[Cite as State v. Raines, 2024-Ohio-3236.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

GALLIA COUNTY

State of Ohio, : Case Nos. 23CA14

 23CA15

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

DECISION AND 

v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

James E. Raines, :

Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 8/19/2024

______________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Christopher Pagan, Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., Middletown, Ohio, for appellant.

Jason Holdren, Gallia County Prosecutor, and Isaac Beller, Gallia County Assistant 

Prosecutor, Gallipolis, Ohio, for appellee.

______________________________________________________________________

Hess, J.

{¶1} In consolidated appeals, James E. Raines appeals from judgments of the 

Gallia County Court of Common Pleas in two cases convicting him, following guilty pleas,

of three counts of violating a protection order and one count of arson. Raines presents 

three assignments of error asserting that: (1) his conviction was unconstitutional because 

he received ineffective assistance at the plea hearing; (2) his conviction was 

unconstitutional under due process because his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or 

voluntary; and (3) the trial court imposed an unlawful sentence. For the reasons which 

follow, we overrule the assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 2

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} On February 15, 2023, the Gallia County grand jury indicted Raines in Case 

No. 23 CR 27 on three counts of violating a protection order (“VPO”) in violation of R.C. 

2919.27(A)(2), fifth-degree felonies. Each count alleged Raines recklessly violated the 

terms of a protection order issued pursuant to R.C. 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214. The 

offenses allegedly occurred on or about December 21, 2022, December 28, 2022, and 

January 11, 2023. Raines pleaded not guilty. The State filed discovery request responses 

indicating it gave defense counsel a copy of a protection order file stamped December 

21, 2022, and a copy of a DVD-R of Raines’ jail calls, but the order and DVD-R were not 

filed with the responses. 

{¶3} On April 13, 2023, the grand jury indicted Raines in Case No. 23 CR 68 on

one count of arson in violation of R.C. 2909.03(A)(1) and (D)(2)(b), a fourth-degree felony. 

The offense allegedly occurred on or about February 24, 2023. The victim of the arson

was the mother of the individual protected under the protection order. Raines pleaded 

not guilty. 

{¶4} In May 2023, Raines changed his pleas to guilty in both cases. At the 

change of plea hearing, the assistant prosecutor explained that the parties had reached 

a “global resolution” and recited the terms of their agreement.1 In Case No. 23 CR 27, 

Raines would plead guilty to the three VPO counts, which would not merge because they 

happened on different dates. In Case No. 23 CR 68, Raines would plead guilty to the 

arson count. Raines agreed that costs would be assessed against him. In exchange, the 

State would dismiss two other cases at sentencing and consider resolved “all charges, 

1 The transcript indicates the trial court recited the terms, but this appears to be a typographical error as 

the statements are preceded by the court’s request for the assistant prosecutor to recite them.
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 3

even unindicted ones pertaining to [the] two victims.” The State also agreed to not oppose 

a bond reduction to allow Raines to go to the Phoenix Center prior to sentencing and to 

not make “a specific recommendation as to what the Court should impose at sentencing,” 

though the victims would be able to “speak freely.” 

{¶5} The trial court asked defense counsel whether he informed Raines of the 

elements of the offenses and talked to him about any available defenses. Defense 

counsel stated that he had. The trial court asked Raines if he acknowledged defense 

counsel informed and advised him of those things, and Raines said, “Yes.” The court 

asked Raines if he understood the allegations, and Raines said, “Yes.” The court asked 

Raines if he had any questions about the elements of the offenses, and Raines said, “No.” 

Defense counsel and the assistant prosecutor told the court there was a stipulation that 

there was a factual basis for each element of the charges. The court asked Raines if he 

understood defense counsel was stipulating that there were facts the State would be able 

to rely upon to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the 

charges. Raines said, “Yes.” The court asked Raines to explain what he did to violate 

the law with respect to each count. With respect to the VPO counts, Raines told the court 

that he “[m]ade contact,” indicated he knew there was a protection order, and 

acknowledged having a prior conviction for violating a protection order. 

{¶6} Raines executed guilty plea forms in both cases in which he indicated that 

he understood the nature of the charges and his possible defenses. While reviewing the 

form regarding the VPO charges with Raines, the court noted one page said, “I 

understand the nature of these charges.” The court asked, “Is that true?” Raines said, 

“Yes.” The court said, “And it says I understand the possible defenses I might have, is 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 4

that also true.” Raines said, “Yes.” The court said, “Okay. So I don’t know a whole lot 

about your cases so I have to rely upon [defense counsel] to talk with you about possible 

defenses. Do you believe that you and [defense counsel] have explored all possible 

defenses?” Raines said, “Yes.” 

{¶7} The court found the guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, 

accepted them, and found Raines guilty. The court granted Raines’ unopposed motion 

for a bond reduction to enter the Phoenix Center for treatment. The court also ordered a 

presentence investigation. The report from that investigation indicates Raines has a 

lengthy criminal history, which includes a 2005 conviction for VPO under R.C. 2919.27. 

{¶8} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel told the court the VPO offenses

were in the form of uh, phone calls from the jail while Mr. Raines was uh, 

being held down there as part of a sentence uh, and Mr. Raines admits that 

each of these was a violation of an active protection order at the time uh, 

but I’d like to give a little context about the nature of the violations. Uh, Mr. 

Raines and [the protected person] had a newborn child at the time. Uh, [the 

protected person’s] phone number was blocked from Mr. Raines[’] account 

as he was you know, in jail uh, she was the victim, she had the protection 

order against him. Uh, [the protected person] called the jail uh, called Mr. 

Raines and gave an alternate number that was not blocked uh, so that he 

could call her on an unblocked number. She also initiated uh, video calls to 

Mr. Raines while he was in the jail. Again, this is not to excuse his behavior, 

he acknowledges that the protection order prohibits that and he is in 

violation of the law by doing that uh, but these were not threatening calls. 

These were not him trying to intimidate her. Um, chasing her down. She 

reached out to him, he called the number she gave, they talked about their 

newborn child. They talked about when he got of jail when he would be 

able to see the child. Uh, they, they discussed plans like that. You know, 

this is not a case of Mr. Raines stalking, harassing, intimidating someone 

putting them in fear.

Counsel asked the court to place Raines on community control. 

{¶9} In Case No. 23 CR 27, the trial court sentenced Raines to 12 months in 

prison on each VPO count. In Case No. 23 CR 68, the court sentenced Raines to 18 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 5

months in prison on the arson count. The court ordered that the sentences in Case No. 

23 CR 27 be served consecutively to each other and the sentence in Case No. 23 CR 68, 

for an aggregate prison term of 54 months. The court ordered that Raines receive 77 

days of jail-time credit as to only Count One in Case No. 23 CR 27. 

{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: 

Under the circumstances with your prior record and the deliberateness of 

the arson uh, charge I am going to find consecutive sentences are 

necessary uh, to protect the public from future crime and to punish the 

offender. Find they are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the 

conduct or to the danger the offender poses to the public. Um, I also didn’t 

mention but you’ve got three separate violation of protection order charges 

in addition to the uh, record that you have concerning uh, violence. Um, so 

I am going to find that these um, the arson was committed while you were 

bond [sic] and awaiting trial. I find that at least two of these offenses were 

part of one or more course of conduct. The harm caused was so great or 

unusual no single term adequately reflects the seriousness of the conduct. 

And your history of criminal conduct * * * demonstrates consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime.

At the end of the hearing, the court noted that

if a Judge tells you, you cannot contact somebody you have to abide by 

that. I don’t care, you know, we always give you, when we put those on um, 

they caution that the person who’s protected cannot give you permission to 

violate the order, it’s a Judge’s order. And so that’s where we are on this.

{¶11} In the sentencing entries in both cases, the court found that “consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the 

offender,” that “[c]onsecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct nor are they disproportionate to the danger the offender poses to the 

public,” that “these offenses were committed while Defendant was awaiting trial,” that “the 

Defendant’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates the necessity of consecutive 

sentences to protect the public from future crime,” and that “at least two of these offenses 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 6

were part of one or more course of conduct and the harm caused was so great or unusual 

that no single term adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.” 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶12} Raines presents three assignments of error:

Assignment of Error No. I: Raines’ conviction was unconstitutional 

because he received ineffective assistance * * * at the plea hearing.

Assignment of Error No. II: Raines’ conviction was unconstitutional under 

Due Process because his plea was not knowing, intelligent, nor voluntary.

Assignment of Error No. III: The trial court imposed an unlawful sentence

III. JUDICIAL NOTICE

{¶13} Raines moved us to take judicial notice of documents from the Gallipolis 

Municipal Court case in which the protection order underlying the charges in Case No. 23

CR 27 was issued, and we granted the motion. The first document is a printout of docket

entries which indicates that the case was filed on December 19, 2022, and the 

arraignment hearing was scheduled for December 21, 2022. The docket indicates that 

on December 21, 2022, the defendant entered a not guilty plea and was served with a 

“TPO.” On January 12, 2023, the defendant pleaded guilty, and the court found the 

defendant guilty and imposed a sentence. On January 17, 2023, the sheriff returned the 

“TPO.” The next document is a complaint with a file stamp of December 19, 2022, which 

indicates Raines was charged with one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 

2919.25(C), a fourth-degree misdemeanor. 

{¶14} The next set of documents include a protection order, warnings concerning 

it, and a notice to the defendant about its existence. The protection order has a file stamp 

of December 21, 2022, and indicates it is a domestic violence temporary protection order 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 7

(“DVTPO”) under R.C. 2919.26. The first page of the order includes two lines of text, “Ex 

Parte DVTPO Granted” and “DVTPO Granted,” which are each preceded by a box and 

followed by a space for the insertion of the date. The box in front of “Ex Parte DVTPO 

Granted” is not marked, and no date was inserted after the text. The box in front “DVTPO 

Granted” is marked, and the date 12/21/2022 was inserted following the text. The first 

page also includes a finding by the court that “the Defendant was provided with 

reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard within the time required by Ohio law.” 

{¶15} The second page states in part: “This matter came before the Court on 

_12_/ 21_/ 2022 for an,” followed by two options which each have a box in front of them. 

The box in front of the first option, which states, “Ex Parte DVTPO,” is not marked. The 

box in front of the second option, which states, “DVTPO hearing on Alleged Victim’s 

Motion for a Domestic Violence Temporary Protection Order,” followed by additional 

information, is marked. The fourth page includes a line stating, “THIS IS ISSUED ON 

THE COURT’S ORDER AFTER THE VICTIM’S REQUEST + DOES NOT REQUIRE A 

WAIVER/CONSENT.” 

{¶16} The fifth page states, “IT IS SO ORDERED,” followed by signature and date 

lines. There are lines for a magistrate and judge to sign and indicate the date for an “EX 

PARTE DVTPO.” These lines are blank. There are also lines for a magistrate and judge 

to sign and indicate the date for a “DVTPO.” The lines for the magistrate are blank. The 

lines for the judge contain a signature and contain the date “12-21-2022.” The page 

includes a warning that the protected person cannot give the defendant legal permission 

to change or violate the terms of the order. There is a section for the court to schedule a 

hearing on the order, which is blank. There is also a place for the defendant to sign and 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 8

date to acknowledge service of the protection order. The line for the defendant’s 

signature states, “REFUSED TO SIGN,” and the date line states, “12-21-2022.” The 

bottom of the page has a waiver of hearing section in which the defendant can waive the 

right to a hearing on a motion for a domestic violence temporary protection order and 

agree to be bound by the terms of the protection order. This section includes lines for the 

defendant’s signature and date. The signature line states, “N/A – ISSUED BY COURT –

12/21/2022,” and the date line appears to contain the judge’s signature. 

{¶17} The notice about the existence of the order indicates that on December 21, 

2022, an officer notified Raines of the protection order, and he refused to sign an 

acknowledgment of notice. The warnings concerning the order include this statement: 

Only the Court may change the terms of this Protection Order. The 

Petitioner/Alleged Victim/Protected Person cannot give you legal 

permission to change this Order. * * * Only the Court may change or end 

this Protection Order. Unless the Court changes or ends this Order, you 

may be arrested for violating this Protection Order. YOU ACT AT YOUR 

OWN RISK IF YOU DISREGARD THIS WARNING.

{¶18} The next document indicates that on January 12, 2023, Raines entered a 

guilty plea, and the court found him guilty and sentenced him. The final document is a 

letter from the deputy clerk to the sheriff’s department requesting the return of the 

temporary protection order as the case “has been disposed.”

IV. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT

{¶19} In his reply to the State’s response to his motion for judicial notice, Raines 

moved us to supplement the record with the transcripts from the municipal court 

proceedings. We did not specifically resolve this motion when we granted the motion for 

judicial notice. However, “[a] reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, 

which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 9

basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of 

the syllabus. Therefore, we deny the motion to supplement.

V. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶20} In the first assignment of error, Raines contends that his “conviction was

unconstitutional because he received ineffective assistance * * * at the plea hearing.” He

asserts that “[f]or reasonable performance, trial counsel must understand the factual basis

for a charge” and “know the available defenses.” Raines claims his “[t]rial counsel failed

to know 2 critical features” of his case—"he was indicted under the wrong VPO division;

and, if properly charged, he had a complete defense.” He asserts the municipal court

issued a DVTPO under R.C. 2919.26 on the protected person’s oral request. Raines

claims he was later indicted under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) for violating the DVTPO by calling

the protected person three times at her request, but that provision “does not criminalize

violating a DVTPO.” 

{¶21} Raines acknowledges R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) criminalizes violating a DVTPO

but asserts that even if he had been charged under that provision, “he had a complete

defense.” Raines does not dispute that he violated the DVTPO on three occasions. 

Instead, he claims “the municipal court failed to hold a hearing on the DVTPO under R.C.

2919.26(D) to comply with Due Process,” rendering the DVTPO “invalid” under State v.

Finley, 2001-Ohio-4347 (1st Dist. 2001). Raines asserts that he “was prejudiced by trial

counsel’s deficient performance” because he “had defenses” and “there was no plea

bargain where [he] waived his defenses for a better result. Instead, he pleaded to the

VPO indictment as charged.” He claims that “[w]ith reasonable advice, there is a
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 10

reasonable probability [he] would have rejected his plea to the indictment and proceeded

to trial on his complete defenses.” 

A. Legal Principles

{¶22} “The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I,

Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, provide that defendants in all criminal proceedings

shall have the assistance of counsel for their defense.” State v. Howard, 2024-Ohio1409, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.). The United States Supreme Court “has recognized that ‘the right

to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14

(1970). “Upon direct appeal, appellate courts generally review claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel on a de novo basis, simply because the issue originates at the

appellate level; no trial court has ruled on the issue. Appellate courts review the trial

record and are left to judge from the bare record whether the assistance was effective.” 

State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 53. 

{¶23} “[A] guilty plea generally waives a defendant’s right to claim that counsel’s 

ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant, except to the extent that the ineffective

assistance of counsel caused the defendant’s plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary.” State v. Bell, 2024-Ohio-1502, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 

2014-Ohio-3415, ¶ 11-12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269, 272 

(1992), citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “[T]he two-part Strickland

v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance 

of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Under Strickland, the defendant

must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, i.e., counsel’s representation fell
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 11

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the defense, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors,

the proceeding’s result would have been different. Strickland at 687-688, 694. “[W]hen

a defendant claims that his counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by

causing him to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a

‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he [or she] would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357,

364-365 (2017), quoting Hill at 59. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland at 694.

B. Was Raines Charged Under the Correct Provision?

{¶24} Raines was not charged under the correct Revised Code provision in Case

No. 23 CR 27. R.C. 2919.27(A) states:

No person shall recklessly violate the terms of any of the following:

(1) A protection order issued or consent agreement approved pursuant 

to section 2919.26 or 3113.31 of the Revised Code;

(2) A protection order issued pursuant to section 2151.34, 2903.213, 

or 2903.214 of the Revised Code;

* * *

Raines was indicted on three VPO counts under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), which only applies

to protection orders issued pursuant to R.C. 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214. However,

the municipal court issued the DVTPO which formed the basis for the charges under R.C.

2919.26. Therefore, Raines should have been charged with three VPO counts under

R.C. 2919.27(A)(1), not R.C. 2919.27(A)(2).
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 12

{¶25} The State concedes that Raines was “indicted under the wrong charging

theory” but then suggests it is significant that the indictment referenced R.C. 2903.213.

R.C. 2903.213 governs the issuance of a protection order as a condition of pretrial release 

when the defendant is charged with a specified offense, unless it “involves a person who 

is a family or household member as defined in section 2919.25 of the Revised Code.” 

R.C. 2903.213(A). The State highlights the fact that R.C. 2903.213(A) states, “If the

complaint or indictment involves a person who is a family or household member, the

complainant, the alleged victim, or the family or household member may file a motion for

a temporary protection order pursuant to section 2919.26 of the Revised Code.” Based

on this language, the State asserts that “the protection order issued against [Raines]

under [R.C.] 2919.26 stemmed from [R.C.] 2903.213(A) * * * .” 

{¶26} The DVTPO did not “stem from” R.C. 2903.213(A). R.C. 2903.213 does not

apply to complaints alleging domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, like the one

filed against Raines in the municipal court. R.C. 2903.213 specifically excludes from its

provisions complaints or indictments involving family or household members as defined

in R.C. 2919.25. An essential element of domestic violence is the victim’s status as a

family or household member. R.C. 2919.25(A)-(C). The fact that R.C. 2903.213(A) crossreferences R.C. 2919.26 to aid readers in locating a provision under which family or

household members can seek a temporary protection order does not somehow turn a

temporary protection order issued under R.C. 2919.26 into one that “stems from” or was

issued pursuant to R.C. 2903.213.

C. Does Raines have a Complete Defense under the Correct Provision?
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 13

{¶27} Raines has not shown that he has a complete defense under the correct

Revised Code provision. At the time the municipal court issued the DVTPO, R.C.

2919.26(A)(1) (effective April 8, 2019), stated: 

Upon the filing of a complaint that alleges * * * any offense of violence if the 

alleged victim of the offense was a family or household member at the time 

of the commission of the offense, * * * the alleged victim, * * * may file, * * * 

a motion that requests the issuance of a temporary protection order as a 

pretrial condition of release of the alleged offender * * *. The motion shall 

be filed with the clerk of the court that has jurisdiction of the case at any 

time after the filing of the complaint.

R.C. 2919.26(C)(1) stated: “As soon as possible after the filing of a motion that requests

the issuance of a temporary protection order, but not later than twenty-four hours after

the filing of the motion, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether to issue

the order.” R.C. 2919.26(C)(1). Alternatively, under R.C. 2919.26(D)(1), the court could

“upon its own motion,” “issue a temporary protection order as a pretrial condition of 

release” if it found “that the safety and protection of the * * * alleged victim, * * * may be 

impaired by the continued presence of the alleged offender.” R.C. 2919.26(D)(2) 

provided that if the court issued “a temporary protection order under this section as an ex 

parte order,” it had to “conduct, as soon as possible after the issuance of the order, a

hearing in the presence of the alleged offender,” under the standards set forth in R.C.

2919.26(C), “not later than the next day on which the court is scheduled to conduct

business after the day on which the alleged offender was arrested or at the time of the

appearance of the alleged offender pursuant to summons to determine whether the order

should remain in effect, be modified, or be revoked.”

2

2 The current versions of the quoted provisions in R.C. 2919.26 are the same or similar to those in effect 

when the municipal court issued the DVTPO at issue.
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 14

{¶28} Raines suggests that because the protected person made an oral, rather

than a written motion for a protection order, we should treat the DVTPO as being issued

by the trial court on its own motion under R.C. 2919.26(D)(1). He suggests the court

issued the order ex parte, so it had to then conduct a hearing under R.C. 2919.26(D)(2).

He claims the court did not do so, so the DVTPO is invalid under Finley. 

{¶29} In Finley, the defendant was charged with VPO under R.C. 2919.27. Finley,

2001-Ohio-4347, at ¶ 1 (1st Dist.). “The order had been granted without a hearing as a

condition of pretrial release in a previous criminal prosecution against [the defendant] for

domestic violence.” Id. The trial court dismissed the VPO charge, holding the temporary

protection order was ineffective because the State failed to establish it was issued in

compliance with the due-process requirements of R.C. 2919.26. Id.

{¶30} The First District Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at ¶ 5. The appellate court

rejected the State’s contention that a defendant may not voluntarily disregard a court

order unless a court has held that the order is invalid. Id. at ¶ 2-3. The appellate court

also rejected the State’s contention that the protection order had been issued pursuant to

R.C. 2919.26(D)(1) and therefore did not invoke the procedural protections of R.C.

2919.26(C). Id. at ¶ 4. The court explained that R.C. 2919.26(D)(2) requires that “if the

court issues the order ex parte, it shall conduct a hearing in the presence of the alleged

offender within a certain amount of time and that the hearing shall be conducted under

the standards set forth under R.C. 2919.26(C).” Id. Because the defendant “never

received a hearing as required by R.C. 2919.26(D),” “the temporary protection order was

therefore ineffective,” and “no rational trier of fact could have concluded that he had

recklessly violated a protection order issued pursuant to that statute.” Id. at ¶ 5. 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 15

{¶31} The State asserts that “there is substantial case law disagreeing with the

logic behind the holding in Finley;” however, we need not express any opinion on Finley. 

Even if we found it persuasive, Raines still has not shown that he has a complete defense

under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) because he has not shown that the municipal court granted the

DVTPO without a hearing. The DVTPO itself indicates that the municipal court did not

issue the order ex parte but rather issued it after a hearing. On the first page of the

DVTPO, the municipal court had the option to indicate whether it was issuing an ex parte

order. The court indicated that on December 21, 2022, it granted a “DVTPO,” not an “Ex

Parte DVTPO.” The court also specifically found that “the Defendant was provided with

reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard within the time required by Ohio law.” The

DVTPO had a place where the court could indicate when and how the matter came before

it. The court indicated that on December 21, 2022, the matter came before it for a

“DVTPO hearing” on the alleged victim’s motion, not as an “Ex Parte DVTPO.” The judge

also signed and dated the lines on the fifth page of the order related to the issuance of a

“DVTPO,” not an “EX PARTE DVTPO.” 

{¶32} Raines suggests the municipal court docket proves the trial court did not

conduct a hearing. It is true that the docket does not indicate that the trial court scheduled

a protection order hearing for December 21, 2022. However, the docket indicates that

the arraignment hearing was scheduled for that date, and on that date, Raines entered a

not guilty plea and was served with the protection order. The protection order indicates

that the victim moved for a protection order and that the court conducted a hearing on the

motion on December 21, 2022. These facts suggest the protected person requested a
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 16

protection order at the arraignment hearing, and the court conducted a hearing on the

request at that time.

{¶33} In one of his appellate filings, Raines asserts the DVTPO was “marked to

show” no hearing occurred because of the language in it indicating it was issued on the

court’s order after the victim’s request, that the order does not require a waiver or consent,

and the notation in the signature line in the waiver of hearing section stating, “N/A –

ISSUED BY COURT – 12/21/2022.” We disagree. The fact that the municipal court 

issued the order on the request of the victim does not prove the court did not conduct a 

hearing. Moreover, it is evident from the DVTPO that the reason the municipal court did 

not need Raines to waive his right to a hearing and consent to the DVTPO is because the 

court issued the DVTPO after a hearing, making a waiver and consent by Raines 

unnecessary. For these reasons, Raines’ contention that he would have a complete

defense if charged under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) is not well-taken.

D. Has Raines Demonstrated Ineffective Assistance of Counsel?

{¶34} Raines’ ineffective-assistance claim is based on defense counsel’s failure

to know and advise Raines that he was indicted under the wrong provision of the VPO

statute and that if properly charged, he had a complete defense. As explained above,

Raines was indicted under the wrong provision of the VPO statute, but Raines has not

shown that he would have a complete defense if charged under the correct provision. 

Moreover, the record does not include Raines’ private communications with defense

counsel. Although Raines told the trial court that defense counsel talked to him about

any defenses that might be available to him, Raines suggests that we can nonetheless
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 17

infer from the record that defense counsel did not know or advise him that he had a

defense to the R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) charges. 

{¶35} But even if we presume that counsel was deficient for failing to know and

advise Raines of the fact that he had been incorrectly charged under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2),

Raines has not shown prejudice. If Raines had insisted on going to trial on the R.C.

2919.27(A)(2) charges, he had a defense to them because that provision does not

criminalize the violation of a protection order issued under R.C. 2919.26. However,

Raines does not assert that an acquittal on the R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) charges would have

precluded the State from prosecuting him under R.C. 2919.27(A)(1). And as explained

above, Raines has not shown that he had a complete defense to charges under R.C.

2919.27(A)(1). Moreover, Raines does not assert that being convicted under R.C.

2919.27(A)(2) instead of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1) has any impact on him. The name of the

offense is the same for a violation of either provision—"violating a protection order.” R.C.

2919.27(B)(1). Both offenses are fifth-degree felonies for someone such as Raines who

has a prior conviction under R.C. 2919.27. R.C. 2919.27(B)(3)(c). And contrary to what

Raines suggests, he benefitted from pleading guilty to the R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) charges. 

In exchange for his guilty pleas in Case Nos. 23 CR 27 and 23 CR 68, two of Raines’

other cases were dismissed at sentencing, and the State considered resolved “all

charges, even unindicted ones pertaining to [the] two victims.” The State also did not 

oppose a bond reduction to allow Raines to go to the Phoenix Center prior to sentencing,

and the State did not make a specific sentencing recommendation to the trial court. 

{¶36} Raines has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled guilty to the VPO offenses and
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 18

would have insisted on going to trial. Therefore, he has not shown that he received

ineffective assistance. We overrule the first assignment of error.

VI. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶37} In the second assignment of error, Raines contends that his “conviction was 

unconstitutional under Due Process because his plea was not knowing, intelligent, nor 

voluntary.” Raines maintains that a plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when it

is based on an erroneous understanding of the applicable law. Raines claims he “was

made to believe by the authorities that he was culpable for 3 violations of R.C.

2919.27(A)(2).” He asserts that the grand jury and prosecutor “made that allegation and

persisted with it throughout the case.” Raines claims his “trial counsel confirmed his

culpability at the plea and sentencing hearings” and “told the court that [he] understood

he had violated a valid protection order by speaking with [the protected person] on the

phone from jail, at [her] request, to discuss their newborn.” Thus, he asserts that “the

totality of the circumstances show that [he] believed he faced criminal liability under [R.C.

2919.27(A)(2)] for violating a valid DVTPO,” and “[t]his belief informed his decision to plea

as charged to the VPO indictment.” Raines claims his “beliefs about his VPO liability were

erroneous,” and he “had complete defenses,” “[s]o his plea was unconstitutional and

cannot be enforced.” 

{¶38} In his reply brief, Raines asserts that he was just “alerted to a binding U.S.

Supreme Court case,” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), which stands for

the proposition that a defendant does not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea when

the defendant, defense counsel, and the trial court did not correctly understand the

essential elements of the crime at the plea hearing. Raines maintains that he “raised a
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 19

knowing-and-voluntary claim in his brief.” He asserts that the grand jury, prosecutor,

defense counsel, and trial court “all mistakenly believed that a violation of a misdemeanor

[DVTPO] stated an offense under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2).” He maintains that “[t]here is now

no dispute it does not,” and “[u]nder Bousley, this shows a Due Process violation because

[his] plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily.” Raines also asserts public policy

favors reversal because “[t]he public must have confidence in the validity of pleas, felony

convictions, and prison sentences,” and “[t]hat is lost when there is no dispute about a

defendant’s legal innocence to the charged offenses for which he is imprisoned.” 

A. Legal Principles

{¶39} “ ‘Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid.’ ” Bell, 2024-Ohio1502, at ¶ 10 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Medina, 2021-Ohio-1727, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). “In

general, when deciding whether to accept a plea a court must determine whether a

defendant enters the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing State

v. McDaniel, 2010-Ohio-5215, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.). “ ‘ “In considering whether a guilty plea was

entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, an appellate court examines the totality of

the circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial court

complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.” ’ ” Id., quoting McDaniel at ¶ 8,

quoting State v. Eckler, 2009-Ohio-7064, ¶ 48 (4th Dist.) (lead opinion). 

{¶40} “ ‘Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court should engage in a dialogue

with the defendant as described in Crim.R. 11(C).’ ” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting McDaniel at ¶ 8. 

“The underlying purpose, from the defendant’s perspective, of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey

to the defendant certain information so that he [or she] can make a voluntary and
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 20

intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480

(1981). “[A]lthough literal compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is preferred, it is not required.” 

State v. Stepp, 2024-Ohio-914, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶

29, citing State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19. “Therefore, an appellate court will

ordinarily affirm a trial court’s acceptance of a guilty plea if the record reveals that the trial

court engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the defendant and explained ‘in a manner

reasonably intelligible to that defendant’ the consequences of pleading guilty.” Id., citing

Ballard at paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶41} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) states:

In felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without

first addressing the defendant personally * * * and doing all of the following:

(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with

understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or

for the imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant

understands the effect of the plea of guilty * * *, and that the court, upon

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.

(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant understands

that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront

witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining

witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the

defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself. 

{¶42} “When a criminal defendant seeks to have [a] conviction reversed on 

appeal, the traditional rule is that [the defendant] must establish that an error occurred in 

the trial-court proceedings and that he [or she] was prejudiced by that error.” State v.

Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 13. However, there are exceptions to the prejudice

component of the rule in the criminal-plea context. Id. at ¶ 14-15. When a trial court fails
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 21

to explain the constitutional rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) that a defendant waives

by pleading guilty or no contest, “we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and

unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required.” Id. at ¶ 14. In addition, “a trial 

court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the 

defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15. “If neither of these 

two exceptions apply, then the defendant is not entitled to have the plea vacated without 

demonstrating prejudice.” State v. Pierce, 2024-Ohio-82, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). “The test for 

prejudice is ‘ “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” ’ ” Pierce at ¶ 13, 

quoting Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

{¶43} “Properly understood, the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the

trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied

fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the

burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the

defendant met that burden?” Dangler at ¶ 17.

B. Analysis

{¶44} In his appellate briefs, Raines does not specifically contend that the trial

court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C). However, one might glean a contention that

the court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that the court determine

that the defendant is making the plea with understanding of the nature of the charges

from Raines’ reliance on Bousley in his reply brief. In that case, the petitioner asserted 

his plea was unintelligent because he was misinformed as to the true nature of the charge. 

Bousley, 523 U.S. at 618-619. The United States Supreme Court explained that it has 

“long held that a plea does not qualify as intelligent unless a criminal defendant first 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 22

receives ‘real notice of the true nature of the charge against [the defendant], the first and 

most universally recognized requirement of due process.’ ” Id. at 618, quoting Smith v. 

O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941). The Court noted there was a presumption the 

petitioner was informed of the nature of the charge against him because he was provided 

with a copy of his indictment prior to pleading guilty. Id. However, the petitioner 

maintained that “his guilty plea was unintelligent because the District Court subsequently 

misinformed him as to the elements of [the] offense.” Id. In other words, he contended 

“that the record reveals that neither he, nor his counsel, nor the court correctly understood 

the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged.” Id. The Court stated, 

“[w]ere this contention proved, petitioner’s plea would be * * * constitutionally invalid.” Id.

at 618-619.

{¶45} Even if Raines’ reply brief challenges the trial court’s compliance with

Crim.R. 11(2)(C)(a), we observe that “[t]he purpose of a reply brief is to afford the 

appellant an opportunity to respond to the appellee’s brief, not to raise an issue for the 

first time. State v. Ross, 2017-Ohio-9400, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.). “ ‘Appellate courts generally 

will not consider a new issue presented for the first time in a reply brief.’ ” Id., 

quoting State v. Spaulding, 2016-Ohio-8126, ¶ 179. In any event, any contention that the 

trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) is meritless. 

{¶46} “In determining whether a defendant understood the charge, a court should 

examine the totality of the circumstances.”  State v. Fitzpatrick, 2004-Ohio-3167, ¶ 56.  

“However, ‘[t]he courts of this state have generally held that a detailed recitation of the 

elements of the charge is not required under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).”  Id. at ¶ 57, quoting 

State v. Swift, 86 Ohio App.3d 407, 412 (11th Dist. 1993).   “Moreover, the Constitution 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 23

does not require that a trial court explain the elements of the charge, at least where the 

record contains a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has 

been explained to the accused.”  Id.   

{¶47} In this case, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Raines 

understood the nature of the VPO charges. The record reflects that Raines received a 

copy of the VPO indictment prior to pleading guilty. At the change of plea hearing, the 

court asked defense counsel whether he had informed Raines of the elements of the 

offenses, defense counsel stated he had, and Raines agreed.  The court asked if Raines 

understood the allegations, and Raines said that he did. The court asked if he had any 

questions regarding the elements of the offenses, and Raines said, “No.” Later, while 

reviewing the guilty plea forms with Raines, the court asked whether it was true that he 

understood the nature of the charges, and Raines said, “Yes.” Unlike the petitioner in 

Bousley, Raines does not allege that the trial court misinformed him of the elements of 

the offenses, nor does our review of the record reflect that the court did so.   In addition, 

we note the record reflects that the trial court complied with the other requirements of 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2).

{¶48} Raines may not have understood that he had a defense to the VPO charges 

under R.C. 2919.27(A)(2) because the relevant protection order was issued pursuant to 

R.C. 2919.26, not R.C. 2151.34, 2903.213, or 2903.214. But “[i]t is well-settled that there 

is no requirement under Crim.R. 11(C)(2) that trial courts apprise defendants of available 

defenses when accepting a change of plea.” State v. Phillips, 2012-Ohio-5950, ¶ 31 (3d 

Dist.). And to the extent Raines implies his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent 

due to defense counsel’s ineffectiveness, as previously explained, Raines has not 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 24

demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 

{¶49} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Raines knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently entered his guilty pleas to the VPO offenses, and we overrule the second

assignment of error.

VII. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶50} In the third assignment of error, Raines contends that the trial court imposed

an unlawful sentence when it imposed consecutive sentences for the VPO offenses and

applied jail-time credit to a single prison term instead of the aggregate sentence. 

A. Consecutive Sentences

{¶51} Raines contends the trial court imposed an unlawful sentence when it 

imposed consecutive sentences for the VPO offenses. Raines asserts the trial court 

“ignored the seriousness of the 3 VPO offenses in its proportionality analysis.” Raines 

maintains that “[t]he seriousness element directs the trial court to the defendant’s conduct 

around the substantive offenses,” that “[i]n most cases, seriousness for consecutive 

sentences is shown by violence and physical harm,” and that “[o]ffenses without violence 

and physical harm are less serious, making consecutive sentences for those offenses

disproportionate to their seriousness.” Raines asserts that the court “observed that [he] 

had a prior record for violence, acted deliberately in the Arson, violated the DVTPO 3 

times, and that the Arson victim was the mother of the VPO victim. That was it.” He

claims the court “ignored [his] conduct around the 3 VPO offenses for seriousness and 

proportionality” and that his conduct was not threatening or violent. Raines contends that 

he “made 3 calls to [the protected person] while incarcerated to discuss their newborn at 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 25

[her] invitation,” and that “[t]he trial court needed to engage these facts for a lawful 

analysis.” The court “never did,” so the “consecutive-sentencing analysis was contrary to 

law.” 

{¶52} Raines also asserts that “[b]y clear and convincing evidence, the record fails 

to show that consecutive VPO sentences were proportionate to the seriousness of [his] 

conduct around the VPO offenses.” He maintains that a VPO offense “is most serious 

when a defendant makes unwanted contact with the protected party and acts with 

violence. That is missing here.” Raines asserts that “[t]he contacts were by phone and 

jail video—not in person,” that they were non-threatening, that the protected person

“consented to the contacts and even facilitated them by providing an unblocked number 

and using jail video,” and that “the contacts were for a reasonable purpose—to care for 

the newborn.” Therefore, he asserts that “the record shows that the VPO conduct was 

clearly not serious,” and characterizing it as such “is demeaning to VPO cases where a 

victim is targeted by a defendant with self-serving desires and acts with threats or 

violence.” He asserts that the trial court “never addressed or engaged the VPO conduct 

in its pronouncement.” Instead, the court used his “violent record, the deliberateness of 

his Arson conduct, and the number of VPO offenses to justify consecutive VPO 

sentences.” But his “past violence and extensive record is probative of other consecutivesentencing factors that [he] does not challenge,” and he “does not challenge his Arson 

conduct and the consecutive sentence imposed for it.” 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 26

1. Standard of Review

{¶53} “R.C. 2953.08(G) instructs appellate courts reviewing the imposition of 

consecutive sentences * * *.” State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 12 (“Jones”). R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2) states:

The court hearing an appeal under [R.C. 2953.08(A), (B), or (C)] shall 

review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or 

modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence 

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand 

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s 

standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this 

division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under 

division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 

2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, 

if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

“R.C. 2953.08(F) requires an appellate court to review the entire trial-court record, 

including any oral or written statements made to or by the trial court at the sentencing 

hearing, and any presentence, psychiatric, or other investigative report that was

submitted to the court in writing before the sentence was imposed. R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) 

through (4).” Jones at ¶ 12.

{¶54} “R.C. 2953.08(G) permits an appellate court to increase, reduce, otherwise 

modify, or vacate a sentence only ‘if it clearly and convincingly finds’ that the record does 

not support the sentencing court’s findings or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to 

law.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 22. 

“The standard to be applied is the standard set forth in the statute: an appellate court has 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 27

the authority to increase, reduce, otherwise modify, or vacate a sentence only after it has 

reviewed the entire trial-court record and ‘clearly and convincingly f[ound] either * * * [t]hat 

the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under [certain statutes]’ or 

‘[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law,’ R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” (Bracketed text in 

original.) Id.

{¶55} Raines did not object to the imposition of consecutive sentences at the 

sentencing hearing and has therefore forfeited all but plain-error review. State v. 

Whitaker, 2022-Ohio-2840, ¶ 166, 171 (defendant who failed to object to imposition of 

consecutive sentences at sentencing hearing forfeited all but plain-error review as to 

contention that when a defendant receives a death sentence, the trial court errs by 

imposing consecutive sentences for noncapital counts because a finding that such

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crimes is nonsensical and 

violates R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)). A party asserting plain error must demonstrate that an 

obvious error occurred and that there is a reasonable probability it resulted in prejudice, 

meaning it affected the outcome of the proceeding. See State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, 

¶ 117. “ ‘It is well settled that a sentence that is contrary to law is plain error and an 

appellate court may review it for plain error.’ ” State v. Price, 2024-Ohio-1641, ¶ 7 (4th 

Dist.), quoting State v. Burrell, 2024-Ohio-638, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.).

2. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

{¶56} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states:

If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of 

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison 

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender 

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 28

of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, 

and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 

was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender. 

{¶57} “Though ‘a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing 

entry, * * * it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.’ ” Jones, 2024-

Ohio-1083, at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, ¶ 37. “ ‘Nor is it required 

to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary 

findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.’ ” Id., 

quoting Bonnell at ¶ 37.

3. Analysis

{¶58} Raines does not argue plain error, and even if he had, he has not shown 

that the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, when it imposed consecutive sentences 

for the VPO offenses. We do not clearly and convincingly find that the imposition of 

consecutive sentences for the VPO offenses is contrary to law. The trial court made the 

requisite findings at the sentencing hearing and in the VPO sentencing entry. The 

contention that the trial court had to “engage” the specific facts Raines has identified on 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 29

appeal “for a lawful analysis” is meritless. The court “ ‘has no obligation to state reasons 

to support its findings.’ ” Jones at ¶ 11, quoting Bonnell at ¶ 37. 

{¶59} We also do not clearly and convincingly find that the trial court’s finding that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Raines’ conduct is 

unsupported by the record. Although threats, violence, and physical harm are certainly 

relevant to the seriousness of an offense, there is no bright-line requirement in R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) that one of those factors be present for the imposition of consecutive 

sentences. Even if the specific communications which prompted the VPO charges were 

just as described by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, Raines demonstrated a 

flagrant disregard for the authority of the municipal court by violating the DVTPO 3 times 

in 22 days. Raines claims “the contacts were for a reasonable purpose—to care for the 

newborn,” but it is not clear what care Raines could provide the child from jail. Moreover, 

his perception of the reasonableness of a communication is immaterial to whether it 

violates the DVTPO. And even if the protected person consented to and facilitated the 

contact, as the trial court pointed out, the protected person could not give Raines 

permission to violate a court order. 

{¶60} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Raines has not shown error, 

let alone plain error, in the imposition of consecutive sentences for the VPO offenses. 

Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error to the extent it challenges the 

consecutive sentences for the VPO offenses. 

B. Jail-Time Credit

{¶61} Raines also contends that the trial court imposed an unlawful sentence with

respect to his jail-time credit. Raines does not challenge the court’s calculation of the
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 30

number of days of jail-time credit to which he is entitled. Instead, he asserts that the court

erred by applying his jail-time credit to a single prison term rather than his aggregate

sentence. Citing Adm.Code 5120-2-04(G) and State v. Fugate, 2008-Ohio-856, he

asserts that when consecutive sentences are imposed, jail-time credit “is applied once

against the aggregate term—not an individual term.” Raines asserts that he “received

consecutive sentences that yielded a 4.5-year term,” so he was entitled to jail-time credit

“against his aggregate 4.5-year term.” 

1. Legal Principles

{¶62} Initially, we observe that “ ‘[t]he decision whether to credit pretrial 

confinement days is simply not part of the sentence. ’ ” In re D.S., 2016-Ohio-7369, ¶ 20, 

quoting State v. Gregory, 108 Ohio App.3d 264, 268 (1st Dist. 1995). “ ‘Credit for jail time 

is not open to tailoring to the individual case in the same sense as sentencing, because 

once the sentence has already been rendered, the remaining calculation is merely a 

computation of how much time has been served and how much remains.’ ” (Emphasis 

sic.) Id., quoting Gregory at 268.

{¶63} Raines suggests the trial court made a legal error when it applied his jailtime credit to only one of his prison terms. Generally, we review an issue regarding

whether a trial court misconstrued or misapplied the law de novo. State v. Gavin, 2022-

Ohio-1287, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.) However, Raines did not challenge the trial court’s jail-time

credit order at the sentencing hearing, so he has forfeited all but plain-error review.

{¶64} R.C. 2967.191(A) states: “The department of rehabilitation and correction 

shall reduce the prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner 

was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 31

convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial * * * as 

determined by the sentencing court under division (B)(2)(g)(i) of section 2929.19 of the 

Revised Code * * *.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(i) provides:

(2) * * * [I]f the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that 

a prison term is necessary or required, the court shall do all of the following:

* * *

(g)(i) Determine, notify the offender of, and include in the sentencing entry

the total number of days, including the sentencing date but excluding

conveyance time, that the offender has been confined for any reason arising

out of the offense for which the offender is being sentenced and by which

the department of rehabilitation and correction must reduce the definite

prison term imposed on the offender as the offender’s stated prison term *

* *. * * *.

{¶65} Adm.Code 5120-2-04(E)-(G) explain how credit is applied depending on

the type of sentence the offender is serving, and at the time of Raines’ sentencing, stated:

(E) If an offender is serving two or more sentences, stated prison terms or 

combination thereof concurrently, the department shall independently 

reduce each sentence or stated prison term for the number of days confined 

for that offense. Release of the offender shall be based upon the longest 

definite, minimum and/or maximum sentence or stated prison term after 

reduction for jail time credit.

(F) If an offender is serving two or more sentences, stated prison terms or 

combination thereof, not to include a non-life felony indefinite sentence, 

consecutively, the bureau of sentence computation shall aggregate the 

sentences * * *. The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce 

the aggregate definite sentence * * * by the total number of days the offender 

was confined for all of the offenses for which the consecutive sentences, 

stated prison term or combination thereof were imposed. Generally, when 

consecutive sentences, stated prison terms or combination thereof are 

imposed by multiple sentencing entries, the bureau of sentence 

computation shall reduce the aggregate sentence * * * by the sum of the 

days specified in each of the sentencing entries plus the number of days 

the offender was confined between the last sentencing date and the date 

committed to the institution.

(G) If an offender is serving one or more non-life felony indefinite sentences 

consecutively, the bureau of sentence computation will independently 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 32

reduce the minimum and maximum sentence, by the total number of days 

specified in each sentencing entry. Unless otherwise instructed by the 

court, the bureau of sentence computation will include the number of days 

the offender was confined between the last sentencing date and the date 

committed to the institution.

Adm.Code 5120-2-04 (effective 5-27-21).

{¶66} In Fugate, the Supreme Court of Ohio considered “whether a defendant who 

is sentenced concurrently on multiple charges is entitled to have ‘jail-time credit’ applied 

toward all terms.” (Footnote omitted.) Fugate, 2008-Ohio-856, at ¶ 1. In addressing an 

earlier version of Adm.Code 5120-2-04, the Supreme Court explained that when a 

defendant is sentenced to consecutive terms, jail-time credit is “applied only once, to the 

total term.” Id. at ¶ 10. Therefore, “[j]ail-time credit applied to one prison term gives full 

credit that is due, because the credit reduces the entire length of the prison sentence.” 

Id. at ¶ 22. “However, when a defendant is sentenced to concurrent terms, credit must 

be applied against all terms, because the sentences are served simultaneously.” Id. 

“[A]pplying credit to one term only would, in effect, negate the credit for time that the 

offender has been held.” Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court held “that when a defendant 

is sentenced to concurrent prison terms for multiple charges, jail-time credit pursuant to 

R.C. 2967.191 must be applied toward each concurrent prison term.” Id.

2. Analysis

{¶67} Raines does not argue plain error, and even if we concluded that an obvious 

error occurred, Raines has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that it resulted in 

prejudice. Contrary to what Raines suggests, the relevant provision in this case is former 

Adm.Code 5120-2-04(F), not (G), because even though the court imposed consecutive 

sentences, they were definite sentences, not non-life felony indefinite sentences. Again, 
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 33

former Adm.Code 5120-2-04(F) directed the bureau of sentence computation to

“aggregate the sentences” and “reduce the aggregate definite sentence * * * by the total

number of days the offender was confined for all of the offenses for which the consecutive

sentences * * * were imposed.” As a practical matter, it is immaterial whether one

aggregates the consecutive prison terms first and then subtracts 77 days of jail-time credit 

or subtracts 77 days of jail-time credit from the prison term on one count and then 

aggregates that term with the prison terms for the other counts. Under either calculation, 

the total time left to be served is the same. See Fugate at ¶ 22 (for consecutive 

sentences, “[j]ail-time credit applied to one prison term gives full credit that is due, 

because the credit reduces the entire length of the prison sentence”). Accordingly, we 

overrule the remainder of the third assignment of error to the extent it challenges the trial 

court’s jail-time credit order.

VIII. CONCLUSION

{¶68} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgments.

JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.
Gallia App. Nos. 23CA14, 23CA15 34

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENTS ARE AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay 

the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Gallia 

County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is 

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. 

The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay 

is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day 

period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________

 Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.