[Cite as Jackson v. Huppert, 2012-Ohio-2934.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97764 

CORNELIA JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

STEFAN HUPPERT

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court 

Case No. CV-750623 

 BEFORE: Blackmon, A.J., Jones, J., and Keough, J. 

 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 28, 2012
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

David A. Bressman 

Law Office of David A. Bressman 

4230 Tuller Road 

Suite 101 

Dublin, Ohio 43017 

Michael D. Falleur 

1625 Bethel Road 

Suite 205 

Columbus, Ohio 43220 

Kimberly S. Wells 

P.O. Box 701 

Blacklick, Ohio 43004 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Shawn W. Schlesinger 

Koeth, Rice & Leo Co., L.P.A. 

1280 West Third St., 3rd Floor 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.: 

{¶1} Appellant Cornelia Jackson, Administrator, (“Jackson”) appeals the trial 

court’s granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Stefan Huppert. Jackson assigns 

the following two errors for our review: 

I. Ohio Law, and public policy, do not allow the defendant to assist 

Rochelle Hooks in committing suicide. The trial court’s decision 

granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment allows for one to 

assist another in ending a life without liability. In this case, defendant 

owed a duty to Rochelle Hooks to not assist her in committing suicide 

because he knew that such was her intention, he provided her with 

counseling about it, and then drove Rochelle to Edgewater Park where 

she died. The law and facts are such that the case should have been 

heard by a jury.

II. The trial court incorrectly granted defendant’s motion to strike 

certain exhibits attached in plaintiff’s reply to the motion for summary 

judgment when each exhibit was admissible.

 Facts

{¶2} On September 7, 2007, Rochelle Hooks (“Hooks”) was pronounced dead 

after committing suicide by drowning herself at Edgewater Park the evening before. She 

was 36 years old. 
{¶3} In 2000, Hooks was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis (“MS”). Because of 

the symptoms of MS, Hooks became increasingly disabled. In 2005, she could not walk 

without a walker. In 2007, her condition worsened to the point she could no longer 

supervise and care for her teenage sons, who went to live with Hooks’s mother, Cornelia 

Jackson. Hooks never said she was depressed, but her family could tell that she was 

depressed at times. Her medical records also indicated she was suffering from 

depression. 

{¶4} Huppert first met Hooks on August 28, 2007, which was ten days prior to her 

suicide. He worked as a driver for Diversified Transportation, which provides 

transportation for disabled people to and from medical appointments. Huppert was also 

an ordained Lutheran minister who worked as a substitute pastor. 

{¶5} On August 28, 2007 and September 3, 2007, Huppert drove Hooks to and 

from her physical therapy appointments. Huppert stated that although Hooks walked 

slowly, she was able to walk down the front stairs with her walker. While driving Hooks 

to and from her medical appointments, Huppert and Hooks engaged in casual 

conversations about Hooks’s health and family. During the first transport, Hooks was in 

a lot of pain after her therapy and told Huppert that a couple of times in the past she had 

thought about ending her life. She also expressed excitement, however, regarding 

upcoming events with her teenage sons. Therefore, Huppert believed Hooks’s suicidal 

thoughts were past feelings. Hooks also discussed the isolation she felt from her family 
and sadness over the fact that her mother had to raise Hooks’s sons because Hooks was 

unable to care for them. 

{¶6} The second time that Huppert transported Hooks, she expressed fear of being 

placed in a nursing home. She was told that she could no longer live in her Section 8 

rental home because her sons no longer lived with her. She, however, seemed “more 

upbeat” on the way home from her appointment. Hooks told Huppert that she liked 

talking to him because she felt he did not judge her and asked him for his telephone 

number. Huppert gave it to her because he felt bad that she did not seem to be receiving 

emotional support from her family. According to Huppert, he never offered Hooks 

spiritual counseling, but merely listened to her. 

{¶7} On September 6, 2007, Huppert worked the 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift at 

Diversified Transportation. At around 12:30 p.m. Huppert received a call from Hooks. 

She asked if Huppert would come over after work to talk. Huppert agreed because he 

felt sorry for her. 

{¶8} After his shift ended, Huppert drove his private car to Hooks’s house. 

Shortly after he arrived, Hooks stated she wanted to go for a drive to the lake to “get 

some lake air.” The hour prior to them leaving, Hooks made a sandwich for herself and 

received treatment from her home health aide. According to Huppert, there was nothing 

about her behavior that would alert him to her pending suicide. In fact, even Hooks’s 

mother testified that she had spoken with Hooks on the telephone that day around 4:30 
p.m., and Hooks had expressed excitement about seeing her sons play football the next 

day. 

{¶9} Around 7:15 p.m., Huppert and Hooks arrived at Edgewater Park. Huppert 

parked near the pier so that Hooks would not have far to walk. They sat for the next 

hour on a bench on the pier. They mostly talked about Hooks’s sons and how proud of 

them she was. Hooks also expressed disappointment regarding the fact her sons lived 

with her mother. According to Huppert, Hooks did not mention that she wanted to 

commit suicide. 

{¶10} At approximately 8:10 p.m., Huppert received a call on his cellular phone, 

which he had left in his car parked a short distance away. He walked to the car and 

talked on the phone with a co-worker for a few minutes and used his asthma inhaler. 

When Huppert turned around to return to Hooks, he saw her walking with her walker 

towards the edge of the pier, which was a short distance from the bench. Because of 

how Hooks was positioned, leaning towards the edge of the pier, Huppert stated that it 

appeared that she was planning on going into the water. Huppert immediately tried to 

stop Hooks from entering the water by grabbing her wrist, but Hooks responded “Don’t 

try and stop me. I have to do this.” Hooks yanked her wrist away and swung her walker 

towards him as she entered the water. She did not resurface and because of the distance 

from the pier to the water, Huppert could not reach her. Huppert immediately called 911. 

 Eventually the Coast Guard responded to the scene and removed Hooks’s body from the 

lake. She was removed from life support the following day. 
{¶11} Jackson refused to believe that her daughter committed suicide. Because of 

Jackson’s continued complaints to the police that her daughter did not commit suicide, the 

police asked Huppert to take a polygraph test. He agreed to take the test and passed. 

Criminal charges have never been filed against Huppert. 

{¶12} On March 10, 2011, Jackson filed a complaint against Huppert alleging a 

claim for wrongful death. 1

 Huppert answered the complaint and filed a motion for 

summary judgment, which Jackson opposed. The trial court granted the summary 

judgment without opinion. 

Motion for Summary Judgment

{¶13} In her first assigned error, Jackson argues the trial court erred by granting 

summary judgment in favor of Huppert. 

{¶14} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of 

review. Baiko v. Mays, 140 Ohio App.3d 1, 746 N.E.2d 618 (8th Dist.2000), citing

Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987); N.E. Ohio 

Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 121 Ohio App.3d 188, 699 N.E.2d 534 (8th 

Dist.1997). Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision and 

independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. 

Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when: (1) no genuine issue as to any 

material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as 

 1

Jackson had originally filed a complaint on September 8, 2009. Following 

discovery, however, she voluntarily dismissed her complaint without prejudiced on 

April 5, 2010. 
a matter of law, and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving 

party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse to the non-moving 

party. 

{¶15} Jackson contends that summary judgment was improperly granted to 

Huppert because he had a special relationship with Hooks; therefore, as a matter of law, 

he had a duty to prevent Hooks from harming herself. 

{¶16} To maintain a wrongful death action on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff 

must show three elements: a duty owed to the decedent, a breach of that duty, and 

proximate causation between the breach of duty and the death. Littleton v. Good 

Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 92, 529 N.E.2d 449 (1988), citing 

Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St.2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 213, paragraph one of the 

syllabus (1966). Generally, under Ohio Law there is no duty to act to prevent harm to a 

person. Littleton at 92. An exception to this general rule arises when a special 

relationship exists between the actor and the person. Id. “Such a ‘special relationship’ 

exists when one takes charge of a person whom he knows or should know is likely to 

cause bodily harm to others [or self] if not controlled.” Id. An example of a “special 

relationship” is the parent-child relationship, where a parent may be held liable in certain 

situations for the minor child’s wrongful act. Huston v. Konieczny, 52 Ohio St.3d 214, 

556 N.E.2d 505 (1990). Medical providers may also have a “special relationship” with 

their patients. Douglass v. Salem Comm. Hosp., 153 Ohio App.3d 350, 794 N.E.2d 107 

(7th Dist.2003). 
{¶17} No special relationship existed between Huppert and Hooks at the time of 

the incident. That night, Huppert was not driving Hooks to a medical appointment. 

