### The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge 1 

### for the Western District of Missouri, affirming the decision of the Honorable Frank W. Koger, Chief Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri. ___________ No. 96-1430

___________ In re: Denise Renee Beasley, * * Debtor, * *

-------------------- * * Appeal from the United States Richard V. Fink, Trustee, * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Appellee, * * [UNPUBLISHED] v. * * Fidelity Financial Service, Inc.,* *

Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 30, 1996 Filed: November 27, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. ("Fidelity") appeals the district court' s affirmance of the bankruptcy court's order setting asid e 1 Fid elity's lien on the debtor's car as a voidable preference. Th e bankruptcy court's ru ling depended on its conclusion that state relationbackstatutes are inapplicable to preference-avoidance analysis under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B). This is an issue of first impression in thi s circuit. In agreement with

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the position of the Ninth Circuit, we now hold that state relation-bac k periods do not apply to section 547 analysis.
Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") allows a trustee i n bankru ptcyto avoid certain prepetition payments and transfers of a de btor's property as "preferential transfers." Not all preferentia l transactions are voidable under section 547(b), however. As relevant here , section 547(c)(3)(A) provides an exception for interests securing ne w value. Section 547(c)(3)(B) allows a creditor a twenty-day grace period in which to perfect an interest securing new val ue and thereby protect the interest from the trustee's preference-avoidance powers.

Under section 547(e)(1)(B), "a transfer of a fixture or propert y other than real property is perfected when a cre ditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of th e transferee." Under Missouri law, if an interest in a vehicle is perfected within thirty days of the purchase, the perfection will be considere d effective as of the d ate of purchase. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 301.600.2 (1994). Acco rding to the parties' stipulation, Fidelity fulfilled stat e requirements for perf ecting its interest in the car twenty-one days after debtor purchased it. The issue in this case is whether Missouri's thirtyday relation-back statute applies in determining whether Fidelity perfecte d its interest within the grace period provided by the Code.
The Ninth Circuit has concluded that state-law relation-back periods are inapplicable to p reference-avoidance analysis. In re Loken , 175 B.R. 56, 61 (B.A.P. 9th Ci r. 1994), cited with approval in Fitzgerald v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho ( I n re Walker ), 77 F.3d 322, 322 (9th Cir. 1996). The court reasoned that the Code's unambiguous definition of perfectio n required it to determine at what point a judicial lienholder is barred fro m obtaining rights superior to those of a transferee. 175 B.R. at 61-62
. It held

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that such a bar arises "when the transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security interest," and until then, "it is not possible to say that other creditors `cannot' obtain superior rights." Id
. at 62. The court con cluded that determining perfection without reference to st ate grace periods is consistent with Congress's desire to have " a uniform rule throughout the country." Id. at 62-63.

We find this reasoning persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm th e judgment of the district court.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.