Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Wendy Barrow Culberson, AG No. 3, 

September Term, 2022, Opinion by Booth, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTIONS – DISBARMENT

Respondent Wendy Barrow Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—

General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary 

Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney 

Trust Account Record-Keeping). 

During a period spanning several years, Ms. Culberson misappropriated hundreds of 

thousands of dollars from her client by using her client’s power of attorney to make cash 

withdrawals from bank accounts held for her client’s benefit. Ms. Culberson failed to 

provide her client with any contemporaneous invoices, accounting, or other documentation 

that might reflect any legitimate use of the cash withdrawals. Ms. Culberson failed to 

maintain any client matter records or client ledgers. During Bar Counsel’s investigation 

into this matter, Ms. Culberson made knowing and intentional misrepresentations of 

material facts to Bar Counsel and created inaccurate and false documentation in an effort 

to conceal her misappropriation. 

The Supreme Court of Maryland concluded that disbarment is the appropriate sanction.
Circuit Court for Harford County

Case No.: C-12-CV-22-000314

Argued: March 2, 2023

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF MARYLAND*

AG No. 3

September Term, 2022

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION

OF MARYLAND

v.

WENDY BARROW CULBERSON

Fader, C.J.,

Watts,

Hotten,

Booth,

Biran,

Gould,

Eaves,

JJ.

Opinion by Booth, J.

Filed: March 27, 2023

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the 

voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 

amendment changing the name of the Court of 

Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of 

Maryland. The name change took effect on 

December 14, 2022. 
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Commission”), acting through 

Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“the Petition”) against 

Respondent, Wendy Barrow Culberson, a member of the Maryland Bar, arising out of her 

representation of Gabrielle Buck and Bar Counsel’s subsequent investigation. The 

Commission alleged that Ms. Culberson violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of 

Interest—General Rule), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and 

Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4)

(Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping).2

The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence 

that Ms. Culberson committed all of the violations alleged by the Commission. The 

hearing judge also determined the presence of eight aggravating factors and one mitigating 

factor. Bar Counsel recommends a sanction of disbarment. Ms. Culberson filed exceptions 

to a number of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and to all of the hearing judge’s 

conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth herein, we determine that the hearing judge’s 

1 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, 

which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules, 

were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, 

Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior 

opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering 

of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22). 

2 The Petition also charged Ms. Culberson with violating Rule 8.1(b), but Bar 

Counsel later withdrew that charge.
2

findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, concur with the hearing judge’s conclusions of 

law, and impose a sanction of disbarment. 

I

Procedural Background

The Commission filed the Petition on March 16, 2022. On June 30, Bar Counsel 

served interrogatories and a request for production of documents on Ms. Culberson’s 

counsel. Ms. Culberson, through counsel, requested a ten-day extension, which Bar 

Counsel granted. Thereafter, Ms. Culberson’s counsel withdrew from the case. On August 

17, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson an email advising her that her discovery responses 

were overdue and inquiring as to when Ms. Culberson intended to provide them. Having 

received no response, on August 29, Bar Counsel sent a follow-up email advising that if 

discovery responses were not provided by September 1, Bar Counsel would seek sanctions. 

Ms. Culberson failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s emails and failed to respond to 

the outstanding discovery. Bar Counsel filed a motion for sanctions on September 2. Ms. 

Culberson wrote to the hearing judge on September 23 and advised that she had not 

received the motion for sanctions. Thereafter, Bar Counsel filed a renewed motion for 

sanctions and a motion to shorten time, which were served on Ms. Culberson. In its motion

to shorten time, Bar Counsel acknowledged that, due to an internal administrative error, 

Ms. Culberson had not been served with the initial motion. Ms. Culberson filed a response 

to the renewed motion for sanctions, stating that she had advised Bar Counsel “on 
3

numerous occasions” that she “ha[d] no other information or documents to provide” and 

Bar Counsel therefore was “not prejudiced” by her failure to respond. 

On October 7, the hearing judge granted Bar Counsel’s motion and entered an order

striking Ms. Culberson’s answer to the Petition and prohibiting Ms. Culberson from calling 

witnesses, presenting records, or testifying on anything other than mitigation at the 

evidentiary hearing.3 The hearing judge held an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2022. 

3 Ms. Culberson excepts to the hearing judge’s entry of the sanctions order. She 

argues that if Bar Counsel had properly served her with the first motion, the motion to 

shorten time would not have been necessary and the motion for sanctions “would not have

[been] ripe to be ruled upon by the [hearing judge] prior to the expiration of the discovery 

deadline[.]” We overrule Ms. Culberson’s exception. After Bar Counsel discovered that 

the motion had not been properly served, Bar Counsel promptly filed a renewed motion, 

which was properly served. Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s renewed 

motion for sanctions in which she admitted that she had no intention of complying with her 

discovery obligations under the Maryland Rules because “all information and

documentation” was provided to Bar Counsel “long ago” in response to Bar Counsel’s 

requests for documents and information in connection with its initial investigation. On 

October 7, 2002—four days after Ms. Culberson filed her response to the motion and two 

days after the discovery deadline—the hearing judge entered her order granting the motion 

for sanctions. Given Ms. Culberson’s unwillingness to comply with her discovery 

obligations, the hearing judge did not abuse her discretion in entering the sanctions order. 

In overruling Ms. Culberson’s exception, we point out that, unless a party files a motion 

for a protective order under Maryland Rule 2-403 that is granted by the court, there is 

nothing in the Maryland Rules that excuses a party from answering interrogatories in 

accordance with Maryland Rule 2-421, or from serving a written response to a request for 

production of documents under Maryland Rule 2-422. 

As part of her exceptions, Ms. Culberson also asserts that Bar Counsel failed to 

properly answer discovery that she propounded. We overrule this exception. Other than 

Ms. Culberson’s unsupported assertion in her exceptions, there is nothing in the record to 

reflect that she served discovery. Moreover, assuming she in fact propounded discovery 

under the Maryland Rules, she did not file a motion with the hearing judge asserting that 

Bar Counsel failed to respond to discovery requests and requesting any relief in connection 

therewith. 
4

Ms. Culberson did not appear. The hearing judge admitted Bar Counsel’s Exhibits 1-30.4 

Bar Counsel called its investigator, Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, who provided testimony 

concerning his review of Ms. Buck’s bank records and the various withdrawals and 

transactions undertaken by Ms. Culberson in connection with her client’s bank accounts 

over a span of several years. Bar Counsel submitted Proposed Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law. Ms. Culberson filed a response to Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Thereafter, the hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law.

Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions. As noted above, Ms. Culberson filed 

exceptions to the factual findings and legal conclusions rendered by the hearing judge. 

With this Court’s permission, Ms. Culberson appeared remotely via Zoom at oral argument 

and presented her argument in support of her exceptions as well as her request that this 

Court not disbar her but instead impose an “alternative resolution.” 

Ms. Culberson also excepts to Bar Counsel’s failure to provide her with the 

transcript from the evidentiary hearing until she requested it. She acknowledges that, when 

she requested the transcript, it was provided. Ms. Culberson’s exception is overruled. 

4 Bar Counsel’s exhibits included: a retainer agreement dated February 27, 2014 

between Gabrielle Buck and Ms. Culberson; Ms. Buck’s Power of Attorney dated March 

24, 2016; emails between Ms. Buck and Ms. Culberson dated July 10, 2019; Ms. Buck’s 

Complaint to Bar Counsel; correspondence between Bar Counsel and Ms. Culberson; legal 

invoices that were prepared by Ms. Culberson and provided to Bar Counsel but never 

delivered to Ms. Buck; records for PNC Bank accounts under Ms. Buck’s control for the 

years 2014–2019; an affidavit of the PNC Bank records custodian attesting that the records 

were produced pursuant to a subpoena; charts prepared by Bar Counsel’s investigator, 

Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, summarizing the bank records; and the transcript of Ms. 

Culberson’s statement under oath taken on November 30, 2020. 
5

When no exception is made to a hearing judge’s finding of fact, this Court may 

accept it as established. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). When a party excepts to a 

finding, we must determine whether the finding is established by the requisite standard 

of proof—in the case of an allegation of misconduct, clear and convincing evidence. 

Maryland Rules 19-740(b)(2)(B), 19-727(c). The standard of review where a party 

excepts to a hearing judge’s factual findings is the clearly erroneous standard. Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016). A factual finding is not 

clearly erroneous “if there is any competent material evidence to support it.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16 (2014) (cleaned up). We review a 

hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo. Maryland Rule 19-740(b)(1).

Ms. Culberson’s General Exceptions

Ms. Culberson has filed “General Exceptions” to the hearing judge’s Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law in its entirety, except for a few pages of the findings. Because 

of the general nature of these exceptions, which permeate nearly all the factual findings 

and legal conclusions, it is appropriate to address them at the outset. 

First, Ms. Culberson argues that it was inappropriate for the hearing judge to adopt, 

in large part, Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that were 

submitted after the evidentiary hearing. Relatedly, Ms. Culberson asserts that there is 

nothing to suggest that the hearing judge conducted “an independent review” of the 30 

exhibits that were entered into evidence.

Second, Ms. Culberson excepts to the findings of fact because she contends that 

there was no “substantive evidence or direct evidence” from her client, Ms. Buck. Ms. 
6

Culberson appears to suggest that Bar Counsel could not satisfy its burden of proving the 

alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence without calling Ms. Buck as a 

witness.

Third, Ms. Culberson excepts to the fact that the hearing judge “totally 

disregard[ed]” information provided by her to refute the allegations. 

We overrule these general exceptions for the following reasons. First, based upon 

our independent review of the record, the hearing judge correctly concluded that Bar 

Counsel met its burden of establishing Culberson’s misconduct by clear and convincing 

evidence. Ms. Buck’s testimony was not required to prove the misconduct alleged in this 

case. Indeed, in many instances, the exhibits establishing the misconduct are Ms. 

Culberson’s own statement under oath and her written correspondence to Bar Counsel. As

we have often repeated, “‘the hearing judge is entitled to ‘pick and choose which evidence 

to rely upon’ from a conflicting array when determining findings of fact.’” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Kane, 465 Md. 667, 676 n.4 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50 (2006)). Second, Ms. Culberson’s exceptions recite 

many facts and conclusions that are not contained in the record. Ms. Culberson essentially 

asks this Court to accept her version of the facts that are not part of the record (due to her 

failure to comply with her discovery obligations and her failure to appear at the evidentiary 

hearing). Third, there is nothing inappropriate about a hearing judge’s decision to adopt a 

party’s proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law where they are supported by the 

record. 
7

We summarize below the hearing judge’s findings of fact and other undisputed 

matters in the record as they pertain to the alleged violations. To the extent that they 

have not already been overruled, we also address any additional exceptions in relation to

the findings to which they pertain. 

II

Findings of Fact

Ms. Culberson was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1994. Between 1995 and 2020, 

Ms. Culberson was a solo practitioner who focused primarily on family law. She 

maintained an office for the practice of law in Cecil County. She closed her law practice 

in September 2020. 

Representation of Gabrielle Buck

Ms. Culberson represented Gabrielle Buck in her divorce proceeding in 2013. 

Following that representation, Ms. Culberson became Ms. Buck’s family attorney, and they 

became close personal friends. 

Ms. Buck lives on an approximately 800-acre farm called Mt. Ararat Farm in Port 

Deposit, Maryland with her two adult sons. She is the beneficiary of two family trusts

(collectively, “the DB Trusts”) that, as of September 2014, were valued at $23 million. 

Raymond James Financial and Esther Streete are the co-trustees of the DB Trusts. In 

addition, Ms. Buck is the sole trustee of the Gabrielle Brown Buck Revocable Living Trust 

(“the GBB Trust”), which she created in June 2015. 

During the period in question, the GBB Trust received a monthly distribution in the 

amount of $38,000 from one of the family trusts, which Ms. Buck used to cover personal 
8

expenses and the costs of operating the farm. Each month, the distribution was transmitted 

to a PNC Bank checking account (“the GBB Account”), and thereafter approximately 

$8,000 to $10,000 was transferred from the GBB Account to another PNC bank account 

(“the Farm Account”), which was used to subsidize Mt. Ararat farming operations. 

In February 2014, Ms. Buck executed an agreement with Ms. Culberson, in which 

Ms. Culberson agreed to help manage Ms. Buck’s business and farm interests (“the 

Retainer Agreement”). Under the Retainer Agreement, Ms. Buck retained Ms. Culberson 

to manage her “business and farm related matters or for any other matters that [Ms. Buck] 

may request [Ms. Culberson’s] involvement except for matters which involve legal 

services (court proceedings; lawsuits; appeals; etc.).” Ms. Buck agreed to pay Ms. 

Culberson a monthly flat fee of $3,500, and any additional legal matters would be billed at 

a rate of $200/hour. The Retainer Agreement specifically stated that “no legal services, 

other than those directly related to the matters(s) referred to herein, will be rendered to [Ms. 

Buck] unless and until a separate written contract of employment is entered[.]” The 

Retainer Agreement also stated that Ms. Culberson would “render a full and final 

accounting of all sums paid to [Ms. Culberson] in connection with” the services provided 

under the Agreement. 

Under the monthly flat fee arrangement established by the Retainer Agreement, Ms. 

Culberson managed Ms. Buck’s interests in the family trusts and other personal and 

business interests that arose, including serving as a liaison between Ms. Buck and the 

trustees of the DB Trusts. In her statement under oath, Ms. Culberson testified that she 

communicated more effectively than Ms. Buck with the trustees of the DB Trusts, thereby 
9

ensuring that Ms. Buck received her requested discretionary distributions from those trusts. 

Ms. Culberson’s additional responsibilities included paying various bills, “getting the 

EzPass account straightened out,” and “working with the bookkeeper for the farm including 

transferring money to the farm account.” The hearing judge concluded that all such 

services were non-legal in nature and were covered by the monthly flat fee in the amount 

of $3,500.

Between February 2014 and April 2016, Ms. Buck wrote checks from the GBB

Account to Ms. Culberson for the monthly $3,500 flat fee. Ms. Culberson considered the 

$3,500 monthly fee earned upon receipt and deposited the funds into her personal account. 

During this period, Ms. Buck occasionally wrote checks to Ms. Culberson in excess of the 

monthly $3,500 flat fee. Ms. Buck paid Ms. Culberson $66,000 in 2014, and $45,216 in 

2015, for both legal and non-legal services provided under the Retainer Agreement. 

In March 2016, Ms. Buck executed a power of attorney naming Ms. Culberson as 

her agent and giving her access to both the GBB Account and the Farm Account. 

According to Ms. Culberson, she advised Ms. Buck to give her a power of attorney because 

Ms. Culberson “got tired of chasing [Ms. Buck] down” to receive funds to pay bills.

Almost immediately after Ms. Buck appointed Ms. Culberson as her agent, Ms. 

Culberson began making cash withdrawals from the GBB Account. Between April 2016 

and July 2019, Ms. Culberson made 323 cash withdrawals from the GBB Account totaling 

$940,297. Of the amounts withdrawn, Ms. Culberson deposited $342,500 into the Farm 

Account to subsidize farm expenses. On occasion, Ms. Culberson would withdraw cash 

from the GBB Account, deposit a portion of the funds withdrawn into the Farm Account, 
10

and retain a portion of the funds.5 Ms. Culberson was unable to account for the remaining 

$597,797 that was not deposited into the Farm Account. 

Assuming that Ms. Culberson was entitled to a monthly flat fee of $3,500 pursuant 

to the Retainer Agreement, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson would have charged 

and collected $133,000 between May 2016 and June 2019. During the representation, Ms. 

Culberson failed to provide Ms. Buck with any time records or billing invoices to 

substantiate any legal services provided or additional fees incurred in excess of $133,000. 

Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck with any accounting of the funds that she

withdrew from the GBB Account using the Power of Attorney. When Ms. Buck 

occasionally questioned Ms. Culberson regarding the cash withdrawals from the GBB 

Account, Ms. Culberson advised her that the withdrawals were used to pay farm bills, 

insurance, or other expenses. The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson failed to advise 

Ms. Buck that Ms. Culberson retained the majority of the cash withdrawals for her own 

personal use and benefit. 

In June 2019, Ms. Buck became frustrated with Ms. Culberson’s representation, in 

part because Ms. Culberson had failed to provide her with invoices and estimates from

contractors hired to perform repair work on the farm. Ms. Buck, with the help of her 

financial advisor, accessed her GBB Account online and discovered Ms. Culberson’s cash 

withdrawals. Ms. Buck terminated Ms. Culberson’s services in July 2019. Ms. Buck sent 

5 For example, the hearing judge found that, on December 1, 2016, Ms. Culberson 

withdrew $12,500 in cash, deposited $10,000 into the Farm Account, and retained $2,500 

for herself. 
11

Ms. Culberson an email on July 10 requesting that Ms. Culberson provide documentation 

supporting her cash withdrawals, including “detailed invoices of [her] legal bills and other 

services [] provided.” Ms. Culberson assured Ms. Buck that she would provide “a full 

accounting” of withdrawals from the GBB Account. 

