alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hazel PECKELS, Independent Executor/Personal Representative of the Estate of Michael Peckels, Deceased, and Hazel Peckels, Individually, Respondents, v. WYATT FARMS, INC., Appellant.

No. WD 60877.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

May 6, 2003.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied July 1, 2003.

Application for Transfer Denied Aug. 26, 2003.

*55John L. Mullen, Keith A. Cary, Kansas City, for appellant.

Grant L. Davis, Thomas C. Jones, Scott S. Bethune, Timothy L. Brake, Kansas City, Daniel M. Kotin, Robert Bingle, Chicago, IL, for respondents.

Before ELLIS, C.J., and LOWENSTEIN and HOWARD, JJ.

Order

PER CURIAM.

Wyatt Farms, Inc. (“Wyatt”), appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in a personal injury case in favor of Michael Peckels (“Michael”) in the amount of $900,000 and for Hazel Peckels (“Hazel”) in the amount of $125,000. Wyatt alleges the trial court abused its discretion in: (1) admitting the testimony of Dr. Savi-no, Michael’s treating physician, regarding work expectancy; (2) admitting evidence regarding Michael’s claim for loss of future wages pertaining to his part-time employment at his employer’s loading dock; (3) admitting evidence regarding Wyatt’s retention of Dr. Lowry Jones; (4) denying Wyatt’s Motion for New Trial; and (5) denying Wyatt’s Motion for Remittitur. Wyatt argues this court should reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.

Affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
# Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 28, 2017

No. 04

- 17

- 00640

- CR

William Boyd PORTER

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 186th Judicial Di strict Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2016CR4455 Honorable Jefferson Moore, Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

The reporter’s record is due on December 29, 2017. On December 22, 2017, the court

reporter responsible for preparing the reporter ’ s record in this appeal filed a notification of late record, stating that although appellant’s counsel contacted her on November 14, 2017 , and stated he would make a deposit of partial fees, counsel has wholly failed to pay any fees.

We, therefore, ORDER appellant to provide wr itten proof to this court within ten days of the date of this order that either (1) the reporter ’ s fee has been paid or arrangements have been made to pay the reporter ’ s fee; or (2) appellant is entitled to appeal without paying the reporter ’ s fee. If appe llant fails to respond within the time provided, appellant ’ s brief will be due within thirty days from the date of this order, and the court will only consider those issues or points raised in appellant ’ s brief that do not require a reporter ’ s record for a decision. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 37.3(c).

_________________________________ Karen Angelini, JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 28th day of December, 2017

.

______________________________ _____ K eith E. H ottle

Clerk of Court
**Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 3 July 2008 – Criminal proceedings against Möginger**

**(Case C‐225/07)**

Article 104(3), first subparagraph, of the Rules of Procedure – Directive 91/439/EEC – Mutual recognition of driving licences – Withdrawal of driving licence – Temporary ban on the issuing of a new licence – Validity of a licence obtained in another Member State during the period of the ban

Transport – Road transport – Driving licences – Directive 91/439 (Council Directive 91/439, as amended by Regulation No 1882/2003, Arts 1(2) and 8(2) and (4)) (see para.
45, operative part)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | Reference for a preliminary ruling – Amtsgericht Landau/Isar – Interpretation of Article 8(2) and (4) of Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences (OJ 1991 L 237, p. 1) – Non-recognition by the Member State of residence, on its territory, of a driving licence obtained in another Member State during the period of a temporary ban on applying for a new licence in the Member State of residence. |

**Operative part**

Articles 1(2) and 8(2) and (4) of Council Directive 91/439/EEC of 29 July 1991 on driving licences, as amended by Regulation
(EC) No 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 September 2003, must be interpreted as meaning that
they do not preclude a Member State from refusing to recognise the validity of a driving licence issued by another Member
State where the holder of that licence was, on the date on which the licence was issued, subject to a temporary ban on obtaining
a new driving licence in the first Member State. The fact that the question of validity arose after the date that marked the
end of the period of the ban is irrelevant.
In the MATTER OF Melisa White GAY, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000237

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

March 21, 2018

**386ORDER

The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to place Respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(a) of **387the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's license to practice law in South Carolina is suspended until further order of this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is hereby appointed to assume responsibility for Respondent's client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts Respondent may maintain. Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, to protect the interests of Respondent's clients. Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from Respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts Respondent may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment.

