IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Paul J. Thiel, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 740 C.D. 2021

: Argued: September 15, 2022

State Employees’ Retirement Board, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: October 19, 2022

Paul J. Thiel (Petitioner) petitions for review of an order of the State 

Employees’ Retirement Board (Board) that declined to reinstate his retirement 

benefits after he was convicted of a crime relating to public employment. 

Petitioner’s primary contention is that the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act1

(Act 140) is being retroactively applied to him, in violation of his constitutional 

rights to be free from ex post facto laws and laws impairing contractual obligations. 

After careful review, we affirm the Board.

I.

Petitioner began working for the Commonwealth on April 15, 1985, as a 

corrections officer with the Department of Corrections (DOC). He worked for DOC

1 Act of July 8, 1978, P.L. 752, No. 140, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1311-15.
2

until July 3, 1994, when he accepted a new position as a parole agent with the 

Pennsylvania Parole Board (Parole Board).2 Petitioner retired from Commonwealth 

service on February 26, 2010, at the age of 50. Certified Record (C.R.) Item No. 6, 

Notes of Testimony (N.T.) from Dec. 16, 2019, Hearing at 8, 13.

As an employee of the Commonwealth, Petitioner was also a member of the 

State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS). Membership in SERS and 

completion of the requisite years of service entitled him to a retirement pension and 

health benefits. See 71 Pa.C.S. § 5308 (providing for annuity payments to retired 

Commonwealth employees); 71 Pa.C.S. § 5308(f)(3)(i) (outlining procedure for 

converting employee health benefits to retirement health benefits).3 Petitioner 

retired with 28.1220 years of service. C.R. Item No. 6, SERS Ex. 5 at 3. This 

included his time with DOC and the Parole Board, as well as time Petitioner 

purchased in 2007 for service in the United States Marine Corps from July 27, 1977,

to July 25, 1980. N.T. at 13; see also 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 5304(c)(2)(i), 5505(b) (allowing 

for purchase of credit for military service).

After retiring from Commonwealth service, Petitioner worked as a part-time 

police officer for Greenfield Township and the City of Carbondale. Additionally, 

sometime in 2013, the Parole Board asked Petitioner to become a “return-to-service 

annuitant,” which meant he would resume his employment as a parole agent on a 

temporary basis to address the Parole Board’s increased workload. See 71 Pa.C.S. 

§ 5706(a.1) (allowing certain employees receiving retirement benefits to return to 

2 The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has been renamed as the 

Pennsylvania Parole Board. See Sections 15, 16, and 16.1 of the Act of December 18, 2019, P.L. 

776, No. 115 (effective February 18, 2020); see also Sections 6101 and 6111(a) of the Prisons and 

Parole Code (Parole Code), as amended, 61 Pa. C.S. §§ 6191, 6111(a).

3 This opinion will refer to the statutory scheme administered by SERS, 71 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-5958,

as the “Retirement Code.”
3

service during “an emergency [that] creates an increase in the work load such that 

there is serious impairment of service to the public”).

On April 21, 2014, Petitioner was involved in an incident that led to his

conviction for official oppression, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5301. That evening, 

while on duty as a patrolman with the Carbondale Police Department (Carbondale 

PD), Petitioner struck an intoxicated arrestee multiple times with a metal baton and 

the back of his hand. While the arrestee had been verbally abusive throughout his 

detention, including by making threats against Petitioner and his family, the arrestee 

was shackled to a bench and unable to physically harm anyone at the time Petitioner 

struck him. This incident was captured on video, which the Chief of the Carbondale 

PD forwarded to the Lackawanna County District Attorney’s Office for review. 

C.R. Item No. 6, SERS Ex. 4. The District Attorney ultimately charged Petitioner 

with official oppression and simple assault.4 On April 9, 2015, Petitioner pled guilty 

to official oppression. Id.

More than three years later, on June 28, 2018, SERS mailed a letter to 

Petitioner indicating his retirement benefits were forfeited as of the date of his guilty 

plea. Petitioner retained counsel and appealed this determination to the Board,

arguing he was not a “public employee” within the meaning of Act 140 at the time 

of his crime, and that Act 140 could not constitutionally be applied to him. More 

specifically, Petitioner maintained that because he purchased credit for his service 

in the Marine Corps from July 27, 1977 to July 25, 1980, the “vesting date” of his 

retirement benefits should be backdated to July 27, 1977. With this assumption in 

place, Petitioner argued SERS violated the ex post facto and contracts clauses of the 

4

18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.
4

United States and Pennsylvania constitutions5 by retroactively applying Act 140 to 

him, as that law was not enacted until July of 1978. See Act of July 8, 1978, P.L. 

752, No. 140. Petitioner also argued the forfeiture of his pension was an 

unconstitutionally excessive fine, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 1.

The Board appointed a hearing examiner (Hearing Examiner Moyer) to 

receive evidence and provide a recommended disposition. Hearing Examiner Moyer

held a hearing on December 16, 2019, at which Petitioner and a number of SERS 

officials testified. During his testimony, Petitioner admitted he was employed by 

both the Carbondale PD and the Parole Board when he committed the acts 

underlying his charges for assault and official oppression, and that he ultimately pled 

guilty to the latter offense. N.T. at 24, 44. SERS’s witnesses merely recounted the 

administrative processes leading to forfeiture of Petitioner’s pension; they did not 

dispute any part of Petitioner’s testimony.

Hearing Examiner Moyer left SERS shortly after the December 2019 hearing, 

which led the Board to appoint a different examiner (Hearing Examiner Kelly) to 

render a recommendation based on the cold record. On May 12, 2020, Hearing 

Examiner Kelly issued a written recommendation that Petitioner’s appeal be denied. 

On June 4, 2021, the Board adopted this recommendation with minor modifications. 

The Board noted it was “not disputed” that Petitioner was employed with the 

Carbondale PD and as a return-to-service annuitant with the Parole Board at the time 

of his offense, and that a conviction for official oppression triggers pension forfeiture 

under Act 140. C.R. Item No. 18 (Board Opinion) at 11; see also Section 2 of Act 

140, 43 P.S. § 1312 (defining forfeiture crimes). Thus, the Board held Petitioner 

5

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
5

was a public employee who forfeited his pension according to the terms of Act 140. 

The Board rejected Petitioner’s ex post facto argument, stating that his purchase of 

military service credit in 2007 did not “create a retroactive vested right to a pension 

benefit” dating back to July of 1977. Board Opinion at 16. The Board also held 

Petitioner was not subject to an unconstitutionally excessive fine because the case 

“d[id] not involve a fine but a forfeiture”—that is, the Board said the forfeiture of 

Petitioner’s pension flowed from a breach of his retirement contract with SERS and 

did not constitute punishment for a crime. Id. at 19. As such, the excessive fines 

clause was not implicated.

Petitioner now appeals to this Court.

II.

As with most appeals from decisions of administrative agencies, our review 

of a decision of the Board is limited to determining whether the Board violated 

Petitioner’s constitutional rights, adhered to statutory law, followed the procedures 

for agency adjudications outlined in the Administrative Agency Law,6and supported 

its factual findings with substantial evidence. Sandusky v. Pa. State Emps. Ret. Bd., 

127 A.3d 34, 47 n.17 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015); see also 2 Pa.C.S. § 704.

III.

We begin with Petitioner’s contention that the record does not contain

substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that he was a “public official 

or public employee” within the meaning of Act 140 when he committed the acts 

leading to his conviction for official oppression.7 Substantial evidence is “such 

6

See 2 Pa.C.S. §§ 501-08.

7 This section addresses issues 1 and 5 of Petitioner’s Statement of Questions Involved, as both 

issues dispute Petitioner’s status as a “public official or public employee” under Act 140. See Br. 

of Petitioner at 4-5.
6

relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as sufficient to support a 

conclusion.” Joyce Outdoor Advert., LLC v. Dept. of Transp., 49 A.3d 518, 523 n.2 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

Act 140 provides for forfeiture of a public employee’s retirement benefits in 

the following terms:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no public official or public 

employee nor any beneficiary designated by such public official or 

public employee shall be entitled to receive any retirement or other 

benefit or payment of any kind except a return of the contribution paid 

into any pension fund without interest, if such public official or public 

employee is found guilty of a crime related to public office or public 

employment or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any crime related to 

public office or public employment.

Section 3 of Act 140, 43 P.S. § 1313(a). To commit a “crime related to public office 

or public employment,” the public employee must commit one of the trigger offenses

enumerated in Act 140 either “through his public office . . . or when his public 

employment places him in a position to commit the crime.” 43 P.S. § 1312. Official 

oppression in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5301 is one such offense. Id. Furthermore, 

the Act defines the “public official[s]” and “public employee[s]” subject to its 

provisions as follows:

Any person who is elected or appointed to any public office or 

employment including justices, judges and magisterial district judges 

and members of the General Assembly or who is acting or who has 

acted in behalf of the Commonwealth or a political subdivision or 

any agency thereof including but not limited to any person who has so 

acted and is otherwise entitled to or is receiving retirement 

benefits whether that person is acting on a permanent or temporary 

basis and whether or not compensated on a full or part-time basis. 

This term shall not include independent contractors nor their employees 

or agents under contract to the Commonwealth or political subdivision 

nor shall it apply to any person performing tasks over which the 

Commonwealth or political subdivision has no legal right of control. 

However, this term shall include all persons who are members of any 
7

retirement system funded in whole or in part by the Commonwealth or 

any political subdivision. For the purposes of this act such persons are 

deemed to be engaged in public employment.

43 P.S. § 1312 (emphasis added).

The record fully supports the Board’s determination that Petitioner met this 

broad definition. Petitioner’s own testimony establishes that, on the day of his 

offense, he held two positions of public employment: his part-time position with the 

Carbondale PD and his position with the Parole Board as a return-to-service 

annuitant. N.T. at 24-7; see also Board Opinion at 4. Petitioner was “acting . . . [on]

behalf of . . . a political subdivision” of the Commonwealth, namely, the City of 

Carbondale. 43 P.S. § 1312; see also id. (defining “political subdivision” as “[a]ny 

county, city, borough, incorporated town, [or] township . . . and any . . . departments, 

instrumentalities, or entities thereof . . . .”). Additionally, Petitioner was “acting . . 

. [on] behalf of . . . [an] agency . . . [of] the Commonwealth,” i.e., the Parole Board. 

Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 102 (defining “Commonwealth agency” as “[a]ny 

executive or independent agency”); 61 Pa.C.S. § 6111 (establishing Parole Board as 

“an independent administrative board”).8 Both jobs fall squarely within Act 140’s 

definition of a “public employee.”

Petitioner resists this conclusion with two unavailing arguments. First, he 

argues he should not be considered a “public employee” for Act 140 purposes 

because he was already retired and receiving benefits at the time he committed his 

criminal act. The plain text of Act 140 defeats this argument, as the law expressly 

includes within its sweep public employees who are “entitled to or . . . receiving 

retirement benefits.” Id. In past cases, this Court has not hesitated to affirm the 

8 Because Act 140 does not specifically define “the Commonwealth . . . or any agency thereof,” 

43 P.S. § 1312, we rely on the above definition of “Commonwealth agency” from the Judicial 

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9914.
8

pension forfeitures of public officials who have begun receiving their retirement 

annuities but have also accepted part-time public employment. See, e.g., Miller v. 

State Emps. Ret. Sys., 137 A.3d 674, 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (retired magisterial 

district judge who worked part-time as a senior judge). Indeed, the text of Act 140 

anticipates this circumstance by “including . . . any person who . . . is receiving 

retirement benefits whether that person is acting on a permanent or temporary basis 

and whether or not compensated on a full or part-time basis.” 43 P.S. § 1312

(emphasis added).

Next, Petitioner argues he is not an Act 140 “public employee” because he did 

not commit the crime of official oppression while occupying the positions of public 

employment through which he earned his pension—that is, hisfull-time employment

with DOC and the Parole Board from 1985 to 2010. This argument is foreclosed by 

Matthews v. Public School Employees Retirement Board, 806 A.2d 971, 975 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2002), where we held that “Act 140 contains no requirement that the 

pension benefits that are forfeited be necessarily connected to the public 

employment” that enabled the employee to commit an Act 140 forfeiture crime. See 

also DiLacqua v. City of Phila. Bd. of Pensions & Ret., 83 A.3d 302, 309-10 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (same). Rather, the Act defines “public employee” in the broadest 

possible terms, covering any “person who is elected to any public office or 

employment.” Matthews, 806 A.2d at 974 (emphasis in original). Act 140 “clearly 

and unambiguously requires a forfeiture of benefits” when any such person commits 

a “crime related to . . . public employment.” Id. at 975; 43 P.S. § 1313(a). 

Accordingly, even though Petitioner did not earn his retirement benefits through his

employment with Carbondale PD, that employment still rendered him a “public 
9

employee” for Act 140 purposes. We affirm the Board’s holding in this regard as 

supported by substantial evidence.

IV.

We now turn to Petitioner’s argument that forfeiture of his pension pursuant 

to Act 140 constitutes both ex post facto governmental action and a retroactive 

impairment of contractual obligations. Both the United States and Pennsylvania 

constitutions protect against “ex post facto Law[s].” Likewise, both constitutions 

prohibit laws which “impair[] the Obligation of Contracts . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, 

§ 10, cl. 1; see also PA. CONST. art. I, § 17. Because these provisions involve a 

similar analysis, we address Petitioner’s arguments concerning them together.9

Generally speaking, an ex post facto law is one that “attaches new legal 

consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film 

Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Similarly, a law “impairing the obligation of 

contracts” retroactively meddles with a preexisting contractual agreement under 

which the parties have various rights and obligations. The inherent unfairness of 

retroactive government action is what animates both clauses—they embody the

principle that people are entitled to know the legal consequences of their decisions 

at the time they are made. See Hickey v. Pension Bd., 106 A.2d 233, 237-8 (Pa. 

1954).

For the vast majority of workers, accepting employment with the 

Commonwealth automatically creates a contractual agreement for retirement 

9 We also note there is no meaningful difference between the text or doctrine of the federal and 

state ex post facto clauses, at least as applied to the facts of this case. See Commonwealth v. 

Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 184 (Pa. 2012) (“[T]he ex post facto clauses of the United States and 

Pennsylvania Constitutions are virtually identical in language, and the standards applied to 

determine ex post facto violations under both constitutions are comparable.”) (citation omitted). 

We have not located a binding decision holding the same with respect to the contracts clauses of 

each constitution, but their identical language suggests the same sort of symmetry.
10

benefits. 71 Pa.C.S. § 5301(a) (providing that, with very limited exceptions,

membership in SERS “shall be mandatory as of the effective date of employment

for all State employees”); see also Bowers v. State Emps. Ret. Bd., 371 A.2d 1040, 

1041 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1977) (“[T]he retirement system creates a contract between the 

Commonwealth and its employe[e]s . . . .”). Like all contracts, this agreement is a 

reciprocal exchange of promises and obligations. The Commonwealth obligates 

itself to provide retirement benefits, but only if the employee satisfies certain 

conditions, like completing a specified number of years of service. 71 Pa.C.S. § 

5308(b) (outlining number of “eligibility points,” or years of service, required for 

annuity payments under different classes of state service). Act 140’s requirement to 

refrain from committing “crime[s] related to public office or public employment” is 

another such condition. Shiomos v. State Emps. Ret. Bd., 626 A.2d 158, 162 (Pa. 

1993) (discussing how “the terms and conditions of Act 140 [are] incorporated into” 

an employee’s “pension contract”). The terms of a public employee’s retirement 

contract are set the moment he begins state service, meaning the laws in effect at 

that time govern his relationship with the Commonwealth. Cmwlth. ex rel. 

Zimmerman v. Officers & Emps. Ret. Bd., 461 A.2d 593, 598 (Pa. 1983). That 

contract can be superseded, however, if the employee accepts a new position of 

employment after new laws governing SERS membership have been enacted. 

Shiomos, 626 A.2d at 162-63.

Petitioner began working for the Commonwealth on April 15, 1985. N.T. at 

19. Act 140 was enacted on July 8, 1978. Therefore, Petitioner’s retirement contract 

with SERS automatically incorporated Act 140’s conditions when he was hired—at 

that moment, he was made aware that his retirement benefits would be forfeited upon 

his conviction for a “crime related to . . . public employment.” 43 P.S. § 1313(a). 
11

Despite this, Petitioner argues that because he later purchased credit for a period of

military service starting on July 27, 1977, his state employment should be deemed 

to start on that date. See Br. of Petitioner at 16 (“Mr. Thiel’s purchasing of 2.9972 

years of active duty military service covering the period commencing on July 27th, 

1977 placed his retirement contract date such that his retirement benefits had vested 

prior to July 8, 1978 . . . .”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This, in 

turn, allegedly makes his Act 140 forfeiture “retroactive” and an impairment of his 

settled contractual rights. Id. at 17-18.

This argument fails. As noted, a state employee’s “contractual rights vest . . .

at the time of his membership in the retirement system,” i.e., on the date employment 

begins.10 Zimmerman, 461 A.2d at 597. There is no indication in the Retirement 

Code that purchasing credit for military service alters the effective date of an 

employee’s membership in SERS. See 71 Pa.C.S. § 5304(c)(1)-(2) (defining types 

of military service for which an employee may purchase credit); 71 Pa.C.S. § 

5505(b) (providing formula for calculating cost of military service credit). 

Petitioner’s contractual arrangement with SERS is a creature of statute—as such, he 

has “only those rights [expressly] granted by the Retirement Code.” Weaver v. State 

Emps. Ret. Bd., 129 A.3d 585, 589 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Therefore, because the 

Retirement Code does not provide that the purchase of credit for military service has 

10 To avoid confusion, we note the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has used the term “vesting” in 

two distinct senses in its pension forfeiture cases. The first is the sense noted above, meaning the 

establishment of a retirement contract with SERS. Zimmerman, 461 A.2d at 597. The second 

refers to the moment when an employee satisfies all eligibility criteria under the Retirement Code 

and becomes entitled to claim retirement benefits. See Shiomos, 626 A.2d at 160 (“Appellant’s 

entitlement to receive retirement benefits . . . vested on July 30, 1979, when he purchased 3.3778 

years of military service, thus crediting him with the necessary ten years of service.”). The first 

sense of the term is implicated here.
12

the “backdating” effect urged by Petitioner, there is simply no legal basis for 

Petitioner’s argument.11

Furthermore, even if Petitioner’s 2007 purchase of military service credit 

somehow retroactively altered his contractual “vesting” date to July 27, 1977, he 

would still be subject to the terms of Act 140 by virtue of his subsequent acceptance 

of new positions of public employment. Act 140 provides that “[e]ach time a . . . 

public employee is elected, appointed, promoted, or otherwise changes a job 

classification, there is a termination and renewal of the contract for purposes of this 

act.” 43 P.S. § 1313(c). Under this provision, 

[w]ith each appointment there is a renewal of the agreement to perform 

the term of public service without violating Act 140; an agreement 

which encompasses all that has gone before. Thus, whether or not a 

public employee’s right to receive retirement benefits has vested, or he 

or she is in actual receipt of benefits, all previous accumulated rights to 

receive such benefits are subject to forfeiture by and through the 

“renewed” agreement which is formed each time a person chooses to 

become a “public official” as defined by [43 P.S.] § 1312.

Shiomos, 626 A.2d at 162-3. Thus, even if his 2007 purchase of military service 

credit gave him a “clean slate” for Act 140 purposes, Petitioner’s subsequent 

acceptance of part-time police officer positions with Greenfield Township and the 

City of Carbondale constituted acceptance of Act 140’s conditions on his retirement 

contract with SERS.

The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Act 140 was never retroactively 

applied to Petitioner. That law’s condition that state employees must refrain from 

committing “crime[s] related to . . . public employment,” 43 P.S. § 1313(a), or risk 

pension forfeiture was part of Petitioner’s contract with SERS when he began 

Commonwealth service in 1985 and was reaffirmed with each subsequent change in 

11 Petitioner does not cite to the Retirement Code or any other statute to support his novel argument.
13

his job title. His purchase of military service credit in 2007—well after the 

enactment of Act 140 and his own constructive awareness thereof—did nothing to 

change that. As such, SERS’s forfeiture decision did not “disrupt . . . [Petitioner’s] 

settled expectations,” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, or retroactively alter his retirement 

contract. Accordingly, no violation of the ex post facto or contracts clauses

occurred, and we affirm the Board’s holding in this regard. 12

V.

Petitioner also argues the forfeiture of his pension constitutes an “excessive 

fine,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, cl. 1. We rejected an identical argument in Scarantino v. 

Public School Employees Retirement Board, 68 A.3d 375 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 

There, we held that pension forfeiture under Act 140 does not implicate the excessive 

fines clause because that clause only applies to fines imposed as punishment for a 

crime. Id. at 384-85. Rather than a punitive fine, Act 140 forfeiture is a civil 

consequence of “a breach of the contract between [the public employee] and . . .

SERS.” Id. at 385; see also 43 P.S. § 1313(b) (providing that conviction for crime 

related to public employment “shall be deemed . . . a breach of a public officer’s or 

public employee’s contract with his employer”). We reaffirmed this holding in 

Miller, 137 A.3d at 680-81, and see no reason to depart from it today. Therefore, 

we affirm the Board’s rejection of Petitioner’s excessive fines argument.

12 We note in passing that Petitioner’s case is completely unlike Bellomini v. State Employees 

Retirement Board, 445 A.2d 737 (Pa. 1982), on which he places heavy reliance. That case 

involved plaintiffs who “had obviously met all of the requirements necessary to receive retirement 

pay” before the enactment of Act 140. Id. at 741. For the reasons given above, that is not 

Petitioner’s situation.
14

VI.

Lastly, we note that Petitioner’s final issue—whether he was denied due 

process when a hearing examiner who did not preside over the hearing in this matter 

issued a recommendation to the Board based on the cold record, alone—is waived 

for failure to develop the issue in the argument section of his brief. In re 

Condemnation ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 76 A.3d 101, 106 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) 

(“[W]here issues are raised in the statement of questions involved, but not addressed 

in the argument section of the brief, courts find waiver.”) (citing Harvilla v. 

Delcamp, 555 A.2d 763, 764 n.1 (Pa. 1989)). And even if the issue were not waived, 

it is nonetheless without merit. We have held that “administrative adjudicators are 

permitted to determine the credibility of testimony from the reading of a transcript,” 

Cavanaugh v. Fayette County Zoning Hearing Board, 700 A.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Pa. 

1997), and that “[a]n adjudicative method where the ultimate decision in a case is 

made by an administrative fact finder who did not hear the testimony does not deny 

a litigant due process of law.” Fisler v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 78 A.3d 30, 42 

n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (quoting Cavanaugh, 700 A.2d at 1356). Furthermore, the 

credibility of Petitioner’s testimony was irrelevant to the outcome of his appeal

because he conceded all the legally relevant facts, namely, that he held positions of 

public employment at the time of his crime and that he pled guilty to a triggering 

offense.

VII.

In conclusion, we affirm the forfeiture of Petitioner’s retirement benefits

solely because Act 140’s requirements for such a forfeiture have been met. While 

working as a part-time police officer, Petitioner pled guilty to a crime that was 

indisputably “related to public office or public employment.” 43 P.S. § 1313(a). 
15

Act 140’s command to refrain from such crimes was part of Petitioner’s contract 

with SERS from his first day of Commonwealth service—it was not sprung on him 

after-the-fact, as he claims in this appeal. We may not reverse Petitioner’s forfeiture 

out of sympathy for his personal circumstances—the law leaves no room for that. 

See Apgar v. State Emps. Ret. Sys., 655 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (in the 

face of employee’s guilty plea, refusing to consider employee’s claim that racial bias 

motivated investigation against her for crimes related to public employment). 

Instead, we may only enforce the plain terms of Act 140, which require a forfeiture 

in this instance. The decision of the Board is therefore affirmed.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge
 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Paul J. Thiel, :

Petitioner :

:

 v. : No. 740 C.D. 2021

:

State Employees’ Retirement Board, :

Respondent :

O R D E R 

AND NOW, this 19th day of October 2022, the June 4, 2021 Order of 

the State Employees’ Retirement Board is AFFIRMED.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge