1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: ___ ____ ____ 3 Fi lin g D at e: A ugus t 18 , 201 5 4 N O. 32, 373 5 ES TA TE OF C HA RLE S A N TH ON Y S A EN Z , b y 6 an d thro ug h hi s pe rs on al repr es enta tiv e, VIRG INI A 7 SAENZ , indi vi dua ll y a nd a s Nex t Frie nd o f ROBI N 8 BRANDY SAENZ , m in or chi ld , MARCUS ANTHONY 9 S A E N Z, a n d J A S O N R A Y S A E N Z, 10 Pl ai nti ff

s- Appe llants , 11 v. 12 RANACK CONSTRUCTORS, I NC., 13 De fendant-Appellee.

14 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF DO ÑAAN A C OUN TY 15 M an ue l I. A rr ie ta , D ist ri ctJu dg e 16 Law O ffice of Jane B. Yohalem 17 Jane B. Yohalem 18 San ta Fe, NM 19 Cervantes L awFirm , P C 20 Joseph Cer

vantes 21 Las C ru ces , NM1 Sch err & Lega te PLLC

2 Maxey M. Scherr 3 El Pas o, TX 4 fo r Appe llants 5 Ro de y , Dick as on , Slo an , Aki n & Ro bb , P.A. 6 Edw ard Ricc o 7 Jocelyn Dre nnan 8 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 9 for Appellee1 OPIN ION

2 BUS TAM AN TE, Judge. 3 { 1} D ef

en da nt R an ac k C onstru ct or s, In c. , a gen er al co ntr ac tor , w as hir ed to b uil d 4 a m ult i- sc re enm ovi e the at er . Rana ck hir ed A la m o G en er al Co ntr act or s, I nc . a s a 5 sub co n t ra ct o r t o b u i l dt h e s t ee l fr amewo rko f t h e t h ea t er . De ce d en tCh ar l es Saenz was 6 anir onw orke r em

plo y ed by A la m o and i ts r el at ed

e ntity T &T S ta ff

Mana ge m en t 7 (T &T ), asta ff

ing ag en cy . S aenz w as w or kin g onthe the at er

pr oj ec t a t a

he igh t i n 8 excess of tw enty -five f eet, without fall protection, w hen he fell and died. T his appeal 9 fo ll ows a jury tria l. 10 { 2} The c ase ra ises two issues. Fir st, w hether th e co ncept of j oint and several 11 lia bil ity in Saiz v. B elen School District , 1992 -N MS C- 018, ¶¶ 18- 21, 113 N

. M. 387 , 12 827 P.2 d 102 shou ld b e ap pli ed in favor of e m plo y ee s of

sub co ntr ac tor s. A nd, 13 se co nd, w he the r a new t ria l on w ro ngf ul d ea th d am ag es f

or S ae nz ’ s e sta te is 14 ap pr opr ia te

. W e co nc lud e tha t Sai z is not applicable to c laim s m ade by empl o ye es 15 of subcont ractors. W e also conclude that a new tr ial addressing the estate’ s dam ages 16 onl y sho uld be he ld. W e thu s a ff

irm in pa rt a nd r ev er se in pa rt

. 17 BACKGRO UND 18 { 3} Sa en z fe ll as the A la m o c re w w as a tte m pti ng to set a ro of

j ois t onthe bui ldi ng. 19 Sa en z’ s j ob w as to re ce ive one en d of the j ois t a s it w as sus pe nde d by

ac rane a nd p ut2

1 it in p la ce . T he j ois t w as sup pose d to be pla ce d on anint er se ct ing be am . S ae nz c oul d 2 ha ve a cc om

pli she d th is t as k by

usi ng a la dde r to g et

on t op o f th e be am th at he 3 ne ed ed to re ac h and e m

plo y ing his f

al l- pr ote ct ioneq ui pm en t. I nst ea d, S ae nz 4 ap pr oa ch ed

the pla ce m en t p oi nt by w al kin g onthe top e dge of ac onc re te a nd 5 Sty rofoam wa ll th at wa s part of the unfinished st ructure and that w as m ore than 6 twenty -five f

eet above the concrete floor. By one witness account, Saenz slipped as 7 he rea ched for the j oist tag lin es, and by another witness account, the r oof joist struck 8 the w al l and c au se d hi m to los e his ba lanc e. Whate ve r th e ca use of his los s of 9 ba la nc e, Saen z fel l t o t he co nc ret e b el ow an d d ie d fr om th e im pa ct

. 10 { 4} In term s of personal f all-protection e quip m ent, evidence at trial s h o we d t h at 11 Sa en z w as w eari ng a harn es s e qui pp ed wit h a lany ar d. I n a ddi tio n, abe am er —a 12 de vic e tha t c la m

ps t o abe am an d pr ovi de s an anc hor poi nt f or the lany ar d—w as on 13 the be am

w he re the j ois t w as to be pla ce d. When a w orke r ha s ho oke d hi s f al l14 protection equi pm ent to a secure poin t he is “ tied off. ” Sa enz w as required to be tied 15 off w hen he was per form ing th e task that led to his fall. Saenz wa s not tied o ff w hen 16 he fel l. 17 { 5} T es tim ony

a t tri al a lso de m onstra te d th at Rana ck fa ile d inanum

be r of r es pe ct s 18 to ensure the safety

of the j ob site. Sum

m arize d, those failures included, am ong o ther 19 thi ngs: af

ai lur e to p ro vid e an d e nf or ce a n a de qua te f

al l- pr ote ct ion sa fet yplan; a3

1 fa ilure to en sur e tha t su bc ontra ct or s w er e ad equa te ly a nd s af el y pe rf or m ing the ir 2 w ork; a

f ai lur e to e nsur e tha t w orke rs we re, in fa ct , pr ote ct ed f ro m f al l ha zard s; a 3 fa ilure to sta ff the j ob wi th ful l- tim e sa fe ty pe rs onne l; an d an e m pha sis on hur

ry ing 4 to g et the j ob d one tha t c au se d su bc ontract or s and w orke rs to ta ke sho rt cu ts, 5 i n c l u d i n g s h o rt c u t t i n g s a f e t y. 6 { 6} Plaintiff V irginia Saenz, indiv iduallyand as personal representative of her 7 husb an d’ s e sta te a nd a s ne xt f ri en d of S ae nz ’ s c hil dr en , R ob in , Marc us, a nd J as on, 8 filed a w rongfu l death lawsuit against Ranack. Beca use Alam o and T&T we re 9 Sa en z’ s e m

plo y er s, w orke rs ’ c om

pe nsa tio n pr ovi de d th e ex cl us ive r em edy a ga ins t 10 them . As s uch, th ey

we re not nam ed in the com plaint, but were identified togeth er a s 11 a sin gle pot en tia l t ortf ea sor in the j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns. T he or igi na l c om pla int 12 spe ci fi ca lly

a sse rt ed pr em ise s li ab ili ty a nd s im ple ne gli ge nc e ca

use s of a ct iona ga ins t 13 Ranack. The com

plaint contains no m ention o f Sai z -ty pe li ab ili ty

ba se d onit s 14 co nc ep ts of p ecu li ar ri skor i nh eren t d an ge r. Id

. ¶ ¶ 18- 21. 15 { 7} Af

ter a ten-day

trial, the case w as sub m i t t ed to the jury on ordinary

car e, 16 ne gli ge nc e, a nd p re m ise s li ab ili ty the or ie s. T he “ th eory

of the c as e” ins tr

uc tio n 17 de ta ile d th e w ay s e ac h party tho ught the oth er

w as ne gli ge nt. T he li st i n th e 18 ins tr uc tio n e ch oe d and e xpande d uponthe sum m ar y pr ovi de d a

bove in Para gr ap h 5. 19 The special interrogatory instructio n subm itted did not ask the jury to specify

which4

1 as se rt e d t h e o r i e s i t c r e d i t e d

. G i v e n i t s v e r d i c t , i t i s o b v i o u s t h a t t h e j u ry f o u n d a 2 de gr ee o f fau lt in all of t he act or s’ act s o r fai lu res to act

. 3 { 8} Pu rs ua n tt o ac o m p a r a t i v e f au l ti n s t r u c t i o n , t h e j u ry

f o u n dR a n a c kf

o rt y - fi ve 4 pe rc en t a t f

au lt, A la m o and T &T thi rty pe rc en t at fault , a nd S ae nz tw en ty -f ive pe rc en t 5 at fault for his dea t h . T he district court entered a j udgm ent ordering Ranack to pay 6 forty -five per cent of the w rongful death judgm ent in additio n to jury -aw arded 7 pu ni ti ve da m ag es . 8 { 9} Ranack has not appealed, nor does it otherwise contest, the district court’ s legal 9 determ ination that it owed Sa enz a duty of ordinary

car e. Interestingly , R anack 10 re que ste d th at

U JI 13- 401 N MRA—d efi ni ng in de pe nd en t co nt ract or s an d l im it ing the 11 lia bil ity of e m pl oy er s f or the w ro ngf

ul a ct s of

the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or s’ 12 em plo y ee s—b e giv ento the j ur y , but the n w ith dr ew the re que st. Rana ck al so d oe s no t 13 re fu te the pr opr ie ty of the j ur y ’ s at tr ibu tio n to it fo r fo rty -f ive pe rc en t of the f

au lt fo r 14 Saen z’s de at h. 15 { 10} T he j ur

y f ound the tot al a m ount

of da m ag es suf

fe re d by P la int if f V ir gin ia 16 Saenz, indiv idually , to be $482,000. A dditi onally, t h e ju ry found Robi n’ s dam ages 17 to be $50, 000, an d Marc us an d Ja son to ea ch ha ve suf fe re d $25 ,00 0 i n dam ag es . 18 Saen z’s wife an d c hi ld ren were al so award ed$1 0,0 00 each in pu ni ti ve da m ag es . As 19 to Saen z’s es ta te , ho wev er, t he jury award edzero da m ag es .5

1 { 11} In a post-trial m otion , P la i n t i ff requested a m istrial on the basis of the zer o 2 da m ag es a w ar d to the e sta te

. A t the he ar ing on the m oti on, Pl ai nti ff a rg ue d th at

the 3 j ury ’ s decision to aw ard ze ro dam ages to Saenz’ s estate w as the result of j ury 4 co nf usi on and, a lte rn at ive ly , tha t i t w as not sup porte d by

sub stanti al e vid en ce . T he 5 dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d P la int if f’ s m oti on. T he c ourt c onc lud ed tha t ba se d onthe f

ac ts 6 at trial, in particular, Saenz’ s crim inal histo ry and his prior incarcera tion, the j ury 7 co ul d re as on ab ly hav e fo un d t ha t t he zero va lu e was ap pr op ria te

. 8 { 12} W ithr eg ar d to w he the r the j ur y w as c onf

used by the ins tr

uc tio ns a s to the 9 dam ages it shou ld aw ard to S aenz’ s estate, the district court apparently decided that 10 Pl ai nti ff waive d any

obj ec tio n ontha t gr ound be ca use P la int if

f’ s c ouns el a gr ee d to 11 the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s pr opos ed r es pon se to aj ur

y que sti on r eg ar din g e sta te da m ag es . 12 D ur ing it s de lib er at ion s, the j ur y sent th e fo llow ing que sti on t o th e dis tr ic t c ourt: 13 “ D oe s ‘ tot al am ount of da m ag es to the E sta te of Ch ar le s S ae nz ’ inc lud e al l a m ount s 14 a w a r de d to Virgi ni a , R ob [ i n] , a nd s on s[ , ] o r

i s i tm e a nt

t o be as e par a t e a m ount ?” 15 A ft er c onf er ri ng w ithc ouns el , the dis tr ic t c ourt su gge ste d th at it r es pond by say ing 16 tha t “ [t ] he ‘ tot al a m ount of da m ag es to the E sta te of

Ch ar le s S ae nz ’ is se pa ra te

. ” A ll 17 co un se l ag reed wit h t ha t s ug ge st io n. 18 { 13} As an alternative to a m istrial, P laintiff requested in her post-trial m otion that 19 the district court enter a j udgm ent notwithstand ing th e verdict o n t h e g round th at6

1 Saenz wa s engaged in inherently dangerous w ork and that, as a resu l t , “ Ranack 2 s h o u l db e h el d

s t r i c t l y l i ab l e f

o r t h e d amag es h er ei n [. ]” At t h e h ea ri n g , P l ai n t i ff ’s 3 counsel argued that th ere s houl d be no reduction for com parative negligence. 4 Standing b y

an ear lier ruling on th is issu e, the distri ct co u rt d eclined to hold that 5 Sa en z w as e nga ge d ininh er en tly dange ro us w ork a t the ti m e of his de ath. 6 { 14} O n a

ppe al , Pl ai nti ff co nti nue s to arg ue tha t S ae nz w as e nga ge d ina n in he re ntl y 7 da nge ro us a ct ivi ty

a nd tha t, ac co rd ing ly , Rana ck shou ld be he ld j oin tly a nd s ev er al ly 8 lia ble f or his de ath. P la int if

f al so c ont en ds tha t r ev er sa l and re m an d f or ane w tr ia l i s 9 re qui re d be ca

use j ur y c onf usi on ari sin g f

ro m c onf lic tin g in str

uc tio ns as to loss of 1 0 co n s o rt i u m

m ay h av e l ed t h e ju ry t o m i s t ak en l y aw ar dt o Pl ai n t i ff an dt o S ae n z’s 11 children dam ages that shou ld have been aw arded to the estate. Alter natively , P laintiff 12 argues t h at t h e zero dam ages aw ard to the estate w as not sup ported by subst antial 13 ev id en ce. 14 DISC US SION 15 The Joint and Se veral Liability Issue 16 { 15} Pl ai nti ff

a rg ue s tha t Rana ck shou ld b e he ld j oin tly a nd s ev er al ly

li ab le f or a ll 17 da m ag es fo und by the j ur y . Pl ai nti ff

r ec ogni ze s th at

j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty is not 18 ge ne ra lly

a va ila ble in N ew Me xic o. T his Co urt ab oli she d j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty 19 in t oto in Bartlett v. New Mexic o W elding S uppl y, Inc. , 1982 -N MC A -0 48, ¶ ¶ 33- 37,7

1 98 N.M. 15 2, 64 6 P.2d 57 9, supe rse de d by statu te as stat ed in P ay ne v . H all , 200 6- 2 N MSC -029, 139 N

. M. 659 , 137 P

. 3d 5 99. T he hol din g in B art le tt w as se ena s a 3 log ic al im

pe ra tiv e fl ow ing fr om our Su pr em e Co urt’ s a dopt ionof pur e co m pa ra tiv e 4 ne gli ge nc e in Sc ott

v . R izz o , 198 1- N MS C-02 1, ¶ 30, 9 6 N

. M. 682 , 634 P

. 2d 1 234 5 (adopting in full t h e Co u rt of Appeals opin ion in the sam e consolidated cases), 6 su pe rs ed ed in pa rt by st at ut e a s s ta te d i n Ro dr ig ue z v. Will ia ms , -N MCA - , 7 P

. 3d , 2 01 5 W L 1 41 26 33 (N os. 33, 138 an d 33 , 668) ( Mar. 26, 201 5)

. S ix 8 y ears la te r, th e Leg is la tu re ad dr es se d t he su bjec t. See NMS A 1978 , § 41-3A- 1 (1987). 9 E ch oin g B art le tt , the L egislature also abolish ed j oint and several l i ability in cases 10 invo lving com

parative fault. U nlike B art le tt , how ev er , the L eg isl at ur e pr ovi de d f

our 11 ex ce pti ons to the ge ne ra l ru le of ab oli tio n. Se ct ion 41- 3A -1 (C ). O nly one of the f our 12 ex ce pti ons is d ir ec tly r el ev an t he re . S ec tio n 41 -3 A -1 (C )( 4) pr ov ides tha t j oin t and 13 se ve ral li ab il it y sh al l app ly “ to si tu at io ns . . . hav in g a so un d b as is in pu bl ic po li cy .” 14 { 16} O ur

S upr em e Co urt r el ie d onS ec tio n 41 -3 A -1 (C )( 4) to impo se joi nt and 15 se ve ra l l ia

bil ity in ca se s in vol vin g w ork or en de av or s w hic h are “ inh er en tly 16 dangerous” or carr

y “ peculiar r i s k s .” Sai

z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 15- 19 ( re ly ing on 17 Se ct ion s 41 3, 416 , a nd 4 27 o f the Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of T or ts (1 96 5) ). T he 18 Suprem e Court held that engaging in such work cre ated a nondelegable duty of car e8

1 that could o nly

be eff ectiv el y enforced through im posit ion of joint and several 2 li ab il it y . Sai

z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 35- 36. 3 { 17} Pl aint iff al so r ec ogni ze s th at Sai zby it se lf doe s no t pr ovi de aba sis f or 4 i m p o s i n g j o i n t a n d s e v e r a l l i ab i l i t y i n t h i s c a s e . I n a n e a r l i e r o p i n i o n i n v o l v i n g a 5 factual sce nario m

uch closer to this case, the S upr eme Co u rt held specifically that 6 Se ct ion s 41 3, 416 , a nd 4 27 o f the Re sta te m en t ( Second ) of T orts s houl d no t be 7 ap pl ie d i n fa v o r of

em pl oyees o f in de pe nd en t co nt ract or s. N.M . Elec. Serv. Co. v

. 8 Montanez , 1976-NMS C-028, ¶¶ 14-15, 89 N.M . 278, 551 P. 2d 63 4. T here are 9 m at er ia l f

ac tua l di ssi m ilari tie s be tw ee n Sai z and this case. W e will detail the factual 10 distin ctio ns in a later section of this Opinion . N evertheless Plaintiff argues that 11 de ve lop m en ts i n N ewMe xic o c as e law—i nc lud ing Sai za nd this Co urt’ s opini on i n 12 E n r i q u e zv . C o c hran , 1998- N MC A -1 57, 126 N

. M. 196 , 967 P

. 2d 1 136— supp ort a 13 co nc lus iontha t Montanezsh ou ld no t co nt ro l th e ou tc om e he re. T o t he co nt rary, as we 14 w ill e xpl ai n, w e co nc lud e tha t Montanez is sti ll good law an d is in ke ep ing w iththe 15 vast m aj ority

of cases a cross the nation add ressing the issu e. 16 { 18} Ou r d i s cu s s i o n wi l l s t a r t w i t h a d et ai l ed re v i ew o f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 17 consideration of Plaint iff’ s request to im pose Sai z -b as ed lia

bil ity on Rana ck

. W e w ill 18 then analy ze Sai

za nd E nriqu ez . F ina lly , w e w ill r ev ie w the c as e law a cr oss the 19 country

and the Restatem ent Second and Third of T orts. Be caus e we co nclude that9

1 Sai z -b ased joi nt and s ev er al li ab ili ty is not appl ic ab le to the e m

plo y ee s of 2 subcon tractors on co n s t ru ct ion sit es, w e need not, and w ill not, consid er w hether 3 Sa en z w as e nga ge d ininh er en tly dange ro us w ork. 4 A . Th e D ist ri ctC ou rtD ec isi on 5 { 19} A s w e not ed

above , P la int if

f did not inc lud e a cl ai m

f or non de le gable duty

a nd 6 joi nt an d s ev eral li ab il it y in he r co m

pl ai nt

. Sai

z and its progeny we re first m entioned 7 during argum ent on the parties’ pretrial m otion s in lim ine about a wee k before tria l 8 co mm en ce d

. T h e f

i r s tm a t t e r

a r g u e dw a s R a n a c k ’ s m o t i o n t o e x c l u d e t e s t i m ony 9 co nc er nin g de lay s onthe pr oj ec t a sse rt ed ly c au se d by

im pr ope r ste el de sig n and 10 foundatio n work. Ranack c ouched its argum ent as a qu estion of d uty , asserting that 1 1 i th a dn o du t y o f

c a r e t o i t s s ub c o n t r a c t o r ’s e mp l o ye e s a n d t h u s e v i d e n c e a s t o d e l a ys 12 in constructio n was ir relevant. In partial r espons e to Ranack’s ar g u m ent, P laintiff 13 argued that Ranack could be found to have a dutyunder Sai za nd Enriquez

. Enriquez , 14 1998 -N MCA -157, ¶ 98 (holding that felling of large tre es wa s inherently dangerous). 15 The district court eventually denied Ranack’ s m otion , not ing specifically that it had 16 no t“ l oo ke d a tt he i ss ue o f i nh e r e nt l y

d a ng e r ou s” a nd

h ol di ng t he i ss ue f

or alater 17 ti m e. 18 { 20} A w eek later

at the beginnin g of the trial, the parties d iscussed whether the idea 19 of “ pe cu liar ri sk o f da nge r” sho uld be inc lud ed in the pr e- voi r dir e de sc ri pti on of the10

1 ca se to the j ur

y . Rana ck obj ec te d to i ts i nc lus iona nd the dis tr ic t c ourt a gr ee d, not ing 2 th atit was s ti ll th in ki ng ab ou t t he is su e. 3 { 21} The par

ties and the district court took the m atter up in earnest as they started 4 w ork onthe j ur

y ins tr uc tions. Re fe rr ing to anappare ntl y of f- the -r ec or d di sc uss ion 5 fr om the pr ev iou s day , the dis tr ic t c ourt a ske d to r eo pe n th e iss ue in or de r “ to 6 reco ns id er i ts rul in g yest erd ay on in he ren tl y

da ng ero us co nd it io n o r pe cu li ar ri sk .” 7 T he dis tr ic t c ourt art ic ula te d anum be r of r ea sons w hy it ha d de ci de d no t t o im pose 8 Sai z -based strict liability even thou gh “both experts and a num ber of individu als [had 9 testified] that this i s inherently dangerous work.” The district court’ s rationale wa s 10 that to im

pose strict liability

would (1) “ igno re the c ontractual relationship betwee n 11 [the ] part ies[; ] ” (2 ) “ nul lif y a ll tho se O SH A standard s and d ir ec tiv es about 12 controllin g contractors,” and (3) m ake every general contractor and every landowner 13 “ strictly

liable for any

fall of any person from

any build ing du ring constructio n.” I n 14 additio n, the district court noted that prior cases fi n d i n g inherent danger invo lved 1 5 in j u r e d t h i r d p a rt i e s r a t h e r t h a n i n d i v i du a l s w h o w e r e d i r e c t l y i n v o l v edin the 16 dangerous activityand who m ay have contributed t o t h ei r o wn in j ury . T he district 17 court decided to “ subm it this case to the jury on the basis o f negligence and prem ises 18 liability .”11

1 { 22} La ter that sam e day the m atter was ar gued again, allowing Ranack to be hear d 2 m or e fu lly

. Rana ck

start ed it s arg um en t by

c iti ng Montanezand i t s h o lding that 3 ge ne ra l c ontra ct or s do not ow e a duty

of c ar e to the em

plo y ee s of

it s in de pe nde nt 4 co ntr ac tor s un de r Se ct ion s 413, 416, an d 427 of the Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of T orts. 5 Rana ck did not a rg ue tha t the w ork Saenz w as e nga ge d inw as not inh er en tly 6 dangerous. Its argum ents revolved around the ty pe of duty Ranack owed as a genera l 7 co ntr ac tor

to em plo y ee s of

it s su bc ontra ct or s. 8 { 23} In the end, the district court adhere d to its p rior ruling that it would not deem 9 t h e “ s t e e l e r e c t i o n b e i n g d o n e i n t h i s c a s e ” t o b e a n i n h e r e n t l y d a n g e r o u s a c t i v i t y. 10 Whe n prom

pte d by P la int if f’ s c ouns el , the dis tr ic t c ourt c onf irm ed tha t i ts d ec isi on 11 was ba se d o n t he po li cy im pl ic at io ns it ha d a rti cu la te d e arl ie r. 12 { 24} T he ne xt d ay

the dis tr ic t c ourt h el d am or e fo rm al pr oc ee din g inw hic h th e 13 parties m ade their re cord with re gard to specific j ury instruction s. P laintiff had 14 re que ste d th at

U JI 13- 1634 N MR

A—de sc ri bin g stri ct

li ab ili ty f or non de le gable 15 dut ie s—b e giv ento th e j ur y . T he dis tr ic t c our

t f orm al ly r ef use d th e ins tr

uc tio n, 16 restating its prior rationale. T he district court expanded its prior rulings by notin g that 17 it did “ not feel that a contrac t o r/l andowner should b e strictly liable for any

steel 18 er ec tio n onthe pr em ise s whe n the m aj or ity of the co ntr ol for the sa fe ty

pr ec au tio ns12

1 is within the independ ent contractor’ s authorityand within the control of the injured 2 indiv idual.” 3 { 25} T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r at ion al e w as int er na lly c onsi ste nt, r ef

le ct ing appr opr ia te 4 pol ic y c oncern s f

or the pot en tia lly

f ar -r ea ch ing a nd l ar ge ly

unknow n im

pa ct of 5 im posi ng Sai

z -based strict liability on lando wner s and general contractors engaged 6 in c onstru ct ionpr oj ec ts. Bu t the dis tr ic t c ourt ne ve r co nduc te d th e ana ly sis se t ou t by 7 our S upr em e Co urt i n G abal

don v. E ris a M ort gage Co

. , 1999-NMS C-039, 128 N. M. 8 84, 990 P2 d 19 7, to de te rm ine w he the r ste el e re ct ionon r el at ive ly larg e pr oj ec ts i s 9 inh e r e n t l y d a n g e r o u s . N e i t h e r d i d i t s q u a r e l y d e c i d e w h e t h e r

— a s a r g u e d by 10 Pl ai nti ff

—the S upr em e Co urt’ s c le ar hol din g in Montanez ha d be enove rt ak enby it s 11 opi nio n in Sai

za nd o ur opi nio n in Enriquez

. We c ertainly do not fault the district 12 co urt f o r not und er ta kin g th es e an al y se s. Co unse l’ s arg um en ts w er e not w el l- fo cu se d, 13 co m ing a s th ey

did a t the e nd of a lon g tr ia l. It is le ft to us w iththe lux ur

y of ti m e to 14 m or e dir ec tly

de al w iththe le ga l i ssu es r ai se d by thi s f ac tua l sc en ar io. 15 B. Nond elegable D uty D oes Not A pply to Em ployees of Sub contract ors 16 1. The Montanez Op in ion 17 { 26} As t he pa rti es reco gn iz e, Montanezstands as a sub stanti al im

pe dim en t t o th e 18 application o f Sai

z -based j oint and several liability to g en er al contractors such as 19 Rana ck

. T he pla int if

f w orke r in Montanezwa s injured w hen he cam e into contact13

1 w ithali ve w ir e in the pr oc es s of dism an tli ng a sec ondary pow er lin e fe ed ing a n oi l 2 we ll. 1976-NMSC -028, ¶ 3. The plaintiff worked for the independent contractor hired 3 t o t a k e d o w n t h e s e c o n d a ry l i n e s . Th e n a med d e f e n d a n t s w e r e Wo l f

s o n O i l C o mp a n y, 4 C a s s - F i t t s El e c t r i c C o mp a n y, a n dt h e Ne w M e x i c o El e c t r i c S e rv i c e C o mp a n y. 5 W olf son ow ne d th e oil w el l and h ir ed G ar y E le ctri c, the pla int iff

’ s e m plo y er , to 6 dis m an tle the se co ndary sy ste m . Ca ss- Fi tts bui lt the se co ndary sy ste m or igi na lly

f or 7 W olf son. T he uti lity

sup pli ed pow er

thr oughit s pr im ar

y sy ste m w hic h oc cu

pie d th e 8 sa m e p ol es as t he sec on da ry syste m . Id

. ¶ ¶ 6- 7. 9 { 27} T he dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d su m m ar y j udgm en t in favor of

a ll the de fe ndants , 10 tho ugh it is n ot c le ar

on w ha t gr ound

. E ac h of the de fe ndants a rg ue d th at the y ha d no 11 duty tow ar d th e plaintif

f, a nd tha t he w as in an y

e ve nt c ontri but or ily

ne gli ge nt a s a 12 m at te r of

law. Se e M

ontane z v. Ca ss (

Ca ss) , 1975 -N MC A -1 42, ¶¶ 3, 5, 89 N

. M. 32, 13 54 6 P .2d 11 89 , aff’d in part a nd rev’d in par t by Montanez , 197 6- N MS C- 028. T he 14 pla int if

f ap pe al ed

. 15 { 28} W e w ill e xam ine the Co urt of Appe al s op ini on in s om e de ta il be ca use it 16 pr ovi de s an e luc id ative ba ck dr op t o th e Su pr em e Co urt’ s ho ldi ng. T he Co urt of 17 Appe al s re ve rs ed as to al l the de fe ndants f ind ing tha t e ac h of

the m ow ed aduty of 18 or din ar

y c ar e tow ar d th e pla int iff

. Ca ss , 1975-NMC A- 142, ¶ 28. O f particular 1 9 re l ev an ce t o u s i s i t s d i s cu s s i o n o f Wo l fs o n ’s du t y. W o l fs o n h i r ed t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s14

1 em plo y er to ta ke dow n the se co ndary sy ste m . W olf son ar gue d th at

it ha d no duty

to 2 the pla int if

f be ca use he w as an em

plo y ee of ind ep en de nt co ntr ac tor s—C as s- Fi tts a nd 3 Gary Elec tri c, th e p la in t i f

f’s em pl oyer. Id

. ¶ ¶ 29- 30. T he Co urt of

Appe al s 4 re co gni ze d, “ [t ] he tr ad iti ona l rul e is tha t the e m plo y er of a n in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or 5 is n ot l ia

ble f or phy sic al harm

c au se d to a nothe r by an act or om iss ionof the 6 contractor or his servants.” Id

. ¶ 3 1 . Th e C o u rt o f A p p ea l s al s o re co g n i ze d t h at “ [a ]n 7 exception to th is tradition al rule arises w hen the independ ent contractor is engaged 8 i n t he p e r f

or m a nc e o f i nh e r e nt l y

d a ng e r ou s w or

k. ” Id

. I n th at

c ir cu m stanc e, the 9 em plo y er i s li ab le to thi rd

pe rs ons fo r phy sic al harm c au se d by

it s in de pe nde nt 10 co nt ract or . Id

. (ci ti ng Pro ss er, La w o

f T ort s , at 4 72 (4t h e d. 1 97 1) ). 11 { 29} The C ourt of Appeals then em barked on what can be reasonably described as 12 anim pa ssi one d st at em en t as to why [p ] ubl ic pol ic y de m an ds tha t thir d per sons . . . be 13 [s o] pr ote ct ed an d why the co nc ep t of thi rd pe rs ons shou ld i nc lud e the e m plo y ee s of 14 subc ont ract or s. Ca ss , 1 9 7 5 -N M CA -1 4 2 , ¶ ¶ 3 3 -3 6 (i n t er n al qu o t at i o n m arks om itted). 15 T he Co urt of

Appe al s no te d th at

N ewMe xic o ha d a lr ea dy inc lud ed e m plo y ee s of 16 subc ontra ct or s as pr ote ct ed thi rd pe rs ons— or

“ oth er s” in the parl an ce of the 17 Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of T orts— w he n it a dopt ed Re sta te m en t ( Fi rs t) of

T orts § 414 18 (1 934) in D eA rm an v . P opps , 196 5- N MSC- 026, ¶ 21, 75 N

. M. 39, 400 P

. 2d 2 15. 19 Ca ss , 197 5- N MC A -1 42, ¶ ¶ 39- 41. T he Co urt of Appe al s the n ex pli ci tly he ld tha t the15

1 sa m e ra tio na le a nd r

ule appl ie d to the duty de sc ri be d in Se ct ion s 416 and 4 27 o f the 2 Re sta te m en t (S ec ond) of T orts. T ha t is, the te rm “ oth er s” in these t wo s ect ion s 3 in cl ud ed em

pl oyees of in de pe nd en t co nt ract or s wit hi n i ts am bi t. Ca ss , 19 75 -NMCA4 142, ¶ ¶ 42- 46. 5 { 30} T he Co urt of

Appe al s r ec ogni ze d th at

the re w as auth or ity

to the c ontrary

a nd 6 tha t the Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) it se lf inc lud ed

ind ica tio ns tha t e m

plo y ee s of 7 ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or s sh oul d no t r ec ei ve the be ne fit of Secti ons 416 an d 42 7 8 pr ot ect io n. Ca ss , 1975-NMC A- 142, ¶¶ 48-49. T he Court of Appeals opinion brushed 9 tho se c onc er

ns as ide an d he ld tha t ba se d onthe Re sta te m en t, pub lic pol ic y , a nd the 10 “ lon g su ste na nc e of

the r ule , ” em plo y ee s of in de pe nd ent c ontra ct or s w er e ow ed a 11 du ty of du e care whe n t he workbe in g p erfo rm edwas i nh eren tl y da ng ero us . Id

. ¶ 54. 12 { 31} T he Co urt of

Appe al s op ini on i n Ca ss m ir ro rs subs tanti ve ly the op inion 13 Pl ai nti ff

w oul d have us i ssue in thi s c as e. T he dif fi cu lty f or P la int if f is tha t our 14 Su pr em e Co urt sp ec if

ic al ly dis ag re ed

w itha nd d isa

ppr ove d of the Co urt of

Appe al s’ 15 ho ld in g a nd rat io na le

. Montanez , 1976-NM SC-028 , ¶ ¶ 15-16. T he Suprem e Court 16 spe ci fi ca lly

he ld tha t the e m

plo y ee s of ind ep en de nt co ntr ac tor s w er e not w ith in the 17 cl as s of per sons pr ote ct ed by Se ct ion s 413, 416, an d 427 of the Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) 18 of T orts. T he Co urt e xpl ic itl y appr ov ed the und er ly ing r at ion al e of oth er c as es so17 O n th e oth er h an d, th e Court r ea ff irm ed li ab ili ty und er S ec tio n 41 4 of

the 1 1 8 R e s t a t e me n t( F i r s t ) o f T o rt s ( 1 9 3 4 ) , w h e n a n o w n e r o r g e n e r a l c o n t r a c t o r

r e t a i n s s o me 19 co nt ro l o ve r th e wor k b ei ng do ne . Montanez , 19 76 -NMSC -0 28, ¶ 17. T his ty

pe of 20 du t y c o n t i n u es to be reco gn iz edin New Mex ic o. Hinger v. Parker &Parsley 21 P etrol eu m Co

. , 199 5- N MC A -0 69, ¶ 36, 120 N

. M. 430 , 902 P

. 2d 1 033. 16 1 hol din g, in pa rt ic ular ca se s th at th e Co urt of Appe al s ha d c ite d w ithdis ap pr ova l. 1 2 Montanez , 197 6- N MS C- 028, ¶ 15; se e W el ker v. Ken ne co tt

Co pp er Co. , 4 0 3 P

. 2d 3 30 3 (Ari z. Ct . App . 19 65 ), rejected on other gr ound s by Lewis v. N. J. Rie be Enters. , I nc. , 4 825 P.2d 5 (Ar iz. 1992 ); Ki ng v . She lbyR ural E le c. Co op. Co rp. , 502 S

. W

. 2d 6 59 5 (Ky . Ct. Ap p. 1 97 3)

. Co ntr a C ass , 197 5- N MC A -1 42, ¶

49. 6 2. Sa iz and En riq ue z Do N ot Un derm ine Montanez 7 { 32} Plaintiff’ s response is that developm ents in Ne w Mexico law have superseded 8 the S upr em e Co urt’ s r ea soni ng i n Montanez . W e d is ag ree. 9 { 33} Pl ai nti ff re lie s on Sai za nd E nri que z fo r he r po si ti on . Sai

z , of c our se , w as the 10 ca se in w hic h N ew Me xic o a dopt ed S ec tio ns 4 13, 416 , a nd 4 27 o f the Re sta te m en t 11 (S ec ond) of T orts and the ir co nc ep ts o f pe cu liar ri sk and i nhe re nt d an ge r. T he f ac ts 12 in Sai z a r e s o d i f

f e r e n tf r o m Montanez , how ev er , tha t Sai zsay s li ttl e if

a nythi ng a

bout 13 whether the Suprem e Court w ould decide Montanez di ffer en tl y no w. Sai zinvol ved 1 4 ac l a s s i c “i n n o c e n tb ys t a n d e r . ” A h i g h s c h o o l s tu d e n ta t t e n d i n g af o o tb a l l g a me 15 sim ult an eo usl y

tou ch ed a m et al el ec tr ic co ndui t runni ng u p aw oode n li ght

pol e an d 16 a ne ar by m et al f en ce . H e w as e le ctro cu te d be ca use the co ntr ac tor w ho ins ta lle d th e17

1 electric al service used the wr ong k ind of bus hing wher e the buried electr ical service 2 li ne m etth e m et al co nd ui t. Sai z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 3- 4, 29. G ive n th es e fa ct s, the 3 Su pr em e Co urt ha d no re as on to co nsi de r the ef fe ct , if a ny , it s de ci sio n w oul d have 4 on the ho lding of Montanez . I n our pos ition as an interm ediate app ellate court w e ar e 5 loath to sp eculate w hether the Court w ould now m odify or rever se Montanez

. Sta te 6 exre l. M

art ine z v . Ci tyof

La s V egas , 200 4- N MS C- 009, ¶ 21, 135 N

. M. 375 , 89 P

. 3d 7 47 ( sta tin g th at Su pr em e Co urt “ de ci sio ns r em ai n bi ndi ng p re ce de nt unti l [ the 8 Suprem e Court] see[s] fit to reconsider them , r egardless of w hether subsequ ent cases 9 ha ve ra ise d doub ts ab out the ir co nti nui ng vit al ity ” (i nte rn al quot at ion m arks a nd 10 ci ta tio n om itt ed )) ; Be hrens v. Gateway C ourt, LLC , 201 3- N MC A -0 97, ¶ 16, 311 P

. 3d 11 822 (statin g t h at the Court of Appeals is bound by Suprem e Court prec edent); 12 D unni ng v . B ue ndi ng , 201 1- N MC A -0 10, ¶ 11, 149 N

. M. 260, 247 P

. 3d 1 145 (s ta tin g 13 tha t the Co urt of

Appe al s is boun d by Su

pr em e Court pr ec ed en t e ve n w he n a spe ct s 14 of that precedent have been r ej ected by other authorities). 15 { 34} Si m il arl y , Enriquezprovides lit tle or no guid ance as to how the Suprem e Court 16 would decide the Montanezis su es to da y . Firs t, Enriquezis an opin ion of this Court 17 and cannot be deem ed to have reverse d or m odified Suprem e Court case lawwhich 18 is o the rw ise in good standi ng. Mor e to the poi nt, how ev er , the fa ct s in Enriqueza ga in 19 ar e m at er ia lly

dif fe re nt f ro m the f ac ts i n Montanez

.18

1 { 35} In Enriquez , an emp l o ye e of a local Boy Scouts council was badly injure d 2 when a large tree he w as helping to cut down broke and fell in an unexpected 3 dir ec tio n. 199 8- N MC A -1 57, ¶ ¶ 12- 17. H e sue d th e Bo y Sc out s of A m er ic a as se rt ing 4 tha t it shoul d have pr ovi de d m or e tr ai nin g and supe rv isi on of the tr ee c utt ing pr oc es s 5 in it s p os it io n a s t he ch art eri ng org an iz at io n fo r t h e l o c a l co un ci l. Id

. ¶ 51. T he 6 re la tio nshi p be tw ee n th e pla int if f in Enriquez an d the Boy Sc out s of Am er ic a w as not 7 tha t of age ne ra l c ontrac to r or ow ne r an d an in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or a nd i ts 8 em plo y ees . Enriquezr ec ogni ze d th is f ac tua l di ff

er en ce w ith Montaneze x p l i c i t l y. 9 Enriquez , 1 99 8- NMCA-1 57 , ¶ 11 3. Th us , E nri que z cannot be r ea d to a lte r or

c al l i nto 10 que sti on the hol din g in M ontane z. 11 { 36} Inint er

pr et ing Sai

z , w e did

obs er ve tha t the “ re la tio nshi p be tw ee n th e 12 ow ne r/ em

plo y er a nd the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or is not , an d shou ld n ot b e, the f oc us 13 of the inquiry .” Enriquez , 1998-NMC A- 157, ¶ 1 0 3 . B ut, again, that com m ent was 14 m ad e in the c our se of an al y zi ng a f ac tua l sc en ar io m

uc h di ff er en t f ro m the one 1 5 p r e s e n th e r e . F u rt h e r , we mad e c l e a r t h a ti mp o s i t i o n o f

s t r i c tl i ab i l i t y wa s ap o l i c y16 dr ive n in qui ry

a nd tha t un de rt ak ing inh er en tly dange ro us wo rk

doe s no t ne ce ssari ly 17 req ui re a fi nd in g o f

joi nt an d s ev eral li ab il it y . See A beita v. N. Rio A rriba Ele c. 18 Co op. , 199 7 -N M CA -0 97, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 97, 946 P.2d 1108 (hol ding that an 19 el ec tr ic al uti lity

tha t w as he ld s ixty

pe rc en t l ia

ble f or a n ele ctro cu tio n ona19

1 co nstru ct ionj ob w as not j oin tly an d seve ra lly

li ab le giv entha t i t ha d no pow er to 2 act ua ll y

ha lt workat t he si te ). 3 { 37} In sum , neither Sai znor Enriquezund er

m ine the r at ion al e and hol din g of 4 Montanez

. A nd, a s w e w ill dis cu ss i n th e ne xt s ec tio n of thi s Opi ni on , the va st 5 m aj or ity

of c as es a ddr es sin g th e iss ue a gr ee w ith Montanez

. 6 3. The G reat We ight of A uth ority Fr om Othe r Jurisdict ions Follow s the 7 Montanez

Ap proach 8 { 38} A s e vid en ce d by the dis cu ss io ns and o utc om es in Montaneza nd Ca ss , the 9 sta tus of

e m plo y ee s of i nd ep ende nt c ontra ct or s a s be ne fi ci ar ie s of the pr ote ct ion 10 of fe re d by the “ pe cu liar ri sk” pr ovi sio n of the Re sta te m en t ha s be enunc er ta in f ro m 11 the be gin nin g. D ean P ro sse r, a s th e re porte r fo r the 196 5 e dit ion of the Re sta te m en t 12 (Sec ond) of Torts, suggest ed a Special Note that would disallow claim s by em ploy ees 13 of i n d ep en de nt co nt ract or s ag ai ns t o wne r/e m pl oyers. See Re sta te m en t ( T hir d) of 14 T orts § 55 cm

t. h (201 2) (p ro vid ing an ove rv ie w of the his tor y of the iss ue w ith in the 15 Re stat em en t pr oces s and an ov er vie w of the c as e law ). T he S pe ci al N ote w as not 16 inc lud ed

appare ntl y

be ca use the c as e law w as sti ll in fl ux, tho ugh D ean Pr oss er did 17 not e tha t the “ pr ev ai lin g po int of vie w is tha t the re is no li ab il it y on the part

of the 18 em pl oyer of t he in de pe nd en t co nt ract or .” I d. 19 { 39} Inthe f

if ty y ears sin ce the 196 5 ve rs ionof the Re sta te m en t ( Se co nd) of T orts 20 de but ed , the pr ev ai lin g vi ewha s on ly str en gth en ed

. T he co m

m en tary to Se ct ion5720

1 of t h e R e s t a t e m e n t ( T h i r d ) o f T o rt s

—w h i c h r e p l a c e s f o rm e r S e c t i o n s 4 1 6 a n d427 , 2 am ong oth er s—n owf

la tly sta te s that “ [t ] he hir er of a n in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or is not 3 subj ec t t o l i ab i l i t y t o a n e m p l o y e e o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t c o n t r a c t o r u n d e r a n y of the 4 vicarious-liabilityaven u es in this [c] hapter.” Id

. c m t. d. A nd S ubse ct ion( d) of the 5 R e p o rt e r s ’ N o t e s t o S e c t i o n 5 7 s t a t e s t h a tt h e “v a s tma j o r i t y o f c a s e s d i s a l l o w c l a i ms 6 by e m plo y ee s of

ind epen de nt c ontra ct or s a ga ins t hi re rs on v ic ar iou s- lia bil ity 7 th eo rie s.” 8 { 40} O ur

own res earc h c on fir m s t hi s o bs erv at io n. We fou nd on ly two ca se s al low ing 9 suc h c la im s a ga ins t a ge ne ra l c ontra ct or

und er S ec tio ns 4 16 and 42 7 of the 10 Res ta te m en t (S eco nd ) of Tort s. See M

ak ane ole v . G am

pon , 777 P

. 2d 1183, 118 7 11 (H aw . 1989); Ell io tt

v. Pub . Ser v. Co . of

N.H. , 517 A. 2d 11 85, 1187-89 (N .H . 1986). 12 It w ould serve little purpose to list all of the contrar y authority . The cases are, as they 13 sa y , “ le gio n. ” Re pr es en ta tiv e of the ca se s hol din g th at S ec tio ns 4 16 and 4 27 d o no t 14 apply to per sonal inj ury claim s by em ploy ees of subcon tractors agai n s t general 15 co nt ract or s or o w ne rs a re : W elker , 403 P

. 2d a t 33 5- 38; P riv et te v . Sup er ior Co urt , 16 854 P. 2d 721, 727- 29 ( Ca l. 199 3) ( in b an k) ; De Shambo v. Nielsen , 684 N

. W

. 2d 3 32, 17 339- 41 ( Mi ch

. 200 4) ; Co nov er v . N. Sta tes P ow er

Co

. , 313 N

. W

. 2d 3 97, 403 -0 5 18 (Minn. 1981); G ay tan v . W al- M art , 853 N

. W

. 2d 1 81, 200 -0 2 ( N eb

. 201 4) ( ove rr uli ng12 T he spe ci al co nc ur re nc e pr opos es an em

plo y ee ce ntr ic appr oa chto ev al ua tin g 2 13 w he the r ana ct ivi ty

sho uld be co ns ide re d in he re ntl y dange ro us. T he appr oa chit 14 sugg ests is contrary to the Restatem ent em phasis o n “ activities” rather than personal 15 at t ri b u t es of potential plaint iffs. In addition, it would be difficult to adm inister. 16 A sse ssi ng the le vel of tra ini ng and the c ap ab ili tie s of ind ivi dua l pl ai nti ff

s inthe 17 ac tiv ity

a t i ssu e w oul d m ak e inh er en t dange r a que sti on f or the j ur y r athe r than th e 18 que sti on o f law it

c ur re ntl y is. H er e, fo r ex am

ple , if Sa en z ha d be enane w co m er to 19 the j ob, w oul d th e ac tiv ity ha ve be eninh er en tly

dange ro us a s to him , but not to 20 som eone on the sam e j ob with m ore experience and training? Such issues are m ore 21 ap pr opr ia te ly

handl ed by appl y ing our

nor m al a nd f

am ili ar r ule s of c om pa ra tiv e 22 negligence. 21 1 pr ior c as e law a llo w ing suc h c la im s) ; Zueck v . O ppenheimer

Gateway Props., Inc. , 2 809 S.W .2d 384, 390 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). 2 3 { 41} Inc ontra st, the li ab ili ty of hir er s of subc ontra ct or s fo r the ir ow n ne gli ge nc e in 4 the e xe rc ise of

r et ai ne d c ontro l i s a liv e an d w el l. S ec tio n 56 of the Re sta te m en t 5 (T hird) of T orts replaces S ection 414 of the Restatem ent (Sec ond) o f Torts. N ew 6 Me xic o ha s r ec ogni ze d th e ap pli ca bil ity of S ect io n 41 4 liabil ity

sin ce a t l ea st o ur 7 Su pr em e Co urt’ s opi nio n in D eA rm an . See 1965 -N MS C- 026, ¶ 21; se e als o Valdez 8 v. Cillessen & Son, Inc. , 19 87 -N MS C- 015, ¶ ¶ 16, 20- 27, 105 N

. M. 575 , 734 P

. 2d 9 1258 (re versing summ ary j udgm ent in favor of genera l contractor beca use there w ere 1 0 g e n u i n e i s s u e s o f

f a c ta s t o t h e e x t e n ta n dn a tu r e o f t h e c o n t r o l i th a s o v e r i n ju ry11 ca usi ng a ct ivi ty ); Moulder v. B rown , 1982 -N MC A -0 78, ¶ 16, 98 N

. M. 71, 644 P

. 2d14 W e note tha t our Su pr em e Court

c ite d Montanezw ithappr ova l i n Valdez

. See 3 15 Valdez , 198 7- N MS C- 015, ¶¶ 29- 31. Jus tic e Ransom , the auth or in Sai z , c onc ur re d. 16 Valdez ha s lik el y be en pa rt ia lly r ev er se d. I n Tafoya v. R ael , 200 8- N MS C- 057, 4 17 ¶ 17, 145 N

. M. 4, 193 P .3d 55 1, th e Su pr em e Co urt r ec ogni ze d ali m ite d c au se of 18 ac tio n fo r ne gli ge nt h ir ing of asub co ntr ac tor

in favor of a n e m plo y ee of the 19 subc ontra ct or . T he Co urt wa s ca re fu l to point out, how ev er , tha t the li ab ili ty w oul d 20 be su bjec t t o n or m al co m pa rat iv e fau lt pri nc ip le s. Id

. ¶ 22.

22 1 1060

. Of course, such negligence claim s based on r etained control do n ot provid e a

3 2 b a s i s f o r i mp o s i n g jo i n ta n ds e v e r a l l i ab i l i ty. 4 3 { 42} In su m , w e co nc lud e tha t Montanezstill control s claim s m ade by em ploy ees 4 of subcont ractors a gainst prop erty owners and general contractors. And neither Sai z 5 nor Enriquezprovide any basis for question ing its co n t i n u i ng vit ality . A s an 6 interm ediate appellate court, we cannot change or overrule Montanez . A s such, there 7 is n o ba sis f

or im posi ng j oin t and s ev er al li ab ili ty on R an ac k. 8 JUR Y IN STR UC TION AN D JU RYVE RD ICT IS SU ES 9 { 43} Pl ai nti ff put s fo rth se pa ra te ar gum en ts co nc er nin g the j ur

y ins tr uc tio n and the 10 ve rd ic t e nte re d by t he jury

. F ir st, she a rg ue s th at the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in 11 givin g—over objection—an incorrect f orm ulation of the w rong ful death dam ages 12 instructio n and thus confusing the j ury as to the proper allocation of dam ages betwe en 13 Saenz’ s estate and his survivors. Second, she argues that the j ury ’ s decision to aw ard23

1 zero in dam ages to the estate is not sup ported by subst antial evidence. W e disagree 2 wit h h er fi rs t ar gu m en t, b ut ag ree wi th th e se co nd

. 3 1. The U JI 13-18 30 NMR A Inst ruct ion Given Was Wrong butno P reju dice 4 Is App arent 5 { 44} U JI 13- 1830 is the uni fo rm ins tr uc tio n onthe m eas ur e of da m ag es in a 6 w ro ngf ul d ea th c as e. I t i nc lud es , a s abr ac ke ted op tio n, apara gr ap h onlos s of 7 co ns or ti um

da m ag es . Id

. ¶ 6. It al so inc lud es br ac ke te d langua ge in its la st p ar ag ra ph 8 that instructs th e j ury

that it m ust not perm it the am ount of dam ages to be influenced 9 by “ the loss o f the dece ased’ s society to the fam ily .” This language is in direct 10 co nf lic t w iththe langua ge de sc ri bin g lo ss o f co nsor tiu m da m ag es . As a

r es ult , the 11 U se N ote s f

or U JI 13- 1830 pr ovi de tha t “ [i ] f the pe rs ona l r ep re se nta tive is a lso the 12 sur viv ing spo use . . . the da m ag es de sc ri be d in[ I] te m 6 sh oul d be inc lud ed

a nd the 13 br ack et edm at eri al in th e la st sen te nc e o f th e in st ru ct io n s ho ul d b e ex cl ud ed .” 14 { 45} Pl ai nti ff

’ s r eque ste d U JI 13- 1830 ins tr uc tio n m ist ak en ly

inc lud ed

both 15 provisi ons. Noting the m istake, Pla intiff point ed it out to the district court and asked 16 tha t the la tte r m at er ia l be del et ed

. Pl ai nti ff ci te d conc er ns for j ur y co nf usi on but d id 17 no t ci te th e Use Not e to th e d is tri ctco ur t. Th e d is tri ctco ur t re fu se d t he req ue st

. 18 { 46} Given the U se Notes, the instructio n g i v en to the jury wa s wr ong. But, as 19 Pl ai nti ff

not es , not

e ve ry de fe ct ive j ur

y ins tr uc tio n, ev enone tha t de via te s f ro m the 20 UJI, gives rise to reversible err or. P laintiff m ust dem onstrate that the error c reate d24

1 pr ejud ic e o r ha rm edsub stant ia l ri gh ts

. Ke nne dyv . D ex te r C onso l. Sc h. , 2000-NMS C2 02 5, ¶ 26 , 1 29 N.M. 43 6, 10 P.3 d 11 5. Our rev ie w is de no vo . Sal ope k v. F rie dm an , 3 2013 -N MC A -0 87, ¶ 16, 308 P. 3d 1 39. A nd w hil e w e w ill r es olv e doub ts i n f av or of 4 the party

claim ing prejudice where an instruction is incons istent with the UJI, 5 Ke nne dy , 2000-NMS C-025, ¶¶ 26-27, we will not set aside a j udgm ent based on m ere 6 speculation that the erroneous instructio n influenced the o u t co m e of the ca se. 7 F ah rb ac h v . D i am on d Sh am ro c k , I nc . , 199 6- N MS C- 063, ¶

31, 122 N

. M. 543 , 928 8 P. 2d 2 69. 9 { 47} Pl ai nti ff

a rg ue s th at

the j ur y ’ s c onf usi on w as e vi de nt fro m the w ay it 10 dis tr ibu te d th e da m ag es it did aw ar d—c om pa ra ble am ount s to e ac h of

the c hil dr en , 11 an d asub stanti al ly

gr ea te r am ount

to Pl ai nti ff

f or los s of c onso rt ium , but

z er o to the 12 estate. Plaintiff a lso relies on the fact that toward the end of its deliberations the j ury 13 pose d th e fo ll owi ng que sti on: “ D oe s ‘ tot al a m ount of da m ag es to the E sta te of 14 Ch ar le s S ae nz ’ inc lud e al l am ount s aw ar de d to V ir gin ia , Ro b[ in] , an d sons [, ] or is it 15 m e a nt t o be as e par a t e a m ount ?” 16 { 48} W e pe rc ei ve no p re j udi ce to Pl ai nti ff

f ro m the j ur y ins tr uction. T he m ost 17 na tur al kin d of pr ej udi ce to b e ex pe ct ed f ro m the e rr or w oul d be ar ed

uc tio n inlos s 18 of c on so rt i um dam a ge s. B ut P l a i nt i f f m a ke s no a r gu m e nt t ha t t ho se dam a ges wer e 19 ina de qua te or ev enr ed uc ed a s ar es ult

of the e rr or . Rathe r, P la int if f sugg es ts tha t the25

1 j ur y m ay ha ve aw ar de d dam ag es a ct ua lly be lon gin g to the e sta te to the ind ivi dua ls t o 2 som eh owm ak e up f

or apr es um ed

beli ef tha t the y c oul d no t aw ar d lo ss o f soc ie ty 3 da m ag es . O n the fa ce of it , thi s su gge sti on i s m er e spe cu la tio n and p ro vid es no b as is 4 fo r se tt in g a si de th e v erd ic t. 5 { 49} Ina ny

e ve nt, P la int if

f’ s su gge sti on i s al l bu t an im poss ibl e sc en ar io. 6 U nusu al ly , w e ha ve in thi s c as e anind ic at ionof the j ur y ’ s thi nki ng. T he j ur

y que sti on 7 quot ed above sho w s th at

the j ur y w as thi nki ng a

bout the iss ue of

div isi on o f da m ag es . 8 W itha ll co unse ls’ appr ova l, the dis tr ic t co urt r es pond ed tha t the “ [t ] ota l a m ount

of 9 da m ag es to the E sta te of Ch ar le s S ae nz ” is s ep ar at e. G iv en th e que sti on and the 10 an sw er , c om

bin ed w ith the ab se nc e of an y ind ic at ionabout c onf usi on a bout los s of 11 co nsor

tiu m da m ag es , the re is no b as is t o su spe ct tha t the j ur

y appor tio ne d any 12 da m ag es be lon gin g to the es ta te to the ind ivi dua ls. T hus the re is no ba sis to sus pe ct , 13 m uc h l es s co nc lu de th atpre jud ic e fl owe d fr om

th e UJI 13 -1 83 0 e rro r. 14 2. Ther e Is No Subst antial Evidenc e to Su pport an Awa rd of Z ero D am ages 15 to the Estate. 16 { 50} Fi na lly , Pl ai nti ff ar gue s tha t the dis tr ic t co urt er re d in de ny ing he r m oti on f or 17 a ne w tr ia l be ca

use the a w ar d of

z er o dam ag es to the e sta te wa s co nt rary to the 18 evidence. T o the extent tha t Ra n ac k argu es that this cont ention was not preserved 19 be ca use P la int if

f fa ile d to r ai se it

be fo re the j ur

y w as e xc use d, w e dis ag re e. T he r ule 20 sta te d in Th om

pson D ril lin g, In c. v. Romig , 198 7- N MS C- 039, 105 N

. M. 701 , 73626

1 P. 2 d 9 7 9 , a n d i t s p r o g e n y ap p l i e s o n l y t o c h a l l e n g e s o f a j u ry v e r d i c t b a s edon 2 inc onsi ste nc y , a m

big uity , or

ind ef ini te ne ss. I n Th om

pson , the defendant argued that 3 “ the j ur

y ve rd ic t [ w as ] inv al id b ec au se it [ w as ] a m big uo us and in de fi nit e as to the 4 am ount of dam ages.” Id

. ¶ 5. S im ilarl y , in Ram os v. R odrig uez , the a ppellant argued 5 tha t “ the spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm sub m it te d by

the j udge om itt ed

ne ce ssary

langua ge 6 w hic h th er eb y

r es ult ed in a j ur y ve rd ic t tha t w as co ntr ad ic tor y an d in co nsi ste nt o n it s 7 fa ce . ” 1994 -N MC A -1 10, ¶ 9, 11 8 N.M. 534 , 882 P

. 2d 1 047. I n bo th c as es , the se 8 argum ents were n o t ad d ressed on appeal because the appellant failed to raise them 9 be fo re t he jury was di sc ha rg ed

. Th om pson , 198 7- N MS C- 039, ¶ 5; R am os , 199 4- 10 N MC A -1 10, ¶

13; se e als o G & G Servs. , I nc. v . A gora Syndicate, Inc. , 20 00 -NMCA11 003, ¶ 41, 128 N. M. 434, 993 P. 2d 751 (“ A litigant who fails to obj ect to an alleged 12 incon sis te nc y

in a j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t be fo re the j ur y is dis m iss ed

m ay be he ld t o have 13 waiv edan y

fur th er ch al le ng e to th e al le ge d i nc on si st en cy .”). 14 { 51} Bu t this r

ule doe s no t a

pply to m oti ons fo r a ne w tr ia l ba se d onala ck of 15 subs tanti al e vid en ce und er Ru le 1- 059 N MR

A

. A ddr es sin g a fa ct

pa tte rnsim ilar to 16 that here, the Ala ska Suprem e Court held that the 17 ru le [ tha t a

c ha lle nge to a ve rd ic t ba se d oninc onsi ste nc y is w ai ve d if

not 1 8 ra ise db e f

o r e t h e j u ry

i s d i s c h a r g e d ] h a s l i m i t e dap p l i c a t i o n h e r e . T he 19 [plaintiff’ s] fail u re to raise the issue of incon sistency before the c ourt 20 dis ch ar ge d th e j ur y pr ecl uded i t f

ro m la te r as se rt ing tha t the 21 inconsi stency

entitled it to a n ew trial as a m atter of law. But that failure 2 2 did n o ts t r i p t h e e s t a t e o f i t s r i g h tt o m o v e f

o r an e w t r i a l o n the27

1 dis cr et ion ar

y gr ound tha t the ve rd ic t w as a ga ins t the weight of the 2 ev id en ce. 3 Ka va v . A m . H

onda M oto r C o. , 48 P. 3d 11 70, 1176-77 (A laska 2002 ). 4 { 52} Re ac hin g a sim ilar co nc lus ion , the K en tuc ky S upr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d th at the 5 dif fe re nc e lie s inw he the r the ve rd ic t c ont ai ns a “ pa te nt i rr eg ulari ty ” or is a “ co m ple te 6 verdict.” Co ope r v . F

ult z , 81 2 S .W .2d 49 7, 4 99 (Ky . 19 91 ), abro gated on other oth er 7 grou nds byCo ope r v . L ea the rm an , 532 U

. S. 424 ( 2001 ). I n Cooper , the j ury aw arded 8 dam a ge s f

or m e di c a l e xp e ns e s bu te nt e r e d “ 0” o n t he l i ne f or m e nt a l a nd

p hy si cal 9 su ffer in g on th e v erd ic t fo rm . Id

. at 498. On appeal, the Court considered “ whether, 10 by thu s sp ec if

y ing a de lib er at e int en tio n to m ak e no aw ar d f or one ( or m or e) e le m en ts 11 of dam ages, the j ury

has returned a ver dict with a patent irregularity which is w aived 12 by f aili ng to ti m el y

obj ec t, or

w he the r thi s r ep re se nts ac om ple te d ve rd ic t w hic h is 13 subject to challenge as inadequate on m otion for a new tr ial.” Id

. at 499. It noted that 14 the explicit entry

of zer o on th e j ury form differs fundam entally from leaving the form 15 blank , s ta ti ng, “ it is f uti le to re qui re aj ur

y tha t ha s c onsc iou sly

ins er te d ‘ 0’ or it s 16 equivalent to rec onsid er its d ec i s i o n . T his is n ot the sam e situation as th at cre ated 17 w he n a j ur

y ha s le ft ave rd ic t sl ot b lank. S uc h ave rd ic t i s pa te ntl y ir re gul ar or 18 incom plete.” Id

. at

500 ( int er

na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c ita tio n om itt ed ). Ci tin g 19 K en tuc ky ’ s ve rs ionof Ru le 59, it

w en t on ,28

1 Whe re th ere is a pa te nt d ef ic ie nc y or ir re gul ar ity , the [ ru le r equir ing 2 ob

je ction before the j ury

is discharged] shoul d be followed. How ever, 3 it is unte nable to uti liz e th at pr oc ed ur e w he re the j ur

y ha s de lib er at el y 4 a w a r d e dn o t h i n g , d e s p i t e t h e e v i d e n c e a n di n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e c o n t r a ry. 5 Su ch a verdict is no m ore incom plete or irre gular than had the jury 6 ins er

te d on e dol lar. I t m ay be de fe ct ive as co ntr ar y to the e vid en ce a nd 7 the law tha t r el at es to the a de qua cy of ana w ar d, but

suc h ade fe ct

is one 8 appropriate to be addresse d b y t h e t rial court upon a m otion for a new 9 tr ia l. 10 Id

. (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 11 { 53} Other states have echoed this reasoning . T he W est Vir ginia Suprem e Court 12 ex pla ine d th at

“ [c ] ri tic al ly , the obj ec tiv e tha t unde rl ie s the ge ne ra l r ule of r equir ing 13 tha t an ob

j ec tio n to the ve rd ic t for

m m ust be m ad e pr ior

to the j ur y ’ s di sc ha rg e is t o 14 pr ovi de the tr ia l c ourt w itha n opportun ity to ‘ cure ’ an y al le ge d de fe ct or ir re gul ar ity 15 in t h e fo rm p repared by the j ury .” Sta te e

x re l. V all eyR adi olo gy

, I nc . v . G augh an , 16 640 S. E

. 2d 1 36, 141 ( W

. V a. 200 6)

. I t w en t onto sta te tha t 17 [n ] o si m ilar oppo rt uni ty to cure is re qui re d fo r an ina de qua te aw ar d of 18 dam ages . . . because a request for a new trial based on the inadequacy 19 of

da m ag es is not a pr oc ed ur al obj ec tio n to the ve rd ic t fo rm , but a 20 subs tanti ve obj ec tio n to the am ount of da m ag es a w ar de d invie w of the 2 1 e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a n d t h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e ju ry a s t o f

au l t

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, 22 there is no basis for invok ing th e w aiver rule .

. . w hen the pos t-trial 23 ob

jecti on is so le ly to t he ad eq ua cy of t he da m ag es . 24 Id

. ; ac co rd G a. F

arm B ure au M

ut. In s. Co . v. Hyer

s , 661 S

. E

. 2d 6 82, 683 ( G a. Ct

. 2 5 A p p . 2 0 0 8 ) ( “ F a i l u r e t o m o v e f o r ad i r e c t e dv e r d i c ta l s o b a r s t h e p a rt y f r om 26 co nte ndi ng o n a

ppe al tha t he is entit le d to j udgm en t a s am at te r of law be ca use of29

1 ins uf fi ci en t ev ide nc e. T his fa ilure doe s not , how ev er , ba r the pa rty fr om c ont en din g 2 that he is e ntitled to a newtrial on that ground .” (citation om itted)); Clayv . Ch oc taw 3 Nation Car e Ctr. , L

LC , 200 9 O K

CI V A PP 35, ¶

¶ 20- 21, 210 P

. 3d 8 55, 860 4 (aff irm ing th e grant of a new tr ial wher e the m ovant failed to objec t before the j ury 5 w as dis ch ar ge d, statin g, “ the re w as nothin g ir re gul ar , inc or

re ct , or c onfus ing about 6 the f orm of the ve rd ic t[ , ] ” not ing tha t “ [t ] he a lleged erro r . . . [ did ] not inv olv e the 7 ve rd ic t’s fo rm , bu t i ts su bs ta nc e[,]” and fin di ng no waiv er). 8 { 54} Pl a i nt i f

f di d no t sp e c i f

y i n he r m ot i on t he r

ul e un de r w hi c h sh e m ov e d for a 9 new trial. Conseq uently , we exam ine the argum ents in the m otion to determ ine which 10 ru le appl ies. Ce ntu ryB ank v . H ym ans , 199 5- N MC A -0 95, ¶ 10, 120 N

. M. 684 , 905 11 P. 2d 722 ( “ T he m ovant n ee d no t c ite the pr ovi sio n auth or iz ing the m oti on; the 12 subs tance of the m otion , not its title, controls.”) . I n Plaintiff’ s m otion , she argued that 13 the j ur

y ’ s aw ar d of

z er o dam ag es to the e sta te “ w as . . . a ga ins t the ove rwhe lm ing 14 ev ide nc e pr opounde d up on the [ j ] ur y in thi s m at te r. ” A c la im tha t the ve rd ic t i s 15 contrary

to the clear we ight of t he evidence falls w ithin the proper ground for a new 16 tri al un de r Ru le 1-0 59

. See Ru le 1- 059( A ) (“ A ne w tr ia l m ay be gr an te d to a ll or

a ny 17 of the part ie s and o n a ll or

part o f th e iss ue s ina n a ct ionin w hic h th er e ha s be ena 18 tria l by j ur

y , f or a ny of t he r e a so ns f

or w hi c h ne w t r i a l s have he r e t of ore been 19 gr an te d. ”) ; se e als o P ool v . L eo ne , 374 F. 2d 9 61, 963 (10th Cir. 1967 ) (stating that30

1 th e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s c l a i m t h a tt h e v e r d i c tw a s c o n t r a ry t o t h e e v i d e n c e i s ag ro und 2 “ reco gn iz ed at

c om m on l awa nd i n th e co urts o f the U nit ed S ta te s pr ior

to the 3 ad op ti on of Rul e 5 9( a) as pr op er gro un ds fo r th e g ran ti ng of a ne w tri al ”). Hen ce, we 4 understand Plainti ff’ s m otion for a new tr ial to invo ke Rule 1-059 and conclu de that 5 he r ar gum en t tha t the ve rd ic t w as not supp orte d by the ev ide nc e w as not w ai ve d by 6 he r fai lu re t o o bjec t t o i t o n t he se gro un ds be fo re t he jury was di sc ha rg ed

. 7 { 56} “ T he gr an t or

de nia l of

ane w tr ia l i s am at te r re sti ng w ith in the sou nd 8 dis cr et ionof the tr ia l cour t, an d the re vie w ing co urt wi ll not re ve rs e abs en t a m an if es t 9 abuse of that discretion.” Martinez v. P ondero sa Prods., Inc. , 198 8- N MC A -1 15, ¶ 4, 10 10 8 N.M. 3 85 , 77 2 P .2d 13 08

. 11 { 57} “ W e ar e of the opin i o n t h at proof of a w rongful death of necessity im plies 12 recovera

ble dam ages.” Baca v. Baca , 197 0- N MC A -0 90, ¶ 25, 81 N

. M. 734, 472 P

. 2d 13 99 7. Co ntr a Marchese v. W arner Commc ’ns, I

nc. , 1983 -N MC A -0 76, ¶¶ 32, 35, 100 14 N. M. 313, 670 P. 2d 11 3 (rej ecting the plaintiff’ s argum ent that “ one cannot f ind a life 15 va lue le ss in Ne w Me xic o” an d stat ing tha t “ the am ount of da m ag es is a c or re ct one 1 6 f o r t h e j u ry t o d e c i d e ” )

. S u c h d a m a g e s m a y b e b a s e do n , b u ta r e n o tl i m i t e dto, 17 pe cu ni ary in

jury. Baca , 197 0- N MC A -0 90, ¶ 25; Sta ng v . H

er tz C orp. , 19 69 -NMCA18 118, ¶

8, 81 N

. M. 69, 463 P. 2d 4 5 ( “ D am ag es f or the w ro ngf

ul d ea th m ay

be 19 recovere d by

proof of the present worth of life of decedent to the dec edent’ s estate. ”),31

1 aff’d 1970 -N MSC- 048, 81 N. M. 348, 467 P. 2 d 1 4 . D am ages based on pecuniary 2 in jury to t he est at e are rare ly zero. R ef fit t v

. H ajj ar , 892 S

. W

. 2d 5 99, 60 3 ( K y . Ct

. 3 App. 199 4) ( sta tin g th at it is not “ pr ope r in a w ro ngf ul de ath a ct ionto aw ar d no thi ng 4 fo r de str

uc tio n of e ar nin g po w er unl es s the re is ev ide nc e fr om w hic h th e j ur

y c oul d 5 re as ona

bly be lie ve tha t the de ce de nt posse sse d no po wer to earn money”(internal 6 quot at ionm ar

ks and c ita tio n om itt ed )) ; see E ri c A

. P osne r & Ca ss R

. S unst ei n, 7 D ollars and

D ea th , 72 U. Chi. L . R ev. 537, 544 (2005) (stating th at zer o dam ages are 8 appropriate for a

“ victim who has no future incom e, no dependents , and no spous e, 9 an d w ho d ie s w ith out

f ee lin g pa in” a s a m at te r of “ fo rm al law , ” but

tha t this r

ule is 10 not alway s followed in practice) . E ven in the absence of pecuniary injury , how ever, 11 the j ury

m ay also consi d er “ [t] he present worth of the life,

. . . [based on] the age, 12 oc cu pa tio n, e ar

nin g c ap ac ity , he al th, ha

bit s, a nd the pr oba

ble dur at ion of the li fe of 13 decedent.” Baca , 1970 -N MC A -0 90, ¶ 25; see Po sn er & Su st ei n, supra (stating that 14 Ne w Me xico recognizes hedoni c dam ages in wrongful death cases). 15 { 58} In Jones v. Po l l ock , 196 3- N MS C- 116, ¶ 5, 72 N

. M. 315 , 383 P

. 2d 2 71, the 16 Co urt c onsi de re d w he the r a ne w tr ia l shou ld ha ve be en gr an te d w he re the j ur y f ound 17 the appe lle es li ab le f

or the ap pe llants ’ inj ur ie s bu t aw ar de d li ttl e or no d am ag es f

or 18 their m edical costs inc u rr ed as a r esult of thos e inj uries. T he Court concluded that 19 “ [i] t does not stand to reason for the j ury to have arr i v ed at the determ ination that32

1 [the ] appe lle es ar e lia

ble fo r the inj ur ie s suff

er ed by [the ] ap pe llants w ith out it a lso 2 finding that [the] appellants m erited an aw ard for the injuries. ” Id

. ¶ 10 . As to the 3 am ount of the award, the a ppellees argued that while they had stipu lated to the total 4 am ount

of the appe llants ’ m ed ic al bil ls, the y did not sti pul at e to the r ec ove ra ble 5 am ou nt

. Id

. ¶ 9. T he Co urt r ej ec te d th is arg um en t, statin g th at the “ ap pe lle es c ite no 6 ev ide nc e in the r ec or d w hic h wou ld te nd t o le sse n th e am ount w hic h [ the ] appe llants 7 cl ai m the y inc ur re d a s ar es ult

of the a cc ide nt. T he re w as no c ontro versy a s to the 8 am ount of the m edical expenses. T he only evidence offe re d on this point wa s that 9 subm itted by

[the] appellants.” Id

. T he re bein g no ev ide nc e te ndi ng t o r ed uc e the 10 re co ve ry

f or m ed ic al c ost s, the Co urt conc lud ed tha t “ w he re it is s how n, . . . tha t the 11 verdict of the j ury on the questio n of d am ages is clear ly not sup ported by

subst antial 12 ev ide nc e ad duc ed

a t the tr ia l of

the c as e, am oti on f

or ane w tr ia l sh oul d be gr an te d, 13 and not to do so is an abuse o f d i s cr et i o n b y the court.” Id

. ¶ 12; see Ham mond v. 14 B lac kw el l , 1966-NMS C-258, ¶ 13, 77 N. M. 209, 421 P. 2d 1 2 4 (h oldin g that a new 15 tr ia l w as r equir ed

w he re the dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound the pla int if

f suf fe re d alos s of

e ar nin g 16 ab il it y as a res ul t o f an acci de nt bu t fa il edto award an y da m ag es forsu ch lo ss ). 17 { 59} H er e, P la int if

f pr es en te d e vid en ce tha t S ae nz w as w orkin g a t the ti m e of his 1 8 de a t h a n dt h a th e w a s ac o m p e t e n ta n dd e p e n d ab l e e m p l o y e e m a k i n g b e t w e e n $ 10 19 an d $3 3 pe r hour

. T he re w as a ls o ev id en ce pre se nte d onS ae nz ’ s r ole in his f am ily33

1 an dh i s re l at i o n s h i p wi t h h i s wi fe an dch i l d re n . Wh i l e t h er e w as ev i d en ce t h at Sa en z’s 2 w ag e- earn ing c ap ac ity w as m iti ga te d by

the f ac t tha t he h ad be en c onvi ct ed a nd 3 incarc er at ed for a felony charge and that he had a fitful relationship with his wife , 4 the se f ac tor s c oul d w ork to r ed uc e the a m ount s S ae nz m igh t ha ve earn ed or 5 contributed to his fam ily —they cannot cancel them out entirely . H aving foun d that 6 Ranack w as forty -five per cent at fa ult for Sae nz’ s death, the j ury could no t find und er 7 the evidence presented t o it that the dam age to his estate was zero. T he j ury wa s free 8 to s et tle on e sse nti al ly

a ny f igu re —r an gin g f

ro m a nom ina l sum to an am ount a kinto 9 the am ount s awarded to his su rvivors—bu t it could n ot und er the evidence find zero 10 da m ag es . W e co nc lud e tha t an aw ar d of z er o dam ag es to Sa en z’ s estat e is n ot 1 1 s up p o rt e db y th e e v i d e n c e a n dr e man df o r an e w t r i a l a s t o d a mag e s t o t h e e s t a t e o n l y. 12 { 60} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

13

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 14 M IC HA EL D . BU ST A M A N TE , Ju dg e 15 I CONCUR: 16

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 17 TI M OT HYL. GA R C IA , Ju dg e 18 JONA THA N B . S UTIN , Jud ge 19 (spec ially concu rring in p art and d issenting in p art).34

1 SU TIN, Judge (sp ecially concurr ing in partand dissen ting in p art). 2 { 61} I do n ot d isa gr ee w iththe Ma j or ity ’ s ana ly sis and c onc lus iontha t Montanez 3 precludes a hold ing that Ranack is j ointl y and severally

liable for all of the dam ages 4 fo und by

the j ur y . Ma j orit yO p. ¶

¶ 15, 26- 42. I w ri te se pa ra te ly to ad dr es s w ha t I 5 believe to be an im

po rt an t issue raised in this case, nam ely , w hether the w ork that 6 Sa en z w as doi ng a t the ti m e of his de ath m ay be c onsi de re d “ inh er en tly dange ro us” 7 as am at te r of

law . T his iss ue w as a dd res sed by the dis tr ic t c ourt, it

is ce ntr al to 8 Plaintiff’ s argum ent on appeal, and in m y view, it high light s an as p ec t of Ne w 9 M e x i c o cas e la w th atne ed s t o b e cl ari fie d. Se e id. ¶¶ 1 4, 2 1, 2 3. Ad di ti on al ly, I 10 dis ag re e w iththe Ma

j or ity ’ s de ci sio n to r em an d f or ane w tr ia l a s to da m ag es to the 11 es ta te , and as t o t ha t i ss ue , I res pe ct fu ll y di ss en t. Id

. ¶ ¶ 50- 59. 12 As a M atter of Law , S aenz Wa s No t Enga ged in an In here ntly D angerous 13 Ac tivity 14 { 62} A c t ing pur suant t o S ec tio n 41 -3 A -1 (C ), in Sai z , o u r S up re m e C o u rt es t ab l i shed 15 a public pol icy exception to several liability . 1992-NMS C-018, ¶ 34. T he Sai z Court 16 be gan i t s a na l y si s by r e c og ni z i ng t he l on gs t a nd i ng t or t pr i nc i pl e t ha t , a l t ho ugh an 17 em plo y er of a n in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or is not ge neral ly

r es pons ibl e fo r the 18 ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or ’ s ne gli ge nc e, the ge ne ra l r ule ha s no appl ic at ionw he re , by 19 virtue of

w ork th at

is “ inh er en tly

dange ro us, ” the em

plo y er ha s anon de le gable duty 20 to en su re t ha t p r e c a u t i on s ar e ta ke n. Id

. ¶¶ 10-12, 15. In order to serve the policy35

1 underly ing th e im

posit ion of a nond elegable duty to ensure that safety

precaution s are 2 taken in r egard to inhere nt dangers, the Sai zCo urt de te rm ine d th at

e m plo y er s sh oul d 3 be he ld st ric tl y

li ab le forin

juri es cau se d b y

th e fai lu re t o e ns ur e su ch pre cau ti on s. Id

. 4 ¶ 33. T his, in turn, w ould prom ote the “ special public po licy ” of protecting “ t hird 5 pe rs ons in an are a of

inh er en t dange r” a nd en co ur ag ing “ co nsc ie nti ous adhe re nc e to 6 standards of s afety wher e in j ury likely will re sult in the absence of pre cautions.” Id

. 7 ¶ 35. T o effe ctuate these public pol icy considerations , the S

a iz Co ur t he ld tha t, 8 pur suant t o Se ct ion 41- 3A -1 (C )( 4) , “ w he n pr ec au tio ns are not ta ke n a ga ins t i nhe re nt 9 da nge r, the e m

plo y er is j oin tly

a nd s ev er al ly

li ab le f or harm appor tio ne d to a ny 10 ind ep en d e n t

c ontra ct or

f or f ai lur e to t ak e pr ec au tio ns r ea sona bly ne ce ssary

to pr ev en t 11 injury to third parties arising from the peculiar risk. ” Sai

z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 34, 12 36. I r ef

er to thi s pu

bli c pol ic y

e xc ep tio n in Sai

zas “ the Sai

zex cep ti on .” 13 { 63} The Sai

ze xc ep tio n wa s der ive d fr om Se ct ion s 416 and 4 27 o f the Re sta te m en t 14 (Sec on d) of To rts

. Sai z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 11- 14. S ec tio n 41 6 of the Re sta te m en t 15 (Sec ond) of Torts, “ W ork Dangerous in Absence of Special P reca ution s,” pr ovid es 16 that when one em

ploy s an independ ent contractor to do work that the em ploy er 17 “ shou ld recogniz e as l i k ely to crea te during its progress a peculiar r isk of phy sical 1 8 ha rm t o o t h e r s u n l e s s s p e c i a l p r e c au t i o n s a r e t a k e n , ” t h e e m p l o y e r i s s ub

j ec t t o 19 liabilityfor phy sical harm to “ others” caused by

the independent contractor’ s failure36

1 to e xe rc ise r ea sona

ble c ar e to t ak e the spe ci al pr ecaut io ns . Thi s is so r eg ar dle ss o f 2 w he the r “ t h e e m

p l o y e r h a s p r o v i d e d f

o r s u c h p r e c au t i o n s i n t h e c o n t r ac t or 3 otherwise. ” Id

. T he Res ta te m en t’ s il lus tr at ion s of the appl ic at ionof

S ec tio n 41 6 4 de m onstrate tha t i t w as int en de d to appl y to inj ur ed

thi rd part ie s w ho h ad

no 5 connection to the em

ploy er or to t h e in dependent con tractor and who wer e inj ured 6 thr ough no fault of the ir ow n by virtue of the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or ’ s f ai lur e to t ak e 7 p r e c a u ti on s fo r th e sa fet y of t he ge ne ral pu bl ic

. Se e id

. c m t

. c , e ( i l l u s t r a t i n g th e 8 intended app lication of Section 416). 9 { 64} Section 427 of the Restatem ent (Sec ond) of Torts, “Ne gligence as to Danger 10 In he re nt i n th e W ork, ” subj ec ts an e m plo y er of a n in de pe nde nt c ontra ct or to lia bil ity 11 fo r inj ur ie s to “ oth er s” c au se d by the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or ’ s f ai lur e to t ak e 12 re as ona

ble pr ec au tio ns a ga ins t “ a spe ci al dange r” w he re the w ork fo r which the 13 ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or w as hir ed

inv olv es a“ spe ci al dange r to o the rs w hic h th e 1 4 emp l o yer k n o ws o r h a s r e a s o n t o kn o w t o b e i n h er en ti n o r n o rmal t o t h e w o rk [. ]” 15 L ike those a cc om

pa ny ing S ec tio n 41 6, the Re sta te m en t’ s il lus tr at ion s of the 16 application o f Se ction 427 dem onstrate that it was intended to applyto circum stances 17 in w hich a third party , a m em ber of the public, w ith no relationship to the em ploy er 18 or to the ind ep en de nt c ontra ct or w as inj ur ed

a s ar es ult

of the ind ep en de nt16 The Sai zCourt concluded that although the term s “ peculiar risk” and “ special 5 17 da nge r” both a

ppe ar in the Re sta te m en t, it w oul d tre at the m a s e qui va le nt; f

oll ow ing 18 the Co urt’ s le ad

in Sai z , I do not dis tin gui sh the se te rm s and, f or sim pli ci ty , use the 19 te rm “ pe cu li ar ri sk ” ex cl us iv el y . Se e id. ¶ 12 n

. 6.

37 1 co ntr ac tor ’ s f

ai lur e to t ak e pr ec au tio ns n ec es sa ry to al ert the pub lic to a da nge ro us 2 co nd it io n. Se e id. cmt. d(pr ov id in g i ll us tra ti on s)

. 3 { 65} R e c o g n i z i n g t h a tS e c t i o n s 4 1 6 a n d 4 2 7 w e r e d i f f e r e n t f o rmu l a t i o n s o f

t h e s a me 4 principle, the Sai

z Co urt sy

nth es iz ed the re spe ct ive se ct ion s init s ho ldi ng tha t “ one 5 w ho e m

plo y s an ind ep en de nt co ntr ac tor to do w ork tha t the em plo y er as a m at te r of 6 law shou ld recognize as likely to crea te a peculia r ri

sk of phy sical harm

to others 7 unless reasonable pre cautions ar e taken is liable for phy sical harm to others caused 8 by an absence of tho se preca ution s.” Sai

z , 1992-NMS C-018, ¶ 15 (em phasis add ed); 9 se e id

. ¶ 12 n.6 (statin g that work that presents a “ peculiar risk ” o r “ special danger” 5 10 is “ inherently

dangerous”). 11 { 66} Pl ai nti ff

a rg ue s th at

S ae nz ’ s w ork a ct ivi ty

w as inh er en tly

dange ro us u nde r the 12 Sai ze xc ep tio n. P la int if

f’ s th eo ry of inh er en t dange r is bas ed on an ar gum en t tha t the 13 w ork a ct ivi ty

tha t S ae nz w as pe rfo rm ing w he n he die d sa tis fi es the thr ee -p ar t t es t 14 es ta bli she d in G abal

don , 199 9- N MS C- 039, ¶ 13, fo r ev al ua tin g whe the r ana ct ivi ty 15 is in he ren tl y

da ng ero us as a m at te r of law.38

1 { 67} T o be c onsi de re d in he re ntl y dange ro us a s am at te r of

law , the a t- iss ue a ct ivi ty 2 m ust present a “peculiar risk.” Sai z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 12 n

. 6 ( sta tin g th at w ork is 3 inh er en tly

dange ro us b ec au se it

pr es en ts a pe cu liar ri sk)

. In ge ne ra l, a “ pe cu liar ri sk” 4 is one that is outsi de the realm of p ersonal experience, such that the person su bje cted 5 to th e ri skis un fami l i a r w i th th e as so ci at edda ng er. See V aldez v. Yates P etrol eu m 6 Co rp. , 2007-NMC A- 0 3 8 , ¶ 1 1 , 141 N. M. 381, 155 P. 3d 78 6 (stating th at personal 7 ex pe ri en ce w itha n a ct ivi ty tha t r es ult s in

f am ili ar ity w ithits da nge rs de fi es a 8 co nc lus iontha t the r isks of the a ct ivi ty

a re pe cu lia

r)

. I n th e co nte xt o f co nstru ct ion 9 w ork, ape cu liar ri sk i s on e tha t is “ not ro uti ne ly en co unt er ed in the co ntr ac tor ’ s li ne 10 of work. ” Sie ve rs v . M cC lur e , 74 6 P .2d 88 5, 8 89 -9 0 (Al as ka 19 87 ). 11 { 68} Under the par

ticular circ um stances of this case, the work that Sa en z w as 12 en ga ge d ina t the ti m e of his de at h do es not

c om e w ith in the le ga l de fi nit ionof 13 “ inh er en tly

dange ro us” w ork. S ae nz w as a ski lle d, ex pe ri en ce d, an d kn ow le dge ab le 14 ironworker, equipped with fall-protection devices, aw are of the hazar ds and required 1 5 s a f e t y p r e c au t i o n s o f

h i s t r a d e , a w a r e o f n o rmal r o u t i n e mat t e r s o f i r o n w o rka c t i v i t y, 16 an d aw ar e of

the r isk a nd h az ar d of

f al lin g fr om the he igh t of

a n un fi nis he d bu ild ing

. 17 Furthe rm or e, S ae nz ha d w orke d on larg e co nstru ct ionpr oj ec ts, inc lud ing ha vin g 18 pa rt ic ipa te d inthe struct ur al ste el c onstru ct ionw ork of se ve ra l bu ild ing s f

ro m the 19 gr ound

up.39

1 { 69} Sa en z ha d tr ai ne d both of his sons , Ja son an d Marc us, to be ir onw orke rs . Ja son 2 te sti fi ed

tha t S ae nz w as “ ex tr em el y sa fe ty c onsc iou s” a nd tha t S ae nz ha d tr ai ne d hi m 3 in i ro nw ork sa fe ty

pr ec au tio ns, inc lud ing howto use aharn es s, abe am er, and a 4 lany ar d, an d ev entua lly , howto w ork a t he igh ts. Marc us, w ho w as w orkin g w ith 5 Sa en z on the day

of S ae nz ’ s ac ci de nt, te sti fi ed tha t Sa en z w ar ne d hi m “ se ve ra l t im es ” 6 not to w ork a t he igh ts o r to w alk across be am s w ith out be ing ti ed

of f. S ae nz a lso 7 advis ed

his c o- w orke rs on saf

ety m at te rs , inc lud ing “ howto be c ar ef ul[ , ] ” “ howto 8 ti e o ff[,]” an d “ ho w to m ak e su re t ha t [t he y ] were wo rk in g s afel y at t he job .” 9 { 70} Bo th R an ac k’ s and A la m o’ s e m plo y ee s w ere re qui re d to use f al l pr ote ct ion , 10 inc lud ing ar equir em en t t o ti e of f w he n w orkin g f

ro m e le va te d ar ea s, w hic h, 11 accor di ng t o R a na c k’ s po l i c y , i nc l ud e d any he i gh t ov e r si x f e e t

. T hu s, S a e nz wa s 12 re q u i re d to be tied off when w orking at the heig ht from which he f

ell. E vidence at 13 tr ia l e sta

bli she d th at

the ta sk tha t S ae nz w as a tte m pti ng to per fo rm

w he n he f

el l c oul d 14 ha ve be ena cc om

pli sh ed sa fel y

by , in ke ep ing w iththe ti e- of f re qui re m en t, ty ing 15 him se lf

of f to a j ois t or to the ste el str uc tur e tha t wa s in pl ac e, or by usi ng a la dde r to 16 reac h his dest ination rather than wa lking across t he concrete wall. Evidence a t trial 17 also showed that had Saenz tied off, he would have fallen no m ore than six feet before 18 his l a ny a r d w ou l d have a rr e st e d hi s f a l l

. T he f or e go i ng f

a c tua l pr e se nt a t i on was 19 cred it edbo th by the jury an d b y th e d is tri ctco ur t.40

1 { 71} O w ing to his kno w le dge a nd e xpe ri en ce in re ga rd to th e da nge rs of the 2 ir onw ork tra de an d th e fa ct tha t he w as ski lle d inguard ing a ga ins t the dange rs , the 3 ris k of deat h or inju ry fro m fal li ng was no t “pe cu li a r ” t o S a en z. See V aldez , 200 7- 4 N MC A -0 38, ¶

11 ( sta tin g th at

pe rs ona l e xpe ri en ce w it h an a ct ivi ty tha t r es ult s in 5 fam iliarity

with its d an g er s defies a c onclusi on that th e risks of the activity are 6 pe cu liar) ; se e als o W

arnick v. H

ome D epot U. S.A ., Inc. , 516 F

. S upp. 2d 4 59, 469 7 (E

. D

. P a. 200 7) ( “ A ll co nstru ct ionw ork in vol ve s ar isk of som e harm ; on ly

w he re the 8 work is done under unu sually dangerous circum stances does it inv olve a

. . . peculiar 9 ri sk. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c ita tio n om itt ed )) ; Sie ve rs , 746 P

. 2d a t 889- 90 10 (h old ing tha t, in the co nte xt of co nstru ct ion w ork, a pec uli ar ri sk is one tha t i s “ not 11 rout i n el y encountered in the contractor’ s line of work” such that the em ploy er of a 12 co ntr ac tor m ay

onl y be he ld l ia

ble f or “ tho se ha zard s w hic h th e ind ep en de nt 13 co ntr ac tor

is unl ike ly

to be a w ar e of

a nd the re fo re una

ble to p ro te ct

a ga ins t” ). T o th e 14 co ntr ar

y , S ae nz w as w el l aw ar e of the r isk of f al lin g and the e ve r- pr es en t ne ed to 15 guard against that risk when working from heights

. Beca use the presence of a

peculiar 16 ri sk i s an in ex tr ic ab le e le m en t of “ inh er en t dan ge r,” the c ir cu m stanc es he re do n ot 1 7 s up p o rtac o n c l u s i o n t h a tS a e n z wa s e n g a g e di n a n i n h e r e n t l y d a n g e r o u s a c t i v i t y. 18 Sai z , 199 2- N MS C- 018, ¶

¶ 11, 12 n. 6 ( expla ini ng tha t w ork is inh er en tly dange ro us 19 because it presents a peculiar risk).41

1 { 72} H a v i n g c o n c l u d e dt h a tt h e w o r k t h a tS a e n z w a s p e r f o rmi n g d o e s n o tc o me 2 w ith in the m ean in g of “ inh er en t dange r” a s th at te rm w as use d in Sai

z , I further 3 co n clude that the three-part te st establish ed by the G abal

don C o u rtf

o r e v a l ua tin g 4 whether an activity

is inherently

dangerous do es not apply under the circum stances 5 of th is cas e. Se e G abal don , 199 9- N MS C- 039, ¶ 13 ( es ta bli shi ng a thr ee -p ar t t es t t o 6 determ ine whether an activity sh o u l d b e con sidered “ inherently dangerous” as that 7 te rm w as use d in Sai

z ). Under the G abal

don te st, in or de r to c onc lud e tha t an a ct ivi ty 8 is i nhe re ntl y

dange ro us: ( 1) “ the a ct ivi ty m ust inv olv e an unus ua l or pe cu liar ri sk o f 9 ha rm tha t i s no t a

nor m al r out ine m at te r of

c ust om ar

y hu m an act ivity ”; ( 2) “ the 10 ac tiv ity

is lik el y to ca use ahig h pr oba

bil ity of harm in the ab se nc e of

r ea sona ble 11 pr ec au tio ns” ; and (3 ) “ the da nge r or pr oba bil ity of ha rm m

ust fl ow fr om

the a ct ivi ty 12 itself when carried out in its ordin ary , e xpected way [. ] ” Id

. Beca use they we re der ived 13 fr om the Sai zdefinition o f “ inherent danger,” t h e fa ct ors of the G abal don te st 14 contem

plated an unwitting plaintiff, a m em ber o f the genera l publ ic, who is unable, 15 by virtue of his la ck of ex pe ri en ce w ith the da nge ro us co ndi tio n aw ai ti ng hi m , to 16 gu ard ag ai ns t th e ris k pre se nt ed by a da ng ero u s c o n d it io n. Se e id. ¶ 14 ( “ T he f

ir st 17 prong add resses th e relative rarity of the activity

and the concom itant lack of contact 18 or ex pe r i e nc e w i t h t he a c t i vi t y a nd i t s dang e r s by

t he g e ne r a l p ub l i c . ” ( i nt e rna l 19 quot ation m arks and citation om itted)). In light of Saenz’ s knowledge and experience42

1 as an ironworking tra desm an and that Saenz w as a subcontractor’ s em ploy ee, instead 2 of a third party , the G abal don thr ee -f

ac tor a na ly sis is too li m ite d an ana ly sis thr ough 3 which to evaluate Saenz’ s ironwork task. E ven if the G abal don test wer e construed 4 t o app l y

t o ac i r c um st a nc e i n w hi c h t he i nj ur e d part y w a s t he e m

pl oy ee of a 5 subc ontra ct or

( co ntr ar y to Montanez ), addit ion al f ac tor s w oul d have to be 6 c o n s i d e r e d

— p a rt i c u l a r l y, t h e kn o w l e d g e , s k i l l , a n d e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e i n ju r e dp a rt y. 7 Consid ering these addition al fac tors would, for the reasons that I set forth earlier, lead 8 to a c onc lus iontha t, und er

the c ir cu m stanc es of

thi s c as e, S ae nz w as not

e nga ge d in 9 a n i n h e r e n t l y d a n g e r o u s a c t i v i t y. 10 Th e D i st r i c t C ou r t ’ s D e n i al of P l ai n t i f f’ s M ot i on f

or a N e w T r i al Should Be 11 Af firm ed 12 { 73} O n the spe ci al ve rd ic t for m , the j ur y re tur ne d ver dic ts f

ind ing “ the tot al a m ount 13 of da m ag es suf

fe re d by P la int if f V ir gin iaS ae nz , I ndi vid ua lly to be $48 2, 000” a nd 14 fi ndi ng “ the to tal am ount of da m ag es suf

fe re d by the E sta te of

Ch ar le s A nth ony 1 5 Sa en z, De ce as ed , t o b e $ 0 .” Th e j u r y’s v er d i ct wa s re ad i n o p en co u rt . P l ai n t i ff ’s 16 co unse l di d no t r ai se a ny iss ue in re ga rd

to es ta te da m ag es pr ior

to the dis ch ar ge of 17 the j ur y . Rathe r, the iss ue w as ra ise d fo r the fi rs t tim e m or e than tw o w ee ks a ft er the 18 trial ended, w hen Plaintiff filed a m otion for a m istrial

. In that m otion , P laintiff 19 soug ht a

m istri al in the post -j ur

y -d isc ha rg e pr oc ee din g ba se d ona n arg um en t tha t, in 20 arri vi ng at th e zero ve rd ic t fo r th e Est at e, th e jury ign or ed“ ov erwh el m in g e vi de nc e,”43

1 s o m e h o w m e a s u r e d b y a s ub s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d , c o n s t i tu t i n g j u ry ab u se of 2 discretion, includin g jury bias, prejudice, or p assion. Ranack asserted in response that 3 the el em en ts of poss ibl e inj ur y to Sa en z an d hi s e sta te w as vig or ousl y c ont es te d and 4 s e to u te x a mp l e s o f

S a e n z ’s d i f

f i c u l t i e s r e t a i n i n g e mp l o ym e n t , h i s c r i mi n a l h i s t o ry, 5 the im pact of that h i s t o ry o n his future em ploy m ent oppo rtunities, his havin g lived 6 ap ar t f ro m his f am ily w hil e in p ri son an d w hil e not in pr iso n, a nd h is f

ai lur e to 7 supp ort his of

fs pr ing

. T he dis tr ic t co urt de nie d Pl ai nti ff ’ s m istri al m oti on, se em ing ly 8 c o n v i n c e dt h a ts ub s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s up p o rt e d t h e v e r d i c t g i v e n t h e “n u mb e r o f i t e ms 9 brough t into evid ence[, ] ” in cluding “ [t] he crim inal histo ry of this ind ividu al, the fact 10 th athe ha d ju st go tt en ou t o f jail so m e m on th s ea rli er, s o o n a nd so for th .” 11 { 74} “ The j ury ’ s verdict is presum ed to be correc t[,] ” and “ [w]h en t h e jury m akes 12 a de te rm ina tio n and the tr ia l c ourt a ppr ove s, the am ount aw ar de d in dol lars stands in 13 the strongest posit ion known in the law. ” E nni s v . Km art

Co rp. , 200 1- N MC A -0 68, 14 ¶ 27, 131 N

. M. 32, 33 P

. 3d 3 2 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c ita tio n om itt ed ). I n th is 15 appeal, ther e exists no issue of bias, passion, prej udice, exce ssive verdict, or im proper 16 adm iss ion of ev ide nc e. T he re e xis ts n o c ont en tio n of dis tr ic t c ourt e rr or

in re ga rd to 17 the spe ci al ve rd ic t su

bm itt ed to the j ur y . Pl ai nti ff

und isp ute dly

did not pr es er ve in the 1 8 dis t r i c tc o u rta n y

c o n c e rn w i t h t h e s p e c i a l v e r d i c t

. T h e j u ry w a s d i s c h a r g e dw i th 19 Pl ai nt iff’s ful l k no wled ge of t he ve rd ic t.44

1 { 75} Instead of attacking the basis on whic h t h e d istrict court concluded th at 2 subs tantial evidence existed, Plaintiff and the Maj ority rely on not ions o f an 3 “ ina de qua te ” ve rd ic t, “ co ntr ar y t o th e e v i d e n c e , ” an d

“ ove rwhe lm ing e vid en ce ” of the 4 j ur y ’ s e rr o n e o u s f

a i l u r e t o a w a r d d a m a g e s t o t h e e s t a t e . M a j o r i t y O p . ¶

¶ 5 0

- 5 2, 54. 5 The M aj ority

buttresses its po sit i o n wi t h foreign (and in m y view, inapplicable) 6 au tho ri tie s to sup port the a sse rt ionf or the c as e at

hand tha t the w ai ve r ru le doe s no t 7 ap ply

. Rana ck

r el ie s on Th om

pson , 1987-NMS C-039, ¶ 11, for the propositio n that 8 by f ai lin g to obj ec t to th e jury ’ s ve rd ic t or oth er w ise a le rt the dis tr ic t c ourt t o th e 9 al le ge d erro r pr ior to the j ur y ’ s dism iss al , Pl ai nti ff w ai ve d the oppo rt uni ty to ra ise a ny 10 cl ai m of e rro r in reg ard to th e am ou nt of e st at e d am ag es . I ag ree with Ran ack

. Se e id. 11 (“ [T ] he r igh t t o ob

j ec t t o an im

pr ope r ve rd ic t i s w ai ve d w he n no t m ad e at the ti m e of 12 t h e v erdict and cannot be recla im ed and revived by resorting to a m otion for a new 13 tr ia l o r on a

ppe al

. ”)

. F or

the r ea sons tha t f

oll owin thi s di sse nt, the de nia l of 14 Pl ai nti ff

’ s po st- j ur y -d isc ha rg e m oti on c ana nd s houl d be uph el d, if not ba se d on 15 subs tanti al e vid en ce a s de te rm ine d by the di st ric t c ourt, the n, c ontrary to the 16 Maj ority ’ s analy sis, because Plaintiff failed to pre serve an attack on the j ury ’ s verdict 17 an d th e fa

ult lay not in ve rd ic t i na de qua cy

but in Pl ai nti ff

’ s li tig at ionappr oa chor 18 fa ilure s.45

1 { 76} Em

bedd ed i n NewMexico lawis the requirem ent that a party objec t to an 2 im proper verdict before the j ury is discharged, and that the party that fails to objec t 3 w ai ve s the ri ght to a ne w tr ia l af te r the j ur y ’ s di sc ha rg e . I

d. ; G uest v

. A lls tat e In s. Co

. , 4 20 09 -NMCA- 03 7, ¶ 3 6, 1 45 N

. M

. 7 9 7 , 2 05 P.3d 84 4, reversed in part o n other 5 grou nds by201 0- N MS C- 047, 149 N

. M. 74, 244 P. 3d 3 42; G & G Servs., Inc. , 200 0- 6 N MC A -0 03, ¶

¶ 40- 42; D iv er

sey Co rp. v . Ch em -S

ourc e Co rp. , 199 8- N MC A -1 12, 7 ¶ 39, 125 N

. M. 748 , 965 P

. 2d 3 32; R am os , 1 9 9 4

- N M C A

- 1 1 0 , ¶ 1 3 ; se e als o 8 Phi li pp ine Na t’ l O il Co

. v . G arr et t C orp. , 7 2 4 F

. 2 d 8 0 3 , 8 0 6 ( 9 t h C i r . 198 4) 9 (rec ogni zing that failure to objec t to a no-dam ages verdict at the tim e that it is read 10 constitu tes a wai v er o f any future obj ections to th e form of the verdict and further 11 stating th at in the federa l sy stem “ failure to aw ard dam ages does not by itself render 12 a ve rd ict i nvali d” ); Balderas v. Starks , 200 6 U T App 2 18, ¶ ¶ 17- 19, 138 P

. 3d 7 5 13 (stating that a failure to object to the sufficiency or legality

of a ver dict before the j ury 14 is d i sc har ge d c on st i tut e s aw a i ve r o f t he o bj e c t i ona nd

r e c og ni z i ng t ha tt he w aiver 15 rule avoids “ the expense and additi onal tim e for a new tr ial by having th e j ury

which 16 he ar d th e fa ct s c lari fy the [ m at te r] w hil e it is abl e to do so” ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks 17 an d c it at io n o m it te d) ). 18 { 77} In D iversey , thi s C ourt e xpl or ed w he the r a funda m en ta l e rr or c oul d ov er

ri de 19 the f ai lur e to t im el y

obj ec t t o an a m

big uous ve rd ic t. 1998 -N MC A -1 12, ¶¶ 36- 40. T he46

1 questio n of am

bigu ity invol ved whether the use of “ and/or” in an instructio n rendered 2 the j ury ’ s verdict am

bigu ous with the consequ ence that the j ury im properly aw arded 3 a d ou bl e rec ov ery fo r th e sa m e in jury. Id

. ¶ 36

. The C ourt determ ined that 4 funda m en ta l e rr or

ge ne ra lly did not ap ply in ci vil ca se s an d lim ite d an y e xc ep tio n to 5 waiv er to sp eci fic “ ex cep ti on al cir cu m st an ces ” fo un d i n fo ursp eci fic cas es . Id

. ¶ 40 6 (stating that fund am ental err or may b e fou nd in civi l cases in which “ subs tantial 7 j ust ic e w as not

don e, the c ourt w as de pr ive d of j ur isd ic tio n to he ar the c as e, the iss ue 8 wa s one of general pu blic interest that would im pact a large nu m

ber o f litigants, or[] 9 th e r e w a s at o t a l ab s e n c e o f a n yt h i n g i n t h e r e c o r do f t h e c a s e s h o w i n g ar i g h tto 10 relief” (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted)). None of the e xcep t ional 11 ci rc um stanc es ex ist in the pr es en t ca se . Furthe rm or e, Pl ai nti ff cr ea te d al l of w hic h sh e 12 nowc om

pla ins

. 13 { 78} The j ury

wa s instructed based on UJI 13- 1830 that “ [t] he lawsuit has been 14 br ough t by V ir gin iaS ae nz , I ndi vid ua lly a nd o n be ha lf

of the e sta te of

. . . S ae nz , w ho 1 5 i s n o w d ec ea s ed .” Th i s i n s t ru ct i o n wa s ad o p t ed v erb at i m b y t h e c o u rt fr o m

Pl ai n t i ff ’s 16 re que ste d U JI 13- 1830 w hic h sh e m odi fi ed , subs tit uti ng “ on b eh al f of

the sur viv ing 17 be ne fi ci ar ie s” w ith“ on b eh al f of the es ta te [. ] ” T he te rm “ es ta te ” w as not de fi ne d f or 18 the j ury

in any j ury instruction . T he special verdict form given to th e j ur y

wa s 19 likewise, in pertinent part relating t o d am ages, a dopt ed from Plaintiff’ s requested47

1 spe ci al ve rd ic t f

orm . Pl ai nti ff

’ s re que ste d spe ci al ve rd ic t fo rm giv ento the j ur y did 2 no t ca rr

y out U JI 13- 1830 ’ s us e not e sugg es tio n th at the “ va ri ous el em en ts o f 3 da m ag es . . . be br oke n ou t sep arat el y on the spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm . . . in or de r to 4 ide nti fy

da m ag es re co ve ra

ble by the es ta te ” as dis tin gui she d fr om tho se r ec ove ra

ble 5 by the de ce de nt’ s sp ouse a nd b en ef ic iari es f or los s of c onso rt ium

. T hus, ne ith er the 6 UJI 13-1 83 0- ba se d i ns t r uc t i on no r t he sp e c i a l ve r di c t f or m a s gi ve n t o t he j ur

yat 7 Plaintiff’ s request explained the dis tingu ishin g factors inherent in “ Virginia Sa enz, 8 In div idu al ly

a nd o n be ha lf

of the e sta te , ” as tho se w or ds a ppe ar ed in the ins tr

uc tio n, 9 or “ Virginia Sa enz” as the “ survivi ng spo use ,” as t hose would have appeared in an 10 unm odi fi ed

U JI 13- 1830

. A nd, im

portantl y , Pl ai nti ff did not poi nt o ut o r ex pla in t o 11 the j ur y an y dif fe re nc es or dis tin gui shi ng fa ct or s ab out da m ag es re co ve ry in cl osi ng 12 arg um en t. 13 { 79} Pl ai nti ff

’ s U JI 13 -1 83 0- ba se d i ns tru ct io n c ould e as ily have giv en

an im pr es sio n 14 to and reasonably

have been interpreted by the j ury to sa y that Virginia Sae nz wa s 15 en tit le d to one r ec ove ry e nc om pa ssi ng b othhe r ind ivi dua l and r ep re se nta tiv e 16 ca pa ci tie s. P la int iff

’ s sp ec ia l ve rd ic t f

orm did not c lari fy pot en tia l r ec ove ri es . T he 17 special verdict form

provided a b l ank space for dam ages “ suffere d by Plaintiff 1 8 V i r g i n i aS a e n z , I n d i v i du a l l y[ , ]” wh i c h , g i v e n t h e wa y th e i n s t r u c t i o n r e a d , n a mel y, 19 “ In div idu al ly

a nd o n be ha lf

of the e stat e,” could

r ea sona bly be r ea d a s c al lin g f

or48

1 re c o v e ry o f o n e a m o u n t c o n s i s t i n g o f d a m a g e s i n b o t h c ap a c i t i e s . N o w h e r e i n th e 2 special verd i ct form

wa s there a se parate place for the j ury to consid er dam ages 3 recovera

ble by “ Virginia Sa enz on behalf of the estate .” Fu rther, Vir ginia Saenz as 4 “ survivi ng spo use” appears nowher e in the special verdict form . I n awarding zero as 5 “ dam ages suffere d by the Estate of Charle s AnthonySae nz” (w ith “ the Estate” 6 now he re de sc ri be d, now he re dif fe re nti at ed

f ro m “ V ir gin iaS ae nz , I ndi vid

ua lly , ” an d 7 now he re ind ic at ing w he the r the a w ar d should be giv ento V ir gin iaS ae nz in he r “ on 8 be ha lf of the es ta te ” ca

pa ci ty ) the j ur

y c oul d r ea sona

bly ha ve c onc lud ed

f ro m the 9 ins tr uc tio ns, the spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm , a nd the la ck of an y ex plana tio n to the j ur y by 10 Pl ai nti ff

, tha t i ts aw ar d of

$48 2, 000 pr ope rl y

inc lud ed a ll of t he co m

pensa tio n f

or 1 1 “Vi r g i n i a S a e n z , I n d i v i du a l l y and on beh al f the es ta te ” ac co rd ing to Pl ai nti ff ’ s U JI 12 13 -1 83 0- ba se d a nd m od ifi edin st ru ct io n. (Em ph as is ad de d.) 13 { 80} D ur ing its de lib er at ion s, the j ur y se nt a not e to the co urt as kin g th e fo llo w ing 14 que sti on: “ D oe s ‘ tot al a m ount of da m ag es to the E sta te of .

. . Sae nz ’ inc lud e al l 15 am ount s aw ar de d to [ Pl ai nti ff a nd the c hi ld ren ] or is it m eant t o be ase pa ra te 16 am ount ?” T his que sti on la ck ed cl ar ity

. G ive n the m an ne r in w hic h Pl ai nti ff ha d th e 17 j ur y ins tr uc te d, inc lud ing howhe r spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm r ea d, the que sti on c oul d 18 reasonably

be interpreted as a sking not w hether there shou ld be separately aw arded 19 da m ag es pur suant t o a divisi on or dist inc tio n betw ee n “ In div idu al ly ” on the one hand49

1 and either “ on behalf of the estate” or “ the Estate” on the oth er hand , b u t whether , 2 upon or af

te r an aw ar d “ of al l a m ount s” to Pl ai nti ff , ind ivi dua lly

a nd o n be ha lf

of the 3 es ta te ( an d to the c hil dr en ), th e Estat e w as sti ll to r ec ei ve ase pa ra te a m ount

. T he 4 co urt c onsu lte d c ouns el f or both part ie s r eg ar din g ho w to re spon d to the que sti on. 5 In it ia ll y , Pl ai nt iff’s co un se l su gg es te d sen di ng th e jury an an swe r sa y in g: “ Yes .” To 6 which the court astutely responded that the problem with that answe r w ould be that 7 the j ur y w oul d th ena sk, “ Wha t i s th e es ta te e nti tle d to ?” T he court i nsi ght fu lly 8 ex pla ine d, f

ro m “ loo kin g a t the da m ag es ins tr uc tio n for w ro ngf

ul dea th,

. . . I a m

not 9 qui te sur e if it ite m iz es the da m ag es f or the e sta te

. ” T he c ourt i nstru ct ed c ouns el to 10 rece ss and loo k at the issue to figure out a wa y t o respond to the note. Counsel 11 returned w ith an agreed up on answer for the j ury , still lacking in clarity , that r ead, “ It 12 is separate[, ] ” w hich the court sug gested be sligh tly m odif i ed to state, “ The ‘ total 13 am ount

of da m ag es to the E sta te of

. . . Sa en z is se pa ra te

. ” Bo th pa rt ie s ag re ed to the 1 4 c o u rt ’s mo d i f

i c a t i o n a n dt h a ta n s w e r

wa s s ub mi t t e dt o t h e ju ry. 15 { 81} T he e viden ce at tri al w as tha t the va lue of S ae nz ’ s lo st w ag es ove r the 16 rem ainder of his working lifetim e w as estim ated to be $450 ,000. N o other doll ar 17 am ount s we re in e vidence with respect to dam ages. O n the face of the special verdict 18 form , the j ur

y a w a r de d $4 82 , 00 0 i n dam a ge s “ su f f e r e d by P l a i nt i f f V i r gi ni aS a e nz , 1 9 In d i v i du al l y[.]” A n dt h e ju ry aw ar d ed d amag es “ s u ff er ed b y” t h e c h i l d re n : t o Sa en z’s50

1 daught er, $50,000 and to each of S aenz’ s sons , $25,000. Th e special verdict form 2 m ad e n o m en ti on of “ co ns or ti um .” 3 { 82} I ti s r e a s o n ab l e t o c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e $ 4 8 2 , 0 0 0 a w a r dt o P l a i n t i f f , i n d i v i du a l l y, 4 ind ic at es tha t the j ur y li ke ly inc lud ed in the a w ar d “ al l a m ount s aw ar de d to 5 [P la int if

f] ”— tha t is, al l am ount s th at

w oul d f lowto he r “ In div idu al ly

a nd o n be ha lf 6 of th e e s t a t e , ” as i ns tru ct ed

. Th i s co n cl u s i o n i s s u p p o r t ed , a m o n g o t h er t h i n gs , b y t h e 7 f a c t t h a t t h e j u r y a s k e d : “ D o e s ‘ t o t a l a m o u n t o f d a m a g e s t o t h e E s t a t e o f

. . . S a e n z’ 8 i n cl u d e a l l a m o u n t s a w a r d ed t o [ P l a i n t i f f a n d t h e ch i l d r en , ] o r i s i t m ea n t t o b e a 9 s e p a r a t e a m o u n t ?” T he que sti on o f howm

uc h of a ny int en de d aw ar d to V ir gin iaS ae nz 10 on b eh al f of

the e sta te sho uld

f lowto he r as a w ro ngf

ul de ath be ne fi ci ar

y und er the 11 Wrongful Death A ct and how m uch shou ld be a l l o cated to Vir ginia Saenz, 12 ind ivi dua lly , f

or los s of c onso rt ium , is not

sug ge ste d or ar gue d by

P la int if f on a ppe al

. 13 Se e ge ne ral lyN MS A 197 8, § 41 -2 -3 ( 2001 ) (g ove rn ing th e distri but ionof the 14 proceeds of a w rongful death judgm ent). 15 { 83} U nde r the c ir cu m stanc es , one can r ea sona bly a ssu m e tha t the j ur

y ’ s aw ar d of 16 $482 , 000 to “ V ir gin iaS ae nz , I ndi vid ua lly ” re pr es en te d m or e than th e va lue of 17 Pl ai nti ff

’ s lo ss o f consor

tiu m , giv enP la int if

f’ s e vid en ce of

e co nom ic da m ag es of 18 $450 ,000. I t is reasonable to conclude that, within i t s $ 4 8 2 ,00 0 award, the j ury51

1 inclu de d da m ages to Pl ai nti ff in both c ap ac iti es , ind ivi dua lly a nd o n be ha lf

of the 2 es t at e, b as ed o n t h e in s t ru ct i o n an d s p ec i al v er d i ct fo rm gi v en t o t h e ju ry, P l ai n t i ff ’s 3 co unse l’ s m isunde rs tandi ng o r m isi nte rp re ta tio n of the j ur y ’ s que sti on and f

ai lur e to 4 as k th e co urt t o in qui re f urthe r, a nd c ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e or de ci sio n no t t o e xpl ai n to the 5 j ur y the dis tin ct ion s an d di ff

er en ce s inP la int if

f’ s c ap ac iti es , the da m ag es e le m en ts, 6 the c om

m en sur at e re co very rig ht s, a nd h owthe j ur y sho uld r ea d and c om

ple te the 7 spe ci al ve rd ic t f

orm . I t i s li ke lytha t the j ur y did not int en d to a w ar d $4 82, 000 to 8 P l a i n t i f f s o l e l y f o r c o n s o rt i u m. 9 { 84} T he out co m e in this c as e is n ot a fa ult of the dis tr ic t cour

t, an d it does not fa ll 10 within any

of Dive rsey ’s alt ern at iv es to fun da m en ta l er ro r. See 19 98 -N MC A -1 12, 11 ¶¶ 36-40. T he outcom e w as the product of Plaintiff not having a ssured that the j ury 12 w as pr operly

a nd c ar ef

ull y ins tr uc te d onthe da m ag es e le m en ts and the dif fe re nt 1 3 c ap a c i t i e s a n dr e c o v e r i e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h ac o n f

o rmi n g s p e c i a l v e r d i c tf

o rm. 14 { 85} The M aj ority

holds t hat a fa ilure to tim ely objec t, bef

ore the j ury

wa s 15 dis ch ar ge d, to anina de qua te da m ag es a w ar d and p ar tic ularl y az er o dam ag es a w ar d, 16 as oppos ed to an i n co nsist ent or am bigu ous verdict, does not con stitut e a w aiver. 17 Ma j or ity O p. ¶ ¶ 50- 53. N ewMe xic o has not a ddr es se d th at iss ue . A s no te d by

the 18 Ma j or ity , on the w ai ve r iss ue , c as es out sid e N ewMe xic o have m ad e a dis ti nctio n52

1 betwee n verdicts with alleged inadequate dam age aw ards an d v erdi cts that are 2 in co ns is te nt wit h re sp ect to su ch award s. Id

. ¶ ¶ 51- 53. 3 { 86} The Majo rit y ’s rel ia n c e o n fo rei gn cas e la w is m is pl aced

. Se e id. ¶ ¶ 51- 54. 4 E ac h f or ei gn au tho ri ty

is dis tin gui sha

ble f or se ve ra l r ea sons . I n no ne of the 5 au tho ri tie s onw hic h th e Ma j or ity r el ie s w as the re c om

pli ci ty by the pla int if

f in 6 subm itting a d efec tive or am bigu ous j ury instructio n and special verdict form and, as 7 here, in perpetuating a m isund erstanding of the jury ’ s questio n. In none of the r elied 8 uponauth or iti es doe s it appe ar tha t the pla int if

f fa ile d inc los ing a rg um en t t o e xpl ai n 9 how to decide what to aw ard. In none o f t h e au thorities was there a special verdict 10 aw ar din g su

bst an tia l c om

pe nsa tor y dam ages c onsi de ra

bly c los e in am ount

to the 11 ev ide nc e of ec onom ic da m ag es pr es en te d in the ca se an d re as ona bly int er pr et ab le to 12 include los s of consortium . I n non e of the authorities wa s a sum aw arded to a plaintiff 13 in a wr ongful d eath case “ indiv idually ” when the aw ard ra tionallycould have been 1 4 int en de d b y t h e j u ry , b a s e d o n i t s r e a d i n g o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a n d v e r d i c t f

o rm , to 15 co ve r not

j ust da m ag es “ ind ivi dua lly ” (f or c onso rt ium ) but

a lso “ on b eh al f of

the 16 es ta te .” 17 { 87} Zhang v. A me rican Gem Seafood s, I nc. , 339 F

. 3d 1 020 (9 th C ir. 20 03 ), is 18 sig nif ic an tly f ac tua lly dif fe re nt f ro m our ca se , an d w he n c ar ef

ull y a na ly ze d, sup ports 19 th is di ss en t. Zh ang shows that the special verdict in our case consisted of two legal53

1 conclusio ns of dam ages and that, despite the claim ed inconsis tency , the verd ict 2 sh ou ld st an d. Zh ang

a lso m ak es c le ar tha t w ithge ne ra l ve rd ic ts o r le ga l c onc lus ion s 3 in a special verdict form , such as in the present ca se, a party can w aive a suffic iency 4 of e vid en ce a rg um en t w he n th e iss ue doe s no t i nvol ve fa ct ua l fi ndi ngs of the j ur

y in 5 a spe ci al ve rd ic t cir cu m stanc e, as he re , but ins te ad inv olv es le ga l c onc lus ion s a s to 6 dam ages. 339 F. 3d at 103 1-34. Further, and signi ficantly , the Zh ang c ourt st at ed : 7 Another persuasive line of cases involves dis crepancies between 8 finding s of liability and dam age aw ards, ty

pically arising when a j ury 9 fi nds lia

bil ity but non ethe le ss aw ar ds z er o dam ag es . . . . [T ] he da m ag e 10 aw ard is not really a separate general verdict, but it is nonetheless a legal 11 co nc lus ion , a nd s o th es e ty pe s of c as es inv olv e pur

porte d c onf

lic ts 12 betwee n two legal conclusion s. . . . Justice Brandeis wr ote that the trial 13 court’ s refusal to grant a newtrial canno t be held erroneous as a m atter 14 of law . Appellate courts sho uld be slo w to im pute to j uries a disregard 15 of

the ir dut ie s, a nd t o tr ia l c ourts a w an t of dili ge nc e or pe rs pic ac ity in 16 ap pr ai sin g th e j ur y ’ s c ondu ct

. T his r

ule r et ai ns v ita li ty, an d w e ha ve 17 not ed tha t the f ed er al r ule is tha t f

ai lur e to aw ar d dam ag es doe s no t by 18 its el f re nde r a ve rd ic t i nva lid

. 19 Id . a t 1036 (internal quotation m arks and citations om itted). 20 { 88} The outcom e here stem m ed from the lack o f clarity of t he UJI 13-180 3-based 21 ins tr uc tio n and the spe ci al ve rd ic t f orm , f ro m the ina de quat e unde rs tandi ng o f an d 22 re spon se to the j ur

y que sti on, a nd f

ro m the f ai lure to ex pl ai n to the j ur y in cl osi ng 23 argum ent how the aw ards should be m ade and divid ed, includi ng w hat the “ Estate” 24 as shown in the special verdict form m eant, as oppo s ed t o what “ Virginia Sa enz,54

1 In div idu al ly

a nd on be ha lf of the es ta te ” (a s sta te d in the m odi fi ed ins tr uc tio n) m eant. 2 Th i s f o o tp r i n to f

c o mp l i c i t y i s t h e c u l p r i th e r e , n o tv e r d i c ti n a d e qu a c y. 3 { 89} Furthe r, it

sim ply c an not be dis put ed

tha t the se ve ral probl em s c re at ed by 4 Pl ai nti ff

c oul d have be enr es olv ed if , upon he ar ing the ze ro da m ag es ve rd ic t fo r the 5 estate along with the subst antial award to Plaintiff, indiv idually , Plaintiff had ra ised 6 the iss ue s a t the ti m e. T his w oul d have giv en th e distri ct c ourt the opp ortun ity

to 7 co nsi de r w ay s in w hic h the j ur y c oul d be f

urthe r ins tr

uc te d or the part ie s c oul d m ak e 8 furthe r ar gum en t t o c lari fy a nd r es olv e que sti ons ab out the ve rd ic t. 9 { 90} Th i s c a se i s no tabo ut e xc e pt i on a l c i r c um st a nc e s, a nd t he r e i s no c lear 10 ina de qua cy

in the ve rd ic t tha t sh oul d gi ve r ise to a ne w tr ia l. T his ca se w as f ull y a nd 11 fa ir ly tr ie d bef or e a j ur y by ex pe ri en ce d coun se l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s 12 d i s c r e ti on or o th erwi se err i n d en y in g P la in ti ff’s m ot io n fo r a n ew tr ia l. Se e id. 13 (s ta tin g th at

w he re aj ur

y f ind s li ab ili ty

but non ethele ss a w ar ds z er o dam ag es , the 14 “ re fu sa l t o gr an t a

ne w tr ia l c an not

be he ld e rr one ous as am at te r of law [ be ca

use 15 a] ppe lla te c ourts s houl d be slo w to im put e to j ur ie s a dis re ga rd of the ir dut ie s, a nd t o 16 tr ia l c ourts a

w an t of dil ige nce or pe rs pic ac ity in ap pr ai sin g th e j ur

y ’ s c ondu ct ” 17 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted)). 18 { 91} In conclusion , I fully understand and am sym pathetic with the difficulties even 19 ex pe ri en ce d li tig at or s have in the vi ci ssi tud es , c ha lle nge s, a nd s ur pr ise s inthe55

1 lit iga tio n ar en a. A tto rn ey s m ust be im

m ed ia te ly aw ar e of

th e p roble m at ic 2 oc curr en ce s. T he y

m ust m ak e on- the -s pot

de ci sio ns. L iti ga tor s ou ght not to en te r int o 3 the f ray w ith out c ar ef ul t houg ht a bout e ve ry a spe ct of tr ia l, f ro m a nti ci pa tin g 4 ev ide nti a ry

i s s u e s , t o r e a d i n e s s i n m a k i n g c l e a r o b j e c t i o n s , t o a n t i c i p a t i n g a nd 5 perceiving error, to assuring clear , correct, and com plete j ury instruction s and special 6 ve rd ic t f

orm s, to an tic ipa tin g j ur

y m isu nde rs tandi ng o f ins tr uc tio ns and f

orm s, a nd 7 to j ur y err or . I t sh oul d be the r ar e ins tanc e in w hic h th is C ourt ov er tur ns, in a fu lly 8 and fairly

tried case, what appears to be an am bigu ous or un clear

j ury verdict, or even 9 one that m ay

appe ar to b e in ad equa te , but , a s he re , ste m s f ro m the c om pla ini ng 10 pa rty ’ s ow n st ep s or

m is- step s. Thi s Court sh oul d no t be in the bus ine ss o f sa vin g 11 parties from

their trial strate gies or m is-steps and forcing com plete new trials on trial 12 co urts and p re va ili ng p ar tie s un de r the se c ir cu m stanc es .

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____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __________ 14 JO N A TH A N B. S U TI N , Ju dg e