PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ GOD'S STOREHOUSE TOPEKA CHURCH, Petitioner - Appellant,

v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent - Appellee. No. 23-3063

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 5:22-C V-04014-DDC-TJJ)

________________ _________________ Ryan A. Kriegshauser, Kriegs hauser Ney Law Group, Olathe , Kansas, (Ryan K. Oberly and Meaghan Falkanger, Wagenmaker & Ober ly, Chicago, Illinois, with him on the briefs) for Petitioner-Appellant. Pooja A. Boisture, Attorney, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., (Kate E. Brubacher, United States Attorney , Of Counsel; David A. Hubbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney General; a nd Arthur T. Catterall, Attorn ey, Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with he r on the brief) for Respondent-Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before MORITZ , MURPHY , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ MURPHY , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 9, 2024 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 12 I. INTRODUCTION God’s Storehouse Topeka Church (“GSH”) 1 appeals from a district court order denying its petition to quash a third-part y summons the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issued to Kaw Valley Bank (“Ka w Valley”). IRS summonsed Kaw Valley pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609, seeking ba nk records for accounts in GSH’s name. GSH claimed the summons was invalid because , before its issuan ce, IRS failed to satisfy requirements applicable to c hurch tax inquiries and examinations. See 26 U.S.C. § 7611. 2 In particular, GSH asserted the Tax Exempt and Government Entities Commissioner (“TE/GE Commissione r”), the IRS official th at signed off on the GSH inquiry, is not an “appropriate high-le vel Treasury official ” for purposes of § 7611(a)(2). The district court denied GSH’s petiti on, concluding (1) the provisions of § 7611 do not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses; and (2 ), even if the provisions of § 7611 did apply to § 7609 third-party summonses , IRS complied with the requirements of § 7611(a)(2). Like the distri ct court, we hold th e plain language of § 7611 makes clear it does not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses. Accordingly,

1 We use GSH to refer to God’s Storehous e Topeka Church b ecause that is the term used by GSH in its appellate briefs.

2 Section 7611 was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 5, 1033, 98 Stat. 494, 1034 (19 84). The provisions of § 7611 are often referred to as the Church Audit Procedures Act. Music Square Church v. United States , 218 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti , 211 F.3d 137, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Church of Scientology W. United States , 973 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1992). Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 23 it is unnecessary to decide whether the TE/ GE Commissioner is an appropriate highlevel Treasury official. Exercising jurisdic tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this

court affirms the district court’s denial of GSH’s petition to quash.
II. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Richard and Pennie Kloos founded GSH in 2009. The follo wing year, Richard Kloos and two other individuals incor porated GSH as a Kansas not-for-profit corporation. GSH did not apply to be rec ognized as exempt from taxation pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Instead, it declared itself a church pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 508(c)(1)(A). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(1) (providing that for purposes of the church inquiry/examination provisions of § 7611, the term “church” includes “any organization claiming to be a church”). GSH operates a thrift store with a small space inside that serves as a coffee shop. GSH’ s thrift store sells donated items to the public. The coffee shop sells co ffee to the thrift store’s pa trons at cost. Richard Kloos is a pastor at GSH; GSH paid gross wa ges to both Klooses in 2019 and 2020. GSH’s tax forms demonstrate that, during that tw o-year period, it withheld employment taxes from the wages of other employees but did not withhold any taxes from the gross wages of the Klooses. In November 2020, Richard Kloos was el ected to the Kansas State Senate. During his run, his campaign purchased yard signs that include d the words “Founder of God’s Storehouse” below his name. The State of Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission vetted and preapproved those si gns. According to Richard Kloos, GSH Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 34 did not “create, purchase, display, distribut e, or in any way contribute to any yard signs associated with” his campaign. Kloos further claims GSH did not “intervene in or support [his] campai gn for Kansas Senate.” 3 In February 2021, IRS assigned Kesroy Henry to investigat e whether it should initiate a church tax inquiry 4 into GSH for the 2019 and 2020 tax years. In June, Henry issued a Notice of Church Tax Inqui ry (“Inquiry Notice”) to GSH after he secured approval from the TE/GE Commissioner. 5 The Inquiry Notice informed GSH of four concerns: (1) it potentially operated as a thrift store instead of a church, (2) it

3 A church that “participates” or “int ervenes” in “any political campaign” may lose its tax-exempt status. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).

