### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y

10, 200 7

CA RL JOHNS ON v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P 26265 Joseph B. Dail ey, Judge

No. W2006-01805-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Novem ber 28, 2007

Th e Ap pe lla

nt, Carl John so n, a

pp e a ls the or de r o f t

he She lby County Cr imi na l Co ur

t de nyinghis p e t i t i o nf o r p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o nr e l i e f

. J o h n s o n , w h o w a s c o n v i c t e d o f e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, is curr ently serving a sentence of twenty -five y ear s in the Department of Correction. F ollowing the aff irmance of his conviction on direc t appea l, J ohnson filed a p et i t i on for post-c onviction relief
a lle g ingnu

me ro us ins tanc e s o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, wh ic h wa s den ie d. On a pp e a l, t his court re manded th e case for an evide ntiary

hear ing “ solely

on the petitioner’s c omplaint of the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel reg ardinglesser- included of fe n s e instructions and Owens .” F oll ow ingan e vid e nti ary he ari ng , d

ur ingwh ic h Joh ns on

c ha lle ng e d o nly

tr ia l c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to reque st that ag g ravated assault be c harg ed as a lesser- included off ense of espec ially

ag g ravated robber y , the post-conviction cour t ag ain denied r elief f

inding that trial counsel was not ineffe ctive for f ailing to r equest the le sser c harg e. I n the instant a ppeal, J ohnson challeng es the denial of relief

. F oll ow ing a re vie w of the re c or d and the law a pp lic a ble a t the tim e of tr ia l, we fi nd no reve rsi ble
err or and a ffirm the de nial of post-convic tion relief.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

L ance Chism, M emphis, Tennesse e, for the Appellant, Car l J ohnson.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Da

vid H. F ind le y , A s s i s t a

nt A tt o rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbon s , Di s t rict Attorney Gene ral; and G regGilbert, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

Th e un de rl y ingfa c ts o f t

he c a se , a s e sta

bli sh e d o n d ir e c t app e a l and a s r e le va nt t o th is a pp e a l,
are a s f oll ow s:-2- The de fenda

nts[ , Carl J ohnson and De rrick Sutton,] were each indicte d for
on e c ount o f e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

and on e c ount o f c ri min a l a tte mpt to commit first deg ree murder for the Aug ust 30, 1998 robber y and shooting of Anthony Hendr ix in Memphis, Tennessee

. The evidence prese nted at their j oint trial was that on Aug ust 29, 1998, the defe ndants and two fema le acquaintance s, Trea sy Alsobrook
and To sh ia Ra ine y , d e ve lop e d a

pla n to ro b th e vic timwh en h e arr ive d at Ms

. Alsobroo k ’s h ouse later

that eveningfor a

date. The evidenc e fur

ther showe d that in the ear ly

morning h o u rs of August 30, 1998, the de fenda nts ex ecute d the plan,
ro bb ingthe vic tima s he sat in his c ar w a iti ngfo r M s. Al so br oo k a nd sh oo tin g him twice a s he fled f

rom the ca

r.

Trea sy Alsobrook testified as f

ollows: Early

on the af ternoon of Aug ust 29, 19 98 , th e vic timdr ov e by he r h ou se , g a ve he r his be e pe r n umb e r, and

a sk e d h e r t o me e t hi m late r i n th e da

y . A ft e r t

he vic timle ft , M s. Al sobr oo k’ s c ou sin , T os hia Ra ine y , a rr ive d, and

Ms. Al so br oo k in fo rm e d h e r o f h e r c o nv e rs a tio n w iththe vic tim

. Ms. Alsobrook and Ms. Rainey went to Der rick Sutton’s house, wher e they visited with Sutt on and [the Appellant]. During the course of that visit, t he four develope d a plan to rob the victim.

