FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 06-50663 Plaintiff-Appellee,

Central District of v.  California

CHRISTOPHER LEMOINE, aka Terry D.C. No.

Giagnoca, CR-03-00037-RT-01

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 07-50083 Plaintiff-Appellee,

Central District of v.  California

CHRISTOPHER LEMOINE, aka Terry D.C. No.

Giagnoca, CR-03-00037-RT-01

Defendant-Appellant. 

CHRISTOPHER LEMOINE, 

Petitioner-Appellee, No. 07-35761

v. District of Oregon  D.C. No. CHARLES A. DANIELS, Federal

Correctional Institution Sheridan, CV-07-00100-MFM

Oregon, OPINION

Respondent-Appellant. 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Robert J. Timlin, District Judge, Presiding

14363
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 9, 2008*

Filed October 9, 2008

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Richard R. Clifton,

Circuit Judges, and Earl H. Carroll,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

**The Honorable Earl H. Carroll, Senior United States District Judge,

District of Arizona, sitting by designation. 

14364 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
COUNSEL

Christopher W. Lemoine, pro se, as appellant in Nos. 06-

50663 & 07-50083 and as appellee in No. 07-35761. 

Kelly A. Zusman and Scott E. Asphaug, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Portland, Oregon, for appellant United

States in No. 07-35761. 

Michael J. Raphael and Robert C. Stacy II, Assistant United

States Attorneys, Los Angeles, California, for appellee United

States in Nos. 06-50663 & 07-50083. 

14366 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge: 

These consolidated appeals present the question of whether

the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the federal agency responsible

for the incarceration of inmates, may require inmates who

participate in the bureau’s Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program (IFRP) to pay restitution to victims at a higher or

faster rate than was specified by the sentencing court, without

obtaining an order from the sentencing court directing or

approving the larger payments. We conclude that the BOP

may do so. 

I. Background

Christopher Lemoine was, after a guilty plea, convicted of

one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. That

proceeding was in the Central District of California. Lemoine

was sentenced to imprisonment for 77 months, to serve five

years thereafter on supervised release, and to pay restitution

in the total amount of $2,835,126.88, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

The Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order entered by

the district court required that Lemoine pay restitution during

his imprisonment “at the rate of not less than $25 per quarter,

and pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program.” The order required Lemoine to

make “monthly payments of at least $500” while on supervised release. 

After he began serving his sentence at the medium security

facility operated by the BOP in Sheridan, Oregon, Lemoine

enrolled in the IFRP. As a condition of his participation in the

program, the BOP required that Lemoine pay restitution at a

rate of $132 per month, a dollar figure and a frequency higher

than the “not less than $25 per quarter” specified in the

court’s judgment. Lemoine filed a motion with the sentencing

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14367
court, the Central District of California, to modify the judgment. He argued that the court had improperly delegated its

authority to schedule restitution payments and raised a series

of challenges, relying on United States v. Gunning, 339 F.3d

948 (9th Cir. 2003) (Gunning I), and United States v. Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gunning II). 

The district court denied Lemoine’s motion, reasoning that

“the only duty which the Ninth Circuit has held non-delegable

under the MVRA is that of scheduling restitution payments.

Here, the court did not delegate scheduling to the BOP. It set

the payment schedule as quarterly in its restitution order.”

[Page 4 of C.D. Cal. Order entered October 20, 2006, which

is ER 26 in the Oregon case originally assigned to us.] The

court also noted that the phrase “pursuant to the Bureau of

Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program” was

included in the judgment because the court assumed “sub

silentio that the defendant would choose to participate in the

voluntary IFRP program” to “qualify for certain benefits and

advantages,” indicating that the order did not mandate Lemoine’s participation and stating that “Lemoine did so choose

[to voluntarily participate in the program], agreeing to pay

$132.00 per month.” The court declined to reach the merits of

Lemoine’s challenges to the IFRP itself because they were

raised in his reply brief and because such challenges are

“properly made in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,

and the petition should be filed in the district court in which

petitioner’s place of incarceration is located.” [C.D. Cal.

Order, at 6.] Lemoine, acting pro se, filed multiple appeals

from the decision of the Central District of California, two of

which are before us, Nos. 06-50663 and 07-50083.1

1The appeals were from the district court’s denial of his motion to modify a restitution order (No. 06-50663) and the denial of reconsideration

(No. 07-50083). This court granted the government’s motion to dismiss

another appeal, regarding an extension of time (No. 07-50084) because

Lemoine was not aggrieved by that order. Lemoine voluntarily dismissed

an appeal from the dismissal of a receiver motion (No. 07-50085). 

14368 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
Shortly after Lemoine’s unsuccessful challenge to his sentence, the BOP modified the schedule of restitution payments

required from Lemoine under the IFRP, setting it as the minimum amount permitted under Lemoine’s sentencing order:

$25 per quarter. The record does not make clear the reason for

the change. Nonetheless, Lemoine followed the suggestion

contained in the order entered by the Central District of California, and in January 2007 filed a pro se § 2241 habeas petition in the District of Oregon, where he was then incarcerated.

That court issued an opinion and order on July 20, 2007. 

Lemoine’s District of Oregon petition presented three challenges. First, he argued that the sentencing order impermissibly delegated authority to the BOP to set his restitution

repayment schedule. The Oregon district court said it declined

to reach this claim because it was the subject of the direct

appeal from the Central District’s order and was thus not ripe

for collateral attack. Later in the order, though, the Oregon

district court seemed to reject this challenge, by stating that

“here the sentencing court set a schedule for making restitution payments during incarceration” and therefore “did not

unlawfully delegate that authority to the BOP.” 

Second, Lemoine contended that the IFRP violated the

Equal Protection Clause by treating otherwise similarly situated prisoners differently based on whether they had the ability to pay their restitution. The Oregon district court rejected

this contention, stating that rational basis review applied

because prisoners were not members of a suspect class and

the IFRP did not impinge upon any fundamental rights. It held

that the IFRP was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of enforcing sentencing orders and ensuring

that inmates fulfill their financial obligations to make good

the harm they visited upon their victims. The court found that

the IFRP furthered this purpose by offering inmates incentives

to work and pay their debts during their imprisonment and

imposing consequences, within constitutional bounds, for failing to do so. The court’s order cited several precedents and

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14369
quoted specifically from Gunning II and stated that “the Ninth

Circuit implicitly endorsed the IFRP” in that decision. 

Finally, Lemoine argued that the BOP lacked the authority

to increase his restitution repayment rate above the $25 per

quarter minimum the sentencing court established in its judgment. The Oregon district court agreed with that challenge.

The court held Congress’s mandate in the MVRA to be clear:

“the sentencing court ‘shall . . . specify in the restitution order

the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the

restitution is to be paid . . . .’ ” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)).

It noted that the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the provision as

decisive when it held in Gunning II that the “district court

must determine the restitution payment schedule.” The court

concluded that, “[t]hough the Ninth Circuit has not yet considered whether the BOP may increase an inmate’s restitution

payment amount without a court order, I find that allowing

the BOP to modify the payment schedule in any way, without

court approval, amounts to an equally impermissible delegation of authority as allowing the BOP to create the payment

schedule.” 

With respect to the potentially voluntary nature of the new

payment schedule, the Oregon district court found that Lemoine “agreed” to pay the higher rate only to avoid the adverse

consequences of failing to do so. It held that the BOP’s modification of Lemoine’s restitution payment schedule pursuant

to the development of a “financial plan” under the IFRP was

in excess of its authority and therefore not in accordance with

law, and on that basis granted Lemoine’s petition and ordered

the BOP to maintain the schedule at $25 per quarter. The government appealed, and that appeal has been assigned No. 07-

35761 by our court. 

The three pending appeals, Nos. 06-50663 and 07-50083

from the Central District of California, and No. 07-35761

from the District of Oregon, have all been assigned to this

panel as related cases. By separate order we have consolidated

14370 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
the three appeals, and we resolve all three in this opinion.

Specifically, we affirm the orders and judgment of the district

court for the Central District of California in Nos. 06-50663

and 07-50083, and we reverse the order and judgment of the

District of Oregon in No. 07-35761. 

II. Discussion

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant or

deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241.” Khotesouvan v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298,

1299 (9th Cir. 2004). 

