1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50045

AMY SHUMWAY, )

)

Claimant-Respondent, )

)

v. )

)

EVANS CHIROPRACTIC, )

Boise, August 2023 Term 

Opinion filed: December 28, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 

PA, Employer, )

)

Defendant-Appellant, )

)

and )

)

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 

LABOR, ) 

)

Respondents. )

__________________________________________)

Appeal from the Idaho Industrial Commission.

The decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission is reversed.

Cooper & Larsen, Chtd., Pocatello, attorney for Appellant, Evans Chiropractic, P.A.

Anthony Budge argued.

Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent, Idaho Department 

of Labor. Douglas Werth argued. 

Amy Shumway, pro se.

BEVAN, Chief Justice.

This appeal stems from an Idaho Industrial Commission (“Commission”) decision that 

awarded unemployment benefits to Amy Shumway.

1 Shumway’s employment was terminated by 

her employer, Appellant Evans Chiropractic, PA (“Evans Chiropractic”), for alleged misconduct. 

Shumway applied for unemployment benefits, and an Appeals Examiner with Respondent Idaho 

1 Shumway is not participating in this appeal.
2

Department of Labor (“IDOL”) entered a determination finding Shumway eligible for benefits. 

Evans Chiropractic appealed to the Commission, which affirmed IDOL’s decision but on different 

grounds. Evans Chiropractic timely appealed to this Court. Evans Chiropractic argues that the 

Commission should have found Shumway ineligible for benefits because her employment was 

terminated for job-related misconduct. Evans Chiropractic asks this Court to reverse the 

Commission’s decision and hold that Shumway is not eligible to receive benefits as a matter of 

law. IDOL maintains that the Commission did not apply the correct legal standards, but it contends

that the proper procedure is to vacate the Commission’s award and remand the case. For the 

reasons below, we reverse the Commission’s decision and hold that Shumway is ineligible for 

benefits as a matter of law. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 15, 2019, Shumway was hired to work as a front desk receptionist for Evans

Chiropractic. Evans Chiropractic provides chiropractic and massage care for its patients. It shares 

an office space with Brizee Family Medicine in Pocatello, Idaho. The owners of Evans 

Chiropractic—Dr. Nathan Evans (“Evans”) and Dr. John Hitchcock (“Hitchcock”)—share certain 

employees, such as receptionists, with Dr. David Brizee (“Brizee”) of Brizee Family Medicine.2

All providers share the same reception area. Shumway testified that Brizee had hired her, but the 

Commission found she was hired by Evans. It is undisputed that Hitchcock did not hire her.

Hitchcock terminated Shumway’s employment on or about April 14, 2022, for 

insubordination. Although Hitchcock testified that Shumway had been discharged for several

reasons, the primary reason was that Shumway never saw him as her boss, and that she refused to 

meet with him on several occasions. Hitchcock testified as follows:

[Shumway], towards the end especially, never really saw me as her – as her 

boss and so it was very difficult to work with [her] or to have her come in for 

meetings. In fact, multiple times she refused to come meet with me and so that 

was the ultimate reason. There is [sic] others, but that was the main reason. I 

think on the third time I tried to – to communicate I needed to meet with her, 

she still refused, and that was the date that we ended up letting her go.

The relationship between Shumway and Hitchcock began deteriorating following an 

incident around March 16, 2022,when Shumway believed Hitchcock had left a patient on a muscle 

2 The Commission erroneously referred to a “Dr. Handcock” several times in its decision and order. In its opening 

brief, Evans Chiropractic clarifies there is no Dr. Handcock at Evans Chiropractic. 
3

stimulation therapy too long. As a result, Shumway informed the patient he did not need to pay for 

his visit. Hitchcock, however, disagreed, and he directed Shumway to collect payment from the 

patient. Shumway admitted that this event made her upset with Hitchcock.

The next day, Shumway asked to have a private meeting with Evans to discuss her concerns

about Hitchcock. In her meeting with Evans, Shumway shared that Hitchcock commented that “he 

had made it very well known that he had been the one that had fired massage therapists in the past 

and he lorded it over our head to the point where you felt very intimidated by that and felt that if 

you pushed his buttons the wrong way or if you got on his bad side that you would be terminated.” 

Evans informed Shumway that he would talk to Hitchcock and get back to her. 

On March 22, Evans called Shumway to the back of the office and said Hitchcock would 

like to speak with her to apologize. Shumway told Evans she did not feel comfortable being alone 

with Hitchcock. Evans “suggested very heavily” that Shumway speak with Hitchcock, and so she 

did. Shumway said her subsequent conversation with Hitchcock was “pretty intense.” Near the end

of the conversation, Shumway told Hitchcock to “stop micromanaging the scheduling up front.” 

At that point, Shumway reported that Hitchcock’s “ears got bright red and he sat up in his chair, 

he got very – his face – you know, you could tell that he was very upset . . . .” Shumway testified 

that Hitchcock told her that “you are going to have to speak with me if you want to continue to 

work here . . . .” Shumway said she did not feel comfortable after Hitchcock made that comment,

and she left the room. 

Around March 31, Shumway had another one-on-one meeting with Evans. In that meeting, 

Shumway apologized for the situation with Hitchcock after which Evans reportedly assured 

Shumway that her job was safe and that everything would be okay. 

Because Shumway worked in an open reception area in the front of the office and 

Hitchcock was generally in a back office, Hitchcock tried to keep personnel matters private by 

asking Shumway to talk to him in his office. Because his office was some distance from 

Shumway’s workspace, when Hitchcock wanted to talk with Shumway he typically would 

communicate via Skype and ask her to come back to see him. Hitchcock testified he tried to meet 

with Shumway on April 4 and again on April 13 to no avail. Hitchcock explained that he had sent

Shumway a Skype message and worked in his office while he waited for her to come back, but 

when he would go to the front office, he would see Shumway had already left. Shumway testified 

that she did not meet with Hitchcock following the March 22 meeting because she did not feel 
4

comfortable speaking to him alone. Together with attempting to meet with Shumway privately, 

Evans Chiropractic held employee group meetings to address problematic behavior so Shumway 

would not feel singled out. 

According to Hitchcock, Shumway was intense and antagonized patients and other 

employees with her behavior. For example, Hitchcock testified that several employees had 

expressed difficulties working with Shumway, which caused them to leave work early and some

even threatened to quit. Hitchcock also recounted several times when his patients complained that 

Shumway was rude to them.

Several employees told Hitchcock that Shumway said she was not willing to work for him

after the March 16 patient treatment/payment issue and she would not send out his appointment 

reminders. Shumway denied that she deliberately failed to send out Hitchcock’s appointment 

reminders, testifying that she must have gotten busy and forgotten to send them out. But she 

admitted she had not forgotten to send out appointment reminders for the other two providers.

Despite these problems, Evans and Hitchcock were willing to overlook many complaints

because Shumway did the focus of her job well. Evans Chiropractic had no written policies in 

place to handle workplace conflicts. 

On Thursday, April 14, 2022, to make sure Shumway met with him, Hitchcock waited in 

the conference room so Shumway could not leave without walking by him. When she walked by, 

Hitchcock called her into the conference room and informed Shumway that her employment was 

being terminated. Shumway felt Hitchcock fired her in retaliation for the March 16 patient 

treatment/payment issue and testified that she would have preferred to have been fired by the 

doctor who she says hired her, Brizee. 

After being fired, Shumway applied for unemployment benefits. Evans Chiropractic

contested her eligibility. Following a hearing in which both Shumway and Hitchcock testified, the

IDOL Appeals Examiner determined that Shumway had been discharged for insubordinate 

conduct. Despite that finding, the Appeals Examiner held Shumway was eligible for benefits 

because Shumway had never been put on notice that failure to meet with Hitchcock would result 

in termination:

The employer discharged the claimant for insubordinate conduct. . . . Without 

argument, the employer has a right to expect employees to meet with it when 

requested. This is a standard expectation in the workplace. However, . . . had the 
5

claimant been put on notice that her failure to meet with the owner would result in 

discharge, this might well have had a different outcome.

Evans Chiropractic appealed the decision to the Commission. The Commission concluded 

that Shumway was eligible for benefits because Evans Chiropractic had failed to show that

Shumway breached a clearly communicated expectation of her employment. Evans Chiropractic 

timely appealed to this Court. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“In appeals from the Commission, this Court’s review is limited to questions of law, ‘which

include whether the Commission’s factual findings are supported by substantial and competent 

evidence and the application of the facts to the law.’” Hiatt v. Health Care Idaho Credit Union, 

166 Idaho 286, 290, 458 P.3d 155, 159 (2020) (quoting Harper v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, 161 Idaho 

114, 116, 384 P.3d 361, 363 (2016)). When, as here, the employee was separated from employment 

by a discharge, the employer has the burden of proving that the employee was discharged for 

employment-related misconduct. Copper v. Ace Hardware/Sannan, Inc., 159 Idaho 638, 641, 365 

P.3d 394, 397 (2016); IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Commission erred by concluding that Evans Chiropractic had failed to meet its 

burden of proving Shumway was fired for job-related misconduct. 

Evans Chiropractic argues there is substantial evidence in the record that Shumway was 

insubordinate when she continuously refused to comply with Hitchcock’s reasonable expectation 

to meet to discuss her behavior at work. Thus, it argues there is sufficient evidence that Shumway 

was terminated for job-related misconduct and that this Court should reverse the Commission’s 

decision and hold Shumway is ineligible to receive benefits. IDOL agrees the Commission 

misapplied the law in reaching its decision, but it argues that this conclusion requires a remand to 

the Commission for further proceedings. 

Reviewing the record, we conclude that the Commission erred when it determined that

Evans Chiropractic failed to meet its burden of proving that Shumway was terminated for jobrelated misconduct. “Claimants who have become unemployed through no fault of their own may 

be entitled to unemployment insurance benefits.” Hiatt, 166 Idaho at 290, 458 P.3d at 159. But a 

claimant is not entitled to benefits where the claimant’s unemployment is “because of the 

claimant’s discharge for misconduct in connection with the claimant’s employment.” I.C. 72-
6

1366(5). As noted above, “[t]he burden of proving that a claimant was discharged for employmentrelated misconduct rests with the employer.” IDAPA 09.01.30.275.01. 

“The focus of the inquiry is not whether the employer’s reason for discharge was 

reasonable but, rather, whether the misconduct was work-related so as to make the employee 

ineligible for unemployment benefits.” Adams v. Aspen Water, Inc., 150 Idaho 408, 413, 247 P.3d 

635, 640 (2011) (citing Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 

(1986)). Misconduct is defined in three ways: (1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer’s 

interest; (2) a deliberate violation of the employer’s reasonable rules; or (3) a disregard of a 

standard of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. IDAPA 

09.01.30.275.02.a-c. The claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. IDAPA 

09.01.30.275.02.c.

Evans Chiropractic fired Shumway for insubordination. Insubordination may satisfy any 

of the three categories of misconduct identified in IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02. But this Court has 

noted that analyzing insubordination under the third category of misconduct, the “standards of 

behavior” test, appears to be the most appropriate category. Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 

129 Idaho 833, 837, 933 P.2d 642, 646 (1997). We will thus apply this test to our analysis here. 

In a standards of behavior case, the test for misconduct is identified in Idaho’s regulations. 

The Commission, as factfinder, must determine both of the following: 

i. Whether the claimant’s conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected 

by the employer; and 

ii. Whether the employer’s expectation was objectively reasonable in the 

particular case. 

IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c.i–ii.

The first condition addresses what the employer subjectively expected from the employee, 

and the second considers whether the employer’s expectations are objectively reasonable. See

Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640. In Adams, we defined what “objectively reasonable”

means for an employer:

In order for an employer’s expectation to be objectively reasonable, the 

expectation must be communicated to the employee, unless the expectation is the 

type that flows naturally from the employment relationship. An expectation flows 

naturally from the employment relationship when the expectations are common 

among employees in general or within a particular enterprise. Such expectations 

are generally limited to fundamental expectations and do not involve specific rules 
7

unless clearly embodied in the job at issue. See, e.g., Pimley v. Best Values, Inc.,

132 Idaho 432, 435, 974 P.2d 78, 81 (1999) (holding that a retail employer has a 

reasonable expectation flowing naturally from the employment relationship that its 

employees will not make vulgar comments about coworkers and supervisors in the 

presence of customers and other coworkers); Bullard v. Sun Valley Aviation, Inc.,

128 Idaho 430, 434, 914 P.2d 564, 568 (1996) (finding that an employer’s 

expectation that an employee will comply with federal rules and the employer’s 

manual, which both required permission prior to crossing a runway, flowed 

naturally from a line service position at an airport). In other words, the relevant 

question is whether the employee has breached “a standard of behavior that would 

flow normally from an employment relationship or which was communicated to 

[the employee] because of its uncommon nature.” Wulff v. Sun Valley Co., 127 

Idaho 71, 75, 896 P.2d 979, 983 (1995).

Adams, 150 Idaho at 413–14, 247 P.3d at 640–41 (alterations in original).

Thus, an expectation that flows naturally need not be communicated to an employee to be 

objectively reasonable. Hiatt, 166 Idaho at 291, 458 P.3d at 162 (citing Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 

247 P.3d at 640). “An expectation flows naturally from the employment relationship when the 

expectations are common among employees in general or within a particular enterprise.” Adams, 

150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640 (citing Appeals Exam’r of Idaho Dep’t of Labor v. J.R. Simplot 

Co., 131 Idaho 318, 322, 955 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1998)).

1. The Commission misapplied the standards of behavior test. 

We first take this opportunity to correct a misstatement of law by the Commission. Citing 

Puckett v. Idaho Department of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 1024, 695 P.2d 407, 409 (1985), the 

Commission wrote that “[a]n employee can only be held accountable for breaching those 

expectations that he or she understood, explicitly or implicitly, and was capable of satisfying.” 

Puckett does not stand for this proposition. The Commission read too much into the following 

statement in that case: “there is substantial evidence demonstrating that Puckett was indeed aware 

and warned of his employer’s expectations.” Id. While it may be good practice for an employer to 

communicate its expectations to its employees, it is not required to do so. We reiterate that the 

correct statement of law is that under the standards of behavior test, an employer’s expectation is 

objectively reasonable when it is either: (a) communicated to the employee; or (b) flows naturally 

from the employment relationship. An expectation that flows naturally need not be communicated 

to an employee to be objectively reasonable. Hiatt, 166 Idaho at 291, 458 P.3d at 160. 
8

With this clarification noted, we hold the Commission misapplied the standards of behavior 

test when it concluded that Evans Chiropractic failed to establish Shumway breached an 

expectation that had been communicated to her. The correct application of the standards of 

behavior test addresses “what the employer subjectively expected from the employee”—not the 

subjective expectations of the employee. Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640 (emphasis 

added). Here, the Commission incorrectly focused on Shumway’s subjective reasons for not 

meeting with Hitchcock, rather than on Hitchcock’s and Evans Chiropractic’s expectations of

Shumway. Therefore, the Commission misapplied the standards of behavior rule for misconduct. 

2. Some of the Commission’s findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence in 

the record.

As we apply the facts to the appropriate law here, the Commission’s conclusion that Evans

Chiropractic failed to prove Shumway had been fired for job-related misconduct is not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record. The Commission found (1) that Shumway was reasonable in

expecting that any meeting with Hitchcock would include a witness, (2) that Shumway was never 

warned her job might be in jeopardy if she failed to meet with Hitchcock, and (3) that criticism or 

concerns from Evans were addressed in a team meeting that allegedly took place on April 14, 

2022.

