Docket No. 105532.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

MAXIT, INC., Appellant, v. JOHN VAN CLEVE et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed October 17, 2008.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

In September 2006, the circuit court of Du Page County granted

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants John

Van Cleve and his wife, Kelley Van Cleve. The appellate court

reversed and remanded. 376 Ill. App. 3d 50. We granted plaintiff’s

petition for leave to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and, for the

reasons set forth below, affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

On December 26, 2001, John suffered an injury to his back as a

result of an automobile accident, when another car caused John’s car

to drive off the road. At the time of the accident, John was an

employee of plaintiff and was working within the course and scope

of his employment. On May 16, 2002, John filed a workers’
 

1On January 1, 2005, the Illinois Industrial Commission was renamed

the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission. See Roberson v.

Industrial Comm’n, 225 Ill. 2d 159, 162 n.1 (2007), citing 820 ILCS

305/1(c) (West 2004). 

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compensation claim against plaintiff with the Illinois Industrial

Commission,1 case No. 02 WC 25917. John also filed a claim under

plaintiff’s underinsured-motorist policy No. 1035982371, which was

held by CNA Insurance Companies (CNA). At the time of John’s

injury, plaintiff was not covered under any workers’ compensation

insurance policy.

On September 10, 2004, defendants signed the release at issue in

this appeal. This document, entitled “Release of All Claims,”

provides:

“[1] FOR AND IN CONSIDERATION of the payment to

us at this time of the sum of $800,000, Eight Hundred

Thousand Dollars, the receipt of which is hereby

acknowledged, we being of lawful age, do hereby release,

acquit and forever discharge Maxit Inc., Transportation

Insurance Co., and their agents, servants, successors, heirs,

executors, insurers, administrators, all other persons, firms,

corporations, associations or partnerships (‘Releasees’) or and

from any and all actions, causes of action, claims, demands,

damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation,

on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all

known and unknown personal injuries and property damage

resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or

about 12/26/2001, and covered by Underinsured Motorist

policy provisions in Policy No. 1035982371.

[2] We hereby declare and represent that the injuries

sustained are permanent and progressive and that recovery

therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and that in making this

release and agreement it is understood and agreed that we rely

wholly upon our own judgment, belief and knowledge of the

nature, extent and duration of said injuries, with the advice of

counsel and that we have not been influenced to any extent

whatever in making this release by any representations or
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statements regarding said injuries, or regarding any other

matters, made by the persons, firms or corporations who are

hereby released, or by any person or persons representing him

or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them

employed.

[3] In consideration of the aforesaid payment, John Van

Cleve and Kelley R. Van Cleve agree to indemnify and hold

forever harmless, Releasees, their heirs, successors,

administrators, insurers or assigns from and against any and

all claims, rights, duties, obligations, debts, liabilities, liens or

causes of action of any kind and nature whether foreseen,

unforeseen, contingent or actual, liquidated or unliquidated

that have been or may hereafter and any time be made or

brought against the said Releasees for the purpose of

enforcing a further claim for damage on account of the

alleged damages or injury sustained in consequence of the

aforesaid accident.

[4] It is further understood and agreed that this settlement

is the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that

the payment is not to be construed as an admission of liability

on the part of the Releasees, by whom liability is expressly

denied.

[5] We further agree that this release shall not be pleaded

by us as a bar to any claim or suit.

[6] The undersigned acknowledge and agree that the

aforesaid sum represents the full amount of damages due

them according to the terms of Policy No. 1035982371 and

further agree, in consideration of such payment, upon the

Releasees request, to take such action as may be necessary to

recover from the owner or operator of such underinsured

automobile the damages suffered by the undersigned. In the

event of a recovery, the Releasees shall be reimbursed out of

such recovery to the extent of any payment made to the

undersigned; and in addition, shall be reimbursed for

expenses, costs and attorney’s fees by it in connection with

such action.

under [sic]
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[7] This release contains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT

between the parties hereto, and the terms of this release are

contractual and not a mere recital.

[8] We further state that we have carefully read the

foregoing release and know the contents thereof, and we sign

the same as our own free act.”

Nearly one year later, on September 6, 2005, John and plaintiff

entered into a written agreement for settlement of John’s previously

filed workers’ compensation claim, case No. 02 WC 25917. Under

the agreement, which was approved by the Illinois Workers’

Compensation Commission (Commission), plaintiff agreed to pay

defendants $200,000 in settlement of the claim.

On October 19, 2005, plaintiff filed its complaint against

defendants in this case, alleging breach of the September 2004

release. In the complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants breached

the terms of the release by refusing to consider their claim for

workers’ compensation benefits released by the September 2004

agreement. Plaintiff claimed that this September 2004 release, “by its

own terms, specifically included the release of [plaintiff] of any and

all claims, of whatever nature or sort raised or to be raised by

[defendants] that would arise out of or on account of[ ] the accident

of December 26, 2001.” According to plaintiff, the workers’

compensation claim was included within the scope of the term “any

and all claims” as stated in the release. Plaintiff sought, as damages,

the $200,000 it was obligated to pay in settlement of the workers’

compensation claim.

Defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiff, alleging that

plaintiff fraudulently induced them to settle the workers’

compensation claim for $200,000. Defendants also filed affirmative

defenses.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on its

complaint and a motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding

defendants’ affirmative defenses and counterclaim.

Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the language in the third

paragraph of the September 2004 release clearly and unambiguously

released plaintiff from any and all claims arising from the December

26, 2001, accident, including John’s workers’ compensation claim.
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Defendants pointed, in response, to the first paragraph of the release.

According to defendants, this paragraph clearly limited the release to

claims covered by the underinsured-motorist policy, which did not

cover John’s workers’ compensation claim. Defendants also pointed

to section 23 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), which

provides, in pertinent part: “No employee *** shall have power to

waive any of the provisions of this Act in regard to the amount of

compensation which may be payable to such employee *** except

after approval by the Commission.” 820 ILCS 305/23 (West 2004).

Defendants note that the September 2004 release was not approved

by the Commission, and the release therefore could not have

constituted a waiver of John’s workers’ compensation claim under the

terms of the Act. Alternatively, defendants argued that the language

in the release was ambiguous and summary judgment was improper.

Defendants then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

In September 2006, the circuit court granted summary judgment

in favor of plaintiff and against defendants. The court also granted

plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding

defendants’ counterclaim and affirmative defenses. In its order, the

court concluded that the September 2004 release was clear and

unambiguous on its face and, therefore, subject to enforcement as a

matter of law. In the court’s view, the release clearly expressed

defendants’ intent to release plaintiff from “any further financial

responsibility proximately caused by the accident, and to indemnify

[plaintiff] for any subsequent loss that might occur.” With respect to

defendants’ claim that plaintiff’s construction of the release

contravened section 23 of the Act, the court agreed with plaintiff that

defendants, in signing the release, did not waive their rights under the

Act. Defendants were free to pursue those rights, but the release

obliged defendants to make good on their indemnification promise to

plaintiff.

On appeal, defendants argued, inter alia, that the plain language

of the release required judgment in their favor and that, by operation

of law, the release did not release John’s workers’ compensation

claim. The appellate court reversed and remanded. 376 Ill. App. 3d at

59. The court asserted that it was well settled that an employer could

not ignore section 23 of the Act and enter into a settlement with its

employee without the approval of the Commission. The court
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concluded that, absent Commission approval, the September 2004

release did not include within its scope John’s workers’ compensation

claim. According to the court, defendants were entitled to prevail, as

a matter of law, on their cross-motion for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

Before this court, plaintiff argues that the appellate court: (1)

incorrectly held that the September 2004 release was potentially

ambiguous; (2) misapplied section 23 of the Act to the release; and

(3) improperly gave defendants a double recovery for a single,

indivisible injury.

The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists. Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp.,

224 Ill. 2d 154, 162 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate only

where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2004). An appellate

court reviews de novo an appeal from a summary judgment ruling.

Horwitz v. Holabird & Root, 212 Ill. 2d. 1, 8 (2004).

Although both plaintiff and defendants argue that the language of

the release is clear and unambiguous, they take opposite views of

what the language means. The parties look to separate paragraphs of

the release to support their assertions that the language of the release

is unambiguous. Defendants point to the first and sixth paragraphs of

the release, wherein the underinsured-motorist policy is expressly

referenced. Defendants argue that because the release specifically

refers to claims covered by the underinsured-motorist policy, it is

clear that the release only releases plaintiff from further liability in

conjunction with that insurance policy, which did not include

workers’ compensation claims. Plaintiff, on the other hand, cites the

use of the phrase “any and all claims” in the third paragraph of the

release as language that is clear and unambiguous, thus requiring

defendants to consider their claim for workers’ compensation benefits

under the Act as released.

We agree with the appellate court below that there appears to be

some ambiguity as to whether the parties intended to limit the
 

2

It should be noted that the underinsured-motorist policy was the only

policy specifically referred to in the release, and that policy could not have

covered the workers’ compensation claim, because plaintiff did not have

workers’ compensation insurance at the time of the accident. 

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operation of the release only to claims arising under the underinsuredmotorist policy, or instead intended the release to include defendants’

workers’ compensation claim as well.2 However, we conclude, as did

the appellate court, that we need not resolve this question, because the

resolution of this appeal is controlled by section 23 of the Act.

Section 23 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/23 (West 2004)), which

governs injuries suffered by employees which occur in the scope and

course of employment, provides in relevant part, as follows:

“No employee *** shall have power to waive any of the

provisions of this Act in regard to the amount of

compensation which may be payable to such employee ***

except after approval by the Commission and any employer

*** who shall enter into any payment purporting to

compromise or settle the compensation rights of an employee

*** without first obtaining the approval of the Illinois

Workers’ Compensation Commission *** shall be barred

from raising the defense of limitation in any proceedings

subsequently brought by such employee ***.” 820 ILCS

305/23 (West 2004).

Neither party disputes the fact that the release was not approved

by the Commission. Nor do the parties dispute that the language of

the release does not make any express reference to the workers’

compensation claim.

Plaintiff, however, insists that this case has nothing to do with the

Act but rather is a simple breach of contract case. According to

plaintiff, based on the terms of the release, defendants are required to

abandon their claim for workers’ compensation benefits under the

Act. Plaintiff contends that the requirement to abandon the claim for

benefits does not constitute a waiver of defendants’ rights under the

Act. According to plaintiff, this requirement is in accordance with the

contractual obligation agreed to in the release. Thus, according to

plaintiff, defendants are now required to indemnify plaintiff for
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payments made to defendants under the Act, based on the terms of the

release. We do not agree.

In the factually similar case of International Coal & Mining Co.

v. Industrial Comm’n, 293 Ill. 524 (1920), an employee was injured

at work. At a hearing on the petition for compensation, an arbitrator

awarded the employee $2,801.14 as compensation for his injury. The

employer subsequently petitioned the Industrial Commission for a

review of the award, and on the same day secured from the employee

a release from any and all claims and demands, including all claims

arising under the Act resulting from the accident in question in

exchange for $1,819.34.

At the hearing before the Industrial Commission, the employer

offered into evidence the release, along with a stipulation to dismiss,

and the receipt for final settlement. The employee objected on the

ground that the final receipt amounted to a lump-sum settlement

which had not yet been presented to the Industrial Commission and

could not have been agreed upon without the approval of the

Industrial Commission. International Coal, 293 Ill. at 527. The

employer contended that by signing the release, the employee waived

no legal rights. This court found that the agreement, if valid, would

cause the employee to waive substantial rights under the Act

amounting to a waiver, which an employee had no right to do under

the Act. International Coal, 293 Ill. at 528.

This court held that while one of the purposes of the Act is to

encourage the settlement of claims arising under it, such a settlement,

in order to be within the contemplation of the Act, must be made in

accordance with the terms and provisions of the Act. International

Coal, 293 Ill. at 529. Thus, the court held that the release was an

attempted lump-sum settlement, and such a settlement must be

petitioned for as provided in the Act and approved by the Industrial

Commission. International Coal, 293 Ill. at 529.

Further, in Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. v.

Industrial Comm’n, 325 Ill. 452, 456-57 (1927), this court recognized

the well-settled rule that direct settlements between an employer and

an employee must be filed with, and approved by, the Industrial

Commission. The court held that an employer was bound by the

provisions of the Act and could not relieve himself from liability

pursuant to a private agreement with an employee. Zurich, 325 Ill. at
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456.

Plaintiff’s argument that the release did not require defendants to

waive their rights under the Act, but did require defendants to

indemnify plaintiff, is unpersuasive. The distinction that plaintiff

contends exists between defendants’ releasing plaintiff from the

workers’ compensation claim, on the one hand, and defendants’

waiving their rights to benefits under the Act, on the other, is

essentially a distinction without a difference, where the end result is

the same. The language in section 23 of the Act is clear in that it

provides, in pertinent part, that no settlement purporting to settle the

claims under the Act can be effective unless it is approved by the

Commission. “ ‘Where the language of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, a court must give it effect as written, without “reading

into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not

express.” ’ ” In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000), quoting Garza v.

Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378

(1996), quoting Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention

Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).

Plaintiff next argues that the appellate court’s ruling gives

defendants a double recovery for a single, indivisible injury.

According to plaintiff, section 23 should not be interpreted to allow

“this type of double recovery by a party that chooses to breach a

Release that was voluntarily signed with the benefit and advice of

legal counsel.”

Plaintiff’s argument arises from defendants’ reference to the same

medical bills both in support of the September 2004 release and in the

demand letter for settlement under the Act. Plaintiff asserts that

defendants’ use of identical documents to prove damages in two

separate agreements violates public policy.

As we have held, the language of section 23 of the Act clearly

states that any waiver of rights under the Act must be approved by the

Commission.Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous,

we must not depart from the plain language and meaning of the

statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the

legislature did not express. Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446

(2002). Thus, we are obligated to interpret the statute in this manner.

To the extent, if any, section 23 allows the kind of double
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recovery plaintiff complains of, the proper forum for this concern is

the legislature. It is not within our province to address concerns more

appropriately addressed to the legislature.

 We hold, as did the appellate court, that the September 2004

release was ineffective to waive defendants’ rights under the Act. We

therefore affirm the appellate court’s judgment reversing the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. We also

conclude, as did the appellate court, that defendants are entitled to

prevail, as a matter of law, on their cross-motion for summary

judgment.

Although defendants raise a number of additional arguments, in

light of our decision today, we need not address those contentions.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the appellate court reversing the

judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause to the circuit

court of Du Page County for further proceedings.

Affirmed.