alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10425 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. REY DENZO KAZEMI Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:02-CR-60-2
Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Defendant-Appellant Rey Denzo Kazemi, federal prisoner # 21084-112, requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal ofthe district court’s order dismissing as frivolous his notices to the district court clerk requesting relief from payment of appellate filing fees and fees for certified copies of documents in his criminal case. The district court’s order also dismissed as frivolous Kazemi’s petition challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the court over his criminal conviction. The district court denied Kazemi’s IFP United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D October 19, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-10425

2 motion and certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving for IFP, Kazemi is challenging the district court’s certification. SeeBaugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 297, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Kazemi’s assertion that a Congressional joint resolution renders monetary payment for goods and services against public policy is meritless. Additionally, Kazemi’s petition challenging the jurisdiction of the district court is an unauthorized motion in the criminal proceedings, and his appeal from this motion is frivolous. See United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir. 1994); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Kazemi also challenges the district court’s order informing him that any further motions, notices, exhibits, and correspondence filed by him would be stricken. When read in context, the court’s order bars the filing of future frivolous pleadings in Kazemi’s criminal case. The district court is authorized to control its docket and may enjoin prose litigants from meritless future filings. Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A. , 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986). Kazemi has not established that the district court abused its discretion in imposing this bar under the circumstances of this case. See id. The instant appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous. Accordingly, Kazemi’s request for IFP status is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20; 5 TH C IR
. R. 42.2.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10425

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

REY DENZO KAZEMI

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:02-CR-60-2

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Rey Denzo Kazemi, federal prisoner # 21084-112,

requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal ofthe district court’s

order dismissing as frivolous his notices to the district court clerk requesting

relief from payment of appellate filing fees and fees for certified copies of

documents in his criminal case. The district court’s order also dismissed as

frivolous Kazemi’s petition challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the

court over his criminal conviction. The district court denied Kazemi’s IFP

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 19, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-10425

2

motion and certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. By moving for

IFP, Kazemi is challenging the district court’s certification. See Baugh v.Taylor,

117 F.3d 297, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).

Kazemi’s assertion that a Congressional joint resolution renders monetary

payment for goods and services against public policy is meritless. Additionally,

Kazemi’s petition challenging the jurisdiction of the district court is an

unauthorized motion in the criminal proceedings, and his appeal from this

motion is frivolous. See United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141-42 (5th Cir.

1994); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).

Kazemi also challenges the district court’s order informing him that any

further motions, notices, exhibits, and correspondence filed by him would be

stricken. When read in context, the court’s order bars the filing of future

frivolous pleadings in Kazemi’s criminal case. The district court is authorized

to control its docket and may enjoin pro se litigants from meritless future filings.

Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1986). Kazemi

has not established that the district court abused its discretion in imposing this

bar under the circumstances of this case. See id.

The instant appeal is without arguable merit and is thus frivolous.

Accordingly, Kazemi’s request for IFP status is DENIED, and his appeal is

DISMISSED. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.
#### Dirk Goldwasser, Plaintiff, v Anthony L. Geller et al., Respondents, and J. Winston Fowlkes et al., Appellants.

[718 NYS2d 349]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ira Gammerman, J.), entered November 5, 1999, after a nonjury trial, dismissing defendants-appellants’ cross claim for indemnification against defendants-respondents, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The trial court correctly held ambiguous the indemnity provision in the agreement settling the action brought by appellants against respondents for losses caused by respondents’ failure to meet a capital call. An agreement to indemnify must be “strictly construed” and “should not be found unless it can be clearly implied from the language and purpose of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” *(Hooper Assocs. v AGS Computers,*74 NY2d 487, 491-492), i.e., there must be an “ 'unmistakable intention’ ” to indemnify *(Matter of Heimbach v Metropolitan Transp. Auth.,*75 NY2d 387, 392). Here, it is unclear whether the indemnity provision was meant to cover any claim for distributions from the parties’ partnership that plaintiff might make, or only such claims as related to respondents’ nonfeasance in failing to meet the capital call, or only a claim for any portion of the $60,361.81 that, in the sentence immediately preceding the indemnity sentence, respondents represented had already been paid to plaintiff, presumably in satisfaction of his then current claims for distributions. The latter interpretation is reasonable since, otherwise, the reference to the $60,361.81 would be meaningless, and the settlement would be susceptible to an interpretation that would make respondents personally responsible for any future claims for distribution made by plaintiff without limitation and without any apparent relationship to the *298nonfeasance alleged in the settled action. We note that appellants challenge only the initial finding of ambiguity, not the subsequent findings of fact justifying the construction urged by respondents.

The trial court also properly rejected appellants’ claim for common-law indemnity since their wrongful breach of the fiduciary duty they owed plaintiff to include him in the settlement, found by this Court on a prior appeal (257 AD2d 489, *lv denied*93 NY2d 954), contributed to plaintiff’s damages, at least in part *(see, Rock v Reed-Prentice Div.,*39 NY2d 34, 39; *Trustees of Columbia Univ. v Mitchell / Giurgola Assocs.,*109 AD2d 449, 453). Indeed, the prior holding, that the measure of plaintiff’s damages is what he would have received had he been included in the settlement, clearly implies that the damages he sustained as a result of respondents’ failure to make a capital call were subsumed in the settlement from which he was wrongfully excluded by appellants. It follows that if appellants were allowed to keep the entire proceeds of the settlement, by way of an award of indemnification against respondents, they would be unjustly enriched. Concur — Sullivan, P. J., Nardelli, Williams, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.
Lisa POWELL, Employee, Plaintiff, v. O'REILLY AUTO PARTS, INC., Employer, Safety National Insurance Company, Carrier (Corvel Corporation, Third-Party Administrator), Defendants.

No. COA 17-1006

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: April 17, 2018

AFFIRMED.
In the MATTER OF: N.L.M., C.L.M. Jr.

No. COA17-1346

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: June 19, 2018

AFFIRMED.
#### In the Matter of Shirley F. Gajewski (Admitted as Shirley Febbell Gajewski), a Suspended Attorney.

[721 NYS2d 225]

Motion granted, Hearing Panel’s Report and recommendation confirmed, and petitioner reinstated as an attorney and counselor-at-law in the State of New York, effective the date hereof. No opinion. Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Tom, Mazzarelli, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.
#### Michael D. BRAMBLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. W.A. DUNCAN, Warden; C.A. Terhune, Director, California Department of Corrections, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 01-55716.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 12, 2002.

Filed June 3, 2003.

Amended Sept. 2, 2003.

Kenneth M. Stern, Woodland Hills, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.

Lawrence M. Daniels, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the respondents-appellees.

Before: THOMPSON and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER,* Senior District Judge.

The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.

ORDER

The slip opinion filed June 3, 2003 is amended as follows:

In the last paragraph that begins at slip op. 7184 with the language “By holding that all three claims ...” delete the following portions of the paragraph from slip op. 7184 and 7185:

> *899
>       *See Allen v. Lewis,*255 F.3d 798, 800-801 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that “[i]f the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to file, after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken.”). *Cf. Anthony v. Cambra,*236 F.3d 568, 577 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that, under Rule 15(c), the district court may deny a petitioner leave to amend if there has been “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive”). In the present case, excluding the time

In lieu of the deleted language, insert “Excluding the time”.

With this amendment, the last paragraph that begins at slip op. 7184, and continues onto slip op. 7185, will read:

> By holding that all three claims in the second petition are timely, we put Brambles in the position he likely would have been in absent the district court’s erroneous dismissal of the first petition. In reaching this decision, we conclude that Brambles exercised reasonable diligence in exhausting his two claims and returning to federal court. Excluding the time Brambles’s habeas petition was pending in state court, it took him 85 days to exhaust those claims and return to federal court. *See Bunney v. Mitchell,*262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that “[a] decision of the [California] Supreme Court becomes final 30 days after filing.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (limitations period stayed while a petition is pending in state court). Taking 85 days, apart from excludable “state time,” to exhaust state remedies does not demonstrate a lack of diligence by Brambles. *Smith v. Ratelle,*323 F.3d 813, 815-819 (9th Cir.2003) (93 days assumed (but not decided) to be reasonably diligent); *cf. Zarvela,*254 F.3d at 381 (60 days not unreasonable).
IB 

Union Calendar No. 318 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4454 

[Report No. 113–430] 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent certain 

rules regarding basis adjustments to stock of S corporations making 

charitable contributions of property. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

APRIL 10, 2014 

Mr. REICHERT (for himself and Mr. KIND) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

MAY 2, 2014 

Additional sponsor: Mr. REED

MAY 2, 2014 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4454 RH

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make 

permanent certain rules regarding basis adjustments to 

stock of S corporations making charitable contributions 

of property. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4454 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RULE REGARDING BASIS ADJUST4 MENT TO STOCK OF S CORPORATIONS MAK5 ING CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROP6 ERTY. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1367(a)(2) of the Internal 

8 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking the last sen9 tence. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 this section shall apply to contributions made in taxable 

12 years beginning after December 31, 2013. 

13 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

14 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Permanent S Corpora15 tion Charitable Contributions Act of 2014’’. 

16 SEC. 2. PERMANENT RULE REGARDING BASIS ADJUSTMENT 

17 TO STOCK OF S CORPORATIONS MAKING 

18 CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PROPERTY. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1367(a)(2) of the Internal 

20 Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking the last sen21 tence. 

22 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this 

23 section shall apply to contributions made in taxable years 

24 beginning after December 31, 2013. 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Union Calendar No. 318 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4454 

[Report No. 113–430] 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to 

charitable contributions of property. adjustments to stock of S corporations making make permanent certain rules regarding basis 

MAY 2, 2014 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit
      32. Certification of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of
      Atlantic**


**Coast
      Federal Corporation Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002**




Robert
      J.
      Larison, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, and Dawna R. Miller, Senior
      Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of Atlantic Coast Federal Corporation
      (the “Company”), each certify in their capacity as an officer of the Company
      that they have reviewed the quarterly report of the Company on Form 10-Q for
      the
      quarter ended September 30, 2008 and that to the best of their
      knowledge:





1.
            the
                report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) of
                the
                Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
                and





2.
            the
                information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.





The
      purpose of this statement is solely to comply with Title 18, Chapter 63, Section
      1350 of the United States Code, as amended by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002.





A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
      and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.





Date:
      November 13, 2008




/s/
                Robert J. Larison, Jr.
            
            /s/
                Dawna R. MillerRobert
                J. Larison, Jr.
            
            Dawna
                R. MillerPresident
                and
            
            Senior
                Vice President andChief
                Executive Officer
            
            Chief
                Financial Officer
Converted by EDGARwiz


Exhibit 4.09
















CONSENT OF FRANÇOIS HUOT







Reference is made to the Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended February 28, 2013 (the “Annual Report”) of Virginia Mines Inc. (the “Company”), filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.




I, François Huot, participated in the preparation of a technical report entitled ““Technical Report and Recommendations, Winter 2012 Drilling Program, Lac Gayot property, Québec, Virginia Mines inc. and KGHM International Ltd.” completed in January 2013 (the “Report”) concerning mineralized material in the Lac Gayot property for the Company. Portions of the report are summarized under headings “Item III – Description of the Business – 3.8.4 Geological Setting; 3.8.5 Exploration and Drilling; and 3.8.6 Mineralization” in the Annual Information Form of the Company for the year ended February 28, 2013 (included as Exhibit 1 of the Annual Report, which Exhibit is incorporated by reference herein). 




I hereby consent to the inclusion of the foregoing written disclosure and to the references to such disclosure and to my name under the foregoing heading and to all other references to such disclosure and to my name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report.







Very truly yours,













			
	/S/ François Huot

	 
	 

	Name:

François Huot, Ph.D., P.Geo.

	 
	 









May 13, 2013
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

October 29, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

134352 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 134352 

 COA: 266329 

Washtenaw CC: 05-000558-FH 

JARRETT JASON McCORMICK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 10, 2007 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

t1022 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

October 29, 2007 

 Clerk
STATE of North Carolina v. James CHARLES, Defendant.

No. COA17-937

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: June 5, 2018

NO ERROR.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection
with the Quarterly Report of Mewbourne Energy Partners 04-A, L.P. (the Registrant) on Form 10-Q for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, in the capacity as indicated below and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                        |  |                    |  |                                  
|----------------------- |  | ------------------ |  | ---------------------------------
|                        |  | /s/ J. Roe Buckley
|                        |  | Name:              |  | J. Roe Buckley                   
|Date: November 14, 2006 |  | Title:             |  | Chief Financial Officer          
|                        |  |                    |  | Mewbourne Development Corporation



20
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 193 (Thursday, October 6, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58472-58473]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-20131]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Motion Picture Laboratories, Inc.

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 8, 2005, pursuant to 
Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Motion Picture 
Laboratories, Inc. (``MovieLabs'') has filed written notifications 
simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal Trade 
Commission disclosing (1) the identities of the parties to the venture 
and (2) the nature and objectives of the venture. The notifications 
were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting 
the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances.
    Pursuant to Section 6(b) of the Act, the identities of the parties 
to the venture are: Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Los 
Angeles, CA; Paramount Pictures Corporation, Los Angeles, CA; Walt 
Disney Pictures & Television, Burbank, CA; Warner Bros.

[[Page 58473]]

Entertainment Inc., Burbank, CA; Universal City Studies LLLP, Universal 
City, CA; and Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Culver City, CA. The 
general area of MovieLabs' planned activity is identifying, 
researching, developing, evaluating, owning and disseminating 
technology (i) relevant to motion picture production and distribution 
and (ii) that lawfully prevents, deters or detects unauthorized and 
illegal copying and/or distribution of copyrighted audiovisual works.

Dorothy B. Fountain,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 05-20131 Filed 10-5-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4547 

To modify the definition of ‘‘antique firearm’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 1, 2014 

Mr. CASSIDY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 

each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To modify the definition of ‘‘antique firearm’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. AMENDMENT TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES 

4 CODE. 

5 Section 921(a)(16)(A) of title 18, United States 

6 Code, is amended by striking ‘‘1898’’ and inserting 

7 ‘‘1913’’. 


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4547 IH

1 SEC. 2. AMENDMENT TO INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 

2 1986. 

3 Subsection (g) of section 5845 of the Internal Rev4 enue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ‘‘1898’’ each 

5 place it appears and inserting ‘‘1913’’. 

Æ 


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STATE of North Carolina v. Tyshawn WILLIAMS

No. COA17-913

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: August 7, 2018

NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED. REMANDED IN PART.
#### STATE of Louisiana v. Eric BERNARD.

No. 2002-KO-3028.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Bernard, Eric; — Defendant; Applying for Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Assumption, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 98-CR-000083; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2000 KA 1644.

Denied.