3 As we discuss below, reasonable minds would not accept the evidence in the record to 

support the Commission’s conclusions. See Hartgrave v. City of Twin Falls, 163 Idaho 347, 351, 

413 P.3d 747, 751 (2018). 

To start, nothing in the record suggests that Shumway asked Hitchcock or Evans if another 

employee or supervisor could be present at meetings involving her and Hitchcock. Shumway told

Evans that she felt uncomfortable meeting with Hitchcock by herself, but this request came after 

the first meeting between Hitchcock and Shumway in which Hitchcock informed Shumway that 

they had to work together. Rather than ask for a witness to be present thereafter, Shumway’s 

response was to repeatedly ignore Hitchcock and avoid meeting with him. As a result, there is no

substantial support in the record for the Commission’s finding that Shumway was reasonable in 

refusing to meet with Hitchcock unless such a meeting included a witness. Instead, the opposite 

was true. Shumway committed insubordination by repeatedly refusing to meet with Hitchcock. 

3

It appears no meeting occurred on April 14, as we discuss below, although there is no dispute that the concerns were 

addressed in a team meeting at some point.
9

The record likewise does not support the Commission’s finding that Shumway was never

warned that her job might be in jeopardy if she refused to meet with Hitchcock. The Commission 

wrote:

As of April 14, 2022, Dr. [Hitchcock] had met with [Shumway] regarding 

the incident on March 16, 2022, and Dr. Evans had met with [Shumway] to 

discuss her interactions with another employee. In neither case was 

[Shumway] told her job was in jeopardy. In fact, Dr. Evans assured 

[Shumway] that her job was not in jeopardy.

The Commission’s conclusion, however, is not supported by substantial and competent 

evidence. Hitchcock’s and Shumway’s testimony established that Shumway was put on notice that 

her continued refusal to meet with Hitchcock could adversely affect her employment. Hitchcock 

testified that, following that March 16 incident, he told her “we needed to work it out, because we 

were both going to work here for a long time and needed to figure out a way to work better together

. . . .” According to Shumway’s own testimony, Hitchcock told her, “[Y]ou are going to have to 

speak with me if you want to continue to work here” but, at that time, Shumway said she did not 

feel comfortable and left the room. The Commission disregarded this direct testimony, including 

Shumway’s own statement, in concluding Shumway was never told her job might be in jeopardy 

and that she was never warned about her refusal to meet with Hitchcock. 

Finally, the Commission relied on this Court’s holding in Oxley v. Medicine Rock 

Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 80 P.3d 1077 (2003), in finding for Shumway. In Oxley, we held 

that an employer cannot discipline an employee (short of discharge) and then later discharge the 

employee for the past behavior unless the employer can show the employee engaged in the same 

behavior again. Applying this proposition, the Commission found that Shumway was part of a 

team meeting on April 14, 2022, at which Hitchcock addressed his concerns about the March 16 

incident, and then fired Shumway for the same conduct right after the meeting.

There is no evidence that any group meeting took place on April 14 prior to Shumway’s 

firing. Hitchcock testified about several group meetings but did not describe any meeting occurring 

on or around April 14. Shumway also described several group meetings, but not one on the date 

she was fired. Because there is no evidence in the record that a team meeting took place on April 

14, 2022, the Commission’s finding that such a meeting occurred is clearly erroneous. 

In short, the Commission’s conclusion that Evans Chiropractic failed to prove Shumway 

committed job-related misconduct is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
10

3. The Commission’s factual findings support a different result: that Shumway’s actions 

constitute misconduct under the standards of behavior test. 

As stated above, the test for misconduct in a standards of behavior case requires the 

Commission to determine both of the following: (1) the claimant’s conduct fell below the standard 

of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) the employer’s expectation was objectively 

reasonable. IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c.i–ii. Under the second prong of the test, an employer’s 

expectation is objectively reasonable when it was either (a) communicated to the employee, or (b) 

was one that “flows naturally” from the employment relationship. Hiatt, 166 Idaho at 292, 458 

P.3d at 161 (citing Adams, 150 Idaho at 413, 247 P.3d at 640). An expectation that “flows 

naturally” need not be communicated to an employee to be objectively reasonable. Id.

First, the Commission’s “Findings of Fact” show that Shumway’s conduct fell below the 

standard of behavior expected by Evans Chiropractic. Evans Chiropractic required Shumway to 

meet with Hitchcock, but Shumway refused to meet with him on several occasions. The 

Commission found that Shumway left the March 21 meeting with Hitchcock of her own volition, 

and that Shumway failed to meet with Hitchcock after his repeated messages asking to meet with 

her. Shumway’s failure to meet with Hitchcock satisfies the first prong of misconduct because her 

conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by her employer. 

Second, the Commission’s Findings of Fact show that Evans Chiropractic’s expectation 

that Shumway meet with Hitchcock was objectively reasonable because that expectation was 

directly communicated to Shumway. Evans told Shumway that Hitchcock wanted to meet with her 

in advance of the March 21 meeting, but Shumway left that meeting. As indicated above, the 

Commission also found that Hitchcock sent Shumway Skype messages on April 4 and 13 asking 

her to meet with him. Evans’ requests for Shumway to meet with Hitchcock were clearly 

communicated, which satisfies the second prong stated in Adams that the employer’s expectation 

was objectively reasonable. 150 Idaho at 413–14, 247 P.3d at 640–41. Because these requests were 

directly communicated and disregarded, there is no need for this Court to consider whether any 

requests to meet with Shumway “flowed naturally” from the employment relationship. As a result, 

we hold as a matter of law that Shumway was discharged for employee misconduct, and she is 

ineligible for unemployment benefits. 

IDOL argues that we must remand this case to the Commission to reapply the law to the 

facts set forth herein. We decline to do so because there is no reasonable dispute about the two 
11

prongs of the standards of behavior test being met. We apply this Court’s precedent from Stark v. 

Assisted Living Concepts, Inc, 152 Idaho 506, 510, 272 P.3d 478, 482 (2012), to reach this 

conclusion. 

In Stark, the employer operated assisted living facilities, and the claimant was a residence 

director at one of the facilities. Id. at 507, 272 P.3d at 479. During a conversation with the 

employer’s regional director of sales, Stark asked about a rumor that another facility was closing. 

Id. Soon after, the employer’s CEO telephoned Stark and asked her about the source of the rumor. 

Id. The employer’s CEO requested this information several times, but Stark felt uncomfortable 

giving the CEO the names of her co-workers who gave her that information and refused to say 

where she had heard the rumor. Id. Stark was eventually discharged because she refused to follow 

a direct order from the CEO. Id. at 508, 272 P.3d at 480. 

The Commission found that Stark’s refusal to name the source of the rumor did not 

constitute job-related misconduct and awarded benefits. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed the 

Commission’s decision, holding that “[a]s a matter of law, Claimant’s conduct constituted 

misconduct in connection with her employment under Idaho Code section 72-1366(5).” Id. at 510, 

272 P.3d at 482.

Here, just as the employer in Stark, Hitchcock testified that he directly asked Shumway to 

meet with him several times. Shumway, by her own testimony, ignored his requests and refused 

to meet with Hitchcock, stating that she felt uncomfortable being alone with him. “The claimant’s 

subjective state of mind is irrelevant.” IDAPA 09.01.30.275.02.c. As we explained previously, the 

record on this point shows that Shumway violated a clearly communicated expectation that 

Shumway meet with the employer. Therefore, the Commission based its decision in this case on 

undisputed facts but reached an incorrect legal conclusion. We thus reverse its decision. 

B. We will not reach the additional grounds argued by IDOL and Evans Chiropractic to 

reach our decision. 

Both parties argue additional grounds related to their respective positions. IDOL argues 

that if the case is remanded, this Court should make clear to the Commission that the “intentional 

disregard of the employer’s interest” prong of misconduct does not require the employer prove 

that the employee acted with “premeditated malice.” For its part, Evans Chiropractic argues that 

if Shumway’s refusal to meet with Hitchcock is not misconduct, the Court should find that her 

allegedly deliberate failure to send appointment reminders to Hitchcock’s patients constitutes an 
12

alternate basis for misconduct. Having decided that this case does not require remand because 

Shumway’s refusal to meet with Hitchcock constituted misconduct, we decline to address the other 

legal grounds asserted by Evans Chiropractic and IDOL in this matter.

IV. CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, Shumway’s unemployment was because of her discharge for 

misconduct in connection with her employment and she is not entitled to benefits under Idaho 

Code section 72-1366(5). We reverse the order of the Industrial Commission.

JUSTICES BRODY, STEGNER, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.