This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of Respondent, shall serve as an injunction to prevent Respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly appointed by this Court.

Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall serve as notice that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, has been duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive Respondent's mail and the authority to direct that Respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office.

Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested.

Within fifteen days of the date of this order, Respondent shall serve and file the affidavit required by Rule 30, RLDE. Should Respondent fail to timely file the required affidavit, **388she may be held in civil and/or criminal contempt of this Court as provided by Rule 30, RLDE.

*/s/ Donald W. Beatty, C.J.*

FOR THE COURT
#### Gary D. GARDNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edwin POGUE, Warden Nevada State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 76-1578.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Jan. 25, 1978.

Robert N. Peccole, Las Vegas, Nev., for petitioner-appellant.

Frank J. Cremen, Las Vegas, Nev., for respondent-appellee.

Before TRASK and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and TAKASUGI,* District Judge.

*

 Honorable Robert M. Takasugi, United States District Judge, Central District of California, sitting by designation.

TRASK, Circuit Judge:

On August 1, 1977, this court considered whether a petition for habeas corpus was properly before us in the light of Fed.R. App.P. 22(b). We concluded that without a certificate of probable cause from the district court, or a statement of its reasons for declining to issue one, we lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. *Gardner*v. *Pogue,*558 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1977). We also held that leave to proceed in forma pauperis is not “tantamount” to the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. We therefore remanded for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.

The appellant has now applied for and been issued a certificate of probable cause by the district court and is before us urging that his guilty plea was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We proceed to consider the merits.

Appellant had been arrested and held for trial on a charge of murder in 1967 in the state court of Nevada. He contends that he entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder upon promises by the prosecution and by his own attorney that if he did so he would receive a sentence of imprisonment of ten years. When his plea of guilty was accepted, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 99 years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the state court of Nevada. His petition enabled him to obtain a post-conviction evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of his plea of guilty. Petitioner testified at that hearing and produced witnesses on his behalf. The state district court ruled that the hearing supported the finding of voluntariness of the plea and relief was denied. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Nevada *649and the ruling of the District Court of Nevada was affirmed.

It was then that he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. That court having read and considered the pleadings, transcripts and papers of record, and having heard and considered arguments of counsel, made numerous and careful findings of fact and based thereon, concluded:

> “That the record of the state court post-conviction proceeding, considered as a whole supports the State court determination that the Petitioner’s plea of guilty was knowing, voluntary and uncoerced.” *Gardner v. Pogue,*No. 75-146 (D.Nev., filed Jan. 19, 1976).

We have carefully considered the record of the evidentiary hearing and have arrived at the same conclusion.

The judgment is AFFIRMED.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1121
MIRZA MUHAMMAD JAFFER, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A72-166-950) Submitted: July 18, 2007 Decided: August 1, 2007 Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior Circuit Judge. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mirza Muhammad Jaffer, Petitioner Pro Se. Mona Maria Yousif, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Mirza Muhammad Jaffer, a native of India and a citizen of Pakistan, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his motion to reopen immigration proceedings. We have reviewed the record and the Board’s order and find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in upholding the denial of Jaffer’s motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(iv) (2007). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review for the reasons stated by the Board. See In re: Jaffer , A72-166-950 (B.I.A. Jan. 19, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
**EXHIBIT 10.1**

 

**AMENDMENTTO**

**AMENDEDAND RESTATED**

**EMPLOYMENTAGREEMENT**

 

ThisAMENDMENT, dated as of July 30, 2008, between GuruNet Israel Ltd., f/k/aAtomica Israel Technologies Ltd., an Israeli corporation (the “**Company**”) and Robert S. Rosenschein, anindividual (“**Employee**”), amendsthat certain Amended and Restated Employment Agreement dated January 8,2004, as subsequently amended on November 27, 2007 and November 6,2007 (the “**Employment Agreement**”).

 

1.                                       Pursuant to this Amendment, the parties agreeto amend the Employment Agreement as follows:

 

·                  Thefirst sentence of Section 2 (“**TERM”)**of the Employment Agreement is hereby deleted in its entirety andreplaced with the following:

 

**“**The term of this Agreement shall be six (6) years measured fromthe Effective Date.”

 

·                  Section 3(a) (“**BASE SALARY”)**of the Employment Agreementis hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

 

“(a) BaseSalary. As of March 1, 2008, for all services to be rendered by Employeepursuant to this Agreement, Employee shall receive a monthly base salary fromthe Company of 79,500 NIS, payable monthly in accordance with the Company’snormal payroll practices. Employee shall receive payment of the aforesaid basesalary in New Israeli Shekel. Employee shall receive a ten percent 10% annualbase salary increase at the end of each full year of employment during the termof this Agreement.”

 

2.                                       The effective date of this Amendment shall bethe date first written above.

 

3.                                       Terms used in this Amendment but not definedherein will have the respective meanings ascribed to such terms in theEmployment Agreement.  In the event ofany conflict between the terms of this Amendment and the terms of theEmployment Agreement, this Amendment shall control.  Except as modified by this Amendment, theEmployment Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

 
| **AGREED AND ACCEPTED:**  | **AGREED AND ACCEPTED:**            |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|
|                      |                                |
| **Robert S. Rosenschein** | **GuruNet Israel Ltd.**             |
|                      |                                |
| **Signature:**            | **/s/**  Robert S. Rosenschein      | ** ** | **Signature:** | **/s/**  Steven Steinberg |
|                      |                                |
|                      | **Name: Steven Steinberg**          |
|                      |                                |
|                      | **Title:  Chief Financial Officer** |
|                           |                                     |  |  |  |

 

1

----
**Exhibit 32.2**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. §1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection withthe Quarterly Report of WPT Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q forthe period ended July 2, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, W. Todd Steele, ChiefFinancial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, asadopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.  The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date: August 10, 2006 |   | /s/ W. Todd Steele      |   |
|-----------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|                  |   | W. Todd Steele          |
|                  |   | Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
STATE v. Kevlin W. SELLARS

64P18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 5, 2018

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, N. Lorrin Freeman, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Kelvin W. Sellars, for Sellars, Kelvin W.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd of March 2018 by Defendant for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 5th of March 2018."

Ervin, J. recused
## Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

In re Andre Renor Evans

No. 06

- 19

- 00110

- CR Original Mandamus Proceeding

Opinion delivered by Justice Stevens, Chief

Justice Morriss and Justice Burgess

participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the petition for writ of mandamus

should be dismissed as moot. Therefore, we dismiss the petition.

RENDERED JULY 17 , 2019

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
| Subsidiaries                                                                                             |   | 2012 |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------|--------|
| Vivo S.A (1)                                                                                             |   | 100% |   |
| Telefônica Data S.A.                                                                                |   | 100% |   |
| A.Telecom S.A.                                                                                           |   | 100% |   |
| Telefônica Sistema de Televisão S.A.                                                           |   | 100% |   |
| Ajato Telecomunicações Ltda.                                                                   |   | 100% |   |
| GTR Participações e Empreend. S.A. (2)                                                         |   | 100% |   |
| TVA Sul Paraná S.A. (2)                                                                             |   | 100% |   |
| Lemontree Participações S.A. (2)                                                               |   | 100% |   |
| Comercial Cabo TV São Paulo S.A. (2)                                                                |   | 100% |   |
| Aliança Atlântica Holding B.V.(3)                                                              |   | 50%  |   |
| Companhia AIX de Participações (3)                                                             |   | 50%  |   |
| Companhia ACT de Participações (3)                                                             |   | 50%  |   |
|                                                                                                     |
| (1) fully consolidated as of April 2011.(2) fully consolidated as of January 2011.(3) jointly controlled |
Exhibit 31.2
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Dennis Grinsteiner, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of First State Financial Corporation.
2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;
3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport;
4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
 (d)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to de designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including our consolidated subsidiary, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared:  (e)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  (f)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee or registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunction):
 (c)  all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal controls overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (d)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls.   Date: May 10, 2005 By*: /s/ Dennis Grinsteiner*   Dennis Grinsteiner      Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
17
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2261

In Re: SEAN DARNELL FOWLKES,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

(1:09-cr-00244-CCB-5)

Submitted: January 22, 2013 Decided: January 30, 2013

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Sean Darnell Fowlkes, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Sean Fowlkes petitions for a writ of mandamus, seeking 

an order directing the district court to modify its order 

dismissing a criminal case without prejudice to reflect a 

dismissal with prejudice. We deny the petition.

Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in 

extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 

426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 

509, 516-17 (4th Cir. 2003). Mandamus is available only when 

the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought, id. at 

517, and may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007).

The relief sought by Fowlkes is not available by way 

of mandamus. Accordingly, while we grant leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED