NOT PRECEDENTIAL U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E T H IRD C IR C U IT

No. 09-3051

UN I TE D ST AT ES O F AM ERI CA

v. DANI ELEARLEYSTER, a/k/a Da niel Ey ster

DA NI EL EA RL EY STE R, Appellant On Appea l from the United States District Court fo r t he Ea ste rn

Di str ic t of

Pe nn sylva

nia District Court No. 5-08-c r-00618- 001 District J udg e: The H onorable J ames Knoll Ga rdner

Submit ted Pursuant to Third Circuit L .A.R. 34.1(a)

J une 21, 2010 Be fore : SMI TH, F I SHER, and COWEN, Circuit Judges

(F iled: J uly

14, 2010)

OPI NI ON

SMI TH , Circuit Judge. Daniel Ey ster plea ded guilty to one count of sex ual ex ploitation of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e ), and one count of possession of c hild pornog raphy , in violation of 18 U. S.C. § 22 52 (a )( 4) (B ). Th e Di str ic t Court se nte nc e d him to 84 0 months in pr iso n. Ey ste r a pp e a lsT he D i s t r i ct C our t had j ur i s di ct i on under 18 U

. S. C

. § 3231. W e have 1 ju ri s d ic tio n u n d e r 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 9 1 a n d 1 8 U .S .C . § 3 7 4 2 (a ). 2 thi s se nte nc e . We wi ll a ff ir m. 1 Ey ster first a

rgues that he is e ntitled to re- sentenc ing beca use the Pre-Sente nce I

nvestig ation Re po rt (“ PSR” ), wh ic h th e Di str ic t Co ur t a do pte d a

nd us e d a s th e sta

rt ingpo int

in d e te rm ini nghis sentenc e, conta ined an e rror . We acc ept his premise but re ject his conc lusion. T h e P S R d et erm i n edth atE y s t er ’s T o t al Of fe n s e Lev el wa s 4 1 , an d

E y s t er d o es n o tch al l en ge this conclusion. I t assigne d Ey ster to cr iminal h i s t o ry C at egory V, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, based on i ts d e termination that Ey ster had a prior “se x offe nse convic tion”—specific ally , a 1988 ra pe conviction under the Uniform Code of Military J ustice (“ UCMJ ”). U sing the se inputs, the Probation Offic e ca lculated his Guidelines r ang e to be 360 months to life. The P SR not ed, howe ver, that the statutes Ey ster admitted to violating in his g uilty plea provided for no more than 70 y ear s in prison. Th e re fo re , it

se t Ey ste r’ s adv iso ry Gu ide lin e s rang e at 360 to 8 40 months . E y ste r d id n ot o bje c t to any of these c alculations. As noted, t he District Court adopted the PSRand sente nced E y ster to 840

months in pr iso n. I f t

he PSR h a d n ot c ounte d th e 19 88 mil ita ry c onvic tio n a s a

pr ior “ se x off e ns e conviction” f

or purpose s of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, that pr ovision would have bee n inapplicable to Ey ster, and he would have be en assig ned to cr iminal hist ory Categ ory I Irathe r than Categ ory

V. Under

that

s ce n ar i o , E y s t er ’s Gu i d el i n es ra n ge wo u l d h av e b ee n 3 6 0 t o 8 4 0 m o n th s

— ex ac t l y th e s am e r an ge g ener ated by

applying § 4B 1.5. On appe al, Ey ster ar gues that the District Court er red by incre asinghis criminal history from Categ ory I Ito Categ ory

V, bec ause his 1988 conviction under the UCMJ was not a qua lifying pr ior “sex offense conviction” a s defined by § 4B1.5. Ey ster did not object to the P SR calculation in the District Court. There fore , we r eview f or plain er ror. See U

nited States v. Knight , 266 F.3d 203, 207-I n K night , we h e ld th a t “a n e rro r in a p p lica tio n o f th e G u id e lin e s th a t re su lts in 2 us e of a hi gher s ent enci ng r ange s houl d be pr es um ed t o aff ect t he def

endant ’ s s ubs t ant i al r i ght s . ” 266 F. 3d at 207. E y s t er does not r el y on K night , and w i t h good r eas on. H er e, t he er r oneous appl i cat i on of § 4B 1. 5 di d not gener at e “a hi gher s ent enci ng r ange. ” Rat he r , i t y i e l de d t he s a me G ui de l i ne s r a ng e t ha t w ou l d h a ve r e s ul t e d h a d t he PSR co rrectl y assig n ed E y ster t o crim inal h ist o ry C ateg o ry II. 3 08 (3d Cir. 2001). Unde r this standard, Ey ster must establish (1) that a n err or wa s committed, (2) that the er

ror wa s plain, i.e. , clea

r or obvious, (3) that the er ror a ffe cted his substanti al ri g hts, and (4) that the e rror

seriously aff ecte d the fa irness or integrity of the proc eeding s. Id. The Gove rnment

c o n c e des, and w e agree , that Ey ster’s 1988 c onviction under the U CMJ was not a qualifying “ sex offense c onviction” for pur pos es o f § 4 B1 .5. There fore , Ey ster’s a dvisory Gui delines ra

ng e should have been c alculate d using c riminal history Categ ory I I , not Categ ory

V. This was er

ror, a nd we a ssume for pr esent purpose s that it was “cle ar or o b v i o u s.” See id. As explained, however , the applica ble Guidelines ra

ng e wa s t h e s am e— 360 to 840 months—under either c riminal history

Categ ory . Be cause this mi stake did not resul t i n t h e ca lculation of an inc or re c t G uid e lin e s r ang e , w e c on c lud e that it did no t a ff e c t E y ste r’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts

. 2 Next, Ey ster ar g ues that the District Court er red by failing to c onsider his argument, based

on Kimbrough v. United States , 552 U. S. 8 5 ( 20 07 ), that he de se rv e d a do wnwa rd va ri anc e be c a

us e the applica

ble child pornog raphy

Guidelines ar e base d upon cong ressional mandates and not empirica l evidence develope d by the SentencingCommi ssion. This argument is forec losed by United States v. Lopez-Re yes , 589 F.3d 667, 671 ( 3d Cir. 2009) , i n whi ch we held that “a district court is not requi re dto eng ag e in ‘indepe ndent ana ly sis’ of the empiric al justifications and deliberative undertakings that led to a par ticu l ar Gu i d eli ne.” Id. (c i t i n g Un ite d S tates v . A gu ila rHu e rta , 576 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009) , and Un ite d States v. D ua rte , 569 F.3d 528, 530 ( 5th Cir. 2009)).4

Finally , Ey s te r

a r g u e s th a t his 840-month sentence is substantively unrea sonable. To suc cee d

on thi s c la im, Ey ste r m

us t e sta bli shthat “ no re a so na

ble se nte nc ing c ourt ” c ou ld have se nte nc e d h im to 840 months i n prison for the r easons the Di s t ri ct C o urt provided. United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 568 ( 3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) . After car efully consideringthe re cord, the sentenc ing f actor s of 18 U.S. C. § 35 53(a ), and the Di str ic t Co ur

t’ s e xpla natio n o f s e nte nc e , w e have no dif fi c ult y in concludingthat Ey ster’s se ntence is reasona ble. The judg ment will be aff irmed.