J-S64028-14 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

MATTHEW I. KURZWEG, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellant 

v. 

HENRY MILLER, 

 Appellee No. 630 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order October 7, 2013 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): GD-04-411 

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and LAZARUS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2014 

Matthew L. Kurzweg appeals from the order entered October 7, 2013, 

overruling preliminary objections raised against Henry Miller’s amended 

complaint.1 We reverse. 

Appellee Henry Miller and Appellant Matthew Kurzweg are Pittsburghbased attorneys. A dispute between them arose when Appellee claimed 

Appellant owed him a contingent fee earned for prior legal work. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 This Court granted Kurzweg’s petition for review brought pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b). See Order of Court, No. 137 WDM 2013 (Apr. 22, 2014). 

Thereafter, the case was transferred to the current docket. 
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In 1997, Janice Miller hired Appellee to represent her in a potential 

medical malpractice case.2 Appellee initiated the case on her behalf by writ

of summons and, thereafter, filed a complaint in December 1999. In 

January 2002, Ms. Miller discharged Appellee, allegedly the result of 

machinations orchestrated by Ms. Miller, Appellant, and his secretary, Kathie 

McBride. Appellant entered his appearance on behalf of Ms. Miller in 

February 2002. In September 2003, Appellant settled the case on Ms. 

Miller’s behalf and subsequently collected a contingent fee. Appellee 

demanded payment of some portion of the fee at various times, but 

Appellant did not acquiesce. 

Appellee commenced the current matter by writ of summons in 

January 2004. Eventually in 2012, Appellee filed a complaint and, 

thereafter, an amended complaint, pleading six counts against Ms. Miller, 

Appellant, and Ms. McBride, and seeking the entire contingent fee from the 

malpractice case. In July 2013, the trial court dismissed for non pros five of 

the six counts pleaded.3 The only remaining claim alleged unjust enrichment

against Appellant. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 It does not appear from the record that Henry Miller and Janice Miller are 

related. 

3

 On August 13, 2013, Appellee timely filed a motion to reconsider entry of 

non pros, which the trial court denied on September 9, 2013. In light of our 

order reversing the dismissal of Appellant’s preliminary objections, and the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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Appellant filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. See

Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4). The trial court denied those objections. Appellant 

petitioned the court to certify that its order denying Appellant’s preliminary 

objections involved a controlling question of law as to which there is a 

substantial ground for difference of opinion, but the trial court denied his 

petition. Nevertheless, this Court granted Appellant’s petition for review and 

issued a stay pending this appeal. See supra, n.1. 

Appellant raises the following question: 

Whether the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County erred 

in overruling Appellants’s [sic] Preliminary Objections, pursuant 

to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4), to a discharged attorney’s claim of 

unjust enrichment against a successor attorney who replaced the 

discharged attorney and who collected a contingent legal fee as 

a result of settlement of the client’s case. 

Appellant’s Brief, at 3. 

We apply the following standard: 

[O]ur standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling 

or granting preliminary objections is to determine whether the 

trial court committed an error of law. When considering the 

appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the 

appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court. 

Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary 

objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings 

are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably 

deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the 

dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

lifting of the stay pending appeal, Appellee may now appeal the denial of his 

motion for reconsideration of entry of non pros. 
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in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be 

unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to 

relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be 

sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the 

preliminary objections. 

Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 779, 783 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting 

Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 941 (Pa. Super. 2011)). 

According to Appellant, Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim in 

unjust enrichment, or quantum meruit, brought by a former attorney against 

a subsequent attorney, citing in support Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, 

Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman, PC, 95 

A.3d 893 (Pa. Super. 2014) (Meyer Darragh). We agree. 

In Meyer Darragh, an attorney representing an estate in a wrongful 

death action left his firm to join another, taking with him the wrongful death 

litigation file. Meyer Darragh, 95 A.3d at 895. Thereafter, the attorney’s 

new firm began to represent the estate. Id. The case settled, and a 

contingency fee was paid to the new firm. Id. The attorney’s original firm 

initiated litigation, claiming quantum meruit against both the estate and the 

new firm, and the trial court entered a verdict in its favor against both 

defendants. Id. at 896. 

On appeal, a panel of this Court stated: 

It is well-settled that a client may terminate his relation with an 

attorney at any time, notwithstanding a contract for fees, but if 

he does so, thus making the performance of the contract 

impossible, the attorney is not deprived of his right to recover on 

a quantum meruit a proper amount for the services he has 

rendered. Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy. It is defined 
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as ‘as much as deserved’ and measures compensation under an 

implied contract to pay compensation as reasonable value of 

services rendered. Quantum meruit and ‘reasonable value of 

services’ are virtually interchangeable phrases. 

There is no Pennsylvania appellate court case holding that an 

attorney who initially represents a client and is dismissed can 

maintain a quantum meruit action against the attorney who 

ultimately settles the case. Rather, the initial attorney has to 

proceed against the client. 

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted; internal quotation marks and other 

punctuation omitted); see also Mager v. Bultena, 797 A.2d 948 (Pa. 

Super. 2002), appeal denied, 814 A.2d 678 (Pa. 2002); Fowkes v. 

Shoemaker, 661 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 674 A.2d 

1072 (Pa. 1996); Styer v. Hugo, 619 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. 1993), affirmed, 

637 A.2d 276 (Pa. 1994). The panel concluded, “Until our [S]upreme 

[C]ourt holds otherwise, we will not recognize a claim for quantum meruit by 

a former attorney against a subsequent attorney.” Meyer Darragh, 95 

A.3d at 898. The panel then vacated the judgment entered. Id. at 895. 

Based upon this authority, we discern no legal basis for Appellee’s 

claim. Moreover, Appellee’s arguments acknowledge this to be so. See, 

e.g., Appellee’s Brief, at 7 (suggesting that the current state of the law in 

Pennsylvania is “neither logical nor fair”); at 8 (“The court should adopt a 

restitutionary approach to this type of case and allow a predecessor attorney 

in a contingent fee case to proceed against his successor.”) (emphasis 

added); at 17 (citing in support, Ruby v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 50 A.3d 

128 (Pa. Super. 2012), a case in which this Court analyzed an employment 
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contract dispute, not a quantum meruit action, between an attorney and his 

former firm, see Ruby, 50 A.3d at 130). Accordingly, we reverse the order 

of the trial court. 

Order reversed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/7/2014