United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

T.B., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Galvin, WA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 17-0676 

Issued: July 24, 2017 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On February 3, 2017 appellant filed a timely appeal from an August 9, 2016 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP).1

 Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case.2

 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant’s claim for compensation was filed within the applicable 

time limitation provisions of FECA. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 

2

 The Board notes that appellant has submitted new evidence on appeal. However, the Board cannot consider this 

evidence as its review of the case is limited to the evidence of record which was before OWCP at the time of its final 

decision. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1). 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On March 30, 2016 appellant, then a 65-year-old former post master, filed a traumatic 

injury claim (Form CA-1) alleging that on November 13, 1998, she was forced to work beyond 

her physical limitations. She contended that she had to lift up to 70 pounds, stand for hours, and 

move boxes from counter to desk. Appellant indicated that this resulted in a lumbar 

laminectomy and decompression at L4-5 and L5-S1, permanent partial impairment to her left 

leg, and foot drop. Appellant also noted severe spasms to her back and legs. The employing 

establishment controverted the claim as being untimely filed. 

The Board notes that appellant had filed a prior claim under OWCP File No. xxxxxx848 

for a December 2, 1997 traumatic injury claim (Form CA-1) which was accepted for sprain of 

the back, lumbar region, degeneration of lumbar or lumbosacral intervertebral disc, prolonged 

depressive reaction, and other acquired deformities of the ankle and foot. The record reflects 

that appellant was paid wage-loss compensation from February 1998 until she returned to work 

on November 13, 1998. She stopped work that day and was returned to the periodic rolls. 

Appellant was receiving compensation for total disability under that file number when she filed 

the March 30, 2016 claim, assigned File No. xxxxxx763. 

On October 5, 2009 appellant had also filed a claim for an alleged traumatic injury on 

November 18, 1998. This claim was denied as untimely on April 20, 2010.3

By letter dated April 25, 2016, OWCP requested that appellant submit further 

information to support her claim for a November 13, 1998 employment injury. It asked that she 

submit, inter alia, evidence to support that she provided timely notification of her work injury, 

evidence that she experienced an employment event or incident, and medical evidence in support 

of her claim. OWCP afforded appellant 30 days to submit the evidence. 

In a statement dated July 23, 2016, appellant contended that the fact that she had been 

injured at work in November 1998 had already been established, as well as the fact that she was 

working regular duty in November 1998. She alleged that her injury was the result of having to 

work starting November 13, 1998 beyond her physical restrictions. Appellant alleged that 

evidence supports that she was having difficulty after returning to work on November 13, 1998 

and that on November 18, 1998 the doctor recommended that she work light duty for two weeks. 

She alleged that her supervisor and the nurse for the employing establishment were fully aware 

of the danger they put her in by not complying with her work restrictions. Appellant also alleged 

that she sent notice of actual damage to OWCP on January 22, 1999. She asserted that her 

supervisor knew of her injury. 

 3

 Appellant continued to request further review of the denial of this claim by OWCP and the Board. In a 

December 2, 2011 decision, the Board found that OWCP had properly denied appellant’s request for 

reconsideration. Docket No. 11-983 (issued December 2, 2011). While the case was before the Board on this prior 

appeal OWCP issued an April 18, 2011 decision, which appellant subsequently appealed to the Board. By order 

dated April 23, 2012, the Board determined that, as OWCP and the Board could not have simultaneous jurisdiction 

over a case, OWCP’s decision of April 18, 2011 was declared null and void. By decision dated February 20, 2013, 

OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration as untimely filed and failing to demonstrate clear evidence of 

error. By decision dated September 5, 2013, the Board affirmed that decision. Docket No. 13-1242 (issued 

September 5, 2013). 
3

By decision dated August 9, 2016, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as it was untimely 

filed. It noted that the date of her alleged injury was November 13, 1998, and the claim for 

compensation was filed on March 30, 2016. OWCP explained that the claim should have been 

filed within three years of the date of injury. It further determined that appellant’s immediate 

supervisor did not have actual knowledge within 30 days of the date of injury.4

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

The issue of whether a claim was timely filed is a preliminary jurisdictional issue that 

precedes any determination on the merits of the claim.5

 In cases of injury on or after 

September 7, 1974, section 8122(a) of FECA provides that an original claim for compensation 

for disability or death must be filed within three years after the injury or death.6

 Compensation 

for disability or death, including medical care in disability cases, may not be allowed if a claim is 

not filed within that time unless: 

(1) the immediate superior had actual knowledge of the injury or death within 30 

days. The knowledge must be such as to put the immediate superior reasonably 

on notice of an on-the-job injury or death; or 

(2) written notice of injury or death as specified in section 8199 was given within 

30 days.7

 

Section 8119 of FECA provides that a notice of injury or death shall be given within 30 

days after the injury or death, be given to the immediate supervisor or the employee by personal 

delivery or by depositing it in the mail properly stamped and addressed, be in writing, state the 

name and address of the employee, state the year, month, day, and list the particular locality 

where the injury or death occurred, state the cause and nature of the injury or in the case of 

death, the employment factors believed to be the cause, and be signed by and contain the address 

of the person giving the notice.8

 Actual knowledge and written notice of injury under section 

8119 serve to satisfy the statutory period for filing an original claim for compensation.9

 For 

actual knowledge, the employee must show not only that the immediate superior knew that he or 

 4

 On August 17, 2016 appellant requested a review of the written record by an OWCP hearing representative 

regarding the denial of her claim. The decision by the hearing representative issued on February 15, 2007 is null 

and void. The Board and OWCP may not exercise simultaneous jurisdiction over the same issue on appeal. See

Arlonia Taylor, 44 ECAB 591, 597 (1993). 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(3). 

5 C.D., 58 ECAB 146 (2006); David R. Morey, 55 ECAB 642 (2004); Mitchell Murray, 53 ECAB 601 (2002). 

6 W.L., 59 ECAB 362 (2008); Gerald A. Preston, 57 ECAB 270 (2005); Laura L. Harrison, 52 ECAB 

515 (2001). 

7

 5 U.S.C. § 8122(a). See J.M., Docket No. 09-1563 (issued February 26, 2010); J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); 

Cory W. Davis, 57 ECAB 674 (2006). 

8

 5 U.S.C. § 8119; Larry E. Young, 52 ECAB 264 (2001). 

9 Laura L. Harrison, supra note 6.
4

she was injured, but also knew or reasonably should have known that it was an on-the-job 

injury.10

When a traumatic injury of definite time, place, and circumstances is involved, the time 

for giving notice of injury and filing for compensation begins to run at the time of the incident, 

even though the employee may not have been aware of the seriousness or ultimate consequences 

of this injury.11 The Board has held that the applicable statute of limitations commences to run 

although the employee does not know the precise nature of the impairment.12

ANALYSIS 

Appellant filed her claim for a traumatic injury on March 30, 2016, more than 17 years 

after the November 13, 1998 alleged employment incident. Therefore, her claim was filed 

outside the three-year time limitation period which ended on November 13, 2001.13

Appellant’s claim would still be regarded as timely under section 8122(a)(1) of FECA if 

her immediate superior or another employing establishment official had actual knowledge of the 

injury with 30 days of the date of injury.14 The knowledge must be such as to put the immediate 

superior reasonably on notice of an on-the-job injury.15 The evidence does not support that 

appellant advised her superior that she sustained a new injury on November 13, 1998, within 30 

days. Knowledge of an employee’s illness alone is insufficient to establish actual knowledge for 

timeliness. Appellant must show that the circumstances were such as to put the superior on 

notice that the alleged injury or condition was actually related to the employment as the 

employee alleged.16

The Board finds that appellant has not established actual knowledge by her supervisors of 

a work-related injury within 30 days of the date of the incident. Furthermore, the record is void 

of any indication that his superior had written notice of a claim within 30 days of the date of 

injury. Accordingly, the exceptions to the statue have not been met, and appellant has failed to 

file a timely claim. 

 10 Delmont L. Thompson, 51 ECAB 155 (1999). 

11 Emma L. Brooks, 37 ECAB 407 (1986). 

12 Supra note 10. 

13 See G.M., Docket No. 16-0220 (issued March 15, 2016). 

14 Larry E. Young, supra note 8. 

15 Kathryn A. Bernal, 38 ECAB 479 (1987). 

16 See id.; Roseanne S. Allexenberg, 47 ECAB 498 (1996) (where the Board held that knowledge of an 

employee’s illness is not sufficient to establish actual knowledge and timeliness of a claim. It must be shown that 

the circumstances were such as to put the superior on notice that the alleged injury was actually related to the 

employment as the employee alleged). 
5

Consequently, appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she filed a 

timely notice of traumatic injury claim for compensation under the applicable time limitation 

periods of FECA. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 10.605 

through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant’s claim for compensation was not filed within the 

applicable time limitation provisions of FECA. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs dated August 9, 2016 is affirmed. 

Issued: July 24, 2017 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board