We hold that the BOP’s operation of the IFRP does not

constitute an unlawful delegation of authority to schedule restitution repayments in violation of the MVRA. The MVRA

requires the sentencing court to set a restitution repayment

schedule. The sentencing court did that here. The MVRA

does not prohibit an inmate from voluntarily making larger or

more frequent payments than what was set by the sentencing

court. Nor does it limit the authority of the BOP, through the

IFRP, to offer incentives to inmates to pay their restitution

obligations in larger amounts or at a faster rate than the court

has required.2

We also reject Lemoine’s argument that his participation in

2After these appeals were filed and were assigned to this panel, Lemoine was transferred to a Residential Reentry Center (RRC), or halfway

house. Although RRCs are independently operated, Lemoine remains in

federal custody and subject to the BOP’s authority. By contract, the BOP

requires its RRCs to “provide for the continuity of the Bureau’s institution

policy concerning the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program” and mandates that they “establish a program” whereby they monitor an inmate’s

progress on his or her “financial plan.” BOP, Residential Reentry Center

Statement of Work, at 48 (Aug. 2007), at http://www.bop.gov/locations/

cc/res_rentry_ctr_sow_2007.pdf. Thus, Lemoine continues to have standing to challenge the BOP’s authority to condition participation in the IFRP

on higher restitution payments than required by the sentencing court. 

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14371
the IFRP was involuntary because he would have been denied

certain privileges if he had refused to join the program. Lemoine did not have a preexisting right to receive any of the benefits conditioned on his participation during his incarceration,

and the consequences the BOP imposes on inmates who

refuse to participate in the IFRP are reasonably related to the

legitimate penological interest of rehabilitation. In addition,

the consequences are not so severe as to impose an “atypical

and significant hardship” and therefore do not infringe on any

constitutionally-protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-85 (1995). The BOP therefore had the

authority to create a financial plan for Lemoine through the

IFRP and to impose penalties if he failed to accept its terms.

[1] The BOP’s IFRP applies to nearly all post-trial inmates

in federal facilities. 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. It is intended to “encourage[ ] each sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate

financial obligations.” Id. Under the IFRP, “unit staff”

develop a financial plan for each inmate and monitor his or

her progress in adhering to that plan. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11. In

doing so, they conduct an independent assessment of inmates’

abilities to pay by reviewing their financial obligations and

“all available documentation.” 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a). The

IFRP typically requires a minimum payment of $25 per quarter for non-UNICOR and UNICOR grade 5 inmates.3

 28

C.F.R. § 545.11(b)(1). For inmates in UNICOR grades 1

through 4, the IFRP requires payments of at least 50 percent

of the inmate’s monthly pay. The BOP may obtain payments

from funds earned through prison employment as well as

from funds received from outside sources, such as money sent

by relatives. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b). 

[2] An inmate is free to decline to participate in the IFRP,

but the failure either to participate or to comply with a finan3UNICOR is the trade name of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., a selfsustaining government corporation that provides employment and job

training to BOP inmates while producing marketable goods and services.

14372 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
cial plan created pursuant to the program carries certain consequences. They are set forth in 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d): 

(d) Effects of non-participation. Refusal by an

inmate to participate in the financial responsibility

program or to comply with the provisions of his

financial plan ordinarily shall result in the following:

(1) Where applicable, the Parole Commission will be notified of the inmate’s failure

to participate; 

(2) The inmate will not receive any furlough (other than possibly an emergency or

medical furlough); 

(3) The inmate will not receive performance pay above the maintenance pay

level, or bonus pay, or vacation pay; 

(4) The inmate will not be assigned to any

work detail outside the secure perimeter of

the facility; 

(5) The inmate will not be placed in UNICOR. Any inmate assigned to UNICOR

who fails to make adequate progress on his/

her financial plan will be removed from

UNICOR, and once removed, may not be

placed on a UNICOR waiting list for six

months. Any exceptions to this require

approval of the Warden; 

(6) The inmate shall be subject to a monthly

commissary spending limitation more stringent than the monthly commissary spending limitation set for all inmates. This more

stringent commissary spending limitation

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14373
for IFRP refusees shall be at least $25 per

month, excluding purchases of stamps, telephone credits, and, if the inmate is a common fare participant, Kosher/Halal certified

shelf-stable entrees to the extent that such

purchases are allowable under pertinent

Bureau regulations; 

(7) The inmate will be quartered in the lowest housing status (dormitory, double bunking, etc.); 

(8) The inmate will not be placed in a

community-based program; 

(9) The inmate will not receive a release

gratuity unless approved by the Warden; 

(10) [Reserved] 

(11) The inmate will not receive an incentive for participation in residential drug

treatment programs. 

In Gunning I and Gunning II, we held that, where a sentencing court had ordered restitution pursuant to the MVRA,

the MVRA forbids delegation of the scheduling of restitution

payments. This is because the “language of the MVRA is categorical,” and provides that “the district court is ultimately

responsible for setting a schedule for making restitution.”

Gunning I, 339 F.3d at 949; see also 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(f)(1)(B)(2) (“Upon determination of the amount of

restitution owed to each victim, the court shall . . . specify in

the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule

according to which, the restitution is to be paid . . . .”). 

In Gunning I, we rejected a judgment that required the

defendant to make restitution “immediately” with any remain14374 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
ing amount “to be paid during the period of supervision as

directed by a U.S. probation officer.” 339 F.3d at 950. We

held that the district court had erred in delegating to the probation office the duty of scheduling payments. Id. On remand,

the district court again ordered immediate payment, but provided that any unpaid amount should be paid through the

BOP’s IFRP during the time of the defendant’s imprisonment

and in monthly payments of at least 10 percent of his salary

during his period of supervised release. Gunning II, 401 F.3d

at 1147. We recognized that the BOP, like the probation

office, had “expertise in the payment area,” but held that such

expertise did not absolve the district court of fulfilling its

responsibility of creating a restitution repayment schedule,

including for the period of the defendant’s imprisonment. Id.

at 1150. Although the district court could seek guidance from

the BOP when setting its schedule, it did not have “the authority to delegate its own scheduling duties—not to the probation

office, not to the BOP, not to anyone else.” Id.4

4The circuits have split over how to interpret the MVRA and to what

extent it permits delegation of restitution scheduling duties. The First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that

a district court must set a restitution repayment schedule, and those that

have reached the issue have concluded, as we did in Gunning II, that a

court may not simply order immediate payment and leave to the BOP the

task of setting the actual schedule. United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406,

409 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Kinlock, 174 F.3d 297, 301 (2d Cir.

1999) (“When restitution cannot be paid immediately, the sentencing court

must set a schedule of payments for the terms of incarceration, supervised

release, or probation.”); United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 228 (3d

Cir. 2007); United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 426 (6th Cir. 2002);

United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2001); United

States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1256 (10th Cir. 2002); United States

v. Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that “setting

a schedule for a prisoner to pay restitution or fines is a core judicial function under the MVRA” and that a sentencing court may not order immediate repayment where funds are unavailable because it implicitly delegates

the authority to schedule repayment to the probation office). 

In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that a

judgment of conviction need not contain a schedule of restitution payUNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14375
[3] While the MVRA forbids the wholesale delegation of

scheduling responsibility to the BOP, nothing in the text of

the statute or our prior decisions places any limits on the

BOP’s operation of an independent program, such as the

IFRP, that encourages inmates voluntarily to make more generous restitution payments than mandated in their respective

judgments. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664. In Gunning II,

even as we held that the IFRP could not act as a substitute for

a court-created restitution schedule, we implicitly endorsed

the program’s continued viability, praising the BOP for

“wisely” creating “the IFRP procedure whereby the BOP will

‘help the inmate develop a financial plan’ and will then ‘monitor the inmate’s progress’ in meeting the terms of that plan.”

401 F.3d at 1150 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 545.11). 

[4] Lemoine argues that the program is involuntary and that

he only assented to the terms of his financial plan “to avoid

the adverse consequences of not agreeing.” The use of incentives to encourage compliance in a rehabilitative program

does not render it unconstitutional or unlawful, however.

McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (plurality) (“An

essential tool of prison administration . . . is the authority to

offer inmates various incentives to behave. The Constitution

accords prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke

these perquisites as they see fit.”). In McKune, the Supreme

Court approved of a prison’s imposition of adverse consequences for failing to participate in a program aimed at

encouraging acceptance of responsibility, notwithstanding the

program’s direct impact on inmates’ constitutional rights. It

ments to be made during the period of incarceration. United States v.

Dawkins, 202 F.3d 711, 716 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 406

F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 796 (7th

Cir. 2008) (concluding that court ordered payment schedules “need not,

and as a rule should not, begin until after the defendant’s release from

prison,” rather “[p]ayments until release should be handled through the

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program rather than the court’s auspices”). 

14376 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
upheld the constitutionality of an incentive system whereby

inmates who refused to waive their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and admit to past offenses in

writing were transferred to another prison where television

sets were not present in each cell, exercise facilities were not

readily available, work and wage opportunities were more

limited, canteen privileges were reduced, and visitation rights

were curtailed. Id. at 36-39 (plurality), 50-51 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment). 

[5] In the present case, our analysis is simplified because

the challenged rehabilitative program does not implicate Lemoine’s constitutional rights. Lemoine had no entitlement, constitutional or otherwise, to any of the benefits agreeing to

participate in the IFRP would provide, such as a work detail

outside the prison perimeter, a higher commissary spending

limit, a release gratuity, or pay beyond the maintenance pay

level.5See 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d). 

[6] Moreover, the consequences of declining to participate

in the IFRP are reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of rehabilitation because the program promotes

acceptance of responsibility and fulfillment of the obligation

to make restitution to victims. See Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d

1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a prison policy of

excluding sexually-explicit materials because it was aimed at

rehabilitating inmates, which the court noted was unquestion5We refer to the conditions imposed through the IFRP as granting or

denying either benefits or privileges interchangeably because we agree

with the plurality in McKune that it would be a mistake “to concentrate on

the so-called reward/penalty distinction and the illusory baseline against

which a change in prison conditions must be measured. The answer to the

question whether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a

privilege rests entirely in the eye of the beholder.” McKune, 536 U.S. at

45-46. If the BOP were permitted to encourage behavior by providing benefits and privileges, but not by denying or revoking them, it would create

“perverse incentives” to initially house all prisoners under the harshest

constitutionally permissible conditions possible. Id. at 46. 

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14377
ably a legitimate penological interest); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (concluding that a “paramount

objective of the corrections system is the rehabilitation of

those committed to its custody”); Johnpoll v. Thornburgh,

898 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that, even if the

BOP did compel participation in the IFRP, it would still not

be unconstitutional because the program was not punitive and

was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective of rehabilitation). 

The consequences for declining to participate in the IFRP

also do not constitute such an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life” that they invoke Lemoine’s liberty interest. See

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484-85 (holding that even a “concededly

punitive” transfer to less desirable housing conditions did not

exceed prison officials’ authority because it did “not present

a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the

inmate’s] indeterminate sentence”). The imposition of those

consequences therefore would not have violated Lemoine’s

due process rights, and it was within the BOP’s discretion to

condition the receipt of privileges under the IFRP on his

acceptance of the terms of its financial plan. Ky. Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1989) (“[A]s

long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the

prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him

and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due

Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment

by prison authorities to judicial oversight.”) (internal quotations omitted); Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548,

549 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the IFRP has been “upheld

generally . . . and against constitutional due process challenges” and collecting cases) (internal citations omitted). 

[7] Permitting the BOP independently to develop voluntary

financial plans through the IFRP not only assists the BOP to

meet its rehabilitative goals for prisoners, it also ameliorates

the practical difficulties engendered by requiring sentencing

14378 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE
courts to set a restitution repayment schedule without knowledge of whether a defendant will be employed in prison or the

amount he will receive in wages or outside assistance. The

IFRP allows the BOP to respond immediately to an inmate’s

changing financial circumstances and saves scarce judicial

resources from being consumed by frequent motions to alter

judgments. 

This is not to say that district courts may not play a continuing role in setting the terms of the mandatory portion of an

inmate’s restitution repayment schedule. Under the MVRA,

defendants have an ongoing duty to inform the court of any

“material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances

that might affect the defendant’s ability to pay restitution.” 18

U.S.C. § 3664(k). After receiving such notification, the court

“may . . . adjust the payment schedule, or require immediate

payment in full, as the interests of justice require.” Id. This

process permits courts to raise the binding payment floor in

response to particular changes if they desire, while leaving

room for the BOP to take full advantage of its institutional

expertise and resources to create voluntary, flexible financial

plans as evolving conditions dictate. 

III. Conclusion 

[8] We hold that, where the district court has properly set

a restitution repayment schedule as required under the

MVRA, the BOP has the authority to encourage voluntary

payments in excess of those required under the court’s judgment by conditioning the receipt of certain privileges during

the term of imprisonment on the inmate’s participation in the

IFRP. 

The orders of the U.S. District Court for the Central District

of California denying Lemoine’s motion to modify the restitution order (No. 06-50663) and motion for reconsideration

(No. 07-50083) are AFFIRMED. 

UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE 14379
The order of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon granting Lemoine’s petition for habeas corpus and directing the BOP to maintain his restitution repayment schedule at

$25 per quarter (No. 07-35761) is REVERSED. 

14380 UNITED STATES v. LEMOINE