Between late July and early August 2019, Ms. Culberson provided Ms. Buck with 

numerous boxes of documents. On August 12, 2019, for the first time, Ms. Culberson 

provided Ms. Buck with “fee statements” purportedly for legal work performed between 

January 2016 and August 2019. Ms. Culberson later provided Bar Counsel with invoices 

summarizing the same information. The invoices totaled $293,014.24. They included 

hourly charges for non-legal services that, pursuant to the Retainer Agreement, were to be 

provided as part of the $3,500 monthly flat fee.6 Ms. Culberson never provided Ms. Buck 

with an accounting of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account and failed to provide 

any accounting showing how the invoices for attorney’s fees were paid. 

Bar Counsel Investigation

In December 2019, Ms. Buck, through counsel, filed a complaint with Bar Counsel, 

alleging that Ms. Culberson misappropriated funds and failed to account for $594,247 that 

she withdrew from the GBB Account. By letter dated February 12, 2020, Bar Counsel 

forwarded the complaint to Ms. Culberson and requested a response. Ms. Culberson 

6 For example, Ms. Culberson charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for communicating 

with the co-trustees of the DB Trusts regarding Ms. Buck’s finances and preparing budgets 

for the trustees. She also charged Ms. Buck her hourly rate for resolving issues surrounding 

Ms. Buck’s E-ZPass account, which was a service Ms. Culberson explicitly acknowledged 

was provided under the monthly flat fee. 
12

responded in a letter dated March 2, 2020, in which she stated that: (1) in December 2015, 

Ms. Culberson and Ms. Buck agreed to increase Ms. Culberson’s monthly flat fee from 

$3,500 to $5,000; and (2) that Ms. Buck told Ms. Culberson not to send her periodic 

invoices. The hearing judge determined that these statements were knowing and 

intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, finding that Ms. Buck never agreed to 

increase the monthly flat fee, and never advised Ms. Culberson not to send her invoices.7

Ms. Culberson also provided Bar Counsel with copies of various spreadsheets 

purporting to account for the funds that she withdrew from the GBB Account between 2016 

and 2019. Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets purported to account for: the funds she withdrew 

and transferred to the Farm Account; the funds she withdrew to pay her fees; and the funds 

she withdrew to provide cash to Ms. Buck. The hearing judge found that the spreadsheets 

were never provided to Ms. Buck. The hearing judge also determined that, in many 

7

In finding that Ms. Culberson’s statements to Bar Counsel were knowing and 

intentional misrepresentations, the hearing judge relied upon Ms. Buck’s complaint to Bar 

Counsel, as well as the following additional exhibits: 

•A budget Ms. Culberson prepared for Ms. Buck on March 29, 2019,

indicating that the flat fee was $3,500 per month.

•An email that Ms. Culberson sent to one of the trustees of the DB Trusts on 

April 16, 2019, in which she explained the following with respect to the fees 

paid to her:

The legal expenses are two separate things. The $3,500.00 is the 

monthly amount [Ms. Buck] pays me for management of everything 

I do (which covers many, many things (basically 24/7) but does not 

include specific legal work). The $3,000 covers actual legal fees 

which includes legal work such as current pending litigation against 

Cecil County regarding a zoning violation issue and other ongoing 

legal matters. 
13

instances, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not match the GBB Account records that were 

provided by the bank pursuant to a subpoena. The hearing judge determined that Ms. 

Culberson’s spreadsheets did not include cash withdrawals totaling $50,005, contained 

numerous errors and intentional misrepresentations, and were created after the fact by Ms. 

Culberson in an attempt to conceal her misappropriation of funds. The hearing judge also 

observed that, when Ms. Culberson was questioned during her statement under oath about 

the discrepancies between her spreadsheets and the PNC Bank records, she was unable to 

explain why numerous cash withdrawals were not listed on her spreadsheet, nor was she 

able to account for other discrepancies and errors.8 Ms. Culberson testified that she 

withdrew funds from the GBB Account “however [she] wanted to do it” and did so “as she 

needed or wanted.” 

By letter dated July 16, 2020, Bar Counsel requested that Ms. Culberson provide 

the bank account information where she deposited fees associated with her representation 

of Ms. Buck. Bar Counsel also requested her client matter records and client ledger 

maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck. By letter dated August 10, 2020, Ms. Culberson, 

through counsel, told Bar Counsel that she no longer had client matter records and a client 

ledger maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck because her assistant’s computer crashed. Ms. 

8 By way of some examples, Ms. Culberson’s spreadsheets did not reflect checks 

written to her by Ms. Buck in 2016 totaling $6,500. In other instances, Ms. Culberson’s 

spreadsheets reflect that she withdrew funds but do not reflect the accurate amount 

withdrawn. For instance, on October 31, 2016, the bank records reflect that Ms. Culberson 

withdrew $6,823, but her spreadsheet only reflects that she withdrew $2,400. Nor do the 

cash withdrawals from the GBB Account correlate with the $3,500 monthly flat fee or the 

purported monthly fees reflected on Ms. Culberson’s invoices.
14

Culberson also stated that she “accounted for every dollar that was withdrawn from Ms. 

Buck’s” GBB Account. The hearing judge also found that, in a letter dated December 10, 

2020, Ms. Culberson provided unsubstantiated explanations for why at least 26 cash 

withdrawal transactions were not accounted for on her spreadsheets. She told Bar Counsel 

that 15 of the cash withdrawal transactions, totaling $26,700, were funds taken by Ms. 

Culberson as fees but mistakenly not accounted for. Ms. Culberson could not account for 

four cash withdrawals totaling $14,250. 

Bar Counsel subpoenaed Ms. Culberson’s attorney trust account records for the 

period between July 2018 through July 2019. Bar Counsel sent Ms. Culberson a letter in 

February 2021 requesting that she provide copies of her client matter records and client 

ledger records associated with her attorney trust account as required by Maryland Rule 19-

407(a)(3). Ms. Culberson followed up with a letter stating that she did not have client 

matter records or client ledgers associated with her attorney trust account, and as a result, 

failed to provide them. 

III 

Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct

Based upon the record and the above-summarized findings of fact, the hearing judge 

concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ms. Culberson violated MARPC 1.4 

(Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest—General Rule), 

1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 8.1(a) (Bar Admissions and Disciplinary Matters), and 

8.4(a)–(d) (Misconduct), and Maryland Rule 19-407(a)(2)–(4) (Attorney Trust Account 

Record-Keeping). Ms. Culberson filed specific exceptions to all of the conclusions of law 
15

with the exception of the violations of MARPC 1.15 and Maryland Rule 19-407. Bar 

Counsel did not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings. Based upon our de novo 

review, we agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions of law and overrule Ms. Culberson’s 

exceptions. 

Failure to Communicate (Rule 1.4)

Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (3) provide that “[a]n attorney shall . . . keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly comply with reasonable requests 

for information[.]” Additionally, Rule 1.4(b) provides that “[a]n attorney shall explain a 

matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 

regarding the representation.” The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 

1.4(a) and (b) when she failed to: (1) provide Ms. Buck with information about the fees 

and expenses that she claimed were charged and collected, thereby depriving Ms. Buck of 

the ability to make informed decisions about her personal, business, and legal affairs; (2) 

provide Ms. Buck with billing invoices between April 2016 and June 2019, which deprived 

Ms. Buck of the ability to confirm or refute whether the legal services charged were 

actually provided or appropriate under the terms of the Retainer Agreement; (3) provide 

Ms. Buck with any accounting of the withdrawn funds, either during the course of her 

representation of Ms. Buck or after her services were terminated, despite Ms. Buck’s 

request for an accounting; and (4) advise Ms. Buck that Ms. Culberson retained the 

majority of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account for her own personal use and 

benefit. 
16

Ms. Culberson excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule 1.4, 

arguing that Bar Counsel introduced no evidence of communications between Ms. 

Culberson and Ms. Buck that would support a finding of a violation of this rule. We 

overrule this exception. In her statement under oath, Ms. Culberson admitted that she never 

provided any invoices between April 2016 and July 2019. The subpoenaed bank records 

also clearly reflect cash withdrawals made by Ms. Culberson. Bar Counsel’s investigator, 

Charles E. Miller, IV, CPA, testified, based upon his review of the bank records,

concerning the errors, discrepancies, and unaccounted funds in Ms. Culberson’s invoices

for services that were provided sometime after Ms. Buck terminated Ms. Culberson’s 

representation. Mr. Miller’s summary charts identifying the various withdrawals and 

discrepancies were admitted into evidence. Emails exchanged between Ms. Buck and Ms. 

Culberson in July 2019 reflect that Ms. Buck requested “any accounting of the withdrawals 

every month from my checking account.” No accounting was forthcoming. Bar Counsel 

established a violation of Rule 1.4 by clear and convincing evidence. 

Charging Unreasonable Fees (Rule 1.5(a))

Rule 1.5(a) states:

(a) An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an 

unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The 

factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee 

include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal 

service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of 

the particular employment will preclude other employment of 

the attorney;
17

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 

services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the 

circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 

client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or 

attorneys performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson charged and collected 

unreasonable fees in connection with her representation of Ms. Buck in violation of Rule 

1.5(a). Ms. Culberson excepts to the conclusion that she violated Rule 1.5, asserting that 

there was no evidence before the hearing judge that the fees charged to Ms. Buck were 

unreasonable. We overrule this exception. 

We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated this rule

by withdrawing hourly fees from the GBB Account for services covered under the monthly 

flat fee established by the Retainer Agreement, such as resolving issues in connection with 

Ms. Buck’s E-ZPass account and communicating with the trustees of the DB Trusts

concerning Ms. Buck’s finances. We also agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that 

Ms. Culberson violated Rule 1.5 by failing to bill Ms. Buck in the manner required by the 

Retainer Agreement. The Retainer Agreement provided that “any and all services 

unrelated to [the management of business and farm related activities] will be billed to [Ms. 

Buck] separately at [Ms. Culberson’s] standard hourly rate, over and beyond” the $3,500 

monthly flat fee. The Retainer Agreement also stated that “[p]ayment of any bill is due on 

receipt of the bill.” We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson’s 
18

failure to provide regular billing invoices to Ms. Buck between 2016 and 2019 was 

inconsistent with the express terms of the Retainer Agreement and constituted a violation 

of Rule 1.5. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 629 (2015) (failure 

to provide invoices as agreed upon in the attorney’s fee agreement violated Rule 1.5); 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md. 80, 91–92 (2014) (failure to provide 

invoices as agreed upon in the attorney’s retainer agreement violated Rules 1.4(a) and 

1.5(a)). 

Acting with a Prohibited Conflict of Interest (Rule 1.7)

Rule 1.7(a) states, in pertinent part, that “an attorney shall not represent a client if 

the representation involves a conflict of interest.” A conflict of interest exists where “there 

is a significant risk that the representation” of a client “will be materially limited by . . . a 

personal interest of the attorney.” Rule 1.7(a)(2). Comment [1] to Rule 1.7 provides: 

“Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the attorney’s relationship to 

a client. Conflicts of interest can arise from the attorney’s responsibilities to another 

client[] . . . or from the attorney’s own interests.” 

Ms. Culberson excepts to this conclusion because she claims that there was “no 

evidence” of the relationship between Ms. Buck and Ms. Culberson. We overrule this 

exception. The record in this case includes Ms. Buck’s Power of Attorney, which Ms. 

