NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEVE ANDREW SUAZO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0192

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-002227-009

The Honorable Justin Beresky, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Linley Wilson

Counsel for Appellee

Stephen M. Johnson PC, Phoenix

By Stephen M. Johnson

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-3-2018
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco1 delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

OROZCO, Judge:

¶1 Steve Suazo appeals his convictions and sentences for 

conspiracy to commit sale or transportation of dangerous drugs, assisting a 

criminal syndicate, possession of dangerous drugs, possession of narcotic 

drugs, use of a wire or electronic communication in drug-related 

transactions, and resisting arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

convictions and affirm the sentences as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2

¶2 On January 28, 2014, detectives surveilled suspected drugdealer Irene Castro from an unmarked police vehicle parked outside her 

apartment building. At approximately 3 p.m., the detectives observed a 

Chrysler sedan enter the apartment complex and park near Castro’s 

residence. The driver, Suazo, then exited the vehicle and entered Castro’s 

apartment. When he emerged from the apartment a few hours later, Suazo 

appeared to place something in the Chrysler’s trunk before driving away.

¶3 Detectives followed the Chrysler from the apartment 

complex, and after observing traffic violations, they activated their 

unmarked vehicle’s lights and siren, attempting to initiate a traffic stop.

Rather than stop, however, the Chrysler accelerated, drove on the wrong 

side of the road for a brief period, and eventually halted in the front yard 

of a private residence. 

 

1 The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, retired Judge of the Arizona 

Court of Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter 

pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
STATE v. SUAZO

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¶4 Once the vehicle stopped, Suazo jumped out, leaving the 

engine running and the driver-side door open. Seeing Suazo flee, the 

detectives yelled, “Police. Stop.” In response, Suazo momentarily looked

at the uniformed officers, but then turned and ran toward the residence’s 

open garage. While the detectives continued issuing commands, they 

followed Suazo into the garage and “clearly” saw him turn away and reach 

into his pockets. 

¶5 Fearing Suazo may draw a weapon, the detectives attempted 

to physically restrain him. Although Suazo struggled, the detectives, 

working together, eventually gained control and placed him under arrest. 

¶6 Once Suazo was in custody, the detectives noticed a small 

baggie, containing a substance later identified as heroin, on the garage floor 

where Suazo had stood. Within a couple of feet of the heroin baggie, the 

detectives also observed a salmon-colored baggie, containing a substance 

later identified as methamphetamine, on a garage table.

¶7 Later, the detectives searched the Chrysler and seized a cell 

phone propped against the center console. They also seized a toiletry bag 

from the trunk that contained an unmarked pill bottle. After a forensic 

analyst examined the contents of the cell phone, detectives learned that 

numerous text messages referred to Suazo explicitly, using either his legal 

name or a nickname, and many texts solicited or otherwise referred to 

drugs, including at least one text from Castro.

¶8 On March 12, 2014, a detective conducted a traffic stop of 

Castro’s vehicle as she left her apartment complex. After determining 

Castro’s license was suspended and impounding her vehicle, the detective 

conducted an inventory search of the car and discovered a candle with a 

false bottom that concealed two salmon-colored baggies of 

methamphetamine. On the same day, detectives executed a search warrant 

on Castro’s apartment and found a digital scale, numerous firearms, ample 

ammunition, a “launcher” for expelling small explosives, drug ledgers, 

body armor, miscellaneous forms of identification bearing a variety of 

names, marijuana, and several prescription pill bottles.

¶9 The State then charged Suazo with one count of conspiracy to 

commit sale or transportation of dangerous drugs (Count 1), assisting a 

criminal syndicate (Count 2), possession of dangerous drugs for sale 

(renumbered Count 3), sale or transportation of dangerous drugs 

(renumbered Count 4), possession of narcotic drugs for sale (renumbered 

Count 5), sale or transportation of narcotic drugs (renumbered Count 6), 
STATE v. SUAZO

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use of wire communication or electronic communication in drug-related 

transactions (renumbered Count 7), and resisting arrest (renumbered 

Count 8). The State also alleged aggravating circumstances and that Suazo 

had four historical prior felony convictions.

¶10 After a five-day trial, a jury found Suazo guilty as charged on 

Counts 1, 2, 7, and 8, guilty of the lesser-included offenses of possession of 

dangerous and narcotic drugs on Counts 3 and 5, and not guilty on Counts 

4 and 6. At the sentencing hearing, the court found Suazo had two prior 

felony convictions and sentenced him to presumptive, concurrent terms 

totaling fifteen and three-quarters’ years imprisonment.3 Suazo timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

(A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

4

DISCUSSION

I. Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

¶11 Suazo contends the trial court improperly denied his motion 

for judgment of acquittal on Counts 1, 2, and 7. For analytic clarity and 

brevity, we first address Count 7, and then the remaining counts in turn.

¶12 We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 20 motion. 

State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15 (2011). “[T]he relevant question is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 562, ¶ 16 (internal 

quotation omitted). Sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury can 

convict may be direct or circumstantial. Id. A judgment of acquittal is 

 

3 As noted by the State, the conviction for possession of narcotic drugs 

was Count 7 rather than Count 5, as reflected in the sentencing minute 

entry. In addition, Counts 3 and 5 are Class 4 felonies, not Class 2 felonies

as designated in the minute entry, see A.R.S. §§ 13-3407(A)(1), (B)(1), -

3408(A)(1), (B)(1), though the sentences imposed on both counts correspond 

to the applicable presumptive sentence for a category-three repetitive 

offender convicted of Class 4 felonies, see A.R.S. § 13-703(J). We modify the 

judgment accordingly. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(d) (authorizing court to 

modify a judgment).

4 Absent material change since the date of relevant events, we cite to 

the current version of statutes. 
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

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appropriate only when “there is no substantial evidence to warrant a 

conviction.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). 

A. Count 7 - Use of Wire or Electronic Communication in 

Drug-Related Transactions

¶13 Pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3417, “[i]t is unlawful for a person” to 

use any wire or electronic communication to facilitate a conspiracy to sell 

or transport illegal drugs. Suazo argues the State failed to present any 

evidence that the seized cell phone “actually belonged” to him, and further 

contends that even if he was the intended recipient of the drug-related texts, 

no evidence demonstrates that he “respond[ed]” to those messages, or 

otherwise conspired to sell or transport drugs.

¶14 The record reflects, however, that the State presented 

substantial circumstantial evidence that Suazo controlled the cell phone 

found in the Chrysler. First, detectives found the phone next to the driver’s 

seat console, where Suazo had been seated. Second, although Suazo 

correctly notes that two text messages contained on the phone were not 

addressed to him (one was directed to his girlfriend and another to a 

woman apparently unrelated to the case), he does not dispute that many

“of the thousands of text messages” recovered from the phone referred to 

him by name. Because numerous text messages solicited drugs, or 

otherwise related to drugs, including a text from Castro stating she would 

not provide Suazo with drugs (though using street terminology) if he did 

not contact her immediately, sufficient evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could find that Suazo used the cell phone to facilitate the 

sale or transportation of illegal drugs. 

B. Count 1 – Conspiracy to Commit Sale or Transportation 

of Dangerous Drugs

¶15 A person conspires to sell or transport dangerous drugs if, 

with the intent to promote or aid the commission of the offense, the person

agrees with one or more persons that one of them, or another person, will

engage in conduct that constitutes sale or transportation of dangerous 

drugs, and one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of such an 

offense. A.R.S. §§ 13-1003(A) (2010), -3407.

¶16 In this case, the State presented evidence that Suazo received 

numerous text messages soliciting drugs and at least one message offering 

drugs. On the day of his arrest, detectives found two baggies of illegal 

drugs in the immediate vicinity of where Suazo had stood, turned, and 

reached into his pockets, and the unusual salmon-colored baggie 
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

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containing methamphetamine matched the methamphetamine baggies 

later seized from Castro’s car. Likewise, detectives found a prescription pill 

bottle in the Chrysler’s trunk that matched the prescription pill bottles later 

seized from Castro’s apartment. Although the State failed to present any 

text messages in which Suazo explicitly agreed to provide or receive drugs, 

on this record, sufficient circumstantial evidence exists from which a 

reasonable jury could find that he agreed to sell or transport dangerous 

drugs, and intended to assist the commission of such an offense when he

transported heroin and methamphetamine from Castro’s apartment.5 See 

State v. Hall, 129 Ariz. 589, 595 (1981) (holding an “unlawful agreement can 

be inferred from the parties’ overt conduct”), overruled on other grounds by

State v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, 576, ¶ 12 (2000).

C. Count 2 – Assisting a Criminal Syndicate

¶17 A person assists a criminal syndicate by selling or transferring 

narcotic or dangerous drugs or conspiring to sell or transfer narcotic or 

dangerous drugs, with the intent to promote or further the criminal 

objectives of a criminal syndicate. A.R.S. § 13-2308 (2010). A “criminal 

syndicate” is any combination of persons or enterprises engaging on a 

continuing basis in conduct that violates a felony statute. A.R.S. § 13-

2301(C)(7).

¶18 As explained above, supra ¶ 16, the State presented 

substantial circumstantial evidence that Suazo conspired with Castro to sell 

and transfer dangerous and narcotic drugs. Viewing these facts in light of 

the ledgers seized from Castro’s apartment that detailed her drug 

operations, sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could 

find that Suazo conspired to sell and transfer dangerous and narcotic drugs 

 

5 To the extent Suazo contends there was insufficient evidence that he 

intended to aid the sale or transport of drugs, as evidenced by the jury’s

lesser-included guilty verdicts on Counts 3 and 5 (convicting him only of 

simple possession rather than possession for sale) and not guilty verdicts 

on Counts 4 and 6 (acquitting him of sale of dangerous and narcotic drugs), 

his claim is not well-founded. It is well-settled that Arizona law permits 

inconsistent verdicts. Gusler v. Wilkinson, 199 Ariz. 391, 396, ¶ 25 (2001). 

Indeed, rather than demonstrating a lack of evidence, an inconsistent 

verdict may be the result of error, jury nullification, compromise, or lenity. 

State v. Hansen, 237 Ariz. 61, 68, ¶ 20 (App. 2015). Accordingly, courts do 

not “speculate about the reason for [an] inconsistency or inquire into the 

jury’s deliberations,” and inconsistent verdicts generally are not subject to 

judicial review. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21.
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

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with the intent to further the objectives of Castro’s drug organization. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err when it denied Suazo’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal.

II. Alleged Admission of Profile Evidence

¶19 Suazo contends the trial court improperly permitted the State 

to elicit profile evidence as substantive proof of his guilt. Indeed, citing

State v. Haskie, 242 Ariz. 582 (2017), State v. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. 262 (2014), 

and State v. Lee, 191 Ariz. 542 (1998), Suazo argues the State presented 

testimony that “created a high risk that the jury would convict” him, not for 

his own conduct, but for the conduct of others. 

¶20 “Profile evidence tends to show that a defendant possesses 

one or more . . . characteristics . . . typically displayed by persons engaged 

in a particular kind of activity.” Ketchner, 236 Ariz. at 264, ¶ 15. Because 

profile evidence “implicitly invit[es] the jury to infer criminal conduct 

based on the described characteristics,” it “may not be used as substantive 

proof of guilt[.]” Id. at 264-65, ¶¶ 15, 17.

¶21 We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Ketchner, 236 Ariz. at 264, ¶ 13. An 

error of law committed in reaching a discretionary conclusion may

constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. Wall, 212 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 12 (2006).

¶22 Without objection, the prosecutor asked one of the 

investigating detectives whether he believed Castro was “part of a group 

that deals drugs.” Citing his “training and experience,” as well as the 

evidence recovered during the investigation, the detective testified that he 

believed Castro ran a drug operation out of her apartment. The prosecutor 

then asked the detective whether he believed Suazo was part of Castro’s 

organization. Over defense counsel’s objection that the question called for 

a legal conclusion, the detective stated that he believed Suazo was part of 

Castro’s drug organization, explaining he reached that conclusion 

primarily based on the contents of the seized cell phone and the “unique” 

salmon-colored cellophane packaging material used to hold the 

methamphetamine found in both Castro and Suazo’s possession. As a 

follow-up question, the prosecutor asked the detective to identify Suazo’s 

role within this group. Defense counsel objected, and the court sustained 

the objection. 
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

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¶23 Contrary to Suazo’s contentions, the State did not elicit any 

“profile evidence” during this exchange. That is, the detective did not 

testify generally regarding drug dealers’ characteristics and patterns of 

behavior. Instead, he testified to the specific evidence discovered during 

the investigation and explained how that evidence linked Suazo to Castro’s 

organization. Stated differently, the detective never suggested, implicitly 

or explicitly, that Suazo shared certain characteristics commonly held by 

drug dealers.

¶24 Although the prosecutor did not elicit profile evidence, he 

asked the detective if he reached an “ultimate” conclusion in the case, 

namely, whether Suazo was a member of Castro’s drug organization. 

Pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence 702, “[a] witness who is qualified as 

an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify 

in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . [such testimony] will help the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Ariz. 

R. Evid. 702(a). ”In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an 

opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or 

condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. 

Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Ariz. R. Evid. 704(b).

¶25 Assuming without deciding that the admission of the 

statement was error, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the 

convictions for conspiracy and assisting a criminal syndicate, as stated supra

in ¶¶ 15-18. 

III. Denial of Motion for Mistrial

¶26 Suazo argues the trial court improperly denied his motion for 

mistrial. Specifically, he asserts the court should have declared a mistrial 

once it realized it had issued an erroneous jury instruction.

¶27 We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of 

discretion. State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32 (2000). Because “a 

declaration of a mistrial is the most dramatic remedy for trial error,” it 

should be granted “only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless 

the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 

250, 262 (1983). 

¶28 During the settling of the final jury instructions, the 

prosecutor questioned whether the State was required to prove that Suazo 

possessed a usable amount as an element of the offense for Counts 3 and 5. 

Acknowledging the law had changed with respect to that issue, the court 

inquired whether the change occurred before the underlying offenses were 
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

9

committed. Without determining the date of the change, however, the 

court ultimately decided to include the “usable amount” element in the 

instruction, reasoning, if in error, the error favored Suazo. Accordingly, the 

court instructed the jurors that they could not convict Suazo of the lesserincluded offense of simple possession (on both Counts 3 and 5) unless they 

found he “possessed a usable amount[.]” 

¶29 During deliberations, the jury submitted a question 

regarding the “usable amount” element: “What is a ‘usable amount’ of meth 

or heroin? One gram? 14 grams? [F]or one person for one time using it?” 

When the trial court asked the prosecutor how he would address the jurors’ 

question, the prosecutor explained that he had researched the issue since 

the settling of the final jury instructions and had discovered that the law 

changed in 2008, well before the charged offenses occurred, and a “usable 

amount” was no longer a requisite element of possession of dangerous or 

narcotic drugs. See State v. Cheramie, 218 Ariz. 447, 451, ¶¶ 20-22 (2008) 

(holding a “usable quantity” is not an element of possession of a dangerous 

drug). The prosecutor then suggested that the court simply inform the 

jurors that a usable quantity is not an element of the offense and instruct 

them to “disregard that language in the jury instructions.” Agreeing that a 

usable quantity was not a required element, defense counsel argued that 

submission of the incorrect instruction necessitated a declaration of 

mistrial. After hearing from counsel, the court acknowledged the 

instruction was incorrect, but determined the “mistake” could “easily be 

cured” by instructing the jurors that the State was not required to prove a 

“usable amount.”

¶30 Here, there is no dispute that the given instructions were 

erroneous. Therefore, the remaining question is whether the error was 

harmless. See State v. Moore, 222 Ariz. 1, 14, ¶ 67 (2009). “An error is 

harmless if it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error . . . did not 

contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶31 Because the erroneous inclusion of an additional element to 

the lesser-included offenses only inured to Suazo’s benefit, he sustained no

prejudice. Stated differently, the given instructions required the State to 

prove all the legally required elements, and an additional element. Thus, 

the error could not have contributed to the guilty verdicts because it 

required the State to meet a greater burden of proof. Moreover, the court 

remedied the error by instructing the jurors to disregard those portions of 

the instructions. See State v. Govan, 154 Ariz. 611, 613 (App. 1987) (holding 

a trial court did not improperly deny a motion for mistrial predicated on an 

erroneous jury instruction because the court remedied the error by 
STATE v. SUAZO

Decision of the Court

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providing supplemental instruction to the jurors during their deliberations, 

before they had reached a verdict). We presume a jury follows a court’s 

instructions, and Suazo has not presented any evidence to overcome that 

presumption. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 403, ¶ 68 (2006). For these 

reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Suazo’s 

motion for mistrial.

CONCLUSION

¶32 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Suazo’s convictions and

affirm his sentences as modified.