T he real pa rt y i n i nt erest i s C at heri ne M i chel l e M eshel l (f o rme rl y W hi t e). T he res p o nd ent i s t he 1 H o no rab l e B asc o m W

. B en t l ey, III, Ju d ge o f t he 3 6 9 t h J ud i cial D i st rict C o urt o f A nd erso n C o un t y, T ex as. 

## NO. 12-08-00214-CV
IN THE COUR T OF APP EALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APP EALS D ISTRICT

TYLER, TEX AS

IN RE: §
WILLIAM L. WHITE

, § ORIGINAL PROCEE DING
RELATOR §

MEMORA NDUM OPIN ION Wil liam L . Whit e bring s this original manda mus proce eding complaining of t he trial court’s

or de r f ind inghim

in co nte mpt fo r vio la tin g c e rt a in pr ov isi on s of a div or c e de c re e
. We c on dit ion a lly 1 g ra nt t he pe tit ion

fo r wri t of

mand a mus in p art

and de ny it i n p art

.

B ACKG ROUND Wil liam L . Whit e and Catherine Miche lle Meshell ( fo rm erly Whit e) w ere divorce d on De c e mbe r 29, 20 05 . The y are the pa re nts of on e c hil d, W.C. W., bo rn Ma y 14 , 2 00 4. B oth

pa re nts
wer e appointed joint mana g ing conser vators of the child, althoug h Wil liam w as g iven the exclusive rig ht to designate the primar y residenc e of the child. I n the standard possession order, Catherine w as g iven p o s s e s s io n an d a c c e s s to W. C. W. o n th e f ir s t, th ir d , an d f

if th F r id ay o f e a c h mo n th a n d on Thursday of each week. Wil liam was ordere d to surre nder W .C.W

. to Catherine at his residenc e at the beg inning of

her posse ssion reg ardle ss of the distance betwee n the re sidence of “a pare nt and the child.” I f the c hild was not in school, Catherin e wa s o rd ered to pick the child up at Willi am’s residenc e at 3:30 p.m., and Willi am was or dere d to surrende r the c hild to C ather ine at his reside nce2

a t 3: 30 p. m. Ad dit ion a lly , e a c h pa

rt y wa s or de re d to no tif

y e a c h o the r p art

y , th e tr ia l c ourt , a

nd the state reg istry of any ch an ge i n the par

ty ’s cur rent re sidence addre ss, mailing addr ess, home telephone number, name of e mploy er, a ddress of e mploy ment, driver’ s license number , and w ork telephone

n u m b er
. E ac h party

was orde red to g ive notice of an intended c hang e in any of the re quired information on or befor e the six tieth day befor e the intended chang e. I f the pa rty did not know or could not have know n of the c hang e in suffic ient time, notice was or dere d to be g iven on or bef ore the fi ft h d ay a ft e r the date the pa rt y kn e w of the c ha

ng e
. Th e or de r s ta te d th a t f a ilure by a pa rt y to pr ov ide the re qu ir e d inf

or ma tio n to the oth e r pa

rt y , the c ourt , or the state re g istry mi ght r esu lt in fu rt he r l iti g a tio n to e nf

or c e the or de r, inc lud ingc on te mpt of c ourt

. I n a division of the debts of the spouses, the trial court order ed Wil liam to pay , as a pa rt of the division of the estate of the parties, the balanc e due, inc luding pr incipal, intere st, and all other char g es, on the promissory note pay able to Chry sler F inancial a nd g iven as pa

rt of the pur chase price of and se cure d by a li en on a Ford t ruck awar ded to Catherine. I n 2006, Catherine f iled a motion for enfor ceme nt of possession or ac cess, a lleg ing that Wil liam fraudule ntly notified her a

nd the trial

c ourt on Marc h 3 1, 20 06 , that hi s r e sid e nc e ha d c ha ng e d to El Pa so , T e xas, wh e n h e c on tin ue d to reside in Palestine, Texas. She also alleg ed that Wil liam had failed to make pay ments on the For d truck fr om F ebrua

ry 2006 throug h J uly 2006, that the note was in a rre ars, and that the For d truck wa s in dang er of

reposse ssion. Af te r a he ari ngon

Ca the ri ne ’s mot ion , th e tr ia l c ourt ma de the fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s:

