1 Delta and the Carriers have asked this Panel to conso lidate their motions to transfer into one cause. Although, for administrative purposes, we have considered these two mo tions together, we do not believe that the consolidation of the motions is warranted and we decline to do so. A ccordingly, we examine each of the three motions individually and on its own merits. 

### N OS 

### . 08-0142, 08-0208 & 08-0427
I N RE 

### D ELTA 

### L LOYDS 

### I NSURANCE 

### C OMPANY OF 

### H OUSTON 

### , T EXAS 

### I N RE 

### H URRICANE 

### R ITA 

### H OMEOWNERS 

### ’ C LAIMS 

### I N RE 

### S OUTHEAST 

### S URPLUS 

### U NDERWRITERS 

### G ENERAL 

### A GENCY 

### , INC



### . O N 

### R EVIEW 

### B Y THE 

### M ULTIDISTRICT 

### L ITIGATION 

### P ANEL

J USTICE H ANKS delivered the opinion of the Multidis trict Litigation Panel, in which J USTICE L ANG and J USTICE S TONE joined.
P RESIDING J UDGE P EEPLES filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which J USTICE M C C LURE joined. Before this Panel are three motions to transfer various insurance coverage cases to a single court for the coordination of pretrial proceedings. 1 These cases, arising from the defendants’ denial of Hurricane Rita property damage claims, are currently pending in Jasper, Jefferson, Hardin and Orange Counties. The first motion, filed by Delta Lloyd’s Insurance Company of Houston (“Delta”), seeks to consolidate four cases brought against Delta and its adjusters. The second motion, filed by Southeast Surplus Underwriters General Agency Inc. (“Southeast”), seeks to consolidate twelve cases brought against Southeast, as the managing general agent for Farmers and Ranchers Insurance Company (“Farmers”), and/or Fa rmers and its adjusters. The third motion, filed by Standard Insurance Company, American-Bankers Insurance Company, American Security Insurance Company and Voyager Insurance Company (collectively, “the Carriers”), seeks to consolidate five cases against the Carriers and th eir adjusters and one case against Underwriters at2 Lloyd’s of London (“Underwriters”) and its adjusters. We grant Delta’s motion in part and deny it in part. We grant Southeast’s motion. We deny the Carriers’ motion. Background For each of the three motions before us, the plaintiffs in the underlying cases own property covered by insurance policies. A ll of the plaintiffs are represented by the same law firm, and they allege that their respective defendants engaged in unfair settlement practices and wrongfully denied their claims for property damage caused by Hurrican e Rita. In each of the petitions, the plaintiffs allege violations of the Texas Insurance Code, fraud, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The petitions in all of the underlying cases contain nearly identical generalized allegations of wrongdoing. The discovery requests are nearly identical, and are typical of initial discovery in insurance coverage disputes—seeking general information regarding each defendant’s justification for denying the claims, as well as each defendants’ policies and procedures for investigating the claims, compliance with the requisite insurance c ode provisions for adjusting the claims and their communications with the plaintiffs. The discovery requests are voluminous, averaging approximately 93 requests for production and 23 interrogatories (plus requests for disclosure) per defendant insurance carrier and 64 requests for pr oduction and 23 interrogatories (plus requests for disclosure) for the remaining defendants. Mandates of Rule 13 Each of the three motions to tran sfer asks us to consolidate a particular subset of cases into an MDL. Rule 13 authorizes this Panel to gran t a motion for the transfer of “related” cases from different trial courts to a single pretrial judge if the transfer will (1) serve the convenience of the

### 3 parties and witnesses and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of litigation. See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN .13.3(a)(2), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 74.162 (West 2005). Our decision regarding a motion to transfer is necessarily influenced by our review of the contents of the parties’ pleadings and discovery in the cases at issue in the motion. Acco rdingly, for each of the three motions to transfer, we analyze the case grouping suggested by the de fendants under the rubric of Rule 13 and the factual issues at play in the cases. Are the Cases Related? Under Rule 13.2(f), cases are re lated if they involve “one or more common questions of fact.” See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN 13.2(f), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE §74.162 (West 2005). While the rule requires common questions of fact, strict identity of issues and parties in the cases is not required and cases containing case-specific issues such as damages may still be transferred under Rule 13.
See In re Hurricane Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d 70, 72 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006). As we have held, “every case is different. No two cases are a like. A rule 13 transfer of cases does not require that the cases be congruent or anything close to it.” In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d at 72. The arguments and counter-arguments made for each of the three motions to transfer are similar. For example, in each of the three moti ons, the movants argue that the cases they list are related because they are all insurance coverage disputes arising from property damage sustained during Hurricane Rita. Accordingly, all three groups of movant defendants contend that a number of common questions of fact exist and that these common questions of fact mandate the transfer of2 Delta and the Carriers specifically request that the cas es they list in their motions be consolidated and transferred to Harris County. Southeast, after initially reque sting that its listed cases be transferred to Bexar County, withdrew its request and now merely asks for a transfer, leaving the choice of appropria te county to our discretion. 

### 4 their cases to a single pretrial court. 2 In contrast, the Respondents argue that all of the cases covered by the three motions are highly individualized and that they do not share common questions of fact. Respondents argue that each individual plaintiff had different problems w ith each defendant carrier and adjuster, and the cases involve separate and distinct pieces of r eal property located in four different counties. At the outset, we note that the fact that these insurance coverage disputes may arise from the same disaster does not mean ipso facto that they are “related” for purposes of Rule 13. Here, in all three motions to transfer, the occurrence of a single disaster–Hurricane Rita–is a common undisputed fact rather than a “common question of fact” under Rule 13. See, e.g., In re Personal Injury Litigation Against Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company LLC, No. 07-0025 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel March 7, 2007)(denying motion to transfer wh ere the alleged similarities between the cases are “not common questions of fac t; instead they are undisputed facts”). Movants’ reliance upon our opinion in In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W. 3d 70 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006) to support their argument that the occurrence of Hurri cane Rita makes all of these cases related under Rule 13 is misplaced. That case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.
In In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation , where we found that the cas es arising from a single disaster–a tragic bus fire–were related, there are common questions of fact regarding the occurrence of the disaster itself. As we noted, because these fact questions are central to the resolution of each case, “none of the parties seriously denied that the liability issues in each of the cases will be substantially the same,” and in all of the cases th e lawyers would have to examine “the same large5 pool of employees and fact witnesses” and explore the same negligence and causation issues of this single event. In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W. 3d at 72; see also In re Cano Petroleum Inc, et. al,. No. 07-0593 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel January 2, 2008)(granting motion to transfer cases where common questions of fact regarding a single disaster–a wildfire–exist in seven lawsuits). However, in each of the three motions curren tly presented to us, the pleadings and the discovery in the underlying cases reveal that the occurrence of Hurricane Rita is not an actual “question of fact,” nor is any purported question of fact pertaining to Hurri cane Rita central to the resolution of the mostly contractual and statutory claims asserted against the various defendants. Rather, the underlying factual questions of each cas e below are the alleged conduct of each of the particular defendants in adjusting the individual in surance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims. These are the unde rlying questions of fact that we must examine to determine whether the cases at issue in each motion are “related” under Rule 13.
Delta Applying the above analysis, each of the four cases against Delta do share common questions of fact regarding Delta’s alleged conduct in adjus ting the individual insurance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims . Accordingly, we agree with Delta that these four cases are “related” under Rule 13.
In In re OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, No. 07-0037 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel March 26, 2007), the Panel addressed factual allegations very similar to the facts before us now and our opinion in that case is instructive to our analysis here. In OCWEN, the plaintiffs argued that the cases were highly individualized and not related because each plaintiffs’6 experience with the defendant in servicing their mortgages “was their own personal nightmare, with unique facts” and each case involves “a different specific piece of real property” located in different counties. Id. However, a review of the pleadings and disc overy revealed that the claims in each of cases are “based on standard practices and pro cedures” followed by a single company in the conduct of its business. Id. Thus we held that, under those circum stances, each case shared one or more common questions of fact and that under Rule 13 they were related.

The claims in each of the nine pending cases are based on standard practices and procedures followed by Ocwen in its business of servicing mortgage loans. Accordingly, in all nine cases, discovery will be aimed at disclosing the nature of these common practices and procedures. In addition, similar legal issues will arise as to whether those standard practices and procedures give rise to liability under the commonly alleged theories. Id. Similarly, as reflected in the plaintiffs’ pleadi ngs and discovery requests, the claims against Delta all arise from standardized policy language used by Delta and from the same standard practices and procedures allegedly followed by Delta with respect to each plaintiff’s claims. Thus, all these cases will focus upon these practices and pr ocedures and the policy language at issue, and the discovery in all of these cases will reflect that same focus. Under these circumstances, we find that the four Delta cases share one or more co mmon questions of fact and are “related” under Rule 13 to warrant transfer. Southeast Likewise, the twelve cases against Southeast al so share common questions of fact regarding the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in adjusting the individual insurance claims and the defendants’ alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’ s claims. The plaintiffs’ pleadings and discovery7 requests for these twelve cases demonstrate that th e claims asserted against Southeast all arise from the same policies issued by Southeast and from the same standard practices and procedures allegedly followed by Southeast with respect to each plainti ff’s claims. Thus, all these cases will be aimed at disclosing the nature of these practices and pro cedures and construing the policy language at issue, and will share common discovery requests and respons es to those ends. Accordingly, we find that these twelve cases are also “related” under Rule 13 to warrant transfer. See In re OCWEN, No. 07- 0037. The Carriers In contrast, we agree with Respondents that th e six cases made the subject of the Carriers’ motion are not “related” under Rule 13 to support transfer. These cases do not share the same underlying questions of fact. They do not share co mmon questions of fact regarding the alleged conduct of each defendant in adjusting the individua l insurance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims. Although the Carriers contend that they a re all members of the “Assurant Group,” a group of companies th at “sells credit related products; memberships products and, extended service contracts,” the Carrier s have not established that the claims against them are based on standard practices and procedures common to all four of the Carriers and the Underwriters in handling the claims, or that the claims arise from the same standardized policy language. See, e.g., In re OCWEN, No. 07-0037. Similarly, there are no allegations before us that the Carriers and Underwriters acted pursuant to a common scheme to harm plaintiffs. Thus, despite identical generalized allegations of wrongdoing, the various petitions presented by Carriers give rise to different questions of fact ba sed on each plaintiff’s dealings and contractual relationship with the defendants. Accordingly, we reject the argumen t that these cases invol ve one or more common8 questions of fact among all of the cases within the meaning of Rule 13. Would the Transfer Further Convenience and Efficiency? We next review whether the transfer of th ese cases would serve the goals of Rule 13—in other words, whether it will (1) serve the convenien ce of the parties and witnesses and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of litigation. See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN .13.3(a)(2), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 74.162 (West 2005). “The movant need not show a nyone has already been inconvenienced or that there are existing problems to be addressed. Instea d, we must simply be convinced that transfer to a pretrial judge woul d promote Rule 13's goals of convenience and efficiency.” In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d 70, 72 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006)

. While the number of parties and cases is a relevant factor in ruling on a motion to transfer, “the number of pending cases and parties is not directly determinative of the necessity of a pretrial transfer.” In re Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin. Inc., 166 S.W. 3d 12, 14 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2005).
Delta
We agree that transferring the cases listed in Delta’s motion to a single pretrial court would further the convenience of both the parties and witnesses in those cases, and would promote the just and efficient resolution of these cases. As a result of the common ques tions of fact regarding Delta’s alleged conduct in adjusting the insurance claims and the contractual basis forthe denial of the claims, the same pool of fact and employee witnesses will likely need to be deposed in each one of the four cases against Delta. As we have held, “[w]hen Rule 13 voices its concern for the convenience of parties and witnesses, it has such persons [fact and employee witnesses] in mind.” In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 2 16 S.W. 3d at 72. Further, as evidenced by the voluminous written discovery sought thus far by plaintiffs, discovery in these ca ses will be time9 consuming and costly to both the parties and witnesses, and both the discovery requests and
responses are likely to be identical in each of the four cases. Coordination of this discovery in a single pretrial court will greatly reduce the time and expense to both the parties and fact witness, because, among other things, the consolidated p roceedings will prevent the needless time and
expense of quadrupled written and deposition discover y, and consolidation will also ensure that identical pretrial issues, including discovery disputes and expert issues regarding Delta’s conduct, are resolved in a consistent manner among the cases. In re Steven E. Looper, Individually, et. al., No. 06-1010 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel April 10, 2006). However, we do not agree that this pretrial judge should necessarily be located in Harris County, a county in which none of these cases are pending. A pretrial judge will be appointed by separate order. Southeast For the same reasons, we find that the transfer of the cases against Southeast to a single pretrial court would be convenient to both the partie s and witnesses and promote the just and efficient resolution of these cases. Eight of the twelve cas es against Southeast were filed in and involve property located in Orange County. The remaining four cases were filed in and involve properties located in Jasper and Hardin Counties–which have a contiguous border with Orange County. Accordingly, we find that the transfer of thes e cases to a single cour t would best serve the convenience the parties and witnesses alike in this case. A pretrial judge will be appointed by separate order. The Carriers We have previously noted that the Carriers cas es are not “related” for purposes of Rule 13.10 Accordingly, we need not address the issue of whet her transfer would be convenient to the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient resolution of the cases listed by the Carriers’ motion. Further, in light of our conclusion, we need not address other arguments raised by movants regarding any alleged efficiency and convenience that might be achieved by transfer due to the common representation by the Mostyn Law Firm of the pl aintiffs in every case, nor do we deem such contention to be relevant in these cases. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Delta and Southeast have shown that the cases listed their motions are “related” within the meaning of Rule 13 and that transferring them to one pretrial court would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the efficient resolution of the claims. Accordingly, Delta’s motion is gran ted in part and denied in part and Southeast’s motion is granted. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the Carriers have not shown that the cases that are the subject of their motion are “related” w ithin the meaning of Rule 13. Accordingly, the Carriers’ motion is denied.

_______________________________ George C. Hanks, Jr. Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: September 5, 20081 Delta and the Carriers have asked this Panel to conso lidate their motions to transfer into one cause. Although, for administrative purposes, we have considered these two mo tions together, we do not believe that the consolidation of the motions is warranted and we decline to do so. A ccordingly, we examine each of the three motions individually and on its own merits. 

### N OS 

### . 08-0142, 08-0208 & 08-0427
I N RE 

### D ELTA 

### L LOYDS 

### I NSURANCE 

### C OMPANY OF 

### H OUSTON 

### , T EXAS 

### I N RE 

### H URRICANE 

### R ITA 

### H OMEOWNERS 

### ’ C LAIMS 

### I N RE 

### S OUTHEAST 

### S URPLUS 

### U NDERWRITERS 

### G ENERAL 

### A GENCY 

### , INC



### . O N 

### R EVIEW 

### B Y THE 

### M ULTIDISTRICT 

### L ITIGATION 

### P ANEL

J USTICE H ANKS delivered the opinion of the Multidis trict Litigation Panel, in which J USTICE L ANG and J USTICE S TONE joined.
P RESIDING J UDGE P EEPLES filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which J USTICE M C C LURE joined. Before this Panel are three motions to transfer various insurance coverage cases to a single court for the coordination of pretrial proceedings. 1 These cases, arising from the defendants’ denial of Hurricane Rita property damage claims, are currently pending in Jasper, Jefferson, Hardin and Orange Counties. The first motion, filed by Delta Lloyd’s Insurance Company of Houston (“Delta”), seeks to consolidate four cases brought against Delta and its adjusters. The second motion, filed by Southeast Surplus Underwriters General Agency Inc. (“Southeast”), seeks to consolidate twelve cases brought against Southeast, as the managing general agent for Farmers and Ranchers Insurance Company (“Farmers”), and/or Fa rmers and its adjusters. The third motion, filed by Standard Insurance Company, American-Bankers Insurance Company, American Security Insurance Company and Voyager Insurance Company (collectively, “the Carriers”), seeks to consolidate five cases against the Carriers and th eir adjusters and one case against Underwriters at2 Lloyd’s of London (“Underwriters”) and its adjusters. We grant Delta’s motion in part and deny it in part. We grant Southeast’s motion. We deny the Carriers’ motion. Background For each of the three motions before us, the plaintiffs in the underlying cases own property covered by insurance policies. A ll of the plaintiffs are represented by the same law firm, and they allege that their respective defendants engaged in unfair settlement practices and wrongfully denied their claims for property damage caused by Hurrican e Rita. In each of the petitions, the plaintiffs allege violations of the Texas Insurance Code, fraud, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The petitions in all of the underlying cases contain nearly identical generalized allegations of wrongdoing. The discovery requests are nearly identical, and are typical of initial discovery in insurance coverage disputes—seeking general information regarding each defendant’s justification for denying the claims, as well as each defendants’ policies and procedures for investigating the claims, compliance with the requisite insurance c ode provisions for adjusting the claims and their communications with the plaintiffs. The discovery requests are voluminous, averaging approximately 93 requests for production and 23 interrogatories (plus requests for disclosure) per defendant insurance carrier and 64 requests for pr oduction and 23 interrogatories (plus requests for disclosure) for the remaining defendants. Mandates of Rule 13 Each of the three motions to tran sfer asks us to consolidate a particular subset of cases into an MDL. Rule 13 authorizes this Panel to gran t a motion for the transfer of “related” cases from different trial courts to a single pretrial judge if the transfer will (1) serve the convenience of the

