FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT J UNE 20, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ __ N o. 07- 1100 3

____ ____ ____ ____ __ D. C. Docket N o. 06-00136 CV -SP M OLEN CLAY GORBY, Pe tit ion er -Appe llant, ve rs us WALTER A. MCNEIL, Secr etary De partm ent of Correc tions of Florida, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the N orthern District of Florida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ (J un e 20, 200 8) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, D U BIN Aand P RY O R, Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

O le n C lay

G or by ( “ Pe tit ion er ”) appe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to dism iss as unti m ely

his petitio n filed under 28 U.S .C. § 2254 . The district court de te rmine d th at

P et iti one r’ s se co nd s uc ce ssi ve m oti on f or pos t- co nvi ct ionr el ie f in state c ourt di d no t t oll the one -y ear statut e of li m itatio ns unde r the A nti te rr or ism an d E ff ec tiv e D eath P en al ty

A ct ( “ A E D PA ”) . W e ag re e an d th er ef or e af fi rm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sm iss al of P et iti one r’ s se ct ion225 4 pe tit ion . I. B ac kgr ound

Pe tit ion er w as se nte nc ed

to de ath a ft er

his c onvi ct ionin Fl or ida f or f ir stde gr ee m ur de r, gr an d th ef

t auto , bur glary

w ithbatte ry , and r obbe ry . T he F lor ida Supr em e Co urt af

firm edPet it io ne r’s co nv ic ti on an d s en te nc e o n d ire ctap pe al . Gorby v. S tate, 630 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1993 ). T he U. S. Suprem e Court denied ce rt ior ar i; an d P et iti one r’ s c onvi ct ionbe cam e fi na l i n O ct obe r 1994 . S ee G or by v. Florida, 115 S. Ct. 99 (1994 ). Pe tit ion er the n f ile d an or igi na l m oti on f

or pos t- co nvi ct ionr el ie f in s tate court, which he later am ended. T he state trial court denied re lief; and Petitioner ap pe al ed . P et iti one r al so f ile d astate pe tit ionf

or wri t of ha be as c or pus. T he Fl o ri d a S up re m e C o u rtaf fi rmedth e t ri al co u rt ’s d ec i s i o nd en yin g Pe t i t i o n er ’sPetitioner’s conviction and sentenc e bec ame f inal befor e AED PA’s eff

ective date, which wa s 1 24 April 1996. As a r esult, the limit ations period did not be g in to run until AEDPA took effec t. See Care y v. Sa ff old , 1 22 S. Ct . 2 13 4, 21 37 (2 00 2) . B e c a us e Pe tit ioner ’s or ig ina l mo tio n f or po stconviction re lief was pending in state court whe n AEDPA bec ame e ffe ctive, the limitations period was tolled until the Florida Supre me Court denied r elief a nd issued its mandate on 10 J u l y 2002. The last day

for Petitioner t o file his section 2254 petition fell on 11 Novembe r 2004; but 2 beca use 11 Nove mber wa s a fe dera l holiday , the limitations period e x pired on 12 Nove mber. 3 o r i g i n a l mo t i o nf

o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o nr e l i e f

; a tth e s ame t i me , th e s t a t e s up r e me co urt de nie d P et iti one r’ s st at e habe as pe tit ion . G or by v. S tate , 819 S o. 2d 6 64 (Fl a. 20 02 ). N o on e dis put es that A E D PA ’ s on e- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns b eg anto run on 1 1 Ju ly

200 2. O n 24 Marc h 20 03, P et iti one r fi le d hi s f ir st s uc ce ssi ve m oti on 1 fo r post -c onvi ct ionr el ie f in s tate c ourt, a lle gin g th at F lor ida ’ s c ap ita l se nte nc ing sc he m e w as unc onst itutio na l un de r Ri ng v . A ri zo na , 122 S . Ct . 242 8 ( 2002 ). T he state trial court denied Petitioner’ s Ring claim ; and the Florida Suprem e Court af fi rm ed . G or

by v. S tate , 880 S o. 2d 1 210 (F la . 200 4) . B ec au se the F lor ida Su pr em e Co urt de nie d P et iti one r’ s m oti on f or r eh eari ng o n 23 Jul y

200 4, AEDPA’ s l im it at io ns pe rio d b eg anto run ag ai n o n 2 4 J ul y . T he li m itatio ns p er iod

w as due to expir e on 1 2 N ove m be r 2004 ; but

on 2 6 2 O ct obe r, P et iti one r fi le d ase co nd s uc ce ssi ve m oti on f or pos t- co nvi ct ionr el ie f in state court based on Craw ford v. W ashingt on, 124 S. C t. 1354 (2004 ). PetitionerRul e 3. 85 1( d) (1 ) s tate s, “ Any mot ion to v a c ate jud g me nt o f c on vi ction a nd se nte nc e of

de ath 3 sh a ll b e fi le d b y

the pr iso ne r w ith in 1 y e ar a ft e r t he jud g me nt a

nd se nte nc e be c ome fi nal.” Rul e 3.851(d)( 2)(B ) provides a n exception to thi s o n e-year limit ations period whe re “ the fundamental constitutional right a sserted was not established within the period provide d for in subdivision (d)(1) and has be en held to apply retroa ctively .” 4 cl ai m ed that, dur ing the se nte nc ing pha se of his tr ia l, the tr ia l j udge vio late d hi s Si xthA m en dm en t r igh t t o c onf ro ntatio n by

a llo w ing aBay

Co unty , F lor ida sh eri ff’s d ep ut y

to tes ti fy ab ou t a p rio r vi ol en t fe lo ny con vi ct io n i n Tex as . The state trial court denied Petitioner’ s second su ccessive m otion as unt im el y . B ec au se P et iti one r fi le d hi s m oti on m or e than te n y ears a ft er his co nvi ct ionbe cam e fi na l and b ec au se ne ith er the U . S. S upr em e Co urt no r the Fl or ida S upr em e Co urt ha d de te rmine d th at Cr aw fo rd

appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y , the state court concluded that Petition er’ s m otion did no t fall w ithin a re cognized exception to th e one-y ear lim itations period und er F lorida Rule of Crim inal Pr oc ed ur e 3. 851( d) . T he F lor ida S upr em e Co urt a ff

ir m ed , c iti ng C handl er

v. 3 Cr osby , 916 S o. 2d 7 28 ( Fl a. 200 5) , f or the pr opos iti on that C raw fo rd sho uld not be appl ie d r etro ac tiv el y . G or by v. S tate , N o. S C0 5- 246, 200 6 F la . L E X IS 894 (Fl a. 20 06 ). Its de ci si on be cam e fi na l o n 2 0 J un e 2 00 6. Pe tit ion er the n f ile d hi s f ed er al pe tit ionf

or se ct ion225 4 r el ie f, whic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed

a s un tim el y . B ec au se the state tr ia l c ourt ( as a ff irm ed by the Florida Suprem e Court) denied Pe tition er’ s second su ccessive m otion as tim e-5

barr ed und er state law , the dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that the m oti on w as not

“pr ope rl y f ile d” f or pur pose s of tol lin g A E D PA ’ s on e- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns and that, as a result, P etitioner’ s federa l petition wa s untim ely . W e granted Pet it io ne r’s ap pl ic at io n fo r a certi fic at e o f ap pe al ab il it y . II . D isc uss ion

T his c as e tur

ns o n whe the r Pe tit ion er ’ s se co nd s uc ce ssi ve m oti on f or state post -c onvi ct ionr el ie f w as “pr ope rl y f ile d, ” thu s to lli ng A E D PA ’ s on e- y ear statut e of li m itatio ns. I f the m oti on w as pr ope rl y f ile d, the n P et iti one r’ s se ct ion225 4 petition wa s tim ely . If the m otion wa s not prop erly filed, then his p etition was unt im el y and s houl d be dis m iss ed . Adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de ci sio n to dis m iss ase ct ion 2254 pe tit iona s ti m e- barr ed is re vie w ed

de nov o. D ay

v. Cr osby , 391 F . 3d 1 192, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004), aff’ d sub n om . D ay v. Mc Donough , 126 S. Ct. 1675 (2006). AE DP A provides that “ [a] 1-y ear period of lim itation sh all apply to an ap pli catio n f

or awri t of ha be as c or pus by ape rs on i n c ust ody

pur suant t o th e j udgm en t of

aS tate c ourt. ” 28 U . S. C. § 22 44( d) (1 ). A E D PA ’ s to lli ng p ro vis ion say s, how ev er , that “ [t ] he ti m e dur ing whic h apr ope rl y f ile d a ppl ic at ionf

or S tate post -c onvi ct ionor

oth er c oll at er al r ev ie ww ithr es pe ct to the pe rt ine nt j udgm en t or6

cl ai m is pe nd in g s ha ll no t b e co un te d t owa rdan y pe rio d o f li m it at io n.” Id. § 2244 (d )( 2) . Astate appl ic at ionis “pr ope rl y f ile d” whe n “ ‘ its de liv er

y and ac ce ptanc e ar e in c om

pli an ce w iththe appl ic ab le law s and r ule s go ve rn ing fi lin gs, ’ ” w hic h ty

pic al ly inc lud e “ ‘ the f

or m of the doc um en t, the ti m e limits upo n its de liv er y , the c ourt and o ff

ic e in whic h it

m ust be lod ge d, and the r equis ite f ili ng fe e. ’ ” S w ee t v. S ec ’ y , D ep t. of Co rr . , 467 F . 3d 1 311, 131 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) (quot ing A rt

uz v. Be nne tt, 121 S . Ct . 361 , 364 ( 2000 )) . A n a ppl ic at ionthat i s u n t i m el y u n d ers t at e l aw i s n o t“p ro p er l y fi l ed ” f o r p u rp o s es o f t o l l i n g AED PA ’s li m it at io ns pe rio d. Id . at 1 31 6. Petitioner say s that the Florida Suprem e Court af firm ed the state trial court on the m erits, not on grounds that Petitioner’ s second su ccessive m otion wa s u n t i m el y. Pe t i t i o n erre l i es m ai n l y o nl an g u ag e i nth e F l o ri d a S up re m e C o u rt ’s opin ion affirm ing th e trial c ourt “based on ou r decision in Chandler.” I n Ch an dle r, the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt de te rmine d th at the c onst itutio na l r igh t announ ce d inCr aw fo rd

v. W as hin gto n, 124 S . Ct . 135 4 ( 2004 ) — the r igh t up on w hic h P et iti one r ba se d hi s se co nd s uc ce ssi ve m oti on f or state pos t- co nvi ct ion rel ie f — s ho ul d n otbe ap pl ie d re tro act iv el y . Cha nd le r, 91 6 S o. 2 d a t 7 29 . Be ca use the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt di d no t st at e expli ci tly that P et iti one r’ s m oti on w as ti m e- barr ed

und er F lor ida lawand b ec au se it

r el ie d in ste ad

on a pr ior de ci sio n7

ab out the r etro ac tiv e ef

fe ct of Cr aw fo rd , P et iti one r ar gue s th at the F lor ida Supr em e Co urt m

us t h av e d eci de d h is cla im on th e m eri ts . Pe tit ion er c ite s th e pla in- state m en t r ule se t f orth i n P ar

ke r v. S ec ’ y

f or the D ep t. of Co rr . , 331 F . 3d 7 64 ( 11th C ir . 200 3) : “ ‘ [A ] pr oc ed ur al de fa ult doe s no t bar co nsi de ratio n of

af ed er al c la im

on e ith er dir ec t or ha be as r ev ie wunl es s th e la st s tate c ourt r en de ri ng a j udgm en t i n th e ca se c le ar ly and e xpr es sly

state s th at

it s j udgm en t r es ts o n astate pr oc ed ur al bar. ’ ” I d. a t 77 1 ( quot ing H ar ri s v. Re ed , 109 S. Ct . 103 8, 104 3 ( 1989 )) . P et iti one r sugg es ts that the pla in- state m en t r ule f or pr oc edur al de fau ltsh ou ldap pl y to AEDPA’ s “ pr op erl y

fil ed ” requi rem en t as well . Be ca use the F lor ida

S upr em e Co urt —

he re , the la st s tate c ourt t o r en de r j udgm en t — d id n ot s ay

that hi s m oti on w as unt im el y , P et iti one r cl ai m s th at the state suprem e court m

ust have reached the m erits and that, as a result, his m otion wa s pr op erl y fil ed . T hat pr oc ed

ur al de fa ult is dis tin ct

f ro m the “pr ope rl y

f ile d” r equir em en t f

or tol lin g A E D PA ’ s st at

ute of li m itatio ns i s c le ar . S ee A rt uz , 121 S . Ct . a t 36 4 (“ [T ] he que sti on whe the r anappl ic at ionha s be en‘ pr ope rl y f ile d’ is qui te se parate fr om the que sti on whe the r the c la im s c ont ai ne d inthe appl ic at ionare m er ito ri ous an d f re e of pr oc ed ur al bar. ” (e m

pha sis in or igi na l) ). P et iti one r of fe rs no explanatio n why

the pla in- state m en t r

ule f or pr oc ed ur al de fa ult sho uld be8

ex te nde d to A E D PA ’ s “pr ope rl y f ile d” r equir em en t. W e se e no r ea son to e xte nd th e ru le he re. Strictly speaking, Petitioner does not d isput e that his m otion actually wa s unt im el y und er F lor ida ’ s R

ule 3. 851( d) . I nst ea d, he sug ge sts that the F lor ida Su pr em e Co urt’ s purp orte d c onsi de ratio n of the “ m er its ” of

his c la im m ad e his m oti on t im el y

and thus pr ope rl y

f ile d un de r A E D PA ’ s to lli ng p ro vis ion . F or ba ck gr ound , se e Smithv. Batta gli a, 415 F . 3d 6 49, 653 ( 7thCi r. 200 5) ( “ T he co urt’ s tr eatm en t of

the m er its of

his c la im is en oughto m ak e it ‘ pr ope rl y f ile d’ f or pu rp os es of t he to ll in g ru le s o f 28 U.S.C. § 2 24 4( d) (2 ).”). E ve n if w e w er e to a cc ep t that the F lor ida S upr em e Co urt r ea ch ed

the

“ m er its , ” co nsi de ratio n of the m er its c annot

a lon e co nve rt

am oti on f

or pos tco nvi ct ionr el ie f that no one dis put es is tim e- barr ed und er state lawint o apr ope rl y fi le d m oti on f

or tol lin g purp ose s un de r A E D PA . C f. E vans v . Ch av is, 126 S . Ct . 846, 852 ( 2006 ) (n oti ng that a state sup re m e co urt or de r “ de ny ing ape tit ion‘ on the m er its ’ doe s no t auto m at ic al ly ind ic at e that the pe tit ionw as ti m el y f ile d” and that instead “ the federa l court m ust decide whether the f

iling ” w as tim ely

under state law ); Sw eet, 467 F.3d at 1318 (“ [W ] hen a state court unam bigu ouslyrules that a post-convi ction petiti on is un tim ely under state law , w e m

ust respect that ruling and con clude that the petitio n was not ‘ properly filed’ for the purposes of §9

2244 (d )( 2) , r eg ar dle ss o f w he the r the state c ourt a lso r ea ch ed the m er its of

one of the c la im s. ”) ; C ar ey

v. S af fo ld, 122 S . Ct . 213 4, 214 1 ( 2002 ) (s tatin g th at whe n a state court determ ines that a m otion is untim ely , “ that [is] the end of the m atter, re gard le ss o f w he the r it al so a ddr es se d th e m er its of the c la im , or

whe the r its ti m el in es s ru li ng was ‘ent an gl ed ’ wit h t he m eri ts ”). W e are ap pl y in g afed eral st atut e an d a re g ui de d b y co ng res si on al in te nt . W e w ill not allo w the tolling of AE DP A’ s lim itations period when it is clear that the petition er f

ailed to seek tim ely

reviewin state court. Cf. Car ey , 122 S. Ct. at 2141 (observing th at the “ willingness to take [the w ords ‘ on the m erits’ ] as an ab sol ute be llw ethe r [f

or ti m el ine ss] r isk s th e tol lin g of the f ed er al li m itatio ns period even when it is highl y likely that the prisoner failed to seek tim ely review in the state appellate courts”). T o do ot herw ise would “ underm ine the statutory pur pose of e nc our ag ing pr om

pt f ili ngs in f ed er al c ourt i n or de r to p ro te ct the fed eral syste m

fro m be in g fo rcedto he ar s ta le cla im s.” Id . Given the decisions of bot h the Florida Suprem e Court and the state trial co urt, w e ar e satis fi ed

that P et iti one r’ s se co nd s uc ce ssi ve m oti on w as unt im el y under Florida law. A ccordingly , his m otion wa s not “ properly filed” for purposes of AE DP A’ s tollin g provis ion; and , a s a result, his section 2254 petition is tim ebarr ed . S ee P ac e v. D iGugl ie lm o, 125 S . Ct . 180 7, 181 2 ( 2005 ) (“ Whe n aIn a footnote at the conclusion of Petitioner’s initial brief , Petitioner raises a

n equal pr otection 4 and due proce ss argument. No ce rtificate of appe alability was grante d on this iss ue. See Mur ray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 ( 11th Cir. 1998). 10 postcon viction petition is untim ely under state law , ‘ that [is] the end of the m atter’ fo r pur pose s of § 22 44( d) (2 ). ” (quot ing Care y , 122 S . Ct . a t 21 41) ( al te ratio n in original)). 4

II I. C onc lus ion

H er e, the state tr ia l c ourt c onc lud ed that P et iti one r’ s se co nd s uc ce ssi ve m otion for post-conviction relief wa s not tim ely

filed under Florida law . Ne ither party dis put es that P et iti one r’ s m oti on a ct ua lly w as unt im el y ; no r did

the F lor ida Suprem e Court question th e state trial c ourt’ s ruling th at Petitioner’ s m otion wa s untim ely . W e conclude, there fore, that Petitioner’ s m otion wa s not prop erly filed un de r Fl or id a la w andth athi s s ect io n 2 25 4 p et it io n i s t im e-b arre d u nd er AEDPA. AFFIR MED.