J-S71011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAYSON CHAMBERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 739 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0911081-2003

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAYSON CHAMBERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 740 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0911091-2003

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAYSON CHAMBERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 746 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-1109611-2004

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
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MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2020

Jayson Chambers appeals from the dismissal of his Post-Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. After careful review, we affirm. 

This Court previously summarized the relevant factual history of these 

cases as follows:

. . . . Between the summer of 2000 and December 2002, 

[A]ppellant, approximately [thirty] years of age, sexually abused 

A.L. . . ., C.E. . . ., and A.R. . . ., all minors under the age of 16.

A.L. resided with [A]ppellant for about three years, from age 

eight to age eleven. During that time, A.L. slept in the same room 

as [A]ppellant and his two other children.1 Appellant 

inappropriately touched A.L. when she was [eleven] years old. 

During the act, [A]ppellant unzipped and pulled down A.L.’s pants, 

pulled down her underwear, and completely undressed himself. 

Thereafter, [A]ppellant sexually abused A.L., forcibly penetrating 

her vagina with his penis while groping her breasts. He continued 

the assault despite her cries and pleas to cease. A.L. testified that 

she refrained from immediately telling someone because 

[A]ppellant threatened to kill her. She felt justified in this belief 

because [A]ppellant had physically assaulted her on numerous 

occasions, sometimes using an extension cord. Appellant’s son 

testified that he witnessed A.L. lying on the bed while [A]ppellant 

hovered over her unclothed, and that [A]ppellant also had 

physically abused him. Appellant eventually asked A.L. to leave 

his residence and return to her mother because of a sexual abuse 

allegation lodged against him by C.E.

C.E., A.L.’s sister, testified that [A]ppellant inappropriately 

touched her on two separate occasions. On both occasions, she 

was visiting for the weekend to spend time with her sister. The 

first time [A]ppellant touched her breasts. During the second 

instance of abuse, he placed his hands underneath her shirt and 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s two children share the same initials. Therefore, for ease of 

identification we refer to them, in order of age, as J.C. and J.C.2. See N.T. 

Jury Trial Transcript, 12/6/04, at 40 (indicating the dates of birth of J.C. and 

J.C.2). 
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groped her breasts while standing behind her and penetrated her 

vaginally with his fingers. C.E. later relayed these events to her 

aunt and mother. 

A.R., [A]ppellant’s cousin, testified her first sexual 

relationship with [A]ppellant ensued around November 2012.5 

She testified that she considered [A]ppellant her best friend prior 

to the sexual abuse. On the first occasion, [A]ppellant pushed 

A.R. down on the bed, pulled her pants and underwear down, and 

forcibly penetrated her vagina. She testified that despite her 

cries, [A]ppellant persisted. A.L. and [A]ppellant’s son testified 

they witnessed [A]ppellant having sexual intercourse with A.R. 

Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse a second time with A.R. 

and she testified she cried “hysterically, like loud” this time.6 As 

a result of one of these sexual encounters, A.R. became 

impregnated and delivered a baby boy on September 23, 2003.7 

A.R. did not immediately disclose the identity of the father to her 

family. Over objection, A.R. testified she fears [A]ppellant 

because he physically abused her on numerous occasions and 

choked her mother during a disagreement.

_______

5 During direct examination A.R. testified the first time 

she engaged in sex with [A]ppellant was in December 

2002, however, during cross-examination she 

testified that the sexual encounter actually occurred 

in November 2002.

6 Appellant resided with A.R. and her family at the 

time of this assault.

7 DNA tests later confirmed [A]ppellant is the father 

of the child.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 959 A.2d 458 (Pa.Super. 2008) (unpublished 

memorandum) (“Chambers II”) (citations to the record omitted).

Appellant was arrested and charged with various sexual offenses as to

all three minors. Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded to a 

bench trial. At trial, all three victims testified and DNA evidence was 

introduced that Appellant was the father of A.R.’s baby. At the conclusion of 
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the trial, the court found Appellant guilty of rape, indecent assault, and 

endangering the welfare of a child as to A.L.; indecent assault as to C.E.; and 

statutory sexual assault as to A.R. On March 30, 2005, Appellant was 

sentenced to an aggregate term of fifteen to thirty years of incarceration. 

Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were denied, and a timely notice 

of appeal. After Appellant failed to timely comply with the trial court’s 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) order, we dismissed the appeal. See Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 913 A.2d 939 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“Chambers I”) (unpublished 

memorandum).2

On July 17, 2007, Appellant filed a PCRA petition requesting the 

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, which the PCRA court 

granted. On appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court’s consolidation of the 

charges against him; its allowance of A.R.’s testimony regarding Appellant’s 

physical abuse as an explanation for her delay in reporting the abuse; and 

that the rape, endangering the welfare of a minor, and two indecent assault 

verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. We rejected Appellant’s 

arguments and affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Chambers II, 

supra. After another successful PCRA petition seeking the reinstatement of 

appellate rights, Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal nunc pro 

____________________________________________

2 While the direct appeal was pending, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition 

which was dismissed.
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tunc, which was denied. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 78 A.3d 1089 

(Pa. 2013) (“Chambers III”).

On June 27, 2014, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in which

Appellant raised numerous allegations of trial counsel, appellate counsel, and 

PCRA counsel ineffectiveness. Additionally, he alleged the discovery of new 

evidence that would exonerate him in the form of a witness recantation. 

Finally, he listed a multitude of alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct

and attached numerous exhibits. On January 22, 2018, following years of 

litigation and changes of counsel, Appellant, through Peter Levin, Esquire, filed 

an amended PCRA petition raising the issues alleged by Appellant in his pro 

se petition. After the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss, the PCRA court 

issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition as meritless and without a 

hearing. On February 15, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed the PCRA petition. 

This timely appeal followed. Appellant was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) statement; however, the PCRA court did file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant raises four issues, which we have reordered for ease of 

disposition:

I. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA 

petition alleging counsel was ineffective.

II. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA 

petition due to newly discovered evidence.

III. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA 

petition alleging prosecutorial misconduct.
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IV. Whether the court erred in denying the Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised 

in the amended PCRA petition regarding trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness.

Appellant’s brief at 10.

We begin with a discussion of the pertinent legal principles. Our “review 

is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record,” and 

we do not “disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of record 

and is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 

(Pa.Super. 2012). Similarly, “[w]e grant great deference to the factual 

findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have 

no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal 

conclusions.” Id. “[W]here the petitioner raises questions of law, our 

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Finally, we 

“may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record supports it.” 

Id.

Appellant’s first claim contains two sub-parts, alleging trial and appellate 

counsel ineffectiveness. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the 

burden of proving otherwise. See Commonwealth v. Becker, 192 A.3d 106, 

112 (Pa.Super. 2018). To do so, a petitioner must plead and prove that: (1) 

the legal claim underlying his ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2) 

counsel’s decision to act (or not) lacked a reasonable basis designed to 
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effectuate the petitioner’s interests; and (3) prejudice resulted. Id. The 

failure to establish any of the three prongs is fatal to the claim. Id. at 113.

In his first sub-claim, Appellant alleges that direct appeal counsel was 

ineffective in the manner that he litigated certain weight-of-the-evidence 

issues on appeal. See Appellant’s brief at 21-24. Specifically, Appellant 

argues that the outcome of the direct appeal would have been different if 

counsel had included weight of the evidence claims regarding the 

inconsistencies between the testimony of A.L. and J.C. regarding the dates 

and locations of the assaults, and the absence of any physical evidence to 

support A.L.’s testimony that Appellant physically assaulted her with an 

extension cord. Id. 

By way of background, direct appeal counsel included a claim that the 

convictions regarding A.L. were against the weight of the evidence because

the medical records, school records, and testimony of the witnesses failed to

corroborate the traumatic effects of the abuse described by A.L. As a result, 

the Commonwealth contends that this claim is a thinly-veiled attempt to relitigate the previously unsuccessful challenge to the weight of the evidence by 

slightly altering the attack on A.L.’s credibility. See Commonwealth’s brief at 

15; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, 

the allegation of error must not have been previously litigated). The PCRA 

court agreed, rejecting the current weight of the evidence claim. See PCRA 

Court Opinion, 4/29/19, at 8-10. 
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The record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that the trial court 

expressly found A.L’s testimony credible in spite of the inconsistencies 

Appellant points to here, rendering an additional appellate challenge on these 

grounds meritless. See Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 217 

(Pa. 2016) (“[C]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless claim.”). During closing argument, trial counsel specifically argued 

that Appellant should be acquitted on the basis that there were inconstancies

between all of the victims’ statements from when they were initially made, to

the preliminary hearing, and then at trial as to when and where the assaults 

happened. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 90-92. The trial court agreed 

that inconsistencies existed, even giving an example that one victim testified 

that an assault happened on a day that it could not have occurred because 

Appellant was still in prison. Id. at 92. Despite these inconsistencies, the 

court still found the victims’ testimonies to be the most persuasive evidence 

in the case:

[Trial Court]: But, again, you know, you’re not talking about 

– you know, I had a case in which the defendant 

was in prison, okay, and the period that was 

involved definitely convinced me that he 

couldn’t have done it; so, as a result thereof, he 

was found not guilty. 

Here we have a youngster talking about – and 

she testified on the witness stand, “Well, it was 

about this time.” And it’s not a question of he 

was off [sic]–she was off ten months, a year, a 

year and a half. She was off, what, about a 

month, a month and a half, two months. You 
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know, so that’s the – again, I’m telling you 

what’s going to influence me and what’s not.

[Trial Counsel]: Right. But—

[Trial Court]: That’s not going to influence me.

N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 92-93. 

After the Court announced its verdict, Appellant immediately uttered, 

“[t]his is crazy.” Id. at 99. The court responded to Appellant’s comment by

offering an explicit explanation as to why it found A.L. and J.C.’s testimonies 

so convincing:

Sir, I sat right over there and I watched that young lady testify –

. . . . 

I saw that little girl testify and I watched her like a hawk, okay. 

And let me tell you something, that little girl came across very, 

very candidly. She came across very, very candidly. In fact, I 

watched her. And that’s why I sit over there, because over here 

I can’t see her face. And I don’t know how any judge could 

determine the demeanor – because that’s one of the factors that 

I have to take into consideration, is the demeanor of a witness. If 

I sit over here and see the back of her head, you got a perfect 

right later on to go up to the Superior Court and say, “The judge 

didn’t do his job right, because he didn’t see what that little girl’s 

– what her actions were when she was testifying, he could only 

see her head.”

And I watched your son very, very closely. And with that boy 

there might have been some inconsistencies there, yes. But let 

me tell you something, I’m convinced that he saw what he saw. 

And so it’s because of all those reasons I just stated, sir.

Id. at 99-101.
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Here, the trial court plainly found A.L. and J.C.’s testimony convincing. 

To the extent there were inconsistencies in A.L.’s testimony, the trial court 

was free to weigh the evidence and resolve those inconsistencies in A.L.’s 

favor. See Widmer, supra. Given the trial court’s findings, Appellant’s 

previously unsuccessful appellate challenge to A.L.’s credibility, and our 

narrow standard of review, Appellant has not convinced us that the PCRA court 

incorrectly concluded that his claim lacks arguable merit. Accordingly, no 

relief is due.

In his second sub-claim, Appellant alleges that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to interview Appellant’s son J.C.2, the victims’ aunt Mia 

Granger, and various unnamed DHS employees. See Appellant’s brief at 24-

27. He also attacks trial counsel’s failure to call these witnesses to testify on 

his behalf. Id. In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim for failing 

to call a witness, a petitioner must show that: (1) the witness existed; (2) 

the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or 

should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing 

to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness 

was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. See 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009). Thus, counsel 

will not be found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner 

can show that the witness’s testimony would have been helpful to the defense. 

See Commonwealth v. Snead, 45 A.3d 1096, 1109 (Pa. 2012). 
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In its opinion, the PCRA court gave a thorough explanation for denying 

all three of Appellant’s allegations regarding counsel’s alleged failures to call 

witnesses:

In the case at bar, [Appellant] claims that [t]rial [c]ounsel 

was ineffective for failing to interview two witnesses. [Appellant] 

claims that trial counsel failed to interview [Appellant’s] son 

[J.C.2], and [A.L. and C.E.’s] aunt, Mia Granger. However, 

[Appellant] failed to state the information these witnesses had 

that would have assisted [Appellant] or changed the outcome of 

the trial. Nothing is known about the content of the prospective 

testimony from either witness, therefore [Appellant] is unable to 

carry his burden to demonstrate that the absence of these 

witnesses’ testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied 

[Appellant] a fair trial.

Furthermore, [Appellant] is incorrect that trial counsel failed 

to reach out to Granger. During closing arguments, trial counsel 

stated the following:

And certainly there has been no testimony from 

the aunt, Mia Granger, Your Honor. And, rest assured, 

we have made every effort to locate her, Judge. We 

have made every effort to locate her. But that’s just 

the way things turned out.

Clearly, trial counsel made the attempt to contact this witness. 

This witness apparently made herself unavailable, which may be 

because she was not willing to testify at trial.

Moreover, [Appellant] claims that trial counsel should have 

interviewed employees of the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”) concerning the homicide of a young girl by 

[Appellant’s] brother, Jerry. According to [Appellant], he was 

charged with the instant sexual assaults because his brother 

would not lie on behalf of DHS in his own homicide case in which 

Jerry was convicted of murdering his niece by beating her to 

death. [Appellant] presented mere speculation without 

evidentiary support. Additionally, trial counsel could not have 

interviewed any of the DHS workers involved in Jerry Chambers’s

unrelated homicide of his niece because [Appellant] was not a 

party to its investigation and DHS’s work is confidential. On top 
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of that, any evidence involving the homicide trial or investigation 

of [Appellant’s] brother would not have been admissible at trial in 

this case because it is completely irrelevant. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/29/19, at 7-8 (citations and unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). 

As the PCRA court observed, Appellant has not shown that any of these 

witnesses were available and willing to testify, or that if their testimony was 

admitted, it would have been helpful to the defense. A review of his pro se 

and amended petitions also reveals that he has never provided certifications 

for these witnesses, despite requesting an evidentiary hearing.3 Nonetheless, 

Appellant argues that J.C.2 and Mia Granger’s testimony “would have been 

beneficial” to his defense. See Appellant’s brief at 24. However, he does not 

name any DHS witnesses or proffer what this alleged testimony might have 

revealed. Further, without certifications pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1), 

he would not have been able to call these witnesses to testify at an evidentiary 

hearing even if they were available and willing to testify. Accordingly, we find 

____________________________________________

3

In order to call witnesses at a PCRA hearing, a petitioner must first submit 

witness certification forms prior to the hearing. More specifically, the PCRA 

requires:

Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition 

shall include a signed certification as to each intended witness 

stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance 

of testimony. Failure to substantially comply with the 

requirements of this paragraph shall render the proposed 

witness’s testimony inadmissible.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(d)(1).
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that the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant 

had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective. Accord Snead, 

supra.

Next, Appellant alleges that he has uncovered evidence that exonerates 

him. See Appellant’s brief at 28-31. In order to obtain relief on an afterdiscovered evidence claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) the 

evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained 

at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not 

cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it 

would likely compel a different verdict. See Commonwealth v. 

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 595-96 (Pa. 2007).

By way of background, the investigation that led to the charges against 

Appellant arose from an interview of J.C. by a homicide detective who was 

investigating Appellant’s brother Jerry. See N.T. Jury Trial, 12/6/04, at 36-

38; see also N.T. Jury Trial, 12/16/04, at 71-78. During the course of the 

interview, J.C. spontaneously volunteered that he had seen Appellant have 

sex with A.L. and A.R. The homicide unit passed this information on to the 

special victims unit, which sent a detective to interview A.L. at her elementary 

school. During the interview, A.L. disclosed that Appellant had sexually and

physically assaulted her and her sister, C.E. The detective than proceeded to 

interview C.E. and A.R. separately. Both of them confirmed that they were 

sexually assaulted by Appellant. Additionally, A.R. confirmed that Appellant 
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was the father of her baby, which DNA testing later corroborated. At trial, 

J.C., A.L., C.E., and A.R. all testified about Appellant’s sexual and physical 

abuse. 

Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim is derived from a letter that 

J.C. wrote to Appellant’s brother, Jerry Chambers, recanting a statement that 

he made in Jerry Chambers’ separate trial for murder. In the letter, J.C. states 

that he never saw his uncle physically assault anyone, but was enticed to lie 

by agents of the Commonwealth with promises of a better life. See

Appellant’s brief at 29. However, J.C. does not recant his eyewitness accounts 

of Appellant’s sexual assaults of A.L. and A.R. While Appellant acknowledges 

that this letter does not reference or concern his case, he nonetheless argues

that because J.C. was the “most important witness for the Commonwealth” in 

his trial and this letter “proves the point that his son was told to lie in general,” 

it would have provided powerful impeachment evidence in his own case. Id. 

at 27, 30. 

The Commonwealth counters that Appellant has not uncovered new 

evidence. Instead, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellant has only 

provided “speculation” that his son may have testified inaccurately at trial. 

See Commonwealth’s brief at 18. Even if this letter is considered evidence, 

the Commonwealth argues that Appellant has failed to show that it would be 

used for anything more than impeachment. Id. The PCRA court agreed, 

finding that Appellant had failed to adequately develop this claim, and that 
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the evidence against him was so overwhelming that this impeachment 

testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/29/19, at 11-12. We concur. 

Appellant’s claim is frivolous and deficiently pled. Importantly, 

Appellant concedes that J.C. does not even refer to Appellant’s case in the 

letter. See Appellant’s brief at 30. Simply put, an unsworn letter recanting 

testimony in a different case, does not constitute a recantation in this case. 

Furthermore, Appellant plainly states that he seeks to use this evidence solely 

for the purposes of impeachment. Id. Even if Appellant had presented 

recantation testimony relevant to this case - which he did not do - his 

challenge still would have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Moore, 633 A.2d 1119, 1136 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting witness’s statement 

against penal interest as reliable after-discovered evidence, where sole 

purpose of statement was to impeach testimony connecting defendant to 

crime). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s 

determination that Appellant’s claim failed to meet the after-discovered 

evidence requirements. No relief is due. 

In his third claim, Appellant lists eleven instances of alleged 

prosecutorial misconduct by referring to eleven exhibits. See Appellant’s brief 

at 31-32. However, these exhibits were not attached to Appellant’s PCRA 

petition, and he has not included them in any submissions to this Court. While 

Appellant has detailed what each exhibit prospectively contains, he has not 
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offered any explanation as to how any of these exhibits amounts to

prosecutorial misconduct, or why copies of this documentation were never 

adduced. Consequently, the PCRA court found these claims were waived, both

as “completely undeveloped” and because Appellant did not litigate these 

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/29/19, at 10. We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claims 

are insufficiently pled; hence, they cannot succeed and dismissal without a 

hearing was appropriate.

In order to succeed on a prosecutorial misconduct claim, Appellant must 

prove that the prosecutor’s misconduct violated a constitutionally or 

statutorily protected right, such as the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 

compulsory self-incrimination or the Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial. 

See Commonwealth v. Burno, 94. A.3d 956, 974 (Pa. 2012). In order “[t]o 

constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of

sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair 

trial. The touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the 

prosecutor.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 97 (Pa. 2012) (internal 

citations omitted).

Here, Appellant has alleged that prosecutorial misconduct occurred and 

listed multiple exhibits to support his contentions. However, he has not 

offered any analysis identifying the precise misconduct, or connected that 

alleged misfeasance to his list of exhibits. As such, Appellant’s deficient 
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pleading has deprived us of the ability to discern what his specific allegations 

are and we are unable to meaningfully review his claim. Therefore, he has 

failed to convince us that the PCRA court erred when it dismissed this claim 

as waived.

In his final allegation of error, Appellant argues that the PCRA court 

wrongly denied his request for an evidentiary hearing. See Appellant’s brief 

at 18-19. Without any elaboration, he asserts that he was entitled to an 

evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. We 

are unpersuaded by Appellant’s boilerplate allegation.

It is well-settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary 

hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the 

record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not 

necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

In order “to obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition 

without a hearing, an appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of 

fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that 

the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” 

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).

Appellant has done nothing to refute the PCRA court’s conclusion that a 

PCRA hearing was unnecessary. See Commonwealth v. Watkins, 108 A.3d 

692, 735 (Pa. 2014) (concluding that if an appellant makes no attempt to 

identify specifically the “legitimate material factual disputes” that he alleges 
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warranted a hearing, as well as develop relevant argument, his “claim of PCRA 

court procedural error cannot succeed”); see also Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 290 (Pa. 2006) (rejecting an appellant’s assertion that 

his other claims warranted a hearing when he failed both to identify and argue 

with specificity what factual issues remained in contention).

Accordingly, we cannot find that the PCRA court’s denial of an 

evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion. See Hanible, supra at 452-

53 (“Appellant has failed to satisfy [his] burden as his reliance on speculation 

and failure to assert facts, which, if believed, would support his claim cannot 

be equated with a genuine issue concerning a material fact that warrants an 

evidentiary hearing”). As such, no relief is due on this claim. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/2020