UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-4414

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

JOHN ROBINSON, 

 Defendant – Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. 

Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00062-RJC-2) 

Submitted: October 9, 2008 Decided: October 22, 2008 

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Randolph M. Lee, LAW OFFICE OF RANDOLPH M. LEE, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States 

Attorney, David A. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 Pursuant to a plea agreement, John Robinson pled 

guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). The 

district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison. Robinson 

appeals, claiming the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no 

abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

 We review the district court’s denial of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A 

defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty 

plea once the plea has been accepted by the district court. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d); United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 

413 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, the defendant bears the burden of 

demonstrating that a “fair and just reason” supports his request 

to withdraw his plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). In 

deciding whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty 

plea, the district court considers: 

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or not 

voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has 

been a delay between the entering of the plea and the 

filing of the motion; (4) whether the defendant has 

had close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether 

withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and 

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(6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste 

judicial resources. 

United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). To 

show a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate 

“(1) that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness and (2) that he was prejudiced in the 

sense that there was a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted upon going to trial.” United States v. Lambey, 974 

F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks, 

alterations and citation omitted). 

 Robinson received an adequate Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

hearing, which creates a strong presumption that his guilty plea 

was final and binding. See id. Robinson argues, however, that 

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he was 

unaware of a potential defense to the charges against him. 

Robinson further alleges that he did not enjoy the close 

assistance of competent counsel. We find that Robinson failed 

to either offer “credible evidence that his plea was not knowing 

and voluntary,” Moore, 931 F.2d at 248, or demonstrate “that his 

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness,” Lambey, 974 F.2d at 1394 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In addition, Robinson’s present allegations are 

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belied by his statements at the plea hearing, see Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), which “carry a strong 

presumption of verity.” Accordingly, we conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that 

Robinson failed to present a fair and just reason that his 

guilty plea should be withdrawn. 

 We therefore affirm Robinson’s conviction and 

sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED