FIRST DIVI SION DECEMBER 01, 2008

No. 1-07- 2787 LA RRY F ILLIUN G and

RYA N HAY ES, ) Appe al fro m the

) Cir cu it Co ur t o f Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, ) Co o k C o un t y.

) v. ) ) CAROL L. ADA

MS, in h er official capacity as ) Sec re t ar y of Dep ar t ment o f Human ) Ser vices, TH E D EP ARTM EN T O F HUM AN ) No. 05 CH 15282 SERVICE S, MICHAEL S. PELLETI ER, in hi s ) off i cial capa ci ty a s the El gi n M en tal Heal th Ce nter ) Facility Dire ct or , a nd DE NNI S H . H EAD LEY , in ) his o fficia l ca pa cit y as E lgin Fo r en sic Pr o gr am ) Di rector, ) Honorable ) Mar y Anne Maso n, Defendan ts-Appellees. ) Judge Presidin g. PR ESI DI NG JU STI CERO BE RTE. G OR DO N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plaint iff s ar e co mmi

t t ed t o a menta l health u nit fo r t he cr imi nally i nsane , t hat is par t of t he Elgi n Men tal Heal th Center, in

Elgi n, Ill in ois. They fi le d this sui t t o challe nge certai n poli ci es at the me ntal h eal th center that aff

ect their acces s to and possessi on of property and f unds. The tri al
cour t gr anted defendants’ m ot ions f or summary

judgm ent and to strike por tions of plai ntif fs’
mo t io n fo rsu mmar y jud ge men t . Fo rt he r ea so ns d isc us se d b elo w, we affir m.No. 1-07- 2787

2 BACK GROUND Parties The tw o pl

ai n ti f f s i n th i s a cti on , L ar ry Fi l l i un g a n d R yan Ha yes , w er e b oth

com m i tted to t he cu st o dy o f t he I llino is D ep ar t men t o f H um an S er vic es ( t he De pa r t men t ) af t er a f ind ing by a cri m i na l court that th ey

were not gui l ty b y reas on of i ns an i ty. A l though both p l ai ntif f s we re ad jud ica t ed cr iminally ins an e, ne it he rpla int iff ha s a co ur t - ap po int ed gu ar dia n t o man ag e h is per so nal funds o r p ro per t y. Bo t h plaint iff s ar e co nfined by the Dep ar t ment t o t he Pinel Unit at t he Elgin Ment al Hea lth Ce nt er (E lgin), a menta l health fac ili t y ope ra t ed by t he St at e o f Illinois and located i n Elgin, Ill

in ois. The Pi

nel Uni t is a f orensi c treatment program wi th approxim

ately 40 pati en ts. Th e c om pl ai nt s tate d that p l ai

nti f f s F i l l i un g a nd Ha yessu ed “ i nd i vi dua l l y an d on be ha l f of all ot her s simil

ar ly si t uat ed. ” I n add itio n, t he co mplaint r efer re d se ver al times t o “member s o f the pla in tif f cl ass.” However, the sui

t was never ce

rtif ie d as a cl ass acti on, and thus these two pl ai ntif f s are the on l y pl ai ntif f s i n th i s action
. The def endan ts in this action are the Il

li nois Departmen

t o f Hum an Servi ces and three officials o f the Dep ar t ment. The t hre e o ffi cials ar e: ( 1) Car ol Ada ms, se cr et ar y of t he Departmen

t; (2) Mich

ael S. Pell etier, fa ci li ty di rector at Elgi

n, who has

been replac ed by

Charl es Ho ffm an; and (3 ) D ennis H. Hea dley, d irect or of t he fo re nsic pr og ra m at E lgin. Co mplaint The compl

ai nt, fi le d Septembe

r 8, 2005, co ntain

ed fi ve counts, alle gin

g : (1) im proper promulgation of certai

n poli ci es at Elgi

n, i n vi olation of the Ill in ois A dmi ni strative Procedure ActNo. 1-07- 2787

3

(5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq . (West 2006)); (2) restrictions on El gin patien ts in violation of

section 2- 104 of the Menta l He al th a nd De ve l opm

en tal Di sa bi l i ti esCode, th

e s tatute govern i ng pos se ss i on of personal

propert y b

y pa tients i n a m ental heal th faci li ty (405 ILCS 5/2-104 (West 2006)); (3)
v i ol ati on s of th e f i rs t am en dm en t ri gh t of f re edom of sp ee ch (U .S. Con

st. am en d. 1 ) d ue to El gi n’ s restrictions on p ati en

ts’ acce ss to f

i l m and m usi c rec ordi ngs ; (4)va

ri ous statutory
v i ol ati on s d ue to El gi n ’s re str i cti on s on pa ten ts’ f i l m an d m us i c acc es s, an

d on pa ti en ts’ ab i l i ty to make p ur chas es; a nd ( 5) violat ion o f Sec t ion 2 -1 05, t he st at ut e pe rmitt ing a ment al healt h pat ient to “ use his m oney as h e ch ooses” (405 IL CS 5/2 -105 (W

est 200 6)). On l y f our c oun ts a re n ow a t i ss ue , b ec au se

pl ai nti f f s d ropp ed the con sti tutiona l cl ai m on appe al . Pl

ai nti f f s’ appe l l atebr

i ef sta ted : “ Cou nt I II h asbe en con ce de d by the Plai nti f f s, a nd i s n ot
a su bj ect of thi s ap peal .” The ta rg et of th es e f our cou n ts were tw o wr

i tten pol i ci es i n th e “ El gi n Me n tal He al th Cente r M an ual .” P ol i cy

210 5 f orb i d pa ti en t ac ce ss to f i l m s a nd m us i c that w ere

vi ol en t, ra ci st or
sex ual l y ex pl i ci t; an d P oli cy 51 25 re qui

re d a ca sh l es s s y ste m of de b i t ca rd s a n d c h ecksf

or i ts forensi c patients. Wi th respect to “the practi ce i n pl ace” concerni

ng Poli cy 2105, the complai

nt all eged,
am ong ot her thi

ngs, that it “restrict[ed] a patient’s acce ss, possessi on and use of

faci li ty-owned and pati ent-owned vi

deo fi lm s and m usi c compact di scs [CDs].” Poli cy 2105 was enti

tled “ Vide o Film s/C omp act Discs” ; and it go ver ned bo t h (1 ) t he pu rc hase of film and music re co rd ings by the facility, and (2 ) t he ability by sta ff, pat ients or anyone else t o br ing suc h re co rd ings into t he f ac i l i ty . The p ol i cy

proh i bi ted the pur ch as e b y the f ac i l i ty of com pa ct di sc s “

tha t i nc l ude orNo. 1-07- 2787

4

pr omo t e vulga r lang uag e, ra cism, vio lence o r a nt i-so cial behavio r. ” Fo r films not ow ned by t he f aci l i ty, th e pol i cy prohi bi ted f i l m s rated R or X. Wi th respect to “the practi ce i n pl ace” concerni

ng Poli cy 5125, the complai

nt all eged,
am ong ot her thi

ngs, that patien

ts were required “

to bri ng a pi cture and descri

ption of the obj ect they wis h to buy to the uni

t mana ger when requestin g hi s or her signature on a wi thdrawal authorization s li

p”; that the uni

t mana gers could thus “

ma ke a personal

judgm ent” about the item t ha t t he pa t ien t wis he d t o bu y; a nd t ha t t he un it man ag er s c o uld de cline t o sig n a wit hd r aw al s lip if t he pa t ien t did no t pr es en t a p ict ur e o f t he int en de d it em. Pol i cy 512 5 w asen

ti tl ed “ Pati en t Tru st F un d”an d gov ern ed the us e b y a p atien t of hi s or her f unds wh il e he was at the faci

li ty. For patients i

n the f orensi c treatment program, the policy pr o vid ed fo ra c as hle ss sys t em u sing o nly d eb it ca r ds an d c he ck s. Aft er de po sit ing fun ds int o his pat ient t ru st fund, t he pa t ient r ece ived a d ebit c ar d t hat he co uld u se t o mak e pu rc hase s at t he facility. When t he pa t ient w ished t o mail a che ck t o p ur chas e an it em fro m ou t side t he facility, he compl eted a withdrawal

slip that was then

signed b y a n em ploy ee desi gnated to aut horize s

uch withdrawal

s. The che ck was then “

ma il ed di rectly from the Trust Fund by

the Trust Fund staff

.” If t he pa t ient w ant ed “t he co rr esp ond ence t o r emain unimpede d, pr ivate and u ncens or ed, ” t hen he could place the corre spondence in a sealed en

velope at tached t o t he wi thdrawal sli

p. The t rust fun d staff would then

ma il the sealed env

el ope with the ch

eck i n an ot her env el ope. Po li

cy 5125,
as w ri tten, di d not req ui re a pi cture. T he ev en t s g iving r ise t o t his la ws uit , as alle ge d in t he co mpla int , inc lud e E lgin ’s r efu sa l: ( 1) t o r en t t he films “Wa kin g L ife, ” r at ed R, an d “ Gh o st in t he Sh ell I I , ” a Ja pa ne se an ime film,No. 1-07- 2787

1 The regul ati on wa s f

i rst added b

y em ergen cy rulem aki ng, e f f ecti ve Jul y 31, 200 6, f

or a ma xi mum of 150 day

s. 30 Ill . Reg. 13527. It was then adde d perman ently , eff ective Decem

ber 27, 2006. 31 Ill . Reg. 412. 5 rated PG-13; (2) t o purchase the f il m “ Mill ion Dol la r Baby ,” rated PG-13; (3) t o appro ve a withdrawal

form for pl ai ntif f F il li ung to buy a

pai r of j uggli ng ba ll s becaus e he di

d not pro vi

de a pic t ur e o f t he ba lls; a nd ( 4) t o ap pr o ve a w it hd r aw al fo r m fo rpla int iff Ha yes t o bu y a mu sic compact di sc by

the ban d “Iron Mai

den.” New R eg ul ati on Effect ive Dec ember 2 7, 200 6, t he De par t ment p ro mulgat ed a new a dministr at ive regulation entitled “Personal Propert y i

n State Mental Hea

lth F acili ties.” 59 Il

l. A dm. Code § 110.30, added at 31 Ill. Reg. 412, ef f. Decem ber 27, 2006. 1 The t rial co ur t offer ed p laintiffs the op po rt unit y to amend t heir co mplaint, but plaint iff s de clined. Thu s, no ne o f the allegat ions o f the
com plai nt are di rected agai nst the new re gul

ati on. On M ay 5 , 2 00 6, de fend ant s filed an a mend ed ans we r t o inclu de an a ffirmat ive d efe nse o f
mo o t ne ss . P lain t iffs ch o se no t t o file a r ep ly. T he ne w D ep ar t men t - wid e r eg ula t io n su pe r ce de d b o t h t he E lgin po licie s c ha lleng ed in t his la wsui t. In their appel

la te brief , defen dants stated that t he n

ew regula tion superceded b ot h Poli cy 21 05 an d P o licy 5 12 5, an d t ha t t he se t wo po licie s w er e n o lo ng er in e ffec t at E lgin
. I n t he ir appe l l ate bri ef

, pl ai ntif f s di d not cl ai m otherwi se. Amo ng o t he rt hing s, t he ne w r eg ula t io n a ut ho r ize s a men t al h ea lt h fa cilit y t o o ffer a d eb itNo. 1-07- 2787

6

card, requires i

ndi vi dual patien ts to compl

ete a withdrawal

form in order t o gain

use of the f

unds i n th ei r i nd i vi dua l ac cou nts , prohi bi ts th e c ate gori cal res tri cti on of f i l m s b as ed on th ei r M oti on Pict ur e Asso ciat ion r at ing, a nd allow s po sses sion o f fi lm and music re co rd ings wit hou t re st rict ion, unless an in div idua li zed clin ic al judgm ent is ma de to t he contrary. 59 Il

l. A dm. Code §110.30, adde d a t 31 I l l . Re g. 4 12, ef

f . De cem be r 27 , 20 06. Th e n

ew reg ul ati on s tate s th at i t “ appl i esto all ad ult ind ividua ls a dmit t ed t o a D ep ar t men t men t al h ea lt h fa cilit y.” ( E mph as is a dd ed
. ) 59 I ll. Adm . Code §110.30 (f), added at 31 Ill. Reg. 412, ef f. Decem ber 27, 2006. Plaint iff s’ Mo t ion fo r S ummary Jud gment On Ma y 17 , 20 07 , pl

ai n ti f f s f i l ed a m oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t, w ri tten b y l aw stu den ts
an d thei r s upe rvi si ng attorn ey s. The moti on s ough

t su m mary j udg em en t, i n p art, base d on
num erous events an

d transactions n

ot alle ged i

n the com pla in t, and man

y of whi ch occurred after t he co mplaint w as filed. The mot ion also so ught summary judg ment, in par t , ba sed on e vent s and tra n sa cti on s i n v ol v i n g a pa ti en t oth er th an th e tw o pl

ai n ti f f s n am ed i n th e c om pl ai n t. Even ts occurri ng af ter the f i l i ng of the com pl ai nt on Septem

ber 5, 20 05, i

ncl uded: (1 ) o n Apr il 16, 2 006 , p laintiff Fil liung was not allowe d t o g ive items t o his family during a fami ly visi t, becau se o f a “new po li

cy” that had go ne into effect; (2 ) “[ o] n *** Apr il 6, 20 06, Elgin ad op t ed a pr act ice t hat pr event s pa t ients fro m using bags i n the f acili ty unl ess they are in volv ed i n an educational

course” and plai

ntif f F il li ung “ was pla ced on restricti on for carryi ng a b ag off

the uni t”; (3 ) o n Ja nua ry 2 2, 20 06 , E lgin c o nfisc at ed a “N ine I nch Na ils CD ” o rd er ed by pla int iff Fil li ung and held it unt il

Dece mber 200 6;No. 1-07- 2787

7

(4 ) o n Mar ch 27 , 2 007 , p laintiff Fil liung was not able t o w ithd ra w $1 0 in cas h; and (5 ) o n Sep t ember 2 8, 200 6, Elgin pa t ients re ceived “a co py of t he Co nt ra band a nd Re str i cte d i tem s l i st” wh i ch i n cl ud ed com pu ter s wi th “b ui l t-i n wi re l es s c ards ,” an

d a s a re su l t, pla in tif f F il li ung coul d not use a laptop computer that he had ordered in Jul y 2006. The m ot ion a ls o sought summ

ary j udgme

nt based on ev

ents concerni

ng Jam es Baker, an El gi n pa tie nt i n the Har tma n U ni t, whi ch i s a d i f f eren t uni t than the on e i n w hi ch pl ai ntif f s are confi ned. Baker has nev

er been nam ed as a pl ai ntif f i n thi s sui t. The motion cl

ai me d that Baker was not allowed to withdraw funds f rom hi s account, to keep cash on hi s uni t, or t o po ssess a wi reless com puter. Defend ant s’ Mo t ions t o S t rike and fo r S ummary Jud gment De f en da nts move d f or s um mary j udg men t an d to s tri keporti ons of pl ai nti f f s’ moti on f

or summ ary j udgment. On May 17, 2007, defendants moved f or summary

judgm ent on t he grounds: (1 ) t hat t he new re gulat ion had moo t ed t he claims ass er t ed in t he last fou r o f the five cou nt s o f the compl ai nt; (2) that plai

ntif fs ’ clai ms “un der the APA i

n Count I fai

l as a m atter of law”; an

d (3) tha t plai nti f f s’ cl ai m s “ reg ard i ng f ac i l i ty -own ed prop erty pur ch as ed or rente d by

[El gi n] f or faci li ty-wide use i

n Counts II and III al so fai l a s a m atter of law.” On Ju ne 7, 2 007 , de f

en da nts ’ m ove d to s tri

kethe porti ons of pl ai nti f f s’ moti on f

or su m mary j udg men t tha t al l eg ed “ne w f ac tua l al l eg ati ons an d c l ai m s f or re l i ef tha t we re n ot
asse rt ed in P laintiffs’ Co mplaint and , fo r t he mos t par t , w er e no t deve lop ed by Plaint iff s du ring di scovery .”No. 1-07- 2787

8 Tr ial Cou rt ’s Ru ling On September 19, 2007, the tr ial cour t issued a written o rder gr anting def endants’
m oti on s f or sum mar y j udgm en t an d to stri ke por ti on s of pl ai n ti f f s’ moti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t, and den yi ng pl ai ntif fs ’ m ot ion f or summ ary j udgme

nt. Before i ssui

ng the wri

tt en order, the tr ia

l
cou rt hea rd argu men t f rom cou n se l an d s tate d th

e r ea son s f or i ts r ul i n g i n open cou rt. Fi rst, the trial

court ruled on

def enda nt’s m otion to strike, statin

g i ts reasons as f oll ows: “A t t he outset, I ’m

going to tell

you, Mr. Hey

rman [plai ntif fs ’ counsel

], I’m goi ng to grant t he m

ot ion to strike. This i s a case, and I have rea d your c omplain t ca refull y, it’s a case ch al le ngi ng particul

ar practices or what y

ou characterize as rules of the Elgin

Mental Heal th Center. And the f

act that your
sum ma ry j udgme nt goes bey

ond that and say

s there are other rules
o r as pe ct s o f rule s p er t ain ing t o pa t ien t s’ r igh t s t o po ss es s c er t ain pe rs ona l prop erty , ac ce ss to ca sh i n th ei r tru st f un d a cc oun ts is n ot appr opri ate

on su m mar y j udgm en t. If it w as, ever y complaint wo uld be a moving t ar get . And the fact that you in

cluded i n y our complai

nt an all egation that these rules or t hat the Elgi

n rules, in cl udin g the particular rules tha

t your
co mplaint fo cus ed o n, vio late pat ients ’ right s do es no t ent itle t he Pla int iffs t o , in su mmar y jud gme nt , ex pa nd t he sc o pe o f t he ir
com pl ai n t.No. 1-07- 2787

9 It is f und am en tal that a p arty

can not m ove f or sum mary judg ment o n a claim not st at ed in t he co mplaint. So t his arg ument is li mi ted to the two po li

ci es that you chal

le nged i n y our com pl ai nt.” Af ter stri ki ng th ese clai m s, the tria l court next con sidered

the cross-m

otion s f or sum mary j udgm en t. The tri al court ex pl ai ne d tha t si nc e i t had struck thes e cl ai m s f i rst, the se c l ai

m s we re not part of i

ts summ ary j udgme

nt ruli ng: “As I sa i d at the outset, I am

not goi ng to con sider, as

part of th i s m oti on , a n y addi ti on al cl ai m s th at th e P l ai n ti f f m i gh t wish to assert t hat were not specif ical ly in cluded i n the complai

nt, because that rea l l y i sn ’t the f unc tion of a sum mary j udgm en t proceed i ng.” The trial court then ruled on the cross-motions f or summ ary j udgme

nt, stat in g: “As t o Co un t On e, I find t ha t t he E lgin fac ilit y, t he E lgin Ment al Hea lth Ce nt er Facility [, ] is no t an ag ency wit hin the
mea ning o f t he Ad minist r at ive Pr o ce du r e A ct , an d t he r efo r e, it is not re quir ed t o c omp ly with t he APA’ s pr ovisio ns re gar ding publi shi ng i ts rules and providin

g for publi

c commen

t o n those rules. Cer t ainly, the Dep ar t ment is s ubject t o t he Administr at ive Pr oc edu re Act and D efenda nt s do n’t ar gue ot her wise, and t he Departmen

t has, in fact, publ

is hed rules di

rected to the subj ectNo. 1-07- 2787

10 ma tt er of thi s litigation, but I don’t agree with Pl ai ntif fs and I accept the anal

ys is in Cann on versus Qui [n]l ey

[351 Ill . App. 3d 1120, 11 30-31 ( 2004)] notwithst andi ng the Plai

ntif f i n that case
wa s p ro s e, th

at the vari ousf ac i l i ti estha t are un de r th e a uspice s of
an ag en cy of th e S tate of Il l i n oi s th em se l v es h av e to c om pl y wi th the Admi ni strat iv e Pro cedure Act t o impl

emen t t hei r own ru les. As t o t he r emaining co unt s o f Plaintiff’s co mplaint, I find that, again, f

ocusin g solel y on the alle gations of

the compl

ai nt as ple d at the time

[ sic ] on the

motion s f

or sum mary j udgm en t were fi le d, that t he rem

ai ni ng cl ai ms for declarator y a

nd i nj unctiv e reli ef
are moot ba se d on

the prom ul ga ti on b y the De pa rtm en t of Sec ti on 110 .30 . I di sa

gre e w i th res pe ct to C oun

t 5, th at the p rovi si

ons of the Menta l He al th C odequote d re qui

res tha t the De pa rtm en t al l ow pa ti en ts th e u nl i m i ted ab i l i ty to ha ve asm uc h c ash on

the i r pe rs on or in the v

ic in ity of thei r person as they

choose. I f i n d th at th e statu te is n ot am b i gu ous an d th at i t si mpl y provi des the patien

t[s] shall n

ot have access to their f

unds restri cted. Th e i m pl em en tation of a cashl ess sy stem or a deb i t card system or a requirem

ent that part ic

ula r purchases requi

re advan ce approval i s not a restriction on acce ss, and the ri ght of access

does not t ransl ate in to the righ

t t o have on a pati ent’s person anNo. 1-07- 2787

11 unlimi t ed a mou nt of c ash. And so for these reaso ns, I’m goin g to grant Defendants’
moti on f or s um mary j udg men t, an d de ny Plai nti f f s’ moti on f

or sum ma ry j udgme nt.” A f ter th e tr i al cou rt gra n ted th e def en da n ts’ moti on s to str

i ke an d f or sum mar y j udgm en t, the trial court off ered pla in tif fs the oppor tunity

to am end the com

pla in t. Plai ntif fs ’ counsel declin ed, stating that he “

would rather hav

e a fi nal and appeal

abl e order.” On Octo ber 9, 2007, pl ai nti f f s f i l ed a n oti ce of appe al , ap

pe al i ng the tri al cou rt’ s g ran t of de f en da nts ’ m oti on f or summary judg ment a nd t he t rial co ur t ’s de nial of plaint iff s’ mot ion fo r su mmary judgment . T he noti ce of appe al made n o ref eren ce to the m

otion to strik e. Thi s ap

peal f oll owed. AN AL YSIS In p laintiffs’ brief t o t his co ur t , p laintiffs claim: (1) t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing t he defen dants’ m ot ion to strike portions of pl ai ntif fs ’ m ot ion f or summ ary j udgme

nt; (2) that the tr ia

l
co ur t er re d in ho lding t hat Elgin is no t an ag ency for t he pu rp os es o f the Illinois Administr at ive Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq . ( We st 20 06 ) ( I AP A) , an d t hu s t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in gr an t ing de fen da nt s’ mo t io n fo rsu mmar y jud gme nt o n c o un t I ; a nd ( 3) t he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in gran tin g def endan ts’ m otion f or sum mary j udgm en t on coun ts II, IV a nd V be caus e the

re were iss ue s o f mat er ial fa ct . As p r ev io us ly no t ed , pla int iffs c o nc ed ed co un t I I I in t he ir b r ief t o t his
cou rt.No. 1-07- 2787

12 Defe ndan ts’ Motion to St rike Before we can consider plai ntif fs’ cl aim s concernin

g defendant’s m

ot ion to st rike, we must f i rst dec i de wh

ethe r we h av e j uri sdi

cti on to he ar the se c l ai

m s. Pe opl

e v . Sm i th , 228 Ill . 2d 95, 103 (2 008 ). In o ur re view o f the re co rd , w e fo und “a po t ent ial jurisdict ional de fect ,” namely the f ail ure of the n otice of a ppea l to men tion the m otion to strik e. Sm i th , 228 Il l . 2d at 10 3. Earli er this ye ar, our supreme court cast iga ted the appell

ate court for fa

il in g to consider wh ethe r a notice of a ppea l wassuf f i ci en t to conf er j uri sdi cti on on th

e app el l ate court. Sm

i th , 228 Il l . 2d at 1 06 . O ur

su pr em e c our t re m i n de d th e a pp el l ate cou rt th at w e h av e a n i n de pen den t du ty t o c ons ider whet her we ha ve jur isdict ion, even if t he issue has no t been r aised by any of t he parties. Sm

i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 105-06. The suprem e court emphasi

zed that conside

ration of our
ow n jurisd ictio n is one of t he “mos t impor t ant t ask s o f an app ellate co ur t pane l when beg inning the review of a case .” Sm i th , 228 Il l . 2d at 10 6. “ By

gi vi ng c aref ul attenti on to *** [th

i s] tas k[], a court can avoid the possi bl y un necess ary ex

pendi ture o f j udic ia

l res ources.” Sm

i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 106. Thus it i s i

rrelev ant that the parties i

n the case bef ore us have n

ot rais ed this

is sue. As an appella te court , we have

jurisdi ction to review a

case, onl y i f the appe ll

ant has f il ed a proper noti ce of appe al
. Sm

i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 104. S upreme C ourt Rul e 303(b)(2) states
un eq uiv o ca lly t ha t a p r o pe rno t ice o f ap pe al “ sha ll specify the judgm

ent or part thereof or ot her
o r de r s a pp ea led fr o m an d t he r elie f so ug ht fr o m t he r ev iew ing co ur t . ” ( E mph as is a dd ed
. ) 21 0 I ll. 2d R .30 3(b)(2 ). Th

e ru l e g i ve s th e a ppe l l an t the option of na m i ng ei the r th e enti re j udg men t or only a part of t he judgment , as the subject of his or her ap peal. 2 10 I ll . 2d R.3 03( b)(2 ); In re Estate o f Hoel

le n , 3 67 I ll. App. 3d 2 40, 244 (2 006 ) ( not ice wa s su ffi cient when it named t heNo. 1-07- 2787

13

entire “ 11- page judgm

ent ‘Order’ ”). However, once the j udgme nt or part is

nam ed, the “notice of appe al con f er s j uri sd i cti on on a c our t of re v i ew to co n si der on l y th e j udgemen

ts o r p ar ts thereof speci

fi ed i n the n ot ic e.” Sm

i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 104. Al though a notice i s j urisdi

ctional , our supreme court has hel d that we must construe a noti ce l i beral l y . Sm i th , 228 Il l . 2d at 10 4. Our s

uprem e court has h

eld tha t a rev i ewi ng c ourt shoul d f i nd th at a def ect i s n ot fatal to the app eal , i f

: (1) a n otice ’sdef

ect i s a def

ect i n f orm rathe r than i n s ubs tanc e; and (2) th e def

ect has n ot prej udiced th

e opposi ng p arty . Sm

i th , 22 8 I ll. 2d a t 105 . I n Sm

i th , o ur sup re me co ur t fou nd t hat t he de fect befo re it w as no t one of fo rm, a nd thus di d not con sider the prejudice pron g. Sm i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 105. In Sm i th , o ur su pr eme co ur t fo un d t ha t t he de fec t wa s o ne o f su bst an ce an d t hu s fa t al, because the notice f

ai le d to “f ai rly and adequatel

y s et out the judgm

ent compl ai ned of.” Sm

i th , 22 8 I ll. 2 d a t 10 5. “T he no t ice no t o nly faile d t o men t io n t he Fe br ua ry 21 , 20 06 o r de r ; it specifi cally me ntioned a dif feren t judgm ent, and onl

y tha t judgm ent.” Sm i th , 228 Il l . 2d at 10 5. Si m i l arl y , i n the ca se a

t bar, the notice

of a ppea l f ail ed to men

tion the m otion to strik e. It al so contained n

o reference to the written order, dat ed Septemb er 19, 2007, in wh ic h the trial court ruled on

both th e m otion to strik e an d the sum mary j udgm en t motions. No t only did t he
no t ice fail t o men t io n e it he rt he en t ire o r de ro rt he r ele va nt pa r t , t he no t ice sp ec ified an en t ire ly different par t of t he o rd er as t he su bject of t he ap pea l: t he su mmary judgment ru ling. Since t he not ice, like t he no t ice in Sm i th , spe ci f i ed a “ di f f eren t” rul i ng, th e def ect wa s one

of s ubs tanc e. Sm i th , 228 Ill . 2d at 105. However, alm

ost 30 years bef

ore Sm i th , our su pre me c ourt rec ogn

ize d a noth er exc ep ti onNo. 1-07- 2787

14

to Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2)’s requirement to nam e the “judgm

ent or part .” 210 I ll . 2d R. 303(b)(2). In addition to the exception for form defec ts, t here i s al so an exce

ption f or ruli ngs that
were ne ces sary

steps to the j udgm

en t nam ed i n the notice
. Burtell

v. Fi rst Charter Service C orp. , 76 I ll. 2d 4 27, 436 (1 979 ). In Bu r t ell , our supreme court held that an unspecifi ed j udgme

nt was reviewabl e i f the s peci fi ed j udgme

nt “di rectly relates b ack to [it]. ” Bu r t ell , 76 Il l . 2d at 43 4. Applying t his rea so ning t o t he fact s o f the cas e befo re it, ou r su pr eme co ur t held t hat t he
un sp ec i f i ed “ de cre e f i nd i ng the ex i stenc e of a j oi nt v en ture wa s b ut a pre l i m i na ry de term i na ti on necess ary” to the judgm

ent nam ed i n the n ot ic e, which was “a m

oney judgm ent based on a

n accountin g.” Bu r t ell , 76 Il

l . 2d at 43 6. People v . Jones , 207 Ill . 2d 122, 138 (2003) (where a
sec ond t rial co ur t fou nd t hat t he first t rial co ur t was wr ong , t he first er ro neo us o rd er led t o t he
sec ond c orrect one ) . There i s some doubt whe

ther the necess ary s

tep exception surv

iv ed Sm i th . Whi le our sup re me co ur t in Sm

i th ci ted Bu r t ell for the proposition that notices s hould b e lib erall

y c onstrued, the Sm i th co ur t did no t analyze t he no t ice und er t he nec essa ry st ep e xcep t ion and made no
men tion of th e ex cepti on at al l
. Sm i th , 22 8 Il l . 2d at 1 05. How ever, wef

i nd tha t the exce ption stil l s tands, becaus e i f our suprem e court intended to overt urn an ex ception of s

uch l ong standi

ng, we as sum e tha t it woul d ha ve done so ex pli ci tly
. Barr y v. Retirement Bo ard o f the Firemen’s An nui ty & B enef

it Fun d of Chi cago , 35 7 I ll. A pp . 3d 74 9, 76 3 ( 20 05 ) ( as su med t ha t su pr eme court did not ove

