# Official Journal C 389/10 O

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
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| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 389 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6510 October 2022 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 389

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6510 October 2022

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| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | Court of Justice of the European Union |
| 2022/C 389/01 | Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

2022/C 389/01

Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

Official Journal of the European Union

1

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | COURT PROCEEDINGS |
| | Court of Justice |
| 2022/C 389/02 | Case C-465/22: Order of the Court of 16 August 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Brussels Airlines SA/NV (Air transport — Compensation of air passengers in the event of long delay of flights — Connecting flight — Delay in the first flight — No contractual relationship between the passenger and the Community air carrier which operated the second flight — Action for damages against the air carrier which operated the second flight) | 2 |
| 2022/C 389/03 | Case C-413/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — Vapo Atlantic, S.A. v Entidade Nacional Para o Setor Energético E.P.E., Fundo de Eficiência Energética, Fundo Ambiental | 2 |
| 2022/C 389/04 | Case C-416/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — EDP — Energias de Portugal, S.A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira | 3 |
| 2022/C 389/05 | Case C-428/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Varna (Bulgaria) lodged on 28 June 2022 — DEVNIA TSIMENT AD v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi | 4 |
| 2022/C 389/06 | Case C-437/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 4 July 2022 — R.M. and E.M. v Eesti Vabariik (Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet) | 5 |
| 2022/C 389/07 | Case C-466/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Veliko Tarnovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 12 July 2022 — V.B. Trade OOD v Direktor na Direktsia Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika — Veliko Tarnovo | 6 |
| 2022/C 389/08 | Case C-473/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Markkinaoikeus (Finland) lodged on 15 July 2022 — Mylan AB v Gilead Sciences Finland Oy, Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland UC, Gilead Sciences, Inc. | 7 |
| 2022/C 389/09 | Case C-497/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 22 July 2022 — EM v Roompot Service B.V. | 7 |
| 2022/C 389/10 | Case C-509/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 27 July 2022 — Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli v Girelli Alcool Srl | 8 |
| 2022/C 389/11 | Case C-522/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 4 August 2022 — GE v British Airways Plc | 9 |
| 2022/C 389/12 | Case C-551/22 P: Appeal brought on 17 August 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 1 June 2022 in Case T-481/17 Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB | 9 |
| | General Court |
| 2022/C 389/13 | Case T-409/22: Action brought on 30 June 2022 — Glonatech v REA | 11 |
| 2022/C 389/14 | Case T-450/22: Action brought on 18 July 2022 — Sberbank Europe v SRB | 12 |
| 2022/C 389/15 | Case T-453/22: Action brought on 21 July 2022 — BASF and Others v Commission | 13 |
| 2022/C 389/16 | Case T-501/22: Action brought on 18 August 2022 — Austria v Commission | 14 |
| 2022/C 389/17 | Case T-506/22: Action brought on 18 August 2022 — CrossFit v EUIPO — Pitk Pelotas (CROSSWOD EQUIPMENT) | 15 |
| 2022/C 389/18 | Case T-509/22: Action brought on 22 August 2022 — Bimbo v EUIPO — Bottari Europe (BimboBIKE) | 16 |
| 2022/C 389/19 | Case T-511/22: Action brought on 23 August 2022 — Olimp Laboratories v EUIPO — Schmitzer (HPU AND YOU) | 17 |
| 2022/C 389/20 | Case T-517/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Aldi v EUIPO — Heredero de Navarra (LYTTOS) | 18 |
| 2022/C 389/21 | Case T-520/22: Action brought on 28 August 2022 — Karić v Council | 18 |
| 2022/C 389/22 | Case T-521/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Golovaty v Council | 19 |
| 2022/C 389/23 | Case T-522/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — QU v Council | 20 |
| 2022/C 389/24 | Case T-528/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belaruskali v Council | 21 |
| 2022/C 389/25 | Case T-529/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — QT v EIB | 22 |
| 2022/C 389/26 | Case T-534/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belarusian Potash Company v Council | 23 |
| 2022/C 389/27 | Case T-415/18: Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission | 24 |
| 2022/C 389/28 | Case T-808/19: Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan International and Silgan Closures v Commission | 24 |

V   Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

2022/C 389/02

Case C-465/22: Order of the Court of 16 August 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Brussels Airlines SA/NV (Air transport — Compensation of air passengers in the event of long delay of flights — Connecting flight — Delay in the first flight — No contractual relationship between the passenger and the Community air carrier which operated the second flight — Action for damages against the air carrier which operated the second flight)

2

2022/C 389/03

Case C-413/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — Vapo Atlantic, S.A. v Entidade Nacional Para o Setor Energético E.P.E., Fundo de Eficiência Energética, Fundo Ambiental

2

2022/C 389/04

Case C-416/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — EDP — Energias de Portugal, S.A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

3

2022/C 389/05

Case C-428/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Varna (Bulgaria) lodged on 28 June 2022 — DEVNIA TSIMENT AD v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi

4

2022/C 389/06

Case C-437/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 4 July 2022 — R.M. and E.M. v Eesti Vabariik (Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet)

5

2022/C 389/07

Case C-466/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Veliko Tarnovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 12 July 2022 — V.B. Trade OOD v Direktor na Direktsia Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika — Veliko Tarnovo

6

2022/C 389/08

Case C-473/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Markkinaoikeus (Finland) lodged on 15 July 2022 — Mylan AB v Gilead Sciences Finland Oy, Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland UC, Gilead Sciences, Inc.

7

2022/C 389/09

Case C-497/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 22 July 2022 — EM v Roompot Service B.V.

7

2022/C 389/10

Case C-509/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 27 July 2022 — Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli v Girelli Alcool Srl

8

2022/C 389/11

Case C-522/22: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 4 August 2022 — GE v British Airways Plc

9

2022/C 389/12

Case C-551/22 P: Appeal brought on 17 August 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 1 June 2022 in Case T-481/17 Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB

9

General Court

2022/C 389/13

Case T-409/22: Action brought on 30 June 2022 — Glonatech v REA

11

2022/C 389/14

Case T-450/22: Action brought on 18 July 2022 — Sberbank Europe v SRB

12

2022/C 389/15

Case T-453/22: Action brought on 21 July 2022 — BASF and Others v Commission

13

2022/C 389/16

Case T-501/22: Action brought on 18 August 2022 — Austria v Commission

14

2022/C 389/17

Case T-506/22: Action brought on 18 August 2022 — CrossFit v EUIPO — Pitk Pelotas (CROSSWOD EQUIPMENT)

15

2022/C 389/18

Case T-509/22: Action brought on 22 August 2022 — Bimbo v EUIPO — Bottari Europe (BimboBIKE)

16

2022/C 389/19

Case T-511/22: Action brought on 23 August 2022 — Olimp Laboratories v EUIPO — Schmitzer (HPU AND YOU)

17

2022/C 389/20

Case T-517/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Aldi v EUIPO — Heredero de Navarra (LYTTOS)

18

2022/C 389/21

Case T-520/22: Action brought on 28 August 2022 — Karić v Council

18

2022/C 389/22

Case T-521/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Golovaty v Council

19

2022/C 389/23

Case T-522/22: Action brought on 29 August 2022 — QU v Council

20

2022/C 389/24

Case T-528/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belaruskali v Council

21

2022/C 389/25

Case T-529/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — QT v EIB

22

2022/C 389/26

Case T-534/22: Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belarusian Potash Company v Council

23

2022/C 389/27

Case T-415/18: Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission

24

2022/C 389/28

Case T-808/19: Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan International and Silgan Closures v Commission

24

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EN

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

Court of Justice of the European Union

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/1 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/1

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Last publications of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Official Journal of the European Union

(2022/C 389/01)

Last publication

OJ C 380, 3.10.2022

Past publications

OJ C 368, 26.9.2022

OJ C 359, 19.9.2022

OJ C 340, 5.9.2022

OJ C 326, 29.8.2022

OJ C 318, 22.8.2022

OJ C 311, 16.8.2022

These texts are available on:

EUR-Lex: http://eur-lex.europa.eu

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V Announcements

COURT PROCEEDINGS

Court of Justice

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/2 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/2

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Order of the Court of 16 August 2022 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Amtsgericht Hamburg — Germany) — flightright GmbH v Brussels Airlines SA/NV

(Case C-465/22) (1)

(Air transport - Compensation of air passengers in the event of long delay of flights - Connecting flight - Delay in the first flight - No contractual relationship between the passenger and the Community air carrier which operated the second flight - Action for damages against the air carrier which operated the second flight)

(2022/C 389/02)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Amtsgericht Hamburg

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: flightright GmbH

Defendant: Brussels Airlines SA/NV

Operative part of the order

Case C-465/22 is removed from the Register of the Court.

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(1)  Date lodged: 12.7.2022.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/2 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/2

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — Vapo Atlantic, S.A. v Entidade Nacional Para o Setor Energético E.P.E., Fundo de Eficiência Energética, Fundo Ambiental

(Case C-413/22)

(2022/C 389/03)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Supremo Tribunal Administrativo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Vapo Atlantic, S.A.

Defendants: Entidade Nacional Para o Setor Energético E.P.E., Fundo de Eficiência Energética, Fundo Ambiental

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 (1) be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, which, for the purposes of compliance with biofuel incorporation targets, provides that economic operators may, alternatively, evidence compliance with the same criteria by i) physically incorporating biofuels into fossil fuel, or ii) purchasing biofuel certificates from other operators with surplus biofuels? |
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1.

Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 (1) be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, which, for the purposes of compliance with biofuel incorporation targets, provides that economic operators may, alternatively, evidence compliance with the same criteria by i) physically incorporating biofuels into fossil fuel, or ii) purchasing biofuel certificates from other operators with surplus biofuels?

| 2. | Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, under which the option of physically incorporating biofuel is confined to producers operating tax warehouses for processing, that option being denied to entities under an obligation to incorporate which import fuel as registered consignees, which have the option of purchasing biofuel certificates, failure to do so triggering a requirement to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must Articles 3(4) and 18 of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that they preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, under which the option of physically incorporating biofuel is confined to producers operating tax warehouses for processing, that option being denied to entities under an obligation to incorporate which import fuel as registered consignees, which have the option of purchasing biofuel certificates, failure to do so triggering a requirement to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)?

| 3. | Does it make any difference to the answer to the previous question if, at the material time, there were no biofuel certificates available for purchase on the market, meaning that a small operator could not buy any (or could do so only with great difficulty), and if the Direção-Geral de Energia e Geologia (Directorate General for Energy and Geology; ‘the DGEG’) had not organised the corresponding auctions, leaving the small operator with no option but to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)? |
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3.

Does it make any difference to the answer to the previous question if, at the material time, there were no biofuel certificates available for purchase on the market, meaning that a small operator could not buy any (or could do so only with great difficulty), and if the Direção-Geral de Energia e Geologia (Directorate General for Energy and Geology; ‘the DGEG’) had not organised the corresponding auctions, leaving the small operator with no option but to pay compensation (materially equivalent to a fine)?

| 4. | Must Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that it requires independent audits (in the case of the national legislation, independent verifications) to be carried out as a precondition for the application of the sustainability scheme? |
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4.

Must Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 be interpreted as meaning that it requires independent audits (in the case of the national legislation, independent verifications) to be carried out as a precondition for the application of the sustainability scheme?

| 5. | Does Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 preclude a national system for the verification of compliance with sustainability criteria which, despite providing that verifying entities must be accredited to carry out independent verifications of compliance with the sustainability criteria (in accordance with Article 18(3) of that directive), did not in practice allow such entities to be selected because no calls for tender were issued, and, at the same time, requires economic operators to demonstrate their compliance with those criteria, without subjecting that compliance to any independent audit? |
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5.

Does Article 18(3) of Directive 2009/28 preclude a national system for the verification of compliance with sustainability criteria which, despite providing that verifying entities must be accredited to carry out independent verifications of compliance with the sustainability criteria (in accordance with Article 18(3) of that directive), did not in practice allow such entities to be selected because no calls for tender were issued, and, at the same time, requires economic operators to demonstrate their compliance with those criteria, without subjecting that compliance to any independent audit?

| 6. | If the previous questions are answered in the negative, must Article 34 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, interpreted in the manner described in the previous questions? |
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6.

If the previous questions are answered in the negative, must Article 34 TFEU be interpreted as meaning that it precludes national legislation, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings, interpreted in the manner described in the previous questions?

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(1)  Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC (OJ 2009 L 140, p. 16).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/3 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/3

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD) (Portugal) lodged on 21 June 2022 — EDP — Energias de Portugal, S.A. v Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

(Case C-416/22)

(2022/C 389/04)

Language of the case: Portuguese

Referring court

Tribunal Arbitral Tributário (Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa — CAAD)

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: EDP — Energias de Portugal, S.A.

Defendant: Autoridade Tributária e Aduaneira

Questions referred

| 1. | Must transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares be considered ‘overall transactions’ within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice resulting from the judgments in Isabele Gielen (C-299/13) (1) and Air Berlin (C-573/16)? (2) |
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1.

Must transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares be considered ‘overall transactions’ within the meaning of the case-law of the Court of Justice resulting from the judgments in Isabele Gielen (C-299/13) (1) and Air Berlin (C-573/16)? (2)

| 2. | Must the expression ‘formalities relating thereto’, used in Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008, (3) be interpreted as covering the purchase of financial intermediation services that are ancillary to transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares? |
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2.

Must the expression ‘formalities relating thereto’, used in Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008, (3) be interpreted as covering the purchase of financial intermediation services that are ancillary to transactions involving (i) an offer for the cash purchase of debentures, (ii) the issue of debentures and (iii) a public offer for subscription of shares?

| 3. | Can Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 be interpreted as precluding the levying of stamp duty on fees charged for financial intermediation services provided by a bank in relation to (i) the repurchase of debt securities, (ii) the issue and placing on the market of negotiable securities and (iii) the increase of capital through a public subscription of the shares issued, where such services include the obligation to identify and contact investors in order to distribute transferrable securities, receive subscription or purchase orders and, in some cases, purchase the transferrable securities to which the offer relates? |
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3.

Can Article 5(2)(b) of Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 be interpreted as precluding the levying of stamp duty on fees charged for financial intermediation services provided by a bank in relation to (i) the repurchase of debt securities, (ii) the issue and placing on the market of negotiable securities and (iii) the increase of capital through a public subscription of the shares issued, where such services include the obligation to identify and contact investors in order to distribute transferrable securities, receive subscription or purchase orders and, in some cases, purchase the transferrable securities to which the offer relates?

| 4. | Must the above questions be answered differently depending on whether the provision of financial services is required by law or optional? |
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4.

Must the above questions be answered differently depending on whether the provision of financial services is required by law or optional?

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(1)  EU:C:2014:2266.

(2)  EU:C:2017:772.

(3)  Council Directive 2008/7/EC of 12 February 2008 concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital (OJ 2008 L 46, p. 11).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/4 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/4

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Varna (Bulgaria) lodged on 28 June 2022 — ‘DEVNIA TSIMENT’ AD v Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia ‘Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi’

(Case C-428/22)

(2022/C 389/05)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Administrativen sad Varna

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant:‘DEVNIA TSIMENT’ AD

Defendant: Zamestnik-predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia ‘Darzhaven rezerv i voennovremenni zapasi’

Questions referred

| 1. | In light of the objective of the directive and Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on energy statistics, and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC (2) of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which persons who have made intra-Community acquisitions of petroleum coke for production purposes in accordance with point 3.4.23 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 may be required to build up emergency stocks? |
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1.

In light of the objective of the directive and Article 2(d) of Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 on energy statistics, and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC (2) of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which persons who have made intra-Community acquisitions of petroleum coke for production purposes in accordance with point 3.4.23 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 may be required to build up emergency stocks?

| 2. | Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which restricts the types of products in respect of which emergency stocks must be built up and held to some of the types of products in Article 2(i) of the directive in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008? |
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2.

Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which restricts the types of products in respect of which emergency stocks must be built up and held to some of the types of products in Article 2(i) of the directive in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008?

| 3. | Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which the realisation by a person of intra-Community acquisitions or imports of a type of product referred to in Article 2(i) of the directive, read in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 entails an obligation on that person to build up and hold emergency stocks of another, different type of product? |
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3.

Must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which the realisation by a person of intra-Community acquisitions or imports of a type of product referred to in Article 2(i) of the directive, read in conjunction with Chapter 3.4 of Annex A to Regulation (EC) No 1099/2008 entails an obligation on that person to build up and hold emergency stocks of another, different type of product?

| 4. | Must the 33rd recital in the preamble, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which a person is obliged to build up and hold stocks of a product that they do not use in the course of their economic activity and that is unrelated to that activity and where that obligation also entails a significant financial burden (leading, in practice, to compliance being impossible) because the person is neither in possession of the product nor are they its importer and/or holder? |
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4.

Must the 33rd recital in the preamble, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of the directive be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, according to which a person is obliged to build up and hold stocks of a product that they do not use in the course of their economic activity and that is unrelated to that activity and where that obligation also entails a significant financial burden (leading, in practice, to compliance being impossible) because the person is neither in possession of the product nor are they its importer and/or holder?

| 5. | In the event that one of the above questions is answered in the negative: Having regard to the aim of the directive and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as meaning that the importer of a particular type of product can only be required to build up and hold emergency stocks of the same type of product as the product that was imported? |
| --- | --- |

5.

In the event that one of the above questions is answered in the negative: Having regard to the aim of the directive and in light of the principle of proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) in conjunction with Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must the 33rd recital, Article 1, Article 3, Article 8 and Article 2(i) and (j) of Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products be interpreted as meaning that the importer of a particular type of product can only be required to build up and hold emergency stocks of the same type of product as the product that was imported?

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(1)  OJ 2008 L 304, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2009 L 265, p. 9.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/5 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Riigikohus (Estonia) lodged on 4 July 2022 — R.M. and E.M. v Eesti Vabariik (Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet)

(Case C-437/22)

(2022/C 389/06)

Language of the case: Estonian

Referring court

Riigikohus

Parties to the main proceedings

Appellants on a point of law: R.M. and E.M.

Other party and injured party: Eesti Vabariik (represented by the Põllumajanduse Registrite ja Informatsiooni Amet)

Questions referred

| 1. | In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, does a basis with a direct legal effect flow from Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (1) of 18 December 1995, read in conjunction with Article 56(1) and Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and with Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 (3) of 11 March 2014, for the recovery of fraudulently obtained aid financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) from the representatives of a beneficiary legal person who intentionally made false declarations with a view to fraudulently obtaining the aid? |
| --- | --- |

1.

In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, does a basis with a direct legal effect flow from Article 7 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 (1) of 18 December 1995, read in conjunction with Article 56(1) and Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (2) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and with Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 (3) of 11 March 2014, for the recovery of fraudulently obtained aid financed by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) from the representatives of a beneficiary legal person who intentionally made false declarations with a view to fraudulently obtaining the aid?

| 2. | In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which aid to be financed by the EAFRD was, as a result of fraud, set and paid to a limited liability company (Osaühing), can the representatives of the beneficiary company who carried out the fraud and who, at the time when the aid was fraudulently obtained, were simultaneously the beneficial owners of that company, also be regarded as beneficiaries within the meaning of Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 of 11 March 2014? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, in which aid to be financed by the EAFRD was, as a result of fraud, set and paid to a limited liability company (Osaühing), can the representatives of the beneficiary company who carried out the fraud and who, at the time when the aid was fraudulently obtained, were simultaneously the beneficial owners of that company, also be regarded as beneficiaries within the meaning of Article 54(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 and Article 35(6) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 of 11 March 2014?

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(1)  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (OJ 1995 L 312, p. 1).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549).

(3)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 640/2014 of 11 March 2014 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the integrated administration and control system and conditions for refusal or withdrawal of payments and administrative penalties applicable to direct payments, rural development support and cross compliance (OJ 2014 L 181, p. 48).

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad — Veliko Tarnovo (Bulgaria) lodged on 12 July 2022 — V.B. Trade OOD v Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ — Veliko Tarnovo

(Case C-466/22)

(2022/C 389/07)

Language of the case: Bulgarian

Referring court

Administrativen sad — Veliko Tarnovo

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant in the main proceedings: V.B. Trade OOD

Defendant in the main proceedings: Direktor na Direktsia ‘Obzhalvane i danachno-osiguritelna praktika’ — Veliko Tarnovo

Questions referred

| 1. | Must the phrase ‘legal effect [of an electronic signature] as evidence’ in Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC be interpreted as meaning that that provision requires the courts of the Member States to presume that, where the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation are met or are not in dispute, the existence and claimed authorship of such a signature must be presumed a priori to be established beyond doubt or dispute, and must that phrase be interpreted as meaning that, where the requirements of those provisions are met, the courts of the Member States are required to recognise that the qualified electronic signature has the evidential value/force equivalent to that of a handwritten signature only to the extent that the relevant national legal regime prescribes in respect of such a handwritten signature? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must the phrase ‘legal effect [of an electronic signature] as evidence’ in Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 (1) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC be interpreted as meaning that that provision requires the courts of the Member States to presume that, where the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation are met or are not in dispute, the existence and claimed authorship of such a signature must be presumed a priori to be established beyond doubt or dispute, and must that phrase be interpreted as meaning that, where the requirements of those provisions are met, the courts of the Member States are required to recognise that the qualified electronic signature has the evidential value/force equivalent to that of a handwritten signature only to the extent that the relevant national legal regime prescribes in respect of such a handwritten signature?

| 2. | Must the phrase ‘shall not be denied ... in legal proceedings’ in Article 25(1) of that regulation be interpreted as imposing on the national courts of the Member States an absolute prohibition on using the procedural possibilities provided for in their legal systems to deny evidential value to the legal effect of the electronic signature provided for in that regulation, or must it be interpreted as meaning that that provision does not preclude the possibility to refute the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation as being met, through the use, by the national courts of the Member States, of the instruments applicable under their procedural laws, thereby enabling the parties to a dispute before the courts to refute an electronic signature’s evidential force and value, as provided for? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Must the phrase ‘shall not be denied ... in legal proceedings’ in Article 25(1) of that regulation be interpreted as imposing on the national courts of the Member States an absolute prohibition on using the procedural possibilities provided for in their legal systems to deny evidential value to the legal effect of the electronic signature provided for in that regulation, or must it be interpreted as meaning that that provision does not preclude the possibility to refute the requirements of [points] 10, 11 and 12 of Article 3 of that regulation as being met, through the use, by the national courts of the Member States, of the instruments applicable under their procedural laws, thereby enabling the parties to a dispute before the courts to refute an electronic signature’s evidential force and value, as provided for?

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(1)  OJ 2014 L 257, p. 73.

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Markkinaoikeus (Finland) lodged on 15 July 2022 — Mylan AB v Gilead Sciences Finland Oy, Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland UC, Gilead Sciences, Inc.

(Case C-473/22)

(2022/C 389/08)

Language of the case: Finnish

Referring court

Markkinaoikeus

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Mylan AB

Defendants: Gilead Sciences Finland Oy, Gilead Biopharmaceutics Ireland UC, Gilead Sciences, Inc.

Questions referred

| 1. | Is a compensation regime based on strict liability, such as that described above (paragraphs 16 to 18 of this request for a preliminary ruling) which is in force in Finland, to be regarded as compatible with Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive? (1) |
| --- | --- |

1.

Is a compensation regime based on strict liability, such as that described above (paragraphs 16 to 18 of this request for a preliminary ruling) which is in force in Finland, to be regarded as compatible with Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive? (1)

| 2. | If the first question is answered in the negative, what then is the nature of the liability for compensation on which the liability under Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive is based? Is that liability to be regarded as a form of liability based on fault, an abuse of rights, or some other ground? |
| --- | --- |

2.

If the first question is answered in the negative, what then is the nature of the liability for compensation on which the liability under Article 9(7) of the Enforcement Directive is based? Is that liability to be regarded as a form of liability based on fault, an abuse of rights, or some other ground?

| 3. | In relation to the second question, what circumstances must be taken into account in assessing the existence of liability? |
| --- | --- |

3.

In relation to the second question, what circumstances must be taken into account in assessing the existence of liability?

| 4. | In particular, as regards the third question, must the assessment be made solely on the basis of the circumstances known at the time when the provisional measure was obtained, or is it permissible to take into account, for example, the fact that the intellectual property right on whose alleged infringement the provisional measure was based was subsequently, after that measure was obtained, found to be invalid ab initio and, if so, what significance is to be attached to that circumstance? |
| --- | --- |

4.

In particular, as regards the third question, must the assessment be made solely on the basis of the circumstances known at the time when the provisional measure was obtained, or is it permissible to take into account, for example, the fact that the intellectual property right on whose alleged infringement the provisional measure was based was subsequently, after that measure was obtained, found to be invalid ab initio and, if so, what significance is to be attached to that circumstance?

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(1)  Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (OJ 2004 L 157, p. 45).

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 22 July 2022 — EM v Roompot Service B.V.

(Case C-497/22)

(2022/C 389/09)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Düsseldorf

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant and appellant: EM

Defendant and respondent: Roompot Service B.V.

Question referred

Must the first sentence of Article 24(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 (1) be interpreted as meaning that a contract which is concluded between a private individual and a commercial lessor of holiday homes in relation to the short-term letting of a bungalow in a holiday park operated by the lessor, and which provides for cleaning at the end of the stay and the provision of bed linen as further services in addition to the mere letting of the bungalow, is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State in which the rented property is situated, irrespective of whether the holiday bungalow is owned by the lessor or by a third party?

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1).

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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Italy) lodged on 27 July 2022 — Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli v Girelli Alcool Srl

(Case C-509/22)

(2022/C 389/10)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Corte suprema di cassazione

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli

Defendant: Girelli Alcool Srl

Questions referred

| 1. | First, should the concept of unforeseeable circumstances giving rise to losses under duty suspension arrangements, within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, (1) be understood, in the same way as force majeure, as abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances extraneous to the authorised warehousekeeper, which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, were objectively outside the warehousekeeper’s control? |
| --- | --- |

1.

First, should the concept of unforeseeable circumstances giving rise to losses under duty suspension arrangements, within the meaning of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, (1) be understood, in the same way as force majeure, as abnormal and unforeseeable circumstances extraneous to the authorised warehousekeeper, which, in spite of the exercise of all due care, were objectively outside the warehousekeeper’s control?

| 2. | Furthermore, to exclude liability in the event of unforeseeable circumstances, is the care exercised in taking the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful act relevant, and if so, to what extent? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Furthermore, to exclude liability in the event of unforeseeable circumstances, is the care exercised in taking the necessary precautions to avoid the harmful act relevant, and if so, to what extent?

| 3. | Subject to the first two questions, is a provision such as Article 4(1) of decreto legislativo 26 ottobre 1995 n. 504 (Legislative Decree No 504 of 26 October 1995), which equates ordinary negligence (by the same person or by third parties) with unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure, compatible with the provisions of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, which mentions no other conditions, particularly as regards the ‘fault’ of the perpetrator or active participant? |
| --- | --- |

3.

Subject to the first two questions, is a provision such as Article 4(1) of decreto legislativo 26 ottobre 1995 n. 504 (Legislative Decree No 504 of 26 October 1995), which equates ordinary negligence (by the same person or by third parties) with unforeseeable circumstances and force majeure, compatible with the provisions of Article 7(4) of Directive 2008/118/EC, which mentions no other conditions, particularly as regards the ‘fault’ of the perpetrator or active participant?

| 4. | Lastly, can the expression ‘or as a consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State’, also contained in Article 7(4), be understood as the possibility for the Member State to identify another general category (slight negligence) that might have a bearing on the definition of release for consumption in the event of destruction or loss of the product, or does that expression preclude a clause of that type, it having to be understood, rather, as referring to specific cases that are individually authorised or otherwise identified by precedents in which the objective elements are defined? |
| --- | --- |

4.

Lastly, can the expression ‘or as a consequence of authorisation by the competent authorities of the Member State’, also contained in Article 7(4), be understood as the possibility for the Member State to identify another general category (slight negligence) that might have a bearing on the definition of release for consumption in the event of destruction or loss of the product, or does that expression preclude a clause of that type, it having to be understood, rather, as referring to specific cases that are individually authorised or otherwise identified by precedents in which the objective elements are defined?

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(1)  Council Directive 2008/118/EC of 16 December 2008 concerning the general arrangements for excise duty and repealing Directive 92/12/EEC (OJ 2009 L 9, p. 12).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/9 |
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landgericht Frankfurt am Main (Germany) lodged on 4 August 2022 — GE v British Airways Plc

(Case C-522/22)

(2022/C 389/11)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Landgericht Frankfurt am Main

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: GE

Defendant: British Airways Plc

Questions referred

| 1. | Must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, (1) in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a passenger who has paid for a flight partly in frequent flyer miles may claim from the operating air carrier, which is not his or her contracting partner, reimbursement (only) in frequent flyer miles in that respect? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, (1) in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that a passenger who has paid for a flight partly in frequent flyer miles may claim from the operating air carrier, which is not his or her contracting partner, reimbursement (only) in frequent flyer miles in that respect?

| 2. | In the event that the Court answers the first question in the affirmative:
  Does Regulation No 261/2004 preclude national legislation under which, in the event of failure to provide reimbursement in the form of frequent flyer miles, contrary to the corresponding obligation under Article 8(1)(a) of that regulation, compensation in lieu of performance may be claimed from the operating air carrier, or is the passenger bound by his or her original request for reimbursement in frequent flyer miles? |
| --- | --- |

2.

In the event that the Court answers the first question in the affirmative:

Does Regulation No 261/2004 preclude national legislation under which, in the event of failure to provide reimbursement in the form of frequent flyer miles, contrary to the corresponding obligation under Article 8(1)(a) of that regulation, compensation in lieu of performance may be claimed from the operating air carrier, or is the passenger bound by his or her original request for reimbursement in frequent flyer miles?

| 3. | In the event that the Court answers the first question in the negative:
  In the event that the passenger may also claim reimbursement in money or is reimbursed in money, must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004, in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that, as reimbursement of the cost of the ticket (...) at the price at which it was bought, the passenger is reimbursed by the operating air carrier the amount in money which would enable, or would have enabled, him or her to purchase, without using frequent flyer miles, re-routing, under comparable transport conditions, to his or her final destination at the earliest opportunity or at a later date at his or her convenience, subject to availability of seats? |
| --- | --- |

3.

In the event that the Court answers the first question in the negative:

In the event that the passenger may also claim reimbursement in money or is reimbursed in money, must Article 8(1)(a) of Regulation No 261/2004, in conjunction with Article 7(3) thereof, be interpreted as meaning that, as reimbursement of the cost of the ticket (...) at the price at which it was bought, the passenger is reimbursed by the operating air carrier the amount in money which would enable, or would have enabled, him or her to purchase, without using frequent flyer miles, re-routing, under comparable transport conditions, to his or her final destination at the earliest opportunity or at a later date at his or her convenience, subject to availability of seats?

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(1)  Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 46, p. 1).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/9 |
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Appeal brought on 17 August 2022 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 1 June 2022 in Case T-481/17 Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL v SRB

(Case C-551/22 P)

(2022/C 389/12)

Language of the case: Spanish

Parties

Appellant: European Commission (represented by: L. Flynn, D. Triantafyllou, A. Nijenhuis, P. Němečková and A. Steiblytė, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings: Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno, Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL), Single Resolution Board (SRB), Kingdom of Spain, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Banco Santander, S.A.

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the judgment of the General Court of 1 June 2022, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL — Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) v Single Resolution Board (T-481/17, EU: T:2022:311), in so far as the General Court found the action for annulment at first instance to be admissible; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the judgment of the General Court of 1 June 2022, Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL — Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) v Single Resolution Board (T-481/17, EU: T:2022:311), in so far as the General Court found the action for annulment at first instance to be admissible;

| — | declare the action for annulment brought in case T-481/17 at first instance inadmissible, and, consequently, dismiss it in its entirety; and |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the action for annulment brought in case T-481/17 at first instance inadmissible, and, consequently, dismiss it in its entirety; and

| — | order Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL, Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) (applicants at first instance) to pay the costs incurred by the Commission both in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Fundación Tatiana Pérez de Guzmán el Bueno and SFL, Stiftung für Forschung und Lehre (SFL) (applicants at first instance) to pay the costs incurred by the Commission both in the proceedings before the General Court and in the present proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The appellant raises three grounds of appeal and submits that the General Court made the following errors of law:

| — | error in the interpretation of Article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and article 18, paragraph 7, of the Regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism, (1) in so far as it treats the resolution scheme as a challengeable act (first ground of appeal), |
| --- | --- |

—

error in the interpretation of Article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and article 18, paragraph 7, of the Regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism, (1) in so far as it treats the resolution scheme as a challengeable act (first ground of appeal),

| — | error in the interpretation of article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and infringement of the rights of the defence of the Commission, as regards the omission to address the action for annulment against the author of the legally binding final act (second ground of appeal), and, |
| --- | --- |

—

error in the interpretation of article 263, paragraph 4, TFEU and infringement of the rights of the defence of the Commission, as regards the omission to address the action for annulment against the author of the legally binding final act (second ground of appeal), and,

| — | contradictory reasoning in the judgment under appeal, resulting from the decision, by the General Court, to find the action for annulment against the contested resolution scheme to be admissible, while the General Court concludes that said resolution scheme only enters into force and produces binding legal effects through the Commission’s decision (third ground of appeal). |
| --- | --- |

—

contradictory reasoning in the judgment under appeal, resulting from the decision, by the General Court, to find the action for annulment against the contested resolution scheme to be admissible, while the General Court concludes that said resolution scheme only enters into force and produces binding legal effects through the Commission’s decision (third ground of appeal).

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(1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

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General Court

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Action brought on 30 June 2022 — Glonatech v REA

(Case T-409/22)

(2022/C 389/13)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Global Nanotechnologies AE schediasmou anaptyxis paraskevis kai emporias ylikon nanotechnologies (Glonatech) (Lamía, Greece) (represented by: N. Scandamis, lawyer)

Defendant: European Research Executive Agency

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that the applicant correctly fulfilled her contractual obligations and is fully entitled to payment of claimed costs of the SANAD Project and set aside Debit Note No 3242113938 as infringing applicable laws by declaring the rejected costs as ineligible; and |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that the applicant correctly fulfilled her contractual obligations and is fully entitled to payment of claimed costs of the SANAD Project and set aside Debit Note No 3242113938 as infringing applicable laws by declaring the rejected costs as ineligible; and

| — | order the REA to pay the costs of the proceedings before this Court, or, in the event that the orders sought in the present action are not granted, refrain from ordering the applicant to pay the costs in view of the complexity of the present case. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the REA to pay the costs of the proceedings before this Court, or, in the event that the orders sought in the present action are not granted, refrain from ordering the applicant to pay the costs in view of the complexity of the present case.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the ‘Final Audit Report’ bearing on applicant’s secondees allowances granted for knowledge sharing and inter-sectoral mobility should be deemed as falling outside the scope of the Agreement (GA) for having been engaged by REA as exceptional in view of a flat-rate financing proper to output and results based research and thus not subject to ex-post verification but also for having been conducted as visibly inquisitorial in suspecting systematic errors which however are deemed of no systematic nature, thus drawing from terms proper to different types of procedure. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the ‘Final Audit Report’ bearing on applicant’s secondees allowances granted for knowledge sharing and inter-sectoral mobility should be deemed as falling outside the scope of the Agreement (GA) for having been engaged by REA as exceptional in view of a flat-rate financing proper to output and results based research and thus not subject to ex-post verification but also for having been conducted as visibly inquisitorial in suspecting systematic errors which however are deemed of no systematic nature, thus drawing from terms proper to different types of procedure.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that in the alternative, if such control were to be deemed as falling within the scope of the GA, it should have been undertaken as ex ante verification by the authorising officer as based on evidence drawn from electronic inspection mechanisms established at the hosting organisation (KU), specifically entrusted in collecting secondment data in own premises, and monitored by the Defendant. In omitting to do so, the latter infringed the terms of the GA in correctly assessing under applicable laws. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that in the alternative, if such control were to be deemed as falling within the scope of the GA, it should have been undertaken as ex ante verification by the authorising officer as based on evidence drawn from electronic inspection mechanisms established at the hosting organisation (KU), specifically entrusted in collecting secondment data in own premises, and monitored by the Defendant. In omitting to do so, the latter infringed the terms of the GA in correctly assessing under applicable laws.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that even if the audit were to be deemed within the scope of the contract and the burden of proof incumbent, as a matter of principle, on the applicant, the rejection of the secondment costs, during an ex post verification for systematic errors improper to such verification as referring to flat rate financing, was reached in infringement of the principle of good faith not only in applying the Financial Regulation 2018/1046 (1), in force at the time of the audit (article 181 (2)), but also in performing under contract in general: by an unlawful discretion, the auditing entity denied the sufficiency of a performance audit for flat rate financing so as to assess it upon certified and auditable historical data of the beneficiary, and, instead, she privileged types of evidence referring to generating events of the activities covered by flat rate financing. Such inversion in the order of proofs deprived the applicant of the right to interpret its contractual obligations to its benefit in a legal context of vagueness of terms as created by the then applicable Financial Regulation (966/2012) (2) as well as by the contradictory behaviour of the defendant in monitoring the implementation of the GA. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that even if the audit were to be deemed within the scope of the contract and the burden of proof incumbent, as a matter of principle, on the applicant, the rejection of the secondment costs, during an ex post verification for systematic errors improper to such verification as referring to flat rate financing, was reached in infringement of the principle of good faith not only in applying the Financial Regulation 2018/1046 (1), in force at the time of the audit (article 181 (2)), but also in performing under contract in general: by an unlawful discretion, the auditing entity denied the sufficiency of a performance audit for flat rate financing so as to assess it upon certified and auditable historical data of the beneficiary, and, instead, she privileged types of evidence referring to generating events of the activities covered by flat rate financing. Such inversion in the order of proofs deprived the applicant of the right to interpret its contractual obligations to its benefit in a legal context of vagueness of terms as created by the then applicable Financial Regulation (966/2012) (2) as well as by the contradictory behaviour of the defendant in monitoring the implementation of the GA.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that on properly considering the variety of concurring evidence, internal as external, but also the misleading orientations before and during implementation, mismatches and lacunae detected in evidence should be disregarded or, at least, brought to their appropriate dimension but not lead to full rejection for being systematic, in particular where they should be ignored as immaterial or negligible in effect according to the general principle of proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that on properly considering the variety of concurring evidence, internal as external, but also the misleading orientations before and during implementation, mismatches and lacunae detected in evidence should be disregarded or, at least, brought to their appropriate dimension but not lead to full rejection for being systematic, in particular where they should be ignored as immaterial or negligible in effect according to the general principle of proportionality.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, OJ L 193, 2018, p. 1.

(2)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002, OJ L 298, 2012, p. 1.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/12 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/12

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Action brought on 18 July 2022 — Sberbank Europe v SRB

(Case T-450/22)

(2022/C 389/14)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Sberbank Europe AG (Vienna, Austria) (represented by: O. Behrends, lawyer)

Defendant: Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare void pursuant to Art. 264 TFEU the SRB’s No Resolution-decision dated 1 March 2022 with respect to the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare void pursuant to Art. 264 TFEU the SRB’s No Resolution-decision dated 1 March 2022 with respect to the applicant;

| — | order the SRB to bear the applicant's costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the SRB to bear the applicant's costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on seven pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the SRB exceeded its competence by adopting a decision with respect to the applicant instead of simply refraining from any action in accordance with its finding that the conditions of Article 18 of the ‘SRMR’ (1) were not met. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the SRB exceeded its competence by adopting a decision with respect to the applicant instead of simply refraining from any action in accordance with its finding that the conditions of Article 18 of the ‘SRMR’ (1) were not met.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to grant the applicant a right to be heard. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to grant the applicant a right to be heard.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the SRB did not provide a sufficient statement of reasons. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the SRB did not provide a sufficient statement of reasons.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to consider appropriately the requirements pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) SRMR. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to consider appropriately the requirements pursuant to Article 18(1)(b) SRMR.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the SRB and the ECB failed to consider the suspension of the applicant’s liabilities. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the SRB and the ECB failed to consider the suspension of the applicant’s liabilities.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the principle of proportionality by failing to consider a number of obvious and less burdensome alternatives, including the transfer of the applicant to another shareholder. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that the SRB violated the principle of proportionality by failing to consider a number of obvious and less burdensome alternatives, including the transfer of the applicant to another shareholder.

| 7. | Seventh plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to follow the resolution plan without providing any plausible explanation for this. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Seventh plea in law, alleging that the SRB failed to follow the resolution plan without providing any plausible explanation for this.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/13 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/13

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Action brought on 21 July 2022 — BASF and Others v Commission

(Case T-453/22)

(2022/C 389/15)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicants: BASF SE (Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Germany), Dow Europe GmbH (Horgen, Switzerland), Nouryon Functional Chemicals BV (Arnhem, Netherlands) (represented by: J.P. Montfort and P. Chopova-Leprêtre, lawyers)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Court should:

| — | annul Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/692 of 16 February 2022 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (‘the contested Regulation’), (1) insofar as it introduces a harmonised classification and labelling for three substances, namely N-carboxymethyliminobis (ethylenenitrilo)tetra(acetic acid) and its pentasodium and pentapotassium salts (together referred to as ‘DTPA’ or ‘the substance’), i.e. Recitals 2 and 3, Articles 1 and 2 and the Annex to the contested Regulation, insofar as they concern DTPA and, in particular, the entries introduced by the Annex to the contested Regulation in Part 3 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (‘the CLP Regulation’), (2) for the individual substances:






  — | N-carboxymethyliminobis(ethylenenitrilo)tetra(acetic acid); |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

annul Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/692 of 16 February 2022 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (‘the contested Regulation’), (1) insofar as it introduces a harmonised classification and labelling for three substances, namely N-carboxymethyliminobis (ethylenenitrilo)tetra(acetic acid) and its pentasodium and pentapotassium salts (together referred to as ‘DTPA’ or ‘the substance’), i.e. Recitals 2 and 3, Articles 1 and 2 and the Annex to the contested Regulation, insofar as they concern DTPA and, in particular, the entries introduced by the Annex to the contested Regulation in Part 3 of Annex VI to Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures, amending and repealing Directives 67/548/EEC and 1999/45/EC and amending Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (‘the CLP Regulation’), (2) for the individual substances:

—

N-carboxymethyliminobis(ethylenenitrilo)tetra(acetic acid);

| — | Pentasodium(carboxylatemethyl)iminobis(ethylenenitrilo)tetraacetate; |
| --- | --- |

—

Pentasodium(carboxylatemethyl)iminobis(ethylenenitrilo)tetraacetate;

| — | Pentapotassium 2,2',2'',2''',2''''-(ethane-1,2-diylnitrilo) pentaacetate. |
| --- | --- |

—

Pentapotassium 2,2',2'',2''',2''''-(ethane-1,2-diylnitrilo) pentaacetate.

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of these proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the classification criteria established in Article 36(1) and Section 3.7.2.2.1 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, in that DTPA does not have the ‘intrinsic, specific property to produce an adverse effect on reproduction’. If some developmental effects were observed in animals exposed to very high doses of DTPA, such effects are ‘non-specific secondary developmental effects’ that do not justify a classification as toxic for reproduction. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the classification criteria established in Article 36(1) and Section 3.7.2.2.1 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, in that DTPA does not have the ‘intrinsic, specific property to produce an adverse effect on reproduction’. If some developmental effects were observed in animals exposed to very high doses of DTPA, such effects are ‘non-specific secondary developmental effects’ that do not justify a classification as toxic for reproduction.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.2.2 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, as the EU authorities failed to properly evaluate and take into account the possible influence of maternal toxicity" when classifying DTPA. DTPA produces zinc deficiency, disrupting the maternal homeostasis in rats, and it is that maternal toxicity which triggers the observed nonspecific secondary developmental effects. This cannot support the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction in line with the requirements of the CLP Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.2.2 of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, as the EU authorities failed to properly evaluate and take into account the possible influence of maternal toxicity" when classifying DTPA. DTPA produces zinc deficiency, disrupting the maternal homeostasis in rats, and it is that maternal toxicity which triggers the observed nonspecific secondary developmental effects. This cannot support the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction in line with the requirements of the CLP Regulation.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.1.1 and Table 3.7.1(a) of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, since the available evidence does not constitute the ‘strong presumption’ that DTPA can produce reproductive effects in humans, nor was there ‘clear evidence’ that DTPA can produce developmental effects in the absence of other toxic effects (i.e., maternal toxicity). Again, without such elements, the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B, is not justified. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of Section 3.7.2.1.1 and Table 3.7.1(a) of Annex I to the CLP Regulation, since the available evidence does not constitute the ‘strong presumption’ that DTPA can produce reproductive effects in humans, nor was there ‘clear evidence’ that DTPA can produce developmental effects in the absence of other toxic effects (i.e., maternal toxicity). Again, without such elements, the classification of DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B, is not justified.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the Commission’s duty pursuant to Article 37(5) of the CLP Regulation to establish that the proposed harmonised classification is ‘appropriate’. The Commission endorsed the Committee for Risk Assessment (‘RAC’) opinions without verifying whether they are consistent, reliable and capable of sustaining the proposed classification. If the Commission had taken into account all the relevant information on the properties of DTPA, as it was repeatedly invited do to by the dossier submitter (‘DS’) between 2018 and 2022, it would not have classified DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the Commission’s duty pursuant to Article 37(5) of the CLP Regulation to establish that the proposed harmonised classification is ‘appropriate’. The Commission endorsed the Committee for Risk Assessment (‘RAC’) opinions without verifying whether they are consistent, reliable and capable of sustaining the proposed classification. If the Commission had taken into account all the relevant information on the properties of DTPA, as it was repeatedly invited do to by the dossier submitter (‘DS’) between 2018 and 2022, it would not have classified DTPA as toxic for reproduction, category 1B.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the procedural requirement of Article 37(4) of the CLP Regulation to consult on the RAC opinions themselves, instead of only on the proposal for a harmonised classification and labelling made by the DS. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging that the contested Regulation was adopted in breach of the procedural requirement of Article 37(4) of the CLP Regulation to consult on the RAC opinions themselves, instead of only on the proposal for a harmonised classification and labelling made by the DS.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging that, in adopting the contested Regulation without the prior conduct and documentation of an impact assessment, the Commission breached its commitments under the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making and the principle of sound administration. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging that, in adopting the contested Regulation without the prior conduct and documentation of an impact assessment, the Commission breached its commitments under the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-making and the principle of sound administration.

---

(1)  OJ 2022 L 129, p. 1.

(2)  OJ 2008 L 353, p. 1.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/14 |
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10.10.2022

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/14

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Action brought on 18 August 2022 — Austria v Commission

(Case T-501/22)

(2022/C 389/16)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Republic of Austria (represented by: J. Schmoll and A. Kögl, acting as Agents)

Defendant: European Commission

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul European Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/908 of 8 June 2022 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), notified under document C(2022) 3543 final and published in the
  Official Journal of the European Union on 10 June 2022, L 157, p. 15, in so far as it excludes from Union financing the expenditure incurred by the Republic of Austria and declared under the EAGF set out in the annex to that decision under budget item 6200, lines 1 to 8, less the amounts listed under budget item 08020601, thus totalling EUR 68 146 449,98; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul European Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/908 of 8 June 2022 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), notified under document C(2022) 3543 final and published in the
  Official Journal of the European Union on 10 June 2022, L 157, p. 15, in so far as it excludes from Union financing the expenditure incurred by the Republic of Austria and declared under the EAGF set out in the annex to that decision under budget item 6200, lines 1 to 8, less the amounts listed under budget item 08020601, thus totalling EUR 68 146 449,98;

| — | order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on the following pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law
  The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1) in so far as it imposed a financial correction by means of the contested implementing decision even though the applicant had applied the reduction coefficient in respect of the allocation of payment entitlements to farmers of alpine pastures in accordance with Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013. (2) The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 (1) in so far as it imposed a financial correction by means of the contested implementing decision even though the applicant had applied the reduction coefficient in respect of the allocation of payment entitlements to farmers of alpine pastures in accordance with Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013. (2) The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made.

| 2. | Second plea in law
  The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it imposed a financial correction even though the use of the national reserve for the remedial action taken in respect of farmers of pasture land (Hutweide) and the linear reduction made in order to avoid exceeding the national ceiling were in compliance with EU law. The applicant submits that it was entitled to rely on Article 30(7)(b) or Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 to take those actions. The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it imposed a financial correction even though the use of the national reserve for the remedial action taken in respect of farmers of pasture land (Hutweide) and the linear reduction made in order to avoid exceeding the national ceiling were in compliance with EU law. The applicant submits that it was entitled to rely on Article 30(7)(b) or Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 to take those actions. The related financial correction was therefore wrongly made.

| 3. | Third plea in law
  The defendant infringed Article 52(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it also refused financing for such EAGF expenditure effected prior to 26 November 2016 — and thus more than 24 months before the date on which the defendant notified the results of its verifications by letter of 27 November 2018. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law

The defendant infringed Article 52(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 in so far as it also refused financing for such EAGF expenditure effected prior to 26 November 2016 — and thus more than 24 months before the date on which the defendant notified the results of its verifications by letter of 27 November 2018.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law
  The defendant infringed the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU in so far it completely failed to address the applicant’s arguments concerning the classification of alpine pastures based on the alpine pasture laws of the provinces and thus failed to provide sufficient and appropriate reasons for the allegation that the applicant infringed the principle of objectivity and equal treatment in applying the exception provided for in Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law

The defendant infringed the obligation to state reasons laid down in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU in so far it completely failed to address the applicant’s arguments concerning the classification of alpine pastures based on the alpine pasture laws of the provinces and thus failed to provide sufficient and appropriate reasons for the allegation that the applicant infringed the principle of objectivity and equal treatment in applying the exception provided for in Article 24(6) of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013.

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98, (EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 549).

(2)  Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing rules for direct payments to farmers under support schemes within the framework of the common agricultural policy and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 637/2008 and Council Regulation (EC) No 73/2009 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 608).

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/15 |
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10.10.2022

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Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/15

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Action brought on 18 August 2022 — CrossFit v EUIPO — Pitk Pelotas (CROSSWOD EQUIPMENT)

(Case T-506/22)

(2022/C 389/17)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: CrossFit LLC (Boulder, Colorado, United States) (represented by: D. Mărginean, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Pitk Pelotas, SL (Noain, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark CROSSWOD EQUIPMENT — Application for registration No 18 064 486

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 22 June 2022 in Case R 325/2021-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | partly annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

partly annul the contested decision;

| — | alter the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the contested decision;

| — | order Pitk Pelotas, SL to pay the costs incurred by CrossFit, LLC in the present action, in the proceedings before the Board of Appeals and in the proceedings before the Opposition Division. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Pitk Pelotas, SL to pay the costs incurred by CrossFit, LLC in the present action, in the proceedings before the Board of Appeals and in the proceedings before the Opposition Division.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSSFIT trade marks; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSSFIT trade marks;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSS trade mark; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the First Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion with the earlier CROSS trade mark;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that the applicant had failed to prove the reputation of its earlier CROSSFIT trademark in the EU, in connection to the services in Class 41. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, as the Board of Appeal wrongly concluded that the applicant had failed to prove the reputation of its earlier CROSSFIT trademark in the EU, in connection to the services in Class 41.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/16 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/16

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Action brought on 22 August 2022 — Bimbo v EUIPO — Bottari Europe (BimboBIKE)

(Case T-509/22)

(2022/C 389/18)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Bimbo, SA (Madrid, Spain) (represented by: J. Carbonell Callicó, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Bottari Europe Srl (Pomponesco, Italy)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark BimboBIKE — Application for registration No 18 274 340

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 16 June 2022 in Case R 2110/2021-1

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | declare inapplicable the order that the applicant bear the costs incurred by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

declare inapplicable the order that the applicant bear the costs incurred by the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal;

| — | order EUIPO and the intervening party to pay all the costs of the dispute before the General Court, including those relating to the procedure before the Board of Appeal. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO and the intervening party to pay all the costs of the dispute before the General Court, including those relating to the procedure before the Board of Appeal.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(5) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 109 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/17 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/17

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Action brought on 23 August 2022 — Olimp Laboratories v EUIPO — Schmitzer (HPU AND YOU)

(Case T-511/22)

(2022/C 389/19)

Language in which the application was lodged: English

Parties

Applicant: Olimp Laboratories sp. z o.o. (Dębica, Poland) (represented by: M. Kondrat, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Sonja Schmitzer (Teltow, Germany)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant of the trade mark at issue: Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal

Trade mark at issue: Application for European Union figurative mark HPU AND YOU — Application for registration No 18 174 721

Procedure before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 23 June 2022 in Case R 1888/2021-4

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision and refer the case back to EUIPO for reconsideration, or, |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision and refer the case back to EUIPO for reconsideration, or,

| — | alter the contested decision, stating that there are relative grounds for the refusal of registration of trade mark application No 18 174 721 for all goods and services in class 5, 35 and 44 and that the trade mark shall not be registered; |
| --- | --- |

—

alter the contested decision, stating that there are relative grounds for the refusal of registration of trade mark application No 18 174 721 for all goods and services in class 5, 35 and 44 and that the trade mark shall not be registered;

| — | award the costs in the applicant’s favour. |
| --- | --- |

—

award the costs in the applicant’s favour.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of the principle of trademarks similarity assessment; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the principle of trademarks similarity assessment;

| — | Infringement of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations and of legal certainty.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/18 |
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10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/18

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Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Aldi v EUIPO — Heredero de Navarra (LYTTOS)

(Case T-517/22)

(2022/C 389/20)

Language in which the application was lodged: German

Parties

Applicant: Aldi GmbH & Co. KG (Mülheim an der Ruhr, Germany) (represented by: N. Lützenrath, C. Fürsen, M. Minkner and A. Starcke, lawyers)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal: Heredero de Navarra, SL (Mendavia, Spain)

Details of the proceedings before EUIPO

Applicant for the trade mark at issue: Applicant

Trade mark at issue: Application for EU word mark LYTTOS — Application No 18 126 191

Proceedings before EUIPO: Opposition proceedings

Contested decision: Decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 18 May 2022 in Case R 1462/2021-2

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order EUIPO to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order EUIPO to pay the costs.

Pleas in law

| — | Infringement of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council; |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 47(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council;

| — | Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/18

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Action brought on 28 August 2022 — Karić v Council

(Case T-520/22)

(2022/C 389/21)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Bogoljub Karić (Belgrad, Serbia) (represented by: R. Lööf, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1),

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) (the ‘Contested Acts’) in so far as they apply to the applicant, and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) (the ‘Contested Acts’) in so far as they apply to the applicant, and

| — | order the Council to bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred on behalf of the applicant in bringing this action. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to bear its own costs and pay the costs incurred on behalf of the applicant in bringing this action.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging violation of the rights of the defence. Firstly, it is alleged that the reasons have been stated inadequately. By failing to set out with sufficient clarity how the Council concluded that the alternative criteria in Articles 3(1)(b) and 4(1)(b) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (3) apply to the applicant, the Contested Acts violate Article 296, 2nd paragraph, TFEU. Secondly, violation of the principle of personal responsibility is alleged on the grounds that by failing to identify the benefit received from, or support provided to, the Belarusian regime by the applicant, the Contested Acts infringe the applicant’s fundamental rights in violation of the principle of personal responsibility. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging violation of the rights of the defence. Firstly, it is alleged that the reasons have been stated inadequately. By failing to set out with sufficient clarity how the Council concluded that the alternative criteria in Articles 3(1)(b) and 4(1)(b) of Council Decision 2012/642/CFSP of 15 October 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Belarus (3) apply to the applicant, the Contested Acts violate Article 296, 2nd paragraph, TFEU. Secondly, violation of the principle of personal responsibility is alleged on the grounds that by failing to identify the benefit received from, or support provided to, the Belarusian regime by the applicant, the Contested Acts infringe the applicant’s fundamental rights in violation of the principle of personal responsibility.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment. Firstly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate benefit from or support for the Lukashenka regime. The Contested Acts are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment as they were adopted in the absence of sufficient evidential support. Secondly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate temporally relevant conduct. The Contested Acts are punitive only, and therefore unlawful, in that the evidence in support discloses historic circumstances only. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment. Firstly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate benefit from or support for the Lukashenka regime. The Contested Acts are vitiated by a manifest error of assessment as they were adopted in the absence of sufficient evidential support. Secondly, it is alleged that there has been failure to substantiate temporally relevant conduct. The Contested Acts are punitive only, and therefore unlawful, in that the evidence in support discloses historic circumstances only.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights. The objective of the Contested Acts has been achieved by other legislative measures; they therefore constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights. The objective of the Contested Acts has been achieved by other legislative measures; they therefore constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental rights.

---

(1)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 77.

(2)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 1.

(3)  OJ 2012, L 285, p. 1.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/19

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Action brought on 29 August 2022 — Golovaty v Council

(Case T-521/22)

(2022/C 389/22)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Ivan Ivanovich Golovaty (Soligorsk, Belarus) (represented by: V. Ostrovskis, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.2); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.2);

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.3); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2) insofar as it concerns the applicant (Annex A.3);

| — | order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.






  — | The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and he cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against him by the Council. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.

—

The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and he cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against him by the Council.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.






  — | The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

—

The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime.

| — | The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society.

| — | Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing. |
| --- | --- |

—

Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging disproportionate infringement of the property rights. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging disproportionate infringement of the property rights.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons.

| 6. | Sixth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of respect for the rights of defence. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Sixth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of respect for the rights of defence.

---

(1)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 77.

(2)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 1.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/20

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Action brought on 29 August 2022 — QU v Council

(Case T-522/22)

(2022/C 389/23)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: QU (represented by: R. Martens and V. Ostrovskis, lawyers)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | Annul, firstly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1) (‘Amended Decision’) to the extent it concerns the applicant, and, secondly, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (2) (‘Amended Regulation’), to the extent it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul, firstly, Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/883 of 3 June 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (1) (‘Amended Decision’) to the extent it concerns the applicant, and, secondly, Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/878 of 3 June 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (2) (‘Amended Regulation’), to the extent it concerns the applicant;

| — | Order the Council to pay all costs of the present proceeding. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Council to pay all costs of the present proceeding.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law alleging breaches Article 2 of the Amended Decision and Article 3 of the Amended Regulation on the grounds that the Council erred in law in incorrectly applying Criterion (g) of Article 2(1) of the Amended Decision and Article 3(1) of the Amended Regulation to the applicant, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law alleging breaches Article 2 of the Amended Decision and Article 3 of the Amended Regulation on the grounds that the Council erred in law in incorrectly applying Criterion (g) of Article 2(1) of the Amended Decision and Article 3(1) of the Amended Regulation to the applicant, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person.

| 2. | Second plea in law alleging breaches Article 296 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), Article 41 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘The Charter’) and Article 2 and 4 of the Amended Decision on the grounds that the Council has not provided sufficiently specific and concrete reasons to justify the decision to take restrictive measures against the applicant, according to Article 4 of the Decision and Article 3 of the Regulation; it has committed manifest errors in conducting its analysis and failing to establish why the applicant would fall under one of the criteria stipulated in the Amended Decision, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law alleging breaches Article 296 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), Article 41 (2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (‘The Charter’) and Article 2 and 4 of the Amended Decision on the grounds that the Council has not provided sufficiently specific and concrete reasons to justify the decision to take restrictive measures against the applicant, according to Article 4 of the Decision and Article 3 of the Regulation; it has committed manifest errors in conducting its analysis and failing to establish why the applicant would fall under one of the criteria stipulated in the Amended Decision, without thoroughly examining the facts and providing sufficient reasons to adopt restrictive measures against a person.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging breaches of Article 41 and 48 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council did not provide the Evidence File to the Applicant with sufficient time to defend its rights; that the Council imposed a 14-day limit to present its observations and that it only presented the Evidence File one day before the deadline; that the applicant did not have any time to examine the Evidence File and present its observations, when the Council should have provided sufficient time to the applicant to examine the Evidence File and present its observations and ensured that all rights of defence were adhered to. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging breaches of Article 41 and 48 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council did not provide the Evidence File to the Applicant with sufficient time to defend its rights; that the Council imposed a 14-day limit to present its observations and that it only presented the Evidence File one day before the deadline; that the applicant did not have any time to examine the Evidence File and present its observations, when the Council should have provided sufficient time to the applicant to examine the Evidence File and present its observations and ensured that all rights of defence were adhered to.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law alleging, breaches of Article 296 TFEU, Article 16 and 45 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council took disproportionate restrictive measures against the applicant based on non-corroborated factual allegations which can in any case no longer be justified. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law alleging, breaches of Article 296 TFEU, Article 16 and 45 of the Charter on the grounds that the Council took disproportionate restrictive measures against the applicant based on non-corroborated factual allegations which can in any case no longer be justified.

---

(1)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 92.

(2)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 15.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/21

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Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belaruskali v Council

(Case T-528/22)

(2022/C 389/24)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Belaruskali AAT (Soligorsk, Belarus) (represented by: V. Ostrovskis, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1) insofar as it concerns the applicant;

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and

| — | order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.






  — | The Contested Acts insofar as they concern the applicant are in breach of fundamental human rights. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of legality.

—

The Contested Acts insofar as they concern the applicant are in breach of fundamental human rights.

| — | The Contested Acts, insofar as they concern the applicant, are in breach of international treaties. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Contested Acts, insofar as they concern the applicant, are in breach of international treaties.

| — | The Contested Acts are in breach of the objectives set forth by the European Union’s legal foundations. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Contested Acts are in breach of the objectives set forth by the European Union’s legal foundations.

| — | The Contested Acts, insofar as they concern the applicant, violate the principle requiring the measures to be targeted — they affect the civilian population not only in Belarus, but throughout the world. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Contested Acts, insofar as they concern the applicant, violate the principle requiring the measures to be targeted — they affect the civilian population not only in Belarus, but throughout the world.

| — | The Contested Acts violate the principle of legal certainty. The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms, which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and it cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against it by the Council. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Contested Acts violate the principle of legal certainty. The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms, which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and it cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against it by the Council.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.






  — | The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

—

The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime.

| — | The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant is responsible for the repression of civil society.

| — | Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing. |
| --- | --- |

—

Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of non-discrimination.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the violation of the principle of proportionality.

| 5. | Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Fifth plea in law, alleging the violation of the obligation to state reasons.

---

(1)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 77.

(2)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 1.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/22

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Action brought on 30 August 2022 — QT v EIB

(Case T-529/22)

(2022/C 389/25)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: QT (represented by: L. Levi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Investment Bank (EIB)

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the present action admissible and well founded;
  as a consequence, |
| --- | --- |

—

declare the present action admissible and well founded;

as a consequence,

| — | annul the decision of 28 September 2021 for the recovery of an amount of EUR 61 186,61 and the decision of 20 May 2022 dismissing the appeal through official channels by the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the decision of 28 September 2021 for the recovery of an amount of EUR 61 186,61 and the decision of 20 May 2022 dismissing the appeal through official channels by the applicant;

| — | order the EIB to reimburse the amounts recovered, which amounts must be increased with default interest at the rate set by the European Central Bank plus two points; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the EIB to reimburse the amounts recovered, which amounts must be increased with default interest at the rate set by the European Central Bank plus two points;

| — | order the EIB to pay all the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the EIB to pay all the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action against the decision of the European Investment Bank (EIB) of 28 September 2021 for the recovery of an amount of EUR 61 186,61 wrongly paid towards education allowances, dependent child allowances and related benefits, for the period from July 2014 to June 2017, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging a flaw due to the lack of competence of the author of the act. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging a flaw due to the lack of competence of the author of the act.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging the infringement of the five-year limitation period under Article 16.3 of the administrative provisions applicable to EIB Staff (‘the Staff Rules’). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging the infringement of the five-year limitation period under Article 16.3 of the administrative provisions applicable to EIB Staff (‘the Staff Rules’).

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging the infringement of Article 16 of the Staff Rules whereby, as well as the five-year limitation period, the conditions for recovery are not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging the infringement of Article 16 of the Staff Rules whereby, as well as the five-year limitation period, the conditions for recovery are not fulfilled.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging the infringement of Articles 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 of the Staff Rules and manifest error of assessment. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging the infringement of Articles 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 of the Staff Rules and manifest error of assessment.

---

| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/23 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/23

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Action brought on 30 August 2022 — Belarusian Potash Company v Council

(Case T-534/22)

(2022/C 389/26)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Applicant: Belarusian Potash Company AAT (Minsk, Belarus) (represented by: V. Ostrovskis, lawyer)

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2022/881 of 3 June 2022 implementing Decision 2012/642/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1), insofar as it concerns the applicant;

| — | annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/876 of 3 June 2022 implementing Article 8a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Belarus and the involvement of Belarus in the Russian aggression against Ukraine (2), insofar as it concerns the applicant (together, the ‘Contested Acts’); and

| — | order the Council to bear the full costs and expenses of the proceedings, including those incurred by the applicant for its defence. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Council to bear the full costs and expenses of the proceedings, including those incurred by the applicant for its defence.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the Contested Acts violate the principle of legality.






  — | The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms, which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and it cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against it by the Council. |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law, alleging that the Contested Acts violate the principle of legality.

—

The reasons for listing of the applicant contain a number of terms, which are defined neither in the Contested Acts nor in jurisprudence. In view of this, their meaning is not clear to the applicant, and it cannot unambiguously understand them and decide how to act in the context of the measures taken against it by the Council.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging violation of the right to effective judicial protection and the obligation to state reasons. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law, alleging violation of the right to effective judicial protection and the obligation to state reasons.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.






  — | Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate, or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing. |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Third plea in law, alleging manifest error of assessment.

—

Most of the evidence adduced by the Council are unreliable, inaccurate, or not related to the applicant or the reasons for listing.

| — | The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. |
| --- | --- |

—

The Council failed to demonstrate the manner in which the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime. Therefore, the Council failed to prove that the applicant benefits from or supports the Lukashenka regime.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, violation of the principle of proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Fourth plea in law, violation of the principle of proportionality.

---

(1)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 77.

(2)  OJ 2022, L 153, p. 1.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/24

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Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan Closures and Silgan Holdings v Commission

(Case T-415/18) (1)

(2022/C 389/27)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 294, 20.8.2018.

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| 10.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 389/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

10.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 389/24

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Order of the General Court of 25 August 2022 — Silgan International and Silgan Closures v Commission

(Case T-808/19) (1)

(2022/C 389/28)

Language of the case: German

The President of the Ninth Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 27, 27.1.2020.

---