UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DAVID E. HILL, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

B. TRUE, Warden; A. FELLOW, Assist 

Health Service Administrator; and Jane 

Doe, Health Service Administrator; W. 

RESTO, Clinical Directory; J. STERETT, 

Doctor; J. SEROSKI; R. HUDDLESTON; 

D. OBA; J. FIRTH, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 21-1139 

(D.C. No. 1:20-CV-03135-RBJ-NRN) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, MORITZ and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

David E. Hill, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district court’s 

denial of (1) his motion for a preliminary injunction and (2) his motion to take 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Hill proceeds pro se, we construe his arguments liberally, but we do 

not “take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 27, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 1
2 

judicial notice of a medical record. We have jurisdiction over the interlocutory 

appeal of the preliminary-injunction ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). We 

exercise pendent jurisdiction to review the nonfinal judicial-notice ruling because 

there is an adequate record for review, the issue is closely related to the denial of the 

preliminary injunction, and addressing the issue promotes judicial economy. See 

Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 1995). We reverse the 

denial of Hill’s motion for a preliminary injunction and remand to the district court 

for further proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. We affirm the 

denial of Hill’s motion to take judicial notice. 

I. Background 

Hill filed this action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Among other claims, he alleges that 

Defendants True, Resto, and Sterett—officials and medical personnel at the federal 

penitentiary in Florence, Colorado—were deliberately indifferent to his serious 

medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. He asserts that he is in excruciating pain from Stage 3 or 4 

chronic kidney disease and that Defendants have refused to transport him to the 

hospital for necessary treatment by an outside nephrology specialist. Although Hill 

had three strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the district court allowed him to proceed 

and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 

840 (10th Cir. 2005). 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 2
3 

in forma pauperis (IFP) on this claim under that provision’s “imminent danger” 

exception.2

 

In December 2020, at the same time he filed the operative Second Amended 

Complaint, Hill filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Relevant to this appeal, 

Hill argued that Defendants failed to comply with the directive of Christine Baugh, 

the outside nephrologist who treated him in October 2019 and submitted an order for 

him to return for follow-up care in three months. Hill stated that he was experiencing 

excruciating stomach and kidney pain, urinary tract infections, and other symptoms 

as a result of Defendants’ inaction. He asked the district court to order his immediate 

transport to the hospital for treatment of his chronic kidney disease. 

In March 2021, Defendants responded that they denied Hill’s referral request 

to see Baugh, who is actually a nurse practitioner at a clinic, because the Bureau of 

Prisons (BOP) is adequately monitoring and treating Hill’s chronic kidney disease, 

following an internal protocol that tracks the protocol an outside specialist would 

implement. They supported this assertion with a declaration by Dr. David Oba. Oba 

also attested that Hill has Stage 2 chronic kidney disease—which indicates “mild 

decreased function” of the kidneys, not “mild to moderately decreased function” 

(Stage 3) or “severely decreased function” (Stage 4). R., Vol. I at 191-92 

(explanation of stages), 195 (diagnosis). In addition, Defendants made the following 

representation about Hill’s future medical care: 

2

 The district court also allowed Hill to proceed IFP on a COVID-related 

medical-treatment claim that is not at issue in this appeal. 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 3
4 

The BOP is also currently scheduling [Hill] for another consultation 

with an outside nephrologist specialist. The outside consultation will 

provide another opinion regarding the progress of Plaintiff’s [chronic 

kidney disease], and that opinion will be taken into account as BOP 

manages his care. That outside consultation should occur within the 

next two months. 

R., Vol. II at 180 (citations omitted). In his declaration, Oba stated that he requested 

the consultation on January 26, 2021, and the request was approved and “will 

probably be performed within the ne[xt] two months” depending on backlog, staffing, 

and availability of transport vehicles. Id. at 216-17. 

Also in March 2021, Hill filed a motion to take judicial notice of a medical 

record that Baugh prepared on October 17, 2019. 

On April 5, 2021, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary 

injunction and the motion to take judicial notice in a text-only electronic docket entry 

that resolved multiple motions. Hill filed this appeal. 

II. Analysis 

A. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction 

Hill appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. 

To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish “(1) that [he] has a 

substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) that [he] will suffer irreparable 

injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the threatened injury to the movant outweighs 

the injury that the opposing party will suffer under the injunction; and (4) that the 

injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n v. 

Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (10th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 4
5 

extraordinary remedy that is granted only when the movant’s right to relief is clear and 

unequivocal.” McDonnell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 878 F.3d 1247, 1257 

(10th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although both parties addressed all four preliminary injunction factors in their 

pleadings, the district court did not reference or analyze the factors in its short order. 

It stated only: “Per the defendant’s response, the BOP is scheduling plaintiff for another 

consultation with an outside nephrology specialist. Therefore, there is no basis for the 

Court to issue a mandatory injunction requiring such a consultation.” R., Vol. II at 293 

(citation omitted). 

“We review a district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of 

discretion.” Utah Licensed Beverage Ass’n, 256 F.3d at 1065. In the preliminary 

injunction context, a district court abuses its discretion if it provides “inadequate” 

analysis on the elements for a preliminary injunction. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 

441 F.3d 1101, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 2006) (vacating a preliminary injunction because the 

district court abused its discretion in concluding that plaintiffs had shown a substantial 

likelihood of success on the merits, in providing an “inadequate” analysis of the last three 

elements, and in “fail[ing] to engage in a more explicit analysis of the public interest” 

element). 

On appeal, Hill argues that the district court’s “failure to engage in a more explicit 

analysis” is an abuse of discretion.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 11 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). He also notes the lack of findings for each preliminary injunction factor. See 

Reply Br. at 8-9 (likelihood of success on the merits), 10 (irreparable harm); 11 (balance 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 5
6 

of harms); 12 (public interest). Defendants do not address the impact of the district 

court’s lack of reasoning in their response brief; instead, they address the merits of the 

underlying motion. 

Hill is correct. The district court’s reasoning is inadequate. “In order to provide 

meaningful appellate review, we require an articulation of the district court’s rationale.” 

United States ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc., 389 F.3d 1038, 1059 (10th Cir. 2004); 

accord In re Bolar Pharm. Co. Sec. Litig., 966 F.2d 731, 732 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

(“‘[A]buse of discretion’ is not the equivalent of ‘unreviewable.’ If we are to be satisfied 

that a district court has properly exercised its discretion, we must be informed by the 

record of why the district court acted as it did.”). The district court abused its discretion 

by not addressing any of the elements for a preliminary injunction. Its ruling may well 

have been correct. But without any legal analysis, we cannot discern whether it applied 

the correct legal standard and properly exercised its discretion. 

Moreover, the very limited reasoning within the text-only order suggests that the 

district court may have denied the motion on mootness grounds. Its concern regarding 

mootness is evident in an earlier order that instructed Defendants to investigate whether 

Hill’s claim was moot and to report their findings to the court. And the order hints at 

mootness when it states immediately after the denial of the motion that “the BOP is 

scheduling plaintiff for another consultation with an outside nephrology specialist.” 

R., Vol. II at 293. 

To the extent the district court concluded the motion for a preliminary injunction 

was moot, it abused its discretion. On February 3, 2021, Defendants reported: “The 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 6
7 

BOP is providing Plaintiff with the standard treatment for [chronic kidney disease] but is 

not doing so using the services of an outside provider at this time, so this claim is 

probably not moot, at least from Plaintiff’s point of view.” R., Vol. I at 181 (emphasis 

added); see also id. at 183 (“Plaintiff’s claim is not technically moot, because he is not 

getting treatment from an outside nephrologist as he wants . . . .” (emphasis added)). 

Likewise, this subsequent statement in the order is inconsistent with a mootness 

determination: “If the government follows up on its representation that it will soon 

arrange for another outside consultation by a qualified nephrology specialist (and the 

sooner, the better), the Court will consider whether any IFP status is still warranted.” 

R., Vol. II at 293. Finally, almost a year later, there is no evidence in the record that an 

outside consultation has taken place. 

B. Motion to Take Judicial Notice 

Hill next appeals the denial of his motion to take judicial notice of a medical 

record that Baugh prepared on October 17, 2019. We also review the denial of this 

motion for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1314 

(10th Cir. 2005). We affirm the denial because judicial notice is unnecessary when a 

document is already included in the record. See Am. Stores Co. v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 

1267, 1270 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). The medical record that is the subject of the motion is 

part of the district court (and now appellate) record. See R., Vol. I at 34-36 (complaint); 

R., Vol. II at 252-55 (Oda Decl., Ex. 1, Attach. 2). 

III. Pending Motions 

We grant Hill’s motion to proceed without prepayment of fees and costs. 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 7
8 

We deny his appellate motion to take judicial notice of a medical record that 

Baugh prepared on October 9, 2018. Unlike the October 17, 2019 medical record 

discussed above, this one is not part of the record. But Hill has not shown that 

judicial notice is appropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), which provides 

that a court can only judicially notice “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.” 

This medical record is not such a fact: Hill contends it establishes that he had Stage 3 

chronic kidney disease as of October 2018, but Oba stated in his declaration that 

Hill’s disease was only at Stage 2 at this time. See R., Vol. I at 192, 194-95. In any 

event, the medical record is not the type of “garden-variety fact[]” for which judicial 

notice is appropriate, United States v. Delgado-Lopez, 974 F.3d 1188, 1193 n.2 

(10th Cir. 2020). “Judicial notice is proper when a fact is beyond debate, for instance, 

what time the sun sets on a given day.” Estate of Lockett ex rel. Lockett v. Fallin, 

841 F.3d 1098, 1111 (10th Cir. 2016). 

IV. Conclusion 

Because the district court did not provide adequate analysis to support its 

denial of Hill’s motion for a preliminary injunction, we reverse and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment. However, we affirm the 

district court’s denial of Hill’s motion to take judicial notice. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 21-1139 Document: 010110624009 Date Filed: 12/27/2021 Page: 8