J-S17005-22

2022 PA Super 146

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

DERRICK RUFFIN

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1913 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 20, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004553-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2022

The Commonwealth appeals from the August 20, 2021 order granting 

Derrick Ruffin’s (“Appellee”) pre-trial motion to suppress evidence recovered 

during a traffic stop. Specifically, the Commonwealth challenges the 

suppression court’s ruling that probable cause did not support a traffic stop 

for a violation of Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code concerning an obscured 

registration plate. Upon careful review, we agree and reverse.

The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. At 6:12 p.m. on 

April 21, 2021, Police Officer Knud Kristensen conducted a traffic stop in the 

5700 block of Warrington Avenue in Philadelphia. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 8/13/21, at 6-7, 22-23, 25. Officer Kristensen initiated the stop due 

to a partially obstructed registration plate. Specifically, the frame encircling 

the plate prevented the officer from viewing the information on the bottom of 
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the plate, i.e., the state tourism website. Id. at 7, 15-16. The frame did not 

obstruct the alphanumerical registration designation. Id. at 15-16. 

Officer Kristensen observed five occupants in the vehicle. He noticed

that Appellee, the front-seat passenger, made furtive movements that 

indicated Appellee had concealed something nearby on the seat. Due to the 

nature of the traffic stop, Officer Kristensen conducted a protective sweep of 

the front seat of the car, which revealed a loaded revolver underneath a 

sweatshirt where Appellee had been sitting. Id. at 7-8, 11-13. The police 

subsequently recovered additional rounds of ammunition from Appellee’s 

pants pocket. Id. at 8-9. After discovering the firearm, Officer Kristensen

learned that the vehicle was not registered, and the driver did not have a valid 

driver’s license. Id. at 12. Similarly, Appellee did not have a valid permit to 

carry the firearm. Id. at 27.

Appellee was charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited 

person, carrying a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on public 

streets or public property in Philadelphia, and possession of marijuana. He

filed a motion to suppress physical evidence asserting, inter alia, that the stop, 

search, and seizure occurred in violation of his rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 8 and 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. See Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence, 

7/27/21, at ¶¶ 3(a)-(b), (d). 

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony 

of Officer Kristensen, and the parties stipulated to the testimony of other 
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police officers involved in the traffic stop. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

8/13/21, at 6-29. Appellee argued that there was no basis for the vehicle

stop because the officer could read the number on the registration plate and 

there was no question as to which state had issued the plate. Id. at 29-31. 

The court deferred a ruling on the suppression motion to allow counsel to file 

briefs responding to the issue concerning the legality of the vehicle stop. Id.

at 31-33, 35, 39-40. After reviewing the submissions, the court granted 

Appellee’s motion to suppress on the basis that there was “no reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause to pull over [the vehicle] because of the obscured 

website.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/20/21, at 3. The court noted that, 

“[i]t is certainly something [the] Commonwealth might want to appeal to get 

further information.” Id. at 4. The Commonwealth timely filed a notice of 

appeal and a statement of issues presented pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

1

 

The Commonwealth presents the following question for our review: “Did 

the lower court err by suppressing a gun found as a result of a lawful traffic 

stop for a Vehicle Code violation?”2 Commonwealth’s brief at 3. 

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1

In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified that the suppression

court’s suppression order would terminate or substantially handicap the 

prosecution of its case. See Notice of Appeal, 9/15/21, at 1. See also

Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (”In a criminal case, under the circumstances provided by 

law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right from an order that 

does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice 

of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the 

prosecution.”).

2 Appellee declined to file a brief. 
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We begin our consideration of the Commonwealth’s issue mindful of the 

applicable legal principles. Our standard of review in this context is wellestablished:

[We] consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses 

together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in 

the context of the . . . record, remains uncontradicted. The 

suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the 

record supports those findings.[3] The suppression court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate court, 

whose duty is to determine if the suppression court properly 

applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016). Thus, 

“[o]ur standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record 

supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de 

novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Id. at 253.

When a police officer initiates a traffic stop of a vehicle, the stop 

constitutes a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and 

activates constitutional protections against unreasonable seizures and 

detentions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996). 

Generally, a traffic stop must be supported by sufficient facts to provide an 

officer with reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle or driver was in 

violation of a provision of the Vehicle Code. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). 

However, a stop based on reasonable suspicion under § 6308(b) must “serve 

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3 Our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record of the pre-trial 

hearing on the suppression motion. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (2013). 
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an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation.” 

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285. 1291 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc); 

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa.Super. 2015). Therefore, 

in circumstances where the violation is such that it requires no additional 

investigation, the officer must possess probable cause before initiating the 

traffic stop. Feczko, supra at 1291.

Here, it is uncontradicted that Officer Kristensen stopped the vehicle 

solely for an obscured license plate in violation of § 1332(b) of the Vehicle 

Code. In particular, Officer Kristensen credibly testified that he could view the 

alphanumerical characters on the registration plate, but he had difficulty 

seeing the website.4 See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/13/21, at 14; see also

See Suppression Court Opinion, 11/12/21, at 2, (citing N.T. Suppression 

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4 A standard registration plate currently issued by the Pennsylvania 

Department of Transportation includes an alphanumerical combination below 

the name of the Commonwealth and above the Uniform Resource Locator 

(“URL”) for the Commonwealth’s official tourism website as in this sample 

plate displayed on the Department of Transportation’s website:

See https://www.dmv.pa.gov/VEHICLE-SERVICES/Registration%20Plates

/Standard-Issue-License-Plate/Pages/standard-license-plates.aspx (accessed 

on July 28, 2022).
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Hearing, 8/13/21, at 39) (finding that Officer Kristensen credibly testified as 

to the basis for the stop). 

Section § 1332(b) prohibits the display of an obscured registration plate 

on a vehicle as follows:

(b) Obscuring plate.--It is unlawful to display on any vehicle 

a registration plate which:

(1) is so dirty as to prevent the reading of the numbers or 

letters thereon at a reasonable distance;

(2) is obscured in any manner which inhibits the proper 

operation of an automated red light enforcement system in 

place pursuant to section 3116 (relating to automated red 

light enforcement systems in first class cities) or 3117 

(relating to automated red light enforcement systems in 

certain municipalities) or any other automated enforcement 

system authorized by this title or an electronic toll collection 

system as authorized under 74 Pa.C.S. § 8117 (relating to 

electronic toll collection);

(3) is otherwise illegible at a reasonable distance or is 

obscured in any manner; or

(4) is obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed in a manner 

which inhibits the visibility of the issuing jurisdiction at a 

reasonable distance.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1332 (emphasis added).

Plainly, investigation beyond the officer’s initial observations would have 

provided no additional information to Officer Kristensen as to whether a 

violation of § 1332(b) occurred. Consequently, he was required to possess 

probable cause before initiating the traffic stop based on this violation. See

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 755 (Pa. Super. 2015) (referring 

to a violation of § 1332(b)(3) as a “non-investigable” offense). Probable cause 
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is established where, from a reasonable distance, characters on a registration 

plate are illegible or the plate is at least partially obscured. See Salter, supra

at 993-94 (concluding that the officer had probable cause to stop Salter’s 

vehicle where officer could not see its registration plate from a reasonable 

distance). 

After reviewing § 1332(b), the suppression court found that Officer 

Kristensen did not have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop because 

§ 1332(b) did not prohibit an obstruction that shielded only the state tourism 

website on a registration plate. See Suppression Court Opinion, 11/12/21, at 

4-5. Instead, it found that § 1332(b) pertained only to the obstruction of the 

issuing authority and the identification number. Since both of these items 

were visible at a reasonable distance, the court found that Officer Kristensen

lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 8/20/21, at 3. 

The Commonwealth argues that the registration plate on the vehicle

transporting Appellee was at least partially obscured, and therefore was 

adequate to sustain a violation of § 1332(b)(3), permitting the traffic stop

effectuated by Officer Kristensen. See Commonwealth’s brief at 8-14. The 

Commonwealth posits that this case “involves a straightforward matter of 

statutory interpretation.” Id. at 8. 

With no disputed facts, the resolution of this appeal indeed turns on the 

meaning of phrase “obscured in any manner” as used in § 1332(b)(3), and 
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whether it encompasses the entirety of the plate or merely the issuing 

authority and vehicle-specific information. While this Court has previously 

addressed situations where the characters of a registration plate number were 

obscured by mud or where a tinted cover darkened the registration plate 

entirely, we have yet to define the phrase “obscured in any manner.

5 Thus,

we must resolve the novel question before us through application of the rules 

of statutory interpretation.

In interpreting a statute, we are guided by the Statutory Construction 

Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. “The object of all interpretation and 

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the 

General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “The plain language of the statute 

is the best indicator of the legislature’s intent. To ascertain the plain meaning, 

we consider the operative statutory language in context and give words and 

phrases their common and approved usage.” Commonwealth v. 

Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa. 2021). “When the words 

of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be 

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5 See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 111 A.3d 747, 755 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

holding probable cause existed to effectuate a lawful traffic stop for a violation 

of § 1332(b)(3) where the defendant’s “license plate cover was obscured and 

illegible from a reasonable distance” due to “a partially tinted license plate 

cover”); Commonwealth v. Wilbert, 858 A.2d 1247, 1250 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(holding traffic stop was legal pursuant to § 1332(b)(1) where the officer was 

unable to discern the characters on the vehicle’s license plate until “after she 

had gotten out of her vehicle and inspected [the] plate” because it was 

“obscured by mud”). 
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disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). 

This Court must give effect and ascribe meaning to each word and provision 

chosen by our legislature, assuming none is mere surplusage. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 734 (Pa. 2020) (“Some 

meaning must be ascribed to every word in a statute . . . and there is a 

presumption that disfavors interpreting language as mere surplusage.”); 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1921(a) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect 

to all its provisions.”). 

We further note that Vehicle Code provisions such as § 1332 that permit 

the imposition of fines are penal in nature, and thus must be strictly construed. 

See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1) (identifying “penal provisions” among the 

enumerated classes of statutes that “shall be strictly construed”); see also

Commonwealth v. Henderson 663 A.2d 728, 733 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en 

banc) (providing that provisions of the Vehicle Code which impose fines are 

penal in nature and must be strictly construed). However, “this principle does 

not require that our Court give the words of a statute their narrowest possible 

meaning, nor does it override the general principle that the words of a statute 

must be construed according to their common and approved usage.” 

Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (cleaned up). 

With these principles in mind, we again examine the language of the 

statute at issue:

It is unlawful to display on any vehicle a registration plate which:
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(1) is so dirty as to prevent the reading of the numbers or 

letters thereon at a reasonable distance;

(2) is obscured in any manner which inhibits the proper 

operation of an automated red light enforcement system in 

place pursuant to section 3116 (relating to automated red 

light enforcement systems in first class cities) or 3117 

(relating to automated red light enforcement systems in 

certain municipalities) or any other automated enforcement 

system authorized by this title or an electronic toll collection 

system as authorized under 74 Pa.C.S. § 8117 (relating to 

electronic toll collection);

(3) is otherwise illegible at a reasonable distance or is 

obscured in any manner; or

(4) is obscured, covered or otherwise obstructed in a manner 

which inhibits the visibility of the issuing jurisdiction at a 

reasonable distance.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1332.

By its terms, subsection (b)(1) targets dirt and grime concealing the 

numbers and letters on a plate. Subsection (b)(2) is focused on interference 

with the ability of automated enforcement systems to obtain identification 

information from the plate. Subsection (b)(4) is concerned with any 

obstruction to the visibility of the issuing jurisdiction. However, in subsection 

(b)(3), our General Assembly forbids “any manner” of obstruction of the 

registration plate without limiting reference to the issuing jurisdiction or 

identifying numbers and letters. 

The suppression court highlighted the references to specific information 

on the registration plate conclude that “it is the issuing authority and the 

identification number which are required to be visible at all times.” 
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Suppression Court Opinion, 11/12/21, at 5. The court noted that, unlike these 

components, the statute does not specifically reference the website and notes 

that specialized “custom and affinity plates” issued by the Department of 

Transportation do not include the state tourism website. Id. at 4-5. Hence, 

the suppression court elevated the information concerning the issuing 

jurisdiction and the alphanumerical characters to essential elements of the 

registration plate while relegating the information concerning the state 

tourism website to a non-essential element completely outside the ambit of 

§ 1332(b).

In so doing, the suppression court failed to give effect to the plain 

meaning of all of the words of the statute. The General Assembly knew how 

to indicate the importance of the visibility of only the issuing authority and the 

alphanumerical designation on the plate by so stating subsections (b)(1), 

(b)(2), and (b)(4). Yet, in subsection (b)(3) it used the catch-all word 

“otherwise” to prohibit “any manner” of obscuring of “a registration plate.” 

The word “any” in this form means “unmeasured or unlimited in amount, 

number, or extent” or “to any extent or degree.” https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/any (accessed on July 28, 2022). To limit subsection 

(b)(3)’s scope to only select portions of the registration plate both contradicts 

the broad language chosen by our legislature and relegates subsection (b) to 

mere surplusage of the other sections which already prohibit the obstruction 

of those portions. 
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Furthermore, if the suppression court’s interpretation were correct, and 

§ 1132(b)(3) required only the issuing authority and the alphanumerical 

designation to be visible at all times, then the General Assembly would have 

deleted the catch-all “obscured in any manner” provision of subsection (b)(3) 

after the Department of Transportation began including the state tourism 

website URL on the standard registration plates in 2003. Since the addition 

of the state tourism website on the Commonwealth’s standard registration 

plate, § 1332 has been amended on four occasions, but the “obscured in any 

manner” language has remained intact.6 

Our legislature’s intent for subsection (b)(3) to have a broader reach 

than the other provisions of § 1132(b) is further supported by its decision to 

make a subsection (b)(3) violation a mere summary offense that incurs a 

lesser fine than violations of the subsections that relate to the obstruction of 

the alphanumerical designation and issuing authority. Compare 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1332(c) (establishing, violations of subsections (b)(2) and (b)(4) are 

punishable by a fine of $100), with 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(a) (establishing, 

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6 The original version of the statute that became effective in 1977 did not have 

separate subsections under section (b). Section (b) originally consisted of the 

terms now separately included in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(3). Various 

subsections have been added over a series of amendments that culminated 

with the latest amendment, effective in 2017, which added, inter alia, the 

present subsection (b)(4), and included a reference to subsection (b)(4) in 

the penalty provision in section (c).
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summary violations of the Vehicle Code for which a penalty is not specified 

are punishable by a fine of $25). 

For the above reasons, we hold that § 1132(b)(3) unambiguously 

prohibits the obstruction or concealment of any portion of a registration plate, 

including the address to our commonwealth’s tourism website.7 While we 

appreciate Appellee’s position that § 1332 should be limited to the elements 

of a registration plate that are actually pertinent to the identification of a 

vehicle’s registration, that interpretation does not comport with a plain reading 

of the statute. As § 1332(b)(3) unambiguously pertains to any partial 

covering of a Pennsylvania license plate, we may not disregard the letter of 

the law “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).

Accordingly, the obstruction of the URL for the Commonwealth’s tourism 

website on the registration plate of the vehicle in which Appellee was riding 

as a passenger constituted a violation of the Vehicle Code and subjected the 

operator to a traffic stop for the purposes of enforcing the $25 fine under 

§ 1332(b)(3). Hence, the suppression court erred in concluding that Officer 

Kristensen lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop based on a 

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7 Our interpretation is consistent with the conclusion reached by the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See United States v. Ha Ngo, 

451 Fed.Appx. 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (agreeing with a district court’s finding 

of a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332(b)(3) where a “registration plate was 

obstructed around the outmost portion of the tag, making the top portion of 

the tag difficult to read”). 
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violation of § 1332(b). We, therefore, reverse the order granting Appellee’s 

suppression motion and remand for further proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2022