NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-7113 

RICHARD A. PROCEVIAT, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

 Richard A. Proceviat, of Elma, Manitoba, Canada, pro se. 

Tara K. Hogan, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. With 

her on the brief were Gregory G. Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. 

Davidson, Director, and Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the 

brief was Michael J. Timinski, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, Office of the General 

Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, of Washington, DC. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Robert N. Davis 
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2008-7113 

RICHARD A. PROCEVIAT, 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES B. PEAKE, M.D., Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 05-3073, Judge 

Robert N. Davis. 

___________________________ 

DECIDED: October 15, 2008 

___________________________ 

Before LOURIE, RADER and BRYSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

 The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) upheld 

the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ (Board) denial of Mr. Richard A. Proceviat’s claim for 

an effective date earlier than June 7, 1996 for the award of a special monthly pension 

(SMP). The Veterans Court also affirmed the Board’s finding that there was no clear 

and unmistakable error (CUE) in a November 29, 1989, rating decision. Because Mr. 

Proceviat only challenges the lower courts’ factual determinations and application of law 

to the facts, this appeal falls outside this court’s jurisdiction. This court therefore 

dismisses Mr. Proceviat’s appeal. 
I 

 Mr. Proceviat served in active duty from June 1970 to February 1972. In March 

1987, Mr. Proceviat wrote a letter to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) indicating 

that he wanted to apply for VA pension benefits. Upon receiving an application, Mr. 

Proceviat applied for nonservice-connected pension benefits in July 1987. In this 

application, Mr. Proceviat reported a history of rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Attached to 

this application was a July 1987 statement from a private physician indicating that he 

had treated Mr. Proceviat for RA and severe hand deformities. 

 In January 1989, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) 

denied Mr. Proceviat’s claim for pension benefits because the appellant was not 

precluded from gainful employment. After receiving a statement from the appellant 

indicating that he had to quit his job as a construction worker due to his RA, the VA 

examined Mr. Proceviat in July 1989. In a November 1989 rating decision, the RO 

granted Mr. Proceviat nonservice-connected pension benefits effective as of August 

1989. The RO found that the veteran’s RA was 60 percent disabling for the purposes of 

his nonservice-connected pension claim. 

 In May 1996, Mr. Proceviat applied for SMP based on the need for regular aid 

and attendance of another person. In his application, Mr. Proceviat noted that he had 

difficulties performing the usual activities of daily life. In an October 1996 rating 

decision, the RO granted Mr. Proceviat’s SMP application and assigned an effective 

date of June 7, 1996. 

 In a March 1997 statement to the RO, Mr. Proceviat indicated that the VA should 

have construed his March 1987 claim for nonservice-connected pension benefits as a 

2008-7113 2
claim for SMP based on the need for aid and attendance. 

 In November 1997, Mr. Proceviat filed a notice of disagreement seeking an 

earlier effective date. Mr. Proceviat also alleged that the RO committed a CUE in its 

November 1989 rating decision. In March 1998, the RO responded that equitable relief 

was not warranted because evidence did not indicate a need for regular aid and 

attendance prior to June 7, 1996. 

 In a November 2001 statement, Mr. Proceviat argued that the RO had not 

considered his entitlement to aid and attendance, and that the RO’s rationale for his 

November 1989 disability rating was inadequately explained. 

 In August 2005, the Board denied both of Mr. Proceviat’s claims. Regarding 

appellant’s claim for a March 1987 effective date, the Board rejected Mr. Proceviat’s 

assertion that his 1987 claim for pension benefits should have been treated as an 

informal claim for SMP. The Board also rejected Mr. Proceviat’s allegation of CUE, 

noting that the November 1989 decision evaluated and weighed evidence and, thus, did 

not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of CUE. 

 In October 2007, the Veterans Court affirmed the Board’s decision. In April 

2008, the Veterans Court entered judgment. This appeal followed. 

II 

This court has limited jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Veterans Court. 

See 38 U.S.C. §7292 (2008). As proscribed by 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2), except for 

constitutional issues, this court “may not review any ‘challenge to a factual 

determination’ or any ‘challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a 

2008-7113 3
particular case.’” Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)). 

A. Entitlement to an Earlier Effective Date 

 On appeal, Mr. Proceviat argues that he is entitled to an earlier effective date 

based on the submission of a July 1987 medical report attached to his original pension 

application. According to Mr. Proceviat, the attached medical report “constitute[d] an 

informal claim for SMP A&A [aid and attendance].” See Attachment to ClaimantAppellant’s Brief at 3. 

 38 C.F.R. § 3.155 governs informal claims and provides that “[a]ny 

communication or action, indicating an intent to apply for one or more benefits . . . from 

a claimant . . . may be considered an informal claim.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2008). 

Furthermore, the “informal claim must identify the benefit sought. “ Id. 

 Determining whether an informal claim for aid and attendance has been filed 

requires an application of the law, that is, applying the definition of an informal claim 

under § 3.155(a) to the facts of a particular case. Contrary to Mr. Proceviat’s allegation 

that the VA failed to acknowledge, consider, or even discuss the July 1987 medical 

report, the Board found that “a July 1987 statement from the veteran’s private physician 

... [provided] no indication that the veteran was unable to dress, keep himself clean and 

presentable, feed himself, or attend to the wants of nature due to his RA.” In the Appeal 

of Richard A. Proceviat, Bd. Vet. App. Docket No. 95-18 908 at 20 (Order, Aug. 24, 

2005). Based on Mr. Proceviat’s “earlier [1987] pension application, as well as other 

evidence,” the Veterans Court stated that it was “unable to conclude that the appellant 

intended to make such a claim [for aid and attendance] prior to the current effective 

2008-7113 4
date.” Proceviat v. Mansfield, Ct. Vet. App. Docket No. 05-3073 at 3 (Memorandum 

Decision, Oct. 22, 2007). Because this court “may not review any challenge to a . . . 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case”, this court lacks jurisdiction to 

decide whether the attached medical report constitutes an informal claim. Buchanan, 

451 F.3d at 1334. 

Mr. Proceviat further argues that the VA should have construed his July 1987 

medical report as an informal claim under 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(2). § 3.157(b) provides 

that 

(b) ... Once a formal claim for pension or compensation has been allowed . . . 

receipt of one of the following will be accepted as an informal claim for increased 

benefits 

. . . 

(2) Evidence from a private physician or layman. The date of receipt of 

such evidence will be accepted when the evidence furnished . . . 

shows the reasonable probability of entitlement to benefits. 

§ 3.157(b) (2008) (emphasis added). Although Mr. Proceviat failed to make this 

argument in lower proceedings, the Board’s and Veterans Court’s analysis of the 

1987 private medical report suggests that even if the medical report was treated 

as an informal claim, there was no “reasonable probability of entitlement to 

benefits.” As mentioned above, both the Board and Veterans Court found no 

indication that Mr. Proceviat intended to apply for enhanced benefits from the 

1987 medical report. Thus, Mr. Proceviat’s alternative reliance on § 3.157(b)(2) 

is unavailing. 

For these reasons, this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

B. Allegation of a Clear and Unmistakable Error 

 Mr. Proceviat contends that the Board erred in finding no CUE in the November 

2008-7113 5
2008-7113 6

ly 

1989 rating decision.1

 A clear and unmistakable error is “a very specific and rare kind 

of error . . . that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the conclusion, 

to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been manifest

different but for the error.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (2008). § 20.1403(d) identifies 

examples of situations that are not clear and unmistakable error. See § 20.1403(d). 

Among these examples, § 20.1403(d)(3) states that “disagreement[s] as to how the 

facts were weighed or evaluated” cannot raise a CUE. Id. 

 On appeal, Mr. Proceviat argues that the RO erred in assigning a 60 percent 

disability rating. Both the Board and Veterans Court explained that determinations 

concerning the application of the diagnostic code do not support a finding of CUE 

because such decisions involve the weighing and evaluation of the evidence under § 

20.1403(d)(3). The Board found and the Veterans Court agreed that although Mr. 

Proceviat “had marked deformity of his hands and feet due to RA ... [t]here ... [was] no 

indication ... that the veteran required assistance with his activities of daily living.” In 

the Appeal of Richard A. Proceviat, Bd. Vet. App. Docket No. 95-18 908 at 23. Because 

Mr. Proceviat has not raised a CUE, this court dismisses Mr. Proceviat’s appeal. 

DISMISSED 

COSTS

 Each party shall bear its own costs. 

 

1

 Mr. Proceviat asserts without explanation or analysis that his CUE claim is also governed by “the cases 

of Moody, Roberson, Hodge, Andrews, Szemraj, and Richardson and VA General Counsel Opinion 4-

2004.” Attachment to Claimant-Appellant’s Brief at 1, 4. The cited cases and the VA General Counsel 

Opinion are inapposite and do not apply. This court cannot consider the Andrews decision as no 

identifying citation is provided.