des obligations

| 1. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

1.

Oslo Børs ASA

Kredittilsynet (Autorité norvégienne de surveillance financière)

| 2. | Oslo Axess






  — | Marché des actions |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Axess

—

Marché des actions

| 2. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

2.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 3. | Nord Pool (marché officiel)






  — | Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce) |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Nord Pool (marché officiel)

—

Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce)

| 3. | Oslo Børs ASA |
| --- | --- |

3.

Oslo Børs ASA

| 4. | Imarex






  — | Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce) |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.

Imarex

—

Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce)

| 4. | Imarex ASA |
| --- | --- |

4.

Imarex ASA

| 5. | Fish Pool






  — | Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce) |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool

—

Marché des instruments dérivés (bourse de commerce)

| 5. | Fish Pool ASA |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fish Pool ASA

---

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/9

---

Communication de la Commission conformément à l'article 16, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) no 1008/2008 du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant des règles communes pour l'exploitation de services aériens dans la Communauté

Obligations de service public portant sur des services aériens réguliers

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2009/C 158/04

| État membre | Italie |
| --- | --- |
| Liaison concernée | Bolzano — Rome Fiumicino et vice versa |
| Date d'entrée en vigueur des obligations de service public | 1er décembre 2009 |
| Adresse à laquelle le texte et/ou l'ensemble des informations et documents pertinents se rapportant à l'obligation de service public peuvent être obtenus | E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile
  Direzione centrale regolazione economica





  Direzione trasporto aereo |
| Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118 |
| 00185 Roma |
| ITALIA |
| www.enac-italia.it |
| E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it |

État membre

Italie

Liaison concernée

Bolzano — Rome Fiumicino et vice versa

Date d'entrée en vigueur des obligations de service public

1er décembre 2009

Adresse à laquelle le texte et/ou l'ensemble des informations et documents pertinents se rapportant à l'obligation de service public peuvent être obtenus

E.N.A.C. Ente nazionale dell’aviazione civile

Direzione centrale regolazione economica

Direzione trasporto aereo

Viale del Castro Pretorio, n. 118

00185 Roma

ITALIA

www.enac-italia.it

E-mail: trasporto.aereo@enac.gov.it

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V Avis

PROCÉDURES ADMINISTRATIVES

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/10

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APPEL À PROPOSITIONS — EACEA/11/2009

Soutien structurel aux organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes et aux organisations de la société civile au niveau européen

Programme «L’Europe pour les citoyens», Action 2, Mesures 1 et 2 — 2010

2009/C 158/05

1.   OBJECTIFS ET DESCRIPTION

Le présent appel à propositions EACEA/11/2009 se base sur la décision du Parlement européen et du Conseil établissant le programme «L'Europe pour les citoyens» pour la promotion de la citoyenneté européenne active pour la période 2007-2013 (1) (ci-après «le programme»).

Le programme représente la base juridique de cet appel à propositions qui se réfère spécifiquement à l’action 2 «Une société civile active pour l’Europe», mesures 1 et 2 «Soutien structurel aux organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes et aux organisations de la société civile au niveau européen».

1.1.   Objectifs généraux du programme

Le programme a pour vocation de contribuer aux objectifs généraux suivants:

| a) | Donner aux citoyens l’occasion d’interagir et participer à la construction d’une Europe toujours plus proche, démocratique et axée sur le monde, unie dans sa diversité culturelle et s’enrichissant de celle-ci, développant ainsi la citoyenneté de l’Union; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Donner aux citoyens l’occasion d’interagir et participer à la construction d’une Europe toujours plus proche, démocratique et axée sur le monde, unie dans sa diversité culturelle et s’enrichissant de celle-ci, développant ainsi la citoyenneté de l’Union;

| b) | Forger un sentiment d’identité européenne, fondé sur des valeurs, une histoire et une culture communes; |
| --- | --- |

b)

Forger un sentiment d’identité européenne, fondé sur des valeurs, une histoire et une culture communes;

| c) | Favoriser l’adhésion des citoyens européens à l’Union; |
| --- | --- |

c)

Favoriser l’adhésion des citoyens européens à l’Union;

| d) | Améliorer la compréhension mutuelle des citoyens européens en respectant et promouvant la diversité culturelle et linguistique, tout en contribuant au dialogue interculturel. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Améliorer la compréhension mutuelle des citoyens européens en respectant et promouvant la diversité culturelle et linguistique, tout en contribuant au dialogue interculturel.

1.2.   Objectifs spécifiques de l'appel à propositions

Les objectifs spécifiques du présent appel à propositions sont les suivants:

| a) | Favoriser l’action, les débats et la réflexion en matière de citoyenneté européenne et de démocratie, de valeurs, d’histoire et de culture communes grâce aux activités et à la coopération des think tanks (structures de réflexion) et d'organisations de la société civile au niveau européen; |
| --- | --- |

a)

Favoriser l’action, les débats et la réflexion en matière de citoyenneté européenne et de démocratie, de valeurs, d’histoire et de culture communes grâce aux activités et à la coopération des think tanks (structures de réflexion) et d'organisations de la société civile au niveau européen;

| b) | Encourager l’interaction entre citoyens et organisations de la société civile, en contribuant au dialogue interculturel et en mettant en évidence tant la diversité que l’unité de l’Europe. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Encourager l’interaction entre citoyens et organisations de la société civile, en contribuant au dialogue interculturel et en mettant en évidence tant la diversité que l’unité de l’Europe.

1.3.   Priorités thématiques

| — | Avenir de l’Union européenne et ses valeurs fondamentales, |
| --- | --- |

—

Avenir de l’Union européenne et ses valeurs fondamentales,

| — | Citoyenneté européenne active, participation et démocratie, |
| --- | --- |

—

Citoyenneté européenne active, participation et démocratie,

| — | Dialogue interculturel, |
| --- | --- |

—

Dialogue interculturel,

| — | Impact des politiques communautaires sur les sociétés, |
| --- | --- |

—

Impact des politiques communautaires sur les sociétés,

| — | Bien-être des citoyens en Europe, emploi, cohésion sociale et développement durable. |
| --- | --- |

—

Bien-être des citoyens en Europe, emploi, cohésion sociale et développement durable.

1.4.   Description de l'appel à propositions

Le présent appel à propositions concerne le soutien structurel, appelé «subventions de fonctionnement», aux organismes poursuivant un but d’intérêt général européen. Les subventions de fonctionnement assurent un soutien financier pour couvrir une partie des frais de fonctionnement nécessaires au bon déroulement des activités régulières de l’organisme sélectionné.

Ce soutien peut être octroyé, en fonction de certains critères, sous forme de subvention annuelle ou de partenariat pluriannuel. Le partenariat pluriannuel est un mécanisme de coopération établi entre un organisme et l'Agence Exécutive Education, Audiovisuel, Culture (ci-après l'Agence exécutive) donnant lieu à des subventions spécifiques. Dans le cadre de cet appel, ce partenariat pourra être conclu pour une durée de trois ans.

2.   CANDIDATS ÉLIGIBLES

2.1.   Organismes

Pour pouvoir bénéficier d’une subvention de fonctionnement, une organisation poursuivant un but d’intérêt général européen doit:

| a) | être sans but lucratif et posséder une personnalité juridique; dans le cas de réseau ne disposant pas de structure de fonctionnement séparée avec un statut propre, la candidature peut être soumise par l’organisation membre en charge de la coordination du réseau; |
| --- | --- |

a)

être sans but lucratif et posséder une personnalité juridique; dans le cas de réseau ne disposant pas de structure de fonctionnement séparée avec un statut propre, la candidature peut être soumise par l’organisation membre en charge de la coordination du réseau;

| b) | être active dans le domaine de la citoyenneté européenne, tel que défini dans son statut ou déclaration de mission et correspondre à l'une des catégories d'organisation suivantes: | Mesure 1:






  A. | Organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes (think tanks — structures de réflexion). |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

b)

être active dans le domaine de la citoyenneté européenne, tel que défini dans son statut ou déclaration de mission et correspondre à l'une des catégories d'organisation suivantes:

Mesure 1:

A.

Organismes de recherche et de réflexion sur les politiques publiques européennes (think tanks — structures de réflexion).

| | Mesure 2:






  B. | Organisations de la société civile au niveau européen






  — | Organisations centrales (plateformes) européennes, |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

Mesure 2:

B.

Organisations de la société civile au niveau européen

—

Organisations centrales (plateformes) européennes,

| — | Réseaux européens, |
| --- | --- |

—

Réseaux européens,

| — | Organisations développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen. |
| --- | --- |

—

Organisations développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen.

| C. | Organisations de la société civile liées à la Mémoire Européenne |
| --- | --- |

C.

Organisations de la société civile liées à la Mémoire Européenne

| D. | Plateformes d'organisations paneuropéennes |
| --- | --- |

D.

Plateformes d'organisations paneuropéennes

| c) | réaliser la majorité des ses activités dans des pays éligibles (cf. point 2.2).

  Pour un partenariat pluriannuel, les organisations doivent légalement être établies et posséder une personnalité juridique depuis plus de quatre (4) ans (au 15 octobre 2009) dans l'un des pays éligibles et avoir, pour les catégories ci-après, la couverture géographique suivante:






  — | pour une organisation centrale européenne ou un réseau européen, avoir des membres dans au moins douze (12) pays éligibles, |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

réaliser la majorité des ses activités dans des pays éligibles (cf. point 2.2).

Pour un partenariat pluriannuel, les organisations doivent légalement être établies et posséder une personnalité juridique depuis plus de quatre (4) ans (au 15 octobre 2009) dans l'un des pays éligibles et avoir, pour les catégories ci-après, la couverture géographique suivante:

—

pour une organisation centrale européenne ou un réseau européen, avoir des membres dans au moins douze (12) pays éligibles,

| — | pour une organisation développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen, être active dans au moins douze (12) pays éligibles, |
| --- | --- |

—

pour une organisation développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen, être active dans au moins douze (12) pays éligibles,

| — | pour une plateforme d'organisations paneuropéenne, avoir un minimum de six (6) organisations centrales en qualité de membres et assurer, à travers ces derniers, une présence dans les 27 Etats membres. |
| --- | --- |

—

pour une plateforme d'organisations paneuropéenne, avoir un minimum de six (6) organisations centrales en qualité de membres et assurer, à travers ces derniers, une présence dans les 27 Etats membres.

Pour une subvention annuelle, les organisations doivent légalement être établies et posséder une personnalité juridique depuis plus d'un (1) an (au 15 octobre 2009) dans l'un des pays éligibles et avoir, pour les catégories ci-après, la couverture géographique suivante:

| — | pour une organisation centrale européenne ou un réseau européen, avoir des membres dans au moins huit (8) pays éligibles, |
| --- | --- |

—

pour une organisation centrale européenne ou un réseau européen, avoir des membres dans au moins huit (8) pays éligibles,

| — | pour une organisation développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen, être active dans au moins huit (8) pays éligibles. |
| --- | --- |

—

pour une organisation développant des activités à large impact au niveau européen, être active dans au moins huit (8) pays éligibles.

Les plateformes d'organisations paneuropéennes ne peuvent introduire une candidature que dans le cadre d'un partenariat pluriannuel.

Les personnes physiques et les organismes publics ne sont pas éligibles à cet appel.

2.2.   Pays éligibles

| a) | les États membres de l’Union européenne: Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Bulgarie, Chypre, Danemark, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grèce, Hongrie, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Portugal, République tchèque, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Slovaquie, Slovénie, Suède; |
| --- | --- |

a)

les États membres de l’Union européenne: Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Bulgarie, Chypre, Danemark, Espagne, Estonie, Finlande, France, Grèce, Hongrie, Irlande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxembourg, Malte, Pays-Bas, Pologne, Portugal, République tchèque, Roumanie, Royaume-Uni, Slovaquie, Slovénie, Suède;

| b) | la Croatie; |
| --- | --- |

b)

la Croatie;

| c) | l'Ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine; |
| --- | --- |

c)

l'Ancienne République Yougoslave de Macédoine;

| d) | l'Albanie. |
| --- | --- |

d)

l'Albanie.

3.   ACTIONS ÉLIGIBLES

Les activités de l'organisation candidate doivent contribuer de manière tangible au développement et à la mise en œuvre des objectifs spécifiques et priorités thématiques de cet appel à propositions. Elles doivent couvrir au moins un objectif spécifique et une priorité thématique parmi ceux mentionnés au point 1.

Le programme de travail de l'organisation candidate pour 2010 ainsi que le programme stratégique de trois ans (en cas de partenariat pluriannuel) doivent couvrir ses activités statutaires, notamment les conférences, séminaires, tables rondes, actions de représentation, communication et valorisation, ainsi que ses autres activités européennes récurrentes.

Période d’éligibilité

Que ce soit pour une subvention annuelle ou pour un partenariat pluriannuel, la période d’éligibilité doit correspondre à l’exercice budgétaire du candidat, tel qu’il ressort des comptes certifiés de l’organisation. Si cet exercice budgétaire correspond à l’année civile, la période d’éligibilité s’étalera du 1er janvier 2009 au 31 décembre 2010.

Pour les candidats dont l’exercice budgétaire diffère de l’année civile, la période d’éligibilité est de 12 mois à compter de la date du début de leur exercice budgétaire en 2010.

4.   CRITÈRES D'ATTRIBUTION

Les candidatures conformes aux critères d'éligibilité et d'exclusion seront évaluées sur base des critères d’attribution par un comité d’évaluation afin de sélectionner celles susceptibles d’être cofinancées.

Les critères d’attribution qui suivent seront appliqués. Les critères qualitatifs et quantitatifs comptent respectivement pour 80 et 20 % de la note attribuée. Dans le cas d'un partenariat pluriannuel, le même poids sera attribué au programme de travail de 12 mois et au programme stratégique de trois ans.

4.1.   Critères qualitatifs (80 %)

Les éléments suivants feront l'objet d'une évaluation:

| a) | Pertinence avec les objectifs et priorités du programme «L’Europe pour les citoyens» (30 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

Pertinence avec les objectifs et priorités du programme «L’Europe pour les citoyens» (30 %);

| b) | Adéquation, cohérence et exhaustivité du programme de travail (20 %); |
| --- | --- |

b)

Adéquation, cohérence et exhaustivité du programme de travail (20 %);

| c) | Impact du programme de travail (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

c)

Impact du programme de travail (10 %);

| d) | Valeur ajoutée européenne (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

d)

Valeur ajoutée européenne (10 %);

| e) | Visibilité des activités, diffusion et exploitation des résultats par rapport aux citoyens européens et autres parties prenantes (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

e)

Visibilité des activités, diffusion et exploitation des résultats par rapport aux citoyens européens et autres parties prenantes (10 %).

4.2.   Critères quantitatifs (20 %)

Les éléments suivants feront l'objet d'une évaluation:

| a) | Nombre de pays éligibles impliqués dans les activités du programme de travail (10 %); |
| --- | --- |

a)

Nombre de pays éligibles impliqués dans les activités du programme de travail (10 %);

| b) | Nombre de bénéficiaires directs potentiels (10 %). |
| --- | --- |

b)

Nombre de bénéficiaires directs potentiels (10 %).

5.   BUDGET

Le budget prévu pour le cofinancement des subventions de fonctionnement s’élève à environ 8,2 Mio EUR en 2010. L’Agence exécutive entend financer environ 55 organisations sous cet appel, mais se réserve le droit, sur base de la qualité des candidatures, de ne pas attribuer l’ensemble des fonds disponibles.

À titre indicatif, les subventions de partenariat pluriannuel représenteront environ 85 % du budget disponible et les subventions annuelles environ 15 %.

Ce soutien sera accordé dans le cadre de la ligne 15.06.66 du Budget général de l’Union Européenne.

6.   DATE LIMITE DE SOUMISSION

La date limite de soumission des dossiers de candidature est le 15 octobre 2009.

L’Agence exécutive travaille actuellement à la mise en place d’un système de soumission électronique de toutes les candidatures.

Pour cet appel à propositions, les candidats doivent envoyer leur demande via un formulaire électronique disponible à compter du 15 septembre 2009. Cette version (annexes incluses) est considérée comme la version principale. Avant cette date, l’Agence exécutive propose une version pdf du formulaire pour permettre aux candidats de commencer à préparer leur dossier.

Par ailleurs, une version papier du dossier de candidature doit être envoyée par courrier à l’adresse suivante avant la date limite:

| Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency |
| --- |
| Unit P7 |
| Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009 |
| Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17) |
| 1140 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency

Unit P7

Call for proposals EACEA/11/2009

Avenue du Bourget 1 (BOUR 01/17)

1140 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Seules les demandes présentées sur le formulaire adéquat, dûment complétées, datées, et signées par la personne habilitée à engager légalement l'organisme demandeur seront acceptées.

7.   INFORMATIONS COMPLÈTES

Les lignes directrices détaillées à l'intention des candidats, ainsi que les formulaires de candidature, se trouvent à l'adresse suivante: http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/citizenship/index_en.htm

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(1)  Décision no 1904/2006/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 12 décembre 2006 (JO L 378, 27.12.2006, p. 32), tel que modifiée par la décision no 1358/2008/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 16 décembre 2008 (JO L 350 du 30.12.2008).

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PROCÉDURES RELATIVES À LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA POLITIQUE DE CONCURRENCE

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/13

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AIDE D'ÉTAT — PAYS-BAS

Aide d'État C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) — ING

Invitation à présenter des observations en application de l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE

(Texte présentant de l'intérêt pour l'EEE)

2009/C 158/06

Par la lettre du 31 mars 2009 reproduite dans la langue faisant foi dans les pages qui suivent le présent résumé, la Commission a notifié aux Pays-Bas sa décision d'ouvrir la procédure prévue à l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE concernant la mesure susmentionnée.

Les parties intéressées peuvent présenter leurs observations sur la mesure à l'égard de laquelle la Commission ouvre la procédure, dans un délai d'un mois à compter de la date de publication du présent résumé et de la lettre qui suit, à l'adresse suivante:

| European Commission |
| --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| State aid Greffe |
| Office: SPA3, 6/5 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

State aid Greffe

Office: SPA3, 6/5

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax +32 22961242

Ces observations seront communiquées aux Pays-Bas. L'identité des parties intéressées ayant présenté des observations peut rester confidentielle sur demande écrite et motivée.

RÉSUMÉ

PROCÉDURE

Le 4 mars 2009, les autorités néerlandaises ont notifié à la Commission un dispositif de soutien des actifs illiquides en faveur d'ING Support Holding (une filiale directe du groupe ING).

EXPOSÉ DES FAITS

ING, dont le siège est aux Pays-Bas, est l'une des principales institutions financières dans le monde et affiche un bilan total de 1 332 milliards d'EUR. En janvier 2009, l'État néerlandais et ING ont signé une liste de conditions pour le transfert des risques et le rapatriement d'une fraction du portefeuille RMBS d'ING détenu aux États-Unis, composé principalement de titres de type Alt-A. Le reliquat du portefeuille ING s'élève à 39 milliards d'USD (valeur nominale: 30 milliards d'USD).

La mesure envisagée consiste en un swap de flux de trésorerie entre l'État néerlandais et ING, par lequel ING transfère les produits de 80 % de la valeur nominale du portefeuille (remboursements en intérêts et en principal) en échange de paiements garantis par l'État à hauteur de 72 % (soit 80 % de 90 %) de la valeur nominale du portefeuille (en principal seulement), complétés par une prime de financement versée par l'État à ING, se montant à 3,50 % pour la part des titres à taux fixe du portefeuille et à un taux égal au taux interbancaire USD à un mois + 50 pb pour la part de titres à taux variable du portefeuille.

L'État néerlandais verse à ING une commission de gestion de 25 pb par an sur le reliquat. En échange de cette mesure, ING verse à l'État néerlandais une prime de garantie annuelle de 55 pb sur 80 % du reliquat.

ÉVALUATION

La Commission a évalué la transaction au regard de sa communication relative aux actifs dépréciés. Elle émet des doutes, à ce stade, sur la valorisation et notamment la méthode de valorisation utilisée pour évaluer la valeur économique réelle. La Commission doit examiner plus avant les hypothèses de travail avancées par l'État néerlandais, notamment en ce qui concerne i) le choix du taux d'escompte, ii) les prix de l'immobilier retenus, iii) les niveaux de rehaussement du crédit et iv) d'autres aspects de la valorisation.

Partant, la Commission émet aussi des doutes quant au partage équitable des charges entre l'État et ING. La Commission doute de la réelle prise en charge par la banque de la différence entre la valeur nominale et la valeur économique réelle du portefeuille, compte tenu des doutes émis plus haut concernant l'évaluation de la valorisation. La Commission n'est pas non plus certaine que le swap de flux de trésorerie susmentionné soit véritablement aussi profitable pour l'État que ce qui est indiqué. En ce qui concerne la prime de financement du portefeuille, en particulier, la Commission émet quelques doutes sur son bien-fondé, vu le peu d'activité apparemment nécessaire à cette opération.

La Commission a décidé d'approuver la mesure pour une durée de six mois, en tenant compte du fait qu'elle répond à un certain nombre de conditions de sa communication relative aux actifs dépréciés et pour des considérations de préservation de la stabilité financière. Dans le même temps, à la lumière de ce qui précède, la Commission a également décidé d'engager la procédure énoncée à l'article 88, paragraphe 2, du traité CE afin de vérifier si la mesure respecte les conditions de la communication relative aux actifs dépréciés pour ce qui est de la valorisation (et notamment de la méthode de valorisation) et du partage des charges.

TEXTE DE LA LETTRE

«The Commission wishes to inform the Netherlands that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the measure temporarily for six months and to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of certain aspects of the measure when assessed in the light of the Commission's Communication on the treatment of impaired assets.

I.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 January 2009 the Dutch authorities informed the Commission of their intention to implement an illiquid assets back-up facility in favour of ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) subject to Commission approval. On 30 January the Commission sent an information request to the Dutch authorities, which was partially answered with the notification. On 4 March the Dutch authorities notified the measure formally with the Commission.

| (2) | The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The measure notified is the second individual aid announced in favour of ING in the context of this financial crisis. ING has already received an emergency recapitalisation of EUR 10 billion from the Netherlands which the Commission approved on 13 November 2008. (1) Furthermore, ING has access to the Dutch Credit Guarantee scheme where the Dutch State granted a guarantee in the amount of USD 9 billion (of which ING has already used USD 8 billion through bond issuance) and an additional EUR 5 billion of granted guarantees of which ING has already used EUR 4 billion by issuing a bond.

| (3) | On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17, 23 and 26 March meetings between the Dutch authorities and the Commission services were held. In the meantime a great number of information exchanges via email and phone took place.

| (4) | On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 13 March, the Commission asked the Dutch authorities to waive the confidentiality requirements for allowing technical experts from the European Central Bank (ECB) to assist the Commission in the assessment of the ING US Residential Mortgage-Backed Security (RMBS) portfolio affected by the aid measure under the Impaired Assets Communication (IAC). Confirmation was provided on 19 March. Thereafter the Commission forwarded to the ECB designated expert all available information to which the technical experts from the ECB replied.

II.   DESCRIPTION OF THE FACTS

1.   The beneficiary

| (5) | Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Based in Amsterdam, ING Group offers banking, insurance and asset management to over 85 million private, corporate and institutional clients in more than 50 countries. With a global workforce of about 130,000 people, ING comprises a broad spectrum of prominent companies that serve their clients under the ING brand.

| (6) | ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries. |
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(6)

ING is composed of ING Groep N.V., the mother holding company that controls 100 % of ING Bank N.V. and ING Verzekeringen N.V., two sub-holding companies respectively controlling ING's banking and insurance subsidiaries.

| (7) | ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure. |
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(7)

ING is the 19th biggest financial institution globally by market value (based on October 2008 values) with a total balance sheet of EUR 1,332 billion at the end of 2008 and total risk weighed assets of EUR 343 billion. In Q4 2008 the group made a total net loss of EUR 3,7 billion and a loss of EUR 0,7 billion for the full year 2008. The Tier-1 capital ratio of ING stands at 9,3 % at the end of 2008. These numbers do not take into account the new measure.

2.   The US RMBS portfolio of ING

| (8) | On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”). |
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(8)

On January 26, 2009 the Dutch State and ING signed a term sheet to transfer the risk and cash flows of a portion of ING’s US based RMBS portfolio (thereafter referred to as “the portfolio”).

| (9) | [...] (2) |
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(9)

[...] (2)

| (10) | The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies. |
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(10)

The outstanding balance of the portfolio amounts to USD 38,7 billion (par value, EUR 30 billion) (3), of which most is held by ING Direct (USD 34,1 billion), a US subsidiary of ING. ING Insurance Americas has a portfolio of USD 4,5 billion US mortgage-backed securities divided over several insurance companies.

| (11) | About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred. |
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(11)

About 2/3rds of the portfolio is composed of Alt-A residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and about 1/3rd in Prime RMBS. All securities in the portfolio are senior RMBS tranches and were originally rated triple A, according to ING. This implies a high level of loss protection. However, following the recent developments in the US mortgage markets, a significant proportion of these tranches were downgraded by rating agencies. Currently, about 29 % of the securities (weighted by outstanding amounts) carry still a triple A rating, with a negative outlook attached to 6 % of them. Depending on the rating agency used and according to information provided by the Dutch authorities, about 56 % are now rated sub-investment grade. So far the level of credit enhancement provided in the structures has been sufficient and explains why few actual impairments have been accounted for on the portfolio and no actual credit loss has occurred.

| (12) | The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels. |
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(12)

The Dutch authorities state that the market for Alt-A loans has dried up and there are few if any buyers and sellers willing to transact at these low levels.

| (13) | Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4) |
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(13)

Although the Alt-A portfolio is not large in terms of ING's total balance sheet, it is significant relative to its equity. This was already noted in the explanation of the events triggering the State recapitalisation measure of ING during 2008, when the Commission noted that the “perceived toxicity of the Alt-A portfolio of ING was a particular cause for concern.” (4)

| (14) | The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates. |
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(14)

The underlying mortgages of the portfolio are heavily concentrated in California (almost 39 % of all underlying mortgages) and another combined 5,5 % of mortgages were originated in Arizona and Nevada. A further 7,6 % were originated in Florida. In the portfolio, about 61 % of all mortgages were originated either in 2006 or in 2007. About 30 % of ING's total portfolio is currently made up of so-called Option adjustable rate mortgages (Option ARMS) (5) which are part of the almost 70 % of all mortgages which have adjustable interest rates. The remaining 30 % have fixed interest rates.

| (15) | The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8) |
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(15)

The “fair value” of the portfolio — an available for sale asset — was alleged to be on the 31 December 2008 EUR 18,442 million that is 71,5 % of its book value (EUR 25,809 million). (6) The book value of the portfolio is for the most part based on a mark-to-model with valuation techniques not supported by observable market inputs. Due to this decline in valuation from the original value, the bank had to build a negative revaluation reserve of EUR 7 billion (pre-tax), which is subtracted from shareholder equity under IFRS (7). However, this negative revaluation reserve is not taken into account for regulatory capital calculations due to so-called prudential filters introduced by supervisors for mitigating the effects of fair value changes on regulatory capital. A valuation change in an “available for sales” asset is only reflected through the profits and loss account at the point when an asset against which there has been a negative revaluation reserve is “impaired”. (8)

| (16) | The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio. |
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(16)

The par value of the portfolio is USD 38,7 billion. Due mostly to USD 2,7 billion (EUR 2,1 billion) impairments on the portfolio, the cost basis from an accountant’s point of view under IFRS amounts to USD 36 billion as per 31 December 2008. The agreed base for the measure is 90 percent of the par value of the portfolio.

3.   The measure

| (17) | In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State. |
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(17)

In order to avoid dealing with the various subsidiaries holding the securities (see above) it is proposed that the legal owners of the securities enter into a participation agreement with ING Support Holding (a direct subsidiary of ING Group) to transfer 80 % of the economic risk from that portfolio while retaining legal ownership. ING Support Holding then enters into a so-called illiquid asset back-up facility for transferring this risk and all respective incoming payments (interest and principal repayments) to the Dutch State.

| (18) | The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US. |
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(18)

The transaction is constructed as a cash-flow swap in which both the Dutch State and ING agree to exchange different cash flows over the duration of the deal. During the deal, the portfolio will not be actively managed as it mostly be held until maturity, although there might be activity expected due to possible legislative change in the US.

| (19) | In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio). |
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(19)

In the transaction 80 % of the incoming payment flows, i.e. repayment and prepayment of principal and interest (thereafter called: portfolio cash flow) from ING's portfolio is swapped against an over-time payment from the Dutch State of the guaranteed amount of USD 28 billion which together with an interest component constitutes the funding fee. This interest component paid by the Dutch State amounts to 350 bp on the outstanding fixed part of the portfolio (amounting to 57 % of the portfolio) and to one month USD Libor + 50 bp on the variable part of the portfolio (amounting to 43 % of the portfolio).

| (20) | For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers. |
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(20)

For evaluating the terms of this deal it is necessary to look at the expected net present value of the various cash flows. For arriving at a net present value of the above cash flows it is necessary to apply a discount rate. (9) The transaction foresees a discount rate of 3 % for all cash flows in the swap. This discount rate is applied to all cash flows, regardless of whether they come from the Dutch State, from ING or from the portfolio transiting via ING to the Dutch State. The reason why a 3 % discount rate is used is because the Dutch State estimates its cost of funding in USD to be around 3 % for a maturity of 5-7 years, corresponding to the weighted average life of the portfolio. The Dutch State has provided two supporting opinions on this from its primary dealers.

(a)   Valuation: methodology, scenarios and discount rate

| (21) | The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses. |
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(21)

The Dutch State commissioned Dynamic Credit Partners to analyse the portfolio of ING for determining the real economic value of the portfolio. The overall approach consists in projecting the probability of default and loss severities on a tranche per tranche basis for the whole portfolio in order to calculate the expected losses.

| (22) | Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted. |
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(22)

Dynamic Credit performed a bottom up evaluation of the underlying mortgages in each securitization deal (from which ING bought a tranche) and was able to calculate the expected losses it estimated would arise on the underlying mortgage loans. Such calculations were based on — inter alia — factors such as the original ratio between the value of the house and the principal (loan to value), the type of loan, the type of lender, the location at postcode level and the estimated change in house prices at postcode level since the loan was granted.

| (23) | As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches. |
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(23)

As a second step, the so-called cash waterfall is considered, as for a given securitization deal, there are various tranches each with different levels of seniority (or “credit cushion”) and credit enhancement. In practice, this means that any incoming cash flow shortfalls are first to be taken by more subordinated tranches, while more senior tranches are still being serviced by remaining cash flows and reserves built-up during times when there had not been defaults. The Dutch authorities claim that ING's portfolio has only very secure senior tranches.

| (24) | Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio. |
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(24)

Two scenarios are projected: a scenario deemed more likely by the Dutch State, the base case, and a less likely stress case scenario. According to the Dutch authorities, key assumptions in the base case are house price declines of about 35 % nationwide peak to trough (2006 to 2009) and up to 65 % in hardest hit areas such as California and a US unemployment rate of 8 % in 2009. An annual decline in US GDP is assumed by 6 % in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 3 % in the first quarter of 2009. The stress case scenario assumes US home price declines of 45 % peak-to-trough and a 70-75 % peak-to-trough decline in the most vulnerable areas and an increase of the US unemployment rate to 9,5 % in 2009. Both scenarios assume a voluntary prepayment rate of 5 % over the lifetime of the mortgages figure when compared with the pre-crisis period. The Dutch State points out that this is a prudent assumption. Both scenarios are then translated into different total expected losses on the portfolio.

| (25) | After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par. |
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(25)

After having determined the expected net cash flows (net of expected losses), they are discounted at a discount rate of 3 % for arriving at a net present value. Alternatively, this corresponds to a discount rate of 4,19 % if gross cash flows (assuming no losses) were considered, under a base case valuation. Based on these calculations the Dutch authorities arrive at a valuation of 97 % of par in the base case scenario. In the stress case scenario, the value of the portfolio would be 89 % of par.

(b)   Effect on ING's capital ratio

| (26) | The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending. |
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(26)

The replacement of the risky portfolio by a secure government receivable reduces the capital required to be held against the risky asset by the bank. In regulatory terms, the Dutch authorities state that this results in a capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion, (10) deriving from a reduction of 13 billion risk weighted asset (RWA) based on 31 December 2008. This capital relief of EUR 1,26 billion can be used for additional lending.

| (27) | According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios. |
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(27)

According to the Dutch authorities from an accounting point of view the IFRS equity capital relief is EUR 5,6 billion — 80 % of pre-tax of the total equity capital relief of EUR 7 billion — which translates into approximately EUR 5 billion post tax. This is caused by the release of the negative revaluation reserve that in turn resulted from a sharp deterioration in market prices of RMBS over the last two years. However, this EUR 5 billion cannot be used for additional lending without reducing the regulatory ratios.

(c)   Additional fees

| (28) | In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013). |
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(28)

In addition ING will pay a guarantee fee to the State amounting to 55 bp p.a. on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The guarantee fee will decline in line with the declining amounts outstanding on the portfolio, the declining RWA relief and the declining risk for the State. As an illustrative example in the first five years the expected guarantee fee will be: USD 170 million, (2009), USD 146 million (2010), USD 127 million (2011), USD 109 million (2012), USD 94 million (2013).

| (29) | Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million. |
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(29)

Furthermore, the State has to pay to ING a management fee amounting to 0,25 bp p.a. of the outstanding portfolio, expected to amount in the first five years, for instance, to USD 77 million, USD 66 million, USD 58 million, USD 50 million, USD 43 million.

(d)   Remuneration of the measure

| (30) | Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios. |
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(30)

Given the above description of the measure the expected discounted cash flows are in the following table. This would imply according to the Dutch authorities that the state would make a gain in both scenarios.

Table 1: Projected net present value flows (11), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (12) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (12) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,867 | 219 |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (12)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (12)

(28,844)

(28,844)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,867

219

| (31) | The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case. |
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(31)

The Dutch authorities state, however, that the management fee is an integral part of the deal and this has to be taken into account when looking at remuneration. Table 2 recalculates therefore the calculations with the management fee included. Based on this calculation, the remuneration for the State amounts to slightly more than USD 2 billion in the base case, but the remuneration is negative in the stress case.

Table 2: Projected net present value flows (14), in million USD

| | Base case | Stress case |
| --- | --- | --- |
| P & I payments to State (15) | 30,376 | 27,728 |
| Guarantee fee to State | 1,011 | 1,011 |
| (Guaranteed value to ING) (16) | (28,844) | (28,844) |
| (Management fee to ING) | (460) | (460) |
| Expected gain (loss) to state | 2,083 | (564) |

Base case

Stress case

P & I payments to State (15)

30,376

27,728

Guarantee fee to State

1,011

1,011

(Guaranteed value to ING) (16)

(28,844)

(28,844)

(Management fee to ING)

(460)

(460)

Expected gain (loss) to state

2,083

(564)

(e)   Duration and end of the measure

| (32) | The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions: |
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(32)

The agreement between the State and ING provides for an exit mechanism whereby the State and ING will meet every year to discuss whether the entire facility should be terminated. If both parties wish to terminate the facility the value will be determined using an exit mechanism commonly used in major financial transactions:

| (33) | Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates. |
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(33)

Each party will appoint an independent advisor to evaluate the outstanding portfolio. If there is little difference between these valuations the average of the two will be used as the basis for the transaction. If the valuations differ widely, the parties will jointly appoint a third independent advisor. The value will then be established as the average of the value as calculated by the third advisor and the value of whichever of the earlier valuations is closest to the third advisor's estimates.

| (34) | As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them. |
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(34)

As an exit mechanism the State is entitled to compel ING to sell the underlying securities once they are being traded on the market again at the price which ING paid when it purchased them.

| (35) | If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years). |
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(35)

If neither the exit mechanism nor the exit incentives lead to the portfolio being run down, or the State being bought out entirely, the facility can in theory remain in operation until the last mortgage has been repaid. This could mean that there will be cash flows between the State and ING resulting from this transaction up until 2047. However, the estimated cash flows are such that majority of the portfolio will be redeemed within a few years (the weighed average life of this portfolio is about 6 years).

III.   THE POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

| (36) | The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority. |
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(36)

The Dutch authorities informed the Commission on 17 March that in case the Alt-A Transaction does not close before 31 March 2009 and the risk transfer would not be effected, they would have serious concerns that this would result in a [...] financial markets and the Dutch economy. A delay in closing would mean that the Alt-A Transaction would not have the intended positive effects on revaluation reserves, IFRS equity and capital adequacy ratios. In view of the volatility of the financial markets this might lead to substantial increase in uncertainty about the position of ING. Another issue that could increase the uncertainty about the position of ING is the accounting notion [...] (17) [...]. Both issues, i.e. a delay in closing or a significant change [...], could, in the view of the authorities, have a material adverse effect on the stability of ING and hence the [...] financial markets and economy. This is confirmed in a letter by the supervisory authority.

| (37) | In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy. |
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(37)

In addition, they note that, without Commission approval, ING's [...] with all the possible consequences this might have for confidence in the banking sector in general and ING in particular, but also for the Dutch and European economy in these times of uncertainty and recession. The Dutch authorities point to the Commission decision on the recapitalisation N 528/2008, where the Commission had already recognised the importance of ING for the Dutch economy.

| (38) | The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty. |
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(38)

The Dutch authorities underline that ING is a sound financial institution with sufficient liquidity and solvency, but it is suffering from exceptional conditions worldwide. ING would therefore certainly not qualify as a firm in difficulties, as defined in the Community guidelines on state aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.

| (39) | The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING. |
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(39)

The Dutch authorities acknowledge that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, which is compatible with the Treaty pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) EC, for remedying a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State. In particular, the measure has been specially designed for the current exceptional circumstances in which, because of their illiquidity, certain assets have to be written down more than their economic value would warrant, for satisfying accounting requirements. They note that the measure was appropriate at such time for tackling the specific problems and at the same time is the least far-reaching and least risky way for the State to assist ING.

| (40) | The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority. |
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(40)

The Dutch authorities confirmed that they have reviewed whether there has been a full prior transparency by ING having disclosed all impairments and there were no indications to believe that this was not the case. In addition, the Dutch authorities note that the valuation of the portfolio is performed by independent experts under an appropriate methodology. The Dutch authorities are of the view that the valuation of ING’s portfolio was particularly complex as there was no active markets for these assets. The Dutch authorities have instructed Dynamic Credit who have undertaken an alternative valuation which they considered the best approximation of the true value of the portfolio. The valuation has been affirmed by the Dutch supervisory authority.

| (41) | The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank. |
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(41)

The authorities state that the total package provides an adequate remuneration for the risk taken over by the state. The authorities point to the more likely base case scenario which shows an overall gain for the Dutch State. The Dutch authorities state that the management fee is part of the overall remuneration package. The total package was considered appropriate at such time. There is also adequate burden sharing, due to the first loss already borne by the bank, and a future loss split in the relationship of 80 % for the State and 20 % for the bank.

| (42) | As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities. |
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(42)

As regards to the management of the assets, the authorities explain that ING remains partly responsible for the portfolio, giving it the perfect incentive to continue to manage the portfolio as efficiently as possible. They underline with reference to point 46 IAC that the Securities are held solely by ING Support Holding and not by ING Groep and that for the duration of this agreement the State, ING Support Holding and ING Groep will establish an operating committee to discuss recent developments, market outlook, data and pricing in respect of the Securities.

| (43) | The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction. |
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(43)

The Dutch authorities state that it would be admissible to use a single discount rate for all cash flows involved. The Dutch authorities state that a higher discount rate for cash flows from ING or for cash flows transiting from ING to the State, due to their higher perceived riskiness, would over-adjust for the flow's riskiness. They explain that the credit risk in the portfolio is more than offset by the positive net present value for the State under the swap transaction.

| (44) | The Dutch government provides the following commitments: |
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(44)

The Dutch government provides the following commitments:

| — | Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
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—

Presentation of a viability review in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC |
| --- | --- |

—

Presentation of a restructuring plan in line with conditions set out in the IAC

| — | The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Dutch State is willing to change the provisions of valuation and burden sharing by means of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration, without compensating ING via changes in the other cash flows ( i.e. the funding fee, the Alt A cash flows and management fee) if the Commission comes to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

IV.   CONSULTATION OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS FROM THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

| (45) | As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING. |
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(45)

As explained in point 4, the Commission has been consulting the technical experts from the ECB for assistance in assessing the valuation of the portfolio. The experts of the ECB reviewed the provided documents and concluded that they did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING.

V.   ASSESSMENT OF THE AID

1.   Existence of aid

| (46) | The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
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(46)

The Commission first assesses whether the measures constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (1) EC. According to this provision state aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition, by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (47) | The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions. |
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(47)

The Commission finds that the measure reduces the amount of capital ING has to hold against these assets. Given that the market value of the portfolio is less than the price paid it is evident that no market operator would provide such a facility under similar conditions.

| (48) | As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid. |
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(48)

As the measure is favouring only ING it is selective and leads to a distortion of competition and affects intra-Community trade because the banking sector operates internationally. Thus, the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes state aid.

| (49) | The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government. |
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(49)

The IAC states that the aid amount corresponds to the difference between the transfer value of the assets (based on their real economic value) and the market price. To this end the assets should be valued on the basis of their current market value, whenever possible. Given that the market for the assets in the portfolio has mostly dried up, as claimed by the Dutch authorities, this implies that there is no market price in the absence of a market as defined by the IAC. Therefore the calculated aid amount as regards the portfolio is the full net present value of all the sums provided to ING by the Dutch government.

2.   Compatibility of the financial support measures

| (50) | The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC. |
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(50)

The Netherlands intends to provide impaired asset relief in favour of ING. Given the present circumstances in the financial market, the Commission considers that this measure may be examined directly under the Treaty rules and in particular under Article 87(3)(b) EC.

| (51) | Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18) |
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(51)

Article 87(3)(b) EC empowers the Commission to declare aid compatible with the common market if it is intended “to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. The Commission would point out that the Court of First Instance has expressly stated that Article 87(3)(b) EC is to be applied restrictively so that the aid may not benefit only one firm or one sector of the economy, but must serve to remedy a disturbance in the whole economy of a Member State. (18)

| (52) | The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy. |
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(52)

The Commission considers that market conditions deteriorated all over the world in the last quarter of 2008 and certain assets classes are no longer frequently traded. This is problematic for financial institutions because accounting provisions (IFRS accounting standards) might require them to write down these illiquid assets (on the basis of their fair value) to a greater extent than is warranted by their economic value. The uncertainty in the market about the scale of the write-downs, the market value of these assets and the high leverage ratios have also had an impact on the financial institutions′ overall risk perceptions. The present measure is designed to address these problems. Therefore it finds that the scheme aims at remedying a serious disturbance in the Dutch economy.

| (53) | The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration. |
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(53)

The Commission has provided guidance on the treatment of asset relief measures by Member States under Article 87(3)(b) EC through the IAC. Impaired assets correspond to categories of assets on which banks are likely to incur losses (e.g. US sub-prime mortgage backed securities, Alt-A loans). The IAC complements and refines the Banking Communication (19) where the Commission set out the principles governing the application of the State aid rules to any support measure for banks in the context of the global financial crisis. The IAC sets out principles that must be followed by any asset relief measure. It should be noted that the Commission emphasises that a common European approach is needed to deal with the treatment of impaired assets, to make sure that foreseeable losses are disclosed, valued and accompanied by an adequate level in terms of burden sharing and remuneration.

| (54) | The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20) |
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(54)

The IAC leaves the methods and design for impaired asset relief measures to the Member Sates, but defines impaired asset relief as all measures whereby a bank is dispensed from the need for severe downward value adjustments of certain asset classes. This is also the case for the present measure. Therefore the present measure must fulfil the conditions for the compatibility of asset relieve as spelled out in the IAC. (20)

(a)   Eligibility of assets

| (55) | As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility. |
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(55)

As regards the eligibility of the assets, the IAC indicates in section 5.4 that asset relief requires a clear identification of impaired assets (21) and that certain limits apply in relation to eligibility to ensure compatibility. US mortgage backed securities (i.e. RMBS) are mentioned as prime examples of impaired assets which can be included in relief operations without doubts as to their eligibility. The Commission notes in this respect that all assets in the portfolio are related to US RMBS. The impaired assets are therefore sufficiently identified and do not raise issues of eligibility.

(b)   Transparency and disclosure

| (56) | As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards transparency and disclosure the Commission notes that the IAC demands in section 5.1 full ex-ante transparency and disclosure of impairments by eligible banks on the assets which will be covered by the relief measures, based on adequate valuation, certified by recognised independent experts and validated by the relevant supervisory authority. In other word the IAC requires that disclosure and valuation should take place prior to government intervention. Moreover, transparency needs to be based on appropriate valuation certified by an independent expert and validated by a letter of the head of the supervisory authority.

| (57) | The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities. |
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(57)

The Commission notes first that the Dutch authorities have engaged an independent expert. Second, as indicated above in point 42 the Dutch authorities have pursuant to point 20 IAC produced the necessary documents from the supervisory authorities.

| (58) | Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with. |
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(58)

Finally, the Commission notes that the requirements concerning transparency and disclosure concerning the asset portfolio covered by the relief measure are met in principle, with the exception of the issue of proper valuation dealt with separately below. Full disclosure on the entirety of impaired assets on ING's balance sheet has not however been provided in the context of the notified measure and will have to be provided in the viability review. At this stage the provisions for transparency and disclosure are thus sufficiently complied with.

(c)   Management of assets

| (59) | As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest. |
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(59)

As regards the management of assets, the IAC in section 5.6 stipulates the necessity of ensuring a clear functional and organisational separation between the beneficiary bank and its assets, notably as to their management, staff and clientele. The Communication states in that respect that this should allow the bank to focus on the restoration of viability and to prevent possible conflicts of interest.

| (60) | In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC. |
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(60)

In that respect, the Commission notes that 80 % of the portfolio will be derecognised by ING. However ING remains the legal owner of all the assets. In order to achieve a functional and organisational separation, ING has appointed a special committee to deal with the portfolio as indicated above in point 42. In view of this arrangement the asset management is thus in line with the IAC.

(d)   Valuation

| (61) | The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States. |
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(61)

The IAC notes in section 5.5 that a correct and consistent approach to valuation is of key importance to prevent undue distortions of competition. The valuation of impaired assets should follow a general methodology established at the Community level, which should be closely co-ordinated ex-ante by the Commission and Member States.

| (62) | The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed. |
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(62)

The Commission has to carefully scrutinize the valuation and in particular the underlying general methodology in order to ensure a consistent approach at Community level. In this respect its assessment should build on the expertise of existing bodies organised at EU level in order to ensure the consistency of valuation methodologies. For that purpose the Commission has called on the technical assistance provided by the experts from the ECB. The Commission notes that the technical experts from the ECB consider more information is needed.

| (63) | Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary. |
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(63)

Valuation implies the determination first of the market value and second of the real economic value, the latter being defined in point 40 of the IAC as the long-term economic value on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons. The main aim of valuation is to establish the real economic value, given that this value represents the benchmark level in that a transfer of impaired assets and at this value indicates compatibility of aid ensuring the relief effect by exceeding current market value but keeping the aid amount to the minimum necessary.

| (64) | The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par). |
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(64)

The Commission notes that, based on an independent expert i.e. Dynamic Credit, the Dutch State has established a real economic value of 97 cents on the dollar under the base case which is above the value at which the portfolio has been transferred at (90 percent of the par).

| (65) | Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues. |
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(65)

Although the Commission does not question the qualification of the independent expert and its general approach it has some doubts on the conclusion reached on the establishment of this real economic value, given that it did not have all the information needed to properly assess the valuation of the impaired assets portfolio of ING (see confirmation by the technical experts from the ECB above in point (45)) and because the valuation is based on a number of assumptions as regards to which the Commission has significant doubts, in particular but not exclusively as regards (i) the choice of the discount rate, (ii) house price assumptions, (iii) the levels of credit enhancement, and (iv) other valuation issues.

| (66) | The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.






  — | Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher. |
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(66)

The Commission is first concerned about the use of a 4,19 % discount rate to discount all the cash flows of the portfolio, which suggests a spread premium above the USD Dutch government risk-free rate of 119 bp only.

—

Given the recent developments in the market and higher loss expectations and the significant drop in credit quality of these tranches as translated by the rating downgrades from triple A to an average of BBB/BB, the spread premium and the discount rate to be used should be significantly higher.

| — | The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising. |
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—

The 4,19 % rate does not capture the downside risk (unexpected losses) of deviating from the base case expected losses, as the Dutch State itself accepted a certain degree of probability of seeing the stress scenario materialising.

| (67) | The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(67)

The Commission considers at this stage that it can not dispel its doubts that the approach taken by the independent expert appears to lead to an overvaluation of the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (68) | In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value. |
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(68)

In addition, the Commission questions whether the house price assumptions applied in the valuations are prudent enough. In particular, it notes that, based on the documents received, the house prices are assumed to decrease only in 2009, then to remain stable in 2010, and then from 2010 onwards to increase by 5,8 % each year. The doubts on this point are highly relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio given the important role played by house prices in the model for the calculation of the real economic value.

| (69) | The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default. |
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(69)

The Commission is also in doubt about the stated levels of subordination/credit enhancement. The levels described for the ING portfolio are significantly higher for both Alt-A and Option ARMs tranches than average levels calculated by assessments from other experts in the context of other cases as well as available subordination/credit enhancement figures for respective typical securities from various asset classes all related to the US housing market from the rating agency Moody’s. To this concern the Dutch State told the Commission that ING had only bought super senior AAA tranches, in structures with higher levels of subordination than other AAA tranches. However, when looking at another report provided by the Dutch authorities to the Commission (commissioned by ING), only 28,1 % of the tranches were qualified as “super senior”, with the remaining being “senior” and “senior support”. The Commission notes that this is relevant for assessing the real economic value of the portfolio as a lower level of subordination/credit enhancement would reduce the protection against losses if payments are not made. Also, the doubts of the Commission are deriving from the fact that a large part of the portfolio is based on mortgages originated during 2006 and 2007, vintages which have so far proven to be most vulnerable to default.

| (70) | Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information. |
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(70)

Further doubts as to the appropriateness of valuation cannot be excluded at this stage in view of the fact that the Commission has not yet received full information both on the valuation methodology and on its application to the individual assets covered. A fully-fledged assessment of the Commission can only be carried out once the Commission is in possession of this information.

| (71) | In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth. |
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(71)

In sum, the Commission has doubts as to the valuation methodology and cannot exclude that the real economic value is lower than that calculated by the independent expert of the Dutch State and intends to assess this in-depth.

(e)   Burden sharing

| (72) | As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par. |
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(72)

As regards burden sharing, the IAC states in section 5.2 the general principle that banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent. That implies first that the bank should bear the difference between the nominal value and the real economic value of the impaired assets. In fact the Dutch authorities submit that the transaction has the effect that ING will transfer the portfolio at 90 % of par.

| (73) | However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient. |
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(73)

However, given that the Commission has doubts as regards the correct valuation of the assets prior to government intervention of the State for the relief measure, there are also doubts as regards the necessary degree of burden sharing included in this measure. In other words should the real economic value be lower than assessed by the Dutch authorities, the theoretical losses absorbed by the beneficiary would be insufficient.

| (74) | In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %. |
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(74)

In that regard, the Commission does not see that the beneficiary is making up for additional possible losses if the real economic value would be lower than currently reported with the envisaged 80/20 division of the portfolio as this is a division pari passu and not a first loss attribution to the beneficiary. In other words, if the real economic value would be 80 instead of 90, the beneficiary would only take the first 10 % of losses from 100 to 90 while for the second part between 90 and 80 he would only take 2 % out of 10 while 8 would remain with the State; proper burden sharing would however require that the beneficiary takes all the losses until the real economic value, i.e. the full 20 %.

| (75) | Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State. |
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(75)

Furthermore regarding the cash flow swap and its funding fee, the Commission doubts whether the respective assumptions as regards the net present value are acceptable. This concerns first the funding fee set at 3,5 % although the Dutch State’s own funding costs in USD are only an estimated 3 %. The Commission also doubts second whether the applied discount rate is appropriate. This is so because the applied discount rate is the same regardless whether cash flows are risky (coming from ING to the State) or are not risky (from the Dutch State to ING). In the view of the Commission, this approach attaches to a more uncertain dollar in the future the same value as to a certain dollar. It therefore leads to an overvaluation of the expected proceeds from the portfolio and to an overestimation of the benefit to the Dutch State.

| (76) | In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In addition, the Commission has also doubt that the cash flow swap adequately compensates for the risk stemming from the difference between the base case of the real economic value and the stress test. This follows from the clear language in Annex 4 IAC that the “pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the state that adequately takes account of the risk of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the real economic value”. Therefore the Commission also requires an additional ex ante coverage of the difference between the real economic value in the base case and the stress case scenario. This is particular the case where the tail risk is significant. In this context the Commission recalls that according to Annex 4 of the IAC the valuation process should be based on rigorous stress-testing against a scenario of protracted global recession and reiterates its doubts on the valuation as set out above.

| (77) | Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Finally, the Commission has doubts about the appropriateness of the management fee charged by ING. It notes that such a fee is not contemplated by the IAC. The Commission acknowledges however the view of the Dutch authorities that the fee is essentially cost based but stresses that so far it has not obtained full information regarding the actual cost for ING to perform such services, such as costs and staff employed, cost for IT infrastructure, etc. The Commission observes moreover that the scope of work to be performed by ING is not clear given that an active management of an amortising portfolio appears unnecessary and because ING remains the legal owner of the entire portfolio and the economic owner of 20 %. To summarise, the Commission notes that if the fee is indeed covering the costs of ING, it would appear to the Commission that such a fee can be accepted on the condition of an adequate overall burden-sharing.

| (78) | In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22) |
| --- | --- |

(78)

In sum, the Commission reserves its final view on the issue of burden sharing until it has come to a conclusion on valuation and recalls that shortcomings in the valuation leading to an inadequate burden-sharing can be counterbalanced by higher remuneration. (22)

(f)   Guarantee fee

| (79) | Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Another element of a proper burden sharing is pursuant to point 21 IAC remuneration. It shall, as noted in Annex 4, ensure that “any pricing of asset relief must include remuneration for the State that adequately takes account of the risks of future losses exceeding those that are projected in the determination of the “real economic value””.

| (80) | In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23) |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In order to assess the guarantee fee charged by the Dutch authorities it must be recalled that pursuant to the IAC the remuneration should be ‘inspired’ by the remuneration that would have been required for recapitalisation measures to the extent of the capital effect of the proposed asset relief. In principle such remuneration should amount to at least 10 %, in line with the first ING decision of November 2008. (23)

| (81) | Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Therefore, the adequate capital effect of the measure needs to be identified. This effect comprises the regulatory capital that was freed due to the transaction (around EUR 1,26 billion = 8 % (24) of 13 billion RWA). A 10 % yield on EUR 1,26 billion would amount to 55 bp on the outstanding value of the portfolio. The current guarantee fee appears to reflect this calculation. Therefore the Commission finds the guarantee fee compatible at this stage.

(g)   Viability review and restructuring plan

| (82) | As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

As regards the need for an assessment of the banks balance sheet and activities the IAC states that an application for aid by an individual bank should be followed by a full review of that bank's activities and balance sheet, with a view of assessing the bank's capital adequacy and its prospects for future viability (viability review). The Commission considers it therefore necessary that such a viability review is performed. It notes positively a commitment in that respect.

| (83) | Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the Dutch authorities commit to present a Restructuring plan complying with the conditions set out in the IAC. Such a plan is in any event required under the first recapitalisation decision and is due by 12 May 2009. The Commission notes that this plan will also cover the present measure and be made on the basis of the IAC. Therefore, the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan will assess all aid measures granted to ING including the present one. The Dutch authorities have provided the necessary commitment in this respect.

(h)   Conclusion

| (84) | The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC but cannot at present conclude that it complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing.

3.   Temporary authorisation of the measure for six months

| (85) | The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Commission observes that if the transaction is not booked in the first quarter 2009 altering the level of valuation and remuneration would have as a likely consequence for ING [...] an additional loss of [...] in the 2008 annual result. This is due to the [...] accounting rules [...] (see above point 36). The Commission takes into consideration, as confirmed by the supervisory authority that the announcement effect would seriously threaten ING's reputation and thus financial stability.

| (86) | In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

In view of the fact that the measure complies with the criteria for eligibility of assets, asset management arrangements, transparency and disclosure and the guarantee fee, the Commission can consider approving the asset relief measure as a temporary measure for six months. (25) The Commission considers that any approval should in any event be limited to six months on the basis of Annex 5 of the IAC.

| (87) | But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

But according to Annex 5 this would normally require that all the conditions for compatibility as set out above are met. In the present case, the Commission finds that at this stage the conditions of the IAC on valuation and burden sharing are not fulfilled, and an in-depth investigation is needed.

| (88) | However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

However, the Commission notes that the specific circumstances of this case require a decision before the end of the first quarter of 2009, in order to avoid that legal uncertainty about the operation obliges important losses to be incurred on the Alt-A portfolio, and that it is not possible to complete the assessment of the portfolio valuation in the necessary time frame. The Commission further notes that financial stability may be at risk, would ING have to [...]. Finally, it can not be excluded that the valuation of the portfolio will be confirmed after a detailed assessment, even though doubts are present at this stage.

| (89) | The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets. |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission accepts the cash flow swap arrangement between the State and ING and its affiliates and will not request changes regarding the transfer of risk from ING to the state and the State's payment obligations in the context of the cash flow swap. This does not preclude the Commission from requesting changes in its final decision to the burden sharing of the measure by way of claw back, increase of the Guarantee fee under the illiquid assets back-up facilities or any other form of remuneration without compensating ING for it, if such change results from the Commission coming to the conclusion that the valuation at 26 January 2009 of the portfolio underlying the illiquid assets back-up facilities or its burden sharing proves to be materially in contradiction with the EC State aid rules on impaired assets.

V.   CONCLUSION

| (90) | The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

The measure in favour of ING constitutes State aid. The Commission finds that the measure complies with the conditions on eligibility of assets, asset management arrangement, transparency and disclosure and a guarantee fee as stipulated in the IAC and in view of the serious threat to financial stability approves the measure for six months. At the same time, the Commission doubts at this stage that the measure complies with the conditions relating to valuation and burden sharing and opens a detailed investigation.

VI.   DECISION

As it complies with a number of conditions of the IAC, and with due considerations for need to preserve financial stability, the Commission has decided to approve the measure for six months. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has also decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88 (2) of the EC Treaty to verify the conditions of the IAC regarding valuation (including the valuation methodology) and burden sharing of the measure.

The Commission requires the Netherlands to provide in addition to all documents already received, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid, and in particular as regards the individual tranches of the portfolio, an updated schedule of all cash flows on a monthly basis, the justification of the discount rate used to value the portfolio, a certified letter from the consultant on valuation on a stand alone basis and a written methodology report.

The Netherlands are requested to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission informs the Netherlands that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Communities. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publishing a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Communities, and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.»

---

(1)  State aid N 528/2008 — The Netherlands Aid to ING Groep N.V., 13 November 2008.

1

(2)  Confidential information.

2

(3)  Exchange rate about EUR/USD 1,3 assumed at the time of the deal announcement in January.

3

(4)  Commission Decision of 13.11.2008 in case State aid N 528/2008 — Aid to ING, point 8.

4

(5)  Where the borrower has the option to repay a very low amount in the first few years and these payments reset at a higher level thereafter.

5

(6)  At the time of purchase, Banks have to put their assets in four different baskets, with different consequences for accounting, the trading book, the available for sale category, the loans & receivables and hold-to-maturity. Following a legal change last October, it became easier to reclassify assets into the hold-to-maturity category.

6

(7)  IFRS accounting rules require to value assets booked in “available for sale” at fair value (i.e. profits and losses are directly affecting equity capital). For “fair valued”: banks can chose three categories based on the availability of valuation input data: “marked to market”, “marked to models with observable inputs” and “market to model with unobservable inputs”.

7

(8)  Under both IFRS and US GAAP a debt security is considered impaired if, based on currently available evidence, there is a reasonable expectation that not all due interest and principal will be recovered.

8

(9)  This is because a dollar today has not the same value as a dollar paid in the future.

9

(10)  This relates to 26 January 2009 as risk weights of the portfolio fluctuate.

10

(11)  3 % discount rate;

11

(12)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

12

(13)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

13

(14)  3 % discount rate;

14

(15)  Principal and Interest payments (including pre-payments);

15

(16)  net present value of flows from the state to ING.

16

(17)  [...]

17

(18)  See in principle Joined Cases T-132/96 and T-143/96 Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG v Commission [1999] ECR II-3663, paragraph 167. Confirmed in the Commission’s decisions in Case C 47/1996 Crédit Lyonnais (OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28, point 10.1), Case C 28/2002 Bankgesellschaft Berlin (OJ L 116, 4.5.2005, p. 1, paragraphs 153 et seq.) and Case C 50/2006 BAWAG, not yet published, paragraph 166. See Commission decision of 5 December 2007 in Case NN 70/2007 Northern Rock (OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1), Commission decision of 30 April 2008 in Case NN 25/2008 Rescue aid for WestLB (OJ C 189, 26.7.2008, p. 3), and Commission decision of 4 June 2008 in Case C 9/2008 Sachsen LB, not yet published.

18

Freistaat Sachsen and Volkswagen AG

Commission

Crédit Lyonnais

Bankgesellschaft Berlin

et seq

BAWAG

Northern Rock

Rescue aid for WestLB

Sachsen LB

(19)  Commission Communication on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270 of 25.10.2008, p. 8.

19

(20)  For a first application: Cf Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 Dexia, not yet published.

20

Dexia

(21)  To be categorized in baskets in line with Annex 3 of the IAC.

21

(22)  Footnote 15 of the IAC.

22

(23)  IAC, Footnote 11.

23

(24)  8 % is equal to the minimum own capital requirements.

24

(25)  The Commission has taken similar decisions. For instance in Commission Decision of 13 March 2009 in case C 9/09 point 77, Dexia, not yet published, where it approved only some elements of compatibility. Similarly in Decision of 24.4.2007 in case NN 15/2006 (C13/2007), New Interline, OJ 2007 C 120/12, the Commission approved a rescue aid for six months and opened on the same rescuer aid thereafter.

25

Dexia

New Interline

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AUTRES ACTES

Commission

| 11.7.2009 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | C 158/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.7.2009

FR

Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

C 158/24

---

Publication d’une demande d’enregistrement au sens de l’article 8, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 509/2006 du Conseil relatif aux spécialités traditionnelles garanties des produits agricoles et des denrées alimentaires

2009/C 158/07

La présente publication confère un droit d’opposition au sens de l’article 9 du règlement (CE) no 509/2006 du Conseil. Les déclarations d’opposition doivent parvenir à la Commission dans un délai de six mois à partir de la présente publication.

DEMANDE D’ENREGISTREMENT D’UNE STG

RÈGLEMENT (CE) No 509/2006 DU CONSEIL

«KIEŁBASA JAŁOWCOWA»

No CE: PL-TSG-007-0047-05.12.2006

1.   Nom et adresse du groupement demandeur:

Nom: Związek «Polskie Mięso» (fédération polonaise des entreprises du secteur de la viande)

Adresse:

| ul. Chałubińskiego 8 |
| --- |
| 00-613 Warszawa |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Chałubińskiego 8

00-613 Warszawa

POLSKA/POLAND

Tél. +48 228302657

Fax +48 228301648

Courriel: info@polskie-mieso.pl

2.   État membre ou pays tiers:

Pologne

3.   Cahier des charges:

3.1.   Nom(s) à enregistrer [article 2 du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]

«Kiełbasa jałowcowa»

3.2.   Il s’agit d’un nom:

 spécifique en lui-même

Image

Le nom kiełbasa jałowcowa (saucisse au genièvre) exprime le caractère spécifique du produit, qui tient avant tout à son arôme et son goût exceptionnels. Ces qualités résultent de l'utilisation, dans le processus de fabrication, des fruits du genévrier (Juniperus), qui sont broyés juste avant d'être ajoutés à la matière première carnée, ainsi que du recours aux brindilles de genévrier au cours du fumage.

3.3.   Demande de réservation du nom conformément à l’article 13, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 509/2006:

 Enregistrement accompagné de la réservation du nom

Image

3.4.   Type de produit:

| Classe 1.2 — | Produits à base de viande (cuits, salés, fumés, etc.) |
| --- | --- |

Classe 1.2 —

Produits à base de viande (cuits, salés, fumés, etc.)

3.5.   Description du produit agricole ou de la denrée alimentaire portant le nom visé au point 3.1 [article 3, paragraphe 1, du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]:

La saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa a l'aspect d'un bâton uniformément ridé, recourbé en collier. Elle a une forme circulaire caractéristique et est sillonnée de plis peu profonds sur toute sa longueur. Les colliers se présentent sous deux calibres:

| — | petit collier en boyau naturel, d'un diamètre maximal de 32 mm et d'une livre environ, |
| --- | --- |

—

petit collier en boyau naturel, d'un diamètre maximal de 32 mm et d'une livre environ,

| — | grand collier en boyau artificiel fabriqué à partir de fibres protéiques, d'un diamètre maximal de 36 mm et pesant 0,8 kg environ. |
| --- | --- |

—

grand collier en boyau artificiel fabriqué à partir de fibres protéiques, d'un diamètre maximal de 36 mm et pesant 0,8 kg environ.

La saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa est de couleur marron foncé, cette teinte étant uniformément répartie sur toute la surface, ce qui caractérise les produits fortement fumés.

Au toucher, comme du point de vue de la consistance, le collier se caractérise par une texture sèche, uniformément plissée, mais douce, le boyau collant étroitement à la farce.

Le produit doit sa saveur et sa tendreté caractéristiques à la sélection des matières premières et des aromates (en particulier le genièvre) et au recours au fumage naturel lors du processus de fabrication.

Composition chimique:

| — | teneur en protéines supérieure ou égale à 15,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en protéines supérieure ou égale à 15,0 %,

| — | teneur en eau inférieure ou égale à 60,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en eau inférieure ou égale à 60,0 %,

| — | teneur en matière grasse inférieure ou égale à 35,0 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en matière grasse inférieure ou égale à 35,0 %,

| — | teneur en sel inférieure ou égale à 3,5 %, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en sel inférieure ou égale à 3,5 %,

| — | teneur en nitrates (III) et en nitrates (V) sous forme de NaNO2 inférieure ou égale à 0,0125 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en nitrates (III) et en nitrates (V) sous forme de NaNO2 inférieure ou égale à 0,0125 %.

Cette composition chimique garantit la qualité traditionnelle du produit. La quantité de produit fini obtenue doit être égale à 75 % (+/– 3 %) de la quantité de matière première carnée utilisée.

3.6.   Description de la méthode d’obtention du produit agricole ou de la denrée alimentaire portant le nom visé au point 3.1 [article 3, paragraphe 2, du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]:

Ingrédients

| | Viande (pour 100 kg de matière première):






  — | viande de porc de catégorie I présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 15 %: 20 kg, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Viande (pour 100 kg de matière première):

—

viande de porc de catégorie I présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 15 %: 20 kg,

| — | viande de porc de catégorie IIA présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 20 %: 50 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

viande de porc de catégorie IIA présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 20 %: 50 kg,

| — | viande de porc de catégorie III — viande tendineuse présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 25 %: 20 kg, |
| --- | --- |

—

viande de porc de catégorie III — viande tendineuse présentant une teneur en graisse inférieure ou égale à 25 %: 20 kg,

| — | lard gras (dit aussi «lard dur»): 10 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

lard gras (dit aussi «lard dur»): 10 kg.

La viande de porc de catégorie II A ou la viande de porc de catégorie III peut être remplacée jusqu’à concurrence de 50 % par de la viande de bœuf.

| | Condiments (pour 100 kg de viande):






  — | poivre naturel – 0,17 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Condiments (pour 100 kg de viande):

—

poivre naturel – 0,17 kg

| — | genièvre – 0,12 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

genièvre – 0,12 kg

| — | sucre – 0,20 kg |
| --- | --- |

—

sucre – 0,20 kg

| | Autres:






  — | mélange de salaison composé de sel de table (NaCL) et de nitrite de sodium (NaNO2): environ 2 kg |
| --- | --- | --- |

Autres:

—

mélange de salaison composé de sel de table (NaCL) et de nitrite de sodium (NaNO2): environ 2 kg

Alimentation des porcs dont la viande servira à la fabrication de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa

L’alimentation vise l’obtention par engraissement de porcs gras et à viande. Il s’agit de produire des porcs d’un poids vif allant jusqu’à 120 kg, se caractérisant par une teneur en gras intramusculaire supérieure à 3 %.

| — | Les races choisies pour l’engraissement sont des races à croissance lente, ce qui permet, lorsque l'opération est menée à bien correctement, d’obtenir la teneur en gras intramusculaire souhaitée. Ces races ne possèdent pas de gène RN- et la fréquence du gène RYR 1T dans la population s’élève à 20 %. |
| --- | --- |

—

Les races choisies pour l’engraissement sont des races à croissance lente, ce qui permet, lorsque l'opération est menée à bien correctement, d’obtenir la teneur en gras intramusculaire souhaitée. Ces races ne possèdent pas de gène RN- et la fréquence du gène RYR 1T dans la population s’élève à 20 %.

| — | L’engraissement doit se dérouler en trois phases, à savoir une première phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 60 kg environ, une deuxième phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 90 kg environ et une troisième phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 120 kg. |
| --- | --- |

—

L’engraissement doit se dérouler en trois phases, à savoir une première phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 60 kg environ, une deuxième phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 90 kg environ et une troisième phase d’engraissement jusqu’à 120 kg.

| — | L’engraissement des animaux jusqu’au poids vif de 90 kg environ est effectué sur la base de deux types de mélange. Entrent dans la composition des mélanges (rations): |
| --- | --- |

—

L’engraissement des animaux jusqu’au poids vif de 90 kg environ est effectué sur la base de deux types de mélange. Entrent dans la composition des mélanges (rations):

| — | à titre d’éléments énergétiques: le froment (blé), l’orge, le seigle, l’avoine, le triticale et le maïs égrugés; le maïs égrugé ainsi que l’avoine nue égrugée peuvent être utilisés jusqu’à concurrence de 30 % dans les mélanges, |
| --- | --- |

—

à titre d’éléments énergétiques: le froment (blé), l’orge, le seigle, l’avoine, le triticale et le maïs égrugés; le maïs égrugé ainsi que l’avoine nue égrugée peuvent être utilisés jusqu’à concurrence de 30 % dans les mélanges,

| — | à titre d’éléments protéiques: les graines de lupin, de féverole et de pois égrugées, les remoulages de soja et de colza, les tourteaux de colza, les levures fourragères et les fourrages verts séchés. |
| --- | --- |

—

à titre d’éléments protéiques: les graines de lupin, de féverole et de pois égrugées, les remoulages de soja et de colza, les tourteaux de colza, les levures fourragères et les fourrages verts séchés.

| — | Entrent dans la composition des mélanges (rations) pour les animaux entre 90 et 120 kg: |
| --- | --- |

—

Entrent dans la composition des mélanges (rations) pour les animaux entre 90 et 120 kg:

| — | à titre d’éléments énergétiques: le froment (blé), l’orge, le seigle et le triticale égrugés. Il est interdit d’utiliser dans les mélanges (rations) des grains égrugés de maïs et d’avoine nue, |
| --- | --- |

—

à titre d’éléments énergétiques: le froment (blé), l’orge, le seigle et le triticale égrugés. Il est interdit d’utiliser dans les mélanges (rations) des grains égrugés de maïs et d’avoine nue,

| — | à titre d’éléments protéiques: des légumineuses (lupin, féverole, pois) égrugées, des remoulages de soja, des tourteaux ou des remoulages de colza et des fourrages verts séchés. |
| --- | --- |

—

à titre d’éléments protéiques: des légumineuses (lupin, féverole, pois) égrugées, des remoulages de soja, des tourteaux ou des remoulages de colza et des fourrages verts séchés.

| — | Pendant toute la durée de l’engraissement, il est interdit d’utiliser dans les mélanges et les rations des huiles végétales et des aliments d’origine animale (lait en poudre, lactosérum séché, farine de poisson). |
| --- | --- |

—

Pendant toute la durée de l’engraissement, il est interdit d’utiliser dans les mélanges et les rations des huiles végétales et des aliments d’origine animale (lait en poudre, lactosérum séché, farine de poisson).

| — | La quantité d’énergie métabolique apportée par les mélanges dans toutes les phases d’engraissement est comprise entre 12 et 13 MJ EM/kg de mélange. La teneur en protéines des mélanges de la première phase d’engraissement se situe entre 16 et 18 % environ de la quantité du mélange, celle des mélanges de la deuxième phase entre 15 et 16 % environ de la quantité du mélange et celle de la troisième phase à environ 14 % de la quantité du mélange. |
| --- | --- |

—

La quantité d’énergie métabolique apportée par les mélanges dans toutes les phases d’engraissement est comprise entre 12 et 13 MJ EM/kg de mélange. La teneur en protéines des mélanges de la première phase d’engraissement se situe entre 16 et 18 % environ de la quantité du mélange, celle des mélanges de la deuxième phase entre 15 et 16 % environ de la quantité du mélange et celle de la troisième phase à environ 14 % de la quantité du mélange.

| — | Les rations destinées aux porcs d’engraissement peuvent être constituées de mélanges riches uniquement, ou bien de mélanges riches et d’aliments grossiers (pommes de terre et fourrages verts). |
| --- | --- |

—

Les rations destinées aux porcs d’engraissement peuvent être constituées de mélanges riches uniquement, ou bien de mélanges riches et d’aliments grossiers (pommes de terre et fourrages verts).

Étapes de la fabrication de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa

| Étape 1 | Hachage préalable de toutes les matières premières carnées. Homogénéisation de la taille des morceaux de viande (diamètre de 5 centimètres environ). |
| --- | --- |

Étape 1

Hachage préalable de toutes les matières premières carnées. Homogénéisation de la taille des morceaux de viande (diamètre de 5 centimètres environ).

| Étape 2 | Salaison traditionnelle (à sec) pendant environ 48 heures par application du mélange de salaison. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 2

Salaison traditionnelle (à sec) pendant environ 48 heures par application du mélange de salaison.

| Étape 3 | Traitement mécanique: hachage de la viande de catégorie I en morceaux de 20 mm environ, hachage de la viande de catégorie II A en morceaux de 8 mm environ, hachage de la viande de catégorie III en morceaux de 3 mm environ, puis cutterage avec ajout de 5 kg de glace. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 3

Traitement mécanique: hachage de la viande de catégorie I en morceaux de 20 mm environ, hachage de la viande de catégorie II A en morceaux de 8 mm environ, hachage de la viande de catégorie III en morceaux de 3 mm environ, puis cutterage avec ajout de 5 kg de glace.

| Étape 4 | Mélange de toutes les matières premières carnées et ajout des condiments: poivre naturel, sucre, baies de genièvre broyées juste avant d'être ajoutées au mélange. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 4

Mélange de toutes les matières premières carnées et ajout des condiments: poivre naturel, sucre, baies de genièvre broyées juste avant d'être ajoutées au mélange.

| Étape 5 | Embossage dans un boyau naturel de porc d’un diamètre supérieur à 32 mm ou dans un boyau artificiel en fibres protéiques d'un diamètre de 36 mm; le boyau est ensuite tourné pour former des bâtons et recourbé jusqu'à donner un collier. Deux types de boyaux sont envisageables pour la production des saucisses:






  — | pour les petits colliers d'une livre, intestin grêle de porc, |
| --- | --- | --- |

Étape 5

Embossage dans un boyau naturel de porc d’un diamètre supérieur à 32 mm ou dans un boyau artificiel en fibres protéiques d'un diamètre de 36 mm; le boyau est ensuite tourné pour former des bâtons et recourbé jusqu'à donner un collier. Deux types de boyaux sont envisageables pour la production des saucisses:

—

pour les petits colliers d'une livre, intestin grêle de porc,

| — | pour les grands colliers de 0,8 kg, boyaux artificiels en fibres protéiques. |
| --- | --- |

—

pour les grands colliers de 0,8 kg, boyaux artificiels en fibres protéiques.

| Étape 6 | Repos à une température ne devant pas dépasser 30 °C pendant deux heures. Assèchement préliminaire de la surface; les ingrédients du mélange se «mettent en place» à l’intérieur des bâtons de saucisse. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 6

Repos à une température ne devant pas dépasser 30 °C pendant deux heures. Assèchement préliminaire de la surface; les ingrédients du mélange se «mettent en place» à l’intérieur des bâtons de saucisse.

| Étape 7 | Assèchement de la surface puis fumage à la fumée chaude (pendant 120 minutes environ) jusqu'à obtention de la coloration souhaitée, et pour terminer, cuisson au four jusqu’à obtention à l’intérieur des bâtons d’une température d’au moins 70 °C. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 7

Assèchement de la surface puis fumage à la fumée chaude (pendant 120 minutes environ) jusqu'à obtention de la coloration souhaitée, et pour terminer, cuisson au four jusqu’à obtention à l’intérieur des bâtons d’une température d’au moins 70 °C.

| Étape 8 | Mise au frais pendant 24 heures. |
| --- | --- |

Étape 8

Mise au frais pendant 24 heures.

| Étape 9 | Fumage à froid à l'aide d'un mélange de copeaux de hêtre et de brindilles de genévrier (120 minutes environ), puis séchage à une température située entre 14 et 18 °C durant trois à cinq jours jusqu’à obtention d'un rendement de 75 % (+/– 3 %). |
| --- | --- |

Étape 9

Fumage à froid à l'aide d'un mélange de copeaux de hêtre et de brindilles de genévrier (120 minutes environ), puis séchage à une température située entre 14 et 18 °C durant trois à cinq jours jusqu’à obtention d'un rendement de 75 % (+/– 3 %).

3.7.   Caractère spécifique du produit agricole ou de la denrée alimentaire [article 3, paragraphe 3, du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]:

Le caractère particulier de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa tient à certaines caractéristiques propres à ce produit:

| — | tendreté et spécificité de la viande, |
| --- | --- |

—

tendreté et spécificité de la viande,

| — | goût et arôme exceptionnels, |
| --- | --- |

—

goût et arôme exceptionnels,

| — | forme unique. |
| --- | --- |

—

forme unique.

Tendreté, jutosité et spécificité de la viande

La viande de porc issue d’animaux de races à croissance lente engraissés jusqu’à un poids vif de 120 kg environ et possédant les caractéristiques génétiques décrites au point 3.6 est l’ingrédient auquel la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa doit principalement sa spécificité. Le respect de ces exigences permet d’obtenir une teneur en gras intramusculaire supérieure à 3 %, ce qui garantit au produit les qualités gustatives voulues ainsi que la qualité technologique nécessaire à la fabrication de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa. L’utilisation de cette matière première et le respect de la méthode de fabrication traditionnelle, eu égard en particulier aux étapes du cutterage, de la salaison et du fumage, confèrent au produit sa tendreté et sa jutosité exceptionnelles.