4 The term church tax inquiry “means any inquiry to a church (other than an examination) to serve as a basis for determining whethe r a church—(A) is exempt from tax under [26 U.S.C. § 501(a)] by reason of its status as a church, or (B) is carrying on an unrelated trade or business (within the meaning of [ id. § 513]) or otherwise engaged in activities which may be subject to taxation under this title.” Id. § 7611(h)(2).

5 Before beginning a church tax inquir y, IRS must obtain approval from “an appropriate high-level Treasury official.” 26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(1)-(2). The appropriate high-level Treasury official must reasonably believe[] (on the basis of facts and circumstan ces recorded in writing) that the church—(A) may not be exempt, by reason of its status as a church, from tax under section 5 01(a), or (B) may be carrying on an unrelated trade or business (within the meaning of section 513) or otherwise engaged in act ivities subject to taxa tion under this title. Id. § 7611(a)(2). According to § 7611(h)(7), the term appropriate high-level Treasury official “means the Se cretary of the Treasury or any de legate of the Secretary whose rank is no lower than that of a principal Internal Revenue offi cer for an internal revenue region.” Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 45 may have improperly intervened in a political campaign, (3) its coffee shop may incur liability for unrelat ed business income tax, 6 and (4) the wage payments to the Klooses may incur liability for unpaid employment taxes. Although the Inquiry Notice also requested GSH’s responses to a series of questions, it did not request any documents. Nevertheless, GS H responded to the questions and provided copies of documents. GSH’s responses and documents did not assuage Henry’s concerns about GSH’s tax-exempt status and potential tax liability. Accordingly, in September of 2021, he obtained approval from the TE/GE Commissioner to in itiate a church tax examination. 7 Henry then issued to GSH a No tice of Church Tax Examination (“Examination Notice”). The Examina tion Notice informed GSH about IRS’s continued concerns. It also described church records and activities Henry might need to examine and offered to conduct a pr e-examination conference. The following month, GSH’s representative met with IRS personnel for the pre-examination conference. Because that conference did not resolve IRS’s concerns, IRS notified GSH it would move forward with an examinati on. Consistent with this determination,

6 For an explanation of the unrel ated business income tax, see United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians , 475 U.S. 834, 837-39 (1986) and 26 U.S.C. § 513.

7 The term church tax examination “m eans any examination for purposes of making a determination described in [26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(2)] of —(A) church records at the request of the [IRS], or (B ) the religious activities of any church.” 26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(3). Notably, before beginning any church tax examination, IRS must provide pre-examination notice to the church. Id. § 7611(b)(1)-(2). That notice must include “a copy of the church tax i nquiry notice [previously] provided to the church.” Id. § 7611(b)(3)(A)(i). Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 56 a few days later, Henry sent GSH a request for documents, including copies of its bank statements for a two-year period. GS H objected to producing those statements on the ground the request was overly broa d. Although GSH did not provide the requested bank statements, it did provide an extensive list of documents. In December 2021, IRS notified GSH it in tended to contact third parties and informed GSH of its right to request a list of people IRS contacted. In February 2022, IRS issued a § 7609 third-party summons to Kaw Valley. IRS requested bank records for all accounts in GSH’s name for the period January 1, 2019, to December 31, 2020. IRS also served a copy of the summons on GSH. B. Procedural Background GSH petitioned the district court to qua sh the third-party summons IRS issued to Kaw Valley. GSH argued IRS failed to meet the requirements of § 7611 prior to summonsing Kaw Valley. As particularly rele vant to the issue GS H raises on appeal, it asserted IRS failed to obt ain the requisite authoriza tion from an appropriate highlevel Treasury official. 26 U.S.C. § 7611(a)(1)-(2). 8 GSH claimed the TE/GE Commissioner’s rank is not equivalent to the rank of the now-defunct Regional

8 In its petition to quash, GSH also argued IRS failed to comply with the requirements of § 7611(b)(1)(A) and (b)(3)(A )(iv) before summonsing Kaw Valley. Because GSH did not raise these is sues on appeal, they are waived. SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc ., 578 F.3d 1201, 1226 (10th Cir. 2009) . In any event, any such claims would fail because, as set out below, the provisions of § 7611 do not apply to third party summons issued under § 7609. Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 67 Commissioners described in § 7611(h)(7 ) and 26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1 at A-1. 9 IRS moved for summary denial of GSH’s peti tion to quash. IRS argued § 7611 was not relevant to the validity of the third-party summons it issued to Kaw Valley. Instead, § 7609, together with the decision in United States v. Powell , 379 U.S. 48 (1964), governed the validity of that summons. 10 In support of this assertion, IRS cited § 7611(h)(4), which provides that the te rm “church records” does “not include records acquired . . . pursuant to a summons to which [§] 7609 applies.”

9 In 1998, Congress restructured IR S from a geographic to a topic-based organization and eliminated the position of “Regional Commissioner.” See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Refo rm Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998). Cong ress did not amend the definition of “appropriate high-level Treasury official” for purposes of th e church tax inquiry. Nor has Treasury promulgated a new regula tion identifying offi cials qualifying as appropriate high-level Treasury o fficials for purposes of § 7611.

10 Powell rejected the notion IRS must show the existence of probable cause to obtain enforcement of its administrative summonses. 379 U.S. at 52-57. Instead, the IRS need only establish its good faith. Id. at 57-58. Powell held IRS could establish its good faith by showing that: the investigation will be conducte d pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Co mmissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by th e Code have been followed—in particular, that the “Secretary or his delegate,” after investigation, has determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing to that effect. Id. In its petition to quash, GSH asserted IR S failed to show its third-party summons to Kaw Valley was issued in good faith. W ith the narrow exception of the argument that Powell ’s administrative-steps component incorporates § 7611(a)(1)-(2)’s “appropriate high-level Treasury official” into all § 7609 third-party summonses, GSH does not advance on appeal any of the Powell -based arguments it made before the district court. Thus, any such arguments are waived. SCO Grp. , 578 F.3d at 1226. Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 78 Alternatively, IRS argued that even assuming § 7611 applied to its third-party summons to Kaw Valley, the TE/GE Commissioner signed off on the inquiry/examination and was an appropriate high-level Trea sury official for purposes of § 7611(h)(7). 11 In response to IRS’s motion for summary denial, GSH argued IRS could not use § 7609 to obtain third-party r ecords relating to chur ches because such actions would “sidestep” the pr otections set out in § 7611. The district court referred GSH’s peti tion to a magistrate judge for initial proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magi strate judge concluded the plain statutory language of § 7611(h)(4)(B)—which excepts records obtained through third-party summonses from the definition of “church records”—makes clear the third-party summons IRS issued to Kaw Va lley was not subject to the heightened requirements set out in § 7611. The magistra te judge noted 26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1 at A-5 expressly provides that records held by a third-party bank are not church records. The magistrate judge next ruled that, based on the four Powell factors, IRS issued the third-party summons to Kaw Valley in good faith. As relevant to the issues on appeal, the magistrate judge conclude d IRS showed it followed all requisite administrative steps, ther eby satisfying the fourth Powell prong. Even though the magistrate judge had alrea dy ruled § 7611 did not apply to the summons IRS issued

11 Before the district court, IRS asserted § 7611(e) precluded GSH from litigating IRS’s compliance with § 7611 in th e context of a petition to quash a thirdparty summons. Like the district court, this court conclude s it is unnecessary to reach this issue given that, as set out below, the requirements of § 7611 do not apply to § 7609 third-party summonses. Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 89 to Kaw Valley, she rejected on the meri ts GSH’s contention IRS had not complied with § 7611(a)(2) and (h)(7). The magistrate judge noted that while both § 7611(h)(7) and 26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1 provide that th e appropriate high-level official is the Regional Commissioner or a higher Treasur y official, the position of Regional Commissioner no longer existed after the orga nizational restructuring of the IRS in 1998. Nevertheless, the ma gistrate judge concluded the TE/GE Commissioner was the logical counterpart of the previously extant position of Regional Commissioner. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recomme nded that the district court deny GSH’s petition and grant IRS’s motion for summary denial. The district court adopted, over GSH’s obj ection, the magistra te judge’s report and recommendation. It began by rejec ting GSH’s assertion that the TE/GE Commissioner was not an appropriate high-lev el Treasury official for purposes of §7611(h)(7). The district concluded the TE/GE Commissi oner was comparable to the former position of Regional Commissione r because the two positions occupy a similar rank and had similarl y broad responsibilities. Desp ite ruling in IRS’s favor on the appropriate-high-level-offi cial question, the district court also rejected GSH’s argument that the provisions of § 7611 a pply to § 7609 third-party summonses. As had the magistrate judge, the district c ourt relied on § 7611(h)(4)(B), which excepts documents acquired through a third-party summons from the definition of “church records.” Because records validly summonsed from a th ird party are not church records, the district court concluded IRS need not comply with any provision of § 7611 before requesting and obtaining such records. Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 910 III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review The sole issue on appeal set out in GSH’s appellate brief is whether the TE/GE Commissioner “is an appropriate high-level Tr easury official to approve church tax inquiries and examinations und er” § 7611. GSH’s Opening Br. 1. Of course, it is only necessary to reach this question if the provisions of § 7611 a pply to third-party summonses issued by the IRS pursuant to § 7609. This second question, one of statutory construction subj ect to de novo review, Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United
States , 955 F.3d 1146, 1155 & n.4 (10th Ci r. 2020), is determinative. “As in all cases of stat utory construction,” this c ourt’s “foremost duty is to ascertain the congressional intent and gi ve effect to the legislative will.” Ribas v. Mukasey , 545 F.3d 922, 929 (10t h Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). To determine congressional intent, this c ourt must first focus on the language of the statute. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co. , 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (“As in all statutory construction cases, we begin wi th the language of the statut e. The first step is to determine whether the language at issue ha s a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.” (quotation omitted)); United States v.
Saenz-Gomez , 472 F.3d 791, 793-94 (10t h Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is a well established law of statutory construction that, absent am biguity or irrational result, the literal language of a statute controls.” ). “When the meaning of the statute is clea r, it is both unnecessary and improper to resort to le gislative history to divine congressional intent.” Id. at 794 (quotation omitted). Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1011 B. Analysis GSH asserts the validity of IRS’s § 7609 third-party summons to Kaw Valley under Powell ’s administrative-steps component, is dependent on IRS’s compliance with § 7611(a)(2). See generally supra n.10 (describing Powell analysis). The plain language of § 7611 is fata l to this assertion. As emphasized by GSH on appeal, § 7611 “affords churches special protections in the audit context.” United States v. C.E. Ho bbs Found. for Religious Training & Educ., Inc. , 7 F.3d 169, 171 (9th Cir. 1993). It creates two distinct types of investigation: a “church tax inqu iry” and a “church tax examination.” See supra nn. 4-5, 7 (quoting the releva nt provisions of § 7611). A church ta x inquiry is “any inquiry to a church (other than an examination)” to determine whether the church is tax-exempt or subject to taxation regard ing certain of its activities. 26 U.S.C. § 7611(h)(2) (emphasis added). A church ta x examination is “any examination . . . of . . . church records ” undertaken for the same purposes of a church tax inquiry (i.e., to determine the status and ta x liabilities of a church). Id. § 7611(h)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 12 Section 7611 imposes si gnificant, heightened pr ocedural requirements before the IRS may undertake either type of church investigation.

12 Section 7611(h)(3)(B) defines “church ta x examination” as also including an examination of the religious activities of a church. GSH does not argue IRS seeks to examine its religious activi ties through the summons to Kaw Valley and, therefore, the third-party summons to Kaw Valley falls within the parameters of § 7611. Thus, the issue is waived, SCO Grp. , 578 F.3d at 1226, and this court does not address it on appeal. But cf. generally God’s Storehouse Topeka Church v. United States , No. 22- mc-00046-PAB, 2023 WL 28 24525, at *5 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2023) (magistrate judge’s report and recommendation) (noting, in identical circumst ances, that a § 7609 Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1112 The problem for GSH is that the plain language of § 7611 makes clear § 7609 third-party summonses are not church ta x inquiries or examinations. As the highlighted language in the previous para graph makes pellucid, a § 7609 third-party summons cannot be a church tax inquiry becau se it is not an inqu iry directed “to a church.” Id. § 7611(h)(2). It is likewise clear such third-party summonses cannot be church tax examinations because they do no t seek “church record s.” Church records are those kept by a church. Id. § 7611(h)(4)(A). IRS’s summo ns to Kaw Valley sought the bank’s records, not GSH’s records. In any event, § 7611(h )(4)(B)(i) makes clear that records obtained pursuant to a § 7609 third party summons are not included within the definition of c hurch records. Because IRS’ s summons to Kaw Valley does not implicate the provisions of § 7611, IRS did not have to demonstrate it complied with the terms of § 7611 to satisfy Powell ’s administrative-steps requirement. And, because the plain language of § 7611 unambiguously resolves this question, there is no need to examine § 7611’ s legislative history. Each of the other three courts that has examined this issue has held or concluded § 7609 alone applies to a third- party summons, even when IRS issues the summons as part of a church tax inquiry or examination. Hobbs , 7 F.3d at 173 (holding that a § 7609 summons issued to third-party bank is not governed by § 7611); Bible Study Time, Inc. v. United States , 240 F. Supp. 3d 409, 420 (D.S.C. 2017) (“Third-party summons es are governed by Section 7609, not Section 7611,

third-party summons to a bank for purely fi nancial information, does not constitute an examination of a chur ch’s religious activities). Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1213 even when the summons is issued in connec tion with a church tax inquiry.”); God’s Storehouse , 2023 WL 2824525, at *4 (concluding “the require ments of Section 7611 do not apply to” third-party summonses). On the other hand, the only case cited by GSH is not remotely helpful. GSH asserts United States v. Church of Scientology of Boston, Inc. , 739 F. Supp. 46, 48 (D. Mass. 1990) , stands for the proposition that § 7611’s procedural requirements have been incorporated into Powell because Powell ’s fourth step requires IRS to fo llow the tax code’s administrative requirements. In Church of Scientology of Boston , however, IRS summonsed church records from a church as part of a church examination. Id. at 47-48. Such a summons quite clearly falls well within the cont ours of § 7611. That being the case, Church of Scientology of Boston has nothing to say about the applicability of the requirements of § 7611 to a § 7609 third-party summons. The relevant statutory language and a pplicable case law are harmonious: the requirements in § 7611 for initiating church tax inquiries and examinations do not apply to a third-party summons, even if summonses are issued in connection with such inquiries and examinati ons. Instead, IRS must satisfy the requirements set out in § 7609, as incorporated into and analyzed by Powell , when it summonses materials from a third party in this context. Ther e is no hybrid set of § 7609 and § 7611 requirements that applies to third-party summonses. Bible Study Time , 240 F. Supp. 3d at 420-21 (concluding § 7611 “has no a pplication to third-party summonses because third-party summonses ar e governed solely by Section 7609”) ; God’s Storehouse Topeka Church , 2023 WL 2824525, at *12 (“[T]he administrative steps Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1314 that the IRS took in initiating its church tax inquiry or ex amination are irrelevant to determining whether the IRS followed the pr oper administrative step s in issuing this third-party summons.”). 13

13 GSH argues that if this court inte rprets § 7609 as allowing IRS to access third-party records free from the constr aints of § 7611 we will defeat § 7611’s purpose of protecting church es from abusive investiga tions. This extra-textual argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, IRS cannot circumvent § 7611 because it cannot, based solely on documen ts collected from a third-party summons, make any (1) determination that a church is not entitled to tax-exempt status, or (2) assessment of unrelated business income tax against a church. The relevant regulation provides as follows: Third party materials may be acqui red without application of the procedures of section 76 11; however, a determina tion that a church is not entitled to an exemption, or an assessment of tax for unrelated business income against a church, ma y not be made solely on the basis of third party records, without firs t complying with the requirements of two notices and offering of a conferen ce . . . pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 7611. This lim itation does not apply to assessments of tax other than income tax resu lting from loss of exemption or for unrelated business income (for instance, assessments of social security or other employment taxes). Third pa rty bank records will not be used in a manner inconsistent with the proce dures set forth in section 7611 . . . . 26 C.F.R. § 301.7611-1 at A-5. Thus, GSH is simp ly wrong in asserting a plain-meaning interpretation of §§ 7609 and 7611 will leave churches entirely at the mercy of IRS. Second, as we ll noted by the magistrate judge in addressing an identical claim in God’s Storehouse Topeka Church , 2023 WL 2824525, at *7: [A]s with any statute, [§] 7611 re flects a legisla tive balance—here, between allowing [IRS] to effectivel y perform its statutorily mandated investigative duties, while providing heightened protections to churches in light of their unique social and c onstitutional status. As the plain text of [§] 7611 makes clear, Congress st ruck this balance by placing certain restrictions on [IRS’s] ability to make an i nquiry to a church and examine the church’s records and relig ious activities, wh ile specifically exempting from those restrictions summonses made to third-party recordkeepers . . . . [The] argument th at this arrangement allows [IRS] Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 1415 IV. CONCLUSION The judgment of the United States Dist rict Court for the District of Kansas denying GSH’s petition to quash and gran ting IRS’s motion for summary denial is hereby AFFIRMED

.

to essentially bypass . . . safeguards afforded to churches under § 7611 is one to be taken up in the ha lls of Congress, not a courtroom. (alterations, quotations, and record citations omitted). Appellate Case: 23-3063 Document: 010111028952 Date Filed: 04/09/2024 Page: 15