[Cite as State v. Lask, 2021-Ohio-1888.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 ADAMS COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 20CA1117 

 

 vs. : 

 

RICHARD LASK, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Steven R. Adams, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant. 

David Kelley, Adams County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony Hurst, Assistant Adams 

County Prosecuting Attorney, West Union, Ohio, for appellee. 

________________________________________________________________ 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT 

DATE JOURNALIZED: 5-26-21 

ABELE, J. 

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas Court judgment of 

conviction and sentence. Appellant assigns the following error for review: 

“THE SEARCH WARRANT IS INVALID WHERE THE 

DECISION TO SEEK A SEARCH WARRANT WAS 

PROMPTED BY INFORMATION GAINED FROM AN 

UNLAWFUL SEARCH.” 

{¶ 2} On October 9, 2017, a Kansas Highway Patrol trooper stopped appellant’s vehicle 

on Interstate 70 for allegedly following another vehicle too closely. During the ensuing 

encounter, the trooper searched appellant’s vehicle and discovered empty duffle bags that 

contained “marijuana shake” and “dryer sheets.” The trooper also observed two large “fairly 

empty coolers” in the vehicle’s back seat. The trooper let appellant leave the scene, but later 
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2

wrote an email to summarize his encounter and his suspicion about appellant’s involvement in 

drug trafficking. The trooper then sent the email to the Adams County, Ohio Sheriff’s Office. 

{¶ 3} Adams County Sheriff’s Detective Sam Purdin received the Kansas email and 

decided to investigate. On October 16, 2017, one week after the Kansas traffic stop, Detective 

Purdin drove to appellant’s residence and observed a pickup truck leave the premises. After 

Purdin observed the vehicle run a stop sign and drive left of the centerline, he stopped the 

vehicle. 

{¶ 4} As Detective Purdin approached appellant, the vehicle’s driver, the detective 

“instantly smelled” a “very strong” odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. 

Appellant later admitted that he had smoked marijuana. Shortly thereafter, another officer 

arrived at the scene and performed field sobriety tests. After officers arrested appellant for 

operating a vehicle while under the influence, a vehicle search resulted in the discovery of 

approximately two pounds of marijuana. 

{¶ 5} After this encounter, Detective Purdin applied for a warrant to search appellant’s 

residence. The search-warrant affidavit states: 

 On October 9, 2017, the Affiant received information from the Kansas 

Highway Patrol indicating a Trooper stopped a vehicle driven by Richard Lask. 

The Trooper discovered two (2) large duffel bags containing marijuana “shake” 

and dryer sheets. The Trooper stated Richard Lask indicated the marijuana 

discovered was his own personal use. 

 The Affiant further states on October 16, 2017, he went to the residence of 

Richard Lask to follow up on this information. While in the area, the Affiant 

observed Richard Lask leaving his residence in a red Dodge Dakota truck. The 

Affiant observed the vehicle failed to stop at a stop sign located at the intersection 

of State Route 41 and Stanfield Road. The Affiant further observed the vehicle’s 

brake lights were broken. Based on these observations, the Affiant conducted a 

traffic stop on the vehicle. The Affiant requested additional law enforcement 

units proceed to the scene to assist. 

 As the Affiant approached the vehicle, he could detect a strong odor of 

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The Affiant states he has been a Law 
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3

Enforcement Officer for approximately 17 years and through his training and 

experience can positively identify the odor of marijuana. While speaking with 

Richard Lask, the Affiant observed his speech was slurred and his eyes were 

“bloodshot”. Richard Lask admitted to the Affiant he had previously smoked 

marijuana. Deputy Walters arrived at the scene and conducted field sobriety tests 

on Richard Lask. Mr. Lask was determined to be driving a vehicle under the 

influence of drugs and/or alcohol and was placed under arrest. The Affiant 

further states an inventory search of Richard Lask’s vehicle revealed 

approximately two (2) pounds of marijuana. Mr. Lask stated this marijuana was 

for his own personal use. 

 The Affiant further states he believes there is being concealed at the 

resident of Richard Lask * * * an undetermined amount of marijuana and items 

used in the cultivation of marijuana. These beliefs are based on the Affiant 

observing Richard Lask leaving his residence just prior to being discovered with 

marijuana in his possession. Based on the amount of marijuana discovered inside 

Richard Lask’s vehicle, the Affiant believes this is not for personal use and 

further criminal activity is being conducted inside Richard Lask’s residence. 

{¶ 6} A judge granted Detective Purdin’s request for a warrant to search appellant’s 

residence and, during the search, officers discovered a substantial amount of marijuana and drug 

paraphernalia. 

{¶ 7} On October 27, 2017, an Adams County Grand Jury returned an indictment that 

charged appellant with possession of marijuana, in an amount of approximately 40,000 grams, a 

second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Appellant entered a not guilty plea and 

filed a motion to suppress evidence. 

{¶ 8} In his motion to suppress evidence, appellant asserted that (1) officers improperly 

detained appellant for a suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, and (2) 

because officers based the search of his home upon information obtained during the Kansas 

unconstitutional search and seizure, the evidence discovered during the search is the fruit of the 

unlawful Kansas traffic stop. Consequently, appellant requested the trial court suppress the 
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evidence discovered during the search of his residence. The trial court, however, overruled 

appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. 

{¶ 9} Subsequently, appellant entered a no-contest plea to the possession of marijuana 

charge, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) a second-degree felony. The trial court sentenced 

appellant to serve a mandatory minimum five-year prison term. Appellant appealed his 

judgment of conviction and sentence. Appellant argued that the trial court incorrectly 

determined that the Kansas state trooper had either probable cause or a reasonable suspicion to 

stop appellant’s vehicle for a traffic violation. 

{¶ 10} After review, this Court noted that (1) the Kansas trooper failed to articulate any 

specific facts that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that appellant committed a traffic violation, 

(2) the video evidence did not show an alleged traffic violation, and (3) the trooper could not 

recall any details regarding the alleged traffic violation. Thus, this Court determined that any 

evidence obtained from the Kansas traffic stop should be inadmissible. We further concluded, 

however, that evidence obtained from the Ohio traffic stop is admissible. Thus, we rejected 

appellant’s argument that the Ohio traffic stop was derived solely from information learned from 

the unconstitutional Kansas traffic stop. Appellant, however, asserted that information learned 

during the unconstitutional Kansas traffic stop motivated Detective Purdin to drive to appellant’s 

house to investigate. We observed that, even if Purdin decided to investigate appellant due to the 

Kansas email, Purdin did not stop appellant’s vehicle on the basis of any information contained 

in the Kansas trooper’s email. Instead, Purdin stopped appellant’s vehicle after the detective 

observed appellant run a stop sign and drive left-of-center. We therefore agreed with the trial 

court’s conclusion that Purdin had probable cause, independent of the unlawful Kansas traffic 

stop, to stop appellant’s vehicle. We further noted that appellant did not challenge the trial 
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court’s finding that Purdin had probable cause to search the vehicle. We then considered the 

issue of whether the evidence discovered during the search of appellant’s home should be 

suppressed because the search-warrant affidavit contained some information obtained from the 

Kansas traffic stop. We recognized that the trial court did not consider whether the searchwarrant affidavit contained sufficient probable cause that evidence of a crime would be 

discovered at appellant’s residence absent the information obtained during the Kansas traffic 

stop. We thus remanded the matter so the trial court could consider whether Detective Purdin’s 

search-warrant affidavit set forth sufficient information to constitute probable cause to search 

without considering information obtained during the Kansas traffic stop. 

{¶ 11} On June 10, 2020, the trial court held a hearing to consider the issue. The state 

asserted that the trial court should be limited to considering whether the remainder of the 

warrant, absent the Kansas information, established probable cause. Appellant, however, argued 

that the court must consider whether the Kansas information also tainted Detective Purdin’s 

decision to obtain the warrant. Appellant claimed the exclusionary rule requires courts to 

suppress evidence discovered during a search unless the state can establish that illegally obtained 

information (here from the Kansas traffic stop) did not prompt Purdin to seek a search warrant. 

Appellant thus claimed that the state must show that officers had an independent source for 

information to obtain a search warrant. 

{¶ 12} After consideration, the trial court did not agree that it must suppress the evidence 

discovered during the search of appellant’s residence. Instead, the court determined that, after it 

redacted information obtained from the Kansas stop, the search-warrant affidavit nevertheless 

contained sufficient information to establish probable cause to believe that a search of 

appellant’s residence would uncover evidence of a crime. The court points to the following facts 
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to support a finding of probable cause: (1) Detective Purdin observed appellant leave appellant’s 

residence in a pickup truck; (2) the detective stopped appellant after he observed two traffic 

violations; (3) the detective detected an odor of marijuana emanating from appellant’s vehicle; 

(4) appellant admitted that he had smoked marijuana; (5) the officers arrested appellant for 

driving while under the influence; (6) a search of appellant’s vehicle resulted in the discovery of 

two pounds of marijuana; and (7) Detective Purdin did not believe appellant’s claim that two 

pounds of marijuana were for his personal use. The trial court thus denied appellant’s motion to 

suppress evidence and reaffirmed his sentence. This appeal followed. 

{¶ 13} In his sole assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his residence. 

Appellant argues that Detective Purdin sought a search warrant based upon information learned 

during the unlawful Kansas traffic stop, and that a search warrant should be invalid when law 

enforcement decides to seek a search warrant based upon illegally obtained information. 

Appellant thus claims that the exclusionary rule requires the trial court to suppress the evidence 

discovered during the search of his residence. 

{¶ 14} The state, however, disagrees with appellant’s analysis and argues that the 

exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence discovered at appellant’s 

residence. Instead, the state contends that the untainted evidence that Detective Purdin collected 

sufficiently establishes probable cause to believe that officers would discover evidence of 

criminal activity at appellant’s residence. The state further contends that the connection between 

the Kansas traffic stop and the search of appellant’s residence is too attenuated to require 

exclusion of the evidence. 
ADAMS, 20CA1117 

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I 

{¶ 15} Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence 

involves a mixed question of law and fact. E.g., State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-

Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 32; State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8; State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-5506, 5 N.E.3d 41 (4th Dist.), ¶ 7. Appellate courts 

thus “‘must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence.’” State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 12, quoting 

Burnside at ¶ 8. Accepting those facts as true, reviewing courts “‘independently determine as a 

matter of law, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 

applicable legal standard.’” Id., Burnside at ¶ 8. 

II 

{¶ 16} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that search 

warrants may be issued only upon probable cause: 

 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 

be seized. 

{¶ 17} Courts that must determine whether a search warrant was issued upon a proper 

showing of probable cause must examine the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). “[T]he duty of a reviewing court is 

simply to ensure that the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for * * * conclud[ing]’ that probable 

cause existed.” Id. at 238–239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 

271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 

448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). And, the issuing magistrate’s duty is to 
ADAMS, 20CA1117 

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determine whether “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found in a particular place.” Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. 

{¶ 18} “The essential protection of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment 

* * * is in ‘requiring that [the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence] be 

drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 

often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” Gates, 462 U.S. at 240, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 

quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). 

Accordingly, a search-warrant “affidavit must set forth particular facts and circumstances 

underlying the existence of probable cause, so as to allow the magistrate to make an independent 

evaluation of the matter.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 

667 (1978). Moreover, the facts and circumstances set forth in the “affidavit must provide the 

magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.” Gates, 462 

U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. A search-warrant affidavit need not, however, comply with any 

“‘[t]echnical requirements of elaborate specificity.’” Id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, quoting 

Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. 741. Instead, 

[i]n determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted in 

support of a search warrant, “[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make 

a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth 

in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of 

persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 

or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 

George at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317; 

accord Castagnola at ¶ 35 (“[T]he evidence must be sufficient for the magistrate to conclude that 

there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”). 
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{¶ 19} A search warrant issued after a magistrate or judge has independently determined 

that probable cause to search exists will enjoy a presumption of validity. State v. Parks, 4th Dist. 

Ross No. 1306, 1987 WL 16567 (Sept. 3, 1987), *4; see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 

98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (noting that search-warrant affidavit presumed valid). 

Thus, “‘the burden is on a defendant who seeks to suppress evidence obtained under a regularly 

issued warrant to show the want of probable cause.’” United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 

528, 534 (5th Cir.1977), quoting Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75, 77 (5 Cir. 1951); accord 

Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 216, 218, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988), citing de la Fuente (stating 

that “[t]he burden of initially establishing whether a search or seizure was authorized by a 

warrant is on the party challenging the legality of the search or seizure”); State v. Wallace, 2012-

Ohio-6270, 986 N.E.2d 498, ¶ 27 (7th Dist.) (explaining that a defendant who “attacks the 

validity of a search conducted under a warrant” carries “the burden of proof * * * to establish 

that evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant should be suppressed”); State v. Clouser, 4th Dist. 

Highland No. 16CA4, 2016-Ohio-5370, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 20} In the case sub judice, appellant asserts that the search warrant is tainted due to 

the information learned during the unlawful Kansas traffic stop that prompted Detective Purdin’s 

decision to investigate and to seek a search warrant. Appellant thus contends that the 

exclusionary rule requires the suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. 

{¶ 21} “The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials 

seized during an unlawful search.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 

2533, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988), citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 

L.Ed. 652 (1914). The rule applies both to “the ‘primary evidence obtained as a direct result of 

an illegal search and seizure’ and * * * ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of 
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an illegality,’ the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 

195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016), quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 

L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); accord Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 

L.Ed. 307 (1939) (stating that the exclusionary rule prohibits evidence that is derivative “of the 

primary evidence, or that is otherwise acquired as an indirect result of the unlawful search, up to 

the point at which the connection with the unlawful search becomes so attenuated as to dissipate 

the taint”). 

{¶ 22} The purpose of requiring suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence is to deter 

Fourth Amendment violations. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). 

Given “the significant costs of th[e exclusionary] rule,” however, the United States Supreme 

Court has “deem[ed] it ‘applicable only * * * where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 

substantial social costs.’” Id., quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 

165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “‘[s]uppression of 

evidence * * * has always been [a court’s] last resort, not [its] first impulse.’” Id., quoting 

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). 

{¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court’s reluctance to suppress evidence under the 

exclusionary rule has led to “several exceptions,” three of which “involve the causal relationship 

between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence.” Id. 

First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence 

obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a 

separate, independent source. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 

108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). Second, the inevitable discovery 

doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered 

even without the unconstitutional source. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 

443–444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). Third, and at issue here, is the 

attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between 

unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted 
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by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the 

constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by 

suppression of the evidence obtained.” Hudson, supra, at 593, 126 S.Ct. 2159. 

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016). 

{¶ 24} We further observe that the United States Supreme Court has refused to hold that 

“‘evidence is “fruit of the poisonous tree” simply because “it would not have come to light but 

for the illegal actions of the police.”’” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 

2164, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 

3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–488, 83 

S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). “Rather, but-for cause, or ‘causation in the logical sense 

alone,’ United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 274, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), can 

be too attenuated to justify exclusion, id., at 274–275, 98 S.Ct. 1054.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 

U.S. 586, 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). Thus, “the more apt question in 

such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which 

instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means 

sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 

U.S. 471, 487–488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), quoting J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 

221 (1959). Accordingly, “evidence is not to be excluded if the connection between the illegal 

police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is ‘so attenuated as to dissipate the 

taint.’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804–05, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 

(1984), quoting Nardone v. United States, supra, 308 U.S., at 341, 60 S.Ct., at 268. 

{¶ 25} In general, evidence that law enforcement officers obtain from an independent 

source dissipates any taint. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804–05, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 

3385, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S., at 392, 
ADAMS, 20CA1117 

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40 S.Ct., at 183 (emphasis added); see also State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 67, 630 N.E.2d 355 

(1994) (“The exclusionary rule does not apply * * * if the connection between the illegal police 

conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, as 

where the police have an independent source for discovery of the evidence.”). Thus, “‘the 

exclusionary rule has no application [where] the Government learned of the evidence “from an 

independent source.”’” Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804–05, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3385, 82 

L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), quoting Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S., at 487, 83 S.Ct., at 417, quoting 

Silverthorne Lumber Co., supra, 251 U.S., at 392, 40 S.Ct., at 183). 

{¶ 26} In the case sub judice, law enforcement officers learned that appellant possessed 

40,000 grams of marijuana in his residence independent of the Kansas trooper’s observations that 

occurred one week before Detective Purdin’s encounter with appellant. Adams County officers 

discovered 40,000 grams of marijuana pursuant to a search warrant that relied upon facts learned 

independently from the Kansas traffic stop. The facts set forth in the search-warrant affidavit 

show that after Purdin stopped appellant’s vehicle for traffic violations, he detected the odor of 

burnt marijuana and subsequently discovered two pounds of marijuana in the vehicle. The 

discovery of the marijuana in appellant’s vehicle, combined with appellant’s recent departure 

from his residence, prompted the search of appellant’s residence. It is important to note that 

neither fact relied upon evidence acquired during the Kansas traffic stop. 

{¶ 27} Moreover, simply because Detective Purdin decided to investigate appellant after 

he received information from the Kansas trooper does not suggest or require the conclusion that 

officers lacked an independent source for the discovery of the marijuana inside appellant’s 

residence. As we observed earlier, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument 

that evidence must be excluded if “it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of 
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the police.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 592, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 

(2006), quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 

(1984), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 

(1963). Instead, the question is “‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the 

evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or 

instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” Wong Sun v. 

United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). In the case at bar, 

officers discovered the large amount of marijuana inside appellant’s residence by a means 

sufficiently distinguishable from the Kansas traffic stop, thus, so as to purge the taint of the 

Kansas stop. 

{¶ 28} Consequently, when an affidavit for a search warrant contains information that 

police improperly obtained, courts will nevertheless uphold the warrant if “after excising tainted 

information from a supporting affidavit, ‘[]sufficient untainted evidence was presented in the 

warrant affidavit to establish probable cause * * *.’ ” See State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 

2002-Ohio-5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 17, quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 

S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). Including illegally obtained information in a search-warrant 

affidavit does not invalidate the warrant, unless the illegally obtained information “proved to be 

critical to establishing probable cause for the issuance of the warrant.” 

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3305, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). 

{¶ 29} In the case sub judice, even though the search-warrant affidavit referenced the 

unlawful Kansas stop, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the affidavit contains 

sufficient untainted evidence to establish probable cause to search appellant’s residence for 

evidence of criminal activity. The illegally obtained information was not critical to establishing 
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probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. After redacting the information gathered during 

the Kansas traffic stop, the search-warrant affidavit shows that shortly after appellant left his 

house, Detective Purdin conducted a valid traffic stop and discovered two pounds of marijuana 

inside appellant’s vehicle. Purdin stated that, in his experience, two pounds of marijuana is not 

intended solely for personal use. Once again, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the 

affidavit sufficiently sets forth untainted evidence to establish a probable cause that a search of 

appellant’s residence would uncover evidence of additional marijuana or contraband. 

Consequently, the trial court correctly overruled appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. 

{¶ 30} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole 

assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and that appellee recover of appellant the costs 

herein taxed. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County 

Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has been previously granted, it is 

continued for a period of sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay is 

to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an application for a stay during the 

pendency of the proceedings in that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the 

expiration of the sixty day period. 

 The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a notice of appeal with the Ohio 

Supreme Court in the forty-five day period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court dismisses the appeal prior to 

the expiration of said sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion 

 

 For the Court 

BY:__________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge 

 

 

 
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the 

time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.