United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

H.A., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, PACIFIC BEACH 

STATION, San Diego, CA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 15-1449 

Issued: October 6, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

VALERIE D. EVANS-HARRELL, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On June 24, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal from a May 19, 2015 merit decision of 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ 

Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3,2 the Board has jurisdiction 

over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained a 

traumatic injury in the performance of duty on April 7, 2015. 

On appeal appellant generally asserts that the medical evidence establishes his claim. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. 

2

 The Board notes that appellant submitted evidence with his appeal to the Board. The Board cannot consider this 

evidence as its jurisdiction is limited to the evidence of record that was before OWCP at the time it issued its final 

decision. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1); P.W., Docket No. 12-1262 (issued December 5, 2012). 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On April 7, 2015 appellant, then a 62-year-old distribution clerk, filed an occupational 

disease claim alleging that he felt low back pain while throwing a parcel that day. He stopped 

work on April 7, 2015. 

By letter dated April 10, 2015, OWCP informed him of the evidence needed to support 

his claim. It specifically asked that he clarify the date of injury and whether he was claiming a 

traumatic injury or an occupational disease. In a response dated April 16, 2015, appellant 

clarified that he was, in fact, filing a traumatic injury claim. He related that, in support of a 

traumatic injury claim, around 6:00 a.m. on Tuesday, April 7, 2015 he was picking up, scanning, 

and throwing boxes to the appropriate hamper for delivery. Appellant stated that he picked up a 

box that weighed approximately 35 to 40 pounds to throw 10 feet into the hamper and, as he 

threw it, he felt a snap in his lower back, followed by pain. He indicated that he immediately 

told his supervisor who took him to the station manager who advised him to see his physician 

and bring in a medical report. On May 6, 2015 appellant reiterated that he intended to file a 

traumatic injury claim. 

Medical evidence of record submitted includes reports dated April 8, 2015 in which 

Dr. Lawrence J. Schlitt, a Board-certified family physician, noted appellant’s complaint of low 

back pain. A lumbosacral spine x-ray that day demonstrated diffuse lumbar spondylosis and a 

transitional L5 body. On a duty status report dated that day, Dr. Schlitt noted physical findings 

of tenderness at L4-5 and advised that appellant could not work. On April 9, 2015 he advised 

that appellant could return to work on April 15, 2015 with no restrictions. 

In an April 14, 2015 report, Dr. Patrick Javidan, a chiropractor, advised that appellant 

was under his care for lower back pain. He indicated that appellant’s symptoms had not 

improved enough for him to return to work, finding that he could return to work on 

April 22, 2015. 

In an April 22, 2015 treatment note, Dr. Schlitt noted appellant’s report that after four 

treatments with Dr. Javidan he had improved somewhat, but had worsening pain when sitting or 

standing for extended periods. He described physical examination findings of tender paralumbar 

and parathoracic muscle trigger points and diminished back range of motion with no 

neurological deficits. Dr. Schlitt diagnosed low back pain and lumbar spondylosis and referred 

appellant for a physiatry consultation and physical therapy evaluation. He also completed a 

Family and Medical Leave Act health care provider certification that day. Dr. Schlitt reported 

that appellant’s condition began on April 7, 2015 and would probably continue for 30 days. He 

reiterated his findings and conclusions and advised that appellant could not return to work until 

cleared. 

By decision dated May 19, 2015, OWCP found that appellant established that the claimed 

employment incident occurred on April 7, 2015 as alleged, but denied the claim as the medical 

evidence did not demonstrate that a diagnosed condition was related to the accepted incident. 
3

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of establishing the essential 

elements of his or her claim including the fact that the individual is an employee of the United 

States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time 

limitation period of FECA, that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged 

and that any disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally 

related to the employment injury. Regardless of whether the asserted claim involves traumatic 

injury or occupational disease, an employee must satisfy this burden of proof.3

 OWCP regulations, at 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee) define a traumatic injury as a condition of the 

body caused by a specific event or incident or series of events or incidents within a single 

workday or shift.4

 To determine whether an employee sustained a traumatic injury in the 

performance of duty, OWCP must determine whether “fact of injury” is established. First, an 

employee has the burden of demonstrating the occurrence of an injury at the time, place, and in 

the manner alleged, by a preponderance of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence. 

