DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

and SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY,

Appellants,

v.

CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC., MIAMI HERALD MEDIA COMPANY, SUNSENTINEL COMPANY, LLC, ABC, INC., THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE 

BRADENTON HERALD, THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, FLORIDA 

PRESS ASSOCIATION, GANNETT COMPANY, INC., LOS ANGELES TIMES 

COMMUNICATIONS LLC, THE NEW YORK TIMES COMPANY, ORLANDO 

SENTINEL COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC, BROWARD COUNTY 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, and

SCOTT ISRAEL, in his official capacity as Broward County Sheriff,

Appellees.

Nos. 4D18-1335

and 4D18-1336

[August 3, 2018]

ON MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTION

OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE

Consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial 

Circuit, Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE 18-

004429 (09).

Michael J. Satz, State Attorney, and Joel Silvershein, Assistant State 

Attorney, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant, State Attorney’s Office of the 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit.

Eugene K. Pettis and Debra Potter Klauber of Haliczer, Pettis & Schwamm, 

P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant, School Board of Broward County.

Dana J. McElroy, James J. McGuire, and Jon M. Philipson of Thomas & 

LoCicero, PL, Fort Lauderdale, for appellees, Cable News Network, Inc.; Miami 

Herald Media Company; and Sun-Sentinel Company, LLC, ABC, Inc.; The 

Associated Press; The Bradenton Herald; the First Amendment Foundation; the 

Florida Press Association; Gannett Co., Inc.; Los Angeles Times Communications 

LLC; The New York Times Company; and Orlando Sentinel Communications 

Company, LLC. 
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GROSS, J.

We deny the School Board’s motion for certification. Because the holding in 

this case is carefully tailored to the specific facts of this case, the decision does 

not pass on a legal issue of great public importance.

By its motion, the School Board seeks to invoke the Supreme Court’s 

discretionary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court “[m]ay review any decision of a 

district court of appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great 

public importance. . . .” Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.; see Fla. R. App. P. 

9.030(a)(2)(A)(v). The suggested question submitted by the School Board reads:

When it is determined that a public records request “relates directly” 

to a security system, and is otherwise confidential and exempt from 

disclosure to the public under §§ 119.071(3)(a) and 281.301(1), 

whether the “good cause” exception to that exemption requires a 

showing of more than the public’s need for the information.

An issue is not “of great public importance” where the issue is important only 

to the parties involved. See generally Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 811 

(Fla. 1958). Where resolution of the question requires “consideration of a narrow 

issue with very unique facts,” the Supreme Court will decline certification review.

Dade Cty. Prop. Appraiser v. Lisboa, 737 So. 2d 1078 (Mem.) (Fla. 1999); see also

State v. Sowell, 734 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1999) (finding jurisdiction 

improvidently granted where question “deals with an extremely narrow principle 

of law, and, as phrased, does not present an issue of ‘great public importance.’”).

In addition, the district courts are discouraged from asking the Supreme Court 

to – “in essence . . . check [their] work.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. 

Ballard, 749 So. 2d 483, 485 n.3 (Fla. 1999) (“Although we accepted review in 

this case, the certified question appears to be more of a request for our approval 

of the conclusion reached by the court below than an issue involving great public 

importance.”).

In its motion seeking certification, the School Board advances the following 

arguments:

• The opinion obviates the statutory exemption put in place to 

maintain safety and security of public buildings.

• The decision could impact every child attending public school in 

Florida (2,804,865 in Florida; 269,610 in Broward).

Addressing the first argument, this court’s opinion did not create the good 

cause exception to the security plan exemption. The Legislature placed the “good 

cause” exception in the statute. Our determination affirming the circuit judge’s 
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decision that the parties seeking the records established good cause in this case

does not obliterate the statutory exemption for every case.

Addressing the second argument, it is hard to imagine any scenario where 

this court’s decision would affect every child attending public school in Florida.

Again, the Legislature placed the “good cause” exception in the statute. This 

court’s decision simply defined the term “good cause” according to wellrecognized common law principles and affirmed the trial court’s discretionary 

finding of good cause in this case.1

The definition of “good cause” formulated in the opinion is based on “the 

peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” State Attorney’s Office of 

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 4D18-1335 (Fla. 

4th DCA July 25, 2018) (quoting Dohnal v. Syndicated Office Sys., 529 So. 2d 

267, 269 (Fla. 1988)). Whether a party seeking release of public records has 

established good cause is “primarily addressed to the conscience and discretion” 

of the judge. Id. This court’s decision reaffirmed Florida precedent that holds 

that a showing of good cause requires a case-specific weighing of the equities.

The finding of good cause in this case was narrowly tailored to the facts of 

this case. Contrary to the School Board’s claim, this court did not simply find 

that good cause was shown based on “the public’s need for the information.”

This court found that the trial court’s finding of good cause in this case was not 

an abuse of discretion where:

• The authorities failed to enter a classroom building where a man was 

shooting at high school students until more than fourteen minutes after 

the shooting started;

• The authorities’ narrative explaining the delay was confusing;

• The authorities’ narrative explaining the delay differed from eyewitness 

accounts; and

• The authorities’ narrative shifted and changed over time.

We held that in this instance, the public record sought (the video footage) will 

reveal the conduct of public servants discharging their assigned duties and 

responsibilities, something that the parents of students should be able to 

evaluate to participate in future decisions concerning the safety of their children.

KLINGENSMITH, J., concurs.

CONNER, J., dissents with opinion.

1 We note that the dissent in the panel opinion violated principles of appellate review; it 

reweighed the evidence and did not apply the deferential standard of abuse of discretion 

review. The adoption of a de novo standard to review a trial court’s determination of 

“good cause” is a departure from established jurisprudence.
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CONNER, J., dissenting.

I dissent from the majority’s decision not to certify a question of great public 

importance. Although the question posed by the School Board is not the 

appropriate question, I contend either the legislature or our supreme court needs 

to give some guidance to courts on what constitutes a good faith exception to the 

public records exclusion of information regarding security systems in public 

places.

The majority contends the underlying opinion issued in this case is very 

narrow and does not raise a question of great public importance, presumably 

because the opinion addresses “unique facts” and “the issue is important only 

to the parties involved.” I contend the majority’s opinion sets a precedent that a 

trial judge, as the finder of fact, can find a good faith reason to grant an exception 

to the exclusion from disclosure of public records under sections 119.071(3)(a) 

and 281.301(1), Florida Statutes (2018), based on a finding that the safety risks 

presented by the disclosure are “minimal.” My dissent to the underlying opinion 

was not based on an improper appellate reweighing of evidence. My dissent was 

based on a contention that the assessment of risk in this case requires an 

analysis a trial judge is ill-equipped to engage in, and there was no countervailing 

evidence to dispute the expert evidence of risk presented by the School Board. 

Cf. Tibbs v. State, 397 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Fla. 1981) (“The weight and the 

sufficiency of the evidence are, in theory, two distinct concepts most often 

relevant at the trial court level. Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. . . . Weight, at 

least in theory, is a somewhat more subjective concept.”); see also State, Dep’t of 

Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Wiggins, 151 So. 3d 457, 476 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2014) (Van Nortwick, J., dissenting) (“A determination that evidence is not 

competent substantial evidence does not involve a reweighing of the evidence.”). 

My fellow panel members apparently contend the video footage they reviewed 

showed competent substantial evidence to support the trial judge’s finding the 

disclosure would “minimally reveal information relating to the security system.” 

If untrained persons can make that assessment, then I agree, the trial judge was 

within his discretion to so find.2

As I did in my dissent to the underlying opinion, I completely agree with the 

majority that the video footage will reveal the conduct of public servants 

2 To the extent the contention is the risk presented by disclosure was “minimal” because 

the School Board was not actively monitoring the video system, thus the video system 

was not really a security system, that argument ignores two things: (1) passive video 

surveillance systems act as a deterrent because they assist law enforcement in 

capturing criminals; and (2) as the appellees repeatedly assert, the School Board has 

been redesigning the security system since the incident, which likely means the security 

cameras are now being monitored. Until cameras are enhanced, added, or relocated, 

security gaps in the existing system can be determined from the public disclosure.
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discharging their assigned duties and responsibilities, something that the 

parents of students and the public at large should be able to evaluate to 

participate in future decisions concerning the safety of their children. I have no 

doubt the School Board is rapidly making changes to the video systems of all 

schools in Broward County. As a matter of public safety for the children 

attending public schools in Broward County, or at least the Douglas campus, I 

simply contend the disclosure should be postponed until competent substantial 

evidence is presented that the public’s right to know outweighs the safety risks 

of disclosure.

I would certify to our supreme court the following question of great public 

importance:

WHEN IT IS DETERMINED THAT A PUBLIC RECORDS REQUEST 

“RELATES DIRECTLY” TO A SECURITY SYSTEM OF A PUBLIC 

BUILDING AND IS SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED FROM DISCLOSURE 

UNDER SECTIONS 119.071(3)(A) AND 281.301(1), FLORIDA 

STATUTES, DOES THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO INFORMATION ABOUT 

GOVERNMENTAL ACTIONS RESPONDING TO A VIOLENT ATTACK 

OCCURING IN A PUBLIC BUILDING CONSTITUTE A GOOD FAITH 

EXCEPTION TO THE EXEMPTION, WHERE THE DISCLOSURE 

COULD EXPOSE EXISTING GAPS IN A SECURITY SYSTEM, AND IF 

SO, TO WHAT EXTENT IS EXPERT EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO 

DETERMINE THE RISK OF EXPOSURE OF WEAKNESSES IN THE 

SECURITY SYSTEM?

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