rrule wh ere n ot expl i ci tly stated). T he ex ce pt io n a pp lies t o t his c as e. I n it s s umma ry jud gme nt rulin g, t he t r ial c o ur t he ld that t here was no issue of m aterial f act for t rial . St riki

ng some of the i ssues raised i n pl ain tiff s’No. 1-07- 2787

15

motion f or summ ary j udgme

nt was a nec essary

step to fi ndi ng that there was no i ssue of m aterial f act. Ri nch ic h v. Vi ll age of Bri dgevi ew , 235 Ill . App. 3d 614, 621 (1992) (unspeci fi ed order stri ki ng c ertai n af f i dav i ts sub m i tted by pl ai ntif f i n re spon se to def

endan ts’ m otion f or sum mary j udgm en t was a ne ces sary

step to spe ci f

i ed order gran tin g def endan ts’ m otion f or sum mary judgment ); but see Dal

en v. O zi te Corp ., 230 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 18 , 24 (19 92) (trial

court’s orders denyi ng defendant’s mot ions to dism iss the complaint were no t a nece ssary step to tr ial cou rt ’s order gra nti ng p l ai ntif f ’smotion f or sum mary j udgm en t). Ha vi ng de term i ne d that w e h

ave j urisd i cti on, wenow

turn to the appropri atesta

nd ard of
re view. In In re Estate o f Hoover , 155 Ill . 2d 402, 420 (1993), our supreme court applied an ab us e of di scre ti on

sta n da rd , to th e q ue sti on of wh eth er a tr i al cou rt p rop erl y gr an ted a m oti on to stri ke an af f i dav i t subm i tted i n s upport of a su m mary j udgm en t motion. Ho weve r, eight years late r, in Jackson v . Graham, 323 Il l . Ap p. 3d 76 6, 773- 74 (20 01), th e a pp el l ate cou rt hel d th at de novo wasthe a

ppropri ate stan dard of revi ew f or the s am

e i ssu e. The Jack son

court dis tingui shed Hoover b y

n oti n g th at Hoover did no t offer a disc uss ion o f the is sue, and Hoover was deci ded bef ore Emplo yers I nsur ance of Wau sau v. E hlco L iquidat ing Trust , 186 Il

l . 2d 127(1999 ). Jack son , 323 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 774. Empl

oyers Ins uranceconcerned
an attorney f ees peti tion , not a m

otion to strik e. Empl oyers Ins urance , 186 Il

l . 2d at 16 0. In Empl oyers Ins urance , o ur sup re me co ur t held t hat , a ltho ugh a buse of d iscre t ion is ge ner ally the proper standard of

revi ew f or an a ttorney f ees peti tion , de novo was appropriate i n that case, because the fees petition was granted in connecti on with a motion for judgm ent on t he pl eadings, whi ch requi red de novo revi ew. Empl oyers Ins urance , 186 Il

l . 2d at 16 0.No. 1-07- 2787

16

Ci ting Jack son , t his c o ur t ha s c o nsis t en t ly held t ha t t he ap pr o pr iat e s t an da r d o f r ev iew is de novo , f

or revi ewi ng a motion to strik e porti ons of

a su m mary j udgm en t motion. E.g., Co lli

ns v. St. Pa ul Mercu ry In su ran ceCo. , 38 1 Ill. App. 3d 4 1, 4 6 (2 008 ); Cam co, Inc . v. L owery, 362 I ll. A pp . 3d 42 1, 42 8 ( 20 05 )
. “We may no t de pa rt fr o m stare de cis is wi thout spe cial

j ustif i cation. [Ci tation] . W

he re th e ru l e of l aw has b een s ettled

an d doe s n ot con trav en e a ny sta tute or constitutional

prin ci ple , it m ay be di sregarded onl

y f or ‘goo d cause’ or ‘com

pel li ng reasons.’ ” Iseberg v. Gro ss , 2 27 I ll. 2d 7 8, 101 (2 007 ). Fo llowing t he pr ece dent of t his co ur t and t he pr incip le o f stare de cis is , we wil l a pply a de novo stan

dard of revi ew. In t he ca se be for e us , t he t rial co ur t st ru ck p or t ions o f plaintiffs’ summary jud gment
m otion be caus e i t foun d tha t these portions con

cern ed i ssues n

ot all eged i n the com pl ai nt. The pur po se o f a co mplaint is t o c ryst allize the issues in cont ro ver sy, so t hat a de fendant wil l know wh at clai m s i t has to mee t. Gold Real

ty Group Corp. v. Kisme

t Café, Inc. , 35 8 I ll. App. 3d 675, 679 (2005) , quot in g Pagano v. Occi

dental Chem ic al Corp. , 257 Ill . App. 3d 905, 911 (1 994 ). When ru ling on a mo t ion fo r su mmary judgment , t he t rial co ur t loo ks t o t he pl eadi ngs to determ

i ne the issues i

n c ontrove

rsy . Gol d R ea l ty , 358 Ill . App. at 679 , q uo t ing Pag ano , 25 7 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 911 . If a p l ai nti f f de si res to plac e i ss

ue s i n c ontr ove rs y tha t we re n ot
na med i n the com pl ai nt, the proper c ourse of

action i s to move to am

end the com pl ai nt. Go ld Re al ty , 358 Ill . App. at 679 , quot in g Pag ano , 25 7 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 911 . If the pl ai nti f f doe s n ot
see k to amend, then i

t can not m ove f or sum mary j udgm en t on those i ssues. Gol

d R ea l ty , 35 8 I ll. App. at 680 , quot in

g Pag ano , 25 7 Ill. App. 3d at 911 ; St ead fast Insu ra nce C o. v. C ar emark Rx, Inc. , 373 Ill . App. 3d 895, 900 (2007) (“A party can not seek sum

ma ry j udgme nt on a theory thatNo. 1-07- 2787

17

wasnever pled i

n the com pl ai nt.”). In t heir ap pellat e br ief to t his co ur t , p laintiffs admit t hat t hey did no t name in the
com plai nt al l the “ restri cti ve practi ces and proced

ures at El gi n” that the y now wi sh

to chal l enge. First , t hey admit t hat t hey wer e no t awa re of a ll the p ra ct ices t hat exist ed a t t he t ime the complai nt was filed; an

d second t hey

assert t hat they want to challen ge new practices that arose si n ce th e f i l i n g of th e c om pl ai n t. As we st at ed in a p rio r c ase re gar ding t he exa ct same issu e, “we a re puz zled” by pla int iffs’ failu r e t o ame nd t he ir c o mpla int t o inc lud e t he iss ue s, dis co ve r ed sinc e t he filing o f t he ir
com plai nt an d as serted i n thei r sum mary j udgm en t motion. Gol

d R ea l ty , 358 Ill . App. 3d at 680. Am endi ng pl ai ntif fs ’ compl ai nt to conform

to their s umm ary j udgme

nt theory “woul

d have taken a fraction of the tim

e spent l itigating the

is sue we deci

de today.” Gol

d R ea l ty , 358 Ill . App. 3d at 680. Plaint iff

s see m to be labo ring u nder t he misapp re hensio n t hat t hey did no t need t o a mend their com pla in t, because they

bel ie ve that thei

r complai nt was si mpl y a bout all restrictiv e practices and pr o ce du re s a t Elg in, whe t her ide nt ified in t he c o mplain t o r n o t . I n t heir ap pe llat e br ief, pla in tif fs kept referrin

g to the unpl

ed practices a

nd procedures as addi

tional “ev ide nce,” thus conf usi ng f act an d ev i den ce. The exi sten ce or n onex i sten ce of a prac tic e i s a f act. Roth v . Il l i n oi s In su ra n ce Gu aran ty Fund , 366 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 78 7, 797 ( 2006)(whethe r or not som

ethi ng a ctual l y exi sts i s a f

act); Ch an dler v . Il l i noi s C en tral R.R . Co. , 207 Ill . 2d 331, 348-350 (2003) ( whether or not a rail road
en gage d i n th e p ra cti

ce of adeq ua tel y mai n tai n i n g i ts war n i n g s i gn als a t a cros si n g w as a f ac t,No. 1-07- 2787

18

properly al le ged i n the com pla in t). By contrast, a pat ie

nt’s af fi davi t detaili ng how El

gin applie d the pract ice to him

is ev iden ce, o n a sum

mary judgm ent motion. 735 I LCS 5/2-100 5(c) ( West 200 6) (e vidence on a summary judg ment mo t ion includ es d epo sitio ns, a dmissions o n fil e, and “affi davits, if any

”); People v . Beam

an , 22 9 I l l . 2d

56 , 75 -7 6 ( 20 08 ) (rel

ev an t ev i den ce ten dsto mak e t he e xist enc e o f a mat er ial fac t mo re o r le ss pr o bab le) . T hus , fo r e xamp le, whe n pla int iffs al le ged i n thei r summ ary j udgme

nt motion that Elgi

n adopted new practices

that prevented pla in tif f F il li ung f rom gi vi ng i tems to hi s f

am il y or f rom usi ng a b ag, these were f

acts that belong ed in t he co mplaint. Fill iung’s a ffi davit des cr ibing how he wa s pr event ed fr om g iving i tem s to his f

am i l y or repri manded f or usi ng a ba g was evi den ce. While plaintiffs did no t have t o list t heir evid ence in their co mplaint, t hey had t o list t he ul tim ate f acts th at they i nten ded to prov e. Iseb erg , 227 Ill . 2d at 86. Plai ntif fs argue that sin

ce their com pla in t name d “speci

fi c pi eces of l

aw,” their s

uit i ncl uded any practice that vi

olated such l awsHowev

er, Il l i noi s i s a f act-pl eadi ng juri sdi cti on, req ui ri ng a com pl ai nt wi th f acts, n ot mer e l egal conc l usi ons. Iseb erg , 227 Ill . 2d at 86. The w ea kn es s of pl ai n ti f f s’ argu men t b ec om es appa re n t wh en on e th i n ksab out th

e statu te of limi t at ions. Co unt I a lleges t hat t he cha llenged r ules w er e impro per ly pro mulgat ed u nder t he Ill in ois A dmi ni strative Procedure Act. 5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq . (West 2006). The IAPA provi des for a t wo -year st at ut e o f li mitat ions fo r a ny “pro cee ding t o c ont est any ru le on t he gr ou nd o f noncompl ia nce wi th the procedural requi

remen ts” of the IAPA. 5 ILCS 100/5-35 (b) (W est 200 6). The l im itations period i s m

easured f rom “the ef

fecti ve date of the rule.” 5 ILCS 100/5-35 (b) (Wes t 200 6) . I f a plaint iff co uld cha llenge any ru le, w het her or not named in t he co mplaint, t hen aNo. 1-07- 2787

19

def endan t and the c ourt woul d ha

ve no cl ue h ow to me asu

re the appropri ate per i od of l i m i tations. Thus we f i nd th at the tri al court was

correct i n strik i ng th e porti ons of

pl ai ntif f s’ sum mary judg ment mo t ion t hat alleged new u ltimat e fact s, no t fou nd in t heir co mplaint o r a mended t o be there. Elgi n i s Not an Agenc

y Secon d, pl ai ntif f s con tend on ap peal that the tria l court erred

by gran tin g sum mary judgm ent in fav or o f def endan ts on count I o f the com

pla in t. In count I , plai

ntif fs alle ged that
ce r t ain po licie s a t E lgin we r e in va lid, be ca us e t he y we r e n o t pr o mulg at ed ac co r din g t o t he I llino is Adm in is trat iv e Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/1-1 et seq . (West 2006)). The trial c ourt granted
sum mary j udgm ent, be cause

i t found th at Elgi n was not an “ agen

cy ” f or purposes of th

e IAPA and thus El

gin was not subj ect to the IAPA’ s provis ions for promul

gating rul es. 5 ILCS 100/1-20 (We st 2006 ) (agency

def i ne d); 5 ILCS 100/5 -10 (W est 200 6) (prov

i sions f or prom ulgati ng r ul es). Plai ntif fs argue that the tr ia

l c ourt was i

n error when i

t found that Elgi

n was n ot an “ agency.” 5 ILCS 100/1 -20 (W

est 200 6). A trial cour t must grant a motion for summ ary j udgment “if the pleadings, depositions, and adm is si ons on f

il e, to gether with the a

ff ida vi ts, if any , show that there is n

o genui ne i ssue as to any ma terial fact an d that t he m

ovin g party i s enti

tled to judgm

ent as a m atter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2- 1005(c) (West 2006) . These do cuments and exh ib its are vi ewed in the l

igh t most f av orabl e to the n onm ovi ng p arty . Hom

e In su ran ceCo. v . Ci

nc i nn ati In su ran ceCo. , 213 Ill . 2d 307, 315 (2004) . On appeal, our st andard of review i s de novo . Home Ins urance , 213 Ill . 2d at 315 . W e m

ay af f i rm the tri al cou rt’ s g ran t of su m mary j udg men t on a ny grou nd appa ren t f romNo. 1-07- 2787

20

the re cord. Home Ins

urance , 213 Ill . 2d at 315. Al though the parties di

d not discuss

the is sue on appeal , it appears that count I is b arred by the a ppl i cab l e statute of

l i m i tations. In

coun t I, pl ai ntif f s arg ued that El gi

n’ s pol i ci es w ere subject t o t he IAPA. If plaintif fs were co rrec t, then t he polici es were subject t o t he IAPA’s statut e of l

im itations and count I was tim

e barred. As n

ot ed above, the IAPA

provides that “[a] pr oce ed i n g to c on test an y ru l e on th e g rou n d of n on -c om pl i an ce wi th th e p roc ed

ur al re qui re men ts of this Section m

ust be commenced wi

thin 2 y ears from the eff

ective date of the ru le.” 5 ILCS 10 0/ 5- 35 (b ) (W

est 20 06 ). In

th e c as e a

t b ar , c opi

es of b oth pol i ci es wereatta ch ed as ex h i b i ts to the compl ai nt. At the to p of each

policy is the date of is suance. Both were i ssued on Novem ber 5, 1 998 . Pol

i cy 512 5 w asalso r ev

i se d on Ma y 1, 2 000 . Pl

ai nti f f s’ com pl ai nt wasf i l ed on Sep t ember 8 , 2 005 , lo ng aft er t he t wo -year lim itat ions p er iod had e xpire d, even if we mea sur e t he period from the date o f the revi sion However, t he statu te o f l im itations is an aff irm ative defen

se that i s wa i ve d i f not ass erted, wh

i ch def endan ts f ail ed to do. City o f Nape rville v. Ma nn , 37 8 I ll. Ap p. 3d 65 7, 66 0 ( 20 08 )
. So we mus t pr o ce ed t o an alyz e t he su bst an ce o f t he cla im. The re is no d isput e t hat t he De par t ment is a n age ncy for pur po ses o f the IAP A. T he que sti on b ef ore u s is w

he the r a f ac i l i ty , su pe rvi se d by

the De pa rtm en t, i s a l so a n a ge nc y f or purposes of the IAPA . Plai ntif fs argue that it is , because the IA PA def in es an age ncy to in cl ude an “ adm in is trat iv e uni t” (5 ILCS 100/1-20 (West 2006)); and pl ai ntif fs argue that Elgi

n i s an

“ ad m i n i str ati v e u n i t” of th e D ep ar

tmen t. A n ad m i n i strati v e u n i t qu al i f i es as an ag en cy onl y i f i t wa s “cr ea

ted b y or p ur suan

t to statut e” or “created by

executi ve order.” 5 ILCS 100/1-20 (West 2006). Neither party h asNo. 1-07- 2787

21

bri efed the

is sue of wh

ether Elgi n was created b

y or pursuant to stat ute or executi ve order. Sinc e we f i nd th at El gi n is n ot an ad m i nistrati ve uni t, we do not need

to reach thi s i ssue. There i s no di spute that t he Departm ent is an agen cy because a statut e express ly

states that it is . The Mental

Heal th and Dev

el opmen tal Di sabi li ties A ct (t he Di sabi

li ties A ct) sets o ut “powers and dut ies of the Department of Human Servi ces relatin g to men tal heal th.” 20 I LCS 17 05 /1 ( We st 20 06 )
. T he Dis ab ilit ies Ac t st at es t ha t t he I AP A is “ ex pr es sly a do pt ed , ” b ut o nly f or “ad m i nistrati ve rules a nd procedur

es of the D epartm

en t.” 20 IL CS 17 05/5 (W

est 200 6). If the IA PA confl i cts wi th the Disab i l i

ties Act, then the Di sab i l i

ties Act prev ail s. 20 ILC S 1705/5 (We st 2006 ). The

Di sab i l i tie s Act gi

ve s the Depa rtme nt su perv i sory authority over “al l f aci l i tie s,” specif ical ly nam in g “[t]he Elgin M ental Heal th Center, at E lgi

n.” 20 ILCS 1705 /4(a) ( West 2006)
. Both s tatute and prec eden t support the

f i ndi ng th at the IA PA d oes n ot appl y to Elgi n. Wh en l ooking to stat uto ry l

aw, we look fi

rst t o t he Di sabi

li ties A ct, because the Di sabi

li ties A ct tru mps the IAPA i

f there is a conf

li ct betw een the two laws. 20 ILCS 1705/5 ( West 2006). Thus, even i f El gin technical ly fel l i nto t he IAPA’s def

in ition of an

agency (5 ILCS 100 /1-20 ( West 2006) ), that i s i

rrelev an t if the D i sab i l i

tie s Act ex cl

udes El gi n f rom th e IA PA’ s rea ch
. The Disabilities Act is clear . I t ado pt s t he I APA o nly f or t he r ules a nd pr oc edu re s “o f the Departmen

t.” 20 ILCS 1705/5 (West 2006). The Disabil ities Act speci

fi cally talks ab out fa cili t ies lik e E lg in, bu t sa ys n o t hin g a bo ut ap pl ying t he I AP A t o t he rul es o f a n in di vid ua l fa cili t y. 20 I LCS 170 5/ 4, 4. 1, 4. 2, 4. 3 ( West 200 6) . I nst ead , t he Disa bili t ies Act gives t he De par t ment sup er visor y aut hor ity o ver its fac ili t ies (2 0 I LCS 170 5/ 4 ( West 200 6) ), t o e nsur e t hat t heNo. 1-07- 2787

22

faci li ties’ rules compl y w ith the De partment’s prom

ulga ted rules. The Disabi

li ties A ct requires t he De par t ment t o mak e r egu lar o n-sit e visits t o “[ d] et er mine facili t y compliance wit h Dep ar t ment polici es and procedu res,” and t o “foll ow-u p on complai

nts” made by

men tal heal th “advocates”
an d others . 20IL CS 170 5/4 .3( a) ( 1), (4) (Wes t 200 6). See also People v . Carpenter , 228 Ill . 2d 250, 274-75 (2008) (discussi ng the diff

erence b etween a rul e subj ect to Act requirem ents and a pol i cy that i m pl em en ts an exi sti ng r ul e). In addi tion, the Di sabi

li ties A ct does require each f

acili ty to publish certai

n of i ts poli ci es (20 ILCS 1705/4.1 (West 2006)), as the IAPA requi res of promul

gated rules. 5 ILCS 100/5- 65(b) (requiri

ng publ ic ation of n

ew rules in the Ill in ois Regi ster) (West 2006). If the IAPA al ready
re qui re d p ub l i ca

ti on of an i n di v i du al f ac i l i ty ’s pol i ci es , then th e D i sa b i l i ti es A ct’ s s ep arate pu b l i sh i n g r eq ui re men t wou l d b e r ed un da n t an d u n n ec es sa ry . Th us , the r el ev an t sta tute su pp orts t he finding t hat t he I APA do es no t app ly to Elgin. Second, case law al so compel s the sam e fi ndi ng. The appel

la te court has al

ready rul ed that a f aci l i ty’ s rul es a re not subj ect to the IA

PA. Cann

on v. Qui nley , 351 Ill . App. 3d 1120, 113 0- 31 ( 200 4) . I n Ca

nn on , t he ap pe llat e c o ur t he ld t ha t wh ile t he rule s o f t he I llino is De pa r t men t o f Co rr ec t io ns ( DO C) ha d t o be pr o mulg at ed ac co r din g t o t he I AP A, t he I AP A d id not app l y to the rul es of an i ndi vi dual correcti onal f aci l i ty. Ca nn on , 351 Ill . App. 3d at 1131. Romero v. O’Sul

li van , 302 Ill . App. 3d 1031, 1034-35 (1999) (co ntrasting the rules of the DOC that must be pub li

shed i n the adm in is trat iv e code, with the i

nsti tut iona l pol ic ie s of each correcti onal f aci l i ty). The analo gy bet wee n Ca

nn on and the cas e at bar is

to o close to ignore. Both casesNo. 1-07- 2787

23

invo lve d a fac ilit y t o wh ich a d efe nd an t co uld be co mmit t ed ; a nd bo t h c as es invo lve d p o licie s o nly i n e f f ect at a p arti cul

ar f aci l i ty. Ca nn on , 3 51 I ll. App. 3d a t 113 0- 31. Eve n t hou gh Ca nn on was th e s ol e c as e on

wh i ch th e tr i al cou rt re l i ed , pl

ai n ti f f s’ appe l l ate

b rief doe s n ot ev en try to di sti ngu i sh i t. Li ke pl ai ntif f s, we can not f i nd a di sti nc tion ei ther. Based on b ot h statute and precedent, we agree wi th the trial

court ’s f in din g that Elgi

n was not an “a gen cy ” f or purpose s of

the IA PA. 5 ILCS 100/1 -20 (W est 200 6). We the

ref ore af f i rm th e tr i al cou rt’ s g ra n t of su m mar y j udgm en t i n f av or of de f en da n ts o n cou n t I of th e c om pl ai n t. Ne w R eg ula t io n Mo o t s R ema ining Cla ims While cou nt I c hallenged t he pr oc edu re by which ru les at Elgin we re made, t he r emaining counts chal

le nged the sub stance of those rules. However, the substanc e of the two challe nged El gi n pol i ci es h as b een made m oot, b y th e D ep ar

tmen t’s su b se qu en t ad opti on of a D ep ar tmentwide, IA PA-p romu l gated re gul

ati on. The

i rony i s tha t by getti ng w ha t they ask ed f or in coun t I –
nam ely , an IAPA-pro mul

gated r ule – i

t moo ted t he rest o f thei

r clai ms. Count I is n

ot moot, for t wo reasons. Fi rst, t he process wh

ic h pl ai ntif fs chal le nged ,
na mely t he imple men t at io n by fa cilit ies o f rule s no t pr o mulg at ed ac co r din g t o t he I AP A, st ill conti nue s, an d thus sti l l af f ects p l ai ntif f s’ ri ghts and def endan ts’ du tie s. Mo hant y v. St . Jo hn Heart Cli nic, S.C. , 225 Ill . 2d 52, 63 (2006) (a case is n ot moot if a deci si on could have a di rect im pact o n the rights and duties of the parties). Seco nd, count I fal ls f irm ly in to the publi

c in terest
ex cepti on to the m

ootness doctri ne . Brown v. Dunca

n , 361 Il l . Ap p. 3d 12 5, 134 ( 2005) . “In order t o fal

l i nto t he pub li

c i nterest exception (1) the question mus t be of a publ

ic nature; (2) an
au t ho r it at ive de t er minat io n o f t he qu es t io n mu st be de sir ab le fo rt he pu r po se o f gu idin g p ub licNo. 1-07- 2787

