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ANNICE HALE,
Plaintiff,

V. No. 18-1607T (Pro Se) (Filed: May 14, 2019)

Keywords: Subject-MatterJurisdiction; Tax Refund; Offset; Illegal Exaction; Presumption ofCorrectness; I.R.C. § 6511; I.R.C. § 6532; I.R.C. § 7422; Statute ofLimitations.

THEUNITED STATES OFAMERICA, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Defendant.



## ________________ )

Annice Hale, Houston, TX, pro se.
Katherine R. Powers, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department ofJustice, Tax Division, Court ofFederal Claims Section, Washington, DC, with whom were G. Robson Stewart, Assistant Chief, Comi of Federal Claims Section, David

### l Pincus, Chief, Court ofFederal Claims Section, and RichardE. Zuckerman, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER KAPLAN, Judge.

In this tax refund case, pro se PlaintiffAnnice Hale claims that she is entitled to a refund oftaxes for the tax years 2012through 2017 because the government improperly adjusted downwardthe refunds claimed in herreturns for each ofthose tax years. Ms. Hale's complaint, liberally construed, also alleges civil rights andtmi claims against the government in connection withthese tax-related government actions. The government has moved to dismiss Ms. Hale's complaintunder Rules 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) ofthe Rules ofthe Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC").
As discussed below, the Comilacks subject-matterjurisdiction overMs. Hale's civil rights andtort claims, part ofher 2012 tax refund claim, and her 2014 refund claim. Moreover, Ms. Hale has failed to state a claim withrespect to tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017, as well
as the portion ofher claimfor tax year 2012 over which the Comi hasjurisdiction. As to these remaining claims Ms. Hale's allegations, taken as true, do not establish any claimupon which reliefcanbe granted.

7018 0040 0001 1393 1280BACKGROUND1

Ms. Hale's complaint alleges that her tax refunds have been improperly "adjusted staiiing year 2012 through current year 2017." Comp!. at 4, DocketNo. 1. She further states thatthe government has violated her "Rightto a Fair and Just Tax System," "Rightto Quality Tax Service," "Rightto Pay no more than the CorrectAmount ofTax," "Rightto be Informed," and "Rightto Finality." Id. According to Ms. Hale, the government has violated her civil rights by "diminishing"her credit history and causing her "financial disparity." Id.
Ms. Hale claims the following refund amounts for each tax year at issue:

Tax Refund Adjusted Difference (Additional Year Claimed Refund Refund Claimed) 

### 2012 $2,975.61 $757.69 $2,217.92 

### 2013 $2,844.39 $1,732.00 $1,112.39 

### 2014 $2,938.20 $1,668.00 $1,270.20 

### 2015 $3,359.00 $1,811.88 $1,547.12 

### 2016 $4,154.00 $2,604.30 $1,549.70 

### 2017 $5,400.00 $1,980.02 $3,419.98

The government filed its motion to dismiss pursuantto RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) on February 25, 2019. DocketNo. 12. The government has construed Ms. Hale's complaint as alleging claims for violation ofcivil rights, tortious damages, and claims for tax refunds for the tax years 2012 through 2017. It contends that the Court lacksjurisdiction over several ofMs. Hale's claims and that, as to the remaining claims, she has failed to state a claim upon which reliefcanbe granted. The collli received Ms. Hale'sresponse to the government's motion on April 8, 2019, and received the government's reply three days earlier, as the government had already received its own copy ofthe response the previous month. DocketNos. 13-14.2 The Court agrees withthe governmentthat Ms. Hale's entire complaintmust be dismissed.

1The facts set forth below are based onthe allegations in Ms. Hale's complaint, as well as jurisdictional facts drawn from the government's motionto dismiss, Ms. Hale'sresponse, andthe documents attachedto the paiiies' filings.

2 As summarized in a previous order ofthe Court, itis considering Ms. Hale'sresponse to have beentimely filed despite the fact thatthe court did not receive its copy ofthe documentuntil April 8, 2019. Order at 2, DocketNo. 15. Ms. Hale first attempted to send the response to the court viaFedEx on March 20, 2019, and the government received a copy the following week. Id.

2

### DISCUSSION


### I. Jurisdictional Principles


### A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Whether a court hasjurisdictionto decide a case is a threshold matter, and, ifno jurisdiction exists, the courtmust order dismissal without proceeding further. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BetterEnv't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998); RCFC 12(h)(3). The plaintiffbears the burden ofestablishing subject-matterjurisdictionby a preponderance ofthe evidence. Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Itis well established that complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, even prose plaintiffs must persuade the court thatjurisdictional requirements have beenmet. Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497,499 (2004), affd, 98 F. App'x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Further, the Court has "anindependent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdictionexists, even in the absence ofa challenge from any party." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp

.. 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Thus, the Courtmay raise the issue ofsubject-matterjurisdiction sua sponte at any time, see Rick's Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2008), and may "inquire intojurisdictional facts" to determine whether it hasjurisdiction, Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991,993 (Fed. Cir. 1991).


### B. The Court ofFederal Claims's Jurisdiction over Tax Refund Cases
The Tucker Act grants the Court ofFederal Claimsjurisdictionto hear "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any regulation ofan executive depa1iment, or upon any express or implied contract withthe United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). It is well established that thisjurisdictional grant extends to suits for the refund oftaxes remitted to the Treasury. See Ont. Power Generation v. United States, 369 F.3d 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ledfordv. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(l) (grantingthe Court ofFederal Claims concurrentjurisdictionwiththe district comis over civil actions "againstthe United States for the recovery ofany internal-revenue tax allegedto have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws").
This Court's exercise ofthatjurisdictionis subject, however, to several statutory and jurisprudentialprerequisites. See Ishler v. United States, 115 Fed. Cl. 530, 534-36 (2014). Among these is the requirement set forth in I.RC. §7422(a) that the taxpayer file an administrative refund request before filing a tax refund suit. Specifically, § 7422(a) provides that:
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any comi for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or



### 3collected

. . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions oflaw in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.
I.R.C. §7422(a). Moreover, under§ 651 l(a), the taxpayer must file the administrative refund request withinthe later of"3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid."Further, "unless a claim for refund ofa tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by§ 651 l(a), a suit for refund

... may not be maintained in any court." United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596,602 (1990).
In additionto filing a timely administrative refund request, a taxpayer wishingto file a tax refund suit in the Court ofFederal Claims must adhere to the filing restrictions set forth in I.R.C. § 6532(a)(l). That sectionprovides as follows:
No suit or proceeding

... for the recovery ofany internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall bebegunbefore the expiration of6 months from the date offiling the claim

... unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within that time, nor aftertheexpirationof2yearsfrom the date ofmailingby cettifiedmail orregistered mail bythe Secretary to the taxpayer ofa notice ofthe disallowance ofthe patt of the claimto which the suit orproceeding relates.
I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). Thus, ifthe IRS disallows the taxpayer's administrative refund request, the taxpayer must file suit withintwo years ofthe date that the IRS mailed the taxpayerthe notice of that disallowance; otherwise, the comtwill lackjurisdiction. Harper Int'! Corp. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 66, 72-73 (2015) (dismissing case for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdictionwhere plaintifffailed to file refund suit withintwo years ofnotice ofdisallowance); !shier, 115 Fed. Cl. at 534-35 (statute oflimitations set forth in§ 6532(a)(l) is ajurisdictional prerequisite); Brach v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 60, 67-68 (2011) (same); see also Rosser v. United States, 9 F.3d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he two-year statute oflimitations laid out in 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l) begins to run in every case on the date the IRS mails the taxpayer a notice of disallowance, whether or notthe taxpayer actually receives the notice.").


### II. The Court's Subject-Matter Jurisdiction over Ms. Hale's Claims
A. 

### Civil Rights and Tort Claims
As noted, the government has construed Ms. Hale's asse1tions concerning violations of cettain alleged rights as civil rights and tortious damages claims. The Court concurs with this interpretation ofMs. Hale'sreferences to alleged violations ofher "Rightto a Fair and Just Tax System," "Rightto Quality Tax Service," "Rightto Pay no more than the Correct Amount of Tax," "Rightto be Informed," and "Rightto Finality," as well as her allegations thatthe government's actions have damaged her credit history and caused her "financial disparity." Comp!. at 4; see also Pl. Resp. Mem. ("Pl.'sResp.") at 99, DocketNo. 13.
The Court finds that it lacks subject-matterjurisdiction overthese claims. The TuckerAct
serves as a waiver ofsovereign immunity and ajurisdictional grant, butit does not create a substantive cause ofaction. Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A plaintiff, therefore, must establish that "aseparate source ofsubstantive



### 4law

... creates the rightto money damages." Id. (quoting Fisherv. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in relevantpart)); Rick'sMushroom Serv., Inc., 521 F.3d at 1343 ("[P]laintiffmust look beyond the Tucker Act to identify a substantive source oflawthat creates the right to recovery ofmoney damages againstthe United States."). Inthis case, Ms. Hale has not identified any such "source ofsubstantive law" providing reliefin this court for the civil rights and tort claims set fo1ih in her complaint. Indeed, it is well settled that the Court ofFederal Claims lacksjurisdictionover tort claims. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621,623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)). Similarly, this Court lacksjurisdiction "to entertain claims involving race, sex, and age discrimination or other claims involving civil rights violations." Cottrell v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 144, 149 (1998). Although Ms. Hale's response reiterates her positionthat the Court hasjurisdiction over her civil rights claims, Pl.'s Resp. at 99, she has notprovided any authority or substantive argumentto contradictthe governing case law cited above. Thus, Ms. Hale has not invoked any source ofsubstantive law providing the rightto money damages related to the non-refund claims set fmih in her complaint. The Courtwill therefore dismiss these claims for lack ofsubjectmatterjurisdiction.


### B. Refund Claim for the 2012 Tax Year
Ms. Hale's return for the 2012 tax year requested a total refund of$2,975.61. Pl.'s Resp. at 13

### I. This was based ontotal self-employmenttax of$1,193.39 subtracted from total credits of $3,169 for the Earned Income Credit ("EIC") and $1,000 for the American Opportunity Credit. Id. Ms. Hale'stax transcript and another line inher returnreflect that her self-employmenttax was actually $1,192.39, rounded down to $1,192.00. Id.; Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") Ex. I, at App. 2, DocketNo. 12. The IRS also found thatMs. Hale incorrectly calculated her EIC and reduced it from $3,169 to $3,069. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 2, at App. 4.
The foregoing adjustments translated to an expected refund of$2,877.00. Id. However, the refund was offset in the amount of$2,119.31 by the Bureau ofFiscal Service to satisfy a "past-due non-tax government agency debt [Ms. Hale] owed." Id. This left a remaining refund of $757.69, which the IRS issued to Ms. Hale on March 20, 2013. Id.
Documents submitted with Ms. Hale's response indicate that the offset was accomplished to satisfy a purported debt Ms. Hale owedto FEMA. See Pl.'s Resp. at 142, 144, 147. These records showthat, inDecember 2012, an "unpaid delinquent debt" to FEMA was referred to the Department ofthe Treasury for collection. Id. at 142. The amount ofthe debt was listed as $2,095.40. Id. Based onthis referral, and in accordance with I.R.C. § 6402(d)(l)(A), $2,119.31 ofMs. Hale'srefund for tax year 2012 was withheld as an offsetto repay FEMA. 3
I.R.C. § 6402(g) states inpertinentpart that "[n]o court ofthe United States shall have jurisdictionto hear any action, whether legal or equitable, broughtto restrain orreview a

3 I.R.C. §6402(d)(l)(A) states, in pertinent part, that "[u]ponreceiving notice from any Federal agency that a namedperson owes a past-due legally enforceable debt

... the Secretary shall

... reduce the amount ofany overpayment payable to such person by the amount ofsuch debt."



### 5reduction authorizedby subsection (c), (d), (e), or (f)."To the extent, therefore, that Ms. Hale is seeking review ofthe IRS'sreduction ofher tax refund to offset a debt she owed to FEMA, the Court lacksjurisdictionto consider it.
Section 6402(g) also provides, however, that it "does notpreclude any legal, equitable, or administrative action againstthe Federal agency
... to which the amount ofsuch reduction was paid." Indeed, where a tax refund is offsetto pay a debtto another agency, the plaintiffmay have
a cognizable illegal exaction claim againstthat agency. See Flander v. United States, 737 F. App'x 530, 532-33 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Court ofFederal Claims erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction over claim arising out oftax-refund offsets because plaintiffpled claim for illegal exaction); Greene v. United States, 124 Fed. Cl. 636,641 (2015) ("The Court ofFederal Claims possessesjurisdiction over an illegal exaction claim based on an offset pursuantto 31 U.S.C. § 3720A."); Ibrahim v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 333,336 (2013) (although court lacked jurisdiction over tax refund claim, court did possessjurisdictionover a claim against agency "for illegal exaction of[the plaintiffs] tax refund bythe means ofan offset").
The Court is cognizant ofits obligationto construe aproseplaintiffs complaint liberally. Nonetheless, in this case, it is apparentthatMs. Hale's complaint does not state a claim for an illegal exaction against FEMA. Beside the fact thatthere is no mention ofFEMA inthe complaint, the record indicates thatMs. Hale ultimately securedrepayment ofthe offset amount fromFEMA. 4
As to the $100 reduction inMs. Hale's 2012 refund due to the IRS's recalculation ofher EIC, the Couttfinds that it has subject-matterjurisdiction overthatportion ofMs. Hale's 2012 tax refund claim. As set out in more detail below, an original or amended tax return rep01ting an overpayment functions as a claim for refund sufficientto satisfy thejurisdictional prerequisite set f01th in I.RC.§ 651 l(a). See 26 C.F.R. §301.6402-3(a)(5). Ms. Hale filed a tax return and, later, two amended returns for 2012. The amended returns both qualify as timely claims for refund because they were filed within three years ofthe original return. I.R.C. § 6511(a); Def.'s Mot. Ex. 1, at App. 2 (reflecting amended returns filed in April and June of2015, following original return filed onApril 15, 2013). Accordingly, Ms. Hale fulfilled§ 6511 's requirementto file a timely administrative claim for refund or credit.

4Documents submitted with Ms. Hale's response include an April 2013 affidavit in which she described previous communications with FEMA and requested that it return the $2,119.31 that
was offset from her refund. Pl.'sResp. at 144. A November 2013 email submittedby Ms. Hale reveals that she appealed the FEMA offset decision and thather appeal was granted butthat she had not yet receivedpaymentfrom FEMA. Id. at 147. According to the email, the representative
on the phone told Ms. Hale thatthe agency's records reflected that she would be receiving a refund. Id. Ms. Hale states in herresponse to the government's motion to dismiss that she was "eventually after a longtime refundedthe Expedite Fund Amount for 2005 and 2006," although "IRS keptthe remaining balance." Id. at 101. 

### It is unclear what "remaining balance" Ms. Hale is referencing; unless it is the $100 reduction based onthe IRS's recalculation ofher EIC, which is addressed in the text above.



### 6Further, while the IRS sent Ms. Hale at least two letters explaining the $100 reduction in her EIC, it never sent a notice ofdisallowance concerning her claim for that sum. Pl.'sResp. at 40 (June 1, 2015 letter explaining mathematical errormade in calculating EIC in amended 2012 return); id. at 52 (September 10, 2015 letter restating IRS'spositionthat 2012 EIC was calculated incorrectly and had been reduced from $3,169 to $3,069). Thus, the two-year statute oflimitations set forth in§ 6532 was nevertriggered, and Ms. Hale's complaintis timely with respect to this portion ofher 2012 tax refund claim. 5The Court has subject-matterjurisdictionto adjudicate that claim.
C. Refund Claim for the 2014 TaxYear
The government contends that Ms. Hale's tax refund claim for the 2014 tax year is timeban·ed. Tax refund claims brought in this courtpursuantto I.R.C. § 7422(a) are subjectto a twoyear statute oflimitations measured "fromthe date ofmailing

...to the taxpayer ofa notice of the disallowance ofthe part ofthe [administrative] claimto which the suit or proceeding relates." l.R.C. § 6532(a)(l). Documents submitted bythe parties in this case establishthat the IRS sent Ms. Hale a patiial disallowance letter regarding her claim for refund on September 9, 2015, which gave her until September 9, 2017 to file any related suit. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 9, at App. 37-38; Pl.'s Resp. at 48-51. The present lawsuit was not filed until October 11, 2018. See generally Comp!. Accordingly, the Comi agrees withthe government that Ms. Hale's complaint
was untimely withrespectto her claim for a refund for the 2014 tax year. This claim must therefore be dismissed for lack ofsubject-matterjurisdiction.


### D. Refund Claims for TaxYears 2013,2015,2016, and 2017
As to the remainingtax years covered inthe complaint, the Courthas determined that it has subject-matterjurisdictionto heat· Ms. Hale's claims. Similar to the $100 adjustmentto her 2012 EIC, Ms. Hale filed a claim for refund inthe form ofher tax return and, in some instances, amended tax returns for these tax years. Moreover, the documents before the Comi indicate that

5The Comi observes that inUnited States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Min. Co., 553 U.S. 1 (2008), the Supreme Comi suggested-butdid not hold-thatin the absence ofanother, more specific limitations period, tax refund cases are subjectto the federal "outside limit" six-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. A.S. Kreider Co., 313 U.S. 443, 447 (1941)). The Supreme Court thus implied thatthe Court ofClaims was incorrect in its 1955 holding that the six-year general statute oflimitations never applies in tax refund cases. See Detroit Trust Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 223, 226-28 (1955) (finding that six-year statute oflimitations did not bar action based inpart onrefund claim filed in 1917 and disallowed in 1951, where suit was filed withintwo years of 1951 disallowance); Wagenet v. United States, No. 08-142, 2009 WL 4895363, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2009) (applyingthe sixyear statute oflimitations setfmih in 28 U.S.C. § 240l(a) because where "no notice of disallowance was mailed

... Section 6532(a)(l) does not apply"). Ms. Hale filed suit within six years ofher claims for refund. With respect to her$100 EIC claim for tax year 2012, Ms. Hale's complaint is timely because her last amendedreturn (in other words, her claim for refund) for 2012 was filed on June 15, 2015 and her complaint was filed on October 11, 2018. Def.'sMot. Ex. 1, at App. 2; see generally Comp!.



### 7the IRS never sent Ms. Hale a notice ofdisallowance ofthe claims in question. Accordingly, and
as explained in further detail below, the Court mayproperly exercise subject-matterjurisdiction
over these claims.


### 1. Ms. Hale Filed Claims for Refund
As noted above, a taxpayer must "duly file[]" a "claim for refund or credit" before bringing a tax refund claim in this comi. I.R.C. §7422(a). Here, Ms. Hale filed an income tax return for each year at issue, and for certaintax years she filed one or more amended returns. See Def.'sMot. Ex. 3, at App. 7 (2013 tax year); id. Ex. 10, at App. 40 (2015 tax year); id. Ex. 14, at App. 61 (2016 tax year); id. Ex. 18, at App. 90 (2017 tax year). Treasury regulations provide that "[a] properly executed

... original income tax return or an amended return

... shall constitute a claim for refund or credit within the meaning ofsection 6402 and section 6511 for the amount of the overpayment disclosed by such return (or amended return)." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402-3(a)(5). Thus, Ms. Hale'sreturns (and amended returns) for tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 constituted claims for refund because they reflected an overpayment oftaxes and requested refunds in varying amounts. See, e.g
.. VanCanagan v. United States, 231 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (taxpayer's return was also claim for refund); Murdock v. United States, 103 Fed. CL 389,394 (2012) ("The filing ofatax return reporting overpayments constitutes a simultaneous filing of [ a claim for refund]."); Simmons v. United States, 29 Fed. CL 136, 140 (1993) ("[R]atherthan file a separate claim for refund, a taxpayer may use his tax return as the refund claim.") (citing Mcllvaine v. United States, 23 CL Ct. 439,442 (1991)). Because an income tax return or amended return may also serve as a claim for refund, the Comifinds that Ms. Hale filed claims for refund when she filed her returns and amended returns for tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017.
Ms. Hale's claims for refund were also timely. As the Federal Circuit explained in VanCanagan, a claim for refund filed as part ofa return is timely because it is "filed within three years of(actually on the same date as) the filing ofthe return." 231 F.3d at 1351. In addition, Ms. Hale's amended returns for the subjecttax years were also filed withinthree years ofthe corresponding original returns. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 3, at App. 7 (two amended tax returns for 2013 filed in April 2015 and July 2015, respectively, withinthree years oforiginal returnfiled on April 15, 2014); id. Ex. 10, at App. 40 (two amended returns for 2015 filed within same calendar year as original retmn filed on April 15, 2016); id. Ex. 14, at App. 61 (amended return for 2016 filed on same date as original return filed April 15, 2017). For these reasons, the Comifinds that Ms. Hale filed timely claims for refund for tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017.


### 2. The IRS Did Not Send Notices ofDisallowance Corresponding to Ms. Hale's Remaining Claims
Under I.R.C. § 6532(a)(l), a taxpayer mustwait at least six months from the date she filed a claim for refund to bring a tax refund suit in this court. Moreover, the taxpayer's time to file suit expires two years afterthe IRS sends a notice ofdisallowance ofthe claim. Id.
In the present case, the documents submittedbythe parties suggest that the IRS never sent Ms. Hale a notice ofdisallowance ofher claims for tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017. In contrast, and as discussed above, the IRS sent Ms. Hale such a notice disallowing herrefund



### 8claim for tax year 2014. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 9, at App. 37-38; Pl.'s Resp. at 48-51. As to the othertax years at issue, the IRS's c01Tespondence with Ms. Hale took other forms. For instance, it sent Ms. Hale "matherror notices" using form letter 474C for tax years 2013 and 2017, a 288C letterrequesting more information for tax year 2015, and a 

### l2C letter requesting more information for tax year 2016. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 5, at App. 15 (letter 474C advising c01Tections onamended return for 2013); Pl.'s Resp. at 44 (same); Def.'s Mot. Ex. 13, at App. 56 (letter 288C asking for more information in order to process 2015 return); id. Ex. 16, at App. 81 (letter 12C requesting additional information regarding 2016 taxes); Pl.'s Resp. at 93 (letter 474C informing Ms. Hale ofcorrections to her 2017 return). Although a notice ofdisallowance need nottake any "particularform," it must adequately notify the taxpayer "ofthe Commissioner's adverse action" in orderto trigger the two-year statute oflimitations set forth in § 6532. Smith v. United States, 478 F.2d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Miller v. United States, 117 F.3d 1414 (Table), 1997 WL 381958, at *2 (4th Cir. 1997). Internal guidance from the IRS suggests that-among other criteria-anotice of disallowance must informthe taxpayer ofher "rightto file suit" and ofthe "periodin which suit may befiled." ChiefCounsel Advisory, IRS CCA 200203002 (Jan. 18, 2002). Notices informing taxpayers that the IRS needs more informationto process a claim, along with math error notices
or similar correspondence, typically fail to adequately notify taxpayers ofa final adverse action
or oftheir rightto file suit within two years. Id.; Form ofNotice ofDisallowance ofa Refund Claim Refund Suits, FED. TAX COORDINATOR,! T-9022 (2d ed. 2019) (discussing "dual purposes" ofinforming taxpayer offinal disallowance and ofthe right to sue along with applicable statute oflimitations). Here, none ofthe correspondence in the record pertaining to tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 meets these criteria for effective notices ofdisallowance. They do not inform Ms. Hale ofherrightto sue or ofthe applicable two-year limitations period. The government does not assert that the IRS ever sent notices ofdisallowance with respect to these tax years. By contrast, the government (and Ms. Hale) submitted evidence ofthe notice ofdisallowance the IRS sent withrespect to Ms. Hale's claims for tax year 2014. That notice unambiguously disallowed Ms. Hale's claims and informed her ofher rightto sue, as well as the limitations period. See Def.'s Mot. Ex. 9, at App. 37-38; Pl.'s Resp. at48-51. The Court concludes that the two-year statute of limitations provided by § 6532 never began to run with respectto these claims, meaning they are subjectto the "outside limit" six-year statute oflimitations set forth in28 U.S.C. §2401(a). 6 Because the relevant claims for refund were filed starting in2014 (original tax returnfor 2013) and her complaintwas filed in October 2018, Ms. Hale's complaint is timely with respect to her 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 tax refund claims. The Comi, therefore, has subject-matter jurisdictionto adjudicate these claims.


### III. Ms. Hale's Complaint Fails To State a Claim as to Her Remaining Claims
When considering a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim under RCFC 12(b)(6), the comi accepts as true the complaint'sundisputed factual allegations and construes them inthe light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court

6 See note 5, supra.



### 9also draws all reasonable inferences in favor ofthe non-moving paiiy. Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001). So construed, the plaintiffs allegations must "raise [the] right to reliefabove the speculative level." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, the plaintiffs claim must be plausible on its face. Id. at 570; see also Acceptance Ins. Cos., Inc. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849, 853 (Fed. Cir. 2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiffpleads factual contentthat allows the courtto drawthe reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, in tax refund cases, there is a "presumption ofthe correctness ofthe findings ofthe Commissioner oflnternal Revenue." Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 549,560 (2014); see also WMI Holdings Corp. v. United States, 891 F.3d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ("It is well established that, in a tax refund case, the ruling ofthe Commissioner ofInternal Revenue is presumed correct.") (internal quotations and alteration omitted). The taxpayer mustrebut the presumption ofcorrectness by "com[ing] forward with enough evidence to support a finding contraryto the Commissioner's determination." Bubble Room, Inc. v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 561 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The taxpayer must also "prove the amount ofthe refund due." WM! Holdings, 891 F.3d at 1021-22 (citing United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,440 (1976); Bubble Room, Inc., 159 F.3d at 561).
Withthese principles in mind, the Comiturns to its analysis ofMs. Hale's remaining refund claims for tax years 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017. The government asserts thatthese remaining claims should be dismissed because Ms. Hale "fails to state a substantive basis for the claims and cannot overcomethe [presumption] ofcorrectness." Def.'s Mot. at 12 (capitalization altered). The Comiagrees with the government as to these tax years-and withrespectto the 2012 $100 EIC claim-forthe reasons discussed below.7


### A. 2012 TaxYear: Reduction ofMs. Hale's Claimed Earned Income Credit
The Court finds that Ms. Hale has failed to state a claim upon which reliefmay be granted with respectto the $100 EIC reduction for the 2012 tax year. Nothing in her complaint or response supplies any basis for the Comito conclude thatthe IRS was incorrectto reduce her EIC. Ms. Hale's response to the government's motion, insofar as it concerns tax year 2012, is mostly focused on the offsettaken from her refund to pay an alleged FEMA debt. Ms. Hale makes no mention ofthe $100 EIC reduction, unless her reference to "theremaining balance" of herrefund, which she alleges the IRS has improperlyretained, refers to that sum. See Pl.'s Resp. at 101. In any event, Ms. Hale has not presented sufficient evidence or argument to overcome the presumption ofcorrectness as to this adjustmentto her claimed 2012 EIC. She has therefore failed to state a claimupon which reliefcan be granted andthe Court must dismiss this claim withprejudice.

7 The government did not specifically address the $100 EIC claim in its submissions to the Comi.



### 10

### B. 2013 Tax Year
Ms. Hale's original return for the 2013 tax year claimed an EIC of$3,250.00, a refundable education credit of$1,000.00, and a total refund of$2,844.39. Id. Ex. 4, at App. 11- 12; id. Ex. 5, at App. 15. The IRS reducedthe EiC to $3,137.00, disallowed the education credit, and issued a refund of$1,732.00. Id. Ex. 3, at App. 7. Ms. Hale later filed amended returns on April 1, 2015 and July 1, 2015. Id. On September 7, 2015, the IRS abated the entire $1,405.00 it had assessed in tax when Ms. Hale filed her original return. Id. It then issued her an additional refund of$1,462.98, including $57.98 ininterest. Id. Thus, the IRS paid a total of$3,194.98 in refunds and interest to Ms. Hale in connection withthe 2013 tax year (first refund of$1,732.00 plus second refund of$1,462.98 including interest). This exceeds Ms. Hale's original requested refund of$2,844.39. Nothing in her complaint contradicts or rebuts the IRS's records ofthese transactions, and her response to the motion to dismiss further confirms that she received one refund of$1,732.00 and a later refund of$1,405.00 for the 2013 tax year. Pl.'s Resp. at 105. Accordingly, Ms. Hale's complaint fails to state a claim as to the 2013 tax yearbecause she has already received refunds which together exceed the refund sherequested in her return for that year. 

### C. 2015 Tax Year
Ms. Hale's return for tax year 2015 requested a refund of$3,359.00. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 11, at App. 43. Along withher Form 1040, Ms. Hale filed a Schedule C-EZ and Schedule SE reporting netprofit from herbusiness as a daycare provider. Id. at App. 44, 48. The Schedule SE rep011ed total self-employment tax of$1,547.19, although the official IRS returntranscript lists the amount as $1,547.12. Id. at App. 48; id. Ex. 12, at App. 54. However, this amount was not transferredto Line 57 ofMs. Hale's Form 1040, as instructed by the Schedule SE. Compare id. Ex. 11, at App. 48 (instructions on Schedule SE) with id. at App. 43 (Form 1040 with amount for Line 57 listed as "O"). Therefore, the IRS reduced Ms. Hale's requested refund of$3,359.00 by the amount ofself-employmenttax owed ($1,547.12) and issued her a total refund of$1,81l.88. Id. Ex. 12, at App. 55.
Ms. Hale's complaint does not allege any facts which contradictthe conclusionthatthe IRS properly deducted from herrequested refund the self-employment tax listed on her Schedule SE and omitted from her Form 1040. Herresponse to the government's motion confirms that she did not include the self-employment tax on her return "because ofwanting IRS to calculate" and because Ms. Hale thoughtthat "perhaps [she] would notpay [d]ouble [s]elf-employment [t]ax." Pl.'sResp. at 106. It appears Ms. Hale may have harbored this beliefbecause the IRS abated her tax and issued an additional refund for the 2013 tax year. Id. In any event, Ms. Hale has not provided any substantive grounds suggesting the IRS's calculations ofher tax owed for 2015
were incorrect. Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim as to this tax year. 

### D. 2016 Tax Year
Ms. Hale's 2016 tax returnrequested a total refund of$4,154.00 based on a claimed $3,154.00 EiC and a $1,000 education credit. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 15, at App. 64. Thereturn also repo11ed net profit for Ms. Hale's business of$9,085.00. Id. at App. 65. In a May 10, 2017 letter,

11the IRS statedthat, based onthe $9,085.00 Ms. Hale reported inprofit onher Schedule C-EZ, she could be liable for self-employment tax. Id. Ex. 16, at App. 8

### I. The letter requested that Ms. Hale complete Schedule SE to determinethe amount ofself-employmenttax due or submit an explanation ofwhy she was not liable for self-employment tax, as applicable. Id. On July 24, 2017, the IRS assessed self-employmenttax of$1,284.00 and issued a refund of$2,604.30 including $23.30 in interest. Id. Ex. 14, at App. 61. This amount represented an EIC of$2,865.00 (corrected bythe IRS from $3,154.00 to $3,069.00, thenreduced by $204.00), plus the $1,000 refundable credit, less $1,284.00 in self-employmenttax. See id.
As noted above with regard to the 2015 tax year, Ms. Hale has not alleged any facts that bring into questionthe correctness ofthe IRS's actions with regard to her return for the 2016 tax year. Based on Ms. Hale's response, her chiefcomplaint as to tax year 2016 appears to be excessive delays ofherrefund without explanation, along with the failure ofvarious services, including the Tax Advocate Service, to provide her with effective assistance in resolving her tax issues. See Pl.'s Resp. at I02-03. These circumstances, while undoubtedly frustrating, do not controvertthe correctness ofthe IRS's calculations ofMs. Hale's taxes owed and refund due. Therefore, this claim must also be dismissed for failure to state a claimuponwhichreliefcanbe granted.
E. 

### 2017TaxYear
Similarto the previous two tax years, Ms. Hale filed a Schedule C-EZ with her 2017 return, rep01ting $10,050.00 in netprofit and, on her Schedule SE, $1,420.02 in self-employment tax. Def.'s Mot. Ex. 19, at App. 95, 97. 8Ms. Hale again did not list the self-employment tax on her Form 1040, which contributed to her excessively high requested refund of$5,400.00. Id. at App. 93. The IRS assessed $1,419.98 in self-employmenttax and found Ms. Hale ineligible for her claimed $2,000 refundable American Opp01tunity Credit. Id. Ex. 18, at App. 90. She was ineligible for the creditbecause herreturn reflected that she (the qualifying student) had not been enrolled "atleasthalf-time for at least one academic period" as required. Id. Ex. 19 at App. 94. Accordingly, the IRS issued a refund of$1,980.02 (EIC of$3,400.00 less $1,419.98 in selfemployment tax). Id. Ex. 18, at App. 90.
Ms. Hale's complaint does not allege any facts that contradictthe propriety ofthe IRS's actions with regard to her 2017 tax return. Her response similarly does not provide any grounds disproving the correctness ofthe IRS's calculations as to hertax due and the refund to which she
was entitled. In light ofthe presumption ofcorrectness and the bm'den placed on plaintiffs in tax

8 In a September 7, 2018 letter, the IRS asserted to Ms. Hale that she "did not complete [her] Form Schedule SE." Pl.'s Resp. at 244. This conflicts withthe document appearing atpage 97 of the government's appendix, which appears to be a Schedule SE form showing self-employment tax of$1,420.02 on Line 5 and $710.01 in Line 6 entered for a self-employment tax deduction. Def.'sMot. Ex. 19, at App. 97. This discrepancy, however, does not affect the Court's abilityto concludethatthe issued refund was correct because Ms. Hale owed $1,420 in self-employment tax which she did not enter on Line 57 ofher Form 1040. Id. atApp. 93.



### 12refund cases, this portion ofthe complaint must also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which reliefcanbe granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the government's motion to dismiss Ms. Hale's complaint is GRANTED. Ms. Hale's claims with respect to the $2,119.31 offset to satisfy a purported debt to FEMA, all ofher claims for tax year 2014, and any civil rights or tort claims,
are DISMISSED without prejudice. Her claims with respect to the $100 reduction ofher 2012 Earned Income Credit, as well as her refund claims for the 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017 tax years, are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enterjudgment accordingly. Each party shall bear its own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.



### 13 ELAINE D. KAPLAN Judge