COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

REGINA BOSSONG BUTLER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1919-95-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JUNE 18, 1996 

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Ralph E. Lawrence for appellant. 

 

 Charles B. Miller, Assistant City Attorney 

(Office of the City Attorney, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Claimant, Regina Bossong Butler, appeals the Workers' 

Compensation Commission's refusal to vacate its award for 

permanent partial disability benefits and to enter an award for 

temporary total disability benefits. The permanent partial award 

was made pursuant to a memorandum of agreement prepared at 

claimant's request and signed by her, which terminated an earlier 

temporary total disability benefits award in her favor. Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

 The relevant facts are as follows. On February 2, 1988, 

claimant suffered a compensable injury by accident while working 

for employer, City of Virginia Beach. As a result, claimant 

received benefits for temporary total disability. A June 11, 

1991 report from Dr. Paul J. Abbott, Jr. states that claimant had 

reached maximum medical improvement from her accident. 

Thereafter, on June 20, 1991, claimant, through counsel, asserted 
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her right to compensation for permanent partial disability and 

requested employer to prepare an agreed statement of fact and 

supplemental memorandum of agreement. Employer prepared and 

claimant executed the agreed statement of fact and supplemental 

memorandum of agreement reflecting claimant's request for 

permanent partial compensation. The agreed statement of fact 

also provided that claimant's outstanding award for temporary 

total disability was terminated, based on claimant having reached 

maximum medical improvement on June 20, 1991. 

 Employer submitted the documents to the commission and, on 

September 9, 1991, the commission, acting in accordance with the 

agreed statement of fact, terminated temporary total disability 

payments and entered an award for permanent partial disability 

payments from June 20, 1991 until November 1, 1993. On November 

2, 1993, claimant resumed temporary total disability benefits on 

a continuing basis. 

 On November 29, 1994, claimant filed an application for 

hearing asking that the commission's September 9, 1991 award for 

permanent partial disability be vacated and claiming entitlement 

to temporary total disability benefits for the period June 20, 

1991 through November 2, 1993. The deputy commissioner refused 

to vacate the September 9, 1991 award. The full commission 

affirmed, finding no evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or 

mutual mistake. The commission further stated that it "was not 

required to second guess claimant's counsel to determine whether 
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the claimant was in fact no longer eligible for temporary total 

disability benefits." 

 On appeal, claimant argues that this Court should vacate the 

September 1991 award because: (1) benefits for permanent partial 

loss can be paid only when benefits for temporary total 

disability have ceased; (2) entry of the award was not in 

claimant's best interest; (3) no evidence proved that she 

intentionally and knowingly waived her right to temporary total 

disability benefits; and (4) the agreed statement of fact which 

prompted the award was incomplete.1

 I. 

 The commission's approval of a memorandum of agreement is 

binding, and "an award of compensation entered upon such 

agreement is as enforceable as an award entered in a contested 

proceeding." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 3 Va. App. 116, 

121, 348 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1986); see also Code § 65.1-93 (now 

Code § 65.2-701(A)). Application for full commission review of 

an award must be made within twenty days of its entry. Code 

§ 65.1-97 (now Code § 65.2-705(A)). Absent clear and convincing 

evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, mutual mistake, or 

imposition the commission has no authority to vacate an award 

from which no party sought timely review. See Brushy Ridge Coal 

Co. v. Blevins, 6 Va. App. 73, 80, 367 S.E.2d 204, 207 (1988); 

 

 1 The agreed statement of fact submitted to the 

commission failed to indicate that claimant had returned to work 

or that she was able to return to pre-injury work. 
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Tucker, 3 Va. App. at 121, 348 S.E.2d at 419; K & L Trucking Co. 

v Thurber, 1 Va. App. 213, 218, 337 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1985); John 

Driggs Co. v. Somers, 228 Va. 729, 734, 324 S.E.2d 694, 697 

(1985). 

 Here, claimant failed to seek timely review of the September 

1991 award. Claimant contends, however, that the commission's 

decision should be reversed based on the doctrine of imposition. 

 We disagree. 

 "[T]he concept known as `imposition' . . . empowers the 

commission in appropriate cases to render decisions based on 

justice shown by the total circumstances even though no fraud, 

mistake or concealment has been shown." Odom v. Red Lobster # 

235, 20 Va. App. 228, 234, 456 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1995) (quoting 

Avon Products, Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415 S.E.2d 225, 

228 (1992)). The doctrine empowers the commission "to `do full 

and complete justice.'" Id. (quoting Avon, 14 Va. App. at 8, 415 

S.E.2d at 229). 

 The doctrine focuses on an employer's or the commission's 

use of superior knowledge of or experience with the Workers' 

Compensation Act or use of economic leverage, which results in an 

unjust deprivation to the employee of benefits warranted under 

the Act. See Somers, 228 Va. at 734-35, 324 S.E.2d at 697; Odom, 

20 Va. App. at 235, 456 S.E.2d at 143; Cheski v. Arlington County 

Public Schools, 16 Va. App. 936, 940, 434 S.E.2d 353, 356 (1993). 

 Thus, this Court has found that the doctrine applies where, 
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inter alia, the record shows a series of acts by the employer or 

the commission upon which a claimant naturally and reasonably 

relies to his or her detriment. Odom, 20 Va. App. at 235, 456 

S.E.2d at 143. 

 Claimant's argument based on imposition is without merit. 

If the commission's actions created an imposition, it resulted 

from claimant's own act. The agreed statement of fact 

terminating her temporary total benefits and substituting 

permanent partial benefits was drawn at the direction of 

claimant's attorney and signed by claimant. Even if we accepted 

claimant's position that the commission's September 1991 award 

should not have been entered, any error on the part of the 

commission was invited by claimant. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the commission is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.