United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

T.C., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, Houston, TX, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 16-1652 

Issued: May 9, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Richwell Ison, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On August 9, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a February 22, 

2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.3

 

                                                             1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 

3

 Appellant timely requested oral argument pursuant to section 501.5(b) of Board procedures. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.5(b). By order dated January 11, 2017, the Board exercised its discretion and denied the request, finding that 

the arguments on appeal could adequately be addressed based on the case record. Order Denying Request for Oral 

Argument, Docket No. 16-1652 (issued January 11, 2017). 
2

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she was totally 

disabled for any period between March 14, 2007 and November 6, 2014, causally related to 

accepted conditions. 

On appeal counsel asserts that the medical evidence submitted, established that appellant 

was entitled to wage-loss compensation due to the accepted conditions. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On March 19, 2007 appellant, then a 40-year-old transportation security officer, filed a 

traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that she suffered stress, and pain in her head, neck, 

shoulders, and back on March 14, 2007 when she passed out at work. She stopped work that day 

and did not return. The employing establishment controverted the claim. 

In support of her claim appellant submitted a March 20, 2007 report, in which 

Linda Thompson, a counselor, noted seeing appellant on March 17, 2007. She diagnosed major 

depressive disorder, single episode; panic disorder with agoraphobia; and post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD). On March 23, 2007 Dr. Junaid Khan, a Board-certified internist, advised that 

appellant should be excused from work from January 14 until March 31, 2007. 

By letter dated April 4, 2007, OWCP informed appellant of the evidence needed to 

support her claim. 

Appellant thereafter submitted a March 20, 2007 statement. She indicated that on 

March 5, 2007 she was harassed by a supervisor while in a group of officers and this offended 

her. Appellant related that on March 10, 2007 a different supervisor told her that she had to 

report the incident, and this led to her collapse on March 14, 2007. 

Hospital discharge instructions indicated that appellant was admitted on March 14 and 

discharged on March 15, 2007. Dr. Khan completed a hospital history and physical on 

March 14, 2007. He noted that appellant reported a similar episode in 1996, underwent stress at 

work, and was admitted following a loss of consciousness at work. Dr. Khan’s impression was 

syncope versus seizure. 

Dr. Nishith Majmundar, a Board-certified neurologist, saw appellant in consultation on 

March 14, 2007. He repeated the medical history, described examination findings, and indicated 

that she had some grip weakness in both upper extremities. Dr. Majmundar noted that a 

magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the cervical spine did not show pathology with 

something behind the T3-4 vertebral body, with a concern of meningioma versus trauma. He 

further noted that a magnetic resonance angiogram and MRI scans of the brain were negative. 

Dr. Majmundar advised that the episode was possibly syncope rather than a seizure. 

Dr. Jeremy Wang, a Board-certified neurosurgeon, also saw appellant in consultation on 

March 15, 2007. He diagnosed syncope versus seizure and noted additional studies were 

scheduled. In a discharge summary dated March 15, 2007, Dr. Khan noted that 
3

electroencephalogram and thoracic spine MRI scan were normal. Discharge diagnoses were 

syncope, hypertension, and sinusitis.4 

On March 30, 2007 Dr. O. Lerey Johnson, a Board-certified internist, advised that 

appellant was under his care. In an April 13, 2007 report, he noted her complaint of extreme 

depression with anxiety, headaches, neck, and upper back pains with paresthesias to her hands 

and forearms, and his review of hospital records. Dr. Johnson advised that appellant had been 

under his care since she relocated to Houston, TX, following Hurricane Katrina and was 

suffering from PTSD. He concluded that her subjective symptoms were not related to any 

physiological disease process. 

Statements from three coworkers confirmed that appellant fell backward and fainted at 

work on March 14, 2007. 

By decision dated May 17, 2007, OWCP noted that appellant had not responded to its 

April 4, 2007 letter and denied the claim. Appellant appealed to the Board. 

By order dated December 27, 2007, the Board noted that she had responded to OWCP’s 

April 30, 2007 development letter and had thereafter submitted additional medical evidence prior 

to the issuance of its May 17, 2007 decision. The Board remanded the case to OWCP to 

properly consider all relevant evidence, to be followed by an appropriate decision.5 

On February 7, 2008 OWCP accepted major depression, single episode, and unspecified. 

No additional evidence was received between OWCP’s May 17, 2007 decision and this 

acceptance.6 

In an August 12, 2008 report, Dr. Dan K. Eidman, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, 

advised that appellant had symptoms following a work injury on March 14, 2007 when she 

sustained blunt trauma to the neck and back. He diagnosed cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. 

On October 9, 2008 Linda K. Nelson, a social worker, noted that she began treating 

appellant on August 25, 2008 for symptoms of PTSD, major depressive disorder, and 

agoraphobia with panic disorder. 

On January 23, 2009 OWCP additionally accepted brachial neuritis or radiculitis and 

thoracic or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis. 

Dr. Eidman submitted reports on January 26 and March 9, 2009 describing appellant’s 

neck and back conditions. He reviewed MRI scans and recommended physical therapy. A 

February 3, 2009 MRI scan of the cervical spine demonstrated no herniation, central canal 

                                                             4

 Copies of the diagnostic test reports are found in the case record. 

5

 Docket No. 07-1910 (issued December 27, 2007). 

6

 Appellant has a separate claim, adjudicated by OWCP under File No. xxxxxx480, accepted for bilateral carpal 

tunnel syndrome. Under that claim, she received wage-loss compensation beginning September 7, 2007. The 

instant claim was adjudicated under File No. xxxxxx554. File No. xxxxxx480 is not presently before the Board. 
4

stenosis, or remarkable foraminal narrowing. A lumbar spine MRI scan that day demonstrated 

posterior protrusions at L3-4 and L4-5. 

On August 2, 2009 Dr. J. Robert Barnes, a Board-certified psychiatrist, noted that he 

began treating appellant on January 30, 2009 for major depression, panic disorder with 

agoraphobia, and PTSD which she reported began when she was sexually harassed at work. 

Dr. Eidman continued to treat appellant. On September 29, 2010 he recommended a 

chronic pain management program. In an October 6, 2010 report, Dr. Eidman described 

appellant’s treatment to date and current complaints of neck and lower back pain. Following 

physical examination, he diagnosed cervical radiculopathy, lumbar radiculopathy, chronic pain 

syndrome, depressive disorder, and sleep disturbance. Dr. Eidman recommended therapy to 

reduce pain and stress. 

On October 6, 2010 Kristie Yeagley, a social worker, performed a psychological 

evaluation. She continued to submit counselling notes. 

On January 22, 2013 Dr. Eidman noted appellant’s continued complaint of cervical and 

low back pain and tenderness. A cervical MRI scan that day demonstrated disc protrusions at C2 

through C7 with bilateral facet arthrosis and multi-level anterior spondylosis. A lumbar MRI 

scan on January 22, 2013 demonstrated disc protrusions at L3-4 and L4-5 with minimal 

foraminal stenosis and multi-level facet arthrosis. 

In a January 28, 2013 report, Ms. Nelson noted appellant’s continued treatment for 

PTSD, major depressive disorder, and agoraphobia with panic disorder. 

Under the instant claim, OWCP paid appellant compensation for intermittent wage loss 

from December 17, 2012 to February 8, 2013 for medical and therapy appointments. 

In a March 15, 2013 report, Dr. Eric R. George, Board-certified in plastic and hand 

surgery, advised that appellant reached maximum medical improvement on June 8, 2011 with 

regard to her hands and carpal tunnels with no evidence of permanent impairment. He advised 

that he could not provide an opinion regarding her neck and back complaints. On April 27, 2013 

Dr. George reported that nerve studies indicated that appellant had, at most, a mild slowing of 

the carpal tunnel and provided medication.7

 

In a claim for compensation (Form CA-7), signed by appellant on November 6, 2014 and 

submitted to OWCP on May 20, 2015, she requested compensation for wage loss during the 

period March 14, 2007 to November 16, 2014.8

 The employing establishment indicated that she 

was removed from employment on June 11, 2007. 

                                                             7

 Appellant also submitted unsigned notes from unidentified health care providers dated September 6, 2011 to 

September 26, 2013. 

8

 On October 20, 2013 OWCP terminated appellant’s monetary compensation under File No. xxxxxx480. By 

decision dated March 25, 2015, issued under File No. xxxxxx480, the Board affirmed OWCP’s October 20, 2013 

termination decision. Docket No. 14-2083 (issued March 25, 2015). 
5

On June 3, 2015 Ms. Nelson described appellant’s treatment since August 26, 2008. She 

advised that appellant’s diagnoses were the result of abusive treatment and harassment at the 

employing establishment, and also noted appellant’s report that she had seizure-like episodes 

since the events at the employing establishment. 

By letter dated June 19, 2015, OWCP requested that the employing establishment provide 

information regarding appellant’s removal from employment. The employing establishment 

forwarded a June 6, 2007 notice of decision indicating that she was to be removed from her 

position on June 11, 2007. The notice indicated that on April 16, 2007 appellant was sent a 

notice of proposed termination, citing an event in which she struck a supervisory transportation 

security officer (STSO) in the face and called him a bitch. The decision noted that at a May 23, 

2007 meeting she admitted that she struck the STSO with a closed fist because he obscenely 

remarked to her and approached her. The decision concluded that workplace violence was a 

serious offense and would not be tolerated. A Notification of Personnel Action (Form SF-50) 

indicated that appellant had been removed from employment for workplace violence and 

inappropriate language, effective June 11, 2007. 

In a July 15, 2015 letter, OWCP informed appellant of the evidence necessary to develop 

her claim for compensation in this case, File No. xxxxxx554. 

In response to a July 15, 2015 development letter from OWCP, appellant thereafter 

submitted a November 18, 2014 report in which Dr. John W. Bick, a psychiatrist, noted treating 

her since August 5, 2009 for symptoms of severe anxiety and depression. Dr. Bick advised that, 

despite treatment with medication and psychotherapy, she remained severely impaired and could 

not return to work in any capacity due to her psychiatric problems.9

 

By decision dated August 15, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss 

compensation for the period March 14, 2007 to November 6, 2014. It noted that she had 

received monetary compensation under File No. xxxxxx480 and had also been terminated for 

cause. 

Appellant timely requested a review of the written record by a representative of OWCP’s 

Branch of Hearings and Review. She also requested that her two claims be administratively 

combined and asserted that she had not been released for work by a physician regarding either 

her neck and back injuries or her mental health condition. In support, appellant submitted 

unsigned, unidentified treatment notes. 

In a February 22, 2016 decision, an OWCP hearing representative denied appellant’s 

claim for wage-loss compensation for the period March 14, 2007 to November 6, 2014. The 

hearing representative noted that major depression, single episode, brachial neuritis or radiculitis, 

and thoracic or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis, were accepted under this claim, File No. 

xxxxxx554. The hearing representative also indicated that, under File No. xxxxxx480, OWCP 

accepted bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and that under File No. xxxxxx480 appellant received 

wage-loss compensation from September 7, 2007 through October 19, 2013, and thus would not 

be entitled to wage-loss compensation under File No. xxxxxx554 for that period. Regarding the 

                                                             9

 Beginning on November 12, 2013, appellant continued to submit unsigned, unidentified treatment notes. 
6

conditions accepted under the instant claim, File No. xxxxxx554, the hearing representative 

found the medical evidence submitted was insufficient to establish disability from work for the 

periods claimed due to the effects of the March 14, 2007 employment injury. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

Under FECA the term “disability” means the incapacity, because of an employment 

injury, to earn the wages that the employee was receiving at the time of injury. Disability is thus 

not synonymous with physical impairment, which may or may not result in an incapacity to earn 

wages. An employee who has a physical impairment causally related to a federal employment 

injury, but who nevertheless has the capacity to earn the wages he or she was receiving at the 

time of injury, has no disability as that term is used in FECA.10 Furthermore, whether a 

particular injury causes an employee to be disabled from employment and the duration of that 

disability are medical issues which must be proved by a preponderance of the reliable, probative 

and substantial medical evidence.11 

Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish a 

causal relationship is rationalized medical evidence.12 The opinion of the physician must be 

based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable 

medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by 

the employee.13 Neither the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period 

of employment nor the belief that the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by 

employment factors or incidents is sufficient to establish causal relationship.14

ANALYSIS 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she had 

employment-related disability from March 14, 2007 to November 6, 2014 causally related to the 

accepted conditions of major depression, single episode, brachial neuritis or radiculitis, and 

thoracic or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis. The Board notes that, under File No. xxxxxx480, 

accepted for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, appellant received wage-loss compensation from 

September 7, 2007 to October 20, 2013. 

The issue of disability from work can only be resolved by competent medical evidence.15 

The issue of whether a claimant’s disability is related to an accepted condition is a medical 

question which must be established by a physician who, on the basis of a complete and accurate 

                                                             10 See 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f); Cheryl L. Decavitch, 50 ECAB 397 (1999). 

11 Fereidoon Kharabi, 52 ECAB 291 (2001). 

12 Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000). 

13 Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000); Gary L. Fowler, 45 ECAB 365 (1994). 

14 Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997). 

15 R.C., 59 ECAB 546 (2008). 
7

factual and medical history, concludes that the disability is causally related to employment 

factors and supports that conclusion with sound medical reasoning.16 A physician’s opinion on 

causal relationship between a claimant’s disability and an employment injury is not dispositive 

simply because it is rendered by a physician. To be of probative value, the physician must 

provide rationale for the opinion reached. Where no such rationale is present, the medical 

opinion is of diminished probative value.17 

Appellant submitted a number of unsigned, unidentified treatment notes. The Board has 

long held that medical reports lacking proper identification cannot be considered as probative 

evidence in support of a claim.18 Likewise, the reports from counselor Ms. Thompson,19 and 

social workers, Ms. Nelson, and Ms. Yeagley,20 do not constitute probative medical evidence. A 

medical report may not be considered as probative medical evidence if there is no indication that 

the person completing the report qualifies as a “physician” as defined in section 8102(2) of 

FECA.21 Section 8101(2) provides that “physician” includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, 

clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope 

of their practice as defined by State law.22 

The diagnostic studies of record, including MRI scans and other diagnostic studies, did 

not provide a cause of any diagnosed conditions, and medical evidence that does not offer any 

opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue 

of causal relationship.23 

As to the period March 14 to September 7, 2007, none of the physicians who provided 

reports during this period commented on appellant’s ability to work. Dr. Majmundar and 

Dr. Wang, who saw her in consultation on March 14 and 15, 2007, and Dr. Khan who prepared 

the discharge summary, did not comment regarding disability. Dr. Johnson, who submitted a 

March 30, 2007 report, likewise did not comment on any work-related disability. Appellant, 

therefore, did not establish that she was entitled to wage-loss compensation for the period 

claimed.24

                                                             16 See Sandra D. Pruitt, 57 ECAB 126 (2005). 

17 Thaddeus J. Spevack, 53 ECAB 474 (2002). 

18 D.D., 57 ECAB 734 (2006). 

19 A professional counselor is not included in the definition of the term “physician” under FECA. See E.R., 

Docket No. 17-0350 (issued March 9, 2017). 

20 Social workers are not physicians as defined under FECA. See M.W., Docket No. 16-0877 (issued 

March 17, 2017). 

21 C.B., Docket No. 09-2027 (issued May 12, 2010). 

22 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2); see Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238 (2005). 

23 Willie M. Miller, 53 ECAB 697 (2002). 

24 Id. 
8

As to the period October 20, 2013 to November 6, 2014, in a November 18, 2014 report, 

Dr. Bick advised that he had treated appellant since August 5, 2009 for symptoms of severe 

anxiety and depression. He advised that despite treatment with medication and psychotherapy, 

she remained severely impaired and could not return to work in any capacity due to her 

psychiatric problems. Dr. Bick, however, did not relate appellant’s condition to the March 14, 

2007 employment injury. In fact, he did not discuss any cause of her diagnosed emotional 

condition. There is no additional probative medical evidence from a physician discussing the 

period of claimed compensation from October 20, 2013 to November 6, 2014. In this case, none 

of the medical reports contain any explanation relating appellant’s diagnosed conditions to the 

accepted conditions caused by the March 14, 2007 employment injury.25

As appellant did not submit sufficient rationalized medical opinion evidence to establish 

that she was disable from work during for the periods claimed due to her accepted conditions, 

she failed to establish that the claimed disability was employment related. She was thus not 

entitled to wage-loss compensation for these periods.26

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she was 

totally disabled for any period between March 14, 2007 and November 6, 2014, causally related 

to accepted conditions. 

                                                             25 See S.B., Docket No. 13-1162 (issued December 12, 2013). 

26 N.R., Docket No. 14-0114 (issued April 28, 2014). 
9

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the February 22, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: May 9, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board