(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., ET AL. v. 

MAKIN 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

No. 20–1088. Argued December 8, 2021—Decided June 21, 2022 

Maine has enacted a program of tuition assistance for parents who live 

in school districts that neither operate a secondary school of their own 

nor contract with a particular school in another district. Under that 

program, parents designate the secondary school they would like their

child to attend, and the school district transmits payments to that 

school to help defray the costs of tuition. Participating private schools

must meet certain requirements to be eligible to receive tuition payments, including either accreditation from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC) or approval from the Maine Department of Education. But they may otherwise differ from Maine 

public schools in various ways. Since 1981, however, Maine has limited tuition assistance payments to “nonsectarian” schools. 

Petitioners sought tuition assistance to send their children to Bangor Christian Schools (BCS) and Temple Academy. Although both 

BCS and Temple Academy are accredited by NEASC, the schools do

not qualify as “nonsectarian” and are thus ineligible to receive tuition

payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program. Petitioners sued 

the commissioner of the Maine Department of Education, alleging that 

the “nonsectarian” requirement violated the Free Exercise Clause and

the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District 

Court rejected petitioners’ constitutional claims and granted judgment

to the commissioner. The First Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause. 

Pp. 6–18.

(a) The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects 
 

 

2 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Syllabus 

against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, 

not just outright prohibitions.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 

Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 450. The Court recently applied this

principle in the context of two state efforts to withhold otherwise available public benefits from religious organizations. In Trinity Lutheran 

Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, the Court considered 

a Missouri program that offered grants to qualifying nonprofit organizations that installed cushioning playground surfaces, but denied such

grants to any applicant that was owned or controlled by a church, sect, 

or other religious entity. The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause 

did not permit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[ ] against otherwise

eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely 

because of their religious character.” 582 U. S., at ___–___. And in 

Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, the Court 

held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government 

aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or

denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious

schools. 591 U. S., at ___. “A State need not subsidize private education,” the Court concluded, “[b]ut once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.” 

Id., at ___. Pp. 6–8. 

(b) The principles applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice 

to resolve this case. Maine offers its citizens a benefit: tuition assistance payments for any family whose school district does not provide

a public secondary school. Just like the wide range of nonprofit organizations eligible to receive playground resurfacing grants in Trinity 

Lutheran, a wide range of private schools are eligible to receive Maine

tuition assistance payments here. And like the daycare center in Trinity Lutheran, the religious schools in this case are disqualified from

this generally available benefit “solely because of their religious character.” 582 U. S., at ___. Likewise, in Espinoza, as here, the Court 

considered a state benefit program that provided public funds to support tuition payments at private schools and specifically carved out 

private religious schools from those eligible to receive such funds. Both 

that program and this one disqualify certain private schools from public funding “solely because they are religious.” 591 U. S., at ___. A law 

that operates in that manner must be subjected to “the strictest scrutiny.” Id., at ___–___. 

Maine’s program cannot survive strict scrutiny. A neutral benefit 

program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through 

the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend 

the Establishment Clause. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 

639, 652–653. Maine’s decision to continue excluding religious schools 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Syllabus 

from its tuition assistance program after Zelman thus promotes

stricter separation of church and state than the Federal Constitution 

requires. But a State’s antiestablishment interest does not justify enactments that exclude some members of the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise. Pp. 9–11.

(c) The First Circuit’s attempts to recharacterize the nature of 

Maine’s tuition assistance program do not suffice to distinguish this 

case from Trinity Lutheran or Espinoza. Pp. 11–18. 

(1) The First Circuit held that the “nonsectarian” requirement was

constitutional because the benefit was properly viewed not as tuition 

payments to be used at approved private schools but instead as funding for the “rough equivalent of the public school education that Maine

may permissibly require to be secular.” 979 F. 3d 21, 44. But the statute does not say anything like that. The benefit provided by statute is

tuition at a public or private school, selected by the parent, with no 

suggestion that the “private school” must somehow provide a “public” 

education. Moreover, the differences between private schools eligible

to receive tuition assistance under Maine’s program and a Maine public school are numerous and important. To start with, private schools 

do not have to accept all students, while public schools generally do. 

In addition, the free public education that Maine insists it is providing 

through the tuition assistance program is often not free, as some participating private schools charge several times the maximum benefit 

that Maine is willing to provide. And the curriculum taught at participating private schools need not even resemble that taught in the 

Maine public schools.

The key manner in which participating private schools are required

to resemble Maine public schools, however, is that they must be secular. Maine may provide a strictly secular education in its public 

schools. But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous other recipients of Maine tuition assistance payments—are not public schools. 

Maine has chosen to offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to

the public or private schools of their choice. Maine’s administration of 

that benefit is subject to the free exercise principles governing any

public benefit program—including the prohibition on denying the benefit based on a recipient’s religious exercise. Pp. 11–15.

(2) The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish this case from 

Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza on the ground that the funding restrictions in those cases were “solely status-based religious discrimination,” while the challenged provision here “imposes a use-based restriction.” 979 F. 3d, at 35, 37–38. Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza

held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids discrimination on the basis 

of religious status. But those decisions never suggested that use-based 
 

 

 

 

4 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Syllabus 

discrimination is any less offensive to the Free Exercise Clause. This 

case illustrates why. “[E]ducating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious 

school.” Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 

___, ___. In short, the prohibition on status-based discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause is not a permission to engage in usebased discrimination. 

Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, does not assist Maine here. The scholarship funds at issue in Locke were intended to be used “to prepare for 

the ministry.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___. Locke’s reasoning

expressly turned on what it identified as the “historic and substantial

state interest” against using “taxpayer funds to support church leaders.” 540 U. S., at 722, 725. But “it is clear that there is no ‘historic 

and substantial’ tradition against aiding [private religious] schools” 

that is “comparable.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___. Locke cannot be read 

to generally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from the

enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their anticipated religious

use of the benefits. Pp. 15–18. 

979 F. 3d 21, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 

ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed 

a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN J., joined, and in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to all but Part I–B. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
 

 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1088 

DAVID CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. A. PENDER MAKIN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2022] 

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the 

Court. 

Maine has enacted a program of tuition assistance for 

parents who live in school districts that do not operate a 

secondary school of their own. Under the program, parents

designate the secondary school they would like their child

to attend—public or private—and the school district transmits payments to that school to help defray the costs of tuition. Most private schools are eligible to receive the payments, so long as they are “nonsectarian.” The question

presented is whether this restriction violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 

I 

A 

Maine’s Constitution provides that the State’s legislature 

shall “require . . . the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support and maintenance 

of public schools.” Me. Const., Art. VIII, pt. 1, §1. In accordance with that command, the legislature has required 

that every school-age child in Maine “shall be provided an 
 

 

 

 

2 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

opportunity to receive the benefits of a free public education,” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §2(1) (2008), and that

the required schools be operated by “the legislative and governing bodies of local school administrative units,” §2(2).

But Maine is the most rural State in the Union, and for 

many school districts the realities of remote geography and

low population density make those commands difficult to 

heed. Indeed, of Maine’s 260 school administrative units 

(SAUs), fewer than half operate a public secondary school 

of their own. App. 4, 70, 73.

Maine has sought to deal with this problem in part by

creating a program of tuition assistance for families that 

reside in such areas. Under that program, if an SAU neither operates its own public secondary school nor contracts

with a particular public or private school for the education 

of its school-age children, the SAU must “pay the tuition . . . 

at the public school or the approved private school of the 

parent’s choice at which the student is accepted.” Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §5204(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021). Parents 

who wish to take advantage of this benefit first select the 

school they wish their child to attend. Ibid. If they select a

private school that has been “approved” by the Maine Department of Education, the parents’ SAU “shall pay the tuition” at the chosen school up to a specified maximum rate.

See §§2902, 2951, 5204(4). 

To be “approved” to receive these payments, a private

school must meet certain basic requirements under Maine’s 

compulsory education law. §2951(1). The school must either be “[c]urrently accredited by a New England association of schools and colleges” or separately “approv[ed] for 

attendance purposes” by the Department. §§2901(2), 2902.

Schools seeking approval from the Department must meet

specified curricular requirements, such as using English as

the language of instruction, offering a course in “Maine history, including the Constitution of Maine . . . and Maine’s 

cultural and ethnic heritage,” and maintaining a student-
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

teacher ratio of not more than 30 to 1. §§2902(2), 2902(3), 

4706(2), 2902(6)(C).

The program imposes no geographic limitation: Parents

may direct tuition payments to schools inside or outside the

State, or even in foreign countries. §§2951(3), 5808. In 

schools that qualify for the program because they are accredited, teachers need not be certified by the State, 

§13003(3), and Maine’s curricular requirements do not apply, §2901(2). Single-sex schools are eligible. See Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, §4553(2–A) (exempting single-sex private, but not public, schools from Maine’s antidiscrimination law).

Prior to 1981, parents could also direct the tuition assistance payments to religious schools. Indeed, in the 1979– 

1980 school year, over 200 Maine students opted to attend 

such schools through the tuition assistance program. App.

72. In 1981, however, Maine imposed a new requirement

that any school receiving tuition assistance payments must

be “a nonsectarian school in accordance with the First 

Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §2951(2). That provision was enacted 

in response to an opinion by the Maine attorney general

taking the position that public funding of private religious

schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First 

Amendment. We subsequently held, however, that a benefit program under which private citizens “direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own 

genuine and independent private choice” does not offend 

the Establishment Clause. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 

U. S. 639, 652 (2002). Following our decision in Zelman, 

the Maine Legislature considered a proposed bill to repeal 

the “nonsectarian” requirement, but rejected it. App. 100, 

108. 

The “nonsectarian” requirement for participation in

Maine’s tuition assistance program remains in effect today. 
 

 

 

4 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

The Department has stated that, in administering this requirement, it “considers a sectarian school to be one that is 

associated with a particular faith or belief system and 

which, in addition to teaching academic subjects, promotes

the faith or belief system with which it is associated and/or 

presents the material taught through the lens of this faith.”

979 F. 3d 21, 38 (CA1 2020). “The Department’s focus is on

what the school teaches through its curriculum and related 

activities, and how the material is presented.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). “[A]ffiliation or association with a church 

or religious institution is one potential indicator of a sectarian school,” but “it is not dispositive.” Ibid. 

B 

This case concerns two families that live in SAUs that 

neither maintain their own secondary schools nor contract

with any nearby secondary school. App. 70, 71. Petitioners 

David and Amy Carson reside in Glenburn, Maine. Id., at 

74. When this litigation commenced, the Carsons’ daughter 

attended high school at Bangor Christian Schools (BCS),

which was founded in 1970 as a ministry of Bangor Baptist 

Church. Id., at 74, 80. The Carsons sent their daughter to

BCS because of the school’s high academic standards and 

because the school’s Christian worldview aligns with their

sincerely held religious beliefs. Id., at 74. Given that BCS 

is a “sectarian” school that cannot qualify for tuition assistance payments under Maine’s program, id., at 80, the Carsons paid the tuition for their daughter to attend BCS 

themselves, id., at 74. 

Petitioners Troy and Angela Nelson live in Palermo, 

Maine. Id., at 78. When this litigation commenced, the 

Nelsons’ daughter attended high school at Erskine Academy, a secular private school, and their son attended middle school at Temple Academy, a “sectarian” school affiliated with Centerpoint Community Church. Id., at 78, 90, 

91. The Nelsons sent their son to Temple Academy because 
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

they believed it offered him a high-quality education that 

aligned with their sincerely held religious beliefs. Id., at 

78. While they wished to send their daughter to Temple 

Academy too, they could not afford to pay the cost of the

Academy’s tuition for both of their children. Id., at 79. 

BCS and Temple Academy are both accredited by the

New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), 

and the Department considers each school a “private school 

approved for attendance purposes” under the State’s compulsory attendance requirement. Id., at 80, 90. Yet because 

neither school qualifies as “nonsectarian,” neither is eligible 

to receive tuition payments under Maine’s tuition assistance program. Id., at 80, 90. Absent the “nonsectarian” 

requirement, the Carsons and the Nelsons would have 

asked their respective SAUs to pay the tuition to send their 

children to BCS and Temple Academy, respectively. Id., at 

79. 

In 2018, petitioners brought suit against the commissioner of the Maine Department of Education. Id., at 11– 

12. They alleged that the “nonsectarian” requirement of 

Maine’s tuition assistance program violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First 

Amendment, id., at 23–27, as well as the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 29–30. Their 

complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against 

enforcement of the requirement. Id., at 31–32. The parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment on a stipulated 

record. 401 F. Supp. 3d 207, 208 (Me. 2019). Applying Circuit precedent that had previously upheld the “nonsectarian” requirement against challenge, see Eulitt v. Maine 

Dept. of Ed., 386 F. 3d 344 (CA1 2004), the District Court 

rejected petitioners’ constitutional claims and granted judgment to the commissioner. 401 F. Supp. 3d, at 209–212.

While petitioners’ appeal to the First Circuit was pending, this Court decided Espinoza v. Montana Department of 
 

6 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

Revenue, 591 U. S. ___ (2020). Espinoza held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid 

to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church,

sect, or denomination,” Art. X, §6(1), violated the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting families from using otherwise 

available scholarship funds at the religious schools of their 

choosing. The First Circuit recognized that, in light of Espinoza, its prior precedent upholding Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement was no longer controlling. 979 F. 3d, 

at 32–36. But it nevertheless affirmed the District Court’s 

grant of judgment to the commissioner. Id., at 49. 

As relevant here, the First Circuit offered two grounds to

distinguish Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement from the

no-aid provision at issue in Espinoza. First, the panel reasoned that, whereas Montana had barred schools from receiving funding “simply based on their religious identity—

a status that in and of itself does not determine how a school 

would use the funds”—Maine bars BCS and Temple Academy from receiving funding “based on the religious use that 

they would make of it in instructing children.” 979 F. 3d, 

at 40. Second, the panel determined that Maine’s tuition

assistance program was distinct from the scholarships at 

issue in Espinoza because Maine had sought to provide “a 

rough equivalent of the public school education that Maine 

may permissibly require to be secular but that is not otherwise accessible.” 979 F. 3d, at 44. Thus, “the nature of the 

restriction at issue and the nature of the school aid program 

of which it is a key part” led the panel to conclude “once

again” that Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 46. 

We granted certiorari. 594 U. S. ___ (2021). 

II 

A 

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment pro-
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

tects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.” Lyng v. 

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 

450 (1988). In particular, we have repeatedly held that a

State violates the Free Exercise Clause when it excludes 

religious observers from otherwise available public benefits. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963) (“It 

is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion

and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing 

of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.”); see also Everson 

v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 16 (1947) (a State

“cannot exclude” individuals “because of their faith, or lack 

of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation”). A State may not withhold unemployment benefits,

for instance, on the ground that an individual lost his job

for refusing to abandon the dictates of his faith. See Sherbert, 374 U. S., at 399–402 (Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. 

Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 709, 720 (1981) 

(Jehovah’s Witness who refused to participate in the production of armaments).

We have recently applied these principles in the context

of two state efforts to withhold otherwise available public 

benefits from religious organizations. In Trinity Lutheran 

Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), we 

considered a Missouri program that offered grants to qualifying nonprofit organizations that installed cushioning

playground surfaces made from recycled rubber tires. The 

Missouri Department of Natural Resources maintained an

express policy of denying such grants to any applicant 

owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity. The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center

applied for a grant to resurface its gravel playground, but 

the Department denied funding on the ground that the Center was operated by the Church. 
 

 

 

8 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

We deemed it “unremarkable in light of our prior decisions” to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[] against otherwise

eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.” Id., at ___– 

___ (slip op., at 9–10). While it was true that Trinity Lutheran remained “free to continue operating as a church,” it 

could enjoy that freedom only “at the cost of automatic and 

absolute exclusion from the benefits of a public program for 

which the Center [was] otherwise fully qualified.” Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 10) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 

626 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Such discrimination, we 

said, was “odious to our Constitution” and could not stand. 

582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). 

Two Terms ago, in Espinoza, we reached the same conclusion as to a Montana program that provided tax credits

to donors who sponsored scholarships for private school tuition. The Montana Supreme Court held that the program, 

to the extent it included religious schools, violated a provision of the Montana Constitution that barred government

aid to any school controlled in whole or in part by a church, 

sect, or denomination. As a result of that holding, the State 

terminated the scholarship program, preventing the petitioners from accessing scholarship funds they otherwise 

would have used to fund their children’s educations at religious schools. 

We again held that the Free Exercise Clause forbade the 

State’s action. The application of the Montana Constitution’s no-aid provision, we explained, required strict scrutiny because it “bar[red] religious schools from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the schools.” 

Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). “A State need not 

subsidize private education,” we concluded, “[b]ut once a

State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private

schools solely because they are religious.” Id., at ___ (slip

op., at 20). 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

The “unremarkable” principles applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice to resolve this case. Maine offers its citizens a benefit: tuition assistance payments for 

any family whose school district does not provide a public 

secondary school. Just like the wide range of nonprofit organizations eligible to receive playground resurfacing

grants in Trinity Lutheran, a wide range of private schools

are eligible to receive Maine tuition assistance payments 

here. And like the daycare center in Trinity Lutheran, BCS 

and Temple Academy are disqualified from this generally 

available benefit “solely because of their religious character.” 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). By “condition[ing]

the availability of benefits” in that manner, Maine’s tuition

assistance program—like the program in Trinity Lutheran—“effectively penalizes the free exercise” of religion. 

Ibid. (quoting McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 626 (plurality opinion)).

Our recent decision in Espinoza applied these basic principles in the context of religious education that we consider 

today. There, as here, we considered a state benefit program under which public funds flowed to support tuition

payments at private schools. And there, as here, that program specifically carved out private religious schools from 

those eligible to receive such funds. While the wording of 

the Montana and Maine provisions is different, their effect 

is the same: to “disqualify some private schools” from funding “solely because they are religious.” 591 U. S., at ___ 

(slip op., at 20). A law that operates in that manner, we

held in Espinoza, must be subjected to “the strictest scrutiny.” Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12). 

To satisfy strict scrutiny, government action “must advance ‘interests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly 

tailored in pursuit of those interests.” Church of Lukumi 

Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993) (quoting McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 628 (plurality opinion)). “A law 
 

10 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment . . . 

will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.” 508 U. S., at 

546. 

This is not one of them. As noted, a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow to religious organizations

through the independent choices of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause. See Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652–653. Maine’s decision to continue 

excluding religious schools from its tuition assistance program after Zelman thus promotes stricter separation of

church and state than the Federal Constitution requires. 

See also post, at 4 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (States may 

choose “not to fund certain religious activity . . . even when 

the Establishment Clause does not itself prohibit the State 

from funding that activity”); post, at 1 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (same point).

But as we explained in both Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, such an “interest in separating church and state ‘more 

fiercely’ than the Federal Constitution . . . ‘cannot qualify 

as compelling’ in the face of the infringement of free exercise.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 18) (quoting 

Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14)); see also 

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 276 (1981) (“[T]he state 

interest . . . in achieving greater separation of church and

State than is already ensured under the Establishment 

Clause . . . is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.”). 

JUSTICE BREYER stresses the importance of “government

neutrality” when it comes to religious matters, post, at 13, 

but there is nothing neutral about Maine’s program. The 

State pays tuition for certain students at private schools—

so long as the schools are not religious. That is discrimination against religion. A State’s antiestablishment interest 

does not justify enactments that exclude some members of 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

the community from an otherwise generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise.* 

III 

The First Circuit attempted to distinguish our precedent

by recharacterizing the nature of Maine’s tuition assistance 

program in two ways, both of which Maine echoes before 

this Court. First, the panel defined the benefit at issue as

the “rough equivalent of [a Maine] public school education,” 

an education that cannot include sectarian instruction. 979 

F. 3d, at 44; see also Brief for Respondent 22. Second, the 

panel defined the nature of the exclusion as one based not 

on a school’s religious “status,” as in Trinity Lutheran and 

Espinoza, but on religious “uses” of public funds. 979 F. 3d, 

at 38–40; see also Brief for Respondent 35. Neither of these 

formal distinctions suffices to distinguish this case from 

Trinity Lutheran or Espinoza, or to affect the application of 

the free exercise principles outlined above. 

A 

The First Circuit held that the “nonsectarian” requirement was constitutional because the benefit was properly

viewed not as tuition assistance payments to be used at approved private schools, but instead as funding for the

“rough equivalent of the public school education that Maine 

may permissibly require to be secular.” 979 F. 3d, at 44. As 

Maine puts it, “[t]he public benefit Maine is offering is a 

free public education.” Brief for Respondent 1–2.

To start with, the statute does not say anything like that.

It says that an SAU without a secondary school of its own 

—————— 

*Both dissents articulate a number of other reasons not to extend the 

tuition assistance program to BCS and Temple Academy, based on the 

schools’ particular policies and practices. Post, at 15–16 (opinion of 

BREYER, J.); post, at 4 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). Maine rightly does not

attempt to defend its law on such grounds, however, because the law rigidly excludes any and all sectarian schools regardless of particular characteristics. See supra, at 3. 
 

12 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

“shall pay the tuition . . . at the public school or the approved private school of the parent’s choice at which the

student is accepted.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, 

§5204(4). The benefit is tuition at a public or private school,

selected by the parent, with no suggestion that the “private

school” must somehow provide a “public” education. 

This reading of the statute is confirmed by the program’s 

operation. The differences between private schools eligible

to receive tuition assistance under Maine’s program and a 

Maine public school are numerous and important. To start 

with the most obvious, private schools are different by definition because they do not have to accept all students. Public schools generally do. Second, the free public education

that Maine insists it is providing through the tuition assistance program is often not free. That “assistance” is available at private schools that charge several times the maximum benefit that Maine is willing to provide. See 

Stipulated Record, Exh. 2, in No. 1:18–cv–327 (Me., Mar. 

12, 2019), ECF Doc. 24–2, p. 11; Brief for Respondent 32. 

Moreover, the curriculum taught at participating private

schools need not even resemble that taught in the Maine 

public schools. For example, Maine public schools must 

abide by certain “parameters for essential instruction in 

English language arts; mathematics; science and technology; social studies; career and education development; visual and performing arts; health, physical education and 

wellness; and world languages.” §6209. But NEASCaccredited private schools are exempt from these requirements, and instead subject only to general “standards and

indicators” governing the implementation of their own chosen curriculum. Brief for Respondent 32; see NEASC,

Standards—20/20 Process (rev. Aug. 2021), https://cis.

neasc.org/standards2020 (requiring, for instance, that

“[c]urriculum planning supports the school’s core beliefs 

and the needs of the students,” and that the “[w]ritten curriculum aligns horizontally and vertically”). 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

Private schools approved by the Department (rather than

accredited by NEASC) are likewise exempt from many of 

the State’s curricular requirements, so long as fewer than

60% of their students receive tuition assistance from the 

State. For instance, such schools need not abide by Maine’s

“comprehensive, statewide system of learning results,” including the “parameters for essential instruction” referenced above, and they need not administer the annual state 

assessments in English language arts, mathematics, and 

science. §§2951(6), 6209; see also ECF Doc. 24–2, at 9. 

There are other distinctions, too. Participating schools

need not hire state-certified teachers. Compare Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §13003(1), with §13003(3). And the 

schools can be single-sex. See ECF Doc. 24–2, at 11. In 

short, it is simply not the case that these schools, to be eligible for state funds, must offer an education that is equivalent—roughly or otherwise—to that available in the Maine

public schools.

But the key manner in which the two educational experiences are required to be “equivalent” is that they must both

be secular. Saying that Maine offers a benefit limited to 

private secular education is just another way of saying that

Maine does not extend tuition assistance payments to parents who choose to educate their children at religious

schools. But “the definition of a particular program can always be manipulated to subsume the challenged condition,” 

and to allow States to “recast a condition on funding” in this

manner would be to see “the First Amendment . . . reduced 

to a simple semantic exercise.” Agency for Int’l Development 

v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205, 215 

(2013) (quoting Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 

531 U. S. 533, 547 (2001)); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of 

City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were,

religious gerrymanders.”). Maine’s formulation does not 
 

14 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

answer the question in this case; it simply restates it. 

Indeed, were we to accept Maine’s argument, our decision 

in Espinoza would be rendered essentially meaningless. By

Maine’s logic, Montana could have obtained the same result 

that we held violated the First Amendment simply by redefining its tax credit for sponsors of generally available scholarships as limited to “tuition payments for the rough equivalent of a Montana public education”—meaning a secular 

education. But our holding in Espinoza turned on the substance of free exercise protections, not on the presence or 

absence of magic words. That holding applies fully whether

the prohibited discrimination is in an express provision like

§2951(2) or in a party’s reconceptualization of the public 

benefit. 

Maine may provide a strictly secular education in its public schools. But BCS and Temple Academy—like numerous 

other recipients of Maine tuition assistance payments—are 

not public schools. In order to provide an education to children who live in certain parts of its far-flung State, Maine 

has decided not to operate schools of its own, but instead to 

offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to the public 

or private schools of their choice. Maine’s administration of 

that benefit is subject to the free exercise principles governing any such public benefit program—including the prohibition on denying the benefit based on a recipient’s religious 

exercise. 

The dissents are wrong to say that under our decision today Maine “must” fund religious education. Post, at 7 

(BREYER, J., dissenting). Maine chose to allow some parents to direct state tuition payments to private schools; that

decision was not “forced upon” it. Post, at 4 (SOTOMAYOR, 

J., dissenting). The State retains a number of options: it

could expand the reach of its public school system, increase

the availability of transportation, provide some combination of tutoring, remote learning, and partial attendance, or 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

Opinion of the Court 

even operate boarding schools of its own. As we held in Espinoza, a “State need not subsidize private education. But 

once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.” 591 U. S., 

at ___ (slip op., at 20). 

B 

The Court of Appeals also attempted to distinguish this 

case from Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza on the ground

that the funding restrictions in those cases were “solely status-based religious discrimination,” while the challenged 

provision here “imposes a use-based restriction.” 979 F. 3d, 

at 35, 37–38. JUSTICE BREYER makes the same argument. 

Post, at 8–9, 13–14 (dissenting opinion).

In Trinity Lutheran, the Missouri Constitution banned 

the use of public funds in aid of “any church, sect or denomination of religion.” 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 2–3). 

We noted that the case involved “express discrimination 

based on religious identity,” which was sufficient unto the 

day in deciding it, and that our opinion did “not address religious uses of funding.” Id., at ___, n. 3 (plurality opinion) 

(slip op., at 14, n. 3).

So too in Espinoza, the discrimination at issue was described by the Montana Supreme Court as a prohibition on 

aiding “schools controlled by churches,” and we analyzed 

the issue in terms of “religious status and not religious use.” 

591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). Foreshadowing Maine’s

argument here, Montana argued that its case was different 

from Trinity Lutheran’s because it involved not playground

resurfacing, but general funds that “could be used for religious ends by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should ‘permeate[]’ everything they do.” Id., at 

___ (slip op., at 11). We explained, however, that the strict 

scrutiny triggered by status-based discrimination could not 

be avoided by arguing that “one of its goals or effects [was] 
 

16 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses.” Ibid. (emphasis added). And we noted that 

nothing in our analysis was “meant to suggest that we 

agree[d] with [Montana] that some lesser degree of scrutiny

applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). 

Maine’s argument, however—along with the decision below and JUSTICE BREYER’s dissent—is premised on precisely such a distinction. See Brief for Respondent 44

(“Maine has not broadly excluded private schools simply because they are affiliated with or controlled by a religious

organization. Rather, a school is excluded only if it promotes a particular faith and presents academic material

through the lens of that faith.”); 979 F. 3d, at 40 (Maine provision “does not bar schools from receiving funding simply 

based on their religious identity” but instead “based on the 

religious use that they would make of it in instructing children.”); post, at 9 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (“[U]nlike the circumstances present in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, it is 

religious activity, not religious labels, that lies at the heart 

of this case.”).

That premise, however, misreads our precedents. In 

Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, we held that the Free Exercise Clause forbids discrimination on the basis of religious 

status. But those decisions never suggested that use-based 

discrimination is any less offensive to the Free Exercise

Clause. This case illustrates why. “[E]ducating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training 

them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the 

very core of the mission of a private religious school.” Our 

Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 

___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 18); see also Hosanna-Tabor 

Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 

U. S. 171, 192 (2012).

Any attempt to give effect to such a distinction by scruti-
 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

Opinion of the Court 

nizing whether and how a religious school pursues its educational mission would also raise serious concerns about 

state entanglement with religion and denominational favoritism. See Our Lady, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26); 

Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 244 (1982). Indeed, Maine 

concedes that the Department barely engages in any such

scrutiny when enforcing the “nonsectarian” requirement.

See Brief for Respondent 5 (asserting that there will be no 

need to probe private schools’ uses of tuition assistance 

funds because “schools self-identify as nonsectarian” under 

the program and the need for any further questioning is 

“extremely rare”). That suggests that any status-use distinction lacks a meaningful application not only in theory,

but in practice as well. In short, the prohibition on statusbased discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause is not 

a permission to engage in use-based discrimination.

Maine and the dissents invoke Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 

712 (2004), in support of the argument that the State may 

preclude parents from designating a religious school to receive tuition assistance payments. In that case, Washington had established a scholarship fund to assist academically gifted students with postsecondary education 

expenses. But the program excluded one particular use of 

the scholarship funds: the “essentially religious endeavor” 

of pursuing a degree designed to “train[] a minister to lead 

a congregation.” Id., at 721; Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 13). We upheld that restriction against a free exercise challenge, reasoning that the State had “merely chosen

not to fund a distinct category of instruction.” Locke, 540 

U. S., at 721. 

Our opinions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, however, 

have already explained why Locke can be of no help to 

Maine here. Both precedents emphasized, as did Locke itself, that the funding in Locke was intended to be used “to 

prepare for the ministry.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 12); see also Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip 
 

18 CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

op., at 13); Locke, 540 U. S., at 725. Funds could be and 

were used for theology courses; only pursuing a “vocational 

religious” degree was excluded. Ibid.; see also Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13) (explaining 

narrow reach of Locke); Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 

op., at 13–14) (same). 

Locke’s reasoning expressly turned on what it identified 

as the “historic and substantial state interest” against using “taxpayer funds to support church leaders.” 540 U. S., 

at 722, 725. But as we explained at length in Espinoza, “it 

is clear that there is no ‘historic and substantial’ tradition 

against aiding [private religious] schools comparable to the 

tradition against state-supported clergy invoked by Locke.” 

591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16). Locke cannot be read beyond its narrow focus on vocational religious degrees to generally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from 

the enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their anticipated religious use of the benefits. 

* * * 

Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for its otherwise

generally available tuition assistance payments violates 

the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Regardless of how the benefit and restriction are described, the 

program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible 

schools on the basis of their religious exercise. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1088 

DAVID CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. A. PENDER MAKIN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2022] 

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, and 

with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins except as to Part I–

B, dissenting. 

The First Amendment begins by forbidding the government from “mak[ing] [any] law respecting an establishment 

of religion.” It next forbids them to make any law “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The Court today pays almost no attention to the words in the first Clause while giving almost exclusive attention to the words in the second. 

The majority also fails to recognize the “‘play in the joints’” 

between the two Clauses. See Trinity Lutheran Church of 

Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., 

at 6). That “play” gives States some degree of legislative 

leeway. It sometimes allows a State to further antiestablishment interests by withholding aid from religious institutions without violating the Constitution’s protections for

the free exercise of religion. In my view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement falls squarely within the scope of that 

constitutional leeway. I respectfully dissent. 

I 

A 

The First Amendment’s two Religion Clauses together

provide that the government “shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
 

 

2 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

thereof.” Each Clause, linguistically speaking, is “cast in

absolute terms.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 

397 U. S. 664, 668 (1970). The first Clause, the Establishment Clause, seems to bar all government “sponsorship, financial support, [or] active involvement . . . in religious activity,” while the second Clause, the Free Exercise Clause,

seems to bar all “governmental restraint on religious practice.” Id., at 668, 670. The apparently absolutist nature of

these two prohibitions means that either Clause, “if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the

other.” Id., at 668–669. Because of this, we have said, the 

two Clauses “are frequently in tension,” Locke v. Davey, 

540 U. S. 712, 718 (2004), and “often exert conflicting pressures” on government action, Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 

709, 719 (2005).

On the one hand, the Free Exercise Clause “‘protect[s]

religious observers against unequal treatment.’” Trinity 

Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Church 

of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 542 

(1993); alteration in original). We have said that, in the 

education context, this means that States generally cannot

“ba[r] religious schools from public benefits solely because 

of the religious character of the schools.” Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 

9); see Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 

9–10).

On the other hand, the Establishment Clause “commands 

a separation of church and state.” Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719. 

A State cannot act to “aid one religion, aid all religions, or 

prefer one religion over another.” Everson v. Board of Ed. 

of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947). This means that a State 

cannot use “its public school system to aid any or all religious faiths or sects in the dissemination of their doctrines 

and ideals.” Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Ed. of 

School Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203, 211 

(1948). Nor may a State “adopt programs or practices in its 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

public schools . . . which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion.” Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968). “This prohibition,” we have cautioned, “is absolute.” Ibid. See, e.g., 

McCollum, 333 U. S. 203 (no weekly religious teachings in 

public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962) (no 

prayers in public schools); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963) (no Bible readings in 

public schools); Epperson, 393 U. S. 97 (no religiously tailored curriculum in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 

U. S. 38 (1985) (no period of silence for meditation or prayer 

in public schools); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992) (no

prayers during public school graduations); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290 (2000) (no prayers during public school football games).

Although the Religion Clauses are, in practice, often in 

tension, they nonetheless “express complementary values.” 

Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719. Together they attempt to chart a 

“course of constitutional neutrality” with respect to government and religion. Walz, 397 U. S., at 669. They were written to help create an American Nation free of the religious

conflict that had long plagued European nations with “governmentally established religion[s].” Engel, 370 U. S., at 

431. Through the Clauses, the Framers sought to avoid the

“anguish, hardship and bitter strife” that resulted from the

“union of Church and State” in those countries. Id., at 429; 

see also Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. 

Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 795–796 (1973). 

The Religion Clauses thus created a compromise in the 

form of religious freedom. They aspired to create a “benevolent neutrality”—one which would “permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” 

Walz, 397 U. S., at 669. “[T]he basic purpose of these provisions” was “to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.” Ibid. This 

religious freedom in effect meant that people “were entitled 
 

 

4 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

to worship God in their own way and to teach their children” in that way. C. Radcliffe, The Law & Its Compass 71 

(1960). We have historically interpreted the Religion

Clauses with these basic principles in mind. See, e.g., 

Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 771–772, 794–796; Walz, 397 U. S., at 

668–670; Engel, 370 U. S., at 429–432. 

And in applying these Clauses, we have often said that

“there is room for play in the joints” between them. Walz, 

397 U. S., at 669; see, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 

455, 469 (1973); Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719; Locke, 540 U. S., 

at 718–719; Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 

6); Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). This doctrine 

reflects the fact that it may be difficult to determine in any

particular case whether the Free Exercise Clause requires

a State to fund the activities of a religious institution, or 

whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the State from 

doing so. Rather than attempting to draw a highly reticulated and complex free-exercise/establishment line that 

varies based on the specific circumstances of each statefunded program, we have provided general interpretive

principles that apply uniformly in all Religion Clause cases. 

At the same time, we have made clear that States enjoy a 

degree of freedom to navigate the Clauses’ competing prohibitions. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U. S., at 713, 719–720. This 

includes choosing not to fund certain religious activity

where States have strong, establishment-related reasons 

for not doing so. See, e.g., Locke, 540 U. S., at 719–722. 

And, States have freedom to make this choice even when 

the Establishment Clause does not itself prohibit the State 

from funding that activity. Id., at 719 (“[T]here are some

state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but 

not required by the Free Exercise Clause”). The Court today nowhere mentions, and I fear effectively abandons, this 

longstanding doctrine. 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

B 

I have previously discussed my views of the relationship 

between the Religion Clauses and how I believe these 

Clauses should be interpreted to advance their goal of 

avoiding religious strife. See, e.g., Espinoza, 591 U. S., at 

___–___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 13–20); Van Orden 

v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 698–705 (2005) (opinion concurring

in judgment); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 

717–729 (2002) (dissenting opinion). Here I simply note the

increased risk of religiously based social conflict when government promotes religion in its public school system.

“[T]he prescription of prayer and Bible reading in the public 

schools, during and as part of the curricular day, involving

young impressionable children whose school attendance is

statutorily compelled,” can “give rise to those very divisive

influences and inhibitions of freedom which both religion 

clauses of the First Amendment” sought to prevent. 

Schempp, 374 U. S., at 307 (Goldberg, J., concurring).

This potential for religious strife is still with us. We are 

today a Nation with well over 100 different religious

groups, from Free Will Baptist to African Methodist, Buddhist to Humanist. See Pew Research Center, America’s 

Changing Religious Landscape 21 (May 12, 2015). People

in our country adhere to a vast array of beliefs, ideals, and 

philosophies. And with greater religious diversity comes 

greater risk of religiously based strife, conflict, and social

division. The Religion Clauses were written in part to help 

avoid that disunion. As Thomas Jefferson, one of the leading drafters and proponents of those Clauses, wrote, “‘to

compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the

propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and

tyrannical.’” Everson, 330 U. S., at 13. And as James Madison, another drafter and proponent, said, compelled taxpayer sponsorship of religion “is itself a signal of persecution,” which “will destroy that moderation and harmony 
 

 

 

6 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its several sects.” Id., at 68– 

69 (appendix to dissenting opinion of Rutledge, J.). To interpret the Clauses with these concerns in mind may help

to further their original purpose of avoiding religious-based

division. 

I have also previously explained why I believe that a

“rigid, bright-line” approach to the Religion Clauses—an 

approach without any leeway or “play in the joints”—will

too often work against the Clauses’ underlying purposes. 

Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 

18); see also Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 669–700 (opinion concurring in judgment). “[G]overnment benefits come in 

many shapes and sizes.” Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 16) (dissenting opinion). Not all state-funded programs that have religious restrictions carry the same risk 

of creating social division and conflict. In my view, that risk

can best be understood by considering the particular benefit

at issue, along with the reasons for the particular religious 

restriction at issue. See ibid.; Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., 

at ___ (slip op., at 1) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). 

Recognition that States enjoy a degree of constitutional leeway allows States to enact laws sensitive to local circumstances while also allowing this Court to consider those circumstances in light of the basic values underlying the 

Religion Clauses.

In a word, to interpret the two Clauses as if they were

joined at the hip will work against their basic purpose: to

allow for an American society with practitioners of over 100 

different religions, and those who do not practice religion at

all, to live together without serious risk of religion-based

social divisions. 

II 

The majority believes that the principles set forth in this

Court’s earlier cases easily resolve this case. But they do 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

not. 

We have previously found, as the majority points out, 

that “a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow 

to religious organizations through the independent choices 

of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establishment Clause.” Ante, at 10 (citing Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652– 

653). We have thus concluded that a State may, consistent 

with the Establishment Clause, provide funding to religious 

schools through a general public funding program if the

“government aid . . . reach[es] religious institutions only by 

way of the deliberate choices of . . . individual [aid] recipients.” Id., at 652. 

But the key word is “may.” We have never previously

held what the Court holds today, namely, that a State must 

(not may) use state funds to pay for religious education as

part of a tuition program designed to ensure the provision

of free statewide public school education. 

What happens once “may” becomes “must”? Does that 

transformation mean that a school district that pays for

public schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who 

wish to send their children to religious schools? Does it 

mean that school districts that give vouchers for use at

charter schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who 

wish to give their children a religious education? What 

other social benefits are there the State’s provision of which

means—under the majority’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause—that the State must pay parents for the religious equivalent of the secular benefit provided? The concept of “play in the joints” means that courts need not, and

should not, answer with “must” these questions that can

more appropriately be answered with “may.”

The majority also asserts that “[t]he ‘unremarkable’ principles applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice to 

resolve this case.” Ante, at 9. Not so. The state-funded 

program at issue in Trinity Lutheran provided payment for 
 

8 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

resurfacing school playgrounds to make them safer for children. Any Establishment Clause concerns arising from

providing money to religious schools for the creation of safer 

play yards are readily distinguishable from those raised by 

providing money to religious schools through the program

at issue here—a tuition program designed to ensure that all 

children receive their constitutionally guaranteed right to 

a free public education. After all, cities and States normally 

pay for police forces, fire protection, paved streets, municipal transport, and hosts of other services that benefit 

churches as well as secular organizations. But paying the 

salary of a religious teacher as part of a public school tuition 

program is a different matter.

In addition, schools were excluded from the playground

resurfacing program at issue in Trinity Lutheran because 

of the mere fact that they were “owned or controlled by a 

church, sect, or other religious entity.” 582 U. S., at ___ 

(slip op., at 2). Schools were thus disqualified from receiving playground funds “solely because of their religious character,” not because of the “religious uses of [the] funding” 

they would receive. Id., at ___, ___, n. 3 (slip op., at 10, 14, 

n. 3). Here, by contrast, a school’s “‘affiliation or association with a church or religious institution . . . is not dispositive’” of its ability to receive tuition funds. 979 F. 3d 21, 

38 (CA1 2020) (quoting then-commissioner of Maine’s Department of Education). Instead, Maine chooses not to fund 

only those schools that “‘promot[e] the faith or belief system 

with which [the schools are] associated and/or presen[t] the

[academic] material taught through the lens of this 

faith’”—i.e., schools that will use public money for religious 

purposes. Ibid. Maine thus excludes schools from its tuition program not because of the schools’ religious character 

but because the schools will use the funds to teach and promote religious ideals.

For similar reasons, Espinoza does not resolve the present case. In Espinoza, Montana created “a scholarship 
 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

program for students attending private schools.” 591 U. S., 

at ___ (slip op., at 1). But the State prohibited families from 

using the scholarship at any private school “‘owned or controlled in whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or 

denomination.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting Mont. 

Admin. Rule §42.4.802(1)(a) (2015)). As in Trinity Lutheran, Montana denied funds to schools based “expressly 

on religious status and not religious use”; “[t]o be eligible” 

for scholarship funds, a school had to “divorce itself from

any religious control or affiliation.” 591 U. S. at ___–___ 

(slip op., at 10–11). Here, again, Maine denies tuition 

money to schools not because of their religious affiliation, 

but because they will use state funds to promote religious

views. 

These distinctions are important. The very point of the

Establishment Clause is to prevent the government from

sponsoring religious activity itself, thereby favoring one religion over another or favoring religion over nonreligion.

See Engel, 370 U. S., at 430 (“Under [the Establishment 

Clause] . . . government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law . . . any program 

of governmentally sponsored religious activity”); Walz, 397 

U. S., at 668 (“[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses 

. . . the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted . . . [any] active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”); 

Everson, 330 U. S., at 15 (States may not “pass laws which 

aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 

another”). State funding of religious activity risks the very

social conflict based upon religion that the Religion Clauses

were designed to prevent. And, unlike the circumstances 

present in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, it is religious activity, not religious labels, that lies at the heart of this case. 

III 

A 

I turn now to consider the Maine program at issue here. 
 

 

 

10 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Maine’s Constitution guarantees Maine’s children a free

public education by requiring that all towns provide “for the 

support and maintenance of public schools.” Art. VIII, pt.

1, §1; see also Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §2(1) (2008).

Because of the State’s rural geography and dispersed population, however, over half of Maine’s school districts do not 

operate public secondary schools. App. 70. To fulfill its constitutional promise, Maine created a program that provides

some parents in these districts with a monetary grant to 

help them educate their children “at the public school or the

approved private school of the parent’s choice.” Me. Rev. 

Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §5204(4) (Cum. Supp. 2021). The program’s “function is limited to authorizing the provision of 

tuition subsidies to the parents of children who live within 

school [districts] that simply do not have the resources to

operate a public school system, and whose children would 

otherwise not be given an opportunity to receive a free public education.” Hallissey v. School Administrative Dist. No. 

77, 2000 ME 143, ¶16, 755 A. 2d 1068, 1073.

Under Maine law, an “approved” private school must be 

“nonsectarian.” §2951(2). A school fails to meet that requirement (and is deemed “sectarian”) only if it is both (1) 

“‘associated with a particular faith or belief system’” and 

also (2) “‘promotes the faith or belief system with which it 

is associated and/or presents the [academic] material

taught through the lens of this faith.’” 979 F. 3d, at 38 

(quoting Maine’s then-education commissioner). To determine whether a school is sectarian, the “‘focus is on what 

the school teaches through its curriculum and related activities, and how the material is presented.’” Ibid. (emphasis

deleted). “‘[A]ffiliation or association with a church or religious institution . . . is not dispositive’” of sectarian status. 

Ibid. 

The two private religious schools at issue here satisfy 

both of these criteria. They are affiliated with a church or 

religious organization. See App. 80, 91. And they also teach 
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

students to accept particular religious beliefs and to engage 

in particular religious practices.

The first school, Bangor Christian, has “educational objectives” that include “‘lead[ing] each unsaved student to 

trust Christ as his/her personal savior and then to follow 

Christ as Lord of his/her life,’” and “‘develop[ing] within 

each student a Christian world view and Christian philosophy of life.’” Id., at 84. Bangor Christian “does not believe 

there is any way to separate the religious instruction from

the academic instruction.” Id., at 85. Academic instruction 

and religious instruction are thus “completely intertwined.” 

Ibid. Bangor Christian teaches in its social studies class, 

for example, “‘that God has ordained evangelism.’” Id., at 

87. And in science class, students learn that atmospheric 

layers “‘are evidence of God’s good design.’” Id., at 89. 

The second school, Temple Academy, similarly promotes 

religion through academics. Its “educational philosophy ‘is

based on a thoroughly Christian and Biblical world view.’” 

Id., at 92. The school’s “objectives” include “‘foster[ing]

within each student an attitude of love and reverence of the 

Bible as the infallible, inerrant, and authoritative Word of 

God.’” Ibid. And the school’s “‘academic growth’ objectives” 

include “‘provid[ing] a sound academic education in which

the subjec[t] areas are taught from a Christian point of

view,’” and “‘help[ing] every student develop a truly Christian world view by integrating studies with the truths of

Scripture.’” Id., at 93. Like Bangor Christian, Temple “provides a ‘biblically-integrated education,’ which means that 

the Bible is used in every subject that is taught.” Id., at 96. 

In mathematics classes, for example, students learn that “a

creator designed the universe such that ‘one plus one is always going to be two.’” Ibid. 

The differences between this kind of education and a 

purely civic, public education are important. “The religious

education and formation of students is the very reason for 

the existence of most private religious schools.” Our Lady 
 

 

12 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2020) (slip op., at 2). “[E]ducating young people in their 

faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live 

their faith,” we have said, “are responsibilities that lie at 

the very core of the mission of a private religious school.” 

Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18). Indeed, we have recognized that 

the “connection that religious institutions draw between

their central purpose and educating the young in the faith” 

is so “close” that teachers employed at such schools act as

“ministers” for purposes of the First Amendment. Id., at 

___, ___ (slip op., at 2, 21); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 

(2012).

By contrast, public schools, including those in Maine,

seek first and foremost to provide a primarily civic education. We have said that, in doing so, they comprise “a most 

vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic

system of government, and . . . the primary vehicle for

transmitting the values on which our society rests.” Plyler 

v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 221 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To play that role effectively, public

schools are religiously neutral, neither disparaging nor promoting any one particular system of religious beliefs. We 

accordingly have, as explained above, consistently required 

public school education to be free from religious affiliation 

or indoctrination. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U. S. 578, 

583–584 (1987) (“The Court has been particularly vigilant 

in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in 

elementary and secondary [public] schools”).

Maine legislators who endorsed the State’s nonsectarian 

requirement recognized these differences between public

and religious education. They did not want Maine taxpayers to finance, through a tuition program designed to ensure the provision of free public education, schools that

would use state money for teaching religious practices. See, 

e.g., App. 104 (Maine representative stating that “[f]rom a 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

public policy position, we must believe that a religiously

neutral classroom is the best if funded by public dollars”); 

id., at 106 (Maine senator asserting that the State’s “limited [tax] dollars for schools” should be spent on those “that 

are non-religious and that are neutral on religion”). Underlying these views is the belief that the Establishment 

Clause seeks government neutrality. And the legislators

thought that government payment for this kind of religious 

education would be antithetical to the religiously neutral

education that the Establishment Clause requires in public 

schools. Cf. Epperson, 393 U. S., at 106; McCollum, 333 

U. S., at 211. Maine’s nonsectarian requirement, they believed, furthered the State’s antiestablishment interests in 

not promoting religion in its public school system; the requirement prevented public funds—funds allocated to ensure that all children receive their constitutional right to a 

free public education—from being given to schools that 

would use the funds to promote religion.

In the majority’s view, the fact that private individuals,

not Maine itself, choose to spend the State’s money on religious education saves Maine’s program from Establishment 

Clause condemnation. But that fact, as I have said, simply 

permits Maine to route funds to religious schools. See, e.g., 

Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652. It does not require Maine to 

spend its money in that way. That is because, as explained 

above, this Court has long followed a legal doctrine that

gives States flexibility to navigate the tension between the

two Religion Clauses. Supra, at 4. This doctrine “recognize[s] that there is ‘play in the joints’ between what the

Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise 

Clause compels.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 6) (quoting Locke, 540 U. S., at 718). This wiggleroom means that “[t]he course of constitutional neutrality

in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line.” Walz, 

397 U. S., at 669. And in walking this line of government 
 

14 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

neutrality, States must have “some space for legislative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause,” Cutter, 544 U. S., at 

719, in which they can navigate the tension created by the

Clauses and consider their own interests in light of the

Clauses’ competing prohibitions. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U. S., 

at 669. 

Nothing in our Free Exercise Clause cases compels Maine 

to give tuition aid to private schools that will use the funds

to provide a religious education. As explained above, this

Court’s decisions in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza prohibit 

States from denying aid to religious schools solely because 

of a school’s religious status—that is, its affiliation with or 

control by a religious organization. Supra, at 7–9. But we 

have never said that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits 

States from withholding funds because of the religious use 

to which the money will be put. Cf. Trinity Lutheran, 582 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12). To the contrary, we upheld in 

Locke a State’s decision to deny public funding to a recipient

“because of what he proposed to do” with the money, when

what he proposed to do was to “use the funds to prepare for 

the ministry.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 12); see also Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) 

(characterizing Locke similarly). Maine does not refuse to 

pay tuition at private schools because of religious status or 

affiliation. The State only denies funding to schools that 

will use the money to promote religious beliefs through a 

religiously integrated education—an education that, in 

Maine’s view, is not a replacement for a civic-focused public

education. See 979 F. 3d, at 38. This makes Maine’s decision to withhold public funds more akin to the state decision

that we upheld in Locke, and unlike the withholdings that 

we invalidated in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza. 

The Free Exercise Clause thus does not require Maine to

fund, through its tuition program, schools that will use pub-
 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

lic money to promote religion. And considering the Establishment Clause concerns underlying the program, Maine’s

decision not to fund such schools falls squarely within the 

play in the joints between those two Clauses. Maine has 

promised all children within the State the right to receive a

free public education. In fulfilling this promise, Maine endeavors to provide children the religiously neutral education required in public school systems. And that, in significant part, reflects the State’s antiestablishment interests 

in avoiding spending public money to support what is essentially religious activity. The Religion Clauses give 

Maine the ability, and flexibility, to make this choice. 

B 

In my view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement is also

constitutional because it supports, rather than undermines, 

the Religion Clauses’ goal of avoiding religious strife. Forcing Maine to fund schools that provide the sort of religiously 

integrated education offered by Bangor Christian and Temple Academy creates a similar potential for religious strife

as that raised by promoting religion in public schools. It 

may appear to some that the State favors a particular religion over others, or favors religion over nonreligion. Members of minority religions, with too few adherents to establish schools, may see injustice in the fact that only those

belonging to more popular religions can use state money for 

religious education. Taxpayers may be upset at having to 

finance the propagation of religious beliefs that they do not

share and with which they disagree. And parents in school 

districts that have a public secondary school may feel indignant that only some families in the State—those families in 

the more rural districts without public schools—have the 

opportunity to give their children a Maine-funded religious

education. 

Maine legislators who endorsed the State’s nonsectarian 

requirement understood this potential for social conflict. 
 

 

16 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

They recognized the important rights that religious schools 

have to create the sort of religiously inspired curriculum 

that Bangor Christian and Temple Academy teach. Legislators also recognized that these private schools make religiously based enrollment and hiring decisions. Bangor

Christian and Temple Academy, for example, have admissions policies that allow them to deny enrollment to students based on gender, gender-identity, sexual orientation, 

and religion, and both schools require their teachers to be

Born Again Christians. App. 82–83, 89, 93, 98. Legislators

did not want Maine taxpayers to pay for these religiously

based practices—practices not universally endorsed by all

citizens of the State—for fear that doing so would cause a

significant number of Maine citizens discomfort or displeasure. See, e.g., id., at 101 (Maine representative noting that

“private religious schools discriminate against citizens of 

the State of Maine,” such as by “not hir[ing] individuals

whose beliefs are not consistent with the school’s religious

teachings,” and asserting that “it is fundamentally wrong 

for us to fund” such discrimination); id., at 104 (Maine representative stating that “the people of Maine” should not 

use “public money” to advance “their religious pursuits,”

and that “discrimination in religious institutions” should 

not be funded “with my dollar”); id., at 107 (Maine senator 

expressing concern that “public funds could be used to teach

intolerant religious views”). The nonsectarian requirement

helped avoid this conflict—the precise kind of social conflict

that the Religion Clauses themselves sought to avoid. 

Maine’s nonsectarian requirement also serves to avoid religious strife between the State and the religious schools.

Given that Maine is funding the schools as part of its effort 

to ensure that all children receive the basic public education

to which they are entitled, Maine has an interest in ensuring that the education provided at these schools meets certain curriculum standards. Religious schools, on the other 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

hand, have an interest in teaching a curriculum that advances the tenets of their religion. And the schools are of 

course entitled to teach subjects in the way that best reflects their religious beliefs. But the State may disagree

with the particular manner in which the schools have decided that these subjects should be taught.

This is a situation ripe for conflict, as it forces Maine into 

the position of evaluating the adequacy or appropriateness

of the schools’ religiously inspired curriculum. Maine does 

not want this role. As one legislator explained, one of the 

reasons for the nonsectarian requirement was that 

“[g]overnment officials cannot, and should not, review the 

religious teachings of religious schools.” Ibid. Another legislator cautioned that the State would be unable to “reconcile” the curriculum of “private religious schools who teach

religion in the classroom” with Maine “standards . . . that 

do not include any sort of religion in them.” Id., at 102. 

Nor do the schools want Maine in this role. Bangor Christian asserted that it would only consider accepting public 

funds if it “did not have to make any changes in how it operates.” Id., at 90. Temple Academy similarly stated that 

it would only accept state money if it had “in writing that

the school would not have to alter its admissions standards, 

hiring standards, or curriculum.” Id., at 99. The nonsectarian requirement ensures that Maine is not pitted against 

private religious schools in these battles over curriculum or

operations, thereby avoiding the social strife resulting from

this state-versus-religion confrontation. By invalidating 

the nonsectarian requirement, the majority today subjects

the State, the schools, and the people of Maine to social conflict of a kind that they, and the Religion Clauses, sought to 

prevent.

I emphasize the problems that may arise out of today’s 

decision because they reinforce my belief that the Religion

Clauses do not require Maine to pay for a religious education simply because, in some rural areas, the State will help 
 

 

18 CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

parents pay for a secular education. After all, the Establishment Clause forbids a State from paying for the practice 

of religion itself. And state neutrality in respect to the 

teaching of the practice of religion lies at the heart of this 

Clause. See, e.g., Locke, 540 U. S., at 721–722 (noting that 

there are “few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment 

interests come more into play” than state funding of ministers who will “lead [their] congregation[s]” in “religious endeavor[s]”). There is no meaningful difference between a 

State’s payment of the salary of a religious minister and the 

salary of someone who will teach the practice of religion to

a person’s children. At bottom, there is almost no area “as 

central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary 

education, of the next generation’s minds and spirits.” Zelman, 536 U. S., at 725 (BREYER, J., dissenting). The Establishment Clause was intended to keep the State out of this 

area. 

* * * 

Maine wishes to provide children within the State with a 

secular, public education. This wish embodies, in significant part, the constitutional need to avoid spending public

money to support what is essentially the teaching and practice of religion. That need is reinforced by the fact that we

are today a Nation of more than 330 million people who ascribe to over 100 different religions. In that context, state 

neutrality with respect to religion is particularly important.

The Religion Clauses give Maine the right to honor that 

neutrality by choosing not to fund religious schools as part 

of its public school tuition program. I believe the majority 

is wrong to hold the contrary. And with respect, I dissent. 
 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 20–1088 

DAVID CARSON, AS PARENT AND NEXT FRIEND OF O. C., 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. A. PENDER MAKIN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2022] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting. 

This Court continues to dismantle the wall of separation 

between church and state that the Framers fought to build.

JUSTICE BREYER explains why the Court’s analysis falters

on its own terms, and I join all but Part I–B of his dissent. 

I write separately to add three points. 

First, this Court should not have started down this path

five years ago. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 

Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017). Before Trinity Lutheran, it was well established that “both the United States 

and state constitutions embody distinct views” on “the subject of religion”—“in favor of free exercise, but opposed to 

establishment”—“that find no counterpart” with respect to 

other constitutional rights. Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 

721 (2004). Because of this tension, the Court recognized 

“‘room for play in the joints’ between” the Religion Clauses,

with “some state actions permitted by the Establishment

Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id., 

at 718–719 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New 

York, 397 U. S. 664, 669 (1970)); see ante, at 4 (BREYER, J., 

dissenting). Using this flexibility, and consistent with a 

rich historical tradition, see Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at 

___–___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 11–16),

States and the Federal Government could decline to fund 
 

2 CARSON v. MAKIN 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

religious institutions. Moreover, the Court for many decades understood the Establishment Clause to prohibit government from funding religious exercise.* 

Over time, the Court eroded these principles in certain 

respects. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 

639, 662 (2002) (allowing government funds to flow to religious schools if private individuals selected the benefiting 

schools; the government program was “entirely neutral

with respect to religion”; and families enjoyed a “genuine 

choice among options public and private, secular and religious”). Nevertheless, the space between the Clauses continued to afford governments “some room to recognize the 

unique status of religious entities and to single them out on

that basis for exclusion from otherwise generally applicable 

laws.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., 

dissenting) (slip op., at 9). 

Trinity Lutheran veered sharply away from that understanding. After assuming away an Establishment Clause 

violation, the Court revolutionized Free Exercise doctrine 

by equating a State’s decision not to fund a religious organization with presumptively unconstitutional discrimination

on the basis of religious status. See id., at ___–___ (slip op., 

at 10–11). A plurality, however, limited the Court’s decision to “express discrimination based on religious identity” 

(i.e., status), not “religious uses of funding.” Id., at ___, n. 3 

(slip op., at 14, n. 3). In other words, a State was barred 

—————— 

*See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 16 (1947) (“No

tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious

activities or institutions . . . ”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203, 222–223 

(1997) (observing that government aid that impermissibly “advanc[ed] 

. . . religion” was constitutionally barred); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 

793, 840 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (“[O]ur decisions 

provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 875–876 (1995) (Souter,

J., dissenting) (chronicling cases). 
 

 

 

Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

from withholding funding from a religious entity “solely because of its religious character,” id., at ___ (opinion of the

Court) (slip op., at 14), but retained authority to do so on

the basis that the funding would be put to religious uses.

Two Terms ago, the Court reprised and extended Trinity 

Lutheran’s error to hold that a State could not limit a private-school voucher program to secular schools. Espinoza 

v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip 

op., at 9). The Court, however, again refrained from extending Trinity Lutheran from funding restrictions based on religious status to those based on religious uses. Espinoza, 

591 U. S., at ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 9–12). 

 As JUSTICE BREYER explains, see ante, at 8–9, this statususe distinction readily distinguishes this case from Trinity 

Lutheran and Espinoza. I warned in Trinity Lutheran, 

however, that the Court’s analysis could “be manipulated to

call for a similar fate for lines drawn on the basis of religious use.” 582 U. S., at ___, n. 14 (dissenting opinion) (slip

op., at 25, n. 14). That fear has come to fruition: The Court 

now holds for the first time that “any status-use distinction”

is immaterial in both “theory” and “practice.” Ante, at 17. 

It reaches that conclusion by embracing arguments from 

prior separate writings and ignoring decades of precedent 

affording governments flexibility in navigating the tension 

between the Religion Clauses. As a result, in just a few 

years, the Court has upended constitutional doctrine, shifting from a rule that permits States to decline to fund religious organizations to one that requires States in many circumstances to subsidize religious indoctrination with

taxpayer dollars.

Second, the consequences of the Court’s rapid transformation of the Religion Clauses must not be understated.

From a doctrinal perspective, the Court’s failure to apply 

the play-in-the-joints principle here, see ante, at 13–14 

(BREYER, J., dissenting), leaves one to wonder what, if anything, is left of it. The Court’s increasingly expansive view 
 

 

4 CARSON v. MAKIN 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

of the Free Exercise Clause risks swallowing the space between the Religion Clauses that once “permit[ted] religious 

exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Walz, 397 U. S., at 669. 

From a practical perspective, today’s decision directs the

State of Maine (and, by extension, its taxpaying citizens) to 

subsidize institutions that undisputedly engage in religious

instruction. See ante, at 10–11 (BREYER, J., dissenting). In 

addition, while purporting to protect against discrimination

of one kind, the Court requires Maine to fund what many of 

its citizens believe to be discrimination of other kinds. See 

ante, at 16 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (summarizing Bangor

Christian Schools’ and Temple Academy’s policies denying 

enrollment to students based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and religion). The upshot is that Maine must 

choose between giving subsidies to its residents or refraining from financing religious teaching and practices.

Finally, the Court’s decision is especially perverse because the benefit at issue is the public education to which 

all of Maine’s children are entitled under the State Constitution. As this Court has long recognized, the Establishment Clause requires that public education be secular and

neutral as to religion. See ante, at 2–3, 12 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). The Court avoids this framing

of Maine’s benefit because, it says, “Maine has decided not 

to operate schools of its own, but instead to offer tuition assistance that parents may direct to the public or private 

schools of their choice.” Ante, at 14. In fact, any such 

“deci[sion],” ibid., was forced upon Maine by “the realities 

of remote geography and low population density,” ante, at 

2, which render it impracticable for the State to operate its 

own schools in many communities.

The Court’s analysis does leave some options open to

Maine. For example, under state law, school administrative units (SAUs) that cannot feasibly operate their own 
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

schools may contract directly with a public school in another SAU, or with an approved private school, to educate

their students. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20–A, §§2701, 

2702 (2008). I do not understand today’s decision to mandate that SAUs contract directly with schools that teach religion, which would go beyond Zelman’s private-choice doctrine and blatantly violate the Establishment Clause.

Nonetheless, it is irrational for this Court to hold that the 

Free Exercise Clause bars Maine from giving money to parents to fund the only type of education the State may provide consistent with the Establishment Clause: a religiously neutral one. Nothing in the Constitution requires 

today’s result. 

* * * 

What a difference five years makes. In 2017, I feared that 

the Court was “lead[ing] us . . . to a place where separation 

of church and state is a constitutional slogan, not a constitutional commitment.” Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ 

(dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 27). Today, the Court leads

us to a place where separation of church and state becomes

a constitutional violation. If a State cannot offer subsidies 

to its citizens without being required to fund religious exercise, any State that values its historic antiestablishment interests more than this Court does will have to curtail the 

support it offers to its citizens. With growing concern for

where this Court will lead us next, I respectfully dissent.