### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00663- CR

K e nne th Le e G e st , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BASTRO P COUNTY , 21ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 10,853 , HO NORAB LE REVA TOW SLEE CORB ETT, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Ke nneth L ee Gest was indi cted for pos session of a controlled substance , methamphetamine, w ith intent to deliver, in an amount of 200 g rams or mo re but less than 400 g rams. See Tex
. He al t h & S afe ty Code Ann. §§ 481.102(6) , .112(a) , (e) (West 2003). Gest pled g uilty without a plea ba

rg ain. The d i s t ri ct co urt ac cepte d Gest’s plea and asse ssed punishment at thirty -five y ear s’ conf

inement. I n his sole issue on appea l, Gest contends t h at h i s trial counsel rende red ine ffe ctive assistanc e. We will affir m the conviction.T h e r e c o r d o f th e s e n te n c in g h e ar in g s h o w s th a t G e s t a ls o id e n ti f ie d th is p erson a s 1 “B uelah” L a F ranc e. 2 BACK GR OUND At his sentencing hear ing, G est testified that, on the e vening o f h i s ar rest, he had
a g re e d to c ut s ome tr e e s o n E ula L a F ra nc e ’s pr op e rt

y . A c c or din g to G e st, L a F ra nc e ha d a g re e d to 1 g ive Ge st a

ri de to h e r p ro pe rt

y be c a us e Ge st d id n ot h a ve a dr ive r’ s lic e ns e . Ge st s ta te d th a t he fe ll aslee p while en r oute and that, while he wa s asleep, L aF ranc e instead dr ove to downtown B astrop and par ked outside a c lot h i ng resa le shop. Gest aw oke to find himself in the ca r alone and wa s
arr ested a fter police office rs found methamphetamine and materials for manuf actur ing methamphetamine in the tr unk of the c ar. A g r an d j u r

y i n d i c t e d G e s t f

o r kn o w i n g l y p o s s e s s i n g a c o n tr o l l e d s u b s t an c e wi th intent to deliver, a f

irst deg ree felony . Gest pled guilty to the offe nse. B efor e ac ceptinghis plea, the court a dmonished Gest that he could “possibly g o to jail for not less than five nor more than 99 y ear s or life.” The c ourt asked G est whethe r he unde rstood ever y thing in the plea

documents, had sig ned them “fr eely

and voluntarily ,” and w as plea ding guilty “bec ause y ou are g uilty

and for no other
rea son.” The c ourt also inquired whe ther Ge st was satisfied with the represe ntation that his counsel had g iven him. Gest answe red e ach of these que stions in t he af

firmative. During the punishment phase of the proc eeding s, Gest’s counsel made the following op e nin g state me nt:3

We d on ’t and ne ve r have a dmi tte d to the ide a that he ’s the ow ne r o f t his me th l a

b in the ve hic le in wh ic h it wa s fo un d, and that’ s the te sti mony that w e wo uld

pr e se nt t o thi s c ourt , th a t th is i s n ot [G e st’ s] r e sp on sib ili ty a lth ou g h he has a dmi tte d guil t to being prese nt at the time.
Gest testified that he lacke d any knowledg e of the m eth l ab in the t runk of L aF ranc e’s vehicle. B ut upon cross-e x amination he admitted telling an offi cer at the sce ne that he ha d seen a wooden box in which t he lab was discovered and “didn’t ask her what was in the box but I had an ide a of w hat it was, Ihad see n her c ook meth befor e.” G est filed a motion for ne w t ri al that was de nied by operation of law. This appe al followed.
DI SCU SSIO N

I n his sole issue on appea l, G est contends that his tria l counsel provided ine ffe ctive assistance by

“allowing ” him to enter a g uilty plea a nd then “a rg u[i ng ] t o the cour

t that Gest was not g uil ty duri ngthe punis hme nt p ha se ” of tr ia l.
Stand ard of review

We apply the Strickland test to claims of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel under the Si xth A mendment. See Strick land v. W

ashington , 4 66 U. S. 6 68 , 6 87 (1 98 4) ; see also Hill v. Loc k ha rt , 474 U.S. 52, 58 (U.S. 1985) ( Strickland test applies to challeng es to g uilty pleas ba sed on ineffe ct i v e assist ance of counse l); He rn an de z v . S tat e , 988 S.W .2d 770, 771-72 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999). To pre vail on such a c laim, appellant must show that his counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient and fe ll below an objec tive standard of rea sonablene ss and that his counsel’s de ficient pe rfor mance prejudice d his defense
. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 68 8 , 691. Prejudice is shown by proving that the4

result of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent but for counsel’s de ficient pe rfor mance . Id . at 69 4; Ex parte Lemk

e , 13 S.W .3d 791, 796 (Tex. Crim
. Ap p . 2000). We must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. Se e J ac k so n v . S tat e , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To over come this presumption,
any a lle g a tio n o f ineff

ect iven e ss m

us t be fi rm ly

fo un de d in

the re c or d a

nd the re c or d mu st aff irmatively

demonstrate the all e g ed inef fec tiveness. Ma lle tt v . S

tat e , 6 5 S. W.3 d 5 9, 63 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2001). I n this case , Gest m ust prove that he would not have ple d g uilty but for his counsel’ s perf ormanc e, and f

ind support in the rec ord for this assertion. See E

x parte Moody , 991 S.W .2d 856, 857-58 (Te x . Crim. App. 1999).
Ineff ect ive assistance of counsel Ge st does not claim specific ally that his counsel’s advic e re ndere d his guilty plea either involuntary

or unknowing
. See E

x parte Adams , 707 S.W .2d 646, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (attac k o n g u il ty p le a b a s e d o n g r o u n d o f in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e o f c o u n s e l r e qu ir e s s h o w in g that g uil ty ple a wa s unk no wi ng ly and inv olu nt a r i l y e nt e r e d ) ; se e als o Co le v . S tat e , N o. 03 -0 4- 00 06 7- CR, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 11218, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Austin, Dec . 16, 2004, no pet.) (not de signated fo r p u b l i ca t i o n ). Be fo re ac ce p t i n g a gu i l t y p l ea , a c o u rt m u s t ad m o n i s h t h e d ef en d an to f t h e r an ge of the punis hme nt atta c he d to the of fe ns e , a nd it mus t a

pp e ar t hat th e defe nd ant i s me nta lly competent a

nd that the plea is fr ee a

nd voluntary
. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc . Ann. ar t. 26.13(a)- (b) (West Supp. 2003). By

admonishing a defe ndant in substantial compliance with a rticle 26.13 a

nd assessing a punis hment that is within both the actual and st ated rang e of punishment, a court make s
a p r im a f a c ie s h o w in g th a t th e d e f e n d an t’ s g u il ty p le a is kn o w in g an d v o lu ntary
. See Eatmon v.5

Sta te , 768 S.W .2d 310, 311-12 (Te x . Crim. App. 1989). I n this case, the r ecor d shows that the cour t admonished Ge st in accor dance with article 26.13, wh i ch co n s titutes a prima fa cie showingthat Gest’s plea was knowingand voluntary . This presumption is also consistent with Gest’s testimony t h a th i s p l e a

w a s kn o w i n g an d

v o l u n t ar y. We construe Ge st’s assertion that his “[t] rial counsel allowed her uneducated client to enter a g u il ty p le a an d th e nar g u e d

to th e c o u rt t

h a t h e w a s n o t gu il ty

d u r in g th e p u n is h ment phase” as cla iming that his g uilty plea wa s based upon his counsel’s errone ous advice . A g uilty plea is not voluntary or knowing when the defendant based i t upon the er roneous a dvice of

counsel. Ex pa rteBa ttl e , 8 17 S.W. 2d 81 , 83 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ). Ge st h a s n ot p ro pe rl y br ie fe d th is argument beca

use he h as not aff

irmatively

demonstrated, f

rom the re cord, that he would not have pled g uilty

and would have insisted on procee ding to tria l if he had been pr operly advised. See E

x parte Moody , 9 91 S.W. 2d a t 85 8. Th e fa c t tha t Ge st de nie d his g uil t dur ingthe se nte nc ingph a se is not nece ssarily

inconsistent with his m aking a knowingand volu n tary g uilty plea. Se e Ex

pa rte Tuley , 109 S.W .3d 388, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (dec ision to plead guilty may be influenc ed by f a c t o r s t h a th a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h d e f e n d an t ’ s g u i l t )
. T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o tr e f

l e c tt h e a d v i c e , i f

a n y, that G e st’ s c ouns e l pr ov ide d b e fo re he e nte re d h is guil ty ple a . T he on ly

re fe re nc e in t

he re c or d to the c on du c t of

Ge st’ s c ouns e l is Ges t’ s te sti mony that he wa s satis fi e d w iththe re pr e se ntatio n h is counsel ha d g iven to him. Thus, Gest cannot overc ome t he presumption that his counsel’s c onduct fell within the wide ra

ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance. Se e Ma lle tt , 65 S.W .3d at 6 3; Jack son , 8 77 S.W. 2d

a t 77 1; se e als o Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 9 S.W .3d 808, 813-14 (Te x . Crim. App.6

1999) (r ecog nizi ng that, in most i nstance s, the rec ord on direc t a ppeal is under develope d and ca nnot adequately

ref lect counse l’s shortcoming s). We overr ule Gest’s sole issue.
CO NC LU SION Be cause Gest has not af

fi rm at i v el y

d em o n s t ra t edt h at h i s t ri al co u n s el was ine ffe ctive,
we a ffirm his conviction.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Jul y

7, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh