2023 UT App 132

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF G.H. AND R.H.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

L.G.,

Appellant,

v.

R.G. AND R.G.,

Appellees.

Opinion

No. 20220920-CA

Filed November 2, 2023

Seventh District Juvenile Court, Price Department

The Honorable Craig Bunnell

No. 1210014

Steve S. Christensen and Clinton Brimhall,

Attorneys for Appellant

Colleen K. Coebergh, Attorney for Appellees

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 The maternal grandparents of two children filed a petition 

for guardianship, alleging neglect by both parents and abuse at 

the hands of the children’s father. The guardianship was 

contested, and a trial was held. After trial, the juvenile court 

granted the petition, finding facts consistent with the allegations 

of the petition and determining that the guardianship was in the 

best interest of the children. Further, the juvenile court 

determined that the mother’s parent-time, if any, would take 

place at the unfettered discretion of the grandparents. The mother 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 2 2023 UT App 132

appeals, claiming the juvenile court erred in determining neglect, 

erred in failing to order parent-time, and wrongfully denied a 

motion to change venue as to one of the children. For the most 

part, we affirm. However, the juvenile court’s findings regarding 

the mother’s parent-time rights are inadequate, and we therefore 

remand this matter for the entry of further findings and 

conclusions as necessary.

BACKGROUND

¶2 AG (Mother) and JH (Father) are the natural parents of GH

and RH (the Children).

1 In April 2022, Mother’s parents, RG and 

RG (Grandparents), petitioned for guardianship and custody of

the Children, alleging that such a placement was in the best 

interest of the Children due to Father’s abuse and both parents’ 

neglect. A few days later, Grandparents filed an ex parte motion

for temporary custody of the Children, and the juvenile court 

granted the request.

¶3 At a pre-trial hearing, Mother asked for an expedited 

evidentiary hearing regarding temporary custody. The court 

declined that request and instead held a combined adjudication 

and disposition hearing over two trial days in July and August

2022.

¶4 After that hearing, the court issued an order setting forth

findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding adjudication 

and disposition. Because Mother does not dispute the findings of 

fact, we recite the facts directly from the juvenile court’s findings.2

1. RH has a twin, who has lived with the maternal greatgrandmother since April 2021 and is not involved in this case.

2. Mother disputes the findings of fact only with regard to venue. 

But as our disposition makes clear, these factual disputes are 

immaterial.
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 3 2023 UT App 132

¶5 The court took judicial notice of a 2019 order in which the 

same court terminated Mother’s parental rights to an older child, 

who was adopted by Grandparents shortly thereafter. Mother 

stated she had “no idea” why her maternal rights for the older 

child were terminated, but the record shows that it was primarily 

due to Mother’s neglect.

¶6 Mother moved in with Grandparents in Price, Utah, in July 

2019 and lived with them through the first part of January 2022.

From June through September 2021, Mother worked evenings 

(5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.). She had surgery for “a minor thing” in 

September 2021. Mother was unemployed until she obtained fulltime employment in December 2021. At this job, she worked tenhour shifts (10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.) four days per week. 

¶7 While living with Grandparents, Mother “relied on 

[Grandparents] almost exclusively and for nearly everything for 

[the Children] . . . . [Grandparents] were the primary caretakers 

for [the Children’s] day-to-day physical, developmental, medical, 

and financial needs.”

¶8 With regard to the Children’s physical needs, Mother “did 

very little to make arrangements for [the Children], provide basic 

care, or assist with household duties,” even when asked to do so.

She did not provide “day-to-day food or meals” for the Children, 

nor did she help with potty training GH. 

¶9 Regarding developmental needs, Grandparents provided

for “the vast majority of [the Children’s] indoor and outdoor 

activities, toys, and one-on-one parent-role interactions.” Mother 

“did very little to actually parent [the Children] or care for their 

needs,” and she did not assist with “mothering” the Children.

When asked to care for the Children, other than watching the 

Children for about five hours some weekdays when 

Grandparents were both working, “Mother would often say she 

was too tired, too busy, be on her phone or smoking, or on her bed 

resting or lounging.” 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 4 2023 UT App 132

¶10 Mother’s sister (Sister) would often visit Grandparents’

house (about two times each week when Grandparents were not 

there), and she observed Mother being “verbally abusive or terse

with [the Children],” leaving them “unattended or unsupervised, 

not changing diapers as needed, or not caring for them.” The court 

also found, based on Sister’s testimony, that Mother would often

“come to [Sister’s] house (at times unannounced) without childcare supplies or clothes,” asking for help with the Children

because Mother was “tired, needed a break, going out with 

friends, or going to work (although, at times, she did not go to 

work, but went back to [Grandparents’] house to sleep or 

smoke).”

¶11 Financially, Mother sometimes shared her government

food assistance card but relied on Grandparents for most of the 

Children’s financial needs. She also relied on Grandparents to

provide birthday or Christmas gifts for the Children. She did, 

however, reimburse Grandparents a few hundred dollars and 

paid for some daycare. 

¶12 Regarding medical needs, Mother took the Children for 

immunizations, but she did not take them to other types of 

medical appointments or help Grandparents when the Children

were sick with ear infections, colds, or other maladies. 

¶13 In January 2022, Mother moved in with another relative 

(Step-Grandmother) in Highland, Utah, which was twenty

minutes from her newly acquired job. Grandparents continued as 

GH’s primary caretakers in Price, but RH moved to StepGrandmother’s house with Mother. 

¶14 During this time-period, RH received daily and weekly 

care in four different cities separated by nearly a hundred miles

and by four different caregivers besides Mother, namely StepGrandmother, Great-Grandmother, Father’s mother, and 

Grandparents. Essentially, Grandparents and GreatGrandmother would relieve Step-Grandmother when she was not 

available to watch RH. Sometimes Mother would be the one to
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 5 2023 UT App 132

take RH to Great-Grandmother’s house. Step-Grandmother, 

Grandparents, the maternal great-grandmother (GreatGrandmother), or Mother transported RH, and sometimes GH, 

from house to house on weekends. Mother’s mother handled 

most of the Children’s care coordination, “unless Mother needed 

to preplan to accommodate her own work schedule.” RH did not 

stay in “one consistent place or house” during this time-period; 

RH was at a “different house almost every day of the week, and 

each week was different than the last.” 

¶15 Watching Mother with the Children “scared” StepGrandmother, and she never saw Mother being “a mother” to the 

Children. Mother was “negative verbally” to the Children and 

“put her own wants and needs before RH’s needs.” Mother would 

get upset when Step-Grandmother wanted to go out, making it 

necessary for Mother to watch RH. 

¶16 Mother provided very little assistance to StepGrandmother with household duties, except for washing her and 

RH’s clothes, and “Mother’s bedroom was always cluttered (with 

RH’s clothes on the floor) and never cleaned.” Mother put RH to 

bed half the time, but Step-Grandmother noted that the time was 

never consistent, as Mother sometimes would come home as late 

as 10:30 p.m. On some Friday nights, Mother did not come home 

at all until later that weekend. 

¶17 While living with Step-Grandmother, Mother changed 

RH’s diaper only about once per day; smoked cigarettes “all the 

time”; was “always on her phone”; did not give baby food or 

regular feeding; and did not read to, play with, sing to, or bathe 

RH. 

¶18 In mid-March 2022, Mother moved into a rental house in 

Murray, Utah, with RH. Although Step-Grandmother no longer 

provided RH daily care after the move, Mother still used 

Grandparents, Great-Grandmother, and Father’s mother to care 

for RH. Mother’s work schedule changed to eight hours per day, 

five days per week (12:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. or 2:00 p.m. to 10:00
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 6 2023 UT App 132

p.m.). Grandparents primarily watched RH on weekends. GH 

continued to live with Grandparents. 

¶19 On April 5, 2022, Mother picked up Father from prison,

and he lived with Mother from then until at least July 2022, when 

Mother learned—on the first day of trial through Father’s 

probation officer’s testimony—that Father had used drugs just a 

week before. Before hearing this testimony, “Mother did not 

believe he would use drugs.” Mother allowed Father to watch the 

Children unsupervised, and until trial, she had planned to 

continue living with him, despite knowing that Father was 

convicted of assaulting someone in prison two months prior to his 

release and despite complaining to Grandparents that Father was 

“controlling and threatening her, taking her phone and car, 

refusing to work, and taking advantage of her.” Father’s assault 

conviction “did not cause her any concern” about him being with 

her or the Children.

3 The court found that Mother’s reintroduction 

of Father into the Children’s lives “was an emphatic 

demonstration to the Court of Mother’s poor judgment and her 

continued inability (since having her parental rights terminated 

to an older child in 2019 and since [the Children] were born) to 

put [the Children’s] needs and welfare before her own.”

¶20 Mother made efforts to obtain a full-time job and to 

perform well at her job to provide for her and the Children.

4 But

the court concluded that Mother “did not progress over the last 

three years as was necessary and appropriate for her to meet the 

daily needs” of the Children. Instead, Grandparents, Step3. Although the court found that Father had “an extensive and 

violent criminal history, including convictions for interfering with 

arrests, assaults, disorderly conduct, and threats of violence,” it 

did not make a specific finding regarding Mother’s knowledge of 

his violent criminal history outside of the event in prison.

4. When asked about how Mother was performing at work, her 

supervisor testified, “She is incredibly reliable. She’s one of my 

go-to staff . . . .”
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 7 2023 UT App 132

Grandmother, Great-Grandmother, and others provided “the 

crucial day-to-day parenting and caretaking that are necessary for 

[the Children] to thrive developmentally and otherwise.” 

¶21 The court also found that the Children “thrived living 

together with [Grandparents] prior to Mother moving out of 

[Grandparents’] home in January 2022” and after being reunited 

in Grandparents’ home in April 2022. The court noted that 

Grandparents “demonstrated their reliability and consistent 

efforts to provide for all of [the Children’s] day-to-day physical, 

mental, emotional, developmental, medical, financial, and 

educational needs.” The court emphasized that the Children 

should be living together. 

¶22 Based on these factual findings, the court concluded there 

was clear and convincing evidence that Mother neglected the 

Children. The court also concluded, based on clear and 

convincing evidence, that the Children’s best interests would be 

met by granting Grandparents permanent custody and 

guardianship. Additionally, the court ordered that Mother’s and 

Father’s parent-time with the Children “shall be at the discretion 

and under the control or management of [Grandparents].”

¶23 As relevant here, Mother moved the court to dismiss 

Grandparents’ petition for improper venue or to transfer venue, 

which the court denied. Mother now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶24 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred when it 

determined that the Children were neglected. Mother clarifies

that she is not disputing the court’s findings of fact but the court’s 

application of these findings to the law; therefore, “we accept 

these findings as true in our analysis on appeal.” d’Elia v. Rice 

Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 416, ¶ 24, 147 P.3d 515. “We view the 

question presented here as law-like because it concerns whether 

the facts as constituted meet the legal standard of the statute. . . . 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 8 2023 UT App 132

Accordingly, we review the issue presented here giving no 

deference to the juvenile court.” In re A.B., 2021 UT App 91, ¶ 10, 

498 P.3d 894, aff’d, 2022 UT 39, 523 P.3d 168. 

¶25 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in not 

awarding her parent-time and thus failing to give due 

consideration to her residual parental rights. “We generally will 

not disturb the district court’s parent-time determination absent a 

showing that the court has abused its discretion. However, we 

review the district court’s interpretation of a statute for 

correctness. Likewise, we review the legal adequacy of findings of 

fact for correctness as a question of law.” Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 

137, ¶ 4, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up).

¶26 Finally, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in 

denying her motion to dismiss or transfer based on venue. Venue

“is a question committed to the district court’s discretion, which 

we review for an abuse of discretion.” Davis County v. Purdue 

Pharma, LP, 2020 UT 17, ¶ 7, 463 P.3d 619. 

ANALYSIS

I. Neglect

¶27 “If, at the adjudication[5] hearing, the juvenile court finds, 

by clear and convincing evidence, that the allegations contained 

in the abuse, neglect, or dependency petition are true, the juvenile 

court shall conduct a dispositional hearing.” Utah Code § 80-3-

402(1). “The dispositional hearing may be held on the same date 

as the adjudication hearing . . . .” Id. § 80-3-402(3). At the 

dispositional hearing, the juvenile court then “may vest custody 

of an abused, neglected, or dependent minor in the division or any 

other appropriate person.” Id. § 80-3-405(2)(a)(i). “If a minor has 

5. Adjudication “means a finding by the court . . . that the facts 

alleged in the petition have been proved.” Utah Code § 80-1-

102(3)(a). 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 9 2023 UT App 132

been placed with an individual or relative as a result of an 

adjudication . . . , the juvenile court may enter an order of 

permanent legal custody and guardianship with the individual or 

relative of the minor.” Id. § 80-3-405(2)(d)(i). “Clear and 

convincing evidence is an intermediate standard of proof that 

implies something more than the usual requirement of a 

preponderance of the evidence; and something less than proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Put differently, this standard requires 

the existence of facts that make a conclusion very highly 

probable.” In re K.K., 2023 UT App 13, ¶ 22, 525 P.3d 519 (cleaned 

up), cert. denied, 531 P.3d 731 (Utah 2023). 

¶28 Neglect is statutorily defined, and can be proved in any one 

of several ways. See Utah Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(i)–(vi).6 While the 

juvenile court found neglect under several subsections, to affirm 

we need conclude only that neglect was established under one of 

the bases. See In re E.F., 2013 UT App 13, ¶ 3, 295 P.3d 1165 (per 

curiam) (upholding juvenile court’s conclusion that mother 

neglected child under the sole basis of lack of proper parental care 

by reason of parent’s faults or habits). Among other bases, the 

juvenile court found neglect under subsection (ii), which defines 

neglect as “action or inaction causing . . . lack of proper parental 

6. Utah Code section 80-1-102(58)(a) defines “neglect” as follows:

[An] action or inaction causing: (i) abandonment of 

a child . . . ; (ii) lack of proper parental care of a child 

by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, 

guardian, or custodian; (iii) failure or refusal of a 

parent, guardian, or custodian to provide proper or 

necessary subsistence or medical care, or any other 

care necessary for the child’s health, safety, morals, 

or well-being; (iv) a child to be at risk of being 

neglected or abused because another child in the 

same home is neglected or abused; (v) abandonment 

of a child through an unregulated child custody 

transfer under Section 78B-24-203; or (vi) 

educational neglect.
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 10 2023 UT App 132

care of a child by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, 

guardian, or custodian.” Utah Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(ii). We agree 

with the juvenile court that the evidence supported a finding that 

this basis for neglect had been proved.

¶29 First and foremost, the factual findings demonstrated that 

Mother did not attend to the Children’s basic health and welfare

needs, such as feeding and bathing them, changing their diapers 

regularly, and obtaining medical care for them when they were 

sick. Mother also did not show any interest in potty training GH. 

¶30 Moreover, Mother did not behave in a manner consistent 

with parenting a child. For example, Mother did not demonstrate 

a desire to play with the Children, read or sing to them, or buy 

them birthday and Christmas presents. And Grandparents were 

the ones to provide the Children’s indoor and outdoor activities 

and toys rather than Mother.

¶31 Similarly, the findings revealed that Mother lacked interest 

in being around the Children, and she would refuse to care for 

them when asked by the family members with whom she was 

living. Mother would complain that “she was too tired” or “too 

busy,” or she would prefer to “be on her phone or smoking, or on 

her bed resting or lounging.” Likewise, Mother would drop off 

the Children unannounced at Sister’s house—“without child-care 

supplies or clothes”—because Mother was “tired, needed a break, 

[or was] going out with friends, or going to work,” although, at 

times she went back to Grandparents’ house “to sleep or smoke”

instead. Mother also would get upset when Step-Grandmother 

wanted to go out some evenings, thus leaving Mother to care for

the Children. In addition, “Mother did not do household duties 

when asked to do so.”

