In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-1627 

PAUL LAMBERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 15-C-1548 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 28, 2018 — DECIDED JULY 19, 2018 

____________________ 

Before MANION, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. 

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Paul Lambert appeals the denial of 

Disability Insurance Benefits for chronic back pain. The 

Social Security Administration denied his application initially and on reconsideration, and an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) concluded that Lambert suffers from degenerative 

disc disease that is severely impairing but not disabling. 

Lambert challenges the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to 
2 No. 17-1627 

the most recent opinions of his treating neurosurgeon and to 

discredit his own testimony about the severity of his pain 

and extent of his limitations. We reverse and remand for 

further agency proceedings. 

I. Background 

Lambert applied for benefits in 2012 at age 41 alleging 

disabling lower back pain since 2011, an onset date that he 

later amended to 2013. Yet his back problems started long 

before then. In 2004 discs in his lumbar spine were surgically 

fused with a rod. In 2008 surgeons repaired the rod. Still, 

Lambert held several jobs over the years. 

In 2010 Lambert began experiencing back pain “most of 

the time” and thereafter also had “intermittent” pain down 

his left leg that often caused him to fall. By late 2012 Lambert 

had tried various treatments, including steroid injections in 

his spine and pelvis, chiropractic care, medication, and 

physical therapy. Nothing produced lasting relief, though 

hydrocodone helped ease the pain. Medical imaging revealed no postsurgical complications or other explanation 

for his persistent pain. Several neurosurgeons found the 

cause unclear; three said further surgery was not an option. 

In September 2012 a pain specialist attributed Lambert’s 

pain to degenerative disc disease or joint disease of the 

lower lumbar spine. Months later he diagnosed Lambert 

with failed back syndrome (meaning he experienced continuous pain despite surgeries) and recommended that he 

accept his chronic pain and proceed with a painmanagement program instead of seeking a surgical cure. The 

pain specialist also recommended that Lambert consider 

behavioral therapy to learn coping skills. Lambert followed 
No. 17-1627 3 

this advice, but in early 2013 the pain specialist referred him 

to a neurosurgeon to find the source of the left-leg pain that 

by this time was causing daily falls. 

Neurosurgeon Kamajit Paul began treating Lambert in 

June 2013 and initially recommended a conservative course 

of steroid injections to determine if his pain was caused by 

dysfunction in the left sacroiliac joint. (The sacroiliac joints 

connect the pelvis to the lower spine and support the weight 

of the upper body when a person stands. Sacroiliac Joints, 

MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseasesconditions/sacroiliiitis/multimedia/sacroiliac-joints/img20005962 (last visited June 28, 2018).) The pain specialist 

administered three injections but continued advising 

Lambert to accept his chronic pain and moderate his activities. Because the injections provided only several hours of 

relief, Dr. Paul believed Lambert had dysfunction in his left 

sacroiliac joint and recommended surgery to fuse it. But he 

cautioned that the surgery offered no guarantee of improvement and that Lambert would still experience some 

back and leg pain and would “never be 100%.” 

Dr. Paul performed the left-joint fusion in October 2013, 

and Lambert’s condition initially started to improve. In 

November Lambert reported minimal pain. After a month of 

physical therapy, he underwent a functional assessment in 

January 2014. He was able to walk without an assistive 

device and reported “improved function at home and in the 

community.” His physical therapist recommended allowing 

him to return to work with some lifting restrictions, and 

Dr. Paul released Lambert to light-duty work. 

But Lambert’s relief was short-lived. In February 2014 he 

returned to Dr. Paul, now reporting pain on his right side. 
4 No. 17-1627 

Dr. Paul was “not sure what [was] happening” and sent 

Lambert back to his pain specialist. Testing revealed potential dysfunction in the right sacroiliac joint. 

In late March 2014, Dr. Paul completed an assessment of 

Lambert’s functional abilities. He diagnosed bilateral joint 

dysfunction and stated that Lambert experienced continued 

pain in his right sacroiliac joint and lower back. He opined 

that in a competitive work situation, Lambert could sit for at 

least six hours out of eight, stand for 30 minutes at a time 

(up to two hours total), and walk one block at a time (if 

allowed to shift between these positions at will). Dr. Paul 

also noted, however, that Lambert’s prognosis was guarded 

and that he “may develop problems in the upper lumbar 

spine.” 

In April 2014 Dr. Paul surgically fused Lambert’s right 

sacroiliac joint. Lambert returned to physical therapy and in 

early June reported that his preoperative pain had resolved. 

But later that month Lambert told his physical therapist that 

the pain on the left side of his lower back had returned; he 

said it was minimal but interfered with sleep. A week later 

Lambert said the pain had worsened and now prevented 

him from walking as far as he could just weeks before. In 

July 2014 Lambert told Dr. Paul that he had been experiencing pain—exacerbated by activity—for as long as four 

weeks. X-rays revealed intact surgical hardware without 

abnormality, so Dr. Paul thought the pain did not stem from 

the recent fusion. He directed Lambert to proceed with a 

previously scheduled functional assessment. 

In late July 2014, Lambert’s physical therapist performed 

the functional assessment and observed a “significant decrease” in his capabilities since the January assessment. The 
No. 17-1627 5 

July assessment revealed that Lambert had “significant 

limitations” in sitting, standing, and walking; he required 

position changes every 15 minutes; and he had a limp that 

grew more severe as he walked. The physical therapist 

opined that Lambert’s work tolerance “would be low to 

sedentary” and recommended that he follow up with a 

physician. 

Dr. Paul examined Lambert once more at the end of July 

2014. Lambert had pain and restricted motion in his back but 

normal coordination with no muscle atrophy or weakness. 

Based on his examination and the therapist’s functional 

assessment, Dr. Paul said Lambert was limited to 15 minutes 

of sitting or standing at a time and needed to change positions frequently. He concluded that Lambert’s “functional 

capacity [was] markedly reduced to the extent that ... he 

cannot do even sedentary work.” Dr. Paul again referred 

Lambert to the pain specialist because his back pain could 

not be controlled by surgery. In August Dr. Paul opined that 

Lambert “would not be able to tolerate a work situation” 

because his “persist[ent] low back pain” had worsened, is 

severe, and is not expected to improve. 

At an August 2014 hearing before an ALJ, Lambert testified that in 2011 he fell down the stairs in his home and his 

employer laid him off so he could obtain unemploymentinsurance benefits without having to search for work while 

he “figured out what was going on.” The ALJ voiced concern over Lambert’s receipt of unemployment benefits after 

his alleged onset date. Lambert then orally amended his 

onset date to January 1, 2013. 

Lambert testified that he could not sit, stand, or walk for 

more than 15 minutes without a lot of pain in his lower back. 
6 No. 17-1627 

He said that nothing entirely relieved the pain, including 

hydrocodone, Vicodin, and participation in the painmanagement program. He had stopped doing housework, 

used a mounted seat while showering, and needed his wife’s 

help putting on and removing his socks. Lambert testified 

that around the time of his first sacroiliac joint surgery in the 

fall of 2013, he had started taking college classes online in 

the hope of possibly working as a music teacher—but his 

pain had progressed so much since March 2014 that he could 

not focus and had to withdraw from classes scheduled for 

fall 2014. 

The ALJ applied the standard multistep analysis, see 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a), and concluded that 

Lambert was not disabled after the amended onset date of 

January 1, 2013. As relevant here the ALJ determined that 

Lambert was severely impaired by degenerative disc disease; that he nonetheless had the residual functional capacity 

(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with specified limitations; and that based on the testimony of a vocational expert, 

he was capable of working as a sorter, assembler, order 

clerk, or office helper. 

In delineating Lambert’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that 

Lambert’s alleged symptoms were caused by medically 

determinable impairments, but that the severity of his pain 

and his claimed functional limitations were “not substantiated by the medical and other evidence of record.” The ALJ 

also said that Lambert’s receipt of unemployment benefits 

after the initial alleged onset date and his subsequent attempt to “moot” the issue by amending his onset date 

“reflect[ed] adversely on his credibility.” 
No. 17-1627 7 

The ALJ gave “little weight” to Dr. Paul’s opinions from 

July and August 2014. They were, in the ALJ’s view, inconsistent with his March 2014 opinion and his objective findings. The ALJ also characterized Dr. Paul’s opinion that 

Lambert would not be able to tolerate a work situation as a 

legal conclusion reserved to the Commissioner. On the other 

hand, the ALJ gave “considerable weight” to two opinions of 

state agency consultants who reviewed Lambert’s medical 

records in August 2012 (before the amended onset date) and 

April 2013 (four months after the amended onset date) and 

concluded that Lambert could perform sedentary work with 

restrictions. 

The Appeals Council denied review. A district judge affirmed the Commissioner’s decision and Lambert appeals. 

II. Analysis 

Lambert challenges the ALJ’s decision to give little 

weight to the most recent opinions of his treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Paul. He also argues that the ALJ was wrong to 

discredit his testimony about the severity of his symptoms 

and limitations. 

A. Treating Neurosurgeon’s Opinions 

Lambert contests the ALJ’s decision to give little weight 

to Dr. Paul’s July and August 2014 opinions that his pain 

had worsened to the point that he could not tolerate even 

sedentary work. Because Dr. Paul is a treating physician, his 

opinion on the nature and severity of Lambert’s medical 

condition is entitled to controlling weight if it is well supported by medical findings and consistent with other record 

evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) (2017); Gerstner v. 

Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that this 
8 No. 17-1627 

treating-physician rule applies only to claims filed before 

March 27, 2017). 

Lambert identifies multiple flaws in the ALJ’s decision. 

He argues that the ALJ overlooked medical evidence substantiating Dr. Paul’s most recent opinions, wrongly found 

the opinions inconsistent with Dr. Paul’s earlier opinion 

from March 2014, and failed to consider the relevant factors 

for evaluating medical source opinions set forth in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). He also challenges the ALJ’s decision to discount Dr. Paul’s opinion as a legal conclusion outside a 

doctor’s role. Finally, Lambert asserts that the ALJ failed to 

explain why Dr. Paul’s opinions were entitled to less weight 

than those of the agency physicians rendered before some of 

the key medical evidence was compiled. 

We agree that the ALJ’s reasons for giving little weight to 

Dr. Paul’s most recent opinions are inadequate to “build an 

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the 

result.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014).

First, the ALJ said there was no objective basis for Dr. Paul’s 

opinion about Lambert’s symptoms as of July 2014 because 

“x-rays revealed good fusion and good position of the 

[sacroiliac] joint.” But no medical source opined that the 

imaging results were inconsistent with Lambert’s complaints 

of disabling pain. Indeed, throughout Lambert’s treatment 

history, medical imaging ruled out specific, objective causes 

of his ongoing pain—yet his doctors performed surgeries, 

prescribed powerful pain medications, and recommended 

long-term pain-management techniques for his suite of 

chronic back problems. ALJs must rely on expert opinions 

instead of determining the significance of particular medical 

findings themselves. Meuser v. Colvin, 838 F.3d 905, 911 
No. 17-1627 9 

(7th Cir. 2016); Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 

2016); see also Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(remanding where the ALJ “play[ed] doctor” by summarizing the MRI results without subjecting them to professional 

medical scrutiny). The ALJ’s finding of a mismatch between 

the objective evidence and the treating neurosurgeon’s 

opinion failed to heed that principle. 

Second, the ALJ discounted Dr. Paul’s mid-2014 opinions 

because Lambert’s symptoms after the April 2014 surgery 

had an “unclear” cause. But Dr. Paul’s conclusion, shared by 

the pain specialist, was that Lambert has a chronic back 

condition that may never be cured. Dr. Paul attempted to 

treat Lambert’s pain through sacroiliac joint surgeries; after 

surgical intervention failed, he returned Lambert to longterm pain management. Degenerative conditions often get 

worse over time, see Hill v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 862, 868–69 (7th 

Cir. 2015), and Lambert has an extensive history of surgeries 

that yielded only temporary or partial relief. Given his 

chronic back condition, it was improper to reject Dr. Paul’s 

mid-2014 assessment merely because he could not isolate the 

source of the pain. See Cole v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 411, 416 (7th 

Cir. 2016); Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Third, it was wrong for the ALJ to say that “no evidence” 

showed that Lambert’s pain after the April 2014 surgery 

would not “respond to conservative treatment.” Lambert’s 

back pain was consistently classified as incurable or chronic 

by Dr. Paul, by the pain specialist, and by Lambert’s 

primary-care physician. And a surgical consultant who 

reviewed Lambert’s records before both sacroiliac joint 

surgeries rated his back and joint pain as “severe” and 

unresponsive to conservative treatment. 
10 No. 17-1627 

Fourth, the ALJ overlooked the extent to which findings 

in the July 2014 functional assessment supported Dr. Paul’s 

most recent opinions. Dr. Paul opined, consistent with the 

physical therapist’s July assessment, that Lambert could sit 

or stand for only 15 minutes and needed frequent position 

changes, and he also concluded that Lambert’s “functional 

capacity [was] markedly reduced to the extent that ... he 

[could] not do even sedentary work.” The physical therapist 

had said that Lambert’s tolerance for sedentary work would 

be low and (unlike in January) did not specifically opine that 

Lambert could return to work. So the functional assessment 

supports Dr. Paul’s opinion. An ALJ’s failure to consider 

findings that support a treating physician’s opinion is error. 

Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Fifth, the ALJ decided, without explanation or record 

support, that Dr. Paul’s most recent opinion was inconsistent 

with his earlier assessment. Dr. Paul’s treatment notes reveal 

that his later views were an update—the product of repeated 

failed attempts to treat Lambert’s pain through surgeries. 

From his first examination of Lambert in June 2013, 

Dr. Paul’s notes refer to his uncertainty about the source of 

Lambert’s pain. His March 2014 opinion discusses the 

likelihood of continued back problems and includes a 

“guarded” prognosis. Between that opinion and the one he 

issued four months later, Lambert underwent another 

surgery, had trouble with physical therapy, and completed a 

functional assessment—all of which supported Dr. Paul’s 

July and August opinions that Lambert’s condition had 

worsened. Physicians may update their views without being 

inconsistent if their later opinions are based on a patient’s 

changed condition. See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 696–
No. 17-1627 11 

97 (7th Cir. 2014). There is no unexplained inconsistency 

here. 

Relatedly, the ALJ weighed Dr. Paul’s opinions without 

considering the regulatory factors listed in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). ALJs must evaluate a treating physician’s 

noncontrolling opinion by considering the treatment relationship’s length, nature, and extent; the opinion’s supporting explanation and consistency with other evidence; and 

any specialty of the physician. Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 

561 (7th Cir. 2009); Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 

2008). Dr. Paul, a neurosurgeon specializing in spinal disorders, treated Lambert’s back problems for over a year, 

examined him at least 15 times, and performed two 

sacroiliac joint surgeries. Dr. Paul based his most recent 

opinions on the physical therapist’s July functional assessment and on his own contemporaneous examinations. Yet 

the ALJ did not explain his view of these factors in assigning 

little weight to Dr. Paul’s opinions. 

Finally, the ALJ wrongly discounted Dr. Paul’s opinion 

as an improper legal conclusion by a medical professional. 

Whether a claimant qualifies for benefits is a question of law, 

Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir. 2013), but a 

medical opinion that a claimant is unable to work is not an 

improper legal conclusion, Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 

647–48 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding for the ALJ to consider the 

opinion that the claimant “remained unable to work”) (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1)). Indeed, ALJs must consider 

medical opinions about a patient’s ability to work full time 

because they are relevant to the RFC determination. Garcia, 

741 F.3d at 760. Here Dr. Paul’s most recent opinion is that 

Lambert’s chronic back pain is so limiting that he no longer 
12 No. 17-1627 

can tolerate even sedentary work. That’s not an improper 

legal conclusion. 

The ALJ’s flawed analysis of Dr. Paul’s opinions is compounded by his failure to explain why he gave considerable 

weight to the opinions of the agency physicians that Lambert 

could perform sedentary work. It is puzzling why the ALJ 

would credit these opinions while discounting Dr. Paul’s as 

an improper legal conclusion. See Bjornson, 671 F.3d at 648. 

That inconsistency aside, an ALJ must weigh medical opinions by applying the regulatory factors in 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2). The reviewing consultants rendered their 

opinions before Lambert was treated by the pain specialist, 

before Dr. Paul fused Lambert’s sacroiliac joints in failed 

attempts to alleviate his pain, before Dr. Paul opined that 

Lambert’s pain had worsened and his limitations had degraded since 2011, and before the physical therapist found 

Lambert’s functional abilities had diminished. ALJs may not 

rely on outdated opinions of agency consultants “if later 

evidence containing new, significant medical diagnoses 

reasonably could have changed the reviewing physician’s 

opinion.” Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 

2018). 

The government responds that any error in weighing 

Dr. Paul’s opinions is harmless. An error is harmless only if 

we are convinced that the ALJ would reach the same result 

on remand. See McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 

2011). Here the outcome is not foreordained; at the very 

least, the ALJ formulated an RFC without including 

Dr. Paul’s most recent opinions. 

The government also argues that under the Social Security Act, Lambert needed to prove that he was unable to work 
No. 17-1627 13 

for an identifiable, continuous 12-month period. This argument misreads the statute. The Act does not specify how 

long a claimant must be unable to engage in substantial 

gainful activity. Instead it is the claimant’s “medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that must 

have “lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 

period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

Lambert’s impairment from degenerative disc disease 

continued from at least January 2013 through August 2014, 

well over a year. The government’s reading of the Act would 

preclude benefits for anyone with an impairment that causes 

12 months of bad days with good days interspersed. See 

Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A person 

who has a chronic disease, whether physical or psychiatric, 

and is under continuous treatment for it with heavy drugs, is 

likely to have better days and worse days ... . Suppose that 

half the time she is well enough that she could work[] and 

half the time she is not. Then she could not hold down a fulltime job.”). 

B. Lambert’s Testimony 

Lambert also argues that the ALJ wrongly discredited his 

testimony about the severity of his back pain and related 

functional limitations. We will overturn an ALJ’s adverse 

credibility determination only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence or rests on legally improper analysis. 

Ghiselli v. Colvin, 837 F.3d 771, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Lambert contends that the adverse credibility determination rests on a misinterpretation of the medical records. The 

ALJ stressed that “imaging studies have consistently 

show[n] good fusions and intact hardware,” and Lambert’s 

exams revealed “normal coordination” and “no atrophy or 
14 No. 17-1627 

deficits in motor, strength, or sensory” abilities. But none of 

Lambert’s physicians interpreted these medical findings as 

inconsistent with his reports of recurrent and worsening 

pain and functional limitations. Even when tests showed no 

hardware malfunction, coordination issues, or strength 

deficits, Lambert’s physicians continued to treat his pain. 

The ALJ also failed to acknowledge that Lambert’s physical 

exams showed only brief periods of coordination and 

strength, which is consistent with his testimony that sitting, 

standing, or walking for more than 15 minutes exacerbated 

his pain. See Gerstner, 879 F.3d at 264 (noting that the claimant’s performance in exams did not undermine her allegation that pain was triggered by prolonged activity). 

Similarly, the ALJ emphasized that Lambert had “good 

responses” to surgeries, physical therapy, and medication 

when the medical records actually show that these treatments were ineffective at either consistently or decisively 

improving his chronic pain or resolving his functional 

limitations. See Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684, 687 (7th Cir. 

2016) (remanding where the ALJ mentioned ongoing treatments in passing but did not consider whether it relieved the 

claimant’s pain). Indeed, two sacroiliac joint surgeries failed 

to eliminate Lambert’s lower back and leg pain, and physical 

therapy in 2013 improved his functioning for only a brief 

period. 

The ALJ also noted that Lambert said he had good control of pain with medication in January 2013, that he had 

pain relief with hydrocodone in July 2013, and that he was 

no longer taking medications on March 4, 2014. But one 

physician opined that hydrocodone interferes with 

Lambert’s ability to work. And Lambert resumed the hydro-
No. 17-1627 15 

codone within a month of stopping it in 2014 and continued 

to experience pain even when taking the medication. The 

ALJ’s evaluation of Lambert’s need for narcotic pain medication omitted these important details. 

The ALJ further concluded, contrary to the evidentiary 

record, that Lambert’s symptoms were “only intermittent.” 

The ALJ relied on an April 2013 treatment note by the pain 

specialist, but that note describes Lambert’s falls and leg pain 

as intermittent while characterizing his back pain as chronic. 

Indeed, the ALJ’s description conflicts with many other 

treatment notes in which Lambert’s pain specialist, his 

primary-care physician, and Dr. Paul assessed his back 

condition in chronic terms. 

The ALJ also overread or overlooked important evidence 

in discrediting Lambert’s testimony about his limited activities of daily living. The ALJ relied on a March 2014 note from 

a physical therapist who reported that Lambert assessed his 

recovery from left sacroiliac joint surgery as “excellent.” But 

the ALJ glossed over another part of that same note in which 

Lambert complained about increasing right-side lower back 

pain that woke him every four to five hours, giving him a 

sleep pattern that was “very disruptive” to his life. Nor did 

the ALJ acknowledge that Lambert underwent another 

surgery and experienced worsened symptoms in the five 

months or so between his March 2014 comment and the 

August 2014 hearing. 

Lambert next contends that the ALJ wrongly discounted 

his severe back pain after the most recent sacroiliac joint 

surgery. The ALJ found that Lambert’s complaints were 

unsupported by objective evidence. To be sure, a lack of 

objective support from physical examinations and test 
16 No. 17-1627 

results is relevant, but an ALJ may not discredit pain complaints solely because they lack objective corroboration. 

Pierce v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 1046, 1050 (7th Cir. 2014); Parker,

597 F.3d at 921–22. Indeed, the recurrence of Lambert’s 

symptoms is consistent with Dr. Paul’s warning that surgery 

was not guaranteed to alleviate his lower back pain and the 

pain specialist’s recommendation that Lambert pursue longterm pain-management strategies for his incurable back 

condition. Lambert “has undergone painful and risky procedures in attempts to alleviate his pain, actions that would 

seem to support the credibility of his claims regarding the 

severity of his pain.” Israel v. Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 441 (7th 

Cir. 2016). 

Last, Lambert argues that the ALJ’s adverse credibility 

determination rests on an improper analysis of his receipt of 

unemployment benefits before his amended onset date. The 

ALJ said that changing the alleged onset date to a period 

after the lapse of his unemployment benefits “evidenced 

either an intent to return to work as required by state unemployment law or misuse of the law.” But a claimant’s desire 

to work is not evidence that the claimant has embellished his 

limitations, see Gerstner, 879 F.3d at 265—especially here, 

where Lambert’s hopeful view of his prognosis was not 

shared by his doctors, who repeatedly urged him to shift 

from seeking a cure to focusing on pain management. And 

although unemployment benefits may be relevant if a claimant has represented to the State that he is able to work during

the period for which he has applied for federal disability 

benefits, Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737, 746 (7th Cir. 2005), 

any work-ready representation that Lambert made, personally or by presumption under state law, occurred before the 

amended onset date. 
No. 17-1627 17 

If the ALJ meant to rely on Lambert’s work-ready representation before the amended onset date, the ALJ failed to 

explain why this affected his evaluation of limitations documented more than a year later—particularly in light of the 

degenerative nature of Lambert’s back condition. See 

Scrogham, 765 F.3d at 699 (remanding because the ALJ relied 

on receipt of unemployment benefits to discount claimant’s 

symptoms without considering the progressive nature of 

disease). The record reveals that when Lambert simultaneously received unemployment benefits and claimed disability, he hoped that medical intervention might reduce his 

back pain to the point that he could return to work. No one 

knew at that time whether he would be able to work again. 

Finally, we note a more fundamental problem with the 

ALJ’s reliance on Lambert’s application for unemployment 

compensation to discount his credibility in seeking disability 

benefits. Under the Social Security Act, the line between 

disabled and nondisabled can be very difficult to chart 

accurately. And the Social Security system is designed to 

encourage everyone who can work to do so. Consider, for 

example, the first step in the five-step analysis of disability. 

No matter how severe the physical or mental challenges 

might be, if the person is actually working (“substantial 

gainful activity”), the person is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). And a person who is not certain 

whether he will qualify for Social Security disability surely 

has, and should have, a strong incentive to keep looking for 

work and to pursue unemployment compensation as an 

interim source of income. An ALJ should not discount a 

claimant’s credibility based on an application for unemployment compensation without taking these incentives and 
18 No. 17-1627 

pressures into account. The ALJ’s opinion here does not 

indicate that he did. 

III. Conclusion 

In sum, the ALJ failed to properly assess the treating 

neurosurgeon’s most recent opinions about Lambert’s 

impairments and limitations and Lambert’s testimony about 

his symptoms. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment in 

favor of the Commissioner and REMAND for further proceedings.