Instead, Huppert was off-duty when he met with Hooks as a social friend. Although 

Hooks had medical problems there was no evidence that she suffered from any mental 

infirmities. She was a fully functional adult except for the physical symptoms she 

suffered from the MS. Because there was no special relationship beyond friendship 

between Hooks and Huppert, Huppert did not have a duty to protect Hooks from harming 

herself. 

{¶18} Even if there was a special relationship, there is no evidence that Huppert 

aided Hooks in committing suicide. Although Huppert took Hooks to Edgewater Park, 

he stated Hooks was the one who chose to go to the lake. She told Huppert that she 

wanted to go to the lake to get “some lake air.” She did not mention her intention to 

commit suicide. Hooks walked unassisted to the edge of the pier while Huppert was 

standing beside his car with his back turned. When he saw what she was about to do, he 

ran towards her and attempted to grab her wrist, but Hooks twisted away and told him “to 

leave her alone” and that “she had to do this.” When Hooks went into the water, she 

never resurfaced, and due to the distance from the pier to the water below, Huppert could 

not reach her. He immediately called 911. Therefore, the evidence indicates that when 

Hooks’s intentions became clear to Huppert, he attempted to stop her from succeeding. 

{¶19} There was also no evidence that Huppert could have foreseen Hooks’s 

suicide. In Thomas v. Parma, 88 Ohio App.3d 523, 624 N.E.2d 337 (8th Dist.1993), a 
prisoner committed suicide while in police custody, resulting in the family suing the city. 

After reviewing the facts, we held that there was “no evidence in the record that the 

officers had any reason to believe that the decedent posed a risk of suicide. Since the 

suicide was not foreseeable, we view it as an intervening force for which appellees cannot 

be held responsible.” Id. at 531. 

{¶20} Likewise, in Schoenfield v. Navarre, 164 Ohio App.3d 571, 

2005-Ohio-6407, 843 N.E.2d 234 (6th Dist.), a prisoner committed suicide while in 

custody. In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Sixth District 

observed that prior to the suicide the prisoner was upset because of marital problems; but 

he appeared calm and rational and did not exhibit any signs he intended to harm himself. 

The court held that “although [the prisoner’s] suicide was very tragic, nothing in the 

record demonstrates obvious signs of what his intentions were or that the police failed to 

act appropriately under the circumstances presented.” Id. at 578. 

{¶21} Here, Hooks had previously told Huppert that she had thoughts of suicide in 

the past; she never told Huppert that she had present thoughts of committing suicide. 

Also, after mentioning her past intentions, Hooks mentioned her excitement regarding 

future events with her sons. In fact, while Huppert sat with Hooks on the pier, Hooks 

expressed excitement regarding watching her son play football the next day. Thus, while 

Hooks’s suicide is tragic, there is no evidence that Huppert could have anticipated her 

intention to end her life. 
{¶22} Jackson also contends that Huppert had provided officers with conflicting 

facts regarding what had occurred. However, this information is contained in the police 

reports, which were stricken from the record. Additionally, the inconsistencies are not 

sufficiently material to have changed the outcome of the trial court’s decision. 

Accordingly, Jackson’s first assigned error is overruled. 

Motion to Strike Exhibits

{¶23} In her second assigned error, Jackson argues the trial court erred by granting 

Huppert’s motion to strike exhibits attached to her motion in opposition to summary 

judgment. The stricken exhibits included unauthenticated police reports, an affidavit and 

email from the Coroner, Erica Armstrong, Huppert’s pro se answer from the first case, 

and an unauthenticated map and directions. 

{¶24} A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is within its sound 

discretion and will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion. 

Abernethy v. Abernethy, 8th Dist. No. 81675, 2003-Ohio-1528, at ¶ 7. 

{¶25} Civ.R. 56(C) provides an exclusive list of materials that a trial court may 

consider when deciding a motion for summary judgment. Those materials are 

“pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, 

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C). The court may 

consider documents that are not expressly mentioned in Civ.R. 56(C) if those documents 

are accompanied by a personal certification that they are genuine and are incorporated by 

reference in a properly framed affidavit pursuant to Civ.R. 56(E). Drawl v. Cornicelli, 
124 Ohio App.3d 562, 569, 706 N.E.2d 849 (11th Dist.1997), citing Martin v. Cent. Ohio 

Trans. Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 89, 590 N.E.2d 411 (10th Dist.1990). 

{¶26} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the police reports 

because they are not listed as documents to be considered under Civ.R. 56(C). The 

police reports could have been admissible if they were properly authenticated by an 

affidavit. However, because Jackson failed to file an affidavit the reports were 

unauthenticated and not admissible. See Stevenson v. Prettyman, 193 Ohio App.3d 234, 

2011-Ohio-718, 951 N.E.2d 794, ¶ 25-28 (8th Dist.). 

{¶27} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking the coroner’s affidavit 

and email. The trial court had ordered expert reports to be produced no later than 

September 6, 2011. Jackson did not submit an expert report from the coroner. Instead, 

on November 1, 2011, she attached to her motion in opposition to summary judgment, an 

email exchange between the coroner and Jackson’s counsel. Such an email exchange is 

not an expert report. The coroner only responded to questions asked of her and did not 

detail how she came to her conclusions. Moreover, in the email, the coroner failed to 

state opinions to a reasonable degree of probability. Stinson v. England, 69 Ohio St.3d 

451, 1994-Ohio-35, 633 N.E.2d 532, paragraph one of syllabus. The coroner’s affidavit 

only detailed the coroner’s qualifications, which is irrelevant once the email was stricken. 

{¶28} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking Huppert’s pro se 

answer to Jackson’s prior complaint because Jackson voluntarily dismissed the complaint 

without prejudice. Once the original complaint was voluntarily dismissed without 
prejudice, it was as if the case was never filed. Lewis v. Fairview Hosp., 156 Ohio 

App.3d 387, 2004-Ohio-1108, 806 N.E.2d 185 (8th Dist.) Moreover, prior to the case 

being dismissed without prejudice, the trial court permitted Huppert to file an amended 

answer. An amended pleading acts as a substitute or replacement of the original 

pleading. Widder & Widder v. Kutnick, 113 Ohio App.3d 616, 622, 681 N.E.2d 977 (8th 

Dist.1996). 

{¶29} The trial court also properly struck the unauthenticated map and directions. 

These are not materials that are authorized under Civ.R. 56(C) to be considered in 

determining a motion for summary judgment; therefore, it was necessary that they be 

authenticated by affidavit. 

{¶30} Jackson also contends that Huppert’s counsel stipulated to the authenticity 

of the exhibits; however, there is no evidence of such a stipulation in the record. Even if 

the court erred in striking the exhibits, no prejudicial harm occurred. Jackson intended to 

include the police reports to show that Huppert gave inconsistent statements. However, 

none of the reports were written statements by Huppert, but were written by the officers. 

Also, the discrepancies were so minor that they would not have changed the outcome of 

the court’s decision. 

{¶31} Likewise, the inclusion of the coroner’s email would not have changed the 

outcome. Although the coroner did conclude that Hooks’s death was from “violence of 

an undetermined origin,” she explained that meant Hooks’s death was not from natural 

causes. She stated that she did not have sufficient information to classify the death as 
either homicide, accident, or suicide. The map and directions played no central role 

regarding the issues before the trial court; therefore, their exclusion also did not affect the 

trial court’s decision. Accordingly, Jackson’s second assigned error is overruled. 

{¶32} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant his costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR