[Cite as Batty v. Batty, 2018-Ohio-4934.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

CHRISTOPHER BATTY, 

 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 - vs - 

JULIE BATTY, 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

CASE NO. CA2017-10-151 

O P I N I O N 

12/10/2018 

CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION 

Case No. CR12-05-0669 

Courtney N. Caparella-Kraemer, Suite A, 4841 Rialto Road, West Chester, OH 45069, for 

plaintiff-appellant 

John C. Kaspar, 130 East Mulberry Street, Lebanon, OH 45036, for defendant-appellee 

 M. POWELL, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Christopher Batty ("Father"), appeals a decision of the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, regarding the care of 

the parties' child. 

{¶ 2} Father and defendant-appellee, Julie Batty ("Mother"), are the parents of a 

seven-year old son. Following the parties' divorce in May 2013, Father was granted custody 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 2 - 

of the child, although parenting time was equal between both parties. Over the years, the 

parties disagreed regarding the care and custody of their child. Disagreements and tension 

heightened after Father married Cassidy ("Stepmother") in 2014. Stepmother is not 

employed outside the home and is the primary caregiver of the child. Father has delegated 

most of his day-to-day parenting duties to Stepmother. Although the divorce decree 

required Father to "notify [Mother] of all activities and school celebrations so that she may 

attend and participate, regardless of whether they take place during her parenting time," 

Mother was not notified of special activities or celebrations at the child's school on several 

occasions. 

{¶ 3} Consequently, on August 3, 2016, Mother filed a contempt motion against 

Father, alleging Father had failed to notify her of special activities or events at the child's 

school on five separate occasions. Mother further moved to be designated as the child's 

custodian and residential parent, or in the alternative, for shared parenting. Father moved 

to modify the parties' parenting time. 

{¶ 4} A hearing on the motions was held before a magistrate. On March 8, 2017, 

the magistrate denied Mother's motion for custody or shared parenting and granted Father's 

motion to modify parenting time. The magistrate further found Father in contempt for failing 

to notify Mother of two special activities or events at the child's school in violation of the 

divorce decree, to wit, a Book Buddy program in January 2016 and a Jesus Love Me Party 

in February 2016. Both parties filed objections to the magistrate's decision. Specifically, 

Father objected to the two contempt findings and to 18 of the magistrate's findings of fact. 

{¶ 5} On September 22, 2017, the trial court upheld the magistrate's contempt 

findings against Father and the magistrate's denial of Mother's motion for custody. The trial 

court further made several orders regarding the parties' care of the child and Father's 

obligation to notify Mother of all information regarding the child. 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 3 - 

{¶ 6} Father now appeals, raising three assignments of error. 

{¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED [SIC] IN FAILING TO ADDRESS 

APPELLANT'S OBJECTION TO THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 

{¶ 9} Father argues the trial court erred in failing to rule on his objections to the 

magistrate's findings of fact. Father's first assignment of error is sustained on the basis of 

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) and Lynch v. Lynch, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-12-145, 2007-Ohio7083. Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) provides that "[i]f one or more objections to a magistrate's decision 

are timely filed, the court shall rule on those objections." Thus, "Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) imposes 

a mandatory duty on the trial court to dispose of a party's timely-filed objections to a 

magistrate's decision." Lynch at ¶ 8; McDaniel v. McDaniel, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2006-

12-142, 2007-Ohio-4220, ¶ 9. Although Father specifically and timely objected to 18 of the 

magistrate's findings of fact, the trial court failed to rule on these objections. The trial court's 

failure to rule on those objections constitutes error. Lynch at ¶ 9. 

{¶ 10} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER AS TO A PERSON NOT A PARTY TO 

THESE PROCEEDINGS IS VOID. 

{¶ 12} In its decision, the trial court ordered, "[Stepmother] is not to attend 

parent/child-oriented activities, such as field trips, hayrides, sports practices, or other 

activities that occur on [Mother's] parenting time absent express agreement of the parties." 

Father argues the trial court erred in prohibiting Stepmother from attending such activities 

because the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over Stepmother, a nonparty. In support 

of his argument, Father cites Ramus v. Ramus, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 38540 and 38148 

thru 38150, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 10098 (July 27, 1978). 

{¶ 13} "In an action in which the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over one 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 4 - 

of the persons involved in the litigation, any judgment rendered against that person will be 

void." Id. at *9. While unartfully worded, we find that the challenged sentence merely 

identifies a person who is not to attend parent/child-oriented activities and does not directly 

order Stepmother not to attend such activities. Indeed, although the order identifies 

Stepmother as a person who is not to attend certain parent/child-oriented activities, the 

order is not directed at her. We find that our position is supported by two qualifications 

surrounding the challenged sentence, to wit: the qualification at the end of the sentence 

allowing the parties to agree otherwise, and the qualification immediately preceding the 

sentence that "Either party may continue to attend any and all activities and functions for 

[the child]." Although unartful, the sentence is an order for Father, as the child's custodian, 

to follow, and not Stepmother. It is Father who must undertake reasonable efforts to prevent 

his wife from attending parent/child-oriented activities occurring during Mother's parenting 

time absent express agreement of both Mother and Father. 

{¶ 14} Father's second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 15} Assignment of Error No. 3: 

{¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED [SIC] IN ENTERING VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS 

AND OVERLY BROAD ORDERS OF WHICH THE PARTIES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO 

HAVE KNOWLEDGE. 

{¶ 17} Father challenges the following trial court's orders on the ground they are so 

vague and overbroad that he cannot know what he must do to comply with them: (1) Father 

"shall take a screenshot of any incidental paperwork or bulletins received and text it to 

[Mother] immediately after he receives them;" (2) Father "will forward all emails and texts 

received from all sources that relate to [the child] to [Mother] immediately after receipt;" and 

(3) "The items that [Father] is required to forward to [Mother] are not simply game or other 

activity dates, but team rosters, parent contact information for teams and all other activities, 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 5 - 

snack schedules for sports or other activities, and anecdotal information that he or his proxy 

may receive." Specifically, Father asserts that "incidental paperwork," "anecdotal 

information," and the order to forward all emails and texts received from all sources are so 

vague or overbroad that he "cannot know what he is required to provide to Mother and 

Mother cannot know what she is required to be provided." 

{¶ 18} We find that the first and third orders are not vague or overbroad. Anecdotal 

is defined as "relating to." Merriam-Webster's Online: Dictionary and Thesaurus, 

https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/anecdotal (accessed Nov. 27, 2018). 

Incidental is a synonym of associated. See William C. Burton, Burton's Legal Thesaurus, 

268 (1st Ed.1980). Upon reviewing the trial court's decision in its entirety, we find that the 

first and third orders are plainly related to the child's activities, projects, events, practices, 

and homework, be it from school, sports, or extracurricular or recreational activities. Thus, 

the orders require Father to provide any paperwork, bulletins, and information related to the 

child's school education, participation in sports, and extracurricular activities to Mother. The 

orders reflect the trial court's goal to reduce the risk of parental alienation regarding Mother 

and to ensure Mother has an active role in the child's school education and school-oriented 

activities, sports of choice and sports-oriented activities, extracurricular or recreational 

activities, and any other parent/child-oriented activities. As the trial court stated, Father "is 

responsible for [e]nsuring that [Mother] has all information regarding [the child]. [Mother] 

should not have to guess where and when an event will take place, or whether valentines, 

snacks, or other details are included if [Father] or his surrogate have the information." 

{¶ 19} We find, however, that the trial court's order requiring Father to forward "all 

emails and texts received from all sources that relate to [the child]" is vague and overbroad. 

Examples provided by Father in his brief suggest the order could apply, among other things, 

to correspondence between Father and his counsel or between Father and his relatives as 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 6 - 

long as they relate to the child, and to texts from Stepmother as to the child's food 

preferences for dinner. It is not clear whether the trial court intended for the order to include 

such or similar situations or to apply solely to emails and texts related to the child's school 

and sports-oriented activities, projects, events, and schedules. We find that this order lacks 

the specificity required for the parties to adequately determine their rights and obligations. 

A more specific delineation of what this order entails is required. Furthermore, given the 

parties' difficulties in communicating with each other, a more specific order is necessary. 

See In re C.E.J., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013-04-059, 2014-Ohio-2713. 

{¶ 20} "We do not believe it is this court's function to second-guess the trial court's 

actions." Williams v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA92-05-084, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 

138, *8 (Jan. 19, 1993). We therefore sustain Father's third assignment of error regarding 

this order and remand the matter to the trial court to clarify the phrase "all emails and texts 

received from all sources that relate to [the child]" as well as Father's obligations pursuant 

to that order. Id.; In re C.E.J. at ¶ 30. 

{¶ 21} Father's third assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. 

{¶ 22} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

S. POWELL, P.J., concurs. 

PIPER, J., concurs separately. 

PIPER, J., concurring separately. 

{¶ 23} I concur with my colleagues that reversal and remand is necessary so that 

the trial court can make a ruling on Father's objection and issue a more detailed order 

regarding future communication between Mother and Father. I write separately to articulate 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 7 - 

some of my reasoning as to the first assignment of error. 

{¶ 24} Within Father's first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court failed 

to address his objections. The record indicates that Father filed detailed objections, 

grouping his disagreement with the magistrate's decision into three main categories: (1) 

factual findings, (2) contempt issues, and (3) the nomenclature to be used by the child in 

referring to his stepmother. Within the first group of objections, and as pointed out by the 

majority, Father addressed 18 specific instances where he believed the magistrate made a 

finding of fact that contradicted the testimony and evidence. 

{¶ 25} While the trial court did not expressly rule on Father's first set of objections 

to the magistrate's findings of fact, the trial court's decision does in fact address some of 

the issues raised by Father. Specifically, the trial court discusses the visitation schedule 

and reviewed the factors for consideration when determining what visitation schedule was 

in the child's best interest. In so doing, the trial court referred to some of the same findings 

by the magistrate that Father challenged within his objections. As such, the record does 

demonstrate the trial court's attempt to address Father's concerns regarding the evidence 

and whether inconsistencies existed. This discussion disposes of some aspects of Father's 

first set of objections. However, the trial court did not address all components of Father's 

objections, many of which could have impact on the five additional orders made by the trial 

court regarding future communication between Mother and Father. 

{¶ 26} While Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) requires the trial court to rule on all objections after 

an independent review, it does not necessarily require a separate listing or explanation as 

to the trial court's decision on the objections. Instead, the rule requires only that the trial 

court ascertain whether the magistrate properly determined the factual issues and 

appropriately applied the law. I recognize the possibility that the trial court herein could 

have addressed and overruled Father's objections, without individually listing each of 
Butler CA2017-10-151 

 - 8 - 

Father's 18 challenges to the magistrate's findings of fact. Yet the trial court's ruling must 

sufficiently address the objections raised. 

{¶ 27} While I sympathize with the trial court and recognize its attempt to address 

Father's objections within its analysis of the best interest factors and other aspects of its 

decision, I agree with the majority that a remand is necessitated here because several 

components of Father's objections remained unaddressed. This is particularly pertinent 

when the trial court's review of Father's objections is also relevant to the ultimate resolution 

of what Father shall be ordered to do in facilitating future communication issues with Mother. 

{¶ 28} As such, I join with the opinion of my colleagues.