Filed 5/19/21 Coston v. Stanislaus County CA5

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

JAMIE COSTON et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STANISLAUS COUNTY et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

RB RANCH DEVELOPMENT, LLC et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

F074209

(Stanislaus Super. Ct. No. 2016561)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Roger M. 

Beauchesne, Judge.

Law Office of Thomas N. Lippe and Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants.

Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Matthew D. Zinn, Sarah H. Sigman, Peter J. 

Broderick; John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Thomas E. Boze, Assistant County 

Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents.

Dennis Bunting, County Counsel (Solano), Peter R. Miljanich, Deputy County 

Counsel, and Jennifer Henning for the California State Association of Counties as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Herum Crabtree Suntag and Steven A. Herum for Real Parties in Interest.

-ooOoo-
2.

This matter has been transferred to us from the Supreme Court for reconsideration 

in light of Protecting Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus 

(2020) 10 Cal.5th 479 (Protecting Our Water).

Appellants and plaintiffs challenge respondent Stanislaus County’s (County) 

approval of well permit 2014-539, alleging the County failed (1) to perform 

environmental review required under the California Environment Quality Act (CEQA) 

(Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et. seq.) and (2) to afford plaintiffs due process 

protections before issuing the permit. Prior to November 25, 2014, County had a policy 

not to apply CEQA’s environmental review procedures to the approval of well permits.1

Permit 2014-539 was approved under this policy.

The County obtained judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that its approvals 

of nonvariance well permits were categorically ministerial under CEQA. Thereafter, the 

Supreme Court decided Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th 479. In that opinion, 

the Supreme Court invalidated the County’s categorical classification of well permit 

approvals as ministerial. As a result, the grounds for County’s judgment on the pleadings 

have been wholly negated. 

The County initially contended the judgment on the pleadings could still be 

affirmed on alternate grounds: There is substantial evidence the specific permit at issue 

here was properly classified as ministerial.2 This contention is untenable on review of a 

judgment on the pleadings. We therefore reverse the judgment and remand to the trial 

court3for further proceedings.

1 Except for variance permits, which are explained below.

2 At oral argument, counsel for the County conceded that reversal and remand is 

proper in light of our conclusions in the recent case of Protecting Our Water and 

Environmental Resources et al. v. County of Stanislaus et al., (Mar. 8, 2021, F073634) 

[nonpub. opn.] (“POWER II”).

3 Plaintiffs ask that we “remand to the County.” However, at this juncture we are 

reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
3.

FACTS

I. History of Water Well Standards in California

In 1949, the Legislature enacted section 231 of the Water Code,4 which then 

provided:

“The department, either independently or in cooperation with any person or 

any county, state, federal or other agency, shall investigate and survey 

conditions of damage to quality of underground waters, which conditions 

are or may be caused by improperly constructed, abandoned or defective 

wells through the interconnection of strata or the introduction of surface 

waters into underground waters. The department shall report to the 

appropriate regional water pollution control board its recommendations for 

minimum standards of well construction in any particular locality in which 

it deems regulation necessary to protection of quality of underground water, 

and shall report to the Legislature from time to time, its recommendations 

for proper sealing of abandoned wells.”5 (Stats.1949, ch. 1552, p. 2795.)

In 1967, the Legislature enacted sections 13800 through 13806 of the Water Code. 

(Stats.1967, ch. 323, pp. 1518–1519; see also Stats.1969, ch. 482, pp. 1081–1082.) 

Those statutes empowered the Department of Water Resources (DWR), after completing 

the studies and investigations described in section 231, to make a determination that a 

particular area of the state “need[s]” “water well construction, maintenance, 

abandonment, and destruction standards ... to protect the quality of water used.” 

(Stats.1967, ch. 323, p. 1518.) Such a determination would then be reported to the area’s 

regional water quality control board (regional board). (Ibid.) If the area’s regional board 

Our reversal of that ruling and the resultant judgment does not resolve the ultimate issue 

of what relief plaintiffs are entitled to in the trial court, if any. The County may move for 

summary judgment or may prevail at trial. Therefore, we must remand to the trial court 

for further proceedings.

4 All further statutory references are to the Water Code unless otherwise stated.

5

In 1969, the statute’s reference to “regional water pollution control board[s]” 

was changed to “the appropriate California regional water quality control board.” 

(Stats.1969, ch. 482, pp. 1047–1048.) Otherwise, the statute’s language remains in effect 

today as it was enacted in 1949. (See § 231.)
4.

concurred in DWR’s determination, it was to make a report to the affected counties and 

cities and transmit any well standards that had been recommended by DWR. (Ibid.) The 

affected counties and cities would then have 120 days to adopt an ordinance establishing 

“standards of water well construction, maintenance, abandonment, and destruction.” 

(Ibid.) If a county or city failed to so adopt an ordinance, the regional board could adopt 

such standards for the area. (Id. at p. 1519.) Standards adopted in that fashion would 

“have the same force and effect as if adopted as a county or city ordinance.” (Ibid.)

A. Bulletin No. 74-68

In February 1968, DWR published a document titled, Bulletin No. 74, Water Well 

Standards: State of California (Bulletin 74-68.)6 Bulletin 74-68 stated that it was 

prepared as part of DWR’s compliance with section 231.7

Bulletin 74-68 stated DWR’s understanding that sections 13800 through 13806 

“established a procedure for implementing standards developed under Section 231.”

In Bulletin 74-68’s foreword, the director of DWR stated, “The standards 

presented in this report are issued as guides to good practice for those engaged in the 

construction of water wells or in the regulation of water well construction and the 

destruction of abandoned wells in California.” The Director claimed Bulletin 74-68 

“fulfill[s] the need for a basic set of standards that are satisfactory under most conditions 

and which can be modified or expanded to accommodate local variations in geologic or 

ground water conditions.” The foreword concluded by acknowledging that the standards 

would need to be revised and updated over time “in light of both changes in practice and 

the degree of success achieved in their application.”

6 This bulletin did not refer to itself as Bulletin 74-68. However, subsequent 

editions are identified as “Bulletin 74-” followed by the last two digits of the year it was 

published. For consistency, we will refer to the original Bulletin No. 74, published in 

1968, as “Bulletin 74-68.”

7 A “preliminary edition” of this bulletin was issued in 1962. The 1962 edition 

was the first recommended statewide standards for water well construction and sealing.
5.

Bulletin 74-68 was organized into three chapters, titled “Introduction,” 

“Standards,” and “Destruction of Wells.” Some of the chapters were further divided into 

parts, and some parts were further divided into sections. Relevant here, Chapter 2 

(Standards) has a Part II titled “Well Construction.” Section 8 of Part II is titled, “Well 

Location with Respect to Contaminants and Pollutants.” It is this section, as later 

amended, that takes center stage in the present appeal.

B. Chapter 9.36 of the Stanislaus County Code

In 1973, County enacted Ordinance No. NS-443, the predecessor of Chapter 9.36 

of the Stanislaus County Code.8 (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 490.) It 

8 The County requests that we take judicial notice of several documents, including 

Ordinance No. 443; a memorandum of the Stanislaus County Health Officer; Stanislaus 

County Board of Supervisors Resolution No. 83-1750; Ordinance No. C.S. 1155; and 

excerpts of the 2016 California Building Code. Plaintiffs object only to judicial notice of 

the Building Code excerpts. Plaintiffs correctly note that only some building permits are 

ministerial. But plaintiffs’ contention goes to the persuasiveness of the argument the 

building code excerpts are intended to support, not the propriety of taking judicial notice. 

We grant the County’s request for judicial notice in its entirety.

Shortly before oral argument, plaintiffs filed another request for judicial notice. 

They apparently request that we take judicial notice of our opinion in POWER II, supra, 

F073634, and the model ordinance referenced in Water Code section 13801, 

subdivision (d). While the request itself seeks notice of the recently filed opinion in 

POWER II, the exhibit attached to the request is the 2018 opinion in Protecting Our 

Water and Environmental Resources et al. v. County of Stanislaus et al. (Aug. 24, 2018, 

F073634), nonpublished opinion (POWER I). It seems clear plaintiffs seek notice of the 

opinion in POWER II, rather than POWER I. We grant the requests for judicial notice but 

observe that they do not alter our analysis or conclusions. 

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice also contains substantive argument akin to a 

supplemental brief. For example, plaintiffs suggest this court in POWER II “introduced a 

new issue” when it observed that the plaintiffs in that case had invoked Water Code 

section 13801 without explaining the actual consequences of the statute’s potential 

applicability. We disagree. The plaintiffs in POWER II had argued that section 13801 

required the County to incorporate provisions from Bulletin 74. The plaintiffs in the 

present case offer a similar argument. However, POWER II simply pointed out that the 

statutory consequence of plaintiffs’ claim was not automatic incorporation of provisions 

from Bulletin 74, as their argument implied. Rather, the consequence was imposition of 

a model ordinance in the jurisdiction. (§ 13801, subd. (d).) In other words, POWER II
6.

provides that a permit from the county health officer is required to construct, repair, or 

destroy a water well. (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.030.) 

Chapter 9.36 establishes several standards for water well construction. It also 

imports certain standards from Bulletin No. 74 as follows:

“Except as may be otherwise provided by this chapter, standards for the 

construction, repair, reconstruction, or abandonment of wells shall be as set 

forth in Chapter II of the Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 74, 

‘Water Well Standards’ (February 1968), or as subsequently revised or 

supplemented, which are incorporated in this chapter and made a part of 

this chapter.”

“Chapter 9.36 also allows for variance permits. The county health officer ‘may 

authorize an exception to any provision of this chapter when, in his/her opinion, the 

application of such provision is unnecessary.’ (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.110.) 

When authorizing a variance, the health officer may prescribe ‘such conditions as, in his 

or her judgment, are necessary to protect the waters of the state ....’ (Stanislaus County 

Code, § 9.36.110.)” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 491.)

C. Bulletin 74-81

DWR updated Bulletin No. 74 in December 1981. We refer to this updated 

bulletin as Bulletin 74-81. Bulletin 74-81 is a nearly 100-page document which, like its 

predecessor, is “filled with technical specifications for water wells ....” (See California 

Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic Water Storage Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1460, 

1469.) 

simply applied the full text of a statute invoked by the plaintiffs themselves. There is a 

difference between an opinion raising a new issue versus a party declining or failing to 

address “ ‘an issue [or] mode of analysis ... that is raised or fairly included within the 

issues raised’ ” on appeal. (Save Laurel Way v. City of Redwood City (2017) 14 

Cal.App.5th 1005, 1015, fn. 9.)

In any event, we order that the supplemental briefing of issues contained within 

the request for judicial notice is stricken, since it is made without leave to offer 

supplemental briefing.
7.

Chapter I of Bulletin 74-81, entitled “Introduction,” describes the history of well 

standards in the state. 

Chapter II of Bulletin 74-81, entitled “Standards,” is split into three parts: 

“General” (Part I); “Well Construction” (Part II); and “Destruction of Wells” (Part III). 

The section 8 standards referenced throughout this opinion are located in Part II of 

Chapter II.

At the beginning of Chapter II, before Part I even begins, there is a two-paragraph 

preamble. Relevant here, the first paragraph reads:

“The standards presented in this chapter are intended to apply to the 

construction (including major reconstruction) or destruction of water wells 

throughout the State of California. However, under certain circumstances, 

adequate protection of ground water quality may require more stringent 

standards than those presented here; under other circumstances, it may be 

necessary to substitute other measures which will provide protection equal 

to that provided by these standards. Such situations arise from practicalities 

in applying any standards or, in this case, from anomalies in ground water 

geology or hydrology. Since it is impractical to prepare standards for every 

conceivable situation, provision has been made for deviation from the 

standards as well as for additional ones. However, the Department believes 

that for most conditions encountered in the State, the standards presented in 

this report are satisfactory for the protection of ground water quality.”

After the preamble section, Part I of Chapter II begins.

Section 3 of Part I of Chapter II is entitled. “Exemption Due to Unusual 

Conditions,” and provides:

“If the enforcing agency finds that compliance with any of the 

requirements prescribed herein is impractical for a particular location 

because of unusual conditions or if compliance would result in construction 

of an unsatisfactory well, the enforcing agency may waive compliance and 

prescribe alternative requirements which are “equal to” these standards in 

terms of protection obtained.”
8.

Section 5.A. of Part II of Chapter II, provides:

“In locations where existing geologic or ground water conditions 

require standards more restrictive than those described herein, such special 

additional standards may be prescribed by the enforcing agency.”

D. County’s CEQA Regulations

“In 1983 County adopted its own CEQA regulations which generally classified 

issuance of all well construction permits as ministerial projects unless the county health 

officer granted a variance. A variance permit was designated as a discretionary project, 

triggering environmental review. As enacted, County’s regulations provided that the 

issuance of a nonvariance well construction permit was presumed to be ministerial ‘[i]n 

the absence of any discretionary provision contained in the relevant ordinance.’ The 

parties stipulated that County’s practice has been to treat all nonvariance permit issuances 

as ministerial. This practice ignores the quoted clause, which mirrors language in CEQA 

Guidelines, section 15268, subdivision (b).” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

p. 491.) 

E. Water Code Section 13801

In 1986, the Legislature amended section 13801. (Stats.1986, ch. 1152; see also 

California Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic Water Storage Dist., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1468–1469.) As amended, section 13801, subdivision (c) required that counties 

adopt a water well ordinance “that meets or exceeds the standards contained in Bulletin 

74-81” by January 15, 1990.9 (§ 13801, subd. (c).)

Through this statute, the Legislature has established the standards in Bulletin 74-

81 as the “baseline for local ordinances.” (California Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic 

9

If they failed to do so, a model ordinance prepared by the State Board of Water 

Resources would take effect in that jurisdiction on February 15, 1990. (§ 13801, 

subd. (d).)
9.

Water Storage Dist., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469.) However, “the Legislature did 

not adopt Bulletin 74-81 as state law.” (Ibid.) 

F. Bulletin 74-90

“In 1991, a supplement was issued as bulletin No. 74-90.” (Protecting Our Water,

supra, at p. 490, fn. 5.) Bulletin 74-90 revised some of the standards contained in 

Bulletin 74-81. All other standards in Bulletin 74-81 remain in effect.

In its “General Introduction,” Bulletin 74-90 has a section titled “Limitations of 

Standards.” That section provides, in pertinent part:

“Well standards contained in Bulletin 74-81 together with well 

standards in this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) are recommended minimum 

statewide standards for the protection of ground water quality. The 

standards are not necessarily sufficient for local conditions. Local 

enforcing agencies may need to adopt more stringent standards for local 

conditions to ensure ground water quality protection.

“In some cases, it may be necessary for a local enforcing agency to 

substitute alternate measures or standards to provide protection equal to that 

otherwise afforded by DWR standards. Such cases arise from practicalities 

in applying standards, and from variations in geologic and hydrologic 

conditions. Because it is impractical to prepare “site-specific” standards 

covering every conceivable case, provision has been made for deviation 

from the standards.

“Standards in Bulletin 74-81 and this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) do 

not ensure proper construction or function of any type of well. Proper well 

design and construction practices require the use of these standards together 

with accepted industry practices, regulatory requirements, and 

consideration of site conditions.” (Italics added.)

Bulletin 74-90 also revised sections 8 and 9 of Bulletin 74-81.

G. Section 8

“Section 8.A of the bulletin (Standard 8.A) addresses the distance between 

proposed wells and potential sources of contamination. It requires that all wells ‘be 

located an adequate horizontal distance’ from those sources. The standard lists 

separation distances that are generally considered adequate for specific situations. For 
10.

example, it notes that a well should be located at least 50 feet from any sewer line; 100 

feet from any watertight septic tank or animal enclosure; and 150 feet from any cesspool 

or seepage pit. However, the standard makes clear that the distances are not intended to 

be rigidly applied. It notes that: ‘[m]any variables are involved in determining the “safe” 

separation distance;’ ‘[n]o set separation distance is adequate and reasonable for all 

conditions;’ and ‘[d]etermination of the safe separation distance for individual wells 

requires detailed evaluation of existing and future site conditions.’ It also provides that 

‘[c]onsideration should ... be given to adequate separation from sites or areas with 

known or suspected soil or water pollution or contamination.’ Significantly, it allows the 

agency to increase or decrease suggested distances, depending on attendant 

circumstances.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 490–491, fn. omitted.)

“Standard 8.B provides that, ‘[w]here possible, a well shall be located up the 

ground water gradient from potential sources of pollution or contamination.’ Under 

Standard 8.C, ‘[i]f possible, a well should be located outside areas of flooding.’ ” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 491.)

H. Standard 9.A

Standard 9.A requires that the annular surface seal for water wells must extend 

from ground surface to certain specified minimum depths (e.g., 20 feet below ground 

surface for agricultural and individual domestic wells.) Standard 9.A permits the 

enforcing agency to grant exceptions to the listed minimum depths “where the water to be 

produced is at a depth less than 20 feet.” However, in no case may the annular seal 

extend less than 10 feet below land surface or be less than 10 feet long. If a well is to be 

located closer to a pollution or contamination source than otherwise allowed by 

Standard 8, then the annular seal must extend to a minimum depth of 50 feet.

Standard 9.A also provides for exceptions from the general requirement for 

annular seals to extend from ground surface: “The top of an annular surface seal may be 

below ground surface in areas where freezing is likely, but in no case more than 4 feet 
11.

below ground surface.” The standard defines “freezing areas” as those where the mean 

length of the freeze-free period described by the National Weather Service is less than 

100 days.” The bulletin observes that those areas generally include portions of Modoc, 

Lassen, and Siskiyou Counties, as well as portions of the North Lahontan area and the 

area of Lake Arrowhead.

The top of an annular surface seal can also be below ground where traffic or 

“other conditions” require, so long as the “seal and casing extend to a watertight and 

structurally sound subsurface vault, or equivalent feature.” Even in that situation, the top 

of the annular seal may not be more than 4 feet below ground surface.

I. Chapter 9.37

“In 2014, County’s board of supervisors amended Chapter 9.37 to prohibit the 

unsustainable extraction and export of groundwater. (Stanislaus County Code, 

§ 9.37.040, subd. A.) The amendment requires that future permit applications satisfy 

both Chapter 9.36 and Chapter 9.37, unless exempt from the latter. (Stanislaus County 

Code, § 9.37.045, subd. A.)”10 (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 491, fn. 

omitted.)

J. Permit 539

On November 18, 2014, the County approved permit No. 2014-539 providing for 

construction of a well on a property on Orange Blossom Road in Oakdale, California 

(“the permit” or “Permit 539”). At the time the permit was approved, the County’s 

policy was to not apply CEQA’s environmental review procedures to well permit 

decisions under Chapter 9.36.11

10 Plaintiffs request that this court take judicial notice of Chapter 9.37 of the 

Stanislaus County Code and excerpts from the record in the POWER I appeal. We grant 

these unopposed requests.

11 Except for variance permits under Chapter 9.36.110. Permit 539 is not a 

variance permit.
12.

II. Present Litigation

On October 16, 2015, seven individuals who own other properties on Orange 

Blossom Road (“appellants” or “plaintiff”)

12 filed a CEQA action, seeking a writ of 

mandate invalidating the permit.13 Specifically, the petition claimed that Chapter 9.36 of 

the Stanislaus County Code requires that the County exercise discretion in deciding 

whether to issue well construction permits. Plaintiffs asserted that because the decision 

was discretionary, CEQA required environmental review, which the County did not 

perform.

In a second cause of action, the petition alleged the County violated plaintiffs’ 

procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a 

government’s adjudicative decision deprives them of a significant property interest. 

Specifically, the petition alleged the County’s issuance of the well permit “has caused 

and threatens to continue to cause a substantial interference with [plaintiffs’] property 

interests including but not limited to loss of groundwater supply in [plaintiffs’] wells; 

increased traffic congestion; increased risk of traffic accidents; increased air pollution by 

dust, pesticide drift, diesel pump generator exhaust, and increased noise pollution.”

A. Protecting Our Water and Environmental Resources v. Stanislaus County

More than a year before the present suit began, another lawsuit was filed in 

Stanislaus County Superior Court challenging the County’s policy of treating standard 

well construction permits as discretionary. That case was decided by the same judge as 

the present case, and was titled Protecting Our Water and Environmental Resources, et 

al. v. Stanislaus County et al., Stanislaus County Case No. 2006153 (the “POWER 

12 Plaintiffs refer to themselves as “plaintiffs” rather than “petitioners.” We will 

do the same.

13 Plaintiffs named Stanislaus County; its Board of Supervisors; Jami Aggers, the 

Director of Environmental Resources at the Department of Environmental Resources 

(DER) and Janis Mein, the Manager of the DER as respondents.
13.

case”). On February 16, 2016, the superior court entered judgment in the POWER case in 

favor of the County, after concluding that the issuance of standard well permits under 

Chapter 9.36 was a ministerial act under CEQA.

B. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Shortly after judgment was entered in the POWER case, the County moved for 

judgment on the pleadings in the present case. The County asked the superior court to 

take judicial notice of its own decision in the POWER case, which it argued “disposes of 

this case as well.”

The superior court granted the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings 

with leave to amend,14 concluding that the issuance of the well construction permit was 

ministerial, and that fact was fatal to plaintiffs’ CEQA and due process claims.

C. Appellate Proceedings in Present Action

In an unpublished decision filed on August 24, 2018, this court reversed the trial 

court’s judgment. (Coston et al. v. Stanislaus County et al. (Aug. 24, 2018, F074209) 

[nonpub. opn.] at p. 25 (Coston I).) In that opinion, we focused on section 8(A) of the 

bulletin, which provided: “ ‘All water wells shall be located an adequate horizontal 

distance from known or potential sources of pollution and contamination.’ ” (Id. at p. 11, 

fn. omitted.) We held that “[d]etermining whether a particular spacing is ‘adequate’ 

inherently involves subjective judgment” (id. at pp. 13–14), and, therefore, the well 

permit issuances were discretionary under CEQA. 

Two footnotes in our prior opinion are important here.

In footnote 15, we discussed Standards 8.B, 8.C, and 9:

“Appellants also point to provisions in section 8(B), 8(C), and 9. 

Section 8(B) provides that, ‘[w]here possible, a well shall be located up the 

ground water gradient from potential sources of pollution or 

14 Plaintiffs elected not to amend their petition.
14.

contamination.’ (Italics added.) Section 8(C) states that, ‘[i]f possible, a 

well should be located outside areas of flooding’ (Italics added.)

“ ‘Possible’ is a more objective standard than ‘adequate.’ While 

determining whether something is ‘possible’ may require scientific 

expertise, the ultimate question being asked is objective (i.e., can this be 

done?) rather than subjective (i.e., should it be done this way?).

“Next, in section 9, the Bulletin provides for the minimum depths to 

which a well’s annular seal must extend below ground surface. An annular 

seal is ‘a watertight seal placed between the well casing and the side wall of 

a drilled hole.’ (Stan. Co. Code, § 9.36.020(G).) For example, the annular 

seals of individual domestic wells must extend at least 20 feet below 

ground surface. But the annular seal requirements do not have an 

overarching ‘adequacy’ standard. Instead, the section lists actual 

‘minimum’ depths that apply for each type of well, without the qualifying 

‘guidepost’ language found in the contamination source spacing section. 

Limited exceptions to the annular seal depth minimums are allowed in 

cases of shallow water depth, freezing areas, etc. But even those exceptions 

have absolute minimum depths – e.g., 10-foot seal depth when water depth 

is less than 20 feet; 50-foot seal depth for wells near pollution source; fourfoot seal depth for freezing areas; four-foot seal depth if subsurface vault or 

equivalent feature is used. (Coston I, supra, F074209 at pp. 10–11.)

In footnote 16, we stated: “The parties disagree ... as to whether other provisions 

in the Bulletin are incorporated by section 9.36.150. We need not resolve that issue 

because we conclude a provision the parties do agree was incorporated – i.e., the 

contamination source spacing standard – renders the issuance of well permits 

discretionary.” (Coston I, supra, F074209 at p. 11.)

D. Appellate Proceedings in the POWER Case

Plaintiffs also appealed the judgment in the POWER case, which we also reversed 

in a separate, unpublished decision filed August 24, 2018 (POWER I, supra, F073634 at 

p. 24). The Supreme Court granted review of POWER I.

In an opinion filed August 27, 2020, the Supreme Court held that, “The plain 

language of Standard 8.A authorizes County to exercise ‘judgment or deliberation when 

[it] decides to approve or disapprove’ a permit. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.)” 
15.

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 496.) Consequently, permit issuances “in 

which County is required to exercise independent judgment under Standard 8.A cannot 

be classified as ministerial.” (Id. at p. 497.) Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed 

our conclusion that the County’s blanket ministerial categorization was unlawful.

However, the Supreme Court determined our holding was too broad because 

Standard 8.A only applies when there is a contamination source “near” a proposed well. 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.) Absent a nearby contamination 

source identified during the permit approval process, the issuance of a construction 

permit may be ministerial.15 Therefore, the court held that while plaintiffs were entitled 

to a judicial declaration that the County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful, 

they were not entitled to a declaration that well permit issuances are always discretionary 

because of Standard 8.A. 

After observing Standard 8.A would be implicated in some, but not all, permit 

applications, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he same principle would apply to Standards 8.B 

and 8.C.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.) However, the court 

“declined to determine whether those provisions [i.e., Standards 8.B and 8.C] confer 

discretionary authority in some instances.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that it need not 

address that issue in light of its conclusions regarding the authority granted by 

Standard 8.A.

15 The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of what constitutes “near” for 

purposes of this rule. Determining what distance is sufficiently “near” to make Standard 

8.A applicable would likely involve some of the same discretionary considerations used 

to determine whether that same distance is “adequate” to satisfy Standard 8.A. 

Regardless, the Supreme Court’s opinion seems clear that if it is determined as a 

preliminary matter that a well is not “near” its closest contamination source and no other 

discretionary decision is involved – then the County may proceed with a ministerial 

permit issuance. 
16.

The court continued, 

“Even if Standards 8.B and 8.C might be understood to grant discretionary 

authority in some cases, we could not conclude that they would always do 

so. Standard 8.B only applies when a proposed well is downhill from a 

contamination source. Standard 8.C is only implicated when a proposed 

well is in a flood area. In other words, like Standard 8.A, Standards 8.B 

and 8.C may or may not be involved in the issuance of a particular permit.” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500, fn. omitted.)

At the conclusion of that excerpt, the opinion includes the following footnote:

“Plaintiffs have also asked us to review whether (1) any other 

standards in Bulletin No. 74 are incorporated into Chapter 9.36 and (2) the 

inclusion of those standards makes permit issuance discretionary. The 

Court of Appeal declined to address these questions because it found that 

the discretion conferred by Standard 8.A made permit issuance a 

discretionary project. These questions should be answered by the Court of 

Appeal on remand in the first instance.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 

Cal.5th at p. 501, fn. 11.) 

The Supreme Court noted that “the fact that an individual project is classified as 

discretionary does not mean that full environmental review, including an EIR, will 

always be required. The project may qualify for another CEQA exemption or the agency 

may be able to prepare either a negative declaration or a mitigated negative declaration 

after its initial study. Any of these circumstances would obviate the need for an EIR.” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 501.)

The Supreme Court concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory 

judgment stating the County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful. (Protecting 

Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 501–502.) However, the plaintiffs are not entitled to 

a judicial declaration that all permit issuance under Chapter 9.36 are discretionary; nor 

are they entitled to an injunction requiring County to treat all such permit issuances as 

discretionary. (Id. at p. 501.)
17.

Finally, the opinion concludes by directing that “[t]he matter is remanded to the 

Court of Appeal for it to evaluate the questions it declined to answer and to reassess 

plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 502.)

E. Transfer from Supreme Court

After deciding Protecting Our Water, the Supreme Court transferred the present 

matter back to this court for reconsideration in light of that opinion.16

DISCUSSION

I. County Not Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings in Light of Parties’ Claims 

and Recent Supreme Court Precedent

The trial court granted County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiffs 

challenge that ruling and judgment on appeal.

A. Law on Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings “tests the sufficiency of a complaint.” 

(Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 

1484, 1491.) We examine “only the face of the pleadings, together with matters subject 

to judicial notice, to determine whether such facts are sufficient to constitute a cause of 

action.” (California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 

Cal.App.4th 1464, 1476.) We liberally construe the complaint and assume the truth of all 

properly pleaded factual allegations. (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of 

Stockton, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491; Katzeff v. Department of Forestry & Fire 

Protection (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 601, 607.) 

16 The Supreme Court also remanded Protecting Our Water itself to this court. 

On March 8, 2021, this court filed an unpublished opinion again reversing the trial 

court’s judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court’s opinion. (POWER II, supra, 

F073634, petn. for review pending, petn. filed Apr. 19, 2021, S268334.)

At oral argument in the present case, counsel for the County conceded that our 

conclusions in POWER II preclude an affirmance here and that remand is necessary.
18.

“ ‘ “We are not concerned with a plaintiff’s possible inability to prove the claims 

made in the complaint ....” ’ ” (Katzeff v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 

supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 607.) The question is whether the complaint supports “any 

valid cause of action against the defendant ....” (Kempton v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 

165 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1347.) 

We review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (Stockton Citizens for Sensible 

Planning v. City of Stockton, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1491.)

B. County’s Motion

In their petition, plaintiffs alleged the County issued Permit 539 without 

conducting required environmental review.

The County moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the petition 

failed to allege a cause of action because the County’s “well permit approvals are 

ministerial actions” and CEQA/due process principles do not apply to ministerial 

actions.17 The County argued the present case presented “the identical legal issue 

presented” in POWER: “whether the County’s well construction permits are 

discretionary or ministerial approvals.” The County posited that its approvals of well 

construction permits – which would include Permit 539 – are ministerial. Therefore, 

according to the County, the court “need not decide any questions of fact.” County 

contended that “[b]ecause the scope of the County[’s] authority is a purely legal issue, the 

Court can properly resolve it on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”

At the hearing on the motion, counsel for the County said he wanted to address 

plaintiffs’ argument that they can “put on evidence to show that there are particular

17 The same ground formed the basis of County’s attack on the first and second 

causes of action. Thus, for present purposes, the two causes of action rise and fall 

together.

The County does note in its briefing that it will argue on remand that plaintiffs 

cannot prove that any liberty or property interest was affected by the issuance of the 

permit and their due process claim fails as a result.
19.

permits ... for which the County ... in fact exercised discretion.” (Italics added.) 

Counsel for the County argued that plaintiffs’ point was “irrelevant” because the court 

faced only legal questions: “[W]hat is the scope of the County’s authority in issuing well 

construction permits? And does that authority make those decisions discretionary or 

ministerial at a matter of law?” Later, the County’s counsel argued that even if plaintiffs’ 

petition had alleged “that the County made X decision or Y decision or Z decision on a 

particular permit[, it] wouldn’t matter, because this is a question of the scope of their 

legal authority.”

In granting the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court observed 

“parties agree the resolution of this case involves the precise issue of whether the 

County’s issuance of well construction permits is ministerial or discretionary.” The court 

concluded that, because the County’s issuance of well construction permits was in fact a 

ministerial decision, the County was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

C. Analysis

After the trial court issued its ruling, the Supreme Court invalidated the County’s 

categorical classification of nonvariance permits as ministerial. (Protecting Our Water, 

supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 498.) And, as explained above, Permit 539 was approved under 

this now-invalid categorical classification. In other words, the grounds for the County’s 

motion for judgment on the pleadings has been directly and wholly negated.

In supplemental briefing, the County acknowledges that the Supreme Court has 

now “disapproved the County’s policy of treating all well-construction permits as 

ministerial.” However, the County argues that “the record shows that the single permit at 

issue here was in fact ministerial.” Thus, because of the intervening Supreme Court’s 

opinion, the County is now making a permit-specific argument of the type it expressly 
20.

avoided in the trial court. Specifically, County argues that “substantial evidence” shows 

there was no potential source of contamination near the well site for Permit 539.18

This argument is untenable on review of a judgment on the pleadings. The 

question is not whether the moving party’s substantive factual assertions are supported by 

substantial evidence. Rather, the question is whether the allegations in the opposing 

party’s pleadings have stated a cause of action (regardless of whether they are supported 

by evidence). 

Here, the plaintiffs alleged the County did not perform the requisite environmental 

review before issuing Permit 539. Accepting that allegation as true, plaintiffs have stated 

a cause of action. 

The County is correct that the Supreme Court has now held that Standard 8.A only 

applies when there is a contamination source “near” a proposed well. (Protecting Our 

Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.) And, if there is no nearby contamination source, 

Standard 8.A does not confer discretion on that “individual issuance decision.” (Ibid.) 

However, whether there is a contamination source “near” the site approved in Permit 539 

(or whether such a contamination source was revealed during the permitting process) is a 

factual question. The fact that the County can point to substantial evidence in their favor 

on this factual question is irrelevant on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Any 

attempt by the County to prevail on the factual issue of whether the application process 

has revealed (or failed to reveal) a contamination source “near” the site of permit 539 

must await an evidentiary hearing, summary judgment, or trial.19 “[J]udgment on the 

18 For example, the area on the permit to indicate the proposed well’s distance to 

the nearest sources of contamination (e.g., septic tank, seepage pit, etc.) is left blank 

except for a handwritten “N/A.” Similarly, the permit’s “plot plan” does not show any 

possible sources of contamination even though the directions indicate that “any ... 

possible source of contamination” must be shown.

19 Requests for judicial notice will not suffice here. A court may consider 

judicially noticed materials in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

However, courts may not take judicial notice of the truth of the matters stated therein 
21.

pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary 

resolution. [Citation.]” (Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 

1205, 1216.)

Because these grounds establish that plaintiff has stated a cause of action and the 

judgment on the pleadings must therefore be reversed, we do not address the parties’ 

remaining contentions, which are immaterial to the disposition of the appeal.20 (See 

Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1071.) 

D. Additional Observations

As an aside, we note that while the County has pointed to some supporting 

evidence, it is by no means conclusive on the factual question at issue (i.e., whether there 

is a contamination source “near” the well site). The well permit application has a section 

intended for the applicant to input the “distance to nearest” contamination sources, such 

as septic tanks, seepage pits, animal enclosures, etc.21 The County points to the 

handwritten text, “N/A” in the upper-left of this “distance to nearest” section of the 

application. However, the meaning of the handwritten “N/A” is unclear. By definition, 

every proposed well site on the planet is some distance to the “nearest” contamination 

source. Consequently, the fact that “N/A” is written in this area suggests the applicant 

was conveying that there are no such contamination sources on the applicant’s own 

(except court orders, judgments, and judicial findings of fact.) (Bach v. McNelis (1989) 

207 Cal.App.3d 852, 865; see also Davis v. Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 619, 632, fn. 11.) When the facts established by a document are reasonably 

subject to the dispute, they require formal proof and judicial notice will not suffice. 

(Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364–

365.) 

20 Our recent, unpublished opinion in POWER II, supra, F073634 addressed some 

of the other issues raised by the parties in this case.

21 While this section lists several types of contamination sources, it does not 

provide for all types of contamination sources expressly identified by section 8.A, 

including: storage and preparation areas for pesticides, fertilizers, and other chemicals; or 

tanks and pipelines for storage and conveyance of petroleum products or other chemicals.
22.

property. Contamination, however, does not respect property boundaries. A 

contamination source could be “near,” even if it is located on a different “property” than 

the proposed well site. 

The fact that this information provided on the permit application does not dispose 

of the nearby-contamination-source issue is highlighted by a different permit application 

in the record. In the “Distance to Nearest” section of permit application No. 2013-271, 

there appears the handwritten word “None” next to “septic tank,” “sewer lines,” “seepage 

pit,” etc. Yet a memo in the County’s file for the permit indicates the permit was 

“flagged in mitigation.” An e-mail in the County’s file indicates there is a “contaminated 

site located approximately 500 feet south of this permit application.” Thus, it is clear the 

permit approval process can identify potential contamination sources even if the 

application itself discloses no such sources. 

The contents of the County’s file on permit No. 2013-271 – which included emails, memos, etc. – establish that the well permitting application process can sometimes 

involve more documentation and information than the permit application itself. Thus, the 

fact that the application for Permit 539 does not disclose a nearby contamination source 

does not necessarily mean that no such source was “identified during the permit approval 

process ....” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.)

We acknowledge the plot plan on Permit 539 does require depiction of six 

categories of items, including item six: “sewage disposal systems on adjoining property 

or within a radius of 100 ft.” for private wells. (Italics added.) However, sewage 

disposal systems are just one of many forms that contamination sources can take. 

Standard 8.A applies to all “potential sources of pollution and contamination.” That 

includes, but is not limited to, barnyard and stable areas; feedlots; tanks and pipelines for 

storage and conveyance of petroleum products or other chemicals; and storage and 

preparation areas for pesticides, fertilizers, and other chemicals.
23.

In item four, the plot plan instructions direct that the applicant is to depict “house 

sewer outlet, public sewer, sewage disposal system, or proposed sewage, disposal system, 

industrial waste pond, or any other possible source of contamination.” (Italics added.) 

However, item four does not contain item six’s directive to include such sources that are 

“on adjoining property” or within a certain radius of the well site.

This is not to say the County cannot prove, at some point, that no contamination 

source “near” the well site was revealed during the permit approval process. Nor is it to 

say that these aspects of the permit application cited by the County do not raise 

inferences in its favor. We express no opinion on those matters. Rather, we are pointing 

out some of the factual issues currently presented, which are inappropriate to resolve at 

this juncture of the case.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with the views expressed in this opinion and in Protecting Our Water, supra, 

10 Cal.5th 479. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

PEÑA, J.