¶32 Although the court did acknowledge Mother’s 

commendable efforts with her current job, it still found that

Mother “did not progress over the last three years as was 

necessary and appropriate for her to meet the daily needs of each 

of [the Children].”
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 11 2023 UT App 132

¶33 Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that Mother was 

not troubled by Father being with her or the Children. Even 

though Mother knew that Father was convicted of assaulting 

someone while in prison and said that he was “controlling and 

threatening her, taking her phone and car, refusing to work, and 

taking advantage of her,” Mother allowed Father to watch the 

Children unsupervised and, until learning of his continued drug 

use at trial, had planned to go on living with him. Additionally, 

despite Father’s history with drug use, Mother “did not believe he 

would use drugs.” Mother’s reintroduction of Father into the 

Children’s lives demonstrated to the court “emphatic[ally]” that 

Mother showed “poor judgment and [a] continued inability (since 

having her parental rights terminated to an older child in 2019 and 

since [the Children] were born) to put [the Children’s] needs and 

welfare before her own.” 

¶34 The court also highlighted that during the time when 

Mother lived with Step-Grandmother, the Children were cared 

for by many different caregivers other than Mother. The court 

found that Grandparents were the main caregivers for GH, and

the court emphasized that RH’s daily and weekly care was 

provided by five different caregivers located in four different 

cities. Mother argues that a “child is not without proper parental 

care solely because that care is not always at the hands of a 

parent” and that it is “not uncommon for parents, especially 

single working mothers, to place children in daycare or arrange 

for care with family.” In support of her argument, Mother cites In 

re A.B., 2021 UT App 91, 498 P.3d 894, aff’d, 2022 UT 39, 523 P.3d 

168, where we held that a child is not neglected if the child

receives proper parental care, “even if not always at [a mother’s]

hand.” Id. ¶ 20.

¶35 We agree with Mother that it can be completely 

appropriate for parents to arrange for others to help them in 

caring for their children, and we empathize with single parents 

whose childcare arrangements may not always seem ideal to 

others of greater means and opportunity. But Mother’s behavior 

in this case is distinguishable from that in In re A.B. Here, the 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 12 2023 UT App 132

juvenile court found, and Mother does not dispute, that Mother 

did “very little to make arrangements” for the Children, would 

drop off the Children at Sister’s “at times unannounced,” would 

not come home when she was expected to, and would not take

care of the Children when at home. In contrast, In re A.B.

concerned a child who spent summers with “welcoming relatives[,]

. . . and on agreement, summer turned into a whole year.” Id. ¶ 1

(emphases added). Moreover, that mother arranged the child’s 

care with the relatives, id. ¶¶ 2–3, and she never refused to take 

care of her child when she oversaw the child’s care, id. ¶ 19. 

Therefore, Mother’s reliance on In re A.B. misses the mark. 

¶36 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile 

court’s findings of fact meet the legal standard of neglect. See Utah 

Code § 80-1-102(58)(a)(ii). Therefore, we affirm its grant of 

permanent custody and guardianship to Grandparents. See id.

§ 80-3-405(2)(d)(i).7

II. Parent-Time

¶37 Mother next argues that the juvenile court erred by failing 

“to even consider providing Mother parent-time in the final 

analysis order.” While we don’t quite agree with Mother’s 

characterization of the order as a complete failure to consider 

Mother’s residual rights, we agree that remand on this issue is 

necessary.

7. After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court may award 

permanent custody and guardianship to a relative if it finds by 

clear and convincing evidence either abuse or neglect by the 

natural parent. See Utah Code §§ 80-3-402(1), -405. Mother made 

additional arguments that the court erred in determining that GH 

was abused by Father and that Mother had standing to appeal any 

determinations regarding Father that contributed to a finding that 

Mother neglected the Children. Because we affirm the juvenile 

court’s determination that Mother neglected the Children, we do 

not need to address these arguments.
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 13 2023 UT App 132

¶38 When the juvenile court vests custody of a child in 

someone other than the child’s natural parent, the court “shall 

give primary consideration to the welfare of the minor.” Utah 

Code § 80-3-405(2)(a)(ii)(A). Here the court did so by awarding 

custody to Grandparents, whom the court found to “have 

demonstrated their reliability and consistent efforts to provide for 

all of [the Children’s] day-to-day physical, mental, emotional, 

developmental, medical, financial, and educational needs.”

¶39 But the court’s responsibilities when awarding custody do 

not end there. The court also “shall give due consideration to the 

rights of the parent or parents concerning the minor.” Id. § 80-3-

405(2)(a)(ii)(B). This includes consideration of awarding 

reasonable parent-time. Specifically, the statute provides that “[a] 

parent of a minor for whom a guardian is appointed retains 

residual parental rights and duties.” Id. § 75-5-209(5). These 

residual parental rights include “the right to reasonable parenttime unless restricted by the court.” Id. § 80-1-102(70)(a)(iv). Thus, 

our legislature intended for juvenile courts to give careful thought 

to an award of parent-time when granting custody and 

guardianship to someone else. And we note that parent-time is 

significant because it offers “the parent the possibility of 

maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child despite lack

of physical custody.” Moreno v. Board of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 890 

(Utah 1996). 

¶40 Yet here, the juvenile court simply stated that Mother’s and 

Father’s parent-time with the Children “shall be at the discretion 

and under the control or management” of Grandparents, without 

making any findings regarding the amount of parent-time that 

would be reasonable. Instead, the court delegated that

determination entirely to Grandparents. And this could lead to 

Grandparents denying Mother any parent-time8 without the court 

8. Mother alleges that when she has asked Grandparents for 

parent-time, they have refused and told her, “You have no rights.” 

(continued...)
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 14 2023 UT App 132

making any findings of fact to justify such a denial.9 Here, we find 

the court’s findings and conclusions regarding parent-time to be 

inadequate.

¶41 A juvenile court’s factual findings “must be sufficiently 

detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to clearly show the 

evidence upon which they are grounded.” In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 

398 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also In re M.G., 2003 UT App 313U, 

para. 5 (holding that “a review of the court’s oral findings reveals 

the subsidiary facts and basis for the juvenile court’s written 

findings and demonstrates that the written and oral findings, 

taken together, are sufficiently detailed to permit appellate 

review”). “Put another way, findings are adequate when they 

contain sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that 

the [juvenile] court’s discretionary determination was rationally 

based. Indeed, the [juvenile] court’s obligation to render adequate 

findings facilitates meaningful appellate review and ensures the 

parties are informed of the [juvenile] court’s reasoning.” Lay v. 

Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 427 P.3d 1221 (cleaned up). “Unless 

the record clearly and [incontrovertibly] supports the [juvenile]

court’s decision, the absence of adequate findings of fact 

ordinarily requires remand for more detailed findings by the 

[juvenile] court.” Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1991) (cleaned up).

¶42 We are unable to determine the court’s basis for leaving all 

parent-time decisions in the hands of Grandparents, a situation 

that potentially denies Mother any parent-time with the Children. 

Mother’s allegations are not part of our appellate record, 

however.

9. It is possible for a juvenile court, in an appropriate case, to 

determine that a parent retaining residual rights is not entitled to 

any parent-time. But any such determination should be rare and 

should be supported with findings that demonstrate why it is not 

reasonable, for example, for the parent to have at least short 

periods of unsupervised or supervised parent-time.
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 15 2023 UT App 132

Accordingly, we vacate the juvenile court’s decision regarding 

parent-time and remand this matter for specific findings

demonstrating what conditions of parent-time are reasonable. If 

the court determines that it is reasonable to award no parent-time

to Mother, then the court must make specific findings to justify 

such a determination.

III. Venue

¶43 Mother brought a motion to dismiss or change venue on 

the morning of trial, asserting that the case had been brought in 

the wrong venue.10 The juvenile court took the motion under 

advisement and delayed ruling on the motion until it could take 

evidence and determine facts relative to venue. In its dispositional 

order, the juvenile court determined that venue was correct in the 

Seventh District. Now on appeal, Mother challenges that 

conclusion only as to RH. Mother maintains that on the day the 

petition for guardianship was filed, RH was living with Mother in 

Salt Lake County. Even assuming, for purposes of the discussion,

that venue was incorrectly determined to be in the Seventh 

District as to RH, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court 

because Mother has failed to show any harm.

¶44 The guardian ad litem’s briefing maintained that Mother 

needs to show harm to obtain reversal based on an erroneous 

denial of the motion to change venue as it pertains to RH. Mother

does not quibble with this legal assertion but claims that she 

implicitly identified and showed harm in her principal brief. As 

both parties have proceeded under the assumption that an 

appellant must show harm, we will do likewise without deciding 

10. Utah law provides that “a proceeding for a minor’s case in the 

juvenile court shall be commenced in the court of the district in 

which . . . the minor is living or found.” Utah Code § 78A-6-

350(1)(b). 
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 16 2023 UT App 132

that discrete issue.11 The sole harm Mother points to is that the 

case regarding RH would have been dismissed and that dismissal 

would have benefitted Mother. Mother is wrong on the first point 

and utterly fails to meet her burden of persuasion on the second.

¶45 First, as to automatic dismissal, this result was rejected 

several years ago by this court when In re adoption of B.N.A., 2018 

UT App 224, 438 P.3d 10, explored the consequences of hearing a 

case in the wrong venue. Initially, we explained that under 

current precedent, subject-matter jurisdiction is not implicated

when a case is filed in the wrong district. Id. ¶¶ 12–24. Then we 

concluded that the “consequence for filing in the wrong district is 

not automatic dismissal.” Id. ¶ 25. Instead, “any party, upon 

proper motion, may request that the case be transferred to the 

correct district.” Id. So, if the Mother’s motion had been granted, 

the case would have been transferred, not dismissed. 

Accordingly, the argument that harm resulted because the case 

would have been dismissed fails.

¶46 Second, Mother fails to identify any other harm. She 

merely concludes that “[d]ismissal would have benefitted 

Mother.” But as just explained, dismissal would not have 

occurred. And Mother presents no argument that she would have 

obtained a different result had the case been transferred. 

Importantly, where Mother does not challenge that the case 

involving GH would have remained in the Seventh District, we 

easily foresee that upon transfer, any other juvenile court would 

have likely transferred the RH case back to the Seventh District 

under its discretionary powers, and more particularly under rule 

11. Some courts that have decided this issue have held that harm 

must be shown. See Lamb v. Javed, 692 S.E.2d 861, 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 

2010); Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

But we do not decide this issue and leave it for another day.
In re G.H.

20220920-CA 17 2023 UT App 132

42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.12 Further, Mother fails to 

show how the result rendered in a different venue would have 

been better for her. Thus, Mother fails to meet her burden of 

persuasion that she was harmed by the denial of her motion to 

change venue. 

¶47 Accordingly, we see no basis to reverse the judgment of the 

juvenile court on the issue of venue.

CONCLUSION

¶48 We affirm the juvenile court’s determination that Mother 

neglected the Children and that venue was proper in the Seventh 

District with regard to RH. We also conclude that the juvenile 

court made inadequate findings regarding its parent-time award. 

Therefore, we vacate the court’s award of sole discretion over 

Mother’s parent-time to Grandparents and remand the matter for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion to consider 

Mother’s residual parental rights when determining a reasonable 

award of parent-time.

12. Mother asserts that venue rights are so substantial that a denial 

of a motion to change venue can be grounds for an interlocutory 

appeal, citing Davis County v. Purdue Pharma, LP, 2020 UT 17, 463 

P.3d 619. While this is true, Mother sought no interlocutory 

appeal here. And other courts have held that failure to 

immediately appeal a denial of a motion to change venue 

constitutes a waiver of the venue claim. See, e.g., Patterson v. 

Alexander & Hamilton, Inc., 844 So. 2d 412, 415 (La. Ct. App. 2003).