Culberson used to make cash withdrawals from her client’s bank account for her personal 

use and benefit. The Power of Attorney clearly established a fiduciary relationship

between Ms. Buck, as the principal, and Ms. Culberson, as her agent. We agree with the 

hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 1.7 when she engaged in self-
19

dealing as it relates to the unreasonable fees charged to Ms. Buck, and fees she paid herself 

in her role as Ms. Buck’s agent or attorney, without providing any accounting, oversight, 

or authorization. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Robbins, 463 Md. 411, 460–61 

(2019) (finding a violation of Rule 1.7 where an attorney, in his role as trustee, paid himself 

from the trust without providing appropriate billing statements or accounting, despite 

repeated requests for information about his charges); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n 

v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 193 (2014) (concluding that an attorney, acting as trustee, violated 

Rule 1.7 when he engaged in self-dealing that had an adverse impact on his duty of loyalty 

to the client and the trust). Ms. Culberson’s use of her client’s power of attorney to make 

cash withdrawals in excess of one-half of a million dollars over a several year period,

unaccompanied by any contemporaneous explanation, accounting, or invoicing, constitutes 

a clear and unequivocal violation of Rule 1.7.

Failing to Safekeep Property (Rule 1.15(a))

Rule 1.15(a) states:

An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an 

attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 

attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 

maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and 

records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that 

Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and 

appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be 

created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other 

property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of 

at least five years after the date the record was created.

We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 

1.15(a) by misappropriating funds from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account for her own personal 
20

use and benefit. As we previously observed, misappropriation is “any unauthorized use by 

an attorney of a client’s funds entrusted to him or her, whether or not temporary or for 

personal gain or benefit.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Goodman, 426 Md. 115, 129–

30 (2012) (cleaned up) (concluding that the attorney misappropriated his clients’ settlement 

funds when he comingled client and personal funds and did not provide financial records 

to establish how the funds were spent). The record in this case is clear that Ms. Culberson 

failed to safekeep Ms. Buck’s property by: using her client’s power of attorney to make 

cash withdrawals from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account for a period spanning several years; 

failing to provide any billing invoices that would reflect any appropriate or legitimate use 

of the funds; and failing to keep any record or accounting of the funds she withdrew from 

the GBB Account while acting as her client’s agent. In sum, Ms. Culberson’s cash 

withdrawals under the circumstances constituted misappropriation of her client’s funds and 

an egregious violation of Rule 1.15. 

Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping (Md. Rule 19-407)

“Rule 19-407[9]sets forth the requirements by which all attorneys must abide in 

connection with trust-account record keeping.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Silbiger, 

478 Md. 607, 631 (2022). These requirements include 

the creation and maintenance of detailed records of all deposits and 

disbursements of client funds and funds held on behalf of third persons, 

9 Rule 19-407(a) states in relevant part:

(a) Creation of Records. The following records shall be created and 

maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of 

third persons:
21

records required for each client matter in which the attorney receives funds 

in trust, a monthly reconciliation of attorney trust account records, client 

matter records, funds of the attorney held in the trust account, and record 

retention requirements.

* * *

(2) Deposits and Disbursements. A record for each account that 

chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as 

follows:

(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the 

deposit that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the 

amount, (iii) the identity of the client or third person for 

whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose of 

the deposit;

(B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made 

by electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time 

of disbursement that shows (i) the date of the 

disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) the 

identity of the client or third person for whom the 

disbursement was made (if not the payee), and (v) the 

purpose of the disbursement;

(C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a 

written memorandum authorizing the transaction and 

identifying the attorney responsible for the transaction.

(3) Client Matter Records. A record for each client matter in 

which the attorney receives funds in trust, as follows:

(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that 

shows (i) the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the 

amount of the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the purpose 

for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a 

disbursement, the payee and the check number or other 

payment identification; and (v) the balance of funds 

remaining in the account in connection with the matter; 

and

(B) an identification of the person to whom the unused 

portion of a fee or expense deposit is to be returned 

whenever it is to be returned to a person other than the 

client.

(4) Record of Funds of the Attorney. A record that identifies the 

funds of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as 

permitted by Rule 19-408(b).
22

Id. at 631. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 

19-407(a)(2)–(4). In a letter from Ms. Culberson’s counsel to Bar Counsel, she admitted 

that she did not have client matter records or client ledgers associated with her attorney 

trust account. 

General Misconduct (Rule 8.4)

Rule 8.4(a) provides that an attorney commits professional misconduct if the

attorney “violate[s] or attempt[s] to violate the [MARPC], knowingly assist[s] or induce[s]

another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.” As a result of Ms. Culberson’s

violations of other disciplinary rules, the hearing judge found, and we agree, that she 

violated Rule 8.4(a). 

Under Rule 8.4(b), it is professional misconduct for an attorney to “commit a 

criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as 

an attorney in other respects[.]” Ms. Culberson excepts to this conclusion because Ms. 

Buck has not filed criminal charges against her and asserts that the record in this case 

contains no evidence that she violated a criminal statute. We overrule her exception. 

As we have observed on several occasions, “[an] attorney may be disciplined for 

acts which are criminal but do not result in a criminal conviction if Bar Counsel proves the 

underlying conduct at the disciplinary proceeding.” Silbiger, 478 Md. at 629 (quoting 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 395 (1997)); see also Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Yates, 467 Md. 287, 301 (2020) (stating that “it is not a prerequisite 

to a finding of a violation of Rule 8.4(b) that the attorney have been charged with, or 

convicted of, a violation of [a] criminal statute”). “To establish a violation of Rule 8.4(b), 
23

there need only be clear and convincing evidence of a criminal act.” Yates, 467 Md. at 

301; see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 508 (2022) (stating 

that “to establish a violation of MARPC 8.4(b), Bar Counsel must prove two elements by 

clear and convincing evidence: (1) the attorney committed a criminal act; and (2) that 

criminal act reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 

lawyer in other respects”) (cleaned up). 

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.4(b) because Bar 

Counsel presented clear and convincing evidence that she violated the elements of Md. 

Code, Criminal Law Article (“CL”) § 7-113, which states:

(a) A fiduciary may not:

(1) Fraudulently and willfully appropriate money or a thing of 

value that the fiduciary holds in a fiduciary capacity contrary 

to the requirements of the fiduciary’s trust responsibility; or

(2) Secrete money or a thing of value that the fiduciary holds in a 

fiduciary capacity with a fraudulent intent to use the money or 

thing of value contrary to the requirements of the fiduciary’s 

trust responsibility.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Culberson used her client’s Power of 

Attorney to “misappropriate[] funds from the [GBB] Account for her own personal use and 

benefit.” Based upon our review of the record, it is evident that the elements of fraudulent 

and willful misappropriation by Ms. Culberson in her fiduciary capacity were established 

by clear and convincing evidence. There is overwhelming evidence in this record that Ms. 

Culberson used her client’s Power of Attorney to access her client’s bank account to make 

numerous cash withdrawals for her own personal benefit. Ms. Culberson admitted that she 

provided no contemporaneous invoices to her client that might have provided 
24

documentation to support her contention that the funds were used for Ms. Buck’s benefit.

To say that misappropriation of a client’s funds “reflects adversely on the attorney’s 

honesty, trustworthiness or fitness” is an understatement and constitutes an obvious 

violation of Rule 8.4(b). 

Under Rule 8.4(c), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]” The hearing judge found that Ms. 

Culberson violated Rule 8.4(c) by: (1) withdrawing funds from the GBB Account that she 

could not account for or substantiate as being for a legitimate expense related to Ms. Buck; 

(2) providing Ms. Buck with false and misleading billing invoices in an attempt to justify 

and conceal her misappropriation; and (3) by charging her hourly rates on the billing 

invoices that were for services provided under the $3,500 monthly flat fee agreement. We 

have consistently determined that an attorney’s intentional misappropriation of client funds 

violates Rule 8.4(c). See Silbiger, 478 Md. at 629–30; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Karambelas, 473 Md. 134, 167 (2021); Goodman, 426 Md. at 129–30. The hearing judge 

also concluded that the misrepresentations made by Ms. Culberson to Bar Counsel that 

form the basis for a violation of Rule 8.1(a) (discussed infra) also constitute a violation of 

Rule 8.4(c). For the same reasons that we conclude that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 

8.1(a), we similarly conclude that she violated Rule 8.4(c). 

Under Rule 8.4(d), it is professional misconduct to “engage in conduct that is 

prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson 

violated Rule 8.4(d) when she misappropriated Ms. Buck’s funds. As noted above, Ms. 

Culberson’s use of her client’s Power of Attorney to make cash withdrawals from her 
25

client’s bank account with no contemporaneous explanation or documentation that might 

have otherwise reflected an appropriate use of the funds for her client’s benefit, is clearly 

conduct that “negatively impacts the public’s perception of the legal profession[.]” 

Karambelas, 473 Md. at 169. We agree with the hearing judge’s assessment that Ms. 

Culberson’s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of 

Rule 8.4(d). 

Impeding Bar Counsel’s Investigation (Rule 8.1(a))

Rule 8.1(a) states that “[a]n applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or 

an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a 

disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact[.]”

The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.1(a) “on multiple 

occasions.” First, she knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that Ms. Buck had 

agreed to increase the retainer amount to $5,000 per month. Second, she “knowingly and 

intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that Ms. Buck instructed her not to send 

invoices.” Third, she “knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that she no longer had 

client matter records or client ledgers maintained on behalf of Ms. Buck because her 

assistant’s computer crashed.”

10

 Lastly, Ms. Culberson violated Rule 8.1(a) when she 

provided Bar Counsel with spreadsheets “that falsely claimed to account for the totality of 

funds [Ms. Culberson] withdrew” from the GBB Account.

10 To support her finding, the hearing judge pointed out that, during Ms. Culberson’s 

statement under oath, she testified that the spreadsheets provided to Bar Counsel were the 

only records she had created and maintained that reflected the payments that she withdrew 

from the GBB Account. 
26

Ms. Culberson excepts to this legal conclusion, asserting that there was “no 

evidence” of knowing and intentional misrepresentations because no one with “personal 

knowledge of the communications” between Ms. Culberson and Ms. Buck testified at the 

hearing. We overrule Ms. Culberson’s exception. For the reasons discussed in part II of 

this opinion, there was clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the hearing 

judge’s factual findings that Ms. Culberson made knowing and intentional material 

misrepresentations to Bar Counsel. We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. 

Culberson knowingly made false statements of material fact to Bar Counsel in violation of 

Rule 8.1(a). 

IV

Sanction

As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney discipline proceedings is not to 

punish the attorney but to protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in 

misconduct. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 499 (2020) (citing Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 456 Md. 483, 497–98 (2017)). The public is protected 

when sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the 

intent with which they were committed[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 

Md. 163, 198 (2015) (quotations omitted). To determine the appropriate sanction in 

attorney disciplinary proceedings, we consider the facts of the particular case, as well as 

the presence of any aggravating and mitigating factors.
27

Aggravating Factors 

Aggravating factors are factors that “‘militate in favor of a more severe sanction.’” 

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 608 (2022) (quoting Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020)). When fashioning a sanction, we 

consult the aggravating factors articulated in Standard 9.22 of the American Bar 

Association (“ABA”) Standards for Imposing Sanctions. See Bonner, 477 Md. at 608; see 

also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018) (outlining the list 

of recognized factors). In this case, the hearing judge found that Bar Counsel had proven 

the existence of eight aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) a pattern of 

misconduct; (3) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding; (4) submission of 

false evidence and false statements during the disciplinary process; (5) refusal to 

acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct; (6) substantial experience in the practice 

of law; (7) indifference to making restitution; and (8) illegal conduct. 

