The Hon. G ordon J. Quis t, United States D is tric t Judge for the Wester n District of Michig an, * sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0800n.06 No. 09-2147 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
TH OM AS L . F UL L ER, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. J ERIA. SHERRY, W arde n, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appea l from the United States District Court for the Ea stern District of Michig an

Be fo re : BO GG S an d M C KE AG UE , C i rc u i tJ u d ges ; an d QU I S T , Di s t ri ct J u d ge * BO GGS, Circuit J udg e. Thomas F uller appe als the di strict court’s denial of hi s petition for
a writ of habea s corpus. Fuller was appointed new defe nse counsel one hour and t we n ty -eig ht minutes before jury

selec tion beg an in his state criminal trial. Fuller a rg ues that he is entitled to a presumption that his counsel was c onstitut ionally ineffe ctive, because it is unlikely that any attorney could provide co m petent re prese ntation with so li ttle prepa ration time. The pr esumption of ine ff e c tiv e ne ss, ho we ve r, is l imi te d to pa rt ic ula rl y e g re g iou s cir c ums tanc e s. B e c a us e F ull e r’ s c a se
wa s f a ir ly str a ig htf or wa rd , and wi tne sse s and e vid e nc e ha d be e n ide nti fi e d by his pr e vio us c ouns e l, we de cline to apply

the pre sumption and affirm the de nial of F uller’s pe tition.No. 09-2147

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- 2 - I The fa cts of F uller’s c ase a re taken fr om the t ra n s cr i p t of his jury trial, held on January 21–22, 2004. Fuller

was tried in Tuscola County Circuit Court, Michig an, on four counts of re sisting and obst ructing a police of fice r, one c ount of criminal sexual conduct in the four th deg ree , and one count of marijuana possession. The counts stemmed from an incident that took pla ce at a g roce ry store on September

3, 2003. Th e mor nin g of the trial , Ful ler

re qu e ste d th e re pla c e me nt o f h is a pp oin te d c ouns e l, Jill Sc hmi dt. The c ourt

g ra nte d F ull e r’ s r e qu e st a

nd imm e diate ly

a pp oin te d d e fe ns e a tto rn e y Am y Gierha rt, prese nt in the courtroom on anot h er case , to repre sent Fuller . After a one hour

and twenty -eig ht minute rece ss during wh i ch Gierha rt confe rre d with Fuller, jury selec tion beg an. Gierha rt asked the jurors whe ther they understood the concept of “re asonable doubt” and that the burden of proof lay with the prosec ution, and she exercise d five pe remptory challeng es. When the jury

was e x cused f

or a lunch break, Gierhart requested a n adjournment a

nd rela y ed to th e c o u rta

n u mb e r o f r e qu e s t s t h a tF u l l e r

h a d m a d e d u r i n g t h e i r

d i s c u s s i o n , i n c l u d i n g r e qu e sts for discove ry

of the c riminal history

of the witnesses, funds for a private investigator, “a motion filed reg ardingprior conduc t of the complaining office r,” and videotapes of the store, jail, and police car . Fuller also soug ht two additional witnesses: a police de tective a nd the store owne r. Gier hart
a dmi tt ed th at sh e did

no t kn owthe purp os e of so me of the re qu e sts . Sh e a lso ma de a mot ion in limine to ex clude e vidence that Fuller was on pa role, whic h was g rante d, and informe d the cour t that Fuller was notified of

a plea offe r. The c ourt then re cesse d for a n hour.No. 09-2147

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- 3 - After the re cess, Gie rhar

t asked the c ourt for a

n adjournment, sta t i n g, “[ B] ased on the circ ums t an ce s, Ihave ha d no time to prepar e[.] Mr. Fuller ’s re questing adjournment ba sed on [t hose] circumstance s, as well as t he other things that have come to m y attention today .” The court
re sp on de d th a t no ne of F ull e r’ s disc ov e ry -r e la te d moti on s had be e n pro pe rl y fi le d an d d e nie d th e m. I n r e sp on se to G ie rh art ’s re qu e st f or an a djo ur nme nt, it s ta te d: The Court is satisfied that counse l representing the def endant is compe tent and ca n provide a dequate repr esentation. Counsel for the de fenda

nt was aw are of jury

trial, was pr epar ing on another case for jury selec tion today
. So I ' m satisfied that counsel c erta inly was pre pare d for jury selec tion in thi s case . Th e re hav e b e e na

n u mb e r o f d i s c o v e r y r e qu e s t s t h a tIr e a l l y

qu i t e f r ank ly do n’ t e ve n und e rs tand

ho w i t w ou ld b e log ic a l, o r r e le va nt, or ma te ri a l, o r a dmi ssi ble in this case. De fe ns e c ouns e l r e a dy ? I ' m r e ady to try the c a se . B ri ngin t

he jur y , w e ’l l have op e nin g state me nts
. The trial then be g an. The prose cution prese nted six witnesses. The first, J ill Brady , testified that Fuller had visited the marke t where she worke d sever al times on September 3, 2003. She stated that F uller stare d at her a nd made se x u al co m m en t s . After Fuller ’s third visit, Brady phoned the she riff’ s depar tment becaus e s h e felt uncomfortable that Fuller was still outsi de. She alleg ed that F uller re turned a nd
a sk e d h e r t o a

pp ro a c h th e c ounte r, and that wh e n sh e did so , he lif te d his arm and

br us he d h e r b re a st with the back of

his hand. She stated that she did not believe the contac t was a cc i d ental and that F ull e r s mil e d. Sho rt ly

a ft e r F ull e r l e ft

the sto re , Sh e ri ff

’s De pu ty Chr is R og ne r a

rr ive d at th e mark e t,
and B ra dy tol d h im that F ull e r w a s wa lki ng do wn the ro a d. On c ro ss- e xami natio n, Gi e rh art ’s on ly question to Bra dy

was what brand of c iga

rettes F uller normally

purcha sed.No. 09-2147

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- 4 - Next, Deputy

Rogne r testified that whe n he re sponded to Br ady ’s ca ll, she told him that Fuller had touche d her a

nd made se x ual innuendos. Rog ner le ft i n p u rs u i t o f Fuller, who he sa w dump some items on the hood of a pickup truck a nd run behind a

house. Rog ner sa id he g ave F uller
ve rb a l c omm and s to sto p, bu t th a t F ull e r atte mpt e d to c lim b a fe nc e . Ro g ne r t e sti fi ed that , w hil e
say ing , “ sto p, po lic e ,” he c on tin ue d to pur su e F ull e r, fi ri ng a sh ot int o the g ro un d. She ri ff ’s De pu ty Joshu a He rm an th e n arr ive d. Th e tw o of fi c e rs tol d F ull e r to g e t on the g ro un d, and

wh e n F ull e r d id not immediately comply , Rogne r spray ed him with pepper spray . The off

icer s cuff ed F uller and took him to a patrol ca

r. F uller then we nt “re latively willingly .” On cr oss-examination, Gierhar t elicited that Rogne r did not activate the lights of his police car while pursing Fuller , and that F uller wa s g i v e nn o f

i r s ta i d t o t r e a tt h e e f

f e c t s o f t h e p e p p e r

s p r ay. The third witness, De puty Her man, confirmed R og ner’ s acc ount of t he arrest. He testified that, w he n h e sto pp e d to a ssi st R og ne r, he w as dri vi ng a mark e d p a tr ol c ar a nd we ari nga

fu ll
un if or m. Af te r ar re sti ng F ull e r, he re tr ie ve d the ite ms l e ft by F ull e r o n th e tr

un k, inc lud inga

sma ll piece of folded pa

per c ontaining w hat appe are d t o b e m arijuana . On cr oss-examination, Gierhar t had He rm an c o n f

ir m th a t F u ll e r r e ma in e d h an d c u f f e d d u r in g th e tr an s p o rt to th e ja il an d d id not attempt to ge t out of the car or strike the office rs. During a twenty -minute rec ess, Gier hart moved fo r a mis tr ia l be c a

us e He rm an h a d te sti fi e d th a t th e re wa s a pa ro le wa rr ant f or F ull e r’ s arr e st, in vio la tio n o f t

he or de r i n li min e . T he c ourt too k th e re qu e st und e r a dv ise me nt. The next witness, Her

bert Terbush, testified that, while picking peac hes at a neighbor ’s house, he sa

w “a n office r cha sing a

fellow.” He state d that Fuller “strug g led” with the of

fice rs, who g ave him “r epeated commands.” Gierha rt did not cross-e x amine Te rbush.No. 09-2147

