1

The Honorable Michael James Davis, United States District

Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the report and

recommendation of the Honorable Raymond L. Erickson, United States

Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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No. 95-3483

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Lawrence C. Anderson, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * District of Minnesota.

of Social Security, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: February 1, 1996

 Filed: February 5, 1996 ___________

Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. ___________

PER CURIAM.

Lawrence C. Anderson appeals from the final order entered in

the district court1 affirming the decision of the Commissioner to

deny Anderson's application for disability insurance benefits. For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Anderson was born in 1946, and had worked as, among other

things, a truck driver and heavy equipment operator. In February

1993, he applied for benefits, alleging disability due to lower

back problems. Anderson's application was denied initially and on

reconsideration.
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In July 1993, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ), at which Anderson expressly waived his right to

representation. Anderson then testified that as a result of his

exertional impairments he had steady lower back pain, that his

impairment severely limited his functional capacity, and that he

was actively seeking employment. A vocational expert also

testified at the administrative hearing and stated that, while a

claimant with Anderson's impairment could not perform his past

relevant work, he nevertheless could perform a variety of sedentary

exertional level work that provided for a sit/stand option and that

existed in the local and national economy.

After analyzing Anderson's subjective complaints of pain under

the criteria set forth in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322

(8th Cir. 1984), the ALJ found Anderson's subjective complaints of

disabling pain not fully credible and noted they were not supported

by the objective medical evidence and were inconsistent with the

record as a whole. The ALJ noted that Anderson's failure to lose

weight--as recommended by his treating physician--and his claim he

was seeking work were inconsistent with a finding of disability.

The ALJ determined that, while Anderson was unable to perform his

past relevant work, his impairment did not meet or equal any listed

impairment, and that Anderson retained the residual functional

capacity to perform a significant number of jobs that existed

within the local and national economy. The Appeals Council denied

further review, and Anderson sought judicial review. The district

court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the

Commissioner's decision and granted the Commissioner's motion for

summary judgment.

This court's task is limited to a determination of whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the

record as a whole. See Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th

Cir. 1995). After a careful review of the record, we conclude the
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ALJ considered all the relevant evidence and properly discredited

Anderson's testimony regarding his subjective complaints of pain.

See Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1987) (standard

to determine whether ALJ properly discredited claimant's subjective

complaints of pain). The record indicates that Anderson only took

Advil to relieve his discomfort; that he sought only conservative

treatment; that he failed to lose weight; and that the degree of

pain Anderson complained of was inconsistent with the evidence as

a whole--including the observations of Anderson's treating

physicians. See House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 1994)

(pain controlled by Tylenol and ability to perform variety of daily

activities inconsistent with complaints of disabling pain); Nelson

v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1992) (ALJ properly

discounted claimant's subjective complaints of pain where claimant

failed to follow doctor's instructions to lose weight in order to

alleviate symptoms); Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 839-40

(8th Cir. 1992) (subjective complaints of pain may be discounted if

there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole); Rautio v.

Bowen, 862 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir. 1988) (failure to seek

aggressive treatment and limited use of prescription medications

not suggestive of disabling back pain); Benskin, 830 F.2d at 884.

We conclude the hypothetical question the ALJ posed to the VE

was proper because it set forth all the limitations which the ALJ

accepted as true and were supported by the record. See Haynes v.

Shalala, 26 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1994); Rappoport v. Sullivan,

942 F.2d 1320, 1323 (8th Cir. 1991). We also conclude that the

record supports the determination that Anderson retained the

residual functional capacity to work, and that the Commissioner--

through the testimony of the VE--showed that there were jobs that

Anderson could perform given his residual functional capacity. See

Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 1995). Moreover,

Anderson's testimony--that he was aggressively seeking employment--

is inconsistent with a finding of disability. See Barrett v.

Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.