alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Justice

###### Antitrust Division

                    Notice is hereby given that, on December 10, 2004, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301*et seq.*                     (“the Act”), International Association of Plumbing and Mechanical Officials (“IAPMO”) has filed written notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission disclosing additions or changes to its standards development activities. The notifications were filed for the purpose of extending the Act's provisions limiting the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified circumstances. Specifically, the nature and scope of IAPMO's standards development activities are: to provide for the erection, installation, alternation, addition, repair, relocation, replacement, maintenance, or use of any solar, swimming pool, spa or hot tub system.                

                    On September 14, 2004, IAPMO filed its original notification pursuant to Section 6(a) of the Act. The Department of Justice published a notice in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act on November 29, 2004 (69 FR 69396).                

Dorothy B. Fountain,

Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.

[FR Doc. 05-1980 Filed 2-1-05; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
Exhibit 32.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of THOMAS PROPERTIES GROUP, INC. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



| | (i) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates and for the
periods expressed in the Report.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |                                        
|------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|Dated: May 11, 2009 |  | /s/ James A. Thomas                    
|                    |  | James A. Thomas Chief Executive
Officer

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350 and shall
not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended or incorporated by reference in any registration statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the
Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Joseph Clifton LEWIS, Plaintiff, v. Shannon LEWIS, Defendant.

No. COA17-790

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: April 3, 2018

DISMISSED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BOYD BROS. TRANSPORTATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER
31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       3,417,174
<SECURITIES>                                   250,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                9,415,737
<ALLOWANCES>                                   237,000
<INVENTORY>                                    263,352
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            16,438,681
<PP&E>                                      48,858,748
<DEPRECIATION>                              23,910,352
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              71,526,002
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       12,654,024
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         4,095
<OTHER-SE>                                  29,450,499
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                71,526,002
<SALES>                                     77,214,629
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            77,214,629
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               72,124,076
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,254,636
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,835,917
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,519,070
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,316,847
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,316,847
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .62


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF

HOMEBANC CORP.

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with HomeBanc Corp.s (the Company) Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2007 (the Report), I, Kevin D. Race, Chief Executive Officer, President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,
as adopted pursuant to § 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                   |  |     |  |                                                                                        
|------------------ |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: May 10, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ KEVIN D. RACE                                                                      
|                   |  |     |  | Kevin D. Race                                                                          
|                   |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer, President, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial Officer
STATE of North Carolina v. Delilah Lavinya WILSON

No. COA17-750

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: February 6, 2018

NO ERROR.
STATE v. Frank Junior CHAMBERS

35A02-3

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 7, 2018

Frank Junior Chambers, for Chambers, Frank Junior.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Brandy Cook, District Attorney, for State of N.C.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 16th of March 2018 by Defendant to Appoint Counsel:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of June 2018."
113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4527 

AN ACT 

To remove a use restriction on land formerly a part of 

Acadia National Park that was transferred to the town 

of Tremont, Maine, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 4527 EH

1 SECTION 1. USE RESTRICTION REMOVED. 

2 The Act entitled ‘‘An Act to authorize the convey3 ance, for school purposes, of certain land in Acadia Na4 tional Park to the town of Tremont, Maine, and for other 

5 purposes’’, approved August 1, 1950, is amended by add6 ing at the end the following: ‘‘Lands conveyed to the town 

7 of Tremont, Maine, under the Act known as NPS Tract 

8 06–126, which were conveyed by the National Park Serv9 ice in deed recorded at the Hancock County Registry of 

10 Deeds Book 737 Page 467, National Park Service Deed 

11 377, shall no longer be required to be used exclusively and 

12 perpetually for school purposes and upon the discontinu13 ance of such use of said land, or any part thereof, shall 

14 no longer be required to revert to the United States.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 8, 

2014. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4527 

AN ACT 

To remove a use restriction on land formerly a part 

poses. the town of Tremont, Maine, and for other purof Acadia National Park that was transferred to
#### Ex parte Anthony Charles THOMAS. (In re Anthony Charles Thomas v. State of Alabama).

1011421.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 6, 2002.

David K. Hogg, Dothan, for petitioner.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Stephen N. Dodd, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

HARWOOD, Justice.

WRIT QUASHED.

MOORE, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ„ concur.

HOUSTON and JOHNSTONE, JJ., dissent.

HOUSTON, Justice

(dissenting).

I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals; therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The United States Supreme Court in *Florida v. Royer,*460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), held that when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the officer and go about his business. Any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.

I cannot distinguish the facts in this case from those in *Florida v. Royer.*In this case, Police Officer Kenny Horn was walking to East Burdeshaw Street (which Officer Horn described as an area known for drug activity) when he saw several individuals (including the petitioner Anthony Charles Thomas) standing in front of a house. No one had made any complaints about Thomas, and it was not uncommon for people in the area to congregate in front of houses. Officer Horn noticed that Thomas was moving something around in his mouth. Although Officer Horn admitted that Thomas could have had candy, chewing gum, a breath mint, or a cough drop in his mouth, Officer Horn believed that Thomas might be concealing crack cocaine in his mouth, so Officer Horn approached Thomas and began questioning him. Thomas attempted to walk away and refused to answer the questions Officer Horn asked. Officer Horn placed his hands on Thomas and asked him to stop and then to open his mouth. I do not believe that Officer Horn had justification to detain Thomas, and I would hold that any evidence gained as a result of that wrongful detention should, upon proper motion, be suppressed. It was not; therefore, I would reverse the conviction. See *Ex parte Tucker,*667 So.2d 1339 (Ala.1995).

JOHNSTONE, J., concurs.
Stephanie T. TREJO v. NC DEPARTMENT OF STATE TREASURER RETIREMENT SYSTEMS DIVISION

No. 420P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 9, 2018.

Ms. Susannah P. Holloway, Assistant Attorney General, Ms. M. A. Kelly Chambers, Special Deputy Attorney General, Mr. James W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General, for NC Department of State Treasurer Retirement Systems Division

Mr. Branch W. Vincent, III, Southern Shores, Mr. John R. Taylor, Mr. Robert E. Zaytoun, Mr. Matthew D. Ballew, Raleigh, Attorneys at Law, for Trejo, Stephanie T.

Mr. M. Jackson Nichols, Attorney at Law, Raleigh, for State Employees Association of North Carolina, Inc.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Petitioner on the 12th of December 2017 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question filed by the Respondent, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 12th of December 2017 by Petitioner in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Petitioner on the 22nd of January 2018 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 9th of May 2018."
NORTON et al. v. UNITED HEALTH SERVICES OF GEORGIA, INC. et al.

A15A2268

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

November 6, 2017

McHugh Fuller Law Group, D. Bryant Chaffin, A. Lance Reins, for appellants.

Arnall Golden Gregory, Jason E. Bring, J. Ryan Hood, Tyler L. Arnold, for appellees.

Doyle, Judge.

In *United Health Svcs. of Ga., Inc. v. Norton*,1 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed this Court's opinion in *Norton v. United Health Svcs. of Ga., Inc.*2 Accordingly, we vacate our prior opinion, and we adopt the opinion of the Supreme Court. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Reese and Self, JJ., concur

1

300 Ga. 736, 797 S.E.2d 825 (2017).

2

336 Ga.App. 51, 783 S.E.2d 437 (2016).
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE ANNUAL
REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                        4716
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                        5406
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                              5489
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                 0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 35,729
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      36,095
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        35,729
<LOANS>                                    287,611
<ALLOWANCE>                                  (1716)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             392,765
<DEPOSITS>                                 233,203
<SHORT-TERM>                                48,261
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          2,912
<LONG-TERM>                                 54,341
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                        26
<OTHER-SE>                                  54,022
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             392,765
<INTEREST-LOAN>                             18,437
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            5,159
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               564
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            24,160
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           9,260
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           4,523
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                       10,377
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  399
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                             234
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              8,759
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,769
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,062
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  .47
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  .47
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                3.26
<LOANS-NON>                                  2,099
<LOANS-PAST>                                 2,044
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                 0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                809
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                              (774)
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                   34
<RECOVERIES>                                     0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                           (1,716)
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                        (1,716)
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                              0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          0


</TABLE>
STATE of North Carolina v. Kevin Lyndell DAVIS

No. COA17-385

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: March 6, 2018

NO ERROR.
#### Wilfred PARKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D03-1496.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 5, 2003.

Wilfred Parker, Blountstown, pro se.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Ap-pellee.

SHARP, W., J.

Parker appeals from the summary denial of his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Although two of the grounds asserted to establish ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit, we find his allegation that defense counsel failed to advise him of the maximum sentence, which resulted in his rejection of a plea offer of seven years, is sufficient to require a hearing below. *See Cottle v. State,*733 So.2d 963 (Fla.1999); *Young v. State,*608 So.2d 111 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). The attachments to the order denying relief indicate Parker was aware of the maximum penalty at the time of his plea, but they do not refute his claim that he was not advised of the maximum penalty at the time he rejected the earlier *603plea offer of seven years. *See Lewis v. State,*751 So.2d 715 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying relief and remand for the court to either attach portions of the record refuting the claim that Parker was not advised of the maximum sentence at the time he rejected a favorable plea offer, or to hold an evidentiary hearing on that issue.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SAWAYA C.J., and PALMER, J., concur.
#### Hindy Eshel et al., Appellants, v Fleet Bank et al., Defendants, and Sterling National Bank, Respondent.

[718 NYS2d 825]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles Ramos, J.), entered on or about July 25, 2000, which, in an action for fraud and misappropriation of investment monies, granted defendant-respondent’s motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ attorneys, unanimously affirmed, without costs, for the reasons stated in *Bassman v Blackstone Assocs.*(279 AD2d 280 [decided herewith]). Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Nardelli, Andrias, Ellerin and Lerner, JJ.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS **AUOTIN**

Honorable B. Jay Jackson County Attorney Somervsll Cotlnty Glen Rose, Texas Dear Sir:

Ne are in receip 1939, in which you submit department for an opinion

tomake of the stribution
into the

of the County, ena the County Aveilw if this is legal. x-Officio County SuThis was clonefrom would like to know if this

habitant of the State between the age.? of 21 and 60 yeare shallbe set apart annually for thebenefit of thepublic free schools. Thismoney becomes e part of the State Available School Fund. Article 2823, Revised Civil Statutes or 1925. Article 7046,Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, provides as follows:Honorable B. Jay Jackson,Page 2

"There shallbe every person between residentwithin this January of each year of $1.50, one dollar levied and collected from the ages of 21 and 60 years, stztz on the first day of

an annual poll tax for tie benefit of the free schools, and fifty cents for general revenue purposes. Said tax shallbe collected .andaccounted for by the tax collector each year and appropriated as herein required. No county shall levymore than twenty-five cent poll tax for county purposes. * * *" The statutesand Constitution relating to the disposition and division of the poll tax make a well-defined distinction between thatpart of the tax which shallbe.used for free school 'purposes,and the portion to be used for general purposes. In authorizing the levy of the county poll tax of twenty-five cents,no provision ismade that such tax shouldbe apportioned or divided between the schools and the county, but on the other hand, the statuteprovides that such tax shall be for "county purposes". By designating that the countypoll tax shouldbe levied for county purposes, itwas evidently intended that themoney thus received shouldbe used for general countypurposes, and is properly credited to the general fund of the county. If it had been intended to apportion the twenty-five cent countypoll tax between general countypurposes and free sohoolpurposes, the Legislature,would no doubt have specifically so provided.

It is our opinion that the twenty-fivecent poll tax authorizedto be levied and collected for county purposes should be paid into thegeneral fund of the county, and that no portion of it shouldbelpaid into the county available school fund.

We await your brief on your second questionas requested in our letter of October 25, 1939. Yours very truly ATTORNEY GENERALOF TEXAS

BY Cecil C. Cammack

Assistant CCC:LW APPROVED DEC 1, 1939 (a)Gerald C. Kann AlTORNEYClWERAL OF TZSXAS APPROVED opinion committee By BWB chairmen