United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

J.M., Appellant 

and 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, 

FOREST SERVICE, Albuquerque, NM, 

Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 16-0717 

Issued: January 12, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Jennifer Raymond, Esq., for the appellant1

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On February 29, 2016 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a January 8, 

2016 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case. 

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On March 5, 2014, appellant, then a 37-year-old recreation specialist supervisor, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that he developed an emotional condition as a 

result of actions by management including verbal abuse, failure to provide proper instructions to 

perform his job, changing work duties without notice, and refusing a request for reasonable 

accommodations. He became aware of his condition and realized it was causally related to his 

employment on March 5, 2013. Appellant stopped work on March 1, 2014. 

Appellant submitted a series notes from Dr. B. Cody Wright, a Board-certified 

psychiatrist, dated November 22, 2013 to May 15, 2014, who requested that appellant not be 

assigned supervisory duties beyond what was detailed in his job description. Dr. Wright 

recommended that appellant not work from March 3 to April 1, 2014 because his work situation 

exacerbated his medical condition. Appellant was also seen by a social worker for generalized 

anxiety disorder. 

On April 18, 2014 OWCP asked appellant to submit additional evidence to include a 

detailed description of the employment incidents that contributed to his claimed illness. It 

requested that the employing establishment provide comments from a knowledgeable supervisor 

on the accuracy of all statements. 

Appellant submitted an April 17, 2014 statement and alleged that K.D, a supervisor, and 

C.R., the center director, harassed and discriminated against him because of his serviceconnected psychological disabilities. He alleged that K.D. demanded that he accept additional 

responsibilities for which he had not been hired and which he was unable to perform without 

creating an extremely stressful situation for himself. Appellant noted that he was not part of the 

management team and was never consulted before he was temporarily assigned as a duty officer, 

which was an increase in responsibility. He asserted that the employing establishment failed to 

appropriately compensate him for duty officer and shift supervisor duties. Appellant alleged that 

K.D. verbally berated him and accused him of using his disability as an excuse. He asserted that 

K.D. belittled him publicly in the gym in front the students he was supervising. Appellant 

alleged that the reason there was a constant need for someone to cover as duty officer was 

because another supervisor, D.F., consistently failed to perform his duties, which included 

preparing a duty roster in advance for job coverage. He alleged that, on April 4, 2014, C.R. 

verbally threatened him to sign a document. Appellant asserted that the employing establishment 

failed to provide reasonable accommodations. He alleged that the management team did not 

elevate his request for assistance in addressing the harassment in the workplace to headquarters. 

In an April 28, 2014 statement, C.R. noted that appellant’s actual duties had not varied 

from his official position description as a recreation specialist. He advised that appellant was 

generally able to perform the required duties in accordance with expectation. C.R. noted, 

however, that appellant had performance and conduct problems. He advised that on 
3

February 28, 2014 appellant had been issued a proposed seven-day suspension for two instances 

of failure to follow instruction, two instances of inappropriate conduct, and one instance of 

absence without official leave. C.R. provided a copy of a recreation specialist, GS-9, position 

description which noted responsibilities of management and supervision of less than 25 percent 

and administration of recreation programs and services up to 50 percent. The description noted 

that the position was located at a Job Corps Center and the incumbent was required to work 

nonstandard tours of duty, weekends, and holidays, and might require overtime on a regular and 

recurring basis. The job description further indicated that the incumbent would perform other 

duties as assigned. 

Appellant submitted a response to OWCP’s questionnaire and reiterated his allegations of 

harassment and discrimination. He advised that he had filed an Equal Employment Opportunity 

(EEO) complaint. Appellant also submitted copies of his timesheets. 

The employing establishment submitted a May 28, 2014 statement from K.D. who 

confirmed that appellant was a GS-9 recreation specialist who had supervisory responsibilities. 

On October 7, 2013 K.D. sent out a tentative work schedule to provide supervisory coverage. He 

noted using bargaining unit employees as little as possible in a supervisory capacity. Appellant 

was asked to cover shifts as was K.D. He noted that he did not want to work from 8:00 a.m. to 

4:30 p.m., but requested to work from 3:30 p.m. to 12:00 a.m. on Sundays because he was 

having financial problems and needed a night differential. K.D. accommodated the shift change 

request. He noted, however, that appellant did not report for work on Sunday evening; rather, 

appellant submitted a new schedule request to work Monday through Thursday from 12:00 p.m. 

to 8:30 p.m. and Friday 2:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. Appellant attributed his schedule request to his 

disability. K.D. requested proper medical documentation supporting why appellant could not 

work his current schedule. He advised that, on October 12, 2013, appellant again requested that 

he changed his schedule so that he could work later in the evening to assist with supervision. 

K.D. reported meeting with appellant more than once to inform him that he was to assist as duty 

officer for only 20 percent of his workload and to inform him if the situation changed. He 

denied that he harassed or bullied appellant. K.D. noted meeting with appellant had in June 2013 

for his mid-year performance appraisal and informed appellant that he was working at an 

unacceptable level. He stated a formal investigation of appellant’s allegations of workplace 

harassment revealed no evidence of harassment. K.D. noted that appellant had admitted to being 

a heavy drinker and having anxiety issues for years. He noted that appellant was accommodated 

in the workplace when he submitted appropriate medical documentation in support of his request 

to work only six hours a day, to not work past 10:00 p.m. and to arrive late so that he could 

attend therapy appointments in the mornings. K.D. submitted e-mails documenting his 

statement. 

In a decision dated September 10, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for an 

emotional condition as he did not meet his burden of proof to establish that he sustained an 

injury in the performance of duty. It explained that he did not establish an emotional condition 

“that arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors.” 

On September 19, 2014 the employing establishment’s Office of Adjudication accepted 

appellant’s EEO complaint, in part, for further investigation. OWCP requested that the 

employing establishment provide additional information regarding this EEO complaint. 
4

The employing establishment submitted a February 5, 2014 notice of proposed 

suspension for seven days based on a failure to follow instructions on two occasions and 

inappropriate conduct on August 17, 2013. It also submitted a June 19, 2014 decision where the 

proposed suspension had been reduced to a letter of reprimand. The employing establishment 

also submitted a March 6, 2014 reasonable accommodation information report, in which it 

approved appellant’s request for an adjustment to his afternoon schedule so that he could attend 

morning medical appointments. 

In an April 4, 2014 statement, L.C., a coworker, reported that appellant was assigned to 

be the shift leader at 7:30 p.m., but refused to assume the responsibilities. Appellant claimed that 

he was the recreation supervisor, but that his supervisor had not directed him to run the shift. 

L.C. indicated that for safety of the center staff and students he assumed all responsibilities of 

shift leader. 

By statement dated April 5, 2014, C.R. acknowledged that he was informed by staff on 

duty that appellant had refused to act as duty officer. He attempted to reach appellant by 

telephone, but was unsuccessful and drove to the facility. Appellant claimed that he had not 

been instructed to be acting duty officer, but was a recreation specialist. 

The employing establishment submitted an April 6, 2014 statement from D.F., a 

supervisor, who noted that on April 3, 2014 he and appellant had reviewed the work schedule 

and appellant’s physician note indicating that appellant could work four hours a day the first 

week, six hours a day the second week, and eight hours a day thereafter. D.F. stated that 

appellant was instructed to come into work the next day from 7:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. to serve as 

the duty officer and appellant agreed. When appellant arrived at 7:30 p.m., however, he refused 

to be the duty officer. 

On November 8, 2014 appellant requested reconsideration of the September 10, 2014 

decision. 

On December 19, 2014 the employing establishment’s injury compensation office 

indicated that appellant had requested several schedule changes as reasonable accommodation. 

On October 7, 2013 appellant had requested a change in work schedule from Sunday 3:30 p.m. 

to 12:00 a.m. instead of 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.; on October 2, 2013 appellant had requested a 

reasonable accommodation for a lower grade position; and appellant requested a work schedule 

from Monday to Thursday from 12:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and Friday 2:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. 

K.D. noted administrative actions in response to appellant’s reasonable accommodation request 

included: changing appellant’s work schedule in October 2013 to work later in the evenings to 

assist with supervision to accommodate appellant; confirming appellant was not required to 

supervise the residential department more than 20 percent of his weekly duties; adjusting 

appellant’s schedule so that he could attend therapy appointments during the day; and adjusting 

appellant’s schedule in April 2014 so that he would not have to work past 10:00 p.m. 

C.R. denied the allegation that, on April 4, 2014, he publicly ridiculed appellant; rather, 

he explained that he and appellant were in a conference room and spoke in a normal tone. He 

further noted that appellant had not signed a document on that evening. C.R. advised that an 
5

employing establishment investigation of appellant’s harassment allegations found no evidence 

of harassment by K.D., but found that appellant had sent inappropriate texts to K.D. 

In a decision dated April 13, 2015, OWCP denied modification of the decision dated 

September 10, 2014 finding that appellant had not established any compensable employment 

factors. 

On July 28, 2015 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration. Counsel 

continued to claim that appellant had developed an emotional condition in the performance of 

duty. In support of his request, appellant submitted a July 10, 2014 declaration (statement) by 

appellant, which detailed allegations of discrimination and harassment. Also submitted was a 

November 13, 2014 affidavit and a December 2, 2014 rebuttal affidavit, which described alleged 

incidents of harassment and discrimination by management. Appellant submitted a 

psychological evaluation dated June 10, 2015, which diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder, 

exacerbated by his work environment. 

Appellant submitted witness statements from M.R., a coworker, dated May 11 and 

December 8, 2014, who observed appellant working as a shift supervisor and duty officer. M.R. 

indicated that appellant had a 50 percent service-connected disability with generalized anxiety 

disorder and did not handle stress well. He noted K.D. would harass appellant by assigning him 

extra duties outside of his position description in an attempt to make appellant fail. Appellant 

reported receiving threatening and intimidating e-mails and being verbally abused by K.D. In a 

December 6, 2014 witness statement, I.M., a recreation assistant, indicated that appellant was his 

supervisor and was often directed by K.D. to be duty officer. In a December 8, 2014 statement, 

G.A., a coworker, witnessed appellant begin to shake and collapse in a meeting. A 

December 15, 2014 witness statement from S.D., a coworker, noted that appellant described his 

anxiety and panic attacks due to work-related issues. 

The employing establishment submitted an August 12, 2015 statement from E.L., an 

injury compensation specialist, who indicated that the employing establishment had 

accommodated appellant’s schedule change requests that would allow him to attend therapy 

appointments and to earn additional premium pay for Sunday evening shifts. Additionally, E.L. 

noted that K.D. had scheduled himself to work evenings and Sundays to assist with overall 

center management in an effort to ease appellant’s concerns about being in charge alone. She 

indicated that, as a GS-9, appellant was responsible for some management and administration 

functions as referenced in his position description. E.L. further indicated that employing 

establishment employees are not provided higher pay when taking on acting duties such as those 

described by appellant and that this was considered to be “other duties assigned” in the position 

description. 

On December 16, 2015 appellant asserted that K.D.’s statements were untrue. He 

indicated that it became routine for him to be the duty officer, which took away from the job he 

was hired to do as a recreation specialist. Appellant noted that, as a GS-9 recreation specialist, 

he was not responsible for management and administration functions within the recreation 

department, but it became a daily occurrence that he was required to be duty officer which 

increased his stress level. 
6

In a decision dated January 8, 2016, OWCP denied modification of the decision dated 

April 13, 2015. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

To establish an emotional condition in the performance of duty, a claimant must submit 

the following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he or she has an emotional or psychiatric 

disorder; (2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused 

or contributed to the condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that 

the identified compensable employment factors are causally related to the emotional condition.3

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. In the case of Lillian Cutler,

4

 the Board 

explained that there are distinctions as to the type of employment situations giving rise to a 

compensable emotional condition arising under FECA. There are situations where an injury or 

illness has some connection with the employment, but nevertheless does not come within 

coverage under FECA.5 When an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or 

her employment duties, and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from an 

emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury 

arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability 

results from his or her emotional reaction to a special assignment or other requirement imposed 

by the employing establishment or by the nature of the work.6 Allegations alone by a claimant 

are insufficient to establish a factual basis for an emotional condition claim.7

 Where the claimant 

alleges compensable factors of employment, he or she must substantiate such allegations with 

probative and reliable evidence.8 Personal perceptions alone are insufficient to establish an 

employment-related emotional condition.9 On the other hand the disability is not covered where 

it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reduction-in-force or his or her frustration 

from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position.10

ANALYSIS 

Appellant has alleged that K.D. and C.R. harassed and discriminated against him because 

of his service-connected psychological disabilities. He alleged that K.D. demanded that he 

 3 George H. Clark, 56 ECAB 162 (2004). 

4

 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

5 See Robert W. Johns, 51 ECAB 137 (1999). 

6 Lillian Cutler, supra note 4. 

7 J.F., 59 ECAB 331 (2008). 

8 M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007). 

9 Roger Williams, 52 ECAB 468 (2001). 

10 See supra note 4. 
7

accept responsibilities for which he had not been hired and which created an extremely stressful 

situation for him. Appellant indicated that he was not part management and had never been 

consulted when he was temporarily assigned as a duty officer, which was a major increase in 

responsibility. He asserted that the employing establishment did not appropriately compensation 

him for duty officer and shift supervisor duties which he claimed were above his grade level. 

Appellant also alleged that K.D. verbally berated him and that C.R. verbally threatened him. He 

asserted that the employing establishment failed to provide him reasonable accommodations. 

Finally, appellant alleged that the employing establishment management team did not 

appropriately address his concerns about workplace harassment. 

The Board must review whether these alleged incidents and conditions of employment 

are covered employment factors under the terms of FECA. Appellant has attributed his 

emotional condition to performing his regular or specially assigned duties of his position. He 

generally alleged that he was overworked and was assigned additional responsibilities as a duty 

officer where he was responsible for the entire facility and he was unable to perform the duties 

without experiencing extreme stress. Appellant submitted witness statements from M.R. and 

I.M. who noted that appellant was often directed by K.D. to be duty officer. However, these 

witness statements provided insufficient corroboration of any specific incidents. C.R. disputed 

appellant’s allegations and explained that appellant’s position as a recreation specialist, GS-9, 

did have management and supervision responsibilities, as well as other duties as assigned. He 

noted that appellant’s actual duties did not vary from his official description and that appellant 

was generally able to perform the required duties in accordance with expectation. Similarly, E.L. 

confirmed that, as a GS-9, appellant was responsible for some management and, administration 

functions and, when he took on acting duties such as those described by him, these were 

considered “other duties assigned” in the position description. The Board has held that 

overwork, if substantiated by sufficient factual information to support the claimant’s account of 

events, may be a compensable factor of employment.11 

The Board finds, however, that appellant has provided insufficient evidence to establish 

these allegations of overwork and being assigned duties outside his position description. 

Therefore, appellant has not established a compensable factor under Cutler.

12 

Appellant made several allegations related to administrative and personnel actions. In 

Thomas D. McEuen,

13 the Board held that an employee’s emotional reaction to administrative 

actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA as 

such matters pertain to procedures and requirements of the employing establishment and do not 

bear a direct relation to the work required of the employee. The Board noted, however, that 

coverage under FECA would attach if the factual circumstances surrounding the administrative 

or personnel action established error or abuse by the employing establishment superiors in 

dealing with the claimant. Absent evidence of such error or abuse, the resulting emotional 

condition must be considered self-generated and not employment generated. In determining 

 11 Bobbie D. Daly, 53 ECAB 691 (2002). 

12 See supra note 4. 

13 See 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff’d on recon., 42 ECAB 566 (1991). 
8

whether the employing establishment erred or acted abusively, the Board has examined whether 

the employing establishment acted reasonably.14

Appellant alleged that K.D. demanded that he accept additional responsibilities that he 

was not hired to perform and that appellant was unable to perform those duties without 

experiencing extreme stress. He further alleged that he was not part of the management team 

and was never consulted when he was temporarily assigned as a duty officer. The Board notes 

that the assignment of work is an administrative function15 and the manner in which a supervisor 

exercises his or her discretion falls outside the ambit of FECA. In a statement dated April 28, 

2014, C.R. noted that appellant’s actual duties did not vary from his position description as a 

recreation specialist and noted that appellant was generally able to perform the required duties in 

accordance with expectation. Similarly, K.D. indicated on May 28, 2014 that appellant’s 

position as a GS-9 recreation specialist had supervisory responsibilities. Absent evidence of 

error or abuse, appellant’s mere disagreement or dislike of a managerial action is not 

compensable.16 The Board finds that he has not offered sufficient evidence to establish error or 

abuse regarding his work assignments. The employing establishment has either denied 

appellant’s his allegations or explained the reasons for its actions in these administrative matters. 

Appellant has presented no corroborating evidence to support that the employing establishment 

acted unreasonably in making his work assignments. Accordingly, he has not established a 

compensable factor of employment in this regard. 

Appellant asserted that the employing establishment failed to pay him appropriate 

compensation for duty officer and shift supervisor duties he performed above his grade level. 

This is an administrative matter and, as noted, a reaction to such matters fall outside the coverage 

of FECA absent evidence of error or abuse.17 The Board finds that no evidence of error or abuse 

in this administrative matter. E.L. indicated that employing establishment employees are not 

provided higher pay when taking on acting duties such as those described by appellant and is 

considered “other duties assigned” in the position description. There is no other contradicting 

evidence. 

Appellant alleged that the reason there was a constant need for someone to cover as duty 

officer was because K.F. consistently failed to perform his job duties, which included preparing a 

duty roster in advance for job coverage. He further alleged that the employing establishment 

management team failed to elevate his request for assistance in addressing the harassment in the 

workplace to headquarters. The Board has found that an employee’s complaints concerning the 

 14 See Richard J. Dube, 42 ECAB 916, 920 (1991). 

15 Donney T. Drennon-Gala, 56 ECAB 469 (2005). 

16 See Barbara J. Latham, 53 ECAB 316 (2002); see also Janet I. Jones, 47 ECAB 345, 347 (1996), Jimmy 

Gilbreath, 44 ECAB 555, 558 (1993); Apple Gate, 41 ECAB 581, 588 (1990); Joseph C. DeDonato, 39 ECAB 

1260, 1266-67 (1988). (The Board finds that allegations such as improperly assigned work duties, which relate to 

administrative or personnel matters, unrelated to the employee’s regular or specially assigned work duties and do not 

fall within the coverage of FECA. 

17 See id.; see also Nona Stanford, Docket No. 00-1295 (issued May 22, 2001) (no evidence of error or abuse by 

the employing establishment with respect to appellant’s allegations of not being properly compensated). 
9

manner in which a supervisor performs his duties as a supervisor or the manner in which a 

supervisor exercises his supervisory discretion fall, as a rule, outside the scope of coverage 

provided by FECA. This principle recognizes that a supervisor or manager in general must be 

allowed to perform his duties, that employees will at times dislike the actions taken, but that 

mere disagreement or dislike of a supervisory or management action will not be actionable, 

absent evidence of error, or abuse.18 Absent evidence of error or abuse, appellant’s mere 

disagreement or dislike of a managerial action is not compensable.19 The Board finds that 

appellant has not established error or abuse in this matter. Appellant provided no corroborating 

evidence regarding this allegation nor did he explain the context and specifics of this incident. 

There is no evidence that the employing establishment acted unreasonably in this matter. 

Appellant asserted that the employing establishment did not provide him with reasonable 

accommodations. The Board notes that reasonable accommodation issues are not generally 

related to the employment; they are administrative functions of the employing establishment and 

not duties of the employee.20 The employing establishment submitted an August 12, 2015 

statement from E.L., injury compensation specialist, explaining that the employing establishment 

had accommodated appellant’s requests for schedule changes that would allow him to attend his 

therapy appointments and also to earn additional premium pay for Sunday evening shift. 

Additionally, E.L. noted that K.D. had scheduled himself to work evenings and Sundays to assist 

with overall center management in an effort to ease appellant’s concerns about being in charge 

alone. Appellant has failed to establish that the employing establishment erred or acted 

abusively in this matter. 

Appellant alleged that he was harassed and discriminated against by K.D. and C.R. 

because of his service-connected mental disabilities. He alleged that K.D. had verbally berated 

him, accused him of using his disability as an excuse, and belittled him in front of students that 

he supervised. Appellant further indicated that on April 4, 2014 C.R. verbally threatened him to 

sign a document. To the extent that incidents alleged as constituting harassment or a hostile 

environment by a manager are established as occurring and arising from appellant’s performance 

of his regular duties, these could constitute employment factors.21 However, for harassment to 

give rise to a compensable disability under FECA, there must be evidence that harassment did in 

fact occur. Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.22 

The evidence fails to support appellant’s claim for harassment as a cause for his 

emotional condition. C.R. denied appellant’s allegation that on April 4, 2014 he publicly 

ridiculed appellant. Rather, C.R. explained that appellant and he were in a conference room and 

that he had spoken to appellant in a normal tone. He advised that an employing establishment 

 18 See Marguerite J. Toland, 52 ECAB 294 (2001). 

19 Supra note 16. 

20 See Judy Kahn, 53 ECAB 321 (2002). 

21 David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991). 

22 Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991). See Joel Parker, Sr., 43 ECAB 220, 225 (1991) (finding that a 

claimant must substantiate allegations of harassment or discrimination with probative and reliable evidence). 
10

investigation of appellant’s allegations of harassment found no evidence that K.D. had harassed 

appellant, but found that appellant had sent inappropriate texts to K.D. K.D. also denied 

appellant’s allegations that he had harassed or bullied appellant. He indicated that appellant had 

complained of being threatened by management, but he failed did to cite any specific instances 

of harassment. Although appellant alleged that his supervisor harassed and engaged in actions, 

which he believed constituted harassment, he provided insufficient corroborating evidence to 

establish his allegations.23 He submitted statements from M.R. who noted that K.D. would 

harass appellant by assigning him extra duties outside of his position description in an attempt to 

make appellant fail. Appellant also submitted statements from G.A., I.M., and S.D. who noted 

witnessing appellant’s panic attacks. The factual evidence, however, fails to support his 

allegations of harassment by C.R. or K.D. The witness statements are not specific as to the time 

or place of any claimed harassing incidents and lack sufficient context to establish any disparate 

treatment. The Board finds that appellant has not established a compensable work factor with 

respect to the claimed harassment. 

Appellant alleged that K.D. and C.R. had verbally berated and threatened him. The 

Board has recognized the compensability of verbal abuse and threats in certain circumstances. 

This does not imply, however, that every statement uttered in the workplace will give rise to 

coverage under FECA.24 The Board finds that the facts of the case do not support any specific 

incidents of verbal abuse. C.R. and K.D. denied ridiculing or threatening appellant. As noted, 

witness statements from G.A., I.M., M.R., and S.D. were not specific as to the time or place of 

any claimed verbal abuse nor did they provide context for any of their statements.25 The Board 

finds that appellant has provided insufficient corroborating evidence to establish that specific 

incidents occurred at particular times and places.26 There is no corroborating evidence to support 

that any verbal interaction with appellant by C.R. or K.D. rose to the level of a compensable 

employment factor.27

Appellant also noted filing an EEO claim for harassment and discrimination. However, 

grievances and EEO complaints, by themselves, do not establish that workplace harassment or 

unfair treatment occurred.28 None of the information submitted established improper action by 

the employing establishment. Thus, the evidence regarding EEO matter does not establish a 

compensable employment factor under FECA. 

 23 See William P. George, 43 ECAB 1159, 1167 (1992) (claimed employment incidents not established where 

appellant did not submit evidence substantiating that such incidents actually occurred). 

24 Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004). 

25 See Joe M. Hagewood, 56 ECAB 479 (2005) (without a detailed description of the specific statements made, a 

compensable employment factor was not established; the mere fact a supervisor or employee may raise his voice 

during the course of a conversation does not warrant a finding of verbal abuse). 

26 See supra note 23. 

27 See Judy L. Kahn, 53 ECAB 321 (2002). 

28 James E. Norris, 52 ECAB 93 (2000). 
11

Consequently, appellant has not established his claim for an emotional condition as he 

has failed to establish any compensable employment factors.29 

On appeal, appellant reiterated his allegations, asserting that he has established error or 

abuse by the employing establishment. As explained, the Board finds that he has not established 

any compensable employment factors. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that the evidence fails to establish that appellant sustained an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 8, 2016 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: January 12, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 29 As appellant has failed to establish a compensable employment factor, the Board need not address the medical 

evidence of record; see Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992).