UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4574

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

AHMAD PETERSON, a/k/a MeltMan,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, 

District Judge. (1:08-cr-00004-IMK-1)

Submitted: April 29, 2010 Decided: May 21, 2010

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, Clarksburg, West 

Virginia, for Appellant. Betsy C. Jividen, Acting United States 

Attorney, Shawn Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Ahmad Peterson was convicted 

on two counts of distributing cocaine base within 1000 feet of a 

protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 

& Supp. 2009) and 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006). The district court 

sentenced Peterson to sixty-three months in prison. Peterson 

timely appealed. 

Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court erred by not striking for cause jurors with ties 

to law enforcement and by allowing the Government to introduce 

evidence of uncharged misconduct.*

Peterson first contends that the district court erred 

by declining to disqualify several jurors who had connections to 

law enforcement. A trial judge’s decision regarding whether to 

remove a juror for cause will not be overruled except for a 

“manifest abuse of . . . discretion.” Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 

F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1989). A district court’s determination 

not to excuse a juror for cause is entitled to “special 

deference.” Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984). The 

 Finding no error, we affirm. 

 * Peterson was advised of his right to file a pro se 

supplemental brief but declined to do so.
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critical issue is whether the juror “could be fair and impartial 

and decide the case on the facts and law presented.” United 

States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1105 (4th Cir. 1995). A 

challenge to a juror for cause is usually limited to 

demonstrations of actual bias, with the doctrine of implied bias 

applying only to “extreme situations” where the circumstances 

make it highly unlikely that the average person could remain 

impartial. United States v. Turner, 389 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 

2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, 

each juror stated that his or her connection to law enforcement 

would not impact his or her ability to serve fairly on the jury. 

Because there was no evidence of actual bias and because the 

jurors’ relationships to law enforcement did not rise to the 

level of an “extreme situation” implying the unlikelihood of 

impartiality, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

refusing to strike the jurors for cause. 

Peterson next argues that the district court erred by 

allowing the Government to introduce evidence of uncharged 

misconduct through the testimony of Neil Floyd, Traci McLean, 

and Nate Jackson. This court typically reviews evidentiary 

rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Perkins, 470 

F.3d 150, 155 (4th Cir. 2006). Rule 404(b) prohibits the 

admission of evidence of “other crimes” solely to prove a 

defendant’s bad character or criminal disposition. United 
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States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2008). “Evidence 

of uncharged conduct is not ‘other crimes’ evidence subject to 

Rule 404 if the uncharged conduct ‘arose out of the same series 

of transactions as the charged offense, or if [evidence of the 

uncharged conduct] is necessary to complete the story of the 

crime on trial.’” Id. at 316 (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 

32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994)) (alteration in original). In 

other words, the Government may “provide context relevant to the 

criminal charges.” United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 663 

(4th Cir. 2007). 

Floyd was a confidential informant who made two 

controlled purchases of crack from Peterson. Floyd’s 

explanation that he became a confidential informant after being 

caught with crack that he bought from Peterson provided context 

relevant to Peterson’s charges. Thus, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion by finding the testimony outside of the 

purview of Rule 404(b) and admitting the evidence.

McLean testified that she purchased crack and powder

cocaine from Peterson, and Jackson testified about Peterson’s 

drug distribution activities. Peterson contends that this “bad 

acts” evidence was inadmissible. Although not admissible to 

prove the defendant’s character, evidence of other wrongs may be 

admitted to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 
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Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule, 

allowing evidence of other crimes or acts to be admitted, except 

that which tends to prove only criminal disposition. United 

States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95 (4th Cir. 1997). For 

evidence of uncharged misconduct “[t]o be admissible under Rule 

404(b), evidence must be (1) relevant to an issue other than 

character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” Siegel, 536 F.3d 

at 317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 

addition, the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. 

Id. at 319 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403). 

The evidence of Peterson’s involvement in ongoing drug 

trafficking activities tended to and was necessary to prove his 

intent, an element of the crime under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841. 

Moreover, the evidence was reliable, because the two witnesses 

corroborated each other’s accounts of Peterson’s involvement in 

drug trafficking activities in the time frame of the offenses 

charged in the indictment. See Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319 

(“Evidence is reliable for purposes of Rule 404(b) unless it is 

so preposterous that it could not be believed by a rational and 

properly instructed jury.” (quoting United States v. Aramony, 88 

F.3d 1369, 1378 (4th Cir. 1996)). Finally, the probative value 

of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair 

prejudice, particularly in light of the limiting instruction 

that the district court gave the jury. See United States v. 
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Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 631 (4th Cir. 2009) (presuming that the 

jury followed the court’s limiting instruction). Therefore, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the 

testimony into evidence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm Peterson’s conviction and sentence. This 

court requires that counsel inform Peterson, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Peterson requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Peterson. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED