United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

I.B., Appellant 

and 

DEFENSE AGENCIES, DECA -- 

HEADQUARTERS, Fort Lee, VA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 15-1228 

Issued: August 1, 2016 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Lonnie L. Boylan, for the appellant1

Office of the Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On May 8, 2015 appellant, through her representative, filed a timely appeal from a 

November 14, 2014 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act2

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 

501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant sustained an emotional condition in the performance of 

duty. 

 1

 In all cases in which a representative has been authorized in a matter before the Board, no claim for a fee for 

legal or other service performed on appeal before the Board is valid unless approved by the Board. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 501.9(e). No contract for a stipulated fee or on a contingent fee basis will be approved by the Board. Id. An 

attorney or representative’s collection of a fee without the Board’s approval may constitute a misdemeanor, subject 

to fine or imprisonment for up to one year or both. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 292. Demands for payment of fees to a 

representative, prior to approval by the Board, may be reported to appropriate authorities for investigation. 

2

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On August 31, 2012 appellant, then a 52-year-old commissary management specialist, 

filed an occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging that she sustained an emotional 

condition as a result of her employment. She first became aware of her condition March 3, 2012 

and that it was caused or aggravated by her employment on April 4, 2012. Appellant stopped 

work on March 3, 2012. 

The record reflects that appellant had been working in a training program for commissary 

management for 19 of the past 30 years of her employment. Appellant was most recently 

stationed in Germany and requested a transfer to Virginia to be with her husband. When she 

arrived in Virginia, the commissary was under a reorganization and many people, including 

appellant, were detailed to different areas to address the new organization that was being 

implemented. The new initiative was called CLASS and the reorganization was a priority for the 

employing establishment. 

In a statement received on September 19, 2012, appellant indicated that in March 2012 

she was reassigned to the grocery team in the store operations unit. After her reassignment she 

experienced tension in the workplace and her workload increased. She provided a list of the tasks 

and projects she performed in March and April 2012, which she alleged constituted a heavy and 

time consuming workload. Appellant indicated that she regularly received information regarding 

her work assignments from various sources (coworkers, other leads, other directorates), but did 

not receive information through official channels. While still under the direction of a “temporary 

detail,” she was following orders from her current supervisor and was also tasked and given 

orders by other team leads. Appellant was extremely concerned about the tasks she was being 

assigned by others who did not notice her already heavy and time consuming workload. She 

indicated that her assignments changed constantly and information flowed through other people 

or by rumor. 

In April 2012, appellant requested an Alternate Work Schedule (AWS) with Mondays as 

her regular day off. However, after beginning her AWS, she started falling behind in her work. 

Appellant began to feel ill and experienced migraine headaches. At home, she was overcome 

with anxiety because she believed she could not afford to be sick due to her workload. Appellant 

had a conversation with her work lead, Bonita Moffett, about how the workload was affecting 

her health, but the dialog became agitated without any resolution of the issues. She told 

Ms. Moffett that she intended to speak to the next level supervisor, which only made matters 

worse. On April 4, 2012 appellant met with Jay Hudson, Deputy Director, to bring to his 

attention how the situation at Store Operations was affecting her health and might negatively 

impact her career. She stated that Mr. Hudson told her that she did not have a choice and must 

work on all projects assigned to her. Appellant requested reassignment, but he told her the only 

reassignment was to a store out of state. She indicated that this statement caused emotional 

distress as she did not understand what his intentions were. Appellant felt Mr. Hudson’s 

statement was heartless and intentionally stated to break her spirit and what small measure of 

wellbeing she still had left. 
3

Appellant noted that she had been on medical leave since May 2, 2012 and that all her 

accrued sick and annual leave had been exhausted, leaving her with no source of income. A 

copy of an October 2, 2012 request for reasonable accommodation was attached. 

In an August 9, 2012 report, Aaron Mexhoubat, PHD, a licensed therapist, diagnosed 

recurrent major depression; anxiety disorder (panic disorder); historic personality disorder; and 

other disorders. Several major life activities, such as seeing, eating, sleeping, speaking, 

concentration, thinking, and working, were noted to be substantially limited. Dr. Mexhoubat 

indicated that appellant was not able to perform her job. 

In a September 11, 2012 statement, Hector Granado, appellant’s former supervisor, stated 

that appellant was assigned to work with the grocery team within the store operations group with 

Ms. Moffett as appellant’s work leader. He noted that Ms. Moffett assigned appellant duties 

which were different from her previous duties. Appellant felt that she could not deal with either 

the workload or the type of work. Mr. Granado indicated that appellant would be provided 

training for the programs she was unfamiliar with (i.e., the tobacco program) and that other 

members of the grocery team would also learn the programs to help when needed. He saw the 

training begin, but lost visibility regarding the day to day goings on within store operations when 

he was reassigned to the vision team. 

In September 27, 2012 note, Dr. Banerje Koduru, a Board-certified psychiatrist, noted 

that appellant had been under his care since October 17, 2006. He opined that she would be 

unable to work from October 1 through November 1, 2012. 

In an October 2, 2012 letter, the employing establishment indicated that it would continue 

to grant appellant leave without pay until October 12, 2012, but that it needed administratively 

acceptable medical documentation for her to continue to be accommodated with leave or leave 

without pay for an extended period of time. 

In an October 8, 2012 report, Dr. Mexhoubat indicated that appellant was receiving 

outpatient psychotherapy. Based on the clinical and psychological assessment, appellant had 

anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, 

histrionic personality disorder. Dr. Mexhoubat indicated that her condition occurred shortly after 

she became aware of the excessive responsibilities that she had to complete. He noted that 

appellant believed that she could not complete all the aspects of her responsibilities. 

Dr. Koduru related that on October 26, 2012 appellant had been a patient since 

October 2006 and was doing well until May 2, 2012, when she decompensated significantly to 

the point of not being able to function at work. He indicated that she suffered with panic/anxiety 

attacks, bipolar disorder with severe depression, and was on medication. 

In a January 15, 2013 letter, the employing establishment indicated that statements from 

Gail Tolbert, one of the leads appellant worked with, and Mr. Granado, appellant’s immediate 

supervisor during that time period indicated that work assignments were normal for that area of 

operations and the workload was evenly distributed amongst all employees. It noted that 

appellant performed well until early 2012 when she started having trouble staying focused and 

focused instead on assignments that were not assigned to her. Her supervisor was informed by 
4

the lead that she had to direct appellant to stay focused. At that time, appellant’s work and 

attendance started to suffer. The individual statements from both Ms. Tolbert and Mr. Granado 

essentially agreed with appellant’s description of the tasks and projects which she had performed 

during March and April 2012. Mr. Granado indicated that the environment was the normal 

hectic pace of the organization. He indicated that with any new organization there were 

unanticipated assignments. Mr. Granado also explained that there were new initiatives that were 

under-resourced, misaligned or mistimed. He stated that the new organization offered many 

challenges to all personnel. Staff was asked to rise to the challenge and accept new assignments 

that previously were accomplished in many other areas of the agency. He indicated that the 

work pace was hectic. 

In a July 2, 2013 letter, OWCP advised appellant of the deficiencies in her claim and 

requested additional medical and factual evidence, including responses to its questionnaire. 

Appellant was provided 30 days to submit the requested information. No new evidence was 

received other than a congressional inquiry. 

By decision dated August 20, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim on the basis she had 

not identified any compensable factors of employment. 

On August 18, 2014 appellant, through her representative, requested reconsideration. In 

an August 18, 2014 statement, she reiterated that, after a period of time at her new duty station, 

she began to experience anxiety because she felt that she was going to be unsuccessful in 

accomplishing her regular and additional special tasks assigned by her employing establishment. 

Appellant voluntarily requested transfer to other positions in hopes that her employing 

establishment would take that into consideration that her constant fear and anxiety of not being 

successful in her current position was real. She noted being anxious and having thoughts that 

she would lose her job due to being unsuccessful. Appellant stopped work on March 3, 2012 as 

her fear and anxiety became overwhelming. She indicated that it became clear to her and 

Dr. Mexhoubat that although certain aspects of the work environment were contributing, the 

actual underlying cause of her psychological condition was due to her constant fear of not being 

able to successfully carry out the assigned duties required by her job and specially assigned tasks 

from her supervisor. 

In an August 18, 2014 letter, appellant’s representative presented arguments and 

indicated that the new medical evidence indicated that appellant’s medical condition was caused 

and/or contributed to by her work. Additional reports from Dr. Mekhoubat dated March 4 and 

May 22, 2014 were also submitted. 

By decision dated November 14, 2014, OWCP denied modification of the prior decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

FECA provides compensation for the disability of an employee resulting from personal 

injury sustained while in the performance of duty.3

 As the Board explained in Lillian Cutler,

4

 3 Id. at § 8102(a). 

4

 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 
5

when an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment duties or 

has fear and anxiety regarding his or her ability to carry out his or her duties, and the medical 

evidence establishes that the disability resulted from his or her emotional reaction to such 

situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course 

of employment. This is true where the employee’s disability resulted from his or her emotional 

reaction to his or her day-to-day duties. The same result is reached where the emotional 

disability resulted from the employee’s emotional reaction to a special assignment or 

requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the nature of his or her work. On the 

other hand, the disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear 

of a reduction-in-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular 

environment or to hold a particular position.5

An employee’s emotional reaction to administrative or personnel matters generally falls 

outside the scope of FECA.6

 Although related to the employment, administrative and personnel 

matters are functions of the employing establishment rather than the regular or specially assigned 

duties of the employee.7

 However, to the extent the evidence demonstrates that the employing 

establishment either erred or acted abusively in discharging its administrative or personnel 

responsibilities, such action will be considered a compensable employment factor.8 

Appellant has the burden of establishing by the weight of the reliable, probative, and 

substantial evidence that an emotional condition was caused or adversely affected by her 

employment.9 Neither the fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of 

employment, nor the belief that the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by 

employment factors or incidents is sufficient to establish a causal relationship.10

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working 

conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its 

adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are 

deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when 

providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed 

factors of employment and may not be considered.11 If a claimant does implicate a factor of 

employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that 

 5

 The Board in Cutler found that when an employee becomes upset over not receiving a promotion, the resulting 

disability does not have such a relationship to the employee’s assigned duties as to be regarded as arising from the 

employment. “The emotional reaction in such circumstances can be truly described as self-generated and as not 

arising out of or in the course of the employment.” 

6 Andrew J. Sheppard, 53 ECAB 170, 171 (2001); Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421, 423 (2001). 

7 David C. Lindsey, Jr., 56 ECAB 263, 268 (2005). 

8 Id. 

9 See Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB 258 (2004). 

10 See Ronald K. Jablanski, 56 ECAB 616 (2005); Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215, 218 (1997). 

11 See Norma L. Blank, 43 ECAB 384, 389-90 (1992). 
6

factor. When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of 

record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of 

the medical evidence.12 Causal relationship is a medical issue and the medical evidence 

generally required to establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence. 

Rationalized medical opinion evidence is medical evidence which includes a physician’s detailed 

explanation regarding the causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition and the 

compensable employment factors.13

ANALYSIS 

Appellant contended that she sustained an emotional condition on or about March 3, 2012 

which resulted from her reassignment to the grocery team, during the reorganization of the 

commissary. In general, an emotional reaction arising from an employing establishment 

reorganization is not a compensable factor as it is akin to an employee’s desire to work within a 

particular environment.14 

However, since Cutler,15 the Board has consistently held that emotional reactions to 

situations in which an employee is attempting to meet his or her position requirements, when 

supported by sufficient evidence, are compensable.16 The Board has found that when a 

reorganization affected a claimant in the performance of his or her regular duties, a compensable 

factor may arise with substantiating evidence. In Donald E. Ewals, the Board remanded the case 

for further factual development as to the affect the reorganization had on the claimant’s work 

duties.17

The Board finds that in the present case appellant has established that the reorganization 

affected her ability to perform her assigned duties. 

Appellant contended that she sustained an emotional condition on or about March 3, 2012 

in meeting the newly assigned requirements of her position with the grocery team. She alleged 

that she was overwhelmed by the workload and the nature of her assignments. Dr. Mexhoubat 

indicated that appellant’s condition occurred shortly after she became aware of the excessive 

responsibilities that she had to complete. He explained that appellant believed she could not 

complete all the aspect of her responsibilities. 

 12 Id. 

13 Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730, 741-42 (1990). 

14 Donald E. Ewals, 45 ECAB 111 (1993) (where appellant contested both the manner of the reorganization and 

his assignment, the preference for a certain assignment was noncompensable, but the case was remanded to 

determine the effect of the reorganization upon his specific job duties). 

15 Supra note 4. 

16 See Tina D. Francis, 56 ECAB 180 (2004). See also Georgia F. Kennedy, 35 ECAB 1151, 1155 (1984); 

Joseph A. Antal, 34 ECAB 608, 612 (1983). 

17 Donald E. Ewals, supra note 14. 
7

Mr. Granado, appellant’s immediate supervisor at the time, supported that appellant 

experienced: multiple supervisors to whom she was answering, new tasks for which she felt 

unprepared, unanticipated assignments, under-resourced staffing, and a hectic pace. 

It is appellant’s emotional reaction to the requirements imposed by the employing 

establishment that triggers coverage under FECA. Appellant attempted to meet the production 

requirements and the evidence reflects she did so, but the stress of doing so caused or aggravated 

her emotional condition. That she was fully able to complete her tasks in a timely manner does 

not mean that her regular and specially assigned duties caused her no stress. Given that these 

duties were part of appellant’s job requirements, the Board finds that she has established 

compensable employment factors related to tasks assigned to her while assigned to the grocery 

team.18 

In the present case, appellant has established a compensable employment factor with 

respect to her established work duties performed in March and April 2012. As she has 

established a compensable employment factor, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of 

the medical evidence. It found that there were no compensable employment factors and did not 

analyze or develop the medical evidence. The case will be remanded to OWCP for this 

purpose.19 After such further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo

decision on this claim.20

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that this case is not in posture for decision. As appellant has established 

a compensable factor of employment, OWCP must review the medical evidence. After such 

further development as deemed necessary, OWCP shall issue a de novo decision on this matter. 

 18 Supra note 4. 

19 See D.C., Docket No. 09-1274 (issued March 18, 2010); see also Lorraine E. Schroeder, 44 ECAB 323, 

330 (1992). 

20 Due to the disposition of this case, appellant’s representative’s arguments on appeal will not be addressed. 
8

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the November 14, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is set aside, and the case remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision of the Board. 

Issued: August 1, 2016 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board