The hearing judge determined that Ms. Culberson demonstrated a dishonest and 

selfish motive when she misappropriated Ms. Buck’s funds for her own use and benefit 

between 2016 and 2019. The misappropriation of funds over the course of several years 

demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. The hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson made 

knowing and intentional false statements to Bar Counsel during the disciplinary process 

and submitted numerous false documents in an effort to conceal the misappropriation. The 

hearing judge further determined that Ms. Culberson engaged in bad faith obstruction of 

the disciplinary proceeding by failing to participate in the proceedings before the court, 

including failing to respond to discovery and failing to appear for trial. “‘This Court has 
28

found bad faith obstruction when attorneys knowingly fail[] to respond to Bar Counsel’s 

requests for documents, attend evidentiary hearings, submit written responses, or otherwise 

fail to comply with the rules or directives of the [Commission].’” Attorney Grievance 

Comm’n v. Young, 473 Md. 94, 129 (2021) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 204 (2017)). 

The hearing judge further determined that Ms. Culberson refused to acknowledge 

the wrongful nature of her misconduct, insisting that she could “account for every dollar” 

withdrawn from Ms. Buck’s GBB Account. In addition to failing to provide Ms. Buck 

with any accounting of the cash withdrawals from the GBB Account or an explanation for 

how her invoices for attorney’s fees were paid, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson 

failed to provide a refund to Ms. Buck of any misappropriated funds. Having been admitted 

to the Maryland Bar since 1994, the hearing judge determined that Ms. Culberson had 

substantial experience in the law. Finally, the hearing judge found that Ms. Culberson’s 

misappropriation of funds through the use of her client’s Power of Attorney constituted 

illegal conduct. We conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to 

support the hearing judge’s findings on all eight factors, for the reasons articulated by the 

hearing judge. 

Mitigating Factors 

“In attorney grievance proceedings, this Court considers several mitigating factors 

based upon ABA Standard 9.32.” Bonner, 477 Md. at 609 & n.17 (quoting Sperling, 459 

Md. at 277–78 (listing the recognized mitigating factors)). In this case, Ms. Culberson did 

not participate in the evidentiary proceeding and therefore did not testify regarding any 
29

alleged mitigation, despite being permitted by the hearing judge to present such evidence. 

Bar Counsel represented to the hearing judge that Ms. Culberson had no prior disciplinary 

complaints. Based upon Bar Counsel’s representation, the hearing judge found the 

presence of one mitigating factor: the absence of a prior disciplinary record. 

Although Ms. Culberson did not participate in the evidentiary hearing, she 

submitted a written response to Bar Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 

of Law in which she argued that the record supported the presence of the following 

additional mitigating factors: (1) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) personal or 

emotional problems; (3) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify 

consequences of misconduct; (4) full and free disclosure to the Commission or a 

cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (5) character or reputation; 

(6) delay in the disciplinary proceedings; and (7) imposition of other penalties or sanctions. 

After summarizing in detail Ms. Culberson’s recitals contained in her written 

response and the arguments made in support of these mitigating factors, the hearing judge 

determined that Ms. Culberson failed to prove any of the mitigating factors by a 

preponderance of the evidence. In making this finding, the hearing judge pointed out that 

Ms. Culberson: (1) deliberately failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel in this proceeding, 

which resulted in the sanctions order limiting her participation in this case; and (2) failed 

to attend the evidentiary hearing, and did not request to participate remotely pursuant to 

Maryland Rule 2-800, et seq. Based upon her complete lack of participation in the 

proceeding, the hearing judge pointed out that the court did not receive any evidence to 
30

support Ms. Culberson’s written arguments on mitigation and was also unable to assess 

Ms. Culberson’s credibility. 

We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions that Ms. Culberson failed to present 

any evidence on mitigating factors for the reasons expressed by the hearing judge. When 

an attorney fails to participate in the disciplinary proceeding, this Court will not accept the 

attorney’s arguments concerning mitigation as a substitute for the requirement that 

mitigation evidence be presented to the hearing judge and established by a preponderance 

of the evidence. 

Disbarment is the Appropriate Sanction

Bar Counsel recommends that Ms. Culberson be disbarred from the practice of law.

Ms. Culberson requests that, in lieu of disbarment, the Court impose a sanction less severe 

than disbarment because she “has not practiced law in over two years and has made it clear 

she has no intention to practice or seek to practice law again[.]” 

Under our well-established case law, “when an attorney engages in knowing and 

intentional conduct that involves the misappropriation of funds, disbarment is warranted.” 

Silbiger, 478 Md. at 634–35. We recently observed that this Court has “not imposed a 

sanction less than disbarment” when an attorney has engaged in theft or misappropriation 

of funds. Id. at 643. An attorney who misappropriates funds entrusted to her by her client

for her own benefit without the client’s knowledge or consent “violate[s] one of the most 

sacred obligations of an attorney[.]” Id. at 644. “It has been our long-held and consistent 

position that the entrustment to attorneys of the money and property of others involves a 

responsibility of the highest order” and that “appropriating any part of their funds to their 
31

own use and benefit without clear authority to do so cannot be tolerated.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Jones, 428 Md. 457, 469 (2012) (cleaned up). 

We are not persuaded to deviate from our sanction jurisprudence based upon Ms. 

Culberson’s representation to this Court that she has no intention of practicing law in the 

future. Nor does the presence of one mitigating factor overcome her many transgressions 

along with several aggravating factors. The only sanction appropriate for Ms. Culberson’s 

conduct is disbarment.

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 

SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY 

THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,

PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-

709, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS 

ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

AGAINST WENDY BARROW 

CULBERSON.