United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

Y.J., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

AGENCY, Denton, TX, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 15-1137 

Issued: October 4, 2016 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Debra Hauser, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On April 23, 2015 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a November 14, 

2014 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On February 27, 2014 appellant, then a 42-year-old emergency management specialist, 

filed an occupational disease claim alleging that she experienced extreme stress, anxiety attacks, 

musculoskeletal pains, chest pains, migraines, insomnia, trouble focusing, high blood pressure, 

and loss of appetite as a result of her federal employment. 

In an attached statement, appellant reported that she first began to work for the 

employing establishment in Washington, D.C. on September 17, 2001 as the executive assistant 

for the employing establishment administrator. She stated that her job required her to be on call 

24 hours a day and that she had to have a packed bag with her at all times in case she had to 

report to an alternate work location. Appellant discussed several disaster situations to which she 

responded and explained that while responding to these disasters she often worked 12 to 14 

hours a day, 7 days a week, and got 4 to 5 hours of sleep. This work schedule would last for 

several months until the response phase was over. 

In June 2007 appellant began to work in Region 6 of the employing establishment as a 

mission assignment manager when responding to disasters. Her responsibility was to issue lifesustaining, life-saving, and high priority tasks to other federal agencies and monitoring the funds 

for these tasks. Appellant stated that she felt overwhelmed when she had to respond to two 

disaster incidents in Texas and Louisiana at the same time. She reported that even though she 

was given employees to assist her, these employees were not trained so she had to train the 

employees and respond to the incident, which provided additional stress to her position. 

Appellant performed the job duties of her position as well as the duties of an action tracker, 

mission adjustment specialist, and project manager. 

Appellant also contended that she worked in a hostile work environment under her 

former boss, W.F., and first line supervisor and operations integration branch chief, L.Y. She 

stated that W.F. told her coworkers that she did not wear underwear. Appellant reported that 

L.Y. called her an “oompa loompa,” which is a racially derogatory term. She noted that she 

participated in a management inquiry requested by L.Y. and she contended that he was 

retaliating against her for complaints she had filed against him. Appellant stated that L.Y. 

intimidated and bullied her and her coworkers. L.Y. referred to himself as the “Bullet” and 

signed his e-mails as “Bulletproof.” He also called her coworkers “cancers” and stated that he 

was going to act like a surgeon and cut the cancer from the organization. Appellant contended 

that he also spread false rumors about her that there was a restraining order against her and that 

she was going to be terminated from employment. She stated that he changed her management 

responsibilities by assigning some of her responsibilities to another employee even though 

appellant was more qualified. Appellant noted that in 2012 she was the only one who was not 

deployed during the response to Hurricane Isaac. She also stated that L.Y. claimed to have drug 

dogs that checked out his office for explosive devices. Appellant stated that she witnessed him 

searching his office and car for explosive devices and explained that these activities and his 
3

failure to report dangerous activities, including someone bringing firearms, to security or to 

management, caused her fear. 

Appellant stated that her physical and mental health suffered and that she had anxiety 

attacks about reporting to work. She complained of insomnia, loss of appetite, high blood 

pressure, diarrhea, headaches, and musculoskeletal pain due to stress from her job. Appellant 

explained that she and other coworkers worked in a very toxic, hostile work environment and 

feared for their safety. She stated that she was helping another coworker who had tried to 

commit suicide. The stress of helping the individual was also affecting her negatively. 

By letter dated March 5, 2014, OWCP advised appellant that the evidence submitted was 

insufficient to establish her emotional condition claim. It requested that she provide a detailed, 

factual statement surrounding the work factors she believed caused or contributed to her 

condition and medical evidence from a physician explaining how her anxiety-related attacks 

were work related. 

Appellant submitted e-mails between herself and C.F., an employing establishment 

administrator, and L.B., an employing establishment special agent, regarding filing a formal 

complaint against management. She stated that a coworker had made attempts to commit suicide 

and that another coworker almost had a car accident because that coworker was unable to focus 

due to stress from work. Appellant claimed to fear for her physical safety and the safety of 

others. She specifically noted that L.Y. had informed them that an explosive device was placed 

on his desk and that guns were frequently brought into the federal workplace. Appellant reported 

that L.Y. crawled on his hands and knees looking for bugs, drugs, and explosive devices in his 

office and his car. She stated that she was having nightmares about bomb explosions, being 

chased, and stabbed in the workplace. 

In a January 31, 2014 e-mail, appellant informed C.F. that she and her fellow coworkers 

were being retaliated against for reporting the violence in their workplace. She explained that a 

coworker had made serious threats to commit suicide and her suicide letter blamed K.C., 

response division director. Appellant reiterated that another coworker had almost been in a car 

accident because of an inability to focus. She requested that she and her coworkers be 

transferred to another program area. 

Appellant submitted e-mails dated March 2012 where she was initially given approval to 

attend a Regional Interagency Steering Committee (RISC) meeting scheduled for March 20 to 

21, 2012. However, on March 19, 2012 L.L., senior operations specialist, advised her to stay at 

work and not attend the conference. 

Appellant provided e-mails from January 2014 between herself and L.B. regarding her 

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint and internal investigation into her hostile work 

environment. She advised that she had filed EEO complaints against L.Y. and K.C. for which 

she had suffered retaliation and discrimination. Appellant requested a meeting with L.B. and 

gave her the names of several witnesses. In a January 28, 2014 e-mail, she informed L.B. that 

she was out sick because the hostile work environment had taken a physical toll on her. 

Appellant explained that she had been having nightmares about bomb explosions in her 

workplace, being chased and stabbed in her workplace, and getting shot. 
4

Appellant also submitted an e-mail dated October 1, 2013 from L.Y. which revealed that 

he used the name “Bulletproof” on his signatory. 

Appellant provided a print-out of her employment history to establish that she was fully 

qualified to work as an action tracking specialist, mission assignment specialist, and mission 

assignment manager. The print-out also listed her duty tour dates and job titles from 

October 2005 to October 2013. 

A March 11, 2014 e-mail from appellant to counsel reported that she had a nightmare 

about a bomb explosion in the annex, that one of her duties and responsibilities was assigned to 

another employee, and that attending EMI/MA classes was one of her duties but her supervisor at 

the time, R.G, sent another employee in her place. Appellant submitted an August 6, 2012 

memorandum that listed employees’ additional duties and responsibilities. She was indicated as 

the “primary” for EMI/MA classes. 

In a February 13, 2014 statement, J.I., an employee of employing establishment 

operations, reported that in August 2012 he had been deployed to Baton Rouge, Louisiana to 

help with Hurricane Isaac and had to assemble staff from the affected region. He received a 

telephone call from appellant that she was deployed and she began to work as his mission 

assistant manager. A few days after appellant arrived in Baton Rouge, K.C. called J.I. and 

informed him that appellant had self-deployed and was to immediately leave the disaster area. 

J.I. sent appellant back to her district office. He also discussed that in October 2012 he had been 

deployed to New Jersey due to Hurricane Sandy and had appellant as one of his mission assistant 

managers. J.I. explained that a few days after appellant arrived he received more staff who 

advised him that they could not work with appellant because there was a restraining order against 

her. 

L.D., a coworker, provided a February 15, 2014 statement. She related that she had 

worked for appellant for several years and that their work was very stressful as they responded to 

large national disasters. L.D. stated that appellant worked long hours without rest and meals. 

She pointed out that the employing establishment did not provide any psychological treatment 

before or after disasters. L.D. reported that appellant’s supervisor, L.Y., had allegedly been 

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that he reacted with bursts of rage. 

She noted that he had been seen crawling on the floor looking for microphones and explosives. 

L.D. stated that L.Y. referred to appellant and her coworkers as cancers that needed to be “done 

away with.” She indicated that she was extremely concerned for appellant’s safety and mental 

health and that she had requested many times for management to remove appellant from her 

office. L.D. referred to an incident when one of appellant’s coworkers admitted that she 

attempted suicide due to the hostile work environment and had to be hospitalized. She related 

that on February 13, 2014 she and appellant began receiving text messages from that coworker 

about ending her life and that appellant stayed on the telephone with her for hours to talk her out 

of it. L.D. indicated that appellant cried all the time and was very depressed. 

In a February 18, 2014 statement, M.B., appellant’s coworker, reported that she had 

worked with appellant in the Operations Branch of the Response Division at Region 6 since 

2005. She stated that it was common to work in excess of 100 hours per week and noted that 

appellant often worked 18 hours a day and got very little rest for months at a time. Ms. Brewer 
5

indicated that appellant frequently went without meals because the operational tempo did not 

allow for breaks. She discussed that during deployments appellant would be away from family 

and friends and witnessed many disaster areas including floods, hurricanes, fires, and tornadoes. 

M.B. pointed out that the employing establishment did not provide psychological treatment for 

their employees, before or after disaster response. She was aware that appellant had issues with 

insomnia, anxiety attacks, chest pains, short attention span, trouble focusing, and a constant 

feeling of being overwhelmed but had never received treatment. 

M.B. stated that in the fall of 2011 they were both deployed to Austin, TX in response to 

the wildfire emergency. During their deployment, their supervisor, L.Y. requested a 

management inquiry against several employees in their division because it was rumored that the 

employees were attempting to get rid of him. M.B. noted that she and appellant were both 

investigated. She confirmed that L.Y. referred to the employees of the Operations Branch as 

cancers that needed to be cut out. M.B. reported that she witnessed firsthand violent outbursts 

between L.Y. and other coworkers. She related that she had seen how easily L.Y. can become 

agitated and lose his temper. M.B. stated that L.Y. referred to himself as the “Bullet” and often 

signed his e-mails “Bulletproof,” which she interpreted to mean that nobody could touch them. 

She also related that L.Y. told them that he often checked his office and car for drugs, IEDs, and 

explosives due to threats. M.B. alleged that she and her coworkers worked in a very hostile, 

violent, and toxic workplace and that she feared for her safety. She explained that even though 

she reported these incidents to upper management, no one did anything about the complaints. 

In a February 18, 2014 statement, J.B., appellant’s coworker, stated that L.Y. often 

bragged that he received disability from the Veterans’ Administration for PTSD. He reported 

that L.Y. often reacted with outbursts of rage and was often seen searching his office and vehicle 

for explosive devices. J.B. indicated that L.Y. released documents with alarming language, 

including that he planned to remove those who were cancers to the employing establishment. He 

stated that L.Y. considered appellant to be one of the cancers that needed to be eradicated. J.B. 

discussed how appellant was petrified of what L.Y. was capable of and had confided to J.B. that 

she feared for her safety and the safety of her coworkers. 

A.S. submitted a March 13, 2014 statement in which he noted that he had worked with 

appellant for four years in a very stressful career. He explained that as first responders, they 

often responded to large, national disasters, witnessed the aftermath of natural disasters, worked 

upwards to 12 or more hours a day with very little rest, and frequently went without meals. A.S. 

reported that as a member of the response division, appellant was on call 24 hours a day, 365 

days a year and was required to respond to e-mails and telephone calls at all times. He stated 

that after returning from the Bastrop Wildfires disaster work, appellant and her coworkers were 

subject to a hostile work environment at Region 6 Operations Branch of the employing 

establishment. A.S. contended that one of the supervisors, L.Y., had made proactive efforts to 

isolate and direct an unprofessional aggression at various employees within the division and that 

appellant was one of his primary targets. He stated that L.Y. referred to removing those who 

were “cancers” from the organization and directed staff not to associate themselves with those 

whom he believed were disrupting the work. A.S. also pointed out that L.Y. suffered from 

PTSD and was seen inspecting his office and car for listening devices or bombs. He related that 

appellant had informed him that she feared for her safety and ensured her that her affairs were in 

order if something were to happen to her. A.S. stated that he had witnessed appellant’s mental 
6

anguish and discomfort from these unethical actions by leadership and that many of them were 

seeking counseling due to the hostile work environment fostered by the leadership. 

Theresa Tucker, a licensed massage therapist, in a February 10, 2014 note stated that she 

had worked with appellant since February 2011 and related that appellant’s muscular condition 

had steadily worsened. She indicated that appellant’s stress level had increased in the past two 

years and she noticed hair loss and an increased Dawager’s Hump. 

In a February 21, 2014 report, Sat Kartar Khalsa, PhD., a clinical psychologist, related 

that appellant’s chief complaint was that she had been through a lot of stressful situations in her 

disaster work but the “threat of violence in the workplace had pushed her over the edge.” She 

discussed appellant’s employment history and noted that, although appellant acknowledged 

experiencing emotional symptoms due to multiple deployments in order to assist survivors of 

natural disasters, she had not sought medical treatment until she experienced the hostile work 

environment regarding L.Y. 

Dr. Khalsa diagnosed PTSD, major depressive disorder, and pain disorder associated with 

both psychological factors and a general medical condition. She opined that appellant appeared 

to be experiencing workplace-related stress and emotional distress due to a “chronic and 

pervasive hostile work environment.” Dr. Khalsa explained that based on her objective findings 

it was her professional opinion that “as a direct result of the incidents described by appellant 

while in the performance of her duties with FEMA she sustained PTSD as well as major 

depressive disorder, single episode, severe.” She stated that appellant’s symptoms stemmed 

directly from the hostile work environment and indirectly from multiple disaster-related 

deployments. 

On May 14, 2014 appellant submitted a March 12, 2012 inter-office memorandum from 

L.Y. He listed recommendations for improving morale in the response division. One of the 

recommendations was to “remove those who are cancers to the organization and its culture.” 

Another memorandum entitled “Branch Chiefs Imperatives” described negative attitudes as 

cancer and instructed leaders to root it out. 

Appellant also submitted e-mails from L.Y. where he signed “Bulletproof” in the 

signature block. 

Appellant submitted pain management and physical therapy progress notes dated 

February 28 to May 9, 2014. 

In a May 16, 2014 statement, appellant reported that while she was at work on May 15, 

2014 she was informed of a malicious gossip/rumor that was being spread around Region 6 of 

the employing establishment that management was planning to terminate her position by the end 

of pay period 9. She alleged that the stress from this malicious gossip/rumor was taking a toll on 

her physical and mental health. 

In a decision dated May 30, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim. 

It determined that the evidence was insufficient to explain in detail how the alleged incidents had 

occurred and was insufficient to establish any diagnosed condition as a result of the alleged work 

factors. 
7

On June 20, 2014 OWCP returned a call from appellant’s counsel who had contended 

that the May 30, 2014 decision letter had not acknowledged all the evidence on file and that 

counsel had not been provided a copy of the decision at the time it was issued. It advised 

counsel that it would do a complete review of the case and either issue a decision accepting the 

claim or place it back under development for an additional 30 days. 

By letter dated August 15, 2014, OWCP requested additional information from the 

employing establishment regarding the accuracy of appellant’s statements relative to her 

emotional condition claim. It did not receive a response to its request. 

Appellant continued to submit pain management and progress notes dated June 6 to 

October 13, 2014. 

In a decision dated November 14, 2014, OWCP accepted that several of appellant’s 

alleged incidents were factually established. It accepted that L.Y. had sent e-mails using a 

signatory line of “Bulletproof,” that L.Y. had referred to appellant in a racially derogatory term 

“oompa loompa” during a response to Hurricane Isaac in August 2012, that appellant had been 

recalled from deployment, that during a response to Hurricane Sandy L.Y. had told coworkers 

that there was a restraining order against appellant and therefore she could not supervise them, 

that L.Y. had informed appellant and coworker Marsha Brewer that when drug dogs inspected 

their office it was because he believed someone planted drugs in his office, that L.Y. checked his 

car and his office for explosives and microphones, that L.Y. had stated in a sworn affidavit that a 

coworker placed an explosive device on his desk, and that it was rumored that the same 

employee routinely brought firearms to the workplace. OWCP found that these incidents, while 

factually established, were administrative in nature. It also listed the allegations which it had 

found had not been factually established. 

OWCP denied appellant’s emotional condition claim finding that appellant had not 

identified any compensable factors of employment. It concluded that personnel and 

administrative matters of an agency are not considered factors of employment and there had been 

no finding of agency error in any of the actions taken against appellant. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

To establish a claim that she sustained an emotional or stress-related condition in the 

performance of duty, an employee must submit: (1) factual evidence identifying the employment 

factors or incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to the condition; (2) medical evidence 

establishing that he or she has an emotional or stress-related disorder; and (3) rationalized 

medical opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are 

causally related to the condition.3

 If a claimant implicates a factor of employment, OWCP 

should determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. Allegations alone are 

insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional condition claim and must be supported 

 3 V.W., 58 ECAB 428 (2007); Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990). 
8

with probative and reliable evidence. If a compensable factor of employment is established, 

OWCP must then base its decision on an analysis of the medical evidence.4

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to a claimant’s employment.5

 There are situations where an injury or illness 

has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation.6

 In the case of Lillian Cutler,7 the Board explained that 

there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a compensable 

emotional condition under FECA. Where an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying 

out her duties, or has fear and anxiety regarding her ability to carry out her duties, and the 

medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from her emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course 

of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability resulted from her emotional reaction 

to her day-to-day duties. The same result is reached when the emotional disability resulted from 

the employee’s emotional reaction to a special assignment or requirement imposed by the 

employing establishment or by the nature of the work.8 

On the other hand, when a disability results from an employee’s feelings of job insecurity 

per se, fear of a reduction-in-force or frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular 

environment or hold a particular position, unhappiness with doing inside work, or frustration in 

not given the work desired or hold a particular position, such disability falls outside FECA’s 

coverage because they are found not to have arisen out of employment.9 The only requirements 

of employment which will bring a claim within the scope of coverage under FECA are those that 

relate to the duties the employee is hired to perform.10

A claimant has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused 

or adversely affected by the employment factors.11 This burden includes the submission of a 

detailed description of the employment factors or conditions which she believes caused or 

adversely affected a condition for which compensation is claimed and a rationalized medical 

opinion relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.12

 4 G.S., Docket No. 09-764 (issued December 18, 2009). 

5 L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006). 

6 A.K., 58 ECAB 119 (2006); David Apgar, 57 ECAB 137 (2005). 

7

 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

8 Id.; see also Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001). 

9 William E. Seare, 47 ECAB 663 (1996). 

10 See Anthony A. Zarcone, 44 ECAB 751 (1993). 

11 See Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987). 

12 See Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993). 
9

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working 

conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP as part of its 

adjudicatory function must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are 

deemed compensable work factors of employment and are not considered by a physician when 

providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed 

compensable factors of employment and may not be considered.13 If a claimant does implicate a 

factor of employment, OWCP should then consider whether the evidence of record substantiates 

that factor. As a rule, allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis 

for an emotional condition claim. The claim must be supported by probative evidence.14

ANALYSIS 

Appellant has alleged that she experienced extreme stress, anxiety attacks, chest pains, 

insomnia, migraines, high blood pressure, and loss of appetite as a result of her work as an 

emergency management specialist for the employing establishment. OWCP denied her claim 

finding that appellant failed to establish a compensable factor of employment. 

Appellant attributed her stress and anxiety to her actual work requirements when 

responding to disaster areas, which if factually established, would constitute a compensable 

factor under Cutler.

15 She related that her job required her to be on call 24 hours a day with a 

packed suitcase in order to be ready to report to a disaster area. Appellant alleged that when 

deployed to disaster situations she often worked 12 to 14 hours a day, 7 days a week, and only 

got 4 to 5 hours of sleep. She reported that this work schedule lasted for several months until the 

response phase of the disaster was complete. Appellant explained that her role as Mission 

Assignment Manager was to issue life-sustaining, life-saving, and high priority tasks to other 

federal agencies and to monitor the funds for these, and she felt overwhelmed when she had to 

respond to two disasters in Texas and Louisiana at the same time. The Board finds that while 

appellant has alleged that she worked long hours with very little rest when deployed to disaster 

areas, she has not factually established these allegations, with the specificity necessary to 

establish a compensable factor of employment. 

As a rule, allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis for 

an emotional condition claim. In claims for an emotional condition attributed to work-related 

stress, the claimant must specifically delineate those factors or incidents to which the emotional 

condition is attributed and submit supporting factual evidence verifying that the implicated work 

situations or incidents occurred as alleged. Vague or general allegations of difficulty arising in 

the employment are insufficient to give rise to compensability under FECA. Based on the 

evidence submitted by the claimant and the employing establishment, OWCP is then required to 

make factual findings which are reviewable by the Board. The primary reason for requiring 

factual evidence from the claimant in support of her allegations of stress in the workplace is to 

 13 See Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001). 

14 See Charles E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711 (2004). 

15 Supra note 7. 
10

establish a basis in fact for the contentions made, as opposed to mere perceptions of the claimant, 

which in turn may be fully examined and evaluated by OWCP and the Board.16 

While appellant was involved in work that concerned emergency events, her allegations 

regarding long days of work, little sleep, and that she felt overwhelmed when responding to two 

emergencies at one time, are general and vague in nature, and are not supported by specific 

factual evidence. Appellant has not provided the requisite detail regarding specific dates and the 

duties she performed, which allegedly overwhelmed her, to establish that her assigned work 

caused her stress. While appellant may have perceived that her work was stressful and while she 

provided witness statements to support her general allegations, the Board finds that appellant has 

not established compensable factors of employment under Cutler with sufficient specificity. 

Appellant’s allegations that her deployment was cancelled in August 2012, that she was 

not allowed to attend a conference in March 2012, and that she believed her employment might 

be terminated, are allegations that directly pertain to administrative or personnel management 

actions. Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to employment, are 

administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially-assigned work duties 

of the employee. In order for an administrative or personnel matter to be considered a 

compensable factor of employment, the evidence must establish error or abuse on the part of the 

employer.17 Appellant has not submitted any evidence to substantiate that these management 

actions were anything more than an ordinary tension between a manager and an employee and 

are not sufficient to prove error and abuse. 

Appellant further attributed her condition to a hostile work environment. Specifically, 

she stated that L.Y. called her and her coworkers cancers and explained that he was a surgeon 

who needed to cut the cancer from the organization. For harassment or discrimination to give 

rise to a compensable disability, there must be evidence which establishes that the acts alleged or 

implicated by the employee did, in fact, occur.18 Appellant submitted a March 12, 2012 interoffice memorandum from L.Y., wherein he recommended that those who were cancers be 

removed from the organization and another office memorandum where he encouraged 

supervisors to root out cancers from their organization. The Board finds that these statements are 

general in nature and do not describe any specific incidents of harassment directed at the 

appellant by the employing establishment or appellant’s coworkers.19 

Appellant also alleged that her former boss, W.F. made a sexual harassing comment 

towards her, that L.Y. had requested that management conduct an inquiry on appellant because 

he suspected that she was part of a plot to get rid of him, and that false rumors were being spread 

about her that hurt her professional career. A claimant must establish a factual basis for his or 

her allegations with probative and reliable evidence.20 Appellant did not submit probative 

 16 L.L., Docket No. 14-1525 (issued July 7, 2015). 

17 Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990); reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991). 

18 K.W., 59 ECAB 271 (2007); Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006). 

19 See F.H., Docket No. 12-741 (issued December 12, 2012). 

20 See Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987). 
11

evidence, such as witness statements that could corroborate these incidents as to time and date. 

Thus, appellant has failed to establish these allegations as a compensable factor of employment. 

Appellant has also alleged generally that her supervisor, L.Y., acted in an abusive and 

threatening manner. OWCP denied the compensability of these allegations stating that they 

involved personnel or administrative matters, and there had been no finding of agency error in 

any of the actions taken against appellant. These general allegations, however, are unsupported 

by witness statements or other evidence that can establish a specific time or place as to their 

occurrence. 

Several of the allegations involved either abusive language or threats of physical 

violence. Examples include Mr. Young’s reference to appellant as an “oompa loompa,” his use 

of the signature line “Bulletproof,” and his references to explosive devices and weapons in the 

workplace. The Board has previously held that verbal abuse or threats of physical violence in 

the workplace are compensable under certain circumstances. This does not imply that every 

ostensibly abusive or threatening statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to coverage 

under FECA.21 In these allegations, while appellant has submitted statements of coworkers who 

agree generally that many of these statements were made, they have not been established as to 

the time and place and under what circumstances. The Board has held that such allegations must 

be surrounded by specificity in order to more appropriately gauge the context in which they were 

made.22 Here, the general allegation that the use of a term which could be offensive is 

insufficient to establish a factor under FECA. 

As for the term “Bulletproof,” the Board finds that there is no evidence that such a term 

was directed at anyone in particular and as such the Board finds it fails to reach the level of a 

compensable factor of employment. 

Consequently, appellant has failed to meet her claim for an emotional condition as she 

has not established any compensable factors with the specificity required under FECA.23 As she 

has failed to establish a compensable employment factor, the Board need not address the medical 

evidence of record.24

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition. 

 21 See S.B., Docket No. 11-766 (issued October 20, 2011). 

22 See Curtis Hall, Docket No. 92-683 (issued January 11, 1994); John N. Babcock, Docket No. 93-1196 (issued 

August 25, 1994). 

23 Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992). 

24 Id.
12

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 14, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.25

Issued: October 4, 2016 

Washington, 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 25 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge, participated in the original decision but was no longer a member of the 

Board effective November 16, 2015.