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BLD-156 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1052

___________

DR. MAXIMO GOMEZ NACER,

Appellant

v.

JERRY CAPUTO, Assistant Superintendent 

of Human Resources UCBOE, Union City, NJ

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 10-cv-04494)

District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 5, 2012

Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : April 19, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Dr. Maximo Gomez Nacer appeals pro se from the District Court’s entry of 

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Jerry Caputo. We will affirm.

I.

Dr. Nacer filed suit pro se in New Jersey state court against Caputo, the Assistant 
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Superintendent of the Union City, New Jersey Board of Education (the “Board”). Dr. 

Nacer alleges that Caputo terminated his eligibility for substitute high school teaching 

assignments because of his Cuban ancestry and in retaliation for his filing of a claim with 

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Dr. Nacer’s complaint also 

includes a number of unrelated allegations concerning his inability to pursue various 

professional opportunities, deficiencies in the educational system in general, and a patent 

on what he calls “Gravity Buoyancy Technology.” 

Caputo removed the suit to federal court on the basis of federal subject matter 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a). Caputo answered the complaint and the 

parties engaged in discovery, which included both their depositions. After the close of 

discovery, Dr. Nacer sought leave to add the Board as a defendant, which the District 

Court denied. Caputo eventually filed a motion for summary judgment. Dr. Nacer 

opposed it with a series of motions for a “speedy trial,” which did not marshal any 

evidence in support of his claims or otherwise respond to the relevant issues. The District 

Court nevertheless addressed Dr. Nacer’s claims on the merits and, on November 30, 

2011, entered summary judgment in Caputo’s favor. Dr. Nacer appeals.1

II.

 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s entry of 

summary judgment de novo. See Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 2010). 

“‘Summary judgment is appropriate only where, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (citation omitted). In opposing the motion, the 

nonmovant must come forward with “‘enough evidence . . . to enable a jury to reasonably find 

for the nonmovant[.]’” Id. (citation omitted). We review for abuse of discretion the District 

Court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint, see id. at 324-25, and its discovery rulings, see

LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 235 (3d Cir. 2007).
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The District Court properly construed Dr. Nacer’s complaint to raise claims of 

discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-1, et seq. As to the discrimination claim, the District Court explained that Title 

VII does not impose liability on individual employees like Caputo. See Emerson v. Thiel 

Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). The District Court also explained that Dr. Nacer 

(1) had not made out a prima facie case by presenting evidence of any nexus between his 

termination and his Cuban ancestry, and that even if he had he (2) failed to present 

evidence rebutting the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination that 

Caputo articulated—i.e., the request of two schools that Dr. Nacer no longer be assigned 

to them, one of which complained about his performance and came the day before his 

termination. See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 

burden-shifting framework under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

We see no basis to disturb these conclusions. Dr. Nacer refers on appeal to 

exhibits that purportedly support his claim, but the “speedy trial” motions he filed in 

opposition to summary judgment do not marshal any evidence or make any showing on 

the merits of his claims (which he appears to have attempted to do for the first time in his 

notice of appeal). Dr. Nacer’s filings instead consist largely of extraneous assertions 

, 411 U.S. 792

(1973)). As to the retaliation claim, the District Court explained that Dr. Nacer presented 

no evidence that Caputo even knew about the EEOC complaint (which Caputo denies) 

when he removed Dr. Nacer’s name from the substitute teacher list. Finally, the District 

Court explained that there was no nexus between Dr. Nacer’s remaining allegations and 

any alleged conduct by Caputo.
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about the United States educational system in general and his “Gravity Buoyancy 

Technology.” Cognizant of Dr. Nacer’s pro se status, we have liberally reviewed his 

filings. We discern only two potentially relevant arguments, and each lacks merit.

First, Dr. Nacer argues that, when he went to Caputo’s office to discuss the 

termination, Caputo directed him to “leave the building” because “you have a lawsuit 

against us.” Dr. Nacer does not explicitly make the argument, but he presumably 

believes that Caputo’s alleged statement is evidence of a retaliatory motive. As the 

District Court explained, however, Caputo denies that he even knew about the EEOC 

complaint when he terminated Dr. Nacer’s eligibility for assignments, and Dr. Nacer has 

presented no evidence to the contrary. Caputo’s alleged statement does not constitute 

such evidence. According to Dr. Nacer’s own recitation of the facts, he filed his EEOC 

complaint on October 1, 2009, Caputo terminated his access to substitute teaching 

assignments on or about December 18, 2009, and Caputo made his statement about the 

lawsuit at some time thereafter.2

Second, Dr. Nacer asserts that the District Court should have permitted him to add 

the Board as a defendant. This argument might have some merit if the District Court had 

 Caputo’s alleged statement thus does not raise an 

inference that he knew about the EEOC complaint when he terminated Dr. Nacer’s 

eligibility for teaching assignments, and consequently does not raise an inference of 

retaliation.

 2

 Dr. Nacer does not argue that the temporal proximity of his termination to his EEOC complaint 

is sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial, and it is not. See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-33 

(explaining that three-month period between EEOC complaint and adverse action was not 

“unusually suggestive” of retaliation and was insufficient to create genuine issue of material 

fact). 
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disposed of Dr. Nacer’s claims on the sole ground that Caputo is not individually liable 

under Title VII. The District Court went on to explain, however, why Dr. Nacer had not 

raised a genuine issue of material fact on his underlying claims. Dr. Nacer has provided 

no reason to believe that the addition of the Board as a defendant (which he first 

requested after discovery had closed) prejudiced his ability to make his case. He does not 

argue, for example, that he was unable to obtain any particular evidence only because the 

Board was not a party. And the only discovery he claimed to require from the Board in 

the District Court was information regarding curricula and job-creation that appears 

related solely to his non-actionable complaints about the educational system in general. 

Dr. Nacer also did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit in opposition to summary judgment or 

anything that the District Court might have construed as such an affidavit. Thus, the 

District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Nacer’s request to add the Board 

as a defendant.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.