United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

R.G., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Dallas, TX, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 15-0144 

Issued: July 27, 2016 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On October 23, 2014 appellant filed a timely appeal from a September 25, 2014 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over merits of the overpayment issues. 

ISSUES 

The issues are: (1) whether appellant received a $7,657.10 overpayment of compensation 

for the period January 9, 2009 through May 31, 2013, for which she was not at fault; (2) whether 

the overpayment is subject to waiver of recovery; and (3) whether OWCP properly withheld 

$300.00 per month from appellant’s continuing compensation payments. 

 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On November 7, 2004 appellant, then a 47-year-old mail handler, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that a box fell on her left temple while in the performance of her 

federal duties. Appellant visited a hospital emergency department that day where she was 

treated for a superficial head injury. OWCP accepted the claim for contusions of the head and 

left shoulder and a concussion without loss of consciousness. On November 7, 2004 appellant 

was released to limited duty. As the employing establishment did not have any limited duty 

available, appellant has not returned to work. She has been paid wage-loss compensation 

benefits. 

On September 18, 2013 appellant advised OWCP that she discovered a mistake in the 

mileage she had claimed for travel to and from her doctor during the period January 9, 2009 

through May 31, 2013. While she had claimed 35 miles each way for a total of 70 miles, she 

asserted the mileage should have been 30.5 miles going to the doctor and 35.5 miles for the 

return trip home, for a total of 66 miles. Appellant stated she would like to pay back any monies 

owed, if any. In an October 24, 2013 letter, OWCP advised appellant they would review her 

case to determine if there was an overpayment of travel mileage reimbursement. 

On January 28, 2014 appellant forwarded a check for $100.00 to start repayment of any 

potential overpayment. 

By letter dated March 25, 2014, OWCP issued a preliminary determination that appellant 

was at fault in the creation of a $7,657.10 overpayment of compensation for the period 

January 6, 2009 through May 31, 2013. OWCP indicated that on March 21, 2013, the 

Department of Labor’s Office of Inspector General related that appellant had submitted a large 

number of mileage reimbursement claims to OWCP for travel relating to seeing Dr. William 

Larkin, a Board-certified surgeon. Since 2009, appellant submitted 252 OWCP-957 forms 

claiming 70 miles round trip from her residence in Red Oak, TX to Dr. Larkin’s office in Dallas, 

TX, for a total of $26,806.65 in mileage reimbursement. OWCP found, however, that appellant 

was entitled to reimbursement only in the amount of $19,149.55 and, thus, was overpaid 

$7,657.10. It advised that its investigation verified appellant was traveling to Dr. Larkin’s office 

for medical appointments. However, appellant had inflated her mileage reimbursements on each 

trip by 20 miles. Using Google maps and odometer readings from the shortest route, the agents 

verified the mileage from appellant’s home to her doctor’s office was actually 50 miles round 

trip, not the 70 miles she had claimed and for which she had been reimbursed. 

OWCP made a preliminary finding that appellant was with fault in the creation of the 

overpayment as she was aware or should have been reasonably been aware that she was 

overstating the mileage claimed on the reimbursement forms. Appellant was advised that she 

could request a telephone conference, a final decision based on the written evidence, or a hearing 

if she disagreed that the overpayment occurred, with the amount of the overpayment, or if she 

believed that recovery of the overpayment should be waived. OWCP requested that appellant 

complete an accompanying overpayment recovery questionnaire (Form OWCP-20) and submit 

financial documents in support thereof within 30 days. 
3

In attached spreadsheets, OWCP calculated the overpayment for the period January 6, 

2009 through May 31, 2013. The spreadsheets noted appellant’s mileage reimbursements from 

January 6, 2009 to May 31, 2013, listed the transaction control billing number from Affiliated 

Computer Systems for each of the 252 OWCP 957 travel reimbursement claims for a total of 731 

trips, the dates claimed for 731 trips, as well as the reimbursement amounts for years 2009 

through 2013.2

 Calculations were also provided for the reimbursement total that should have 

been received for the actual mileage of 50 miles roundtrip. For the period January 6, 2009 to 

May 31, 2013, OWCP found that appellant had received a total of $26,806.65 at 70 miles 

roundtrip claimed but was only was entitled to reimbursement for 50 miles for a total of 

$19,149.55, which resulted in an overpayment in the amount of $7,657.10. 

In an April 8, 2014 response, appellant requested a prerecoupment hearing. She 

disagreed with the amount of the overpayment as she felt she was denied due process because 

she was never asked what route she drove. Appellant included a handwritten outline of the route 

driven to the physician’s office, which included street names, but did not list mileage. She stated 

that the IG Agent drove a route that was shown on Google Maps, which was approximately 26.5 

miles, and that he had rounded it up to 30 miles. Appellant indicated that Commonwealth and 

Inwood roads were congested and she did not use them.3

 She stated she did not like to drive 

freeways as they made her nervous and, if at all possible, she would take another route, even if it 

was longer. She stated that when she first started going to the doctor, OWCP told her that she 

did not have to drive the freeways and could take another route. However, since the interviews 

with the Special Agent and the Postal Inspector, she now drove the most direct route, including 

freeways. She stated that she took medication to calm her nerves while driving freeways. She 

stated that if OWCP used the mileage the IG Agent used, rounded to 30 miles, it would reduce 

the overpayment amount by half and she would settle for that amount, $3,828.55, in a one-time 

payment. 

On June 20, 2014 appellant partially completed a Form OWCP-20, Overpayment 

Recovery Questionnaire. She alleged that OWCP had not used the route she drove to figure the 

amount that may be owed. Appellant related that in November 2004 she was told that she did 

not have to drive the freeway and she still had not been told that she had to drive freeways. She 

listed $4,690.00 in monthly income. Appellant did not complete the section of the form that 

asked her to list her FECA income.4

At the July 10, 2014 hearing appellant disagreed with the amount of overpayment. Her 

representative at the time stated that appellant was told by a U.S. Postal liaison for OWCP, Tara 

Johnson, that appellant could drive any route. The representative stated appellant did not think it 

fair that she now had to drive the most direct route as she was never told that in the beginning. 

 2

 From January 6, 2009 to December 29, 2009, appellant was reimbursed at .55 cents a mile; from January 4, 

2010 to December 17, 2010, she was reimbursed at .50 cents a mile; from January 7, 2011 to April 13, 2012, 

appellant’s travel mileage was reimbursed at .51 cents a mile, and from April 19, 2012 to May 31, 2013, she was 

reimbursed at .55 cents a mile. 

3

 Inwood Road was listed on appellant’s handwritten outline of the route driven to and from the physician’s office 

to her home. 

4

 According to the record, at that time she was receiving net compensation every 28 days of $3061.16. 
4

The representative contended that the mileage should be mitigated as, while there was no doubt 

some type of overpayment occurred, there was no intent to defraud OWCP by inflating the 

mileage. Regarding the issue of using the Hampton Road route that Google maps suggested, 

which avoided freeways and took 25.6 miles from appellant’s home to Dr. Larkin’s office, 

appellant testified that both Hampton Road and the freeway were bad alternatives as there often 

were wrecks and congestion on those roads. Appellant testified that there was no medical reason 

that she was unable to drive freeways, just that she felt it was nerve racking. Appellant initially 

testified that she did not know whether she had an asset base over $8,000.00. However her 

husband testified and confirmed that they had assets equal to or in excess of the $8,000 resource 

base. Appellant was advised at the hearing of the type of financial documentation needed to 

establish hardship to repay the overpayment. 

In an August 14, 2014 response to the hearing transcript, an employing establishment 

manager stated that appellant had stopped working in 2004. He contended that appellant should 

have been aware she was overstating her mileage by 20 miles each trip and that she should 

reimburse the funds owed. The employing establishment manager referenced the August 14, 

2014 email from an employing establishment official, Ms. Johnson, worked in injury 

compensation from 2008 to 2011, but he stated that she did not have the authority to authorize 

appellant to drive a route of her choice to her doctor, and Ms. Johnson did not speak to appellant 

at any time about her mileage for her OWCP claim. He further stated the employing 

establishment was not in agreement with appellant’s suggestion to pay a reduced amount, that 

she did not fully complete the Overpayment Recovery Questionnaire, and that she was less than 

truthful in declaring her income and assets. 

In an August 22, 2014 letter, appellant objected to the employing establishment statement 

that she was less than truthful. She indicated that she did complete the Overpayment Recovery 

Questionnaire and her only income was what she received from OWCP. Appellant stated that 

the employing establishment had no personal knowledge of her case. 

By decision dated September 25, 2014, an OWCP hearing representative found that 

appellant was without fault in creating the overpayment. He noted that while OWCP’s 

procedure manual noted that travel to a physician’s office was to be by the most direct route for 

expense reimbursement, appellant had not been advised of such requirement. The hearing 

representative noted, however, that appellant’s husband’s testimony that their asset base 

exceeded $8,000 precluded waiver. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1 

Section 8103 of FECA provides that the United States shall furnish to an employee who 

is injured while in the performance of duty, the services, appliances and supplies prescribed or 

recommended by a qualified physician, which OWCP considers likely to cure, give relief, reduce 

the degree of the period of disability or aid in lessening the amount of monthly compensation.5

 

 

 5

 5 U.S.C. § 8103. 
5

With respect to travel expenses for medical treatment, the regulations provide: 

“(a) The employee is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable and necessary 

expenses, including transportation needed to obtain authorized medical services, 

appliances or supplies. To determine what a reasonable distance to travel is, 

OWCP will consider the availability of services, the employee’s condition and the 

means of transportation. Generally, a round[-]trip distance of up to 100 miles is 

considered a reasonable distance to travel.6

 Travel should be undertaken by the 

shortest route, and if practical, by public conveyance. If the medical evidence 

shows that the employee is unable to use these means of transportation, OWCP 

may authorize travel by taxi or special conveyance.”7

 

In interpreting this section, the Board has recognized that OWCP has broad discretion in 

approving services provided under FECA. The only limitation on OWCP’s authority is that of 

reasonableness.8 OWCP may authorize medical treatment but determine that the travel expense 

incurred for such authorized treatment was unnecessary or unreasonable.9 

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1 

In this case, appellant admitted she mistakenly claimed and was reimbursed for 70 miles 

roundtrip travel to Dr. Larkin during the period January 6, 2009 through May 31, 2013. She 

does not dispute that an overpayment occurred, but disputes the amount of the overpayment. 

OWCP noted that during the period in question appellant filed 252 travel vouchers for which she 

was reimbursed a total of $26,806.65 as the trip to Dr. Larkin was 70 miles roundtrip travel, but 

was only entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $19,149.55 as the trip to Dr. Larkin was in 

fact no more than 50 miles roundtrip. Thus she was overpaid $7,657.10. OWCP advised its 

investigation verified that appellant was traveling to Dr. Larkin’s office for medical 

appointments. However, she had inflated the mileage on the 252 travel vouchers by 20 miles for 

each trip. Using Google maps and odometer readings, IG agents verified the mileage from 

appellant’s home to her doctor’s office was at the most 50 miles. 

The hearing representative noted that the route one-way from appellant’s home to 

Dr. Larkin’s office via interstate highway 35 was 23.98 miles per MapQuest and 24.6 miles per 

Google maps. An alternative one-way direct route, which did not use any highways, from 

appellant’s home to Dr. Larkin’s office was via Hampton Road and was 25.6 miles.10 The 

 6

 Effective August 29, 2011, the regulations changed and a round-trip of up to 100 miles is considered reasonable. 

See FECA Bulletin No. 14-02-03 (issued January 29, 2014). 

7

 20 C.F.R. § 10.315(a). 

8 A.O., Docket No. 08-580 (issued January 28, 2009); see also Marjorie S. Geer, 39 ECAB 1099 (1988) (OWCP 

has broad discretionary authority in the administration of FECA and must exercise that discretion to achieve the 

objectives of section 8103). 

9 W.M., 59 ECAB 132 (2007); Mira R. Adams, 48 ECAB 504 (1997). 

10 The Board notes that these different routes average 24.73 miles, which rounds to 25.00 miles one-way from 

appellant’s home to Dr. Larkin’s office or 50 miles roundtrip. 
6

hearing representative noted, and the record supports, there is no medical evidence of record 

from a physician which supports appellant is unable to drive freeways. Appellant testified that 

the Hampton Road route was congested and always had wrecks, but provided no documentation 

to support her assertion. 

Appellant asserted the mileage should have been 30.5 miles going to the doctor and 35.5 

miles for the return trip home, for a total of 66 miles. While appellant provided a copy of the 

map for the route she took, supporting documentation for the mileage was not provided. 

Additionally, there is no indication that appellant’s preferred route was the most direct or 

shortest route. 

As noted above, OWCP has discretion to authorize reimbursement for travel expenses 

related to medical treatment. The evidence is sufficient to establish that an overpayment 

occurred, as appellant submitted inflated travel reimbursement on 252 travel vouchers. The 

evidence is also sufficient to establish that the roundtrip distance from appellant’s home to 

Dr. Larkin’s office using the shortest, most direct route from her residence to Dr. Larkin’s office 

was no more than 50 miles. As such, OWCP properly found appellant was overpaid $7,657.10 

during the period January 6, 2009 through May 31, 2013 as she was reimbursed a total of 

$26,806.65 during the stated period for 70 miles roundtrip travel, but was only entitled to 

reimbursement in the amount of $19,149.55 for 50 miles roundtrip travel. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2 

Section 8129(a) of FECA provides that when an overpayment of compensation occurs 

because of an error of fact of law, adjustment or recovery shall be made by decreasing later 

payment to which the individual is entitled.11 The only exception to this requirement that an 

overpayment must be recovered is set forth in section 8129(b): 

Adjustment or recovery by the United States may not be made when incorrect payment 

has been made to an individual who is without fault and when adjustment or recovery would 

defeat the purpose of FECA or would be against equity and good conscience. 

Thus, a finding that appellant was without fault is not sufficient, in and of itself, for 

OWCP to waive the overpayment. OWCP must exercise its discretion to determine whether 

recovery of the overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA or would be against equity and 

good conscience, pursuant to the guidelines provided in the implementing federal regulations. 

Section 10.436 of the implementing regulations12 provide that recovery of an 

overpayment will defeat the purpose of FECA if recovery would cause hardship to a currently or 

formerly entitled beneficiary such that: (a) the beneficiary from whom OWCP seeks recovery 

needs substantially all of his or her current income, including compensation benefits, to meet 

 11 5 U.S.C. § 8129(a). 

12 20 C.F.R. § 10.436. 
7

current ordinary and necessary living expenses;13 and (b) the beneficiary’s assets do not exceed 

the resource base as determined by OWCP from data provided by the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics.14

Recovery of an overpayment is considered to be against equity and good conscience 

when any individual, in reliance on such payments or on notice that such payments would be 

made, gives up a valuable right or changes his position for the worse.15 Conversion of the 

overpayment into a different form, such as food, consumer goods, real estate, etc., from which 

the claimant derived some benefit, is not to be considered a loss.16 

The individual who received the overpayment is responsible for providing information 

about income, expenses and assets as specified by OWCP. This information is needed to 

determine whether or not recovery of an overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA or be 

against equity and good conscience. This information will also be used to determine the 

repayment schedule, if necessary.17 

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2 

OWCP found that appellant was without fault in creating the overpayment of 

compensation because she had not been informed that she would only be reimbursed for travel 

via the shortest route for her medical appointments. It then considered whether she was entitled 

to waiver of recovery of the overpayment. Waiver is only possible if recovery would defeat the 

purpose of FECA or would be against equity and good conscience. In order to establish that 

repayment of the overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA, appellant must show that she 

requires substantially all of her income to meet current ordinary and necessary living expenses 

and that her assets do not exceed the established limit as determined by OWCP’s procedures.18 

Appellant has not established that recovery of the overpayment would defeat the purpose 

of FECA as OWCP properly found that appellant did not meet the second prong of this test. Her 

$8,000.00 in assets, as testified by her husband, exceeded the allowable resource base. The asset 

base is determined from established sources as outlined in OWCP procedures. Liquid assets 

include such sources as cash, the value of stocks, bonds, savings accounts, mutual funds and 

 13 An individual is deemed to need substantially all of his or her current income to meet current ordinary and 

necessary living expenses if monthly income does not exceed monthly expenses by more than $50.00. In other 

words, the amount of monthly funds available for debt repayment is the difference between current income and 

adjusted living expenses (i.e., ordinary and necessary living expenses plus $50.00) Federal (FECA) Procedure 

Manual, Part 6 -- Debt Management, Initial Overpayment Actions, Chapter 6.200.6 (a) (June 2009). See also C.J.,

Docket No. 14-644 (June 10, 2014). 

14 Id. OWCP’s procedures provide that assets must not exceed a resource base of $4,800 for an individual with a 

spouse. 

15 20 C.F.R. § 10.437(b). 

16 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 13 at Chapter 6.200.6.b(3) (October 2004). 

17 Id. at § 10.438(a); Ralph P. Beachum, Sr., 55 ECAB 442 (2004). 

18 20 C.F.R. § 10.436. 
8

certificates of deposit. Nonliquid assets include the fair market value of an owner’s equity in 

property such as a camper, boat, second home, and furnishings/supplies, vehicles, jewelry and 

artwork.19 While the testimony elicited at the hearing, other than appellant’s husband’s 

admission, was vague in nature regarding the couple’s asset base, the Board notes that the 

evidence of record does indicate that appellant and her husband own two properties, have a 

savings account, and an undocumented JPMorgan account, from which funds are transferred to 

savings. 

Because appellant has not met the second prong of the two-prong test for whether 

recovery of the overpayment would defeat the purpose of FECA, it is not necessary for OWCP to 

consider the first prong of the test, i.e., whether appellant needs substantially all of her current 

income to meet ordinary and necessary living expenses. 

Appellant also has not established that recovery of the overpayment would be against 

equity and good conscience because she has not shown that she would experience severe 

financial hardship in attempting to repay the debt or that she relinquished a valuable right or 

changed her position for the worse in reliance on the payment which created the overpayment.20 

The Board notes in this regard that in reporting her income and expenses, appellant did not 

provide specific information regarding her FECA benefits for consideration of financial 

hardship. 

Because appellant has failed to establish that recovery of the overpayment would defeat 

the purpose of FECA or be against equity and good conscience, she has failed to show that 

OWCP abused its discretion by refusing to waive the overpayment. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 3 

The Board’s jurisdiction over recovery of an overpayment is limited to reviewing those 

cases where OWCP seeks recovery from continuing compensation under FECA. Section 

10.441(a) of the regulations provides: 

“When an overpayment has been made to an individual who is entitled to further 

payments, the individual shall refund to [OWCP] the amount of the overpayment 

as soon as the error is discovered or his or her attention is called to same. If no 

refund is made, [OWCP] shall decrease later payments of compensation, taking 

into account the probable extent of future payments, the rate of compensation, the 

financial circumstances of the individual and any other relevant factors, so as to 

minimize any hardship.”21 

Under OWCP’s procedures, the compromise of all or part of the overpayment and any 

charges may be made depending upon the claimant’s financial circumstances in order to set a 

repayment schedule. Compromise of the principal of the overpayment can be considered if 

 19 Supra note 12. 

20 See 20 C.F.R. § 10.437; William J. Murphy, 41 ECAB 569, 571-72 (1989). 

21 20 C.F.R. § 10.441. 
9

application of the interest charges would extend the period of repayment more than 35 percent. 

Such a determination is made at the time the repayment schedule is established.22 Compromise 

is a matter which rests in the discretion of OWCP.23

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 3 

In this case, OWCP determined that appellant was without fault in the creation of the 

overpayment. The hearing representative denied compromise of the debt and set recovery at 

$300.00 from appellant’s continuing compensation. 

Charges can be waived if appellant is without fault in the creation of the overpayment 

and the application of charges will extend the period of indebtedness beyond the debtor’s life 

expectancy. In setting the rate of recovery from appellant’s continuing compensation, OWCP’s 

hearing representative considered the fact that recovery of the principal balance of $7,657.10 

with interest would take appellant 25.81 months to repay, which was less than appellant’s life 

expectancy of 296.4 months. Therefore, charges could not be waived. As previously noted 

compromise is a matter which rests in the discretion of OWCP, and a compromise order is not 

subject to review by the Board.24

The record reflects that OWCP exercised its discretion in not compromising the 

outstanding balance of the overpayment and in setting the rate of recovery from appellant’s 

continuing compensation. In doing so, it considered the factors provided under section 10.441, 

such as appellant’s age, life expectancy, the rate of compensation paid and the period in which 

recovery could be obtained with reference to her financial circumstances. There is no evidence 

of record to establish that OWCP abused its discretion is setting the rate of recovery of $300.00 a 

payment cycle from appellant’s continuing compensation so as to minimize financial hardship. 

On appeal appellant argues that she was without fault in creating the overpayment and 

she was never informed that she had to drive the most direct route. A finding that appellant was 

without fault does not automatically result in waiver of the overpayment. OWCP must then 

exercise its discretion to determine whether recovery of the overpayment would defeat the 

purpose of FECA or would be against equity and good conscience.25 As discussed, recovery of 

the overpayment would not defeat the purpose of FECA or would be against equity and good 

conscience. 

 22 See Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 13 at Chapter 6.300.5 (May 2004). See Jorge E. Diaz, 53 

ECAB 403 (2002). 

23 D.C., Docket No. 10-1046 (issued January 19, 2011); Linda D. Lane, 46 ECAB 727 (1995). 

24 Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 6 -- Debt Management, Initial Overpayment Actions, Chapter 

6.300.6(d) (May 2004). 

25 L.S., 59 ECAB 350 (2008). 
10

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that OWCP properly determined that appellant received an overpayment 

of compensation in the amount of $7,657.10 for the period January 6, 2009 through 

May 31, 2013. OWCP also properly determined that appellant was not entitled to waiver of 

recovery of the overpayment, and that recovery should be made by withholding $300.00 per 

month from her continuing compensation benefits. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 25, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed.26

Issued: July 27, 2016 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 26 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge, participated in the original decision, but was no longer a member of the 

Board effective November 16, 2015.