### NUM BER 13-09- 0045 8-CV 

## COURT OF A PP EA LS T H I R T E E N T H D I S T R I C T O F T E X AS C OR P U S C H R I S T I - E D I N B U R G
M IS SI ON CONSOLI DA TED IND EPEN DEN T SCH OOL D ISTR ICT , A pp ellan t,
v. GLO RIA GA RC IA , A pp ellee.
On a p p ea l f ro m th e C o u n ty C o u rta t L aw N o . 6 of H ida lgo C ou nty , T exas . 

## OP I N I ON Be fo re Ju stice s R od rigu ez, Garza, a nd B en av ide s

Op in io n b y

J u st ic e Ga rza In t his ac cel erated int er locu tor y appeal , app ell ant, Mi ss ion C onsol ida ted Indepen dent Scho ol Di str ict ( the “D is tr ict” ), ch all eng es the t ri al cour t’ s d eni al of a pl ea to the jurisdiction in favor of a ppe llee, Gloria Garcia. By four i ssues, w hich can be p rope rly cat eg or iz ed as three, t he D is tr ict arg ues that the t ri al cour t er re d i n deny ing i ts ple a to the jur is dicti on bec ause: ( 1) Garci a faile d to all eg e j ur is dicti onal facts v est ing su bje ct- matter jur is dicti on i n the tr ial co urt; (2 ) Garci a’s l aw suit wa s n o t t imel y fil ed unde r the Tex as Commi ss ion on Human Ri g hts Ac t ( “TC HRA” ), see T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21. 254 ( Ver non 200 6); and (3) the District is not an “emp loyer” w ithin the cont ext of the T CHRA, and, thus, th ere i s n o w ai v er

o f s ov erei g n i mmu ni ty

. W e affi r m.G ar ci a f i l ed h er or i gi nal pet i t i on o n Jul y 2, 200 4, asser t i ng v ar i ous wr ongf ul t er m i nat i on, def am at i on, 1 n e g lig e n t m is r e p r e s e n ta tio n , a n d f r a u d u le n t m is r e p r e s e n ta tio n c la im s . T h e r e c o r d d o e s n o t c o n ta in in f o r m a tio n r e g a r d in g th e s ta tu s o fS o tu yo ’s a n d M e d in a ’s la w s u its ; h o w e v e r , t h e y a r e n o t p a r tie s to th is a p p e a l

. F u rth e rm o re , G a rc i a a c k n o w l e d g e s o n a p p e a l th a t D y e r w a s d i s m i s s e d fro m th e u n d e rly i n g s u i t. 2 I. B A CKGRO UND Ini ti all y , t his ca se inv olv ed th re e ter minat ed school -d is tr ict empl oy ees— Garci a, Me li nda So tuy o, an d D eborah M edi na—w ho fil ed l aw suit s a g ain st the D is tr ict and i ts super int endent, H .F . “ Jac ki e” D y er , al leg ing v iol ati ons of the TCHRA and v ar iou s c ommonlaw claims. See Missi

on Con sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia , 1 6 6 S

. W

. 3 d 9 0 2 , 9 0 3 (T e x. 1 App.–C or pus Chr is ti 2005) , aff’ d in part, rev’

d in part , 253 S.W .3d 6 53 ( Tex . 200 8)

. The Di str ict fil ed a ple a to the j ur is dicti on i n eac h c ase ass erti ng im m uni ty under se cti on 101.106 of the Tex as Tort Cl aims Ac t, and the tri al cour t denied the Di str ict’ s p lea s. See T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 10 1.1 06 (Ve rnon 200 5). On origi nal sub mission to this Cou rt , w e aff ir med the tr ial co urt’ s d eni al of the pl eas, co ncl udi ng thatse cti on 101. 106 of the Tex as Tort Cl aims Act did n ot ap ply to the u nder ly ing cl aims

. See Garcia , 166 S.W .3d at 90 5. On fur th er a pp ea l , th e s up rem e c ou rt c on c l ud ed t hat : ( 1) t he Te x as To rt C l ai ms Act ’s el ect ion -o f-remedie s p ro v is ion g ov er ns all law sui ts filed ag ain st a g ov er nmental uni t; (2) the em ployee s ’ co mm on-law cl aim s against the Distri ct and the sup erinte nde nt w ere bar re d by

the Tex as Tort Cl aims Ac t’ s electi on- of-remedie s p ro v is ion ; and ( 3) the Tex as T ort Claims Act’s elect ion sche me did notbar the emp loyees’ recovery und er the T CHRA “beca use th e Legislature has consen ted to suits against the gov ernm ent und er the T CHRA . . . and a suit tha t is based on the TCHRA is not o n e b ro u gh tu n d er the [T exas] To rt C l ai ms Act. ” Garcia , 253 S.W .3d at 654 , 660 -61 (statin g, i n pa rticular, tha t “[w]hile th is Co u rth a s n o tp re vio u s l ya d d r e s s e d t h e is s u e , a ll t h e co u rt s o f a p p e a ls t h a th a ve
c o n s i d e re d i th a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a tt h e T C H RAc l e a r l y a n d u n a m b i g u o u s l y

wa i v e s i m m u n it y, and w e agree. . . . In this case . . . Garcia’s TCHRA claims against th e ISD survi v e”).W e ar e com pel l ed t o no t e t hat t he Di st r i ct ’ s j ur i sdi ct i onal com pl ai nts r ai sed i n t he p l ea t o t he 2 j uri s di c t i on at ba r c ou l d ha ve be en rai s ed i n t he i ni t i al pl ea t o t he j uri s di c t i on fi l ed i n 2 00 4. W hi l e t he re ap pe ars t o be no pr ohi bi t i on o n such a pi ecem eal app r oach, t hi s pr act i ce sho ul d be di scour aged because of t he i n e v i ta b l e d e l a y a n d a d d i ti o n a l e x p e n s e
. See T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 10. 001( 1) ( Ver non 2002) ( pr ov i di ng, am ong ot her t hi ngs, t hat “ [ t ] he si gni ng o fa pl eadi ng o r m ot i on .
. . const i t ut es a cer t i f i cat e byt he s i g n a to ry t h a t t o th e s i g n a to ry’ s b e s t k n o w l e d g e , i n fo rm a ti o n , a n d b e l i e f, fo rm e d a fte r re a s o n a b l e i n q u i ry .
.

. t he p l eadi ng o r m ot i on i s not bei ng p r esent ed f or anyi m pr operpur pose, i ncl udi ng t o ha r ass ort o cau se unnece ssar

y delay or needless increase in the co st of li ti gati on
. . . ”) (em ph as i s ad de d); s e e a ls o C o lu m b ia M ed. C tr
. of

Las C olinas, I nc. v. H ogue , 271 S

. W

. 3d 238, 258 (T ex. 2008) (Br i st er , J. , concur r i ng) ( quot i ng I l ey v. H ughes , 158 T ex. 362 , 311 S. W

. 2d 6 48, 651 ( 1958) ( “ ‘ O ur cour t s hav e al way s f r owned u pon pi ecem eal t r i al s, dee m i ng t he p ubl i c i nt er est , t he i nt er est s of l i t i gant s[ , ] and t he ad m i ni s t rat i on o fj ust i ce t o be bet t er s e rv e d b y ru l e s o f tria l w h i c h a v o i d a m u l ti p l i c i ty o f s u i ts .’ ”) ); Tra nsp. I ns. C o. v. Mor i el , 879 S. W

. 2d 1 0, 30 n. 29 (T ex
. 19 94 ) ( “[ W ] e rem ai n res ol ute t ha t pi ec em ea l t ri al s as a g en era l rul e s ho ul d b e a voi de d .

. . . ”)

. 3 On remand, t he D is tr ict f iled another pl ea to the jur is dicti on co ntendi ng that : (1 ) 2 Garci a fail ed to alleg e in her ori g ina l peti ti on jur is dicti onal fact s demonstrati ng that she had been di sc ri minat ed or ret ali ated ag ain st by the Di str ict; (2) Garc ia fail ed to comply w it h the noti ce prov is ion s c ontai ned i n the TCH RA , see T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21. 254; and ( 3) the District i s not an “emp loyer” w ithin the cont ext of the TCHRA, an d, th erefore, th e trial court lac ked subj ect -matter jur is dicti on ov er Garci a’s cl aims

. See i d. § 21. 002( 8) ( Ver non Su pp. 2009)

. After a hear ing , t he tr ial co u rtd e n ie d t he D is tr ict’ s p lea to the j ur is dicti on. Thereafter , t he D is tr ict fil ed a re q uestfor fin din g s o f factand conc lus ion s of law

. The tr ial
cour t di d noti ss ue any

fact fin din g s o r conc lus ion s; thi s a cc ele ra ted i nter loc utor y appeal
e n sued. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 28.1; see a lso T EX
. C IV
. P R AC
. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. §§ 51.014( a) (8 ) (V er non 200 8) , 101 .001( 3) (B ) (V er non 200 5)

. II. S TA NDA RD OF R EVI EW A pl ea to the jur is dicti on i s a dil ator y ple a us ed to defeat a caus e of act ion w it hout
re g ard to w hether

the cl aims a ss e rt e d h av e mer it

. Bl and Indep. Sch. D is t. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 5 47, 5 54 ( Tex . 200 0)

. The pl ea c hal len g es the t ri al cour t’ s s ubje ct- matter ju ris dicti on. Id. ; see Tex. D ep’ t of T ra nsp. v. Jo nes , 8 S. W .3 d 63 6, 6 38 ( Tex

. 19 99). W hether a t ri al cour

t has su bje ct- matter jur is dicti on and w hether the ple ader

has al leg ed facts that affi r ma t i v e l y

d e mo nst ra te t he tr ial co urt’ s s ubj ect -matter j ur is dicti on are q uest ion s of l aw that w e rev iew

de n ov o. Tex. Dep’

t of Par ks & Wildli fe v . M ir anda , 133 S.W .3d 2 17, 226 (Tex . 200 4) ; Tex. Natu ral Res. Conservat ion Comm ’

n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 8 49, 8 55 (Te x . 200 2).4

T he p laintif

f has the b urde n to plea d facts af f irmatively

showi ng that th e trial court has juris d ict io n
. Tex. As s’ n of Bus. v. T

ex. Ai r Con tr ol Bd. , 8 5 2 S

. W

. 2 d 4 4 0 , 4 4 6 (T e x. 1993) ; Uni v. of N. T

ex. v. Har

vey, 124 S.W .3d 2 16, 2 20 (Tex

. App.–F ort W orth 20 03, p et. den ied). W e const rue the plea dings liberally in fa v or of

the ple ade r, look to the plead er’s int ent, and ac ceptas tr ue th e fact u a l a llegat ion s i n the pl eadi ng s. See M ir anda , 133 S.W .3d a t 226 , 228 ; City of F or t Worth v. Cr

ock ett , 142 S.W .3d 550 , 552 (Tex. App. –Fort W orth 20 04, p et. deni ed)

. If a pl ea to the jur is dicti on ch a lleng es the e x is tenc e of jurisdictiona l fa cts, w e con sider relevant evidence su bm itted bythe par ti es w hen nece ssary to resolve the jurisdiction al i s s u e s r a ise d, as th e trial court is req uired to do, even th ose facts w hic h may impl ic ate the meri ts of t he caus e of acti on. Mi ra nda , 133 S.W .3d a t 227 ; Blue , 34 S.W .3d a t 555 ( confini ng ev ide nti ar y rev iew to ev ide nce that is rele v ant t o the jur is dicti onal i ss ue) ; see City of W aco v. Ki rwan , No. 08- 0121, 2009 Tex . LE X IS 9 69, a t * 6 (Tex . N ov . 20, 2009)

. A tr ia l court’ s rev iew

of a pl ea to the jur is dicti on c hal len g ing the ex is tenc e of jur is dicti onal facts mir ro rs that of a tradi ti onal moti on for summar y j udg ment. Mi

ra nda , 133 S.W .3d a t 228 ; see T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 166a( c)

. The g ov er nmental uni t i s req uired to meet the
summar y j udg ment s tandard of proof for i ts ass erti on th at t he tr ial cour t l ack s j ur is dicti on. Mi ra nda , 1 3 3 S

. W

. 3 d a t2 2 8

. O n c e t h e g o v e r n me n t a l u n i tm e e t s i t s b u rd e n , t h e p l a i n t i ff is then req uired to sh ow thatthere is a dis puted mater ial fact reg ardin g the jur is dicti onal is sue. Id. If th e evidence creates a fact questio n regarding juri sdiction , the trial court must deny the ple a to the j ur is dicti on and lea v e i ts re sol uti on to the fact finder

. Id. at 227- 28. But, if the ev ide nce is undisp uted or fail s to rai se a factques ti on on the j ur is dicti onal i ss ue, the t ri al cour

t r ule s o n the pl ea to the jur is dicti on as a mat ter of law

. Id. at 22 8. “I n c onsi der ing thi s e v ide nce , we ‘t ake as tr ue al l ev ide nce fav orabl e to the
nonmovan t’ and ‘i ndul g e ev er y reason abl e i nferenc e and re sol v e any doubt s i n the
non mo v ant ’s fa v or.’” Ki rwan , 2009 T ex . LEX IS 969, at*6 (qu o ti n g Mi ra nda , 133 S.W .3d at 22 8)

. Fur

ther , a defendant c annot si mply deny the ex is tenc e of jur is dicti onal facts and5

fo rce t he pl ain ti ff

to ra is e a facti ss ue. S ee Joh ns on v
. Br ewe r &Pr itcha r d, P .C

. , 73 S.W .3d 193 , 207 (Tex. 2002 ); s ee al s o C ou nt y o f C am er

on v
. Br own , 80 S.W .3d 5 49, 5 55 (Tex . 200 2) ( “I n dec idi ng a pl ea to the j ur is dicti on, a co urt may not w eig h the cl aims ’ meri ts but mus t consi der

only the pla int iffs’ plead ing s and ev ide nce per ti nent to t he j ur is dicti onal inq uir y .” ). III
. A N AL Y S IS A
. Whe ther Garc ia’s Original Pe tition C ontained Sufficient Juris dictional Fac ts In i ts firs t i ss ue, t he D is tr ict co n te nds that Garci a fail ed to al leg e i n her or ig ina l peti ti on s uff ic ien t j ur is dicti onal facts to make o ut a pr im a f a cie ca se of dis cr imi nati on or
re tal iat ion

. Garci a c ounters t hat t he pl eadi ng s s uff icie n tl y i nv oke the s ubj ect -matter jur is dic ti o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt

. G a r c i a fu rt h e r a rg u e s t h a tt h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e n i a l o f t he Di str ict’ s p lea to the jur is dicti on w as pro per because the D is tr ict i s a ttempt ing to re sol v e the under ly ing mer it s o f the c ase, w hic h i s a n i nappropr iat e us e of a pl ea to the jur is dicti on. 1. A pp licab le L aw The TCH RA

prohi bit s a n empl oy er from di sc harg ing or in anyothe r w ay d is c ri m in a t in g a ga in s ta n e m p lo ye e b e c a u s e o f t h e e m p lo ye e ’s ra c e , co lo r, d is a b il it y, re li g ion , s ex , nat ion al or ig in, or ag e. T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21 .05 1 (Verno n 20 06). Sp e cif ica lly, s e ct io n 21 .0 5 1 of th e la b o r co d e pro vide s t h e fo llo wing: An empl oy er

commits an unl awful employ ment pract ic e i f becaus e of race, color, disab ility , relig ion, se x , nat iona l orig in, or age the e mp loyer: (1 ) fails or

refuses to hi re an i ndi v idu al, di sc harg es an indi v idu al, or dis cr imi nates i n any

othe r manner

ag ain st an i ndi v idu al in conne cti on w it h com pen sation or the term s, cond itions, o r priv ileges of emp loyment ; or (2 ) li mits , s e gre gates, or cl ass ifies an e mploy ee or appl ic ant for employ ment i n a mann er thatw oul d depr iv e or tend to depr iv e an ind iv idu al of anyempl oy ment opp ortuni ty or adv ersel y

affectin any

othe r manner

the sta tus of an empl oy ee. Id. The TC HRA al so prohi bit s e mploy ers from retal iat ing or di sc ri minat ing ag ain st an employ ee w ho: “( 1) oppos es dis cr imi nator y pract ic e; ( 2) makes or files a c harg e; ( 3) fil es
a c omplai nt; or

( 4) tes ti f ie s, a ss is ts, or par ti ci pates i n any

manner i n an inv est ig ati on, proce edin g, or hea ring.” Id. § 21 .055 (V er non 200 6)

. Beca use one of the pur poses of the6

TCH RA i s t o c or re lat e s tate law w it h federa l law w it h re spect to empl oy ment di sc ri minat ion , w e may l ook to federal law

i n i nter preti ng prov is ion s o f the TCH RA

. See i

d. § 21. 001 (Verno n 20 06); se e also M.D. A nde rson Hosp. v. Tum or Inst. v. W illr ich , 28 S.W .3d 22, 2 4 (Te x . 200 0); NME Hosps. , Inc. v. Ren nels , 994 S.W .2d 142 , 144 (Tex. 1999 ). 2. Discus sion In her origi nal petition , Garcia noted tha t she first began w orking for the District in Oct ober 1976, and “p er

formed all the duti es ass ig ned to her w it h loy alty , ded ic ati on[,] and hard w or k.” H ow ev er , on or about Febr uar y 19, 2003, she w as “w ro ng fully di sc harg ed by
a ma nagem ente mp loyee o f De fend ant[ the District] for illegal and discriminat oryreason s, includin g, butn o tl im ited to , participa ting in an inv estigation inv olvi ng anot her district
em ployee .

. . a n d f o r ex ercising her protecte d rig ht to f reed om of associat ion.” Garcia further al leg ed that “s he w as dis cr imi nated ag ain st by the DefendantSc hool D is tr ict due to he r ra ce and nat ion al or ig in, namel y —H is pani c/ Mex ic an- Amer ic an des cent , g ender —female, and due t o her ag e, 48 ( d.o.b .—0 6/15/ 1954) ” and t hat “ her ter minat ion
w as par t of a l arg er

unw ri tten pla n or s cheme of the D efendant Sc hool D is tr ict t o dis cr imi nate ag ain st old er H is pani c female empl oy ees w ho w ere pol it ic all y ass oci ated w it h persons adv erse to t he Admi nis trati on.” G arci a al so sta ted t hat “t here w as no l eg it imat e busi ness j ust ific ati on f or her ter minat ion ” becau se she “h ad al w ay s p er formed a sat i s fac to r

y j ob for th e D efe nd an t du r i ng he r em pl oy me nt

. . . an d th at th ere w as w ork
av ail abl e and there c onti nues to be w or k a v ail abl e w hic h [Garci a] coul d perform” and that she had fulfil led al l sta tutor y prereq uis it es before fil ing thi s a cti on. In respon se to G ar ci a’s or ig ina l peti ti on, t he D is tr ict fil ed a ple a to the j ur is dicti on, whic h th e tri a l co u rtde n ie d . T h e D i s tr ictco n te n d e d th a t G a rci a fa ile d to al le ge jur is dicti onal facts demonstrati ng that she had been di sc ri minat ed or retal iat ed ag ain st by the D is tr ict. Sp eci fical ly , t he D is tr ict arg ued t hat t he tr ial co urt l ack ed s ubj ect -matter jurisdiction over Garcia’s discriminatio n claims b ecau se the em ployee selecte d to rep lace Garci a i s o f the s ame g ender , nat iona l or ig in, and ra ce and i s t hree y ears o lde r than Garci a. The Di str ict furt her arg ued t hat t he tr ial co urt di d nothav e s ubj ect -matterO ur concl usi on i s f ur t her supp or t ed b y t he s up rem e c our t ’ s det er m i nat i on t hat t he Di st r i ct i s not 3 i m m u n e fro m s u i t w i th i n th e c o n te x t o f th e T C H R A

. S e e M is s io n C o n s o l. In d e p . S c h

. D i s t . v . G a rc ia , 253 S .W .3 d 6 5 3 , 6 6 0 (T e x . 2 0 0 8 ); see a lso Tex. D ep’ t of Par ks & W i l dlif e v. Mir anda , 133 S. W

. 3d 2 17, 224 ( T ex. 20 04 ) ( ho l di ng t ha t i m m un i t y from s ui t de pri ves a c ou rt of su bjec t -m att er j uri s di c t i on ); Sw eeny C m t y. H osp. 7 jur is dicti on ov er

Garci a’s retal iat ion cl aim bec ause she “d id not p arti ci pate in an investig ation related to a claim b rought pu rsuan t to Chap ter 21 [o f the lab or code ].” At t he hear ing on t he Di str ict’ s ple a to the jur is dicti on, tw o aff ida v it s w ere admi tted
as par t of t he Di str ict’ s ev ide nce. The firs t aff ida v it w as ex ecut ed by Dr . R ebecc a M or ri son, the D irect or

of Human Res ources for the D is tr ict, w hic h av er re d tha t: ( 1) D r. M or ri son had
re vie we d G a rc ia ’s e m p lo ym e n tre c o rd s ; (2 ) G a rc ia h a d s e rve d a s “o n e o f two Co m m u n it y/ Ho m e S c h o o l L ia is o n s fo r V e t e ra n s Me m o ri a l H ig h S c h o o l” ; a n d (3 ) t h e n e xt person h ire d t o fil l Garci a’s pos it ion w as Zoi la Long or ia. The s econd aff ida v it , ex ecut ed by Long or ia, prov ide d the foll ow ing personal i nformati on per tai nin g to Long or ia: ( 1) her bir thday i s A pr il 14, 1951; (2 ) she is H is panic; (3) sh e i s a female; and ( 4) her nati onal
or ig in is M ex ic an- Amer ic an. Bey ond i ts bare as ser ti ons at t he hear ing on t he pl ea to the j ur i s di c ti on , th e D i s tr i c t di d no t pres en t an y e v i de nc e ad dres s i ng G arc i a’ s ret al i at i on c l ai m. W e find that the ev ide nce submi tted by the Di str ict merely

att ack s t he mer it s o f Garci a’s under ly ing ca uses of act ion and does not d efeat sub ject- matter

j ur is dicti on. See Mi ra nda , 133 S.W .3d a t 228 ( “W e adhere to the fundamental preceptthata c our t mus t not proceed on t he mer it s o f a cas e u n ti l leg it imat e c hal len g es to i ts jur is dicti on hav e been deci ded.

. . . H ow ev er , by reser v ing for t h e f a ct finder the re sol uti on of di sput ed jurisdictiona l fa cts tha t implicat e the me rits of the claim or def ense , w e prese rv e the parties’ ri g ht t o presentthe meri ts of thei r cas e at tr ial .” ); s ee a l so Brown , 80 S.W .3d a t 555

. Acc epti ng as tr ue th e factual alle g ati ons made byGarc ia in her ori g ina l peti ti on, t aki ng as tr ue al l ev ide nce fav orabl e to Garci a, an d i ndul g ing ev er y reaso n a b le i n ferenc e and
re sol v ing any

doubt s i n Garci a’s fav or , w e c oncl ude t hat Garci a has ple aded s uff ic ien t facts demonst ra ti ng thatthe tr ial co urt has su bje ct- matter j ur is dicti on ov er

thi s d is pute, and therefore, w e c annot say thatthe tr ial co urt er re d i n deny ing the Di str ict’ s p lea to the jur is dicti on. See K

ir wan , 200 9 Tex . LE X IS 9 69, a t * 6; Mi ra nda , 133 S.W .3d a t 226 , 228 ; 3v. Mendez , 22 6 S

. W

. 3d 58 4, 58 9 (T ex
. A pp
. –H ou s t on [ 1s t D i s t

. ] 20 07 , no pe t

. ) ( s am e). 8 see als o Cro ck

ett , 142 S.W .3d a t 552

. Acc ordin g ly , w e ov er ru le the D is tr ict’ s first is sue. B. Whe ther Garc ia Complied W ith Section 21. 254 of the Labor Code By i ts sec ond i ss ue, t he Di st ric t ass erts that Garci a fail ed to co mply w it h the mandator

y and jur is dicti onal noti ce re q uirements cont ain ed in the TC HRA. See T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21. 254. Garci a c ontend s that she filed su itw it hin the si xty -d ay deadl ine impos ed by

the TCH RA

and that she ex erci sed due di li g ence in ser v ing the Di str ict w it h noti ce of her lawsui t. T he lab or code estab lishes tw o time lines w ith w hich an agg riev ed e mp loyee must compl y
. Fi rs t, an employ ee must file an admini strati v e compl ain t w it hin 180 day s o f any all eg ed di sc ri minat or

y ac ts. See i

d. § 21 .20 2(a) (Vernon 200 6); Rice v. R ussell-Sta nley, L.P. , 131 S.W .3d 510 , 513 (Tex. App. –W aco 2 004 , pet . de n ied); see also Sch roeder v. Tex. Iro n W

o rks, Inc. , 813 S.W .2d 483 , 485 -86 (Te x . 199 1). Th is req uirem entis “mand ator

y and jur is dicti onal ”; thus, “fail ing to compl y depr iv es the c our

t of su bje ct[ -] matter jurisdiction. ” Schr

oeder , 813 S.W .2d a t 486 ; Czerw inski v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. , 116 S. W .3d 1 19, 1 21 ( Tex

. Ap p .– Ho u st on [1 4th D is t.] 2002, pet. deni ed) ; see Ve la v. W a co Indep. S ch. D is t. , 69 S .W .3 d 69 5, 7 00 ( Tex

. Ap p. –W ac o 20 02 , pe t. w i th dr awn). W hether Garci a c ompli ed w it h thi s t imel ine i s n ot i n di sput e i n thi s c ase. Seco nd, t he employ ee mus t fil e s uitw it hin si xty day s o f rec eiv ing a r ig ht- to- sue letter from the admini strati ve ag ency
. See Vela , 69 S.W .3d a t 699 ; see a lso T EX
. L AB
. C ODE A NN
. § 21. 254. The Tex as Supreme C our t has not address ed w hether the si xty -d ay

fil ing per iod i s j ur is dicti onal

. See Tex. D ep’ t of Crim inal Justice v. Guard , N o. 10 -0 6- 00065- CV , 200 7 T ex. App

. LEXIS 2859, at **7-8 (Te x
. App .–W aco Apr. 11, 200 7, no pet. ) ( me m. op.). Sev eral of our si ste r cour ts, how ev er , hav e concl uded that the s ixty -d ay fil ing per iod i s n ot jur is dicti onal

. See i

d. a t **9 -1 0 (cit in g Tex. D ep’ t of T ra nsp. v. Beckner

, 74 S.W .3d 9 8, 10 3 (Tex . Ap p.–W aco 2002, no pet .) ; M idd leton v
. Gou ld , 9 5 2 F. S u p p
. 4 3 5 , 4 3 8 (S

. D. T e x. 1996) ; Corner v. Gate s of Cedar Hill , N o. 3- 00- CV -2 499- N, 2002 U. S. D is t. LEX IS 1 6944,T he Di st r i ct ar gues t hat G ar ci a’ s al l eged f ai l ur e t o not i f y t he Di st r i ct of hersui t wi t hi n t he si xt y - day 4 f i l i ng p er i od d epr i v ed t he t r i al cour t of subj ect
- m at t er j ur i sdi ct i on, consi der i ng s ect i on 3 11. 034 oft he go vern m e n t co de provi de s t ha t “[ s ] t atut ory prere qu i s i t es t o a su i t , i nc l ud i ng t he provi s i on of no t i c e, are j uri s di c t i on al requ i rem en t s i n a l l su i t s ag ai ns t a g ove rnm en t al en t i t y
. ” See T EX
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 31 1. 034 ( Ver non Supp. 2 009)

. However , t he l angua ge r ef er enced by t he Di st r i ct was no t i ncl uded i n t he v er si on o f s e c ti o n 3 1 1 .0 3 4 th a t w a s i n e ff e c t w h e n G a rc i a fi l e d s u i t o n J u l y 2 , 2 0 0 4

. See A c t o f J u n e 1 5 , 2 0 0 1 , 7 7 th L e g ., R .S ., c h . 1 1 5 8 , § 8 , 2 0 0 1 T e x . G e n
. L a w s 2 3 7 4 , 2 4 3 3 (a m e n d e d 2 0 0 5 ) (c u rr e n t v e rs i o n a t T EX
. G OV ’ T C OD E A NN
. § 311. 034)

. I n f act , t he p r edecesso r t o sect i on 3 11. 034 pr ov i ded t he f ol l owi ng:

S e c
. 3 1 1

. 0 3 4 W A I V E R OF S OV E RE I GN I MMUN I TY I n or der t o pr eser v e t he l egi sl at ur e’ s i nt er est i n m anagi ng st ate fi s cal m at t er s t hr ough t he a p p ro p ria ti o n s p ro c e s s , a s ta tu te s h a l l n o t b e c o n s tru e d a s a w a i v e r o f s o v e re i g n i m m u n i ty unl ess t he wai v er i s eff ect ed b y cl ear and una m bi guous l angua ge. I n a st at ut e, t he u se of

“ p e r s o n ” a s d e fin e d b y S e c ti o n 3 1 1 .0 0 5 to i n c l u d e g o v e rn m e n ta l e n ti ti e s d o e s n o t i n d i c a te l egi sl at i v e i nt ent t o wai v e sov er ei gn i m m uni t y unl ess t he cont ext of t he st at ut e i ndi cat es no ot her r easona bl e con st r uct i on. I d. Because t he p r edecesso r t o sect i on 3 11. 034 i s si l ent as t o s t atut or y pr er equi si t es an d j ur i sdi ct i onal 9 at * *6- 7 ( N. D. Tex . Se pt. 9, 20 02) ); W indle v. Mary Kay, In c. , N o. 05 -0 2- 00252- CV , 200 3 Tex . Ap p
. L E X I S 5 5 9 4 , a t* 4 ( Te x
. A p p
. – D a l l a s J u l y 1 , 2 0 0 3 , p e t

. d e n i e d ) ( me m. o p.) (h old ing thatse cti on 21. 254 doe s not est abl is h a jur is dicti onal bar ; i nst ead, itmerely affect s
a pl a in ti f f ’s ri ghtto m a in ta in su itun d e r th e T CHRA) (cit in g Lotti nger v. Shel l Oi l Co. , 143 F. Supp. 2d 743, 753 (S.D . Tex. 2001) ( int er preti ng the TCH RA ); Duba i Petroleu mCo. v. K a zi , 12 S.W .3d 71, 76-77 ( Tex . 2000) ( hol din g that secti on 71.031 of the ci v il pract ic e and
re medies co de i s n ot a jur is dicti onal bar but af fects a plai nti ff ’s rig ht to mai ntai n a s uit ))

. W e ag re e wit h our

si ste r cour

ts that sec ti on 21. 254 doe s n ot es tabl is h a jur is dicti onal bar

but does affectGarc ia’ s ri g ht to maintai n a sui t und er the TCH RA

. See Beck ner , 7 4 S

. W

. 3 d at 103 (holding thatthe forty- day filing period in a workers’ compens ati on c ase is a l imi tati ons per iod and not a j ur is dicti on ba r a n d s ta ti ng that “statu tory requireme n t s a re not ‘jurisdiction al’ mere ly beca use th ey imp ose a man dat ory requireme nt on the plaint if f before j udicial relief ma y b e so ught”); see also Gu ard , 200 7 Tex . Ap p. LE X IS 2 859, at * *7-9 ( h o ld in g that“ Cha pter 21' s 6 0- day

fil ing per iod i s n ot jur is dicti onal ” and “a fili ng per iod is not an act that must be per formed pr

ior to fili ng su itand
so is not a s tatut or

y prereq uis it e ” (emphasi s i n or ig ina l) ); W indle , 200 3 Tex . Ap p. LE X IS 559 4, at*4. B ecau se w e ha v e con clude d tha t the sixty- day filing period is notjurisdictional, itca nnot ser

v e as the proper

bas is for a pl ea to the jur is dicti on, and the re fore, w e c annot add ress it on interlocu tory a p p eal. See T ex. Educ . Ag ency

v. D onna Indep. Sch. D is t. , 4r equi r em ent s, we do not consi der t he Di st r i ct ’ s ar gum ent t o be per suasi v e. 10 221 S. W .3d 7 91, 7 96 n.3 (Tex . App.—C or pus Chr is ti 2007, no p et.) ( “The proper av enue for rais ing the sta tute of l imi tati ons is a mot ion for s ummary j udg ment—n ot a ple a to the jurisdiction”); In s t

r u me n t S p e ci a l it ie s C o
. v
. T e x
. E mp loy me n t C o mm ’n , 924 S.W .2d 4 20, 421 (Tex. App. –Fort W orth 19 96, w rit denied ) ( raising servi ce issue by motio n for sum ma ry ju d gm ent) ; see a lso Gua rd , 2 0 0 7 T e x. Ap p . L EXI S 2 8 5 9 , a t * 9 (cit in g C o z b y v
. City of W aco , 110 S.W .3d 3 2, 35 ( Tex . Ap p.–W aco 2002, no pet .) ). Acc ordin g ly , w e ov er ru le the Di str ict’ s s econd i ss ue. C. Whe ther the District is an “Employ er” Within the Context of Chapter 21 of t he Labor Code In i ts thi rd i ss ue, t he D is tr ict arg ues that it is not subj ectto the w aiv er of immuni ty
con ta in e d i n chapter

21 o f the l abor

co de bec ause iti s a sc hool di str ict and not an “emp loyer.” See T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21. 002( 8)

. On or ig ina l submi ss ion , t he Tex as Supreme C our t hel d tha t i mmunity

i s w aiv ed as to a sc hool di str ict u n der ch apter 21 o f the l abor

co de. See Garcia , 253 S.W .3d a t 660 ; s ee a l s o C oppe r

as Co v e In dep. S c h. D i

s t. v
. Br own , N o. 10 -0 9- 00047- CV , 200 9 Tex . Ap p. L EXI S 9 8 1 4 , a t * *1 -2 (T e x. Ap p .– W a co De c. 3 0 , 20 0 9 , no p e t h. ) (m e m . o p .) (reje ct in g a
sc hool di str ict’ s arg ument that sc hool dis tr icts are not “e mploy ers” as defined b y C hapter 21, a nd th erefore, immuni ty i s n ot w aiv ed)

. On ap peal , t he D is tr ict es sent ial ly as ks us to
re cons ide r the s upreme co urt’ s resol uti on of thi s i ss ue. W e first note that the “ law of the c ase” doc tr in e r e qui re s that “q uest ion s o f law deci ded on appeal to a cour t of l ast re sor

t w il l g ov er n the ca se throug hout it s s ubseq uent stages.” Hudso n v. W

akef ield , 711 S.W .2d 628 , 630 (Tex. 1986 ). Furthermo re, this Court is bound to foll ow

the supreme co u rt ’s resol uti on of thi s i ss ue. See Lu bbo ck Count y v. Tr am m el’ s L ubbock B ail

Bonds , 80 S. W .3d 5 80, 5 85 ( Tex . 200 2) ( “I t i s n ot t he functi on of
a c our t of appeal s t o abrog ate o r modify e stabli shed precede nt.

. . . That funct ion l ies sol ely w ith t h is C our

t.

. . . Gene ra ll y , t he doctr ine of sta re dec is is di cta tes thatonc e the Supreme C our

t ann ounce s a proposi ti on of l aw , t he dec is ion i s c onsidered bin din g“H ere , G arc i a a l l eg es t ha t t he Le gi s l ature w ai ved t he I S D ’ s i m m un i t y i n t he T C H R A

. ” G a rc ia , 253 5 S. W

. 3d a t 660

.

W e a l s o no t e t ha t t he D i s t ri c t , i n argu i ng t ha t i t i s no t an “em pl oy er” w i t hi n t he co ntex t of C ha pter 21 6 o f th e l a b o r c o d e , a rg u e s th a t i t i s n e i th e r a “p o l i ti c a l s u b d i v i s i o n ” o f th e S ta te o f T e x a s n o r a “s ta te i nst r um ent al i t y
. ” I f t hi s wer e t r ue, t hen, i n r econci l i ng chapt er 21 of t he l abor code wi t h sect i on 5 1. 014 oft he ci v i l pr act i ce an d r em edi es cod e ( t he st at ut e au t hor i z i ng ce r t ai n i nt er l ocut or y app eal s) , t he D i st r i ct woul d no t b e e n ti tl e d to a p p e a l th e tri a l c o u rt’ s i n te rlo c u to ry o rd e r i n th i s c a s e
. C om pa re T EX
. L AB
. C OD E A NN
. § 21

. 00 2(8 ) w i th T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 51

. 014( a) ( 8) ( pr ov i di ng t hat a gov er nm ent al u n i t a s d ef i ned by sect i on 1 01. 001 oft he ci v i l pr act i ce an d r em edi es code m ay appeal fr om an i nt er l ocut or y or der gr ant i ng o r d e n y i n g a p l e a to th e ju r is d i c ti o n ); see T EX
. C IV
. P RAC

. & R EM
. C OD E A NN
. § 10 1. 001( 3) ( B) ( def i ni ng a “[g ]o v e rn m e n ta l u n i t” a s “a p o l i ti c a l s u b d i v i s i o n o f th i s s ta te i n c l u d i n g a n y
. . . s c h o o l d is tri c t

. . . ” ) ( e m p h a s is ad de d). 11 precede nt.” ). The Di str ict arg ues that Ga r cia is no t the “law

of the case ” becau se the specif ic is sue of w hether

a s chool di str ict i s i mmune under the TCH RA w as nev er fully br iefed or argued. It fu rther argues tha t the suprem e cou rt’s more recen t decision in Har ri s C ounty Hospita l Di

strict v. Tom ball Regio nal Hosp ital calls Garcia i nto q uest ion

. See 283 S. W .3d 838 ( Tex . 200 9)

. W e are unpersuade d by thes e arg uments

. Notw it hst andi ng the lac k o f br iefin g or arg ument, the supreme courtconsi dered the w aiv er iss ue and conc lud ed th at

5 the “TCHRA clearly

and una mb iguously w aives i mm unity.” Garcia , 253 S .W .3 d at 660. Thus, w e mustco ncl ude t hat t he defini ti on of “ employ er” in chapt er 21 o f the l abor

code inc lud es sc hool dist ri cts , and therefore , immunity is w aiv ed. Acc ordin g ly , w e ov er ru le the

6 Di str ict’ s t hird i ss ue. IV. C ONCL US I ON Hav ing ov er ru led al l of the Di str ict’ s is sues on appeal , w e af firm the j udg ment of the tr ial co urt.

DO RI C ON TRERAS G AR ZA, J u s t i c e Del iv ered and filed the 28th day of Janua ry , 201 0.