alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1



# CASE NO. 01 -15-00396-CV

IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

___________________________________________

John W. Hankins

v.

Sarah T. Harris

_______________________________________

On Appeal from the 333rd Judicial District Court

of Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2014

– 01360

________________________________________

A PPELLANT ’ S N OTICE OF A PPEARANCE AND

D ESIGNATION OF L EAD A PPELLATE C OUNSEL

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

Under T EXAS R ULE OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE 6.1(c), please note that

Sean Michael Reagan is now lead appellate counsel for Appellant, John W.

Hankins. Please send all further communications relating to this appeal

addressed to Mr. Reagan ’s attention at Leyh, Payne & Mallia, PLLC, 9545

Katy Freeway, Suite 200, Houston, Texas 77024, or via email addressed to

sreagan@lpmfirm.com

. ACCEPTED

01-15-00396-CV

FIRST COURT OF APPEALS

HOUSTON, TEXAS

7/9/2015 11:21:31 PM

CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERK2 Respectfully submitted,

LEYH, PAYNE & MALLIA, PLLC

By : /s/ Sean M. Reagan

Sean Michael Reagan

sreagan@lpmfirm.com

Texas Bar No. 24046689

9545 Katy Freeway, Suite 200

Houston, Texas 77024

Telephone: 713

- 785

- 0881

Facsimile: 713

- 784

- 0884

ATTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been served

to all interested parties of record on July 9, 2015 as follows:

Brian B. Kilpatrick Via Email

H. Fred Cook Via Email

W i lson , Cribbs & Goren, P.C.

2500 Fannin Street

Houston, Texas 77002

Jarrett L. Ellzey Via Email

W. C raft Hughes Via Email

H u ghes Ellzey , L.L.P.

2700 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 1120

Galleria Tower I

Houston, Texas 77056

Hartley Hampton Via Email

H ampton & K

ing

3 Riverway, Suite 910

Houston, Texas 770563

William Feldman Via Email

Michael J. Mazzone Via Email

Michael T. Powell Via Email

Robert Carlton Via Email

Haynes & Boone , LLP

1221 McKinney Street, Suite 2100

Houston, Texas 77010

- 2007

/s/ Sean M. Reagan

Sean M. Reagan
DAVIS v. The STATE.

A16A1650

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 25, 2018

Amy Lee Ihrig, Robert Lawrence Persse, Statesboro, for Appellant.

Margaret Heap, Greg M. McConnell, Lyndsey Hurst Rudder, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Dillard, Chief Judge.

In *State v. Davis* ,1 the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that we lacked jurisdiction to consider this case because it addresses a constitutional question of first impression, and, therefore, our decision in *Davis v. State*2 is a nullity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated that decision; decided the merits of the appeal as if the case had been properly transferred; and remanded the case to this Court with direction that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the remittitur be transmitted with the Supreme Court's opinion.

*Judgment reversed.*

Reese and Bethel, JJ., concur.

1

303 Ga. 684, 689 (1), 814 S.E.2d 701 (2018).

2

340 Ga. App. 652, 798 S.E.2d 474 (2017).
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

#### **CERTIFICATIONS**

 

I. John B. Wadsworth, certify that:

 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of BlueRidge Paper Products Inc. (the “registrant”);

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

 

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

 

(b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

 

(c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the caseof an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,based on our most recent evaluation of internal  control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

 

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

(b) any fraud, whether or not material,that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date:  August 15, 2005

 
| ** **                     | **/S/  JOHN  B. WADSWORTH** | ** ** |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------|
| John B. Wadsworth              |
| Chief  Financial Officer       |
| (Principal  Financial Officer) |

 

----
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-22-00682-CR

NO. 03-22-00686-CR

In re Jason Eric Lenderman

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM BELL COUNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Jason Eric Lenderman pleaded guilty on October 17, 2022 to 

possession of methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams. 

See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(d). He has not yet been sentenced. He has filed two 

applications for writ of habeas corpus contending that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel during the plea proceedings, that his guilty plea was involuntary, that his due process 

rights were violated, that the trial court “simply ignored” his motion to suppress, and that

evidence in the case has been “severely tainted.” He asks that we “remove” his guilty plea, order 

an evidentiary hearing, and allow him to proceed to trial. 

“The Texas Constitution grants courts of appeals original jurisdiction only where 

specifically prescribed by law.” Ex parte Braswell, 630 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. App.—Waco

2021, no pet.); see Tex. Const. art. V, § 6. Our original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas 

corpus is limited to those cases where a person’s liberty is restrained because the person has 

violated an order, judgment, or decree entered in a civil case. Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(d); 
2

In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364 n.3 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). Consequently, we lack 

original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters.1 Braswell, 630 S.W.3d at 601–02; 

Queen v. State, 212 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); see Chavez v. State, 

132 S.W.3d 509, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“A court of appeals does

not have original habeas corpus jurisdiction in felony cases.”); Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833, 

835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (“The courts of appeals have no original habeas 

corpus jurisdiction in criminal matters; their jurisdiction is appellate only.”).

Accordingly, we dismiss the proceedings for want of jurisdiction.2

__________________________________________

Edward Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith

Filed: December 23, 2022

Do Not Publish

1 “Only the Court of Criminal Appeals possesses the authority to grant relief in a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding where there is a final felony conviction.” Padieu v. Court

of Appeals of Texas., Fifth Dist., 392 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding)

(quoting Ex parte Alexander, 685 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see Tex. Code Crim. 

Proc. art. 11.07 § 3 (providing that post-conviction applications for writs of habeas corpus, for 

felony cases in which death penalty was not assessed, must be filed in court of original 

conviction and made returnable to CCA).

2 In addition, all pending motions are dismissed as moot.
#### Roy J. MARSH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 2D03-1589.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Aug. 27, 2003.

COVINGTON, Judge.

Roy J. Marsh challenges the summary denial of his motion for postconviction DNA testing filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In 1987, a jury found Marsh guilty of sexual battery, engaging a child in sexual activity, and incest. In his motion, Marsh sought DNA testing of all the physical evidence that was gathered during the investigation of this case. The trial court concluded that the motion was facially sufficient and ordered the State to respond to Marsh’s motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853(c)(2). The State responded by pointing out that, according to the investigating law enforce*946ment agency, it did not have custody of any evidence in the case. The State further claimed that it “has ascertained that no physical evidence suitable for DNA testing was submitted at trial.” As proof of this, the State attached the individual evidence listing for these cases. Based on this response, the trial court denied Marsh’s motion without an evidentiary hearing finding that no physical evidence containing DNA existed.

Where a defendant claims that DNA evidence exists, but the State denies the claim, a factual dispute results and an evidentiary hearing is required. *Borland v. State,*848 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Because in this case the State’s response created a factual dispute, the trial court should have conducted a hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing on Marsh’s motion.

Reversed and remanded.

WHATLEY and CANADY, JJ., Concur.
STATE of North Carolina v. Armond DEVEGA

No. 48P18

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 7, 2018

Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Devega, Armond.

Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender.

Mary Carla Babb, Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney Generals, N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant on the 20th of February 2018 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question *859filed by the State of NC, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of June 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 20th of February 2018 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of June 2018."
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

**ANSWERS CORPORATION**

**FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 2008**

**PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**

 

I am the Chief Executive Officerof Answers Corporation, a Delaware corporation (the “Company”). I am deliveringthis certificate in connection with the Form 10-Q of the Company for thequarter ended March 31, 2008 and filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission (“Form 10-Q”).

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Ihereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Form 10-Q fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Qfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 
|   | Date: May 12, 2008   |   |
|--------|---------------------------|--------|
|   |                      |
|   | /s/ ROBERT S. ROSENSCHEIN |
|   |                      |
|   | Robert S. Rosenschein     |
|   | Chief Executive Officer   |

 

----
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on September 15, 2004, pursuant to section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), American College of Surgeons (“ACS”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission Disclosing (1) the name and principal place of business of the standards development organization and (2) the nature and scope of its standards development activities. The notifications were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances.                

Pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act, the name and principal place of business of the standards development organization is: American College of Surgeons, Chicago, IL. The nature and scope of ACS's standards development activities are: Fellowship requirements; statements and guidelines on surgery, surgery practice and surgeon conduct; trauma guidelines, evaluation, management and education relating to trauma; and cancer standards, evaluation, management and education relating to cancer.

Dorothy B. Fountain, 

Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 05-1970  Filed 2-1-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
# Official Journal L 302/2019

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 302 |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 6222 November 2019 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 302

English edition

Legislation

Volume 6222 November 2019

---

| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | RULES OF PROCEDURE |
| | | European Parliament |
| | * | Rules of Procedure — 9th parliamentary term — July 2019 | 1 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

RULES OF PROCEDURE

European Parliament

*

Rules of Procedure — 9th parliamentary term — July 2019

1

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

283 

KA 10-01962 

PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ETHAN MILLER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

TERRENCE BAXTER, BATH, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

JOHN C. TUNNEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATH, FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Steuben County Court (Joseph W.

