[Cite as Holden v. Holden, 2016-Ohio-5557.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BROWN COUNTY 

JEREMY MATTHEW HOLDEN, : 

 CASE NO. CA2015-07-016 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 O P I N I O N 

 : 8/29/2016 

 - vs - 

 : 

MINDY MICHELE HOLDEN, : 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

APPEAL FROM BROWN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION 

Case No. 20120894 

Croswell & Adams Co., L.P.A., Gregory L. Adams, 1208 Sycamore Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 

45202, for plaintiff-appellant 

Fred Miller, Baden & Jones Bldg., 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendantappellee 

 HENDRICKSON, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Jeremy Matthew Holden ("Father"), appeals from the final 

decree of divorce entered by the Brown County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 

Division, raising issues related to the adoption of a shared parenting plan and the court's 

reservation of jurisdiction over hidden marital funds. For the reasons set forth below, we 

reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
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I. FACTS

{¶ 2} Father and Mindy Michele Holden ("Mother") were married on June 9, 2001, 

and two children were born issue of the marriage, to wit: a daughter, born in February 2004, 

and a son, born in November 2005. Father filed a complaint for divorce in September 2012, 

and sought shared parenting of the children. Father filed a proposed shared parenting plan 

on October 30, 2012. Mother did not file a proposed shared parenting plan. 

{¶ 3} A final hearing on the divorce complaint was held on June 6, 2013, August 27, 

2013, September 5, 2013, and October 8, 2013. At the final hearing, the parties both alleged 

that the other party had removed and concealed marital funds. Mother alleged Father 

removed approximately $24,000 from the parties' joint account between June 14, 2011 and 

September 4, 2012, and hid the funds with the assistance of his mother. In turn, Father 

accused Mother of improperly removing funds from their joint account. Both parties, 

however, testified that any funds removed from their joint account had been used for living 

expenses or the payment of marital bills. 

{¶ 4} On December 13, 2013, the magistrate issued a decision recommending that a 

divorce be granted and that the parties' marital debts and assets be divided equally. With 

respect to the alleged "hidden" marital funds, the magistrate stated the following: 

[B]oth parties have alleged that the other party removed marital 

funds from their joint bank accounts. * * * 

Based upon all of the evidence and testimony presented, the 

Court finds that both parties withdrew funds from joint marital 

accounts right at the time of the filing of the divorce or prior to the 

filing of the divorce and used the said funds for living expenses 

and/or the payment of marital bills. It is therefore recommended 

that that [sic] neither party shall owe the other any 

reimbursement for any alleged funds taken from the parties' joint 

marital accounts prior to the filing of the divorce complaint. It is 

further recommended that the Court shall reserve jurisdiction in 

the event that either party comes into any newly discovered 

evidence not available at the time of this trial which purports to 

show that either party is indeed hiding marital joint funds from the 
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other party and upon proof of the same shall be subject to further 

division by this Court. 

{¶ 5} In its decision, the magistrate also found it was in the parties' children's best 

interest for the parties to have shared parenting. The magistrate recommended that Father's 

shared parenting plan be adopted "with modifications being made to the said plan by this 

Court and as otherwise set forth in the Magistrate's Decision." The magistrate crossed out 

various provisions of Father's shared parenting plan that he did not agree with and 

substituted his own provisions in their place. Among the changes the magistrate made to 

Father's shared parenting plan were (1) removing the provisions specifying that "[e]ach 

parent shall be designated as residential parent * * *" and substituting it with provision that 

Mother "be named as the primary residential parent with * * * [Father] receiving parenting 

time," (2) changing Father's proposed visitation schedule to "a schedule as can be agreed 

upon between the parties" and if no agreement can be reached, visitation in accordance with 

the Brown County Standard Visitation Guidelines, and (3) removing terms related to the 

parties' right of first refusal when the other parent is in need of a caretaker for the children. 

The magistrate also struck various portions of Father's shared parenting plan dealing with the 

parties' child support obligations and the payment of the children's medical expenses and 

extracurricular activities. 

{¶ 6} Both Mother and Father filed objections to the magistrate's decision. Father 

objected to that portion of the decision dealing with shared parenting on the following bases: 

8. [Father] believes the Parenting Schedule was not in the best 

interest of the minor children considering the [guardian ad litem] 

recommended week on week off rotating schedule and the Court 

agreed to the same for the summer months. 

* * * 

10. The Child Support calculations are unreasonable, unjust, 

and inappropriate both in the amount and effective date. * * * 

[T]he Court failed to deviate the child support amount based 
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upon the time that * * * [Father] spends with the children. 

12. The Court continued the extended summer parenting time 

although it was ordered a week on week off summer schedule. 

* * * 

14. This Honorable Court failed to address what the parties are 

to do with the minor children if they are off of school on 

Tuesdays. 

* * * 

16. [Father] objects to not having equal access to picking the 

children up from school without permission of * * * [Mother]. 

While the objections were pending before the trial court, Mother filed for bankruptcy and the 

case was stayed. 

{¶ 7} The case was reactivated in June 2014. A few months later, on October 30, 

2014, the trial court held a hearing on the parties' objections to the magistrate's decision. 

Following argument on the objections, the trial court issued an Interim Order on Objections, 

in which the court noted that the parties' original objections "fail[ed] to specify exactly what is 

wrong regarding each [objectionable] item in the decision. There is no specificity as to what 

the proper Order should be and no legal authority for any position taken by Counsel in the 

Objections." The court, therefore, ordered that the parties file memoranda setting forth 

"exactly what they find objectionable about each objection the[y] have filed and it must 

specify exactly what they want the Court to Order if the objection is sustained." Mother and 

Father both complied with the court's order by filing supplemental memoranda in support of 

their objections. 

{¶ 8} On April 13, 2015, the trial court issued a decision denying the majority of the 

parties' objections. With respect to the parties' objections to shared parenting, the court 

stated it "agree[d] with the Magistrate's Decision that the Shared Parenting Plan proposed by 

the [Father] is in the best interests of the children." However, the court, in response to 
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Mother's objections and concerns regarding medical care for the children, stated the 

following: 

The Court does believe that there should be one change to the 

Plan and that is the provision that deals with medical decisions 

for the children. The plan shall provide that both parents should 

consult with another in making medical decisions and that either 

party may obtain a second medical opinion at their own cost, 

regarding any medical, dental, optical or mental health decisions 

that concern the parties [sic] children. If the parties still cannot 

agree, the recommendation of the child's treating physician or 

medical provider shall control. If there is an emergency, the 

parent who is exercising parenting time may make the decision. 

The Court believes that this modification is necessary given the 

parties [sic] distrust of one another. 

After ruling on the remaining objections, the court ordered that Father's attorney prepare and 

submit the final decree of divorce by May 15, 2015. 

{¶ 9} Mother and Father were unable to agree on some of the wording to be used in 

the decree, and a hearing was held on June 10, 2015, to resolve these disputes. At this 

time, Father's counsel indicated the following: 

[M]y client took concern with * * * the way the wording was with 

the parenting issues. The magis - - the decision, on objection, 

states that the father's shared parenting plan should be adopted, 

but it didn't say the next words, which I - - I - - I think - - I don't 

know if it was an oversight or not, it didn't say, "as modified by 

the magistrate." It said, "father's shared parenting plan was in 

the best interest." So my client insisted that the decree states 

that his shared parenting is adopted with the one clarification that 

was in the decision on objections. 

The court responded to Father's concerns by stating: 

Well, what the parties, apparently, don't understand is that I can 

do whatever I want. I can modify anything that's proposed. I can 

do whatever I think is in the best interest. If I don't like the 

magistrate's decision, in full, I can scrap it. I can change it. I can 

modify it. If I don't like the shared parenting plan, I can scrap it. I 

can change it, to make it my own order. 

{¶ 10} Thereafter, on June 17, 2015, the trial court issued its final decree of divorce. 

The decree of divorce provided that "the parties shall have shared parenting for their said 
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minor children pursuant to the [Father's] proposed shared parenting plan * * * which is 

incorporated herein by reference as if being completely rewritten with modifications being 

made to the said plan by this Court and as otherwise set forth in this Decision." 

{¶ 11} Father has timely appealed from the decree of divorce, raising two assignments 

of error. 

II. ANALYSIS 

{¶ 12} Assignment of Error No. 1: 

{¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO FOLLOW THE REQUIREMENTS 

OF OHIO LAW WHEN ADOPTING A SHARED PARENTING PLAN. 

{¶ 14} In his first assignment of error, Father argues that both the magistrate and the 

trial court judge "exceed[ed] [their] subject matter jurisdiction" by failing to observe the 

limitations set forth in R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) when they modified Father's shared parenting 

plan before the plan was adopted and set forth in the final decree of divorce. Alternatively, 

Father argues the magistrate and judge committed reversible error in modifying Father's 

shared parenting plan. 

A. Jurisdictional Challenge

{¶ 15} Father argues the trial court's adoption of the shared parenting plan is void as 

the court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to act. In support of his argument, appellant 

cites Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 208, 37 Ohio St.3d 

56 (1988). 

{¶ 16} In Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., the Ohio Supreme Court examined R.C. 

4117.16(A) to determine a trial court's jurisdiction to extend a temporary restraining order 

enjoining a union from striking. Id. The court found that "[u]nder R.C. 4117.16(A), the court 

of common pleas is without jurisdiction over a strike by public employees after the State 

Employment Relations Board ["SERB"] has determined pursuant to that statute that the strike 
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does not pose a clear and present danger to the public health or safety." Id. at paragraph 

two of the syllabus. In reaching this determination, the court noted that the language of R.C. 

4117.16(A) limited a trial court's jurisdiction in extending a temporary restraining order to 

those situations in which SERB determines that a clear and present danger exits. Id. at 61. 

"Once SERB issues a finding that no such danger is present, the trial court is absolutely 

without authority to proceed in any manner." Id. The trial court's exercise of jurisdiction 

subsequent to SERB's negative finding was therefore found to be void. Id.

{¶ 17} Father argues that the General Assembly did not give the trial court the 

authority under R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) to unilaterally modify a plan proposed by a party or 

to create its own shared parenting plan. He contends that the court, by attempting to fashion 

its own shared parenting plan, "exceeded the subject matter jurisdiction bestowed upon it by 

the legislature [making the] order * * * void ab initio." 

{¶ 18} R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) provides as follows: 

If each parent makes a request in the parent's pleadings or files 

a motion but only one parent files a plan, or if only one parent 

makes a request in the parent's pleadings or files a motion and 

also files a plan, the court in the best interest of the children may 

order the other parent to file a plan for shared parenting in 

accordance with division (G) of this section. The court shall 

review each plan filed to determine if any plan is in the best 

interest of the children. If the court determines that one of the 

filed plans is in the best interest of the children, the court may 

approve the plan. If the court determines that no filed plan is in 

the best interest of the children, the court may order each parent 

to submit appropriate changes to the parent's plan or both of the 

filed plans to meet the court's objections or may select one filed 

plan and order each parent to submit appropriate changes to the 

selected plan to meet the court's objections. If changes to the 

plan or plans are submitted to meet the court's objections, and if 

any of the filed plans with the changes is in the best interest of 

the children, the court may approve the plan with the changes. If 

changes to the plan or plans are not submitted to meet the 

court's objections, or if the parents submit changes to the plan or 

plans to meet the court's objections but the court determines that 

none of the filed plans with the submitted changes is in the best 

interest of the children, the court may reject the portion of the 
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parents' pleadings or deny the parents' motion or reject the 

portion of the parents' pleadings or deny their motions requesting 

shared parenting of the children and proceed as if the request or 

requests or the motion or motions had not been made. If the 

court approves a plan under this division, either as originally filed 

or with submitted changes, or if the court rejects the portion of 

the pleadings or denies the motion or motions requesting shared 

parenting under this division and proceeds as if the request or 

requests or the motion or motions had not been made, the court 

shall enter in the record of the case findings of fact and 

conclusions of law as to the reasons for the approval or the 

rejection or denial. Division (D)(1)(b) of this section applies in 

relation to the approval or disapproval of a plan under this 

division. 

Therefore, under R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii), if only one parent files a shared parenting plan, 

the court shall review the plan to see if the plan is in the best interest of the children. If the 

court determines that the proposed plan is not in the best interest of the children, the court 

may request that the parent make appropriate changes to address the court's objections. 

Should the changes still not satisfy the court, the court may proceed as if the request or 

motion for shared parenting had not been made. DaSilva v. DaSilva, 12th Dist. Butler 

CA2004-06-127, 2005-Ohio-5475, ¶ 11, citing R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii). "The statute does 

not give the court authority to create its own shared parenting plan." Id. See also

Schattschneider v. Schattschneider, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-06-24, 2007-Ohio-2273, ¶ 6; 

Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d 616, 641 (9th Dist.1999). 

{¶ 19} We find, contrary to Father's arguments, that the juvenile court's failure to follow 

the procedure outlined in R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) implicates an improper exercise of the 

court's subject matter jurisdiction rather than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction altogether. 

See Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 10. As the Ohio Supreme Court 

explained in Pratts: 

"Jurisdiction" means "the courts' statutory or constitutional power 

to adjudicate the case." * * * The term encompasses jurisdiction 

over the subject matter and over the person. * * * Because 

subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to 
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adjudicate the merits of the case, it can never be waived and 

may be challenged at any time. * * * It is a "condition precedent 

to the court's ability to hear the case. If a court acts without 

jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void." * * * 

The term "jurisdiction" is also used when referring to a court's 

exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case. * * * "The third 

category of jurisdiction [i.e., jurisdiction over the particular case] 

encompasses the trial court's authority to determine a specific 

case within that class of cases that is within its subject matter 

jurisdiction. It is only when the trial court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction that its judgment is void; lack of jurisdiction over the 

particular case merely renders the judgment voidable." * * * 

"Once a tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of 

an action and the parties to it, '* * * the right to hear and 

determine is perfect; and the decision of every question 

thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus 

conferred.'" * * * 

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11-12. 

{¶ 20} Applying the above principles, we conclude that the magistrate's and judge's 

actions in modifying Father's shared parenting plan prior to adopting the plan did not divest 

the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction so that the judgment rendered is void ab initio. 

Rather, it consists of an error in the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over this particular 

case. 

{¶ 21} The issue then becomes whether the magistrate's and judge's improper 

exercise of jurisdiction results in reversible error. We begin by examining the magistrate's 

actions. 

B. Magistrate's Modifications to Plan

{¶ 22} As set forth above, R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) does not give a court the authority 

to create its own shared parenting plan. DaSilva, 2005-Ohio-5475 at ¶ 11; Schattschneider, 

2007-Ohio-2273 at ¶ 6. If a court determines that a parent's proposed shared parenting plan 

is not in the children's best interest, the court may make suggestions for modification of the 

plan and request that the parent resubmit the shared parenting plan. McClain v. McClain, 87 
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Ohio App.3d 856, 857 (9th Dist.1993); DaSilva at ¶ 11. If the parent does not make the 

appropriate changes or if the court is not satisfied with the changes that are resubmitted, the 

court may proceed as if the request or motion for shared parenting had not been made. Id. 

If no satisfactory plan is filed with the court, the court will not adopt any plan. Id., citing R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(b). 

{¶ 23} There is no dispute in the present case that the magistrate acted in violation of 

R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) when he struck various provisions of Father's proposed shared 

parenting plan and replaced those provisions with his own provisions. Mother argues, 

however, that the error is not reversible as Father failed to specifically object to the 

magistrate's actions in his written objections to the magistrate's decision. Mother also 

contends, contrary to Father's arguments, that the magistrate's actions do not rise to the level 

of plain error. 

{¶ 24} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) provides that "[a]n objection to a magistrate's decision 

shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection." Further, the rule 

provides that "[e]xcept for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal 

the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion * * * unless the party has 

objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)." Civ.R. 

53(D)(3)(b)(iv). 

{¶ 25} Father did not object to the magistrate's actions in striking the various 

provisions of the shared parenting plan and substituting his own provisions in their place. By 

failing to object to the magistrate's actions, Father has waived all but plain error on appeal. 

Thompson v. Cannon, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2015-02-003, 2015-Ohio-2893, ¶ 12.1 Plain 

 

1. Although Mother disputes whether Father adequately raised a plain error argument on appeal, we find that 

Father sufficiently raised the issue in his appellate brief when he argued that the court's "[f]ailure to follow th[e] 

statutorily mandated process [set forth in R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii)] is plain error." 
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error is only found in "exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was 

made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 

the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying judicial process 

itself." Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997), syllabus. 

{¶ 26} Having reviewed the record, we find that the magistrate's actions in the present 

case rises to the level of plain error. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-06-56, 

2007-Ohio-5771, ¶ 39-41 (appellate court sua sponte raising and finding plain error where 

the trial court modified father's shared parenting plan to require mother to pay father child 

support before adopting the plan); Elson v. Plokhooy, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-10-24, 2011-

Ohio-3009, ¶ 42-45 (appellate court sua sponte raising and finding plain error where the 

magistrate modified the visitation portion of a father's shared parenting plan that was later 

adopted by the trial court). The magistrate's actions in striking a large number of provisions 

in Father's shared parenting plan and replacing those provisions with his own was an 

exceptional circumstance affecting the underlying fairness of the proceedings. If the 

magistrate found the terms of Father's proposed shared parenting plan objectionable, he 

should have asked Father to submit appropriate changes to meet his objections, and if the 

changes did not satisfy the magistrate, he should have recommended that Father's parenting 

plan be rejected. R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) and (D)(1)(b). Because the magistrate failed to 

comply with R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii), we find plain error. 

C. Trial Court's Modifications to Plan

{¶ 27} We further find that the trial court's modification to the shared parenting plan to 

address medical care for the children was in violation of the court's authority under R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii) and, therefore, is reversible error. The trial court, in ruling on the parties' 

objections to the magistrate's decision, modified the shared parenting plan to provide that 

both parents should consult with another in making medical 
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decisions and that either party may obtain a second medical 

opinion at their own cost, regarding any medical, dental, optical 

or mental health decisions that concern the parties' children. If 

the parties still cannot agree, the recommendation of the child's 

treating physician or medical provider shall control. If there is an 

emergency, the parent that is exercising parenting time may 

make the decision. 

{¶ 28} Mother argues on appeal that the trial court's modification of the shared 

parenting plan to address medical care for the children was an error that Father invited. She 

contends "[Father] had asked the court for the very wording regarding a second opinion that 

the court then inserted in the decree." However, we find no evidence in the record to support 

Mother's contention. The only party that raised objections to the magistrate's decision 

regarding the medical care of the children was Mother. Father did not "invite" the trial court 

to make the foregoing change to his proposed shared parenting plan.2 Rather, the court 

amended the shared parenting plan on its own volition and in violation of the requirements of 

R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii). 

{¶ 29} We therefore sustain Father's first assignment of error. The judgment of the 

trial court is reversed and the matter remanded for the proper application of R.C. 

3109.04(D)(1)(a)(iii). 

D. Reservation of Jurisdiction

{¶ 30} Assignment of Error No. 2: 

 

2. At the June 10, 2015 hearing, Father did request that the court's final decree of divorce state that the adopted 

shared parenting plan had been modified by the magistrate. Father's counsel specifically stated: 

[M]y client took concern with * * * the way the wording was with the parenting 

issues. The magis - - the decision, on objection, states that the father's shared 

parenting plan should be adopted, but it didn't say the next words, which I - - I - 

- I think - - I don't know if it was an oversight or not, it didn't say, "as modified by 

the magistrate." It said, "father's shared parenting plan was in the best 

interest." So my client insisted that the decree states that his shared parenting 

is adopted with the one clarification that was in the decision on objections. 

In no way can the foregoing be characterized as Father asking for the trial court to modify the medical care 

provision of the shared parenting plan. 
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{¶ 31} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RESERVING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY 

THE PROPERTY DIVISION IN THE FUTURE. 

{¶ 32} In his second assignment of error, Father contends the trial court erred when it 

reserved jurisdiction over newly discovered evidence of previously hidden marital property. 

Father argues the court lacks the authority to reserve jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 75(F) and 

R.C. 3105.171(I). We agree. 

{¶ 33} In the final decree of divorce, the trial court made its property division orders 

and then stated that 

[i]t is further Ordered that the Court shall reserve jurisdiction in 

the event that either party comes into any newly discovered 

evidence not available at the time of this trial which purports to 

show that either party is indeed hiding marital joint funds from the 

other party and upon proof of the same shall be subject to further 

division by this court. 

{¶ 34} However, a court cannot enter final judgment on a claim for divorce unless one 

of the following applies: 

(1) The judgment also divides the property of the parties, 

determines the appropriateness of an order of spousal support, 

and, where applicable, either allocates parental rights and 

responsibilities, including payment of child support, between the 

parties or orders shared parenting of minor children; 

(2) Issues of property division, spousal support, and allocation 

of parental rights and responsibilities or shared parenting have 

been finally determined in orders, previously entered by the 

court, that are incorporated into the judgment[.] 

(Emphasis added.) Civ.R. 75(F). Moreover, "a division of marital property is not subject to 

modification through the continuing jurisdiction of the court." Robins v. Robins, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 04AP-1152, 2005-Ohio-4969, ¶ 11. See also Pettit v. Pettit, 12th Dist. Fayette 

No. CA2011-08-018, 2012-Ohio-1801, ¶ 58; R.C. 3105.171(I) ("A division or disbursement of 

property * * * is not subject to future modification by the court except upon the express written 

consent or agreement to the modification by both spouses"). Therefore, once the trial court 
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divides the marital property and enters the final decree of divorce, the judgment is final and 

the court no longer possesses jurisdiction over the division of marital assets. 

{¶ 35} However, while a trial court cannot reserve jurisdiction to modify a property 

division, the court does have jurisdiction to grant a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(8) or to 

grant relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(2). See, e.g., McSweeney v. 

McSweeney, 112 Ohio App.3d 355 (10th Dist.1996); Costakos v. Costakos, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 97APF04-553, 1997 WL 607477 (Sept. 30, 1997). Therefore, if the parties in 

the present case discover new evidence of hidden marital funds, they may, at that time, file 

the appropriate motion asking the court to exercise jurisdiction over the newly-discovered 

assets. 

{¶ 36} Accordingly, we sustain Father's second assignment of error and reverse the 

trial court's judgment to the extent that it attempts to reserve jurisdiction to divide additional 

marital property. The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to remove the 

following language from the final decree: 

It is further Ordered that the Court shall reserve jurisdiction in the 

event that either party comes into any newly discovered evidence 

not available at the time of this trial which purports to show that 

either party is indeed hiding marital joint funds from the other 

party and upon proof of the same shall be subject to further 

division by this court. 

III. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 37} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and 

the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

{¶ 38} Judgment reversed and remanded. 

 M. POWELL, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.