UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Pl aintiff - Appellee,

v. TIMOTHY EDMUN JOHNSON, a/k/a Timothy Edmund Johnson, De fendant - Appellant. No. 17-6228 (D.C. No. 5:16- CR-00239-HE-1) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH, MURPHY, and MORITZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ This appeal involves a challeng e to a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The sentence enhancemen t was applied to Mr. Timothy Johnson after a convicti on for possessing a firearm following a felony conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The Armed Career Criminal Act created a minimu m sentence of fifteen years if Mr. Johnson had three

* The parties have not requested oral argument, and we conclude that oral argument would not ma terially aid our consid eration of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). Thus, we have decided the appeal based on the briefs. Our order and judgment does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be ci ted for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 2, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug of fense, or both, committed on occasions different from one anothe r.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Mr. Johnson had multiple felony convictions in his past. Two of them were for distributing cocai ne base and possessing co caine base with intent to distribute. See Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401( A)(1). Mr. Johnson argues that these prior offenses

 did not qualify as serious drug offenses and

 had been committed on the same occasion. The district court rejected these ar guments and sentenced Mr. Johnson to fifteen years in pr ison. We affirm. I. The prior convictions were for serious drug offenses. Mr. Johnson first contends that the two prior offenses did not constitute “serious drug offense[s]” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Classification as a “serious drug offe nse” involves statut ory interpretation, which we review de novo. United States v. Trent , 884 F.3d 985, 991 (10th Cir. 2018). The parties agree that

 the statute of convictio n is divisible and

 the modified categorical approach applies. Under the modified categorical appr oach, we identify the crimes of conviction and compare the elements of those crimes and their generic3 counterparts. United States v. Madkins , 866 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2017). The Oklahoma crimes were set out in a statute prohibiting individuals from transpor ting illicit drugs with th e intent to distribute them. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-401(A)(1). The federal definition of a “serious drug offense” is “an offense under State law, involvin g manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924( e)(2)(A)(ii). Mr. Johnson contends that the federal definition of “serious drug offense” does not encompass the transpor tation of drugs. We disagree. It is true that the federal defi nition does not include the word “transportation.” But the federal definition does use the term “possessing,” and “the transportation of drugs necessari ly implies thei r possession.” United States v. Svacina , 137 F.3d 1179, 1182 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Karam , 496 F.3d 1157, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Nor can there be any dispute that . . . [transporting] dr ugs intended for sale by the defendant . . . involve[s] posse ssion with intent to di stribute . . . .”). Mr. Johnson relies on United States v. McKibbon , 878 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Madkins , 866 F.3d 1136 ( 10th Cir. 2017). In these opinions, we applied the sentencing guidelines ’ definition of a controlled-substance offense, holding that this definition did not cover offers to sell drugs. McKibbon , 878 F.3d at 972-73; Madkins , 866 F.3d at4 1145, 1147-48. But th e Oklahoma statute does not include offers to sell. This difference matters: Someone can offer to sell drugs without being guilty of an attempted sale, 1 but it is impossible to transport drugs without possessing them. McKibbon and Madkins involved statutes of conviction broader than their guideline counterp arts; here, however, the statute of conviction is not broader than its c ounterpart in the Armed Career Criminal Act. In light of this difference, McKibbon and Madkins lack any bearing on the present issue. We therefore conclude that

 transportation of drug s with intent to di stribute is a crime “involving . . . possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute” and

 the Oklahoma crime does not extend beyond the federal definition of a “serious drug offense.” II. Mr. Johnson’s prior conviction s were for distinct offenses. Mr. Johnson also contends that the two prior offenses were committed on the same occasion. This contention is ba sed on the Armed Career Criminal Act, wh ich counts prior convictio ns only if the underlying crimes were committed on different occasions. 18 U.S. C. § 924(e)(1). In reviewing this contention, we engage in de novo review. United States v. Delossantos , 680 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Ci r. 2012). This review

1 See Madkins , 866 F.3d at 1147 (“[B]ecause a pe rson can offer a controlled substance for sale without having the intent to actually complete the sale, a conviction for an offer to sell can be broader than a conviction for an attempt to sell.”).5 calls for us to consider how the two offenses un folded. One af ternoon, at about 4:20 p.m., an und ercover investigator met with Mr. Johnson and asked to buy an ounce of crack cocaine. Mr. J ohnson did not have an ounce, but he did have three grams and sold them to the investigator. Mr. Johnson also told the investigator how much an ounce would cost and agreed to call when a full ounce became available. Th e sale of three grams led to Mr. Johnson’s conviction for distributing cocaine base. The next day, at 7:15 p.m., officers found thir teen grams of cocaine base in Mr. Johnson’s vehi cle. Discovery of the dr ugs led to Mr. Johnson’s conviction for possessing cocaine ba se with intent to distribute. Mr. Johnson argues that thes e two incidents involved the “continuation of a single drug deal, ne gotiated at the sa me time, between the same parties.” Appell ant’s Opening Br. at 24. The two crimes were separated by little more th an a day and were relate d in the sense that Mr. Johnson and the investigator had disc ussed a future drug purchase during the initial transaction. Nonetheless, the two of fenses were distinct. Two offenses are “committed on occasions different from one another” when they are “committe d at distinct, different times.” United States v. Johnson , 130 F.3d 1420, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the defend ant decided to continue with a criminal course of conduct after “a meaningful opportu nity” to st op, the crimes will be6 considered distinct. United States v. Delossantos , 680 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012). The crimes remain distinct even when the incidents take place in a short time span. Fo r example, in United States v. Delossantos , we approved of a Fourth Circuit opinion holding th at two sales of crack cocaine were distinct even though they had involved the same buye r at the same location within a two-hour time span. See id. (discussing United States v. Letterlough , 63 F.3d 332, 334, 337 (4th Cir. 1995)). And we have considered the crimes di stinct when a de fendant successively burgled three businesses in the same shopp ing mall on a single night. United States v. Tisdale , 921 F.2d 1095, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1990). Under these opinions, Mr. Johnson’s two prior offenses were distinct because

 they took place at “distinct, differ ent times” and

 Mr. Johnson had “a meaningful opportuni ty” to stop his criminal course of conduct af ter selling three grams to the undercover investigator. Johnson , 130 F.3d at 1431 (interna l quotation marks omitted); Delossantos , 680 F.3d at 1220. The crim es remain distinct even though they had been committed on consecutive days and a future drug sa le had been discussed at the first drug transaction. See United States v. Brown , 706 F. App’x 474, 476 (10th Cir. 2017) ( unpublished) (rejecting the argument that “convictions arising from repeat sales of controlled substances, the7 subsequent sales of which are the direct result of the first sale, should be treated as the same offense” (i nternal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Mr. Johnson’s two prior offenses were “committed on occasions different from one another” under th e Armed Career Criminal Act. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). III. Conclusion We conclude that Mr. Johnson’s two prior drug offenses

 were “serious dr ug offense[s]” and

 took place on diffe rent occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Accord ingly, the district court did not err and we affirm the sentence.

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge