UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-4065

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

TERRANCE ANTWAN WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (5:08-cr-00160-D-1) 

Submitted: October 26, 2009 Decided: November 24, 2009 

Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne 

M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010
PER CURIAM: 

 Terrance Antwan Williams appeals his conviction of 

possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime 

punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and his 322-month sentence. 

Williams pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to possession 

with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006) (Count 

One), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006) 

(Count Two), and the felon-in-possession charge (Count Three). 

On appeal, Williams argues that his conviction and sentence must 

be vacated because the predicate crimes used to determine that 

he was a felon and that he qualified for sentencing as a career 

offender were not punishable by more than one year of 

imprisonment. He also argues that the district court committed 

procedural error in failing to adequately consider his request 

for a downward variance based on the sentencing disparity 

between powder and crack cocaine. We affirm. 

 In the presentence report (PSR), the probation officer 

concluded that Williams qualified for sentencing as a career 

offender based on two prior North Carolina state court 

convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver 

marijuana. After he received the PSR, Williams filed a motion 

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to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, he asserted that he 

was actually innocent of the felon-in-possession charge in Count 

Three, and did not have the required predicate felony 

convictions for career offender sentencing, because his prior 

state drug convictions were not punishable by more than one year 

of imprisonment. He based this argument on the then-recent 

decision in United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 

2008), which interpreted the North Carolina sentencing statutes 

to require examining each defendant’s prior record level to 

determine if a particular crime was punishable by more than one 

year of imprisonment. The Government opposed Williams’ motion, 

relying on this court’s decisions in United States v. Harp, 406 

F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Jones, 195 F.3d 

205 (4th Cir. 1999). 

 At sentencing, the district court concluded that Harp

and Jones remained controlling in the Fourth Circuit, and denied 

the motion to withdraw Williams’ guilty plea to the felon-inpossession count. The court also overruled Williams’ objections 

to career offender status and adopted the Guidelines 

calculations in the PSR. The court sentenced Williams to the 

bottom of the Guidelines range of 262 months on Count One, a 

consecutive sixty months on Count Two, and a concurrent 120 

months on Count Three, for a total of 322 months of 

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imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $300 

special assessment. 

 Williams first asserts that the district court erred 

in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, based on the 

same arguments asserted in the district court. He argues that 

his conviction on Count Three and his career offender sentence 

must be reversed, because he had not previously been convicted 

of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. He 

again relies on Pruitt, and argues that the decisions in Jones

and Harp are no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s 

decision in United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008). 

 A district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). The 

defendant has the burden of demonstrating “a fair and just 

reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e); Ubakanma, 215 

F.3d at 424. A “fair and just reason” is one that challenges 

the fairness of the guilty plea colloquy conducted pursuant to 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United 

States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). 

 In determining whether the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, six 

factors are considered. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 

248 (4th Cir. 1991). Williams asserts that he is factually and 

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legally innocent of the felon-in-possession count because he has 

not been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year 

of imprisonment. Using the same legal basis, Williams also 

argues that he was improperly sentenced as a career offender. 

In considering the district court’s application of the 

Guidelines, this court reviews factual findings for clear error 

and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d 

522, 527 (4th Cir. 2006). 

 Williams argues that Pruitt correctly interpreted and 

applied Rodriquez to the North Carolina sentencing scheme, and 

therefore his two drug convictions were not punishable by more 

than one year of imprisonment. This court has repeatedly 

rejected Williams’ argument. Jones rejected analysis of the 

sentencing situation faced by a particular North Carolina 

defendant in favor of looking at the maximum sentence that could 

be imposed on any defendant convicted of a particular crime. 

Jones, 195 F.3d at 207. Harp rejected a challenge to the Jones

methodology and held that the crime of which Williams was 

convicted, possession with intent to distribute marijuana in 

North Carolina, is punishable by more than one year of 

imprisonment and thus constitutes a controlled substance offense 

for purposes of career offender sentencing. Harp, 406 F.3d at 

245-47. Further, “a panel of this court cannot overrule, 

explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of 

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this court. Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en 

banc can do that.” Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 

264, 271-72 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). We conclude that the district court 

properly denied Williams’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 

overruled his objection to career offender status. 

 Williams also argues that the district court committed 

procedural error in failing to address his request for a 

downward variance based on the crack-powder cocaine disparity. 

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse 

of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __, 

128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). This review requires appellate 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id. After determining whether 

the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory 

Guidelines range, this court must then consider whether the 

district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) 

factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and 

sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 596-97; 

see United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) 

(holding that, while the “individualized assessment need not be 

elaborate or lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale tailored 

to the particular case . . . and [be] adequate to permit 

meaningful appellate review”). Finally, this court reviews the 

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substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United States v. 

Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

district court fully and adequately considered Williams’ request 

for a variance as well as his request that the court calculate 

his offense level using the powder cocaine Guidelines. The 

district court made “‘an individualized assessment based on the 

facts presented.’” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (quoting Gall, 128 

S. Ct. at 597). We are also satisfied that the court complied 

with our instruction that “‘[t]he sentencing judge should set 

forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has 

considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Id.

(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)); see

United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007). 

 Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ convictions and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED