2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-13-2002

Williams v. Secretary Defense

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 01-4016

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Recommended Citation

"Williams v. Secretary Defense" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 497.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 01-4016 

 ___________ 

 BARBARA WILLIAMS, 

 Appellant 

 v. 

 

 DONALD RUMSFELD, Secretary, Department of Defense 

 

 ___________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civ. No. 1: CV-00-1283) 

 District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 

 ___________ 

 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

 Tuesday, July 16th, 2002 

 Before: SCIRICA, ALITO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed: August 13, 2002) 

 

 ________________________ 

 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 ________________________ 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 

 Plaintiff Barbara Williams appeals the district court’s grant of the Defendant’s 

summary judgment motion. Williams, an African-American female, had alleged that she 

was separated from federal service based on her race, in violation of Title VII. She also 

claimed that she was terminated in retaliation for pursuing administrative EEO remedies, 

a protected activity under Title VII. Because we agree with the district court that 

Williams’ claim raised no genuine issues of material fact, we affirm. 

 I. 

 Barbara Williams brought the instant lawsuit after having been separated from 

federal service in September 1999. Williams had been employed by the Defense 

Logistics Agency (DLA), a component of the United States Department of Defense, 

since 1985. At all times relevant to this case, Williams held the position of 

Administrative Assistant, GS-05. 

 In 1997, the DLA was re-organized and two of its distribution regions were 

consolidated as part of a "Most Efficient Organization" plan ("MEO"). As a result, fiftyseven positions within the newly created Defense Distribution Center ("DDC") 

(including all GS-05’s in Williams’ office) were slated to be eliminated. However, 

because of the two-year differential between the proposal of the MEO and the 

implementation of the force reduction, many of the DLA employees in positions that the 

MEO had identified as ’excess’ were able to take advantage of either Voluntary Early 

Retirement (VERA) and/or Voluntary Separation Incentive Payment (VISP) initiatives. 

In addition, others applied and were selected for promotion or reassignment to positions 

that became vacant prior to September 1999 (the MEO’s implementation date). Together, 

these groups constituted the majority of the employees whose positions were slated to be 
eliminated by the MEO. 

 Nevertheless, by July of 1999, the voluntary staffing reductions of the MEO had 

not been fully realized, and a mandatory Reduction-in-Force (RIF) was initiated. 

Although sixteen employees in the DDC headquarters were still employed in positions 

targeted by the RIF in July, the only employees who were ultimately involuntarily 

separated in September were Williams and one Hispanic female. 

 II. 

 We exercise plenary review over an order granting summary judgment, applying 

the same standard that the lower court should have applied. Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 

32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). Therefore, we must grant summary judgment "if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. In 

making this determination, "a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor." Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 

777. Our jurisdiction to review summary judgment orders is based upon 28 U.S.C. 

1291. 

 III. 

 Williams first claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

because there existed sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, 

namely whether three non-protected employees were treated more favorably through the 

RIF. The Supreme Court has set forth a three-step, burden-shifting framework for the 

presentation of evidence in discriminatory treatment cases litigated under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonnel-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In the 

first step, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case of race discrimination. See In re: 

Carnegie Center Assoc., 129 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1997). The district court below 

found, and the defendant stipulates on appeal, that Williams has met her threshold 

burden. See Id. at 294-95 (determining that, "in a Title VII case...involving a reduction in 

force...to make out a prima facie case the plaintiff must show that (1) she belonged to a 

protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated, (3) 

she was terminated and (4) persons outside of the protected class were retained."). 

Furthermore, we agree with the District Court that the defense has clearly met its 

intermediate burden of articulating a facially legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 

Williams’ termination, namely that it had conducted the RIF in accordance with the 

procedure prescribed by the OPM. See App. Br. at 16; Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F3d 759, 

763 (3d Cir. 1994) (instructing that, in order to satisfy its burden of production, 

defendant need only "introduc[e] evidence which, taken as true, would permit the 

conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment 

decision."). 

 Once the defendant has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 

actions, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff. Fuentes, 32 F3d at 763. In Fuentes, 

we instructed that; 

 [T]o defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers 

 the plaintiff’s prima facie case with legitimate, non-discriminatory 

 reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, 

 direct or circumstantial, from which a fact finder could reasonably 

 either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; 

 or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more 

 likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 

 employer’s action. In other words...a plaintiff who has made out a 

 prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by 

 either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially 

 or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or 

 direct, that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or 

 determinative cause of the adverse employment action. Id. 

 This third and final stage of the McDonnel-Douglas test is the only one at issue 

here. On appeal, Williams claims that the district court erred in granting the defendant’s 

summary judgment motion because "conflicting and misleading evidence of [Williams’] 

seniority status" created a genuine issue of material fact. App. Br. at 19. She identifies 
three different documents that appear to indicate three different tenure ranking dates for 

her. She alleges that, if the DDC had relied on the highest of her three tenure rankings 

(and the one which Williams alleges is correct), she would have been listed ahead of 

three "excess" employees who were retained, even though none of them were members 

of a protected class. App. Br. at 19-20. 

 Nevertheless, Williams offers no evidence that any of the three non-protected 

employees were hired based on their seniority. As Fuentes makes clear, at this stage of 

the proceedings, the burden of proof is on Williams. Fuentes, 32 F3d at 763. Specifically, 

she must offer some material evidence that casts doubt on the DDC’s proffered, facially 

non-discriminatory explanation of its reasons for separating her from Federal service. 

However, Williams’ evidence that she may have had a higher seniority status than the 

three retained employees is not material if it was a non-factor in the hiring process. See 

Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992) ( "[a] disputed fact 

is ’material’ if it would affect the outcome of the suit as determined by the substantive 

law"). Therefore, Williams’ attempt to discredit the DDC’s facially legitimate claim for 

separating her from federal service based on her proffered conflicting and misleading 

evidence of her seniority status must fail as a matter of law. Id. (instructing that a party 

attempting to avoid a motion for summary judgment must offer "sufficient evidence for 

jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party; if the evidence is merely 

colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted"). 

 Williams also claims that "a position for which [Williams had] interviewed and 

was qualified, was available exclusively to her as of September 30, 1999," and the fact 

that she was not offered the position is evidence that Defendant’s proffered legitimate 

non-discriminatory purpose was actually a pretext for racial discrimination. The District 

Court rejected Williams’ claim, indicating that the position that Williams claims was 

available "exclusively" to her on September 30, actually did not become open until 

October 12, 1999. Since Williams had already been separated by that time, the Court 

reasoned that the Defendant’s refusal to offer the position to Williams is not evidence 

that Defendant’s non-discriminatory reason for separating Williams was a pretext for 

racial discrimination. App. at 10. 

 On appeal, Williams claims that since the availability date given for the job 

opening, October 12th, is not "a sworn and verified date" the District Court resolved a 

material fact issue against a non-moving party, and therefore its decision to grant 

summary judgment should be reversed. See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777 (instructing that, 

in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the facts in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor). 

Nevertheless, there is evidence in the record that a previously selected employee did not 

refuse the position until October 12th, 1999, See App. at 131 (DDC’s Referral and 

Selection Register), and Williams offers no evidence to the contrary. While this Court 

must, on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, view the facts in a light most 

favorable to Williams’ claim, we are not obligated to accept Williams naked assertions 

contrary to evidence that exists in the record. Williams further claims that there was a 

"legitimate opportunity to avoid the impact of the RIF as it relates to [Williams]," citing a 

recommendation made by the chief union steward to the DDC that Williams "could be 

placed in the Dispatcher position" once the previously selected employee had declined. 

App. at 132. Nevertheless, this information is clearly not "significantly probative" as to 

the Defendant’s alleged pretext for Williams’ separation, since Williams had already 

been separated once the previously selected employee had declined the position in 

question. Therefore, Williams has failed to meet her burden of proof to show that 

Defendant’s proffered legitimate reason was actually a pretext for racial discrimination, 

and we find that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to this claim. 

 Williams also offers evidence that three non-protected DDC employees each held 

two jobs simultaneously with the Department of Defense during the period in question, 

and that this evidence is "alone dispositive" of her racial discrimination claim. In 

addition, she also alleges that she has presented sufficient evidence of a discriminatory 

workplace atmosphere and that her separation was retaliation for earlier EEOC claim. 

With regard to each of these issues, we find the reasoning of the district court to have 

been thorough and persuasive. We therefore affirm substantially for the reasons stated in 

that opinion. 

 
 

_____________________________ 

TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 

Kindly file the foregoing Opinion. 

 /s/ Julio M. Fuentes 

 Circuit Judg