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- 5 - The fina l two witnesses testified re g ardingthe ha n d lingof the substanc e re trieved by Her man and the labor atory

tests confirming that it was marijuana . The prose cution then re sted. Gierha rt made a n opening statement in w hich she reminded the jury that the prosec ution had to prove e ach e lement of each count bey ond a reasonable doubt. She stated that Fuller would testify that his contact with B rady was a ccide ntal. Fuller , the s ole defense witness, testified that he we nt to the market thre e times on September 3, 2003. He f

irst went in to buy

beer , then ran o u t o f g as and r eturne d to look for a g as ca n, then
e nte re d th e sto re a g a in to buy c ig are tte s. He de sc ri be d h is c on ta c t w ithB ra dy a s a n a c c ide nta l bump that happene d while he wa s rea ching for the c iga rettes, which wer e kept above the counter behind which she w as working. He left the s tore, he said, beca use Brady had a strang e look on her fac e and, kn ow ing he wa s sti ll on pa ro le , he wa

nte d no tr ou

ble
. F ull e r sa id that he wa lke d do wn the ro a d to a fr ie n d ’ s h o u s e , w h e r e h e h e ar d a c ar r o ar u p . H e b e g an to r

u n an d c o n ti n u e d r

u n n in g w h e n he he ard a g un sh ot, fea

ri ngfo r h is l if

e . H e c la ime d th a t he did no t se e the fi rs t po lic e c ar o r D e pu ty Rogne r and did not re alize he was being chase d by an office r until Deputy Her man ar rived. F uller said he did not immediately g et on the g round whe n told to do so because he was a fra id. Gierha rt asked him if he ha d resisted the of fice rs, an d h e cl ai m ed he had not. On cr oss-examination, he admitted the marijuana

possession. Dep ut y Rog ne r, c a lle d a s a

re bu tta l w itn e ss, te sti fi e d th a t F ull e r l oo ke d “ dir e c tly” a t hi m during the cha se. Gier

hart, on c ross, ag ain aske d whether Rogne r used f

lashing lights or sire ns when h e e n c o u n t e r e d

F u l l e r , an d

R o g n e r c o n f i r m e d t h a th e d i d n o t
. T h e c o u rtt h e nr e c e s s e d f o r t h e d ay. The only exhibi ts in the case w ere the marijuana and the lab r eport.No. 09-2147

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- 6 - The ne x t morning, both sides g ave closing arguments. Gierha rt emphasized that Fuller

had
no t in te nti on a lly

ma de c on ta c t w ithB ra dy , th a t D e pu ty Rog ne r d id n ot us e his lig hts and sir e n w hil e pursuing Fuller , and that F uller wa s not told by the offic ers that h e wa s u n d er arr est. The jury
re a c he d a ve rd ic t th a t a ft e rn oo n, vo tin g to c on vic t F ull e r o f cri mi nal sexua l c on du c t in the fo ur th deg ree , possession of marijuana , and two of the four c o u n t s o f re sisting and obstruc ting a police office r. F uller wa s s en t en ce d as a ha bitual offende r to one y ear in prison for the mar ijuana
c on vic tio n a

nd c on c ur re nt t e rm s o f

f i v e -a nd -a -h a lf to f if te e n y e ars in p ri so n f

or the oth e r c on vic tio ns . On state a ppellate r eview, F uller ar g ued that he w as d enied the e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel g uara nteed by the Six th Amendment because his attorney had so littl e ti me t o confe r wit h him before the trial. In his brief on a ppeal, F uller re lied on Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 (1932), Morris v. Slappy , 461 U.S. 1 (1983), and Un ite d S tat es v . Cr on ic , 466 U.S. 648 (1984). He explained: The a rg ument in t h i s ca se is not that Ms. Gierhar t did any thing spe cifica lly

that resulted in ine ffe ctive assistance of counsel; the argument is that no attorney place d in her position c ould ha

ve rende red Mr. Fuller

eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel. A line of ca ses beg inning with [ Cro nic ] deals with this exact situation. Qu o t i n g Bell v. Cone , 5 35 U. S. 6 85 , 6 96 (2 00 2) , F ull e r argue d th a t hi s c a se fe ll i nto a c a te g or y in which a presumption of prejudice applies, beca use counsel was plac ed in “c ircumstance s in which competent c ounsel very

likely could not rende r assistance .” Th e Mic hig an Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls r e

je c te d F ull e r’ s ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im. Th e c ourt

did not cite Cro nic , relying instea d on Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984): I n o rd er t o show that counsel wa s ineffe ctive, def endant must show that counse l’s “re prese ntation fell below a n objective standard of reasona bleness,” [ Strickland , 466 U.S. at 688], and that “there is a rea sonable proba bi l ity that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional er ro rs, t he re sult of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” Id.No. 09-2147

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- 7 - at 694.
. . . Def

endant c annot over come the pr esumption that his counsel was eff ective or demonstrate that he was prejudice d by counsel’s limited time to prepar e. De fe nd ant’ s tr ia l a tto rn e y fu lly pa rt icip ated i n ju

ry vo ir dir e , e ff

e c tiv e ly cross-e x amined the pr osecution’s witnesse s, p re sented de fenda nt’s witnesses, and argued for acquittal bef

ore the jury
. We also note that def endant wa s acquitted of two other c harge s of re sisting and obstruc ting. More over, the case was fa ctually very simple and straig htforwa

rd. People v . Fuller , No. 25 5 9 6 1 , 2 0 0 5 WL 3076931, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2005) ( per curiam). The Michig an Supreme Court denied leave to appe al. People v . Fuller , 721 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 2006). On Novembe r 6, 2006, Fuller filed a fede ral ha beas pe tition. He ag ain alleg ed that the tria l court violated his Six th Amendment right t o counsel by appointing him new counsel on the day of tr ia l and de nyinghis mot ion fo r a

c on tin ua nc e , a nd that Cro nic , n ot Strickland , g ov e rn e d h is c la im. The district cour

t acknowle dg ed that, under Cro nic , th e re are c ir c ums tanc e s in wh ic h pr e

jud ic e is pr e su me d. I n F ull e r’ s c a se , h ow e ve r, it f ound that the c ir c ums tanc e s “ we re su c h th a t pr e jud ic e to him could have [ been] and [ was] avoided by competent counsel.” The court thus held that Fuller ’s
c l a i m w a s g o v e r

n e d b y Strickland , and that bec ause F uller had f ailed to alleg e any

“spec ific er

rors that aff ecte d his a

bility to r ece ive a fair trial,” he “wa s not deprived of his right to ef

fec tive assistance of c ouns e l.” F ull e r f

ile d th is t ime ly

a pp e a l. II The question befor e this c ourt is whether , under Cro nic , Fuller is entitled to a presumption of ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel in violation of t he S ix th Amendment. Fuller ’s collater al attac k on h i s s t at e co urt conviction is g overne d by the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act of 19 96 , Pu b. L . No. 10 4-13 2, 11 0 St a t. 1 21 4 ( 19 96 ) ( “ AE DPA ” ). Un de r A ED PA, fe de ra l c ourt sNo. 09-2147

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- 8 - cannot g rant a

habea s petition for any

claim that a state court a djudicated on the me rits unless the state co u rt’s adjudication: “(1) re sulted in a dec ision that was contra ry to, or involved an
unrea sonable a

pplication of, cle arly

established F eder al l aw as deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a de cision that was base d upon an unre asonable deter mination of the fac ts in light of the evidenc e prese nted in the state c ourt proce eding .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);

se e als o M

ill e r v . F ra nc is , 269 F.3d 609, 614 ( 6th Cir. 2001). I n this case, F uller cla imed that his counsel was pe r se i n ef fe ct ive, under Cro nic . The Michig an Court of Appea ls did not a ddress whe ther Cro nic applied to Fuller ’s s ituation. See F uller , 20 05 WL30 76 93 1. Ra the r, the c ourt a dju dic a te d th e me ri ts o f F ull e r’ s in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im using the Strickland

standard. Id . at *2. As the s tate cour t did not articulate its rea soning in re jecting Cro nic , w e m u s td e c i d e w h e t h e r i t s r e f u s a l t o a p p l y Cro nic ’s pre sumption of prejudice w as “c ontrary to . . . clear ly

established F eder al law.” Such is the case “‘if the state cour t appl i es a rule that
c on tr a dic ts the g ov e rn inglaw s e t f or th i n [th e Sup re me Cou

rt ’s ] ca se s’ or

‘i f the state c ourt

c on fr on ts a set of f acts that a

re materially

indisti ngu i s h ab le from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and
never theless arrives at a result differ ent from [ that] precede nt.’” J os e ph v . Co y le , 469 F.3d 441, 450 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( qu o t i n g W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 405–6 (2000)).

III Cour ts ty p ic ally revie w a de fenda

nt’s claim that he wa s denied e ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel under the standard set forth in Strickland , which re quires him to make a show ing of both deficie nt perf ormanc e by counsel and actua l pr ejudice to his c ase. Strickland , 466 U. S. at 68 7. B ut i n c e rt a in circ umstances, c ourts may dispense with the Strickland test: a defe ndant is entitled to a presumptionNo. 09-2147

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- 9 - of pre judice whe re c ircumstance s arising in a cr iminal prosecuti o n “ar e so likely to prejudice the
acc used that the cost of litigating their eff ect in a particula

r case is unjustified.” Cro nic , 4 66 U. S.
a t 65 8. Th e Sup re me Court ide nti fi e d thre e sit

uatio ns wh e re a

de fe nd ant i s e nti tl e d to thi s presumption: (1) the “ complete de nial of counsel,” i ncluding situations wher e counsel was abse nt at a “ critica l stag e” of

the proc eeding s; (2) situations where defe nse counse l “entire ly fails to subject the prosec ution’s case to meaning ful adver sarial testing ;” and ( 3) situations where “the likelihood that any law y er, eve n a

fu lly c omp e te nt o ne , c ou ld p ro vid e e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e is s o s ma ll that a presumption of pre

judice is appropr iate.” Id. at 6 59 –6 0; se e als o B e ll , 535 U.S. at 695–96 (r ea ff i rm i n g Cro nic ’s holding)
. Fuller argues t hat hi s case falls wit hin the t hird categ ory of Cro nic . Appellant’s B r. at 33. Gierha rt, he c ontends, was “ put into a positi on wher e she c ould not provide compete nt repre s e ntation due to the st at e t ri al cour t’s ref usal to g rant a

continuance .” Id. at 47. B eca use Gier hart “ was aff orded insuff

icient time to responsibly

repr esent he r client or pr epar e for trial,” Fuller argues that he is entitled “to the pre sumption of prejudice unde r Cro nic .” Id. at 41. Under the third categ ory

of Cro nic , the pre sumption of prejudice ap plies in lim ited, eg reg ious circumstanc es. I t is warra nted “o nly

when surr ounding c ircumstance s justify ” it, not
me re ly be c a us e c ouns e l w a s b e la te dly a pp oin te d a

nd the c ourt re fu se d to g ra

nt a dd iti on a l ti me to prepare. Cro nic , 466 U.S. at 661–62. I n Cro nic , the Court noted five f actor s “re levant to an evaluation of a lawy er’ s eff ectivene ss in a particula

r ca se,” id. at 663, wit hout stating that all of the criter ia ar e re quired or that these ar e the only fac tors a court may consider. These f actor s were : “(1) the time aff

orded for i nvestig ation and pre paration; (2) the experienc e of c ounsel; (3) the g ravity ofNo. 09-2147

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- 10 - the cha rg e; (4) the complexit y

of possible defe nses; and (5) the ac cessibility of witnesses to counse l.” Id. at 652 (c itations omi tted). F or the pre sumption t o apply , the C o u rt stated, the a naly sis of the criter ia must “demonstrate that counsel fa iled to functi o n in any meaning ful sense a s the Gover nment’s adve rsar

y .” Id. at 666. Other

wise, a de fenda

nt must poi nt to specific er rors by counsel in orde r to make out a n ineffe ctive assistanc e cla im under Strickland
. Ib id
. The Cronic Court cited Po we ll as an example of a c ase in whic h the pre sumption was
war rante d. That 1932 ca se involved nine blac k defe ndants indicted for a ca p ital offense who had
no re pr e se ntatio n a t a ll un til the mor nin g of the ir tr ia l. T he Sup re me Court fo un d th is s itu a tio n s o eg reg ious that, without ex amining c ounsel’s ac tual perf ormanc e, i t co n cl uded that the tria l was “i n h er en t l y u n fa i r. ” 4 6 6 U. S
. a t 6 6 0

– 6 1 ( c i t i n g Po we ll , 2 87 U. S. at 53 ). Th e Court a lso no te d in Cronic its failure to apply a pre sumption o f i n ef

fec tiveness in Ave ry v. Alabama , 308 U.S. 444 (1940), in which c ounsel was a ppointed three day s befor e the star t of a c apital trial, bec ause it found that evidenc e and w itnesses wer e re adily acc essible to counsel. Cro nic , 466 U.S. at 450–53. Po we ll and Ave ry indicate that the exception to Strickland a pp lie s o nly

in r are c ir c ums tanc e s. The Court made that point ag ain in Be ll . Addre ssing a n argument that the sec ond cate g ory of Cro nic applied, it stated: “When we spoke in Cronic of the possibili ty of pre suming pre

judice base d on an attorney ’s fa ilur e t o t es t t h e prose cutor’s c ase, w e indicate d that the attorne y ’s fa ilure must be
c omp le te .” 53 5 U.S
. at 69 6– 97 . T his c ourt , to o, ha s st a te d th a t Cronic applies “only wher e the
c on str uc tiv e de nia l of c ouns e l and the a sso c ia te d c oll a ps e of the a dv e rs ari a l sy ste m is [e]mi ne ntl y clea r.” Moss v. Hofbaue r , 2 8 6 F
. 3 d 8 5 1 , 8 6 1 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 2 ) ( d e c l i n i n g t o a p p l y Cro nic ’s second cate g ory when de fense counsel fa iled to cross-e x amine key ey ewitnesses)
.No. 09-2147

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- 11 - Apar t from in Po we ll , th e Sup re me Court ha s ne ve r fo un d a pr e su mpt ion

of ine ff e c tiv e ne ss
war rante d under the third cate g ory of Cro nic . Our Circuit, howe ver, ha s applied the pre sumption in a trio of case s involving the late appointment of c ounsel. Hu nt v . M itc he ll involved a def

endant
c ha rg e d w ithfe lon iou s ass a

ult and do me sti c vio le nc e wh o wa s app oin te d co un se l the da y of the vo ir dire; his trial beg an the ne x t day . 261 F.3d 575, 578–79 ( 6th Cir. 2001). The judg e g ave H unt the choice of waiving his r ight to a speedy trial or proce eding to tr ial immediately
. Id. at 578. Hunt’s counsel e x presse d conce rn about inadequate time to prepa re and aske d for “ ten minutes” to speak to his new client, but no time to consult was allowed, a nd opening statements and the f irst three prosec ution witnesse s wer e prese nted the next day
. Id. at 579. Counsel was thus require d to proce ed to voir dire and the n to trial “without ever discussing the case with his client and without conduc ting any discovery or independe nt inve stigation of the fa cts.” Id. at 583. We held that the state c ourt had failed to a pply clea rly established law in holding t hat Hunt’s counsel wa s not per se ine ffe ctive. No attorney could provide e ffe ctive counse l without an opportunity for pr e-tria l consultation. Ib id
. I n Mitchell v. M

ason , 325 F.3d 732 ( 6 t h C i r. 2003), this court he ld that the presumption applied wher e defe nse counsel did not consult with the defe ndant, fac ing a char g e of first-deg ree murder, dur ing the pretria l period be cause he wa s suspended fr om prac tice duringthe month before the trial. Althoug h the defendant repeatedly notified the t rial court that his attorney had neve r visited him in prison, the court denied a motion for new c ounsel, and th e at t o rn ey ap pear ed on the defe ndant’s beha lf on the first day of jury selec tion. Id. a t 73 5– 36 . B e c a us e the a tto rn e y

me t w ith the def endant “fo r no more than six mi nutes” be fore trial, id. at 742, this court conc luded that theNo. 09-2147

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- 12 - defe ndant had been completely denied counsel during a “c ritical stag e” of the proc eeding s, and that the ca se fe ll within t he first c ateg ory of Cro nic
. Id. at 748. I n Un ite d S

tat es v . M

orris , 470 F.3d 596 ( 6th Cir. 2006), this court found the Cro nic pr e su mpt ion

a pp lie d wh e re a de fe nd ant me t wi th his a pp oin te d c ouns e l fo r on ly a fe w m inute s, in
a pu bli c and c ro wd e d “b ull pe n” c e ll, be fo re be ingre qu ir e d to de c ide wh e the r t o p le a d guil ty to s ta te char g es or r isk facingmore ser ious fede ra l char g es. Id. at 598-99. The attorney had not re ceive d complete discove ry

on the ca se, wa s not awar e of the defe ndant’s cr iminal recor d, and wa s misinformed about the fe dera l guide line rang e the de fenda nt would fac e. Id. a t 59 9, 60 2. We h e ld that the situation fell wit h in Cro nic ’s third categ ory , beca use no compe tent counsel c ould rende r eff ective a ssistance a

bsent more time to consult and pre pare . Id. at 602. O u r an a l ys i s i s a l s o g u i d e d

b y s e v e r a l c a s e s i n w h i c h t h e p r e s u mp t i o nw a s h e l d n o tt o a p p l y. The Supreme Court has dec lined to apply it o n s ev er al o ccasions. I n Chambers v. Marone y , 399 U.S. 42 (1970), a de fenda nt was represe nted by one lega l aid attorney at hi s first trial, but by a new
a tto rn e y fr om t he same or g anizatio n at hi s r e tr ia l. T he la tte r d id n ot c on fe r w iththe de fe nd ant u nti l minutes be fore the trial beg an and w as not entirely familiar with the c ase. Id. a t 53 . T he Court did not find a pre sumption of pr ejudice. I t refuse d “to fa shion a per se rule re quiring reve rsal of e very conviction following tardy appointment of counsel.” Id. at 54. I n Morris v. Slappy , the Court found that a state tria l court had not a bused its discretion by

denying a continuance when substitute counsel had seve n day s to prepar e and multiple opportunities to confe r with previous c ounsel, and told the court that he was prepa

red for trial. 461 U.S. at 11–12. And in Cronic itself, the Court found that no presumption of pre

judice applied w hen a y oung rea l estate law y er w ith no trial ex perie nce w asNo. 09-2147

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- 13 - a pp oin te d to re pr e se nt a

de fe nd ant i nd ic te d o n c omp lic a te d f e de ra l ma il f

ra ud c ha rg e s and g ive n o nly twenty -five da

y s to prepar e for

trial. 466 U.S. at 649–52. The Court noted that the c ircumstance s
wer e made less eg reg ious beca use the unde rlying historical fac ts in the c ase w ere not in disput e, and the only rea l issue for the jury

was whe ther the de fenda nt had ac ted with intent. Id. at 663–65. I n this c ase, F uller empha siz es that Gier hart wa s appointed as his attorne y only eig hty -eig ht
m i n u t e s b e f

o r e t h e v o i r d i r e . A p p e l l an t ’ s B r . a t4 4

–4 5
. T h i s w a s c o n s i d e r a b l y l e s s “ t h ant h e 2 5 d ays at issue in Cro nic , the six day s at issue in Slappy , and the thre e day s at issue in Av e ry ,” and “ vir tua lly prec luded [Gierhar

t] from any prepa

ration, investig ation, or eve n meaning ful consultation with her client other tha

n a pre sume d cursor

y revie w of doc uments.” Ib id . F ull e r c on te nd s th a t th is t ime frame makes his ca se more a kin to Hu nt than to Cro nic , Slappy and Av e ry . Id. at 45. Al tho ug h this sh or

t time fo r pr e pa

ra tio n is inde e d s tr iki ng , th e Sup re me Court ha s ma de it clea r that tar d y ap p o i n tment of counsel a lone does not wa rra nt the application of the per se rule. Cham be rs , 399 U.S. at 54. As previously mentioned, Cronic id e n ti f ie d a nu mb e r o f o th e r f a c tor s rele vant to deter

mining whe ther the pr esumption of ineffe ctiveness a pplies: “(1) the time affor ded for investig ation and pre paration; (2) the experienc e of c ounsel; (3) the g ravity of the c harg e; (4) the complexit y

of possible defe nses; and (5) the acc essibility of witnesses to counsel.” 466 U.S. at 652 (c itatio ns omi tted). W hen e a c h o f t he se fa c tor s is c on sid e re d, the la te a pp oin tme nt o f c ouns e l in Fu l l er ’s ca s e ap p ea rs l es s t ro u b l i n g. Wit h respe ct t o the first fa ctor, time for investigation and prepa

ration, we acknow ledg e that Gierha rt was f orce d to meet with a new client, discuss a potential plea , consider motions and dis c ov e ry re qu e sts , re vie w d isc ov e ry do c ume nts , a

nd re a d th e pr e lim ina

ry e xami natio n tr ans c ri pt,No. 09-2147

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- 14 - all w it h in e ig h ty
- e ig h t m in

u te s . Sh e th e nh a d

a p p r o xim a te ly

o n e h o u r b e tw e e nju

r y s e le c ti o nand the beg inning of

testimony

to prepa re for t rial. All six of the witnesse s in the case testified on the day that she was appointed; onl y closing arguments wer e made the s econd da y of the trial. Gie rhar

t ob vio us ly ha d n o tim e fo r any ind e pe nd e nt inv e sti g a tio n o f t he c a se and

pr ob a bly did no t ha ve tim e to reviewall of the discove ry . She had eve n less time to prepar e than the attorney in Hu nt had, as he wa s appointed the da

y befor e the a ctual trial be g an. Gier hart a lso told t he judg e that she w as not pr e pa re d to tr y the c a se , a

fa c t th a t di sti nguish es Ful ler’s c a se fr om Slappy , in which the attorne y ind ic a te d th a t he wa s p re pa re d to g o to tr ia l. On the oth e r ha

nd , F ull e r’ s c a se dif

fe rs in a c ru c ia l r e sp e c t f

ro m Hu nt and Mi tc he ll , in which the late a ppointment of counsel left defe ndants completely unrepr esente d during the pre -trial per iod. I n Hunt , the def

ense attorney

had virtually

no opport unity

to consult with his client before tr ial or
co nduct any

investigation. 261 F.3d at 583. In Mi tc he ll , s im il ar ly , th e r e w a s e s s e n ti a ll y no
re pr e se ntatio n d

ur ingthe pr e -t

ri a l pe ri od . 3 25 F.3 d at 7 41 . H e re , F ull e r w a s n e ve r c omp le te ly without counsel. He wa s re prese nted by Schmidt during his ar

raig nment and the pr eliminary examination. P resumably , Schmidt investigated Fuller’s case and w ould have identifie d additional evidenc e and w itnesses wer e any available
. Although Fuller made re quests for a dditional discovery the day of tri al , S ch m i d t m ay

have be en aw are of his reque sts and may have de termined that no discovery -re lated motions were nece ssary . I ndeed, g iven that the ca se turned la rg ely on Fuller ’s intent, it seems unlikely

that additional investigation could have unc overe d useful evide nce. We n ote that G ie rh art

may no t hav e ha d a

n o pp or tun ity to a c tua lly

c on su lt w ithSc hmi dt. Thus, it would be improper to conc lude that Gier hart be nefitted fr om all of Schmidt’s trialNo. 09-2147

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- 15 - prepa ration. Gier

hart ha d to rely

mainly on her brief conversation with Fuller , the pol ice r eports, and the t ransc ript of the pre liminary exam, during w hich prosec ution witnesses had bee n cross-e x amined by Schmidt. S till, given that witnesses and evidenc e had alre ady been ide ntified, and g iven that the preliminary

examination transcript sug g ested the w itnesses’ li kely testimony , the par ameter s of Fuller ’s ca se we re la

rg ely es t ab l i shed whe n Gierha rt took over. Unlike H unt and Mitchell’s attorney s, she did not have to g o to trial entirely unprepa red. Wit h respe ct to the sec ond fac tor, Gierha rt was a n experience d criminal attorne y . Nothing sug g ests that she wa s not competent—eve n with little prepa ration—to handle the voir dire and the evidentiar y matters and obje ctions that arose during the trial. S he was also equipped to argue to t he jury that the prosec ution had not met its burden of proof
. Third, while F uller re ceive d a leng thy sentenc e for criminal sex ual conduct and resisting and obstructing a poli ce office r, t his sentenc e was more reflec tive of hi s habitual-off ender status than the gra v i t y o f t he cha

rg es he f ace d. Those cha

rg es we re le ss serious than those in Hu nt ( f e lo n ious assault and domestic violenc e), Mi tc he ll (first deg ree murder) , and Po we ll (ca pital murder)
. Four t h , Fu l l er ’s ca se wa s relatively uncomplicated. T here wer e six witnesses and two
e xhibi ts. Th e pr e lim ina

ry e xami natio n tr ans c ri pt w a s o nl y thi rt y -s e ve n p a g e s lo ng . T he c a se essentially

turned on c redibility : whether the jury believed t h at Fu l l er had not intended to touch Br ady or to resist ar

rest. In Cro nic , th e Sup re me Court no te d that a de fe ns e lawy e r’ s ta sk

wa s le ss burd e ns ome wh e n th e on ly re a l is su e a t tr ia l w a s th e de fe nd ant’ s int e nt. 46 6 U. S. a t 66 3– 65 . T hu s, Gierha rt nee ded little time to assemble a def ense the ory .No. 09-2147

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- 16 - Fina ll y , b e c a

u s e Sc h mi d t w a s r e s p o n s ib le f o r inv e s ti g a ti n g F u ll e r ’ s c a s e , th e r e le vant wi tne sse s we re ide nti fi e d an d pre pa re d for tr ia l bef

or e Gi e rh art

wa s a pp ointe d. Sc hmi dt p re su ma bly would have ide ntified and pre pare d additional defe nse witnesses we re a ny available
. Al tho ug h in

so me c ir c ums tanc e s, a

pp oin tin g ne w d e fe ns e c ouns e l on the da y of tr ia l w ou ld so damag e the integr ity of a criminal t rial t hat a presumption of ineffe ctiveness would be justified, that was not so her e. Be cause Fuller ’s case was fairly straig htforwa rd, and witnesses a

nd evidenc e ha d a lr e ady

be e n id e nti fi e d, it w a s p os sib le fo r a n e xpe ri e nc e d c ri min a l a tto rn e y lik e Gi e rh art

to provide F uller with a

n eff ective defe nse, even when she had little time to speak with her new c lient
and re vie w d isc overy mat e ri a ls. F ull e r’ s tr ia l w a s n ot s tr ipp e d “ of a ll i ts i nte g ri ty

so that a pe r- se rule of pr ejudice is justified w i thout resort to an e x amination of the a ctual cir cumstance s of the
case .” Gl ov e r v . M

iro , 262 F .3 d 268 , 278 (4 th C ir . 2 00 1) . T hu s, the state c ourt ’s re fu sa l to a pp ly the pr e su mpt ion

of pr e jud ic e wa s n ot c on trary to cle arl y -e sta bli sh e d Su

pr e me Cou

rt pr e c e de nt. Rather, the state court proper ly considere d, under Strickland , Gierha rt’s actual perf

ormanc e and the prejudi c e F u ll e r

s u f f e r e d
. B e c a

u s e F u ll e r h a s id e n ti f

ie d n o s p e c if ic e r r o r s o nG ie r

h art’ s p art, and Gierha rt by all acc ounts perfor

med ef fec tively , our inquiry

is at an end. I V Be cause the presumption of i neff ectivene ss does not apply in Fuller ’s case, we AFF I RM the district court’s de nial of F uller’s pe tition for a writ of ha beas c orpus.