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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED June 15, 2017

v No. 332150 Eaton Circuit Court ADAM MICHAEL KIRCHEN, LC No. 15-020311-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O’B RIEN , P.J., and H OEKSTRA and B OONSTRA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant, Adam Michael Kirch en, pleaded guilty to two counts of larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, and was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual off ender, MCL 769.12, to 46 months to 15 years in prison on each count. Notably, the trial court ordered that defendant’s sentences in this case were to be served consecutive to a 5-to- 20-year sentence that he was already serving for unarmed robbery in another county because h e was on bond at the time he committed the instant offenses. This Court originally denied d efendant’s application for leave to appeal, People v Kirchen , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 5, 201 6 (Docket No. 332150), but our Supreme Court, in lieu of granting his application for leave to appeal, remanded this matter to this Court for consideration as on leave granted, People v Kirchen , 500 Mich 879; 886 NW2d 627 (201 6). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant’s convictions and prison sentences but remand this ma tter to correct the amount of the restitution award.

On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred i n concluding that he was on bond at the time he committed the instant offenses. “It is we ll settled in Michigan that in the absence of statutory authority the imposition of consecutive se ntences is forbidden.” People v Chambers , 430 Mich 217, 222; 421 NW2d 903 (1988). “[W]hen a statute gr ants a trial court discretion to impose a consecutive sentence, the trial court’s decision to do so is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the trial court’s decision w as outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v Norfleet , 317 Mich App 649, 654; ___ NW2d ___ (2016).

In this case, the trial court relied on MCL 768.7b to impose c onsecutive sentences, which “authorizes consecutive sentencing where a defendant commits a felony while free on bond for a prior felony charge.” Chambers , 430 Mich at 218. “The purpose of [MCL 768.7b] is to deter persons accused of one crime from committing others by removing the security of concurrent-2- sentences should the conviction re sult on any or all of the cri mes so committed.” People v Thompson , 117 Mich App 210, 214; 323 NW2d 656 (1982). The issue before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion by concluding tha t defendant was “on bond” at the time he committed the instant offenses. We conclude that it di d not.

Defendant’s convictions in this case arise out of the theft of several artifacts from a museum in Charlotte, Michigan. It is undisputed that defendant was on bond as of May 29, 2015. Museum personnel reported the stolen items to law enforc ement on June 9, 2015. Defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to two counts of larceny in a building based on the theft of those ar tifacts. According to the information, th e theft took place “on or about May 1, 2015, through June 9, 2015,” and, at his plea hearing, defen dant stated that he stole the artifacts at issue “[d]uring the middle of May[.]” Defendant n ow argues that, based on his statement at the plea hearing, i .e., that he sto le the artifact s “[d]uring the middle of May,” he could not have committed the instant offenses while on bond. W e disagree.

Stated simply, defendant’s statement at the plea hearing is th e only thing that supports his position. As the trial court rec ognized at sentencing, defenda nt pleaded guilty to committing the crimes at issue between May 1, 2015, and June 9, 2015, and that timeframe obviously includes the time period between when he was released on bond and when t he theft was discovered, i.e., from May 29, 2015, to June 9, 2015. Additionally, according to the museum’s manager, the museum was left unlocked overnight on June 7, 2015, and the the ft was discovered shortly thereafter, on June 9, 2015. Furthermore, it appears from the record that defendant sold or attempted to sell the stolen artifacts during the month of June , not May. This evidence largely supports a conclusion that the instant offenses were committed on the night of June 7, 2015, or the morning of June 8, 2015, not “[d]uring the middle of May” a s defendant claimed. In fact, defendant’s attorney expressly ad mitted that defendant did not know the exact dates that the crimes were committed. Based on this, we conclude the trial co urt’s decision did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.

On appeal, defendant also argue s that the trial court’s restit ution award must be reduced to reflect the fact that law enforcement had recovered one of t he stolen items, a bayonet. While the prosecution correctly notes t hat it was not entirely clear whether the bayonet had been recovered at the time the restitution award was calculated, it nevertheless concedes that the restitution award must be correct ed as defendant claims. We th erefore remand this matter for the limited purpose of correcting the restitution award to reflect the recovery of the bayonet. In all other respects, however, we affi rm the judgment of sentence.

Affirmed but remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien /s/ Joel P. Hoekstra /s/ Mark T. Boonstra