### 3 parties and witnesses and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of litigation. See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN .13.3(a)(2), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 74.162 (West 2005). Our decision regarding a motion to transfer is necessarily influenced by our review of the contents of the parties’ pleadings and discovery in the cases at issue in the motion. Acco rdingly, for each of the three motions to transfer, we analyze the case grouping suggested by the de fendants under the rubric of Rule 13 and the factual issues at play in the cases. Are the Cases Related? Under Rule 13.2(f), cases are re lated if they involve “one or more common questions of fact.” See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN 13.2(f), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE §74.162 (West 2005). While the rule requires common questions of fact, strict identity of issues and parties in the cases is not required and cases containing case-specific issues such as damages may still be transferred under Rule 13.
See In re Hurricane Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d 70, 72 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006). As we have held, “every case is different. No two cases are a like. A rule 13 transfer of cases does not require that the cases be congruent or anything close to it.” In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d at 72. The arguments and counter-arguments made for each of the three motions to transfer are similar. For example, in each of the three moti ons, the movants argue that the cases they list are related because they are all insurance coverage disputes arising from property damage sustained during Hurricane Rita. Accordingly, all three groups of movant defendants contend that a number of common questions of fact exist and that these common questions of fact mandate the transfer of2 Delta and the Carriers specifically request that the cas es they list in their motions be consolidated and transferred to Harris County. Southeast, after initially reque sting that its listed cases be transferred to Bexar County, withdrew its request and now merely asks for a transfer, leaving the choice of appropria te county to our discretion. 

### 4 their cases to a single pretrial court. 2 In contrast, the Respondents argue that all of the cases covered by the three motions are highly individualized and that they do not share common questions of fact. Respondents argue that each individual plaintiff had different problems w ith each defendant carrier and adjuster, and the cases involve separate and distinct pieces of r eal property located in four different counties. At the outset, we note that the fact that these insurance coverage disputes may arise from the same disaster does not mean ipso facto that they are “related” for purposes of Rule 13. Here, in all three motions to transfer, the occurrence of a single disaster–Hurricane Rita–is a common undisputed fact rather than a “common question of fact” under Rule 13. See, e.g., In re Personal Injury Litigation Against Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company LLC, No. 07-0025 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel March 7, 2007)(denying motion to transfer wh ere the alleged similarities between the cases are “not common questions of fac t; instead they are undisputed facts”). Movants’ reliance upon our opinion in In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W. 3d 70 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006) to support their argument that the occurrence of Hurri cane Rita makes all of these cases related under Rule 13 is misplaced. That case is factually distinguishable from the case at bar.
In In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation , where we found that the cas es arising from a single disaster–a tragic bus fire–were related, there are common questions of fact regarding the occurrence of the disaster itself. As we noted, because these fact questions are central to the resolution of each case, “none of the parties seriously denied that the liability issues in each of the cases will be substantially the same,” and in all of the cases th e lawyers would have to examine “the same large5 pool of employees and fact witnesses” and explore the same negligence and causation issues of this single event. In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 216 S.W. 3d at 72; see also In re Cano Petroleum Inc, et. al,. No. 07-0593 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel January 2, 2008)(granting motion to transfer cases where common questions of fact regarding a single disaster–a wildfire–exist in seven lawsuits). However, in each of the three motions curren tly presented to us, the pleadings and the discovery in the underlying cases reveal that the occurrence of Hurricane Rita is not an actual “question of fact,” nor is any purported question of fact pertaining to Hurri cane Rita central to the resolution of the mostly contractual and statutory claims asserted against the various defendants. Rather, the underlying factual questions of each cas e below are the alleged conduct of each of the particular defendants in adjusting the individual in surance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims. These are the unde rlying questions of fact that we must examine to determine whether the cases at issue in each motion are “related” under Rule 13.
Delta Applying the above analysis, each of the four cases against Delta do share common questions of fact regarding Delta’s alleged conduct in adjus ting the individual insurance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims . Accordingly, we agree with Delta that these four cases are “related” under Rule 13.
In In re OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, No. 07-0037 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel March 26, 2007), the Panel addressed factual allegations very similar to the facts before us now and our opinion in that case is instructive to our analysis here. In OCWEN, the plaintiffs argued that the cases were highly individualized and not related because each plaintiffs’6 experience with the defendant in servicing their mortgages “was their own personal nightmare, with unique facts” and each case involves “a different specific piece of real property” located in different counties. Id. However, a review of the pleadings and disc overy revealed that the claims in each of cases are “based on standard practices and pro cedures” followed by a single company in the conduct of its business. Id. Thus we held that, under those circum stances, each case shared one or more common questions of fact and that under Rule 13 they were related.

The claims in each of the nine pending cases are based on standard practices and procedures followed by Ocwen in its business of servicing mortgage loans. Accordingly, in all nine cases, discovery will be aimed at disclosing the nature of these common practices and procedures. In addition, similar legal issues will arise as to whether those standard practices and procedures give rise to liability under the commonly alleged theories. Id. Similarly, as reflected in the plaintiffs’ pleadi ngs and discovery requests, the claims against Delta all arise from standardized policy language used by Delta and from the same standard practices and procedures allegedly followed by Delta with respect to each plaintiff’s claims. Thus, all these cases will focus upon these practices and pr ocedures and the policy language at issue, and the discovery in all of these cases will reflect that same focus. Under these circumstances, we find that the four Delta cases share one or more co mmon questions of fact and are “related” under Rule 13 to warrant transfer. Southeast Likewise, the twelve cases against Southeast al so share common questions of fact regarding the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing in adjusting the individual insurance claims and the defendants’ alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’ s claims. The plaintiffs’ pleadings and discovery7 requests for these twelve cases demonstrate that th e claims asserted against Southeast all arise from the same policies issued by Southeast and from the same standard practices and procedures allegedly followed by Southeast with respect to each plainti ff’s claims. Thus, all these cases will be aimed at disclosing the nature of these practices and pro cedures and construing the policy language at issue, and will share common discovery requests and respons es to those ends. Accordingly, we find that these twelve cases are also “related” under Rule 13 to warrant transfer. See In re OCWEN, No. 07- 0037. The Carriers In contrast, we agree with Respondents that th e six cases made the subject of the Carriers’ motion are not “related” under Rule 13 to support transfer. These cases do not share the same underlying questions of fact. They do not share co mmon questions of fact regarding the alleged conduct of each defendant in adjusting the individua l insurance claims and the alleged contractual basis for denying each plaintiff’s claims. Although the Carriers contend that they a re all members of the “Assurant Group,” a group of companies th at “sells credit related products; memberships products and, extended service contracts,” the Carrier s have not established that the claims against them are based on standard practices and procedures common to all four of the Carriers and the Underwriters in handling the claims, or that the claims arise from the same standardized policy language. See, e.g., In re OCWEN, No. 07-0037. Similarly, there are no allegations before us that the Carriers and Underwriters acted pursuant to a common scheme to harm plaintiffs. Thus, despite identical generalized allegations of wrongdoing, the various petitions presented by Carriers give rise to different questions of fact ba sed on each plaintiff’s dealings and contractual relationship with the defendants. Accordingly, we reject the argumen t that these cases invol ve one or more common8 questions of fact among all of the cases within the meaning of Rule 13. Would the Transfer Further Convenience and Efficiency? We next review whether the transfer of th ese cases would serve the goals of Rule 13—in other words, whether it will (1) serve the convenien ce of the parties and witnesses and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of litigation. See T EX
. R. J UD
. A DMIN .13.3(a)(2), T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE § 74.162 (West 2005). “The movant need not show a nyone has already been inconvenienced or that there are existing problems to be addressed. Instea d, we must simply be convinced that transfer to a pretrial judge woul d promote Rule 13's goals of convenience and efficiency.” In re Hurricane Rita Bus Evacuation, 216 S.W. 3d 70, 72 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006)

. While the number of parties and cases is a relevant factor in ruling on a motion to transfer, “the number of pending cases and parties is not directly determinative of the necessity of a pretrial transfer.” In re Vanderbilt Mortgage & Fin. Inc., 166 S.W. 3d 12, 14 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2005).
Delta
We agree that transferring the cases listed in Delta’s motion to a single pretrial court would further the convenience of both the parties and witnesses in those cases, and would promote the just and efficient resolution of these cases. As a result of the common ques tions of fact regarding Delta’s alleged conduct in adjusting the insurance claims and the contractual basis forthe denial of the claims, the same pool of fact and employee witnesses will likely need to be deposed in each one of the four cases against Delta. As we have held, “[w]hen Rule 13 voices its concern for the convenience of parties and witnesses, it has such persons [fact and employee witnesses] in mind.” In re Hurricane Rita Evacuation Bus Fire, 2 16 S.W. 3d at 72. Further, as evidenced by the voluminous written discovery sought thus far by plaintiffs, discovery in these ca ses will be time9 consuming and costly to both the parties and witnesses, and both the discovery requests and
responses are likely to be identical in each of the four cases. Coordination of this discovery in a single pretrial court will greatly reduce the time and expense to both the parties and fact witness, because, among other things, the consolidated p roceedings will prevent the needless time and
expense of quadrupled written and deposition discover y, and consolidation will also ensure that identical pretrial issues, including discovery disputes and expert issues regarding Delta’s conduct, are resolved in a consistent manner among the cases. In re Steven E. Looper, Individually, et. al., No. 06-1010 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel April 10, 2006). However, we do not agree that this pretrial judge should necessarily be located in Harris County, a county in which none of these cases are pending. A pretrial judge will be appointed by separate order. Southeast For the same reasons, we find that the transfer of the cases against Southeast to a single pretrial court would be convenient to both the partie s and witnesses and promote the just and efficient resolution of these cases. Eight of the twelve cas es against Southeast were filed in and involve property located in Orange County. The remaining four cases were filed in and involve properties located in Jasper and Hardin Counties–which have a contiguous border with Orange County. Accordingly, we find that the transfer of thes e cases to a single cour t would best serve the convenience the parties and witnesses alike in this case. A pretrial judge will be appointed by separate order. The Carriers We have previously noted that the Carriers cas es are not “related” for purposes of Rule 13.10 Accordingly, we need not address the issue of whet her transfer would be convenient to the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient resolution of the cases listed by the Carriers’ motion. Further, in light of our conclusion, we need not address other arguments raised by movants regarding any alleged efficiency and convenience that might be achieved by transfer due to the common representation by the Mostyn Law Firm of the pl aintiffs in every case, nor do we deem such contention to be relevant in these cases. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Delta and Southeast have shown that the cases listed their motions are “related” within the meaning of Rule 13 and that transferring them to one pretrial court would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the efficient resolution of the claims. Accordingly, Delta’s motion is gran ted in part and denied in part and Southeast’s motion is granted. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the Carriers have not shown that the cases that are the subject of their motion are “related” w ithin the meaning of Rule 13. Accordingly, the Carriers’ motion is denied.

_______________________________ George C. Hanks, Jr. Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: September 5, 2008