i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 65 6- CR Martin Edg ar GU ZM AN , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 406 J udicial District Court, Webb County , Texas

th Trial Court No. 2007-CRS-000104-D4 Honora ble Mark L

uitjen, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: Aug ust 5, 2009 AFF I RMED Mart in Ed g ar Gu zman wa s convic te d of thr e e c ounts of a g g ra vate d sexua l ass a

ult of a c hil d under the ag e of fourtee n and two counts of se x ual assault of a person unde r the a g e of se ventee n. On appea l, Guzman c ontends he re ceive d ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel bec ause his trial c ounsel wi thd re w d ur ingthe thi rt

y da y tim e pe ri od

fo r fi ling a

mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l and fa ile d to fi le
a ff ida vit s i n s u

p p o rt o f a m o t i o n f

o r n e w t r i a l
. G u z m an a l s o c o n t e n d s t h e t r i a l c o u rt e r r e d in04
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1 ... B ria n a is t h e p se u d o n ym us e d a t t ria l b e c a u se the vic tim w a s a m ino r a t t h e ti m e o f t h e o ff e n se a n d trial.

- 2- admitting evide nce of

extraneous bad a ct s beca use the probative value of the evidenc e wa s substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. L astly , Guzman contends the e vidence is factua lly

insufficient to support his third count of ag g ravated sexual assault. We affirm the tr ial
c ourt ’s jud g me nt. B ACKG ROUND I n 2001, Br iana, 1 who was twe lve y ea rs o ld, met Guzman, her biolog ical father. B riana ’s mot he r s ub se qu e ntl y

marr ie d G uzma

n in July of 20 02 , a nd the y liv e d to g e the r f

or a pp ro xi mat e ly two y ear s. On Marc h 10, 2006, Br iana submitted a wr itten statement to the police a ccusingGuzman of sexually abusing her since she wa s twelve y ear s old. A jury subsequently

convicted Guzman of three counts of ag g ravated sexual assault of a child under the ag e of f

ourtee n and two counts of sexual assault of a per son under the a g e of se ventee n. At trial, Guzman was re prese nted by court-a ppointed trial counsel, Hug o D. Martinez. On J une 27, 2008, Guzman was se ntence d to three lif e se nte nc e s and

tw o tw e nty

y e ar s e nte nc e s a s w e ll a s th e ma ximumfi ne on e a c h c ount. On J uly 14, 2008, Guzman filed a pro se motion for new trial. On J uly 21, 2008, Guzman filed a pr o se motion to set a hearing on the m otion for new t rial. His attorne y , Martinez, prepa red
an ame nded m o t i o n for ne w trial on Jul y 25, 2008, and attac hed his aff idavit and af

fidavits from Guzman and Mary

J o Vela, one o f t he jurors in the c ase. The amende d motion for new tria l and
a ff ida vit s w e re no t f

ile d, ho we ve r, be c a

us e Gu zman r e fu se d to sig n h is a ff ida vit
.04
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2 ... A c o p y o f t h e a m e n d e d m o tio n fo r n e w trial tha t M a rtine z ha d p re p a re d w a s a ttac h e d t o h is m o tio n to wi t hdr aw. B as ed on t he cer t i f i cat e of s er vi ce, i t appear s t hat M ar t i nez i nt ended t o s er ve t he amended mo t i on f or n ew t ri al on the as si st ant D i st ri ct A t t o rney , R aul G uerra, on July 25 , 20 0 8
. V el a’ s af f i d avi t was dated Jul y 17 , 20 0 8 , and M ar t i n ez ’ s a f

f i dav i t w as da t ed Ju l y 25, 2008.

- 3- On J uly 31, 2008, Martinez filed a motion to withdraw f rom the ca se. 2 On August 21, 2008, the trial cour

t denied Guzman’s pro se motion for newtrial. On September 9, 2008, the trial cour

t g rante d Martinez’s motion to withdraw and issued a n order appointing a

n at t o rn ey for Guzman’s appea l. I N EF FE C TI V E A SSI STA N C E O F C OU N SEL I n three issues on appea l, Guzman asserts he wa s denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel as g u ar an te e d b y th e U n it e d St a te s an d T e xa s Co n s ti tuti o n s . Sp e c if ic a ll y , G u zm an c o n te n d s : (1) he wa s w ith ou t a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l dur ing a

c ri tic a l po rt ion

of his pr oc e e din g s, i.e ., the thi rt y da y tim e pe ri od fo r fi lin g a

mot ion fo r n e w tri a l; a

nd (2 ) h is tri a l c ouns e l f

a ile d to fi le a ff

ida vit s in support of a motion for ne w trial and instea d withdrew f rom the ca se. Under both the United States and Te x as Co n s tituti ons, a def endant is entitled to eff

ective
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. U .S. C O N ST . ame nd . V I ; T EX . C O N ST . art . I , § 10 ; T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt . 1 .0 51 (Ve rn on

Sup p. 20 08 ). Th is gua ra nte e do e s n ot p ro mis e a

de fe nd ant e rr or le ss repr esentation, but ins tead of fer s a def endant an attorney

who is rea sonably

likely to rende r ef

fec tive assistance
. Mo or e v . S

tate , 694 S
. W
. 2 d 5 2 8 , 5 3 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). I n order to prove ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel on appe al, the appe llant must show that trial counsel’s assistance fell below a

n objective pr ofessio n al s t an d ard of rea sonablene ss, and as a result, trial counsel’s a ctions prejudice d appellant' s defe nse. Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 69 2 ( 19 84 ); Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To establish prejudice,04
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- 4- the appe llant must prove by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that, but for c ounsel’s unprof essional
e rr or , th e re is a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that the ou tco me of his tr ia l w ou ld h a ve be e n d if fe re nt. J ac k so n v . S tate , 9 73 S.W. 2d

95 4, 95 6 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ). “ A r e a so nable pro ba bil ity is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. I n revie wing an inef

fec tive assistance of counse l claim, we c onsi d er t h e t o tality of trial counsel’s r epre sentation in light of the p ar t i cu l ar circ umstances of the ca se and pr esume that trial
co u n s el ac ted compete ntly and made decisions base d on a re asonable trial strateg y . S e e E xp ar te W elborn, 785 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). I n order to refute this presumption, the appellant must ensure that his alleg ation of i neff ectivene ss of trial counse l is affirmatively founded in the record. Thompson , 9 S
. W
. 3 d at 8 1 3
. I f t h e r ec o rdd o es n o ts p ec i fi ca l l y m en t i o nt ri al co u n s el 's
rea sons f or his a ctions and the appellant does not de velop an evide ntiary rec ord throug h a hea

ring
on a motion for new trial, then it is very difficult for an appellant to e stabli s h an i n eff ective assistance claim. Se e Gi bb s v . S tate , 7 S.W. 3d

17 5, 17 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. ref ’d). A . Deprivation of Coun sel During Time P eriod to F ile Motion for New Trial Guzman first contends he was unrepre sented by trial counsel throughout the entire thirty day period for

filing a motion for new tria l. Guzman describe s t h e t h i rt y d ay period a s a per iod of “conf usion.” Guzman states he filed a pro se motion for ne w trial, a pro se not ice of appea l, and a pro se motion for appointment of counse l during that thirty day period be cause he believe d he wa s
unre pr e se nte d b y

tr ia l c ouns e l. A c c or din g to Guzma n, a ft e r s e nte nc ing , Mar

tin e z did no t me e t w ith him un til July 25 , 2 00 8 to dis c us s th e a

pp e a ls p ro c e ss, and the me e tin g le ft Gu zman c on fu se d a s to whether Martinez would repr esent him on appe al.04
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- 5- A cr iminal defenda

nt may file or amend a motion for ne w trial within t h i rt y d ay s of the imposit ion of his se ntence
. T EX . R. A PP . P. 21.4. This thi rty day time period is deeme d “a c ritical stag e” requiring repr esentation of counsel unless the rig ht is waived. Se e Coo k s v . S tate , 240 S.W .3d 906, 910-11 (Tex
. Crim. App. 2007). Gene rally , there is a presumption that trial counse l continued to adequately

repr esent the de fenda

nt during the per iod for filing a motion for new trial; howeve r,
a de fe nd ant c an r e fu

te thi s p re sumpt ion

by sh ow inghe wa s dep ri ve d of co un se l, wh ic h u lti mate ly resulted in the lack of an opportunity to file a motion for ne w trial. Id. a t 91 1; Gr e e n v . S tate , 264 S.W .3d 63, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, pet. re f’d)
. I n this case , Guzman's sentence was imposed on June 27, 2008. By J uly 25, 2008, Martinez ha d p re pa re d a n ame nd e d mo tio n f

or ne w tri a l, whic h w a s w ith in t he thi rt y da y tim e pe ri od

to f ile
or ame nd a motion for new trial. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 21. 4; see also Gre en , 264 S.W .3d at 69 (explaining that a

ppellant must show a re cord of no ac t i vity

by trial counsel to def

eat the presumption of re prese ntation)
. M ar t i nez prepa red a n amende d motion because Guzman had previously

filed a pr o se motion for new t rial on J uly 14, 2008. Although the amende d motion for new tria l was timely

prepa red, Martinez did not file the amende d motion because Guzman refuse d to s ig n h is a ff

ida vit . O nly a ft e r Guzma

n r e fu se d to sig n th e a ff

ida vit did Ma rt ine z fi le a

mot ion to withdraw a s counsel on Jul y 31, 2008. Fur thermore , the trial cour

t did not gra

nt Martinez’s motion to withdraw until September 9, 2008, we ll after e x piration of the thirty day period. Whil e we rec og nize there a re some situations dea ling with ‘the ambig uity of re prese ntation which all too often f

ollows a conviction,’ this is not a s i tuation where Guzman was depr ived of assistance of counse l. Se e Bu rn e tt v . S tate , 959 S.W .2d 652, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1 9 9 7 , p e t
. re f’ d ) ( qu o t i n g W ar d v . S tate , 740 S.W .2d 794, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). Her e,04
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- 6- Martinez timely

prepa red an amende d motion for new tria l and only failed to file it bec ause G uzman ref used t o sign the attache d aff idavit; Martinez did not move to withdraw until after the thirty day period ha d expired. These c ircumstance s do not show Guzman was without the assistance of counsel during the t ime period for filing or amendinga motion for new trial. See G reen , 264 S.W .3d at 69. Moreove r, in view of the rec ord, Guzman’s pro se motion s are not indications of deprivation of counsel. See id . (stat i ng appellant must show more tha n evidenc e of pr o se motions to defeat the pr e su mpt ion

of re pr e se ntatio n) ; se e als o B ur ne tt , 959 S.W .2d at 659 (“The filing of pro se matter s does not establish deprivation of counsel, beca use the pra ctice is c ommonplace whe n defe ndants are repr esente d by

counsel.” ). Ac cording ly , Guzman's f irst two issues are ove rruled. B . F ail ur e of Tr ialCo unse l t o F ile Affida vit s Suppo r ti ng M ot ion for Ne w Tri al Guzman further

contends he rec eived inef fe ct i ve assistanc e of c ounsel bec ause Ma rtinez failed to file t he affidavits in support of t he amended mot ion for new t rial and moved to withdraw from the c ase. G uzman co n t en d s that despite the fa ct he r efuse d to sign the a ffidavit Mar tinez prepa red f or his signature duringtheir mee ting, Ma rtinez deprived him of effec tive repr esentation by fi lin g a mot ion to w ith dr aw s e ve ra l da

y s late r wi tho ut a g a in c on fi rm ingwh e the r Guzma n w ou ld be willing to sig n the af

fidavit. We first note that Guzman’s contention closely duplicates his first two issues on appea l. As
no te d a bo ve , M art ine z' s ina

bil ity to fi le the a me nd e d moti on fo r ne w tri a l witha tta c he d a ff ida vit s d u e to G u zm an ' s r e f

u s a l to c o o p e r a te d o e s n o t d e mo n s tr a te in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o unsel. See Ro dr igu e z v . S tate , 74 S.W .3d 563, 568-69 (Te x . App.—Amar illo 2 002, pet. re f’d) (stating the intentional withholding of infor mation by a clien t c a nn o t r e s u lt in an ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel
c l a im) ; see al

so Can no n v . S

tate , 668 S.W .2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (holding c ounsel04
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- 7- eff ective when the de fenda

nt failed to impar

t suf ficient information to counsel); He rn an de z v . S tate , 88 5 S. W.2 d 5 97 , 6 01 -6 02 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 94 , n o p e t.) (st ati ng a de fe nd ant’ s f a ilure to provid e h is a tt o r

n e y w it h r e le v an t in f

o r mati o n d e f

e a ts a late r c la im o f in e f f e c ti v e a s s is tance of counsel ba sed on attorne y ’s fa ilure to obtain the information). Fur thermore , to preva il on an ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, Guzman has t he burde n to pr oduce a rec ord on appea l show ing Martinez’s failure to file the ame nded motion for new trial
was due to Ma

rtinez’s defic iencies. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. Her e, the r ecor d shows Martinez did not pur s u e th e a me n d e d mo ti o nb e c a

u s e G u zm anf

a il e d to c o o p e r a te
. E v e nif

G u zm anhad shown that Martinez’s per formanc e wa s deficie nt, Guzman failed to establish prejudice by demonstrating t h at a new trial would have been g rante d if the ame nded motion for new trial and aff idavits had bee n filed. Se e Re dm on d v . S tate , 30 S.W .3d 692, 699 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2000, pet. re f’d) (indicatingno prejudice was shown on the rec ord from counse l’s failure to supplement mot ion fo r n e w tri a l w ithsu

pp or tin g a ff ida vit s) ; B a c e

yv . S t a te , 990 S. W. 2 d

3 1 9 , 3 3 3
- 3 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) (s tatin g no pr e jud ic e wa s sh ow n fr om c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to o bta in he ari ngon

mot io n for new tr ia l w ith in s e ve nty -f ive da y s) ; Br y an t v . S tate , 974 S.W .2d 395, 400 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref ’d) ( holding a

ppellant did not show prejudice on the re cord fr om t ri a l c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to f ile a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l) . A c c or din g ly , G uzma n’ s th ird i ssu e is
overr uled. R U LE 403 Guzman c ontends the trial court abused its discr etion in a dmitti ng evide n ce o f ex trane ous ba d a c ts be c a

us e the ir pr ob a tiv e va lue wa s su bs tanti a lly ou tw e ig he d by the da ng e r of unf

a ir prejudice . The State re sponds that the trial court pr operly admitted the evidenc e as same transa ction04
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- 8- c on te xtua l e vid e nc e , a

nd the e vid e nc e wa s n ot s ub stan ti ally ou tw e ig he d b y

the da ng e r o f u nf a ir prejudice
. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or ex clude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. W

e ath e rre d v . S

tate , 15 S.W.3 d 540 , 542 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Mo ntgom e ry v . S tate , 81 0 S. W.2 d 3 72 , 391 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ) ( op . o n r e h’ g ). A t ri a l c ourt do e s n ot a

bu se its dis c re tio n s o lo nga s th e de c isi on to a dmi t or

e x clu de evide nc e is w ith in t he zon e of

re a so na ble disag ree ment and is corr ec t under a ny theory of law a pplicable to the c ase. Mo ntgom e ry , 810 S.W .2d at 391. Texas Rule of Evidenc e 403 al l o ws for the e x clusion of re levant evide nce if that evidenc e’s probative value “ is substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice, c onfusion of t he is sues, or misleading the j ury , or by considerations of undue delay , or needless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence .” T EX . R. E V ID . 403. “Rule 403 favors t he admission of re levant evide nce and ca rries a presumption that rele vant evidenc e will be more probative tha n prejudicia l.” Sh uff

ie ld
v . S tat e , 189 S.W .3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); se e als o M on tgo me ry , 810 S.W .2d at 389. When conducting a Rule 403 ana ly sis, we must consider, but ar e not limit ed to, t he following fa c tor s: “ (1 ) h owpr ob a tiv e the e vid e nc e is; (2 ) t he po te nti a l of

the e vid e nc e to i mpr e ss t he jur y in some irrat ional, but never theless indelible way ; (3) the time the pr oponent nee ds to develop the evidenc e; and (4) the proponent' s need f or the e vidence .” Se e Sh uff ie ld , 189 S.W .3d at 787 (c iting Mo ntgom e ry , 8 10 S.W. 2d a t 38 9- 90 ); se e als o Cas e

y v . S tate , 215 S.W .3d 870, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “[A]lt houg h a trial court must sti ll perfor m a balanc ing te st to see if [the probative va lue of] same tra nsaction conte x tual evidenc e . . . is substantially outweig hed by

its prejudici al ef

fec t, the prejudicia l nature of

[same transac tion] contextual evidence rar ely rende rs such e vidence i n ad missibl e, as longas it sets the stag e for the jury ' s comprehe nsion of the whole c riminal04
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- 9- transac tion.” Swa rb v . S tate , 1 25 S.W. 3d

67 2, 68 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 03 , p e t. dism’d). The State g ave Guzman notice of thirty -three extraneous bad a cts i t i n t ended to introduc e during its case- in-chief

. Twenty -one of

the ac ts were based on se x ual ac ts betwee n Guzman and Br iana. The trial court r

uled that “these ty

pe of a ctiviti es , t h ey

are surroundingspecific instances that she is testify ing to, a nd it appear s to me that they are contextual and there fore admissible.” When the State beg an inquiring into the ext rane ous bad acts, Guzman obje cted to the e vidence as more pre jud i ci al t h an probative; the trial cour t overrule d Guzman’s objection af ter both sides questioned B riana

on voir dire. Br iana then te stified that during the incidents Guzman would touch her stomac h, vag ina, buttocks, and breasts. Br iana also testified Guz man would kiss her mouth and brea sts as he exposed himself to her. B riana further testified Guzman would threaten her by asking he r i f she ha d a boy fr ie nd , an d wou ld thr e a te n to ha rm he r, he r m oth e r, and

he r s ibl ing s if

sh e tol d them about the sexual abuse. Her e, th e p r o b a ti v e n a tu

r e o f th e e xtr an e o u s b a d a c ts a dmi tt e d b y th e tr ia l c o urt was not substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice. T he e v ide nce w as probative in describing the contex tual details of t he sex ual episodes be tween B riana and Guzman. Se e Swa rb , 125 S.W .3d at 681-82 (stating same transa ction c o nte xtu a l e vidence is admissibl e as pr obative whe n the evidenc e
se ts the sta g e fo r t

he jur y ’s c omp re he ns ion of

the c ri min a l of

fe ns e ). Th e e vid e nc e wa s n e e de d to adequately descr ibe t he circumstance s of t he offenses with which Guz man was charg ed. See Parent
v . S tat e , No. 05-01-00666- CR, 2002 WL 253927, at *4 (Te x . App.—Dallas F eb. 22, 2002, pet. r ef’ d) (n ot d e sig nate d f

or pu bli c a tio n) (h ighli gh tin g that e vid e nc e of e xtra ne ou s mi sc on du c t ma

y be “ so intertwined with the c harg ed off ense that it [ is] nece ssarily probative of the cha

rg ed off ense” ). Afte r04
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- 10- revie wing the re cord, w e ca nnot c onclude the probative va lue of B riana ’s testimony indicating that Guzman kissed a

nd touched her stomac h, vag ina, buttocks, and bre asts as we ll as threate ned her and her f amily was substantially

outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudi ce . See id. at *4 (holding evidenc e that appe llant frenc h kissed the child v ic tim was not substantially outweig hed by

the dang er of unfa ir prejudice ). Ac cording ly , Guzman’s fourth issue on appe al is overr uled. F A C TUA L S UF F I CI E NCY I n h is l a st i ssu e on

a pp e a l, Guzma

n a sse rt s th e e vid e nc e pr e sen ted at tria l is fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

his c on vic tio n o n the t hi rd c ount o f a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult wi th a c hil d under the ag e of fourtee n. Specifica lly , Guzman contends the State failed to establish Briana was sexually abused be tween January

1, 2003, when she was thirteen y ear s old, a nd Fe bruar

y 4, 2003, her f ourtee nth birthday
. We reviewthe fa ctual suff iciency of the e vidence by

rev i ew i n g al l of the e vidence in a neutra l light. Se e W

ats on v . S tate , 2 04 S.W. 3d

40 4, 41 4 ( Te x. Cr im
. App
. 20 06 ). We wi ll o nly
re ve rs e if (1 ) t he e vid e nc e is so we a k th a t it make s th e ve rd ic t c le arl y wr on g or manif e stl y un jus t, or (2) the ver dict g oes ag ainst the g reat weig ht and prepondera nce of the evidenc e. See id. at 414-15; J oh ns on v . S

tate , 23 S.W .3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Under a fac tual sufficie ncy

revie w, the jur y is t he so le jud g e of

the c re dib ili ty

and we ig ht o f t

he wi tne sse s’ te sti mony

and may c ho os e to believe all, some, or none of their testimony
. W estb ro ok v . S tate , 29 S.W.3 d 103 , 112 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2000). A de fe nd ant c omm its a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hil d if he int e nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly
c a us e s th e se xua l or g an o f a c hil d to c on ta c t or pe ne tr a te the se xua l or g an of a pe rs on , a nd the c hil d is a person young er tha

n fourtee n y ear s of age at t he ti me of the offense and is not the adult’s spouse.04
- 08
- 00 65 6- CR

- 11- T EX . P EN . C ODE . ANN . § 22.021 (Ve rnon Supp. 2008). A child victim’s testimony alone is suffic ient to support a conviction for ag g ravated sexual assault. Ga rc ia v . S tate , 5 6 3 S. W. 2 d 9 2 5 , 9 2 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1978). At trial, Br iana testified that afte r she turned thi rtee n and before she turned four teen, Guzman took her to diffe rent motels and se x ually abused he r up to two or three times a wee k. Whil e Guzman contends pa

rts of B riana ’s testimony

reg arding the number of incidents and he r ag e at the time of the incidents was unc erta in, it was within the province of the jury to rea sonably believe the testimony that instances of

sexual abuse occ urre d on or about J anuar y 1, 2003, when Br iana wa s thirteen, and befor e her

fourtee nth birthday . After revie wing all the evidenc e in a ne utral ligh t an d gi v i n g due defe renc e to the jury , we conclude the evidenc e is not so weak as to make the verdic t clear ly wrong or manife stly

unjust, nor is the verdict ag ainst the g reat weig ht a nd preponde ranc e of the e vidence
. See W atson , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 41 4- 15 ; W

estbrook , 29 S.W. 3d

at11 2; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11. Acc ording ly , Guzman’s last issue on appea l is overruled. C ONCL US I ON B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g , w e a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Do Not Publish