### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE June 9, 200 9 S es sio n WIREL ESS PR OPE RTIE S, LLC , v. THE B OAR D O F A PP EAL S F OR THE

CIT Y OF CHATTANOO GA, ET AL 

### . Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Hamilton County No. 07-C- 1305 W. Jeff rey Hollingsworth, Judge

No. E2008-01896-COA- R3-CV - FILED SEPT EMBER 25, 2009

The plaintiff f

iled a petition challenging the gr ant o f a buil ding permit to Verizon W ireless. The decision of the City wa s aff irmed by the Board. After the trial court conducte d a hearing, it af firmed a nddis mis se d th e pe tit ion . T he plaint if f a pp e a ls. W e a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court

Affir med; CaseRem anded
J OHN W. M C C LARTY , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER S CHEL P. F R ANKS , P.J., and C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., joined. John R. Anderson, Robert S. Gr ot, and Katherine Higgason Lentz, Chattanooga, Te nnessee , for the Ap pe lla nt, W ir e le ss P ro pe rt ie s, LL C.
Kenne th O. Fritz, Chattanooga, Te nnessee , for the A ppellee, City of Chattanooga

. Trac y C. Wooden, Chattanooga , Tenne s s ee , for the A ppellee, V eriz on Wire less Tenne ssee Partnership.
OP IN ION
I. BACKGROUND
In Februa ry 2007, def

endant Verizon Wire less Tenne ssee Partnership (“ Verizon”) applied to the defe ndant Board of Appea ls (“Board” ) for

the City of Chattano o g a (“ C i t y”) f or a Spec ial Pe rm it t o c on str

uc t a wi re le ss c ommun ic a tio n f a c ili ty anda n 8 0- fo ot m on op ole tow e r ( pu rs ua nt t o Article V III § 107(16)( C) of the City’s Zoning Ordinanc e). The Board first c onsidered V eriz on’s Spe c ia l Pe rm it app lic a tio n app ro xim a te ly on e mon th la te r. At that tim e , a re pr e se ntativ e of

W ir e le ss Properties, LLC (“ Wire less”), indicated to the Board that it had secur ed a Spec ial Permit of its ownT h e o p erat i o n s o f W i rel ess i n cl u d e t h e co n st ructi o n o f cel l t o w ers an d t h e l easi n g o f space u p o n s u ch t o w ers 1
t o w i reless p ro v i d ers u n d er lo n g -term l ea ses. -2- for the c onstruction of a tower si te nearby, but had not yet signed a le ase f or that site. Counsel for

1 Verizon as s er t ed t h at i t had exe cuted a lease for its site, in keeping with the re quirement that the applicant f

or a Spec ial Permit have a n owner ship interest in the land. The Board tabled the matter to allow both Veriz on and Wir eless to supply it with m ore information.
Th e fo llo wi ng mon th, Ve ri z on a ga in app e are d be fo re the Boa rd ; c ouns el f

or Wir e le ss appea red in opposition. At the meeting, a membe r of the City’s planning st aff stated t hat discussions wer e ongoing with Verizon to make the c hanges ne cessa ry for the communi cations facility to qualify for a dminist rative a

pproval. S u ch ap p ro val would negate the nee d for a Special Permit from the Board. Ve rizon subseque ntly made re visions to t h e l o ca tion, layout, and design of the pr oposed communications fac ility and filed for a dminist rative a pproval unde r t h e C i t y ’s Zoning Ordinanc e (“O rdinanc e”) , Article V III , § 107(16)( A)(1)

. On J u l y 7 , 2007, Wire less filed suit in Chance ry Court se eking to e njoin the issuance of a building permit to Ve ri zo n. Three days later , howeve r, the City’s Depa rtment of Public Works issued Buildi ng Permit No. 07-11223 (“ Buildi ng Permit”) to Verizon for the construction of an 80- foot light pole to be used as a stealth wirele ss communications fac ility.
Th e ne xt d ay, Ve ri z on app e are d be fo re the Boa rdto ann ou nc e that it

ha d ma de c ha ng e s to the planned communications fac ility and that the City had issued the Building P ermit. In view of the C i ty’s action, Ve rizon re quested that it be a llowed to withdraw its application for a Spec ial Permit without pre

judice. The reque st w as grante d by unanimous vote of the Board. Counsel for Wire less was pre sent at the mee ting, but no objections were ma de t o either the issuance of the Buildi ng Permit by the City or the withdrawal of the Special Permit application by the Board.
A Chance ry Court hea

ring was he ld in mid-July, at which time an office r of Wireless testified a s f oll ow s r e ga

rd ing the po te nti a l inju ry W ir e le ss fa c e d withthe iss ua nc e of the Bui ldi ng Pe rm it t o Verizon:
Would allow other wirele ss pr oviders the a bility t o come in and build existing poles of thi s n a tur e dir e c tly be sid e e xis tin g p ol e [s ic ] s uc h a s th e on e we ha ve a t th is location, which would de value the towe r that we have in plac e, as the re a re o nly a limit ed amount of te nants in eac h city or jurisdiction.
Ho we ve r, the of

fi c e r l a te r a dmi tte d that wh e n Ve ri z on fi le d its ini tia l re qu e st fo r a Spe c ia l Pe rm it to build it s own communication fa cility, Wireless ha d not even signed a lease for its own propose d site, nor had W ireless be gun construction on its proposed t ower site. Instead, upon le arning of Ve ri z on ’s Spe c ia l Pe rm it a pp lic a tio n, W ir e le ss r

us he d to le a se the sit e a nd e re c t it s o wn tow e r i n an attemp t t o bar the construction of a fac ility by Verizon. The of fice r noted that W ireless is the on ly c omp a ny to h a ve bu ilt a c e ll t ower withi n th e City in t he pr e vio us fi ve ye ars , a ndit i s th e ir int e nti on to c on tr ol the mark e t f or c e ll tow e r sp a c e wi thi n the City

. Th e Chanc e ry Cou rt ult imate ly-3-

found that Wire less lacke d standing to challenge the dec ision of the City t o administratively approve the communications fa cility a n d d i s m issed the suit. See Wireless Properties, LLC v. Verizon Wi re le ss T

e nn e sse e Pa rtn e rsh ip , No. 07-0597 (H amilton Count y Ch. Ct., Aug. 27, 2007).
Meanw hile, Wire less filed an a ppeal with the Boar d rega rding the City’s de cision to issue the Building P ermit to Veriz on. At a hea ring h el d o n September 12, 2007, W ireless a sserted that the proposed V eriz on communications fac ility did not qua lify for administrative appr oval under the terms of the O rdinanc e.
Gary Hilbert, Dire ctor of the City’s Land Deve lopment Office , stated , i n rega rds to the re qu ir e me nts of

the Or din a nc e , th a t “ the po le is a str uc tur e by de fi nit ion , a ndthe a nte nn a [i s] conce aled in the struc ture” and that the e quipment on the ground “is conc eale d within a wall, and there fore , to us, that’s arc hitectura lly indis cernible.” He indicated that Ve ri zo n an d the City had “wor ked very hard . .

. trying to come up with what was arc hitectura lly indiscernible.” He noted that a t th e re qu e st o f the Cit y, Verizo n h a d mo ve d th e loc a tio n o f the po le , c ha ng e d th e sc re e nin g to ma tc h th e ba c k o f the bu ild ing , an d move d all the c able s and wi re s u nd e rg ro un d. Th e re su lt o f a ll the work and all the change s was that “[the antenna s] are conce aled behind the top cap on the pole, and the equipment is sc ree ned, and that was our de cision in making it architectur ally indiscernible.” Th e Boa rdvo te d u na nim ou sly to a pprove the City ’s de c isi on to g rant the Bui ldi ng Pe rm it t o Verizon.
On No ve mbe r 9 , 2 00 7, W ir e le ss f ile d a pe tit ionfo r a

c omm on la w w ri t of

c e rt ior ari in C ir c uit Court, seeking judicial re view of the Board’s judgment. A hearing was conducte d on July 22, 2008. Two days late r, the co u rt i ssued an or der dismissing Wireless’ pe tition wit h prejudice . The trial court found that “the Board a cted within its authority and the law and did no t ac t ar b i trarily or fraudulently and that t here is evidenc e in the record to support the Boar d’s dec ision.” Wirele ss filed a tim e ly n oti c e of

app e a l.

II. I SSUES
Th e iss ue s p re se nte d b y W ir e le ss a re re state d a s f

oll ow s:
A. Whe ther the tria l court er red in r efusing to allow Wir eless to pre sent additional a nd /or ne w e vid e nc e a t th e tr ia l.
B. W he the r the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in fa ili ng to fi ndthat Bo ardof Ap pe a ls f

or the City acte d in an illegal, ar

bitrary, a nd/or ca

pricious manner

.

III . STANDARD OF REVIEW-4-

The prope r vehic le for se eking judicial revie w of an administrative a ction by a loca l board of zoning a

ppeals is a petition f

or common law writ of ce rtiorari. Mc Cal le n v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 786 S.W.2d 633, 639 (Tenn. 1990). A common law w rit of ce rtiorari provides quite limited judicial revie w. Wi lli s v . Te nn e sse e De p’ t of Cor r. , 11 3 S.W .3 d 70 6, 71 2 (T e nn
. 20 03 ). Th e sc op e of thi s revie w goes no further than determining whe ther the a dminist rative body e xcee ded its jurisdiction, followed a

n unlaw fu l p ro ce d u re , ac t ed i l l eg al l y , arb i tra ri l y , o r f ra u d u l en t l y , o r a ct ed wi t h o u tm at erial evidenc e to support its decision. Fa lli n v . Kn ox Cou ntyBd

. o f Co mm ’r

s , 656 S.W.2d 338, 342-43 (T e nn . 1 98 3) ; see also Lafferty v. City of Winche ster , 46 S.W.3d 752, 758-59 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000).
Under the ce rtiorari standard, c ourts may not ( 1) inquire into the intrinsic c orre ctness of the lower tribuna l’s decision, Arnold v. T ennesse e Bd. of Paroles , 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997) ; rew eigh the evide nce, Wa tts v
. Civ il S e rv . B d. for Col um bia , 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980) ; or (3) substitute their judgment for that of the lower tribunal. 421 Corp. v. Metro Gov ’t , 36 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Common law writ of certiorari is simply not a vehicle that allows the courts to consider the intrinsic cor rec tness of the c onclus i o ns of the administrative de cision maker

. Powell v. Parole Eligibilit y Re view , 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). Judic ial revie w under

a common law w rit o f certiorari is limited to the recor d made be fore the boar d or agenc y, unless the court has permitted the introduc tion of additional evide nce on the issue of whe ther the board or agency e xcee ded its jurisdiction, or acted illegally, capric iously, or arbitrarily. Cooper v. Williamson County Bd. of Educ. , 746 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 1987)

. Because a c om mon law writ of c ertiora ri is an extra ordinary judicia l remedy, Robinson v. Traughber , 13 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), it is not available as a matter of right. Yokley
v . S tat e , 6 32 S.W .2 d 1 23 , 1 27 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 81 ). De c isi on s e ith e r t o g rant o r t o d e ny the writ are addre ssed t o the t rial court’s discretion. Blackm on v. Tennesse e Bd. of Paroles , 29 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). A ccordingly, the courts re view these decisions using the “a buse of discretion” sta ndard. U nder this standar d, a re viewing court s h o u l d n o t reve rse a trial court’ s discretionary decision unless it applies an incorre ct legal decision on a c lear ly errone ous assessment of the ev i dence , or employs re asoning that causes an injustice to the c omplaining party. Perry v

. Pe rry , 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003)

.

IV. DI SCUS SION
A

. Wire less contends that the tria l court committed reve rsible er ror in limiting t he scope of the new a nd/or additional evidenc e it sought to int roduce . It asserts that Tenn. Code Ann. § 27- 9-111(6) provides that hea

rings on writs of ce rtiorari shall be upon the proof introduced be fore the board or c omm iss ionc on ta ine d inthe tr a ns c ri pt, a nd up on su c h oth e r e vid e nc e a s e ith e r p arty may d e sir e to introduce. Pursua nt to the statute, Wirele ss contends that a tria l court m ay co n s i d er additional evidenc e to consider

“whe ther the Boar d exce eded its jurisdiction or ac ted illegally, arbitra rily, or capri ci ously.” Se e He mo nto lor v . W ils on Cou ntyBd

. o f Zo nin g A

pp e als , 883 S.W.2d 613, 618 (citing Wa tts v . Ci v il S e rv . B d. for Col um bia , 606 S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Te nn. 1980) (“ [N]e wW i r el es s cl ai m s i t w ant ed t o exam i ne t he C i t y em pl oy ees r egar di ng how t hey d et er m i ned w hat 2

“ a rc h itec tu ra l l y i n d i scerni b l e” sho u l d m ean , an d i t w an t ed t o qu est i o n t h e B o ard m em b ers ab o u t w h et h er t h e B o ard
exa m i ned t he O r di nanc e pr ovi s i on or m er el y a dopt ed t he Ci t y’ s i nt er pr et at i on of t he pr ovi s i on. -5- evidenc e is admissible on the i ssue of whe ther the a dminist rative body e xcee ded its jurisdiction or acte d illegally, capriciously, or arbitra rily.”))

. The trial c ourt conduc ted a he aring to d et ermine the suitabilit y of new and/or a dditional e vid e nc e go ing to w he the r the Boa rda c te d a

rbi tr ari ly , fr aud ule ntl y, or ou tsi de the la w andits authority. Wire less produce d only one potential witness – a proposed expert in urban planning – a nd the cou rt fou ndthat hi s te sti mon y d id n ot f it the pr e vio us ly e sta

bli sh e d c ri te ri a . W hil e W ir e le ss claims that it also desired to prese nt the testimony of Cit y employees and members of the Board, 2 such pr o p o s ed wi tnesses we re not brought be fore the trial court at the hea ring. The tria l court there fore ruled that the matter would be he ard upon the rec ord of the Boa rd and that no additional evidenc e w o u ldb e a ll o w e d

. Sp e c if ic a ll y , th e tria l c o u r t s tate d“ th a t w it n e s s e s o r o th e r e vidence relating to the intrinsi c cor rec tness o f t h e d ecision m ade by Re spondent Board of A ppeals for the City of Chattanooga that was in the P etitioner’s possession or reasonably could have been pr oduced, and was not prese nted t o the B oard, cannot be introduced to prove arbitrary or ca pricious dec isionmaking[.]”
“Ge nera lly, the admissibil ity of evidenc e is within the sound dis cr et ion of the trial court.” Merc er v. Vande rbilt Univ., Inc. , 13 4 S.W .3 d 12 1, 13 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) . “ Th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to admit or exc lude evidenc e will be overturne d on appea l only wher e ther e is an a buse of discr etion.” Id.
Ad dit ion a lly , a

c ou rt ma y n ot c on sid e r e vid e nc e no t pr e se nte d ina prior pr oc e e din g in determining whether mate rial evide nce in the r ecor d supports the prior de cision. See Weav er v. Knox Cou nty Bd

. of Zo nin g A

pp e als , 12 2 S. W .3 d 7 81 , 7 86 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 3) . Su c h e vid e nc e wo uld no t be re le va nt t o w he the r the Boa rda c te d f ra ud ule ntl y, ill e ga lly , c apric ious ly or arb itr ari ly i n it s de c isi on if

the Boa rdwa s n e ve r g ive n a n o pp ortun ity to c on sid e r s uc h e vid e nce. Had W ir e le ss desired to introduc e other evidenc e at the trial, such as the te stimon y of the City employees, the evide n c e s h o u ld h a v e b e e n p r e s e n te d b y W ir e le s s a t th e s p e c ia l h e ar in g to p r o v id e th e trial court with the opportunity to review suc h proposed e vidence for a dmissibi lity. Having failed to bring such ne w and /or a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e fo r re vie w a s wa s or de re d b y th e tr ia l c ou rt , th e arg ume nt o f W ir e le ss rega rding evidentiary matters is consider ed wa ived on appe al under Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

. Wire less prese nted no other e vidence befor e the tria l court at the spec ial hearing. We f ind that the evidenc e at tria l was prope rly limit ed to the re cord pr esente d by the Board. Additionally, a revie w of the record revea ls that Wire less made no of fer of proof as re quired by Tenne ssee law . We f

ind the ref ore that Wire less waived the right to challenge the exc lusion of the proposed e vidence

.-6-

Th e tr a ns c ri pt o f the Boa

rdhe ari ng re fl e c ts that e xte ns ive e vid e nc e wa s r e c e ive d f ro m bo th sides, with testimony and exhibits int roduce d for a nd against t he is suance of t he permit to Verizon. Th e e vid e nc e su pp ortin g th e Boa rd ’s deci si on to up ho ld the iss ua nc e of the Bui ldi ng Pe rm it t o Verizon exc eeds the amount that is nece ss ar y to support a rational conclusion and to furnish a rea sonably sound basis for the a ction under c onsideration. We find no abuse of discretion.
B

. Wire less further

contends that the Boar d acte d arbitra rily, capriciously, and illegally in that its determination was plainly contra ry to the zoning law s.
Under Article V III , § 107(16)( B) of the C i t y ’s Z o ning Ordinanc e, Specia l Permits are require d for c ommercia l radio, television, and microwa ve towers exce pt as exe mpted by regulations of a pa rticular z one. Article II of t he Ordinance define s “Communication Tower ” as “[a] ny structure that is designed and c onstructed primarily for the pur pose of supporting any c ommun i cations antenna , dish, or transmitter, i ncluding monopole communications towers and lattice c ommun ic a tio ns towe rs .” Artic le II de fi ne s “ Mo no po le Com mun ic a tio ns To we r” a s a “communication facil i t y which consists of monopolar struc ture, e rec ted on the ground to support communication antenna s and conne cted a ppurtena nces.” Special Permit a

pplications require public hearings, w ith notice to the gener al publ i c and neighboring landowner s. Article VII §§ 104-105. The authority of the Board to gran t S p ecia l Permits is set forth in Article VII I, § 107:
The Boar d shall be empowe red to he ar and decide whether Sp ecia l Exceptions Permits (here inafter

ref err ed to as Special Permits) shall be issued as pr oposed, base d on a si te pl an map furnished by the applica nt and other supporting documentation as app ro pria te

. . . . [t ]h e Boa rdsh a ll d e te rm ine tha

t th e pr op os e d u se wi ll n ot b e in conflict with the adopted plans and zoning districts of C hattanooga. . . . other c riteria, including but not limit ed to noise, traf fic ge nerated by proposed use , odors, et ce tera that may be de tr ime nta l to pu bli c he a lth , s a fe ty o r w e lf are of a dja c e nt p ro pe rty owner s and the surr ounding community may be considere d in review ing the following case s. . . .