Latham, J.), rendered April 28, 2010. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the second degree (two

counts) and falsifying business records in the first degree (two

counts). 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

following a jury trial of, inter alia, two counts of assault in the

second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2], [9]). Viewing the evidence in

light of the elements of the crimes as charged to the jury (see People

v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), and affording the appropriate deference

to the jury’s credibility determinations (see People v Hill, 74 AD3d

1782, 1782-1783, lv denied 15 NY3d 805), we reject defendant’s

contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see

generally People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Contrary to

defendant’s contention, scalding hot water constitutes a “dangerous

instrument” (§ 120.05 [2]; see People v Mableton, 17 AD3d 383, 383, lv

denied 4 NY3d 888; People v Cruz, 257 AD2d 664; People v Holden, 188

AD2d 757, 760, lv denied 81 NY2d 887), and the People were not

required to establish the precise temperature of the water or the

length of exposure that caused second degree immersion burns to the

feet and ankles of the child victim. 

Defendant further contends that County Court violated his

constitutional right to present a defense when it precluded him from

offering hearsay testimony regarding the fact that children of the

victim’s mother were previously removed from her custody and placed in

foster care (see generally Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302). 

That contention is not preserved for our review (see People v

Gonzalez, 54 NY2d 729, 730; People v Simmons, 283 AD2d 306, 306, lv

denied 96 NY2d 924) and, in any event, it is without merit inasmuch as
-2- 283 

KA 10-01962 

defendant made no effort to establish such fact by a means other than

inadmissible hearsay. 

Entered: March 23, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
ccni_ex101.htm


EXHIBIT 10.1


 



May 17, 2013


 







 


TO: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS


        COMMAND CENTER, INC.












For personal reasons, I hereby resign as Chief Financial Officer and as an employee of Command Center, Inc., effective immediately.  I confirm for you that I have no disagreement on any matter relating to the Company’s operations, policies or practices.







I wish you all the best in the future.












Sincerely,







 /s/ Dan Jackson
Exhibit 10.23

 

MethylGene Inc.

 

December 18, 2008

 

Dr. Jeffrey M. Besterman

41 Gray Cresent

Baie D’Urfé, Québec

H9X 3V3

 

Re:                             Employment Agreement Originally dated as of January 1, 1999, as amended and restated between Dr. Jeffrey M. Besterman and MethylGene Inc.

 

Dear Mr. Besterman:

 

This letter agreement (the “Letter Agreement”) is being entered into for the purpose of amending and clarifying the terms of your employment agreement (the “Agreement”) with MethylGene Inc. (the “Company”).  Capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings given to them in the Agreement.

 

1.             Amendment and Clarification.  Section 4.3 of the Agreement currently provides that if you are terminated by the Company without Cause, the Company will pay immediately to you a lump sum payment as set forth in such provision.  This Letter Agreement clarifies that the Company may delay making this payment to you, with your consent, to such time as you agree, provided, however, that the payment is made no later than two and one half months following your entitlement to the payment, or such other time as permitted to be received by you without incurring an excise tax under § 409A of the Internal Revenue code of 1986, as amended.

 

2.             Survival.  Except as expressly amended hereby, the Agreement as in effect on the date hereof shall remain and continue in full force and effect and is hereby confirmed in all respect.

 

3.             Binding Effect.  This Letter Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall inure to the benefit of, the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns as set forth in the Agreement.

 

4.             Execution in Counterparts.  This Letter Agreement (x) may be executed in counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all of which shall constitute one and the same instrument and (y) by facsimile signature (which shall be deemed an original for all purposes).

 

5.             Governing Law.  This Letter Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of Quebec.

 











 

	
 
    	
 
    	
METHLYGENE   INC.
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
By:
    	
/s/   Raymond C. Egan
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Name:
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    	
Title:
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
ACKNOWLEDGED   ACCEPTED AND AGREED
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
to   as of the day and year first above written
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
/s/   Jeffrey M. Besterman
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
Dr. Jeffrey   M. Besterman
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Mem o r a ndum Opinion filed August 3 , 2023.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14 - 23 - 00502 - CV

IN RE KELSEY - SEBOLD MEDICAL GROUP, P . L . L . C . AND DEEPALI PATNI, M . D . , Relator s
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS 164th District Court Har ris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020 - 79130



### MEMORANDUM OPINION On July 18, 2023 , relator s Kelsey

- Sebold Medical Group, P

. L
. L
. C

. and Deepali Patni, M

. D
. filed a petition for writ of m andamus in this Court. See Tex. Gov’t Co de Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the petition, relator s ask this Court to compel the Honorable C. Elliott Thornton, presiding judge of the 164th District Court of Harris County , to vacate the trial court ’ s June 2, 2023 order2 denying rela t ors ’ tra ditional and no

- evidence summary jud gment motion on plaintiff ’ s info rmed consent claim

. Relator s ha ve not established that t he y are entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny relator s ’ petition for writ of m andamus.
PER CURI AM Panel c onsists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Zimmerer and Poissant.