24

off ic ers; an d (3) the question m

ust be like ly

to recur.” Brown , 3 61 I ll. App. 3d a t 134 . Fir st , t he que st ion is o f a pu blic natu re , since it co ncer ns whe t her t he r ules o f a st at e- ru n facility must be publ i sh ed to the publ i c. S ec ond , an

au thor i tati ve de term i na ti on i s des i rabl e f or th e p urp ose

of guid ing t he pu blic officers who ru n t hese facilities. Third , t he qu est ion may ver y well be bro ught ag ai n i n a noth er c om pl ai nt, tha t si m pl y na mesa di f f ere nt p ai r of i nm ate s a nd a di f f ere nt p ai r of pol i ci es. Th

us, the m ootness doctri ne did not b ar our con siderati on of coun t I. The rem ai ni ng counts (counts II, IV and V) are moot because they concern the sub stance of poli ces that have

been superceded by

the passage of

a new regul

ation. Our suprem

e court has held t hat “ ‘wher e a c hallenged st at ut e is amend ed w hile the c aus e is pe nding, t he qu est ion o f the statut e’s v

alidi ty be comes m

oot , thus renderi

ng unn ecessary its rev ie w by the court .’ ” Peo ple v. Joh ns on , 225 Ill . 2d 573, 580 (2007), quot in g Peo ple v. B. D. A. , 102 Il l . 2d 229 , 233 (1 984). In addi tion, pl ai ntif fs have adm

itted that Po li

cy 2105 and Poli

cy 5125, the two polici es n am ed i n th ei r c om pl ai n t, w er e r en

dere d m oot by th e p as sa ge of th e n ew re gul ati on . D ef en da n ts
am en de d thei r an sw er to a dd a n a f f i rm ati ve de f en se of mootne ss . “ If

ne w m atte r by wa y of defen se i s pl eaded i

n the answer, a reply

shal l b y f il ed by the pla in tif f ***.” 735 ILCS 5/2-602 (Wes t 200 6). In

addi ti on, “ [e] ve

ry al l eg ati on [ i n a pleadi ng ], e xc ep t al

l eg ati ons of da mag es , not
ex pl i ci tl y den i ed i s a dm i tted ** *.” 73 5 I LC S 5 /2 -6 10 (b ) (W est 20 06 ). Th

us , “ f ai l ur e to rep l

y to an af fi rmati ve def ense cons titutes an adm

is si on of the al

le gations contai

ned therei n.” State Fa

rm Mut ual Aut omo bile Insur ance Co . v. Has kins , 215 Ill . App. 3d 242, 246 (1991), citin g Lun dbe rg v. Gage , 2 2 I ll. 2d 2 49, 251 (1 961 ) ( “No re ply was mad e t o t he allega t ions s et t ing up t he affirmative d efense and t hey are t her efo re admit t ed. ”) . P laintiffs cho se no t t o file a r eply, a ndNo. 1-07- 2787

25

there by adm i tted the def

en se. Supreme C ourt Rul e 136 provides an ex ception to the deni al

rule, b ut t hi s exception does not help pl

ai ntif fs . 134 Ill . 2d R. 136. Supreme Court Rule 136(b) i s enti tled “Plea din gs Af ter Repl y,” an d it states that “no response to a reply or subsequent pleadi

ng i s requi

red.” 134 Ill . 2d R. 136. Thus, the expl

ic it and un

am bi guous lan guage of Suprem

e Court Rule 136 provi des that
no de nia l is ne ce ss ar y eit he r : ( 1) t o a r ep ly; o r( 2) t o an y ple ad ing su bse qu en t t o a r ep ly. 1 34 I ll. 2d R. 13 6. De fen da nt s’ ame nd ed an sw er do es no t fall int o eit he rca t eg o ry, s o t his e xc ep t io n is of n o hel p to pl ai ntif f s. Anot her exce pt ion t o t he de nial rule is t hat if the a dde d allega t ions a re not new a nd t he
exi sti ng c omp l ai

nt al ready ne gatesthem

, then a repl y i s n ot nece ssa

ry . Ce nt r al I llino is P ub lic Se r vic e C o . v. Mo linar o lo , 22 3 Ill. App. 3d 4 71, 473 (19 92) ; St at e F ar m, 215 Ill . App. 3d at 246; Adam s v. Zay re Corp. , 14 8 Ill. App. 3d 7 04, 711 (19 86) ; Shive v. Shive , 57 Ill . App. 3d 754, 759 (1978) . This exception does not help plai ntif fs ei ther, because defendants’ aff irm ative defen

se wa s ne w a nd t he c o mplain t co uld no t be c o nst ru ed t o alr ea dy d eny it . F o r t hes e r ea so ns, pla int iffs h av e adm i tted th e m ootnes s of

th e tw o pol

i ci es n am ed i n th ei r c om pl ai n t. In their appell

ate brief, plain

tiff s argue t hat the remaini

ng counts ar e not moo t because “restrictive poli

cies an d rules are still i

n pl ace” at E lgi

n, despite the new regulation. Plai ntif fs’ brief does not iden

tify the rest rictive polici

es and rules stil

l i n pl ace, so t hi s court is l

eft to guess wh ich o ne s p laint iffs h ad in mind
. I f pla int iffs w an t ed t o ar gu e e it he rt ha t t he ne w r eg ula t io n d id not co mply with t he st at ut es c ited in their co mplaint o r t hat cer t ain named a nd co nt inuing pr act ices at Elgin did no t co mply with t he new re gulat ion, t hen t he so lut ion wa s t o a mend t heNo. 1-07- 2787

26

compl ai nt to in corpo rate t he n

ew regula tion. However, after the trial court hel d that t he n

ew r eg ula t io n mo o t ed t he ir c laims , t he t r ial c o ur t o ffer ed pla int iffs t he o pp o r t un it y t o ame nd t he ir compl ai nt, and plai

ntif fs refuse d. Plaint iff s also ar gue t hat t heir claims ar e no t moo t , d ue t o t he ad dit ional po licies and practices ci

ted in the ir m

ot ion f or summ ary j udgme

nt. But, as discuss ed above, that ma terial was properly struck by the trial court and thus is of n

o avail to plai

ntif fs . Agai n, pl ai ntif fs were off ered the oppor tunity

to am end thei r complai nt to in cl ude this addi tional ma terial , and they

declin ed. For the f oregoi ng r eas ons, we af

f i rm the tri al court’s f i ndi ng th at coun ts II, IV a nd V are m oot. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reas ons, this court aff irm s the order of the trial

court . Fi rst, we fi nd that the tri al court properl

y struck , f rom p l ai ntif f s’ sum mary j udgm en t motion, the

i ssues that were not alleged i

n pl ai ntif fs ’ compl ai nt. Second, we aff

irm the trial court ’s f in din g that Elgi

n i s not an ag en cy f or pu rpos esof the IA PA , an d th usaf f i rm the tri al cou rt’ s g ran t of su m mary j udg em en t on
cou nt I i n f av or of de f en da nts . Th i rd, weaf f i rm the tri al cou rt’ s g ran t of su m mary j udg men t on the remai ni ng counts (counts II, IV and V), because the two challe nged polic ie s were rendered
mo o t by t he s ubs eq ue nt ena ct ment o f su pe rc ed ing r eg ula t io n. As p re vio us ly no t ed , p laint iffs
conc eded coun t III on app eal
. Af f i rmed. HA LL and GA RCIA, JJ., c oncu

r.