Wire les s ar g u es that the Or dinance require s Special Permits for the c onstruction of communications towers. I t claims that Veriz on’s “light po l e” w as, in fac t, a tower designed a nd constructe d “primarily for the purpose of supporting [a] tel ec ommunications antenna.” The c omp a ny fu rthe r c on te nd s th a t th e c ir c ums ta nc e s in whic h a Sp e c ia l Pe rm it i s n ot r e qu ir e d r e la te to equipment only – not towe rs. Thus, ac cording to Wire less, a re ading of the O rdinanc e re veals that a c e ll to wer or mono po le c ommun ic a tio ns tow e r m a y o nly be c on str uc te d w itha

Spe c ia l Pe rm it. Wire less contends that it has fo l l o we d t h e proce dure se t forth in the Ordina nce to c onstruct eight mon op ole tow e rs in the City , a ndis a gg ri e ve d b y th e Boa rd ’s de c isi on to a llo w V e ri z on to c ir c umv e nt the pr oc e du re . W ir e le ss cla ims the va lue of the c ommun ic a tio ns tow e rs it h a s b uil t acr oss the City pursuant to the regulated Spec ial P er m it process ha s decr ease d as a r esult of the-7-

Boa rd ’s de c isi on to ille ga lly a llo w co ns truc tio n o f the Ve ri z on lig ht p ole wi tho ut a Spe c ia l Pe rm it. Acc ording to Wi re l es s , t h e actions of the City and the Boar d have c reated a pr ece dent for the c on str uc tio n o f s imi lar t ow e rs that w ou ld f urthe r d e c re a se the va lue of W ir e le ss’ e xis tin g to we rs
. Wire less further

asserts that the Buildi ng Permit was issued in violation of the Ordinanc e and in c on tr a dic tio n o f i ts m e a nin g a ndint e nt. W ir ele ss cla im s th e Boa rda c te d w ith ou t a

fu ll understandi n g o f wh at the Ordina nce r equire s. It contends the City attempted to interpre t the Ordinanc e with the assistance of Verizon, resulting in a construction of the law to conf orm with the application, rather than a

consideration of whether the application met the require ments of the law. Acc ording to Wirele ss, the exce ptions to t he Speci al P ermit proce ss do not allow administrative app ro va l f

or the c on st ruc tio n o f n e w m on op ole tow e rs , u nle ss the tow e r i tse lf is c on ta ine d w ith in an addition or fe ature of a struc ture that is arc hitectura lly indisce rnible from the building or structure to which it is to be a part. W ireless c laims that while the antenna s are co n ce al ed wi thin the light pole, the pole itself wa s not archi te c tu r all y h a rmonious with anything around it. There fore , acc ording to Wirele ss, the Board ac ted ar bitrarily, ca

priciously, and illegally by af firming the City’s decision to i lle ga lly iss ue the Bui ldi ng Pe rm it.
The Gene ral Assembly has delegated to loc al officia ls the authority to a pply and enfor ce zoning ordinanc es. See e .g. , T e nn . Co de An n. §§ 13 -7- 10 9 (es ta bli sh ing the po we rs of

c ou nty boards of zoning appeal s ); 1 3 -7-110 (providing for county building commissioner and for the enfor ce ment of zoning re gulations through the withholding of buildi ng permits); and 13-7- 111 (desc ribing modes of enf

orce ment and pena lties for violation). A city and its boar d there fore have wide latitude in the interpr etation of a city’s codes and ordinances. Courts are hesitant to interfer e with zoning decisions, and will re fra in from substituti ng their ju d gments for that of loc al government officia ls. Laf

fe rty , 46 S.W.3d at 758. “The meaning of a zoning ordinanc e and its a pplication to a parti c u la r c ir c u ms tan c e ar e , inth e f ir s t i n s tan c e , q u e s ti o n s f o r th e lo c a l o f

f ic ia ls to d e c id e.” Whittemore v . Brentwood Planning Comm’n, 835 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 1 992). “[A ]dministrative dec isions a re p re s u m ed to be va lid and a hea vy burden of proof r ests upon the shoulders of the pa

rty who cha llenges the a ction.” McCallen , 786 S.W.2d at 641. The City issued the Buildi ng Permit to Verizon pur suant to the C oncea led Devic es sec tion of Artic le VI II, § 1 07 (1 6) (A ). Artic le VI II , § 10 7( 16 )( A) pr ov ide s se ve ra l me tho ds pu rs ua nt t o which Specia l Permits are not re quired, including the provision at issue:
Concea led Devic es – C o m m u nications equipment which is conc eale d within a bu ild ing or

str uc tur e so that it is arc hit e c tur a lly ind isc e rn ibl e ma y b e pe rm itt e d ina ll
z on ing dis tr ic ts s ub

je c t to bu ild ing pe rm it p ro c e du re s a ndstand ard s. Ar c hit e c tur a lly indis cernib le sh a ll m e a n th a t th e a dd iti on or fe a tur e c on ta ini ng the a nte nn a is arc hitectura lly harmonious in suc h aspec ts as materia l, height, bulk, scale a nd design with the building or structure to which it is to be a pa rt.
Article V III , § 107(16)( A)(1) . If the a bove ref ere nced standards can be met, then a f acility can be constructe d without obtaining a Special Permit from the Board, subject only to the ordinary building permit proce dures of

the City.-8-

In support of its argume nt, Wirele ss a sserts that Mr. Hilbert testified that the City’s decisionmaking proce ss did not consider whether or not the tower itself was “ arc hitectura lly indis cernible.” Rather, c onsideration wa s given to whether the equipment and antenna we re c oncealed within and/or arc hitectura lly indis cernible from the store and the tower, re spectively (Mr . Hilbert commente d that the light pole is a structure and that administrative appr oval wa s p roper if the ante nnas we re “co n c e a le d w ith in a b u il d in g o r a s tr u c tu r e
. ” )

. W ir e le s s f

u r th e r c laim s th a t th e Bo ar d at no point considere d whether

there was a ny evidenc e that the pole w as “a rchitec turally harmonious” w ith the building or structure to which it is to be a pa rt.
The e vidence reve als that the Board a dequate ly considere d the evidenc e rega rding whethe r or not the light pole was ar chitectur ally harmonious with the prope rty, including the buildi n g and oth e r pr e vio us ly ex ist ing (and c ur re ntl y ex ist ing ) lig ht pol e s. Th e te sti mon y r e ve a le d th a t th e po le was moved to the back of t he shoppi ng cente r as a result of t he discussions with the City. One Board member note d that the pole is “totally oblivious to everybody.” The Board cle arly c onsidered the issue – it sim ply disagree d with Wirele ss’ interpre tat i o n o f t h e Ordinanc e. The meaning of the Ordinanc e is for the City t o decide

. Se e Wh itt e mo re , 8 35 S.W .2 d at 16 . The Boa rda do pte d th is sa me int e rp re ta tio n o f the Or di na nc e a ndapp ro ve d th e de c isi on of the City to i ssu e the pe rm it t o Verizon.
Wire less has provided us no case law or prior Board de cisions that demonstrate the Boa rd has reache d a conclusion that is contra ry t o the requirements of the O rdinanc e. Instea d, the company only urges an a lternative interpre tation of the Ordinanc e, one r aised be fore the Board a nd trial court and re jected. W e find that the Boar d’s ac tions were w ithin it s authority, and its interpre tation was c on sis te nt w iththe le ga l princ ipl e s g ov e rn ing it. Th e de c isi on wa s b a se d o n a re a so na ble interpre tation of the Ordina nce.

V. CONCLUSION
Th e ju dg ment of

the tr ia l c ou rt

is a ff ir me d. Cos ts o n a

pp e a l are ta xe d to the Ap pe lla nt, W ir e le ss P ro pe rt ie s, LL C. Th e c a se is r e ma nd e d f or c oll e c tio n o f c os ts a sse sse d b e low , p ur su a nt t o applicable law.

___________________________________ JOHN W . McCLARTY, JUDGE