1

. t ha t W i l l i am ’ s reside nc e is and wa s i n P alesti ne , T ex as;
2. t hat W i l l i am f

r audul ent l y not i f

i ed t he t r i al cour t and Cat her i ne t hat hi s r es i dence ha d cha ng ed t o E l P aso , T ex as;
3

. tha t W ill ia m faile d to fo ll o w the c o u rt’s o rd e r a n d su rr e n d e r th e c h ild a t his re sid e n c e in Pal es t i n e, T ex as on s ev en da t es be g i n n i n g i n Apr i l 2006;
4. t h at e n f

or ce men t of

t h e cou r t ’ s or der wa s an d i s n ec es s ar y t o e n s u r e t h e ch i l d’ s ph y s i ca l or em o t i o nal heal t h or welf are; and
5

. t hat W i l l i am f ai l ed t o m ake p ayments on t he Fo rd t ruck b e g inni ng Feb ruary 20 0 6 t hrough Ju l y 2006, t h at t h e n ot e wa s i n a r r ea r s , a n d t h at t h e t r u ck w as r epos s es s ed.3

Th e tr ia l c ourt

the n fou nd Willi a m in c on te mpt

fo r e a c h s e pa

ra te vio la tio n a

nd or de re d h im confine d in the county

jail for t h i rt y d ay s. Howeve r, the trial c ourt suspended William’s

c o m m i t m e n to nt h e c o n d i t i o nt h a tp i c k u p an d d e l i v e r y o f W

. C

. W

. b e c o n f

i n e d t o A n d e r s o nC o u n t y, Texas, that William pa

y Catherine $12,000 in a ttorney ’s fee s, and that Wil liam p ay C at h erine $1 6, 80 0 f or the los s re su lti ng fr om re po sse ssi on of the F or d tr uc k. Willi a m pa id t

he or de re d s ums into the court’s re g istry

pending the outcome of

this procee ding. T his origina l proce eding followed.

A V A ILA BILITY O F M ANDAMUS Mandamus is intended to be a n extraordinary

reme dy , available only in limi ted circ umstances. Walker v. Pac ker , 827 S.W .2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992). I t is available only to corre ct a cle ar a buse of discr etion when ther e is no ade quate r emedy by appea l. In r eJ. D. Edw ards Wo rld So lu tio ns Co. , 87 S .W. 3d 54 6, 54 9 ( Te x. 20 02 ). A t ri a l c ourt c le arl y a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if

“ it

rea ches a dec ision so arbitrary and unre asonable as to amount to a cle ar a nd prejudicia l error

of law.” Walker , 8 2 7 S

. W

. 2 d

at 8 3 9 (q u o t i n g Jo hnso n v . Fo urth Cour

t of App e als , 700 S.W .2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)). In other wor ds, the relator must establish that the trial co u rt could re asonably have reache d only

one dec ision. Id. at 840. Mandamus is proper whe n a trial c ourt issues an orde r bey ond its jurisdi ction. In re Sw. B ell Tel. Co. , 35 S.W .3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000). Moreove r, contempt orde rs ar e not appe alable. Ex p arte Ros e , 704 S.W .2d 751, 752 n
. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). And c ontempt orders that do not involve confine ment cannot be revie wed by writ of habe as
c orpus. In re

Lo ng , 984 S.W .2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig . proce eding ). He re, the trial court’ s order for c onfinement ha s been suspe nded. C o n s eq u entl y , the only possible relief is a

writ of mandamus. Id

.

F AI L URE T O M A KE I N STALLM ENT P A Y M ENTS As pa rt of his fi rs t iss ue , Willi a m argue s th a t th e po rt ion of the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r h old inghim in contempt for f

ailing t o m ak e p aym ents on a F ord truck a war ded to Catherine in the underlying divorce decr ee is void. More specific ally , he conte nds that the trial court’s order violates the Texas

c o n s ti tuti o n a l p r o v is io na g a in s t im p r is o n me n t f

o r d e b t. T h e T e xa s Co n s ti tuti o np r o v id e s th a t “ [n ]o person sha ll ever be imprisoned for de bt.” T EX
. C O N ST
. ar t

. I , § 18. A commitment order that4

violates the Texas Constitution is bey ond a cour t’s power and is void. In r eHe nry , 154 S.W .3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005). Al t h o u gh an orde r re quiring pay ment of debt may

be enf orce d throug h leg al pr oc e sse s su c h a s e xec uti on or a tta c hme nt, a

c on fi ne me nt o rd e r p re mis e d o n f a ilure to p ay

a de bt i s void. Id. I f a court finds that cer tain proper

ty at issue curr ently exis ts and awa rds that prope rty

as part of the community

estate’s d i v i sion, the contemnor is not indebted to the other party , but become s a constructive trustee who holds that party ’s assets. Id. at 597. I n such instance , a cour t may find the holding party in c ontempt a nd order confine ment for willfully ref using to obe y

an orde r to turn over f

unds to which the other pa rty is leg ally entitled. Id

. Her e, Willi am’s pay

ments for the F ord truck a re a ddresse d in a s ection of the divorce decr ee devoted to the division of the mar ital estate, spec ifically , debts to the husband, a nd the pay

ments are require d “as a part of the division of the e state of the pa rties.” See id. The divorc e dec ree does not indicate that funds to ma ke pay ments on the For d truck prese ntly exis ted, nor does i t s p ec i fy par t i cu l ar co mmunity

funds from whic h the pay ments were to be paid. See id. Wit hout such identification of e x isting fu n d s , William cannot be c onsidered a constructive tr

ustee or f iduciary who holds community

assets that rig htfully

belong to Catherin e. See id. Consequently , Wil liam’s obligation to make pay

ments on the For d truck is a debt owed to C hry sler F inancial. See id . The fa ct that th e pa

y me nts we re imp os e d a s p art of the divi si on of com mun ity pr op e rt y do e s n ot i n it se lf transfor m the obligation into one enforc eable by coer cive c ontempt. See id . Be cause Wil liam’s obligation to make pay ments on the Ford truck a s order ed in the divorc e decr ee is a debt, t he obli g ation is not enfor cea ble by confine ment for c ontempt. See id . at 597–98. Thus, the trial cour

t abused its discretion by fi n ding William in contempt and order ing that he be

c on fi ne d f

or thi s v iol a tio n, and

su sp e nd ingc omm itm e nt c on tin g e nt o n p ay ment of $16, 80 0 to Ca the ri ne . T hat po rt ion

of the or de r fo r e nf

or c e me nt by c on te mpt

c on sti tut e s im

pr iso nme nt f

or de bt, and is void. Acc ording ly , that portion of Wil liam’s first issue reg ardinghis being held in contempt for f ailure to make pay

ments on the For d truck is sustained.

F R A U D U LENT R E S I DE NCE I n his se c on d, thi rd , an d fou rt h issu e s, Willi a m ar g ue s tha t the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r h old inghim in contempt for f

raudule ntly

notify ing the court a

nd Catherine that his residenc e had c hang ed to El5

Paso, Texas is void bec ause his ac tion was not in violation of a rea sonably specific order . Fur

ther, he conte nds that the trial cour t’s order is void beca

use t he underly ing divorce decre e does not specify compliance in clear

and unambig uous terms so that h e would know his duties or obligations, and beca use the motion for e nforc ement does not state when, how, and by what means he was g uilty of the a lle g e d c on te mpt

. Appli cable Law I t is well established that for a party to be held in contempt for disobeying a

court order , the order must spell out the details of compliance in cle ar, spe cific, a nd unambig uous terms so that the party will readily

know exactly

what duties or obligations the order imposes. Ex p arte Sla v in , 412 S.W. 2d 43 , 44 (T e x. 19 67 ). Th e jud g me nt m us t a lso or de r t

he pa rt y to p e rf or m th e re qu ir e d a c ts. Ex parte Bris ter , 801 S.W .2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1990). I nterpr et at i o n of the provisions of the c ourt order in question should not rest upon impl ication or c onjecture

. E x p a r t eB l a s i n ga me , 748 S.W .2d 44 4, 44 6 ( Te x. 19 88 ). Th e a lle g e dly c on te mpt uo us a c ts mus t be dir e c tly c on tr ary to the e xpre ss t e rm s
o f th e court order. Id. On the other hand, the or der ne ed not be “ full of superf luous terms and specific ations adequate to counter any flig ht of fancy

a conte mnor may

imag ine in order

to declar e it vag ue.” Id. (c i t i n g Ex p arte Mc Ma nus , 589 S.W .2d 790, 793 (Tex. Civ. App.–Dallas 1979, no writ)). Moreove r, the order alleg edly violated must be strictly

construed. Ex parte Jones , 1 6 0 T e x. 32 1, 32 5, 33 1 S.W.2 d 202 , 204 (1 96 0)

. B e fo re a c ourt c an pun ish fo r co nte mpt no t c omm itt e d in its pre sence , the acc used must have full and complete notification of the subject matter, and the show

cause order

or other me ans of notification must state whe n, how, and by what mea ns the ac cused ha s been guilty

of the a lleg ed conte mpt. Ex parte Carney , 9 03 S.W. 2d 34 5, 34 6 ( Te x. 19 95 ). Th e se g e ne ra l r ule s o f l aw r e qu ir e us to ba lanc e the du e pr oc e ss ri g hts of tho se a c c us e d o f c on te mpt wi th the power of cour ts to enforc e their or ders. E x p a r t eB l a s i n ga me , 748 S.W .2d at 446. Section 156.001 throug h 156.410 of t h e T ex as Family Code establishes the e x clusive proce dure f

or making substantive chang es to a divorc e dec ree that provides for the conse rvatorship, support, or possession of and a cce ss to a child. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. §§ 156.001-.410 (Ve rnon 2008). Section 156.101 authorizes a c ourt to modify an order that provides for the possession of or

acc ess to a child if modification would be in the best intere st of the child and the c ircumstance s of the c hil d, a con ser vator , o r o the r p art y a ff e c te d b y the or de r h a ve ma te ri a lly and su bs tanti a lly6

chang ed since the ea

rlier of the date of

the re ndition of the order or the date of the sig ning of a mediated or collaborative law settlement a g ree ment on which the or der is base d. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 156.101 (Ve rnon 2008). Ana lys is I n the underly ing divorce decre e in this case, William was order ed to notify Catherine, the trial court, and the state reg istry of any chang e in his c urre nt residenc e addr ess. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 105.006(b), ( e) (Ver non 2008). In 2006, Wil liam informed Cather ine and the tr ial court that his residenc e addr ess had c hang ed fr om Pale stine, Texas, to El Paso, Texas. Howeve r, the trial c ourt found that Wil l i am ’s re s idence “is and wa s” Palestine, Te x as, there by implicitl y

finding that Wil liam’ s n o t ice that his re sidence had cha ng ed wa s false. William contends that the under ly ing divorce decr e e s im

p ly o r d e r e d h im to n o ti f

y Cath e r in e , th e tr ia l c o u rt, an d th e s tate r e g is tr y of a chang e of a ddress, whic h he did. I t is clear f

rom the underly ing divorce decre e that Wil liam had to inform C ather ine, the trial court, a nd the state re g istry of a chang e in his residenc e addre ss. I t is equally clea r that Will iam was obligated t o provide Catherine and the t rial court with his actua l residenc e address, not a fa lse one. No other de tails were nece ssary in order f or Wil liam to obey this orde r. B eca use the trial c ourt found that Will iam’ s r e sid e nc e a dd re ss had no t cha

ng e d, the c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in deter mining that Willi am disobey ed a clear and spec ific cour

t order by informing Catherine a

nd the tr ia l c ourt that his re sid e nc e ha d c ha ng e d to El Pa so , Te xas. Thus , the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion by

finding Wil liam in contempt and orde ringthat he be c onfined for this viol ation. As pa rt of his fo ur th iss ue , Willi a m c on te nd s th a t th e mot ion fo r e nf or c e me nt d id n ot s ta te when, how, and by what means he was g uilty of the a lleg ed conte mpt. Ex parte Carn ey , 903 S.W .2d at 346. I n her motion for c ontempt, C at h erine stated that Will iam failed to c omply with the

un de rl y ingdiv or c e de c re e by fraudu len tly

no tif y inghe r t hat hi s r e sid e nc e a dd

re ss h a d c ha

ng e d to El Pa so , T e xas, an e le ven ho ur dr ive awa

y fr om h e r r e sid e nc e , w he n h e c on tin ue d to re sid e in Palestine, Texas, one-qua rter mile from her r esidenc e. She also stated that she was unde r a c ourt
o r d e r t o p i c k u p t h e c h i l d

a tW i l l i a m ’ s r e s i d e n c e a tt h e b e g i n n i n g o f h e r p e r i o d s o f

p o s s e s s i o n
. In Catherine’ s supporting a ffi d av i t, she alleg ed that Willi am and the c hild had been de parting from Wil liam’s P alestine, Te x as addr ess on the day befor e her

schedule d visitations and driving to El7

Paso, Texas (an ele ven hour dr ive) for her w eeke nd visitation. C ather ine stated that during April and May of 20 06 , s he pa id f

or a ir fl ig hts to a

nd fr om E l Pa so , T e xas, fo r h e r h us ba nd to p ic k u p th e c hil d in order to e x erci s e h er visitation. The child was flown a nd driven ba ck to Palestine, Texas by Catherine’ s husband, another seven and one-ha lf hours. These alleg ations provided suff icient notice to Wi lli a m of

wh e n, ho w, and

by wh a t me ans he wa s g uil ty of the a lle g e d c on te mpt

. As part of his second, third, and f ourth issues, Wil liam contends that the portion of the trial court’s or der that pertains to modification of the pickup a nd delivery

of the c hild should be vacated. I n the orde r of e nforc ement, the tria l court orde red that Wi lliam’s commitmen t be suspende d

c on tin g e nt o n p ic ku

p a nd de liv e ry of the c hil d, W.C. W., be ing c on fi ne d to A nd e rs on Cou nty , T e xas. I n the u nd erly ingdiv or c e de c re e , Wil liam w a s o rd e re d to surr e nd e r W. C.W. to C a the ri ne a t hi s residenc e at the be g inning of eac h period of he r possession. Catherine wa s also order ed to surre nder W.C .W. to Will iam at her residenc e at the end of eac h period of posse ssion. Further , the trial cour t order ed that the primary residenc e of the child, W.C .W., would be the states of Tex as, Oklahoma , and L ouisiana. The or der a lso prohibited th e p ar t i es fr o m removing the child from the states of Te xas, Ok laho ma , a

nd L ou isi ana

fo r the purp os e of

c ha ng ingthe pr ima

ry re sid e nc e of

the c hil d unti l modified by

further order of the court of continuing jurisdiction or by written ag ree ment signe d by the pa rt ie s and fi le d w iththe c ourt

. The modification procedur e in the Te x as F amily Code is t h e ex clusive mea ns for making substantive chang es to a di v o rce decr ee that provides for posse ssion of and ac cess to a c hild. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE A NN
. §§ 156.001-.410. When the trial cour t limi ted pickup and de livery of the child to Anderson County , Texas, it made s u b stantive cha ng es to the under lying divor ce de cre e reg ardingpicku p an d d eli very of the c hild, and also, potentially , to the states allowed to be the primary residenc es of the c hild. Be cause the t rial cour t’s contempt orde r made substantive chang es to the possession of

and ac cess to the c hild as order ed in the under ly ing divor ce de cre e, the tria l court abused its discre tion b y o rd er i n g that pickup and de livery of W.C.W . be conf

ined to Ander son County , T e xas. The portions of William’s second, third, and f o u rth issues relating to modification of the pic ku p a nd de liv e ry of the c hil d a

re su sta ine d. Th e po rt ion s of Willi a m’ s se c on d, thi rd , a nd fo ur th issues relatingto his being he ld in contempt for fra udulently notify ing Catherine a nd the trial cour

t8

that his residenc e addr ess had c han ged , and re lating to the suf ficienc y of Cather ine’s motion for enfor ceme nt are overr

uled.

A TTOR N EY ’ S F EES As part of

his f irst, se cond, third, and four th issues, W illiam contends that the trial cour t’s

or de r r e qu ir inghim

to p ay a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Ca the ri ne in t he a mount of $1 2,00 0 to su sp e nd his confine ment is void. More specif ically , he ar g ues that the orde r violates the Te x as constitutional p r o v is io na g a in s t i mp r is o n me n t f o r d e b t. A s n o te d

a b o v e , th e T e xa s Co n s ti tuti o n p r o v id e s th a t “ [n ]o p e r s o n s h a ll e v e r b e im

p r is o n e d f

o r d ebt.” T EX
. C O N ST
. art. I , § 18. Prior to 2005, the taxi ng of attorney ’s fe es in an a ction for c hild s u p p o rt wa s authoriz ed by the Texas Family

Code, and the resulting obligation was rec og nized to fa ll outside the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. In r eEst

re llo , 1 3 0 S.W .3d 391, 394 (Tex. App.–Be aumont 2004, no pet.). B ut contempt order s that order ed conf

inement for violating visitation provisions and that allowed suspension of confine ment by pay

ment of costs and fees constit uted a prohibited imprisonment for debt. See Ex parte Rosser , 899 S.W .2d 382, 386 (Tex. App.–Houston [14t h Dist.] 1995, no writ). However, in 2005, the leg islature re enac ted and amended se ction 157.167 of the Te x as Family Code reg ardingattorney ’s fe es in an a ction to enforc e possession of or ac cess to a c hild. Act of May 17, 2005, 79th L eg ., R.S., ch. 253, § 1, 2005 T EX
. G EN
. L A WS 452. As amende d, subsection (b ) o f s e c tio n 1 57 .1 67 re a ds a s f oll ow s:

If t he co urt fi nd s t hat the respo nd ent ha s f ai l ed to co m p l y w i t h t he t erm s o f an ord er pro vi d i ng f

o r t he p o sse ssio n o f o r a c c e ss to a c h ild , t h e c o u rt sh a ll o rd e r th e re sp o n d e n t t o p a y the m o v a n t’s re a so n a b le at t o rney ’ s f

ees and all co urt co st s in a d d it i o n t o any other remed y . If t he co urt f

i nd s t hat t he enf o rce men t of

t h e or der w i t h w h i ch t h e r es pon den t f ai l ed t o c ompl y w as n ec es s ar y t o e n s u r e t he chi l d’ s phy s i cal or emo t i onal he al t h or wel f ar e, t he f ees an d cost s order ed un der t hi s s ubs ect i on may be en f or ce d by a n y m ea n s av ai l abl e f or t h e e n f

or ce men t of

ch i l d s u ppor t , i n cl u di n g con t empt , bu t n ot i ncl ud i ng i nco m e wi t hho l d i ng.

T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 157.167(b) ( Ver non 2 0 0 8 ). C o nsequently , pay ment of attorne y ’s fe es assessed a g ainst a par

ty who has fa iled to comply with an orde r for

the possession of or a cce ss to a child is now enfor cea

ble by contempt. See Ex parte Rosser , 899 S.W .2d at 386. S imilar to the ta xing of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s in

an a c tio n f

or c hil d s up po rt , th is o bli g a tio n to pa y a tto rn e y ’s fe e s n owfa lls9

outside the constitutional prohibiti on of imprisonment for de bt. See In r eEst re llo , 130 S.W .3d at 394. Her e, the tria l court found th at Wil liam failed to comply with the terms of the unde rly ing di v o rc e d ec re e providing for possession of or acc ess to W.C .W. and, thus, found that Catherine’ s attorney ’s fees i n the amount of $12,000 should be a ssessed ag ainst Wi lliam. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE ANN
. § 157.167(b). The court also found that enf orce ment of the orde r with which Willi am fa iled to comply reg ardingpossession of or acce ss to W.C .W. was a nd is nece ssary

to ensure the child’s phy sical or e motional health or we lfare

. See id . Fur ther, the trial court order ed th at W i l liam’s commitment be suspended conting ent upon paying Catherine $12,000 in attorney ’s fe es, which sum has been paid into the court’s reg istry

. Be cause of the 2005 amendments to se ction 157.167, the trial court wa s authorized to order pay ment of C ather ine’s attorne y ’s fe es. See id. Thus, the trial cour t did no t a buse it s di scre tio n in

or de ri ngWilli a m to pa

y Ca the ri ne ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to su sp e nd his confine ment. Acc ording ly , those portions of Will iam’s first, sec ond, third, and four th issues reg ardingpay

ment of Cather ine’s attorne y ’s fe es ar e over ruled.

C ONCL US I ON B e c a us e the tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in

or de ri ngWilli a m c on fi ne d unle ss h e pa id Cath e r in e $ 1 6 , 8 0 0 f

o r th e lo s s r e s u lt in g f

r o m r e p o s s e s s io n o f th e F o r d tr u c k , an d in o r d e r in g that pickup and de livery

of W. C

. W

. b e co n fined to Ande rson County , Texas, we c ond itiona lly grant Wil liam’s petition for writ of manda mus in part. We tr u s t that, within fi ft e e n ( 15 ) d ay s from the date of this opini on and cor

respondingorder , the trial cour t w ill vac ate its Apr il 2, 2008 order insofa r as it directs that Willi am be c onfined unless he pay Catherine $16,800, a nd that pickup and de livery of W.C.W . be conf

ined to Ander son County , Texas. The writ will issue only if it f ails to do so. The trial court sha ll furnish this court, within the tim e of complianc e with this court’s opinion and orde r,
a ce rtified copy

of the orde r evide ncing such complianc e. Howeve r, base d upon our re view of the rec ord and the foreg oing a naly sis, we conc lude that the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion in holding Will iam in contempt for f raudule ntly

notify ing Catherine a

nd the trial cour

t that his residenc e address had chang ed, or in orderingWil liam to pay Catherine $12,000 in attorney ’s fe es to suspend hi s co n fi nement. The ref ore, w e deny Wil liam’s10

pe tit ion fo r w ri t of

mand a mus re g ard ingtho se iss ue s.



### BRIAN HO Y LE J ustice

Opinion delivere d April 30, 2009. Pane l co ns i s t ed of

Wor t hen , C. J. , Gri

f f i t h, J. , an d Hoyl e, J.

(PUBL I SH)