NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

LAURIE LYNNE DUNCAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-5067 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in case no. 10-CV-697, Judge George W. Miller. 

_________________________ 

Decided: August 4, 2011 

_________________________ 

LAURIE LYNNE DUNCAN, Of Birmingham, Alabama, 

pro se. 

JOSHUA A. MANDLEBAUM, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendantappellee. With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, 

and FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR., Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 
DUNCAN v. US 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PROST, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Laurie Lynne Duncan, pro se, appeals the dismissal of 

her action by the Court of Federal Claims for failure to 

comply with a court order, court rules, and applicable 

pleading requirements. Because we find that the Court of 

Federal Claims did not abuse its discretion in dismissing 

this action, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2010, Duncan filed ten documents in 

the Court of Federal Claims that were labeled as a “complaint” on the court’s docket, consisting of the following: 

1. A February 17, 2005 letter from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) to Duncan 

indicating in the first paragraph that her 

name was referred to the FBI because she 

was a possible victim of a federal crime. The 

second paragraph of the letter detailed eight 

rights that crime victims possess pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. § 3771, including the rights to 

be notified about and to be present at proceedings involving the accused. In the letter 

Duncan filed, the first paragraph was circled, and the second paragraph was circled 

and starred; 

2. A February 24, 2005 letter from the United 

States Attorney’s Office for the Northern 

District of Alabama to Duncan notifying her 

that charges have been filed against Doris J. 

Blue and informing Duncan of the date of a 

sentencing hearing and her right to attend 

the proceeding; 
3 DUNCAN v. US

3. Duncan’s Earnings and Leave Statement 

from the Department of Veterans Affairs; 

4. A final order from the Alabama Crime Victims’ Compensation Commission 

(“ACVCC”), dated July 15, 2010, denying 

Duncan’s claim for crime victims’ compensation benefits. The order indicates that Duncan claimed that she was a victim of perjury 

due to a February 2003 affidavit filed in 

connection with a civil class action lawsuit, 

in which Duncan was a plaintiff, against the 

Veterans Affairs Hospital, her employer; 

5. A money order payable to the “Law Office of 

Jimmy A. Bell, PC”; 

6. A February 2003 affidavit signed by Doris J. 

Blue in a civil action in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of 

Alabama captioned Hampton v. Department 

of Veterans Affairs, Case No. 2:01-cv-1536; 

and 

7-10. Various letters from the ACVCC to Duncan 

from June to September 2009 regarding her 

claim for crime victims’ compensation benefits. 

 None of these documents contain any assertions or 

allegations written by Duncan, and none of the documents 

bear Duncan’s signature. 

On December 14, 2010, the Court of Federal Claims 

entered an order requiring Duncan to file an amended 

complaint that complies with Rule 11(a) of the Rules of 
DUNCAN v. US 4

the United States Court of Federal Claims1 (“RCFC”) and 

other court rules by January 7, 2011. The order warned 

that, if the plaintiff fails to do so, the Court “may strike 

the complaint and dismiss the case.” Appellee’s Appendix 

(“AA”) 6; see also AA 5 (docket entry containing the same 

warning). Duncan did not take any action in response to 

the court’s order. On January 21, 2011, two weeks beyond the stated deadline, the court issued an order striking Duncan’s complaint and dismissing the action without 

prejudice pursuant to RCFC 11(a), 12(f)(1), and 41(b).2 

AA 6. Judgment was entered pursuant to RCFC 58, and 

Duncan filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal in 

this case for an abuse of discretion.3 Kadin Corp. v. 

 1 In relevant part, RCFC 11(a) provides that, 

“[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must 

be signed by or for the attorney of record in the attorney’s 

name—or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. The paper must state the signer’s address, e-mail 

address, and telephone number. . . . The court must strike 

an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.” 

2 RCFC 12(f)(1) permits the court to “strike from a 

pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” RCFC 41(b) 

provides that, “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to 

comply with these rules or a court order, the court may 

dismiss on its own motion or the defendant may move to 

dismiss the action or any claim against it.” 

3 The Court of Federal Claims dismissed this action 

without prejudice. Although “[o]rdinarily, a dismissal 

without prejudice is not a final, appealable order,” Turley 

v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1008 n.3 (7th Cir. 2010), involuntary dismissals under Rule 41(b), whether with or without 

prejudice, constitute final, appealable orders. See, e.g., 
5 DUNCAN v. US

United States, 782 F.2d 175, 176 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reviewing dismissal under RCFC 41(b)). We will not disturb the 

trial court’s exercise of discretion unless, upon a weighing 

of relevant factors, we are left with a “definite and firm 

conviction” that the court below committed a clear error of 

judgment. Claude E. Atkins Enters., Inc. v. United States, 

899 F.2d 1180, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Adkins v. 

United States, 816 F.2d 1580, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1987)). 

On appeal, Duncan does not explain her failure to respond to the court’s order requiring her to file an 

amended complaint, and she does not otherwise contend 

that the Court of Federal Claims abused its discretion in 

dismissing her case. Rather, she appears to argue that 

she is entitled to compensation under the Crime Victims’ 

Rights Act of 2004 (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771. Because 

Duncan did not adequately plead a claim under the CVRA 

in the Court of Federal Claims, we cannot consider the 

merits of such a claim in the first instance on appeal. See

Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 

1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[T]his court does not ‘review’ that 

which was not presented to the district court.”). The only 

issue for this court to consider is whether the Court of 

Federal Claims abused its discretion in dismissing this 

action, and we conclude that it did not. 

 

Rogers v. Andrus Transp. Servs., 502 F.3d 1147, 1151 

(10th Cir. 2007) (“Because the court’s order [dismissing 

without prejudice for failure to prosecute] closed the case, 

it is appealable.”); Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 76 

(2d Cir. 2004) (“We have jurisdiction to consider [a challenge to a Rule 41(b) dismissal] because a dismissal 

without prejudice that does not give leave to amend and 

closes the case is a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291.”) Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over this 

appeal. 
DUNCAN v. US 6

At most, Duncan asserts unsupported constitutional 

violations, contending without explanation that the Court 

of Federal Claims “violated the plaintiff’s right of due 

process” and “the right to protection from intimidation 

and harassment.” Appellant’s Informal Br., Response to 

Question 2. To the extent Duncan is arguing that dismissal for failure to prosecute under RCFC 41(b) is unconstitutional, she offers no basis for that contention, and 

that argument is without merit. Likewise, there is no 

support for her unelaborated claim relating to intimidation or harassment, and that argument must be rejected. 

Here, the Court of Federal Claims gave Duncan notice 

that failure to amend her complaint could result in dismissal of her case. In light of Duncan’s failure to respond 

to this order, and based on the serious deficiencies in the 

“complaint” that made proceeding with the case impossible without clarification of Duncan’s allegations, the 

Court of Federal Claims did not err in dismissing this 

action. Indeed, under RCFC 11(a), the court was required

to strike the complaint because it was not signed. See

RCFC 11(a) (“The court must strike an unsigned paper 

unless the omission is promptly corrected after being 

called to the attorney’s or party’s attention.”)(emphasis 

added); see also RCFC 12(f)(1) (permitting the court to 

strike from a pleading “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter”). Although Duncan is proceeding pro se, the court’s order was clear and 

unambiguous in stating that it could dismiss Duncan’s 

case if she did not submit an amended complaint. See

Mendoza v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 966 F.2d 650, 653–54 

(Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The court does not expect a pro se 

litigant to be made to jump through a confusing array of 

procedural hoops,” but “there was nothing mysterious or 

incomprehensible in the Show Cause Order”). In these 

circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. 
7 DUNCAN v. US

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Court 

of Federal Claims dismissing this action is affirmed. 

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

AFFIRMED