### 2000 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d

S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

9-11-2000 

# P . v . Att or ne y Ge n ' l N

J

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al :

D ock e t 00-5244

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2000

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a

U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2000 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a

U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du

. 

### R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" P . v . Att or ney Ge n ' l N

J " (2000). 2000 D e cisio n s

. P a pe r 194.
h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w

. v i l l a no v a

. e du/thir dc ir c uit_2000/194Filed September 11, 2000

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 00-5244

PAUL P, (a minor, by Laura L, his legal guardian); QUINCY Q; RONALD R; STEVEN S, (a minor, by Sally S, his legal guardian), (all fictitious names), Indivi dually and as Representatives of a class pursuant to Fed.R.Civ .P.23 (a) and 23(b) (2)

v.

JOHN J. FARMER, JR.*, Attorney General New Jersey; JEFFREY S. BLITZ, Atlantic County Prosecutor; WILLI AM SCHMIDT, Bergen County Prosecutor; ROBERT D. BERNARDI*, Burlington County Prosecutor; LEE A. SOLOMON, Acting Camden County Prosecutor; DAVID E. BLAKER*, Cape May County Prosecutor; ARTHUR MARCHAND, Cumberland County Prosecutor; DONALD C. CAMPOLO*, Essex County Prosecutor; ANDREW YURICK, Gloucester County Prosecutor; FRED J. THEEMLING, JR.*, Hudson County Prosecutor; STEPHEN B. RUBIN, Hunterdon County Prosecutor; DANIEL G. GIAQUINTO*, Mercer County Prosecutor; GLENN E. BERMAN*, Middlesex County Prosecutor; JOHN KAYE, Monmouth County Prosecutor; JOHN B. DANGLER, Morris County Prosecutor; E. DAVID MILLARD*, Ocean County Prosecutor; RONALD S. FAVA, Passaic County Prosecut or; JOHN E. BERGH*, Salem County Prosecutor; WAYNE W. FORREST*, Somerset County Prosecutor; DOLORES M. BLACKBURN*, Sussex County Prosecutor; THOMAS V. MANAHAN*, Union County Prosecutor; JOHN G. LAKY,* Warren County Prosecutor,

PAUL P. and RONALD R., Appellants

* Amended Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2)ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 97-2919 District Judge: The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas

Argued: July 12, 2000

Before: BARRY and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER,* District Judge

(Opinion Filed: September 11, 2000)

Edward L. Barocas, Esquire (Argued) Michael Z. Buncher, Esquire
Office of Public Defender Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

P.O. Box 850 Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Attorneys for Appellants

John J. Farmer, Jr., Esquire (Argued) Rhonda S. Berliner-Gold, Esquire B. Stephan Finkel, Esquire Office of Attorney General of
New Jersey Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex

P.O. Box 80 Trenton, New Jersey 08625

Steven S. Sand, Esquire
Office of Prosecutor of Gloucester County

Broad & Hunter Streets

P.O. Box 623 Woodbury, NJ 08096

___________________________________________________ ______________

* The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

2Maureen O'Brien, Esquire

Office of Prosecutor of Union County County Administration Building Elizabeth, NJ 07207

Attorneys for Appellees

Robert J. Cleary, United States
Attorney George S. Leone, Assistant United States Attorney (Argued)

970 Broad Street

Room 700 Newark, New Jersey 07102

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General
Leonard Schaitman and Lowell Sturgill, Attorneys, Appellate Staff, United States Department of Justice,
Civil Division Room 9152, 601 "D" Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530

Attorneys for United States as Amicus-Curiae Supporting Appellees

OPINION OF THE COURT

BARRY, Circuit Judge.

For several years now, the District Court and this Court have been adjudicating appellants' various challeng es to the dissemination of sex offender notices in New Jersey under what has popularly become known as "Megan's Law." A s to one of those challenges, and alone among the Courts of Appeals which have considered Megan's Law cases, we found that sex offender notices implicate a nontriv ial privacy interest, albeit only with respect to one p iece of
information -- the home address of the offender. Th is litigation, however, now comes to an end, for we co nclude that appellees have shown, in the words of our prio r order of remand, that appellants' "interest in assuring t hat

3information is disclosed only to those who have a p articular

need for it has been accorded adequate protection" by the Attorney General Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender and Community Notification Laws (Mar. 2000) (the "New Guidelines" ). Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 406 (3d Cir. 1999) (" Paul P. I"). Accordingly, we will affirm.

I.

Megan's Law, so named for Megan Kanka, a little gir l who was sexually abused and murdered by a twice-convict ed sex offender, was enacted "to identify potential re cidivists and alert the public when necessary for the public safety." E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir. 1997 ). Given that laudatory goal, therefore, this case begins wi th the understanding and, indeed, the requirement that wha t might otherwise be private information be made publ ic.

As we set forth in great detail in Artway v. Attorn ey General, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996), Megan's Law "requires all persons who complete a sentence for c ertain designated crimes involving sexual assault after Me gan's Law was enacted to register with local law enforcem ent." Id. at 1243; see also N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-2."The registrant must provide the following information to the chief law enforcement officer of the municipality in which he [or she] resides: name, social security number, age, race, s ex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, addre ss of legal residence, address of any current temporary legal residence, and date and place of employment." Artwa y, 81 F.3d at 1243; see also N.J.S.A.S 2C:7-4b(1). Once t he information is provided by the sex offender, it is forwarded "to the Division of State Police, which incorporate s it into a central registry and notifies the prosecutor of the county in which the registrant plans to reside." Artway , 81 F.3d at 1243. At this stage, the information is not yet ava ilable to the public.

Once the information is received in the prosecutor' s office of the county in which the registrant plans to resi de, that office, in consultation with the prosecutor's offic e of the county in which the registrant was convicted, "dete rmine[s]

4whether the registrant poses a low, moderate, or hi gh risk

of reoffense. In making that determination, the pro secutor must consider the guidelines the Attorney General h as promulgated pursuant to the Act." Id. at 1244 (citi ng N.J.S.A. SS 2C:7-8d(1), 2C:7-8a to b). The law mand ates
that

[e]very registrant at least qualif[y] for Ti er 1 treatment, otherwise known as `law enforcement alert,' where notification extends only to law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the registrant. N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(1). In the case of those registrants posing a mo derate risk of reoffense, Tier 2 notification, or `law e nforcement, school and community organization alert,' is sues to registered schools, day care centers, summer camps, and other community organizations which care for children or provide support to women and whe re individuals are likely to encounter the sex offender. N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(2). The high risk registr ants merit Tier 3's `community notification,' where mem bers of the public likely to encounter the registrant ar e notified. N.J.S.A. S 2C:7-8c(3).

E.B., 119 F.3d at 1083. After a classification tier is determined, the prosecutor notifies the registrant of the proposed notification and he or she can then challe nge the classification through a pre-notification judicial review process in state court.

Appellants in this case "are Tier 2 and Tier 3 regi strants
who have been certified as a class and whose offens es were committed after the enactment of Megan's Law." Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 399. On June 16, 1997, appellants filed a class action complaint against the Attorney General of Ne w Jersey and all twenty-one county prosecutors (colle ctively, the "State defendants") alleging that Megan's Law v iolated their constitutional rights of privacy and due proc ess, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. After the filing of the complaint, however, this Court rejected most of the
same claims in E.B. v. Verniero. See 119 F.3d at 11 11. Pursuant to E.B., therefore, the District Court gra nted summary judgment to the State defendants on October 29, 1997. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961, 96 2-963 (D.N.J. 1997). With respect to the right to privacy claim, the

5Court held that the information did not fall "withi n the

`zones of privacy' protected under the Constitution ." Id. at
966.

On appeal to this Court, appellants raised only one issue: whether the dissemination of notices under Megan's Law violates their constitutional right to privacy. See Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 399. Specifically, appellants "argue[d] that the statutory requirement that the class members provid e extensive information to local law enforcement pers onnel, including each registrant's current biographical da ta, physical description, home address, place of employ ment, schooling, and a description and license plate numb er of the registrant's vehicle, and the subsequent commun ity
notification is a violation of their constitutional ly protected right to privacy." Id. at 398.

We rejected appellants' claim "[t]o the extent that

. . . [the] alleged injury stems from the disclosure of t heir sex offender status, alone or in conjunction with other information." Id. at 403. We explained that "the Di strict Court's opinion is in line with other cases in this court and elsewhere holding specifically that arrest records and related information are not protected by a right to privacy."

Id.

With respect to the disclosure of home addresses, however, we took a different position. As we explai ned:

The compilation of home addresses in widely available telephone directories might suggest a consen sus that these addresses are not considered private w ere it not for the fact that a significant number of pe rsons, ranging from public officials and performers to just ordinary folk, choose to list their telephon es privately, because they regard their home addresses to be private information. Indeed, their view is supported by decisions holding that home addresses are en titled to privacy under FOIA, which exempts from discl osure personal files `the disclosure of which woul d constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal p rivacy.'

Id. at 404 (quoting 5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(6)). We also noted that:

Plaintiffs' primary argument receives furthe r support from the New Jersey Supreme Court holding, r elying on

6FOIA cases, that `[t]he fact that plaintiff' s home address

may be publicly available' aside, privacy in terests were implicated by the disclosure of the home add ress along
with the other information.

Id. (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 83 (1995)). From these cases, we concluded that there is a "general understanding that home addresses are entitled to s ome privacy protection, whether or not so required by a statute." Id. We were, therefore, "unwilling to hold that abs ent a statute, a person's home address is never entitled to privacy protection," and instead accepted appellant s' claim
"that there is some nontrivial interest in one's ho me address by persons who do not wish it disclosed." I d.

Having accepted the argument that there was a priva cy interest, we proceeded to determine whether the information was nonetheless subject to disclosure i n light of a compelling governmental interest. See United S tates v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir . 1980) (holding that an individual's privacy interest is n ot absolute and, therefore, can be curtailed by some government al interests). Based on the governmental interest at s take in Megan's Law, we concluded that the privacy interest must give way:

The nature and significance of the state int erest served by Megan's Law was considered in E.B. There, we stated that the state interest, which we cha racterized as compelling, `would suffice to justify the deprivation even if a fundamental right of the registran t's were implicated.' E.B., 119 F.3d at 1104. Wefind no reason to disagree. The public interest in knowing where prior sex offenders live so that susceptible indiv iduals can be appropriately cautioned does not differ whet her the issue is the registrant's claim under the Do uble Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses, or is the registrant's claim to privacy. Thus, as the District Court concluded, the plaintiffs' privacy cla im based on
disclosure of information must fail.

Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 404.

In reaching our conclusion, we declined to address appellants' "evidence of recent incidents which hav e caused

7serious adverse consequences to" appellants and the ir

families. Id. at 406 (noting that appellantsfiled s everal motions "seeking to supplement the record"). 1 We r easoned that in light of our holding, "the material [was] n ot relevant
to a determination of the issue before us -- whethe r Megan's Law's notification provisions violate plain tiffs' constitutional right to privacy." Id. We recognized , however,

that

this court has previously held that `[t]he f act that protected information must be disclosed to a party who has a particular need for it . . . does not strip the information of its protection against disclo sure to those who have no similar need,' and we have requi red the government to implement adequate safeguards against unnecessary disclosure.

Id. (quoting Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 118 (3d Cir. 1987)). We
, therefore, remanded the case to the District Court so that it could "consider whether plaintiffs' interest in assuring that information is disclosed only to those who hav e a particular need for it has been accorded adequate protection in light of the information set forth in the
motions." Id.

On remand, appellants raised the following challeng es to the notification system:

(1) the Law lacks penalties to deter the una uthorized disclosure of information; (2) there is no u niform requirement that the registration process oc cur in a setting which protects the registrant's priv acy; (3) many
counties have inconsistent or unclear rules regarding
which school staff members are entitled to r eceive information concerning Tier 2 offenders; (4) not all counties deliver Tier 3 notices by hand to a n authorized adult; and (5) home addresses are included

___________________________________________________ ______________

1. Those incidents, provided in the record for our review, include the

loss of employment, forced eviction from residence, thre ats of physical harm, and gun shots being fired into a registrant's home following the
unauthorized dissemination of notification fliers t o the general public
and the media.

8in all Tier 2 notices and are disclosed to a ll notice

recipients despite the fact that this inform ation is not needed by all recipients.

Paul P. v. Farmer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 320, 322-23 (D.N. J. 2000) (footnotes omitted). The State defendants cou ntered, inter alia, by citing various sections of the then- in-place AG Guidelines "which caution against improper disclosu re of Megan's Law information." Id. at 323. The District Court noted, however, that appellants had "summarized for ty-five
incidents where confidential information released u nder Megan's Law was distributed to unauthorized persons " as well as "provided many equally glaring examples whe re Megan's Law notices were publicly disseminated." Id . at 324-25. The Court, therefore, rejected the State de fendants' suggestion that the Court should "overlook any defi ciencies in the current system in light of the compelling pu rposes served by the Act." Id. at 325. The Court explained that "the procedural safeguards contained within the Attorney General Guidelines are crucial to maintaining the constitutional balance between plaintiffs' privacy interests and the goals of the statute. If, in practice, thes e safeguards fail to limit the release of plaintiffs' home addresses to those persons with a statutorily defin ed need for this information, a different constitutional ba lance would result." Id. (citation omitted). The Court ob served

that

[a] system of distributing this information with zero `leakage' to unauthorized persons is, in rea lity, unattainable. However, the mandate for the A ttorney General is not to devise a perfect system, b ut one calculated to achieve the goals of the statu te without unreasonably impinging on the `nontrivial' p rivacy interests of the plaintiffs. The record befo re this Court shows that the current system fails to meet this standard. Currently, there is no uniform met hod of distribution which ensures that, in all twen ty-one counties, Megan's Law notices will be distri buted in a manner reasonably calculated to get the info rmation to those with `a particular need for it' while avoiding
`disclosure to those who have no similar nee d.'

9Id. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the Guideli nes be

redrafted. See id.

Along with its Opinion of January 24, 2000, the Dis trict Court issued an Order "enjoining the enforcement of Megan's Law until the Attorney General promulgates Guidelines which comply with the holding of this Co urt." Id. at 326. The Court, however, "temporarily suspended the enforcement of this injunction pending appeal to an d decision by the Third Circuit." Id. No appeal was p ursued at that time. Instead, the parties entered into a c onsent order allowing the State defendants until March 23, 2000 to promulgate new guidelines.

On March 23, 2000, the Attorney General issued the New Guidelines, certain discrete portions of which are the subject of this appeal. See App. at 76. As everyone
, including appellants, agrees, the Attorney General has gone to great lengths in the New Guidelines toward ensur ing uniform distribution of Megan's Law notices.

The New Guidelines call for two types of notices to be prepared for each registrant: "[1] an Unredacted No tice,
which includes all sex offender information without omission, and [2] a Redacted Notice, which omits th e specific street number of the offender's home and t he exact
street address and business name of the offender's employer." Id. at 102. "The Redacted Notice may inc lude the

street name and block number or nearest cross-stree t of the offender's residence and workplace, but . . .[i t] should not specify the exact street number or, if applicab le, unit number of a multi-dwelling, apartment, building or other
structure." Id. If the offender resides in "a motel or other residence which may be identified by name, the name may be disclosed [in a Redacted Notice] but the particu lar unit
or room number should be omitted." Id.

The New Guidelines mandate that only those individu als
who are entitled to an Unredacted Notice and who si gn a "receipt form" can receive the Unredacted Notice.2 The

___________________________________________________ ______________

2. Briefly summarized, under the New Guidelines, wh en a registrant is classified as a Tier 2 offender, notices are "provi ded to school and community organization personnel so that they can t ake all appropriate

10receipt form's language varies minimally depending on the

recipient. See id. at 153-55. With respect to schoo l principals and designated officials of community organizations, the recipient is informed "that the
information in the notification form is to be treat ed as confidential and may be shared only with appropriat e persons." App. at 153-54. By signing the form, the recipient agrees "to be bound by the terms of the Court Order which authorized the provision of notification . . . and. . . agree[s] to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court." Id. Wi th respect to parents and other individuals in the community w ho receive the form for Tier 3 registrants, they simil arly agree to: (1) "comply with the Order of the Court which a llows me to receive the sex offender information"; (2)"compl y with

___________________________________________________ ______________

steps to protect those children and others under th eir supervision." App. at 109. For schools, the principal signs the receip t form and receives an Unredacted and a Redacted Notice. The principal can then share the Unredacted Notice with other personnel if he or she feels there is a particular need to do so and if that other individu al also signs a receipt form. See id. at 113 (opining that "[t]he principal should share the
notice with any person who in the course of the duties of his or her employment . . . is regularly in a position to obse rve unauthorized persons on or near the property of the notified sch ool"). Alternatively,

the principal can distribute the Redacted Notice withou t the need to have the receipt form signed. A similar procedure is set for th for community organizations beginning with a "designated official " signing the receipt form and receiving the Unredacted Notice. See App. at 116-19.

When a registrant is classified as a Tier 3 offende r, in addition to those individuals who are notified pursuant to Tier 2, no tification is made "to community members and businesses within the court-a uthorized notification zone and to the parents and guardians of children attending
schools located within the area in which the court ordered notification to the community." Id. at 119. Notification is made by "law enforcement hand-delivering the Notice . . . to an adult member of each household and to a full-time adult supervisory employee or ow ner in every business located in the area in the scope of notification." Id. at 120. If no one
is available to receive the notice, a copy of an Attem pted Delivery Form is left, instructing the person to contact the local l aw enforcement agency or County Prosecutor's Office. See id. Additionally , a Redacted Notice can be sent to all parents and guardians of students at tending a school
located in the court-authorized notification zone v ia regular United
States mail. See id. at 122.

11the Megan's Law Rules of Conduct"; and (3) "submit to the

jurisdiction of the Court." Id. at 155. 3

Once the receipt form is signed, the individual rec eives the Unredacted Notice along with a copy of the cour t order and the "Rules of Conduct," which also vary somewha t depending on the recipient. See 145-48. With respec t to school personnel, the Rules of Conduct state that t he recipient cannot "share the information in this not ification flier, or the flier itself, with anyone." Id. at 14 5.4 The Rules of Conduct for community organization recipients st ate that they are not allowed to share the information in th e"flier, or the flier itself, with anyone outside of the com munity organization." Id. at 146. Finally, parents and leg al guardians are told that they can share the informat ion "with those residing in [their] household, such as family members," and "with anyone caring for [their] child ren at [their] residence in [their] absence." Id. at 147. They are not allowed, however, to share the information with any one outside of the household or not in their care and, specifically, not "with the media." Id. All of the Rules expressly warn that inappropriate conduct vis-a-vis the notices "may result in court action or prosecution being taken against you." Id. at 145-48.

If an individual refuses to sign a receipt form, he or she is still permitted to receive a Redacted Notice. So meone receiving a Redacted Notice is also warned that he or she, along with household members, is "bound to comply w ith the Megan's Law Rules of Conduct." Id. at 121.

___________________________________________________ ______________

3. The court orders of ten of the twenty-one counti es in New Jersey contained language warning that one who discloses s ex offender information without authority to do so will be subj ect to penalties for contempt. On July 17, 2000, the state judges respon sible for Megan's Law cases were advised that the Supreme Court of Ne w Jersey did not approve the use of contempt of court language in co urt orders permitting notification and specifically instructed that such language not be
included in those orders. See Letter from the Honor ables David S. Baime, P.J.A.D., and Lawrence M. Lawson, A.J.S.C., to Megan's Law Judges, submitted under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j).

4. The Rules of Conduct note that "[l]aw enforcemen t will notify all appropriate community members, schools, organizatio ns, residences and business." See, e.g., App. at 145.

12Upon receipt of the New Guidelines, appellants move d to

enforce the injunction issued on January 24, 2000. This time, however, appellants only raised two challenge s. First, they argued "that the revised Guidelines are defici ent because they do not require the issuance of a court order which would make the recipient of sex offender info rmation subject to contempt of court sanctions for subseque nt unauthorized disclosures." Paul P. v. Farmer , 92 F . Supp. 2d 410, 412 (D.N.J. 2000). Second, they argued "tha t a person's block of residence is constitutionally pro tected information which will be disseminated without any safeguards against its improper use in the `redacte d'
notices." Id.

The District Court rejected both arguments. First, noting that the adequacy of safeguards "is a flexible dete rmination to be made based upon the facts of the particular c ase and the goals of the particular statute," the District Court determined that "the Attorney General has devised a reasonable method of distributing sex offender info rmation to authorized persons, while avoiding disclosure to unauthorized persons." Id. at 413-14. Second, the D istrict Court held that "[i]nformation concerning the gener al area in which a person lives is not information of an ex tremely personal or private nature. Nor is this information generally within a person's `reasonable expectations of confidentiality.' " Id. at 415. Thus, the District Court concluded that the New Guidelines adequately protec t any private information from unauthorized disclosure an d vacated its injunction against disseminating Megan' s Law
notices.5

Appellants filed this timely appeal.

II.

All that remains at issue in this case, after more than

___________________________________________________ ______________

5. On April 18, 2000, we granted appellants' motion to stay the District Court's Order and, in doing so, reinstated the inju nction which the District Court had stayed on January 24, 2000. On J uly 12, 2000, after hearing oral argument in this case, we vacated our stay, thus permitting the dissemination of notices to proceed under the N ew Guidelines.

13three years of extensive litigation, is a single is sue

addressed to the Unredacted Notices and a single is sue addressed to the Redacted Notices. Appellants initi ally argued, as to the Unredacted Notices, that the New Guidelines were inadequate as a matter of federal
constitutional law because in ten counties the cour t orders which accompanied those notices did not contain con tempt of court language and, thus, authorized individuals who received Megan's Law notices were not deterred from distributing the information to persons unauthorize d to receive it. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Cour t of New Jersey rejected the use of contempt language in any notification order, see supra note 3, and appellant s now appear to be arguing that because there is no longe r a sanction, contempt or otherwise, they are inadequat ely protected from unauthorized disclosures of an offen der's home address. We do not agree.

In Paul P. I, although we accepted appellants' clai m "that
there is some nontrivial interest in one's home add ress by persons who do not wish it disclosed," we made it c lear that that interest must give way to the state's compelli ng interest in notifying the public "where prior sex o ffenders live so that susceptible individuals can be appropr iately cautioned." 170 F.3d at 404; see also E.B. , 119 F. 3d at 1104 (opining "that the state's interest here would suffice to justify the deprivation even if a fundamental right of the registrant's were implicated" in Megan's Law notifi cations). In evaluating whether the New Guidelines provide ad equate safeguards, we cannot ignore this compelling state interest. Indeed, it is this very interest which places this case in a different posture than other cases in which we have been called upon to evaluate whether the safeguards in p lace were adequate to protect the privacy interest at st ake.

In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F .2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980), and Fraternal Order of Police v . City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1987), for exam ple, the disclosure sought was extremely limited and the int erest which justified even that limited disclosure was na rrow. In Westinghouse, the National Institute of Occupationa l Safety and Health ("NIOSH") sought Westinghouse's employee s' medical records as part of its health hazard evalua tion of

14the Westinghouse plant. See 638 F.2d at 572. The

information would not be shared with individuals ou tside of NIOSH, except perhaps outside contractors who were bound to nondisclosure by their contracts with NIOS H. See id. at 580. We recognized that NIOSH had an interes t militating toward disclosure of the employees' priv ate information, but only for this specific purpose. Se e id. at 579. Because the procedures for safekeeping the information protected this limited disclosure, we c oncluded that there were adequate safeguards in place. See i d. at
580.

In Fraternal Order of Police, the Philadelphia Poli ce Department sought information about certain applica nts' medical history, financial status, and gambling and drinking habits. We found that there was a strong p ublic interest in seeing that the Department obtain this information as it was sought not only for the purpo se of selecting officers who were physically and mentally capable of working in dangerous and highly stressful positi ons, but to combat corruption among officers assigned to uni ts which performed investigations in areas traditional ly susceptible to corruption. See id. 812 F.2d at 116. However, this interest, at most, only justified dis closure for the narrow purpose of the application process and o nly to those officials within the Department responsible f or the application process. See id. at 118. Because there was a "complete absence" of procedures limiting access to the private information and specifying its handling and storage, we determined that there were no adequate safeguard s against unnecessary disclosure to the public. See i d. at 118 (noting that "there is no statute or regulation tha t penalizes
officials with confidential information from disclo sing it").

In neither Westinghouse nor Fraternal Order of Poli ce, therefore, was the articulated state interest or in terests sufficient to justify public disclosure of the priv ate information being collected. Consequently, there wa s a need for safeguards which adequately protected against unnecessary public disclosure.

Megan's Law's fundamental purpose, however, is pub lic
disclosure. The Law calls for the disclosure of sex offenders' information to numerous individuals in the general public

15pursuant to the Attorney General's Guidelines and s ubject

to the judicial review process provided by the New Jersey state courts. See supra note 2; see also Doe v. Por itz, 142 N.J. 1, 30 (1997) (requiring "judicial review of th e Tier classification and the manner of notification prior to actual notification"). For example, with a Tier 3 offender , every parent of a child attending a school within the cou rtauthorized notification zone is entitled to receive an Unredacted Notice. Appellants do not, nor could the y, contest the necessity for such disclosures. See Pau l P. I, 170 F.3d at 404, 406 (holding that appellants' priv acy interest claim based on the disclosure of informati on to those who have a particular need for it must fail); see also Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 88 (1995) (addressing a challenge to the sex offender registration and notification l aws and concluding that "the state interest in public discl osure substantially outweighs plaintiff's interest in pri vacy"). Moreover, within the Unredacted Notice, there is an abundance of information, e.g., name, date of birth , sex, and conviction, the disclosure of which does not im plicate a privacy interest, and appellants do not argue tha t it does. See Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 403.

In light of these authorized public disclosures, al l that remains is the potential that a minimal burden, alb eit a real one, will be placed on appellants' nontrivial privacy interest if there are subsequent, unauthorized disc losures with respect to a single piece of information, an o ffender's home address. Wholly aside from the fact that appel lants do not suggest that, with adequate safeguards, the
inclusion of home addresses in the Unredacted Notic es would be inappropriate, the New Guidelines reasonab ly attempt to avoid any burden on appellants' privacy rights by requiring for the Unredacted Notices stringent d elivery and notification procedures. See supra at 10-12. Mo reover, the notification order itself and the accompanying Rules of Conduct rigorously stress the confidentiality of th e information being provided, comprehensively explain how the information can and cannot be used, and firmly warn against unauthorized disclosures. Consequently, we agree with the District Court that "the Attorney General has devised a reasonable method of distributing sex off ender information to authorized persons, while avoiding

16disclosure to unauthorized persons." Paul P. , 92 F . Supp.

2d at 414. We further agree with the District Court that although contempt of court language may further red uce the number of unauthorized disclosures, a conclusio n it reached even before the Supreme Court of New Jersey struck that language from the orders, the absence o f such language does not render the New Guidelines
unconstitutional. See id.

We, therefore, reject appellants' initial argument that uniform contempt language is required in the court orders which accompany the Unredacted Notices and their la ter argument that without a sanction such as contempt t he safeguards are inadequate.6 Stated in positive term s, we find that, as a matter of federal constitutional la w, appellants' privacy interest is adequately protecte d.

The single issue raised with respect to the Redacte d Notices is this: the "governmental disclosure of on e's street name, block of residence, and name of apartment bui lding . . . breaks the veil of anonymity surrounding one' s place of residence" and, thus, infringes upon appellants' pr ivacy interest. Appellants Br. at 45. Again, we disagree.

Whatever privacy interest, if any, may exist in the area of one's residence, i.e., street name, block of reside nce, or name of apartment building, however, is substantial ly outweighed by the state's compelling interest in di sclosing Megan's Law information to the relevant public, an interest recognized in Paul P. I, 170 F.3d at 404. Redacted Notices, it must be remembered, are not released willy-nilly to the general public. Rather, they are generally given on ly to
individuals within the court-authorized notificatio n zone, individuals who are otherwise authorized to receive an Unredacted Notice, but who do not sign a receipt fo rm. Any burden imposed on appellants as a result of the identification of a quite specific area of residenc e, albeit not the precise home address itself, simply does not tr ump the state's interest in providing that information to a uthorized

___________________________________________________ ______________

6. We recognize that the New Guidelines have only r ecently gone into effect because, as explained above, we only recentl y vacated the stay earlier ordered by this Court. If the safeguards pr ove to be inadequate, we do not preclude an application to the District C ourt for relief.

17individuals within the court-authorized notificatio n zone.

Hence, we reject appellants' contention that the us e of Redacted Notices infringes upon their privacy inter est.

III.

We conclude that the New Guidelines adequately safeguard appellants' interest in assuring that inf ormation is disclosed only to those individuals who have a p articular need for the information. Moreover, we find that in cluding in the Redacted Notices information concerning appe llants' area of residence does not unjustly infringe upon appellants' privacy interest. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

A True Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

18