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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Board of Tax and Land Appeals

No. 2020-0538

APPEAL OF KEITH R. MADER 2000 REVOCABLE TRUST & a.

Argued: June 17, 2021

Opinion Issued: October 8, 2021

Cooper Cargill Chant, P.A., of North Conway (Randall F. Cooper on the 

brief and orally), for the petitioners.

Donahue, Tucker & Ciandella, PLLC, of Exeter (Brendan Avery O’Donnell

and Christopher T. Hilson on the brief, and Brendan Avery O’Donnell orally), 

for the respondent.

MACDONALD, C.J. The eighteen petitioners (the Taxpayers) appeal an 

order of the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA) issued 

following our decision in Appeal of Keith R. Mader 2000 Revocable Trust, 173 

N.H. 362 (2020). In that decision, we vacated the BTLA’s prior dismissal of the

Taxpayers’ property tax abatement appeals and remanded for the BTLA to 

further consider whether the Taxpayers omitted their personal signatures and 

certifications on their tax abatement applications to the respondent, the Town 

of Bartlett (Town), “due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.” Mader 

2000 Revocable Trust, 173 N.H. at 372 (quotation omitted). On remand, the 

BTLA found that “based on the facts presented, the Taxpayers [had] not met 

their burden of proving the omission of their signatures and certifications was 

due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect,” and again dismissed their 

appeals. We affirm.
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I. Facts

We repeat the facts stated in Mader 2000 Revocable Trust for context. 

The Taxpayers own property at a condominium development in Bartlett. Id. at 

364. On February 7, 2018, the Taxpayers’ attorney received a message from 

the condominium developer, requesting legal representation related to a 

substantial increase in the Taxpayers’ real estate taxes. Id. The attorney 

explained that he was leaving on an overseas vacation in two days and would 

not return until February 26, two days before the March 1 abatement filing 

deadline. Id. He assured the developer that he would nonetheless be able to 

timely submit abatement applications on behalf of the Taxpayers. Id. The 

Taxpayers engaged his services and, on February 20, agreed to the terms of the 

representation agreement. Id. at 365.

The attorney returned from vacation on February 26, prepared the 

abatement applications, and submitted them to the Town on or about February 

27. Id. The Taxpayers did not personally sign or certify their respective 

applications. Id. Instead, the attorney signed on their behalf. The Town 

denied the applications, and the Taxpayers appealed to the BTLA.

The BTLA requested written proof that the Taxpayers had signed the 

abatement applications as required by New Hampshire Administrative Rules, 

Tax 203.02. Id. Rule 203.02 requires “[t]he taxpayer” to file an abatement 

application on a form “prescribed by” the BTLA or on a “written document” that 

includes, among other items “[t]he taxpayer’s signature on the abatement 

application certifying that the application has a good faith basis and the facts 

stated are true.” N.H. Admin. R., Tax 203.02(b)(4). The rule provides that “[a]n 

attorney or agent shall not sign the abatement application for the taxpayer,” 

but that an attorney or agent “may . . . sign the abatement application along 

with the taxpayer to indicate the attorney’s or agent’s representation.” N.H. 

Admin. R., Tax 203.02(d). Under Rule 203.02(d), “[t]he lack of the taxpayer’s 

signature and certification shall preclude an RSA 76:16-a appeal to the board 

unless it was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.” Id. Rule 102.39 

defines the term “[t]axpayer” as “the person or entity that filed [the] tax appeal.” 

N.H. Admin. R., Tax 102.39. 

The Taxpayers filed a motion seeking an exception to Rule 203.02’s 

personal signature and certification requirement. Mader 2000 Revocable 

Trust, 173 N.H. at 365. They acknowledged that they had not personally 

signed or certified their respective applications, but argued that the omissions 

were “‘due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.’” Id. (quoting N.H. 

Admin. R., Tax 203.02(d)). The BTLA denied the motion and dismissed the 

appeals. Mader 2000 Revocable Trust, 173 N.H. at 365. The Taxpayers 

unsuccessfully moved for rehearing and then appealed to this court. Id. 
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On appeal, we concluded that Rule 203.02(d)’s “reasonable cause and 

not willful neglect” standard referred not only “to whether the taxpayer acted 

voluntarily . . . , but also to whether the filer’s reason for so acting was 

objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 369 (quotation 

omitted). We construed the reasonable cause and not willful neglect standard 

to permit an appeal to the BTLA without a taxpayer signature and certification 

“if the taxpayer can show that, despite exercising ordinary business care and 

prudence, it was not reasonably possible to submit the application with the 

taxpayer’s signature and certification,” and can also show “that he or she was 

not recklessly indifferent to the signature and certification requirement in 

preparing the application.” Id. at 370. 

Because the BTLA did not have the benefit of our construction of Rule 

203.02(d) when it dismissed the Taxpayers’ appeals, we vacated its decision 

and remanded for the BTLA to “further consider[] . . . whether the omissions of 

the [Taxpayers’] personal signatures and certifications on their applications 

were ‘due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect’ as we [had] construed 

that phrase.” Id. at 372 (quoting N.H. Admin. R., Tax 203.02(d)).

On remand, the BTLA found that the Taxpayers failed to prove that they 

exercised “ordinary business care and prudence.” The BTLA observed that the 

Taxpayers knew of their property assessments no later than December 1, 2017, 

but “took no discernible steps” to challenge them until February 7, 2018. The 

BTLA further observed that the Taxpayers chose to hire an attorney who was 

leaving the country on February 9 and was not expected to return until 

February 26. The Taxpayers engaged his services, but did not agree to the 

terms of representation until February 20. The BTLA noted that “[t]he 

Taxpayers’ collective decision to seek representation from [the attorney] (despite 

his vacation plans and their delay in signing the Representation Agreement) 

does not excuse his or their noncompliance” with Rule 203.02(d). 

The BTLA also found that the attorney signed and certified the 

abatement applications without consulting “anyone, including the Taxpayers,” 

or the appraisal firm he had previously contacted to appraise their properties. 

(Emphasis added.) Rather, the attorney “determined entirely on his own that 

‘good faith grounds’ existed for filing abatement applications and he did so 

simply by comparing the 2017 assessments with those of the prior tax year.” 

The BTLA found that there was “no evidence” that the Taxpayers took or were 

given “the opportunity to review the abatement applications before they were 

filed.” 

As to whether it was “reasonably possible” for the Taxpayers to have 

submitted their abatement applications with their own signatures and 

certifications, the BTLA found that they “could have signed and certified each 

abatement application using various modalities, including faxed or e-mailed 

signatures.” The BTLA observed that “[i]n their individual appeals for the 
4

subsequent tax year (2018), the Taxpayers did sign and certify each abatement 

application.” Based upon the record before it, the BTLA found that “it was not 

‘objectively reasonable’ for Taxpayer signatures and certifications to be omitted 

from their abatement applications.”

With regard to whether the Taxpayers established that neither their 

attorney nor they were recklessly indifferent to the signature and certification 

requirements, the BTLA was “persuaded by a review of the entire record and 

the relevant timeline that neither the Taxpayers nor their agent . . . made any 

attempt to comply with the taxpayer signature and certification requirements 

at all, in a timely manner.” The Taxpayers unsuccessfully moved for rehearing, 

and this appeal followed.

II. Analysis

Our standard for reviewing BTLA decisions is set forth by statute. See

RSA 541:13 (2021); RSA 71-B:12 (2012) (providing that BTLA decisions may be 

appealed in accordance with RSA chapter 541). The BTLA’s findings of fact are 

deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable. See RSA 541:13. To prevail, the 

Taxpayers must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the BTLA’s 

decision was “clearly unreasonable or unlawful.” Id. “We will not set aside or 

vacate a BTLA decision except for errors of law, unless we are satisfied, by a 

clear preponderance of the evidence before us, that such order is unjust or 

unreasonable.” Appeal of N.H. Elec. Coop., 170 N.H. 66, 72-73 (2017)

(quotation omitted). “[O]ur task is not to determine whether we would have 

found differently than did the board, or to reweigh the evidence, but rather to 

determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence in the 

record.” Id. at 74 (quotation omitted). 

On appeal, the Taxpayers first argue that the BTLA was compelled to find 

that they exercised ordinary business care and prudence because most of them 

live out of state, the tax bills were received right before “the Holiday season,” 

and they did not know that they were required to sign the abatement 

applications personally. They assert that “it cannot be said that [it] 

. . . was reasonably possible to file the applications with [their] signatures” 

because their attorney had only approximately three days to complete and file 

the applications and all but one of the Taxpayers live out of state. The

Taxpayers further contend that their attorney “certainly thought and had good 

reason . . . to believe that he had no obligation to look into anything further 

until his return from vacation.” They maintain that even if their attorney had 

such an obligation, “there is no evidence that [he] knowingly and purposely 

chose to ignore such a duty or [that he] actually knew of and ignored the 

board’s rule.”

The Taxpayers’ arguments fail to demonstrate that the BTLA’s order, “by 

a clear preponderance of the evidence, . . . is unjust or unreasonable.” RSA 
5

541:13. Both the Taxpayers and their attorney are presumed to know the law. 

See State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 457 (1989). “Ignorance of the law is no 

excuse.” Id. The Taxpayers do not challenge the BTLA’s finding that they 

could have signed and certified each abatement application by using faxed or 

emailed signatures. Nor do they challenge the finding that neither they nor 

their attorney took any action to comply with the requirement that the 

Taxpayers personally sign and certify the abatement applications. Indeed, in 

his affidavit, the attorney concedes that, in fact, he took no such action. Under 

these circumstances, we uphold the BTLA’s determination that the Taxpayers 

failed to prove that the omission of their signatures and certifications was due 

to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.

The Taxpayers next assert that the BTLA exceeded its authority by 

adopting Rule 203.02(d), which requires a taxpayer to sign an application to 

abate property taxes. See RSA 71-B:8 (2012) (granting the BTLA rule-making 

authority). “[A]dministrative rules may not add to, detract from or modify the 

statute they are intended to implement.” Appeal of Mays, 161 N.H. 470, 473 

(2011). Thus, the determination of whether an administrative rule is ultra 

vires involves statutory interpretation. When interpreting statutes, we ascribe 

the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. In re A.D., 172 N.H. 438, 

441 (2019). 

Rule 203.02(d) is consistent with RSA 76:16. Both the rule and the 

statute require the taxpayer, and not the taxpayer’s agent, to sign the 

application and, by so doing, certify that its contents are true. See RSA 76:16, 

I(b) (Supp. 2020), III (2012).

RSA 76:16, I(b) authorizes “[a]ny person aggrieved by the assessment of a 

tax by the selectmen or assessors and who has complied with the requirements 

of RSA 74” to “apply in writing . . . to the selectmen or assessors for an 

abatement of the tax.” RSA 76:16, I(b) (emphasis added). Under RSA 76:16, 

I(b), therefore, the person who may “apply . . . for an abatement of the tax” is 

the “person aggrieved.” RSA 76:16, III sets forth the information that the BTLA 

must include in the “abatement application form” that a “person aggrieved by 

the assessment of a tax” may file to obtain an abatement. RSA 76:16, I(b), III. 

Among other things, pursuant to RSA 76:16, III(g), the form must include “[a] 

place for the applicant’s signature with a certification by the person applying 

that the application has a good faith basis and the facts in the application are 

true.” 

In a “long line of cases,” we have held that a “person aggrieved” for the 

purposes of RSA 76:16 is the person who has paid the allegedly 

disproportionate tax — in other words, the taxpayer. Appeal of Thermo-Fisher 

Scientific, 160 N.H. 670, 673-74 (2010) (citing cases); see Appeal of Gillin, 132 

N.H. 311, 313 (1989) (referring to the person aggrieved as “the taxpayer”);

Appeal of City of Concord, 161 N.H. 169, 172 (2010) (same). Indeed, the third 
6

sentence of RSA 76:16, I(b) uses the word “taxpayer” to refer to the “person 

aggrieved by the assessment of a tax.” Accordingly, when RSA 76:16 is viewed 

as a whole, the terms “applicant” and “person applying” in RSA 76:16, III(g) are 

synonymous with the word “taxpayer.” See TS & A Motors v. Kia Motors 

America, 172 N.H. 94, 99 (2019) (explaining that when interpreting statutes, 

“we will focus on the statute as a whole, not on isolated words or phrases”). 

In Appeal of Wilson, we rejected a nearly identical challenge to Rule 

203.02(d). See Appeal of Wilson, 161 N.H. 659, 662-65 (2011). As in this case, 

the taxpayers in Appeal of Wilson did not sign their abatement application. Id. 

at 660. Instead, their non-attorney agent attached a form signed by the 

taxpayers authorizing him to act on their behalf. Id. The BTLA dismissed the 

taxpayers’ appeal after they had failed to sign the abatement application form, 

certifying the truth of its contents, because the BTLA found that there was no 

reasonable cause for their failure to do so and that their agent’s failure to 

obtain their signatures constituted willful neglect. Id. at 660-61. On appeal to 

this court, the taxpayers claimed that Rule 203.02(d) was unlawful because it 

conflicted with certain tax abatement statutes. Id. at 662. We held that the 

rule is consistent with those statutes and “constitutes a reasonable rule for 

carrying out the BTLA’s functions.” Id. at 662-65. 

We also specifically rejected the taxpayers’ argument that their agent’s 

“signature on their tax abatement application should have been deemed 

sufficient to comply with RSA 76:16, III(g).” Id. at 665. Like the Taxpayers in 

this case, the taxpayers in Appeal of Wilson argued that allowing the agent’s 

signature on the application to suffice would be “consistent with the goal of 

keeping tax abatement proceedings free from technical and formal obstructions 

and the requirement that the statutory scheme be construed liberally.” Id. We 

disagreed, concluding that the agent’s signature on the application form did 

not comply with the statutory requirement that the taxpayer sign the 

application. Id. We also observed that “[h]ad the legislature intended a 

representative’s signature to suffice, it could have so stated,” id., as it did in 

other statutes specifying that a tax document may be signed either by the 

“taxpayer or by [the taxpayer’s] authorized representative,” RSA 77-A:6, I

(Supp. 2020); RSA 78-C:3, I (2012); RSA 84-A:4 (Supp. 2020). In Henderson 

Holdings at Sugar Hill v. Town of Sugar Hill, 164 N.H. 36, 40 (2012), we 

reiterated these conclusions.

 

The Taxpayers do not ask us to overrule Appeal of Wilson. Nor are we 

inclined to do so. Rather, they attempt to distinguish Appeal of Wilson on the 

ground that their agent is an attorney, while the agent in Appeal of Wilson was 

not. Their attempts to distinguish an attorney-at-law signing on behalf of a 

client from an attorney-in-fact signing on behalf of a principal are unavailing. 

The Taxpayers fail to establish a persuasive basis for this distinction. 

The Taxpayers observe that attorneys-at-law stand in the place of their clients;
7

however, attorneys-in-fact also stand in their principals’ place when signing 

documents on their behalf, see Usher v. Daniels, 73 N.H. 206, 207 (1905) 

(“[T]he act of the agent in signing the agreement in pursuance of his authority 

is in law the act of the principal—the agent’s signature is the principal’s 

signature.”). 

The Taxpayers also note that attorneys are subject to the New Hampshire 

Rules of Professional Conduct. However, some attorneys-in-fact representing 

taxpayers in abatement proceedings will also owe ethical duties to their 

principals. See RSA 564-E:114 (2019). In addition to other duties, those 

attorneys-in-fact must “act in good faith” and “with the care, competence, and 

diligence ordinarily exercised by agents in similar circumstances.” RSA 564-

E:114(a)(2), (b)(3). 

Because the Taxpayers have failed to persuade us that Appeal of Wilson

is distinguishable from this case, we adhere to our holding in that case and

reject the Taxpayers’ assertion that the BTLA exceeded its authority by 

adopting Rule 203.02(d). We decline to address the Taxpayers’ argument that 

Rule 203.02(d) violates their rights under the New Hampshire Constitution to 

equal protection because they did not preserve it for our review. The Taxpayers 

raised this issue for the first time in their motion for rehearing filed with the 

BTLA, which is insufficient to preserve it for our review. See RSA 541:3 (2021); 

Appeal of Alexander, 163 N.H. 397, 404-06 (2012); Appeal of Campaign for 

Ratepayers Rights, 133 N.H. 480, 484 (1990).

Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.