IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

TRUST NO. 602W0 DATED 7/16/15, 

DEMA INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D15-4334

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 

PATRICIA A. HARBAUGH 

AND SABAL POINT PROPERTY OWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Appellees.

________________________________/

Opinion filed December 22, 2016

Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Seminole County,

Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.

Shannan M. Field, of The Law Office of 

Shannan M. Field, P.A., Titusville, and 

Aaron W. Saoud, of Saoud Law & 

Associates, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Nicole R. Ramirez, of eXL LEGAL, PLLC, 

St. Petersburg, for Appellee, Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A.

No Appearance For Other Appellees.

PER CURIAM.

Trust No. 602W0 dated 7/16/15, DEMA Investments, LLC as Trustee (“the Trust”), 

appeals from the denial of its motion to intervene into a foreclosure lawsuit filed by Wells 

Fargo Bank, N.A. Because the Trust was a purchaser pendent lite, we affirm.
2

On January 20, 2015, Wells Fargo filed a foreclosure complaint against Patricia 

Harbaugh and Debra Mascher, the owners of the subject property. That same day, Wells 

Fargo filed a notice of lis pendens for the subject property. After a default was entered

against the property owners, defense counsel filed a notice of appearance both on behalf 

of Harbaugh and Mascher and on behalf of the Trust. The Trust also filed a “Motion to 

Intervene or Substitute or Joinder.” The Trust asserted that it was a necessary party to 

the litigation because the original defendants transferred the deed for the subject property 

to the Trust on July 16, 2015, giving it a due process right to be a party to the action and 

to assert any applicable defenses. The trial court denied the Trust’s motion. 

The Trust argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for intervention, 

substitution, or joinder because (1) it was a necessary and indispensable party to the 

proceedings; (2) it purchased the ability to participate in the case when it purchased the 

deed to the subject property; (3) it was assigned the litigation rights to this case by the 

initial defendants and was therefore a real party in interest; and (4) due process principles 

would be violated if it were not allowed to intervene. 

The Trust is incorrect. A person who purchases property that is the subject of a 

foreclosure lawsuit in which the bank has previously filed a lis pendens is a purchaser 

pendente lite. See Bymel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 159 So. 3d 345, 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). 

The law is well settled that a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to intervene or 

otherwise be made a party to the ongoing lawsuit. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Graham, 130 

So. 608, 611 (Fla. 1930) (“[A] purchaser pendente lite is bound by the judgment or decree 

rendered against the party from whom he makes the purchases as much so as though 

he had been a party to the judgment or decree himself.”); Timucuan Props. v. Bank of 
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N.Y. Mellon, 135 So. 3d 524, 524 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“This court is committed to the 

doctrine that a purchaser pendente lite is not entitled to intervene.” (quoting Intermediary 

Fin. Corp. v. McKay, 111 So. 531, 531 (Fla. 1927))). 

In this case, the Trust took ownership of the property with notice of the pending 

foreclosure litigation, in which Wells Fargo had filed a lis pendens. As a purchaser 

pendente lite, the Trust was not entitled to intervene in the foreclosure proceedings. See

Greenwald, 130 So. at 611 (noting that purchasers pendente lite “take the risk of the result 

of the suit, and are concluded by the decree therein. It is not necessary that they should 

be made parties thereto. Such is the general doctrine of lis pendens.”). 

AFFIRMED. 

COHEN, BERGER and WALLIS, JJ., concur.