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reversed the Division Director’s Decision and vacated the withholding order. The Division 

timely appeals.1

 On appeal, we review the administrative agency’s decision rather than the judgment of 

the circuit court; however, we affirm or reverse the circuit court’s judgment based upon our 

review of the administrative decision. Schumer v. Lee, 404 S.W.3d 443, 445 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2013). We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and order that the Division Director’s 

Decision and the corresponding withholding order be reinstated. 

Facts and Procedural History2

 The Circuit Court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Father and Cynthia Tetzner 

(“Mother”) on March 5, 1984 (“Dissolution Decree”). Mother was awarded custody of the 

parties’ child born March 27, 1982; Father was ordered to pay $150 per month child support to 

Mother. Without obtaining a modification of legal custody, Mother relinquished physical 

custody of the child to Dorothy Tetzner, the child’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). 

Grandmother raised the child and drew AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) 

financial assistance from the State of Missouri. 

 On or about October 9, 1996, the Division sent a Notification to Circuit Clerk 

(“Notification”). The Notification identified Father as an “absent parent,” the child as being 

raised by a “NCPR [Non-Parent Caretaker Relative],” and state financial assistance in the form 

of AFDC benefits. The Notification directed the Circuit Clerk to send child support payments to 

the Division. 

 1

 Father, as the party aggrieved by the agency decision, is the Rule 84.05(e) appellant. 

2

 In reviewing an administrative agency’s decision, we look to the whole record, not merely at that 

evidence that supports the agency’s decision, and we no longer view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

agency’s decision. Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 136 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Mo. banc 2004). 
3

 On June 4, 1997, the Division issued an Administrative Order on an Existing Order 

(“administrative order”). The administrative order indicated that as of May 30, 1997, Father 

owed $8440.21 in child support arrearages. On August 7, 2007, the Division issued a 

withholding order to Father’s employer to enforce the administrative order, with Grandmother as 

obligee. Father requested an administrative hearing, which was held on July 2, 2009. 

Thereafter, on August 11, 2009, the Division’s Director issued a Decision affirming the 

withholding order. 

 Father filed a petition for review of administrative decision in the Circuit Court on 

September 22, 2009. The Circuit Court issued its judgment on June 19, 2013, reversing the 

Division Director’s Decision and vacating the withholding order. The Division appeals. 

Standard of Review 

 In an appeal following judicial review of an agency’s administrative action, this court 

reviews the decision of the agency, not the circuit court. Lajeunesse v. State, Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., Dir., Family Support Div., 350 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). Our scope of 

review is limited to whether the agency’s decision: 

(1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions; 

(2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; 

(3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record; 

(4) Is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law; 

(5) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial; 

(6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; 

(7) Involves an abuse of discretion. 
4

§ 536.140.2.3

 While we defer to the agency’s findings of fact, we review the agency’s 

interpretation, application, or conclusions of law de novo. Lajeunesse, 350 S.W.3d at 844 (citing 

§ 536.140.3). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Spradling v. 

SSM Health Care St. Louis, 313 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Mo. banc 2010).

Analysis 

 Father raises four points on appeal challenging the Division’s authority to issue the 

withholding order. Father challenges: (1) The Division’s jurisdiction to issue the withholding 

order; (2) the Division’s lack of authority to enforce child support rights where Grandmother 

never acquired such rights; (3) the Division’s lack of authority to assert rights it purportedly 

acquired via an alleged assignment of rights from Grandmother; and (4) the Division’s lack of 

authority to enforce child support rights barred by application of section 516.350.2. 

I. 

 In his first point on appeal, Father argues that the Division erred in issuing the August 7, 

2007 withholding order because it was without subject matter jurisdiction to do so. 

 “As a basic tenet of administrative law, an administrative agency has only such 

jurisdiction as may be granted by the legislature.” St. Charles Cnty. Ambulance Dist., Inc. v. Mo. 

Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs., 248 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (internal quotation 

omitted). “If the agency lacks statutory authority to consider a matter, it is without subject 

matter jurisdiction.” Id.

 The Division had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because the legislature has 

granted it statutory authority to enforce court orders of support. Section 454.505.1 provides that 

“if a support order has been entered, the director shall issue an order directing any employer or 

 3

 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2000, as updated through the 2013 

Cumulative Supplement. 
5

other payor of the parent to withhold and pay over to the division . . . money due.” The child 

support obligor’s income is subject to such withholding on the date the obligor becomes one 

month delinquent in child support payments. § 454.505.1. 

 At the administrative hearing to contest the withholding order, “the certified copy of the 

court order and the sworn or certified statement of arrearages shall constitute prima facie 

evidence that the director’s order is valid and enforceable.” § 454.505.3. At the administrative 

hearing in this case, the hearing officer admitted into evidence the Division’s hearing packet, 

which included the Dissolution Decree that ordered Father to pay $150 per month in child 

support, the Division’s child support arrearage calculation summary, and Circuit Court payment 

records showing that Father paid $335.94 on March 17, 1999. Thus, the Division established its 

prima facie case. 

 “If a prima facie case is established, the obligor may only assert mistake of fact as a 

defense.” Id. A “mistake of fact” is defined as “an error in the amount of the withholding or an 

error as to the identity of the obligor.” Id. As obligor, Father had the burden of proof on these 

issues. Id. Father did not present any factual evidence on these issues at the administrative 

hearing. Thus, Father did not rebut the Division’s prima facie case. 

 Father contends that the Division did not have jurisdiction because an existing court order 

setting a determinable amount of child support precludes the Division from establishing new 

support orders pursuant to section 454.470. The Division did not, however, issue an 

administrative order establishing child support or entering a “new” support order. Instead, the 

Division’s order merely enforced the existing court order, as the Division is statutorily authorized 

and directed to do pursuant to section 454.505.1.4

 4

 Father, currently a resident of Iowa, also cites to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), 

which Missouri has adopted and codified in sections 454.850 to 454.997. The UIFSA does not aid Father’s 
6

 Point I is denied. 

II. and III. 

 The issues in Father’s second and third points are whether Grandmother properly 

acquired rights to be enforced by the Division and, if not, whether any purported assignment of 

rights by Grandmother to the Division was a legal nullity. Father asserts that the Division acted 

without authority in bringing an action in the name of the Grandmother because the Circuit Court 

did not enter an order directing a change in the payee from Mother to Grandmother and the 

Division had not acquired child support rights via valid assignment. 

 The Circuit Court agreed with Father, explaining its judgment as follows: 

[Grandmother] is a caretaker relative that raised [the child]. Apparently, the 

custodial parent in the original divorce judgment, [Mother], relinquished custody 

to [Grandmother]. There is no evidence in the record to suggest this custodial 

transfer was done by Court order. Pursuant to R.S.Mo. § 454.455.3, “If an order 

for child support has been entered, no assignment of support has been made, and 

the legal custodian and obligee under the order relinquishes physical custody of 

the child to a caretaker relative without obtaining a modification of legal 

custody . . . the division may, thirty days after the transfer of custody and upon 

notice to the obligor and obligee, direct the obligor or other payor to change the 

payee to the caretaker relative or appropriate state agency.” The statute’s use of 

the term “direct” contemplates [an] order as the next sentence states, “An order 

changing the payee to a caretaker relative shall terminate when the caretaker 

relative no longer has physical custody of the child . . .” In the present case, no 

order was entered by the agency directing a change in payee from [Mother] to 

[Grandmother]. 

. . . 

The issue is not whether the Division had authority, the issue is whether the 

designated obligee, [Grandmother], ever properly acquired rights to be enforced 

by the Division. The Court finds that pursuant to § 454.455.3 she never properly 

 argument. By issuing the original child support order in the 1984 Dissolution Decree, Missouri established 

continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the order. State ex rel. Brantingham v. Grate, 205 S.W.3d 

317, 320 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). Missouri would lose its subject matter jurisdiction over the support order only if 

certain criteria in section 454.867(a)(1) were met. Id. Father has not alleged, and there is no evidence in the record, 

that any such statutory criteria have been met. Thus, there is nothing in the UIFSA preventing the Division from 

enforcing the Missouri support order; instead, the UIFSA expressly authorizes the withholding order in question. 

§ 454.932. 
7

acquired the rights of [Mother] to receive support as caretaker relative because 

there was no order changing the payee. 

(Emphasis added.) Were this a situation in which Grandmother had never applied for and 

received AFDC benefits from the State of Missouri, the Circuit Court’s reliance upon section 

454.455.3 would be well taken. However, where, as here, the caretaker relative has applied for 

and received AFDC benefits, section 454.455.1 provides the applicable statutory link for the 

caretaker relative to acquire child support rights that are deemed to have been assigned to the 

Division by operation of law, § 208.040.2(2). In other words, the Circuit Court improperly 

concluded that “no assignment of support has been made,” which led to its improper reliance 

upon section 454.455.3, instead of section 454.455.1. 

Section 454.455.1 presupposes both the relinquishment of physical custody by the child 

support obligee to a non-parent caretaker relative and an assignment of support rights to the 

Division by the caretaker relative in order to receive state assistance. Section 454.455.1 

provides, in pertinent part: 

In any case wherein an order for child support has been entered and the legal 

custodian and obligee pursuant to the order relinquishes physical custody of the 

child to a caretaker relative without obtaining a modification of legal custody, and 

the caretaker relative makes an assignment of support rights to the division of 

family services in order to receive aid to families with dependent children 

benefits, the relinquishment and the assignment, by operation of law, shall 

transfer the child support obligation pursuant to the order to the division in 

behalf of the state. 

(Emphasis added.) Here, the undisputed facts reflect that both a relinquishment of custody and 

an assignment of child support rights have occurred: 

 Mother, as the legal custodian and child support obligee pursuant to the Dissolution 

Decree, relinquished physical custody of the child to Grandmother without obtaining a 

modification of legal custody; 
8

 Grandmother is a caretaker relative. § 208.040.1(2); 

 Grandmother applied for and received AFDC benefits from the State of Missouri; 

 Grandmother’s application for AFDC constituted an assignment of support rights from 

Mother to Grandmother to the Division, by operation of law. 

[E]ach applicant for or recipient of assistance: . . . [s]hall assign to the family 

support division in behalf of the state any rights to support from any other person 

such applicant may have in the applicant’s own behalf or in behalf of any other 

person for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving assistance. An 

application for benefits made under this section shall constitute an assignment of 

support rights which shall take effect, by operation of law, upon a determination 

that the applicant is eligible for assistance under this section. 

§ 208.040.2(2) (emphasis added). 

 Thus, pursuant to section 208.040.2(2) and section 454.455.1, Grandmother, as the 

caretaker relative of the child via relinquishment of custody by Mother, was entitled to seek 

AFDC benefits from the State of Missouri and, upon doing so, by operation of law, the Division 

acquired the collection rights of the child support obligation set forth in the Dissolution Decree. 

 Points II and III are denied.5

IV. 

 For his fourth and final point, Father asserts that the Division’s claims are barred in 

whole or in part because the underlying support order is deemed satisfied in whole or in part by 

application of section 516.350. The Division responds that Father’s payment of child support in 

March 1999 revived the child support judgment until March 2009; therefore, the presumption of 

payment did not bar the Division’s withholding order issued in June 2007. We agree with the 

Division. 

 5

 The Division also argues that Father does not possess standing to challenge the validity of an assignment 

of his child support obligations, citing State ex rel. Williams v. Williams, 647 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983). 

Given our ruling today, we need not and do not address the Division’s alternative argument in defense of the 

propriety of the withholding order. 
9

 Section 516.350.2 provides that periodic payments of child support “shall be presumed 

paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date that periodic payment is due, 

unless the [child support] judgment has been otherwise revived as set out in [section 516.350.1].” 

In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 636 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Mo. banc 1982), the Missouri Supreme Court 

held that the ten-year period of limitation starts to run separately for each periodic child support 

payment when it is due. 

 Therefore, pursuant to section 516.350.1, each time Father failed to make a monthly child 

support payment after the entry of the Dissolution Decree in March 1984, a ten-year period of 

limitation for that particular payment obligation commenced. The period of limitation for each 

unpaid monthly child support obligation began to expire in March 1994. Further, the period of 

limitation as to all of the periodic child support obligations expired as of March 27, 2010, ten 

years after the final child support payment was due, when the child was emancipated6

 when she 

turned eighteen on March 27, 2000, unless the Dissolution Decree was revived pursuant to 

section 516.350.1. 

 The obligation to remit periodic child support payments ordered by a judgment, order, or 

decree may be revived by the obligor’s payment on the judgment “duly entered upon the record 

thereof.” § 516.350.1. “Thus, the ten year period of limitations for each unpaid periodic child 

support obligation will begin anew if . . . revival occurs before the original ten year period of 

limitations has expired.” Martin v. Martin, 334 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). It 

is not disputed that Father made a child support payment “duly entered upon the record” on 

March 17, 1999. That payment operated to revive the Dissolution Decree for all arrearages 

 6

 “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the judgment, provisions for the support of a 

child are terminated by emancipation of the child.” § 452.370.4. “Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly 

dictate otherwise and the court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent to make child support payments 

shall terminate when the child: . . . [r]eaches age eighteen . . . .” § 452.340.3(5). 
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