No. 3--04--0529

_________________________________________________________________

							IN THE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2005 

SENACHWINE CLUB,				)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

							)	of the 10th Judicial Circuit,

	Plaintiff-Appellant,		)	Putnam County, Illinois

							)

	v.						)	No. 03--MR--11

							)	

PUTNAM COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW	  )	

and the STATE OF ILLINOIS	  )	

PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD,	  ) 	Honorable

							)	Scott A. Shore

	Defendants-Appellees.		)	Judge, Presiding

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court:

_________________________________________________________________

	Plaintiff Senachwine Club (the Club) appeals from an order

of the circuit court of Putnam County affirming the

administrative determination of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal

Board (PTAB) denying the Club’s request to change the assessment

classification of several parcels of land it owned in Putnam

County from residential (recreational) to agricultural.  Because

we conclude that PTAB did not err, we affirm.

	The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff’s property

should be classified as agricultural for property tax purposes. 

Section 1--60 of the Illinois Property Tax Code governs the

classification of the parcels at issue:  

"Farm.  When used in connection with valuing

land and buildings for an agricultural use, any property used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops; for the feeding, breeding and management of livestock; for

dairying or any other agricultural or

horticultural use of combination thereof;

including but not limited to, hay, grain,

fruit * * *.  The dwellings and parcels of

property on which farm dwellings are

immediately situated shall be assessed as a

part of the farm. * * * For purposes of this

Code, ‘farm’ does not include property which

is primarily used for residential purposes

even though some farm products may be grown

or farm animals bred or fed on the property

incidental to its primary use."  (Emphasis

added).  35 ILCS 200/1--60 (West 1994).

	Thus, only parcels used "solely for the growing and

harvesting of crops" are entitled to an agricultural assessment.1  Parcels used primarily for any other purpose are not entitled to

agricultural assessment.  Further, it is the present use of the

land that determines whether it receives agricultural or

nonagricultural valuation.  Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. PTAB, 113 Ill. App. 3d 872, 875 (1983).	A parcel of land may be classified as farmland even if that parcel is part of a parcel

that has other uses, so long as the parcel at issue is used

solely for the growing and harvesting of crops.  Kankakee County Board of Review v. PTAB, 305 Ill. App. 3d 799, 803 (1999).  Additionally, multiple uses of a parcel may be made so long as

the uses are not inconsistent with and are incidental to the

primary purpose.  McLean County Board of Review v. PTAB, 286 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1078 (1997).  

	This court reviews decisions of the PTAB, not the decision

of the circuit court.  Metropolitan Airport Authority v. PTAB, 307 Ill. App. 3d 52, 55 (1999).  As in other administrative

review actions, the PTAB’s factual findings are deemed prima facie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.  National City Bank of Michigan/Illinois v. PTAB, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1042 (2002). How the land at issue is used is a question of fact. 

McLean, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1081. 

	Here, PTAB determined that the parcels in question were not

used solely for the growing and harvesting of crops, but were, in

fact, used primarily for the hunting of ducks.  The question

before this court is whether the land usage determination by PTAB

was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.  We find

that PTAB’s determination was supported by the manifest weight of

the evidence.  

	The parties herein are familiar with the record, and we see

no need to recite in great detail the evidence presented by the

PTAB hearing officer.  The evidence established that the Club

planted crops on approximately 115 acres on several parcels at

issue in the instant matter.  Specifically, the Club planted

corn, buckwheat and sudax in the two years prior to the

assessment year in question.  The Club maintains that the

planting of these crops leads to the conclusion that the property

at issue is agricultural.  However, the record is quite clear

that the Club’s purpose in planting those crops was to facilitate

the hunting of ducks, not "the growing and harvesting of crops." 

Testimony established that the crops planted were specially

selected for their attractiveness to ducks.  Rather than harvest

these crops, the Club either allowed the crops to remain in the

field or intentionally flooded the crop area in order to provide

a constant source of food, habitat and cover to attract and hold

ducks, which thereby facilitated duck hunting.    

	Based upon this evidence, PTAB determined that the primary

purpose of the parcels at issue was not "the growing and harvesting of crops" but rather was the hunting of ducks.  The

manifest weight of the record evidence amply supports the PTAB’s

conclusion.

	The Club argues, nonetheless, that PTAB’s decision is

contrary to law.  PTAB’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo review.  Metropolitan Airport, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 55.  We find that PTAB’s decision was not contrary to law.    

	The Club maintains that PTAB failed to consider certain

Department of Revenue guidelines when determining whether to

assess the property at issue as agricultural.  It argued that our

supreme court’s holding in O’Connor v. A&P Enterprises, 81 Ill.2d 260, 269 (1980), somehow mandates a finding in its favor in the

instant matter.  We disagree.  First, O’Connor does not mandate a different result here.  Rather, the court therein merely noted

that Department guidelines were available to personnel attempting

to apply the statutory definition of farmland.  O’Connor, 81 Ill.2d at 269.  Second, we find nothing in PTAB’s finding herein

to be in conflict with the guidelines, which in relevant part

merely note that land planted with cover crops or land where

crops go unharvested may still be assessed as agricultural, if

the land was used solely for the planting and harvesting of

crops.  Here, the fact that crops were planted but not harvested

was not the reason the land was non-agricultural.  The land was

non-agricultural because its primary purpose was duck hunting.  

	The Club also maintains that PTAB’s decision is contrary to

the law articulated in Santa Fe Land Impovement.  Again, we disagree.  Santa Fe Land Impovement stands for the proposition that it is the use of the real property that determines if the

property is to be given an agricultural assessment.  Santa Fe Land Improvement, 113 Ill. App. 3d at 874.  Here, PTAB looked at the use of the property and determined, based upon the evidence,

that the use of the property was duck hunting, not agriculture. 

We see no improper interpretation of the law.  

	Next, the Club maintains that PTAB’s decision was contrary

to the law articulated in Kankakee County Board of Review.  Again, we disagree.  Kankakee County Board of Review stands for the proposition that a parcel of land may be classified as

farmland provided that those portions of the property so

classified are used solely for the growing of and harvesting of

crops, even if the farm is part of a parcel that has other uses. 

Kankakee County Board of Review, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 802.  PTAB’s decision herein is consistent with Kankakee County Board of Review.  Simply put, PTAB found that the primary purpose of all the land at issue was duck hunting.  As such, it did not need to

consider whether certain parts of the property had agricultural

uses and other parts had other uses.  Since there clearly was

only one primary use for all the property, we see no error.  

	Finally, the Club maintains that PTAB’s decision was

contrary to the law articulated in McLean County Board of Review.  Again, we find no error of law.  McLean County Board of Review stands for the proposition that multiple uses may be made of the

property so long as the uses are not inconsistent with the

primary agricultural purpose.  McLean County Board of Review, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 1079.  Again, PTAB found that there was only one

use for the property at issue -- duck hunting.  This was not a

case where there were multiple uses for the property and PTAB was

called upon to determine whether one of the uses was inconsistent

with an agricultural use.  Here, the facts supported PTAB’s

conclusion that the only use of the property was duck hunting.  All activities maintained upon the property were to support and

facilitate that one purpose -- the hunting of ducks.  We find no

error at law in PTAB’s decision.    	 	

	We find no error in fact or law in PTAB’s decision.  The

record clearly establishes that the primary purpose for which the

parcels at issue were used, indeed the primary or sole purpose of

all assets of the Senachwine Club, was the hunting of ducks. 

Everything the Club had, everything it maintained, every action

it took, every decision it made, was for one single purpose --

ducks; the attracting of ducks, the holding of ducks, the hunting

of ducks.  Despite the Club’s protests to the contrary, here it

can truly be said -- if it walks like a duck and quacks like a

duck, it’s a duck.  

	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court

of Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	LYTTON and MCDADE, JJ., concur.