Ms. Alsobrook testified that in acc ordanc e with their plan, she telephoned the victim and asked if he would take he r out to eat. He ag ree d, and Ms. Alsobrook and Ms. Rainey

returned t o M s

. Al sobrook’s house to wa it for the victim. When the victim arrived a

round1:00 a.m., Ms. Alsobrook g ot into his c ar, and he beg an to drive down the stree t. She a sked him to stop, te lling him that she wanted to investigate an
un fa mil iar c ar i n h e r b a c ky ard. He c omp lie d, wa iti ngin h is c ar a s sh e g ot o ut, walked to he r house, c hecke d the bac kdoor, and the n returne d. She was about to ge t back into the victim’s car when Sut ton, in a show for the victim’s benef it, came up be hin d h e r, pu t a

g un to h e r h e a d, g ra

bb e d h e r, and or de re d he r t o s it o n th e c ur b w ith her he ad down. Sutton then g ot into the front passeng er side of the ca r, followed by [the Ap pe llant], w ho g ot i nto the ba c ks e at. A c c or din g to M s. Al so br oo k, bo th defe ndants wer e ar

med wit h handg uns. Ms. Alsobrook heard t he defenda nts ask the vic ti m f o r mo n e y an d th e n h e ar d th e v ic ti m b e in g h it o n th e h e a d w it h a g un. The victim got out of the c ar a nd beg an running , and Ms. Alsobrook hea rd g unfire. She loo ke d u p to se e [the Ap pe lla

nt] s ho oti nga t th e fl e e ingvic tim , w ho stumbl e d, a s if abo u t to f

a ll

. A f te r w ar d , Su tt o n la id h is g u n o n h e r f r o n t p o r c h , and the two de fe nd ants g ot i nto the ir car p ark e d in

he r b a c ky ard

and dr ov e awa

y . Sh or tly there afte r, the police arr ived and a rre sted her.

. . . . The victim prov id e d

e s s e ntially

the same a ccount a s Ms. Alsobrook reg arding his after noon meeting with Ms. Alsobrook at her house, their subseque nt telephone communication, and his ar rival at he r house f

or the date. He f

urther te s t i fied a s-3-

follows: As he waited outside Ms. Alsobrook’s house in the ear ly morning hours of Au g us t 30 , h e no ticed tw o men bu t di d n ot p ay the m mu c h atte nti on . A ft e r M s. Alsobro o k c a me o u t o f th e h o u s e an d g o t in to h is c ar , h e b e g an to dr iv e aw ay but stopp ed wh en s h e told him t hat she wa nted to chec k a strang e ca r in her ba cky ard. He be came uneasy

when he saw Ms. Alsobrook pe er into a w indow of her house,
rathe r t ha n at th e c ar i n th e ba c ky ard . H e sa id t hat he loc ke d the dr ive r’ s do or of his
car and dec ided to drive a

way when Derric k Sutton suddenly opened the passeng er door, held a

g un on him, and order ed him to “drop it off.” The victim testified that he pushe d the g un awa y and g ave Sutton $690. Sutton t ook the money

and orde red the victim to pull his shirttail over his head a nd
no t to loo k a t him

. An oth e r man e nte re d the ba c ks e a t of the c ar, a nd Sut ton we nt t o the front pa sseng er se at. As Sutton held the gu n on the victim and rummag ed throug h the ca r’s glove c ompartment, the man in the ba ckseat hit the victim i n the back of th e h ea d t hree times with a g un, saying “ make that c all, bitch” and “ bitch, y ou think we’re playing w ith y ou, don’t y ou? ” F rom his voice, the victim re cog nized the man in the bac kseat a s [t he Appe llant,] a man wi t h wh o m h e had ga mbled and f r o m w h o m h e h a d

r e c e n t l y w o na

l ar g e s u m o f

m o n e y.
Th e vic timte sti fi e d th a t he jum ped ou t of

the c ar a nd ra n to wa rd a wa ll. When he jumped on the wa ll, h e h ea rd gu n shots, realized he ha d been shot, a nd started spitting up blood. He kept g oing, however , and manag ed to esca pe by falling
over a fenc e and running in a zigzag pattern dow n the stree t to a neig hborhood house, wher e he w aited until an ambulanc e ar rived. The victim testified that he experienc ed a lot of pain fr om his two gunshot woun d s an d t hat two or thre e months passed befor e he w as able to resume his normal a ctivities.

. . . . Phill ip Collins, [the Appellant’s] cell mate in the Shelby County J ail for f our months in 1999, t estified as f ollows: [ The Appe llant] told him t hat he ha d g otten close to se ven hundred dollars by robbing the victim. Acc ording to Co l l i n s , [t he Appellant] said that a woman “bee ped” the victim to ask hi m to take her out. When the victim arrive d at the woman’ s house, [the App el l ant] sneake d around his ca r, cre pt i n t o t h e backseat, “smacke d” the victim’s hea d with a pistol, and demande d money and drug s. [The Appellant] tol d him that the victim tried to ru n an d t h at he fired f ive or six s hots at him, from both inside and outside th e ca r, u n t i l h is ninemil lim e te r gun

jamme d. [Th e Ap pe lla

nt] r e la te d that he c ha se d th e fl e e ingvic tim

. [Th e Ap pe llan t] tol d Co lli ns that th e vic timfe ll b ut g ot u p a nd jum pe d a fe nc e to
esca pe.

. . . .T h e ju ry d e a d lo c k e d o n the re m a inin g c o u n t o f cr im ina l atte m p t t o c o m m it first d e g re e m u rd e r. 1

W e are const rai ned t o note t hat t he A p p el l ant has f ai l ed t o i ncl ud e a co p y of t he p et i t i o n i n t he reco rd b ef o re 2

u s. T h u s, o u r k n o w le d g e is l im ited to tha t ex p re sse d in the p rio r o p inio n fi le d b y a p a n e l o f t h is c o u rt.

W e no te tha t the A p p e llan t h a s faile d to inc lud e the ju ry in stru c tio n s in th e re c o rd ; he , no n e the le ss, a sk s u s to 3

ta k e ju d ic ia l no tice o f p rio r a p p e a ls. A s the q u e stio n o f w h e the r t h e ins tru c tio n w a s g ive n is n o t i n d isp u te , w e e le c t t o revi ew d espit e t he A p p el l ant ’ s f ai l ure t o prep are a co m p l et e reco rd f o r ap p eal

. T hi s co urt has hel d on m ul t i p l e o ccasi o ns t hat i t i s t he A p p el l ant ’ s d ut y t o pro vi d e an ad eq uat e reco rd f o r revi ew. T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 2 4 (b). In an ap p eal where t he

o nl y i ss ue rai sed i s o ne regardi ng t he p rop ri et y o f t he jury i nst ruct i o ns, i t wo ul d b e m o st p rudent t o i ncl ud e t he charge in th e re c o rd

. -4-

The [Appellant] elected not to testify , and no proof wa s p re s en t ed by

the defe nse. . . .
State v. Carl Johnson and Derrick Sutton , No. W2000-00278-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, A

pr. 4, 2001). F ollowing a

jury trial, the Appellant was c onvicted of e specia lly ag g ravated robber y and sente nced, a s a Rang e I , violent offende r, to twen t y -f i v e y ear s in the Depa

rtment of Correc tion. Id . The c onviction was subseque ntly aff irmed on direc t appea l. Id

. 1

There afte r, the Appe llant filed a t i m ely petition for post-conviction re lief, with his chief complaint being that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive. Car l J oh ns on v . S

tat e , No. W2003-02760-CCAR3- PC ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. at Jac ks on , Jan . 2 5, 20 05 ). I n th e pe tit ion , th e Ap pe lla nt a sse rt e d mu lti ple instances of

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Specifica lly , he alleged t h at t ri al counse l was 2 ine ff e cti ve: (1) by

fa ili ngto r e qu e st that th e tr ia l c ourt ins tr uc t th e jur

y on a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult a s a lesser- included offe nse of espec ially ag g ravated robber y ; and (2) by

failing to pursue a judg ment of acquittal base d upon State v. Owens , 20 S.W .3d 634 (Tenn. 2000)

. Id . At the initial post-conviction hear ing, the court fa iled to consider these t wo allegations, finding that it was “ not the place - - the time or place to make these arguments.” Id . I n d i s m i s s i n g t he petition, the cour t noted that the arguments should have bee n made at trial or re cog nized by this court on d i re ct appea l. Id . On appea l, a pane l of this court conc luded that the Appe llant h ad n o t been g iven a f ull evidentiary he ari ng on the se iss ue s and re mand e d th e c a se to t

he po st- c on vic tio n c ourt

fo r a he ari nglim ite d to tho se iss ue s. Id

.
F oll ow ingre mand , a

n e vid e nti ary

he ari ngwa s h e ld o n July 23 , 2 00 5, at whi ch the on ly witness to testify

was trial c ounsel. Trial c ounsel ac k n o wl ed ged that he did not reque st an instruction with reg ard to a g g ravated assault as a lesser- included of

fe n s e of e specia lly

ag g ravated robber y , but he stated he did so beca use “[i] t was not part of

the def ense the ory .” Trial counse l

3 stated that, duringthe trial, he pur sued a two- fold defe nse th eo ry : (1 ) challeng ing the prosec ution witnesses’ c redibility

with reg ard to whe ther the A ppellant was pr esent at the crime scene ; and (2) arg uing that t

h e c o mp le te d

c r im e w a s n o t e s p e c ia ll y a g g r a v a te d

r o b b e r y b u t r a th e r

a g g r a v a te d robber y beca u s e t h e v i ct im’s injuries did not rise to the level of “ serious bodily injury .” Tria l counsel testified that he did not rec all if he wa s awa re, at the time of the Appe llant’s trial, whethe r ag g ravated assault wa s a lesser -included of fense of espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry

.-5-

After hear ing the proof pr esente d, the post-convic t i o n court entered a n order on J uly 24, 2006, denying the Appellant’s r equest for relief

.
Ana lys is

On a pp e a l, t he Ap pe lla

nt r a ise s th e sin g le iss ue of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of cou ns e l. Spe ci fi ca l l y , he conte nds that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to re quest an instruction on ag g ravated assault as a lesser- included offe nse of espec ially ag g ravated robber y

. Acc ording to the Appellant, it wa s ineffe ctive for trial counsel not to reque st this instruction be cause the law at t he tim e of tr ia l su pp or te d a g oo d fa ith argume nt that a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult wa s a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

and that he wa s pre

jud ic e d by tr ia l couns e l’ s fa ilure to re qu e st s a id instruction.

To succe e d

o n a c h alleng e of ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, the Appe llant bear s the burden of establishing the alleg ations set forth in his petition by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. T.C.A. § 40-30-110( f) ( 2006). The A ppellant must de monstrate that counsel’s repr esentation fell below the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal case s. Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. C t. 2052, 2064 (1984), the Appellant must establish (1) de ficient pe rfor manc e an d (2 ) prejudice re sulting fr om the de fi c ie nc y . T he pe tition e r i s n ot e nti tle d to the be ne fi t of hin ds ig ht, may

no t se c on d- g ue ss a rea sonably

based trial strateg y , and ca nnot criticize a sound, but unsucce ssful, tactica l decision made during the cour se of the pr ocee dings. A d k i n s v

. S t a te , 911 S.W .2d 334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). This defe renc e to the tac tical dec isions of trial counsel is depende nt upon a showing that the decisions wer e made afte r ade quate pr epar ation. Coo pe r v . S tat e , 8 47 S.W. 2d

52 1, 52 8 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 19 92).

I t is unnecessa

ry for a court to addr ess def

i ci en cy and pre judice in any

particula r orde r, or eve n to addre ss both if the petitioner makes a n insufficient showing on either. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct . at 2069. I n order t o es t ab l i sh prejudice , the petitioner must establish a “re asonable probability

that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional er rors, the r esult of the proc eeding would have b e e nd if

f e r e n t. A r e a s o n a

b le p r o b a b il it y is a p r o b a b il it y s u f f ic ie n t t o u n d e r

mi ne confide nce in the outcome.” State v. Burns , 6 S

. W

. 3 d 4 5 3 , 4 6 3 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068).

The issues of de ficient pe rf o rm an ce b y

counsel a

nd possible prejudice to the defe nse ar e mix ed questions of l aw and fac t. Id

. a t 46 1. “ [A] tr ia l c ourt ' s findings of fact underlying a

claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel are revie wed on appea l under a de novo sta nd ard , a c c omp anie d w ith a pre sumption t hat those finding s are corr ect unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise .” Fi e lds v . S

tat e , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 50 , 4 58 (T e nn . 2 00 1) (c iti ngTe nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; He nle yv . S tat e , 960 S.W .2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997) ). Howe ver, conclusions of law , ar e r e v i e w e d

u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard w ith no presumption that the post-conviction court’s f indings a re c orre ct. Id

.-6-

The Appe llant’s trial was he ld during the wee k of Oc tober 25, 1999. Fr om the rec ord, we g lean that the trial court did instruct the jury on ag g ravated robbe ry

and robbe ry

as lesser -included offe nses of es p ec i all y

ag g ravated robbe ry . Moreove r, there is no indication, and trial counse l
conce des, that he did not re quest that an instruction be g iven on ag g ravated assault.

The lawin Tennesse e is clea r that “the issue of l esser included offenses is controlled by the preva iling law a

t the time of trial . . . .” Chivous Robinson v . S tat e , N o. E2 00 5- 01 03 6- CCA -R 3- PC (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. at Kn o x v i l l e, M ay 1 9 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g W

ile yv . S tat e , 183 S.W .3d 317, 328 (Tenn. 2006)). Thus, we must look t o the law of lesser- included offe nses as it wa s define d in October 1999, which wa s set forth in Sta te v . Tr us ty , 919 S.W .2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996)

. T ru sty h el d t h at “an offe nse qualifies a s a lesser included off

ense only if the elements of the included off ense a re a subset of the elements of the cha rg ed off ense a nd only if the g reater off

ense c annot be c ommitt ed without also committing the lesse r off ense.” Tru sty , 9 1 9 S

. W

. 2 d at 3 1 0 (c i t i n g S

c h m u c k v

. U n it e d S tates , 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1450-51 (1989) ). The sta ndard is that “[t]he lesser off ense ma y not require proof of

any element not included in the g reater off ense a s char g ed in the indictment.” Id

. at 3 1 1 (i n t er

p re t i n g Ho war

d v . S tat e , 578 S.W .2d 83, 85 (Tenn. 1979)). Thus, a lesser -included of fe ns e ne e d no t or ig inate fr om t he same c la ss a s th e g re a te r o ff e ns e , a s lo nga s th e le sse r o ff e ns e is established by proof of the same or less than a ll the elements re quired to establish the c ommissi on of the off ense c harg ed. The Appe llant i s corr ect that unde r this definition ag g ravated assault is a lesse r-include d offe nse of e specia lly

ag g ravated robbe ry . Especia l l y ag g ravated robbe ry

require s the “intentional or knowing theft of pr operty from the pe rson of a

nother by violence or putting the person in fea r,”
an d : ( 1 ) i s a c c o mp l i s h e d

w i t h a d e a d l y w e a

p o n ; an d ( 2 ) t h e v i c t i m s u f

f e r s s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n

j u r y. T.C.A. §§ 39-13-401, - 403 (1997). Aggr avated assault is committed when a pe rson commits an assault by causingbodily

injury and: (1) c auses se rious bodily injury to an o t h er ; o r (2 ) uses or dis pla y s a de a dly we a po n. T. C.A . § § 3 9- 13 -1 01 , - 10 2 ( 19 97 ). Cle arl y , to pr ov e a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult by bo dil y inj ur y require s p ro of

of no a dd iti on a l e le me nts tha n th os e re qu ir e d to pr ov e e sp e c ia lly
a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . T he dis tin g uis hin g e le me nt be tw e e n the tw o is the the ft of pr op e rt y . A t th e tim e of trial, two unre ported c ases by this court had re cog nized that ag g ravated assault wa s a lesser

included off

ense of ag g ravated robbe ry

. See State v . George Brooks , No. 02C01-9602-CR-00050 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, May 14, 1997); see also State v. V ickie R . Herron , e t al

. , No. 02C01- 9702-CR-00067 (Tenn. Crim. App. at J ackson, Dec. 31, 1998). As noted by the Appellant, it was
rea sonable to assume that as a lesser- included off ense of ag g ravated robbe ry , ag g ravated assault wa s likewise a le sser-inc luded of e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

. See State v. T ho ma s J . Ta c k e tt , No. M1999-02541-CCA-R3-CD (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, June 28, 2001). Having d et er m ined that the off ense of ag g ravated assault wa s a lesser -included of fense , howeve r, does not end our inquiry into whether ineffe ctive assist ance of counse l was established by trial counsel’ s failure to reque st the char g e. Unde r the law exis ting at the time, the trial cour t was not require d to instruct the jury on the l esser offe nse of ag g ravated assault in ever y indictment which charg ed ag g ravated robbe ry . I n Sta te v . La ng for d , 9 9 4 S. W. 2 d

1 2 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 ) , th e T e n nessee Sup re me Court

state d th a t “ [w]hi le it i s g e ne ra lly e rr or fo r a tr ia l c ourt no t to ins tr

uc t the jur y on a ll-7-

lesser inc luded offe nses, this Court has interpre ted this statutory provision [ Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(a ))] t o m ea n t h at a trial court must instruct the jury on all lesser inc luded offe nses if the evidenc e introduce d at trial is leg ally suffici en t t o s u p p ort a c onviction for the lesse r off ense.” Lan gfo rd , 9 9 4 S

. W

. 2 d at 1 2 8 (c i t i n g State v. Bolden , 979 S.W .2d 587, 593 (Tenn. 1998)). The c ourt explained that “[f] ailure to instruct is not err or whe re the rec ord is devoid of a ny evidenc e per

mitti ng an in fe re n ce of

g uilt of the lesser of

fense .” Id

. (c i t i n g State v. Stephe nson , 878 S.W .2d 530, 550 (T e nn . 1 99 4) ). Thus , th e law w a s th a t a tr ia l c ourt

ha d to ins tr

uc t th e jur y on the le sse r o ff

e ns e on ly if the trier of fa ct could rationally

find the def

endant guilty

of the lesser

offe nse and not guilty

of the g reater off

ense. Brooks , No. 02C01-9602-CR-00050 (c iti n g Jam es v . S tat e , 385 S.W .2d 86, 89 (T e nn . 1 96 4) ); se e als o Tr us ty , 9 19 S.W. 2d a t 31 0; Sta te v . H

owa rd , 926 S.W .2d 579, 586 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986). Acc ording ly , an instruction on a lesse r off ense w as prope rly

ref used if the
ev i d en ce s h o we d that the def endant wa s either guilty

of the g reater off

ense or not guilty

of any offe nse. Brooks , No

. 0 2 C 0 1 -9 6 0 2 -C R -0 0 0 5 0 (c i t i n g Ho war d , 926 S.W .2d at 585).

Acc ording to the Appellant, the instruction in this case w as wa rra nted bec ause the evidenc e prese nted did not “clea

rly ” show that he was g uilty of the g reater off

ense of espec ially

ag g ravated
ro bb e ry . H is a

rgume nt i s b a se d u

po n a c re dib ili ty

a tta c k o f t

he State ’s thr e e pri mar y

wi tne sse s, wh ic h w e no te wa s a lso ma de and reject ed on dir e c t a

pp e a l. It is no t th e pr ov inc e of thi s c ourt

to revie w and make cre dibilit y deter minations of tr ial witnesses. Rather , it is t he jury , as the finde r of fac t, who bear s the burden of making such dete rminations, and we w ill not rew eig h their dec isions on appea l. Sta te v . P ru e tt , 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990)

. Th e un dis pu te d p ro of

pr e se nte d at tr ia l est a

bli sh e d tha t the Ap pe lla

nt w a s p art

of a pla n to
ro b th e v i c t i m

. N o p r o o f w a s p r e s e n t e d t o e s t a b l i s h a s e c o n d m o t i v e f

o r t h e a t t a c k o n t he vic tim

. Cf

. Brooks , No. 02C01-9602-CR-0005 0 . The Appe llant’s theory of def ense w as two-f

old: (1) challeng ing the cre dibilit y of t he S tate’s witnesses with reg ard to whether he was prese nt when the robber y occur red; a nd (2) disputing that the vi ctim suffe red serious bodily injury . As noted, the trial
c ourt ha d a duty to ch arg e on le sse rs on ly wh e n the e vid e nc e “ vie we d in the lig ht mos t f a vo ra ble to t h e d e f e n d an t ’ s t h e o r

y o f t h e c a s e , w o u l d

j u s t i f y a j u r y v e r d i c ti na c c o r d

w i t h t h e d e f

e n d an t ’ s t h e o r

y, and would per

mit a ra t i o n al t rier of

fac t to find the defe ndant guilty of the lesse r off

ense a nd not g uilty of the g reater off

ense.” State v. Elder , 98 2 S .W.2d 871, 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citations and f

ootnotes omitt ed). N onetheless, r eg ardle ss of the Appe llant’s theory of defense, the re wa s si mpl y

no e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in thi s c a se wh ich wou ld hav e al low e d th e jur y to r a tio na lly convict the Appe llant of ag g ravated assault and acquit him of espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . Ag ain, the uncontrove rted proof established that th e as s au l t upon the victim was committed during the perpe tration of the planne d robber y . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that tria l counsel wa s not deficient in f a ili ngto r e qu e st the ins tr

uc tio n o n a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult

. Mo re ov e r, a s n ote d b y the State , d e sp ite the re lease of B u rns p ri or to the filing of the Appe llant’s motion for new tria l, counsel ca nnot be found defic ient for not pur suing the matter on appea l be cause no prejudice could b e e s tablished based upon the undisputed proof of the robbe ry

. See State v . Henry Hawkins , No. W2005-00781- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, J une 21, 2006). I n oth er wo rds, any

challeng e to the jury char g e would have lacke d merit beca use, if the jury found the ser ious bodily injury element of-8-

ag g ravated assault, no rational juror could have not convicted of espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry

. See Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W .3d 710, 725 (Tenn. 2001)

.
Re g ard le ss, e ve n if

de fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e ha d be e n e sta

bli sh e d, the Ap pe lla

nt ha s f a ile d to establish that prejudice resulted f rom the fa ilure to cha

rg e the jury

with the lesser- included off ense, a dec ision which is subject to harmless er ror r eview. See State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d 181, 189 (Tenn. 2002). In making such a de termination, this “ court should conduc t a thoroug h examination of the
r e c o r d , in c lu d in g th e e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t tr ia l, th e d e f e n d an t’ s th e o r

y o f th e d e fense , and the verdic t returned by

the jury .” Id

. a t1 9 1

. W e m u s td e c i d e “ w h e t h e r a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y wou ld have convicted the defe ndant on th e l es s er -i ncluded of fense instead of the c harg ed off ense.” State v. Richmond , 90 S.W .3d 648, 662 (Tenn. 2002) (empha sis in orig inal). As noted, we cannot c onclude that the jury

would have so f

ound in this ca se. Clear ly , the jury acc epted the motive of

robber y as t h e b a s i s f o r t h e c r i m e , a s e v i d e n c e d

b y t h e A p p e l l an t ’ s c o n v i c t i o n o f e s p e c i a l l y a g g r a v a t e d r o b b e r y, with r ejec tion of the lesser offe nses of ag g ravated robber y and robbe ry

. See State v . W illiams , 977 S.W .2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998) . Thus, the Appellant has failed to e stablish a ny resulting prejudice

. CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-convic tion relief is affirme d.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE