Filed 8/20/24 P. v. Cornejo CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NELSON CORNEJO,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329213

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA506931)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed.

Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant 

Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________
2

Nelson Cornejo and Crystal R. were in a dating

relationship and had a child together. One night in July 2022, 

Cornejo slashed Crystal’s face with a sharp object, giving her a 

large cut on her cheek. A jury convicted Cornejo of mayhem (Pen. 

Code,

1 § 203; count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. 

(a)(1); count 2), and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, 

subd. (d); count 3). On appeal, Cornejo contends there is 

insufficient evidence to support his mayhem conviction. He also 

contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a 

judgment of acquittal on the mayhem charge under section 

1118.1. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Relevant Prosecution Evidence

On July 2, 2022, Crystal was living at the L.A. Grand 

Hotel. Video surveillance footage showed that around 1:30 a.m., 

Crystal was sitting on a chair in front of the hotel smoking a 

cigarette. Minutes later, a person wearing a grey hooded top and 

dark colored pants approached Crystal. Crystal looked directly at 

and extended her left arm towards the person. At that moment, 

the person cut Crystal’s face with an unknown object and then 

ran away. Crystal went inside the hotel and told the security 

desk what happened. 

Immediately after, John Gillett, a program manager at the 

hotel, received a radio call about the incident. He then spoke to 

Crystal and called 911. During the 911 call, Gillett was standing 

next to Crystal and both of their voices can be heard on the call. 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code. 
3

Gillett told the 911 operator that Crystal’s “baby’s dad” was the 

person who attacked her. Crystal identified Cornejo as her 

attacker and said that he had done something like that to her 

before.

Shortly after, Los Angeles Police Officer Bradley Goetting

arrived at the hotel and met with Crystal. Crystal “had a severe 

laceration to the left side of her face.” She told Goetting that 

Cornejo, “the father of her child,” cut her face. That night, 

officers searched for Cornejo and the weapon used to cut Crystal, 

but they found neither. 

Paramedics treated Crystal’s face at the hotel and then 

transported her to the hospital. At the hospital, Crystal met with 

a surgeon and received “reconstructive surgery” on her face, 

including stitches. 

Days later, several Los Angeles Police Department officers 

went to the hotel after receiving a radio call that the suspect of 

the July 2, 2022 attack had returned. Officer Gilbert Rodiles

spoke to Crystal about the attack. Crystal said she was outside 

the hotel having a cigarette when Cornejo approached and asked 

her for a cigarette. As Crystal turned to hand Cornejo a 

cigarette, Cornejo cut her face with what appeared to be a piece 

of glass. 

Officer Eric Orozco searched for Cornejo and found him a 

block from the hotel. After a short pursuit, Orozco detained 

Cornejo. Crystal identified Cornejo at the scene of the arrest as 

the person who cut her on July 2, 2022.2

2 At trial, Crystal recanted her statements to police officers 

about the July 2022 incident. She testified that she did not know 

who cut her face. 
4

At trial, the People showed Crystal photographs of herself

that were taken while Crystal was at the hospital. The 

photographs were close-up images of the left side of Crystal’s 

face. Crystal testified that the photographs accurately depicted 

her injury from the attack: they showed her “face was slashed” 

from the area near her nose to “all the way back to [her] scalp.” 

The People also showed Crystal another close-up 

photograph of the left side of her face that was taken some time 

after the incident. The photograph showed a thick scar on her 

face that starts at the middle of her cheek and extends behind 

her left ear. Crystal testified that the “injury” in the photograph 

is the same one that she had at trial. 

Dr. Angela Zhu treated the cut on Crystal’s face at 

LAC+USC Medical Center. The cut was a “large” 11-centimeter 

laceration which began under her left eye. It extended behind 

her ear and into the scalp. The cut went through the skin and “a 

little bit of the subcutaneous tissue,” but did not reach the fat 

underneath. Zhu opined that a sharp object caused the cut. 

To treat the cut, Zhu cleaned it and repaired it with 

stitches. Zhu then instructed Crystal to come back to the 

hospital for a follow-up appointment. Zhu also instructed Crystal 

to put an antibiotic ointment over it and keep it moisturized. 

Crystal did not come back for a follow-up appointment. 

Zhu looked at the photograph of Crystal’s face taken some 

time after the incident. Zhu acknowledged that the photograph

showed a scar on Crystal’s face. When asked whether the scar 

would be permanent, Zhu stated, “[It] depends on the type of care 

that she gives, but given that its location – on a sun-exposed part 

of her face, it would likely remain visible for some amount of 

time, at least a degree, to the naked eye.” As to how long the scar 
5

would remain visible, Zhu stated, “Generally these types of 

injuries take several years to lessen in appearance. Again, it 

depends on the type of care that she does for it. But because of 

the size, it will – it may be noticeable for at least several years 

unless camouflaged [by makeup].” Zhu repeated that she “would 

expect that a scar of this size would still be apparent for at least a 

few years to several years afterwards.”

II. Defense Evidence

Cornejo did not testify or call any witnesses. The defense 

introduced into evidence records from the hospital that treated 

Crystal after the incident, showing Crystal told medical 

personnel that “a stranger” cut her. 

III. Section 1118.1 Motion, Verdict, and Sentencing 

At the close of the People’s case-in-chief, the defense moved 

for a judgment of acquittal on the mayhem charge under section 

1118.1. The defense argued there was no evidence that Crystal’s 

injury was permanent. The trial court denied the motion. 

The jury convicted Cornejo on all counts. After a bifurcated 

trial, the jury found several aggravating circumstances true. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1)-(3), (b)(5).) Then, 

in a bench trial, the court found true Cornejo’s prior strike 

conviction for attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). 

The trial court sentenced Cornejo on count 1 to 16 years in 

prison, consisting of the upper term of eight years, doubled under

the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-

(e)). The court imposed consecutive one-year sentences on each of

counts 2 and 3 (one-third the middle term for each offense) but 

stayed these sentences under section 654. 
6

DISCUSSION

I. There Is Sufficient Evidence To Support the Mayhem

Conviction

Cornejo contends the evidence is insufficient to support his 

mayhem conviction. Specifically, he argues there is no 

substantial evidence that Crystal’s disfiguring injury is 

permanent. We disagree. 

A. Relevant legal standards

“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 

entire record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could 

have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Citation.] ‘The record must disclose substantial evidence to 

support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] In 

applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and presume in support of the judgment 

the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence . . . . [W]e may not reverse for insufficient evidence 

unless it appears ‘ “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there 

sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” 

(People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1157-1158, 

superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in 

People v. Villegas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 253, 281, fn. 9, review 

granted Jan. 31, 2024, S283126, review dism. May 15, 2024.) 

“The uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction unless the testimony is physically impossible 

or inherently improbable.” (People v. Romero (2019)

44 Cal.App.5th 381, 386 (Romero).)
7

“Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a 

human being of a member of his body, or disables, disfigures, or 

renders it useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an 

eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.” (§ 203.) 

“Disfigurement of the body ‘ “impairs or injures the beauty, 

symmetry or appearance of a person or thing . . . [or] renders 

unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some 

manner.” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 387.) A 

person’s head qualifies as a member of the body. (People v. 

Newble (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 444, 449 (Newble).) 

The modern rationale behind the offense of mayhem is 

“ ‘ “the preservation of the natural completeness and normal 

appearance of the human face and body.” ’ ” (People v. Santana 

(2013) 56 Cal.4th 999, 1004 (Santana).) “In other words, section 

203 ‘protects the integrity of the victim’s person.’ ” (Ibid.)

“Section 203 pays particular attention to the face, recognizing the 

particular pain and emotional scarring that results from 

disfiguring a person’s face.” (People v. Johnson (2018) 

21 Cal.App.5th 267, 281 (Johnson).)

“To prove mayhem based on a disfiguring injury, the injury 

must be permanent. [Citations.] Permanent scarring constitutes 

a disfiguring injury. [Citation.] An injury within the meaning of 

mayhem is still considered permanent if modern technology 

effectively repairs the injury. [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘the 

possibility of medical alleviation [does] not . . . diminish one’s 

culpability for infliction of an injury that would otherwise 

constitute mayhem.’ ” (Romero, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 387; 

see Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1007 [“the victim’s disability 

must be more than ‘slight and temporary,’ ” and must instead “be 

permanent”].)
8

Although “ ‘not every visible scarring wound’ ” constitutes 

mayhem (Santana, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1004), “[t]he law of 

mayhem has evolved to such a degree that a number of cases 

have affirmed mayhem convictions based on relatively minor 

injuries.” (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 281 [bite to lip 

and eyelid]; e.g., People v. Keenan (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 26, 35-

36 [cigarette burns to breasts] (Keenan); People v. Caldwell (1984) 

153 Cal.App.3d 947, 952 [bitten-through lower lip]; Newble, 

supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at p. 448 [three-inch facial laceration from 

a fingernail file]; Goodman v. Superior Court (1978) 

84 Cal.App.3d 621, 623 [five-inch facial wound from a knife]

(Goodman); see Santana, at p. 1004 [cataloguing cases to show 

wide range of disfiguring injuries found to constitute mayhem].)

B. Analysis

Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial that Crystal’s 

injury is permanently disfiguring. The evidence demonstrates 

Cornejo cut Crystal’s face with a sharp object. The cut went 

through her skin and subcutaneous tissue. As Zhu noted, the cut 

was “large”—it covered nearly the entire length of Crystal’s left 

cheek. At some point, the cut turned into an equally lengthy 

scar. Cornejo thus “caused a disfiguring injury on a sensitive and 

prominent feature on [Crystal’s] face. Indeed, the language of the 

[mayhem] statute singles out . . . the face, as worthy of special 

protection.” (Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 281; see 

Keenan, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 36 [“if the burns had been 

inflicted on Ms. H.’s face there would be no question that 

mayhem had been committed”]; Goodman, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 625 [“The facts before us show a victim whose face is terribly 

marred, probably for life, with all attendant emotional and even 

economic disabilities”].) A jury could reasonably conclude that a 
9

scar that was still visible on Crystal’s face three months after the 

injury constituted a permanent disfiguring injury.3 (See 

Johnson, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 271-272 [victim’s 

testimony that she continued to have scar on her face four 

months after defendant bit her was enough to satisfy mayhem’s 

requirement of permanent injury]; see also Keenan, supra,

227 Cal.App.3d at p. 36, fn. 6 [cigarette burn scars remaining on 

victim’s breasts after three and one-half months “assume[d]” to 

be permanent absent evidence to the contrary].) Further, from 

our review of the photographs of Crystal’s injury that were shown 

to the jury, depicting both Crystal’s injury before she received 

stitches and then once a scar had formed, we conclude a 

reasonable juror could have found her injury was permanently 

disfiguring.

Contrary to Cornejo’s argument, Zhu’s testimony does not

contradict the conclusion that Crystal’s scar is permanent. 

Cornejo argues that Zhu’s testimony on the issue of permanency 

was “equivocal.” Zhu stated that whether Crystal’s scar is 

permanent “depends on the type of care” that Crystal gives it. 

But the possibility that medical care could lessen the appearance 

of the scar “ ‘[does] not . . . diminish one’s culpability for infliction 

3 During Crystal’s testimony, the People showed Crystal a 

photograph of her scar that was taken some time after the 

incident. The People asked, “Was this a photograph that was 

recently taken within the last week or so?” Crystal answered, “It 

was when the detective came to my friend’s house to ask me to 

come to court.” The People then asked, “That injury that we see, 

that’s the same injury that you have; correct?” Crystal 

responded, “Yeah.” 
10

of an injury that would otherwise constitute mayhem.’ ” (Romero, 

supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 387.) 

Zhu also testified that “because of the size,” and “its 

location – on a sun-exposed part of her face,” Crystal’s scar “may 

be noticeable for at least several years unless camouflaged [by 

makeup].” The word “may” in Zhu’s statement does not make 

Crystal’s permanent disfigurement impossible or improbable. “In 

a criminal prosecution, ‘ “[a] medical diagnosis based on 

probability . . . is admissible; the lack of scientific certainty does 

not deprive the medical opinion of its evidentiary value.” ’ ” 

(People v. Chavez (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 159, 167.) Moreover, 

Zhu subsequently stated she “would expect” the scar to “still be 

apparent for at least a few years to several years afterwards.” 

Testimony that an injury is likely or probably permanent is

sufficient to satisfy the permanency requirement. (Newble, 

supra, 120 Cal.App.3d at pp. 448, 453 [trier of fact could 

reasonably find mayhem was committed where doctor testified 

laceration on victim’s face was “likely to leave a scar”]; Goodman, 

supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 623, 625 [upholding mayhem 

conviction where evidence suggested scar on victim’s face at trial 

was “probably” permanent].) Therefore, the record discloses

substantial evidence to support the verdict. 

II. The Denial of Cornejo’s Section 1118.1 Motion Was 

Proper

Cornejo contends the trial court erred in denying his 

section 1118.1 motion as to the mayhem charge. Cornejo’s 

argument focuses entirely on the trial court’s reasoning in 

denying the motion. Based on the trial court’s reference to Zhu’s 

testimony as “ ‘somewhat vague,’ ” Cornejo argues “[i]t is clear 

the trial court did not believe the evidence was substantial with 
11

respect to the element of permanent disfigurement.” The claim 

lacks merit. 

We must affirm the trial court’s ruling if it reaches the 

correct result, regardless of the reasoning the court employed. 

(People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976; People v. Fruits 

(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 205.) The trial court did not err in 

denying Cornejo’s section 1118.1 motion because there was 

sufficient evidence of mayhem.

“Section 1118.1 provides in pertinent part: ‘In a case tried 

before a jury, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own 

motion, at the close of the evidence on either side and before the 

case is submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of 

a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in 

the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on 

appeal.’ [¶] An appellate court reviews the denial of a section 

1118.1 motion under the standard employed in reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. . . . Review of 

the denial of a section 1118.1 motion made at the close of a 

prosecutor’s case-in-chief focuses on the state of the evidence as it 

stood at that point.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 

1215.)

Cornejo made his section 1118.1 motion at the end of the 

People’s case-in-chief. Afterward, the defense introduced 

Crystal’s hospital records to show Crystal told doctors a 

“stranger” cut her. The defense did not call any witnesses. We 

have already reviewed the People’s evidence in our discussion of 

whether the evidence was sufficient to support the mayhem 

conviction. “This evidence also demonstrates that the trial court 
12

did not err in denying [Cornejo’s] section 1118.1 motion.” (See 

People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 522.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

STONE, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.