J-S55006-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

QUYDEEM JAMALL HAWKINS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 447 WDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-26-CR-0000215-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: May 11, 2021

Quydeem Jamall Hawkins appeals from the judgment of sentence of life 

imprisonment imposed after a jury convicted him of assault by life prisoner, 

assault by prisoner, aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly 

endangering another person (“REAP”), and disorderly conduct, and the trial 

court convicted him of summary harassment. We affirm.

On August 20, 2018, while serving a life sentence at SCI Fayette for the 

2013 murder of Khaalid Boyd, Appellant participated in a prison fight in the 

facility’s 300-inmate dining hall.1 He was observed wielding a dining tray and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 As the parties stipulated that Appellant “is an inmate incarcerated for a life 

sentence that has not been commuted,” the certified record does not reveal 

the details of the conviction that led to the imposition of the life sentence. We 

previously identified the victim in our memorandum affirming the murder 

conviction. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 144 A.3d 199 (Pa.Super. 

2016) (unpublished memorandum at 1). 
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swinging it at other inmates. Several correctional officers responded to the 

scuffle, but Appellant continued to be aggressive and grappled with Officer 

William Pletcher, Jr., who was the first officer on the scene. Sergeant David 

Zebrowski came to Officer Pletcher’s assistance and while the two guards 

attempted to subdue the prisoner, Appellant struck Sergeant Zebrowski on 

the head with a weapon fashioned from a plastic dining cup that had been 

melted and sharpened to a point. The blow to Sergeant Zebrowski’s head 

opened a wound that required five sutures to close and left him scarred. 

Additional officers arrived and eventually restrained Appellant. They

seized the hand-crafted weapon that is commonly referred to as a prison 

shank. Officer Andrew Jennings was among the officers who responded to the 

fracas. As he helped escort Appellant to the medical unit, Appellant spit on 

Officer Jennings’s arm. 

Based on the foregoing events, the Commonwealth charged Appellant 

with five counts of assault-related offenses and disorderly conduct in relation 

to Sergeant Zebrowski and one count each of aggravated harassment and 

disorderly conduct stemming from his interaction with Officer Jennings. At 

the subsequent jury trial, during which Appellant was removed due to his

disruptive outbursts, the Commonwealth presented, inter alia, the surveillance 

video depicting the assault and the testimony of Sergeant Zebrowski, Officer 

Pletcher, and Officer Jennings. Appellant did not present any evidence. 

The jury convicted Appellant of the six offenses relating to Sergeant 

Zebrowski and acquitted him of aggravated harassment and disorderly 
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conduct related to the spitting incident. As noted, the trial court convicted 

Appellant of summary harassment. 

On December 11, 2019, the trial court imposed the statutorily mandated 

sentence of life imprisonment for aggravated assault by a life prisoner.

2

 The 

sentence was imposed concurrent with the life sentence that Appellant was 

currently serving. No further penalty was imposed on the remaining 

conviction. The trial court permitted an appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant 

complied with the ensuing order to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents six issues for our review:

1. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of assault by life prisoner. 

2. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of assault by prisoner. 

3. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of aggravated assault.

4. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of simple assault.

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2 The court initially imposed ten to twenty years of incarceration for assault

by life prisoner; however, following the Commonwealth’s post-trial motion, 

the court vacated that sentence and imposed a second term of life 

imprisonment, which is the mandatory penalty for that offense. See

18 Pa.C.S. § 2704 (“[T]he penalty for which shall be the same as the penalty 

for murder of the second degree.”).
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5. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of recklessly endangering another person.

6. Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] had the requisite intent to commit the 

crime of disorderly conduct.

Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

We apply the following standard of review of Appellant’s assertion that 

the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict against him:

[W]e examine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support the 

jury’s finding of all the elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 151 A.3d 662, 664 (Pa.Super. 2016).

Appellant’s first five issues all relate to the necessary mens rea for the 

respective offenses. Stated plainly, he argues that the Commonwealth failed 

to adduce evidence to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that he

possessed the necessary intent to commit the various forms of assault, REAP, 

and disorderly conduct relating to Sergeant Zebrowski. As to all but the 

disorderly conduct conviction, he recycles a single argument, i.e., that he 

struck Sergeant Zebrowski unintentionally as a consequence of “being tackled 

by several officers at once and being pushed backwards.” Appellant’s brief at 

10. He attempts to support this contention by highlighting that the blow did 

not prevent the officers from restraining him, that Sergeant Zebrowski only 

become cognizant of the injury when he observed the blood, and “there was 
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no evidence or testimony of record that Appellant voluntarily moved his hand 

down to strike the victim[.]” Id. The common thread among all of Appellant’s 

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the assault convictions

is that assault requires a voluntary movement that is intentional, knowing, or 

reckless, an element that he asserts is missing in this case. Id. For the 

following reasons, we disagree.

First, we observe that Appellant’s references to the effects of the assault 

on Sergeant Zebrowski or the officers’ ability to restrain Appellant are wholly 

irrelevant to the determination regarding whether the Commonwealth 

established the necessary element of intent. Moreover, in contrast to 

Appellant’s contentions, the certified record supports the inference that 

Appellant acted with volition. 

In order to convict Appellant of assault by life prisoner, assault by 

prisoner3, aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP, the Commonwealth

was required to established beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia,

Appellant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. See 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2702(a) Aggravated assault (“attempts to cause serious bodily injury to 

another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 

circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 

life”);18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 Simple assault (“attempts to cause or intentionally, 

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3 When committed against a correctional officer, assault by prisoner, is an 

assault with a deadly weapon or instrument, or by any means or force likely 

to produce bodily injury. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2703(a)(1)(ii).
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knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another”); 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705 

REAP (“A person commits [REAP] if he recklessly engages in conduct which 

places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily 

injury.”). 

The integral component of assault by life prisoner is that the prisonerassailant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or instrument. 

A person is guilty of that central offense if he or she “attempts to cause serious 

bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly under the circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 

value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). The Pennsylvania Crimes Code 

defines “serious bodily injury” as “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial 

risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted 

loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2301. Use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body is sufficient to 

establish intent to cause serious bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 

692 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa.Super. 1991). 

REAP and simple assault are lesser-included offenses of aggravated 

assault, and evidence sufficient to prove aggravated assault is sufficient to 

prove those offenses as well. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 A.2d 429, 

432 (Pa.Super. 1992) (elements of REAP and simple assault are met by a 

conviction for aggravated assault).

In rejecting Appellant’s argument, the trial court explained as follows:
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Here, the prison shank that [Appellant] used to strike 

Sergeant Zebrowski was clearly a deadly weapon. The way in 

which the shank was made-formed by melting a dining hall cup to 

a sharp point and then adding cloth around the handle-also shows 

that [Appellant] premeditated an assault with such instrument. 

Bringing the shank with him into the dining hall is further evidence 

that Mr. Hawkins planned an assault. [Appellant] then in fact used 

that weapon to strike Sergeant Zebrowski in the head after being 

involved in a fight with another inmate. Although Sergeant 

Zebrowski’s injury did not itself constitute a serious bodily injury, 

an Aggravated Assault only requires that an attempt was made to 

cause such an injury. Because [Appellant] used a deadly weapon 

on a vital part of Sergeant Zebrowski’s body, it was proper for the 

jury to conclude that Mr. Hawkins intended to commit the 

Aggravated Assault-and therefore Assault by a Life Prisoner-on 

Sergeant Zebrowski. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/1/20, at 6.

The certified record supports the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

rationale. During the jury trial, Pennsylvania State Trooper Melinda Churney 

testified about the criminal investigation of the assault. She described the 

collection of evidence, including the weapon that she identified as a “shank” 

and described as “a six and a half inch melted dining hall cup which is 

sharpened to a point with a cloth handle.” N.T., 10/9/19, at 82. Similarly, 

Corrections Officer Casey Morrison described the weapon that was confiscated

following the assault as “a plastic shank with a cloth handle wrapped around 

it.” Id. at 77. Officer Morrison further explained that, it was “an inmate dining 

hall cup [that was] melt[ed] down and then mold[ed] . . . into a sharp . . . 

pointed object[.]” Id. at 79. The officer continued, “they will sharpen it down 

on the floor [or] anything they can kind of rub it against to get it to a point.” 

Id. 
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Sergeant Zebrowski, the victim, has fifteen and one-half years of 

experience as a correctional officer at SCI Fayette. Id. at 54. He testified 

that he first observed the shank, which he correctly assumed to be a weapon,

in Appellant’s right hand while Appellant was grappling with Officer Pletcher. 

Id. 55-57. As Sergeant Zebrowski joined the fray, Appellant hit him on the 

right side of the forehead with the shank. Id. at 56. After securing Appellant, 

Sergeant Zebrowski discovered that he was bleeding from the area where he 

had been struck by Appellant. Id. Sergeant Zebrowski was transported to 

an urgent care facility in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, where physicians used five 

sutures to close the wound, which left him scarred. Id. at 59. 

While it is plausible that Appellant inadvertently slashed at Sergeant 

Zebrowski’s face with the knife-like shank that he brandished during his scuffle 

with the correctional officers, the jury, as the ultimate arbiter of fact, flatly 

rejected that proposition. Instead, the jury credited the foregoing evidence 

favoring the inference that Appellant attempted to injure Sergeant Zebrowski 

by striking him in the head with a sharp weapon. Although the resulting injury

did not prove to be life-threatening, the fact that Appellant did not wield the 

shank more effectively does not negate the inference that it was intended to 

cause serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d 

1289, 1296 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“The mere fact that defendant could have 

employed his ‘instrumentality’ more effectively, as the trial court intimates, 

does not preclude” factfinder from inferring that he intended to cause serious 

bodily injury.); Nichols, supra at 184 (use of deadly weapon on vital part of 
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body is sufficient to establish intent to cause serious bodily harm). Hence, 

when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict 

winner, the foregoing evidence was sufficient to satisfy the mens rea for

aggravated assault—attempts to cause serious bodily injury, and therefore the 

evidence was legally sufficient to convict Appellant of assault by life prisoner, 

which subsumes aggravated assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2704 (a life prisoner 

“who commits an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or instrument 

upon another, or by any means of force likely to produce serious bodily injury, 

is guilty of [assault by life prisoner]”). 

Similarly, since the elements of simple assault and REAP are met by a 

conviction for aggravated assault, the instant evidence also supports those 

convictions. See Brown, supra at 432. In addition, Appellant’s violent 

behavior toward Sergeant Zebrowski also constitutes assault by prisoner. Id.

at 431-32 (“flinging fecal matter into the face of a prison guard . . . constitutes 

an assault by a means or force likely to produce serious bodily injury” that 

supports conviction for assault by prisoner). 

As to Appellant’s final argument, which concerns the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting the disorderly conduct verdict, Appellant asserts that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that “he intended to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or that he recklessly created a risk of a 

hazardous or physically offensive condition.” Appellant’s brief at 13. The 

familiar refrain underlying this argument is that Appellant was not in control 
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of the situation when he participated in the prison altercation and then 

assaulted Sergeant Zebrowski. Id. Again, we disagree.

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code provides, 

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause 

public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating 

a risk thereof, he: 

(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous 

behavior; 

(2) makes unreasonable noise; 

(3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or 

(4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any 

act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a).

It is beyond cavil that the foregoing evidence presented by Sergeant 

Zebrowski and Officer Pletcher established that Appellant engaged in fighting 

or violent and tumultuous behavior and created a hazardous condition by acts 

that served no legitimate purpose. In summary, during the ordeal, Appellant

fought other inmates in a crowded prison dining hall, wrestled with Officer 

Pletcher as the officer attempted to maintain order, and cut Sergeant 

Zebrowski’s head with a prison shank. This evidence supports the jury’s 

finding that Appellant either 1) intended to cause public inconvenience, 

annoyance or alarm; 2) recklessly created a risk of triggering one or more of 

those conditions; or 3) recklessly risked creating a hazardous or physically 

offensive condition through actions that serve no legitimate purpose. See 
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 574 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1990) 

(explaining, “hazardous condition” involves danger or risk of potential injury 

and “physically offensive condition” encompasses direct assaults on physical 

senses); Commonwealth v. Roth, 531 A.2d 1133, 1137 (Pa.Super. 1987)

(“When Appellants proceeded to disrupt the Church services, albeit peaceably, 

they in reality engendered a ‘hazardous’ condition. Appellant’s conduct of 

moving towards the Church’s property certainly created a dangerous situation 

in which altercations between the demonstrators and Church members could 

have occurred.”). Hence, we reject Appellant’s assertion that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish the mens rea for disorderly conduct. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2021