In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-1906 

PLATINUM SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE, INC., 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

GUARANTEE TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

Nos. 17-cv-08872 & 18-cv-03109 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JANUARY 13, 2021 — DECIDED MARCH 2, 2021 

____________________ 

Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. The current dispute is the latest in a 

string of lawsuits involving plaintiff Platinum Supplemental 

Insurance, Inc. (“Platinum”) and defendant Guarantee Trust 

Life Insurance Company (“GTL”). In 2002, GTL and Platinum 

began their professional relationship when GTL engaged 

Platinum to market its insurance products through a “Marketing Agreement.” After a customer sued both parties in a 

costly lawsuit, GTL terminated the Marketing Agreement. 
2 No. 20-1906 

The parties then entered their first settlement agreement, the 

“2015 Settlement Agreement.” Around the same time, GTL 

sued Platinum for breaching the Marketing Agreement. In arbitration, GTL and Platinum settled their disputes in a second 

settlement agreement, the “2017 Settlement Agreement.” That 

agreement resolved all their claims that had and could have 

been brought in that litigation. It further provided for “reasonably proportionate” attorneys fees to the prevailing party 

in any future litigation. 

Two and a half months before the parties executed the 

2017 Settlement Agreement, another customer had sued GTL 

in Missouri. After the 2017 Settlement Agreement took effect, 

GTL filed a third-party complaint against Platinum in that 

Missouri lawsuit based on claims that Platinum breached the 

Marketing Agreement. In turn, Platinum sued GTL in the district court because the claims in the third-party complaint 

mirrored those already resolved by the 2017 Settlement 

Agreement and were therefore barred. The district court 

granted Platinum summary judgment and awarded it 

$108,445.10 in attorneys fees—or 150% of the underlying 

damages award. We affirm the district courts grant of summary judgment because the 2017 Settlement Agreement bars 

the claims in GTLs third-party complaint. We also affirm the 

grant of attorneys fees because the award is “reasonably proportionate” to the underlying damages. 

I. Background 

Platinum markets and sells insurance policies. GTL is a 

mutual reserve company that underwrites insurance policies. 

In 2002, Platinum and GTL entered into the Marketing Agreement for Platinum to exclusively market and sell certain insurance products underwritten by GTL. Section 17 of the 
No. 20-1906 3

Marketing Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring all disputes arising from the Marketing Agreement to “be 

submitted to binding, non-appealable arbitration.” The agreement also contained an indemnification clause stating that 

Platinum would indemnify GTL for any liability connected to 

its conduct governed by the Marketing Agreement. Finally, 

the Marketing Agreement incorporated GTLs Advertising 

Policy and Code of Ethical Market Conduct by reference. 

Platinum and GTLs business relationship began to deteriorate when both parties were sued in Colorado by a dissatisfied customer. Platinum had engaged Joanna Gaylord as 

one of its “Independent Solicitors.”1 Gaylord made a presentation to Michael Casper in August 2010. Casper expressed 

concerns that prior arterial blockages in his legs would disqualify him from coverage as advertised, but Gaylord reassured him he would be covered. Consequently, Casper 

bought the policy, only to have GTL later deny him benefits 

when he was diagnosed with prostate cancer. 

This denial of benefits gave rise to a Colorado state court 

lawsuit, the “Casper Litigation,” in which Casper sued GTL 

for unreasonable denial of benefits and breach of contract. As 

part of this lawsuit, Casper also sued Gaylord and Platinum 

for negligent misrepresentation and fraud connected to their 

marketing of the policy he bought, but he settled with both. 

The case therefore went to trial as to GTL, which revealed that 

1 Platinum could procure applications for GTLs insurance policies 

through “Independent Solicitors,” defined in the Marketing Agreement as 

“licensed brokers, agents, sub-agents, marketing companies or any entity 

that has authority to act as agent or broker who is legally authorized to 

legally solicit insurance in a particular state and is appointed with the state 

by GTL.” 
4 No. 20-1906 

Platinum had used aggressive marketing tactics and certain 

materials that GTL had not pre-approved, as required under 

the Marketing Agreement. The trial court directed a verdict 

for Casper on his breach of contract claim against GTL. The 

jury then awarded him $1,716,799.40, and the court awarded 

$281,197.00 in attorneys fees. 

GTL terminated the Marketing Agreement effective July 

17, 2015, because of Platinums misconduct precipitating the 

Casper Litigation, and the parties entered into the 2015 Settlement Agreement to begin to resolve the disputes between 

them. The 2015 Settlement Agreement contained an arbitration clause providing that any disputes must be “resolved 

through arbitration as delineated in the Marketing Agreement.” However, section 10 of the 2015 Settlement Agreement 

specifically listed “Excluded Matters” that were “not intended to be encompassed by this Settlement Agreement,” 

meaning those matters could later be brought in litigation. 

Listed exclusions included “[s]uch indemnification rights as 

GTL may have, if any, arising out of existing and future claims 

as may from time to time be asserted against GTL attributable 

to the conduct of Platinum agents, brokers and representatives in connection with the offering and sale of insurance policies.” 

In December 2015, with the Casper Litigation still unfolding, GTL sued Platinum and its president and chief executive 

officer, Wayne A. Briggs, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 

the “Cook County Litigation,” for fraud, breach of contract, 

and breach of fiduciary duty, asking for rescission of the Marketing Agreement. The seven-count complaint alleged, inter 

alia, breaches of the Marketing Agreement and various common law duties connected to Platinums training and 
No. 20-1906 5

supervision of its agents marketing GTLs insurance policies 

and a violation of GTLs Advertising Policy and Code of Ethical Market Conduct. One allegation, for example, posited 

that Platinum “recklessly disregarded that its supervision, 

management and training of its employees and the Independent Solicitors created the risk that applications would not be 

solicited and procured in compliance with all applicable local, 

state and federal laws and regulations and/or any rules and 

requirements established by GTL.” GTL thus sought all damages for what it “suffered, and continues to suffer, as a direct 

and proximate result of Platinums breaches of the Marketing 

Agreement.” Specifically, GTL sought “the loss of use of 

amounts GTL paid in compensation and commissions to Platinum for services that it was obligated to, but did not provide; 

i.e., the solicitation and procurement of applications in compliance with all applicable local, state and federal laws and 

regulations and any rules and requirements established by 

GTL.” 

On a motion by Platinum and Briggs, the state trial court 

compelled GTL and Platinum to arbitrate their dispute, invoking the arbitration clauses from both the then-terminated 

Marketing Agreement and the 2015 Settlement Agreement.2

The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed that decision. GTL filed 

a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, 

but in the interim the parties reached a new settlement, the 

2017 Settlement Agreement, rendering the petition moot. 

The Circuit Court of Cook County approved the 2017 Settlement Agreement and dismissed the action with prejudice 

2 The counts brought against Briggs were stayed pending the arbitration between GTL and Platinum because GTL had no contract with Briggs. 
6 No. 20-1906 

on March 31, 2017, stating the “parties agree that all claims 

that were filed or could have been filed in the Cook County 

litigation shall be deemed settled and resolved.” The 2017 Settlement Agreement itself contained nearly identical language: 

“all claims that were filed or could have been filed in the Cook 

County litigation shall be deemed to be settled and resolved 

by this AGREEMENT.” Relevant on appeal, the agreement 

also rescinded section 10 of the 2015 Settlement Agreement, 

terminating GTLs previous reservation of the right to pursue 

indemnification claims through litigation. It further provided 

that “[t]he Parties agree that the prevailing Party in any lawsuit brought to enforce this Agreement shall be awarded its 

reasonable costs and attorneys fees, but such an award must 

be reasonably proportionate to the ultimate relief secured by 

the prevailing Party.” 

On the tail end of the Cook County Litigation, on December 8, 2016, GTL-insured Thomas Grisham brought another 

lawsuit against GTL in federal court in Missouri, the “Missouri Litigation.” He sued for: breach of contract for GTL improperly refusing to pay benefits owed to Grisham under a 

policy sold by Platinum and underwritten by GTL; defamation by GTL; and, under Missouri statutory law, a “vexatious 

refusal to pay.” This lawsuit arose two and a half months before the 2017 Settlement Agreements approval and the related dismissal of the Cook County Litigation in March 2017. 

In October 2017, several months after the parties entered 

into the 2017 Settlement Agreement, GTL responded in the 

Missouri Litigation by filing a third-party complaint against 

Platinum for indemnification and contribution based on Platinums alleged breaches of the Marketing Agreement and 
No. 20-1906 7

Fraud.3 GTL alleged that Platinum failed to ensure its contractors compliance with applicable “laws and regulations,” 

GTLs “rules, guidelines, and requirements” for advertising 

its insurance products, and GTLs Code of Ethical Market 

Conduct. 

We now arrive at the instant lawsuit, which began when 

Platinum, invoking diversity jurisdiction, sued GTL in the 

Northern District of Illinois alleging that GTL breached the 

2017 Settlement Agreement by filing the third-party complaint in the Missouri Litigation. Platinum then moved for 

summary judgment, arguing the claims for contribution and 

indemnification in the third-party complaint are barred by the 

2017 Settlement Agreement because they could have been 

filed in the Cook County Litigation and because res judicata 

applied. The district court found for Platinum on both 

grounds. Securing this favorable judgment, Platinum invoked 

the 2017 Settlement Agreement to file a fee petition for “reasonably proportionate” attorneys fees. The district court accepted briefing from both parties and awarded Platinum 

$108,445.10 in attorneys fees. 

II. Discussion 

A. Summary Judgment 

The first issue on appeal is whether the district courts 

grant of summary judgment was proper. “We review a district courts summary judgment ruling de novo and consider 

the facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party.” Troyer v. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, 981 F.3d 

3 At some point, GTL and Grisham settled the underlying dispute in 

the Missouri Litigation, leaving only the dispute between GTL and Platinum in the third-party complaint. 
8 No. 20-1906 

612, 615 (7th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is proper where 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The district court granted summary judgment 

on two independent bases: that (1) the 2017 Settlement Agreement and (2) res judicata barred GTLs claims. We reach only 

the district courts first conclusion that GTLs claims in its 

third-party complaint were barred under the 2017 Settlement 

Agreement because those claims “could have been filed in the 

Cook County litigation.” 

We are called upon to interpret the meaning of the 2017 

Settlement Agreement, which by its own terms “shall be construed under the law of the State of Illinois.” Under Illinois 

law, “a settlement agreement is considered a contract, and 

construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are 

governed by principles of contract law.” Cannon v. Burge, 752 

F.3d 1079, 1088 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Cushing v. Greyhound 

Lines, Inc., 991 N.E.2d 28, 92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)). Likewise, 

contract law governs a release within a settlement agreement. 

See id. (citing Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Whitlock, 581 

N.E.2d 664, 667 (Ill. 1991); Rakowski v. Lucente, 472 N.E.2d 791, 

794 (Ill. 1984)). “Where a written agreement is clear and explicit, a court must enforce the agreement as written. Both the 

meaning of the instrument, and the intention of the parties 

must be gathered from the face of the document without the 

assistance of parol evidence or any other extrinsic aids.” 

Rakowski, 472 N.E.2d at 794. “[T]he question of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law for the court.” 

Omnitrus Merging Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1165, 

1168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
No. 20-1906 9

We hold that the 2017 Settlement Agreement unambiguously resolved “all claims that were filed or could have been 

filed in the Cook County litigation” and that this broad language encompassed the claims brought in GTLs third-party 

complaint against Platinum in the Missouri Litigation. In 

reaching this conclusion, we begin narrowly with the plain 

language of that release before expanding our analysis to 

other contractual provisions evidencing the parties intent to 

have broadly released GTLs claims. 

1. The release itself is unambiguous. 

“Illinois uses in general a ‘four corners rule in the interpretation of contracts, holding ... that ‘if the language of a 

contract appears to admit of only one interpretation, the case 

is indeed over.” Bourke v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 159 F.3d 

1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic 

Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also

Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 47 (Ill. 2011) (“If the words 

in the contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given 

their plain, ordinary and popular meaning.”). Ambiguity 

only arises in a contract “if it is capable of being understood 

in more than one sense.” Cannon, 752 F.3d at 1089 (citing Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d at 667; Farmers Auto. Ins. Ass’n v. Kraemer, 

857 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)). 

Logically, the “plain, ordinary and popular meaning” of 

the broad, unqualified language of the release entails a broad, 

unqualified release of claims. See Thompson, 948 N.E.2d at 47. 

In fact, we cannot conceive of how “all claims that were filed 

or could have been filed” could be construed as anything but 

“clear and explicit,” as the phrase is not “capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Cannon, 752 F.3d at 1089. 

The language means precisely what it says: the parties have 
10 No. 20-1906 

resolved all claims that “were filed or could have been filed.” 

Admitting of only one interpretation, the issue, then, “is indeed over.” Bourke, 159 F.3d at 1036. 

The parties can, and do, debate whether the claims in the 

third-party complaint fall within this phrases reach (i.e., 

whether those claims in fact “could have been filed”). That 

dispute is not one of interpretation or ambiguity, however, 

but rather one of the appropriate application of this otherwise 

clear language. Stated differently, if GTL could in fact have 

brought its claims from the third-party complaint in the Cook 

County Litigation, then the language of the 2017 Settlement 

Agreement would unquestionably bar GTL from bringing 

those claims now, an assertion GTL cannot genuinely dispute. 

That leaves only one question: whether GTL could have 

brought its claims in the Cook County Litigation. In short, the 

2017 Settlement Agreement settled GTLs claims about Platinum breaching the Marketing Agreement by failing to ensure 

its employees conducted themselves honestly and fairly. In all 

meaningful respects, the third-party complaint encapsulated 

the same claims, alleging that Platinum failed to ensure its 

employees conducted themselves honestly and fairly. Therefore, GTL “could have” brought—indeed, likely actually 

brought—the claims from the third-party complaint in the 

earlier Cook County Litigation. 

Parsing the specific claims brought in each suit highlights 

the relevant similarities. In the Cook County Litigation, GTL 

sued Platinum under broad breach of contract and fraud 

claims: “Platinum materially breached its contractual obligations under the Marketing Agreement by failing to ensure 

that its employees and the Independent Solicitors solicited 

and procured applications in accordance GTLs Advertising 
No. 20-1906 11

Policy and Code of Ethical Market Conduct so as to avoid exposing GTL to claims similar to those made in the Casper 

Lawsuit.” The referenced Advertising Policy and Code of Ethical Market Conduct required that marketers, like Platinum, 

be “honest and fair,” “engage in fair competition,” and engage in “fair dealing and good faith.” GTL essentially claimed 

in the Cook County Litigation that Platinum failed to live up 

to these shared expectations in supervising its employees and 

Independent Solicitors. Based on these claims, GTL sought 

damages for the injuries it “suffered, and continues to suffer, 

as a direct and proximate result of Platinums breaches of the 

Marketing Agreement.” 

Next, in GTLs third-party complaint against Platinum in 

the Missouri Litigation, GTL repeated that Platinum must ensure its agents “compl[y] with all local, state, and federal laws 

and regulations” and that Platinum would ensure its 

“agents ... comply with[] all of GTLs company procedures 

and rules concerning advertising policies, marketing guidelines, and GTLs code of ethical market conduct.” GTL then 

sought indemnification because Platinum made “certain negligent misrepresentations concerning [Grishams] answers to 

an insurance policy application.” GTL complained of Platinum “negligent[ly] supervising and monitoring its agents in 

the marketing and selling of insurance policies.” GTL also alleged Platinum and or its agents made “intentional actions or 

omissions in the solicitation and procurement of the insurance policy application of [Grisham].” While some of these 

claims were colored in terms of the specific facts leading to 

Grishams dispute, at base, the claims in the third-party complaint contended that Platinum negligently trained and supervised its employees and agents, which breached the 
12 No. 20-1906 

Marketing Agreement, violated GTLs ethical and marketing 

rules, and led to the sale of GTLs products in improper ways. 

GTL thus brought claims against Platinum in both suits 

that swept more broadly than the particulars of Platinums alleged misconduct connected to the specific insurance policies 

sold to Casper or Grisham. Even those claims that centered on 

facts specific to Grishams lawsuit still “could have been filed 

in the Cook County litigation” because, as discussed below, 

GTL knew of those claims at the time it entered the 2017 Settlement Agreement. Accordingly, GTL is now barred by the 

2017 Settlement Agreement from bringing those claims. 

On appeal, GTL urges a crimped and unconvincing interpretation of the 2017 Settlement Agreement. GTL argues that 

the agreement elsewhere provides that “GTLs Cook County 

lawsuit and all appeals related to that lawsuit shall hereinafter be referred to as the ‘Cook County litigation.” GTL asserts 

that this definition of “Cook County litigation” does not include arbitration, thus limiting the agreements reach. In 

GTLs view, once the court compelled the Cook County Litigation to arbitration, all the claims alleged therein accordingly 

arose not in “litigation” but in a separate and distinct arbitration. GTL therefore contends that it could not have brought 

the third-party complaint claims in the Cook County Litigation, and the 2017 Settlement Agreement does not bar them 

now. 

We “will not interpret a contract in a manner that would 

nullify or render provisions meaningless, or in a way that is 

contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of the language 

used.” Thompson, 948 N.E.2d at 47. GTLs argument implies 

there were never any claims brought in litigation because the 

claims in the Cook County Litigation were moved to an 
No. 20-1906 13

arbitral forum. It goes without saying, if we deemed all the 

claims filed in the complaint to the Circuit Court of Cook 

County as not “filed in the Cook County litigation” because 

the state court later compelled the parties to arbitrate the matter, then we would undermine the release in its entirety; the 

release would reach zero claims and have no effect. We decline to assume the parties intended to include such a “meaningless” provision. See id. 

Furthermore, contrary to GTLs proposition, the specific 

reference to the Cook County Litigation in the 2017 Settlement 

Agreement, without more, does not automatically limit the 

scope of GTLs release of its claims against Platinum. See

Crosby v. City of Chicago, 949 F.3d 358, 361 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the argument that “an agreements reference to a specific claim always limits an otherwise general release to only 

the claim mentioned”). The release of “all claims that were 

filed or could have been filed in the Cook County litigation” 

is of course constrained by “Cook County litigation.” If GTL 

had brought claims that it could not have brought in the Cook 

County Litigation, then the release would clearly not impede 

GTLs pursuit of those claims. We need not entertain that 

counterfactual because the third-party complaint claims 

“could have been filed in the Cook County litigation,” barring 

GTLs pursuit of them now. 

2. Other provisions of the 2017 Settlement Agreement 

confirm that the release is unambiguous. 

Our analysis could end here, but GTL attempts to make 

ambiguous the otherwise clear release in the 2017 Settlement 

Agreement based on other contractual provisions that, in 

GTLs view, illustrate a contrary intent by the parties. As Illinois courts have said: “The scope and effect of a release are 
14 No. 20-1906 

controlled by the intention of the parties. Particularly with a 

release, this intent is discerned from the language used and the 

circumstances of the transaction.” Farmers Auto., 857 N.E.2d at 

694 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “The intention of the parties to contract must be determined from the 

instrument itself, and construction of the instrument where 

no ambiguity exists is a matter of law.” Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d 

at 667. We therefore examine the rest of the instrument before 

us and hold that its relevant provisions conform with and reinforce our view that the parties intended for GTL to broadly 

release its claims against Platinum, including the claims at issue here. Accordingly, the 2017 Settlement Agreement is unambiguous, and GTL is barred from bringing those claims. 

Beyond the plain text of the release, we glean strong evidence of the parties intent from their decision in the 2017 Settlement Agreement to excise the indemnification exclusion 

from the 2015 Settlement Agreement. Initially, in section 10 of 

the 2015 Settlement Agreement, the parties specifically excluded from the agreement “existing and future claims” of indemnification GTL may have against Platinum. In other 

words, GTL reserved its right to later sue Platinum for indemnification. 

Yet, in the 2017 Settlement Agreement, GTL and Platinum 

reversed course when they expressly terminated section 10 

from the 2015 Settlement Agreement, indicating a new understanding between and intent by the parties. GTL could have—

as it had in the 2015 Settlement Agreement—included express 

contractual language to preserve certain claims, including 

those claims it then had in the Missouri Litigation against 

Platinum. GTL did not and instead agreed to terminate the 
No. 20-1906 15

one provision, section 10, from the 2015 Settlement Agreement that might have preserved those claims. 

A simple chronology underscores the significance of 

GTLs decision to terminate section 10. The parties entered 

the 2017 Settlement Agreement as part of the Cook County 

Litigation on February 28, 2017, but the Missouri Litigation 

began more than two months earlier, on December 8, 2016. 

Therefore, GTL knew of its Missouri Litigation claims well in 

advance of its agreement to resolve and settle “all claims that 

were filed or could have been filed in the Cook County litigation.” Moreover, in formulating the 2017 Settlement Agreement, GTL and Platinums express departure from the 2015 

Settlement Agreement strongly suggests that—unlike the 

2015 Settlement Agreement that reserved GTLs right to sue 

later for indemnification—GTL forfeited any indemnification 

rights relevant to Platinum. GTLs third-party complaint not 

only alleged indemnification claims but also premised those 

claims on the same allegations raised in the Cook County Litigation. All told, the express termination of the section 10 indemnification clause, coupled with the fact that GTL knew of 

any potential claims it had against Platinum in the Missouri 

Litigation prior to agreeing to the 2017 Settlement Agreement, 

solidifies our conclusion that GTL could have brought the 

third-party complaint claims in the Cook County Litigation. 

Next, GTLs resort to certain contract recitals—introductory statements that commonly precede a contract to state a 

contracts purpose—in the 2017 Settlement Agreement falls 

short. Even if “recitals are not [an] operational part of [a] contract between the parties, they reflect the intent of the parties 

and influence the way the parties constructed the contract.” 

Hagene v. Derek Polling Constr., 902 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ill. App. 
16 No. 20-1906 

Ct. 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting First Bank & Tr. Co. 

of Ill. v. Village of Orland Hills, 787 N.E.2d 300, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2003)); see also Farmers Auto., 857 N.E.2d at 693 (“General 

words of release are restrained in effect by the specific recitals 

contained in the instrument.”). Based on the recitals, GTL argues “it is unreasonable to interpret the Settlement Agreement as a general release relating to or arising out of claims 

unrelated to the arbitration dispute.” GTL principally relies 

on paragraph D, which provides that “[t]o avoid further litigation costs and expenses, and without admitting any liability, the Parties now desire to settle the Arbitration and civil 

lawsuit according to the following terms.” GTL points to 

Gladinus v. Laughlin, 366 N.E.2d 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), to support its view that paragraph Ds specific reference to the lawsuit should constrain the otherwise broad release later included in the 2017 Settlement Agreement. See id. at 432 (“Illinois courts will restrict the language of a general release to the 

thing or things intended to be released and refuse to interpret 

generalities so as to defeat a valid claim not then in the minds 

of the parties.”). 

GTL overstates Gladinus. In narrowly interpreting a broad 

release, the Gladinus court relied on factors including “very 

specific indicia of the parties intent to restrict ostensibly 

broad language” and claim-specific coding. See Crosby, 949 

F.3d at 361 (discussing Gladinus). The Gladinus court considered a settlement check given to the plaintiff to satisfy a property damage claim. See 366 N.E.2d at 431. On its back, the 

check also included a release of “all claims.” See id. Despite 

this apparently general release, the court held the release did 

not preclude future litigation for personal injury claims. See

id. at 432–33. 
No. 20-1906 17

Later analyzing that case in Crosby v. City of Chicago, however, we noted that although the check contained a broad release on its back, the settlement check was still “coded for 

property damage with settlement amounts to match.” 

949 F.3d at 361. Specifically, the Gladinus “court held that the 

front of the check established ‘the understanding of all concerned parties that the release affected her claim for property 

damage only and not her action for personal injuries.” Id. 

(emphasis added) (quoting Gladinus, 366 N.E.2d at 432–33).

Even though the Gladinus court read the release before it 

to only apply narrowly, we reached a different conclusion in 

Crosby, in which we read a release contained in a settlement 

for § 1983 excessive force claims to apply broadly. See id. at 

359. Crosby “agreed to do more than dismiss his existing suit 

with prejudice: he also agreed to release the [defendants] 

from liability for ‘all claims he had, has, or may have in the 

future ... arising either directly or indirectly out of the incident which was the basis of this litigation.” Id. at 361 (some 

alterations in original). We accordingly dismissed Crosbys 

new lawsuit then before us, rejecting his Gladinus-based argument that “an agreements reference to a specific claim always 

limits an otherwise general release to only the claim mentioned.” See id. Indeed, “[i]t would have been odd for the settlement not to mention the underlying suit that prompted it; 

the desire to dispose of those claims is what drove the parties 

to the bargaining table.” Id.

The language of the 2017 Settlement Agreement resembles 

the language of Crosby more than of Gladinus. Like Crosbys 

release of “all claims” he “may have in the future,” id., GTL 

released “all claims” that “could have been filed.” This release 

does not contain the sort of narrowing language “coded” for 
18 No. 20-1906 

specific claims on which the Gladinus court relied to reach its 

different outcome. See id. Nowhere does paragraph D reflect 

an “understanding of all concerned parties that the release affected” GTLs claim against Platinum in the Cook County Litigation “only and not [GTLs] action” against Platinum for the 

same claims in other lawsuits. See Gladinus, 366 N.E.2d at 432–

33. Even though the release mentions “Cook County Litigation,” it plainly extends broadly to claims that “could have 

been filed” therein, including the claims now before us. Furthermore, the recital in paragraph D stating the parties intent 

“to settle the Arbitration and civil lawsuit according to the following terms” does not provide “very specific indicia of the 

parties intent to restrict ostensibly broad language” contained in the binding portion of the contract. See Crosby, 949 

F.3d at 361. In fact, the recital necessarily incorporates the 

broad language of the contracts release in agreeing to resolve 

their dispute “according to the following terms.” Finally, the 

mere mention of the “civil lawsuit” in paragraph D is insufficient, without more, to permit the narrowing construction 

GTL now seeks. “It would have been odd for the settlement 

not to mention the underlying” Cook County Litigation; “the 

desire to dispose of those claims is what drove the parties to 

the bargaining table.” Id. 

Finding the 2017 Settlement Agreement unambiguous, the 

district court correctly granted summary judgment to Platinum because the 2017 Settlement Agreement barred GTL 

from bringing the claims in its third-party complaint. Having 

determined that the agreement precludes GTL from bringing 

those claims, we need not address whether res judicata also 

barred those claims. 
No. 20-1906 19

B. Attorneys’ Fees 

The second issue on appeal is whether the district courts 

award of 150% of the ultimate relief secured as attorneys fees 

was “reasonably proportionate.” After the district court 

granted summary judgment for Platinum in its first order, 

Platinum invoked the 2017 Settlement Agreement to seek attorneys fees of $210,476.25 based on the $72,296.734 in controversy. Applying the 2017 Settlement Agreement provision 

that “the prevailing Party in any lawsuit brought to enforce 

this Agreement shall be awarded its reasonable costs and attorneys fees, but such an award must be reasonably proportionate to the ultimate relief secured by the prevailing Party,” 

the district court concluded that, while reasonable, 

$210,476.25 was not a proportionate amount. Accordingly, the 

court reduced Platinums requested attorneys fees to 

$108,445.10 (or 150% of the $72,296.73 in relief secured). 

Before turning to the merits of GTLs challenge to this decision, we must resolve the dispute over the appropriate 

standard of review. In its opening brief, GTL calls on us to 

apply de novo review because “[w]e review [a] courts interpretation of [a] contract[] de novo.” Chemetall GMBH v. ZR 

Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2003). By contrast, Platinum argues for application of an abuse-of-discretion review 

because “[d]istrict courts have wide discretion in determining 

the appropriate amount of attorneys fees and costs; therefore, 

our review of such determinations is limited to a highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.” Spegon v. Cath. Bishop 

of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1999). 

4 This is the sum of the amount paid to settle Grishams claim and the 

amount paid to defend Grishams claim. 
20 No. 20-1906 

In this case, the applicable standard of review turns on the 

nature of each individual argument. See Thomas v. Gen. Motors 

Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The proper 

standard of review depends on the character of the ruling 

sought to be reviewed.”). Between its briefing and oral argument, GTL oscillates between the contention that “reasonably 

proportionate” requires a 1:3 proportion (necessitating a reduction by this Court in the amount of fees awarded)5 and the 

contention that “reasonably proportionate” is ambiguous (necessitating a remand for the trial court to consider parol evidence to determine the parties intent). GTL never reconciles 

these mutually exclusive views. We will first review de novo 

GTLs two arguments addressing the appropriate meaning of 

“reasonably proportionate.” Cf. Tax Track Sys. Corp. v. New 

Inv. World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The standard of review for the award of attorneys fees has been the 

subject of some debate in this case. We review the meaning of 

the contract term ‘substantially prevailing de novo.”). Rejecting both, we next turn to the appropriateness of the district 

courts award of attorneys fees—the thrust of the parties dispute—which we review for abuse of discretion. See Anderson 

v. AB Painting & Sandblasting Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 

2009) (applying abuse-of-discretion review to the award of 

fees but applying de novo review to the district courts legal 

analysis). 

5 At oral argument, GTL for the first time on appeal advocated that 

“proportionate” means a one-to-one ratio. GTLs tendency to alternate between different proportions only underscores that the parties intended the 

“reasonably proportionate” language to be applied, in the discretion of a 

judge, to the specific facts in a given dispute. 
No. 20-1906 21

1. The 2017 Settlement Agreement does not require an 

award in a 1:3 proportion. 

Without question, the parties did not, as GTL argues, intend for “reasonably proportionate” to exclusively mean a 1:3 

proportion (or any other specific proportion). “[A] court cannot alter, change or modify existing terms of a contract, or add 

new terms or conditions to which the parties do not appear to 

have assented.” Thompson, 948 N.E.2d at 51. Had the parties 

intended a one-third proportion, and only a one-third proportion, they would have said “such an award must be [one third 

of] the ultimate relief secured,” and not, as they did, “such an 

award must be reasonably proportionate to the ultimate relief 

secured.” We will not make that edit now. 

The parties clearly intended a more malleable standard for 

determining attorneys fees. Establishing ex ante that one proportion for attorneys fees should govern all future legal disputes, regardless of the specific facts and issues at hand, 

makes little sense for sophisticated parties such as GTL and 

Platinum. Not all legal disputes are created equally: some can 

be resolved swiftly and therefore inexpensively while others 

present complex legal questions requiring substantial time 

and resources of the parties and their counsel. 

The Illinois cases GTL cites to suggest that the 2017 Settlement Agreement requires a one-third proportion are inapposite. See Will v. Nw. Univ., 881 N.E.2d 481, 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2007) (affirming a “trial courts one-third fee award”); Blankenship v. Dialist Int’l Corp., 568 N.E.2d 503, 508 (Ill. App. Ct. 

1991) (same). In Will, the parties expressly contracted to permit a one-third contingency fee, thereby rendering that 

amount reasonable. 881 N.E.2d at 488. By contrast, GTL and 

Platinum here chose not to mandate a specific proportion, so 
22 No. 20-1906 

we are not confined to reading their contract as requiring a 

one-third proportion. In Blankenship, the court never considered proportionality as a factor in assessing attorneys fees, so 

the case speaks only to the courts view that a one-third fee is 

permissible, if not “normal,” see 568 N.E.2d at 508, which is 

not the same as saying it is the only acceptable proportion. 

Finding no contractual language or case law supporting 

GTLs one-size-fits-all reading of the “reasonably proportionate” language, we decline to rewrite the parties contract to 

say something it does not. 

2. The 2017 Settlement Agreement is not ambiguous. 

Beyond finding that “reasonably proportionate” does not 

necessitate a specific proportion, we also conclude the term is 

not ambiguous under relevant case law. “In Illinois, a contract 

is considered ambiguous if it is capable of being understood 

in more than one sense.” Cannon, 752 F.3d at 1089 (citing Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d at 667; Farmers Auto., 857 N.E.2d at 693). A 

contract deemed ambiguous may be submitted to a jury to determine the parties intent; however, “evidence [is] given to 

the jury” only when “objective evidence of ambiguity [is] presented first to the judge, and only if the judge concludes that 

it establishes a genuine ambiguity.” Home Ins. Co. v. Chi. & 

Nw. Transp. Co., 56 F.3d 763, 768–69 (7th Cir. 1995); see also

Whitlock, 581 N.E.2d at 667 (“Where a court determines that a 

contract is ambiguous, its construction is then a question of 

fact, and parol evidence is admissible to explain and ascertain 

what the parties intended.”). The district court below did not 
No. 20-1906 23

find this contractual term to “establish[] a genuine ambiguity,”6 see Home Ins., 56 F.3d at 769, nor do we now. 

As GTL helpfully illustrates, the disputed language, “reasonably proportionate,” has a clear meaning. Despite encompassing a range of permissible amounts, it remains understood in a singular sense. Let us begin with the second word 

in the disputed phrase: “proportionate,” from the root “proportion.” Dictionaries define “proportion” to mean “the relation of one part to another or to the whole with respect to 

magnitude, quantity, or degree : relative size : RATIO.” Proportion, Websters Third New International Dictionary 1819 

6 GTL points to the following discussion by the district court to argue 

the district court found the contract ambiguous: 

Unfortunately, the contract language—“reasonably proportionate to the ultimate relief”—does leave some room 

for interpretation. The parties could have selected an exact ratio. For example, they could have said 50%, 100%, 

150% of the total monetary value of the relief obtained. Or 

they could have imposed a percentage cap: no more than 

150% or 200% of the monetary value. Or an overall cap: 

no more than $100,000 or $200,000 or even $1 million. Any 

of these elaborations would have made this Courts task 

easier. Another complication is the absence of any citations in the parties briefs to case law applying proportionality language in a contract. 

The district court does not state the contract language is ambiguous but rather states its view that the parties left to a judge the determination of appropriate attorneys fees in particular disputes. In fact, the district court 

later found that “[p]erhaps this uncertainty is exactly what the parties intended and envisioned; if not, they should have chosen their words with 

greater precision.” Accordingly, what GTL characterizes as ambiguous in 

the parties contract, the district court appropriately read as entrusting it 

with discretion. 
24 No. 20-1906 

(1993); see also Disproportionate, Blacks Law Dictionary 593 

(11th ed. 2019) (defining disproportionate as “[h]aving too 

much or too little in relation to something else; not suitable in 

comparison with something else in size, amount, importance, 

etc.”). Furthermore, Illinois law, which governs interpretation 

of the contract before us, also encourages courts assessing attorneys fees to consider “whether there is a reasonable connection between the fees and the amount involved in the litigation.” Kaiser v. MEPC Am. Props., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 424, 428 

(Ill. App. Ct. 1987). Traditionally, consideration of proportionality is not mandatory under Illinois law, see J.B. Esker & 

Sons, Inc. v. Cle-Pa’s P’ship, 757 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2001) (“[A]ttorney fees may be reasonable even if the fees are 

disproportionate to the monetary amount of an award.”), but 

the 2017 Settlement Agreement requires such consideration. 

Therefore, an award of attorneys fees pursuant to that agreement must bear some “relation” to the relief secured. 

The 2017 Settlement Agreement begs the obvious question: what “relation” is permissible? The first word in the disputed phrase, “reasonably,” helps answer our open question 

and cabins the otherwise wide breadth (and potentially ambiguous reach) of “proportionate.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines the root word “reasonable” as “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; sensible.” Reasonable, Blacks 

Law Dictionary 1518 (11th ed. 2019). Illinois law further illuminates the contours of “reasonably proportionate” because 

attorneys fees must always be reasonable in Illinois based on 

a slate of eight factors (the “Powers factors”).7 Taking both 

7 “To determine a reasonable fee award, a court must consider (1) the 

skill and standing of the attorney employed, (2) the nature of the cause, 

(3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (4) the amount and 
No. 20-1906 25

words in the disputed phrase together, attorneys fees that 

must be “reasonably proportionate” to the ultimate relief 

translates to attorneys fees that must bear a sensible relation 

to the ultimate relief under the Powers factors. 

While “reasonably” (or “reasonably proportionate”) encompasses a range of permissible values, it is nevertheless unambiguous, even under Illinois law.8 The breadth of the 

phrase merely means that a range of proportions can share a 

sensible relation to the underlying relief secured,9 and that 

importance of the subject matter, (5) the degree of responsibility in the 

management of the case, (6) the time and labor required, (7) the usual and 

customary charges in the community, and (8) the benefits resulting to the 

client.” Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 761 N.E.2d 237, 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 

2001) (emphasis added).

8 The argument GTL makes that “reasonably proportionate” is ambiguous is more accurately characterized as an argument that the language is 

vague. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 

27 Const. Comment. 95, 97–98 (2010). For present purposes, the words 

“reasonably proportionate” are vague, not ambiguous, which calls for 

contract construction, not interpretation. Id. at 98 (“[L]egal texts can (usually) be resolved by interpretation, but ... vagueness always requires construction.”); id. at 100 (“[I]nterpretation yields semantic content, whereas 

construction determines legal content or legal effect.”). Therefore, the district court engaged in contract construction to “give[] legal effect to the semantic content of [the] legal text” in the 2017 Settlement Agreement. See 

id. at 103. 

9 A hypothetical helps illuminate this point. If a homeowner contracted with a painter to paint her house “reasonably blue,” we would not 

say that contractual term is ambiguous; rather, we would say the parties 

intended to give the painter some leeway in choosing what color to paint 

the house. The painter could comply with the contract by using sapphire, 

cerulean, cobalt, indigo, or any other shade of blue paint. Clearly, though, 

the painter could not use red paint. The language is broad—perhaps even 

vague—but not ambiguous. 
26 No. 20-1906 

relationship should naturally ebb and flow with the complexity of and resources poured into a dispute. 

The unambiguous character of “reasonable” is no better 

evidenced by its ubiquity in the law.10 To suggest otherwise 

would sanction litigants artfully characterizing as ambiguous 

myriad legal terms of art. It would invite “fertile legal ‘imagination [to] conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of (disputed) terms will be in nice question.” Grayned v. 

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 n.15 (1972) (quoting Am. 

Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950)). “Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.” Id. at 110. Accordingly, 

“reasonably proportionate,” as broad a phrase as it might be, 

Just as “reasonably blue” is not ambiguous because it encapsulates 

many shades of blue, “reasonably proportionate” is not ambiguous 

simply because it potentially encapsulates many proportions. None could 

say (and it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court judge to 

find) that a 1,000,000,000:1 ratio is “reasonably proportionate” because seldom would that relation be sensible to the ultimate relief. Nevertheless, a 

3:2 ratio (adopted by the district court in this case) or a 1:3 ratio (endorsed 

by GTL) can both be “reasonably proportionate” to the relief secured in 

the same way that teal and navy can both be “reasonably blue.” The parties could have required a 1:3 ratio just as the homeowner could have required teal paint; but the parties instead used language to permit a range 

of outcomes. 

10 See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. IV (prohibiting “unreasonable searches 

and seizures”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (providing for a Terry

stop upon an officer finding “reasonable suspicion”); Stephen G. Gilles, 

On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person 

Standard, and the Jury, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 813, 822 (2001) (“For as long there 

has been a tort of negligence, American courts have defined negligence as 

conduct in which a reasonable man (nowadays, a reasonable person) 

would not have engaged.”). 
No. 20-1906 27

is not ambiguous. Rather, it unambiguously requires that attorneys fees bear some sensible relation to the ultimate relief, 

leaving to the district judge the task of applying that language 

to the facts at hand. 

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding Platinum attorneys’ fees amounting to 

150% of the ultimate relief secured. 

Rejecting GTLs contention that a 1:3 proportion is required under the contract as well as GTLs attempt to make 

ambiguous the attorneys fees provision, we are now left with 

assessing whether the district court selected a reasonably proportionate award. Distinct from any interpretation of the contract, which we reviewed de novo, the district courts decision 

to award attorneys fees in the amount of 150% of the ultimate 

relief secured turned on its construction of that contract.11 We 

therefore review how the district court applied and “enforced” the “reasonably proportionate” contractual language 

for abuse of discretion. See Powers, 761 N.E.2d at 240 (“[C]ontract provisions regarding attorney fees should be strictly construed and enforced at the discretion of the trial court.” (emphasis 

added)). A district court enjoys “significant deference in fee 

matters because: (1) it possesses ‘superior understanding of 

the litigation and [there exists a] desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters.; (2) the need for uniformity in attorneys fees awards is 

not great enough to warrant appellate review of minutia; and 

(3) the desirability of avoiding ‘a second major litigation

11 See supra note 8 (discussing the difference between contract interpretation and contract construction, with the latter referring to a court 

“giv[ing] legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text”). 
28 No. 20-1906 

strictly over attorneys fees is high.” Spellan v. Bd. of Educ. for 

Dist. 111, 59 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) 

(citations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

437 (1983)). We hold the district did not abuse its discretion. 

Recognizing that the parties contract requires any award 

be both reasonable and proportionate, the court disaggregated its analysis for each requirement. First, the district court 

found the requested attorneys fees to be reasonable by applying the eight Powers factors. The thrust of its analysis turned 

on the fact that the amount requested, $210,476.25, reflected 

the actual amount billed and paid by Platinum in this complex 

litigation that would affect Platinums potentially widereaching liability. See Spegon, 175 F.3d at 552 (concluding that 

fees may be reasonable if a “fee-paying client” would pay 

them). To that end, the district court relied on “detailed time 

sheets” and “affidavits that all of the attorneys rates are what 

they customarily charge.” See Powers, 761 N.E.2d at 240 (requiring consideration of “(7) the usual and customary charges 

in the community”). It also found that “counsels skill showed 

throughout its management of the present action” and 

“brought many benefits to bear for their client.” See id. (requiring consideration of “(1) the skill and standing of the attorney 

employed” and “(8) the benefits resulting to the client”). 

At the same time, the district court meaningfully engaged 

with and dismissed GTLs grievances about insufficient or 

questionable billing documentation. See id. (requiring consideration of “(3) the novelty and difficulty of the questions” and 

(6) the time and labor required”). The time sheets examined 

by the district court revealed that Platinums counsel properly 

separated billable from non-billable work. GTL argued that 

multiple partners working on this case was “duplicative,” but 
No. 20-1906 29

the district court found this concern unwarranted because this 

was a “long-standing and multi-faceted dispute” where “the 

outcome of this smaller piece of the puzzle could have 

broader ramifications.” Such a dispute naturally demands 

greater attention. Finally, the court reiterated Platinums actual payment of the amount billed strongly supported the reasonableness of those fees. 

Furthermore, the court addressed GTLs concerns that this 

low-stakes lawsuit does not warrant such a large award. See 

id. (requiring consideration of “(2) the nature of the cause” 

and “(4) the amount and importance of the subject matter”). 

A fee award of $210,476.25 is appreciably larger than the 

$72,296.73 at issue in this dispute, but that does not automatically render it unreasonable. As we have said: 

To say that a court should give “increased reflection” before awarding attorneys fees that 

are several times the amount of the actual damages is nothing more than to say that a comparatively large fee request raises a red flag. As we 

just said, in many cases the amount in controversy and the complexity of the case will track 

with one another. But small claims can be complex and large claims can be very straightforward. So while a fee request that dwarfs the 

damages award might raise a red flag, measuring fees against damages will not explain 

whether the fees are reasonable in any particular case. 

Anderson, 578 F.3d at 546. Therefore, large awards are not per 

se unreasonable, even if they may presumptively “raise a red 

flag.” Id. “[I]t is no surprise that the cost to pursue a contested 
30 No. 20-1906 

claim will often exceed the amount in controversy.” Id. at 545. 

In this case, the district court appropriately found the requested relief to be reasonable after consideration of the disputes complexity and ramifications. Thus, it did not abuse its 

discretion. 

Second, the district court turned to analyze whether the 

requested relief of $210,476.25 was reasonably proportionate to 

the $72,296.73 secured by Platinum. It concluded that the requested fees were not and reduced them to $108,445.10, or 

150% of the ultimate relief secured. We hold this too was not 

an abuse of discretion. 

As set forth above, Illinois courts permit consideration of 

proportionality in calculating attorneys fees but do not require it. See Kaiser, 518 N.E.2d at 428; J.B. Esker, 757 N.E.2d at 

1277. On appeal, GTL admits that in its “diligent research” it 

could not identify a similar “contractual fee-shifting provision [that] has been interpreted in any Illinois published decision or in the published decision of any other jurisdiction.” 

The district court, also finding no Illinois case law speaking 

directly to how it should determine proportionate attorneys

fees, looked elsewhere. This approach is consistent with what 

an Illinois court confronted with the same dilemma might do. 

See Racky v. Belfor USA Grp., Inc., 83 N.E.3d 440, 471 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2017) (“While it is well settled that federal decisions are 

not binding on Illinois state courts, federal decisions can be 

considered to be persuasive authority, and they may be followed if we believe the federal analysis to be reasonable and 

logical.” (citations omitted)). 

Scouring the law for a useful analogue, the district court 

arrived at the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), which 

allows successful prisoner litigants to recover attorneys fees 
No. 20-1906 31

so long as the fees are “proportionately related to the court 

ordered relief for the violation.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i); 

see also id. § 1997e(d)(1)(A) (requiring the fee also be “reasonably incurred”). The PLRA language is meaningfully analogous to the current contract because both require proportionality in awarding attorneys fees. The statute continues to 

cabin the size of potential awards by instructing that an award 

not be “greater than 150 percent of the judgment.” Id. 

§ 1997e(d)(2); see also Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 742 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (applying this 150%-of-judgment cap to an award 

of fees). 

The district court opted to rely on the PLRA, a federal law 

passed by Congress and signed by the President, as opposed 

to “simply plucking a number, or even a percentage, out of 

thin air.” We find the federal analysis considered by the district court to be “reasonable and logical,” such that an Illinois 

court could rely on it as persuasive authority. See Racky,

83 N.E. 3d at 471. The court therefore found $210,476.25 not 

reasonably proportionate to the relief secured and instead 

awarded Platinum $108,445.10, or 150% of the $72,296.73 in 

controversy. Seeing as the district court arrived at one (of potentially many) “reasonably proportionate” awards for attorneys fees, we will not upset that discretionary decision. See 

Powers, 761 N.E.2d at 240. 

For all these reasons, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by deciding that $108,445.10 in attorneys fees for 

Platinum was an amount “reasonably proportionate to the ultimate relief secured.” 
32 No. 20-1906 

III. Conclusion 

In summation, we AFFIRM the district courts entry of summary judgment for Platinum and its award to Platinum of 

$108,445.10 in attorneys fees.