Goût et arôme exceptionnels

La saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa doit avant tout sa spécificité à son goût et son arôme exceptionnels, qui résultent de l'utilisation, dans le processus de fabrication, de baies de genévrier (Juniperus). Le broyage des baies en dernière minute, juste avant que soit lancée la fabrication, renforce le goût caractéristique du produit et influe sur sa spécificité, tandis que le fumage par exposition à la fumée issue de la combustion de bois de genévrier en parfait le goût et intensifie son arôme exceptionnel.

Forme unique

La saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa se distingue des autres saucisses par sa forme. Le produit est exclusivement proposé à la vente sous deux formes, présentant une grande similitude, de sorte que les consommateurs le reconnaissent facilement. La saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa a l'aspect d'un bâton uniformément ridé recourbé en collier. Elle a une forme circulaire caractéristique et est sillonnée de plis peu profonds sur toute sa longueur.

3.8.   Caractère traditionnel du produit agricole ou de la denrée alimentaire [article 3, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]:

Matières premières traditionnelles

| 1. | Genièvre (Juniperus)
  «Le bois de genévrier, lorsqu'il est brûlé, dégage une odeur aromatique fort agréable au nez». C'est là une des qualités de cet arbuste assez commun, présent depuis plusieurs siècles sur le territoire polonais, parmi celles que décrit l'encyclopédie Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Grande encyclopédie universelle illustrée) de 1903. L'article en question signale également que «les rameaux, copeaux, ou baies de genévrier sont recherchés pour le fumage de la viande (variété d'encens à brûler ou pour le fumage); les fumées issues de la combustion du genévrier donnent à la charcuterie un goût et un arôme raffinés.» Des documents datant de la seconde moitié du 19e siècle indiquent que déjà à cette époque, le genévrier était utilisé comme condiment ou ingrédient des plats et préparations à base de viande. L'encyclopédie Encyklopedyja Powszechna (Encyclopédie universelle) publiée à Varsovie en 1863 donne la description suivante: «les baies de genièvre ont un goût épicé, doux-amer, et un parfum agréable; elles figurent au nombre des aromates bien connus.» La méthode uniformisée de fabrication de saucisses aux baies de genièvre et fumées au bois de genévrier est apparue en Pologne au tournant des années 1940-50, comme l'indique l'article intitulé «Réglementation des assortiments de charcuteries pour l'approvisionnement du marché», paru dans la revue spécialisée Gospodarka Mięsna, no 3, 1954. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Genièvre (Juniperus)

«Le bois de genévrier, lorsqu'il est brûlé, dégage une odeur aromatique fort agréable au nez». C'est là une des qualités de cet arbuste assez commun, présent depuis plusieurs siècles sur le territoire polonais, parmi celles que décrit l'encyclopédie Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna Ilustrowana (Grande encyclopédie universelle illustrée) de 1903. L'article en question signale également que «les rameaux, copeaux, ou baies de genévrier sont recherchés pour le fumage de la viande (variété d'encens à brûler ou pour le fumage); les fumées issues de la combustion du genévrier donnent à la charcuterie un goût et un arôme raffinés.» Des documents datant de la seconde moitié du 19e siècle indiquent que déjà à cette époque, le genévrier était utilisé comme condiment ou ingrédient des plats et préparations à base de viande. L'encyclopédie Encyklopedyja Powszechna (Encyclopédie universelle) publiée à Varsovie en 1863 donne la description suivante: «les baies de genièvre ont un goût épicé, doux-amer, et un parfum agréable; elles figurent au nombre des aromates bien connus.» La méthode uniformisée de fabrication de saucisses aux baies de genièvre et fumées au bois de genévrier est apparue en Pologne au tournant des années 1940-50, comme l'indique l'article intitulé «Réglementation des assortiments de charcuteries pour l'approvisionnement du marché», paru dans la revue spécialisée Gospodarka Mięsna, no 3, 1954.

| 2. | Viande porcine:
  La viande issue des animaux élevés pour la fabrication de la kiełbasa jałowcowa doit se caractériser par une teneur en matière grasse intramusculaire supérieure à 3 %, autrement dit, par ce que l’on peut appeler des «marbrures», lesquelles donnent au produit sa tendreté, sa jutosité et son goût exquis. L’utilisation de ce type de viande détermine la qualité finale du produit ainsi que son caractère spécifique et est conforme à la méthode de fabrication traditionnelle. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Viande porcine:

La viande issue des animaux élevés pour la fabrication de la kiełbasa jałowcowa doit se caractériser par une teneur en matière grasse intramusculaire supérieure à 3 %, autrement dit, par ce que l’on peut appeler des «marbrures», lesquelles donnent au produit sa tendreté, sa jutosité et son goût exquis. L’utilisation de ce type de viande détermine la qualité finale du produit ainsi que son caractère spécifique et est conforme à la méthode de fabrication traditionnelle.

Méthode de production et composition traditionnelles

Le fumage est une méthode de conservation de la viande; un moyen parmi les plus répandus consistait à brûler du genévrier. C'est ce qui ressort, entre autres, de sources manuscrites datant de l'époque de l'Ancienne Pologne, comme par exemple ces notes anonymes de l'intendant d'une métairie dans les années 1780, dans lesquelles sont consignées des recettes pour la conservation des charcuteries (manuscrit — Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (AGAD) à Varsovie, archives issues de la collection du musée national («Zbiór z Muzeum Narodowego»), côte 1249). La description du petit déjeuner des nobles dans Pan Tadeusz (1834), œuvre du grand poète polonais Adam Mickiewicz, nous fournit des indications sur la popularité du fumage au genièvre: — «Cochonnailles exquises, préparées dans le secret des cuisines, fumées dans la cheminée, au bois de genévrier».

Les traditions d'assaisonnement et de fumage de la viande au genièvre se sont maintenues dans des variantes locales et régionales se différenciant les unes des autres sur le plan des techniques utilisées, mais aussi parfois au travers du type de viande utilisée. W. Łęg, dans son étude «Des expériences menées en matière de fabrication de charcuterie» («Z doświadczeń przy produkcji wędlin») parue dans la revue Gospodarka Mięsna, no 6, 1953, signale l'expérimentation d'une saucisse au genièvre à base de gibier (viande de lièvre ou de sanglier en plus de la viande de porc). Si les saucisses fabriquées de la sorte se distinguaient par leur goût, la recette demeurait fondamentalement inchangée (farce et fumage au genièvre). Un spécialiste de la branche ayant sillonné la Kurpie [région située au Nord-est de la Mazovie] signale lui aussi, dans un article intitulé «Charcuterie régionale du terroir» paru dans Gospodarka Mięsna (no 7-8, 1950), l'existence d'une variante locale de la saucisse au genièvre: «Saucisse de Myszyniec en Kurpie: saucisse fumée au bois de genièvre et parfumée aux baies de genièvre. Saucisse sèche au goût et à la saveur incomparables.»

Après 1945, sous le régime de la planification centrale, on a entrepris d'ériger une industrie de transformation de la viande, fondée sur de grandes conserveries. Le souci de la qualité de la charcuterie, et notamment de ses qualités gustatives, a conduit à une standardisation des produits et des normes techniques, se réclamant des recettes traditionnelles. C'est en 1947 et 1948 que la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa, en tant que nom de produit, a fait son apparition dans la réglementation normative des denrées alimentaires. 1954 a vu l'introduction d'une norme harmonisée pour la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa, développée par la suite dans la norme de la centrale de l’industrie de la viande, publiée en 1964 (Wydawnictwo Przemysłu Lekkiego i Spożywczego, Varsovie, 1964), sur laquelle se fonde la présente demande.

Ces normes ont été mises en place afin de garantir la meilleure qualité possible à la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa. Bien qu'aujourd'hui, la norme sur laquelle s'appuie la présente demande ne soit pas contraignante, ses prescriptions n'en continuent pas moins de constituer les standards les plus élevés pour la fabrication de la kiełbasa jałowcowa.

3.9.   Exigences minimales et procédures en matière de contrôle du caractère spécifique [article 4 du règlement (CE) no 1216/2007 de la Commission]:

Pour garantir le caractère spécifique de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa, il y a lieu de contrôler en particulier les éléments mentionnés ci-dessous.

| 1. | la qualité de la matière première utilisée pour la production (viande de porc, condiments), en particulier:






  — | la qualité technologique de la viande, |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

la qualité de la matière première utilisée pour la production (viande de porc, condiments), en particulier:

—

la qualité technologique de la viande,

| — | le type d’engraissement, |
| --- | --- |

—

le type d’engraissement,

| — | le temps de salaison, |
| --- | --- |

—

le temps de salaison,

| — | condiments utilisés pour fabriquer la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa et proportions voulues. |
| --- | --- |

—

condiments utilisés pour fabriquer la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa et proportions voulues.

| 2. | le processus de fumage de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa

  Au cours du contrôle, il convient de vérifier:






  — | le respect de la température de fumage traditionnel à la fumée chaude et de la température de chauffage, |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

le processus de fumage de la saucisse kiełbasa jałowcowa

Au cours du contrôle, il convient de vérifier:

—

le respect de la température de fumage traditionnel à la fumée chaude et de la température de chauffage,

| — | le respect du temps et de la température de la deuxième étape du fumage à l’aide de fumée froide, |
| --- | --- |

—

le respect du temps et de la température de la deuxième étape du fumage à l’aide de fumée froide,

| — | l’utilisation de copeaux de hêtre pour le fumage à froid. |
| --- | --- |

—

l’utilisation de copeaux de hêtre pour le fumage à froid.

| 3. | la qualité du produit fini:






  — | teneur en protéines, |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

la qualité du produit fini:

—

teneur en protéines,

| — | teneur en eau, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en eau,

| — | teneur en graisse, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en graisse,

| — | teneur en chlorure de sodium, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en chlorure de sodium,

| — | teneur en nitrates III et en nitrates V, |
| --- | --- |

—

teneur en nitrates III et en nitrates V,

| — | goût et arôme. |
| --- | --- |

—

goût et arôme.

| 4. | la forme du produit |
| --- | --- |

4.

la forme du produit

Intensité des contrôles

Les étapes susmentionnées doivent faire l’objet d’un contrôle une fois tous les deux mois. Lorsque toutes les étapes sont réalisées dans les règles de l’art, la fréquence des contrôles peut être ramenée à deux par an.

Dans les cas où des irrégularités sont constatées pour une étape donnée, il y a lieu de la soumettre à la fréquence plus rapprochée (contrôles une fois tous les deux mois). Les autres étapes peuvent continuer à être contrôlées une fois tous les semestres.

4.   Autorités ou organismes charges de vérifier le respect du cahier des charges:

4.1.   Nom et adresse:

Nom: Główny Inspektorat Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno-Spożywczych (Inspection générale de la qualité commerciale des produits agricoles et denrées alimentaires)

Adresse:

| ul. Wspólna 30 |
| --- |
| 00-930 Warsaw |
| POLSKA/POLAND |

ul. Wspólna 30

00-930 Warsaw

POLSKA/POLAND

Tél. +48 226232901

Fax +48 226232099

Courriel: —

Image Public  Privé

4.2.   Tâches spécifiques de l’autorité ou de l’organisme:

L’organisme de contrôle susmentionné est chargé du contrôle de la totalité du cahier des charges.

---