alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 11
               Statement Re: Computation of Per Share Earnings

Basic earnings per share is computed by dividing net earnings by the
weighted average number of common shares outstanding for the period. ESOP
shares released or committed to be released are considered outstanding
while unallocated ESOP shares are not considered outstanding. Diluted
earnings per share reflects the potential dilution that could occur if
securities or other contracts to issue common stock were exercised or
converted into common stock or resulted in the issuance of common stock
that then shared in the earnings of the Company. The following table
presents the basic and diluted earnings per share computation for the years
ended December 31, 2001, 2000 and 1999, as adjusted for the stock dividend.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                            Years ended December 31,
                                                        --------------------------------
                                                          2001        2000        1999
                                                          ----        ----        ----


                                                     <c>         <c>         <c>
Net income applicable to common stock                   $792,068    $238,466    $403,001
                                                        ================================

Weighted average number of common shares outstanding     552,696     584,423     597,629
Less: weighted average unallocated ESOP shares           (31,201)    (35,401)    (38,401)
Less: weighted average unvested shares
 held by Stock Based Incentive Plan                      (13,853)      1,011           -
                                                        --------------------------------
Average number of common shares outstanding used
 to calculate basic earings per share                    507,642     550,033     559,228
                                                        --------------------------------

Effect of dilutive options                                10,643       3,759           -
Effect of dilutive unvested stock awards                   6,185       2,357           -
                                                        --------------------------------
Average number of common shares outstanding used
 to calculate diluted earnings per share                 524,470     556,149     559,228
                                                        ================================

Earnings Per Share:
  Basic                                                 $   1.56    $   0.43    $   0.72
  Diluted                                               $   1.51    $   0.43    $   0.72
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND THE RELATED STATEMENTS OF  OPERATIONS,
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY AND CASH FLOWS FOR THE YEAR THEN ENDED AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           8,554
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,629
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                13,877
<PP&E>                                          19,724
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,092
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  29,125
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            4,033
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        37,514
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    29,125
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                26,090
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   24,719
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (408)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 334
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,445
<INCOME-TAX>                                        13
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,432
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,432
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    $0.13
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    $0.13


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
 (2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.
 By:
    
    /s/ FREDDIE M. KOTEKName:
    
    Freddie M. KotekTitle:
    
    Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Chief Executive Officer and President of the Managing General PartnerDate: August 16, 2010
IIB 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4137 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 17 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 16), 2014 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

AN ACT 

To prohibit assistance provided under the program of block 

grants to States for temporary assistance for needy families from being accessed through the use of an electronic 

benefit transfer card at any store that offers marijuana 

for sale. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 4137 RFS

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Preserving Welfare for 

3 Needs Not Weed Act’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF ELECTRONIC BENEFIT 

5 TRANSFER CARD TO ACCESS TANF ASSIST6 ANCE AT ANY STORE THAT OFFERS MARI7 JUANA FOR SALE. 

8 (a) PROHIBITION.—Section 408(a)(12)(A) of the So9 cial Security Act (42 U.S.C. 608(a)(12)(A)) is amended— 

10 (1) by striking ‘‘or’’ at the end of clause (ii); 

11 (2) by striking the period at the end of clause 

12 (iii) and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

13 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

14 ‘‘(iv) any establishment that offers 

15 marihuana (as defined in section 102(16) 

16 of the Controlled Substances Act) for 

17 sale.’’. 

18 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

19 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date that is 2 years 

20 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 16, 

2014. 

Attest: KAREN L. HAAS, 

Clerk. 


emcdonald on DSK67QTVN1PROD with BILLS
* Concurring in judgment only.

** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 4, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-10968

PENELOPE LYNCH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Northern District of Texas

_________________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, GARZA, and DENNIS,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:**

The judgment of the district court is affirmed for these reasons:

1. We will assume that an employer’s denial of access to its internal grievance

proceeding, responding to the filing of a Title VII charge by the employee,
can violate the anti-retaliation provision. That may be true even where the

internal proceeding and the resolution are purely discretionary with the

employer, as is true here. We do suggest that the employer should explain

in its policy that the internal proceeding is not available when legal charges

are pending. 

2. The problem with appellant’s case is the absence of injury or harm either as

of the employer’s action or as adjudicated by the judgment on appeal. 

Harm is required by the Burlington decision and its absence is the position

advanced by appellee. Appellant had no discrimination claim of substance. 

Only speaking of gender and religious discrimination, her evidence showed

merely a disagreement between appellant and another nurse. The district

court entered summary judgment for that reason, and appellant makes no

objection. This complaint would have gained nothing for appellant if

pursued the internal route. Appellant suffered no harm then or now. 

AFFIRMED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sonya Bagley, Appellant.

[718 NYS2d 854]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Brenda Soloff, J.), rendered on or about January 21, 1998, unanimously affirmed.

Application by appellant’s counsel to withdraw as counsel is granted. *(See, Anders v California,*386 US 738; *People v Saunders,*52 AD2d 833.) We have reviewed this record and agree with appellant’s assigned counsel that there are no non-frivolous points which could be raised on this appeal.

Pursuant to CPL 460.20, defendant has the right to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals by making application to the Chief Judge of that Court and by submitting such application to the Clerk of that Court or to a Justice of the Appel*355late Division of the Supreme Court of this Department on reasonable notice to the respondent within thirty (30) days after service of a copy of this order, with notice of entry.

Denial of the application for permission to appeal by the Judge or Justice first applied to is final and no new application may thereafter be made to any other Judge or Justice. Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Rubin, Saxe and Friedman, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-07-371-CV

NAHIDA REZA	APPELLANT

	V.

MOHAMMED MORTAZA REZA	APPELLEE

	------------

	FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	After the execution of a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) and a hearing on a motion to set aside the MSA, the trial court signed a divorce decree and later denied Appellant Nahida Reza’s motion for new trial.  In four issues, Appellant complains about the property division.  Because we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and remand this case to the trial court for a new division of the marital estate.  

	In their MSA, the parties agreed, among other things, that Appellee Mohammed Mortaza Reza would get Sunset Gas and Grill and that Appellant would get Bowie Fina Mart.  The agreement did not specifically state that “Sunset Gas and Grill” included the value of the associated real estate, nor did it specify that each store’s inventory and value as a going concern was included in its respective value.  A handwritten note appended to Exhibit A of the MSA provided, “Restructure the corporate entity consistent with the property settlement agreement.”

	The sparse record and briefs before us show that at the time the parties executed the MSA, D&R Investments, Inc., identified variously as a corporation and a limited liability company (LLC) owned by the parties, owned the two businesses as well as the real estate associated with Sunset Gas and Grill.2  The record also shows that D&R had filed assumed name certificates in the names of Sunset Gas and Grill and Bowie Fina Mart.  Neither party pled alter ego, nor was it tried by consent because there was no trial.3

	D&R was not divided or even mentioned in the MSA.  Nevertheless, in the divorce decree, the trial court awarded all interest in D&R to Appellee.  Appellant complained of this award in her motion for new trial, preserving the issue.  Because the MSA did not divide D&R, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding all interest in D&R to Appellee.4  We therefore sustain Appellant’s first issue.  We do not reach her remaining issues.5

	We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse it in part.  The parties have not challenged the validity of their divorced status or the provisions regarding the children.  We therefore affirm that part of the trial court’s judgment granting the divorce and all provisions related to the children.  But because the trial court went beyond the terms of the MSA by awarding all interest in D&R to Appellee, we reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment dividing the marital estate, and we remand this case solely for a new division of the marital estate.

								LEE ANN DAUPHINOT

								JUSTICE

PANEL:  LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED:  October 2, 2008
EXHIBIT 31.1
                                  CERTIFICATION

         I, Giuseppe Pino Baldassarre, certify that:

         I have reviewed this report on Form 10-QSB of Logica Holdings Inc.;

1. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

2. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

3. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

                  (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our
supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

                  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

                  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's
most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case
of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting;
and

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditor and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

                  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

                  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involve
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting.




Date: November 19, 2007.



/s/ Giuseppe Pino Baldassarre
--------------------------------
Name: Giuseppe Pino Baldassarre
Chief Executive Officer
#### Olga PAEZ, Appellant, v. CITY OF CORAL GABLES, etc., Appellee.

No. 3D02-1253.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 11, 2003.

Rehearing and Certification of Question Denied July 30, 2003.

*190Paul Morris; Robert A. Rosenblatt, Miami, for appellant.

Adorno & Yoss, P.A., and John Arrastia Jr., Miami; Katherine Fernandez Rundle, State Attorney, and David Macey, Assistant State Attorney, for appellee.

Before GODERICH, GREEN, and RAMIREZ, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Olga Paez, appeals from a Final Judgment of Forfeiture in which the trial court found that she lacked standing to challenge or participate in the forfeiture action. Because the appellant signed an affidavit stating that she did not have any legal interest in the seized funds, the trial court properly found that the appellant lacked standing. *See Gonzalez v. City of Homestead,*825 So.2d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“To establish standing, a claimant as a general rule must show ownership, or an ownership interest, in the property which has been seized.”); *Munoz v. City of Coral Gables,*695 So.2d 1283, 1286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“[T]o contest a forfeiture action, a party must first demonstrate an interest in the seized property sufficient to satisfy the court of the party’s standing as a claimant.”); *but see City of Fort Lauderdale v. Baruch,*718 So.2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Therefore, the order under review is affirmed.

Affirmed.
113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4152 

AN ACT 

To provide for the costs of loan guarantees for Ukraine. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 4152 EH

1 SECTION 1. PROVISION OF COSTS OF LOAN GUARANTEES 

2 FOR UKRAINE. 

3 From amounts appropriated or otherwise made avail4 able under ‘‘Economic Support Fund’’ in division K of the 

5 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Public Law 113– 

6 76), and prior Acts making appropriations for the Depart7 ment of State, foreign operations, and related programs, 

8 funding from unobligated balances shall be made available 

9 for the costs, as defined in section 502 of the Congres10 sional Budget Act of 1974, of loan guarantees for 

11 Ukraine, which are authorized to be provided in an appro12 priations Act, in accordance with section 504 of the Con13 gressional Budget Act of 1974: Provided, That amounts 

14 made available for the costs of such guarantees shall not 

15 be considered ‘‘assistance’’ for the purpose of provisions 

16 of law limiting assistance to such country: Provided fur17 ther, That none of the funds may be made available from 

18 amounts designated pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A) of 

19 the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act 

20 of 1985. 

Passed the House of Representatives March 6, 

2014. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4152 

AN ACT 

To provide for the costs of loan guarantees for 

Ukraine.
ZLOOP, INC. v. PARKER POE ADAMS & BERNSTEIN LLP, et al.

122P18-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 21, 2018

Gavin J. Reardon, Attorney at Law, Greensboro, Amiel J. Rossabi, Attorney at Law, for Zloop, INC.

Robert W. Fuller, Attorney at Law, Stuart L. Pratt, Attorney at Law, Charlotte, for Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, et al.

*253The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 21st of May 2018 by Defendants for Extension of Time to Respond to Petition for Writ of Certiorari:

"Motion Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 21st of May 2018."

Defendants shall have up to and including the 5th day of July, 2018 to Respond to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
[J-84-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Appellee

v.

KAREEM BARNES,

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 36 EAP 2015

Appeal from the judgment of Superior 

Court entered on 6/27/14 at No. 1784 

EDA 2013 affirming the judgment of 

sentence entered on 11/1/10 in the 

Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia 

County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-51-

CR-0005943-2009

ARGUED: September 13, 2016

CONCURRING OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 28, 2016

I join the majority’s specific holding that sentences violative of Alleyne v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), are illegal sentences, alleviating the 

requirement of issue preservation.1 However, I do not support the majority’s decision to 

adopt the lead opinion in Commonwealth v. Foster, 609 Pa. 502, 17 A.3d 332 (2011) 

(plurality), since such expression favored a considerably broader litmus for the illegalsentence doctrine, and, in this respect, I maintain the concerns that I had voiced in 

 

1 As the majority notes, this understanding does not apply to cases that have reached 

the post-conviction stage, since the determination of whether final judgments of 

sentences are illegal under Alleyne depends upon whether Alleyne is retroactive to 

cases pending on post-conviction review, see Commonwealth v. Washington, ___ Pa. 

___, ___, 142 A.3d 810, 814-15 (2016), and this Court has concluded that it is not, see 

id. at ___, 142 A.3d at 820.
[J-84-2016][M.O. – Baer, J.] - 2

Foster. See id. at 539-41, 17 A.3d at 355-56 (Saylor, J., concurring); accord id. at 525-

39, 17 A.3d at 346-54 (Castille, C.J.) (cautioning that the approach of redefining the 

concept of an illegal sentence to encompass all sentencing claims other than those 

challenging purely discretionary aspects effectively disapproves decades of existing 

Superior Court precedent and unduly overrides salutary issue preservation 

requirements across a broad array of sentencing challenges). 

Justice Mundy joins this concurring opinion.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

February 19, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice
135356 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 135356 COA: 272250 Wayne CC: 06-000475-01 EDUARDO PELLOT, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 23, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented s hould be reviewed by this Court.

s0211 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

February 19, 2008

Clerk