NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0588n.06 Filed: August 15, 2007 No. 06-3988
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. JO S E A LB ER TO RE YE S -PERE Z, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEFORE: BOGG S, Chief Judge; CLAY and ROGERS , Circuit Judges
. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. De fe nd ant Jose Al be rt o Re y e s- Pe re z (a .k .a Javi e r A rm and o Re y e sPerez) appe a ls h is s e n te n c e f o r h is c o n v ic ti o no f

o n e c o u n t o f

c o n s p ir a c y

to d e f r a u d th e U nited States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of aiding and abe tting mail fra ud, in violation of §§ 1341 and 2; one count of m ail fra ud, in violation of § 1341; one c ount of possession of fra udulent identification docume nts, in viol ation of § 1546(a ); and one count of illeg al re -e n try following deportation, in vio l at i o n o f 8 U.S .C. § 1326. Defe ndant pled g uilty to these cha

rg es and w as
se nte nc e d to sixty mon ths in pr iso n. De fe nd ant n owa pp e a ls h is s e nte nc e . F or

the re a so ns se t f

or th below, we AF F IRM the sentenc e imposed by the district court.No. 06-3988

2 BACK GR OUND Def endant, a ci t izen of Mexi co, wa s convicted of four c ounts of burg lary , an ag g ravated felony , on November

3, 1992. He was rele ased to the c ustody of I .N.S. on Dece mber 21, 1995 a nd was de ported from the Unit ed S tates on Decembe r 26, 1995. De spite the fac t that he did not rec eive permission fro m t h e S ecr etar y of Homela

nd Security

or fr om the Attorney

Gene ral to re apply

for admission, Defe ndant reentere d the Unit ed States ag ain at some point and wa s convicted of I lleg al Reentry and depor

ted on J anuar

y 18, 1996. The fo l l o wi ng day , J anuar y 19, 1996, Def

endant wa s appre hended attempting to re enter the United States y et ag ain and wa s subsequently convicted, on Marc h 25, 1996, of illeg al reentry following deportation. Defe ndant was se ntence d to twenty -four months in prison. Defenda nt was depor

ted and remove d from the United States a g ain on Octobe r 15, 1997. Be g inning on or

about J anuar

y 15, 2005 and continuing unt il on or about October 7, 2005, De fe nd ant a

nd his c o-defendant S y lvi a

Sob arzo -R e y e s d e vis e d a nd e xec ute d a

sc he me to f

ur nis h counter feit identity

documents to, or proc ure suc h documents, for, other Mexi can na

tionals livi ng ill e g a lly in the Un ite d State s and us e d the Un ite d State s Ma il to dis se minate t he count e rf e it documents. Those documents included alien reg istration car ds and socia l security car ds that were fr a ud ule ntl y pr oc ur e d in

Ar izon a ; D e fe nd ant a

nd Sob arzo -R e y e s se nt o rd e rs and pa y me nt f or tho se documents fr om t h ei r l o cation in P ainesville, Ohio to Arizona, and r equeste d that the completed documents be sent back throug h the mail to Ohio from Arizona. Knowing that the documents we re fra udulent Def

endant use d the documents to pr ove authorization f or himself to remain in the United State s and

a s e vid e nc e of

e mpl oy me nt w ith in t

he Un ite d St a te s.No. 06-3988

I t is un c le ar f

ro m th e re c or d whe the r the inc lus ion of fi ve so c ia l se c ur ity c ard s in ste a d o f s ix 1 was by desig n or by acc ident. Howeve r, the underly ing f acts of D efe ndant’s off

ense a re unc ontested and thus, this confusion does not aff ect the issues that are befor e us on this appea l.

3 On Octobe r 6, 2005, Sobarzo-Rey es mailed a n express mail packa g e conta ining the na mes of six individuals with bi og raphic al information and a photogr aph for eac h, along with $300.00. The packa g e wa s sent to an address in Arizona and bore a re turn addre ss in the name of Javier A.R.P., which was Defe ndant’s alias. O n October 7, 2005, Def

endant sig ned for

an express mail delivery fr om P ho e nix a dd

re sse d to Javi e r A .R. P. T he pa c ka g e c on ta ine d s ix ali en re g istra tio n c a rd s,
corr es p o n d i n g t o the picture s and biog raphie s that were mailed out on the pre vious day , and five
so c ia l se c ur ity

c a rd s. After

acc epting the pac kag e, De fenda nt was deta ined and que stioned. 1 Def endant a dmitted these fac ts and pled guilty to the five-c ount indictment pursuant to a plea ag ree ment with the g overnme nt. At Defe ndant’s sente ncing hear ing, the d is trict court c alculate d that Def endant’ s Guideline ra

ng e wa s fifty -one to sixt y -three months. Defendant was re prese nted by counsel, but submitted a pr o s e sentenc ing me morandum ar g uing tha t h e wa s en t itled to a lower
se nte nc e on

se ve ra l g ro un ds . D e fe nd ant’ s pr o s e memorandum a rg ued that he ha d acc epted responsibility

and exhibited rehabili t at i o n , and wa s thus entitled to a lower sente nce. D efe ndant additionally

argued that a dif

ficult childhood and a lcohol and drug problems should be consider ed mitigating fac tors in d etermining a se ntence . Finally , Def endant a rg ued that as a

n undocumented person, he is ine ligible for the Bur eau of Prison’s substance abuse pr og ram, pa rticipation in which would make him e l i gi ble for a one-y ear reduc tion in his sentenc e. B eca use that prog ram wa s unavailable to him, Def

endant arg ued that he was unnece ssarily penalized because of his status asNo. 06-3988

4 an undocume nted per son and t his presente d another mitigating fac tor that should be consider ed during sentenc ing. Def endant a rg ued throug h counsel that he should rece ive a se ntence on the lower end of the applicable Guidelines ra

ng e. Intere stingly , Def

endant’ s counsel re peate dly ref err ed to a sentencing memorandum that he had prepa red, as opposed to De fenda nt’s separ ate pr o s e memorandum, during the hea ring , despite t he fact t hat counsel’s memorandum wa s never submitt ed to the cour

t. Counsel
e xpla ine d tha t the me mor and um w a s n ot s ub mit te d d

ue to a n o ve rs ig ht o n h is p art , b ut n on e the le ss, proc e e d e d

w it h th e ar g u me n ts th a t w e r e s u p p o s e d ly c o n ta in e d

in th a t m e mo r an d

u m. Co u nsel pointed out that Def

en d ant had acce pted re sponsibili ty , which wa rra nted a lowe r sentenc e. Additionally , he noted that Def endant had a wife and that his Guidelines rang e was only as hig h as it was bec ause D efe ndant had be en convic ted of a n ag g ravated fe lony

in 1992, and aske d the cour t to consider the le ng th of time that had ela psed betwe en De fenda

nt’s curr ent co n v i ct i o n s and that
a g g ra vate d o ff e ns e and the e ff e c t it wo uld have on De fe nd ant’ s f

a mil y in f a sh ion ingan a

pp ro pr ia te sentenc e. F inally , counsel made an argument that was difficult to follow beca use it was explained in de tail only in the sentenc ing memorandum that was never submitt ed to the co u rt
. De fenda nt
argue d th a t so me state s, no ta bly Ar izon a and Ca lif or nia , h a ve a fa st- tr a c k pro g ra m for de a lin g wi th immigration cases. B eca

use such a prog ram wa s unavailable to Defe ndant, he e ssentially argued that the re sult was a disparity

in sentence s betwee n jurisdictions. Afte r h e ar in g a ll o f

D e f e n d an t’ s mi ti g a ti o ne v id e n c e , th e c o u rt c a lc u late d D e f e n d a n t’ s of fe ns e le ve l. Th e c ourt g ro up e d Coun ts 1- 4 an d fou nd that the ba se of

fe ns e le ve l f

or tho se c ounts
wa s e le ve n, wh ic h w a s enhan ced thr e e le ve ls b e c a

us e the po sse ssi on

of fr a ud ule nt d oc ume ntsNo. 06-3988

5 involved six to twenty -fou r s et s o f d ocuments. Two leve ls were added be cause the offe nse wa s
comm i t t ed after a f

elony immigration conviction. The re sult was an off ense le vel of sixt een f

or Counts 1- 4. The court then considered C ount 5, the i lleg al reentry offe nse, sepa

rate ly . Wit h respe ct to Count 5, t he cour

t found a ba se off

en s e l ev el of eig ht and six teen leve ls were added f or De fe nd ant’ s p re vio us c on vic tio n an d depor ta tio n f or a vio le nt c ri me . T his re su lte d in an o ff e ns e level of twe nty -four

for C o unt 5. Pursuant to § 3D1.4, the court pe rfor med a multiple count adjustment: Bec ause the adjusted count offe nse for Count 5 was twenty -four , that y ielded a unit of one. The adjusted off

ense le v el for Counts 1-4 wa s six teen, whic h y ielded a ha lf unit. W hen a defe ndant’s ca lculation y ields one and one -half units, § 3D1.4 mandates incre asing the offe nse leve l f o r t h e g r o u p w i t h t h e h i g h e s to f

f e n s e l e v e l b y o n e . T h e g r e a t e r a d j u s t e d o f f e n s e l e v e l w a s t w e n t yfour, so it was incr ease d by one leve l, which yielded a c ombined offe nse leve l of twenty -five, w hich
was re duced by

three levels for

acc eptanc e of r esponsibility , which re sulted i n a t o t al combined offe nse leve l of twent y -t wo. After computing Def endant’ s Criminal History , the cour t beg an consideration of other fa ctors. The district cour

t considere d in detail the § 3553(a) fac tors following arguments by counsel fo r D e fe nd a nt a

nd the g ov e rnme nt. Th e c ourt c on sid e re d D e fe nd ant’ s p rior cri mi nal r e c or d, his family obligations, his financial situation, and hi s p h y s i cal c ondition. Additi onally , the cour t considere d the mitigatingfac tors that h ad been r aised. The court c oncluded that De fenda nt’s childhood abuse did not seem t o i m p ai r hi m now or in any way diminis h his capa city . The c ourt considere d the ef

fec t of Def

endant’ s sentence on his wife, who was also his co-de fenda nt, and noted that Def endant a nd his wife had no c hildren t og ether . The c ourt eve n addre ssed Def endant’ sNo. 06-3988

6 argument about the fast-tra ck prog ram despite it not being well-de veloped at the hea ring , noting that he wa s familiar with the a rg ument from another case. Ultimately , the court held t hat there was no equal pr otection violation arising from the decision of some jurisdictions to use a fa st-trac k prog ram that w ou ld b e un a va ila

ble to De fe nd ant. Th e c ourt a dd iti on a lly c omp are d D e fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e to the sentenc e of Sobarzo-Rey es, but noted t hat s he was fac ing only probation bec ause she was be ing char g ed with two fe wer

counts and ha d no criminal re cord. The c ourt seeme d particula rly conce rned with the fac t that D efe ndant had “c ontinued to defy the law r eg ardingree ntry

into the United States.” (J.A. at 72). The c ourt, while dec iding the ne ed for the se ntence imposed, noted that Def endant “ continues to involve himself into illeg al ac tiviti es
onc e h e s e tt le s in to th is c o u n tr y . ” ( J. A
. a t 7 2 )
. F u rth e r , h e n o te d th a t h e w a s c o ncer ned that De fe nd ant d id n ot r e ve a l hi s so ur c e fo r p ro c ur ingfr a ud ule nt d oc ume nts . T he c ourt no te d th a t He a pp e ars to b e in t

he re g ula r b us ine ss o f p ro c ur ingI Ds fo r o the r i lle g a l a lie ns . That we ighs he avily

on this court beca

use he is perpe tuating a dditional criminal activity and this specific ally

hurts those immigra

nts who have leg ally

applied for entry into the United States and ar e abidingby our laws. I t hur

ts the m as much as the re st o f u s. (J.A. at 72-73). B ased on the se consider ations, the court se nten ced Defe ndant to six ty months of i mp r i s o n m e n tan d

t h r e e ye ar s o f

s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e o ne a c h c o n v i c t i o n , t o b e s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y. Def endant timely

filed a notice of appe al.

DI SCU SSIO N I. Defendan t’s Base Off ense Level A. Stand ard of ReviewNo. 06-3988

7 “Guideline inter

pretation is a question of law to be re viewed by this Court de novo.” United States v. Bec kner , 983 F.2d 1380, 1383 ( 6th Cir. 1993). B. Ana lys is Acc ording to § 3D1.2(c) , All counts involving substan t i al l y t he same harm shall be g rouped tog ether into a sin g le Gr ou

p. Counts inv olv e su

bs tanti a lly

the same ha

rm wi thi n th e me anin g of

thi s rule: . . . (c) When one of the c ounts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offe nse c ha ra c te ri sti c in, or

oth e r a dju stm e nt t o, the g uid e lin e a pp lic a ble to a no the r o f t

he c ounts
. § 3D1.2( c )
. T h u s , th e r e ar e tw o o p ti o n s e mb e d d e d in s u b s e c ti o n C th a t a d e f

e n d an t ma

y proce ed
un de r: if the c on du c t th a t g ive s r ise to o ne of fe ns e c an e ith e r be tre a te d a s a sp e c if ic of fe ns e char acte ristic in, or is used to adjust the applicable Gu i d eline of a second of

fense , those offe nses
m u s t be g rouped. D efe ndant ar g ues that the c ourt err ed in fa iling to g roup his illega l ree ntry conviction (Count 5) with Counts 1-4. Defe ndant cl ai m s that Count 5 invol ved substantially the same ha rm as the f

irst four Counts, and thus, t h at § 3 D1
. 2 (c ) requires they be g rouped tog ether
. No ta bly , w e have he ld t

hat “ [w]he re dis tin c t so c ie ta l in ter e sts are inf ri ng e d b y c on du c t in differ ent counts they

should not be g rouped tog ether , even if they are g ener ally considere d part of
a common plan or sche me.” United States v. Sims-Robe rtson , 1994 U.S. A pp. L EXI S 1146 (6th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g U

n it e d S ta te s v . Egson , 897 F.2d 353 ( 8th Cir. 1990)). Thus, we r equire more than
mere ly a finding that the harms arise out of the same plan or scheme
. I n Bec kner , we she d some light on what is consider ed “substantially the same ha

rm.” 983 F .2d at 1383. I n that case , the def endant
was c onvicted of two ma il fraud c ounts and two cha rg es of resisting arr est. Id . The district cour t did not gr oup the counts involving r esisting a rre st with the mail fra

ud counts. Id . We held that theNo. 06-3988

8 district court er

red in fa iling to g roup these c ounts. I n that case , we r easone d that the def endant’ s mail fraud base offense level had been enhanc ed by two levels because of “re ckless enda ng erme nt during flig ht,” which wa s formed by the same conduct as her attempt to escape arr est. Id . B e c a us e that was the sa

me conduc t that formed the basis of t he re sisting ar rest count, we deter

mined that the counts should have be en g rouped pur suant to § 3D1.2(c)
. Id
. The Guideline for t h e m ai l fr aud conviction was a djusted beca use of the c onduct that g ave r ise to the resisting arr est conviction, which cle arly

falls within § 3D1.2(c) Id . “The very same c onduct, def

endant’ s driving o f the ca r in her futile attempt to escape arr est . . . is a lso e mbodied in de fenda nt’s resisting arr est counts” a nd “[a]s a result, section 3D1.2(c ) applies.” Id
. at 1383-84. Simply put, “using conduct f

rom one g roup of counts to adjust the offense level of another g roup of c ounts without t here afte r g rouping all the counts toge ther is inconsistent” with § 3D1.2(c)
. Un ite d S tat es v . R os s , 279 F.3d 600, 605 ( 8th Cir. 2002). De fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t Co un ts 1 -4 we re e nh anc e d b e c a us e of Count 5 , a

nd thu s, tha t th is c a se is i nd ist inguis ha

ble fr om Bec kner . Def

endant’ s PS R clear ly

states that, with respe ct to Counts 1-4, “bec ause the Def

endant c ommitt ed the instant off ense a fter sustaininga convic tion for a f elony imm ig ratio n a

nd na tur a lizatio n o ff

e ns e , th e of

fe ns e le ve l is inc re a se d by tw o (2) le ve ls, purs ua nt t o § 2L 2.1(b)( 4)(A) .” (J.A. at 86). Count 5, however , is based on t h e o ff en s e o f illeg al re entry following deportation on or about Octobe r 7, 2005. I mportantly , Def endant ha d been c onvicted of I lle g a l Re e ntr

y tw o ti me s p ri or

to t he oc c a sio n th a t f

or me d th e ba sis fo r C ount 5 . D e fe nd ant f a ils to a dd re ss the fa c t that e ith e r of the se e arl ie r c on vic tio ns c ou ld have fo rm e d th e bas is for this
e nh anc e me nt. F ur

the r, the PSR e xplic itl y

state s th a t th e e nh anc e me nt i s b e ingimp os e d b e c a us eNo. 06-3988

9 De fe n d an tco m m i t t edt h e i n s t an to ff en s es (C o u n t s 1 -4 ) a ft er

b ei n g convic ted of a f

elony immigration and natur alization offense. When De fenda nt committed the conduct that g ave r ise to Counts 1-4 he had not bee n convicted of Count 5 y et. Thus, the onl y logic al conc lusion is t hat Def endant’ s twolevel enha nceme nt was imposed bec ause of his previous convictions of I lleg al Reentry . The c onduct that g ave r ise to the enha nceme nt was not the same c on d u ct t h at gave rise to Count 5, and
a c c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in fa ili ng to g ro up Counts 1- 4 w ithCount 5 fo r t he purp os e of dete rmining D efe ndant’s base offe nse leve l. Bec kner , 983 F.2d at 1383-84. II. Ineff

ect ive Assistance of Counsel A. Stand ard of Review “When a convicted defe ndant complains of the ine ffe ctiveness of counsel’s a ssistance, the defe ndant must show that counsel’s re prese ntatio n fell below a n objective standa

rd of
rea sonablene ss.” Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 667, 688 (1984). “T he def endant must show that there is a rea sonable proba bility that, but f

or counsel’s unpr ofessional e rror s, the result of the pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity is a pr ob a bil ity su ff ic ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Id . at 694. B. A nal ys is I n the instant case , Def

endant’ s only ar gu m en t t hat he r ece ived ineff ective a ssistance of
c ouns e l is that couns e l fa ile d to art ic ulate the le g a l ba sis fo r D e fe nd ant’ s c ha lle ng e to t he mul tip le count adjustment. Thus, becau s e we fi n d Def endant’ s claim that his sentence was c alculate dNo. 06-3988

I t is unclear w hy Def

endant limit s his ine ffe ctive assistance of counsel claim to the failure 2 to object to the offe nse leve l calculation when a strong er arg ument could l ikely be made that counsel wa s in e ff e c tiv e fo r h is f

a ilu re to f ile a se nte nc ingme mor and

um d ue e nti re ly

to h is o wn

ne g le c t. Howeve r, we may

not expand Defe ndant’s inef fec tive assistance of counse l claim t o make a n argument that he does not broac h, and thus, we ma y not consider this argument. Ma rk s v . Ne wc ou rt Credit Group, Inc ., 342 F.3d 444, 462 ( 6th Cir. 2003).
10 improperly to be unper suasive, De fenda nt likewise ca

nnot succe ed on his ineff

ective a ssistance of
c ouns e l c la im. 2 III. P roce dural Reasonab leness of Defend ant’s Sentence A. Stand ard of Review “Af ter [U nit e d Sta te

s v. ] Bo ok

e r [543 U.S . 220 (2005)], which re ndere d the Sentencing Guidelines advisory for all criminal case s, district c ourts have enhanc ed discretion in the sentenc ing of cr iminal defe n d an t s . Ultimately , howeve r, Booke r require s that the sentenc e imposed by the d is tr ic t c o u rt b e r e a s o n a

b le .” Un ited States v. Jac kson , 408 F.3d 301, 304 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citing Booke r , 543 U.S. at 260). B. Ana lys is De fe nd ant a

rgue s th a t hi s se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly un re a so na

ble be c a us e the c ourt

fa ile d to
a de qu a te ly

c onside r D e fe nd ant’ s mi tig a tin g e vid e nc e pr e se nte d in his se nte nc ingme mor and um. Th is i s a n a rg ument i nv ol vi ng pro cedu ral reas on abl enes s. I n d ete rm in in g proce du ral reason a ble ne ss,
we re vie w “ the fa c tor s e va luate d a nd the pr oc e dure s emp loy e d by the dis tr ic t court in r e a c hin g its sentenc ing de ter m i n at i on.” Id . Sp e c if ic a lly , w e mus t a sk

wh e the r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

“ fa il[e d] to ‘consider ’ the a

pplicable Guidelines rang e or neg lect[ed] to ‘consider ’ t he other fac tors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a

nd instead simply

selec t[ ed] what the judg e de em[ed] an appropriate sentenc eNo. 06-3988

11 without such require d consideration.” Id . ( fo otn ote omi tte d)
. A dis tr ic t c ourt is n ot d uty -b ound

to
re cit e ea c h § 35 53 fa c tor and ana ly ze i t in or de r f or thi s Co ur

t to c on c lud e that th e se nte nc e is proce durally

rea sonable. The court must, howeve r, “provide a reasone d explanation for its choice of sentenc e and its expla n at i o nm u s tb e s u ff i ci en t l y t h o ro u gh t o p er m i tm ea n i n gfu l ap p el l at e r ev i ew .” Un ite d S tat es v . B lac k

we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 773 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I n the instant case , Def

endant argues that the district c ourt did not give a n adequate basis for reje cting his mit igation arg uments. Howeve r, the rec ord tells a diffe rent story . The c ourt consider ed Def endant’ s prior cr iminal recor d, his family obligations, his financial situation, and his phy sical condition. He conside red a ll of Defe ndant’s off ere d mitigating fac tors, including a di scussion of the fast-tra ck prog ram a

rg ument that require d the cour t to entertain a n argume nt that had not been de ta ile d b e fo re the c ourt . H e a dd iti on a lly no te d th a t De fe nd ant ha d a c c e pte d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r h is crimes, a nd was gran t ed a three- level re duction for doing so. The cour t compare d Def

endant’ s sentenc e with that of his co- defe ndant, and c onsidered his a g e and likelihood o f re ci d i v i s m. The court e x plained on the r ecor d that the mitigation ar g uments were ultimately unper s u a s ive and voice d
a conc ern that Def

endant ha d continued to commit crimes ea ch time he r e-e ntere d the United States
and ind ic a te d th e be lie f t

hat D e fe nd ant’ s r e fu sa l to g ive the name of the pe rs on wh o f ur nis he d h im with illega l documents implied that he was not finished working with the i ndividual. As we have held “[w]hen a district court a dequate ly explains why it impos ed a pa rticular se ntence , espec ially one wi t h in the advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e, we do not further

require that it ex haustively explain the obverse –why an alternative sentence was not selec ted–in ever y instance.” Un ite d S

tat es v . G ale , 468 F.3d 929, 940 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (e m p h as i s omitt ed). The rec ord supports a f inding of proce duralNo. 06-3988

12 re a so na ble ne ss a nd , th us , D e fe nd ant’ s a

rg um ent doe s li ttl e mor e tha n to inv ite thi s Co ur

t to
rec onsider the mit igating factors that Def endant offer ed and impose a lower sentenc e. We may

not
a c c e pt s uc h a

n invit a tio n, a s it

is n ot o ur ro le on a re vie w of pr oc e dura l re a so na ble ne ss t o s ub sti tut e our judg ment for that of

the district court whe n a sentence is re asonably imposed. United States v. Pu c k e tt , 4 22 F .3 d 3 40 , 3 44 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5)
. Thus , we fi nd that De fe nd ant’ s se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly
rea sonable. CO NC LU SION
For the forg oing r easons, we AF F IRM the sentenc ing or der of the district court.