Second, the employee must submit sufficient evidence, generally only in the form of medical 

evidence, to establish a causal relationship between the employment incident and the alleged 

disability and/or condition for which compensation is claimed. An employee may establish that 

the employment incident occurred as alleged, but fail to show that his or her disability and/or 

condition relates to the employment incident.5

 Causal relationship is a medical issue, and the medical evidence required to establish a 

causal relationship is rationalized medical evidence.6 The opinion of the physician must be 

based on a complete factual and medical background of the claimant, must be one of reasonable 

medical certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the 

relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors identified by 

the employee.7

 Neither the mere fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period 

of employment nor the belief that the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by 

employment factors or incidents is sufficient to establish causal relationship.8

Under section 8101(2) of FECA, the term “physician” includes chiropractors only to the 

extent that their reimbursable services are limited to treatment consisting of manual manipulation 

of the spine to correct a subluxation as demonstrated by x-ray to exist and subject to regulation 

by the Secretary.9 Implementing regulations indicate that the diagnosis of spinal subluxation 

 3 Gary J. Watling, 52 ECAB 278 (2001). 

4

 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee) (1999, 2011); Ellen L. Noble, 55 ECAB 530 (2004). 

5 Supra note 3. 

6 Jacqueline M. Nixon-Steward, 52 ECAB 140 (2000). 

7 Leslie C. Moore, 52 ECAB 132 (2000); Gary L. Fowler, 45 ECAB 365 (1994). 

8 Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997). 

9

 5 U.S.C. § 8102(2); see D.S., Docket No. 09-860 (issued November 2, 2009). 
4

must appear in the chiropractor’s report, and a chiropractor may interpret his or her x-rays to the 

same extent as any other physician.10

ANALYSIS 

The Board finds that the April 7, 2015 incident occurred as alleged. However, the 

medical evidence submitted by appellant is insufficient to establish a medical condition causally 

related to the April 7, 2015 incident. 

Medical evidence submitted to support a claim for compensation should reflect a correct 

history, and the physician should offer a medically sound explanation of how the claimed work 

event caused or aggravated the claimed condition.11 No physician did so in this case. 

As noted above, a chiropractor is not considered a physician under FECA without an xray diagnosing subluxation.12 Appellant submitted an April 14, 2015 report in which 

Dr. Javidan, a chiropractor, indicated that appellant was under his care for lower back pain and 

could not return to work. Dr. Javidan did not diagnosis a subluxation or discuss any x-ray 

findings. The Board, therefore, concludes that he is not a physician as defined under FECA, and 

his report is of no probative value on the issue of whether appellant sustained an injury causally 

related to the April 7, 2015 incident.13

In his reports dated April 8 and 22, 2015, Dr. Schlitt provided examination findings and 

diagnosed low back pain and lumbar spondylosis. However, he did not discuss the history of 

injury or a cause of these diagnosed conditions. Medical evidence that does not offer any 

opinion regarding the cause of an employee’s condition is of limited probative value on the issue 

of causal relationship.14 Appellant, therefore, did not meet his burden of proof to establish that 

he sustained a traumatic injury on April 7, 2015. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant did not establish that he sustained a traumatic injury in the 

performance of duty on April 7, 2015. 

 10 20 C.F.R. § 10.311(b)(c). 

11 D.D., Docket No. 13-1517 (issued April 14, 2014). 

12 Supra note 9. 

13 See A.O., Docket No. 08-580 (issued January 28, 2009). 

14 Willie M. Miller, 53 ECAB 697 (2002). 
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ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 19, 2015 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: October 6, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Valerie D. Evans-Harrell, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board