alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Silver Standard Resources Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2013, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Gregory J. Martin, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:








|   |                                                                                                                      
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




|   |                                                                                                                                                     
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




By:/s/ Gregory J. MartinGregory J. MartinSenior Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerDated: March 14, 2014
#### Leo Paul COLANTUONO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D02-2999.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Sept. 3, 2003.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Melntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals an order entered after an evidentiary hearing on a violation of probation. During the pendency of this appeal, the defendant filed a motion to correct certain technical errors in the sentencing order, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). The court denied the motion. Defense counsel has now raised these errors in this appeal. The State agrees that the sentencing order needs correction. We therefore remand the ease to the trial court for correction of the following technical errors.

First, the trial court failed to enter a written sentencing order on count two after making its oral pronouncement. Second, the order refers to the original *576sentence on count two as “two years probation” instead of correctly reflecting the one year term imposed by the court. Third, the order refers to the substantive violation as having occurred on May 23, 2001, when it occurred on February 2, 2002. The case is remanded for the trial court to correct these errors. *See*Fla. R.App. P. 9.110(b), 9.020(g); *Marinelli v. State,*706 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); *McBride v. State,*655 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

STEVENSON, MAY, JJ„ and CHAVIES, MICHAEL B., Associate Judge, concur.
#### Suzana LONG, Claimant/Appellant, v. TA OPERATING CORPORATION and Division of Employment Security, Respondents.

No. ED 83214.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Five.

Sept. 2, 2003.

Suzana Long, Cape Girardeau, MO, pro se.

Robert Eugene James, Overland Park, KS, for TA Operating Corp.

Ronald Joe Miller, Jefferson City, MO, Larry Raymond Ruhmann, St. Louis, MO, for Division of Employment.

SHERRI B. SULLIVAN, Chief Judge.

Suzana Long (Claimant) appeals the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission’s (Commission) decision denying her application for review as untimely. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

On December 14, 1999, a deputy of the Division of Employment Security (Division) found that Claimant was eligible for unemployment benefits. Her employer, TA Operating Corporation, filed a timely appeal with the Appeals Tribunal. After a hearing in which Claimant did not appear, the Appeals Tribunal determined Claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she voluntarily quit work without good cause attributable to her work or employer. The Appeals Tribunal mailed this decision to Claimant on February 9, 2000.

Over three years later, Claimant filed an application for review with the Commission on June 23, 2003. The Commission denied the application for review because it was untimely under Section 288.200.1 Claimant now appeals to this Court. The Division has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending that Claimant’s untimely appeal to the Commission divested both the Commission and this Court of jurisdiction to consider her appeal. Claimant has not filed a response to the motion.

Section 288.200 provides that an application for review filed with the Commission shall be postmarked or filed within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the Appeals Tribunal decision. Here, the Appeals Tribunal mailed its decision to Claimant on February 9, 2000. Claimant filed her application for review over three years later, on June 23, 2003. Therefore, her appeal to the Commission was untimely.

In her application for review with the Commission, Claimant contended that she did not know about the employer’s dispute of her unemployment or the hearing. However, no matter the reason, Section 288.200 fails to provide a party with any way to seek a special order for late application for review. *McAtee v. Bio-Medical Applications of Missouri, Inc.,*87 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Mo.App. E.D.2002); *see also, Bass v. Yong Min Kim,*101 S.W.3d 333 (Mo.App. E.D.2003). In addition, as the Division suggests, Claimant’s failure to file *694her appeal in a timely fashion divested both the Commission and this Court of jurisdiction. *Id.*The Division’s motion to dismiss is granted and Claimant’s appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

LAWRENCE E. MOONEY, J., and GEORGE W. DRAPER III, J., concur.

1

. All statutory references are to RSMo.2000, unless otherwise indicated.
# Official Journal C 161A/18 J

| | ISSN 1725-2423 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 161A |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 4718 June 2004 |

ISSN 1725-2423

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 161A

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 4718 June 2004

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | I   Information |
| | Commission |
| 2004/C 161A/1 | Common catalogue of agricultural plant species — 10th supplement to the 22nd complete edition | 1 |
| 2004/C 161A/2 | Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 4th supplement to the 22nd complete edition | 35 |

Notice No

Contents

page

I   Information

Commission

2004/C 161A/1

Common catalogue of agricultural plant species — 10th supplement to the 22nd complete edition

1

2004/C 161A/2

Common catalogue of varieties of vegetable species — 4th supplement to the 22nd complete edition

35

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
f8k042213ex10iv_carcharging.htm


Exhibit 10.4


 





CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION


CITY OF CHICAGO


 


March 1, 2013


 


John Pierce


DLA Piper


701 Fifth Ave., Suite 7000 


Seattle, WA 98104


 



	
Re:

	
 First Amended and Restated Grant Agreement Between the City of Chicago ("City") and 350Green, LLC ("350Green")







 


Dear Mr. Pierce:


 


You have notified the City's Department of Transportation (CDOT) of your client 350Green's intent to transfer the ownership of 350Green to Car Charging Group, Inc. ("CCG"). CDOT approves this change in ownership, and will not consider it an Event of Default under Sec. 8.1(G) of the Grant Agreement.


 


As you know, 350Green is in default of the Grant Agreement. (See Notice of Default of June 14, 2012). This approval in change of ownership does not cure or obviate 350Green's events of default under the Grant Agreement in any way. In order for CCG to acquire 350Green's interests under the Grant Agreement free from default, the City will need to amend the Agreement pursuant to Sec. 9.4(B).


 




	 	
Very trul yours,

	 
	 	 	 
	
 

	/s/ Gabe Klein	 
	 	Gabe Klein	 
	 	
Commissioner


Chicago Department of Transportation

	 







 



	
cc: 

	
Amy K. Maliza



Office of the General Counsel CarCharging, Inc.


1691 Michigan Ave., Suite 601 Miami Beach, FL 33139









 


30 NORTH LASALLE STREET, SUITE 1100, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60602
#### STATE ex rel. Terry HILL v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2003-KH-1711.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Hill, Terry; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. I, No. 399-463; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2003-K-0640.

Application dismissed at relator’s request.
#### Elmer WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D01-4499.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

Aug. 20, 2003.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Mclntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

The defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising ten separate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court summarily denied claims two through eight on July 16, 2001. The defendant has not raised any error concerning the court’s ruling on these claims. Concerning claim one, the trial court reserved ruling and granted an evidentiary hearing.

At the evidentiary hearing, the defendant argued that his trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to strike an allegedly biased juror for cause. When the hearing concluded, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion. The trial court has yet to rule on claims nine and ten.

We have reviewed the record and find no error in the trial court’s ruling on claim one, concerning the allegedly biased juror. *Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Because the trial court has not ruled on *396claims nine and ten, the matter is not properly before us.

AFFIRMED.

STONE, SHAHOOD and MAY, JJ„ concur.
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2009-3147

PAMELA D. DINKLER,

Petitioner,

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

Respondent.

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in

CH0831070409-1-1.

ON MOTION

Before GAJARSA, FRIEDMAN, and LINN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

ORDER

Pamela D. Dinkier moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and submits

correspondence requesting that the court accept her untimely petition for review. The

court considers whether the petition should be dismissed.

On April 30, 2008, the Merit Systems Profection Board issued a final decision in

Dinkier v. Office of Pers. Mqmt., No. CH-0831-07-0409-1-1, specifying that its decision

was final and that any petition for review must be received by this court within 60

calendar days of receipt of the Board's decision. The Board's records reflect that
Dinkier received the Board's decision on May 9, 2008. The court received Dinkler's

petition for review 62 days later, on July 10, 2008.*

A petition for review of a Board decision must be filed within 60 days of receipt of

the decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). The 60-day filing period is "statutory,

mandatory, [and] jurisdictional." Monzo v. Dept. of Transp. 735 F.2d 1335, 1336 (Fed.

Cir. 1984); see also Oia v. Department of the Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir.

2005) ("[c]ompliance with the filing deadline of 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) is a prerequisite to

our exercise of jurisdiction").

Because Dinkler's petition for review was received by this court two days late,

this court must dismiss Dinkler's petition as untimely.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The petition for review is dismissed.

All pending motions are moot.

FOR THE COURT

MAY - 5 2009

/s/ Jan Horbaly

Date Jan. Horbaly

Clerk

cc:	Pamela D. Dinkier

Richard P. Schroeder, Esq.

s17

MAY -5 2009

JAN HUizetur

CLERK

The petition for review listed the docket number for an earlier petition of

Dinkler's and was originally filed under that number. However, upon review of the file,

the court determined that Dinkler's July 10, 2008 submission was a new petition for

review and docketed it as 2009-3147.

2009-3147	 2
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended June 27, 2009 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any other securities
law.

Each of the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a), or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sensus (Bermuda
2) Ltd. and Sensus USA Inc.



|                |  |                                             |  |          |  |                                            
|--------------- |  | ------------------------------------------- |  | -------- |  | -------------------------------------------
|/s/ PETER MAINZ |  | /s/ JEFFREY J. KYLE                        
|Name:           |  | Peter Mainz                                 |  | Name:    |  | Jeffrey J. Kyle                            
|Title:          |  | Chief Executive Officer & President         |  | Title:   |  | Chief Financial Officer                    
|Company:        |  | Sensus (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus USA
Inc. |  | Company: |  | Sensus (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus USA Inc.
|Date:           |  | July 23, 2009                               |  | Date:    |  | July 23, 2009
NO.

14TH COA NO. 14-14-00403-CR

GEDRIC HOPES § IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL

§

V. §

Ss J2ECEIVED THE STATE OF TEXAS § APPEALS AT AUSTIN^EMSRIAfflNAL APPALS

MOTION FOR EXTENTION OF TIME TO FILE A ^2015

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW AbelACOSta, Cl@fk

COMES NOW, Cedric Hopes, #01932624, Petitioner in the above

-styled and -numbered cause and files his motion for an extention

of time to file his Petition for Discretionary Review, and shows

this Honorable Court GOOD CAUSE to GRANT this motion as follows:

1* Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the TDCJ-CID Cof-

•FJLEDIN field in Anderson County, Texas, and is indigent. ^QURTOFCRlft/Mui

2* Petitioner does not have counsel for his help and irs"'-> ^ - «-.~..~

proceeding in the Pro se-status.

Abel Acosta Cierk

3* The -Coffield unit s law library only allows for each '

offender to have 10 hours per week to conduct their research,

draft out their briefs, and properly prepare for any legal docu

ment to be filed with the allotted time.

4* The Petitioner's memorandum Opinion was handed down on

November 5, 2015. See 14th Court of Appeals' Opinion under No.

14-14-00403-CR. Therefore, the Petitioner's PDR is currently due

on December 5, 2015.

5* The Petitioner is seeking for' a 60 day extention in order

to properly prepare and file his PDR on his own behalf.

6* The Petitioner's proposed deadline will fall on February

page 1
3, 2016.

7* The Petitioner respectfully requests this Honorable Court

to extend the current due date to February 3, 2016, or to a

reasonable amount of time that will secure the Petitioner the

full opportunity to file a meaningful PDR on his own behalf.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Petitioner prays that this Honorable Court will GRANT

this motion and reset the deadline to February 3, 2016, or to

a reasonable maount of time that this Hononrable Court sees fit.

y

Cedric T. Hopes u /

#01932624-Coffield '

2661 FM 2054

Tenn. Colony, Tx. 75884

Pro se.

INMATE DECLARATION

I, Cedric T. Hopes, #01932624, Currently incarcerated in the

TDCJ-CID Cof field unit in Anderson County, Texas, declares:." that'

the foregoing is true and correct under the penalty of perjury.

Executed this day of November 25, 2(

^OLA^ /_. ^-f)g^v£^<-—"

Cedric T. Hopes

#01932624-Coffield

2661 FM 2054

Tenn.Colony, Tx. 75884

Pro se.

PROOF OF MAILING

i'l I, Cedric T. Hopes, #01932624, have placed this motion for

an,extention of time into the internal mailing system of the Cof-

:: :.?:!•• page 2
field unit in Anderson County, Texas, on November 25, 2015.

This is true and correct under the penalty of perjury. Executed

this day of November 25, 2015.

Cedric T. Hopes

#01932624-Coffield

2661 FM 2054

Tenn.Colony, Tx. 75884

Pro se.

page 3 of 3

flfi^^
#### Robert J. Dwyer, Respondent-Appellant, v Carolyn B. Dwyer, Appellant-Respondent.

[719 NYS2d 48]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.), entered January 5, 1999, which, *inter alia,*granted defendant mother’s cross motion for an upward modification of child support only to the extent of modifying the parties’ stipulation of settlement, incorporated in their judgment of divorce, so as to require plaintiff father to pay for 85% 70% and 50% of the parties’ child’s uninsured speech and occupational therapy expenses over a three-year period, and awarded defendant $1,000 in counsel fees, unanimously modified, on the facts, to award defendant $3,500 in counsel fees, and otherwise affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about March 8, 2000, which, *inter alia,*directed defendant, in the first instance, to use therapists who are part of plaintiff’s health insurance plan unless there is a verifiable medical reason for doing otherwise, unanimously modified, on the facts, to delete such directive, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Defendant fails to show a change of circumstances warranting an upward modification of child support other than the cost of the child’s speech and occupational therapy, which cost was appropriately isolated by the motion court as health care expenses for which defendant is to separately account to plaintiff. The award of these expenses, which was made in downward sliding percentages over a three-year period, is challenged by defendant as grossly disproportionate to the parties’ respective incomes, and less than she was entitled to under the Child Support Standards Act. However, the parties elected to have their child support obligations determined by agreement, not statute, and the agreement herein, under which plaintiff must pay $125 a month in uninsured medical expenses, and now modified to add a portion of the therapy costs for a three-year period, is not so unfair that plaintiff should be required to pay more on a permanent basis. However, the court should not *307have directed defendant, in the first instance, to use therapists who belong to plaintiffs health insurance plan since it might be disruptive to the child’s therapy to have him change therapists in mid-course. The counsel fees awarded to defendant were inadequate to the extent indicated. We have considered and rejected the parties’ other arguments for affirmative relief. Concur — Andrias, J. P., Lerner, Saxe, Buckley and Friedman, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           4,460
<SECURITIES>                                    10,007
<RECEIVABLES>                                   10,007
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (470)
<INVENTORY>                                      4,941
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                22,794
<PP&E>                                          28,192
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,960
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 136,382
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,965
<BONDS>                                         83,129
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            10
<OTHER-SE>                                      37,280
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   136,382
<SALES>                                         73,860
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                73,860
<CGS>                                           54,699
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   54,699
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                16,288
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   395
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,091
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,218)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,330)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (4,888)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (4,888)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (4.89)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (4.89)


</TABLE>
Order entered October 28, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 13
- 00889
- CR ISAAC JOHN RUSSELL, Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6

Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006
- 81954
- 2013



### O RDER By letter dated October 2, 2013, the Court notified the trial court judge that none of the boxes is checked on the certification of appellant’s right to appeal. We asked the trial court to review the record and file, with in ten days, a certification that accurately reflects the trial court proceedings. To date, we have not received the completed certification. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2 requires the trial court to prepare a certification in every case in whic h the defendant is appealing. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a), (d), Cortez v. State , 2013 WL 5220904 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2013). Accordingly, we ORDER the trial court to file, within TEN DAYS of the date of this order, a completed certification of appel lant’s right to appeal that accurately reflects the trial court proceedings.We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the

Honorable Jay Bender, Presiding Judge, County Court at Law No. 6, and to counsel for all parti es.

/s/ DAVID EVANS JUSTICE