# Official Journal C 185/2008

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 185 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5122 July 2008 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 185

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5122 July 2008

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2008/C 185/01 | Special report No 4/2008 concerning the implementation of milk quotas in the Member States which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 together with the Commission's replies | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Court of Auditors

2008/C 185/01

Special report No 4/2008 concerning the implementation of milk quotas in the Member States which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 together with the Commission's replies

1

| EN | |
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EN

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES

Court of Auditors

| 22.7.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 185/1 |
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22.7.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 185/1

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SPECIAL REPORT No 4/2008

concerning the implementation of milk quotas in the Member States which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 together with the Commission's replies

(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph of the EC Treaty)

(2008/C 185/01)

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

| I-IX | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
| --- | --- |

I-IX

| 1-7 | INTRODUCTION |
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1-7

| 1-4 | General observations |
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1-4

| 5-7 | Audit objectives and approach |
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5-7

| 8-14 | SPECIFIC PRODUCTION STRUCTURES |
| --- | --- |

8-14

| 8-9 | A plethora of micro-holdings after transition |
| --- | --- |

8-9

| 10-11 | Enlargement tripled the number of EU milk producers but brought an increase in production of less than 20 % |
| --- | --- |

10-11

| 12-14 | Production units have increased in size but remained diverse in structure |
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12-14

| 15-26 | ESTABLISHING NATIONAL REFERENCE QUANTITIES (NATIONAL QUOTAS) |
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15-26

| 15 | The Commission applied a standardised methodology |
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15

| 16-17 | Sound statistical bases for adopting national reference quantities for deliveries |
| --- | --- |

16-17

| 18-19 | Data difficult to estimate for direct sales |
| --- | --- |

18-19

| 20-22 | Direct sales declared by producers were systematically lower than all statistical estimates |
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20-22

| 23-26 | The Commission released the special restructuring reserve on the basis of information difficult to verify |
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23-26

| 27-34 | THE ALLOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE QUANTITIES (INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS) |
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27-34

| 27 | Reference periods differ from one Member State to another depending on Acts of Accession |
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27

| 28-30 | The initial allocation of individual delivery quotas |
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28-30

| 31 | The initial allocation of individual direct sales quotas |
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31

| 32-34 | Commercial producers with a quota account for half of all milk producers |
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32-34

| 35-52 | INTRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME |
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35-52

| 35-39 | Adoption of the ‘acquis communautaire’ |
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35-39

| 40-43 | Systems introduced by the Member States within the allotted time, but of varying quality and with room for improvement |
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40-43

| 44-46 | Replenishment of the national reserve: options that differ from one Member State to another |
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44-46

| 47 | The use of the national reserve: varying procedures |
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47

| 48-49 | The massive conversion of unused ‘direct sales’ reference quantities |
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48-49

| 50-52 | The fat content of deliveries: an important parameter that is sometimes ignored |
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50-52

| 53-61 | CONTROLS |
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53-61

| 55-59 | Late and inadequate planning of controls by the Member States |
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55-59

| 60-61 | Late and poorly documented controls |
| --- | --- |

60-61

| 62-71 | AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST MARKETING YEARS |
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62-71

| 62-66 | The national reference quantities for ‘deliveries’ have been attained and the national reference quantities for ‘direct sales’ have been under-used |
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62-66

| 67-69 | Restructuring continues in the new Member States |
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67-69

| 70-71 | Enlargement has increased crossborder shipments without destabilising the milk CMO |
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70-71

| 72-80 | CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS |
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72-80

| 73-74 | Did the Commission prepare for and supervise the extension of the milk quota scheme to the new Member States effectively? |
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73-74

| 75-76 | Have the new Member States created adequate structures for administering milk quotas? Do the management and oversight of the scheme comply with EU legislation? |
| --- | --- |

75-76

| 77 | Does the milk quota scheme cover all milk marketed in the new Member States? |
| --- | --- |

77

| 78-80 | What overall influence has the introduction of quotas had on national dairy sectors? How has enlargement affected the milk CMO? |
| --- | --- |

78-80

The Commission's replies

ABBREVIATIONS





  AIRBC (ŽŪIKVC)

| AIRBC (ŽŪIKVC) | The Agricultural Information and Rural Business Centre (Lithuania) |
| --- | --- |
| APA Slovakia | Agricultural Paying Agency, the paying agency for agriculture in Slovakia |
| ARR | Agencja Rynku Rolnego (Agricultural Market Agency), the paying agency for agriculture in Poland |
| ARSKTRP | Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Agricultural Markets and Rural development, the paying agency for agriculture in Slovenia |
| CMO | Common Market Organisation |
| CVI | Ciltsdarba valsts inspekcija (National Inspectorate of Pedigree Breeding), the inspecting agency in Latvia |
| CY | Cyprus |
| CZ | Czech Republic |
| EE | Estonia |
| GUS | Główny Urząd Statystyczny, National Statistical Office of Poland |
| HU | Hungary |
| KSH | Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office) |
| LDC | Lauksaimniecības Datu Centrs (Agricultural Data Centre), the managing body for the quota scheme in Latvia |
| LV | Latvia |
| LT | Lithuania |
| MT | Malta |
| MVH | Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal (Agricultural and Rural Development Agency), the paying agency for agriculture and rural development in Hungary |
| NMA | Nacionalinė Mokėjimo Agentūra (National Paying Agency), the paying agency for agriculture in Lithuania |
| PL | Poland |
| PRIA | Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet (Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board), the paying and managing agency for milk quotas in Estonia |
| SI | Slovenia |
| SK | Slovakia |
| SZIF | Státní zemědělský intervenční fond (State Agricultural Intervention Fund), the paying agency for agriculture in the Czech Republic |
| ZMP | Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle für Erzeugnisse der Land-, Forst-, und Ernährungswirtschaft |

The Agricultural Information and Rural Business Centre (Lithuania)

APA Slovakia

Agricultural Paying Agency, the paying agency for agriculture in Slovakia

ARR

Agencja Rynku Rolnego (Agricultural Market Agency), the paying agency for agriculture in Poland

ARSKTRP

Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Agricultural Markets and Rural development, the paying agency for agriculture in Slovenia

CMO

Common Market Organisation

CVI

Ciltsdarba valsts inspekcija (National Inspectorate of Pedigree Breeding), the inspecting agency in Latvia

CY

Cyprus

CZ

Czech Republic

EE

Estonia

GUS

Główny Urząd Statystyczny, National Statistical Office of Poland

HU

Hungary

KSH

Központi Statisztikai Hivatal (Hungarian Central Statistical Office)

LDC

Lauksaimniecības Datu Centrs (Agricultural Data Centre), the managing body for the quota scheme in Latvia

LV

Latvia

LT

Lithuania

MT

Malta

MVH

Mezőgazdasági és Vidékfejlesztési Hivatal (Agricultural and Rural Development Agency), the paying agency for agriculture and rural development in Hungary

NMA

Nacionalinė Mokėjimo Agentūra (National Paying Agency), the paying agency for agriculture in Lithuania

PL

Poland

PRIA

Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet (Estonian Agricultural Registers and Information Board), the paying and managing agency for milk quotas in Estonia

SI

Slovenia

SK

Slovakia

SZIF

Státní zemědělský intervenční fond (State Agricultural Intervention Fund), the paying agency for agriculture in the Czech Republic

ZMP

Zentrale Markt- und Preisberichtstelle für Erzeugnisse der Land-, Forst-, und Ernährungswirtschaft

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

| I. | With the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the 10 new Member States took on the obligation to apply the milk quota scheme. The scheme requires Member States to adhere to production thresholds that are allocated to them separately for milk deliveries to dairies and direct sales to consumers, and provides for a financial penalty if the thresholds are exceeded. |
| --- | --- |

I.

With the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the 10 new Member States took on the obligation to apply the milk quota scheme. The scheme requires Member States to adhere to production thresholds that are allocated to them separately for milk deliveries to dairies and direct sales to consumers, and provides for a financial penalty if the thresholds are exceeded.

| II. | The Court audited the implementation of the milk quota scheme in the new Member States, carrying out on-the-spot checks in eight of them and basing its work on an in-depth analysis of the information provided by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

II.

The Court audited the implementation of the milk quota scheme in the new Member States, carrying out on-the-spot checks in eight of them and basing its work on an in-depth analysis of the information provided by the Commission.

| III. | In the new Member States, the dairy sector has already experienced profound changes, with the same trends in evidence everywhere: reductions in livestock, enlarged holdings, continuing rises in milk yields and an increased delivery rate. The economic development which followed the transition period has not, however, been accompanied by a reduction in what is still a substantial subsistence or semi-subsistence farming sector, thereby helping to moderate the effects of structural unemployment. |
| --- | --- |

III.

In the new Member States, the dairy sector has already experienced profound changes, with the same trends in evidence everywhere: reductions in livestock, enlarged holdings, continuing rises in milk yields and an increased delivery rate. The economic development which followed the transition period has not, however, been accompanied by a reduction in what is still a substantial subsistence or semi-subsistence farming sector, thereby helping to moderate the effects of structural unemployment.

| IV. | In this very specific context, although the delivery quotas allocated to the new Member States were estimated at levels very close to actual requirements, direct sales quotas were, by contrast, considerably overestimated on the basis of very approximate statistical data. |
| --- | --- |

IV.

In this very specific context, although the delivery quotas allocated to the new Member States were estimated at levels very close to actual requirements, direct sales quotas were, by contrast, considerably overestimated on the basis of very approximate statistical data.

| V. | When individual quotas were being allocated to producers, the auditors noted over-allocation of delivery quotas in two Member States. At the end of the first two quota years, the Court must conclude that half of all dairy holdings have not been brought within the milk quota scheme. The fact they have been excluded does not indicate an inability to implement the scheme, but rather reflects the scale of the semi-subsistence farming sector. |
| --- | --- |

V.

When individual quotas were being allocated to producers, the auditors noted over-allocation of delivery quotas in two Member States. At the end of the first two quota years, the Court must conclude that half of all dairy holdings have not been brought within the milk quota scheme. The fact they have been excluded does not indicate an inability to implement the scheme, but rather reflects the scale of the semi-subsistence farming sector.

| VI. | In the pre-accession phase, the Commission played an essential role in the negotiations to establish national quotas. As regards the Commission's activities in the 2004-2006 period, the Court noted certain shortcomings. |
| --- | --- |

VI.

In the pre-accession phase, the Commission played an essential role in the negotiations to establish national quotas. As regards the Commission's activities in the 2004-2006 period, the Court noted certain shortcomings.

| VII. | The implementation of milk quotas posed a major logistical challenge for the new Member States. On the whole, a considerable effort was made to ensure that administrative and control systems were operational in good time. At the time of the audit, these systems were still uneven in quality and were subject to comment by the Court as regards management of the ‘acquis communautaire’ and the national reserve, rules for converting quotas, and the planning and implementation of checks. |
| --- | --- |

VII.

The implementation of milk quotas posed a major logistical challenge for the new Member States. On the whole, a considerable effort was made to ensure that administrative and control systems were operational in good time. At the time of the audit, these systems were still uneven in quality and were subject to comment by the Court as regards management of the ‘acquis communautaire’ and the national reserve, rules for converting quotas, and the planning and implementation of checks.

| VIII. | Most of the shortcomings noted may be considered as intrinsic to the system's start-up phase. It is up to the Commission and the Member States to continue to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the scheme is properly managed and that proposals are drawn up for its future, it is vital for the Commission to have reliable, standardised information in order to understand the actual extent of the restructuring process and to corroborate the data on direct sales. |
| --- | --- |

VIII.

Most of the shortcomings noted may be considered as intrinsic to the system's start-up phase. It is up to the Commission and the Member States to continue to ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken. Furthermore, in order to ensure that the scheme is properly managed and that proposals are drawn up for its future, it is vital for the Commission to have reliable, standardised information in order to understand the actual extent of the restructuring process and to corroborate the data on direct sales.

| IX. | After the first two quota years, restructuring continues in the new Member States' dairy sectors. Milk deliveries have continued to increase as a proportion of total production. National delivery quotas were close to saturation, or even exceeded in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Poland. Under-use of direct sales quota was mitigated as a result of large-scale conversions of direct sales quotas into delivery quotas. There has been a move towards concentration of production units as the price of milk has risen. As a result of the enlargement, milk products have been traded more widely without destabilising the European market and without leading to budgetary drift. |
| --- | --- |

IX.

After the first two quota years, restructuring continues in the new Member States' dairy sectors. Milk deliveries have continued to increase as a proportion of total production. National delivery quotas were close to saturation, or even exceeded in the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Poland. Under-use of direct sales quota was mitigated as a result of large-scale conversions of direct sales quotas into delivery quotas. There has been a move towards concentration of production units as the price of milk has risen. As a result of the enlargement, milk products have been traded more widely without destabilising the European market and without leading to budgetary drift.

INTRODUCTION

General observations

| 1. | The milk quota scheme has applied in the European Union since the 1984-1985 milk year and will remain, if the regulations do not change, until the 2014-2015 marketing year (1). The essential aim of the scheme is to ‘reduce the imbalance between supply and demand on the milk and milk products market and the resulting structural surpluses, thereby achieving better market equilibrium’ (2). |
| --- | --- |

1.

The milk quota scheme has applied in the European Union since the 1984-1985 milk year and will remain, if the regulations do not change, until the 2014-2015 marketing year (1). The essential aim of the scheme is to ‘reduce the imbalance between supply and demand on the milk and milk products market and the resulting structural surpluses, thereby achieving better market equilibrium’ (2).

| 2. | On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the European Union. Earlier, the Copenhagen European Council, in December 2002, had set the national reference quantities applicable to dairy production in the ten candidate countries. The milk quota scheme thus came into full effect in all the new Member States on the date of enlargement, except for Poland and Slovenia which, at their own request, were granted extra time to implement the scheme completely (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.

On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the European Union. Earlier, the Copenhagen European Council, in December 2002, had set the national reference quantities applicable to dairy production in the ten candidate countries. The milk quota scheme thus came into full effect in all the new Member States on the date of enlargement, except for Poland and Slovenia which, at their own request, were granted extra time to implement the scheme completely (3).

| 3. | The accession arrangements for each new Member State, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, included the creation of a special restructuring reserve for the dairy sector (4). This reserve was available for release from 1 April 2006 to support the restructuring of the national dairy sector and, in particular ‘the shift from production for on-farm consumption to production for the market’ (5). |
| --- | --- |

3.

The accession arrangements for each new Member State, with the exception of Cyprus and Malta, included the creation of a special restructuring reserve for the dairy sector (4). This reserve was available for release from 1 April 2006 to support the restructuring of the national dairy sector and, in particular ‘the shift from production for on-farm consumption to production for the market’ (5).

| 4. | After the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the national reference quantities for the 25 Member States totalled 137,3 million tonnes. Together, the ten new Member States had 18,3 million tonnes available to them, i.e. 13,3 % of the EU total (Table 1).
  Table 1
  Initial milk quotas for the new Member States (1 May 2004)









  (tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Member States | Deliveries | Direct sales | Total | Special reserve |
| Czech Republic | 2 613 239 | 68 904 | 2 682 143 | 55 788 |
| Estonia | 537 188 | 87 365 | 624 483 | 21 885 |
| Cyprus | 141 337 | 3 863 | 145 200 | 0 |
| Latvia | 468 943 | 226 452 | 695 395 | 33 253 |
| Lithuania | 1 256 440 | 390 499 | 1 646 939 | 57 900 |
| Hungary | 1 782 650 | 164 630 | 1 947 280 | 42 780 |
| Malta | 48 698 | 0 | 48 698 | 0 |
| Poland | 8 500 000 | 464 017 | 8 964 017 | 416 126 |
| Slovenia | 467 063 | 93 361 | 560 424 | 16 214 |
| Slovakia | 990 810 | 22 506 | 1 013 316 | 27 472 |
| EU-10 | 16 806 368 | 1 521 597 | 18 327 895 | 671 418 |
| EU-15 | 117 771 708 | 1 241 943 | 119 013 651 | |
| EU-25 | 134 578 076 | 2 763 450 | 137 341 616 | |
| EU-10: Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.
  EU-15: Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 3950/92, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 739/2004. |

4.

After the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the national reference quantities for the 25 Member States totalled 137,3 million tonnes. Together, the ten new Member States had 18,3 million tonnes available to them, i.e. 13,3 % of the EU total (Table 1).

Table 1

Initial milk quotas for the new Member States (1 May 2004)

(tonnes)

Member States

Deliveries

Direct sales

Total

Special reserve

Czech Republic

2 613 239

68 904

2 682 143

55 788

Estonia

537 188

87 365

624 483

21 885

Cyprus

141 337

3 863

145 200

0

Latvia

468 943

226 452

695 395

33 253

Lithuania

1 256 440

390 499

1 646 939

57 900

Hungary

1 782 650

164 630

1 947 280

42 780

Malta

48 698

0

48 698

0

Poland

8 500 000

464 017

8 964 017

416 126

Slovenia

467 063

93 361

560 424

16 214

Slovakia

990 810

22 506

1 013 316

27 472

EU-10

16 806 368

1 521 597

18 327 895

671 418

EU-15

117 771 708

1 241 943

119 013 651

EU-25

134 578 076

2 763 450

137 341 616

EU-10: Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

EU-15: Annex to Council Regulation (EC) No 3950/92, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 739/2004.

Box 1 — The milk quota systemEach Member State is allocated a ‘national reference quantity’, i.e. a national production quota, which is subdivided into a national ‘deliveries’ quota for milk delivered to purchasers (the majority of them dairies) and a national ‘direct sales’ quota for milk sold or delivered directly by producers to consumers and for other dairy products sold or delivered by producers. Producers receive individual reference quantities for their deliveries and/or direct sales within national limits.If a Member State exceeds one of its national quotas, the Member State becomes liable to the EU for an ‘additional’ levy set at a level deemed to be dissuasive (33,27 euro per 100 kilos of milk for the 2004-2005 period), and separately determined for deliveries and direct sales. Each year before 1 September, the Member States provide the Commission with the information needed to calculate the levy. The Member State liable for the levy is required to divide it up between the producers that have contributed to the overrun of the national reference quantity, after unused reference quantities have been reallocated.The milk quota scheme imposes a general framework on Member States and guidelines to be respected when calculating the levy. The Member States nevertheless have latitude, in particular when defining the arrangements for transferring quotas between producers, to administer their national reference quantities in accordance with their own economic and social objectives, e.g. regarding the type of holding they consider desirable or even the territorial distribution of holdings. No compensation is possible between the quotas of Member States with surplus production and those with a shortfall.

Audit objectives and approach

| 5. | The aim of the audit was to check the introduction and operation of the milk quota system in the new Member States at the end of the first marketing year in which it applied (1 May 2004 to 31 March 2005) (6). The principal audit questions were as follows:






  — | Did the Commission negotiate the allocation of national reference quantities to the new Member States correctly? How did it support and supervise the extension of the scheme to these new Member States? |
| --- | --- | --- |

5.

The aim of the audit was to check the introduction and operation of the milk quota system in the new Member States at the end of the first marketing year in which it applied (1 May 2004 to 31 March 2005) (6). The principal audit questions were as follows:

—

Did the Commission negotiate the allocation of national reference quantities to the new Member States correctly? How did it support and supervise the extension of the scheme to these new Member States?

| — | Have the Member States created adequate structures to administer the milk quotas? Do their systems for managing and checking the activities of producers and purchasers comply with EU legislation? Does the milk quota scheme cover all the milk marketed in the new Member States? What influence has the introduction of quotas had on national dairy sectors? How has the introduction of quotas influenced national dairy sectors? How has enlargement affected the milk CMO? |
| --- | --- |

—

Have the Member States created adequate structures to administer the milk quotas? Do their systems for managing and checking the activities of producers and purchasers comply with EU legislation? Does the milk quota scheme cover all the milk marketed in the new Member States? What influence has the introduction of quotas had on national dairy sectors? How has the introduction of quotas influenced national dairy sectors? How has enlargement affected the milk CMO?

| 6. | In response to these questions, the Court's observations dealt with each stage in the implementation of the scheme, i.e.:






  — | the specific production structures in the new Member States which directly influenced the implementation of the milk quota system (paragraphs 8-14); |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

In response to these questions, the Court's observations dealt with each stage in the implementation of the scheme, i.e.:

—

the specific production structures in the new Member States which directly influenced the implementation of the milk quota system (paragraphs 8-14);

| — | the setting of national quotas (paragraphs 15-26); |
| --- | --- |

—

the setting of national quotas (paragraphs 15-26);

| — | the allocation of individual quotas (paragraphs 27-34); |
| --- | --- |

—

the allocation of individual quotas (paragraphs 27-34);

| — | the implementation and administration of the scheme (paragraphs 35-52); |
| --- | --- |

—

the implementation and administration of the scheme (paragraphs 35-52);

| — | the organisation and implementation of controls (paragraphs 53-61); |
| --- | --- |

—

the organisation and implementation of controls (paragraphs 53-61);

| — | an assessment of the initial quota years (paragraphs 62-71). |
| --- | --- |

—

an assessment of the initial quota years (paragraphs 62-71).

| 7. | The Court visited eight Member States in 2005 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia) and Poland and Slovenia in 2006. The Member States audited on the spot were thus central and eastern European countries (CEECs) which had made the post-Communism transition to a market economy and which together held approximately 99 % of the total reference quantities allocated to the 10 new Member States. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The Court visited eight Member States in 2005 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia) and Poland and Slovenia in 2006. The Member States audited on the spot were thus central and eastern European countries (CEECs) which had made the post-Communism transition to a market economy and which together held approximately 99 % of the total reference quantities allocated to the 10 new Member States.

SPECIFIC PRODUCTION STRUCTURES

A plethora of micro-holdings after transition

| 8. | The agricultural economies of the central and eastern European candidate countries underwent profound restructuring in the 1990s following the collapse of the Communist regimes. At the time of enlargement, and in spite of restructuring, marked differences in productivity still remained between the candidate countries and the EU-15. The handicap that the agricultural sector had to overcome, which varied in scale from one country to another, was mainly a result of under-investment, the low productivity of production inputs and delayed development in the agri-food sector (7). |
| --- | --- |

8.

The agricultural economies of the central and eastern European candidate countries underwent profound restructuring in the 1990s following the collapse of the Communist regimes. At the time of enlargement, and in spite of restructuring, marked differences in productivity still remained between the candidate countries and the EU-15. The handicap that the agricultural sector had to overcome, which varied in scale from one country to another, was mainly a result of under-investment, the low productivity of production inputs and delayed development in the agri-food sector (7).

| 9. | A corollary of the relative inefficiency of the agricultural sector, combined with high levels of structural unemployment, was the preservation or creation of a very large number of small-scale individual subsistence or semi-subsistence holdings.

  Box 2 — Semi-subsistence agricultural holdingsNo standard definition exists. Semi-subsistence agricultural holdings is the term generally applied to holdings which produce primarily for their own consumption but also market a proportion of their output. This is the definition used in the EU legislation that provides for transitional support measures for rural development in the new Member States (8).On a semi-subsistence holding, the farmer derives income from his agricultural production, although most of his income is actually made up of social benefits such as retirement pensions, or salaries and income from non-agricultural economic activities. Income in kind takes the form of on-farm consumption of food, and the self-supply of current and fixed inputs (9).The restructuring of dairy production, as the European Union understands it, entails the development of commercially viable units. Studies show, however, that traditional agricultural holdings based on semi-subsistence contribute significantly in some central and eastern European Member States to cushioning the effects of structural unemployment and they may thus continue to exist in the long term. |
| --- | --- |

9.

A corollary of the relative inefficiency of the agricultural sector, combined with high levels of structural unemployment, was the preservation or creation of a very large number of small-scale individual subsistence or semi-subsistence holdings.

Box 2 — Semi-subsistence agricultural holdingsNo standard definition exists. Semi-subsistence agricultural holdings is the term generally applied to holdings which produce primarily for their own consumption but also market a proportion of their output. This is the definition used in the EU legislation that provides for transitional support measures for rural development in the new Member States (8).On a semi-subsistence holding, the farmer derives income from his agricultural production, although most of his income is actually made up of social benefits such as retirement pensions, or salaries and income from non-agricultural economic activities. Income in kind takes the form of on-farm consumption of food, and the self-supply of current and fixed inputs (9).The restructuring of dairy production, as the European Union understands it, entails the development of commercially viable units. Studies show, however, that traditional agricultural holdings based on semi-subsistence contribute significantly in some central and eastern European Member States to cushioning the effects of structural unemployment and they may thus continue to exist in the long term.

Enlargement tripled the number of EU milk producers but brought an increase in production of less than 20 %

| 10. | Due to the small number of farms in the ten new Member States, the enlargement meant that slightly more than a million milk producers were added to the 500 000 producers already operating in EU-15. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Due to the small number of farms in the ten new Member States, the enlargement meant that slightly more than a million milk producers were added to the 500 000 producers already operating in EU-15.

| 11. | However, the million new EU producers produced only 21,7 million tonnes of milk in 2004, whereas the EU-15 producers produced 121,3 million tonnes (Table 2). On initial examination, these figures provide an adequate illustration of the difference in average productivity at the time of accession between ‘old’ and ‘new’ milk producers. It should also be noted that four Member States accounted in 2004 for 84 % of dairy production in the ten new Member States: Poland (54 %), the Czech Republic (12 %), Lithuania (9 %) and Hungary (9 %).
  Table 2
  Milk production in the CEECs (1991-2005)
















  (1000 tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| | CZ | EE | LV | LT | HU | PL | SI | SK | EU-10 | EU-15 | EU-25 |
| 1991 | 4 248 | 1 093 | 1 771 | 2 916 | 2 620 | 14 022 | 643 | 1 573 | 29 014 | 122 797 | 151 811 |
| 2000 | 2 708 | 630 | 823 | 1 725 | 2 080 | 11 900 | 649 | 1 099 | 21 807 | 121 197 | 143 005 |
| 2001 | 2 702 | 687 | 848 | 1 730 | 2 080 | 12 030 | 653 | 1 114 | 22 032 | 121 398 | 143 430 |
| 2002 | 2 801 | 612 | 814 | 1 771 | 2 068 | 11 776 | 728 | 1 163 | 21 921 | 122 188 | 144 108 |
| 2003 | 2 717 | 647 | 786 | 1 796 | 1 977 | 11 892 | 755 | 1 109 | 21 869 | 122 625 | 144 494 |
| 2004 | 2 673 | 640 | 786 | 1 850 | 1 939 | 11 810 | 815 | 1 047 | 21 745 | 121 307 | 143 052 |
| 2005 | 2 770 | 670 | 800 | 1 900 | 1 839 | 11 905 | 810 | 1 068 | 21 950 | 121 515 | 143 464 |
| Source: ZMP-Marktbilanz Milch 2006. |

11.

However, the million new EU producers produced only 21,7 million tonnes of milk in 2004, whereas the EU-15 producers produced 121,3 million tonnes (Table 2). On initial examination, these figures provide an adequate illustration of the difference in average productivity at the time of accession between ‘old’ and ‘new’ milk producers. It should also be noted that four Member States accounted in 2004 for 84 % of dairy production in the ten new Member States: Poland (54 %), the Czech Republic (12 %), Lithuania (9 %) and Hungary (9 %).

Table 2

Milk production in the CEECs (1991-2005)

(1000 tonnes)

CZ

EE

LV

LT

HU

PL

SI

SK

EU-10

EU-15

EU-25

1991

4 248

1 093

1 771

2 916

2 620

14 022

643

1 573

29 014

122 797

151 811

2000

2 708

630

823

1 725

2 080

11 900

649

1 099

21 807

121 197

143 005

2001

2 702

687

848

1 730

2 080

12 030

653

1 114

22 032

121 398

143 430

2002

2 801

612

814

1 771

2 068

11 776

728

1 163

21 921

122 188

144 108

2003

2 717

647

786

1 796

1 977

11 892

755

1 109

21 869

122 625

144 494

2004

2 673

640

786

1 850

1 939

11 810

815

1 047

21 745

121 307

143 052

2005

2 770

670

800

1 900

1 839

11 905

810

1 068

21 950

121 515

143 464

Source: ZMP-Marktbilanz Milch 2006.

Production units have increased in size but remained diverse in structure

| 12. | Apart from the individual characteristics of each new Member State, the fundamental trends in the dairy sector between 2000 and 2005 were as follows: a drop in the number of dairy cows offset by an increase in milk yields, and an increase in the average size of holdings, linked to steadily falling numbers (Illustration 1). |
| --- | --- |

12.

Apart from the individual characteristics of each new Member State, the fundamental trends in the dairy sector between 2000 and 2005 were as follows: a drop in the number of dairy cows offset by an increase in milk yields, and an increase in the average size of holdings, linked to steadily falling numbers (Illustration 1).

Image

| 13. | The countries of central and eastern Europe can be placed in two quite distinct categories:






  — | in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia, the large holdings (50 cows or more), that generally emerged from the old collective farms, account for a large share of milk production. In these Member States, the average stock of agricultural holdings is comparable to the stock in some EU-15 regions; in the Czech Republic, it is even much higher than the EU-15 average. The proportion of production delivered to dairies is regarded as an overall indicator of the level of industrialisation in the dairy sector since milk deliveries are subject to strict health standards (10). The countries where large and medium-sized structures occupy an important position are those with a delivery rate very close (in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) or fairly close (Estonia) to the EU-15 average. These Member States also have the largest average delivery quotas and the highest productivity; |
| --- | --- | --- |

13.

The countries of central and eastern Europe can be placed in two quite distinct categories:

—

in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia, the large holdings (50 cows or more), that generally emerged from the old collective farms, account for a large share of milk production. In these Member States, the average stock of agricultural holdings is comparable to the stock in some EU-15 regions; in the Czech Republic, it is even much higher than the EU-15 average. The proportion of production delivered to dairies is regarded as an overall indicator of the level of industrialisation in the dairy sector since milk deliveries are subject to strict health standards (10). The countries where large and medium-sized structures occupy an important position are those with a delivery rate very close (in the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) or fairly close (Estonia) to the EU-15 average. These Member States also have the largest average delivery quotas and the highest productivity;

| — | in Poland, by contrast, where there was little collectivisation of agriculture, and in Latvia and Lithuania, where the big State farms were dismantled, the average stock is no more than four cows. The position of Slovenia is somewhere in between. |
| --- | --- |

—

in Poland, by contrast, where there was little collectivisation of agriculture, and in Latvia and Lithuania, where the big State farms were dismantled, the average stock is no more than four cows. The position of Slovenia is somewhere in between.

| 14. | However, despite the differences in production structures in the new Member States, there remains a predominant share of small and very small farms, which are often subsistence or semi-subsistence holdings, within the total number of dairy producers. Only those marketing their production through deliveries to dairies or direct sales were required to participate in the milk quota scheme. A major challenge for each of the new Member States was to identify the producers concerned and have them join the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

14.

However, despite the differences in production structures in the new Member States, there remains a predominant share of small and very small farms, which are often subsistence or semi-subsistence holdings, within the total number of dairy producers. Only those marketing their production through deliveries to dairies or direct sales were required to participate in the milk quota scheme. A major challenge for each of the new Member States was to identify the producers concerned and have them join the scheme.

ESTABLISHING NATIONAL REFERENCE QUANTITIES (NATIONAL QUOTAS)

The Commission applied a standardised methodology

| 15. | National reference quantities were the subject of intense negotiation. The central and eastern European candidate countries, with the exception of Slovenia, could argue that their milk production had fallen sharply during the transition towards a market economy. However, the production statistics for the period prior to transition appeared unreliable. In addition, had they been taken into consideration, this would have departed from the general principle that quotas were to be based on data for the most recent production period for which information was available. Exceptional cases aside (11), in order to adopt the national reference quantities in December 2002, average milk production for 1997-1999 was taken as the starting point for negotiations. |
| --- | --- |

15.

National reference quantities were the subject of intense negotiation. The central and eastern European candidate countries, with the exception of Slovenia, could argue that their milk production had fallen sharply during the transition towards a market economy. However, the production statistics for the period prior to transition appeared unreliable. In addition, had they been taken into consideration, this would have departed from the general principle that quotas were to be based on data for the most recent production period for which information was available. Exceptional cases aside (11), in order to adopt the national reference quantities in December 2002, average milk production for 1997-1999 was taken as the starting point for negotiations.

Sound statistical bases for adopting national reference quantities for deliveries

| 16. | The candidate countries were able to provide statistics for their total national production, estimated on the basis of stock size and yields, and precise data on deliveries to dairies accounted for during the reference period. When preparations were being made for enlargement, the Commission (Enlargement DG) coordinated peer review exercises on the progress of milk quota implementation. The reliability of the statistics on milk deliveries to purchasers in the candidate countries was not called into question. |
| --- | --- |

16.

The candidate countries were able to provide statistics for their total national production, estimated on the basis of stock size and yields, and precise data on deliveries to dairies accounted for during the reference period. When preparations were being made for enlargement, the Commission (Enlargement DG) coordinated peer review exercises on the progress of milk quota implementation. The reliability of the statistics on milk deliveries to purchasers in the candidate countries was not called into question.

| 17. | For the most part, the negotiations yielded national reference quantities for deliveries that were close to the situations observed immediately prior to accession. No new Member State received an initial deliveries quota that was lower than the quantities delivered in each of the five years prior to accession. Only Poland and Lithuania obtained a deliveries quota substantially lower than they initially asked for, i.e. 65 % and 75 % respectively of their expected quota (Illustration 2). |
| --- | --- |

17.

For the most part, the negotiations yielded national reference quantities for deliveries that were close to the situations observed immediately prior to accession. No new Member State received an initial deliveries quota that was lower than the quantities delivered in each of the five years prior to accession. Only Poland and Lithuania obtained a deliveries quota substantially lower than they initially asked for, i.e. 65 % and 75 % respectively of their expected quota (Illustration 2).

Image

Data difficult to estimate for direct sales

| 18. | For the years before 2000, no specific data were compiled for direct sales and on-farm consumption of milk in the candidate countries. The Commission did not take into consideration the direct-sales data provided by the candidate countries on the grounds that they were incomplete (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia) or too approximate (Hungary and Poland). For these countries, the statistical volume of direct sales was established by subtracting from the total production volume the quantities delivered to dairies and the estimated on-farm consumption. Only the initial amounts requested by the Czech Republic and Estonia were considered by the Commission as a basis for discussion. |
| --- | --- |

18.

For the years before 2000, no specific data were compiled for direct sales and on-farm consumption of milk in the candidate countries. The Commission did not take into consideration the direct-sales data provided by the candidate countries on the grounds that they were incomplete (Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia) or too approximate (Hungary and Poland). For these countries, the statistical volume of direct sales was established by subtracting from the total production volume the quantities delivered to dairies and the estimated on-farm consumption. Only the initial amounts requested by the Czech Republic and Estonia were considered by the Commission as a basis for discussion.

| 19. | The data in Table 3 show that with the exception of Poland the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe had provided direct sales figures that were far higher than the Commission's estimates in support of their initial requests.
  Table 3
  Evolution of data on direct sales of milk and milk products














  (tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| | CZ | EE | LV | LT | HU | PL | SI | SK | Total |
| Initial request (1) | 155 000 | 90 000 | 300 000 | 550 000 | 200 000 | 564 000 | 139 000 | 61 800 | 2 059 800 |
| 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Commission position (2) | 26 686 | 77 833 | 84 307 | 284 667 | 156 333 | 1 918 867 | 92 875 | 14 000 | 2 655 568 |
| 17 | 86 | 28 | 52 | 78 | 340 | 67 | 23 | 129 |
| Quota accepted (3) | 68 904 | 87 365 | 226 452 | 390 499 | 164 630 | 464 017 | 93 361 | 22 506 | 1 517 734 |
| 44 | 97 | 75 | 71 | 82 | 82 | 67 | 36 | 74 |
| Utilisation of 2004/2005 quota(4) | 2 776 | 9 585 | 11 380 | 76 301 | 25 978 | 308 934 | 20 278 | 6 803 | 462 906 |
| 2 | 11 | 4 | 14 | 13 | 55 | 15 | 11 | 22 |
| Utilisation of 2005/2006 quota (5) | 2 600 | 8 565 | 10 748 | 55 985 | 19 313 | 195 038 | 20 085 | 3 657 | 315 991 |
| 2 | 10 | 4 | 10 | 10 | 35 | 14 | 6 | 15 |
| (1) and (2) | Commission document SEC(2002) 95 final of 30.1.2002 and documents CONF-H 21/02, CONF-PL 45/02 and CONF-SI 21/02 of 20.6.2002. |

19.

The data in Table 3 show that with the exception of Poland the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe had provided direct sales figures that were far higher than the Commission's estimates in support of their initial requests.

Table 3

Evolution of data on direct sales of milk and milk products

(tonnes)

CZ

EE

LV

LT

HU

PL

SI

SK

Total

Initial request (1)

155 000

90 000

300 000

550 000

200 000

564 000

139 000

61 800

2 059 800

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Commission position (2)

26 686

77 833

84 307

284 667

156 333

1 918 867

92 875

14 000

2 655 568

17

86

28

52

78

340

67

23

129

Quota accepted (3)

68 904

87 365

226 452

390 499

164 630

464 017

93 361

22 506

1 517 734

44

97

75

71

82

82

67

36

74

Utilisation of 2004/2005 quota(4)

2 776

9 585

11 380

76 301

25 978

308 934

20 278

6 803

462 906

2

11

4

14

13

55

15

11

22

Utilisation of 2005/2006 quota (5)

2 600

8 565

10 748

55 985

19 313

195 038

20 085

3 657

315 991

2

10

4

10

10

35

14

6

15

(1) and (2)

Commission document SEC(2002) 95 final of 30.1.2002 and documents CONF-H 21/02, CONF-PL 45/02 and CONF-SI 21/02 of 20.6.2002.

| (3) | Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Annex I to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

| (4) | Member States' replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (11 months' data extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and the paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Member States' replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (11 months' data extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and the paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP).

| (5) | Member States' replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Member States' replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

Direct sales declared by producers were systematically lower than all statistical estimates

| 20. | According to the data in Table 3, direct sales declared in the first two quota years (2004-2005 and 2005-2006) accounted for only a small percentage of the quotas granted. For the eight CEECs as a whole, there is a difference of over 1 million tonnes between the quantities recorded as direct sales and the reference quantities granted. This phenomenon is at least partly explained by the fact that, in the absence of statistical data, the method used to estimate the volume of direct sales produced results that were far removed from the actual situation, which led to the future Member States' direct sales quota requirements being overestimated on a large scale. This overestimate subsequently favoured professional producers that only delivered to dairies but had been authorised to apply for direct sales quotas before converting them into deliveries quotas. |
| --- | --- |

20.

According to the data in Table 3, direct sales declared in the first two quota years (2004-2005 and 2005-2006) accounted for only a small percentage of the quotas granted. For the eight CEECs as a whole, there is a difference of over 1 million tonnes between the quantities recorded as direct sales and the reference quantities granted. This phenomenon is at least partly explained by the fact that, in the absence of statistical data, the method used to estimate the volume of direct sales produced results that were far removed from the actual situation, which led to the future Member States' direct sales quota requirements being overestimated on a large scale. This overestimate subsequently favoured professional producers that only delivered to dairies but had been authorised to apply for direct sales quotas before converting them into deliveries quotas.

| 21. | Comparison of the recent statistics for direct sales with the quantities declared for the two first years (Table 4) shows that the quota management agencies are unaware of a considerable proportion of direct sales and that many sales are not charged to the national reference quantity. Undeclared direct sales would appear to account for more than 80 % of direct sales in Estonia and Hungary, 60 %-70 % in Slovenia, 60 %-65 % in Poland and just under 40 % in Lithuania. During the audit, the Estonian, Lithuanian, Hungarian and Slovenian authorities acknowledged that the amount of direct sales had not been declared in their entirety.
  Table 4
  Statistical direct sales and declared direct sales













  (1000 tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Direct sales | CZ | EE | LV | LT | HU | PL | SI | SK |
| Statistical data for calendar year |
| 1997 | n/a | 74 | 467 | n/a | 146 | 1 663 | n/a | 59 |
| 1998 | n/a | 75 | 345 | n/a | 150 | 1 953 | n/a | 62 |
| 1999 | n/a | 85 | 294 | n/a | 148 | 2 141 | n/a | 65 |
| 2000 | 22 | 97 | 309 | n/a | 147 | 1 700 | 91 | n/a |
| 2001 | 21 | 120 | 330 | 192 | 85 | 1 239 | 84 | n/a |
| 2002 | 13 | 63 | n/a | 142 | 77 | 1 141 | 119 | 31 |
| 2003 | 4 | 53 | n/a | 124 | 168 | 1 318 | 78 | 32 |
| 2004 | 2 | 67 | n/a | 76 | 116 | 869 | 65 | 13 |
| 2005 | 4 | 66 | n/a | 91 | 159 | 484 | 58 | 7 |
| Quantities declared for quota year |
| 2004/2005 | 3 | 10 | 11 | 76 | 26 | 309 | 20 | 7 |
| 2005/2006 | 3 | 9 | 11 | 56 | 19 | 195 | 21 | 4 |
| CZ: Report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve.
  EE: Ministry of Agriculture (1997) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (1998-2005). Extrapolation over 12 months from nine months for 2005.
  LV: ‘Additional information to the position paper of the Republic of Latvia (CONF-LV 26/02)’
  LT: Ministry of Agriculture (2001-2004) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2005).
  HU: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH).
  PL: Central Statistical Office of Poland (1997-1999) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2000-2005).
  SI: Report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve.
  SK: Paying Agency APA (1997-1999) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2002-2005).
  Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 and information provided by the paying agencies (PL and SI). For 2004-2005 (11 months), extrapolation over 12 months (CZ, LV, LT, HU and SK). |

21.

Comparison of the recent statistics for direct sales with the quantities declared for the two first years (Table 4) shows that the quota management agencies are unaware of a considerable proportion of direct sales and that many sales are not charged to the national reference quantity. Undeclared direct sales would appear to account for more than 80 % of direct sales in Estonia and Hungary, 60 %-70 % in Slovenia, 60 %-65 % in Poland and just under 40 % in Lithuania. During the audit, the Estonian, Lithuanian, Hungarian and Slovenian authorities acknowledged that the amount of direct sales had not been declared in their entirety.

Table 4

Statistical direct sales and declared direct sales

(1000 tonnes)

Direct sales

CZ

EE

LV

LT

HU

PL

SI

SK

Statistical data for calendar year

1997

n/a

74

467

n/a

146

1 663

n/a

59

1998

n/a

75

345

n/a

150

1 953

n/a

62

1999

n/a

85

294

n/a

148

2 141

n/a

65

2000

22

97

309

n/a

147

1 700

91

n/a

2001

21

120

330

192

85

1 239

84

n/a

2002

13

63

n/a

142

77

1 141

119

31

2003

4

53

n/a

124

168

1 318

78

32

2004

2

67

n/a

76

116

869

65

13

2005

4

66

n/a

91

159

484

58

7

Quantities declared for quota year

2004/2005

3

10

11

76

26

309

20

7

2005/2006

3

9

11

56

19

195

21

4

CZ: Report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve.

EE: Ministry of Agriculture (1997) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (1998-2005). Extrapolation over 12 months from nine months for 2005.

LV: ‘Additional information to the position paper of the Republic of Latvia (CONF-LV 26/02)’

LT: Ministry of Agriculture (2001-2004) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2005).

HU: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH).

PL: Central Statistical Office of Poland (1997-1999) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2000-2005).

SI: Report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve.

SK: Paying Agency APA (1997-1999) and report to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve (2002-2005).

Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 and information provided by the paying agencies (PL and SI). For 2004-2005 (11 months), extrapolation over 12 months (CZ, LV, LT, HU and SK).

| 22. | The aim of the quota scheme is that the relevant authorities in the Member States should verify that quota holders declare their direct sales in full. They must therefore possess all the necessary information to establish, even on an approximate basis, that the milk production of producers without a quota is not marketed, in other words that it is all consumed on farm. |
| --- | --- |

22.

The aim of the quota scheme is that the relevant authorities in the Member States should verify that quota holders declare their direct sales in full. They must therefore possess all the necessary information to establish, even on an approximate basis, that the milk production of producers without a quota is not marketed, in other words that it is all consumed on farm.

The Commission released the special restructuring reserve on the basis of information difficult to verify

| 23. | The new Member States of central and eastern Europe were required to present to the Commission, by 31 December 2005 at the latest, a report detailing the results and trends of the restructuring process in their dairy sectors (12). The special restructuring reserve was available for release with effect from 1 April 2006 insofar as on-farm consumption of milk and milk products in each of these countries had decreased since 1998 in Estonia and Latvia, and since 2000 in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. |
| --- | --- |

23.

The new Member States of central and eastern Europe were required to present to the Commission, by 31 December 2005 at the latest, a report detailing the results and trends of the restructuring process in their dairy sectors (12). The special restructuring reserve was available for release with effect from 1 April 2006 insofar as on-farm consumption of milk and milk products in each of these countries had decreased since 1998 in Estonia and Latvia, and since 2000 in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

| 24. | On the basis of the reports referred to above, the Commission released the whole of the special restructuring reserve for the Member States concerned, i.e. a total of 671 418 tonnes, allowing an increase of 3,7 % in the national reference quantities initially allocated to these Member States (13). |
| --- | --- |

24.

On the basis of the reports referred to above, the Commission released the whole of the special restructuring reserve for the Member States concerned, i.e. a total of 671 418 tonnes, allowing an increase of 3,7 % in the national reference quantities initially allocated to these Member States (13).

| 25. | Although the figures for direct sales and on-farm consumption are unreliable due to difficulties in dividing undelivered quantities of milk between the two statistical categories, the Commission used the changes in on-farm consumption reported by the Member States as the main assessment criterion, and did not question the data supplied by the national authorities, even after a cross-check with the replies to the annual questionnaires on the implementation of milk quotas. All the Member States concerned, except for Lithuania, reported a decline on national territory of on-farm consumption of milk and milk products. |
| --- | --- |

25.

Although the figures for direct sales and on-farm consumption are unreliable due to difficulties in dividing undelivered quantities of milk between the two statistical categories, the Commission used the changes in on-farm consumption reported by the Member States as the main assessment criterion, and did not question the data supplied by the national authorities, even after a cross-check with the replies to the annual questionnaires on the implementation of milk quotas. All the Member States concerned, except for Lithuania, reported a decline on national territory of on-farm consumption of milk and milk products.

| 26. | However, the reliability of the data forwarded to the Commission is questionable. In the Czech Republic, for example, the sharp decrease in on-farm consumption between 2000 and 2004 is chiefly due to the decrease in milk production: production for the commercial market increased by only 0,8 %. The Latvian and Slovakian authorities submitted statistics for on-farm consumption that differ significantly from the data for the same periods that were used in the membership negotiations. The special reserve provided for Lithuania was released in full, although the statistical data provided by the national authorities did not show any significant fall in on-farm consumption. For Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, statistical cross-checks (Table 5) show that on-farm consumption was underestimated in the reports submitted by these Member States, and/or that direct sales were under-declared.
  Table 5
  Comparison between quantities of milk for on-farm consumption and non-marketed quantities















  (1000 tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Member State | Approach (1)
  On-farm consumption as reported by the Member States | Approach (2)
  Estimated on-farm consumption (quantities produced and not declared) |
| 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2004/2005 | 2005/2006 |
| CZ | | | 199 | 174 | 197 | 114 | 70 | 70 | 63 | 72 |
| EE | 108 | 122 | 111 | 122 | 43 | 66 | 63 | 37 | 123 | 93 |
| LV | 381 | 349 | 357 | 343 | 350 | 302 | 268 | 251 | 271 | 232 |
| LT | n/a | n/a | n/a | 554 | 663 | 629 | 632 | 614 | 563 | 615 |
| HU | 68 | 63 | 53 | 65 | 28 | 26 | 22 | 20 | 284 | 344 |
| PL | | | 3 408 | 3 409 | 3 296 | 3 039 | 2 802 | 2 625 | 3 167 | 2 814 |
| SI | | | 99 | 96 | 119 | 85 | 82 | 79 | 131 | 120 |
| SK | 234 | 176 | 169 | 167 | 163 | 134 | 128 | 102 | 123 | 87 |
| Approach (1): Reports to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve. Reference years are underlined.
  Approach (2): Difference between production for the calendar year (per the Reports to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve) and the quantities declared to the paying agencies (replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004). |

26.

However, the reliability of the data forwarded to the Commission is questionable. In the Czech Republic, for example, the sharp decrease in on-farm consumption between 2000 and 2004 is chiefly due to the decrease in milk production: production for the commercial market increased by only 0,8 %. The Latvian and Slovakian authorities submitted statistics for on-farm consumption that differ significantly from the data for the same periods that were used in the membership negotiations. The special reserve provided for Lithuania was released in full, although the statistical data provided by the national authorities did not show any significant fall in on-farm consumption. For Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, statistical cross-checks (Table 5) show that on-farm consumption was underestimated in the reports submitted by these Member States, and/or that direct sales were under-declared.

Table 5

Comparison between quantities of milk for on-farm consumption and non-marketed quantities

(1000 tonnes)

Member State

Approach (1)

On-farm consumption as reported by the Member States

Approach (2)

Estimated on-farm consumption (quantities produced and not declared)

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2004/2005

2005/2006

CZ

199

174

197

114

70

70

63

72

EE

108

122

111

122

43

66

63

37

123

93

LV

381

349

357

343

350

302

268

251

271

232

LT

n/a

n/a

n/a

554

663

629

632

614

563

615

HU

68

63

53

65

28

26

22

20

284

344

PL

3 408

3 409

3 296

3 039

2 802

2 625

3 167

2 814

SI

99

96

119

85

82

79

131

120

SK

234

176

169

167

163

134

128

102

123

87

Approach (1): Reports to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve. Reference years are underlined.

Approach (2): Difference between production for the calendar year (per the Reports to the Commission for the release of the restructuring reserve) and the quantities declared to the paying agencies (replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004).

THE ALLOCATION OF INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE QUANTITIES (INDIVIDUAL QUOTAS)

Reference periods differ from one Member State to another depending on Acts of Accession

| 27. | Producers were notified of individual reference quantities by the national authorities before the beginning of the first quota year. Poland and Slovenia, where the obligation to apply individual reference quantities was deferred until 1 April 2005, were nevertheless in a position to allocate individual quotas for 2004-2005 and extended them to the 2005-2006 quota year. |
| --- | --- |

27.

Producers were notified of individual reference quantities by the national authorities before the beginning of the first quota year. Poland and Slovenia, where the obligation to apply individual reference quantities was deferred until 1 April 2005, were nevertheless in a position to allocate individual quotas for 2004-2005 and extended them to the 2005-2006 quota year.

The initial allocation of individual delivery quotas

| 28. | In allocating individual reference quantities for deliveries, Hungary and Slovakia did not take account of the upper limit mentioned in the EU legislation (14); these countries allocated delivery quotas to a total quantity above this limit (15). Over-allocation of quotas entailed the risk that the available national reference quantity would be more quickly exhausted by inciting producers to produce more milk. |
| --- | --- |

28.

In allocating individual reference quantities for deliveries, Hungary and Slovakia did not take account of the upper limit mentioned in the EU legislation (14); these countries allocated delivery quotas to a total quantity above this limit (15). Over-allocation of quotas entailed the risk that the available national reference quantity would be more quickly exhausted by inciting producers to produce more milk.

| 29. | In the case of Hungary, the over-allocation was resolved only in the course of the 2006-2007 campaign year, when the Council authorised the Commission, at the request of the Member States, to convert quantities from the national reserve for direct sales into quantities for delivery for the 2005-2006 quota year (16). |
| --- | --- |

29.

In the case of Hungary, the over-allocation was resolved only in the course of the 2006-2007 campaign year, when the Council authorised the Commission, at the request of the Member States, to convert quantities from the national reserve for direct sales into quantities for delivery for the 2005-2006 quota year (16).

| 30. | The Slovakian authorities took steps to ensure that individual ‘delivery’ quotas did not exceed the amended national reference quantity at the end of the 2004-2005 marketing year. However, the method used to achieve this balance does not comply with EU legislation (17). The Commission accepted the Slovakian authorities' proposal for the final distribution of the national quota between deliveries and direct sales for 2004-2005, although the additional quantities allocated to deliveries were greater than the quantities converted by producers. |
| --- | --- |

30.

The Slovakian authorities took steps to ensure that individual ‘delivery’ quotas did not exceed the amended national reference quantity at the end of the 2004-2005 marketing year. However, the method used to achieve this balance does not comply with EU legislation (17). The Commission accepted the Slovakian authorities' proposal for the final distribution of the national quota between deliveries and direct sales for 2004-2005, although the additional quantities allocated to deliveries were greater than the quantities converted by producers.

The initial allocation of individual direct sales quotas

| 31. | As regards direct sales, the Member States allocated individual quotas for total quantities that were generally far lower than the national reference quantities (Table 6). Poland was an exception. The national ‘direct sales’ reference quantity allocated to Poland of 464 017 tonnes, proved much lower than producer demand (715 921 tonnes). The Polish authorities consequently imposed a ceiling on the quantities allocated of 64 % of the quantities requested by producers.
  Table 6
  Allocation of individual direct sales quotas (2004-2005 milk year)













  (tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Quantities | CZ | EE | LV | LT | HU | PL | SI | SK |
| Ceiling for direct sales
  (1) | 68 904 | 87 365 | 226 452 | 390 499 | 164 630 | 464 017 | 93 361 | 22 506 |
| Total quantities initially allocated
  (2) | 4 360 | 11 585 | 96 580 | 115 698 | 20 018 | 458 190 | 69 446 | 11 250 |
| (2)/(1) | 6 % | 13 % | 43 % | 30 % | 12 % | 99 % | 74 % | 50 % |
| (1) Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.
  (2) Individual reference quantities allocated to producers at the beginning of the 2004-2005 milk year (data supplied by the paying agencies). |

31.

As regards direct sales, the Member States allocated individual quotas for total quantities that were generally far lower than the national reference quantities (Table 6). Poland was an exception. The national ‘direct sales’ reference quantity allocated to Poland of 464 017 tonnes, proved much lower than producer demand (715 921 tonnes). The Polish authorities consequently imposed a ceiling on the quantities allocated of 64 % of the quantities requested by producers.

Table 6

Allocation of individual direct sales quotas (2004-2005 milk year)

(tonnes)

Quantities

CZ

EE

LV

LT

HU

PL

SI

SK

Ceiling for direct sales

(1)

68 904

87 365

226 452

390 499

164 630

464 017

93 361

22 506

Total quantities initially allocated

(2)

4 360

11 585

96 580

115 698

20 018

458 190

69 446

11 250

(2)/(1)

6 %

13 %

43 %

30 %

12 %

99 %

74 %

50 %

(1) Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

(2) Individual reference quantities allocated to producers at the beginning of the 2004-2005 milk year (data supplied by the paying agencies).

Commercial producers with a quota account for half of all milk producers

| 32. | Milk producers join the quota scheme on their own initiative. Reference quantities are allocated to them on application in accordance with the arrangements adopted by the national authorities. In most of the new central and eastern European Member States, approximately half of all producers remained outside the quota scheme (Table 7 and Box 3). The estimated participation rates for the scheme are particularly low in Slovakia (6 %), Estonia (less than 20 %) and Hungary (30-40 %). The Court's assessment is that milk production of approximately 3,6 million tonnes (18) is not covered by the quota scheme for the eight new Member States of central and eastern Europe, i.e. 17 % of their total production.
  Table 7
  Number of dairy holdings and number of quota holders (2004-2005 and 2005-2006)














  2004-2005 | CZ | EE | LV | LT | HU | PL | SI | SK | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2005-2006 |
| (1)
  Holdings | 8 450 | 12 400 | 61 239 | 195 231 | 22 000 | 734 112 | 17 190 | 14 230 | 1 064 852 |
| 6 780 | 9 210 | 50 900 | 170 790 | 16 250 | 727 100 | 19 710 | 13 460 | 1 014 199 |
| (2)
  Deliveries (producers) | 2 950 | 1 585 | 24 409 | 99 384 | 5 194 | 310 460 | 10 148 | 800 | 454 930 |
| 2 871 | 1 525 | 22 919 | 86 601 | 4 821 | 284 475 | 9 509 | 740 | 413 461 |
| (3)
  Direct sales (producers) | 252 | 443 | 2 253 | 22 516 | 1 284 | 76 014 | 2 624 | 99 | 105 485 |
| 264 | 437 | 1 808 | 16 027 | 1 561 | 52 837 | 2 509 | 100 | 75 543 |
| (4)
  Total | 2 991 | 1 859 | 25 457 | 112 073 | 6 076 | 374 000 | 10 575 | 814 | 533 845 |
| 2 903 | 1 752 | 24 039 | 98 387 | 5 980 | 330 019 | 9 956 | 766 | 473 802 |
| (5)
  Holdings outside the system | 5 459 | 10 541 | 35 782 | 83 158 | 15 924 | 360 112 | 6 615 | 13 416 | 531 007 |
| 65 % | 85 % | 58 % | 43 % | 72 % | 49 % | 39 % | 94 % | 50 % |
| 3 877 | 7 458 | 26 861 | 72 403 | 10 270 | 397 081 | 9 754 | 12 694 | 540 397 |
| 57 % | 81 % | 53 % | 42 % | 63 % | 55 % | 50 % | 94 % | 53 % |
| (1) 2004-2005 milk year: Eurostat 2003 data for all Member States except LV (2004 data of the Latvian Central Bureau of Statistics), LT (AIRBC 2004 data) and PL (ARR 2004 data);2005-2006 milk year: Eurostat 2005 data.
  (2), (3) and (4) Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 and information from paying agencies (PL and SI for 2004-2005). |

32.

Milk producers join the quota scheme on their own initiative. Reference quantities are allocated to them on application in accordance with the arrangements adopted by the national authorities. In most of the new central and eastern European Member States, approximately half of all producers remained outside the quota scheme (Table 7 and Box 3). The estimated participation rates for the scheme are particularly low in Slovakia (6 %), Estonia (less than 20 %) and Hungary (30-40 %). The Court's assessment is that milk production of approximately 3,6 million tonnes (18) is not covered by the quota scheme for the eight new Member States of central and eastern Europe, i.e. 17 % of their total production.

Table 7

Number of dairy holdings and number of quota holders (2004-2005 and 2005-2006)

2004-2005

CZ

EE

LV

LT

HU

PL

SI

SK

Total

2005-2006

(1)

Holdings

8 450

12 400

61 239

195 231

22 000

734 112

17 190

14 230

1 064 852

6 780

9 210

50 900

170 790

16 250

727 100

19 710

13 460

1 014 199

(2)

Deliveries (producers)

2 950

1 585

24 409

99 384

5 194

310 460

10 148

800

454 930

2 871

1 525

22 919

86 601

4 821

284 475

9 509

740

413 461

(3)

Direct sales (producers)

252

443

2 253

22 516

1 284

76 014

2 624

99

105 485

264

437

1 808

16 027

1 561

52 837

2 509

100

75 543

(4)

Total

2 991

1 859

25 457

112 073

6 076

374 000

10 575

814

533 845

2 903

1 752

24 039

98 387

5 980

330 019

9 956

766

473 802

(5)

Holdings outside the system

5 459

10 541

35 782

83 158

15 924

360 112

6 615

13 416

531 007

65 %

85 %

58 %

43 %

72 %

49 %

39 %

94 %

50 %

3 877

7 458

26 861

72 403

10 270

397 081

9 754

12 694

540 397

57 %

81 %

53 %

42 %

63 %

55 %

50 %

94 %

53 %

(1) 2004-2005 milk year: Eurostat 2003 data for all Member States except LV (2004 data of the Latvian Central Bureau of Statistics), LT (AIRBC 2004 data) and PL (ARR 2004 data);2005-2006 milk year: Eurostat 2005 data.

(2), (3) and (4) Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 and information from paying agencies (PL and SI for 2004-2005).

| 33. | However, the low rate of producer participation does not suffice as an indicator to cast doubt on the new Member States' administrative capacity to operate the milk quota system. It is worth noting that, overall, 70 % of dairy holdings in the new central and eastern European Member States consist of no more than two cows and may therefore be part of the subsistence or semi-subsistence sector. Since the total number of such micro-holdings (680 000) is more than 25 % of the total number of holdings without a quota, it may be concluded that most of the holdings without a quota are indeed non-commercial or semi-commercial holdings. |
| --- | --- |

33.

However, the low rate of producer participation does not suffice as an indicator to cast doubt on the new Member States' administrative capacity to operate the milk quota system. It is worth noting that, overall, 70 % of dairy holdings in the new central and eastern European Member States consist of no more than two cows and may therefore be part of the subsistence or semi-subsistence sector. Since the total number of such micro-holdings (680 000) is more than 25 % of the total number of holdings without a quota, it may be concluded that most of the holdings without a quota are indeed non-commercial or semi-commercial holdings.

| 34. | The level of producer participation varies considerably from one Member State to the next. Some Member States permitted and encouraged the distribution of small and very small quotas. Producers allocated reference quantities under 1 000 kg (deliveries and/or direct sales) for the first year thus accounted for 12 % of quota-holders in Latvia and 6 % in Lithuania. By contrast, producers with quotas under 1 000 kg accounted for under 2 % of quota-holders in Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, no producer had been allocated a reference quantity under 1 000 kg. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the quota allocation policy was clearly orientated towards large commercial producers. In these Member States, approximately 75 % of delivery quota holders have a herd of more than 50 cows.

  Box 3 — Producers without milk quotas — The cases of Lithuania and SlovakiaIn Lithuania, 43 % of milk producers did not receive a quota.At the time of accession, milk was still produced by a large number of producers (195 231), almost all of which (95 %) had no more than five cows. The process of structural concentration is slow but perceptible, as evidenced, for example, by the increase between 2001 and 2005 in the number of holdings with six or more cows (from 4 501 holdings in 2001, or 2 % of holdings to 11 242 holdings in 2005, or 6,2 % of holdings). There was a parallel decline in the number of very small structures resulting from land privatisation, but these are still very significant in numerical terms.The audit showed that milk quotas had been the subject of a well-organised publicity campaign aimed at all producers. Given the nature of the dairy sector in Lithuania, the 57 % rate of coverage achieved by the Lithuanian authorities for the first quota year seems reasonable.For the 2004-2005 marketing year, 77 484 producers with only one or two cows received a quota, although their total number was 138 591 (19). The difference (61 107 producers) constitutes the majority of the population of producers without a quota (63 723). It is likely that producers that have no quota and only one or two cows, practise subsistence or semi-subsistence farming. It is also the managing agencies’ responsibility to check that these producers make no undeclared direct sales.In Slovakia, 94 % of milk producers received no quota.Slovakia's agricultural economy divides into two clear parts. A large number of family farms (15 586 in 2001, 9 853 in 2005) co-exist with a limited number of farms set up as commercial entities (2 087 in 2001, 1 696 in 2005). In 2005, 89 % of family holdings had only one cow; 10 % had two or three. In the case of commercial holdings, 38 % had more than 50 cows. Only 6 % of the national dairy stock belonged to family farms and 94 % to commercial holdings.A system of milk quotas was applied in Slovakia prior to accession. However, there were no ‘direct sales’ quotas and ‘deliveries’ quotas were granted only to producers delivering over 20 000 litres per year. In 2002, 950 producers held a quota and around 1 000 small producers (20) made direct sales or deliveries below 20 000 litres per year.For the first quota year (2004-2005), by allocating only 814 quotas for deliveries or direct sales, the Slovakian authorities gave priority to bringing commercial entities under the system. According to the auditors’ estimate, 78 % of delivery quota holders had at least 50 cows, while 21 % had between two and 49 cows. The very small quotas, corresponding to fewer than two cows accounted for 1 % of the total. |
| --- | --- |

34.

The level of producer participation varies considerably from one Member State to the next. Some Member States permitted and encouraged the distribution of small and very small quotas. Producers allocated reference quantities under 1 000 kg (deliveries and/or direct sales) for the first year thus accounted for 12 % of quota-holders in Latvia and 6 % in Lithuania. By contrast, producers with quotas under 1 000 kg accounted for under 2 % of quota-holders in Poland, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic. In Slovakia, no producer had been allocated a reference quantity under 1 000 kg. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the quota allocation policy was clearly orientated towards large commercial producers. In these Member States, approximately 75 % of delivery quota holders have a herd of more than 50 cows.

Box 3 — Producers without milk quotas — The cases of Lithuania and SlovakiaIn Lithuania, 43 % of milk producers did not receive a quota.At the time of accession, milk was still produced by a large number of producers (195 231), almost all of which (95 %) had no more than five cows. The process of structural concentration is slow but perceptible, as evidenced, for example, by the increase between 2001 and 2005 in the number of holdings with six or more cows (from 4 501 holdings in 2001, or 2 % of holdings to 11 242 holdings in 2005, or 6,2 % of holdings). There was a parallel decline in the number of very small structures resulting from land privatisation, but these are still very significant in numerical terms.The audit showed that milk quotas had been the subject of a well-organised publicity campaign aimed at all producers. Given the nature of the dairy sector in Lithuania, the 57 % rate of coverage achieved by the Lithuanian authorities for the first quota year seems reasonable.For the 2004-2005 marketing year, 77 484 producers with only one or two cows received a quota, although their total number was 138 591 (19). The difference (61 107 producers) constitutes the majority of the population of producers without a quota (63 723). It is likely that producers that have no quota and only one or two cows, practise subsistence or semi-subsistence farming. It is also the managing agencies’ responsibility to check that these producers make no undeclared direct sales.In Slovakia, 94 % of milk producers received no quota.Slovakia's agricultural economy divides into two clear parts. A large number of family farms (15 586 in 2001, 9 853 in 2005) co-exist with a limited number of farms set up as commercial entities (2 087 in 2001, 1 696 in 2005). In 2005, 89 % of family holdings had only one cow; 10 % had two or three. In the case of commercial holdings, 38 % had more than 50 cows. Only 6 % of the national dairy stock belonged to family farms and 94 % to commercial holdings.A system of milk quotas was applied in Slovakia prior to accession. However, there were no ‘direct sales’ quotas and ‘deliveries’ quotas were granted only to producers delivering over 20 000 litres per year. In 2002, 950 producers held a quota and around 1 000 small producers (20) made direct sales or deliveries below 20 000 litres per year.For the first quota year (2004-2005), by allocating only 814 quotas for deliveries or direct sales, the Slovakian authorities gave priority to bringing commercial entities under the system. According to the auditors’ estimate, 78 % of delivery quota holders had at least 50 cows, while 21 % had between two and 49 cows. The very small quotas, corresponding to fewer than two cows accounted for 1 % of the total.

INTRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME

Adoption of the ‘acquis communautaire’

| 35. | As part of the shared management that is characteristic of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Member States take appropriate action to implement the regulations on the establishment of a levy in the milk and milk products sector (Box 1). The Member States are required to provide the Commission with a limited amount of information. Before 1 September each year, they complete and return to the Commission a questionnaire which is then used to calculate the levy (21). Furthermore the Member States were required to provide the Commission, by 1 September 2004 (22), with a short report on their system for managing national reference quantities (23). After a reminder from the Commission, the Maltese and Slovene authorities submitted this short report in February 2007, followed by the Polish authorities in March 2007. |
| --- | --- |

35.

As part of the shared management that is characteristic of the Common Agricultural Policy, the Member States take appropriate action to implement the regulations on the establishment of a levy in the milk and milk products sector (Box 1). The Member States are required to provide the Commission with a limited amount of information. Before 1 September each year, they complete and return to the Commission a questionnaire which is then used to calculate the levy (21). Furthermore the Member States were required to provide the Commission, by 1 September 2004 (22), with a short report on their system for managing national reference quantities (23). After a reminder from the Commission, the Maltese and Slovene authorities submitted this short report in February 2007, followed by the Polish authorities in March 2007.

| 36. | Although EU legislation applies directly, all the new Member States have included the EU's milk-quota acquis as part of national legislation or administrative provisions. In Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia the regulatory framework adopted by the national authorities gave rise to the comments below. |
| --- | --- |

36.

Although EU legislation applies directly, all the new Member States have included the EU's milk-quota acquis as part of national legislation or administrative provisions. In Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia the regulatory framework adopted by the national authorities gave rise to the comments below.

| 37. | Since Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 gives no working definition of deliveries, the Lithuanian authorities decided that deliveries concern milk ‘that can be sold to a purchaser’. Thus, any occasional transfer free of charge by a producer should not be counted as a delivery. There is risk that a producer that has exceeded its quota may transfer its milk free of charge so as to avoid paying the levy. Under EU legislation, the Member States must ensure that all milk delivered, even free of charge, is declared. |
| --- | --- |

37.

Since Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 gives no working definition of deliveries, the Lithuanian authorities decided that deliveries concern milk ‘that can be sold to a purchaser’. Thus, any occasional transfer free of charge by a producer should not be counted as a delivery. There is risk that a producer that has exceeded its quota may transfer its milk free of charge so as to avoid paying the levy. Under EU legislation, the Member States must ensure that all milk delivered, even free of charge, is declared.

| 38. | In Hungary, the sum of individual reference quantities for producers in a dairy cooperative may be treated as if it were a single overall quota. If some producers in the cooperative exceed their individual quotas, the cooperative receives compensation. If a levy is payable at national level, the cooperative is not held liable as long as the total for affiliated producers' quotas is not exceeded. Under EU legislation, individual reference quantities may be merged only if the cooperative is an approved purchaser. During the audit, the Hungarian authorities acknowledged the need to amend national legislation on dairy cooperatives that are not approved purchasers. |
| --- | --- |

38.

In Hungary, the sum of individual reference quantities for producers in a dairy cooperative may be treated as if it were a single overall quota. If some producers in the cooperative exceed their individual quotas, the cooperative receives compensation. If a levy is payable at national level, the cooperative is not held liable as long as the total for affiliated producers' quotas is not exceeded. Under EU legislation, individual reference quantities may be merged only if the cooperative is an approved purchaser. During the audit, the Hungarian authorities acknowledged the need to amend national legislation on dairy cooperatives that are not approved purchasers.

| 39. | Hungary and Slovakia allowed for the possibility of being an approved purchaser and a producer at the same time. Combining the roles of purchaser and producer entails specific risks that should be taken into consideration in risk analysis and on-the-spot checks. The fact that the entire document chain (registers, declarations, supporting documents and analysis findings) is managed by a single party increases the risk of data being manipulated in the event that the national reference quantity is exceeded and a levy is established. In such an eventuality, producers/purchasers would then have to provide data for calculating a levy for which they themselves were liable. |
| --- | --- |

39.

Hungary and Slovakia allowed for the possibility of being an approved purchaser and a producer at the same time. Combining the roles of purchaser and producer entails specific risks that should be taken into consideration in risk analysis and on-the-spot checks. The fact that the entire document chain (registers, declarations, supporting documents and analysis findings) is managed by a single party increases the risk of data being manipulated in the event that the national reference quantity is exceeded and a levy is established. In such an eventuality, producers/purchasers would then have to provide data for calculating a levy for which they themselves were liable.

Systems introduced by the Member States within the allotted time, but of varying quality and with room for improvement

| 40. | The new Member States visited by the Court (including Poland and Slovenia) had put in place the structures essential for getting the system off the ground and for the everyday management of milk quotas as early as 1 May 2004. In due course, managers had the operational facility to manage the file on holders of reference quantities and the file on purchasers, to charge declared quantities against reference quantities, to use the national reserve, to manage quota transactions (purchase, leasing, transfer, inheritance and cessation of production) and to adjust delivered quantities on the basis of fat content. |
| --- | --- |

40.

The new Member States visited by the Court (including Poland and Slovenia) had put in place the structures essential for getting the system off the ground and for the everyday management of milk quotas as early as 1 May 2004. In due course, managers had the operational facility to manage the file on holders of reference quantities and the file on purchasers, to charge declared quantities against reference quantities, to use the national reserve, to manage quota transactions (purchase, leasing, transfer, inheritance and cessation of production) and to adjust delivered quantities on the basis of fat content.

| 41. | It is worth underlining this overall result, insofar as it contrasts with the long period of uncertainty which followed the introduction of milk quotas in some old Member States after 1984 due to negligence in the administration of the scheme and a large number of protracted legal cases (24). |
| --- | --- |

41.

It is worth underlining this overall result, insofar as it contrasts with the long period of uncertainty which followed the introduction of milk quotas in some old Member States after 1984 due to negligence in the administration of the scheme and a large number of protracted legal cases (24).

| 42. | The systems encountered in the new Member States nevertheless appeared to vary in quality as regards internal control. The audit highlighted transactions that were inadequately traced and delays in updating the quota database in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In Slovakia, the computer system initially in place was rudimentary; in the absence of an integrated database, APA managers created a spreadsheet at the beginning of the year containing the individual quota allocations and another file at the end of the year listing deliveries and individual direct sales. In the meantime, the APA had no information about changes in the situation of producers. |
| --- | --- |

42.

The systems encountered in the new Member States nevertheless appeared to vary in quality as regards internal control. The audit highlighted transactions that were inadequately traced and delays in updating the quota database in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In Slovakia, the computer system initially in place was rudimentary; in the absence of an integrated database, APA managers created a spreadsheet at the beginning of the year containing the individual quota allocations and another file at the end of the year listing deliveries and individual direct sales. In the meantime, the APA had no information about changes in the situation of producers.

| 43. | At the time of the Court's audit, the Commission had not yet carried out any detailed on-the-spot checks in the new Member States to ensure that the scheme was running smoothly, the checks provided for in the legislation had been implemented and the weaknesses identified in the peer review exercises had been rectified. The visits that it made to the new Member States in 2005 with a view to clearing the accounts gave rise to no specific comments about milk quotas. |
| --- | --- |

43.

At the time of the Court's audit, the Commission had not yet carried out any detailed on-the-spot checks in the new Member States to ensure that the scheme was running smoothly, the checks provided for in the legislation had been implemented and the weaknesses identified in the peer review exercises had been rectified. The visits that it made to the new Member States in 2005 with a view to clearing the accounts gave rise to no specific comments about milk quotas.

Replenishment of the national reserve: options that differ from one Member State to another

| 44. | The milk quota scheme provides for the establishment of a national reserve, distinguishing between deliveries and direct sales. The Member States may replenish the national reserve by taking back unused reference quantities, retaining part of transfers or making an across-the-board reduction in quotas. |
| --- | --- |

44.

The milk quota scheme provides for the establishment of a national reserve, distinguishing between deliveries and direct sales. The Member States may replenish the national reserve by taking back unused reference quantities, retaining part of transfers or making an across-the-board reduction in quotas.

| 45. | The Member States are therefore allowed to recover some or all of the quantities that are not used when a producer does not market at least 70 % of its individual reference quantity over a 12-month period (25). The new Member States have adopted different practices. Producers that under-used their quota during the first quota year were not penalised in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic because the year was based on 11 rather than 12 months. The Estonian authorities did not take this factor into account and reduced quotas. During the first quota year (2004-2005), the Slovakian authorities applied a penalty system that had been in force prior to accession (26) and was stricter than the one laid down in EU legislation. |
| --- | --- |

45.

The Member States are therefore allowed to recover some or all of the quantities that are not used when a producer does not market at least 70 % of its individual reference quantity over a 12-month period (25). The new Member States have adopted different practices. Producers that under-used their quota during the first quota year were not penalised in Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and the Czech Republic because the year was based on 11 rather than 12 months. The Estonian authorities did not take this factor into account and reduced quotas. During the first quota year (2004-2005), the Slovakian authorities applied a penalty system that had been in force prior to accession (26) and was stricter than the one laid down in EU legislation.

| 46. | In cases of force majeure or in duly substantiated situations, the arrangements for withdrawing quantities belonging to partly or wholly inactive producers do not apply (27). In Poland, withdrawal decisions were made in 2005 and 2006 in respect of producers that were completely inactive or that had used less than 70 % of their reference quantity. Approximately 3 900 producers, i.e. 1 %, were completely inactive in 2004-2005. However, they kept their full quota for 2005-2006 after lodging an appeal with the paying agency. Appeals are assessed and a decision taken by the regional directors of the paying agency (ARR), even though national provisions have not been adopted to guarantee uniform treatment of such appeals. |
| --- | --- |

46.

In cases of force majeure or in duly substantiated situations, the arrangements for withdrawing quantities belonging to partly or wholly inactive producers do not apply (27). In Poland, withdrawal decisions were made in 2005 and 2006 in respect of producers that were completely inactive or that had used less than 70 % of their reference quantity. Approximately 3 900 producers, i.e. 1 %, were completely inactive in 2004-2005. However, they kept their full quota for 2005-2006 after lodging an appeal with the paying agency. Appeals are assessed and a decision taken by the regional directors of the paying agency (ARR), even though national provisions have not been adopted to guarantee uniform treatment of such appeals.

The use of the national reserve: varying procedures

| 47. | The purpose of the national reserve is to allocate quotas to new producers or additional quantities to existing producers on the basis of objective criteria set by the national authorities. The allocation criteria applied in some new Member States have deliberately excluded certain applicants. Some Member States also used the national reserve to convert available quantities intended for direct sale into delivery quotas on a massive scale (Box 4).

  Box 4 — Allocation of quantities from the national reserveIn Poland, national legislation did not allow new producers to receive quotas from the national reserve. However, the quotas allocated to existing producers were not limited to the quantities requested by producers. Some producers were therefore allocated reference quantities in excess of their requirements, as a result of which the ‘deliveries’ national reserve was quickly exhausted.In Lithuania, producers with fewer than five cows were not allowed to receive reference quantities from the national reserve in 2004-2005.In Estonia and Hungary, during the first two quota years, direct sales quotas were systematically granted from the national reserve to producers that made no direct sales and had no intention of doing so. This practice is explained by the respective allocation criteria applied in Estonia (utilisation rate of the overall quota) and Hungary (inadequate delivery quota).Hungary and Slovakia continued to allocate additional delivery quotas for 2004-2005 even though the national reserve for deliveries had become negative. |
| --- | --- |

47.

The purpose of the national reserve is to allocate quotas to new producers or additional quantities to existing producers on the basis of objective criteria set by the national authorities. The allocation criteria applied in some new Member States have deliberately excluded certain applicants. Some Member States also used the national reserve to convert available quantities intended for direct sale into delivery quotas on a massive scale (Box 4).

Box 4 — Allocation of quantities from the national reserveIn Poland, national legislation did not allow new producers to receive quotas from the national reserve. However, the quotas allocated to existing producers were not limited to the quantities requested by producers. Some producers were therefore allocated reference quantities in excess of their requirements, as a result of which the ‘deliveries’ national reserve was quickly exhausted.In Lithuania, producers with fewer than five cows were not allowed to receive reference quantities from the national reserve in 2004-2005.In Estonia and Hungary, during the first two quota years, direct sales quotas were systematically granted from the national reserve to producers that made no direct sales and had no intention of doing so. This practice is explained by the respective allocation criteria applied in Estonia (utilisation rate of the overall quota) and Hungary (inadequate delivery quota).Hungary and Slovakia continued to allocate additional delivery quotas for 2004-2005 even though the national reserve for deliveries had become negative.

The massive conversion of unused ‘direct sales’ reference quantities

| 48. | The first two milk marketing years in the new Member States were marked by a shortage of reference quantities in the national reserve for deliveries, while sizeable quantities were left unused in the national reserve for direct sales. The twofold problem of overestimating the new Member States' requirements in terms of direct sales quotas and the under-declaration of direct sales was mentioned above (see paragraphs 20 et seq.). |
| --- | --- |

48.

The first two milk marketing years in the new Member States were marked by a shortage of reference quantities in the national reserve for deliveries, while sizeable quantities were left unused in the national reserve for direct sales. The twofold problem of overestimating the new Member States' requirements in terms of direct sales quotas and the under-declaration of direct sales was mentioned above (see paragraphs 20 et seq.).

| 49. | In order to increase the quantities available for delivery, the new Member States were allowed to authorise the conversion of ‘direct sales’ reference quantities into ‘deliveries’ reference quantities and vice versa, at the duly justified request of the producer (28). In all of the new Member States these provisions were intensively applied. The transformation of direct sales quotas into delivery quotas was particularly extensive in the Czech Republic and the Baltic States (Illustration 3). |
| --- | --- |

49.

In order to increase the quantities available for delivery, the new Member States were allowed to authorise the conversion of ‘direct sales’ reference quantities into ‘deliveries’ reference quantities and vice versa, at the duly justified request of the producer (28). In all of the new Member States these provisions were intensively applied. The transformation of direct sales quotas into delivery quotas was particularly extensive in the Czech Republic and the Baltic States (Illustration 3).

Image

The fat content of deliveries: an important parameter that is sometimes ignored

| 50. | Milk quotas limit the quantities of milk that are marketed but also, where deliveries are concerned, the production of fat. Each delivery quota is therefore allocated a representative fat content or individual reference fat content based on historic yield data for the producer. The quantities delivered are adjusted up or down for each producer, based on the difference between the actual fat content and the individual reference fat content. The latter is therefore an important parameter in the definitive statement of quantities delivered. |
| --- | --- |

50.

Milk quotas limit the quantities of milk that are marketed but also, where deliveries are concerned, the production of fat. Each delivery quota is therefore allocated a representative fat content or individual reference fat content based on historic yield data for the producer. The quantities delivered are adjusted up or down for each producer, based on the difference between the actual fat content and the individual reference fat content. The latter is therefore an important parameter in the definitive statement of quantities delivered.

| 51. | In Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia, some producers made deliveries during the 2004-2005 marketing year without a quota or a reference fat content. In Poland, the system does not detect producers that have received an unrealistic reference fat content, i.e. beyond the 30-50 g/kg range. For 2004-2005, the Court identified some producers with abnormally low or abnormally high reference quantities. |
| --- | --- |

51.

In Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia, some producers made deliveries during the 2004-2005 marketing year without a quota or a reference fat content. In Poland, the system does not detect producers that have received an unrealistic reference fat content, i.e. beyond the 30-50 g/kg range. For 2004-2005, the Court identified some producers with abnormally low or abnormally high reference quantities.

| 52. | When ‘direct sales’ quantities are converted into ‘deliveries’ quantities, the reference fat content associated with the converted quota is 38 g/kg (29). The reference content for deliveries may remain the same only if the producer provides supporting documentation deemed satisfactory by the relevant authority. The Czech, Lithuanian and Slovakian authorities do not take account of this constraint; they systematically refrain from changing the reference content of producers that have carried out a conversion. |
| --- | --- |

52.

When ‘direct sales’ quantities are converted into ‘deliveries’ quantities, the reference fat content associated with the converted quota is 38 g/kg (29). The reference content for deliveries may remain the same only if the producer provides supporting documentation deemed satisfactory by the relevant authority. The Czech, Lithuanian and Slovakian authorities do not take account of this constraint; they systematically refrain from changing the reference content of producers that have carried out a conversion.

CONTROLS

| 53. | EU legislation requires a number of controls to be implemented (30). The Member States are required to check the accuracy of declarations by producers and purchasers and to ensure, where appropriate, that the burden of the levy actually falls on the producers responsible for the overrun of the national reference quantities. |
| --- | --- |

53.

EU legislation requires a number of controls to be implemented (30). The Member States are required to check the accuracy of declarations by producers and purchasers and to ensure, where appropriate, that the burden of the levy actually falls on the producers responsible for the overrun of the national reference quantities.

| 54. | The audit showed that considerable improvements could be made in the way the controls were planned and implemented. |
| --- | --- |

54.

The audit showed that considerable improvements could be made in the way the controls were planned and implemented.

Late and inadequate planning of controls by the Member States

| 55. | The relevant national authorities must draw up a control plan for each 12-month period on the basis of risk analysis. The controls (on farms, during transport and at the purchaser's) must be carried out during and after the quota year, and no later than 18 months after the end of the marketing year concerned. |
| --- | --- |

55.

The relevant national authorities must draw up a control plan for each 12-month period on the basis of risk analysis. The controls (on farms, during transport and at the purchaser's) must be carried out during and after the quota year, and no later than 18 months after the end of the marketing year concerned.

| 56. | In some Member States, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, the control plans were published late. The control plan must also include the list of purchasers and producers chosen, which was not the case in Slovakia and Hungary, for the 2004-2005 quota year. |
| --- | --- |

56.

In some Member States, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, the control plans were published late. The control plan must also include the list of purchasers and producers chosen, which was not the case in Slovakia and Hungary, for the 2004-2005 quota year.

| 57. | The risk analysis for the controls covering the 2004-2005 marketing year was rudimentary in Hungary and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic and Latvia, the risk analysis became available only in March 2005, i.e. at the end of the marketing year. In Poland, the checks performed during 2005-2006 were not based on risk analysis; this was performed after the marketing year had ended. |
| --- | --- |

57.

The risk analysis for the controls covering the 2004-2005 marketing year was rudimentary in Hungary and Slovakia. In the Czech Republic and Latvia, the risk analysis became available only in March 2005, i.e. at the end of the marketing year. In Poland, the checks performed during 2005-2006 were not based on risk analysis; this was performed after the marketing year had ended.

| 58. | It should be borne in mind that approximately 17 % of the new Member States' milk production comes from producers without a quota, the majority of whom are small producers with herds of no more than four cows. Statistical cross-checks show, however, that a proportion of these producers without a quota market milk, essentially in the form of direct sales. As a rule, risk analysis in the new Member States does not take account of producers without a quota. As these producers are practically never checked, the national authorities have no reasonable assurance that all producers correctly declare the quantities of milk they market. The risk of under-declaration is nevertheless lower for deliveries than for direct sales. The fact is that it is very difficult to check that direct sales made without a quota have been properly declared. Deliveries by producers without a quota can, however, be checked from purchasers' accounts. The Court identified producers who delivered milk without a quota or an individual fat reference quantity, principally in Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia (31). |
| --- | --- |

58.

It should be borne in mind that approximately 17 % of the new Member States' milk production comes from producers without a quota, the majority of whom are small producers with herds of no more than four cows. Statistical cross-checks show, however, that a proportion of these producers without a quota market milk, essentially in the form of direct sales. As a rule, risk analysis in the new Member States does not take account of producers without a quota. As these producers are practically never checked, the national authorities have no reasonable assurance that all producers correctly declare the quantities of milk they market. The risk of under-declaration is nevertheless lower for deliveries than for direct sales. The fact is that it is very difficult to check that direct sales made without a quota have been properly declared. Deliveries by producers without a quota can, however, be checked from purchasers' accounts. The Court identified producers who delivered milk without a quota or an individual fat reference quantity, principally in Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary and Slovakia (31).

| 59. | None of the new Member States visited, except for Lithuania, systematically cross-checked the milk quotas database against the animal identification database. This type of cross-check would, however, identify clear risks to the scheme, e.g. holders of quotas who have no dairy cows, owners of dairy cows with no quota, and quotas allocated or quantities declared with no bearing on the size and composition of the herd. Some Member States have informed the Court that cross-checks are being carried out as a result of its audits. |
| --- | --- |

59.

None of the new Member States visited, except for Lithuania, systematically cross-checked the milk quotas database against the animal identification database. This type of cross-check would, however, identify clear risks to the scheme, e.g. holders of quotas who have no dairy cows, owners of dairy cows with no quota, and quotas allocated or quantities declared with no bearing on the size and composition of the herd. Some Member States have informed the Court that cross-checks are being carried out as a result of its audits.

Late and poorly documented controls

| 60. | In Lithuania, the principle that some of the checks must be carried out during the marketing year (32) was formally observed, as four producers were checked on 31 March 2005. Almost all of the checks were therefore carried out after the end of the year. In Hungary, no producers were checked during the 2004-2005 quota year, only later in September 2006. |
| --- | --- |

60.

In Lithuania, the principle that some of the checks must be carried out during the marketing year (32) was formally observed, as four producers were checked on 31 March 2005. Almost all of the checks were therefore carried out after the end of the year. In Hungary, no producers were checked during the 2004-2005 quota year, only later in September 2006.

| 61. | The Court's audit brought to light a number of shortcomings in the on-the-spot checks:






  — | in the Czech Republic (2004/2005) and Slovenia (2005/2006), inspection procedures were not precise enough and did not ensure that the checks carried out were uniform in nature. These two Member States told the Court that markedly improved inspection instructions had been issued for the second quota year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

61.

The Court's audit brought to light a number of shortcomings in the on-the-spot checks:

—

in the Czech Republic (2004/2005) and Slovenia (2005/2006), inspection procedures were not precise enough and did not ensure that the checks carried out were uniform in nature. These two Member States told the Court that markedly improved inspection instructions had been issued for the second quota year;

| — | in Estonia, the compatibility between marketed quantities and production capacity (33) was checked using the holding register. However, the register was not checked for updates as the procedures made no provision for the animals to be physically inspected. Since 2006, a new IT system has allowed the herd register to be cross-checked against the quota database; |
| --- | --- |

—

in Estonia, the compatibility between marketed quantities and production capacity (33) was checked using the holding register. However, the register was not checked for updates as the procedures made no provision for the animals to be physically inspected. Since 2006, a new IT system has allowed the herd register to be cross-checked against the quota database;

| — | in Poland, the annexes to the reports on the checks carried out at the producers' in the course of 2005-2006 had not been kept, thus making it impossible to monitor the checks. At one dairy visited by the Court, the actual fat contents established by an accredited laboratory differed from the average and varied to an abnormal extent over time. No additional checks had been required by the inspectors even though national instructions provide for such cases. Inspectors' estimates of production capacity were systematically incorrect as they were based on unrepresentative milk yields that were too low; the number of irregularities noted was therefore excessive (34); |
| --- | --- |

—

in Poland, the annexes to the reports on the checks carried out at the producers' in the course of 2005-2006 had not been kept, thus making it impossible to monitor the checks. At one dairy visited by the Court, the actual fat contents established by an accredited laboratory differed from the average and varied to an abnormal extent over time. No additional checks had been required by the inspectors even though national instructions provide for such cases. Inspectors' estimates of production capacity were systematically incorrect as they were based on unrepresentative milk yields that were too low; the number of irregularities noted was therefore excessive (34);

| — | in Slovakia, the relevant authorities were able to provide an overall rate of infringement for 2004-2005 (44 % of checks) but there were no statistics on the types and frequency of anomaly. |
| --- | --- |

—

in Slovakia, the relevant authorities were able to provide an overall rate of infringement for 2004-2005 (44 % of checks) but there were no statistics on the types and frequency of anomaly.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST MARKETING YEARS

The national reference quantities for ‘deliveries’ have been attained and the national reference quantities for ‘direct sales’ have been under-used

| 62. | The first milk marketing year (2004-2005) in the new Member States (Tables 8 and 9) saw no instance of national reference quantities being exceeded. The deliveries quota was, however, very close to saturation, whereas the direct sales quota was significantly under-used. |
| --- | --- |

62.

The first milk marketing year (2004-2005) in the new Member States (Tables 8 and 9) saw no instance of national reference quantities being exceeded. The deliveries quota was, however, very close to saturation, whereas the direct sales quota was significantly under-used.

| 63. | The second year (2005-2006), see (Tables 8 and 9), saw an increase in deliveries in all the new Member States, with the exception of Hungary and Malta where they remained stable. The Czech Republic, Cyprus and Poland had to pay a levy totalling 67,7 million euro as they exceeded their national reference quantity for deliveries (35). |
| --- | --- |

63.

The second year (2005-2006), see (Tables 8 and 9), saw an increase in deliveries in all the new Member States, with the exception of Hungary and Malta where they remained stable. The Czech Republic, Cyprus and Poland had to pay a levy totalling 67,7 million euro as they exceeded their national reference quantity for deliveries (35).

| 64. | The volume of direct sales stabilised or regressed, particularly in Poland. The general increase in the rate at which quotas for direct sales were used stems from the fact that the national quantities available fell significantly following conversions. |
| --- | --- |

64.

The volume of direct sales stabilised or regressed, particularly in Poland. The general increase in the rate at which quotas for direct sales were used stems from the fact that the national quantities available fell significantly following conversions.

| 65. | In Cyprus, the national reference quantity for direct sales was almost attained, to within one kilo (36). |
| --- | --- |

65.

In Cyprus, the national reference quantity for direct sales was almost attained, to within one kilo (36).

| 66. | For 2006-2007, the quantities released from the special restructuring reserve as from 1 April 2006 reduced the risk of the delivery quota being exceeded in the Czech Republic and Poland. In Cyprus, the national reference quantity was exceeded for both deliveries and direct sales; the levy to be collected is approximately 180 000 euro for deliveries and 16 000 euro for direct sales.
  Table 8
  Utilisation of national reference quantities for deliveries in the new Member States (2004-2005 and 2005-2006)
















  (1000 tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Year | Quantities | CZ | EE | CY | LV | LT | HU | MT | PL | SI | SK |
| 2004-2005 | Deliveries
  (1) | 2 608 | 520 | 141 | 502 | 1 209 | 1 589 | 46 | 8 347 | 499 | 949 |
| Available quota
  (2) | 2 616 | 554 | 141 | 632 | 1 280 | 1 783 | 49 | 8 500 | 516 | 1 003 |
| Utilisation of deliveries quota
  (1)/(2) | 99,7 % | 93,9 % | 99,9 % | 79,3 % | 94,5 % | 89,1 % | 93,8 % | 98,2 % | 96,7 % | 94,6 % |
| 2005-2006 | Deliveries
  (1) | 2 696 | 569 | 144 | 568 | 1 250 | 1 581 | 41 | 8 931 | 509 | 981 |
| Available quota
  (2) | 2 679 | 605 | 142 | 678 | 1 520 | 1 835 | 49 | 8 730 | 536 | 1 005 |
| Utilisation of deliveries quota
  (1)/(2) | 100,6 % | 94,1 % | 100,9 % | 83,7 % | 82,2 % | 86,1 % | 84,6 % | 102,3 % | 95,0 % | 97,6 % |
| 2004-2005 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (data for 11 months extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP).
  2005-2006 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.
  Quotas are post conversion (provisional and final). |

66.

For 2006-2007, the quantities released from the special restructuring reserve as from 1 April 2006 reduced the risk of the delivery quota being exceeded in the Czech Republic and Poland. In Cyprus, the national reference quantity was exceeded for both deliveries and direct sales; the levy to be collected is approximately 180 000 euro for deliveries and 16 000 euro for direct sales.

Table 8

Utilisation of national reference quantities for deliveries in the new Member States (2004-2005 and 2005-2006)

(1000 tonnes)

Year

Quantities

CZ

EE

CY

LV

LT

HU

MT

PL

SI

SK

2004-2005

Deliveries

(1)

2 608

520

141

502

1 209

1 589

46

8 347

499

949

Available quota

(2)

2 616

554

141

632

1 280

1 783

49

8 500

516

1 003

Utilisation of deliveries quota

(1)/(2)

99,7 %

93,9 %

99,9 %

79,3 %

94,5 %

89,1 %

93,8 %

98,2 %

96,7 %

94,6 %

2005-2006

Deliveries

(1)

2 696

569

144

568

1 250

1 581

41

8 931

509

981

Available quota

(2)

2 679

605

142

678

1 520

1 835

49

8 730

536

1 005

Utilisation of deliveries quota

(1)/(2)

100,6 %

94,1 %

100,9 %

83,7 %

82,2 %

86,1 %

84,6 %

102,3 %

95,0 %

97,6 %

2004-2005 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (data for 11 months extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP).

2005-2006 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

Quotas are post conversion (provisional and final).

Table 9

Utilisation of the national reference quantities for direct sales in the new Member States (2004-2005 and 2005-2006)

| (1000 tonnes) |
| --- |
| Year | Quantities | CZ | EE | CY | LV | LT | HU | MT | PL | SI | SK |
| 2004-2005 | Direct sales
  (1) | 3 | 10 | 2 | 11 | 76 | 26 | 0 | 309 | 20 | 7 |
| Available quota
  (2) | 67 | 70 | 4 | 63 | 367 | 165 | 0 | 464 | 45 | 10 |
| Utilisation of direct sales quota
  (1)/(2) | 4,2 % | 13,6 % | 61,7 % | 18 % | 20,8 % | 15,8 % | | 66,6 % | 45,4 % | 66,3 % |
| 2005-2006 | Direct sales
  (1) | 3 | 9 | 3 | 11 | 56 | 19 | 0 | 195 | 21 | 4 |
| Available quota
  (2) | 3 | 19 | 3 | 17 | 127 | 112 | 0 | 234 | 25 | 8 |
| Utilisation of direct sales quota
  (1)/(2) | 81 % | 44,3 % | 100 % | 63,3 % | 44,2 % | 17,2 % | | 83,2 % | 83,5 % | 44,6 % |
| 2004-2005 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (data for 11 months extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP).
  2005-2006 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.
  Quotas are post conversion (provisional and final). |

(1000 tonnes)

Year

Quantities

CZ

EE

CY

LV

LT

HU

MT

PL

SI

SK

2004-2005

Direct sales

(1)

3

10

2

11

76

26

0

309

20

7

Available quota

(2)

67

70

4

63

367

165

0

464

45

10

Utilisation of direct sales quota

(1)/(2)

4,2 %

13,6 %

61,7 %

18 %

20,8 %

15,8 %

66,6 %

45,4 %

66,3 %

2005-2006

Direct sales

(1)

3

9

3

11

56

19

0

195

21

4

Available quota

(2)

3

19

3

17

127

112

0

234

25

8

Utilisation of direct sales quota

(1)/(2)

81 %

44,3 %

100 %

63,3 %

44,2 %

17,2 %

83,2 %

83,5 %

44,6 %

2004-2005 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 (data for 11 months extrapolated over 12 months, except for Estonia) and paying agencies for PL (ARR) and SI (ARSKTRP).

2005-2006 year: Replies to the questionnaire required by Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

Quotas are post conversion (provisional and final).

Restructuring continues in the new Member States

| 67. | In-depth restructuring of the professional milk sector in the new Member States began long before enlargement (see paragraph 8 et seq.). The introduction of milk quotas did not therefore radically disrupt the production apparatus, which continues to develop gradually towards the technical and economic standards of the old Member States. |
| --- | --- |

67.

In-depth restructuring of the professional milk sector in the new Member States began long before enlargement (see paragraph 8 et seq.). The introduction of milk quotas did not therefore radically disrupt the production apparatus, which continues to develop gradually towards the technical and economic standards of the old Member States.

| 68. | The most recent comprehensive data on the new Member States' dairy herds relate to 2005. Provisional data show that dairy herd numbers in the new Member States experienced a further fall of approximately 366 000 units between 2005 and 2007, i.e. 8 % (37). Restructuring also manifests itself in the dairy industry through a reduction in the number of approved purchasers, which fell from 935 in 2004-2005 to 895 in 2006-2007. The dairy industry in the new Member States has changed its market outlets. It produces more cheese and fewer other low value-added milk products (skimmed milk, milk powder and butter). |
| --- | --- |

68.

The most recent comprehensive data on the new Member States' dairy herds relate to 2005. Provisional data show that dairy herd numbers in the new Member States experienced a further fall of approximately 366 000 units between 2005 and 2007, i.e. 8 % (37). Restructuring also manifests itself in the dairy industry through a reduction in the number of approved purchasers, which fell from 935 in 2004-2005 to 895 in 2006-2007. The dairy industry in the new Member States has changed its market outlets. It produces more cheese and fewer other low value-added milk products (skimmed milk, milk powder and butter).

| 69. | The introduction of milk quotas coincided with the beginning of a general rise in milk prices. The price paid to producers remains lower in the new Member States than the price paid to EU-15 producers, but the gap is narrowing. Price changes have encouraged milk producers to increase their deliveries to the detriment of direct sales. The new Member States' delivery rate therefore continues to converge with that of the other Member States although a significant gap remains between those countries where milk production is highly concentrated (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and those where production is still fragmented (Lithuania and Poland). |
| --- | --- |

69.

The introduction of milk quotas coincided with the beginning of a general rise in milk prices. The price paid to producers remains lower in the new Member States than the price paid to EU-15 producers, but the gap is narrowing. Price changes have encouraged milk producers to increase their deliveries to the detriment of direct sales. The new Member States' delivery rate therefore continues to converge with that of the other Member States although a significant gap remains between those countries where milk production is highly concentrated (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) and those where production is still fragmented (Lithuania and Poland).

Enlargement has increased crossborder shipments without destabilising the milk CMO

| 70. | Since joining the EU, the ten new Member States have increased their intra-EU trade in milk and milk products (Table 10). A transfer trade in raw milk has developed in some border regions of the new Member States, where the price of milk is lower, towards neighbouring Member States where prices are higher. This phenomenon has affected Slovenia in particular (Box 5).
  Table 10
  Milk and dairy products — External trade of CEECs











  (1000 tonnes) |
| --- | --- |
| Quantities | Intra-EU exports | Intra-EU imports |
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
| Milk and cream, not concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter | 334 | 978 | 1 470 | 127 | 322 | 514 |
| Raw milk included in the above | 144 | 570 | 905 | 38 | 147 | 292 |
| Milk and cream, concentrated and containing added sugar or other sweetening matter | 144 | 165 | 160 | 19 | 30 | 33 |
| Buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yoghurt, kephir, and other fermented or acidified milk and cream | 62 | 124 | 163 | 79 | 106 | 121 |
| Whey, products consisting of natural milk constituents | 68 | 102 | 197 | 38 | 48 | 69 |
| Butter and other butterfats | 53 | 49 | 36 | 15 | 18 | 25 |
| Cheeses | 120 | 170 | 184 | 75 | 114 | 144 |
| Source: Commission, Eurostat (COMEXT). |

70.

Since joining the EU, the ten new Member States have increased their intra-EU trade in milk and milk products (Table 10). A transfer trade in raw milk has developed in some border regions of the new Member States, where the price of milk is lower, towards neighbouring Member States where prices are higher. This phenomenon has affected Slovenia in particular (Box 5).

Table 10

Milk and dairy products — External trade of CEECs

(1000 tonnes)

Quantities

Intra-EU exports

Intra-EU imports

2004

2005

2006

2004

2005

2006

Milk and cream, not concentrated or containing added sugar or other sweetening matter

334

978

1 470

127

322

514

Raw milk included in the above

144

570

905

38

147

292

Milk and cream, concentrated and containing added sugar or other sweetening matter

144

165

160

19

30

33

Buttermilk, curdled milk and cream, yoghurt, kephir, and other fermented or acidified milk and cream

62

124

163

79

106

121

Whey, products consisting of natural milk constituents

68

102

197

38

48

69

Butter and other butterfats

53

49

36

15

18

25

Cheeses

120

170

184

75

114

144

Source: Commission, Eurostat (COMEXT).

Box 5 — The massive transfer of Slovenian raw milk to ItalySlovenia is the new Member State whose local milk market has changed the most since joining the EU. Due to price differences with Italy, exports of Slovenian raw milk to Italy have expanded since 2005. In 2006, the price of milk in Slovenia was approximately 18 % lower than in Italy. Approximately 28 % of Slovenian milk production was exported and processed in Italy in 2006. The effect of this phenomenon has been to limit the production of milk products in Slovenia (22 % in the case of butter production in 2006, 13 % for drinking milk, 11 % for cream and 7 % for cheese) and to encourage imports of these products.

| 71. | However, the scenario whereby EU enlargement would create substantial additional surpluses in milk products to be exported as from 2005 (38) did not materialise. Only very small quantities of milk products have been subsidised by the EU since 2004 in the new Member States. In 2005 and 2006, budgetary expenditure on milk in the new Member States accounted for 3,7 % and 4,8 % respectively of total milk-related expenditure on intervention, refunds and disposal measures. |
| --- | --- |

71.

However, the scenario whereby EU enlargement would create substantial additional surpluses in milk products to be exported as from 2005 (38) did not materialise. Only very small quantities of milk products have been subsidised by the EU since 2004 in the new Member States. In 2005 and 2006, budgetary expenditure on milk in the new Member States accounted for 3,7 % and 4,8 % respectively of total milk-related expenditure on intervention, refunds and disposal measures.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| 72. | The quota scheme limiting milk production was extended to the Member States that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. Since then, the dairy market has undergone profound change, characterised by rising world prices and the gradual disappearance of the structural surpluses that provided the raison d’être for the quotas. Although milk quotas are practically certain to disappear in 2015, until they do so the way they are applied must nevertheless be subject to an adequate level of control. |
| --- | --- |

72.

The quota scheme limiting milk production was extended to the Member States that joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. Since then, the dairy market has undergone profound change, characterised by rising world prices and the gradual disappearance of the structural surpluses that provided the raison d’être for the quotas. Although milk quotas are practically certain to disappear in 2015, until they do so the way they are applied must nevertheless be subject to an adequate level of control.

Did the Commission prepare for and supervise the extension of the milk quota scheme to the new Member States effectively?

| 73. | During the pre-accession phase, the Commission supported the implementation of the scheme, mainly by coordinating peer review exercises and by negotiating national reference quantities with the candidate countries. ‘Delivery’ quotas were set at levels close to the quantities actually delivered during the reference period. The negotiations for ‘direct sales’ quotas, by contrast, resulted in the granting of reference quantities that considerably exceeded requirements (see paragraphs 15 to 21). |
| --- | --- |

73.

During the pre-accession phase, the Commission supported the implementation of the scheme, mainly by coordinating peer review exercises and by negotiating national reference quantities with the candidate countries. ‘Delivery’ quotas were set at levels close to the quantities actually delivered during the reference period. The negotiations for ‘direct sales’ quotas, by contrast, resulted in the granting of reference quantities that considerably exceeded requirements (see paragraphs 15 to 21).

| 74. | As regards the Commission's activities in the 2004-2006 period, the Court noted the following shortcomings:






  — | the Commission released the special restructuring reserve for all the new central and eastern European Member States, even though supporting evidence for certain aspects of the restructuring process was lacking. It used the changes in on-farm consumption reported by the Member States as the main assessment criterion and did not question the data supplied by the national authorities (see paragraphs 23 to 26); |
| --- | --- | --- |

74.

As regards the Commission's activities in the 2004-2006 period, the Court noted the following shortcomings:

—

the Commission released the special restructuring reserve for all the new central and eastern European Member States, even though supporting evidence for certain aspects of the restructuring process was lacking. It used the changes in on-farm consumption reported by the Member States as the main assessment criterion and did not question the data supplied by the national authorities (see paragraphs 23 to 26);

| — | at the time of the audit, the Commission had still not carried out any detailed on-the-spot checks in the new Member States to ensure that the scheme was running smoothly, the weaknesses identified in the peer review exercises had been rectified or the checks envisaged in the regulations had been implemented (see paragraphs 40 to 43). |
| --- | --- |

—

at the time of the audit, the Commission had still not carried out any detailed on-the-spot checks in the new Member States to ensure that the scheme was running smoothly, the weaknesses identified in the peer review exercises had been rectified or the checks envisaged in the regulations had been implemented (see paragraphs 40 to 43).

Recommendation 1As part of shared management, the Commission should continue to take all necessary action to ensure that the implementation and sound management of the milk quota scheme are effectively monitored.It is vital for the Commission to have reliable, standardised information in order to assess the actual extent of the restructuring process and to corroborate the data on direct sales.

Have the new Member States created adequate structures for administering milk quotas? Do the management and oversight of the scheme comply with EU legislation?

| 75. | The implementation of milk quotas posed a major logistical challenge for the new Member States. For the most part, the new Member States made a considerable effort to ensure that their administrative and inspection systems were operational in good time and have actually created structures that are broadly adequate for administering milk quotas (see paragraphs 35 to 61). Based on the main findings of the audit, the summary table below (Illustration 4) assesses how well they have been implemented at each stage of the process and in each of the Member States visited. |
| --- | --- |

75.

The implementation of milk quotas posed a major logistical challenge for the new Member States. For the most part, the new Member States made a considerable effort to ensure that their administrative and inspection systems were operational in good time and have actually created structures that are broadly adequate for administering milk quotas (see paragraphs 35 to 61). Based on the main findings of the audit, the summary table below (Illustration 4) assesses how well they have been implemented at each stage of the process and in each of the Member States visited.

Illustration 4

Evaluation of the implementation of the milk quota scheme in the countries of central and eastern Europe (based on the situation at the time of the audit in 2005 or 2006)

| | 2004-2005 marketing year | 2004-2005 and/or 2005-2006 marketing years |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Deliveries | Direct sales | Adoption of the acquis communautaire | Management of the national reserve | Design and updating of databases | Controls |
| Estimated amount required | Quota use | Estimated amount required | Quota use | Risk analysis | Control plan | On-the-spot checks carried out |
| CZ | | | (2) | (4) | | | (10) | (12) | | (16) |
| EE | | | (2) | (4) | | (9) | (10) | (12) | | (16) |
| LV | | | (3) | (5) | | | | (12) | (13) | |
| LT | | | (3) | (5) | (6) | (9) | (10) | (12) | (13) | (14) |
| HU | (1) | | (2) | (5) | (7) | (9) | (10) | (12) | (13) | (15) |
| PL | | | | | | (9) | (10) | (12) | (13) | (16) |
| SI | | | | (5) | | | (10) | (12) | | (16) |
| SK | (1) | | (3) | | (8) | (9) | (11) | (12) | (13) | |
| Good (no problems identified) | Average (room for improvement) | Poor (serious weaknesses) |

2004-2005 marketing year

2004-2005 and/or 2005-2006 marketing years

Deliveries

Direct sales

Adoption of the acquis communautaire

Management of the national reserve

Design and updating of databases

Controls

Estimated amount required

Quota use

Estimated amount required

Quota use

Risk analysis

Control plan

On-the-spot checks carried out

CZ

(2)

(4)

(10)

(12)

(16)

EE

(2)

(4)

(9)

(10)

(12)

(16)

LV

(3)

(5)

(12)

(13)

LT

(3)

(5)

(6)

(9)

(10)

(12)

(13)

(14)

HU

(1)

(2)

(5)

(7)

(9)

(10)

(12)

(13)

(15)

PL

(9)

(10)

(12)

(13)

(16)

SI

(5)

(10)

(12)

(16)

SK

(1)

(3)

(8)

(9)

(11)

(12)

(13)

Good (no problems identified)

Average (room for improvement)

Poor (serious weaknesses)

| 76. | It is reasonable to conclude that most of the problems and shortcomings brought to light by the Court's audit are intrinsic to the system's start-up phase. By way of comparison, it should be borne in mind that in some EU-15 Member States the introduction of milk quotas was followed by a long period of uncertainty during which the levy was not collected correctly due to negligence in the administration of the scheme and a large number of protracted legal cases.

  Recommendation 2It is the Commission's responsibility to continue to ensure that the Member States take appropriate action to rectify the most significant shortcomings identified by the Court's audit, as detailed in the summary table evaluating the system (Illustration 4).First and foremost, the Commission should invite the new Member States to improve their database record-keeping (identification of cattle, deliveries and direct sales declared, and results of checks) and to optimise cross-checks.As regards direct sales, the legislation requiring controls to cover at least 5 % of producers seems inappropriate to the fragmented structure of the dairy sector in most of the new Member States. The upshot is that the national authorities have to carry out a large number of potentially superficial inspections, which do not allow the probable veracity of declared direct sales to be verified. With a view to the reform of the milk market, and for the sake of simplification, the Commission should examine the possibility of authorising the Member States to tailor the rate of on-the-spot checks to the structure and size of the holdings concerned.The Commission should also encourage the Member States to combine on-the-spot checks of dairy producers with other CAP checks (identification of cattle, direct payments and environmental cross-compliance). |
| --- | --- |

76.

It is reasonable to conclude that most of the problems and shortcomings brought to light by the Court's audit are intrinsic to the system's start-up phase. By way of comparison, it should be borne in mind that in some EU-15 Member States the introduction of milk quotas was followed by a long period of uncertainty during which the levy was not collected correctly due to negligence in the administration of the scheme and a large number of protracted legal cases.

Recommendation 2It is the Commission's responsibility to continue to ensure that the Member States take appropriate action to rectify the most significant shortcomings identified by the Court's audit, as detailed in the summary table evaluating the system (Illustration 4).First and foremost, the Commission should invite the new Member States to improve their database record-keeping (identification of cattle, deliveries and direct sales declared, and results of checks) and to optimise cross-checks.As regards direct sales, the legislation requiring controls to cover at least 5 % of producers seems inappropriate to the fragmented structure of the dairy sector in most of the new Member States. The upshot is that the national authorities have to carry out a large number of potentially superficial inspections, which do not allow the probable veracity of declared direct sales to be verified. With a view to the reform of the milk market, and for the sake of simplification, the Commission should examine the possibility of authorising the Member States to tailor the rate of on-the-spot checks to the structure and size of the holdings concerned.The Commission should also encourage the Member States to combine on-the-spot checks of dairy producers with other CAP checks (identification of cattle, direct payments and environmental cross-compliance).

Does the milk quota scheme cover all milk marketed in the new Member States?

| 77. | Overall, the introduction of the milk quota scheme concerned only half of all milk producers The majority of milk producers without a quota practise subsistence or semi-subsistence agriculture. A proportion of them market some milk, however, mainly in the form of direct sales (see paragraphs 14, 21 to 22 and 32 to 34).

  Recommendation 3The Commission should invite the new Member States to adhere to the general principle that all milk marketed must be recorded. As long as the milk quota scheme is in force, all producers that make undeclared deliveries or direct sales should be reminded that membership of the scheme is compulsory. |
| --- | --- |

77.

Overall, the introduction of the milk quota scheme concerned only half of all milk producers The majority of milk producers without a quota practise subsistence or semi-subsistence agriculture. A proportion of them market some milk, however, mainly in the form of direct sales (see paragraphs 14, 21 to 22 and 32 to 34).

Recommendation 3The Commission should invite the new Member States to adhere to the general principle that all milk marketed must be recorded. As long as the milk quota scheme is in force, all producers that make undeclared deliveries or direct sales should be reminded that membership of the scheme is compulsory.

What overall influence has the introduction of quotas had on national dairy sectors? How has enlargement affected the milk CMO?

| 78. | In most of the new Member States, the introduction of milk quotas has not been detrimental to self-sufficiency and has not made the milk sector less dynamic. Milk quotas were generally introduced against a backdrop of rising milk prices, the primary beneficiaries of which have been professional producers that make deliveries (see paragraphs 62 to 69). |
| --- | --- |

78.

In most of the new Member States, the introduction of milk quotas has not been detrimental to self-sufficiency and has not made the milk sector less dynamic. Milk quotas were generally introduced against a backdrop of rising milk prices, the primary beneficiaries of which have been professional producers that make deliveries (see paragraphs 62 to 69).

| 79. | The semi-subsistence sector still acts as a drag on the new Member States' agricultural productivity but is also a factor for social stability and helps shore up the rural population (see paragraphs 8 to 14). Given this situation, the new Member States have responded differently to the question of whether milk quotas were primarily a restructuring tool for professional producers or whether they could also help to bring certain small producers into the formal market (paragraphs 20, 33 and 34). |
| --- | --- |

79.

The semi-subsistence sector still acts as a drag on the new Member States' agricultural productivity but is also a factor for social stability and helps shore up the rural population (see paragraphs 8 to 14). Given this situation, the new Member States have responded differently to the question of whether milk quotas were primarily a restructuring tool for professional producers or whether they could also help to bring certain small producers into the formal market (paragraphs 20, 33 and 34).

| 80. | The 2004 enlargement had no negative impact on the overall balance of the EU's milk and dairy products market. The new Member States' share of responsibility for the milk product surpluses to be subsidised by the EU budget is minimal (see paragraphs 70 and 71).

  Recommendation 4The Commission is invited to take account of all the findings of the Court's audit as part of the ‘health check’ for the common agricultural policy.Consideration of possible adjustments to the milk CMO and the milk quota scheme should focus on:





  — | transitional and accompanying measures to be envisaged in regions where small producers still largely predominate; |
| --- | --- | --- |

80.

The 2004 enlargement had no negative impact on the overall balance of the EU's milk and dairy products market. The new Member States' share of responsibility for the milk product surpluses to be subsidised by the EU budget is minimal (see paragraphs 70 and 71).

Recommendation 4The Commission is invited to take account of all the findings of the Court's audit as part of the ‘health check’ for the common agricultural policy.Consideration of possible adjustments to the milk CMO and the milk quota scheme should focus on:





  —

transitional and accompanying measures to be envisaged in regions where small producers still largely predominate;

| — | the need for milk producers in the new Member States to have a stable regulatory framework and clear prospects, encouraging them to make the investments that are vital if their activity is to remain viable. |
| --- | --- |

—

the need for milk producers in the new Member States to have a stable regulatory framework and clear prospects, encouraging them to make the investments that are vital if their activity is to remain viable.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 5 June 2008.

For the Court of Auditors

Vítor Manuel DA SILVA CALDEIRA

President

---

(1)  The milk year, or quota year, is the 12-month period beginning on 1 April and ending on 31 March.

1

(2)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing a levy in the milk and milk products sector, third recital (OJ L 270, 21.10.2003, p. 123).

2

(3)  For these two Member States, the national reference quantities were applicable from 1 May 2004, but the obligation to set individual reference quantities did not take effect until 1 April 2005.

3

(4)  Annex I(g) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

4

(5)  Article 1(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

5

(6)  1 April 2005 to 31 March 2006 in the case of Poland and Slovenia.

6

(7)  See, in particular, the study carried out at the request of the European Commission by A. Pouliquen ‘Compétitivité et revenus agricoles dans les secteurs agro-alimentaires des PECO’, INRA, October 2001.

7

(8)  Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), (OJ L 277, 21.10.2005, p. 1). As part of its rural development plan, each new Member State has to provide its own definition of a semi-subsistence agricultural holding, based on various criteria: the minimum and/or maximum size of the holding, the proportion of production marketed and/or the level of income of eligible holdings.

8

(9)  See A. Pouliquen, op. cit., p. 41-45.

9

(10)  Council Directive 92/46/EEC of 16 June 1992 laying down the health rules for the production and placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products (OJ L 268, 14.9.1992, p. 1).

10

(11)  For the Baltic States, the data for 1999 were excluded because of the disruption resulting from the economic crisis in Russia.

11

(12)  Article 1(4) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

12

(13)  Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 927/2006 of 22 June 2006 on the release of the special restructuring reserve specified in Article 1(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 (OJ L 170, 23.6.2006, p. 12).

13

(14)  According to of Article 6(1)(2), of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, the basis for calculating reference quantities for deliveries and direct sales appeared in Table (f) of Annex I.

14

(15)  In Hungary a surplus of 23 201,4 tonnes, or 1,3 % of the national reference quantity for deliveries, was allocated to producers at the beginning of the 2004-2005 quota year. In Slovakia, total quotas for deliveries allocated for the 2004-2005 quota year exceeded the national reference quantity by 10 348,4 tonnes (1 %).

15

(16)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1611/2006 of 27 October 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 832/2006 on the division between deliveries and direct sales of national reference quantities fixed for 2005/2006 in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 (OJ L 299, 28.10.2006, p. 13).

16

(17)  In accordance with Articles(6)2 and 8 of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, Slovakia should have notified the Commission of the quantities finally converted at the request of producers.

17

(18)  This estimate is based on the number of producers without a quota (2004-2005) and on the average productivity of dairy cows (2005), the assumption being that producers without a quota own 1,5 cows on average.

18

(19)  Data at 1 January 2005 (Agriculture Information and Rural Business Centre).

19

(20)  Source: Peer Review — Evaluation Mission on Milk in the Slovak Republic, Final report, DG AGRI and DG ELARG, 2003.

20

Source:

(21)  Article 26(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 of 30 March 2004 laying down detailed rules for applying Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 establishing a levy in the milk and milk products sector (OJ L 94, 31.3.2004, p. 22).

21

(22)  Before 1 September 2005 for Poland and Slovenia.

22

(23)  Article 27(3) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

23

(24)  Annual Report 1988, paragraphs 5.33 to 5.38 (OJ C 312, 12.12.1989).

24

Annual Report 1992, paragraphs 2.17 to 2.19 (OJ C 309, 16.11.1993)

Annual Report 1993, paragraphs 2.10 to 2.59 (OJ C 327, 24.11.1994)

Special Reports Nos 2/87 (OJ C 266, 5.10.1987), 4/93 (OJ C 12, 15.1.1994) and 6/2001 (OJ C 305, 30.10.2001).

(25)  Article 15(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

25

(26)  Ordinance of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic of 25 November 2002 No 2953/2002-100, Annex 2, paragraph III. Under this system, the paying agency cut the ‘delivery’ quotas of milk producers that had used less than 90 % of their quota in 2003-2004. In addition, the utilisation percentage was calculated using the overall quota (deliveries + direct sales), even though it should have been calculated separately for each quota.

26

(27)  Article 15(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

27

(28)  Article 6(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

28

(29)  Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

29

(30)  Articles 18 to 22 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

30

(31)  Producers who market milk without a quota allocation may incur heavy financial penalties if the national reference quantity (deliveries or direct sales) is exceeded. In such an eventuality, the ‘overrun’ corresponds to all quantities marketed by the producer and the levy must be applied to all quantities delivered or sold directly during the quota year.

31

(32)  Article 19(2) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

32

(33)  Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

33

(34)  The inspectors found 755 irregularities for 2005-2006. The Ministry of Agriculture examined 12 cases and no penalty was imposed.

34

(35)  The systems in force for the levy were not audited as the national reference quantities were not attained at the end of the first year in which milk quotas applied (2004-2005). As regards the levies owed by the Czech Republic, Cyprus and Poland for 2005-2006, no data were available at the time of the audit.

35

(36)  National reference quantity for direct sales: 2 780 863 kg; total quantity declared: 2 780 862 kg.

36

(37)  Source: European Commission, Management Committee for milk and milk products, Quarterly questionnaires (March 2008).

37

Source:

(38)  Agenda 2000, volume II, Com(97) final of 15 July 1997.

38

(39)  Member States were ranked according to their score in comparison with the average rate of allocation (41 %) or utilisation (31 %) of the national reference quantities for 2004-2005. Poor performance = rates less than 50 % of the average rate. Average performance = rates in the range between the average rate –50 % and the average rate +50 %. Good performance = rates above the average rate +50 %.

39

Poor performance

Average performance

Good performance

---

THE COMMISSION REPLIES

SUMMARY

On 1 May 2004, the system of milk quota entered into force in the 10 new Member States. While evidently not everything went perfectly well from the first day, the overall result can be considered to be very positive given the huge task the enlargement posed for the new Member States. Existing teething problems have been resolved during the first two campaigns, and if/where needed shortcomings will be followed up through the clearance procedures.

| IV. | The Commission has used the data that were made available to it and its estimations were at the basis of the final decision taken by the Council on the determination of the quota attributed to each new MemberState.
  Regarding the determination of the direct sales, the Commission has been as restrictive as possible, using an estimation method based on objective criteria. For instance, on-farm consumption has been evaluated on the basis of the number of persons living on the farm and the number of small calves on the farm. These estimations are deemed to be reasonable and have been applied in a uniform way for all Member States. |
| --- | --- |

IV.

The Commission has used the data that were made available to it and its estimations were at the basis of the final decision taken by the Council on the determination of the quota attributed to each new MemberState.

Regarding the determination of the direct sales, the Commission has been as restrictive as possible, using an estimation method based on objective criteria. For instance, on-farm consumption has been evaluated on the basis of the number of persons living on the farm and the number of small calves on the farm. These estimations are deemed to be reasonable and have been applied in a uniform way for all Member States.

| V. | Two instances of over allocation of deliveries quantities occurred in Hungary and in Slovakia.
  Both have been dealt with: the case for Slovakia during campaign 2004/2005, the one for Hungary during campaign 2005/2006. |
| --- | --- |

V.

Two instances of over allocation of deliveries quantities occurred in Hungary and in Slovakia.

Both have been dealt with: the case for Slovakia during campaign 2004/2005, the one for Hungary during campaign 2005/2006.

| VI. | The Commission systematically examined the national implementing measures adopted, and replied to numerous questions from Member States during 2004-2006, either in writing or during the bi-weekly management committee. Moreover, the Commission followed up the Court's observations, and monitored improvements and developments during the bilateral meetings arranged following on-the-spot audit enquiries conducted in 2004 and 2005 under its clearance of accounts procedure. Recent missions enable audit coverage of the years and Member States considered by the Court as most at risk from the shortcomings highlighted by it. So far, no financial corrections have been identified as necessary. |
| --- | --- |

VI.

The Commission systematically examined the national implementing measures adopted, and replied to numerous questions from Member States during 2004-2006, either in writing or during the bi-weekly management committee. Moreover, the Commission followed up the Court's observations, and monitored improvements and developments during the bilateral meetings arranged following on-the-spot audit enquiries conducted in 2004 and 2005 under its clearance of accounts procedure. Recent missions enable audit coverage of the years and Member States considered by the Court as most at risk from the shortcomings highlighted by it. So far, no financial corrections have been identified as necessary.

| VII. | The Commission considers that Community law has been respected and that the management of the national reserve, has been consistent with the provisions in force. See replies to paragraphs 35 to 39, and 44 to 47. |
| --- | --- |

VII.

The Commission considers that Community law has been respected and that the management of the national reserve, has been consistent with the provisions in force. See replies to paragraphs 35 to 39, and 44 to 47.

| VIII. | The Commission accepts the recommendation, and points out that it is already, in a number of cases, following-up the Court's observations in the context of the clearance of accounts procedure. In July 2007, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Member States and received further information about the structures: number of producers and quota size per producer.
  For the Commission, the most relevant data are based on the milk quantities declared by purchasers or by individual producers in direct sales in the Member States concerned. The summary of this information is already provided in the questionnaire sent to the Commission each year before 1 September according to Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004. |
| --- | --- |

VIII.

The Commission accepts the recommendation, and points out that it is already, in a number of cases, following-up the Court's observations in the context of the clearance of accounts procedure. In July 2007, the Commission sent a questionnaire to the Member States and received further information about the structures: number of producers and quota size per producer.

For the Commission, the most relevant data are based on the milk quantities declared by purchasers or by individual producers in direct sales in the Member States concerned. The summary of this information is already provided in the questionnaire sent to the Commission each year before 1 September according to Article 26 of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

| IX. | On-the-spot audit enquiries undertaken in 2007 and early 2008 by the Commission have already targeted those same three Member States mentioned by the Court, thereby providing audit coverage for the earlier and current years in question. |
| --- | --- |

IX.

On-the-spot audit enquiries undertaken in 2007 and early 2008 by the Commission have already targeted those same three Member States mentioned by the Court, thereby providing audit coverage for the earlier and current years in question.

ESTABLISHING NATIONAL REFERENCE QUANTITIES (NATIONAL QUOTAS)

| 19. | The Commission agrees with the Court on the data and concludes that its method of negotiation was well elaborated and based on the most objective criteria possible and aimed to restrict the initial requests which were overestimated. |
| --- | --- |

19.

The Commission agrees with the Court on the data and concludes that its method of negotiation was well elaborated and based on the most objective criteria possible and aimed to restrict the initial requests which were overestimated.

| 20. | The Commission's estimation methodology can be considered as reasonable. Thanks to this methodology, the initial request of the new Member States (except Poland) initially evaluated at 1,5 million tonnes have been reduced to the acceptable level of 0,83 million tonnes (negotiation position of the Commission). The volume negotiated in the Council has been in the order of 1 million tonnes.
  Subsequently, as explained by the Court, the process of restructuration implied a loss of interest in direct sales. Aware of the need of restructuration and the necessity to authorise the Member States to manage their reference quantities according to their needs, the Council of Ministers of 18 September 2006 introduced the possibility to transfer reference quantities for direct sales (remaining unused quantities in the national reserve) to the reference quantities for deliveries for campaign 2006/2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2006). |
| --- | --- |

20.

The Commission's estimation methodology can be considered as reasonable. Thanks to this methodology, the initial request of the new Member States (except Poland) initially evaluated at 1,5 million tonnes have been reduced to the acceptable level of 0,83 million tonnes (negotiation position of the Commission). The volume negotiated in the Council has been in the order of 1 million tonnes.

Subsequently, as explained by the Court, the process of restructuration implied a loss of interest in direct sales. Aware of the need of restructuration and the necessity to authorise the Member States to manage their reference quantities according to their needs, the Council of Ministers of 18 September 2006 introduced the possibility to transfer reference quantities for direct sales (remaining unused quantities in the national reserve) to the reference quantities for deliveries for campaign 2006/2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2006).

| 21. | In Poland, a large number of producers having received a quota for direct sales has subsequently renounced it and the national reserve has increased accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

21.

In Poland, a large number of producers having received a quota for direct sales has subsequently renounced it and the national reserve has increased accordingly.

| 22. | The follow up has to be assumed firstly by the Member States' competent authorities according to Regulation (EC) No 595/2004. |
| --- | --- |

22.

The follow up has to be assumed firstly by the Member States' competent authorities according to Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

| 24-25. | As foreseen in the act of accession, the Commission has decided to release the restructuration reserve in favour of the Member States concerned after having thoroughly analysed the issue in a report.
  In this analysis the Commission has used the data made available to it by the Member States and assessed the shift from production for on-farm consumption to production for the market based on two criteria: the trend of marketed quantities and the on-farm consumption. |
| --- | --- |

24-25.

As foreseen in the act of accession, the Commission has decided to release the restructuration reserve in favour of the Member States concerned after having thoroughly analysed the issue in a report.

In this analysis the Commission has used the data made available to it by the Member States and assessed the shift from production for on-farm consumption to production for the market based on two criteria: the trend of marketed quantities and the on-farm consumption.

| 26. | In its report, the Commission noticed a decrease of autoconsumption in all countries concerned between 2000 and 2005, with the exception of Lithuania where a decrease of autoconsumption was registered between 2002 and 2005.
  Regarding the Czech Republic, the production intended for the market has increased by 0,8 % between 2000 and 2004 and then by 3,7 % between 2004 and 2005.
  Concerning Latvia and Slovakia, there are no very significant differences between the data estimated by the Commission during the accession negotiations and those in the reports on the restructuration reserve.
  The main criteria assessed were the trend in percentage of on-farm-consumption and marketed quantities. |
| --- | --- |

26.

In its report, the Commission noticed a decrease of autoconsumption in all countries concerned between 2000 and 2005, with the exception of Lithuania where a decrease of autoconsumption was registered between 2002 and 2005.

Regarding the Czech Republic, the production intended for the market has increased by 0,8 % between 2000 and 2004 and then by 3,7 % between 2004 and 2005.

Concerning Latvia and Slovakia, there are no very significant differences between the data estimated by the Commission during the accession negotiations and those in the reports on the restructuration reserve.

The main criteria assessed were the trend in percentage of on-farm-consumption and marketed quantities.

| 28. | Given the production context of the first two milk years 2004/2005, which had only 11 months, and 2005/2006, this over-allocation did not carry much risk of rapidly saturating the available national reference quantity. Moreover, this risk did not arise. In Hungary, 82 % of the delivery quota were used during campaign 2004/2005 and 86 % during campaign 2005/2006.
  Similarly in Slovakia the figures were 87 % for campaign 2004/2005 and 97 % for campaign 2005/2006. |
| --- | --- |

28.

Given the production context of the first two milk years 2004/2005, which had only 11 months, and 2005/2006, this over-allocation did not carry much risk of rapidly saturating the available national reference quantity. Moreover, this risk did not arise. In Hungary, 82 % of the delivery quota were used during campaign 2004/2005 and 86 % during campaign 2005/2006.

Similarly in Slovakia the figures were 87 % for campaign 2004/2005 and 97 % for campaign 2005/2006.

| 30. | According to Article 6 of the Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, the Commission accepted requests about conversion sent in February 2005 for all Member States including Slovakia. In fact for Slovakia, the Commission later realized the inconsistency of the method used, after receiving some extra information from the Slovakian authorities.
  Aware of the need of restructuration and the necessity to authorise the Member States to manage their reference quantities according to their needs, the Council of Ministers of 18 September 2006 introduced the possibility of transfering reference quantities for direct sales remaining unused in the national reserve to the reference quantities for deliveries for campaign 2006/2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2006). |
| --- | --- |

30.

According to Article 6 of the Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, the Commission accepted requests about conversion sent in February 2005 for all Member States including Slovakia. In fact for Slovakia, the Commission later realized the inconsistency of the method used, after receiving some extra information from the Slovakian authorities.

Aware of the need of restructuration and the necessity to authorise the Member States to manage their reference quantities according to their needs, the Council of Ministers of 18 September 2006 introduced the possibility of transfering reference quantities for direct sales remaining unused in the national reserve to the reference quantities for deliveries for campaign 2006/2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2006).

Box 3, fourth paragraph

The follow up has to be assumed firstly by the Member States' competent authorities according to the Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

INTRODUCTION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SCHEME

| 35. | The most important source of information was the national legislation that the Member States have to transmit to the Commission in the month after their adoption. All Member States, including Poland, Slovenia and Malta did this. This was the central element in the monitoring of the implementation of the acquis. |
| --- | --- |

35.

The most important source of information was the national legislation that the Member States have to transmit to the Commission in the month after their adoption. All Member States, including Poland, Slovenia and Malta did this. This was the central element in the monitoring of the implementation of the acquis.

| 37. | The definition of delivery in Article 5(f) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/03 does not refer explicitly to either sales or gratuitous donations by milk producers to their purchasers. The definition of purchaser in Article 5(e) on the other hand states that purchasers ‘buy’ milk from producers. In line with this, the Lithuanian definitions refer to the producer selling quantities to the purchaser. When asked by the Commission to ensure that all milk movements from producer to purchaser should be declared for quota purposes, the Lithuanian authorities replied that because of the definition of purchaser as ‘buying’ milk from the producer, producers cannot and do not give away milk to purchasers free of charge.
  The Lithuanian authorities have confirmed that all deliveries (including gratuitous deliveries) are declared. |
| --- | --- |

37.

The definition of delivery in Article 5(f) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/03 does not refer explicitly to either sales or gratuitous donations by milk producers to their purchasers. The definition of purchaser in Article 5(e) on the other hand states that purchasers ‘buy’ milk from producers. In line with this, the Lithuanian definitions refer to the producer selling quantities to the purchaser. When asked by the Commission to ensure that all milk movements from producer to purchaser should be declared for quota purposes, the Lithuanian authorities replied that because of the definition of purchaser as ‘buying’ milk from the producer, producers cannot and do not give away milk to purchasers free of charge.

The Lithuanian authorities have confirmed that all deliveries (including gratuitous deliveries) are declared.

| 38. | The provisions called into question regarding cooperatives in Hungary permit a dairy cooperative to request the competent authorities to treat the individual quotas of its constituent members as one global quota, the management of which is in the hands of the cooperative. Therefore one quota is entered in the quota register in the name of the legal person which is the cooperative. It is further provided that the cooperative thereafter assumes, on behalf of its constituent members, all the obligations incumbent upon producers under the quota regulations. The Commission does not consider that this regime involves any risk regarding levy collection. The fact that certain types of cooperatives in Hungary may aggregate the individual quotas of the constitutive members without a transfer of ownership rights in the quotas is entirely similar to the situation of partial GAECs (Groupement Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun or collective farming grouping) in France, as results from the description of such associations in paragraph 45 of the conclusions of the Advocate General in case C-15/95. The Court of Justice approved in its judgement in that case, recourse to certain forms of company such as partial GAECs for the purposes of milk production under the milk quota regime. |
| --- | --- |

38.

The provisions called into question regarding cooperatives in Hungary permit a dairy cooperative to request the competent authorities to treat the individual quotas of its constituent members as one global quota, the management of which is in the hands of the cooperative. Therefore one quota is entered in the quota register in the name of the legal person which is the cooperative. It is further provided that the cooperative thereafter assumes, on behalf of its constituent members, all the obligations incumbent upon producers under the quota regulations. The Commission does not consider that this regime involves any risk regarding levy collection. The fact that certain types of cooperatives in Hungary may aggregate the individual quotas of the constitutive members without a transfer of ownership rights in the quotas is entirely similar to the situation of partial GAECs (Groupement Agricole d'Exploitation en Commun or collective farming grouping) in France, as results from the description of such associations in paragraph 45 of the conclusions of the Advocate General in case C-15/95. The Court of Justice approved in its judgement in that case, recourse to certain forms of company such as partial GAECs for the purposes of milk production under the milk quota regime.

| 39. | Any inherent risk in the status of producer/purchasers can be taken into account in the risk analysis implicit in the control process of producers and purchasers. Evidently, in his capacity of producer, the subject will be registered as a quota holder, and will, as a purchaser, be approved under the normal procedures. He may be subjected to controls in both capacities regarding any given quota period.
  It would be disproportionate to exclude the exercise by a producer of the functions of a purchaser and vice versa. Such an exclusion would rule out for example the activities of producers of milk processing their own product increased for reasons of viability by quantities acquired from other producers. Moreover, producer-purchasers have already been recorded in the old Member States without giving rise to contradiction with the milk quota regime. |
| --- | --- |

39.

Any inherent risk in the status of producer/purchasers can be taken into account in the risk analysis implicit in the control process of producers and purchasers. Evidently, in his capacity of producer, the subject will be registered as a quota holder, and will, as a purchaser, be approved under the normal procedures. He may be subjected to controls in both capacities regarding any given quota period.

It would be disproportionate to exclude the exercise by a producer of the functions of a purchaser and vice versa. Such an exclusion would rule out for example the activities of producers of milk processing their own product increased for reasons of viability by quantities acquired from other producers. Moreover, producer-purchasers have already been recorded in the old Member States without giving rise to contradiction with the milk quota regime.

| 42. | The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken in 2007 by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced. |
| --- | --- |

42.

The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken in 2007 by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced.

| 43. | Any potential financial risk to the Community budget began only with the first year of application that could involve the additional levy, namely 2005/2006. The Commission undertook two on-the-spot audit enquiries in 2007 in the two Member States presenting the greatest financial risk (i.e. proximity to or overshooting of the national milk quota) for which, thanks to the clearance of accounts mechanism with its retrospective coverage of 24 months, the quota year 2005/2006 was indeed covered. Furthermore, in the framework of other audits that the Commission did perform in 2005, the resulting bilateral meetings provided excellent opportunities to discuss the Court's findings on milk quotas, and to follow-up relevant developments. A further audit was made in early 2008 in the third new MemberState to overshoot the quota, and likewise audit coverage takes in the quota year 2005/2006. |
| --- | --- |

43.

Any potential financial risk to the Community budget began only with the first year of application that could involve the additional levy, namely 2005/2006. The Commission undertook two on-the-spot audit enquiries in 2007 in the two Member States presenting the greatest financial risk (i.e. proximity to or overshooting of the national milk quota) for which, thanks to the clearance of accounts mechanism with its retrospective coverage of 24 months, the quota year 2005/2006 was indeed covered. Furthermore, in the framework of other audits that the Commission did perform in 2005, the resulting bilateral meetings provided excellent opportunities to discuss the Court's findings on milk quotas, and to follow-up relevant developments. A further audit was made in early 2008 in the third new MemberState to overshoot the quota, and likewise audit coverage takes in the quota year 2005/2006.

| 45. | The Commission advised the new Member States that the discretion to place unused quantities in the national reserve when the producer failed to produce at least 70 % of his quota in a 12 month period should not be used in respect of production in the first period after accession. Due to the date of accession at 1 May 2004, producers in the new Member States did not have the benefit of the full regulatory reference period of 12 months against which to measure their production, so reductions would not have a sound legal basis.
  The Estonian and Slovak authorities demonstrated, on the basis of their national pre-accession provisions that their producers had operated from 1 April 2004 under a reduction clause for a full 12-month period against which to measure their production. The Commission confirmed that they were consequently in a position to make reductions, on condition that the pre-accession higher thresholds of production were relaxed so that no reductions would interevene in respect of the 2004-2005 period which did not respect the 70 % threshold.
  Reference is made in footnote 26 to the application by the Slovak Republic of reductions calculated at a higher threshold than 70 % and calculated on the global quota instead of separately for deliveries and direct sales. These reductions were made in respect of production in the pre-accession 2003-2004 period, and were not therefore subject to the post accession regulatory limitations. |
| --- | --- |

45.

The Commission advised the new Member States that the discretion to place unused quantities in the national reserve when the producer failed to produce at least 70 % of his quota in a 12 month period should not be used in respect of production in the first period after accession. Due to the date of accession at 1 May 2004, producers in the new Member States did not have the benefit of the full regulatory reference period of 12 months against which to measure their production, so reductions would not have a sound legal basis.

The Estonian and Slovak authorities demonstrated, on the basis of their national pre-accession provisions that their producers had operated from 1 April 2004 under a reduction clause for a full 12-month period against which to measure their production. The Commission confirmed that they were consequently in a position to make reductions, on condition that the pre-accession higher thresholds of production were relaxed so that no reductions would interevene in respect of the 2004-2005 period which did not respect the 70 % threshold.

Reference is made in footnote 26 to the application by the Slovak Republic of reductions calculated at a higher threshold than 70 % and calculated on the global quota instead of separately for deliveries and direct sales. These reductions were made in respect of production in the pre-accession 2003-2004 period, and were not therefore subject to the post accession regulatory limitations.

| 46. | The first period in respect of which the abrogation of quota in cases of total inactivity became obligatory, except for cases of force majeure or due justification, in Poland is 2005-2006. It was not an obligation for Poland to allocate individual quotas for the period 2004-2005, nor therefore could it have been an obligation to revoke quotas on the ground of underuse in that period. The criticism of the Court regarding the favourable outcome of appeals against revocations which were not obligatory or the rules applying to such appeal procedures is not relevant to Poland's application of the Community milk quota regime.
  The procedure as described by the Court related to the 3 900 producers in Poland conforms with Article 15(1) and (3), of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003. |
| --- | --- |

46.

The first period in respect of which the abrogation of quota in cases of total inactivity became obligatory, except for cases of force majeure or due justification, in Poland is 2005-2006. It was not an obligation for Poland to allocate individual quotas for the period 2004-2005, nor therefore could it have been an obligation to revoke quotas on the ground of underuse in that period. The criticism of the Court regarding the favourable outcome of appeals against revocations which were not obligatory or the rules applying to such appeal procedures is not relevant to Poland's application of the Community milk quota regime.

The procedure as described by the Court related to the 3 900 producers in Poland conforms with Article 15(1) and (3), of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

| 47. | As the Court of Auditors itself observed earlier, the Member States enjoy considerable latitude in managing their national reference quantities in function of their particular economic or social objectifs. The exercise of this discretion is regulated by Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 which provides that the Member States shall make allocations to producers of quantities out of the national reserve ‘on the basis of objective criteria to be notified to the Commission’. |
| --- | --- |

47.

As the Court of Auditors itself observed earlier, the Member States enjoy considerable latitude in managing their national reference quantities in function of their particular economic or social objectifs. The exercise of this discretion is regulated by Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 which provides that the Member States shall make allocations to producers of quantities out of the national reserve ‘on the basis of objective criteria to be notified to the Commission’.

Box 4, first paragraph

In accordance with the discretion conferred on Member States, the Polish system favours existing producers who expand their production rather than new entrants. According to the legislation notified by the Polish authorities, allocations from the national reserve to existing producers are conditional upon a documented increase in sales compared with the previous quota year. Allocations are determined by a mathematical computation of the average annual sales of the expanded holding. The resulting allocation therefore coincides with actual documented milk sales over a given period and is therefore not more than is required to cover the capacity of the beneficiary. The objectivity of this system appears not to be open to question.

Second paragraph

The Commission considers that production scale and capacity are objective criteria for distinguishing between categories for access to the national reserve.

Third paragraph

On 18 September 2006 the Council, aware of the need of restructuration and the necessity to authorise the Member States to manage their reference quantities according to their needs, introduced the possibility to transfer reference quantities for direct sales remaining unused in the national reserve to the reference quantities for deliveries for campaign 2006/2007 (Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2006). This also applies to point 49.

| 51. | An individual fat reference can only be fixed with reference to a producer's milk quota. It is therefore inevitable that producers making deliveries without a milk quota do not dispose of a fat reference, in relation to which their deliveries might be adjusted either upwards or downwards. |
| --- | --- |

51.

An individual fat reference can only be fixed with reference to a producer's milk quota. It is therefore inevitable that producers making deliveries without a milk quota do not dispose of a fat reference, in relation to which their deliveries might be adjusted either upwards or downwards.

| 52. | Generally, when producers using ‘direct sales’ switch to deliveries they do not change their herd. As a consequence, they still have milk cows of the same race and homogenuous in terms of quality of produced milk. Therefore, it seems coherent to apply the derogation foreseen in Article (7)(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.
  The reply of the Lithuanian authorities showed their riguour in the analysis on the issue of fat content at the moment of the fixation of the reference levels and during the transfer to deliveries.
  Moreover, to avoid risks of deviation of reference levels compared to the value fixed at the start of the regime, in conformity with Article 9(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, an adjustment mechanism was foreseen to reestablish the reference levels for fat from the moment there is an increase of more than 0,1g/Kg of fat. |
| --- | --- |

52.

Generally, when producers using ‘direct sales’ switch to deliveries they do not change their herd. As a consequence, they still have milk cows of the same race and homogenuous in terms of quality of produced milk. Therefore, it seems coherent to apply the derogation foreseen in Article (7)(2) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 595/2004.

The reply of the Lithuanian authorities showed their riguour in the analysis on the issue of fat content at the moment of the fixation of the reference levels and during the transfer to deliveries.

Moreover, to avoid risks of deviation of reference levels compared to the value fixed at the start of the regime, in conformity with Article 9(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003, an adjustment mechanism was foreseen to reestablish the reference levels for fat from the moment there is an increase of more than 0,1g/Kg of fat.

CONTROLS

| 53. | Whilst agreeing the importance of the controls to be installed, it is stressed that, for the first year's implementation examined by the Court, there was an extremely low financial risk as there was little likelihood of over-shooting the national reference quantities given that they applied for an 11-month period (1 May 2004-31 March 2005). |
| --- | --- |

53.

Whilst agreeing the importance of the controls to be installed, it is stressed that, for the first year's implementation examined by the Court, there was an extremely low financial risk as there was little likelihood of over-shooting the national reference quantities given that they applied for an 11-month period (1 May 2004-31 March 2005).

| 54. | The Commission's bilateral contacts with the Member States involved, and recent on-the-spot audit enquiries in Poland and the Czech Republic, indicate that the Court's findings have been taken on board and that improvements have been, and continue to be, put in place. |
| --- | --- |

54.

The Commission's bilateral contacts with the Member States involved, and recent on-the-spot audit enquiries in Poland and the Czech Republic, indicate that the Court's findings have been taken on board and that improvements have been, and continue to be, put in place.

| 55. | Controls at purchasers are carried out on the basis of his annual declaration of purchases and are therefore best carried out after that declaration has been made. |
| --- | --- |

55.

Controls at purchasers are carried out on the basis of his annual declaration of purchases and are therefore best carried out after that declaration has been made.

| 56. | The control plan for purchasers would logically only be completed after the end of the milk campaign as it is based on the purchasers' declarations. As regards producers and transporters, the Commission agrees that late control plans hamper proper control.
  The Hungarian authorities have explained that all purchasers were controlled for 2004/2005, but risk criteria have been introduced for later years.
  Slovakia has explained that some form of risk analysis existed already for 2005/2006, and as from 2006/2007 a points-based system is used. As from April 2007 an independent risk analysis section is established in the control department. |
| --- | --- |

56.

The control plan for purchasers would logically only be completed after the end of the milk campaign as it is based on the purchasers' declarations. As regards producers and transporters, the Commission agrees that late control plans hamper proper control.

The Hungarian authorities have explained that all purchasers were controlled for 2004/2005, but risk criteria have been introduced for later years.

Slovakia has explained that some form of risk analysis existed already for 2005/2006, and as from 2006/2007 a points-based system is used. As from April 2007 an independent risk analysis section is established in the control department.

| 57. | It is difficult to conceive a risk analysis for an area that has not previously been controlled and for which all the risks are not yet known. The Commission's bilateral discussions and audit show that risk analysis and control planning in subsequent years have become more sophisticated. In the Czech Republic, for example, the risk analysis was formalised as from 2005/2006.
  The Polish authorities carry out their risk analysis for milk purchasers at the end of the quota year. The control verifies the completeness and veracity of the deliveries declaration (made in May) and so it is reasonable that the risk analysis be made after the end of the quota year. In Poland, the control plan was issued in September 2006 — and controls for the 2005/2006 milk period did not have to be completed until 30 September 2007. It has been verified by a Clearance of Accounts mission that the 2006/2007 controls were based on a risk analysis. It was also verified that, while not based on an ex ante risk analysis, the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 controls were executed. |
| --- | --- |

57.

It is difficult to conceive a risk analysis for an area that has not previously been controlled and for which all the risks are not yet known. The Commission's bilateral discussions and audit show that risk analysis and control planning in subsequent years have become more sophisticated. In the Czech Republic, for example, the risk analysis was formalised as from 2005/2006.

The Polish authorities carry out their risk analysis for milk purchasers at the end of the quota year. The control verifies the completeness and veracity of the deliveries declaration (made in May) and so it is reasonable that the risk analysis be made after the end of the quota year. In Poland, the control plan was issued in September 2006 — and controls for the 2005/2006 milk period did not have to be completed until 30 September 2007. It has been verified by a Clearance of Accounts mission that the 2006/2007 controls were based on a risk analysis. It was also verified that, while not based on an ex ante risk analysis, the 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 controls were executed.

| 58. | The Commission agrees that the control regime should encompass all farmers marketing milk and, during audit missions and bilateral contacts the Commission has requested Member States to include all producers of milk, whether or not they have quota, in their risk analysis.
  However, delivery of milk without a quota is not in breach of the Regulation, and the financial risk for the very small producers cannot be great. The proportion of direct sales to delivery quota is considerably less than 3 % in most cases. |
| --- | --- |

58.

The Commission agrees that the control regime should encompass all farmers marketing milk and, during audit missions and bilateral contacts the Commission has requested Member States to include all producers of milk, whether or not they have quota, in their risk analysis.

However, delivery of milk without a quota is not in breach of the Regulation, and the financial risk for the very small producers cannot be great. The proportion of direct sales to delivery quota is considerably less than 3 % in most cases.

| 59. | Although not required by the milk quota legislation, the Commission also strongly urges the cross-checks described by the Court. |
| --- | --- |

59.

Although not required by the milk quota legislation, the Commission also strongly urges the cross-checks described by the Court.

| 60. | The Commission recognises the importance of proper control at the most opportune time. During missions/bilateral contacts, Member States have been reminded that producer controls must be at least partially carried out in-year. For 2005/2006 quota year the Lithuanian authorities performed in-year checks on producers and transport companies.
  Hungary, performed no ‘in-year’ controls on producers in respect of 2004/2005 or 2005/2006, but did make them after the end of the milk years. However, in-year controls were carried out in respect of 2006/2007. |
| --- | --- |

60.

The Commission recognises the importance of proper control at the most opportune time. During missions/bilateral contacts, Member States have been reminded that producer controls must be at least partially carried out in-year. For 2005/2006 quota year the Lithuanian authorities performed in-year checks on producers and transport companies.

Hungary, performed no ‘in-year’ controls on producers in respect of 2004/2005 or 2005/2006, but did make them after the end of the milk years. However, in-year controls were carried out in respect of 2006/2007.

61, Third indent

The Polish authorities accepted the Court's recommendation and as from August 2006 agreed to attach the working sheets to the control reports.

The Polish authorities follow-up and sanctioning process is being handled in the context of the Commission's clearance of accounts procedure, which covers the year in question and is on-going.

61, Fourth indent

Whereas the keeping of such information may be useful in certain circumstances, for example for adapting risk analysis criteria from one year to the next, it is not a regulatory requirement.

Recommendations to this effect will be made to Member States.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

| 73. | Regarding the determination of the direct sales, the Commission has been as restrictive as possible, using an estimation method based on objective criteria. These estimations are deemed to be reasonable and have been applied in a uniform way for all Member States.
  Thanks to this methodology, the initial request of the new Member States (except Poland) initially evaluated at 1,5 million tonnes have been reduced to the acceptable level of 0,73 million tonnes (negotiation position of the Commission). The volume negotiated in the Council has been in the order of 1 million tonnes. |
| --- | --- |

73.

Regarding the determination of the direct sales, the Commission has been as restrictive as possible, using an estimation method based on objective criteria. These estimations are deemed to be reasonable and have been applied in a uniform way for all Member States.

Thanks to this methodology, the initial request of the new Member States (except Poland) initially evaluated at 1,5 million tonnes have been reduced to the acceptable level of 0,73 million tonnes (negotiation position of the Commission). The volume negotiated in the Council has been in the order of 1 million tonnes.

| 74. | As demanded by the act of accession, the Commission decided to release the restructuration reserve in favour of the Member States concerned after a thorough examination in a report. The statistics made available by the Member States have been used and cross-checked. Cross-checks have been made between the data in the report and the data in the survey on quota (Article 26(1) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004) and between the statistics in the report and those of Eurostat and ZMP. See reply to points 24-25.
  Any potential financial risk to the Community budget began only with the first year of application that could involve the additional levy, namely 2005/2006. The Commission undertook two on-the-spot audit enquiries in 2007 in the two Member States presenting the greatest financial risk (i.e. proximity to or overshooting of the national milk quota) for which, thanks to the clearance of accounts mechanism with its retrospective coverage of 24 months, the quota year 2005/2006 was indeed covered. Furthermore, in the framework of other audits, that the Commission did perform in 2005, the resulting bilateral meetings provided excellent opportunities to discuss the Court's findings on milk quotas, and to follow-up relevant developments. A further audit was made in early 2008 in the third new MemberState to overshoot the quota, and likewise audit coverage takes in the quota year 2005/2006. |
| --- | --- |

74.

As demanded by the act of accession, the Commission decided to release the restructuration reserve in favour of the Member States concerned after a thorough examination in a report. The statistics made available by the Member States have been used and cross-checked. Cross-checks have been made between the data in the report and the data in the survey on quota (Article 26(1) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004) and between the statistics in the report and those of Eurostat and ZMP. See reply to points 24-25.

Any potential financial risk to the Community budget began only with the first year of application that could involve the additional levy, namely 2005/2006. The Commission undertook two on-the-spot audit enquiries in 2007 in the two Member States presenting the greatest financial risk (i.e. proximity to or overshooting of the national milk quota) for which, thanks to the clearance of accounts mechanism with its retrospective coverage of 24 months, the quota year 2005/2006 was indeed covered. Furthermore, in the framework of other audits, that the Commission did perform in 2005, the resulting bilateral meetings provided excellent opportunities to discuss the Court's findings on milk quotas, and to follow-up relevant developments. A further audit was made in early 2008 in the third new MemberState to overshoot the quota, and likewise audit coverage takes in the quota year 2005/2006.

Recommendation 1

Second paragraph

In July 2007, the Commission has sent a questionnaire on the application of the quota to collect statistical information on the evolution of the number and size of producers producing for direct sales and for deliveries.

However, whereas a follow-up of the restructuration process is useful in terms of knowledge about the product chain, it is less important for the purpose of monitoring the obligations of the quota regime.

| 75. | (1) | An over-allocation of deliveries quota occurred in 2 Member States. The allocations were brought within the relevant global quantities within the first period (Slovakia) and with effect in the second period (Hungary). Neither Member State concerned registered production in excess of its deliveries quantity. |
| --- | --- | --- |

75.

(1)

An over-allocation of deliveries quota occurred in 2 Member States. The allocations were brought within the relevant global quantities within the first period (Slovakia) and with effect in the second period (Hungary). Neither Member State concerned registered production in excess of its deliveries quantity.

| (6) | The Lithuanian authorities have confirmed that all deliveries (including gratuitous deliveries) are declared. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The Lithuanian authorities have confirmed that all deliveries (including gratuitous deliveries) are declared.

| (7) | The operation of cooperative level quotas in Hungary is in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice and does not present a risk for collection of levy. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

The operation of cooperative level quotas in Hungary is in line with the case-law of the Court of Justice and does not present a risk for collection of levy.

| (8) | The Commission considers that any risks inherent in the status of producer-purchasers are to be taken into account in the risk assessment implicit in the control procedure. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Commission considers that any risks inherent in the status of producer-purchasers are to be taken into account in the risk assessment implicit in the control procedure.

| (9) | As explained in detail in Commission's replies to paragraph 47 and box 4, the Commission does not consider that anomalies took place in the framework of the operation of the national reserves. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

As explained in detail in Commission's replies to paragraph 47 and box 4, the Commission does not consider that anomalies took place in the framework of the operation of the national reserves.

| (10) | The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced.

| (11) | The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The outcome of the various bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audits undertaken by the Commission demonstrate that the problems and criticisms raised by the Court with regard to the quota operations in the first implementing years have been addressed, and that improvements have been introduced.

| (12) | Teething problems in early years have been rectified with significant improvements by Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Teething problems in early years have been rectified with significant improvements by Member States.

| (13) | As explained in Commission's reply to paragraph 56, improvements have been introduced by the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

As explained in Commission's reply to paragraph 56, improvements have been introduced by the Member States.

| (14) | The Commission recognises the importance of proper control at the most opportune time. Improvements have been introduced by the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Commission recognises the importance of proper control at the most opportune time. Improvements have been introduced by the Member States.

| (15) | Hungary, and other MemberStates concerned, have been reminded that controls on producers and transporters must be at least partially carried out in-year. Improvements have been subsequently introduced by Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Hungary, and other MemberStates concerned, have been reminded that controls on producers and transporters must be at least partially carried out in-year. Improvements have been subsequently introduced by Member States.

| (16) | The Commission has followed up the issues raised with the Member States, and is satisfied that improvements have been introduced in years subsequent to the Court's enquiry. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Commission has followed up the issues raised with the Member States, and is satisfied that improvements have been introduced in years subsequent to the Court's enquiry.

| 76. | The problems encountered are inherent in the inauguration of a new regime. However, it has found that the Court's concerns in respect of first years' implementation, when there was little risk of financial impact on the Community budget, have been addressed and improvements put in place. This continues to be monitored under the clearance procedure, also in respect of the quota years under investigation by the Court, and especially in those Member States where overshoot is apparent or likely. |
| --- | --- |

76.

The problems encountered are inherent in the inauguration of a new regime. However, it has found that the Court's concerns in respect of first years' implementation, when there was little risk of financial impact on the Community budget, have been addressed and improvements put in place. This continues to be monitored under the clearance procedure, also in respect of the quota years under investigation by the Court, and especially in those Member States where overshoot is apparent or likely.

Recommendation 2

First paragraph

The Commission has followed up developments both in the context of bilateral meetings and on-the-spot audit enquiries conducted in the context of its clearance of accounts procedures.

As regards point 1 of illustration 4: the Hungarian and Slovak overallocations of deliveries quota have been corrected.

Concerning point 10 of illustration 4: the use of the national reserve in Poland and Lithuania was based on objective criteria and is not therefore discriminatory.

Second paragraph

The Commission agrees to further underline the observations of the Court, whose position it shares.

Third paragraph

The Commission, after consulting the management committee for milk and milk products, has already proposed a reduction of the intensity of the controls foreseen in Article 21(2) of Regulation (EC) No 595/2004. A control rate of 1 % has been set for those producers having a production below 5 000 kg. Commission Regulation (EC) No 228/2008 (1) applies from the 2007/2008 period.

Fifth paragraph

Where possible such practice is indeed encouraged. However, due to the involvement of different services, competences, technical expertise, etc, it is often not practical.

Recommendation 3

There is no obligation to allocate quota to all producers. However, the Commission agrees that all the milk that is commercialised has to be accounted for.

Recommendation 4

First paragraph

The Health Check will allow to verify if the level of quota has to be adjusted or if technical improvements have to be made before 2015, before the end of the regime. The objective is to have a transition before 2015 in a framework as transparent and simple as possible.

First bullet point

Member States have a lot of leeway to organise the transfer of quota. This allows a restructuration which is the most appropriate to their situation. For instance, they can opt to implement a restructuration programme according to Article 18(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003.

Second bullet point

The Commission endeavours to propose to the Council a precise framework with stepwise quota increases until their expiry in 2015 in order to give the producers a clear outlook on their future. This allows the active producers to continue developing their business.

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(1)  Commission Regulation (EC) No 228/2008 of 13 March 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 with regard to intensity of controls on deliveries and direct sales of milk (OJ L 70, 14.3.2008, p. 7).

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