* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-30743

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RICHARD DANIEL SHAFFETT,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(CR-95-25-A)

August 8, 1996

Before BENAVIDES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge: *

Shaffett was convicted after a guilty plea of misdemeanor violations of the Endangered

Species Act and the Lacey Act for importing and selling four handbags made from the skins of two

species of endangered African crocodiles. Based on his own expert’s report that put into question

the government’s identification of the crocodile ski n s, Shaffett moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

The district court denied his motion, and Shaffett appeals. Finding no clear error, we AFFIRM.2 FACTS

Shaffett owns an alligator tanning business and also acted as a distributor for a French

co mpany, Creations D.P., which manufactures handbags and other items made from croco dile,

alligator, and other reptile skins. Certain items were seized from his business in June 1993 and were

examined by a government expert in the field of crocodile skin identification. Another handbag was

purchased and examined by an undercover agent for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

As a result of these examinations, Richard Shaffett was originally charged with two felonies,

one under the Lacey Act and one under the smuggling act, based on allegations that the seized items

were made from endangered species. Shaffett entered into a plea agreement, whereby he agreed to

plead guilty to a supersed ing bill of information charging him with (1) knowing receipt in foreign

commerce of three handbags made from the skin of the Nile Crocodile, a violation of the Endangered

Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(E), 1540(b); (2) knowing and unlawful sale in in t erstate

commerce of a handbag made from the skin of the African slender-snouted Crocodile, another

violation of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(F),1540(b); and (3) sale of a purse

made from the skin of the African slender-snouted Crocodile which he knew or should have known

had been possessed, trans po rt ed or sold in violation of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§3372 (a),

3373(d)(2).

After he was sentenced to three years’ probation with a special condition that he reside at The

Ecumenical House for six months and pay a $3,000 fine, Shaffett moved for and received permission

to have the contraband handbags examined by his own expert. Following the examination, Shaffett

moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his expert had found that the count 1 purses were

not from the Nile crocodile, but from a another species that is not listed as endangered, and alleging3

that the fourth handbag referred to in Counts 2 and 3 was made from a subspecies of the African

slender-snouted crocodile that is legal to import under the provisions of the Lacey Act, provided its

importation is accompanied by proper identification. Shaffett contends that there was no factual basis

for the plea sufficie nt t o show that the conduct would constitute the criminal offense charged. He

argues that this lack of factual basis affects the voluntariness of the plea because the plea was based

on the Government’s misrepresentation that a crime had been committed, when in fact no crime had

been committed. Shaffett also contends that he was coerced into the guilty plea by threats from a

Government attorney.

DISCUSSION

“The plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be disregarded because of belated misgivings about

[its] wisdom.” United States v. Fitzhugh , 78 F.3d 1326, 1328 (8th Cir. 1996)(citing United States

v. Morrison

, 967 F.2d 264, 268 (8th Cir. 1992). In accord with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d), a court may

permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason, but a

defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea, and the decision to allow him

to do so is within the sound discretion of the trial court. U nited States v. Nash

, 29 F.3d 1195, 1198

(7th Cir. 1994)( citations omitted). When a defendant enters a guilty plea, the sentencing court must

satisfy itself, through an inquiry of the defendant or examination of the relev ant mat erials in the

record, that an adequate factual basis exists for the elements of the offense, in accord with the dictates

of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f). United States v. Adams , 961 F.2d 505, 508 (5th Cir.

1992)(citation omitted). The record must reveal specific factual allegations supporting each element

of the offense. A dams

, 961 F.2d at 508. The acceptance of a guilty plea is deemed a factual finding4

that there is an adequate factual basis for the plea, and w e review t his finding under the clearly

erroneous standard. I d .; United States v. Rivas

, ___F.3d

___, 1996 WL 284972, *1 (5th Cir. 1996).

The Nile crocodile and the African slender-snouted crocodile are both listed as protected by

the Endangered Species Act, 50 C.F.R. §17.11(h). Thus, it is unlawful for any person subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States to deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign

commerce eith e r species, and it is unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale either species in

interstate or foreign commerce. 16 U.S.C. §1538(a)(1)(E),(F). Furthermore, under the Lacey Act,

it is unlawful for any person to illegally transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any species listed

as covered by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

(“CITES”), to which the United States is a signatory. 16 U.S.C. §3372(a). The African slendersnouted crocodile is on the CITES list, though one subspecies may be transporte d if properl y

documented. 50 C.F.R. §23.23.

The factual basis for the guilty plea was based on testimony given at the plea hearing by U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Special Agent John Collins. Collins testified that both the Nile River crocodile and

the slender-snouted crocodile were endangered species

. He also testified that the African slendersnouted crocodile is listed in the appendices to the CITES Treaty, which means that a permit from

the U.S. Department of the Interior is required before articles made from this particular species can

be imported, and that the Department of the Interior did not issue any such permits to Shaffett. In

testifying that the three handbags listed in Count 1 were made from the skin of Nile River crocodiles,

Co llins relied on a report prepared by Dr. Wayne King, a professor of herpetology at the University

of Florida. (Herpetology is the branch of zoology dealing with reptiles and amphibians.) Dr. King’s

impressive Curriculum Vitae had been made part of the re cord at the ti m e the court consi

dered5

Shaffett’s guilty plea. Collins testified that the handbag listed in Counts 2 and 3 was identified as

being African slender-snouted crocodile by an unnamed undercover agent.

Shaffett alleges that the skins were misident ified by the government and that therefore there

was no factual basis for the plea. In his motion, Shaffett argued that his expert, Karlheinz Fuchs, had

found that the three Count 1 purses were made from the skins of New Guinea crocodiles, a species

not listed as endangered, and that the fourth handbag, while made from the slender-snouted crocodile,

was from a subspecies not prohibited for import under the CITES treaty. Furthermore, Fuchs, while

not debating that the fourth handbag was made from the African slender-snouted crocodile, did

question the identification methodology employed by Co llins in the courtroom and apparently relied

on by the undercover field agent. Shaffett admitted that identification of the origin of a crocodile skin

is highly specialized, and testified that only five people in the world are expert enough to be able to

distinguish the various species and subspecies.

The legislative history of the Endangered Species Act shows that Congress intended to make

violations of its provisions a general intent crime, and no specific intent to po ssess an endangered

animal product is necessary. S ee United States v. Nguyen

, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018-19 (5th Cir. 1990).

Thus, the only element necessary to show a violation of the act is a generalized knowledge of

possession of the animal product in question. It is not necessary to know that the animal product is

from a protected species or subspecies, and the government need not prove that the possessor knew

that the product was from a threatened species or that he knew that it was illegal to transport, import,

or sell it. S ee Nguyen

, 916 F.2d at 1018. Shaffett admitted at the plea hearing that he knew the

purses were made from crocodile skin. Given the highly specialized ide nt ification process

acknowledged by Shaffett, it would not be unexpected that experts might disagree in their conclusions6

about the skins in question. The fact that Shaffett can point to a difference of opinion between

experts does not automatically render his guilty plea infirm. Our review of the record satisfies us that

t he district court established an adequate factual basis for each element of the offenses charged.

Consequently we reject Shaffett’s claims to the contrary.

Shaffett also argues that his plea was involuntary because it was induced by a threat made by

a United States Department of Justice attorney

. Shaffett sought to introduce evidence of the threat

at the hear ing o n the motion to withdraw the plea, but decided not to pursue the argument on the

advice of the district court. Because Shaffett declined to pursue the issue, he is deemed to have

waived it.

As the trial court did not make any clear error in fi nding an adequate factual basis for the

guilty plea in accord with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f), and Shaffe t t waived any

a rgument that his plea was induced by a threat, the district court did not abuse it s discretion in

denying Shaffett’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the district court’s decision is

AFFIRMED.