alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4483 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4483

    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
  eligibility of certain additional programs for the National Science 
     Foundation competitive grant program for K-12 math, science, 
     engineering, and technology education, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 10, 2014

  Ms. Shea-Porter (for herself, Mr. Holt, Mr. Massie, and Ms. Kuster) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and in addition to the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for the 
  eligibility of certain additional programs for the National Science 
     Foundation competitive grant program for K-12 math, science, 
     engineering, and technology education, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``STEM Mentoring and Inspiration Act 
of 2014''.

SEC. 2. PROGRAMS ELIGIBLE FOR NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION COMPETITIVE 
              GRANT PROGRAM FOR K-12 MATH, SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND 
              TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION.

    Section 286(s)(4)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. 1356(s)(4)(B)) is amended--
            (1) by inserting after ``provide college preparatory 
        support'' the following: ``(including after-school support)''; 
        and
            (2) by inserting after ``careers in science, mathematics, 
        engineering, and technology;'' the following: ``support math, 
        science, engineering, and technology engagement programs that 
        incorporate self-directed student learning, inquiry-based 
        learning, cooperative learning in small groups, collaboration 
        with mentors in the field of study, and participation in 
        related competitions;''.
                                 <all>
```
EHMANN, et al. v. MEDFLOW, INC., et al.

433A17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 30, 2018

Mr. Matthew N. Leerberg, Raleigh, Attorney at Law, for Medflow, Inc., et al.

Mr. Harold C. Spears, Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Ehmann, Eugene K., et al.

Mr. Christopher P. Raab, Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Ehmann, Eugene K., et al.

Mr. C. Bailey King, Jr., Charlotte, Attorney at Law, for Medflow, Inc., et al.

The following order has been entered on the Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief filed on the 29th of May 2018 by Defendants:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 30th of May 2018."

Defendants shall have up to and including the 6th day of July 2018 to file and serve his/her brief with this Court.
STATE v. Tilmon Charles GOLPHIN

441A98-4

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

July 20, 2018

Mr. Jay H. Ferguson, Durham, Attorney at Law, for Golphin, Tilmon Charles

Mr. Kenneth J. Rose, Durham, Attorney at Law, for Golphin, Tilmon Charles

Ms. Danielle Marquis Elder, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Mr. Jonathan P. Babb, Raleigh, Special Counsel to Attorney General, for State of N.C.

Mr. James E. Williams, Jr., Carrboro, Attorney at Law, for N.C. Advocates for Justice

Mr. Grady Jessup, Attorney at Law, for N.C. Association of Black Lawyers

Ms. Lisa A. Bakale-Wise, Attorney at Law, for N.C. State Conference of the NAACP

Mr. Irving Joyner, Durham, Attorney at Law, for N.C. State Conference of the NAACP

Mr. Edward Joseph Blocher, Jr., Attorney at Law, for Social Scientists

Ms. Janet Moore, Attorney at Law, for National Assocation for Public Defense

Mr. Robert P. Mosteller, Attorney at Law, for Professors John Charles Boger & Robert P. Mosteller

Mr. Carlos E. Mahoney, Durham, Attorney at Law, for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Defense Fund, Inc.

Ms. Jin Hee Lee, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Defense Fund, Inc.

Mr. W. Kerrel Murray, Attorney at Law, Pro Hac Vice, for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Defense Fund, Inc.

Ms. Cynthia F. Adcock, Attorney at Law, for N.C. Council of Churches

Mr. Burton Craige, Raleigh, Attorney at Law, for N.C. Advocates for Justice

Mr. Jeremy M. Falcone, Raleigh, Attorney at Law, for Former State and Federal Prosecutors

Mr. William R. West, District Attorney, for State *687The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 17th of July 2018 by Former State and Federal Prosecutors to Not Require the Payment of Additional Pro Hac Vice Fees:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of July 2018."

Beasley, J. recused
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. RIVERA, et al.

245P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 17, 2017

Angel L. Rivera, Jennifer Lynn Wilson, for Wilson, Jennifer L. (aka Jennifer Wilson), et al.

Ashley H. Campbell, Raleigh, Rebecca F. Holljes, Attorneys at Law, for Bank of America, N.A.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of July 2017 by Defendant (Jennifer L. Wilson) to Withdraw Notice of Appeal and Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of August 2017."

Ervin, J. recused
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-7360

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MICHAEL LOVELL HINTON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Frederic N. Smalkin, District Judge. (CR89-434-S, CA-97-2900-S)

Submitted: April 16, 1998 Decided: April 20, 1998

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael Lovell Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Harvey Ellis Eisenberg,

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, although we grant leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, we deny a certificate of appealability

and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court.

United States v. Hinton, Nos. CR-89-434-S; CA-97-2900-S (D. Md.

Aug. 22, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

In fact, having carefully reviewed the record and Appellant's

brief, we conclude that Appellant's appeal is frivolous within the

meaning of Fed. R. App. P. 38. See e.g., Brock v. Angelone, 105

F.3d 952 (4th Cir. 1997). We therefore order Appellant to show

cause why sanctions should not be assessed against him.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 4.3


 


 


Consent of Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm


We consent
to the reference made to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Part B of the
Prospectus and to the use of our report dated May 14, 2013, in this Registration Statement (Form S-6 No. 333-187067) of Smart Trust,
Diversified Dividend Trust, Series 4.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


Grant
Thornton LLP


Chicago, Illinois


May 14, 2013
#### Jane B. Katz, Appellant-Respondent, v Anthony R. Katz, Respondent-Appellant. Cohen Goldstein & Silpe, L. L. P., Nonparty-Respondent-Appellant.

[719 NYS2d 586]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, (1) the plaintiff ap*455peals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Scancarelli, J.), entered December 14, 1999, as, *sua sponte,*imposed a sanction upon her counsel in the amount of $500 for failure to comply with a prior order of the same court dated October 13, 1999, (2) the nonparty, Cohen Goldstein & Silpe, L. L. P., cross-appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of the same order as, *sua sponte,*imposed a sanction upon it in the amount of $500 for its failure to comply with a prior order of the same court dated October 13, 1999, and (2) the defendant separately cross-appeals from the same order.

Ordered that the appeal by the plaintiff is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as she is not aggrieved by the portion of the order appealed from *(see,*CPLR 5511; *Scopelliti v Town of New Castle,*92 NY2d 944); and it is further,

Ordered that the cross appeal by the defendant is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, for failure to perfect the same in accordance with the rules of this Court *(see,*22 NYCRR 670.8 [e]); and it is further,

Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the nonparty’s notice of cross appeal is treated as an application by the nonparty, Cohen Goldstein & Silpe, L. L. P., for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted *(see,*CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from by the nonparty, without costs or disbursements, and the sanction imposed upon the nonparty-respondent-appellant is vacated.

The imposition of a sanction upon the nonparty-respondentappellant was not warranted, as it provided an acceptable excuse for failing to fully comply with the Supreme Court’s preliminary conference order dated October 13, 1999. In any event, it appears that the dates set by the Supreme Court for completion of discovery were not realistic. Moreover, the date set out in the preliminary conference order was for a compliance conference, not a trial readiness conference. Thus, it was improper to proceed as if the parties had failed to be ready for trial on a date certain. Under these circumstances, the conduct of the nonparty-respondent-appellant was clearly not frivolous, a waste of judicial resources, or without basis in law, and therefore it was error to impose a sanction upon it *(see, Sacca v Symbol Technologies,*270 AD2d 236; *Mancini v Mancini,*269 AD2d 366).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the respondent-appellant’s remaining contentions.

We note that the plaintiffs counsel did not file a notice of ap*456peal on its own behalf, and accordingly, we do not review the propriety of the Supreme Court’s imposition of a sanction upon that counsel *(see, Tartaglione v Tiffany,*275 AD2d 319). Krausman, J. P., Florio, Luciano and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
----

**EXHIBIT      32.1**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | (1) | The                  Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or                  15 (d) of                  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                  and |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   |   |
|--------|--------|--------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Partnership. |
|--------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | By:    | /s/                Freddie M. Kotek    |
|--------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|   | Name:  | Freddie                M. Kotek        |
|   | Title: | Chief                Executive Officer |
|   | Date:  | August                15, 2005         |
|   |   |                                   |

----
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-20-00205-CV

__________________

OBERHEIDEN LAW GROUP, PLLC, NICK OBERHEIDEN, 

OBERHEIDEN, P.C., AND OBERHEIDEN & MCMURREY, LP, Appellants

V.

CORROSION RESISTANT SOLUTIONS, INC., ET AL, Appellees

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 58th District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. A-202,825

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Oberheiden Law Group, PLLC, Nick Oberheiden, Oberheiden, P.C., and 

Oberheiden & McMurrey, LP, appellants, filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this

accelerated appeal with prejudice. When, as here, the appellants move to dismiss, 

the Court may dismiss the appeal “unless such disposition would prevent a party 

from seeking relief to which it would otherwise be entitled.” Tex. R. App. P. 
2

42.1(a)(1). On this record, the exception in Rule 42.1 does not apply. The Court 

grants the motion and dismisses the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).

APPEAL DISMSSED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on May 4, 2021

Opinion Delivered October 28, 2021 

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 32.2****CERTIFICATION OF CFO OF PERIODIC REPORT**     The undersigned, Mark E. Pape, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer ofAffirmative Insurance Holdings, Inc. (the “Company”), certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, to the best of his knowledge, that:(1) the Interim Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period endedSeptember 30, 2006 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirementsof Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company.Dated: November 9, 2006  /s/ Mark E. Pape     Mark E. Pape    Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer    (Principal Financial Officer)  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to theCompany and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.
STATE OF TEXAS

PENALTY FOR

PRIVATE USE

ANDRADE,

11/30/2015

NOELVALDEZ

On this day, the application for?

and presented to the Court.

NOEL VALDEZ At

WEST TEXAS ISF #857698

2002 LAMESA HWY

BROWNFIELD, TX 79316

ZIP 78701

02 W

0001401623DEC 01 2015

371$ 22B WR-44,017-06

JjHifabeas Corpus has been received

Abel Acosta, Clerk

>K

|.j.i.f-fiffi.j.|tJf-,.f|-J,J--11,f.f.f.11.if,|ff|, |.|,ic |fffff.r 43B 7S3i£
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-6506

JIMMY GALLISHAW, JR.,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN OF LEE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,

 Respondent - Appellee,

and

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

 Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Beaufort. 

Sherri A. Lydon, District Judge. (9:18-cv-03253-SAL)

Submitted: March 19, 2021 Decided: April 1, 2021

Before MOTZ, RICHARDSON, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jimmy Gallishaw, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jimmy Gallishaw, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on Gallishaw’s 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists could find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 

759, 773-74 (2017). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable and that 

the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Gonzalez v. 

Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gallishaw has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We deny Gallishaw’s motion to remand and dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________ 

No. 1D18-2666 

_____________________________ 

KENNETH NEWSOME, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellee. 

_____________________________ 

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County. 

Linda F. McCallum, Judge. 

February 8, 2019 

PER CURIAM. 

 AFFIRMED. 

ROWE, BILBREY, and KELSEY, JJ., concur. 

_____________________________ 

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331. 

_____________________________ 

Kenneth Newsome, pro se, Appellant. 
2 

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Kelvin THOMAS.

No. 2003-KH-2287.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Thomas, Kelvin; — Defendant; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 98313; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2003 KW 0951.

Denied.
STATE of North Carolina v. Nell Monette BALDWIN

No. 69P18-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 7, 2018

Monette Baldwin, for Baldwin, Monette

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of N.C.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Defendant on the 30th of April 2018 in this matter for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of June 2018."

Beasley, J. and Morgan, J., recused
STATE v. John Lewis WRAY, Jr.

382P10-8

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

Derrick Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, For State of North Carolina.

John L. Wray, Jr., For Wray, John Lewis, Jr.

Mike Miller, District Attorney, for the State.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 27th of November 2017 by Defendant to Proceed In Forma Pauperis:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."

Beasley, J. recused
STATE of North Carolina v. Vincent Linnell CHANCELLOR, Defendant.

No. COA16-993

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 19, 2017

DISMISSED.
Jacquelyn BROWN, Employee, Plaintiff, v. N.C. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION (MACON COUNTY SCHOOLS), Employer, Self-insured (Corvel Corporation, Third-party Administrator), Defendant.

No. COA17-276

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 7, 2017

AFFIRMED.
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 432 

To prohibit the further extension or establishment of national monuments 

in Nevada except by express authorization of Congress. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 29, 2013 

Mr. AMODEI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To prohibit the further extension or establishment of national 

monuments in Nevada except by express authorization 

of Congress. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON FURTHER EXTENSION OR ES4 TABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL MONUMENTS IN 

5 NEVADA. 

6 This proviso of the last sentence of the first section 

7 of the Act of September 14, 1950 (64 Stat. 849, chapter 

8 950; 16 U.S.C. 431a), is amended by inserting ‘‘or Ne9 vada’’ after ‘‘Wyoming’’. 

Æ 


jbell on DSK7SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
[Cite as State v. Gassaway, 2019-Ohio-688.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Respondent 

-vsFRANKLIN L. GASSAWAY 

 Petitioner 

JUDGES: 

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

Case No. CT2018-0073 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Writ of Procedendo 

JUDGMENT: Dismissed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 25, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Respondent For Petitioner 

D. MICHAEL HADDOX FRANKLIN GASSAWAY 

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY PRO SE 

GERALD V. ANDERSON II BELMONT CORR. INSTITUTION 

ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR 68518 Bannock Road 

27 North 5th Street, Suite 201 St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950 

Zanesville, Ohio 43701 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0073 2

Wise, John, J. 

{¶1} Petitioner Franklin Gassaway has filed a “Writ and Motion for Procedendo.” 

The State of Ohio has filed a motion to dismiss. Attached to the motion to dismiss is a 

copy of the order from the trial court denying Petitioner’s motion for transcript at state 

expense. 

{¶2} The crux of the petition is a request for this Court to order the Court of 

Common Pleas to provide Petitioner with copies of pleadings, as well as a transcript at 

state expense. 

{¶3} The caption of the petition before us lists the State of Ohio as the Plaintiff, 

and Franklin Gassaway as the Defendant. Gassaway is not the proper defendant in this 

case nor is the State of Ohio the Plaintiff. Petitioner has failed to name a proper 

respondent for an action which requests a writ of procedendo to issue. 

{¶4} The Supreme Court has noted, “The writ of procedendo is merely an order 

from a court of superior jurisdiction to one of inferior jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. 

It does not in any case attempt to control the inferior court as to what that judgment 

should be.” State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, *106, 12 N.E.2d 144, *149 

(1937). 

{¶5} A writ of procedendo is proper when a court has refused to enter judgment 

or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment. State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & 

Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 184, 652 N.E.2d 742 (1995). 

{¶6} In this case, Petitioner has not averred that the trial court has refused to 

enter judgment. 
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2018-0073 3

{¶7} Finally, Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A) 

which requires, “[a]t the time that an inmate commences a civil action or appeal against 

a government entity or employee, the inmate shall file with the court an affidavit that 

contains a description of each civil action or appeal of a civil action that the inmate has 

filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court.” 

{¶8} Because Petitioner was not named a proper plaintiff or defendant, has not 

alleged any facts which would support a claim in procedendo, and has not complied with 

the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A), the petition is dismissed. 

By: Wise, John, J. 

Hoffman, P. J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur. 

JWW/d 0122