# Official Journal C 100/16 M

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 100 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6616 March 2023 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 100

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6616 March 2023

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions |
| | RESOLUTIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022 |
| 2023/C 100/01 | Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on The long-lasting legacy of the European Year of Youth: youth mainstreaming and empowerment | 1 |
| | OPINIONS |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022 |
| 2023/C 100/02 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Gender-based investments in national recovery and resilience plans (Own-initiative opinion) | 8 |
| 2023/C 100/03 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Gender lens investing as a way to improve gender equality in the European Union (Own initiative opinion) | 16 |
| 2023/C 100/04 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communicating fundamental rights and the rule of law (Own initiative opinion) | 24 |
| 2023/C 100/05 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on An industrial strategy for the maritime technology sector (Own-initiative opinion) | 31 |
| 2023/C 100/06 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education (own-initiative opinion) | 38 |
| 2023/C 100/07 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on European Citizens Initiative — Save bees and farmers (own initiative opinion) | 45 |
| 2023/C 100/08 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Food price crisis: the role of speculation and concrete proposals for action in the aftermath of the Ukraine war (Own-initiative opinion) | 51 |
| 2023/C 100/09 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Socio-economic situation in Latin America following the COVID-19 crisis — the role of civil society in the recovery process (own-initiative opinion) | 61 |
| 2023/C 100/10 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Digital transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region (own-initiative opinion) | 68 |
| 2023/C 100/11 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on A competitiveness check to build a stronger and more resilient EU economy (exploratory opinion) | 76 |

Contents

page

I   Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

2023/C 100/01

Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on The long-lasting legacy of the European Year of Youth: youth mainstreaming and empowerment

1

OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

2023/C 100/02

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Gender-based investments in national recovery and resilience plans (Own-initiative opinion)

8

2023/C 100/03

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Gender lens investing as a way to improve gender equality in the European Union (Own initiative opinion)

16

2023/C 100/04

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communicating fundamental rights and the rule of law (Own initiative opinion)

24

2023/C 100/05

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on An industrial strategy for the maritime technology sector (Own-initiative opinion)

31

2023/C 100/06

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education (own-initiative opinion)

38

2023/C 100/07

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on European Citizens Initiative — Save bees and farmers (own initiative opinion)

45

2023/C 100/08

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Food price crisis: the role of speculation and concrete proposals for action in the aftermath of the Ukraine war (Own-initiative opinion)

51

2023/C 100/09

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Socio-economic situation in Latin America following the COVID-19 crisis — the role of civil society in the recovery process (own-initiative opinion)

61

2023/C 100/10

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Digital transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region (own-initiative opinion)

68

2023/C 100/11

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on A competitiveness check to build a stronger and more resilient EU economy (exploratory opinion)

76

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| | III   Preparatory acts |
| --- | --- |
| | European Economic and Social Committee |
| | 574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022 |
| 2023/C 100/12 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Report on Competition Policy 2021 (COM(2022) 337 final) | 83 |
| 2023/C 100/13 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A New European Innovation Agenda (COM(2022) 332 final) | 89 |
| 2023/C 100/14 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on: (a) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Single Market Emergency Instrument and repealing Council Regulation No (EC) 2679/98 (COM(2022) 459 final — 2022/0278 (COD)); (b) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2016/424, (EU) 2016/425, (EU) 2016/426, (EU) 2019/1009 and (EU) No 305/2011 as regards emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency (COM(2022) 461 final — 2022/0279 (COD)); (c) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2000/14/EC, 2006/42/EC, 2010/35/EU, 2013/29/EU, 2014/28/EU, 2014/29/EU, 2014/30/EU, 2014/31/EU, 2014/32/EU, 2014/33/EU, 2014/34/EU, 2014/35/EU, 2014/53/EU and 2014/68/EU as regard emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency (COM(2022) 462 final — 2022/0280 (COD)) | 95 |
| 2023/C 100/15 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2022) 454 final — 2022/0272 (COD)) | 101 |
| 2023/C 100/16 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation (COM(2022) 245 — final) | 105 |
| 2023/C 100/17 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (COM(2022) 457 final — 2022/0277 (COD)) | 111 |
| 2023/C 100/18 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on working towards an asbestos-free future: a European approach to addressing the health risks of asbestos (COM(2022) 488 final) and on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work (COM(2022) 489 final — 2022/0298 (COD)) | 118 |
| 2023/C 100/19 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Skills 2023 (COM(2022) 526 final — (2022)0326 (COD)) | 123 |
| 2023/C 100/20 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the way forward (JOIN(2022) 24 final) | 132 |
| 2023/C 100/21 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the sustainable use of plant protection products and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 (COM(2022) 305 final — 2022/0196 (COD)) | 137 |
| 2023/C 100/22 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 as regards the exchange of information maintained in the electronic registers concerning economic operators who move excise goods between Member States for commercial purposes (COM(2022) 539 final — 2022/0331 (CNS)) | 145 |
| 2023/C 100/23 | Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Area covered under the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) (COM(2022) 563 final — 2022/348 (COD)) | 146 |

III   Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

2023/C 100/12

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Report on Competition Policy 2021 (COM(2022) 337 final)

83

2023/C 100/13

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A New European Innovation Agenda (COM(2022) 332 final)

89

2023/C 100/14

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on: (a) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Single Market Emergency Instrument and repealing Council Regulation No (EC) 2679/98 (COM(2022) 459 final — 2022/0278 (COD)); (b) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2016/424, (EU) 2016/425, (EU) 2016/426, (EU) 2019/1009 and (EU) No 305/2011 as regards emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency (COM(2022) 461 final — 2022/0279 (COD)); (c) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2000/14/EC, 2006/42/EC, 2010/35/EU, 2013/29/EU, 2014/28/EU, 2014/29/EU, 2014/30/EU, 2014/31/EU, 2014/32/EU, 2014/33/EU, 2014/34/EU, 2014/35/EU, 2014/53/EU and 2014/68/EU as regard emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency (COM(2022) 462 final — 2022/0280 (COD))

95

2023/C 100/15

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 (COM(2022) 454 final — 2022/0272 (COD))

101

2023/C 100/16

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation (COM(2022) 245 — final)

105

2023/C 100/17

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (COM(2022) 457 final — 2022/0277 (COD))

111

2023/C 100/18

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on working towards an asbestos-free future: a European approach to addressing the health risks of asbestos (COM(2022) 488 final) and on Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work (COM(2022) 489 final — 2022/0298 (COD))

118

2023/C 100/19

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Skills 2023 (COM(2022) 526 final — (2022)0326 (COD))

123

2023/C 100/20

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the way forward (JOIN(2022) 24 final)

132

2023/C 100/21

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the sustainable use of plant protection products and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 (COM(2022) 305 final — 2022/0196 (COD))

137

2023/C 100/22

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 as regards the exchange of information maintained in the electronic registers concerning economic operators who move excise goods between Member States for commercial purposes (COM(2022) 539 final — 2022/0331 (CNS))

145

2023/C 100/23

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Area covered under the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) (COM(2022) 563 final — 2022/348 (COD))

146

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| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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I Resolutions, recommendations and opinions

RESOLUTIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/1

---

Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The long-lasting legacy of the European Year of Youth: youth mainstreaming and empowerment’

(2023/C 100/01)

proposed by SOC section president Laurenţiu PLOSCEANU at the request of the coordination group for the European Year of Youth (Katrīna LEITĀNE (president), Neža REPANŠEK, Michael McLOUGHLIN, Nicoletta MERLO, Mateusz Maciej SZYMANSKI, Florian MARIN, Pierre BOLLON, Dolores SAMMUT BONNICI and Davor MAJETIĆ)

| Legal basis | Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure |
| --- | --- |
| | Resolution |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 150/0/1 |

Legal basis

Rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure

Resolution

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

150/0/1

Despite of the uncertainties of the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis, young people remain the engine of the European project and their creativity, energy and enthusiasm are the driving force for its sustainability. Decisions made today determine our world tomorrow, thus it is crucial to ensure that young people have a say in decisions affecting their future, since even indirect policies can have great impact and relevance for young people and generations to come.

In December 2021, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, designated 2022 the European Year of Youth because ‘Europe needs all of its youth’ and ‘our Union needs a soul and a vision they can connect to’ (1). Furthermore, as stated by Commissioner Mariya Gabriel, ‘the European Year of Youth should bring a paradigm shift in how we include young people in policy and decision-making’ (2).

In the European Economic and Social Committee’s (EESC) opinion (3) on the EU Youth Strategy for 2019-2027, it calls for focus on the cross-sectoral approach, taking a holistic view of young people and their needs and rights and emphasises that ‘the EESC is convinced that youth involvement in decision-making processes should be promoted beyond one-off events. Moreover, in further developing the Youth Dialogue, the role of youth voluntary organisations and National Youth Councils needs to be improved and additional avenues utilised. The EU institutions should take the lead in this regard, with the EESC being at the forefront of institutions enhancing youth involvement at EU level’.

For some years now the EESC has been working on how to better integrate the voice of young people in its work and in the EU decision-making process in a structured and meaningful way by covering different dimensions such as climate and sustainability (4) by establishing the Youth Climate and Sustainability Round Tables and including a youth delegate in the official EU delegation to UNFCCC COP meetings as well as in the delegation of the EESC; emphasising the role of education for sustainable development (5); elaborating on the employment and labour market situation and provisions (6); youth inclusion in the development of the National Recovery Plans (7) which called for better involvement of youth organisations in the implementation and monitoring phases of the plans and in decision-making processes; youth policy in the Western Balkans (8) where the EESC invites the EU to further support the Western Balkans in improving youth participation; mainstreaming youth perspective in all policy fields at EU level by introducing the EU Youth Test (9), which also includes concrete recommendations and proposals, and by proposing to enhance the internal engagement of young people and youth organisations in the EESC’s work.

Furthermore, the EESC welcomed (10)
  the proposal to designate 2022 the European Year of Youth (EYY) by stating that the EESC is ready to play a lead role in the EYY, building on successful EESC initiatives such as ‘Your Europe, Your Say!’, Youth Climate and Sustainability Round Tables and the EESC Youth Delegate to the COP programme. The EESC is uniquely positioned to facilitate engagement with youth networks. Accordingly, the EESC established a Coordination Group for the European Year of Youth (CG EYY) in order to ensure the representation and visibility of this initiative within the EESC and to coordinate the ongoing youth-related initiatives. The CG EYY received a mandate to strengthen cooperation with youth organisations and young people during and beyond the EYY and to cooperate with the other EU institutions and civil society organisations to ensure better cross-cutting integration of young people in their everyday activities.

The draft resolution prepared by the CG EYY calls on the EU institutions and national governments to secure the long-lasting legacy of the European Year of Youth by promoting structured and meaningful youth engagement in policy-making and decision-making at all levels and by promoting participatory mechanisms for young people and youth organisations. Furthermore, the EESC reaffirms its commitment to strengthen youth engagement within its work and to promote youth mainstreaming at all levels for a more united and stronger Europe.

‘We cannot always build the future for our youth, but we can build our youth for the future.’
   —
  Franklin D. Roosevelt

1.   Long-lasting legacy of the European Year of Youth in the EESC

| 1.1. | The EESC believes that the deliberations of the EYY must be followed up on and approached with open-mindedness by all stakeholders. It is crucial that there is a concrete legacy for the year and the work on the follow up is continued in the Year of Skills and beyond. Furthermore, the EU Youth Strategy and the Conference on the Future of Europe also foresee important steps towards more structured and meaningful engagement of young people in building the future of Europe. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC believes that civil society organisations, and in particular youth organisations, are crucial to identifying innovative participatory instruments to mainstream youth perspectives in policy-making at all levels and across all policy fields and emphasises the role of civil society organisations in strengthening active citizenship, safeguarding basic human rights and democratic values for young people. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC regrets that the civil space for youth organisations has been shrinking (11) and emphasises its democratic relevance. The EESC calls for measures to empower youth organisations and to provide them with sustainable resources that will increase their capacity to represent and advocate for their rights and interests. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC highlights the successful initiatives towards structured and meaningful youth participation of the last few years in its opinions (12) and expresses its commitment to develop new initiatives in order to promote youth engagement and youth perspectives in policy-making. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes that active participation of youth in policy-making and decision-making is vital in building the future of Europe and in building a vision that young people can connect to. Therefore, it encourages EU institutions to implement the EU Youth Test to ensure that all policy-making at EU level is seen through a youth lens. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Following on from the proposals presented in the opinion on the EU Youth Test, the EESC calls for youth mainstreaming in policy-making at all levels and for the development of a common approach towards structured and meaningful youth engagement for all EU institutions. The latter should build on the following pillars:






  — | co-creating youth-related initiatives/projects/events with youth organisations involved from the very beginning and ensuring that they have a say during each step of the process; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.6.

—

co-creating youth-related initiatives/projects/events with youth organisations involved from the very beginning and ensuring that they have a say during each step of the process;

| — | sharing the ownership of the initiatives/projects/events with youth organisations, giving them a leading role and following their priorities and needs; |
| --- | --- |

—

sharing the ownership of the initiatives/projects/events with youth organisations, giving them a leading role and following their priorities and needs;

| — | strengthening the capacity of youth organisations, supporting them with the necessary financial resources and adequate tools to participate; |
| --- | --- |

—

strengthening the capacity of youth organisations, supporting them with the necessary financial resources and adequate tools to participate;

| — | building structured and meaningful follow-up processes, going way beyond ad hoc meetings and mere calls for consultations. |
| --- | --- |

—

building structured and meaningful follow-up processes, going way beyond ad hoc meetings and mere calls for consultations.

| 1.7. | The EESC commits to establish a permanent group within the EESC to have transparent and cross-sectional coordination mechanisms to mainstream youth perspectives in the EESC’s work and to further explore and consider possible ways to apply the EU Youth Test concept in its work to develop a consistent approach on youth involvement in the EESC. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.7.1. | Furthermore, the EESC calls for the creation of a structure representing and/or involving youth organisations in all EU institutions and/or possibly a stakeholder platform like the European Circular Economy Stakeholders Platform (ECESP) which would be in the remit of the EESC. In addition, since the EU Youth Dialogue is the most substantial participatory process of Europe involving decision-makers and young people discussing issues and coming up with solutions together, further steps could be taken to strengthen this participatory mechanism, for example, introducing the co-management structure (13) which would also be led by the EESC. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.1.

| 1.8. | The EESC urges stronger youth engagement in decision-making processes, from drafting legislative proposals and initiatives through to implementation, monitoring and follow-up. This approach has been used since 2021 at the EU delegation to the UNFCC COP meetings, where the delegation has at least one young delegate. The EESC strongly recommends that other EU delegations adopt a similar approach and take into account the intergenerational perspective. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | To strengthen the EESC’s own role in bridging the gap between policymakers and youth organisations and young people at both national and European levels, it is recommended, firstly, to establish a transparent, structured and meaningful youth participatory mechanism to effectively coordinate legislative work, for instance, a youth panel. Secondly, to engage with and involve young people and youth organisations within its work. Additionally, coordination and exchange of good practices on youth engagement at all levels and across all Member States and more targeted outreach activities should be implemented. In particular, strengthening relations with national youth organisations and bringing local youth projects into focus within the EESC and among the members. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | Furthermore, taking into account the current turbulent geopolitical context, it is crucial to secure youth engagement in sustainability, security and peace building. The EESC welcomes the recently adopted Youth Action Plan in EU External Action and is going to adopt an own-initiative opinion on it in 2023. Additionally, the EESC invites the EU to further support the Western Balkans in improving youth participation, taking into account the positive correlation of educational or training mobility with the civic and political engagement of young people. The same principle should be taken into account in the relationship with Ukraine and Georgia. The EESC insists on strengthening the cooperation on youth policies with candidate status countries. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC will strive to systematically take into account the voice of young people in its opinions, including own-initiative opinions and exploratory opinions adopted at the request of the rotating presidencies or other European institutions. The EESC will, thanks to its excellent relationship with them, do its best to convince them that these requests should cover aspects pertaining to young people. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

2.   The focus for upcoming years: to build a better future — greener, more inclusive and digital — together

| 2.1. | The EESC emphasises the importance of increasing the knowledge and the information levels of young people on European institutions, functioning mechanisms, fields of action, concrete examples from everyday activities and opportunities for personal and professional development among youth. The number of European experience exchange and training programmes (Erasmus+, Discover EU etc.) should be increased both locally and externally, as well as programmes under co-supervision with other educational institutions in the country and abroad. The EESC will promote and encourage the EESC members to organise going local initiatives focusing on youth. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The EESC points out the need to create and guarantee the framework for all young people to participate in the decision-making process at the European and national level by building institutions more open and willing to work with young people. It is particularly important to enable disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginalised young people to participate in decision-making processes. Promoting the participation of young people in political elections should be a priority. Furthermore, youth participation contributes to creativity and innovation, and young people must be heard and their civil and community participation should be encouraged from a young age. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EESC recommends implementing second chance programmes and literacy programmes for early school leavers and measures to reduce early school leaving by ensuring guidance, support and social protection programmes addressed to young people from rural areas and those from poor families, in order to facilitate access to educational services. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | It is necessary to achieve high-quality and inclusive education and training and lifelong learning to ensure that everyone has the knowledge, skills, competences and attitude needed for Europe to establish a more just, more cohesive, more sustainable, more digital and more resilient society. Young people need to have skills that enable them to participate fully in society and successfully manage transitions in the labour market (14), with a focus on the most vulnerable people. Skilled workers are an important component of ensuring European competitiveness, as also recognised in the European Commission proposal for the European Year of Skills 2023 (15) alongside ensuring good working conditions, career predictability and access to opportunities. Participation in educational institutions should be encouraged. Implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights in relation to youth should be a priority. There is also a need to progress in education reform, addressing skills mismatches and focusing on lifelong learning, reskilling and upskilling (16). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The EESC calls for access to the educational system for young people from rural areas to be made easier by ensuring the material and digital infrastructure necessary for a high-quality educational process, especially in the field of sustainable development and the protection of the environment. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | In collaboration with civil society organisations, the EESC encourages Member States to create targeted access to schools for people with rare diseases or people who cannot attend school for medical reasons and guarantee the necessary infrastructure to ensure equal access to educational services for people with disabilities as a priority so that no one will be left behind. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | Education is a key enabler of all other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, the EESC supports the work of the European Commission towards learning for a green transition and sustainable development and calls on the Member States to implement and transform education in their countries accordingly (17). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | The EESC proposes developing information and counselling sessions or educational curricula aimed at explaining the basic elements that constitute an integral part of the labour market, referring here to notions such as employer, employment contract, etc., alongside social partners and civil society. Enough resources should be allocated in this regard, especially for vulnerable youth and those employed in atypical forms of employment. This same information is also to be targeted to young migrants upon entering an unknown country, so as to integrate them faster into the new society, its educational and work systems and culture. More globally, young people should be offered increased means to learn about topics such as financial education and, very importantly, to have a strong knowledge of their rights as citizens and workers. All this is important to help young people prepare for their future adult life. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The EESC has already stated that entrepreneurship can also play a crucial role in improving competitiveness, innovation and well-being and the development of a social and green economy, even more so in the context of the post-pandemic recovery. Encouraging entrepreneurship education to develop entrepreneurial skills could be a way to create career paths, especially among young people (18). |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The EESC encourages finding appropriate solutions at national level to ensure rent price control in order to facilitate mobility for educational or professional purposes and also implementing a social housing construction programme for young people, especially in large cities and economic development centres. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | The EESC calls for young people to have better access to good-quality health services, especially for young people from rural areas, by increasing the number of hospital units or mobile sites that provide primary medical services and carrying out awareness campaigns in educational institutions targeting themes such as injury prevention, eating disorders, mental health and general health education and reproductive health, which are important subjects. Specific research programmes should be developed to help young people fight illnesses (such as cancer), as cures devised for adults often do not suit them. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | Through collaboration with civil society organisations the EESC calls for increased and continuous efforts towards actions aimed at traffic education, prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, bullying and hate speech, consumption of tobacco, alcohol and drugs to take place in schools and with the involvement of youth and civil society. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | The EESC proposes to ensure that young people have access to formal representation systems in the relationship with interested actors in the labour market and about the freedom of association and the right of workers and employers to form and join organisations of their own choosing for all young people, especially those who do not have a job or who have a precarious one. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | The EESC is calling for the capacity of social partners and civil society organisations to be strengthened in order to represent youth and facilitate the process of transition from school to active working life and to involve youth organisations within social dialogue institutions, collective bargaining and in tripartite organisations that have responsibilities on the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

| 2.15. | The EESC is requesting modernisation and reinforcement of the institutions active on the labour market in the sense of adapting the services they provide to the specifics of young people in order to make them easily accessible, dynamic, friendly and less bureaucratic. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

| 2.16. | The EESC is calling for fair treatment to be guaranteed in terms of equal opportunities between women and men but also in terms of young people compared to other age categories, referring here to salaries, working conditions, training and advancement opportunities at work. The work of trainees, especially young people, should not imply exploitation and should not be a tool for circumventing the employment relationship. Unpaid or uncompensated internships can have a very negative impact on young peoples’ experience of the labour market (19) and must be banned (20). Youth representation should be further strengthened. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

| 2.17. | The EESC believes that support for the social economy is necessary, as this sector actively assists socially marginalised young people and other vulnerable individuals, notably through measures aimed at increasing self-esteem, communication, etc. |
| --- | --- |

2.17.

| 2.18. | The EESC believes that the context created by the pandemic due to low accessibility of health services requires more effort to help young people detect signs of mental health and wellbeing issues and promote correct information on as many channels as possible to identify valuable information in contrast to false promises of help/support including by using health tools in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

2.18.

| 2.19. | The EESC calls for social protection systems and labour legislation to be reformed to adapt them to new realities and forms of work and to ensure that subsequent changes in the field of work can be adjusted and regulated more quickly in the future, in full respect of national industrial relations models and the autonomy of social partners. |
| --- | --- |

2.19.

| 2.20. | The EESC suggests that pension systems and social protection systems be recoupled to youth economic and social realities and should be fair, inclusive and adapted to the labour market reality, assuring protection for young people who practice new forms of work and those who are not employed. High-quality jobs for all young people must be a priority. |
| --- | --- |

2.20.

| 2.21. | The EESC outlines that the period of the coronavirus pandemic showed that health and safety issues, including psychosocial risks, are important in addition to stability and predictability in employment. There is a need to engage in dialogue with young people on how to prevent problems in this area in the future. Availability of different forms of employment based on stability and quality standards is important to facilitate labour market participation of young people. In addition, measures are needed to strengthen the oversight of young people’s employment conditions including the strengthening of labour inspections. |
| --- | --- |

2.21.

| 2.22. | The EESC is asking for protection of youth rights and guaranteeing social protection through work-life balance, protecting the right to private life and preserving the space for collective negotiation. Finding ways to facilitate appropriate work schedule flexibility for finishing studies should be encouraged. |
| --- | --- |

2.22.

| 2.23. | The EESC calls for more synergy between different instruments dedicated to youth such as the Youth Guarantee and Child Guarantee to be taken into account. Young people should be provided a real guarantee that provides them predictable career prospects. Public funding to support young people in the labour market should not contribute to precarity and involvement of the social partners and civil society in assisting youth on the labour market should remain a priority. |
| --- | --- |

2.23.

| 2.23.1. | The EESC is aiming to make sure that appropriate and high-quality alternative care is organised for all children and young people who lack proper parental care and, as relationships are even more crucial in these circumstances, that sisters and brothers are permitted to stay together unless it is not in their best interest. More generally, it is important that support mechanisms do not end abruptly when young people turn 18. |
| --- | --- |

2.23.1.

| 2.24. | The EESC underlines the need to appropriately address the economic, social and environmental challenges generated by the current economic model especially for youth. This should be done keeping in mind that making our societies greener, fairer, inclusive, sustainable and more focused on well-being should start with youth interest as the basic pillar for the future. Youth should be a transversal theme/objective in the ESIF investments. |
| --- | --- |

2.24.

| 2.25. | The EESC considers it necessary to ensure that young people have the opportunities to have families. Increasing efforts to motivate youth to build a family and to have children are crucial for the stability and future of Europe. Therefore, it is essential to assure access to housing, childcare services and flexible social support by creating a dedicated EU programme in this regard. |
| --- | --- |

2.25.

| 2.26. | The EESC strongly calls for the younger generation to be provided with a truly democratic and pluralistic public space to express their opinions without fear of exclusion or experiencing hatred. At the same time, it is extremely important to build knowledge and awareness about information manipulation and disinformation. |
| --- | --- |

2.26.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_21_4701

1

(2)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_5226

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Engaging, connecting and empowering young people: a new EU Youth Strategy’ (COM(2018) 269 final) (OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 142).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Towards structured youth engagement on climate and sustainability in the EU decision-making process’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 44).

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 38).

5

(6)  EESC information report on The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market (ongoing).

6

The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 27).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Youth Policy in the Western Balkans, as part of the Innovation Agenda for the Western Balkans’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 443, 22.11.2022, p. 44).

8

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The EU Youth Test’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 46).

9

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122).

10

(11)  SAFEGUARDING20CIVIC20SPACE20FOR20YOUNG20PEOPLE20IN20EUROPE202020_v4.02028129.pdf (youthforum.org).

11

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Engaging, connecting and empowering young people: a new EU Youth Strategy’ (COM(2018) 269 final) (OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 142), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Towards structured youth engagement on climate and sustainability in the EU decision-making process’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 44), Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122), Opinion on the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The EU Youth Test’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 46).

12

(13)  Co-management system of the Council of Europe.

13

(14)  See e.g. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to promote, based on education and training, from a lifelong learning perspective, the skills needed for Europe to establish a more just, more cohesive, more sustainable, more digital and more resilient society’ (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Portuguese presidency) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 27), points 1.2 and 2.3.

14

(15)  Commission kick-starts work on the European Year of Skills (europa.eu).

15

(16)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market (ongoing).

16

(17)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 38).

17

(18)  Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee: Contribution to the 2023 European Commission's work programme (OJ C 443, 22.11.2022, p. 1), point 4.14.

18

(19)  EESC information report on The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market (ongoing).

19

The Equal Treatment of Young People in the Labour Market (ongoing).

(20)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to guarantee decent work for young people and ensure the inclusion of NEETs through the proper elaboration of National Recovery Plans’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 27), point 1.9.

20

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OPINIONS

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/8

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Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Gender-based investments in national recovery and resilience plans’

(Own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/02)

| Rapporteur: | Cinzia DEL RIO |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Cinzia DEL RIO

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted in section | 8.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 163/5/14 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted in section

8.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

163/5/14

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC reiterates that only greater and better economic and social convergence in the European Union can help ensure full gender equality and the promotion of equal opportunities by focusing on measures and strategies in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC points out that most of the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) have been drawn up by the Member States without an ex-ante assessment of the impact of individual investments in terms of removing gender inequalities and making it easier for women to access and stay in the labour market. Very few Member States have taken a strategic approach with specific, cross-cutting measures and reforms to the six investment strands under the NRRP. The methodology adopted by the European Commission is based on an impact assessment of how effective the measures implemented are. To this end, the EESC recommends that the Commission adopt comparable specific indicators at the evaluation stage to measure improvements in equal pay, access to the labour market, the reconciliation of work and care time, and in promoting of women’s self-entrepreneurship. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The measures set out in the NRRPs include direct and indirect measures, with different impacts in the short or medium-to-long term, to encourage women to access and stay in employment, but in a framework that is fragmented and uneven across countries. The EESC considers it a priority that, when the NRRPs are being implemented, both direct and indirect measures are stepped up. This will require clear, lasting investment channels with resource planning also in the medium-to-long term. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Among the direct measures to promote women’s employment, the EESC believes that providing incentives for creating stable, quality jobs for women should be given priority over other occasional incentives, and should be excluded from the State aid map. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC calls for the bonus clause for companies that promote female employment to be strengthened and extended to all public procurement contracts, and for public calls for tender for implementing entities to be regulated with an explicit requirement for gender equality objectives. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC welcomes policy measures for encouraging and supporting self-entrepreneurship provided for in some NRRPs, and calls for the support also to include financial and managerial training and access to financial instruments. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | As stated in the Commission communication on gender equality, the EESC considers it important when implementing the NRRPs to take action on the taxation aspect by offering tax breaks on the second source of household income for low-income households, and on the income of less-affluent, single-parent families. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Indirect measures in the NRRPs include investment in childcare and care services. The EESC believes it paramount to invest resources in services for reconciling working time and time spent on long-term care, to provide additional services, and to make these services available to low-income households. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC believes that specific investments to incentivise women’s participation in the medium and long term in technical and scientific institutes and university courses (STEM), which can promote women’s employment in sectors that are currently male-dominated, can no longer be postponed. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC recommends that NRRPs be planned and coordinated in a way that complements all other Community resources and programmes, starting with resources and programmes for cohesion and rural areas. The Commission’s assessment in the framework of the European Semester with country-specific recommendations should include these objectives with a gender perspective, using new, transparent, accessible indicators that are comparable across countries and broken down by gender. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC recommends gender budgeting at all levels of public administration to be made mandatory in the European Semester phase. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The available data shows that involvement of the social partners and civil society organisations has been limited and infrequent in most countries. The EESC recommends that they be fully involved in implementing, monitoring and evaluating the NRRPs at European, national and local level. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1. | This opinion aims to highlight reforms and investments that promote gender equality provided for by the Member States in the NRRPs, on the basis of available information that is also updated by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Presidency of the EU Council. It should be noted that the EIGE (European Institute for Gender Equality) is conducting a study on gender equality and gender mainstreaming during post-COVID-19 recovery for the Swedish Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2023 (1), precisely on the measures set out in the NRRPs with a gender-based approach at all of their stages, from planning to implementation and evaluation, and on the extent to which Member States considered equality to be a lever for recovery. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | On 21 July 2020, the European Council, in its conclusions, adopted the NextGenerationEU plan, together with the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF 2021-2027). The objectives of the MFF and NextGenerationEU include promoting equal opportunities by ensuring that the activities and actions of the relevant programmes and instruments incorporate the gender perspective and can make a meaningful contribution to achieving equality, in line with the European strategy. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council (2) establishes the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which aims to support post-pandemic recovery, promote cohesion, and invest in the green and digital transitions. The Regulation explicitly states that NRRPs have to promote gender equality. The EESC endorses the Regulation’s recognition of the importance of measures combating gender inequalities, because it is in line with the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Commission, in its Communication on the 2021 Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy (AGS 2021) of 17 September 2020, set out the guidelines for the RRF, calling on Member States to pay special attention to disadvantaged groups, women and young people entering the labour market, by creating quality job opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | EU Delegated Regulation of 28 September 2021 sets out the common indicators and detailed elements of the recovery and resilience scoreboard, defining 14 indicators. Of these indicators, only 4 are specifically disaggregated by gender (3). For example, there is no gender breakdown in indicators 6 and 9 for supported businesses that are run by women. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The war in Ukraine, following the Russian aggression, has led to a significant slowdown, with growth prospects characterised by uncertainty, especially with regard to the supply of energy resources and the spike in costs — factors that affect the allocation of expenditure and investment in national budgets. This uncertainty will also have an impact on the implementation of the NRRPs. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The world of work and society as a whole are trying to emerge from the crisis by looking towards a long-term economic and social recovery, on which the NRRPs are based, and which cannot disregard the adoption of a gender-based framework to address and overcome the inequalities and gender gaps that the COVID-19 crisis has unfortunately widened in some production sectors, population groups and local and regional situations (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

3.   Background, preparation of the funding and resources allocated to the NRRPs

| 3.1. | Last July, the European Commission presented the European Parliament and the Council with a review report on the implementation of the scheme, which also addresses gender inequalities (5). The report explains the state of play of the contributions received from Member States on the basis of the NRRPs they submitted, which sets out the target priorities of the 25 NRRPs analysed on the basis of the six action pillars of the RRF (6). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Most of the measures proposed by the Member States have cross-cutting objectives that do not necessarily specifically target gender equality; out of 129 proposed measures, only 13 have so far been launched with investments. Not all Member States have planned reforms and resources explicitly addressing gender-related challenges or targeting women as beneficiaries. Innovative measures in sectors with low female employment are also poor (7). There is a lot of focus on childcare, caregiving and education. The Commission’s report shows that only a few countries have NRRPs which provide for a strategic approach with measures and reforms addressing gender equality. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Other Member States have prioritised certain strands, such as measures for social and territorial cohesion, focussing on equal opportunities, which often also incorporates the goal of gender equality; or measures aimed at vulnerable groups, which often include women and young people. Finally, measures to accompany the green and digital transition with a focus on training, where women in some countries lag behind in terms of equal access to training and reskilling programmes. It should be noted that most Member States have not identified gender-based violence as one of the challenges in the framework of measures to support gender equality in their NRRPs. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The NRRPs were drawn up with a national ex-ante assessment of the economic and social situation, broadly in line with spending priorities that had already been set and which did not take the gender dimension into account in terms of either resources allocated or the content of investment projects submitted. The initial proposal for the Commission’s RRF Regulation did not include any reference to gender equality as an objective and did not mention women as a specific target group. Only subsequently, as the result of pressure from the economic and social partners and civil society organisations, was a gender dimension added to the NRRPs in the Regulation published in February 2021. This is also why the gender dimension and gender budget do not feature in all NRRPs, but only in those that had originally established a gender-based classification for spending and investment. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The RRF requires Member States to indicate how the NRRPs address gender inequalities, but the impact assessment will only take into consideration how effective the measures implemented are. It is therefore important for the Commission to measure the effectiveness of the planned measures and investments at the evaluation stage, involving economic and social partners and civil society organisations, using comparable specific indicators. Data collected thus far do not reflect the actual national situation. It is therefore difficult to say now what impact some of the measures to tackle gender discrimination — especially cross-cutting measures — will have on the six pillars. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The resources allocated to the NRRPs do not give us a clear picture today of the investments supported not only by the RRF, but also by additional national public and private resources exclusively targeting gender equality in the various spheres of work and society. The resources allocated will only be able to be quantified at the implementation stage. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | According to the Commission report on specific gender equality measures in the NRRPs, however, the percentage of actions varies widely, from 11 % allocated by Sweden to less than 1 % by Croatia, with several countries below 2 %. However consideration should also be given to the impact of indirect measures set out in the NRRPs, and direct and indirect measures planned with NextGenerationEU Community resources, supplementing the NRRPS, such as REACT-EU and the EAFRD (European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | According to the Commission report and the initial information gathered by the EIGE, the picture that emerges is fragmented and uneven across countries. Not all countries provide data broken down by gender, despite being asked by the Commission to do so, to enable the Commission itself to report in a regular and timely way on gender-related expenditure in the NRRPs on the basis of some common elements. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | As not all Member States have made available gender-based studies before drafting the NRRPs there is no impact assessment on measures on additional and quality employment or on skilled jobs. Gender equality was considered a generic cross-cutting principle by 14 countries (8), but only Spain mentioned the criterion of gender mainstreaming throughout its NRRP. Italy has introduced specific measures for gender equality and has also detailed the impact of the measures in terms of increased employment, but concerns remain as to their actual effectiveness and the quality of the measures (9). In other countries, indirect measures such as investment in work-life balance, investment in care services, incentives to take part in STEM training, and improvements in working conditions and training have been planned to promote gender equality. These will have an impact in the medium to long term, but it cannot be quantified today. Alongside these investments, some Member States have planned direct measures such as recruitment incentives and subsidies for female entrepreneurship. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | Some countries have paid particular attention to ‘gender procurement (10)’ with conditionality measures for the recruitment of women and young people in public contracts concluded with NRRP resources. It would be advisable to regulate public calls for tender for implementing entities, explicitly requiring gender equality objectives. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The innovative NRRPs in this field include those of Spain, Italy and France. The Spanish NRRP gave a significant commitment by stipulating that all public administrative procedures must adopt a gender perspective. The Italian NRRP introduced guidelines on equal opportunities in contracts financed by the NRRP, that provide for the use of bonus measures and model clauses in calls for tenders, differentiated according to the sector, type and nature of the project, with the obligation to reserve 30 % of the hires needed for the contract’s implementation for young people under 36 years of age and women, as well as certification of gender equality by companies. The French NRRP instead included the introduction of new indicators for companies to calculate professional equality and progression through an action plan, while the Irish and Croatian NRRPs award funding bonuses to companies that adopt criteria for the promotion of gender equality (11). |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The Commission’s July 2022 report highlights that discussions with the economic and social partners and civil society organisations during the preparation of the NRRPs were extremely limited and infrequent. Social stakeholders and other civil society organisations express great concern regarding participation in the implementation and monitoring phase of the actions. In particular, gender experts point out (12) that without reliable, comparable, targeted, gender-disaggregated and, above all, quality data covering different areas and sectors, it will be difficult to assess the impact of measures. The EESC strongly recommends that social partners and civil society organisations that promote equal opportunities be more closely involved, both by the European institutions and by national and regional institutions in implementing, evaluating and monitoring the NRRPs. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

4.   NRRP background assessments

| 4.1. | The EESC emphasises the importance of implementing the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes achieving gender equality among the 17 goals, together with the objectives set out in the Commission Communication A Union of Equality: gender equality strategy 2020-2025 (13) in the areas of equal participation in different economic sectors, and the gender pay gap. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The gender equality strategy encompasses policies and actions aimed at combating all forms of discrimination and inequality, including those directed at the LGBTIQ community (14), and should be a reference point for implementing the NRRPs. The EESC stresses the importance of implementing key actions, shared with all parties, to ensure equal participation and opportunities in the labour market, to reduce the pay gap for equal roles and the lack of access to senior management positions, and to achieve gender balance in decision-making and policy. The EESC calls for the swift adoption and implementation of the directive on pay transparency (15), which sets out tools and measures at national level to address and close the pay gap, and calls for the causes and responsibilities to be closely monitored. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The objective of greater participation by women in the labour market needs to be addressed in a structural and comprehensive manner, taking into account economic, educational, geographical, social and cultural variables, including in remote and rural areas. An integrated approach should therefore be adopted, drawing the contributions of all European, national and regional institutions with effective social dialogue mechanisms with all actors and at all levels. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | In order to increase women’s participation in the labour market, the EESC notes the urgent need for all Member States to implement — as soon as possible — the Work-Life Balance Directive (Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council (16)), which introduces rules on family leave and flexible working arrangements for workers, and promotes a fair sharing of care responsibilities between parents, helping to remove obstacles that impact people’s ability to freely decide to have children and become parents. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | In the context of the Semester, the 2019 and 2020 Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs) on actions to reduce gender inequalities have prompted some Member States to incorporate a gender dimension into the NRRPs (17), but unfortunately in a framework of action that is fragmented across countries. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Following the pandemic and its impact on the situation of women, CSRs have been sporadic and infrequent. In 2022, only three countries (Austria, Germany and Poland) had CSRs covering women’s participation in the labour market and the operation of childcare services, while a further 22 countries received CSRs for disadvantaged groups (18), which led to indirect measures on women’s employment and their situation, which were difficult to quantify. The EESC notes that in the light of data on the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on women’s economic and social situation, gender-equality-specific CSRs would have been desirable in order to call for coherent ex-ante programming in the NRRPs, including targeted investments. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | In several reports, the EIGE highlights the unequal distribution of family burdens, especially in the areas of childcare and long-term care for older people and people with disabilities (19). These responsibilities are one of the main reasons for women’s low participation levels in the labour market (20). With the lockdown and the closure of schools, the situation has worsened. In this context, it should be noted that many NRRPs recognise the relationship between unpaid caring and work-life balance measures, and have introduced specific measures that help strengthen childcare services (21). |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | These services should also be made accessible to less affluent families by reviewing pricing criteria to make it easier for all to use them. Particular attention should be paid to promoting full-time education in all schools of all types and levels through school-based and extracurricular activities, and to providing additional services in preschools, such as before- and after-school clubs, and to boosting the number of public summer holiday clubs available to girls and boys. These are indirect measures which must find secure and lasting investment channels, which are unfortunately not reflected in the NRRPs with medium- to long-term resource planning. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EESC would like to see training measures for job centre operators aimed at providing gender-sensitive guidance to establish and disseminate a culture free of gender stereotypes. At the same time, it is important to promote partnerships between businesses and workers in employment and training in order to promote the integration of women into sectors in which men are predominantly employed. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC supports the idea of prioritising incentives for companies that hire women who are the beneficiaries of active policies with stable employment contracts and good working conditions. Additionally, incentives for encouraging and supporting self-entrepreneurship (including through targeted support for financial and managerial training and access to finance (22)) are important. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

5.   Specific assessments

| 5.1. | The crisis has dealt a hard blow to women, who often find themselves having to accept unskilled jobs. Furthermore, involuntary part-time work is an increasingly prevalent condition among female workers. In order to reverse the trend and increase women’s participation in the labour market and promote quality skilled employment, it is paramount that the NRRPs strengthen direct and indirect measures. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | In order to reduce gender gaps, the EESC recommends that NRRPs be planned and coordinated in a way that is complementary with all other Community resources and programmes, starting with cohesion resources and programmes. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | Existing gender differences and inequalities make public policies non-gender-neutral, so it is important for all institutions, including European, national and local, to adopt a gender budget document to supplement fiscal policies. To this end, the EESC recommends that gender budgeting be made mandatory in the European Semester phase (23). |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | The EESC warns of the danger that the RRF, as designed, could increase disparities in some production sectors, such as the green and digital sectors. Although gender equality is a cross-cutting priority, without specific and measurable action to promote female employment, including in terms of high qualifications in sectors with high female employment, the danger is that the gender employment gap will widen even further, which could exacerbate the way women are relegated to less well-paid activities. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | The NRRPs should include comparable indicators to measure improvements in pay equality, access to the labour market broken down by sector, reconciling working time and time spent on caring, subsidised credit, incentives to promote women’s self-entrepreneurship, and self-employment. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

| 5.6. | Incentives for the permanent hiring of women should be prioritised over other incentives and should be excluded from the State aid map. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

| 5.7. | Improving the reconciliation of working time and time spent on caring is one of the main objectives for enabling women to fully achieve their potential in the world of work and to improve business productivity. To this end, the EESC considers it a priority to invest resources in services for reconciling work and caring, not only for additional services in preschools and promoting the progressive provision of free education services for the 0-3 age group for low-income households, but also stepping up investment to provide long-term care and support services. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

| 5.8. | Achieving the objectives in reconciling working time and caring must be supported by the recruitment of specific professionals and the need for continuous training for all operators of these services, which are currently dominated by women. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

| 5.9. | The EESC points to the importance of extending the female employment bonus clause to all public procurement contracts, in order to support companies that commit to creating stable jobs, strengthening social inclusion and reducing gender employment gaps. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

| 5.10. | The gender gap in science subjects is very real and is entrenched from the earliest levels of education. Unfortunately, only a few NRRPs have included measures to increase women’s participation in technical and scientific institutes and university courses (STEM). Therefore, specific investments are needed for training plans to encourage the participation of girls in science, in research and in development, as well as investments and new forms of support for targeted projects to ensure that more women participate in innovative activities. These measures will have a positive impact in the medium to long term and therefore need a strategic approach when they are programmed. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

| 5.11. | The EESC believes that it is also important to take action on the taxation aspect, including as recommended by the Commission (24) and on the basis of national legislation, by offering tax breaks on the second source of household income (which is often that of women) for low-income households. It is also important to offer tax breaks on the incomes of less-affluent single-parent families. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

| 5.12. | In addition to the measures outlined in the NRRPs, the EESC proposes, as strategic accompanying measures, mandatory gender equality certification to reduce the gender gap and to improve women’s working conditions, tackle gender-based violence (25), disseminate smart working through negotiations with the social partners, and facilitate remunerated voluntary part-time work (in accordance with national practices and legislation) for women returning from maternity leave. |
| --- | --- |

5.12.

| 5.13. | The EESC welcomes the approach proposed by the Commission in the report, which provides for individual countries’ NRRPs to be monitored from a gender perspective. It will be important for Commission missions in the different Member States to focus specifically on the gender-equality measures in place, ensuring that data is managed in such a way that it is transparent and accessible. |
| --- | --- |

5.13.

| 5.14. | The EESC recommends the full involvement of the economic and social partners and civil society in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NRRPs, including through dedicated ‘steering committees’ at European and national level to promote the coordinated planning of gender equality initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

5.14.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  The EIGE's Study on Gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the COVID-19 recovery, to be published in 2023.

1

Gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the COVID-19 recovery

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17).

2

(3)  These specific indicators are: a) researchers working in supported research facilities; b) number of participants in education or training; c) number of people in employment or engaged in job searching activities; d) number of young people aged 15-29 years receiving support.

3

(4)  The EIGE’s 2021 Research note on Gender equality and the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

4

Gender equality and the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

(5)  COM(2022) 383 final.

5

(6)  The Netherlands submitted their NRRP later than other countries; Hungary’s NRRP is currently on hold for issues related to respect for the rule of law.

6

(7)  See footnote 1 and the article PNRR Italia, Gender Gap e politiche per l’innovazione e la digitalizzazione nel PNRR: quali misure? [Italy’s NRRP, gender gap and policies for innovation and digitalisation in the NRRP] by Marusca de Castries, Università degli Studi di Roma Tre, and Barbara Martini, Università di Roma Tor Vergata, September 2022.

7

PNRR Italia, Gender Gap e politiche per l’innovazione e la digitalizzazione nel PNRR: quali misure?

Italy’s NRRP, gender gap and policies for innovation and digitalisation in the NRRP

(8)  See footnote 1.

8

(9)  See footnote 6.

9

(10)  Gender procurement is an innovative strategy introduced by the European Commission to foster investment in equality through the inclusion of specific gender-sensitive bonus requirements or criteria that include social parameters. Gender procurement aims to increase gender equality in the labour market, improve the presence of women in top jobs and reduce the pay gap.

10

The EIGE’s report on Gender-responsive public procurement: the key to fair and efficient public spending in the EU, published in 2022, indicates how public procurement can guide and support gender equality by improving the effectiveness and quality of public spending with case studies and recommendations.

(11)  Data collected from an EIGE analysis, see footnote 1.

11

(12)  The European Parliament’s briefing on Gender equality in the Recovery and Resilience Facility, published in April 2022, in which concerns from different studies carried out at national level (both by research centres and universities) are expressed.

12

(13)  Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 5 March 2020. COM/2020/152 final.

13

(14)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Union of Equality: LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025’ (COM(2020) 698 final) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 128).

14

(15)  The proposal for a directive on pay transparency is being negotiated in trilogue.

15

(16)  Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79).

16

(17)  The European Parliament’s report on CSRs and RRPs — Thematic overview on gender-related issues, published in October 2021.

17

(18)  See footnote 14.

18

(19)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The role of family members caring for people with disabilities and older persons: the explosion of the phenomenon during the pandemic (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 75, 28.2.2023, p. 75), which provides important recommendations on measures to be taken.

19

(20)  The EIGE’s report, Gender mainstreaming — gender stakeholder consultation, published in 2019.

20

(21)  See footnote 1.

21

(22)  The Spanish NRRP allocates EUR 36 million to help female start-up entrepreneurs, while the Italian NRRP harnesses EUR 400 million to support women’s participation in entrepreneurial activities.

22

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Gender lens investing as a way to improve gender equality in the European Union (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 16), which puts forward proposals to encourage investment in female entrepreneurship.

(23)  The European Commission’s discussion paper on Gender Budgeting Practices: Concepts and Evidence, published in June 2022.

23

(24)  See footnote 10.

24

(25)  Member States have been urged to ratify ILO Convention No 190 on violence and harassment in the world of work, which has so far only been ratified by two European countries.

25

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/16

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Gender lens investing as a way to improve gender equality in the European Union’

(Own initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/03)

| Rapporteur: | Ody NEISINGH |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Maria NIKOLOPOULOU |

Rapporteur:

Ody NEISINGH

Co-rapporteur:

Maria NIKOLOPOULOU

| Referral | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 23.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 172/6/7 |

Referral

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

23.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

172/6/7

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC strongly believes that with the collaboration of men and women, and by creating a fertile ground for women entrepreneurship and the adequate financial and legislative instruments, such as gender budgeting, we can create an inclusive financial ecosystem in the EU and Member States and advance faster towards gender equality. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Data, impact assessments and common indicators are essential to gender mainstreaming. Data and indicators from Member States and among institutions at EU level require harmonisation in order to be instrumental in addressing the gender gap. The EESC stresses that the EU should collect gender-disaggregated data in the European context of investments and integrate them into the annual Gender Equality Index. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | So as to accelerate the future growth of female entrepreneurship, it is worth investigating the role of business angels, seed investments and the ‘circle of giving back’. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC strongly believes that by improving the position of women in receiving funds, there will be a positive ‘trickledown effect’ that leads to better financial and social outcomes. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | In order to create a fertile ground for female entrepreneurship, the EESC finds it important to provide women with more networking and training opportunities and mentoring programmes. In addition to this, the EESC stresses the importance of education in challenging gender stereotypes, including the stereotypical ideas of male entrepreneurs and in building an entrepreneurial culture that prepares women to think big. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC recommends that Member States provide access to maternity benefits and parental leave options for female entrepreneurs in line with the principles set out in the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC stresses that Member States should start to get girls interested in the STEM fields at an early stage, to support women entrepreneurs and female role models in these sectors and invest in programs to make girls in high school interested in STEM. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC recommends the gender mainstreaming of the Social Economy Action Plan by providing targeted actions for women and keeping a gender perspective as a criterion when it comes to the allocation of EU and national funds and in public procurement so as to promote and retain female talent in the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC suggests that diversity of teams with a specific focus on women should be a criterion for receiving public funding. It is important to set specific standards so as to avoid ‘pinkwashing’ (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC recommends that in the medium term all European authorities and Member States should use gender budgeting tools at all levels of the budgetary process. The participation of civil society and social dialogue are also crucial in order to detect the areas that need to be addressed through the budget. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | Unconscious biases in the financial sector persist, so awareness campaigns and unconscious bias training for investors and juries is important. In addition to this, the EESC considers that all juries of European financial institutions should achieve gender balance as soon as possible to avoid homophily or ‘similar attracts similar’ bias, and also receive training on unconscious bias. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC suggests that the EC publishes a gender impact assessment of the annual EU budget and present this as an annexed document, create a task force to participate in the negotiations and to align and include gender mainstreaming EU objectives in the next MFF (2028-2034) and in the mid-term review of the current MFF (2021-2027) (2). |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC calls for EU funds to be made more accessible to women’s organisations by simplifying procedures and providing grants for their core activity. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC finally calls for an ambitious vision from the European Commission and the European institutions on gender budgeting and gender lens investing, including concrete targets on women receiving funding, concrete KPIs, legislation, updated criteria and (intensified) programmes on improving female entrepreneurship and access to finance (e.g., dedicated grants for women, dedicated limited partner funding for women-owned and co-owned funds, loan guarantees or microfinance, co-investment platforms, gender bonds or microcredits). |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | Gender mainstreaming is a core objective of the European Union (EU), in compliance with both Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and Article 8 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Despite these legal obligations to ensure equality between women and men, progress on effective gender mainstreaming, particularly with regards to finance and budgets, has been slow. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | This opinion wants to emphasise the challenges and opportunities of entrepreneurship, public and private investments and budgeting in relation to gender equality and call for an ambitious vision from the European Institutions and Member States on gender lens investing and gender budgeting. This focus will have a positive impact on the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals on achieving gender equality (SDG5) and reducing inequalities (SDG10). It is also important to acknowledge that in order to achieve gender equality we need collaboration from both women and men in promoting equality. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | According to the European Commission, women represent roughly 52 % of the overall population in Europe, but constitute 34,4 % of the self-employed and 30 % of start-up entrepreneurs (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | All-male founded teams receive almost 92 % of all venture capital invested in Europe. As regards funding, in early stages only 1 % of funding goes to female-led companies, and it never rises to more than 30 % in later stages, even though teams with female founders and mixed-gender teams are found to outperform their male counterparts (4) (5) (6) (7). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | In March 2017, the OECD reported that women are less likely than men to report that they can access the financing needed to start a business in all countries except for the United States, Mexico, Greece and Indonesia. This gender gap can be associated with women having lower levels of experience, operating in highly competitive and low-growth sectors, as well as gender-biased credit scoring and gender stereotyping in investment evaluations. Women are also often hindered by less access to basic financial services (e.g. checking and savings accounts) (8). Furthermore, self-employed women are more likely than self-employed men to be discouraged borrowers. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | According to the European Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, only one in ten decision-makers at venture capital (VC) and private equity firms are female, even though some private funds identified as operating with a gender focus have 72 % female partners. Findings indicated that, on average, 85 % of VC general partners are men and just 15 % are women. If women are partners, they tend to be partners of smaller funds. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The COVID-19 pandemic has widened gender and economic inequalities. In social and economic aspects, there is a clear distinction on how the coronavirus has had an impact on different genders. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had an impact on women’s access to finance. While European figures are missing, the United States even faced a widening of the already existing gender gap in venture capital funding for women-led start-ups (9). |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Globally, awareness of gender lens investing continues to gain momentum. The European investment ecosystem for women entrepreneurs and founders is however still fragmented and lacks a systemic and strategic gender focus (10). Specific gender equality funds are scarce, and these initiatives fail to attract more women entrepreneurs. Around 50 % of funding in the European Union consists of taxpayers’ money. A collective effort on an EU level creating a more gender-nuanced and equal financing ecosystem, along with accompaniment throughout the entire process of creating a business, can bring consensus and help overcome the obstacles towards change. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | When we talk about gender lens investing, we need to be aware of all the intersections with other inequalities that influence access to finance even further, like women with a disability, women with low socioeconomic status, young women, women with a migration background, or the intersection with sexual orientation, race, etc. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | The EESC strongly believes that by improving the position of women in receiving funds, there will be a positive ‘trickledown effect’ that leads to better financial and social outcomes. When women venture capitalists do make the decisions, they are twice as likely to invest in female founding teams, thus increasing women employment. Start-ups with a female founder fill their staff with 2,5 times more women. Companies with a female founder and a female executive hire six times more women (11). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Data collection is paramount so as to evaluate the current situation and design strategies to move forward. In spite of the effort in this respect, the EC, the Council, the OECD, EuroStat and EIGE collect data about several gender aspects, but they require harmonisation in order to be instrumental in addressing the gender gap. The collection of relevant data needs to be mandatory for Member States. The methodologies and metrics used should be brought together to create a holistic view and be able to use additional data (social bias, ethnicity bias, intersectionality bias, etc.) to allow monitoring and evaluation of progress and policies. In addition, more regular and improved analytical studies need to be conducted. The EESC stresses that the EU should collect gender-disaggregated data in the European context of investments and integrate them into the annual Gender Equality Index. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Equally important is to take a look at the ticket size (the amount of money invested), and the role of business angels and seed investments. Also worth researching is the ‘circle of giving back’: women who are invested in, grow and start to grow investment capital of their own and become angel investors themselves. This could be a positive accelerator for future growth of female entrepreneurship and could be increased through targeted promotion campaigns, aimed at increasing overall understanding of the opportunities and contributions angel investors can make, combined with information on how to start. Member States could also investigate tax breaks to support this. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC considers that gender mainstreaming in the EU will be achieved by actively promoting gender equality in all policy-making and decision making, including social and cohesion policies and EU competition policy — and in spending the EU budget. The necessary prerequisites and effective monitoring during implementation, in order to correct policy actions if necessary, are still missing. Since we know that effects of the COVID-19 pandemic are not gender-neutral, the EESC reiterates its call to policymakers at all levels to follow the principle of gender mainstreaming and include the gender equality aspect in all decisions, including those on budgeting, investment and funding and public procurement. This also includes the MFF 2021-27 budget cycle and in the Recovery and Resilience Plans, and should include gender impact assessments, proper binding indicators, and also monitoring and evaluation systems (12). |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | A recent report of the European Court of Auditors states that the Commission paid little attention to the gender analysis of the policies and programmes they examined. It made limited use of gender-disaggregated data and indicators, and published little information on the EU budget’s overall impact on gender equality. However, in areas where legal requirements were set out in detail, this facilitated the incorporation of gender equality into programmes. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

4.   Concrete actions

4.1.   Create a fertile ground for female entrepreneurs

| 4.1.1. | In order to create a fertile ground for female entrepreneurship, the EESC finds it important to provide women with more networking and training opportunities and mentoring programmes. It is crucial that women develop an ‘old girls’ network’ next to the existing ‘old boys’ network’, because women tend to have smaller, less diverse networks. Role models and mentors also play an important role: in a study in Italy, 70 % of girls said they felt differently about their future after meeting a role model. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.1.

| 4.1.2. | Stereotypical ideas about entrepreneurship start as early as in primary education. The EESC stresses the importance of education in challenging gender stereotypes, including the stereotypical ideas of male entrepreneurs and in building an entrepreneurial culture that prepares women to think big. Negative social connotations surrounding women entrepreneurs and executives still exist in Europe. Also, schools play a vital role in financial and entrepreneurial capacity building, and these skills should be included in school curricula starting in primary education and being reinforced and developed throughout the school system. Entrepreneurial fairs and other programs where women could gain access to seed money and with, for example, a girls in science approach would be a good way to encourage female entrepreneurship from an early stage. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.2.

| 4.1.3. | The ‘impostor syndrome’ describes the phenomenon where people doubt their abilities and feel they are not good enough at what they do. This syndrome exists on a wide scale among women entrepreneurs. Working on women’s capacities and self-esteem all throughout education will reduce the phenomenon and will open more perspectives for women’s development (13). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.3.

| 4.1.4. | To a large extent, the time poverty that women currently experience due to unpaid care responsibilities is a barrier to entrepreneurship. Cultural changes, such as co-responsibility among the partners when it comes to running the household and taking care of children and others, in combination with systemic measures such as affordable or free child and elderly care, are key. The EESC recommends that Member States provide access to maternity benefits and parental leave measures for female entrepreneurs in line with the principles set out in the Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed (14) (15). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.4.

| 4.1.5. | Entrepreneurship training programs that target women tend to focus on markets and sectors in which women are already well represented. There are sectors where numbers of women entrepreneurs are severely lacking, such as in high-tech and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) fields. The EESC stresses that Member States should begin to get girls interested in these fields at an early stage, to support women entrepreneurs and female role models in these sectors and invest in programs to make girls in high school interested in STEM. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.5.

| 4.1.6. | The current gender imbalance in the labour market is also an obstacle for women’s future endeavours. Women face fewer opportunities to acquire the proper managerial and entrepreneurial training and savings to start their business. For young women there are therefore more barriers to starting a business. Also, the gender pay gap or the absence of fair pay may limit their financial resources. Since a lot of funding opportunities require a private initial investment by the entrepreneur, the EESC believes that closing the gender pay gap and fixing the gender imbalance in the labour market will have a positive effect on women’s entrepreneurship. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.6.

| 4.1.7. | Women are more prone to start a business in sustainable and social areas in order to make a measurable positive impact on society and to run a social start-up (16) (17). Companies operating in the frame of the social economy put at the centre of their activity the economic and social needs of the communities and their workers, as well as environmental sustainability. They invest in wellbeing and put values at the core of their business. Therefore increasing the financing of social economy projects and promoting the creation of social enterprise ecosystems will have a positive impact on women’s economic emancipation and development. Likewise, the promotion of female entrepreneurship will boost the growth of social enterprises. The European Commission’s Social Economy Action Plan notes that the prevalence of female entrepreneurs is higher in social entrepreneurship than in conventional entrepreneurship. However, there are no targeted actions to boost women’s entrepreneurship, including social entrepreneurship. The EESC recommends the gender mainstreaming of the Social Economy Action Plan (18) by providing targeted actions for women. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.7.

4.2.   Create change within the financial and investment sector

| 4.2.1. | The EU should play a leading role in creating the fertile ground for a gender conscious ecosystem. Four EU countries accounted for the majority of Series C funding for women-led companies between 2006-2018 in Europe: Sweden, Germany, Spain and France. Success in the top countries was supported by a strong ecosystem and targeted activities to promote gender inclusion (19). The EESC recommends developing a European network of gender conscious investors that can share best practices and promote the opportunities already in place with respect to financing for women’s entrepreneurship. The Investing in Women Code of the British Business Bank, a commitment by financial services firms to improve female entrepreneurs’ access to tools, resources and finance, could be an inspiration for engaging with the private sector (20). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

| 4.2.2. | Around one in ten decision makers in Venture Capital and Private Equity are female. Attracting female talent and improving female career development within the financial and investment sector is needed to change the current masculine culture, which makes it unattractive for women to stay or start in this sector, into an inclusive culture. This culture should also measure return of investment not only by economic reports, but also by the sustainability and social returns of their investment. Therefore, the EESC would like to see diversity of management and founders’ teams becoming one of the main criteria for receiving public funding, including public pension funds, and by doing so inspire recruitment and retention of female talent in the financial and investment sector. The EESC also suggests that Member States exchange best practices on methods for promoting diversity of teams and women-led teams in the finance sector. An investor seal of excellence or standard in the investment sector should be developed. A standard could serve as one of the criteria when applying for public funding (21). A standard, compared to a one-off pledge could be audited and annually reviewed to avoid ‘pinkwashing’. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

| 4.2.3. | The EESC recommends that institutions in the private financial sector be given access to technical assistance and training about gender lens investing, provided by the European Union or Member States. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

| 4.2.4. | There is a general assumption that women tend to be more risk-averse than men, more cautious and exhibit a less-aggressive competitive behaviour. The EESC suggests reflecting this lower-risk behaviour in the financial instruments and building specific products for certain low risk projects that require fewer guarantees and lower interest rates to grant a loan or cover a higher percentage of the initial capital when granting a subsidy.
  Biases persist in the financial sector, most often unconscious ones, for example where there is a preference towards pitches presented by men or where the content written by women focuses on social impact, while men are more focused on finance and numbers. Awareness campaigns and unconscious bias training for investors and juries can be of extreme importance to raise awareness of these biases. Also crucial is awareness raising within the sector of the importance of solid and resilient business models that grow slowly but firmly, rather than a focus on fast short-term revenue growth and valuation. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

Biases persist in the financial sector, most often unconscious ones, for example where there is a preference towards pitches presented by men or where the content written by women focuses on social impact, while men are more focused on finance and numbers. Awareness campaigns and unconscious bias training for investors and juries can be of extreme importance to raise awareness of these biases. Also crucial is awareness raising within the sector of the importance of solid and resilient business models that grow slowly but firmly, rather than a focus on fast short-term revenue growth and valuation.

4.3.   Gender Budgeting and Gender Lens Investing through public funding

| 4.3.1. | Budgets mirror political priorities and are the most important economic policy instrument for transforming societies. Public policies play an important role in leading the way and creating an enabling environment for investors, and by doing this create decent jobs. It has long been acknowledged that gender budgeting, targeted funding for women’s empowerment, the earmarking of budgets and the regulation of gender-responsive public procurement procedures and processes as a means of implementing gender budgeting, are all necessary tools for achieving gender equality. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.1.

| 4.3.2. | Gender budgeting is a process through which public budgets are examined in order to assess whether they contribute to more equality between women and men, and reshaped accordingly to make sure that they do. Gender budgeting requires a twin-track or dual approach: mainstreaming gender equality in all budgets and programs and specific targeted funding to address the root causes of gender inequality. The gender dimension should be integrated into all phases of the budgetary cycle, from budgetary proposals (ex ante) and throughout the spending itself (ex nunc) to the evaluation and control of the money actually spent (ex post). Data, impact assessments and common indicators are essential to gender mainstreaming across the budgetary cycle: planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Even though it can be difficult for Member States to collect gender-disaggregated data, it is the only way to move forward and establish proper gender mainstreaming policies. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.2.

| 4.3.3. | The EESC recommends that in the medium term all European authorities and Member States should use gender budgeting tools at all levels of the budgetary process. The participation of civil society and social dialogue is also crucial in order to detect the areas that need to be addressed through the budget. A gender analysis is a precondition for gender budgeting and gender mainstreaming in (financial) policies, especially the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the Next Generation EU package and the European Structural and Investment funds. Particular attention should be paid to Cohesion Policy, which is one of the essential tools for correcting imbalances between countries and regions. The EESC recommends collecting data specific to gender equality in Cohesion Policy according to indicators developed explicitly for this purpose. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.3.

| 4.3.4. | The EESC is pleased to see that the Commission has started an internal training program on gender budgeting, but it is still small-scale. The EESC would like to see that all people working on the European Commission’s budgets and at the European’s financial institutions are properly trained on gender lens investing, gender mainstreaming and gender budgeting. This training at national level is also crucial for the implementation of gender equality objectives. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.4.

| 4.3.5. | The EESC believes it is important to create dedicated funds and financial instruments to support women’s entrepreneurship, including women-led (and co-led) and owned venture capital and private equity funds, and also to explore innovative financing solutions that address market failures (e.g., dedicated grants for women, dedicated limited partner funding for women-owned and co-owned funds, loan guarantees or microfinance, co-investment platforms, gender bonds or microcredits). |
| --- | --- |

4.3.5.

| 4.3.6. | Furthermore, the EESC believes that updating the criteria of investment funds is necessary to narrow the gender gap. For example, if European funds like Invest EU and European Investment Fund use ‘experience’ as an important criterion in start-up funding but not ‘diversity’, we do not grant women equal access to the capital market. The EESC suggests that having a gender equality plan, which includes the fund’s strategy on gender lens investing and the funds’ commitment to achieving gender equality, should be conditional in the assessment of funds of funds (FOF), venture capital and private equity funds when applying for public funding. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.6.

| 4.3.7. | The principles of gender budgeting and gender lens investing should also be used outside the European borders in external financing mechanisms, including development cooperation policies. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.7.

| 4.3.8. | The EC should carry out a gender impact assessment of the annual EU budget and present this as an annexed document. This annex to the budget will serve as a gender mainstreaming monitoring document aiming at reshaping budgets in the future, and in relation to this the EP Women’s Rights and Gender Equality Committee (FEMM) could adopt an opinion. The EESC also recommends publishing the information and research in consultation with gender budgeting experts and non-governmental organisations working on gender equality well before the parliamentary decision on the annual budget, in order to promote broad debates on budgetary and macroeconomic policies. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.8.

| 4.3.9. | The EESC states that all juries of European financial institutions should achieve gender balance as soon as possible to avoid homophily or ‘similar attracts similar’ bias and also receive training on unconscious bias. The European Innovation Council, for example, set a target of improving the number of women-led start-ups under its Accelerator programme by increasing the number of female jury members to 50 %, and by inviting more women to pitch their businesses. The Council increased the percentage of female-led start-ups from 8 % to 29 %. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.9.

| 4.3.10. | We also suggest appointing a Women’s Enterprise Director or High-level representative within the European Commission and the Member States’ enterprise ministries with a cross-departmental role in raising awareness and promoting the economic benefits of encouraging more women to start and grow businesses, including social businesses. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.10.

| 4.3.11. | The EU and Member States should support the role of public, local or regional development agencies in the investment market and their role in social impact. For example, in the Netherlands, these regional development agencies invest in start-ups and value social impact greatly. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.11.

| 4.3.12. | Civil society and non-profit organisations that work on gender mainstreaming are generally underfunded in Europe. The EESC calls for the EU funds to be made more accessible to women’s organisations by simplifying procedures and providing grants for their core activity. Structural funds granting procedures should be more aligned with the direct funds so as to avoid bureaucracy. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.12.

| 4.3.13. | The EESC finally calls for an ambitious vision from the European Commission and the European institutions on gender budgeting and gender lens investing, including concrete targets on women receiving funding, concrete KPIs, legislation, updated criteria and (intensified) programmes on improving female entrepreneurship and access to finance. The EESC recommends establishing a Gender Budgeting Working Group within the European Commission, mainstreaming gender in the current MFF and other financial instruments. To prepare for more robust gender mainstreaming in the future, the EESC suggests creating a task force as soon as possible among the EU institutions to participate in the negotiations and to align and include gender mainstreaming EU objectives in the next MFF. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.13.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  By pinkwashing we mean pretending to be very active in gender equality but in reality lagging behind, (comparable to the term greenwashing in sustainability).

1

(2)  D’Alfonso, A. (2021). Multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (europa.eu) (EPRS briefing; PE 637.979). European Parliamentary Research Service. The European Commission proposed a compulsory mid-term review of the functioning of the MFF, to be carried out by December 2023, p 8.

2

The European Commission proposed a compulsory mid-term review of the functioning of the MFF, to be carried out by December 2023

(3)  https://www.eib.org/attachments/thematic/why_are_women_entrepreneurs_missing_out_on_funding_en.pdf.

3

(4)  Eurostat and European Commission. The State of European Tech 2020; Atomico (2020).

4

(5)  Why are women entrepreneurs missing out on funding? Reflections and considerations — Executive summary (eib.org).

5

(6)  Funding women entrepreneurs: How to empower growth, 2020.

6

(7)  https://europeanwomeninvc.idcinteractive.net/8/.

7

(8)  COSME Programme Call for Proposals Encouraging community building around the issue of women entrepreneurship — Management and running of the WEgate platform.

8

(9)  Women-Led Startups Received Just 2,3% of VC Funding in 2020 (hbr.org).

9

(10)  UN Women (2021) Investment with a gender lens in Europe.

10

(11)  https://www.kauffmanfellows.org/journal_posts/women-vcs-invest-in-up-to-2x-more-female-founders.

11

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee ‘on Gender-based investments in national recovery and resilience plans’ (OJ C 100, 16.3.2023, p. 8).

12

(13)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on gender equality (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Czech Presidency) (OJ C 443, 22.11.2022, p. 63).

13

(14)  Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU (OJ L 188, 12.7.2019, p. 79).

14

(15)  Council Recommendation on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed, adopted 8 November 2019.

15

(16)  The Value of Investing in Female Founders (Forbes, 2019).

16

(17)  According to S&P Global, which polled investors in 11 countries.

17

(18)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy (COM(2021) 778 final).

18

(19)  Funding Women Entrepreneurs Through MFF 2021-2027 EU Parliament hearing Women & Investment – April 19, 2021.

19

(20)  https://www.british-business-bank.co.uk/investing-in-women-code/.

20

(21)  A good example is the Diversity VC standard now used across the EU and US: www.diversity.vc.

21

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/24 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/24

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communicating fundamental rights and the rule of law’

(Own initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/04)

| Rapporteur: | Cristian PÎRVULESCU |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | José Antonio MORENO DÍAZ |

Rapporteur:

Cristian PÎRVULESCU

Co-rapporteur:

José Antonio MORENO DÍAZ

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 23.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 199/3/4 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

23.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

199/3/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Union is based on common values, as stated in Article 2 TEU: the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women. The rule of law and human rights are part of the European identity. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Moreover, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, an essential and binding document, states that the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity, and is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law (1). Strengthening the application of the Charter is both an obligation and a meaningful way to protect people and make them aware of the importance of the rule of law and fundamental rights protection. While the Committee endorses all efforts across these dimensions, it emphasises the need for all EU institutions to actively communicate directly to the general public. The rule of law and fundamental rights are crucial and must become part of the shared civic and democratic culture on the continent. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe offers a clear description of the key principles covered by the rule of law: legality, legal certainty, prevention of abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination, and access to justice (2). These are clear criteria for assessing the conformity of any State action with the principles of the rule of law, and have been endorsed by the Court of Justice (3). |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC urges all EU institutions to demonstrate zero tolerance for rule of law breaches in the Member States. The EU has a legal duty to uphold the rule of law and protection of fundamental rights, regardless of the intentions of various political actors which may run counter to that aim. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC points to the Court ruling whereby the budget is one of the instruments which give practical effect to the obligation of all Member States to abide by the core values of the EU, including the rule of law and respect for human rights (4). |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The European Commission’s Annual Rule of Law Report is a valuable instrument which can prevent backsliding in democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights protection. However, it has to be reformed in order to achieve its aims. It should be adjusted to include all the Article 2 TEU values, legal and/or financial actions when country-specific recommendations are not fully addressed, and a fifth pillar dedicated to monitoring national developments relating to civic space (5). |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC has already underlined that civil society plays a key role in preserving democracy in Europe, and that only a strong and diverse civil society can defend democracy and freedom and preserve Europe from authoritarianism (6). Moreover, there is no rule of law without democracy and fundamental rights, and vice versa; the three concepts are intrinsically linked (7). Hence, the EESC urges all concerned parties to stop conversation of so-called illiberal democracy, even to criticise the concept. There is no democracy without liberal principles. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | More stakeholders should be involved in the efforts to make the rule of law a more tangible reality: the social partners, professional organisations such as Bar and Law societies, and grassroots organisations that work with vulnerable people and communities at greater risk of harm, disadvantage and discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The rule of law and human rights can be perceived by some as excessively abstract, distant, jargonistic and legalistic concepts. Communicating the rule of law effectively requires focusing on shared values and relatable concepts of fairness and justice. Telling a human story by showing the human face and the person behind the evidence, as well as statistics, can also help. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC calls for Member States to mainstream the rule of law and fundamental rights in schools and higher education. Civic education should be compulsory, start as early as possible and be taught for a significant number of years. In addition, EU and national resources have to be provided for the proper training of civic education teachers. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The human rights framework is built on the principle of accountability, and therefore requires measures to identify who is responsible for what outcome, and to identify desirable policy changes. It is also important to identify issues of broad interest to the general public, such as access to energy, transport, regional equality, work, housing, healthcare and various other public services, at local, regional and national level. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | Human rights protection and the rule of law are strengthened by a strong welfare state, regardless of the various forms it may take across Europe. This interconnectedness is recognised by the European Pillar of Social Rights, an essential policy tool for building a more inclusive Union. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | Grassroots movements and people with lived experience of poverty must be at the centre of a democratic case for human rights. There is no better way to defend human rights, particularly social rights, than having the voices of the people most affected by inequality, poverty and social exclusion heard in public spaces and policy debates. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The EESC recalls the position expressed in its opinion SOC/598 (2018): ‘The rule of law is interdependent and indissoluble from guarantees protecting pluralist democracy and respect for fundamental rights. The rule of law ensures that governments respect fundamental rights standards, and pluralist democracy ensures that governments pursue policies that advance their peoples’ well-being. Upholding the rule of law by itself does not guarantee that the law respects fundamental rights, nor that that law is made according to an inclusive and legitimate process based on well-informed, pluralist and balanced public debate and participation. To avoid mere “rule by law”, it is necessary to uphold fundamental rights and pluralist democratic standards alongside the rule of law.’ (8) |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | As observed in the Commission’s 2021 and 2022 Rule of Law Reports, preserving citizens’ trust in public institutions and the rule of law requires, among other things, the existence of an independent judicial system, with effective judicial review to ensure compliance with EU Law; a strong public commitment to fighting corruption and ensuring democratic accountability; media pluralism and media freedom, including transparency of media ownership; transparent constitutional and institutional mechanisms to ensure checks and balances, with active participation from civil society; and strengthening international cooperation for sustainable development, human rights, democracy and rule of law (9). In the 2022 Report, the Commission also highlights the significant threats to the EU values and the rule-based order of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, an aggression which grossly violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter and undermines democracy as well as the rule of law, in addition to European and global security and stability (10). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | No democratic and representative norm can be invoked to legitimise rule of law and fundamental rights breaches. The EU institutions, and the European Commission in particular, must use all instruments at its disposal to restore the integrity of the EU’s principles. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | By monitoring the situation on the ground, civil society organisations and human rights defenders have an essential role to play, particularly when rule of law deteriorates and human rights are under attack (11). Authoritarian governments threaten civil society organisations not only by shrinking and shifting the spaces available for their activities but also through personal threats and persecution, financial restrictions, or inadequate protection against physical or verbal attacks (12). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | As previously stated, the overall capacity of civil society organisations and human rights defenders to work within the Charter of Fundamental Right framework should be significantly strengthened through a package that includes training and knowledge transfer, organisational and financial support, and protection from attacks and negative campaigns (13). To this end, the EESC encourages the Commission to propose a comprehensive European civil society strategy to guide the collaboration, capacity-building efforts and effective communication of rule of law and fundamental rights. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The EESC considers the work of civil society organisations and human rights defenders essential in helping vulnerable groups cope with serious challenges to their safety, well-being and dignity. All people could one day find themselves in a position of vulnerability. In many cases, the sources of vulnerability overlap and result in structural marginalisation and discrimination. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The rule of law and fundamental rights protection should be ensured in relation to democracy, especially the promotion of free and fair elections and strong democratic participation (14). Those who are in a position to challenge the rule of law also act against political opposition and independent mass-media. The EU Democracy Action Plan (EDAP) is a necessary step in this direction. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Social partners have a significant role to play in communicating the rule of law and fundamental rights. All workplaces are affected by the deterioration of the political and legal climate in a country. Businesses, SMEs and social enterprises cannot effectively function if the rule of law and fundamental rights protection systems are not in place. Social partners should commit to acting to improve their integrity and effectiveness. Workers must be free to form and join the trade union of their choice, and unions must be able to function freely (15). Workers and employers have the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements and, in cases of conflict of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action (16). |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The Fundamental Rights Agency has a significant capacity to gather relevant information. It has already built a vast knowledge base which all interested actors can use. Its expertise is solid and it should provide the basis for enhancing its communication dimension. More resources should be granted to the Agency to engage in public communication in all the EU member countries. More cooperation is needed with specialist institutions like the Council of Europe and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR). |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The EU is also a global actor, whose responsibility to respect the rule of law and fundamental rights stands central to its international identity and role. All external policies, programmes, instruments and actions should reflect their centrality for the EU and the importance for a democratic and peaceful world. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

3.   Specific comments

3.1.   Positive narrative and framing

| 3.1.1. | Civic education on the principles of democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law should be reinforced at all levels. The Commission should also continue promoting public awareness with an ambitious communication agenda (17). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | The EU’s founding myth alone is no longer enough to appeal to the people of Europe. The EU should propose narratives on a desirable future and revive key principles that have played a major role in the European project (18), including the rule of law and human rights. This is especially important in the context of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.1.3. | The human rights framework is built on the principle of accountability, and therefore requires measures to identify who is responsible for what outcome and what desirable policy change. It is also important to identify issues of broad interest to the general public, issues such as access to transport, energy, work, housing, healthcare and various other public services, at local, regional and national level. One must go beyond the criticism of the situation that does not meet human rights standards, and describe the future that the rule of law and human rights can help build by inspiring positive associations in people’s minds (19). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.3.

| 3.1.4. | There is no rule of law without democracy and fundamental rights, and vice versa; the three concepts are intrinsically linked (20). Hence, the EESC urges all concerned parties to stop talking of so-called illiberal democracy, even when they do so to criticise the concept. There is no democracy without liberal principles. Illiberal democracy is not an alternative or even a diluted form of democracy. Illiberal democracy is no democracy. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.4.

3.2.   Necessary policies and relevant policy areas

| 3.2.1. | As observed by the EESC before, there is a correlation between people’s perceived or real lack of benefit from economic prosperity on one hand, and negative attitudes towards public institutions and fundamental principles on the other (21). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.1.

| 3.2.2. | Making the case for human rights and the rule of law requires steps to identify policies that can improve people’s daily lives. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.2.

| 3.2.3. | Human rights protection and the rule of law are strengthened by a strong welfare state, regardless of the various forms it may take across Europe. This interconnectedness is recognised by the European Pillar of Social Rights, an essential policy tool for building a more inclusive Union (22). Workers must have the right to fair wages that provide a decent standard of living (6th principle of the Pillar), and everyone lacking sufficient resources must have the right to an adequate minimum income to ensure that they can live with dignity at all stages of life, and effective access to enabling goods and services (14th principle) (23). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.3.

| 3.2.4. | The COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder of the importance of a universal, accessible and fair public healthcare system. The EESC reiterates the position expressed in opinion SOC/691 (2022): ‘The EU and its Member States should engage in a deep societal reflection on the origins of the crisis and the reasons why most European health systems were pushed to the verge of collapse because of the pandemic. Years of austerity policies have led to a general trend of disinvestment in the health sector and other key social services (assistance to dependent and vulnerable persons, nursing homes, etc.), creating a time bomb that exploded in the face of a major health challenge.’ (24) |
| --- | --- |

3.2.4.

| 3.2.5. | The pandemic is not the only crisis which affects fundamental rights. The war in Ukraine is endangering millions of people in Ukraine and around the world. Climate change and its associated challenges and disasters like wildfires directly affect people across the continent. Many Europeans are struggling with increased energy prices. Europe’s tools for action should be updated and adjusted accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.5.

| 3.2.6. | Policies, particularly economic reform policies, should be based on systematic ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments (25), in order to facilitate informed and inclusive European and national debates on the arbitration and adjustment of political choices (26). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.6.

| 3.2.7. | Greater emphasis should be placed on Chapter III (Equality) and Chapter IV (Solidarity) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as core elements of the EU’s democratic and value-based credentials (27). All human rights recognised in the Charter are indivisible, interdependent and equally important. As pointed out by the European Court of Human Rights in a landmark case, there is no watertight division between socioeconomic rights and civil and political rights (28). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.7.

| 3.2.8. | Further cooperation between EU institutions and Member States would be desirable to ensure all citizens and residents enjoy all the rights recognised in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter (in its multiple forms) and the relevant UN human rights conventions. The EESC calls on the Commission and Member States to have due regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights and to the European Social Charter when designing, interpreting and implementing EU Law. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.8.

| 3.2.9. | The EESC calls on all Member States to sign and ratify the 1996 European Social Charter (Revised) and accept the collective complaints procedure of the European Committee of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.9.

| 3.2.10. | The EESC supports the Commission’s initiative to allow for economic corrective measures with regard to Member States that commit serious and persistent violations of the values listed in Article 2 TEU (29). ‘The Commission needs to allocate appropriate human and financial resources and consistently follow up on signs of potential infringements. In doing so, the Commission must apply strictly objective criteria and investigate infringements in the same way in all Member States’ (30). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.10.

3.3.   A democratic case for human rights and the importance of lived experience

| 3.3.1. | According to a wide-ranging survey conducted by the Fundamental Rights Agency, nearly nine in ten people in the EU think that human rights are important for creating a fairer society (31). Europeans believe that human rights can play a meaningful role in their lives. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.1.

| 3.3.2. | Making human rights real across Europe requires action to highlight the way in which human rights — for example social rights such as work, social security, housing, education and healthcare — can make a difference for everyone in their daily lives, in the places that matter most to them and in their local communities (32). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.2.

| 3.3.3. | Grassroots movements and people with lived experience of poverty must be at the centre of a democratic case for human rights. There is no better way to defend human rights, particularly social rights, than having the voices of the people most affected by inequality, poverty and social exclusion heard in public spaces and policy debates. Telling a human story and showing the human face and the person behind the evidence, as well as statistics, can also help. Taking social rights seriously requires not only different policies, but also more inclusive processes to come up with them (33). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.3.

| 3.3.4. | European society cannot afford a fraudulent rights-versus-democracy binary choice. Upholding human rights requires making them popular by building and preserving a movement to champion the rights at the local, national and global levels. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.4.

| 3.3.5. | Civil society groups must lead this process, and public authorities in the EU and in the Member States must facilitate the democratic case for human rights by acting transparently and by respecting the role of civil society in holding them accountable. National human rights institutions should be strengthened, and they should raise awareness of possible remedies available to citizens. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.5.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391), Preamble.

1

(2)  Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, The Rule of Law Checklist, adopted at its 106th Plenary Session, 2016.

2

Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, The Rule of Law Checklist, adopted at its 106th Plenary Session, 2016

(3)  Judgment of 16 February 2022, Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, EU:C:2022:98 CJEU ruling, para. 325.

3

(4)  Poland v Parliament and Council, C-157/21, para. 130-131; Judgment of 16 February 2022, Hungary v Parliament and Council, C-156/21, EU:C:2022:97 CJEU ruling, para. 116-117.

4

(5)  Laurent Pech and Petra Bard, Rule of Law Report and the EU Monitoring and Enforcement of Article 2 TEU Values, Report for the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, February 2022, pp. 12-13.

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Resilient democracy through a strong and diverse civil society’ (own initiative opinion) (OJ C 228, 5.7.2019, p. 24).

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European control mechanism on the rule of law and fundamental rights’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 34, 2.2.2017, p. 8).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States’ (COM(2018) 324 final — 2018/0136 (COD)) (OJ C 62, 15.2.2019, p. 173).

8

(9)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2021 – Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union (COM/2021/700 final).

9

(10)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2022 – Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union (COM/2022/500 final).

10

(11)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council — Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union State of play and possible next steps’ (COM(2019) 163 final) (OJ C 282, 20.8.2019, p. 39).

11

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Populism and fundamental rights — suburban and rural areas (own initiative opinion) (OJ C 97, 24.3.2020, p. 53), point 1.6.

12

(13)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Strategy to strengthen the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (COM(2020) 711 final) (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 50).

13

(14)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Action Plan’ (COM(2020) 790 final) (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 56).

14

(15)  Article 8(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

15

(16)  Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

16

(17)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Action Plan’ (COM(2020) 790 final) (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 56).

17

(18)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Populism and fundamental rights — suburban and rural areas (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 97, 24.3.2020, p. 53).

18

(19)  FRA, 10 keys to effectively communicating human rights, 2018; European Network of National Human Rights Institutions, Tips for Effective Messaging about Economic & Social Rights, 2019.

19

(20)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The European control mechanism on the rule of law and fundamental rights’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 34, 2.2.2017 p. 8).

20

(21)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Populism and fundamental rights — suburban and rural areas (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 97, 24.3.2020, p. 53).

21

(22)  European Commission, The European Pillar of Social Rights in 20 principles.

22

(23)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘For a European Framework Directive on a Minimum Income’ (own initiative opinion) (OJ C 190, 5.6.2019, p. 1).

23

(24)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The impact of COVID-19 on fundamental rights and the rule of law across the EU and the future of democracy’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 11).

24

(25)  UN Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Guiding Principles for human rights impact assessments for economic reform policies, UN doc. A/HRC/40/57, 19 December 2018.

25

(26)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Populism and fundamental rights — suburban and rural areas (own initiative opinion) (OJ C 97, 24.3.2020, p. 53).

26

(27)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Strategy to strengthen the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU’ (COM(2020) 711 final) (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 50).

27

(28)  Airey v Ireland, Judgment, Merits, App No 6289/73 (1979) ECHR Judgment of 9 October 1979, para. 26.

28

(29)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The impact of COVID-19 on fundamental rights and the rule of law across the EU and the future of democracy’ (own initiative opinion) (OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 11).

29

(30)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Rule of law and the recovery fund (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 194, 12.5.2022, p. 27).

30

(31)  FRA, Many Europeans believe human rights can build a fairer society but challenges remain, press release, 24 June 2020.

31

(32)  Casla, Koldo and Barker, Lyle, Human Rights Local, Human Rights Centre blog — University of Essex, 17 January 2022.

32

Human Rights Centre blog — University of Essex

(33)  Casla, Koldo, ‘Nothing about us, without us, is really for us’, Global Policy, 14 October 2019.

33

Global Policy

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/31

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘An industrial strategy for the maritime technology sector’

(Own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/05)

| Rapporteur: | Anastasis YIAPANIS |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Christophe TYTGAT |

Rapporteur:

Anastasis YIAPANIS

Co-rapporteur:

Christophe TYTGAT

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change |
| Adopted in section | 11.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 207/2/4 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change

Adopted in section

11.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

207/2/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC is writing this own-initiative opinion to acknowledge the lack of sectoral policy actions to support the challenges and needs of the maritime technology (MT) sector, and makes concrete proposals for immediate action to strengthen Europe’s maritime resilience and strategic maritime autonomy and to regain global competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The Committee is worried about the future of the MT sector in Europe, which is facing unfair competition, especially from Asia. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC requests that MT be considered an EU strategic sector and its activities ‘critical infrastructure’ as soon as possible and calls for a maritime industry strategy and enough dedicated resources in the EC’s services. A sustainable European maritime strategy must take into account and reassess the ownership of European harbours and other related critical infrastructure. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The Committee calls for urgent measures that stimulate domestic demand for green and high-tech vessels, including an EU programme for fleet renewal and the retrofit of existing vessels in line with European Green Deal (EGD) goals, and for immediate investments in infrastructure and in alternative fuels. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC requests specific clauses in bilateral and free trade agreements that ensure free market access for EU maritime companies, prohibit trade barriers, demand reciprocity and secure due diligence. If international negotiations are unsuccessful, the EU needs to consider unilateral actions to create leverage over its international competitors. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | To ensure sustainable economic and social development, safeguard the EU’s defence and strategic maritime autonomy and secure jobs and critical capabilities, the Committee believes that incentives should be provided, both for relocating production facilities to the EU, with EU-manufactured technologies, and for keeping supply chains and subcomponent production in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC urges the EC and the Member States to implement large-scale reskilling, upskilling and vocational education and training (VET) programmes, with programme evaluation and skills certification and with the full involvement of social partners and academia, and requests financial support for the EU Pact for Skills (1) and for designated campaigns to make the sector attractive, including for women and young people. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC calls for increased efforts to ensure a just transition for all workers and SMEs, to create and consolidate European Works Councils and to meet the highest international social standards in full compliance with EU legislation and ILO rules. The EESC believes that the European Shipbuilding Sectoral Social Dialogue Committee (SSDC) has an essential role to play in this matter and in strengthening the MT sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | Accessing bank loans and public financing is very difficult for MT companies, especially for SMEs. The EESC calls for EU taxonomy rules that support sustainable investments in the maritime sector, promote its inclusiveness and ensure legal certainty for technological investments. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The Committee demands that funds collected from infringements of FuelEU Maritime (2) and revenues from the EU Emission Trading Scheme (3) be used to help finance also the waterborne sector (4) and its supply chain, in particular the maritime technology sector. The EESC calls for an EU Guarantee Fund to be set up that facilitates access to finance for risk-intensive maritime investments. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC believes that EU financing tools and access to the internal market should not be used by or granted to foreign companies that perpetuate social dumping and disrupt the global level playing field. The return on investment of these tools should benefit European companies. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | To achieve full decarbonisation of the MT sector, a complete switch to alternative fuels and technologies is necessary. The EESC welcomes the adoption of the Co-Programmed Partnership on Zero-Emission Waterborne Transport. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The Committee believes that a ‘Maritime Expert Group’ and a ‘European industrial alliance for the maritime technology sector’ could help improve and regain global competitiveness for the MT sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | Finally, the EESC is ready to get more involved in helping the MT sector tackle its challenges and calls on the European Commission and the Member States to urgently implement a maritime industrial strategy. The EESC is worried that, without a targeted toolbox, the EU will lose its maritime capabilities, know-how and jobs and will become fully dependent on Asia for its civil and naval ships and platforms and for maritime and offshore equipment. Failing to deliver and rapidly implement a dedicated maritime industrial strategy would be a significant political mistake. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1. | The EESC is writing this own initiative opinion following the opinion adopted in 2018 CCMI/152 — The LeaderSHIP 2020 strategy as a vision for the maritime technology industry (5). The aim is to raise awareness of the serious problems that the EU MT (6)
  sector is facing and of the lack of sectoral policy actions from EU and national public authorities to support the sector’s challenges and needs. The EESC makes concrete proposals for actions to ensure competitiveness and create growth and business for the MT sector. It urges the EU institutions, Member States, social partners and other stakeholders to jointly identify and take policy actions as soon as possible to save and protect this strategic sector to ensure the EU’s defence and coastal protection, maritime autonomy, access to trade, blue economy and global maritime leadership. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The EESC is intentionally following the structure of the EC LeaderSHIP Communication (7) to highlight the little progress made on the four proposed directions and sound the alarm that immediate and targeted intervention is needed for the MT sector, especially considering the impact of the pandemic and the war in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

3.   Improving Market Access and Fair Market Conditions

| 3.1. | Demand for food, merchandise and energy is expected to increase, which will require increased waterborne (maritime and inland waterways) transport infrastructure, capabilities, vessels, technologies and logistics management. Demand for waterborne and coastal tourism and leisure is also growing. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have demonstrated the strategic risks for the EU of being too dependent on foreign nations, while generating shortages and blockages of the supply chains, and increased prices for raw materials and energy, which put extra pressure on MT companies. The war in Ukraine has also reminded the EU of the importance of having critical maritime military capabilities, including commercial and naval vessels and technologies for defence, security, and border and coastal protection. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The global competition for EU producers is fierce, with companies from Asia, especially China and South Korea, gaining more and more markets thanks to strong governmental support, including through complex state aid schemes, while applying lower social and environmental standards. This has enabled them to gain traditional EU markets and attract orders from European companies at injurious prices. The current inflation rise and high energy prices put extra pressure on European producers. The EESC is worried about the future of the MT sector and believes that immediate action is necessary to strengthen Europe’s maritime resilience, regain global competitiveness, protect Europe’s strong position in complex shipbuilding and recreational boating and safeguard Europe’s strategic maritime autonomy. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | A sustainable European maritime strategy must also take into account the ownership of European harbours and other related critical infrastructure, many of which have been bought, entirely or partly, by Chinese companies which are under the total or partial control of the Chinese state. To ensure European strategic autonomy, it is of paramount importance to reassess the ownership structures and re-establish wherever possible European ownership. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC calls for a sectorial strategy for the MT sector to boost its global competitiveness and enable it to tap into business opportunities from the twin green and digital transition. Specific EU trade mechanisms, access to financing, labour training schemes and R & D programmes need to be developed immediately if the EU aims to continue competing in this heavily subsidised and unbalanced global market where its main competitors do not comply with WTO rules. Furthermore, the EESC demands that MT be considered an EU strategic sector, as it is in the USA, China, Japan or South Korea and that enough human and financial resources be dedicated to the sector in the EC’s services. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The European MT sector is a cornerstone for the EU’s defence and surveillance, for the transport of goods, energy and passengers, and for achieving the EU’s political goals in terms of the European Green Deal (EGD) and the blue economy. The EESC calls for urgent measures that stimulate domestic demand for green and high-tech vessels, including an EU programme for fleet renewal (e.g. of national fishing fleets, short sea and cabotage fleets, and recreational boats) and the retrofitting of existing vessels in line with EGD goals. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC notes that the competitiveness of the sector is directly influenced by the EGD as this represents a paradigm shift for the entire waterborne sector. Its implementation will result in speedier adoption of alternative fuels and technologies. However, the EESC points out that the limited infrastructure and availability of alternative fuels hinder a faster switch and therefore calls for immediate investments in this regard, for instance by setting up a dedicated EU Maritime Fund. The specific features of each vessel type should be considered, with specific roadmaps for propulsion systems, fuels and zero-emission technologies. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC is worried by the trade barriers in Asia towards European companies and calls for current and future bilateral and free trade agreements and economic partnerships to be updated with clauses that ensure free market access for EU maritime companies, prohibit trade barriers, demand reciprocity and secure due diligence. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC believes that international discussions and agreements represent the best way forward against trade protectionism and asks the EC to step up its international efforts to achieve global rules. Alternatively, the EC needs to apply unilateral actions — as long as it is necessary — to create leverage over its international competitors. The EESC considers it a top priority to act against foreign subsidisation and injurious pricing. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The MT industry is a cornerstone for Europe’s blue economy as it builds and retrofits vessels, structures and technologies, e.g. for developing a green fishery fleet, offshore renewable energy, aquaculture and deep sea mining. In order to achieve the EGD goals, the EU will need to significantly increase its industrial capacity for offshore marine renewables and for other alternative fuels. Otherwise, the EU will need to rely on foreign capacity to develop this strategic market and achieve its own EGD targets. To avoid this risk, the EESC calls on the EC to immediately qualify the strategic MT sector and its activities as ‘critical infrastructure’. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The Committee firmly believes that the EU’s economic leadership can only be achieved with strong production facilities on EU soil, as this is the only possibility to ensure a sustainable economic and social development, safeguard the EU’s defence and strategic maritime autonomy, keep EU citizens safe and secure their jobs. The EESC also calls for a dedicated programme and incentives for producers that want to relocate their production facilities to the EU (reshoring). |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

4.   Employment and Skills

| 4.1. | The MT sector creates about 1 million jobs in maritime regions across Europe (8). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Embracing greening and digitalisation and adopting breakthrough technologies require a specialisation of the labour force. For that, the EESC urges the EC and the Member States to develop and immediately implement large-scale reskilling, upskilling and VET programmes, through programme evaluation and skills certification, with the full involvement of the social partners and academia. Furthermore, the EESC calls for concrete financial support for the EU Pact for Skills and for designated campaigns that will make the sector more attractive, including for women and young people, and persons with disabilities and special competences. The EESC also points out that the MT sector requires workers with enhanced skills in robotics, AI, cybersecurity, sensoring, automation and 3D printing as well as highly skilled engineers, in addition to the sector’s special need for blue collar workers (e.g. welders, electricians, pipe fitters). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | European companies meet the highest international social standards in full compliance with EU legislation and ILO rules. The EESC acknowledges the work of European companies in leading the way in and raising international labour standards, and the importance of good working conditions, decent salaries and social security for the sector’s workforce and calls for increased efforts to create and consolidate European Works Councils. Furthermore, the Committee reiterates the need for workers posted to another Member State to be entitled to a set of core rights in force in the host Member State in accordance with the Posting of Workers Directive. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | As highlighted in the LeaderSHIP 2020 strategy (2013), the MT sector faces difficulties in ensuring the intergenerational transfer of know-how. The EESC is very disappointed that no specific (EU) actions have been taken so far and calls for a clear roadmap to ensure a Just Transition, make the MT sector more attractive and create adequate education and training facilities with new curricula and skills adapted to new trends and business models and to the green and digital transition. The just transition framework must be based on social dialogue and provide for adequate resources to attract a new workforce and support job-to-job transitions and the re- and upskilling of workers, including health and safety training on new technologies and processes. All programmes should be evaluated and certified, with the aim of making training uniform and based on the same standards. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC believes that the SSDC has an essential role to play in strengthening the MT sector. Quality social dialogue (e.g. through ambitious joint actions), agreements and collaboration between the social partners, including via the SSDC, are vital and should be respected. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

5.   Access to Finance

| 5.1. | The EESC considers it vital to keep production facilities in Europe and make them competitive and calls for the EU and MS to make industry financing a priority. The MT sector faces increased difficulties in accessing bank loans and public financing and has very limited exposure to other sources of financing, with SMEs being the most affected. The EESC also calls for EU taxonomy rules that support sustainable investments in the maritime sector, while leaving no one behind and avoiding any discrimination between actors in the sector. Environmental performance criteria must also be aligned with EU legislation and ensure legal certainty for technological investments. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The EESC believes that the EU should financially incentivise EU shipowners to build vessels in Europe, while keeping supply chains and subcomponent production in the EU as much as possible. Dedicated funds and calls for proposals should be taken into account due to the fact that maritime opportunities are barely mentioned or addressed in partnership agreements or national recovery and resilience plans. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | The Committee calls for funds collected from infringing FuelEU Maritime as well as the revenues from the EU Emission Trading Scheme to be used also as an additional dedicated financing source for the MT sector, especially for RDI. The EESC is ready to get involved in creating new policies and EU funding schemes and asks the EU institutions to be included in all future talks on the matter. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | Since the existing financial instruments are not sufficient or adapted to capital-intensive sectors, the EESC calls once again on the EC ‘to launch a dedicated financial instrument that would enhance investment in a capital-risk-intensive sector, such as the European MT industry’ (9), while ‘consideration should also be given to setting up a financing programme to enable European recycling facilities to scrap larger ship types’. The EESC calls for the establishment of an EU Guarantee Fund that facilitates access to finance for risk-intensive maritime investments. The dismantling and recycling of end-of-life vessels, including recreational and fishing boats, should also be enabled with EU financing. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | Finally, it is unacceptable that non-EU companies that do not respect EU standards still have access to EU funds (e.g. EIB finance) and the internal market. Therefore, the EU should strictly apply the principle of reciprocity and due diligence for the respect of EU standards and ensure that EU financing tools and access to the internal market are not used by or granted to companies perpetuating social dumping and disrupting the global level playing field. The EC should apply the foreign subsidy regulation to foreign subsidised shipyards and maritime equipment manufacturers and consider revising Regulation (EU) 2016/1035 of the European Parliament and of the Council (10) on injurious pricing of vessels. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

6.   Research, Development and Innovation (RDI)

| 6.1. | In order to accomplish the EGD targets and implement the EU industrial strategy, a sectoral approach is needed, with specific sectoral policy actions. The EESC highlights that there is a long road from theory to practice and is highly disappointed by the lack of action in supporting the EU’s industrial progress. The Committee, the social partners and local producers have waited in vain for a stimulus for the sector’s switch to green vessels, alternative fuels and technologies to comply with the Fit-for-55 package (11). |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | Embracing new disruptive technologies (e.g. smart sensors for both ships and ports, data analytics, IoT, cloud computing, AI) is vital to stay ahead of the competition. These will allow for more integrated shipping services and supply chains, increased safety and energy efficiency, and superior design. However, the EESC points out that the local producers already invest on average a significant 9 % of their annual turnover in RDI and calls for designated public policies and increased financial support for these frontrunners. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The Committee also requires enhanced efforts at national, EU and international level to increase cybersecurity capacities, since cyber risk will increase together with the technological evolution and the introduction of automated processes and vessels. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | To achieve full decarbonisation of the MT sector, a complete switch to alternative fuels and technologies is necessary. Although the sector is the most energy-efficient means of transport, the EESC points out that there is still room for improvement in terms of recycling, greening investments, zero-emission and climate-resilient ports, waterways infrastructure and lean port logistic chains. The EESC calls for support for research and innovation in the MT sector, as they are key for the development of breakthrough technologies and potential alternative concepts for maritime transport, and for the competitiveness of the MT sector. In this respect, broad cooperation with the defence industry should be sought. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

| 6.5. | The future of the MT sector relies on data gathering and management, as data analytics represent an important opportunity to improve the logistics, ship operations, spatial monitoring of large sea areas and the environmental performance of ships. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

| 6.6. | Protecting know-how and intellectual property is vital for the MT sector. The knowledge from EU-funded RDI must make EU companies more competitive and benefit society. Green and smart maritime technologies developed via EU projects should therefore be considered strategic for the EU’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy and it should be possible to temporarily restrict non-EU companies’ access to these projects’ results, in line with the legal provisions of Horizon Europe. Sectors of the waterborne industries not yet included in the scope of existing partnerships, such as recreational boats and yachts, should also benefit from RDI financing under Horizon Europe. |
| --- | --- |

6.6.

| 6.7. | Finally, the EESC points out that RDI investments can ensure the EU’s leading role in global competition, and therefore welcomes the adoption of the Co-Programmed Partnership on Zero-Emission Waterborne Transport. |
| --- | --- |

6.7.

7.   Final Comments

| 7.1. | Like for other modes of transport, the Committee believes that a ‘Maritime Expert Group’ and a ‘European industrial alliance for the maritime technology sector’ could help improve and regain global competitiveness for the MT sector. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

| 7.2. | If no action is taken at sectoral level, this EESC opinion may be one of the last calls for immediate support to the MT sector to safeguard the market, industrial capabilities and jobs in Europe and fight to recover lost markets. The EESC has done its part to raise awareness of the policy actions needed and is ready to take further action to make the sector more competitive. If the EU fails to take urgent action, and deliver and rapidly implement a dedicated maritime industrial strategy, the EU might become fully dependent on Asia for its civil and naval ships and structures and maritime and offshore equipment. This would not only be a real shame, but also a significant political mistake! |
| --- | --- |

7.2.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Pact for Skills

1

(2)  The FuelEU Maritime proposal

2

(3)  Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).

3

(4)  The term ‘waterborne sector’ must be broadly interpreted as including maritime technology, maritime transport, inland navigation, recreational boating and yachting, and their supply chains.

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The LeaderSHIP 2020 strategy as a vision for the maritime technology industry: towards an innovative, sustainable and competitive maritime industry in 2020’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 8)

5

(6)  The maritime technology sector comprises shipyards and the full supply chain of producers and suppliers of maritime systems, equipment and technologies. It does not include maritime service providers (e.g. shipping companies, port authorities and port service providers).

6

The maritime technology sector comprises shipyards and the full supply chain of producers and suppliers of maritime systems, equipment and technologies. It does not include maritime service providers (e.g. shipping companies, port authorities and port service providers).

(7)  LeaderSHIP 2020 — The Sea: new opportunities for the Future

7

(8)  A Future European Maritime Technology Industrial Policy

8

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The LeaderSHIP 2020 strategy as a vision for the maritime technology industry: towards an innovative, sustainable and competitive maritime industry in 2020’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 262, 25.7.2018, p. 8)

9

(10)  Regulation (EU) 2016/1035 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against injurious pricing of vessels (OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 1).

10

(11)  ‘Fit for 55’: delivering the EU's 2030 Climate Target on the way to climate neutrality

11

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/38 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/38

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Empowering youth to achieve sustainable development through education’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/06)

| Rapporteur: | Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 24.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 126/1/1 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

24.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

126/1/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC calls on the Member States to reaffirm the commitment they made at COP26 (1) to making climate action and sustainable development a core component in the educational curriculum. It is essential to recognise the need to re-imagine the future together with the youth and devise a new social contract that positively transforms education. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | To achieve a paradigm shift, the EESC stresses the need for a comprehensive cross-cutting approach, ensuring cooperation between the different stakeholders, social partners and civil society organisations. Youth organisations and non-formal education have a crucial role to play in raising awareness about and supporting the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC encourages the European Commission to continue focusing on the needs of youth in the European Year of Skills 2023, linking it to sustainable development and the challenges young people are facing in the changing world. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the coordinating role of the Commission in promoting projects, training, exchanges of good practices and communication among teachers to foster the implementation of the SDGs in education. However, education, both theoretical and practical, for sustainable development approaches and strategies should be designed at local, national and regional levels and be based on consistent research and clear action plans; it should include monitoring, enabling continuous improvement and the exchange of experience. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC emphasises the important roles of social and civic dialogue in integrating the SDGs across education levels, in formal and non-formal education, and in teacher education, to ensure that these include explicit competence frameworks enabling concrete learning objectives and assessment methods. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC points out that everyone needs the necessary knowledge to fight climate change, especially with regard to all aspects of sustainable consumption and production, making responsible food choices and reducing food waste, as well as the use of sustainable energy. Education of children should be supported by lifelong learning for parents and citizens’ education. In addition, outreach to all should be promoted, including by supporting youth-led organisations on this matter. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC calls for EU investment to be better linked to sustainable development education using EU funds, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Erasmus+, Horizon, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+). |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC calls on all the Member States to provide sustainable and quality public investment in order to ensure that the sustainable development goals are integrated in national education, not only in theory, but also in practice by developing comprehensive curricula for instilling critical thinking skills and informed decision-making. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC calls on the Member States to provide effective support for teachers to make the profession more attractive. While there is a huge teacher shortage in Europe, education for sustainability needs valued teachers, with decent salaries and good working conditions. To transform the education system, it is essential to ensure high quality initial and continuous training of teachers, equity and inclusion in the education and training systems, and an innovative organisation of schools. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC calls for youth to be put at the centre of the education and learning process. This can be achieved by reducing the bureaucracy involved in the teaching profession, focusing on innovative pedagogy and close cooperation with students. In this context, it is important to prepare all teachers for an efficient use of new technologies and for new learning contexts, whether in the curriculum or in their own lives. It would be beneficial to assess the feasibility of developing a dedicated online platform or dashboard to exchange best practices. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls on the European Commission to work on introducing a European indicator on reducing poverty and early school leaving, in line with sustainable development education in order to combat inequality. This could be developed in tandem with a global indicator. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

2.   Background and context

2.1.   The need for sustainable development

| 2.1.1. | Politicians, decision-makers and stakeholders at all levels must acknowledge that the large-scale transformation from a fossil fuel-based, resource-intensive and linear economy to a climate-friendly circular economy is much needed, but brings much upheaval to the life and future plans of citizens, especially the youth and future generations. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.1.

| 2.1.2. | Russia’s war against Ukraine has also highlighted Europe’s unsustainable fossil energy dependence and has put the green transition into a new geopolitical context. To decrease our dependency, speeding up decarbonisation is inevitable and more necessary than ever. In the light of current and future challenges, the 2030 Agenda, its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the pledge to leave no one and no place behind provides a unique pathway to a wellbeing economy, to build back better and to achieve a more equitable, just, inclusive, sustainable and resilient world. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.2.

| 2.1.3. | In the near future, the EU should set an example in forging an economically sustainable path towards a green and socially just transition. To achieve this, the EESC calls on the Member States and EU institutions to empower young people and involve them in decision-making, adapting education and employment, and mobilising even more young people. According to the World Programme of Action for Youth until the year 2000 and beyond (2) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1995, young people in all countries are both a major human resource for development and key agents for social change, economic development and technological innovation. The EESC points out that young people are the leaders of the future. They need to be supported in accessing progressive innovation, and fully integrated in policy-making in order to enhance sustainable development. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.3.

| 2.1.4. | The objective of this own-initiative opinion is to analyse whether and how the SDGs are embedded in the educational curriculum of the Member States and to examine whether the approach by the respective Member States can be regarded as transformative education to promote sustainable development (3). In addition, the opinion provides recommendations to support the European Commission and Member States on how to foster opportunities and overcome challenges to further develop youth policies, while ensuring that education for sustainable development is mainstreamed early on. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.4.

| 2.2. | Policy landscape |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.2.1. | In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as an ambitious blueprint for the world to address environmental degradation and issues of social and economic development together. The 17 SDGs, with 169 associated targets to be reached by 2030, place education at the centre of their delivery. Education is a human right and education (including education for sustainability) should be accessible to all. However, according to the Unesco report on the implementation of the SDGs, public education is not free for everyone and often not inclusive. Implementing SDG 4.7 has therefore proven difficult. Furthermore, ‘many countries are still not fully committed to making the climate action a core component of curriculum’ (4). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.1.

| 2.2.2. | SDG 4.7 states that, by 2030, signatories will be required to ‘ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and nonviolence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.’ The relevant EESC opinion on Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all (5) is in line with this recommendation. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.2.

| 2.2.3. | In recent years, EU policy has increasingly focused on environmental sustainability. The European Green Deal (6), launched in 2019, is the European Commission’s plan to make the EU’s economy sustainable, marking its ambition for Europe to become the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.3.

| 2.2.4. | As part of its plan for education and training to contribute to the green transition, the European Commission suggested a range of initiatives: first, the launch of the Education for Climate Coalition (7); second, the recently adopted Council conclusions on fostering engagement among young people as actors of change in order to protect the environment (8), and a Council recommendation on learning for the green transition and sustainable development (9). Third, the development of a European competence framework on climate change and sustainable development (10). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.4.

| 2.2.5. | On 4-5 April 2022, the Education, Youth, Culture and Sport Council underlined the important role played by sport in education for sustainable environment and it recommended to ‘find ways to promote sustainable development education and the construction of a sense of environmental and civic responsibility among sports clubs, federations and other stakeholders in the field of sports’ (11). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.5.

| 2.2.6. | The European Year of Youth 2022 is also intended to promote the new opportunities and possibilities offered by the green and digital transitions. These transitions should be inclusive and give attention to integrating young people with fewer opportunities and vulnerable groups of young people. The EESC calls on the European Commission to continue focusing on the needs of youth in the European Year of Skills 2023, linking it to sustainable development and the challenges young people are facing in the changing world. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.6.

| 2.2.7. | It is important to better link EU investment to sustainable development education using EU funds, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Erasmus+, Horizon, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+). The fight against biodiversity loss, pollution and climate change is one of the four overarching priorities of the new Erasmus+ programme for 2021-2027, along with inclusion and diversity, digital transformation, and participation in democratic life. The EESC welcomes that online mobility will be also encouraged in the Erasmus programme in order to reduce the carbon footprint. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.7.

3.   Youth, education and sustainable development

| 3.1. | The importance of skills development in the field of climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, as well as in the circular economy, needs to be taken into account in reskilling and upskilling young people. The social partners (employers’ organisations and workers’ trade unions) and civil society organisations have a key role to play in defining professional and occupational job profiles and standards and in integrating the sustainability aspects in apprenticeships and employee training. The social partners and civil society help young people to adapt in the transition from school to work in a way that includes sustainable development. The roles of social and civic dialogue are essential and need to be strengthened. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Young people need digital and social inclusiveness, quality education and training, stable employment, good working conditions, affordable housing, and support in the everyday fight against climate change. More research and data is needed on the impact of climate change on countries, regions and the local level, linking it to forecasting skills and jobs. While acknowledging that there is a major food crisis in Europe and other continents, young people need to learn about all aspects of sustainable consumption and production, reducing food waste and making responsible food choices. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Inequality should be tackled by introducing a global and European indicator on reducing poverty and early school leaving, in line with sustainable development education. The depopulation of rural areas due to a lack of job prospects and insufficient education opportunities is having a detrimental impact on young families. Early school leaving is a problem in urban and rural areas, therefore, policies dealing with the labour market and fair economic growth must be effective in order to reduce the number of NEETs (12). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Effectively implementing the European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (13) and enhancing the European Quality Framework for Traineeships are essential in relation to sustainable development education. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC believes that given the scale, complexity and immediacy of these issues, a strengthened and better coordinated effort by the EU and the Member States is needed, including on improving education for sustainability, which is now critical. This also includes education on the use of sustainable energy. EU and Member State policies on education need to be consistently monitored and mapped, with good practises exchanged among countries and organisations. At the heart of education for sustainable development are humanistic values that focus on the acquisition of knowledge and the formation of balanced, practical solutions, considering environmental and social consequences. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Teachers and parents play an essential role in education for a sustainable environment. Teachers and trainers need to be supported with quality initial and continuous professional training on sustainability. The EESC opinion Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all (14) underlined the important point that everyone needs the necessary knowledge to fight against climate change. Lifelong learning for parents and citizens’ education are essential and should be strengthened through outreach to all, including by supporting youth organisations on this matter. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC calls on the Member States to provide effective support to teachers to make the profession more attractive. While there is a huge teacher shortage in Europe, education for sustainability needs valued teachers, with decent salaries and good working conditions. To transform the education system, it is essential to ensure high quality initial and continuous training for teachers, equity and inclusion in the education and training systems, and an innovative organisation of schools, creating a culture of peace and safety. Empowering youth for sustainable development through education requires capable professionals, equipped with diverse and assertive tools. Skilled teachers will know how to make the best use in their day-to-day work of the Paris Declaration (15) and the Osnabrück Declaration on VET (16) promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination in education. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Europe’s young people constitute invaluable human capital and a source of innovative ideas, with their creative imagination, enthusiasm and energy, and they have the biggest role to play in driving sustainable development in the EU Member States now and in the near future. In this regard, the EU Member States have a large source of untapped potential to act. Youth organisations and non-formal education have an important role to play in supporting sustainable education and learning. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC calls for youth to be put at the centre of the education and learning process. This can be achieved by reducing the bureaucracy involved in the teaching profession, focusing on innovative pedagogy and on a close relationship with students, and preparing all teachers for a use of new technologies, for new learning contexts, whether in the curriculum or in their own lives. A transformative education requires transformative teachers, transformative skills and transformative citizens. Teachers and trainers need sufficient time, space and resources to be able to implement the ‘hands-on’ and cross-cutting approach of Education for Environmental Sustainability (EES), based on efficient teamwork amongst stakeholders. This is a cross-cutting subject that concerns all the disciplines of education and vocational training in an interdisciplinary pedagogical approach. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | It is gratifying to note that young people are already contributing to sustainable development in their countries and to international climate goals along the lines of ‘environmental friendliness’ and, moreover, are actively joining the international networks of youth movements aimed at conserving nature and combating climate change. To complement this, we need to adapt all education systems to provide space for transformative education that will enable more young people to direct their efforts to bringing about the transformative change we need. According to the recent IPCC report, ‘transformative learning is critical because it helps to induce both shared awareness and collective actions’ (17). |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

4.   Sustainable development must be seen as a continuous and comprehensive learning process

| 4.1. | It is important to recognise that the sustainable development of the state and society cannot exist without constant learning, and the acquisition and understanding of new experiences. In this regard, sustainable development must be seen as a continuous process through which society must learn to live more sustainably from an environmental, economic and social perspective. Through access to information and by increasing awareness, but more importantly by building people’s capacity to innovate and implement solutions, education for sustainability is essential if we are to re-orientate the way we live and work. In order to educate young people to consciously approach the most complex sustainable development issues facing communities and states, it is necessary to develop comprehensive curricula for instilling critical thinking skills and informed decision-making. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Based on studies and research carried out for the European Commission to prepare the proposal for a Council Recommendation on learning for environmental sustainability, only 13 Member States have a clear definition of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) or Education for Environmental Sustainability (EES). It is regrettable that the term ‘Education for Sustainable Development’ and target SDG 4.7 are not applied in some Member States even though it is recognised as an integral element of Sustainable Development Goal 4 (SDG 4) on quality education and a key enabler of all other Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The analysed country reports did not specifically ask about funding. However, Italy, which has started to make pledges on ESD, clearly mentioned that the lack of funding is one of the main reasons why the implementation of ESD has stalled. When governments are forced to make cuts due to economic, energy and cost-of-living crises, education, like other social areas, is always in the equation. The lack of investment causes different forms of privatisation and asymmetries in the systems, eroding equity and pedagogical and academic freedom. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | What also provides food for thought is whether we need a centralised, top-down strategy to successfully implement ESD, or whether there are other factors determining its success? Denmark and the Netherlands do not have a national strategy for ESD but their schools are actively working on this topic. Finland has a national strategy but fears that education for ESD is fragmented across schools. Italy has already included ESD in the national curriculum, yet experiences some challenges in its implementation at regional level. France has developed a national strategy, which is managed by local educational authorities and implemented in all schools through the national curriculum and pedagogical projects. In this way, every level is involved which, in turn, ensures its success. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | One of the crucial issues is the prioritisation of education for sustainable development. The OECD, in collaboration with the European Commission, recently published research (18) mapping the environmental sustainability competence of young people across the EU and OECD countries. This new approach to studies and assessments could provide a good signal towards prioritisation of ESD in the Member States. It could be useful to further explore the relationship between the UN’s measures to promote education for sustainable development and the OECD’s measures to assist the development of education policy through PISA in order to see if there are any asymmetries in the ways these two sets of measures shape education systems. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | One potential barrier is the implementation of education for sustainable development in countries with a federal system. What we have seen in the national reports is that the degree of coordination between the federal ministry in question and the regional authorities differs between the Member States — Germany is struggling with it while Austria has a network that regulates the coordination. The way in which the Austrian federal government is involved with the bottom-up initiatives is an example that other countries could follow. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | It is essential for present and future societies to reassess, rethink, and redefine education from the perspective of sustainable education and learning from preschool to university and beyond so that it ultimately embraces the principles, knowledge, skills, beliefs, and values associated with sustainability in all three areas: ecology, society and economy. Such a process should be global, interdisciplinary and involve grassroots initiatives as well as the general public, and be supported by the respective governments. However, the implementation in the individual countries needs to take into account local characteristics and specific cultural features. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Education for sustainable development should disseminate knowledge about the environment and its condition, and show the possibilities that exist for adapting our economy in a way that incentivises giving priority to the well-being of people and the planet, while promoting intergenerational equity and conserving the natural environment. This adapted economy should give increased importance to environmentally friendly methods of management, provide opportunities for nurturing the careful respect of natural and cultural values, and be values-led, based on the ecological ethics of responsibility for the conservation of the environment for present and future generations, and for the sustainable use of natural resources. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | A transformative education for sustainable development should:






  — | be based on the principles and values that underlie sustainable development, |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.8.

—

be based on the principles and values that underlie sustainable development,

| — | affect all three areas of sustainable development: the environment, society and the economy, |
| --- | --- |

—

affect all three areas of sustainable development: the environment, society and the economy,

| — | stimulate lifelong and life-wide learning that fosters sustainable, respectful, responsible, proactive, and critical societies, |
| --- | --- |

—

stimulate lifelong and life-wide learning that fosters sustainable, respectful, responsible, proactive, and critical societies,

| — | stand for an education that is of high quality, actively supported, and holistic in its approaches, |
| --- | --- |

—

stand for an education that is of high quality, actively supported, and holistic in its approaches,

| — | foster an accessible rights-based education that is respectful, inclusive, and celebrates diversity, |
| --- | --- |

—

foster an accessible rights-based education that is respectful, inclusive, and celebrates diversity,

| — | think globally, but also focus on local issues and cultural characteristics, |
| --- | --- |

—

think globally, but also focus on local issues and cultural characteristics,

| — | cover formal, non-formal and informal education, |
| --- | --- |

—

cover formal, non-formal and informal education,

| — | take into account the evolutionary nature of the concept of sustainable development. |
| --- | --- |

—

take into account the evolutionary nature of the concept of sustainable development.

| 4.9. | There are no universal models of a transformative education for sustainability and therefore each country will have to determine with the effective involvement of relevant social partners, organised civil society and other stakeholders, including youth organisations, its own priorities and actions in the field of sustainable development and education. Collaborative school leadership and citizenship education play a key role in shaping schools to enhance sustainability education. Objectives, main lines of action and mechanisms should be determined, taking into account local environmental, social and economic conditions and cultural characteristics. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | Creating an education system for sustainable development involves the transition from traditional education to a sustainability-oriented model, which should be based on broad interdisciplinary knowledge underpinned by an integrated approach to the development of society, the economy and the environment. Such education should involve work at the level of formal (schools, universities, advanced training institutions) and non-formal education (creation of training centres, seminars and round tables, use of the media, etc.) and informal education (peer-to-peer learning through events, youth exchanges, youth-led projects etc.). Education and training programmes integrating education for environmental sustainability need to be accessible and inclusive. Governments need to take into consideration, at an early stage, the reality facing young people from disadvantaged backgrounds and make sure they find ways to include these groups. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Co-chairs conclusions of Education and Environment Ministers’ summit at CoP26 ‘Learn for our Planet. Act for the climate’.

1

(2)  UN — World programme of action for youth.

2

(3)  Various terms are used — the opinion refers to ‘transformative education to promote sustainable development’. However ‘Education for Sustainable Development’ (ESD) and ‘Education for Environmental Sustainability’ (EES) are used interchangeably in the current context. See also the glossary in the appendix.

3

(4)  Unesco Global education monitoring report, 2021/2: non-state actors in education: who chooses? who loses?

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 1).

5

(6)  European Green Deal.

6

(7)  European Commission — Education for Climate Coalition.

7

(8)  Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council — Fostering engagement among young people as actors of change in order to protect the environment (OJ C 159, 12.4.2022, p. 9).

8

(9)  Council recommendation of 16 June 2022 on learning for the green transition and sustainable development (OJ C 243, 27.6.2022, p. 1).

9

(10)  Bianchi, G., Pisiotis, U. and Cabrera Giraldez, M., GreenComp The European sustainability competence framework, Punie, Y. and Bacigalupo, M. editor(s), EUR 30955 EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2022, ISBN 978-92-76-46485-3, doi:10.2760/13286, JRC128040.

10

(11)  Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member States on ‘Sport and physical activity, a promising lever to transform behaviour for sustainable development’ (OJ C 170, 25.4.2022, p. 1).

11

(12)  NEET is an acronym for ‘Not in Education, Employment, or Training’, and refers to a person who is unemployed and not receiving an education or vocational training.

12

(13)  Council Recommendation of 15 March 2018 on a European Framework for Quality and Effective Apprenticeships (OJ C 153, 2.5.2018, p. 1).

13

(14)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Towards an EU strategy for enhancing green skills and competences for all (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 56, 16.2.2021, p. 1).

14

(15)  Promoting citizenship and the common values of freedom, tolerance and non-discrimination through education Eurydice.

15

(16)  Osnabrück Declaration on vocational education and training as an enabler of recovery and just transitions to digital and green economies — osnabrueck_declaration_eu2020.pdf.

16

(17)  IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, Working Group III report: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change, p. 2871.

17

(18)  Borgonovi, F., et al. (2022), ‘Young people’s environmental sustainability competence: Emotional, cognitive, behavioural, and attitudinal dimensions in EU and OECD countries’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No 274, OECD Publishing, Paris. Borgonovi, F., et al. (2022), ‘The environmental sustainability competence toolbox: From leaving a better planet for our children to leaving better children for our planet’, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No 275, OECD Publishing, Paris. The papers were prepared as background for the forthcoming OECD Skills Outlook 2023 publication.

18

Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers

Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/45

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘European Citizens Initiative — Save bees and farmers’

(own initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/07)

| Rapporteur: | Arnold PUECH d’ALISSAC |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Arnold PUECH d’ALISSAC

| Plenary Assembly decision | 19.5.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 24.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 168/0/2 |

Plenary Assembly decision

19.5.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

24.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

168/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The success of this European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) illustrates the high expectations that European citizens have of the European Commission. The EESC would first like to congratulate the organiser and acknowledge the commitment of citizens towards this achievement, given the difficulty in collecting all the signatures needed. It therefore calls on the Commission to provide precise and specific answers to the requests made by this ECI. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC regrets that the main proposal of the ECI, consisting of a total phase-out of synthetic pesticides by 2035, is not highlighted in the title chosen: ‘Save the bees and the farmers’. Moreover, the EESC points out that many legislative acts are being prepared or have already been adopted by the Commission in favour of bees, pollinators, biodiversity, the sustainable use of pesticides, and support for farmers in the agro-ecological transition. It recognises, however, that these measures have not fully achieved their objectives. It therefore calls on the Commission to take additional measures to achieve its ambitious objectives more effectively in practice. For example, it recommends stronger support for precision agriculture, digital agriculture, biological control, and robotics, as well as agro-ecology. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC stresses the need to take into account all three pillars of sustainability (environmental, social and economic), without neglecting the economic situation, which is often overlooked, in an essential context of systemic sustainability and food sovereignty. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC also calls on the Commission to carry out impact assessments before taking any decision, in order to assess, in particular, the costs of the initiative for agricultural production and the economy, compared to the financial cost of biodiversity loss for farmers. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

2.   Background

2.1.   An ECI for an agriculture that is more respectful of bees, people and the environment

| 2.1.1. | The ECI scheme offers European citizens the opportunity to participate actively in the democratic processes of the European Union (EU) by asking the European Commission to propose new legislation. Once an initiative receives the support of at least one million EU citizens and reaches the required thresholds in at least one quarter of the Member States (1), the Commission must respond to the ECI. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.1.

| 2.1.2. | The ‘Save bees and farmers! Towards a bee-friendly agriculture for a healthy environment’ ECI, having reached these thresholds, therefore calls on the Commission to propose legislative acts to phase out synthetic pesticides by 2035, restore biodiversity, and support farmers through this transition phase. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.2.

2.2.   A background of pollinator decline and biodiversity erosion in Europe

| 2.2.1. | The requests made under this ECI come in a context in which Europe is facing a decline in bees. Indeed, according to the European Red List of Bees, one in three bee and butterfly species is in decline, with one in ten being threatened with extinction (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.1.

| 2.2.2. | However, 84 % of European crops benefit, at least partially, from animal pollination (3) and 78 % of wild plants in the EU depend on pollinating insects (4). Protecting them is therefore a crucial issue for agricultural production, in the vital context of food security and food sovereignty we are currently facing. In addition, bees are vital for the production of honey, while the European Union is only 60 % self-sufficient in terms of honey. To meet demand, it has to rely on imports (28 % of which come from China), which are of lower quality than European honey. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.2.

| 2.2.3. | According to the Assessment Report on Pollinators, Pollination and Food Production of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (5), the main drivers of pollinator decline are changes in land use, intensive agricultural practices and pesticide use, environmental pollution, invasive alien species, pathogens and climate change. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.3.

| 2.2.4. | A diversified food resource (nectar and pollen) which is available in sufficient quantities throughout the year is also a key factor for the proper development of bees and for ensuring more regular honey production for beekeepers (6). |
| --- | --- |

2.2.4.

| 2.2.5. | The decline in bees is part of a broader context of biodiversity erosion. Indeed, the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, drawn up by IPBES (7) in 2019, described an unprecedented erosion of biodiversity. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.5.

| 2.2.6. | Following these IPBES reports, the French Research Institute for Agriculture, Food and the Environment (INRAE) and the French Research Institute on Marine Exploitation (Ifremer) published, in May 2022, a collective scientific appraisal (ESCo) on the impacts of plant protection products on biodiversity and ecosystem services (8). The ESCo highlights the multifactorial nature of biodiversity decline, as well as the difficulty in determining to what extent plant protection products (PPPs) are responsible for this decline due to the interdependence of different factors. On the other hand, thanks to scientific knowledge, the ESCo was able to establish a clear causal link between the use of PPPs and the decline of certain populations, including pollinating insects. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.6.

2.3.   Many legal acts are being prepared or have already been adopted by the Commission in support of bees, the sustainable use of pesticides, the restoration of biodiversity, and support for farmers in the agro-ecological transition

| 2.3.1. | Concerning the protection of bees and pollinators: in 2018, the EU launched the EU Pollinators Initiative, which aims to tackle the decline of wild pollinators in the EU. The initiative comprises 10 actions, split between three priority headings:






  — | improving knowledge of pollinator decline, its causes and its consequences; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.1.

—

improving knowledge of pollinator decline, its causes and its consequences;

| — | tackling the causes of pollinator decline; |
| --- | --- |

—

tackling the causes of pollinator decline;

| — | raising awareness, engaging society-at-large, and promoting collaboration. |
| --- | --- |

—

raising awareness, engaging society-at-large, and promoting collaboration.

Nevertheless, in its Special Report 15/2020 on the protection of wild pollinators in the EU (9), the European Court of Auditors found that ‘this had little effect on halting the decline and that the initiative needed better management to achieve its objectives’. In its report on the implementation of the initiative (10), the Commission also acknowledged that, while significant progress has been made in implementing the initiative’s actions, efforts were still needed to address the various causes of decline.

| 2.3.2. | Concerning the reduction of the impact and risks of plant protection products: the Commission launched the revision of its Directive on the sustainable use of pesticides, in order to address the major issue of the Directive’s limited effectiveness in reducing their use as well as the risks to human health and the environment, by presenting a new draft Regulation in June 2022 (11). Some of the main developments include:






  — | legally binding targets at EU level to reduce, by 50 %, the use and risk of chemical pesticides and the use of the most hazardous pesticides by 2030; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.2.

—

legally binding targets at EU level to reduce, by 50 %, the use and risk of chemical pesticides and the use of the most hazardous pesticides by 2030;

| — | new measures to ensure that farmers implement integrated pest management; |
| --- | --- |

—

new measures to ensure that farmers implement integrated pest management;

| — | the prohibition, where no derogation has been granted, of all pesticides in sensitive areas. |
| --- | --- |

—

the prohibition, where no derogation has been granted, of all pesticides in sensitive areas.

| 2.3.3. | The marketing of PPPs in the EU is strictly regulated. The legal framework for placing PPPs on the market in the EU is established by Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council (12). According to this Regulation, risk assessments must be carried out prior to the approval of an active substance at European level, in order to avoid potential adverse effects on health or the environment. In addition, the guidelines on the assessment of the risks of plant protection products for bees (Bee Guidance Document (13)) are currently being revised in order to take into account the latest scientific developments in this area. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.3.

| 2.3.4. | Concerning the restoration of biodiversity in agricultural areas: although it does not only concern agricultural areas, the EU can draw on the Natura 2000 network and the Birds (14) and Habitats (15) Directives, which form the basis of EU nature conservation legislation. The Commission has also implemented the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030 (16). This strategy includes actions and commitments aimed at restoring biodiversity in agricultural areas, as set out in the draft Nature Restoration Regulation (17), presented by the Commission on 22 June 2022. In particular, Article 8 of the project would enshrine the binding target for the Member States to reverse the decline of pollinator populations by 2030, and Article 9 would include commitments to restore agricultural ecosystems, for example ensuring that at least 10 % of EU agricultural areas is under ‘high diversity landscape features’ by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.4.

| 2.3.5. | Concerning support for farmers in the transition: the new CAP 2023-2027 is a key tool for achieving the ambitious objectives of the European Green Deal and for supporting farmers. A special report by the Court of Auditors from 2020 showed that the contribution of the current CAP had failed to halt the decline in biodiversity on agricultural land (18). The Court of Auditors concluded that the Commission’s tracking of biodiversity-related expenditure was unreliable, that the impact of CAP direct payments was limited or unknown, and that the Commission and the Member States had promoted rural development measures that had a rather low impact. The new CAP provides for new measures to improve its environmental impact, such as improved conditionality. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.5.

| 2.3.6. | EU texts and work in sectors other than agriculture may also have an indirect positive effect on pollinators, for example, the ‘Fit for 55’ legislative package with regard to the EU’s objective of reducing carbon emissions by 55 % by 2030 (given that bees are also affected by climate change), the Zero Pollution Action Plan aimed at eliminating air, water and soil pollution, the Renewable Energy Directive and even the New EU Forest Strategy through the Commission’s goal of planting three billion trees across Europe by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC stresses the importance of ECIs as a tool for the direct participation of European citizens. ECIs are in fact the most powerful participatory democracy tool available at European level. Acting as a bridge between civil society organisations and the European institutions, the EESC has strengthened over the years the importance given to ECIs and has increased their visibility in the daily work of the institutions. It welcomes the fact that this opinion is the first to be adopted on the basis of an ECI, before the response of the European Commission, whom it calls on to respond to the requests made in a precise manner. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC regrets that the main proposal of the ECI, consisting of a total phase-out of synthetic pesticides by 2035, is not highlighted in the title chosen: ‘Save the bees and the farmers’. It points out that many legal acts are being prepared or have already been adopted by the Commission in an attempt to address these requests, but recognises that these measures have not fully achieved their objectives. It therefore calls on the Commission to take additional measures to achieve its objectives in practice and in a swifter manner. However, the EESC stresses the need to take into account all three pillars of sustainability (environmental, social and economic), in an essential context of systemic sustainability and food sovereignty, and to carry out impact assessments before taking any decision, particularly in order to assess the costs of the initiative for agricultural production and the economy. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | On the ECI’s call to ‘phase out synthetic pesticides in EU agriculture by 80 % by 2030, starting with the most hazardous, to become free of synthetic pesticides by 2035’: |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.1.1. | the EESC warns against setting idealistic or unachievable objectives within overly tight deadlines. It stresses that the Commission is already proposing to reduce the use and risk of chemical pesticides and the use of the most hazardous pesticides by 50 % by 2030. More generally, the Committee is against the setting of reduction targets for pesticides without any link to the availability of effective and accessible alternatives for farmers. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.1.

| 4.1.2. | The EESC stresses that the regulatory framework for PPPs in Europe is among the most demanding in the world in terms of objectives, as it codifies, as a principle, the absence of unacceptable effects on the environment. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.2.

| 4.1.3. | In the EESC’s view, as the decline of honey bees and wild pollinators has multifactorial causes, ending the use of pesticides should not be seen as the sole or main lever for saving them. It is essential to tackle all factors behind the decline. For example, in the case of honey bees, tackling varroa mites and the Asian hornet is a major concern for professional beekeepers, who are hoping for new treatment solutions to better protect their bees. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.3.

| 4.1.4. | The EESC notes the importance of honey bees, wild pollinators and other insects for agriculture (crop pollination, natural pest regulation, etc.). It cites the example of win-win partnerships between farmers and beekeepers such as the ‘Adopt a hive’ schemes (19) launched by farmers. Indeed, farmers who adopt beehives pay particular attention to the protection of bees when carrying out phytosanitary treatments to protect their crops. ApiAlert-type devices (20) should also be developed, making it possible to count the mortality of beehives and to determine the actual causes of this mortality. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.4.

| 4.2. | On the ECI’s call to ‘restore natural ecosystems in agricultural areas so that farming becomes a vector of biodiversity recovery’: |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.2.1. | the EESC stresses that human activity, such as certain agricultural practices, is one of the reasons for the decline in pollinators and biodiversity, but that agriculture can also be a solution. For example, it would like to see more support for projects such as the replanting of hedges or the development of melliferous resources by farmers, in order to dedicate the latter to the protection of bees and biodiversity. At the same time, it will be essential to pay farmers better for the ecosystem services they provide, in order to support them in carrying out such projects. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

| 4.2.2. | The EESC notes the Commission’s strong ambition for agriculture to become a means of restoring biodiversity, with the objectives and measures of the Biodiversity and Farm to Fork strategies and the draft Nature Restoration Regulation, and expresses its concern about respect for the EU’s food sovereignty. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

| 4.2.3. | The EESC believes that use should also be made of voluntary agricultural initiatives that favour pollinators and biodiversity, which are disappearing throughout Europe. For example, in France, the FNSEA has published a compendium of agricultural initiatives that favour pollinators (21). Aimed at spreading good practices in the area of bees and agriculture, it identifies voluntary initiatives in France favouring pollinators, compiling inspiring, positive and pragmatic examples. On the same principle, a communication campaign entitled ‘10 bee-friendly recommendations for your farm’ (22) was launched in Denmark in 2018. It promotes various voluntary initiatives that farmers can implement on their farms, such as planting hedges and flower strips, or reducing spray drift when plant protection products are applied by spraying under appropriate weather conditions (e.g. low wind) or by using drift reduction systems. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

| 4.2.4. | The EESC believes that in order to restore natural ecosystems in agricultural areas, the Commission will need to draw on a set of levers: maintenance and restoration of agro-ecological infrastructure; crop diversification in order to promote a crop mosaic in the landscape; development of agroforestry, organic farming and products with official quality and origin indicators; maintenance of permanent grassland; reduction in the use and impact of pesticides, etc. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.4.

| 4.3. | Concerning the ECI’s call to ‘reform agriculture by prioritising small scale, diverse and sustainable farming, supporting a rapid increase in agro-ecological and organic practice, and enabling independent farmer-based training and research into pesticide- and GMO-free farming’: |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.3.1. | The EESC points to the existence of a report produced by 300 experts from 23 Member States who have analysed the potential impacts of the future CAP on biodiversity protection and restoration (23). The scientists make specific proposals to improve the CAP’s impact on biodiversity and to support farmers in this transition. The EESC recommends that the Commission and the Member States draw inspiration from this in the context of CAP reform, which is a powerful tool for agricultural reform. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.1.

| 4.3.2. | Nevertheless, the EESC considers that the agro-ecological transition and the improvement of biodiversity cannot happen from Brussels only via the CAP, and also stresses the importance of the local level. Local solutions must also be developed with farmers and landowners in order to adapt to the specific characteristics of regions. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.2.

| 4.3.3. | In addition, the EESC stresses its commitment to finding effective alternatives so as to leave no farmer without a solution. It would therefore like to encourage more precision agriculture, digital agriculture, biological control, robotics as well as agro-ecology, with a significant financial component for the development of research, the implementation of innovation, and the uptake of innovation by sectors and farmers. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.3.

| 4.3.4. | The EESC recognises the importance of beekeeping as an economic sector in many Member States, which contributes in particular to rural development and the maintenance of local populations. Given the shortage of honey production in Europe, support for beekeeping and the economic development of honey and other bee products (pollen, wax, royal jelly, etc.) should be bolstered in order to maintain an apiculture sector that is professional, environmentally friendly, and capable of meeting the demand for honey consumption in Europe. The EESC considers it important for beekeepers to form professional organisations so as to better organise themselves and defend the interests of European beekeeping more effectively. In particular, it would like the Commission to seize the opportunity of the upcoming revision of the Honey Directive to strengthen the labelling and traceability of honey in order to more effectively combat fraud in this area as well as imports from non-EU countries that do not comply with our standards, which undermine EU honey production. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.4.

| 4.3.5. | Finally, in order to ensure that the agro-ecological transition is acceptable to European farmers, the EESC recommends that the Commission rapidly implement the reciprocity of standards in order to limit distortions of competition for European farmers. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.5.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Regulation (EU) 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on the European citizens' initiative (OJ L 130, 17.5.2019, p. 55).

1

(2)  Nieto et al., 2014. European Red List of Bees.

2

(3)  Williams, 1994. The dependence of crop production within the European Union on pollination by honeybees.

3

(4)  Ollerton et al., 2011. How many flowering plants are pollinated by animals?

4

(5)  IPBES, 2016. Assessment Report on Pollinators, Pollination and Food Production.

5

(6)  French Technical and Scientific Institute for Bees and Pollination (ITSAP), 2015. Ressources alimentaires pour les abeilles (Food resources for bees).

6

(7)  IPBES, 2019. Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services.

7

(8)  INRAE and Ifremer, 2022. Impacts des produits phytopharmaceutiques sur la biodiversité et les services écosystémiques (Impacts of plant protection products on biodiversity and ecosystem services).

8

(9)  European Court of Auditors. Special report 15/2020.

9

(10)  COM(2021) 261 final.

10

(11)  COM(2022) 305 final.

11

(12)  Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 1).

12

(13)  EFSA, 2022. Revised guidance on the risk assessment of plant protection products on bees (Apis mellifera, Bombus spp. and solitary bees).

13

(14)  Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7).

14

(15)  Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7).

15

(16)  COM(2020) 380 final.

16

(17)  COM(2022) 304 final.

17

(18)  European Court of Auditors. Special report 13/2020.

18

(19)  Le Betteravier. Quand 14 agriculteurs de l'Aisne deviennent apiculteurs (When 14 farmers from Aisne became beekeepers).

19

(20)  20 Minutes. Toulouse: Pour suivre la mortalité des abeilles, BeeGuard met au point un compteur vidéo sur ses ruches connectées (Toulouse: to monitor bee mortality, BeeGuard installs a video-based counter on its beehives).

20

(21)  EFSA, 2022. Recueil des initiatives agricoles favorables aux pollinisateurs (Compendium of agricultural initiatives favouring pollinators).

21

(22)  Danish Agriculture & Food Council, 2018. 10 bee-friendly recommendations for your farm.

22

(23)  Pe’er et al., 2022. How can the European Common Agricultural Policy help halt biodiversity loss? Recommendations by over 300 experts.

23

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/51 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/51

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Food price crisis: the role of speculation and concrete proposals for action in the aftermath of the Ukraine war’

(Own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/08)

| Rapporteur: | Peter SCHMIDT |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Peter SCHMIDT

| Plenary Assembly decision | 14.7.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 24.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 157/7/5 |

Plenary Assembly decision

14.7.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

24.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

157/7/5

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

The EESC:

| 1.1. | Draws attention to the global food price crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, leading to supply disruption of vital food items such as wheat and sunflower oil; stresses that the crisis is not only due to the conflict but to structural and systemic problems that create hunger and threaten people’s livelihoods globally. Food should not be treated as a financial asset as it is not a commodity like many others; |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | While recognising that the issue of food prices and speculation is highly complex where the causality has to be investigated further, the current structure of the commodities market is not delivering for the ‘sustainable economy we need’ and for the objectives linked to sustainable development, climate ambition and just transition enshrined in the UN Agenda 2030 and the European Green Deal — but actively works against them. It undermines the efforts to solve hunger, foster fair revenues for farmers and workers and fair prices for consumers, as well as protect small and medium food processors and the retail sector from the risks of rising inflation. It must therefore be changed through regulation in order to contribute to people’s wellbeing and societal development for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Bearing in mind that the EU is already the most regulated market, it is evident that, to be effective, such regulation should be extended at global level; |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Highlights the need to deal with concentration in food chains and financial ownership; stresses that global physical grain trade is highly concentrated. Four companies control an estimated 70-90 per cent of global grain trade: Archer-Daniels-Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus. These companies not only exercise an oligopoly over global grain trade, but also over information about market fundamentals, and are also highly financialised; |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Notes that exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index-based mutual funds, including those specifically linked to food and agriculture, represent new and extensively used avenues for financial investment and profit, while ordinary individuals increasingly partake in these investment vehicles via their pension funds and individual retirement savings accounts. The rise of these equity-linked investment funds works to reshape agri-food systems in ways that prioritise the needs of shareholders over other social and environmental goals; |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | Notes that high and fast-rising prices and secrecy about stock holdings create uncertainty and fan fear and panic. Fear and panic, especially during times of high uncertainty, such as in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, drive excessive price levels and volatility as speculative traders, jumping on the bandwagon of the price boom, dominate the market; |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | Calls on Member States and EU institutions to enhance market transparency, in particular by:






  — | ESG reporting and non-financial disclosure of actors involved in speculation. The role of the ESG rating must be investigated as far as food speculation is concerned; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.6.

—

ESG reporting and non-financial disclosure of actors involved in speculation. The role of the ESG rating must be investigated as far as food speculation is concerned;

| — | Every player globally should report to the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), including countries and private actors; |
| --- | --- |

—

Every player globally should report to the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), including countries and private actors;

| — | Further scrutinise Over-the-counter (OTC) transactions. |
| --- | --- |

—

Further scrutinise Over-the-counter (OTC) transactions.

| 1.7. | Highlights that commodity derivative markets fulfil key services to the producers and users of food commodities, namely risk management and price discovery, and that the functioning of these markets is undermined through speculative activity; urges Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary steps to curb excessive commodity speculation, in particular by: |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.7.1. | Regulating the futures market:







  — | re-introduce a regulated market for food derivatives, as was the case for several decades until the end of the last century, which preserves the function of futures for hedging. Futures are important from the farmers’ perspective in order to manage risks. It allows them to fix the price for both input and output for a given time in the future; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.7.1.

—

re-introduce a regulated market for food derivatives, as was the case for several decades until the end of the last century, which preserves the function of futures for hedging. Futures are important from the farmers’ perspective in order to manage risks. It allows them to fix the price for both input and output for a given time in the future;

| — | introduce strict price movement curbs and daily position limits as soon as trading activities on the commodity futures markets show abnormalities (Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments — MiFID II). Position limits should be recalibrated to reflect the genuine interest of a trading party in relation to the need of real-life risk exposure hedging; |
| --- | --- |

—

introduce strict price movement curbs and daily position limits as soon as trading activities on the commodity futures markets show abnormalities (Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments — MiFID II). Position limits should be recalibrated to reflect the genuine interest of a trading party in relation to the need of real-life risk exposure hedging;

| — | limit access to derivative/hedging to qualified and knowledgeable investors and traders who are genuinely concerned about the underlying agricultural commodities; |
| --- | --- |

—

limit access to derivative/hedging to qualified and knowledgeable investors and traders who are genuinely concerned about the underlying agricultural commodities;

| — | introduce short/medium/long term contract obligations to add stability; |
| --- | --- |

—

introduce short/medium/long term contract obligations to add stability;

| — | incentivise withdrawal of financial speculation in food commodities by banks and fund companies with the introduction of increased capital requirements in order to reduce leverage effects; |
| --- | --- |

—

incentivise withdrawal of financial speculation in food commodities by banks and fund companies with the introduction of increased capital requirements in order to reduce leverage effects;

| 1.7.2. | Regulating indexes (commodities indexes and food indexes):







  — | Regulate and ban commodity index funds and replication via swaps and exchange traded products, as this maximises the link between energy and food markets; position limits do not work for commodity index traders/swap traders, as these are synchronised; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.7.2.

—

Regulate and ban commodity index funds and replication via swaps and exchange traded products, as this maximises the link between energy and food markets; position limits do not work for commodity index traders/swap traders, as these are synchronised;

| — | Stop public funds/mutual funds (1) to actors involved in food speculation — and no public actor should be trading in food derivatives for speculative purposes that are not serving the public interest; |
| --- | --- |

—

Stop public funds/mutual funds (1) to actors involved in food speculation — and no public actor should be trading in food derivatives for speculative purposes that are not serving the public interest;

| — | Ban soft commodities (e.g. funds, ETFs) allocated in portfolios of institutional actors (e.g. pension funds, insurances); |
| --- | --- |

—

Ban soft commodities (e.g. funds, ETFs) allocated in portfolios of institutional actors (e.g. pension funds, insurances);

| — | Considering the need to regulate this market, concrete recommendations must be further developed in future EESC opinions; |
| --- | --- |

—

Considering the need to regulate this market, concrete recommendations must be further developed in future EESC opinions;

| 1.7.3. | Addressing the financialisation of the food sector as massive money-making off the backs of people:






  — | Introduce global windfall taxation on excess profits before dividends of trade and financing corporations and a food speculation tax (2) to curb high frequency trading; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.7.3.

—

Introduce global windfall taxation on excess profits before dividends of trade and financing corporations and a food speculation tax (2) to curb high frequency trading;

| — | Break oligopolies at all levels of the international food trade chain and financial interests. |
| --- | --- |

—

Break oligopolies at all levels of the international food trade chain and financial interests.

2.   Context — food price crisis in the aftermath of the Ukraine war

| 2.1. | Despite hopes that the world would emerge more quickly from the crisis and that food security would begin to recover from the pandemic in 2021, world hunger rose further in 2021. Disparities in the impact of the pandemic and the recovery, together with the limited coverage and duration of social protection measures, led to widening inequalities that have contributed to further setbacks in 2021 with respect to achieving the target of Zero Hunger by 2030, with a particular impact on women and children. It is estimated that between 702 and 828 million people in the world (corresponding to 8,9 and 10,5 percent of the world population respectively) faced hunger in 2021 — a total of 150 million more people since 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (3). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The ongoing war in Ukraine, involving two of the biggest global producers of staple cereals, oilseeds and fertiliser, and other external shocks, are disrupting international supply chains and pushing up the prices of grain, fertiliser and energy. This comes as supply chains are still recovering from COVID and are already being adversely affected by increasingly frequent extreme climate events, especially in low-income countries, and has potentially sobering implications for global food security and nutrition. There is no scarcity, but due to the conflict there is temporary shortage and a serious disruption in the food supply chain and distribution problems (4)
  , including where stocks are located as well as a negative impact on production (harvesting and planting/sowing) in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | In the course of 2022, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) registered a record food price index, with prices 34 % higher than the previous year. It is important to note that the FAO food price index had already hit levels as high as the peaks seen in 2008 back in January of this year. In this context, it was inevitable that a supply shock affecting two of the world’s major grain exporting countries would destabilise global markets on some level. However, the scope and scale of the current price volatility can only be partially explained by market fundamentals. One of the underlying flaws in the food system that has turned the Ukraine crisis into a global food security crisis is the opaque and dysfunctional nature of grain markets (5). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | In its resolution on ‘Ukraine — from relief to reconstruction — proposals by European civil society’, the EESC draws attention to the global food price crisis, which has been exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, and calls on the Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary steps to curb commodity speculation and to enhance market transparency. The European Parliament also called for measures to prevent excessive speculation in two recent resolutions (6). |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The current structure of the commodities market is not delivering for the ‘sustainable economy we need’ (7)
  and for the objectives linked to sustainable development, climate ambition and just transition enshrined in the UN Agenda 2030 and the European Green Deal. It does not contribute either to fostering fair revenues for farmers (8) and workers and fair prices for consumers, nor to protecting food processors (especially SMEs) and the retail sector from the risks of rising inflation. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   Role and implications of commodity speculation: markets and mechanisms

| 3.1. | Speculation is an investment in the hope of a future gain, with a risk of loss. Commodity speculation can take three forms: (i) outright buying or selling of a physical commodity, (ii) buying or selling of a contract which specifies the future acquisition or delivery of a commodity, and (iii) buying or selling of the equity or debt of a corporation that produces or trades in commodities. Standardised commodity contracts are called ‘futures contracts’ or ‘commodity derivatives’ and are traded in ‘commodity derivative markets’, which are regulated financial markets. Commodity speculation can therefore take place in both physical and financial commodity markets, and indirectly in stock and bond markets. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Commodity derivative markets have seen a large inflow of liquidity from ‘non-traditional’ investors since the early 2000s following changes in the regulatory frameworks governing these markets. The arrival of new traders has been termed the ‘financialisation’ of commodity markets (9). While the increase in liquidity has contributed to the depth of commodity derivative markets, making outright market manipulation more difficult, it has also introduced speculative demand that is unrelated to conditions in the physical commodity market, which undermines the ability of these markets to fulfil key functions. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | In their original form, regulated commodity derivative markets fulfil two main purposes: (i) risk management for producers and users of commodities, and (ii) price discovery. Risk management is achieved via hedging, which means taking offsetting positions in the physical and the derivative markets and thereby fixing the price of the commodity at the time of placing the hedge. Hedging requires a close relationship between commodity futures markets and the physical market. To ensure this close relationship, physical trade tends to be benchmarked against the derivative price. While this practice ensures hedging efficacy, it also ensures a direct pass-through of speculative positions in derivative markets to the physical market. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Futures contracts are traded for different maturity months. Each futures contract has an agreed buyer and seller. Offers made by buyers and sellers are matched by the clearing house of the exchange. The matched price is not paid in full. Instead, both traders transfer a security deposit to a margin account which is registered with the clearing house. Gains and losses are taken directly from the security deposit. Commodity futures trading is therefore highly leveraged. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | When a futures contract approaches its maturity date, traders have two options: (i) holding on to the contract and forcing (if seller) or taking (if buyer) delivery, or (ii) taking an offsetting position to close the contract before the maturity date. The great majority of all commodity futures contracts are settled by offsetting positions. Therefore, trading in commodity futures does not require the trader to own the physical commodity that they are selling or to own storage capacity to take on the physical commodity that they are buying. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Only brokers can trade in registered commodity exchanges. Brokers trade on behalf of their clients and for their personal gain. A large secondary market exists where commodity derivatives are sold on and repackaged outside the exchange. Futures contracts are also traded outside regulated exchanges, referred to as ‘Over-the-counter’ (OTC) trades, where deals are agreed without the involvement of a clearing house. This makes commodity derivatives easily accessible to retail investors, mostly in the form of exchange-traded fund (ETFs) for specific commodities or commodity indices (10). |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | Due to the deregulation of commodity derivative markets and their ease of trading, these markets are highly liquid, and trade in commodity derivatives outstrips trade in physical commodities by a long way. Liquidity is a key requirement for price discovery. Price discovery is the market’s ability to reflect, correctly and in good time, information about physical demand and supply conditions. Price discovery is provided if, and only if, all traders take positions independently and solely based on their knowledge about physical demand and supply conditions; these conditions are referred to as ‘market fundamentals’. Price discovery is undermined by traders that take positions that are unrelated to market fundamentals. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Not all traders take positions based on market fundamentals (11). The academic literature distinguishes between active and passive traders. Active traders are further subdivided into informed and uninformed traders. Active and informed traders are commodity trading houses, which trade commodity futures for hedging and speculative purposes as part of their core business, and specialist money managers (e.g. hedge funds) that pursue trading strategies based on market intelligence. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Active and uninformed traders (positive feedback traders) are money managers that pursue trading strategies that are based on statistical pattern analysis and little or no market intelligence. Passive and uninformed traders (index traders) are institutional investors, such as pension funds, as well as retail investors investing in ETFs, who seek exposure to a broad set of commodity prices, including agricultural commodities as well as energy and minerals and metals, for portfolio diversification purposes. Exposure is achieved via replication of commodity indices, akin to stock market indices. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | Index replication involves taking on only buying positions which are rolled over at the end of the futures contract’s maturity date. Index traders are therefore one-sided in their position taking. They are also synchronised across commodity groups, signalling strong demand across a broad spectrum of commodities, leading to co-movement between prices of different commodity groups that is unrelated to market fundamentals (12). |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | Such speculative price signals can be aggravated by positive feedback traders that gauge the market support for price directions. By betting on a particular price direction, positive feedback traders lend further support in a self-fulfilling manner, leading to speculative bubbles and high price volatility. Speculative bubbles can persist, especially if information about market fundamentals is limited, that is, in times of high uncertainty, and if uninformed and passive traders dominate in the market. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The gathering of market intelligence is costly, and relatively more costly than statistical analysis or quick scanning of headlines, especially when traders invest in multiple markets at the same time. Informed traders are therefore relatively few, and they tend to be large trading houses which gather market intelligence as part of their physical commodity business. This makes commodity derivative markets prone to persistent speculative bubbles, especially in times of uncertainty and market panic. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | Global physical grain trade is highly concentrated. Four companies control an estimated 70-90 per cent of global grain trade and make excessive profit: Archer-Daniels-Midland, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus, known collectively as ABCDs (13) (ADM recorded the highest earnings in its almost 120-year history, and a 38 % year on year increase in operating profits (14)). Those companies not only exercise an oligopoly over global grain trade, but also over information about market fundamentals, including storage. Storage positions are held for transactional, precautionary or speculative purposes. Information about storage levels is carefully guarded against competitors. As traders, they are forward looking, attempting to buy low and sell high. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | The ABCDs are also highly financialised. Archer-Daniels-Midland and Bunge are listed companies and subject to shareholder pressures, which favour short-term gains over long-term investments. Shareholders include hedged funds (e.g., Black Rock), investment banks and to a large extent also institutional investors such as pension funds. Cargill and Louis Dreyfus are privately owned companies, which besides trading in grains also count hedge funds, banks, haulage, freight, storage, real estate and infrastructure companies among their subsidiaries. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | Large physical commodity traders trade in both the derivative and the physical markets and entertain their own broker service for direct access to commodity derivative markets. They also wield substantial power over their suppliers and customers. This power enables them to delay payments to increase cash reserves or delay commodity deliveries if they expect prices to change to their advantage. In contrast to producers and consumers, physical traders thrive on market volatility, as large, rapid price changes create opportunities to sell storage and financial positions with large profits within a short time span. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | High and rising prices and secrecy about stock holdings fan fear and panic. Fear and panic, especially during times of high uncertainty, such as in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, drive excessive price levels and volatility as speculative traders, jumping on the bandwagon of the price boom, dominate the market (15). Physical traders have little interest in intervening in the short and medium run as high prices increase the value of their speculative as well as their transactional storage positions, which they are selling at a huge profit. The ABCD traders have all recorded record high or near-record high profits in 2021. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | Exceptionally high prices cause fear over supply shortages and supply unaffordability and increase the demand for precautionary storage holdings. Hoarding food commodities, either by stockpiling imports or through the introduction of export bans, creates artificial shortages in the physical market, lending further support for rising prices. Speculative price surges are thereby validated by market fundamentals ex post, in a self-fulfilling manner. During the 2008 food crisis, India reacted to high grain prices by introducing a rice export ban, leading to a sharp increase in rice prices. Currently, China is stockpiling large quantities of corn, rice and wheat over worries of shortages (16). While governments that engage in the hoarding of food commodities act speculatively, their hoarding is out of fear and the desire to fulfil the right to food for their citizens rather than profiteering. This clearly distinguishes these activities from speculation by financial and physical traders. Hoarding by governments and consumers is a reaction to high food prices, not a cause, and is not contributing to food security and strategic autonomy neither in the EU nor in developing countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

4.   The role of environmental, social and governance (ESG) rating agencies and trading companies

| 4.1. | Currently, national eco-labels such as the Austrian UZ49 eco-label or the German FNG eco-label do not explicitly consider food speculation in their evaluation process. Derivatives that are not used solely for hedging purposes are generally speaking banned. Eco-labels consider supply chains in the food industry as being too complex to provide an easily applicable set of rules. Some examples include the use of fertilisers, which can be evaluated differently based on their carbon footprint, the missing data for identifying land grabbing issues, and the lack of transparency surrounding speculative trading activities in annual reports, etc. The complexity of the supply chains does not lead to hardcoded exclusion criteria, but to less important ‘controversial criteria’ that have a higher probability of being interpreted significantly differently by rating agencies. National eco-labels do not include explicitly implemented criteria linked to soft commodities in their evaluation process. Controversial criteria, focusing on governance, play a minor part in the overall rating process due to the possibility of different interpretations. These controversial criteria mainly cover business ethics, where speculative trading, lack of transparency, land grabbing, etc. come into play. One eco-label, for instance, investigates the ‘ESG quality’ of the fund when derivatives of commodities are used, but the process and its possible outcomes remain unclear and are not documented publicly. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | A key component of the ESG rating is the assessment of corporate governance (ownership, control, board, accounting, etc.) and corporate behaviour (business ethics and tax transparency) of the food industry. However, ratios such as percentage of speculative trading of soft commodities executed by treasury departments or transparent information concerning storage levels at storage facilities are missing and are rarely covered by governance criteria. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Rating agencies assess the food market as being more vulnerable than other sectors. The food industry has a higher-than-average climate risk relative to other ESG industries, as the agri-food sector is both a contributor and vulnerable to climate related problems (such as temperature increase, draughts, floods etc.). Although the average ESG rating of food industry companies has risen over the last five years, the food products peer set has been dominated by a high proportion of companies having a controlling shareholder, with a large prevalence of family ownership. This corporate structure carries corporate governance risks associated with complex ownership structure with disparate voting rights: management contracts/transactions between the company and the controlling owner, or entities owned by the same controlling individual. Prioritising the personal enrichment of the dominant owner over ensuring sustainable profits may leave minority investors exposed to the risks of decisions that heavily favour family groups. Controlled ownership dominates in the food products industry: 58,4 % of the companies that make up the MSCI ACWI index have a shareholder or a shareholder group that controls 30 % or more of the voting rights. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The majority of companies in the food industry (60 %) are listed as being above the ESG rating investment grade (BBB). Nearly 2 out of every 10 constituents have a high or very high ESG rating. This development leads to heavy inflows by asset managers into food industry stocks. Food prices are at their highest level in a decade and the rally could persist. However, investors are becoming increasingly averse to industries that violate ESG principles, such as the palm oil industry. There will be a growing demand for ESG-compliant portfolio construction based on commodities. From September 2008 to September 2011, the FAO index rose 12 %, which is more than inflation. The impact of the food price spike on stocks was characterised by the following features: firstly, it was broad-based in its impact. The food price rally had a positive impact on food producers, food processors and fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) companies. This time around, ESG will be a key determining factor in asset allocation decisions. The underperformance of palm oil stocks amid the 2021 palm oil price rally is an example of these new considerations having an impact on share prices. However, as stated in points 4.1-4.4, these ESG ratings do not cover the issue of food speculation. When considering, for example, highly speculative trading or the excessive stockpiling of physical commodities forcing price levels to rise higher as part of the company’s business ethics and governance, the overall ESG rating must be adapted accordingly. In this respect, the average ESG rating for the food industry as well as fund companies may be too high. This must be investigated in more detail. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The high and rapidly increasing levels of concentration in the agri-food sector are reinforcing the industrial food and farming model, exacerbating its social and environmental fallout and aggravating existing power imbalances (17). Collectively, the asset management giants, namely BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street, Fidelity, and Capital Group, own significant proportions of the firms that dominate at various points along agri-food supply chains. When considered together, these five asset management firms own around 10-30 % of the shares of the top firms within the agri-food sector. The firms with the highest degree of ownership by the large asset management firms are those firms that dominate in highly concentrated market segments, including agricultural inputs, commodity trading, and processed and packaged foods (18). These corporate strategies can collectively lead to broader effects, such as greater inequality in the food system, a weakening of innovation in the sector, and enhanced market and political power among the sector’s leading firms. Further research is necessary to build a solid base on which to formulate policy directions moving forward in the case of equity-related investments in the food and agriculture sector. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | In the case of equity-related investments in the agri-food sector, multiple aspects of financialisation feature prominently. Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and index-based mutual funds, including those specifically linked to food and agriculture, represent new avenues for financial investment and profit, while ordinary individuals increasingly partake in these investment vehicles via their pension funds and individual retirement savings accounts (19). The rise of these equity-linked investment funds works to reshape agri-food systems in ways that prioritise the needs of shareholders over other social and environmental goals. The Vaneck Vectors Agribusiness ETF, for instance, is the largest agricultural index fund. It has returned an annual average of 8,32 % over the last 10 years. Meanwhile, its net asset value rose to 32 % between 2020 and 2021. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

5.   Current regulatory framework: challenges and obstacles

| 5.1. | The MiFID II Directive (2014/65/EU) imposed comprehensive disclosure and reporting requirements to curb excessive speculative trading and promote transparency. It proposed position limits per trading venue not only on securities trading but also extending to cover equivalent OTC transactions. Firms are also obligated to provide daily position reports to venues and regulators. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | These measures, especially the position restrictions, are useful but also limited in their effectiveness to curb excessive financial market speculation. They are closely linked to the question of the role of such speculation in price formation. Criticism of position limits from civil society and academics is not exclusively related to position limits’ (possible) weak execution, but also to regulatory issues such as (i) the frequency of review, (ii) the consideration of index funds in determining position limits, and (iii) regulators’ exemption rules. Regulators must face questions about when position limits kick in and why the strong capital inflows in agricultural commodities over the past two years have not raised alarms. Increased regulator transparency is also essential. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | All transactions should be reported to national authorities as soon as they happen: real-time (or as close as possible) transaction reporting should be put in place for all commodity derivatives, including OTC contracts, on all major exchanges. As many trades as possible should be done on transparent platforms and all OTC contracts should be registered. Different types of counterparties should be subject to appropriate disclosure requirements: market participants and positions should be categorised by type of entity (e.g. bank or physical trader) and activity (e.g. speculative or hedging) and be subject to appropriate disclosure requirements and regulatory constraints accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | The CFTC, for instance, only releases weekly data on trading positions, although daily data exist. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | Limits should be introduced on how much prices can move up or down within a day and the exchange should have the right to close the market if the limits are exceeded. Time-bound intra-day price limits should be put in place, initially set at cautious but appropriate levels, which could be gradually tightened after monitoring for any adverse consequences, such as poor liquidity. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

| 5.6. | In addition, position limits should be recalibrated to reduce the price impact of a single player. Ex-ante position limits should be aggregated across financial markets. Limits on the number of times contracts can be turned over in a single day should be introduced. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

| 5.7. | OTC trades should be regulated, and transactions should be registered with a clearing house for oversight. Registered exchanges should also have the right to cease trading if the order of the market cannot be ensured. No trader should be able to hold the exchange liable for any losses incurred due to trading stops that are within the exchanges’ regulatory remit. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

| 5.8. | Aggregated position limits should be introduced for all types of derivative contracts and should be applied to all counterparties: any exemptions to position limits should be restricted to businesses dealing directly in physical commodities and using commodity markets to hedge risks that are core to their commercial business. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

| 5.9. | A tax regime should be put in place to limit the use of passive speculation, exchange traded funds and high frequency trading in agriculture derivatives markets. A financial transactions tax could also be used to help curb excessive speculation while raising money for development and climate change finance. However, it may be too difficult to tax transactions popping up in milliseconds. Thanks to automated trading, the average duration of a trade is eight seconds. It would be more appropriate to tax the exchange as an entity based on defined criteria rather than focusing on each trade entry and exit. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

| 5.10. | Due to the Ukraine crisis, wheat prices are diverging in some local markets, with the differential between cash prices and benchmark futures on the Chicago exchange plummeting as wheat buyers balk at the highest prices witnessed since 2008. This may be side-lining farmers, who are already contending with the worst farm cost inflation in years. This cash market scenario we are seeing because of the war is hurting farmers’ current ability to market their old and even new crop wheat. Some growers say their bids have been pulled from grain elevators. Wheat futures are in ludicrous mode. Futures and cash are diverging sharply. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

| 5.11. | To put the discussion of further regulation into perspective, it should be noted that the EU already has the most regulated financial markets. It is evident that, to be effective, such regulation should be extended at global level. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

| 5.12. | In conclusion, financial market speculation is not the only contributor to price dynamics on commodity futures markets and thus to food price increases, but it is a significant one! A deeper analysis of the regulatory instruments and their functioning and possible adaption during the crisis is needed. |
| --- | --- |

5.12.

6.   The way forward: civil society’s proposals for action

| 6.1. | The EESC calls on Member States and EU institutions to enhance market transparency, in particular by ESG reporting and non-financial disclosure of actors involved in speculation. The role of the ESG rating must be investigated under the perspective of food speculation. In particular, the methodologies of the rating agencies must be put under review on how they are assessing the food industry and the participants in the food sector in general. Currently, ESG ratings correlate to less than 50 %. This leads to misguided assessments which have a significant impact on the inflows of agro-funds. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | Every player globally should report to the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), including countries and private actors, possibly through the FAO. The more is known about food reserves the better. Information about storage/flows of reserves globally is essential. OTC transactions should also be further scrutinised. All OTC products must be cleared and registered via a clearing house. Data about positions broken down by clients be made available to regulators. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The EESC highlights that commodity derivative markets fulfil key services to the producers and users of food commodities, namely risk management and price discovery, and that the functioning of these markets is undermined through speculative activity. The EESC therefore urges Member States and EU institutions to take the necessary steps to curb excessive commodity speculation, in particular by: |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.3.1. | Regulating the futures market for food derivatives, as was the case for several decades until the end of the last century, which preserves the function of futures for hedging. Other recommended measures include:






  — | introducing strict price movement curbs and daily position limits as soon as trading activities on the commodity futures markets show abnormalities (MiFID II). Position limits should be recalibrated to reflect the genuine interest of a trading party in relation to the need of real-life risk exposure hedging. More transparency and effective implementation of position limits would be helpful; |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.3.1.

—

introducing strict price movement curbs and daily position limits as soon as trading activities on the commodity futures markets show abnormalities (MiFID II). Position limits should be recalibrated to reflect the genuine interest of a trading party in relation to the need of real-life risk exposure hedging. More transparency and effective implementation of position limits would be helpful;

| — | limiting access to derivative/hedging to qualified and knowledgeable investors and traders who are genuinely concerned about the underlying agricultural commodities; |
| --- | --- |

—

limiting access to derivative/hedging to qualified and knowledgeable investors and traders who are genuinely concerned about the underlying agricultural commodities;

| — | introducing short/medium/long term contract obligations to add stability; |
| --- | --- |

—

introducing short/medium/long term contract obligations to add stability;

| — | incentivising withdrawal of financial speculation in food commodities by banks and fund companies with the introduction of increased capital requirements in order to reduce leverage effects. Examples of big financial institutions (such as Deutsche Bank, ERSTE Bank, Raiffeisen Austria, etc.) banning the trading of food speculation by derivatives show that it is possible for those actors to adapt their governance accordingly; |
| --- | --- |

—

incentivising withdrawal of financial speculation in food commodities by banks and fund companies with the introduction of increased capital requirements in order to reduce leverage effects. Examples of big financial institutions (such as Deutsche Bank, ERSTE Bank, Raiffeisen Austria, etc.) banning the trading of food speculation by derivatives show that it is possible for those actors to adapt their governance accordingly;

| — | Stronger regulation in the event of anomalies. Exchanges should introduce rules that limit the destabilising influence of high-frequency trading (20). |
| --- | --- |

—

Stronger regulation in the event of anomalies. Exchanges should introduce rules that limit the destabilising influence of high-frequency trading (20).

| — | Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for abusive positions in the market need to be reinforced and made more agile to offer timely response. |
| --- | --- |

—

Monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for abusive positions in the market need to be reinforced and made more agile to offer timely response.

| 6.3.2. | Regulating indexes (commodities indexes and food indexes), in particular by regulating and banning commodity index funds and replication via swaps and exchange traded products, as this maximises the link between energy and food markets. Position limits do not work for commodity index traders/swap traders, as these are synchronised. Public funds to actors involved in food speculation should also be stopped — and no public actor should be trading in food derivatives for speculative purposes that are not serving the public interest. A ban on soft commodities (e.g. funds, ETFs) allocated in portfolios of institutional actors (e.g. pension funds, insurances) should also be introduced. Considering the need to regulate this market, concrete recommendations must be further developed in future EESC opinions. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.2.

| 6.3.3. | Addressing the financialisation of the food sector as massive money-making off the backs of people, e.g. by introducing windfall taxation on excess profits before dividends of corporations and a food speculation tax (21) to curb high frequency trading, as well as breaking oligopolies at all levels of the chain and financial interests. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.3.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS).

1

(2)  A financial transaction tax exclusively on food speculation. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’ (COM(2011) 594 final) (OJ C 181, 21.6.2012, p. 55).

2

(3)  FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2022), In Brief to The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. Rome, FAO.

3

(4)  FAO statistics.

4

(5)  IPES Food.

5

(6)  European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2022 on addressing food security in developing countries (2021/2208(INI)) (OJ C 47, 7.2.2023, p. 149) and European Parliament resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022/2593(RSP)) (OJ C 361, 20.9.2022, p. 2).

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘The sustainable economy we need’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 106, 31.3.2020, p. 1).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain’ (COM(2018) 173 final) (OJ C 440, 6.12.2018, p. 165).

8

(9)  Unctad (2009), ‘The Financialization of Commodity Markets’, chapter II of the 2009 Trade and Development Report. Unctad: Geneva; Unctad (2011), ‘Price Formation in Financialized Commodity Markets: The Role of Information’.

9

(10)  Heidorn, van Huellen, Loayza-Desfontaines, Riedler, Schmaltz, and Schröder (2014), ‘Flankierende Ansätze zur Verbesserung der Markttransparenz und Bekämpfung von Marktmissbrauch im Rohstoffterminhandel’, Bundesministerium der Finanzen (BMF), Berlin, Mannheim.

10

(11)  van Huellen (2020), ‘Approaches to Price Formation in Financialized Commodity Markets’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 34(1): 219-237. doi:10.1111/joes.12342.

11

Journal of Economic Surveys,

(12)  van Huellen (2018), ‘How financial investment distorts food prices: evidence from U.S. grain markets’, Agricultural Economics, 49(2): 171-181. doi:10.1111/agec.12406.

12

Agricultural Economics,

(13)  Murphy, Burch, and Clapp (2012), ‘Cereal Secrets: The World’s Largest Gain Traders and Global Agriculture’, Oxfam Research Report.

13

(14)  From the shareholder report for the fiscal year December 2020 to December 2021.

14

(15)  IFPRI.

15

(16)  Bloomberg article.

16

(17)  IPES Food report.

17

(18)  Clapp, J. (2019), ‘The rise of financial investment and common ownership in global agrifood firms’, Review of International Political Economy.

18

Review of International Political Economy.

(19)  https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09692290.2019.1597755.

19

(20)  https://www.welthungerhilfe.de/welternaehrung/rubriken/wirtschaft-menschenrechte/befeuert-finanzspekulation-die-globale-ernaehrungskrise.

20

(21)  A financial transaction tax exclusively on food speculation. Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC’ (COM(2011) 594 final), OJ C 181, 21.6.2012, p. 55.

21

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/61 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/61

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Socio-economic situation in Latin America following the COVID-19 crisis — the role of civil society in the recovery process’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/09)

| Rapporteur: | Josep PUXEU ROCAMORA |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Josep PUXEU ROCAMORA

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 16.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 159/2/0 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

External Relations

Adopted in section

16.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

159/2/0

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Efforts should focus on improving dialogue and enhancing cooperation between the two regions by taking a horizontal approach and engaging in multilevel dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The bi-regional relationship is being strengthened based on shared values and objectives. However, it also needs to be attractive in terms of resources, technology transfers and results, and in its social dimension. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | With regard to the EU’s and Latin America’s geopolitical competition, establishing strategic autonomy makes it possible to enhance bi-regional cooperation, strengthen commitment to multilateralism and give a bigger presence and more relevance on the international stage when it comes to strategic issues. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | One of the most important characteristics of vulnerability in Latin America is the low quality of jobs. The recovery would need to focus on promoting the creation of more formal and decent jobs, improve the vocational training and sectoral policies as well as promoting minimum wage and collective bargaining, within the framework of social dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | Europe and Latin America are committed to democracy, the rule of law and environmental sustainability, which means ensuring civil society has the protection and guarantees to play a leading role in development and in overcoming crises and to promote the necessary dialogue for a new social contract. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The principle of leaving no one behind must be maintained, which involves re-thinking vulnerability not only in terms of income, but also in terms of its impact on different groups of the population, such as women, people with disabilities, older people and children. Freely and democratically organised civil societies are the best instrument to make this affirmation cease to be a mere statement and become reality. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The social tension in Latin America and the threats to democracy around the world highlight the need to rethink development with more and better policies, greater inclusion and pluralism, and by understanding the underlying sources of discontent so that they can be turned into sources of social well-being. Europe and Latin America can be partners in an alliance for democracy, sustainability, social justice and multilateralism (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Europe and Latin America should be partners in an alliance for the defence of democracy, for fairer and more egalitarian economies and societies, which strengthens multilateralism and fully assumes the protection of the environment. This alliance requires the full recognition and participation of its organised civil societies, human rights organisations, trade union and business organisations, environmental associations, among others. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | Latin America has been experiencing a gradual economic slowdown, following the end of the expansionary cycle in raw materials. Before the COVID-19 crisis, average growth was only 0,3 %. In fact, the 2014-2020 period saw the lowest economic growth in seven decades, while public debt has reached record levels. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The health crisis caused by coronavirus has had hard consequences in the region, overtaking the average number of cases and deaths worldwide. This took a heavy toll on health systems, which were already having difficulties in coping with endemic diseases and even in primary care (2). The COVID crisis has only highlighted the negative effects of the policies implemented during decades (health budgets cuts, staff reduction, disinvestment in infrastructure among others) which proved ineffective in facing the challenge imposed by the virus. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Faced with the pandemic, most countries in the region anticipated events by imposing restrictions on mobility and preparing support and transfers for vulnerable sectors. In addition, unprecedented counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies were implemented (3). Despite this, losses in terms of human life, the economy and social inclusion have been high, given structural weakness and the limited fiscal scope of response measures. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | Average inflation in the region, which has been on the rise, reached 9,8 % in 2021. Exacerbated by the effect of the war, it is expected to increase to 11,2 % in 2022 (4). This is widening the gaps that limit development. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Latin America is facing ‘development traps’ (5) |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.5.1. | The productivity trap means that diversified economic structures and more sophisticated products and services are required. Returning to primary sector production does not guarantee proper integration into global value chains and generates few incentives to invest. Moreover, the pandemic hit MSMEs especially hard as they have more difficulties in adopting new technologies, while the war is weakening the agricultural sector. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.1.

| 2.5.2. | In order to get out of the social vulnerability trap, labour and social protection institutions should be improved where more inclusive formal employment and better quality jobs need to be created in order to break the vicious circle of vulnerability, volatile incomes and poor social protection. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.2.

| 2.5.3. | To solve the institutional trap, better institutions and inclusion policies are needed to restore trust, improve the quality of public services, respond to the aspirations of a broad middle class and provide strength to resist populist and authoritarian impulses. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.3.

| 2.5.4. | The environmental vulnerability trap is rooted in the production bias towards natural resource-intensive sectors and means incurring the high costs of adapting a model based on high carbon emissions and exploitation of non-renewable resources. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.4.

| 2.6. | Structural problems and development traps (6) are affecting the economic and jobs recovery. Regional GDP contracted by 6,8 % in 2020 (7). Average growth was 6,1 % in 2021, and the region is expected to grow by only 2,1 % in 2022, which is considered insufficient to compensate for increased structural problems. The situation is worsening due to the crisis caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the rise in the price of fossil fuels, agricultural inputs and food, even though some countries are offering more primary goods for export. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   Social and economic impact of the pandemic and the war

| 3.1. | Of the 22 million jobs lost in 2020, 4,5 million still need to be recovered, mainly affecting low-skilled jobs and female, youth and informal employment. Between 2019 and 2020, the female employment rate fell from 51,4 % in 2019 to 46,9 % in 2020. Job losses in the domestic sector (20,9 %) affected between 11 and 13 million women in 2019 (8). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The region has lost more than a decade in terms of poverty reduction and could find itself facing another lost decade (9). In 2021, the poverty rate reached 32,1 % and the extreme poverty rate reached 13,8 %. The number of poor people stands at 201 million and the number of people in extreme poverty has increased from 81 million to 86 million. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The health and inflation crises highlight the vulnerability of those on middle incomes, characterised by limited contributions to a contributory welfare system and low coverage of non-contributory welfare (10). The informal economy has become smaller, but it still generates 140 million jobs, in particular for agricultural workers, women and young people. This means greater vulnerability, less social mobility and less revenue-raising and welfare on the part of the State. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The pandemic had a major impact on children and young people by limiting the protection provided by in-person education: 114 million children were out of school, and in some countries this situation lasted for up to two years. The gap in connectivity, digital skills and families’ abilities to cope with the compulsory switch to online learning created a difference between high-income and low-income students that is equivalent to two years of education (11). Moreover, the burden of care work increased for women. People with disabilities — some 85 million people — have also been affected. The lack of accessible information, as well as discrimination in healthcare, are worsening fragile inclusion, which is also being threatened by inflation. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Given the concentrated supply limits in the global north, Latin American countries accessed vaccines through bilateral negotiations, and received 93 million doses under the COVAX programme. The EU exported over 130 million doses, and Member States donated another 10 million doses (12). Despite the difficulties, an average of 63,3 % of the population in the region has been vaccinated with two doses. While this figure has reached 89 % in some countries, it is less than 1 % in others (13). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

4.   Heightened social unrest

| 4.1. | The social protest movements that shook several countries in 2019 have not been fully addressed. Some tensions have worsened and will worsen even further due to the increase in food prices. Aggrieved citizens are concerned about the poor quality of public policies, corruption, the vulnerability of the middle classes, social exclusion and lack of safety. Social expectations in the first decade of the 21st century were not met and the gap between citizens and institutions widened. The results of the 2020-2022 regional electoral cycle show a trend towards change, posing major challenges for elected presidents. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The region is one of the most unequal in the world. Between 2019 and 2020, while the high and medium-high income groups shrank by 1 %, the medium-intermediate and medium-low income groups decreased by 3,5 %; meanwhile, low-income sectors (with incomes 1,8 times below the poverty threshold) increased by 4,7 %, and the population experiencing poverty or extreme poverty by 3,3 % (14). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Another area of dissatisfaction is the lack of safety that Latin Americans experience, especially in cities. Violence could certainly be connected to organised crime, trafficking and the inability of states to stop it (15). However, it is not just associated with crime; there is also a social violence, linked to extreme poverty rates, that requires public policies on the creation of decent work and changes in quality education for all; and there is also a political violence that encourages adversary disqualification, that tries to preserve power through it. The very disturbing violence against trade unionists, journalists, environmental and human rights activists and businesspeople has also increased during the pandemic and the waves of protests. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Following the last EuroLat meeting, where the need for greater protection of justice operators was underlined, the evaluation of the COPLA project (Corte Penal Latino Americana y del Carribe) would be useful. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | One structural challenge is vulnerability to climate change: the region is one of the most affected, with an economic impact of up to EUR 85 852 million per year. The social dimension of this impact needs to be considered, including food insecurity and increasingly frequent disasters. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Lack of safety, poverty and the presence of authoritarian regimes have sparked a significant flow of people across the continent. The vulnerability of these migration and asylum processes has created a humanitarian crisis to which there has not been an adequate response and that requires a regional approach. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | Democracies are in a vulnerable position. Elites, political parties and parliaments are suffering from a crisis of legitimacy and trust, which, together with the perception of corruption, and high levels of fragmentation and polarisation, has rendered the collective decision-making and bargaining mechanisms inadequate (16). The current situation of global instability highlights even further the threat of authoritarianism and the need to strengthen democracies. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

5.   Towards a new social contract

| 5.1. | Despite discontent and low trust in the system, citizens are willing to call for political change on the street and at the ballot box. The role played by young people and women in these movements is important: their involvement in the political sphere is a valuable asset. It is vital to promote an institutionalised social dialogue model like that in Europe and to consolidate existing cooperation with the European Economic and Social Committee and the International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | Citizens must play a key role in transitions, strengthening mechanisms for deliberation and participation, and ensuring their accessibility and protection. There is a need to restore trust through open and inclusive policy-making, and to create clear communication strategies and have social compensation systems. There is also a need to strengthen accountability, and the evaluation of policies and their impacts. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | A new social contract can be achieved: through cross-cutting agreements between socio-economic groups, between regions and between generations; fostering resilient and sustainable productive strategies that create quality employment, and fostering the green and digital transition. This also requires comprehensive and effective social protection systems and a more sustainable model for financing development. It should make sure that rights are respected, jobs are decent with minimum living wages and collective bargaining, social protection is universal and that social dialogue ensures just transition measures for climate and technology. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | This social contract needs a stable and fiscally sustainable public expenditure policy. In the short term, international cooperation initiatives, increasing liquidity and channelling it towards middle-income countries, and debt relief for low- and middle-income countries are important. This is in addition to boosting public revenue through more efficient tax collection. In the medium term, progressive and efficient tax collection needs to be strengthened in order to meet the permanent expenditure needs of an active social policy. International consensus will also be needed to restructure public debt. In the long term, there is a need to increase the role played by taxes, digital collection and green taxation. International cooperation is also needed to reduce tax evasion and avoidance (17). |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | In this connection, it is essential to develop the social market economy in the region, given its key role in developing an inclusive and resilient production system. To this end, the right markets and distribution channels need to be created (18). It is important to recognise and strengthen the role of Domestic Advisory Groups in monitoring free trade agreements (19). |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

6.   Alliance with the European Union

| 6.1. | The EU’s development cooperation policy recognises the need to implement new approaches that go beyond north-south paradigms and those relating to official development assistance (ODA), by adopting new forms of multi-actor and multilevel partnership (20). The Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) meets the need to allocate funds more flexibly in terms of geographical and thematic areas and to deal with global challenges and the SDG roadmap. The Global Gateway strategy aims to connect the world in a smart, clean and secure way in the digital, energy and transport sectors, and to strengthen health, education and research systems. These changes aim to equip the EU with the necessary resources and tools to reconcile its values and interests in a more complex, contested and interconnected international environment. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | To coordinate strategies, the Team Europe initiative has been launched, which aims to combine the efforts of the European institutions, the Member States and their implementing agencies, and development finance institutions. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The aim of European cooperation has been to move away from graduation based on income per capita and embraces the concept of ‘development in transition’, which is better suited to the needs of the region. However, there is still the challenge of improving dialogue and the ability to communicate the strength of the relationship and its advantages. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | At the current juncture featuring many extremely serious challenges at the global, regional, and national levels, it is important to point out that Europe and Latin America could be ideal partners in an alliance for the defence of democracy, for fairer and more egalitarian economies and societies, which strengthens multilateralism and entirely assumes the protection of the environment. And to emphasize that this alliance would not be viable without the full recognition and participation of its organised civil societies, human rights organisations, trade union and business organisations, environmental associations, among others. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

7.   Supporting a recovery that involves civil society

| 7.1. | There were changes in the origin of foreign direct investment in 2020. Until 2019, European businesses were the main investors in the region and accounted for 55 % of foreign direct investment inflows. In 2020, European investment fell by 49 % and intra-regional investments by 35 %, compared to a drop of 4 % from the US (21) and a rise in investment from China. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

| 7.2. | Europe’s crisis exit strategy is based on improving its economic model through the European Green Deal and Next Generation funds. These aspects are key to the bi-regional strategy and the development of tools to promote the energy, digital, green and social transitions, which will also have broad benefits for both regions. |
| --- | --- |

7.2.

| 7.3. | The trade relationship with Europe must be strengthened through agreements already signed or those with Mercosur, Chile and Mexico. These agreements not only strengthen trade, but affect the quality of employment and its social function, technology transfer and the transition to sustainability. This means promoting a trade partnership that sets itself apart from other partners in terms of its quality, long-term sustainability and profitability, in contrast to other, predatory and irresponsible international relationship models. However, the trade agreements must focus on people and their fundamental rights, decent work and solidarity with the most vulnerable, respect for the environment and the defence of democracy and be able to effectively enforce rights. The main aspects are: |
| --- | --- |

7.3.

| 7.4. | Attracting investments that help to meet the SDGs, with a multilateral regulatory framework to help achieve this, focusing on people’s quality of life, their rights, decent employment, inclusion, sustainability and the defence of democracy. Further cooperation through projects and positive implementation of the European Strategic Compass is also desirable in order to achieve common objectives. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.

| 7.4.1. | Digitalisation as an opportunity for development. Latin America is at an intermediate level of development in terms of digitalisation, but its growth rate is the lowest of the emerging countries. On the digital front, the EU-LAC Digital Alliance, linked to the transatlantic fibre optic cable (EllaLink), and the European Union’s connectivity strategy ‘Global Gateway’ will come together. Strong backing for digitalisation must enhance the social dimension and support stronger businesses. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.1.

| 7.4.2. | Promoting the formal economy and preventing informal employment (22). The multi-party agreements include specific clauses that require compliance with ILO agreements, as well as steps to guarantee rights, prevent child labour and strengthen labour inspection. These clauses have a positive effect on capacity-building in the Andean countries with which agreements were signed (23). |
| --- | --- |

7.4.2.

| 7.4.3. | Directly supporting the improvement, quality and coverage of education at all levels and stronger education and science networks with Europe. The Erasmus Mundus programme is an asset that can be further exploited to connect universities. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.3.

| 7.4.4. | The EU has embarked since 2021 on a process of reviewing its trade policy and strengthening its approach to trade and sustainable development. It affirmed that its objective is an open, sustainable, and assertive trade policy, mainstreaming sustainable development must go hand in hand. Which while promoting competitiveness between productive sectors and economic agents (large, medium, and small) must go hand in hand with promoting values and principles such as democracy, all human, cultural, gender, environmental, labour and trade union rights. The organised civil society of both regions should actively participate to strengthen their relationship through virtual and/or face-to-face thematic meetings, with a more ambitious calendar and implementing roadmap. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.4.

| 7.4.5. | The European Union aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 and to lead the global effort to protect the planet and ensure its ecological recovery (24). Promoting these objectives in European trade policy to achieve more ambitious environmental cooperation (25) is important for trade relations with Latin America and for strengthening civil society, which is facing numerous threats both because of vulnerability to climate change and because of its confrontation with violent actors. It is vital to protect the people concerned and those who defend human rights, as well as trade unionists and journalists, and to urge Latin American governments to commit to ensuring their integrity. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.5.

| 7.4.6. | The Team Europe initiative supports efforts to tackle deforestation in the Amazon, and the new phase of the EUROCLIMA+ programme will allocate EUR 140 million to support commitments under the Paris Agreement. However, Latin America has earmarked only 15 % of fiscal investment for the post-pandemic economic recovery, with less than 6,9 % going towards the green recovery. It is essential to support the region in order to generate green taxation, public spending and private investment. It is also desirable to strengthen an alliance for the responsible management of strategic raw materials and to ensure sustainable technology transfer based on European experience and knowledge. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.6.

| 7.4.7. | The European Union’s partnership with Latin America needs the agreement with Mercosur, a common market of 780 million consumers, which could increase GDP by 1,5 % in Brazil or by up to 10 % in Paraguay. Environmental protection must be a step forward that paves the way for new-generation bi-regional partnerships. Progress should be made in the search for viable systems to include environmental protection certificates for some products and mirror clauses. If the EU successfully articulates this dimension, it will strategically strengthen its vision of global development and its strategic potential. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.7.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Sustainable supply chains and decent work in international trade’ (exploratory opinion) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 197); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on a new framework for free trade agreements, economic partnership agreements and investment agreements that guarantees the real involvement of civil society organisations and the social partners and ensures public awareness (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 11).

1

(2)  UNESCO (2021), COVID-19 and vaccination in Latin America and the Caribbean: challenges, needs and opportunities.

2

(3)  OECD (2021), Latin America Economic Outlook 2020.

3

(4)  IMF data.

4

(5)  OECD (2022), Latin America Economic Outlook 2021.

5

(6)  Idem.

6

(7)  ECLAC (2021), Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean.

7

(8)  ILO (2022), Labour Overview; ECLAC, 2021, Social Panorama of Latin America.

8

(9)  ECLAC (2021), op. cit.

9

(10)  Nieto Parra (2020), Desarrollo en transición en América Latina en tiempos de la COVID-19 (Development in transition in Latin America during COVID-19), Fundación Carolina.

10

Desarrollo en transición en América Latina en tiempos de la COVID-19

(11)  UNESCO (2021) Responding to COVID-19: Education in Latin America and the Caribbean.

11

(12)  2.12.2021 — meeting of EU and Latin American and Caribbean leaders: Joining Forces for a Sustainable post-COVID Recovery — Press release by Presidents Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen.

12

(13)  Our World in Data.

13

(14)  ECLAC (2021), op. cit.

14

(15)  UNODC (2019), Global Study on Homicide.

15

(16)  IDEA Int.(2021), The State of Democracy in the Americas 2021.

16

(17)  ECLAC (2021), Fiscal, Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2021.

17

(18)  European Commission (2021), EU Social Economy Action Plan.

18

(19)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Sustainable supply chains and decent work in international trade’ (exploratory opinion) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 197); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on a new framework for free trade agreements, economic partnership agreements and investment agreements that guarantees the real involvement of civil society organisations and the social partners and ensures public awareness (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 11).

19

(20)  Sanahuja,. Ruiz Sandoval, E (2019), La Unión Europea y la Agenda 2030 en América Latina: políticas de cooperación en una región de ‘desarrollo en transición’ (The European Union and Agenda 2030 in Latin America: cooperation policies in a ‘development in transition’ region), Fundación Carolina; new European Consensus on Development (ECD) 2017, Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, 2018.

20

La Unión Europea y la Agenda 2030 en América Latina: políticas de cooperación en una región de ‘desarrollo en transición’

(21)  ECLAC (2021), Report, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2021.

21

(22)  See: European Consensus on Development (2006); European Commission Communication on promoting decent work for all (2006); Agenda for Change, European Commission (2011); New European Consensus on Development (2017); Working document: Promote decent work worldwide: responsible global value chains for a fair, sustainable and resilient recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, European Commission (2020); A new neighbourhood, development and international cooperation instrument of the European Union (NDICI) (2020).

22

(23)  Fairlie Reinoso, A. (2022), Nuevos retos para el Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes de la Unión Europea con Perú, Colombia y Ecuador (New challenges for the European Union’s Multiparty Trade Agreement with Peru, Colombia and Ecuador); Fundación Carolina-EULAC.

23

Nuevos retos para el Acuerdo Comercial Multipartes de la Unión Europea con Perú, Colombia y Ecuador

(24)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Green Deal (COM(2019) 640).

24

(25)  Giles Carnero, R. (2021), La oportunidad de una cláusula ambiental de elementos esenciales en acuerdos comerciales de la Unión Europea con Estados terceros: a propósito del Acuerdo Unión Europea-Mercosur (The opportunity for an environmental clause of essential elements in EU trade agreements with third countries: the European Union-Mercosur Agreement); Fundación Carolina DT. 44.

25

, La oportunidad de una cláusula ambiental de elementos esenciales en acuerdos comerciales de la Unión Europea con Estados terceros: a propósito del Acuerdo Unión Europea-Mercosur

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/68 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/68

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Digital transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region’

(own-initiative opinion)

(2023/C 100/10)

| Rapporteur: | Dolores SAMMUT BONNICI |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Dolores SAMMUT BONNICI

| Plenary Assembly decision | 20.1.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure |
| | Own-initiative opinion |
| Section responsible | External Relations |
| Adopted in section | 16.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 181/0/3 |

Plenary Assembly decision

20.1.2022

Legal basis

Rule 52(2) of the Rules of Procedure

Own-initiative opinion

Section responsible

External Relations

Adopted in section

16.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

181/0/3

1.   Conclusions

| 1.1. | The digital transition is revolutionising every aspect of life with significant gains in terms of efficiency and enabling users to achieve more fulfilling lives. It is regarded as a pillar of resilience in the post-COVID-19 period, and has accelerated exponentially since the beginning of the pandemic, notably with the EU’s actions in the digital field which the COVID-19 mitigation strategy has shown to be effective. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The benefits of digitalisation are well-known in specific sectors such as e-education, e-health, e-government, agri-business, e-justice and e-banking. Many governments in the Mediterranean region are promoting these sectors, but the effort is not homogeneous across the region and may lead to an even deeper digital divide among countries. Provision of infrastructure to support these technologies is therefore crucial. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The digital divide in terms of access and usage exists not only between different Mediterranean countries, but also within countries in the region, with rural and remote areas, informal workers, women and the elderly worsen off. Thus in order not to exacerbate existing inequalities, efforts to close the digital gap are essential both at the regional and national level. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Digital connectivity is becoming a right for every human being. The UN Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation has already produced a set of targets for 2030. In contrast, the ‘right to disconnect’ is a debated issue and a reality in a number of European countries. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | Digital skills are essential and therefore should be integrated into the training programmes aimed at young people in the region, given the very high youth unemployment rates. An effective labour market policy in the region will aim to make young people not only technology users but also technology producers. Both employment and entrepreneurship in this field are very promising career paths. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | A solid legal framework is necessary to protect users from digital risks such as cybersecurity attacks, and to ensure data protection mechanisms respect human rights on digital privacy. The cyber security index provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) measures the commitment of countries to cybersecurity at a global level. The index shows, in general, higher security levels in the northern Mediterranean region, whereas Egypt outperforms among the southern Mediterranean countries. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | It is also needed to ensure a fair and competitive digital market in light of digital giants. There is a significant gap within the digital legal framework of the countries in the northern and southern Mediterranean. One can highlight the lack of an independent authority in charge of promoting the digital transition in the southern Mediterranean region. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC explicitly emphasises that the UN Human Rights Conventions and the ILO Core Conventions must be ambitiously implemented in all states of the Mediterranean region so that the digital transition can genuinely contribute to prosperous ecological, economic and social development. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   Introduction

| 2.1. | The digital transition has implications for every aspect of our lives, from consumption to work and production. In response to the COVID-19 global pandemic, there has been an unprecedented acceleration in this transition within the past few years With digitalisation considered one of the main pillars of recovery on both shores of the Mediterranean, people are adopting digital tools faster than ever. Tele- and remote working are becoming a reality, and e-commerce and the platform economy are growing at an unprecedented pace, compensating for business shutdowns due to the pandemic. Meanwhile, this rapid transition can create a new source of deepening inequality as the most vulnerable population groups who are facing digital exclusion, are the ones hit the hardest by the pandemic. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The main goals of this document are to:






  — | assess the current state of digital transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region, programmes and progress made; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

assess the current state of digital transition in the Euro-Mediterranean region, programmes and progress made;

| — | highlight the potential benefits of digitalisation and in particular new opportunities for SMEs, through e-commerce, e-education, e-governance, e-health and digital banking; |
| --- | --- |

—

highlight the potential benefits of digitalisation and in particular new opportunities for SMEs, through e-commerce, e-education, e-governance, e-health and digital banking;

| — | identify barriers to digitalisation, with the main barriers relating to digital infrastructure and access, the digital divide both within a country (rural/urban, women/men, youth/elderly) and between countries (north/south), lack of essential digital skills and digital literacy. Hence, the digital transition can lead to increased inequality in a country and also to divergence in development patterns among the countries in the region; |
| --- | --- |

—

identify barriers to digitalisation, with the main barriers relating to digital infrastructure and access, the digital divide both within a country (rural/urban, women/men, youth/elderly) and between countries (north/south), lack of essential digital skills and digital literacy. Hence, the digital transition can lead to increased inequality in a country and also to divergence in development patterns among the countries in the region;

| — | highlight risks associated with digitalisation, from risks relating to cybersecurity, digital sovereignty, data protection, digital piracy to civil freedom. |
| --- | --- |

—

highlight risks associated with digitalisation, from risks relating to cybersecurity, digital sovereignty, data protection, digital piracy to civil freedom.

3.   Background

| 3.1. | We are currently living through a period of rapid digitalisation and can find digital tools present in every aspect of our lives, including health, work, governance, education and running a business, among others. Digital skills are essential in the new world of work to secure job opportunities, and are rewarded with higher incomes. The digital economy is composed of the core IT/ITC sectors, such as hardware manufacture, software and IT consulting, information services and telecommunication, the narrow scope digital economy including digital services and platform economy and the broad scope digitalised economy taking into account e-businesses, e-commerce, industry 4.0, precision agriculture and algorithmic economy, with the sharing economy and gig economy being at the forefront of the digital economy (1). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Digitalisation was on the rise even before the COVID-19 pandemic, with the major recent trends in digital technologies in the fields of blockchain, data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), 3D printing, internet of things, automation and robotics, cloud computing (2) as well as tracking and remote monitoring systems. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | This trend towards rapid adoption of digital tools and technologies has been called the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with outstanding potential to raise global income and quality of life. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Furthermore, with more than 30 % of the population all over the world using social media platforms, digitalisation can be regarded as a double-edged sword that can enhance social cohesion and bring different cultural backgrounds together, or act as a tool for spreading extreme ideas, ideologies and fake news. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The number of individuals using the internet has been on the rise in past decades and in the region, reaching as much as 93,2 % of the population in Spain in 2020, 90,8 % in Cyprus, 90,1 % in Israel, 86,9 % in Malta, 86,6 % in Slovenia, 84,1 % in Morocco, 77,7 % in Türkiye, 77,6 % in Montenegro and 71,9 % in Egypt. The lowest figure in the region is for Algeria covering 49 % of population in 2018 (latest available data, ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators database). These figures merely highlight the regional disparity in terms of digital access. One should note that at the national level, rural and remote areas have much lower levels of connectivity. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The Mediterranean EU Member States have endorsed the digital transition, and scaled up their virtual policies, including the Digital Single Market (3) and the Digital Europe Programme (4). Europe’s Digital Decade was published by the European Commission in March 2021, outlining digital targets for 2030 and a vision for Europe’s digital transformation (5). One instrument of the Digital Decade is the Digital for Development (D4D) Hub (6), launched in December 2020, with the goal of harmonising and coordinating digital initiatives among the Member States (7). Furthermore, digitalisation is a main pillar within the new Agenda for the Mediterranean, proposed by the European Commission in February 2021. In particular, the ‘new Agenda aims for a green, digital, resilient and just recovery, guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal.’ (8) |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The COVID-19 pandemic has had implications for working behaviour and has pushed people towards remote working. While teleworking has a number of disadvantages, its advantages range from spending less time commuting, lower emissions and positive effects on the environment, to better work-life balance especially for parents (9). The teleworking capacity differs across both shores of the Mediterranean. Many workers from the south have less teleworking capacity as they cannot access the necessary tools, or are simply carrying out jobs that cannot be accomplished remotely. Al Azzawi (2021) has developed a ‘teleworkability’ index for Arab countries, finding a significant gap in that teleworking capacity across the region. She confirms that the most vulnerable workers do not have the capacity to work remotely and thus have been the most severely affected by the pandemic (10). Europe’s experience on wide adoption of teleworking highlights the importance of having in place a legal framework for ‘the right to disconnect’ in order to respect the boundaries between personal and professional life (11). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | Digitalisation has led to the rise of the platform and gig economy. Even though there are many opportunities within the platform economy, it has also led to growing concerns about working conditions and, in particular, limited social security coverage, fragmented working hours and low income levels and the struggle to ensure collective rights (12). In this regard, the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work (2019) calls for policies and measures to address the challenges and opportunities of the digital transformation of work, including platform work. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The rapidly advancing digital transition, especially in economic and working life, naturally has strong effects on all sociocultural structures. Thus, it could be observed during the Arab Spring that digital communication tools were primarily used for the successful organisation of civil resistance and cooperation amongst activists. However, further developments showed that in those countries where no sustainable democratic structures were established, the suppression of fundamental freedoms — including the right to freedom of expression in digital media — as well as workers’ rights — including the right to freedom of association, which is becoming even more important in the platform and gig economy — has worsened again. For example, independent civil society organisations, such as trade unions, human rights NGOs or employers’ organisations and their activists, are repressed simply because they exercise fundamental freedoms or express dissenting opinions. In addition, websites of domestic and international news and independent organised civil society organisations are repeatedly blocked. The UN Conventions on Human Rights and the ILO Conventions are often only formally, but not properly, implemented in some states in the Mediterranean region. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | Digitalisation is crucial for SME development (13). The benefits vary from lower costs, time and resource savings and greater efficiency, to better supply chain integration and product differentiation (14). The OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook 2019 (15) offers a more detailed picture of such benefits. One example is big data analytics which, combined with sensors, apps, cloud computing, and 3D printing, allows for greater customisation. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | Although there are numerous benefits of digitalisation for SMEs, they face a number of obstacles, with one of the most important being lack of access to finance (16). The second major obstacle is lack of access to digital skills, education and training whereas the adoption of digital business models and technologies requires both financial investments and in-house digital skills. A digital preparedness index for SMEs has been developed by the Euro-Mediterranean Economists Association (EMEA), based on a survey targeting southern Mediterranean SMEs. Showing that the level of preparedness for the digital transformation depends on the infrastructure capacity, telecoms and technological progress achieved at country level but also on the capacity of firms at micro level; larger firms are more prepared for digitalisation and younger firms are more likely to pursue it (17). |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The downside of digitalisation is the loss of jobs due to automation in some economic sectors. Civil society can play an important role in accompanying workers to upskill, with the goal of making the digital transition a just transition and in line with the EU’s ‘leave no one behind’ action plan. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | In order to promote digitalisation and to design the most effective policies, it is of paramount importance to measure and monitor the digital transition using sound and measurable indicators. Since 2014, the European Commission has developed the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) (18), showing progress in the areas of digitalisation in the Member States but also a persistent digital gap (19).The DESI Index can form the basis for a reference monitoring framework for non-EU Mediterranean countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

4.   General comments

| 4.1. | The profound impact of the digital transition is being felt across societies and the economies. Although the southern Mediterranean region is facing challenges in terms of providing universal accessibility, and enhancing citizens’ digital skills, the region is no exception in accelerating towards the digital transition and benefiting from it in numerous areas. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | E-commerce has been ramped up due to social distancing measures. Online shopping is widely adopted, with a rise in both business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business (B2B) e-commerce. The chief executive of Africa’s largest e-commerce operator, Jumia, announced a four-fold surge in grocery sales, especially in Tunisia and Morocco where lockdowns resulted in a 100 % rise in sales (20). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | E-education flourished at a fast pace as COVID-19 led to school closures. Governments even introduced some e-learning platforms, such as the ‘Darsak’ platform in Jordan. Some countries have introduced a hybrid system, for instance in Egypt (21). Online platforms are becoming very trendy, even for specific projects to connect with local professional associations, municipalities, and key actors (22). Some EU funding should be specifically directed at education/training in digital upskilling and for young people to develop e-competences, to pursue IT and AI studies for future secure work. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | E-governance is believed to reduce red tape and the burden of administrative procedures, leading to efficient and easy delivery of public services. Moreover, it can be a tool for democratisation and to increase active participation of citizens. Enhancing e-governance is a priority among the EU Member States, and forms one of the pillars of the DESI Index. The southern Mediterranean region is also moving in this direction. Morocco has made significant progress with its national e-government initiative (23). In 2019, Egypt launched an e-payment system for tax collection and paying bills, among other things. In January 2020, the Jordanian Ministry of the Digital Economy migrated its information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure to the cloud to expand services to citizens (24). |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | E-health is a cost-effective way of obtaining and providing necessary support. E-health solutions played a key role in the fight against the COVID-19. These solutions employ telemedicine and mobile health applications. In the past two years, big data analytics for epidemiological surveillance has proven to be useful to fight the pandemic. For instance, in Tunisia, Tobba.tn, a digital platform for online consultation, was launched by a group of doctors (25). |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | Digital banking is an efficient tool to make financial inclusion a reality, with mobile banking already haven proven its role in the past. Fintech solutions can boost digital transformation and enhance financial inclusion. These services are taking over and their goal is to eliminate the use of cheques and cash transactions completely which could cause the exclusion of the elderly who may not be equipped with the necessary digital skills. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | E-justice facilitates access to legal services and reduces the cost of court hearings, filings, etc., and the time needed to access them. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | Given the present impact of global warming, the diminishing food supply chain and higher food prices, the agricultural industry can become more competitive and efficient by applying precision agriculture, and by using big data and block-chain technology. This can lead to high efficiency in water, soil nutrient management and disease control with advanced temperature monitoring and less need for manpower (26), and hence become a tool for mitigating climate issues. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | Internet usage patterns vary across Mediterranean countries. In the southern Mediterranean countries, internet usage through mobile phones and social media is dominant. Unlike the northern Mediterranean countries, however, online shopping is not very common. This could be to some extent explained by financial exclusion and a low proportion of bank account ownership in the south (27). |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

5.   Obstacles to digitalisation

| 5.1. | One of the main obstacles to digitalisation is the digital divide, which not only exists between countries, especially among Mediterranean countries (there are significant gaps within the 2021 edition of the Network Readiness Index-NRI (28)). At the national level, different population groups do not have the same level of access to technological tools. The divide is present among men and women, rural and urban areas, young people and the elderly. From a business perspective, there is a digital divide based on the size and sector of activity, with smaller firms — unlike larger firms — facing exorbitant costs not only in terms of materials but also and, above all, due to the need to upskill workers. Other socioeconomic factors, such as income and education levels, can be a source of digital exclusion. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | Most of the Southern Neighbourhood countries have significant mobile internet coverage gaps. This problem arises particularly in geographically large countries such as Algeria and Libya and, to a lesser extent, in Egypt. Investment in digital infrastructure and building steady high-speed internet connections are crucial in rural areas, where digitalisation can be a potential lever for inclusive growth (29). |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | Digital illiteracy, more present among people with lower educational attainment, is often highlighted as another obstacle to digitalisation. This calls for reforms to education and vocational training programmes so that they include vital digital skills for the future labour market. Digitalisation is also considered as part of the upskilling needs of employees. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | Gender is another factor influencing digital literacy, with men generally having better access to digital tools and accordingly a better knowledge of digital skills. In Tunisia, 72,5 % of men use the internet while this figure is 61,1 % for women. Some countries have already bridged the gap. In Slovenia, for instance, this gap is less than 2 percentage points with 87,2 % of men and 86 % of women using the internet. Türkiye, on the other hand, has a deeper gender gap in internet access, amounting to 11,2 percentage points (ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators). EU Member States are committed to bridging the gender gap in digital skills by 2030 by developing policies to encourage girls to follow ICT subjects and monitoring progress through the Women in Digital (WiD) scoreboard. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

6.   Risks associated with digitalisation

| 6.1. | Rising concerns about governments, businesses and citizens gradually losing control over their data brings the issue of ‘Digital Sovereignty’ into the spotlight. This also affects countries’ capacity for innovation, and the ability to shape legislation in a digital environment (30). These concerns are valid as Europe and the Mediterranean are lagging behind in investment in AI, while the presence of foreign social media giants is gaining increasing influence. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | Some of the Mediterranean countries are reluctant to venture into rapid digital transition. The political unwillingness is due to the fear of losing control over the population, leading to filtering and censorship. Meanwhile, digital tools can allow civil society organisations to be heard and to promote democracy. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, laureate of the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize, is an example of the important role that civil society organisations can play in a peaceful transition of a society. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | Since digitalisation paves the way for social and economic development, an independent authority should put in place an adequate digital regulatory framework, promoting digital rights principles, such as internet neutrality. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | Rapid digitalisation increases the risk of cyber threats. The role of the authorities is key in setting up a well-designed legislative framework to protect users. Currently Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt have all enacted cybersecurity laws. However, these laws lack data protection components (31). It is key to protect people’s personal sensitive data such as data relating to health, etc. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

| 6.5. | Data protection is becoming one of the most crucial areas of the digital transition. The question of ownership and safeguarding the massive amount of data is high on the agenda of policymakers. This is in response to the surge in big data analysis and with social media platforms gaining unprecedented power and influence. It is argued that the regulatory framework in the Southern Neighbourhood is still underdeveloped and legislation for emerging technologies is not being passed quickly enough (32). There are countries that even express a lack of political will to advance on this matter. The issue is even more acute in the case of sensitive data, for instance regarding health applications and platforms. Notably, there is scepticism in southern countries where the legislation for GDPR and similar privacy protection might still not be in place. In Europe, the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) aim to build a safer digital space for users while fostering innovation and competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

| 6.6. | Digital piracy is another pitfall of digitalisation. Digitalised creations subject to Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) are extremely easy and cheap to be copied and distributed at large scale. Creative businesses will suffer more from this phenomenon and, in the absence of effective legislation, artists’ and creative workers’ business models will become unsustainable. |
| --- | --- |

6.6.

| 6.7. | Digitalisation can lead to civil suppression. In some countries, digital rights are under attack by authorities as digitalisation is viewed as a means of surveillance. For instance, due to the pandemic, location-tracking applications have been used to monitor the spread of the virus, raising concerns over human rights (33). The possible tracking of every digital activity presents a serious threat to democracy and can be used as a means of oppression. The 2021 ‘Freedom of Net report’ ranks France the highest with a score of 78 out of 100, Italy 76, Tunisia 63, Morocco 53, Lebanon 51, Jordan 47, Türkiye 34 and Egypt 26 (34). |
| --- | --- |

6.7.

| 6.8. | The persistent digital divide can potentially lead to more significant inequalities and divergence within the Mediterranean region. Some countries lack the digital infrastructure (coverage or access to fixed broadband), or some remote and rural areas may be simply left without coverage or 4G/5G networks. Another source of the divide is the lack of digital skills among the population and digital illiteracy. In particular, low levels of digital literacy are more common in the countries from the south, especially among women and the elderly (35). |
| --- | --- |

6.8.

| 6.9. | The formation of technology giants creates an obstacle for fair competition in the digital markets. Tax evasion makes the markets unfair for local emerging SMEs, which are very unlikely to survive. It also contributes to a digital brain drain. Another risk associated with the technology giants is their capacity to absorb emerging actors, which creates monopolies and prevents digital hubs from being created in Europe and the Mediterranean area. This may be due to the lack of a regulatory framework and even tax loopholes for multinational companies that adversely affect fair competition. |
| --- | --- |

6.9.

| 6.10. | The lack of serious implementation of the UN Human Rights Conventions and the ILO Conventions in some states of the Mediterranean region acts as a barrier to the establishment of independent civil society organisations — including NGOs, independent trade unions and employers’ associations — and thus endangers the sustainable digital transition. The EESC therefore explicitly emphasises that the UN Human Rights Conventions and the ILO Conventions must be ambitiously implemented in all states of the Mediterranean region so that the digital transition can genuinely contribute to prosperous ecological, economic and social development. |
| --- | --- |

6.10.

| 6.11. | Furthermore, the war in Ukraine presents a major threat for the countries across the region and could be associated with higher risks of cybersecurity attacks. |
| --- | --- |

6.11.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Bukht, R. and Heeks, R., ‘Defining, conceptualising and measuring the digital economy’, Development Informatics Working Papers, No 68, 2017.

1

Development Informatics Working Papers

(2)  Digital economy report 2019, UNCTAD.

2

(3)  The Digital Single Market aims at enhancing the access, quality and security of connectivity within the Member States. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/ict/bloc-4.html

3

(4)  The Europe Digital Decade is composed of four main pillars covering Skills, Infrastructure, Government and Business: https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/digital-europe-programme_en

4

(5)  https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/europes-digital-decade-digital-targets-2030_en

5

(6)  The Digital for Development (D4D) Hub

6

(7)  Langendorf, M., ‘Applying Europe’s Digital Agenda in Mediterranean Partner Countries: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook, 2021.

7

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook

(8)  Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood, European Commission, 2021.

8

(9)  Working from home: From invisibility to decent work, ILO, 2021.

9

(10)  Al Azzawi, S., ‘Lives Versus Livelihoods: Who Can Work from Home in MENA?’, ERF Working Paper, No 1471, 2021.

10

ERF Working Paper,

(11)  EPRS Briefing on The right to disconnect, PE 642.847 — July 2020.

11

The right to disconnect

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Better working conditions for a stronger social Europe: harnessing the full benefits of digitalisation for the future of work (COM(2021) 761 final) and the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving working conditions in platform work (COM(2021) 762 final) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 95).

12

(13)  EESC information report on Digitalisation and SMEs in the Mediterranean region

13

Digitalisation and SMEs in the Mediterranean region

(14)  Kergroach, S., ‘Giving momentum to SME digitalization’, Journal of the International Council for Small Business, Vol. 1, No 1, 2020, pp. 28-31.

14

Journal of the International Council for Small Business

(15)  OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook 2019

15

(16)  EESC information report on Access to finance for SMEs and midcaps in the period 2014–2020: opportunities and challenges

16

Access to finance for SMEs and midcaps in the period 2014–2020: opportunities and challenges

(17)  Ayadi, R. and Forouheshfar, Y., ‘MSMEs digitalization in the Mediterranean: A new digital preparedness index’, EMANES working paper, 2022, to be published soon.

17

EMANES working paper

(18)  https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/desi

18

(19)  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5481

19

(20)  Sidło, K., ‘Digital Transformation in the Southern Neighbourhood’, EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey, 2021.

20

EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey,

(21)  El Kadi, T.H., ‘Uneven Disruption: Covid-19 and the digital divide in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 2020.

21

IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook,

(22)  For instance, in this project it is proposed that the owner of the platform should be the EU, municipalities, universities, companies or ministries of education in Türkiye, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria: Akpınar P., van Heukelingen, N., Babüroğlu O.N. and Durukan, F.R., ‘A new formula for collaboration: Turkey, the EU & North Africa’, 2022.

22

(23)  Digital Government Review of Morocco, OECD, 2018.

23

(24)  El Kadi T.H., ‘Uneven Disruption: Covid-19 and the digital divide in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 2020.

24

(25)  El Kadi T.H., ‘Uneven Disruption: Covid-19 and the digital divide in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 2020.

25

(26)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on The energy and digital transition of rural areas (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 486, 21.12.2022, p. 59).

26

(27)  El Kadi T.H., ‘Uneven Disruption: Covid-19 and the digital divide in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, 2020.

27

(28)  https://networkreadinessindex.org/nri-2021-edition-press-release/

28

(29)  Smart Cities and Inclusive Growth, OECD, 2020.

29

(30)  EPRS Briefing on Digital sovereignty for Europe (PE 651.992 — July 2020).

30

Digital sovereignty for Europe

(31)  Langendorf, M., ‘Applying Europe’s Digital Agenda in Mediterranean Partner Countries: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook, 2021.

31

(32)  Sidło, K., ‘Digital Transformation in the Southern Neighbourhood’, EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey, 2021.

32

(33)  Langendorf, M., ‘Applying Europe’s Digital Agenda in Mediterranean Partner Countries: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook, 2021.

33

(34)  https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/internet-freedom

34

(35)  Sidło, K., ‘Digital Transformation in the Southern Neighbourhood’, EuroMeSCo Euromed Survey, 2021.

35

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/76 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/76

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘A competitiveness check to build a stronger and more resilient EU economy’

(exploratory opinion)

(2023/C 100/11)

| Rapporteur: | Christian ARDHE |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Giuseppe GUERINI |

Rapporteur:

Christian ARDHE

Co-rapporteur:

Giuseppe GUERINI

| Referral | Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 30.6.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 10.11.2022 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 54/1/2 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 150/4/11 |

Referral

Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 30.6.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

10.11.2022

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

54/1/2

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

150/4/11

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC regards the request by the Czech Presidency to prepare an exploratory opinion on a competitiveness check as highly topical. Given the current and envisaged future challenges, the EESC considers it critically important to make the EU economy more competitive. Recognising that the single market and the EU social market economy are the EU’s greatest assets for achieving economic growth and social wellbeing, the EESC calls for a competitiveness check to support enterprise, job creation and improved working conditions, as well as sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC considers the competitiveness check as an approach to ensure that competitiveness aspects are properly considered in decision-making. This requires adequate knowledge on the competitiveness impacts of initiatives as well as a competitiveness-sensitive mindset in making decisions. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC emphasises that the competitiveness check should be a key part of balanced EU decision-making and should be applied in the context of any EU policy and law-making process. It should cover legislative initiatives, secondary legislation, fiscal measures, strategies and programmes, as well as international agreements. It should also be integrated into the European Semester process, since Member States’ policies are crucial in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | As solid impact assessment is the factual basis for a competitiveness check, it is crucial to ensure that competitiveness impact assessment is mandatory, effective and fully enforced at each stage of the decision-making process. The EESC appreciates the current Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox but points out that, as highlighted by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, there is an evident need for improvements, especially with respect to the implementation of the tools. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes that competitiveness check should consider the impact on businesses, employment, working conditions at various levels, including compliance costs and other direct effects, multiplier impacts on value chains, and their consequent macroeconomic impacts. In this regard, attention should be paid to the competitive position of the wide variety of enterprises in terms of sector, size and business model, including social economy enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC thinks it is important to cover both positive and negative impacts on competitiveness, with the aim of not only avoiding competitiveness losses but also improving competitiveness, paying special attention to competitiveness in relation to development of EU products and services that are competitive in the global market. The competitiveness check needs to consider the wide diversity of businesses, which may be affected in different ways. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | While the main focus of the competitiveness check is on initiatives with primary objectives other than improved competitiveness, the EESC calls on the Commission to prepare a specific competitiveness agenda as well, with the principal long-term goal of enhancing the EU’s competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | A competitiveness agenda should build on the EU social market economy, and focus on basic issues such as the single market and foreign trade, investment and access to funding, tax systems, research and innovation, skills and labour markets, as well as MSMEs and the twin transitions, taking into account the sustainable finance framework with competitiveness being consistent with social and environmental objectives. As competitiveness also has linkages with social and environmental aspects and is a matter that concerns everyone, the representatives of social partners and other civil society actors need to be closely involved in the preparation of the agenda, with social dialogue playing a key role as outlined in the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | This opinion is a response to the Czech Presidency request for an EESC exploratory opinion in the area of EU competitiveness and the regulatory aspects of EU legislation for EU businesses. Its theme is a competitiveness check to build a stronger and more resilient EU economy. The Presidency underlines the need to decrease the EU’s strategic dependency and ensure greater resilience, as well as to ensure openness to the outside world and competitiveness of EU businesses. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Swedish government has also outlined competitiveness as one element of the political direction of Sweden’s upcoming EU Presidency. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | The EESC has already called for a competitiveness check in its opinion on Fit for 55 (1), in which it stated that ‘in transiting towards a climate neutral society, we need to embark on a model that results in a thriving economy. If we want the EU to be a frontrunner and be emulated by the rest of the world, we should aim at shaping the most successful model — one that is just and sustainable from an economic, social and environmental viewpoint’. The EESC also stated that ‘all legislative proposals put forward within the framework of Fit for 55 should undergo a competitiveness check in line with Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) principles so that the full implications on enterprise are well understood’. Before that, the EESC called for a competitiveness test in its opinion on the Capital Markets Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) report also requested that new EU policy initiatives should undergo a ‘competitiveness check’ to analyse their impact on companies and their business environment (cost of doing business, capacity to innovate, international competitiveness, level playing field, etc.) and that such a check shall be in accordance with the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals, including gender equality, and shall not undermine the protection of human, social and workers’ rights nor environmental and consumer protection standards. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Recently, the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declared in her speech (3) that we will introduce a standard competitiveness-check in our regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

3.   Motives and need for a competitiveness check

| 3.1. | Competitiveness as an explicit objective has been on the EU agenda in various forms since the Lisbon Strategy of 2000, followed by the Europe 2020 Strategy, the industrial strategy as well as a series of reports regarding European competitiveness and the single market. Over the years, however, international competition has become increasingly fierce and, given the current and envisaged future challenges, it is critically important to create renewed momentum to make the EU more competitive. The EU response to the COVID-19 pandemic was the Next Generation EU, a massive investment programme that promises to boost the global competitive position of the EU economy, building on greener and more digital businesses supported by more efficient public services, reinforced infrastructure and dynamic labour market. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Europe’s share of the global economy has been going down for quite some time. It has been estimated that, in 2050, the EU will represent less than 10 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), and 85 percent of forecasted global GDP growth will come from outside the EU in the next couple of years. Europe’s poor growth outlook exacerbates the relative economic decline. This means that Europe’s voice in the world counts for less and weakens the EU’s global role and influence in international cooperation (4). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The short-term outlook is to a great extent related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which continues to negatively affect the EU economy, and also the fact that the EU is still recovering from the various impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. The war has put additional upward pressures on energy and food commodity prices which are feeding global inflationary pressures and eroding the purchasing power of households (5). In response to the high inflation rates, the European Central Bank has raised euro interest rates, similar to the action taken by the Federal Reserve Bank in the US. Moreover, weakening global growth decreases external demand. The EU and its Member States for their part reacted by multiplying support to enterprises with several programmes to preserve their competitiveness in a dim and highly unstable economic outlook. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Besides the unprecedented situation caused by the pandemic and the war, Europe is facing a historic structural transformation, driven by geopolitical developments, demographic change, digitalisation and the transition to a climate-neutral and circular economy. This is reshaping markets and accelerating competition regarding production factors. Success in the transformation ultimately depends on how well the overall economy works. Only by being a world leader in innovation and sustainability will Europe be able to successfully compete globally, delivering the necessary prosperity. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The distinction between competitiveness in the internal and global market should be noted. The first includes competition on equal terms, harmonisation of rules, and removal of barriers (6). The latter implies favourable conditions and better and more accessible products and services in competition with competitors outside the EU. A well-functioning internal market also contributes to better conditions for global competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | It is important to strike the balance between different policy objectives. However, there should be a greater focus on creating win-win situations, considering that competitive businesses provide benefits for the economy and society as a whole and that a sound economy and stable society increase resilience and contribute to a competitive business environment. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | It is also evident that the EU needs to strengthen its international position and influence in the digital and green transitions. A stronger position in the development and uptake of digital technologies is not only about economic competitiveness but also about security and the geopolitical role of the EU. It is also a prerequisite for the EU to be a global standard-setter, for example in trustworthy AI. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The need for stronger global influence also applies to combating climate change. This requires both considerable diplomatic influence and strong competitiveness in terms of cost-effectiveness, innovation, skills and supply of low-carbon products, technologies and solutions to global markets. A positive development is that a number of EU companies are already aligning investments to environmental and social objectives as witnessed by the fast increasing use of ESG products in global and European financial markets. The EU is elaborating a full-fledged framework for sustainable finance that has to provide more transparency and space to ESG products and be in line with the overall sustainability. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Considering the importance of a thriving economy with competitive businesses in creating prosperity and wellbeing in Europe, as well as sustainable solutions to climate and environmental problems, it is vital to provide EU businesses with a favourable environment to innovate, invest and trade. As many elements of the business environment are determined by the policy, regulatory and fiscal framework, policymakers need to make sure that this framework supports the competitiveness of enterprises and, consequently, the overall economy and society. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

4.   Elements of a competitiveness check

| 4.1. | As there is no single or universal definition of competitiveness, the content of a competitiveness check is dependent on the scope and perspective to be taken. The request of the Czech Presidency explicitly refers to the competitiveness of EU businesses, with the aim of building a stronger and more resilient EU economy. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The competitiveness of businesses can be described as their ability to succeed in the market in a profitable way, creating value for themselves and for society at large. This again is dependent on the availability of production factors (skilled workforce, energy and raw materials, capital, data), the overall production costs, the demand and markets for the products, and the capacity of enterprises to innovate and seize opportunities while enhancing the EU’s social market economic model. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EU’s unique social market economy, together with accompanying sound macroeconomic governance, research and innovation, social dialogue, involvement of civil society, as well as comprehensive education, motivated workforce with stable jobs, health and social systems, a thriving social economy sector and sustainable investors, constitute essential assets to build on when striving for better competitiveness. Given the current and envisaged future challenges, the EESC calls for a competitiveness check to support enterprise, job creation and improved working conditions, sustainable economic growth and social cohesion. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC considers the competitiveness check as an approach to ensure that competitiveness aspects are properly considered in decision-making. This requires understanding how initiatives will affect competitiveness as well as a competitiveness-sensitive mindset in making decisions. The competitiveness check thus consists of two levels:






  — | impact assessment level (‘technical’ level), which is about assessing various ways in which policy and regulatory initiatives affect competitiveness, |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.4.

—

impact assessment level (‘technical’ level), which is about assessing various ways in which policy and regulatory initiatives affect competitiveness,

| — | decision-making level (political level), which is about paying due attention to competitiveness and giving it the proper weight when shaping new initiatives, building on the EU’s social market economic model. |
| --- | --- |

—

decision-making level (political level), which is about paying due attention to competitiveness and giving it the proper weight when shaping new initiatives, building on the EU’s social market economic model.

| 4.5. | The EESC believes it is important for the competitiveness check to be as comprehensive as possible considering impacts on businesses and supply chains, employment and working conditions, as well as their consequent macroeconomic impacts. A robust competitiveness check for all new initiatives should serve as a control measure to make sure that proposals support increased competitiveness, more jobs and sustainable growth. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

5.   Impact assessment as the foundation of competitiveness check

| 5.1. | The competitiveness check should be based on solid information on the impacts of policy and regulatory initiatives at various levels, including compliance costs, ease of access to markets and other direct effects on businesses. Of particular importance are the multiplier impacts in value chains, such as the impacts on the availability of energy and raw materials. The competitiveness check should also cover the consequent impacts on jobs, investment, innovation, productivity, litigation aspects, functioning of the single market, foreign trade, and the overall European social model and sustainable growth. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The current Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox established in the context of the European Commission’s Better Regulation agenda already require that initiatives which are expected to have significant economic, social or environmental impacts are accompanied by impact assessments. The impact assessment report must include a description of the environmental, social and economic impacts, including impacts on SMEs and competitiveness. The EESC calls for comprehensive reporting on the competitiveness impacts on the wide diversity of businesses in terms of sector, size and business model, including social economy enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | The EESC appreciates the content of the current toolbox and notes that in an OECD working paper, the European Commission’s competitiveness tool has been referred to as the most comprehensive existing document for assessing regulatory impacts on competitiveness (7). However, there is also an evident need for improvements, especially with respect to the implementation and enforcement of the tools. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | According to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB), the impact analysis has often been underdeveloped, with certain significant impacts not sufficiently assessed. As described in its Annual Report 2021 (8), the RSB frequently asked for further analysis of the impacts on consumers, competitiveness, innovation, Member States and SMEs. It also often asked for further quantification, in particular of the administrative costs and savings. In its Annual Report 2020 (9), the RSB most often referred to a lack of analysis of competitiveness (often linked to insufficient analysis of costs), impacts on SMEs and societal impacts. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | The EESC thus highlights the need for impact assessments to focus more on competitiveness to ensure that they are properly balanced. The Committee also thinks it important that the various competitiveness-related parts of the toolbox, including those regarding sectoral competitiveness, SMEs, innovation, competition, internal market, trade and investment, be considered in an integrated way. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

| 5.6. | The competitiveness check needs to consider the wide diversity of businesses which may be affected in completely different ways. The EESC therefore calls for proper assessment of the impacts on various business sectors and ecosystems, on enterprises of different sizes (including MSMEs), on enterprises operating in different parts of value chains and in different markets and geographic locations, and on enterprises with different business models, including corporations, cooperatives and social economy enterprises. |
| --- | --- |

5.6.

| 5.7. | The EESC calls for specific attention to be paid to the international competitiveness of EU businesses, which is particularly important from the point of view of the EU’s open strategic autonomy and the export opportunities. |
| --- | --- |

5.7.

| 5.8. | The EESC emphasises that assessment of competitiveness impacts should not be limited to the impacts of an individual initiative in isolation but should also consider the cumulative burden, especially the compliance costs of legislation or other measures affecting the same actors. Assessment should, moreover, cover both short-term and long-term impacts, including in various foresight scenarios. To find the best policy option, it is also necessary to assess the competitiveness impact of alternative options and spell them out comprehensively. It is also important for impact assessment on competitiveness to focus more and elaborate on quantitative data. |
| --- | --- |

5.8.

| 5.9. | The EESC calls for robust assessment and evidence of both the positive and negative impacts on competitiveness. The aim should not only be to avoid competitiveness losses, but also to strive for a more ambitious goal of improving the overall competitiveness of the European social market economy to favour robust, sustainable and inclusive growth. |
| --- | --- |

5.9.

| 5.10. | The EESC also believes it important to take a comprehensive view of competitiveness in terms of sustainability. Environmental sustainability is linked to business competitiveness, not just as a cost factor but because good environmental performance is expected by several market players, including customers, investors and financiers. The same applies to social sustainability, including respect for human rights, gender equality and labour rights. In doing this, several aspects need to be reconciled, including technological advances, costs and societal acceptance, among others. |
| --- | --- |

5.10.

| 5.11. | As assessment of competitiveness impacts is the factual basis for the competitiveness check, the EESC deems it crucial to ensure that competitiveness impact assessment is mandatory, effective and fully implemented and enforced. It should also be updated in the course of the law-making process if substantial changes are made. At the same time, the EESC stresses that adequate resources and the right skills are needed to accomplish the assessments. The EESC also recommends regular benchmarking of competitor countries’ practices. |
| --- | --- |

5.11.

| 5.12. | The competitiveness check should also make full use of other existing tools such as fitness checks, the REFIT programme and the Fit for Future Platform. These are particularly important for assessing the cumulative impacts of various initiatives. |
| --- | --- |

5.12.

6.   Competitiveness check as part of decision-making

| 6.1. | The EESC deems that the competitiveness check should be a key part of balanced decision-making and be applied in the context of any kind of EU policy and law-making processes, also covering the EU’s strategies and programmes, budget and fiscal provisions, secondary legislation, and international agreements. Moreover, it should be applied to the European Semester process, since Member State policies are crucial in this respect. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | While the main focus of the competitiveness check is on initiatives with primary objectives other than improved competitiveness, the EESC calls on the Commission to prepare a specific competitiveness agenda as well, with the long-term goal of enhancing the EU’s competitiveness. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The competitiveness agenda should focus on the long-term perspective and pay attention to such basic issues as developing the single market and reducing market barriers; enhancing investment and access to finance and funding, including gender lens investment; facilitating foreign trade and external cooperation; promoting innovation, high-level talent and research excellence; enhancing skills through education, vocational training and life-long learning; making labour markets more inclusive and improving working conditions; speeding up permit procedures, reducing bureaucracy and compliance costs, and making tax systems more encouraging. It should also empower business models that align competitiveness with social and environmental objectives as it happens for example for companies and organisations that adopt ESG criteria for their investments. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | Strengthening MSMEs and enhancing the digital and green transition should be essential parts of the agenda as well. Moreover, due attention should be given to Member States’ capacities, the differences and necessary cooperation between Member States, as well as to the enforceability of the initiatives and regular monitoring of the implementation and results of the agenda. The EESC also stresses the key role of social dialogue as outlined in the European Pillar of Social Rights. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

| 6.5. | As regards short-term measures, the EESC appreciates the swift adaptation of the EU competition policy to the COVID-19 pandemic and to the war in Ukraine and their economic implications (10). The flexibility in the application of State aid rules, even though exceptional and temporary in nature, has been vital to enable the survival of EU companies through very hard times, thereby preserving the competitiveness achieved by European companies through innovation and productivity. |
| --- | --- |

6.5.

| 6.6. | Sound and fair competition both internally and in relation to foreign competitors is also of the utmost importance. The Committee appreciates the ongoing work aimed at making the rules on State aid to health and social services of general economic interest (SGEI) more efficient, so as to provide enhanced quality and accessibility of such services for people at the local level (11). |
| --- | --- |

6.6.

| 6.7. | The EESC also generally welcomes the Commission’s initiative concerning a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, since it is aimed at avoiding impactful distortions to the functioning of the single market, thereby ensuring a level playing field with respect to foreign competitors (12). |
| --- | --- |

6.7.

| 6.8. | The competitiveness agenda would be the next step to respond to the basic objective of the request by the Czech Presidency, i.e. to build a stronger and more resilient EU economy. Consequently, it would contribute to the wellbeing of EU citizens and also to the achievement of a climate-neutral and circular economy. As competitiveness is a matter that concerns everyone, the representatives of social partners and other civil society actors need to be closely involved in the preparation of the agenda. |
| --- | --- |

6.8.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: ‘Fit for 55’: delivering the EU’s 2030 Climate Target on the way to climate neutrality [COM(2021) 550 final] (OJ C 275, 18.7.2022, p. 101).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A Capital Markets Union for people and businesses — new action plan’ (COM(2020) 590 final) (OJ C 155, 30.4.2021, p. 20).

2

(3)  Speech by President von der Leyen at the European Parliament Plenary on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 20-21 October 2022.

3

(4)  Achtung Europa, ECIPE 2021.

4

(5)  Summer 2022 Economic Forecast.

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the cost of non-Europe — the benefits of the single market (exploratory opinion) (OJ C 443, 22.11.2022, p. 51).

6

(7)  How do laws and regulations affect competitiveness, OECD 2021.

7

How do laws and regulations affect competitiveness

(8)  Regulatory Scrutiny Board, Annual Report, 2021.

8

(9)  Regulatory Scrutiny Board, Annual Report, 2020.

9

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A competition policy fit for new challenges (COM(2021) 713 final) (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 34).

10

(11)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on State aid rules applicable to health and social services — SGEI in a post-pandemic scenario. Thoughts and proposals on the Commission evaluation to amend the 2012 legislative package (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 8).

11

(12)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsid7ies distorting the internal market (COM(2021) 223 final — 2021/0114 (COD)) (OJ C 105, 4.3.2022, p. 87).

12

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III Preparatory acts

European Economic and Social Committee

574th plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee, 14.12.2022-15.12.2022

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/83 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/83

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Report on Competition Policy 2021’

(COM(2022) 337 final)

(2023/C 100/12)

| Rapporteur: | Philip VON BROCKDORFF |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Philip VON BROCKDORFF

| Referral | European Commission, 27.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 10.11.2022 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 51/0/3 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 206/0/2 |

Referral

European Commission, 27.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

10.11.2022

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

51/0/3

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

206/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) calls for continued dialogue with the Commission on the further action required to strengthen the operation of the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC urges DG Competition to continuously monitor the schemes approved by the Commission itself and launched by Member States in response to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, in order to avoid funds being diverted to companies that are not economically viable. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | That said, the EESC calls on the Commission to use the maximum flexibility permitted within State aid rules to enable Member States to enact schemes that provide effective aid to firms affected by the war in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s new guidelines on State aid rules in the areas of climate, environment protection and energy and deems them to be a step in the right direction. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC supports investigations into non-competitive practices by tech giants; this is in line with the position adopted by the EESC on the Digital Markets Act. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC calls for stronger cooperation between national authorities within the European Competition Network in order to further enforce EU competition law against companies that engage in cross-border business practices that restrict competition and are harmful to customers. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC calls for competition on equal terms across the aviation sector. However, it would caution against the development of an aviation market that might in time be dominated by a small number of airline companies. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC supports the Commission’s proposed regulation on market-distorting foreign subsidies granted to non-EU firms operating in the EU, but calls on the Commission to also focus its attention on market-distorting subsidies and other anti-competitive practices in both State-run and private companies outside the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC warns against possible anti-competitive agreements or abuses of a dominant position in the hypermarket and grocery store industry, impacting consumers by way of higher prices, and producers by way of lower supply prices. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal on the new Single Market Emergency Instrument, which complements other EU legislative measures for crisis management. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC calls for further steps to strengthen competition and the Single Market at a time when economies are continuing to face challenges caused by high energy prices, supply-side constraints and economic uncertainty. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC firmly believes that the EU’s agenda for a green and digital economy based on the foundations of a social market economy should not change because of the war in Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | Finally, the EESC recommends the application of State aid as allowed under EU legislation to counteract the socioeconomic consequences of the war in Ukraine, with special attention given to gender equality and the broader gender perspective, particularly in the case of refugees in Member States that neighbour Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The 2021 Report on Competition Policy presents the key policy developments and legislative initiatives undertaken last year, as well as a selection of enforcement actions. In 2021 the Commission carried out its review of key competition regulations, guidelines and notices, as set out in its Communication on a competition policy fit for new challenges (1), which frames the role of competition policy for Europe’s path towards recovery, for the green and digital transitions, and for a resilient Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The Commission also adopted a proposal for a new regulation to address distortions caused by market-distorting foreign subsidies granted by third countries to companies active in the Single Market (2), following the 2020 proposals on the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and Digital Services Act, both aimed at addressing a wide range of digital challenges (3). The DMA in particular put obligations into place that act as gatekeepers for businesses and consumers in the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | Antitrust and merger rules and guidance were updated to address challenges. This included a review of rules on vertical supply and horizontal cooperation, the latter in particular aimed at making it easier for firms to cooperate in ways that enhance economic efficiency. The Commission in addition published the results of its evaluation of the Market Definition Notice, which provides guidance on how competition is enforced in product and geographic markets. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The Commission also updated State aid rules and guidance to help address changing circumstances and support the green and digital transitions. Particularly relevant is the need to enhance the resilience of the Single Market in the face of economic uncertainty. This the Commission is doing by monitoring market developments. The Temporary Framework for State aid measures was especially timely and relevant to provide support to firms across the EU. Developments caused by the Russian aggression in Ukraine require further policy adjustment on the part of the Commission. In the meantime, the Commission introduced investment support up to the end of the 2022 and solvency support up to 31 December 2023, enabling Member States to leverage private funds and make them available to SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Likewise important was the review of the Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and the decarbonisation of economic activities. It was necessary to widen the scope of these guidelines to cover new economic activities such as clean mobility and the decarbonisation of industry. The revised guidelines therefore support the European Green Deal. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | Moreover, the Commission revised the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Vertical Guidelines. The aim is to update previous rules that were deemed not to be fit for purpose, given market developments such as the growth of online sales. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | The scope of the General Block Exemption was also extended to facilitate EU-funded programmes. In essence, this helps streamline the State aid rules as applied to national funding and in connection with specific EU programmes. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | Moreover, revised Regional Aid Guidelines were adopted to allow Member States to support less-favoured regions as well regions facing structural challenges. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | An important development was the Commission’s adjustment to current and future enforcement in relation to the challenges caused by the digital transformation. The efficiency and effectiveness with which the Commission can respond to anti-competitive practices by the likes of Apple, Amazon or Facebook, was deemed critical. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | In the same vein, the Commission carried out a re-organisation to deal with Important Projects of Common European Interest. Also relevant was the creation of a Task Force to support implementation of the Digital Markets Act. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | To strengthen the operation of the Single Market, a budget of EUR 4,2 billion has been provided for what is known as the Single Market Programme, aimed at enforcing EU competition policy. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | Effective enforcement of EU competition rules and regulatory reforms are critical for the digital transformation of the EU economy and for greater resilience of the Single Market in very challenging times. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | In this connection, the relevance of antitrust investigations and abusive practices by large multi-national corporations is of utmost importance. Merger control by the Commission also ensures that consolidation takes place in a way that allows competition in markets and addresses market dominance. The number of merger decisions was an impressive 396 in various sectors. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | Another important development was the direction provided on broadband infrastructure that meets the needs for very exacting digital speeds, as set out in the EU 2025 Gigabit Society and the Digital Strategy, as well as in the targets referred to in the 2030 Digital Compass. State aid supports broadband infrastructures across the EU in addressing situations where there is no incentive for private operators to provide adequate broadband coverage. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

| 2.15. | The Commission’s activities likewise contributed to environmental objectives, especially with regard to the decarbonisation of economies and the gradual but steady shift in the transport sector from fossil to alternative fuels. Avoiding distortions of competition is critical in supporting the European Green Deal and in this connection too, the Commission approved a number of State aid measures aimed at facilitating the EU’s green transition. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

| 2.16. | Also relevant was the antitrust enforcement and merger control in the automobile industry, which help contribute to the green transition. This Commission action involved the imposition of fines running into hundreds of millions of euros. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

| 2.17. | Hugely important is the fact that the Commission’s role in furthering competition policy relates to how competition works for consumers across the EU. As the report rightly points out, the social market economy is one of the mainstays of the EU and enforcing competition rules and protecting competition at all times supports further development of the social market economy. |
| --- | --- |

2.17.

| 2.18. | The same rationale applies to financial services, where the Commission tackled potential cartels in the financial services sector with the imposition of hefty fines on a number of financial institutions. |
| --- | --- |

2.18.

| 2.19. | Equally important was the Commission’s response to the economic and social fall-out from COVID-19 by applying the flexibility allowed in the State aid rules via the Temporary Framework for State aid measures. This enabled Member States to provide schemes for businesses such as loan guarantees. The Commission approved a number of schemes running into billions of euros under the Temporary Framework in a number of sectors impacted by COVID-19 restrictions, including the aviation sector, to address liquidity and capital needs. |
| --- | --- |

2.19.

| 2.20. | An important role fulfilled by the Commission was the guidance and support provided to facilitate the Recovery and Resilience Plans submitted by Member States. This was necessary to ensure that the plans were compatible with State aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

2.20.

| 2.20.1. | In 2021 the Commission continued to ensure that Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union were applied consistently. Also, the Commission monitored and assisted Member States in their efforts to transpose the ECN+ Directive (4) into national law. This directive empowers the competition authorities across the EU to enforce competition rules more effectively and to ensure the proper operation of the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

2.20.1.

| 2.21. | Finally, the Commission remained active in the OECD Competition Committee, the International Competition Network and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. |
| --- | --- |

2.21.

3.   General Comments

| 3.1. | The EESC notes the constructive work carried out by the Commission in continuing to strengthen the Single Market by enforcing competition rules and protecting competition across the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC also notes the efficiency with which the Commission responded to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 restrictions by adopting a temporary framework for State aid measures to allow the necessary Member State support to businesses, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The same level of efficiency has been applied in response to the crisis that has unfolded following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The EESC is of the view that the swift adoption of the State aid Temporary Crisis Framework was just as critical as the action taken in relation to COVID-19 restrictions. The EESC therefore urges the Commission to apply all the flexibility permitted under the State aid rules when Member States are faced with economic shocks. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC also notes the work carried out by the Commission in its review of key regulations, guidelines and notices to ensure they remain fit for purpose, especially in the revision of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation and Vertical Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC considers the adoption of a regulation extending the scope of the General Block Exemption Regulation and the publication of Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection and energy as important steps in support of the EU’s main policy objectives. The adoption of a revised Communication for Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) is also deemed relevant. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC notes the efforts undertaken to move towards adoption of the Digital Market Act. The EESC considers this piece of legislation to be a huge step towards enforcing competition and protecting customers in the use of digital services. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC also notes that the proposal for a regulation on foreign subsidies that distort the internal market is in the process of being adopted. In a number of its opinions, the EESC has argued against market-distorting foreign subsidies being given to firms active in the EU; the proposed regulation would give the Commission new powers to investigate such foreign subsidies and take redress measures whenever necessary. This, the EESC believes, is compatible with the principle of fair competition on equal terms. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC takes note of the antitrust action as well as action taken on the control of mergers. Such action is necessary to preserve the integrity of the Single Market and protect EU citizens, particularly against decisions taken by tech giants. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The Commission’s approval of a number of State aid measures in support of the EU’s green transition, including measures to support renewable energy and clean mobility, paves the way for further positive action in the future. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

4.   Specific Recommendations

| 4.1. | The EESC calls for continued dialogue with the Commission on the further action required to strengthen the operation of the Single Market. In this connection, the EESC would highlight its recent opinion identifying shortcomings in the EU’s Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | Whereas the EESC has commended the speed at which the Commission responded to the COVID-19 restrictions and, more recently, to the economic effects caused by the war in Ukraine, it calls for continuous monitoring of schemes approved by the Commission itself and launched by Member States in response to COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, in order to avoid funds being diverted to companies that are not economically viable. The level of support needed, as well as the pressures faced by governments across the EU to provide State aid, is extraordinary and may result in such situations. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | That said, the EESC calls on the Commission to use the maximum flexibility permitted within State aid rules to enable Member States to enact schemes that provide effective aid to firms and communities impacted by the war in Ukraine. At the same time, the EESC stresses that such aid should be allowed with minimal distortions to competition. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC highlights the efforts made to support the EU’s green agenda through competition policy. This is vital, and the Commission’s new guidelines on State aid rules in the areas of climate, environment protection and energy are a step in the right direction. As the three sectors are inter-related, the EESC believes that the new guidelines provide a solid basis for effective support for the European Green Deal. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC points to the investigations carried out by the Commission into a number of tech giants for non-competitive practices and fully supports such investigations, as they are in line with the position adopted by the EESC on the Digital Markets Act, especially its relevance in allowing for competition in digital services and for protecting EU citizens from abusive practices by tech giants. This proves that the Commission now has more leverage with regard to its aim of moving towards a more regulated digital market. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC calls for stronger cooperation between national authorities within the European Competition Network to further enforce EU competition law against companies that engage in cross-border business practices that restrict competition and are harmful to customers. The EESC considers the coordination of investigations to be vital. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC has noted the importance of Commission decisions regarding the aviation sector, particularly during the pandemic, and calls for competition on equal terms across the sector. However, it would caution against the development of an aviation sector and market that in time could be dominated by a small number of airline companies. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC fully supports the Commission’s proposed regulation on market-distorting foreign subsidies granted to non-EU firms operating in the EU. This has obvious distorting effects on competition, and foreign firms may also be benefiting from tax advantages, creating further competitive distortions. The EESC also calls on the Commission to take appropriate action on market-distorting subsidies and other anti-competitive practices in companies (State-run or private) outside the EU. This would also help to achieve the objectives of the European industrial strategy. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EESC notes that the Commission and national competition authorities are monitoring the situation of food supply chains in Europe. The EESC warns against possible anti-competitive agreements or abuses of dominant position impacting consumers by way of higher prices. The EESC also cautions against the hypermarket and grocery store industry assuming a dominant role in the food market to the detriment of consumers in terms of higher prices and to the detriment of producers in terms of lower supply prices. The EESC is aware that the onus is on Member States to ensure implementation of the directive on unfair trading practices in order to address situations where there are imbalances in individual business relations (5). The EESC therefore urges the Commission to continuously monitor the effectiveness of market analysis and action being undertaken by national authorities. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal on the new Single Market Emergency Instrument, which complements other EU legislative measures for crisis management such as the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, as well as EU rules for specific sectors, supply chains and products like health, semiconductors and food security, which already provide for targeted crisis response measures. It is the EESC’s view that this provides a well-balanced crisis management framework to identify different threats to the Single Market and ensure its smooth operation by: creating a crisis governance architecture; proposing new measures to offset negative impacts on the Single Market; and allowing last-resort measures in an emergency. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | The EESC calls for further steps to strengthen competition and the Single Market at a time when economies continue to face challenges caused by high energy prices, supply-side constraints and economic uncertainty. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | The EESC firmly believes that the EU’s agenda for a green and digital economy based on the foundations of a social market economy should not change because of the crisis unfolding in Ukraine. Markets delivering competitive and fair prices to EU citizens should remain the EU’s objective, by means of action by the Commission and national authorities across the EU. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the Commission’s recent proposal on joint procurement of natural gas as a temporary but effective solution to stabilise energy prices. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | The last point refers to the application of State aid, as allowed under EU rules, to support measures to counteract the socioeconomic consequences of the war in Ukraine, including the refugee crisis affecting Member States bordering Ukraine, and the need to give particular attention to gender equality and the broader gender perspective. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  A competition policy fit for new challenges, COM(2021) 713 final.

1

(2)  COM(2021) 223 final.

2

(3)  COM(2020) 842 final.

3

(4)  Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market (OJ L 11, 14.1.2019, p. 3).

4

(5)  The directive was amended by Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules (OJ L 328, 18.12.2019, p. 7).

5

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/89 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/89

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A New European Innovation Agenda’

(COM(2022) 332 final)

(2023/C 100/13)

| Rapporteur: | Maurizio MENSI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Christophe LEFÈVRE |

Rapporteur:

Maurizio MENSI

Co-rapporteur:

Christophe LEFÈVRE

| Referral | European Commission, 27.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 10.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 177/0/0 |

Referral

European Commission, 27.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

10.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

177/0/0

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s European Innovation Agenda and particularly its twofold objective of fostering Europe’s competitiveness, on the one hand, and of promoting European citizens’ welfare, on the other. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s focus on closing the so-called ‘scale-up’ and deep tech gaps which the EU currently has in comparison with third states where growth-stage tech businesses are more common. The EESC suggests that the Commission put more emphasis on the role played by businesses, SMEs and startups in particular and the innovation networks that they lead in delivering the green and digital transition. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC appreciates the initiative’s architecture which is focused around five flagship initiatives. Tools for verifying and monitoring results will also need to be provided for. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC welcomes the proposal to set up an Innovation-Friendly Regulations Advisory Group within public services and proposes that an EESC representative be a full member of the group. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC points out the importance of funding experimentation and testing infrastructures in order to help startups and to close the gap between labs and commercial applications. In this regard, the introduction of the new concept of ‘testing and experimentation infrastructures’ in the draft revised General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) on state aid is welcome. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC also welcomes the initiative linked to public procurement. In this context, the EESC suggests providing for the participation of at least one startup in innovation procurement procedures. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC underlines the importance of a sound intellectual property (IP) regime applicable to startups’ inventions in order to promote continuous research development. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC urges the Commission to encourage the interregional dimension of investments, with the joint participation of less and more innovative regions. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC points out that public support should also benefit higher education and innovation labs. In this regard, suggests that the Commission use a number of pilot research centres and universities to pursues innovative goals. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s support for Member States in taking forward cross-border projects of common European interest. It therefore proposes that both research work and the professional development of researchers be funded and that research results, which are publicly supported, be open to further development by innovators, possibly through the Innospace platform. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC welcomes the issuance of a guidance document in order to assist interested authorities in opting for the most appropriate EU policy programme, and stresses the importance of applying these programmes in a horizontal way. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC welcomes the idea of studying more favourable tax treatment of stock options and a fiscal regime for talented individuals moving across borders. It invites the Commission to coordinate the national initiatives aimed at nurturing talents. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s intention of developing more robust, comparable databases and a common data taxonomy that could inform policies at all levels, as well as of disseminating best practices in a structured way through the European Innovation Council Forum. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s plans to share best practices and to issue guidelines for governments on how to use them, in order to overcome regulatory fragmentation across Member States. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | The New European Innovation Agenda aims to position Europe at the forefront of the new wave of deep tech innovation and startups by:






  — | improving access to finance for European startups and scale-ups; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.1.

—

improving access to finance for European startups and scale-ups;

| — | improving the conditions to allow innovators to experiment with new ideas through regulatory sandboxes; |
| --- | --- |

—

improving the conditions to allow innovators to experiment with new ideas through regulatory sandboxes;

| — | helping create ‘regional innovation valleys’, including in regions lagging behind; |
| --- | --- |

—

helping create ‘regional innovation valleys’, including in regions lagging behind;

| — | attracting and retaining talent in Europe; |
| --- | --- |

—

attracting and retaining talent in Europe;

| — | improving the policy framework through clearer terminology, indicators and data sets, as well as policy support for Member States. |
| --- | --- |

—

improving the policy framework through clearer terminology, indicators and data sets, as well as policy support for Member States.

| 2.2. | The New European Innovation Agenda sets out 25 dedicated actions under five flagships:






  — | Funding scale-ups will mobilise institutional and other private investors to invest. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

Funding scale-ups will mobilise institutional and other private investors to invest.

| — | Enabling innovation through experimentation spaces and public procurement will facilitate innovation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Enabling innovation through experimentation spaces and public procurement will facilitate innovation.

| — | Accelerating and strengthening innovation in European ecosystems across the EU addressing the problem of the gap between countries and regions, will support the creation and interconnection of regional innovation valleys and help Member States direct at least EUR 10 billion towards regional-level innovation linked to EU priorities. |
| --- | --- |

—

Accelerating and strengthening innovation in European ecosystems across the EU addressing the problem of the gap between countries and regions, will support the creation and interconnection of regional innovation valleys and help Member States direct at least EUR 10 billion towards regional-level innovation linked to EU priorities.

| — | Fostering, attracting and retaining deep tech talents will ensure the development and flow of essential deep tech talents within the EU. |
| --- | --- |

—

Fostering, attracting and retaining deep tech talents will ensure the development and flow of essential deep tech talents within the EU.

| — | Improving policy-making tools will be the key for development and use of robust, comparable data sets and shared definitions (startups, scale-ups) that can inform policies at all levels across the EU. |
| --- | --- |

—

Improving policy-making tools will be the key for development and use of robust, comparable data sets and shared definitions (startups, scale-ups) that can inform policies at all levels across the EU.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s European Innovation Agenda and particularly its twofold objective of fostering Europe’s competitiveness, on the one hand, and of promoting European citizens’ welfare, on the other. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In this regard, the EESC appreciates that the Commission’s plan is based on the overarching goal of closing the persistent innovation divide across Member States and within European regions that could hamper social and economic cohesion. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | In the EESC’s view, the digital dividend should be available to all European citizens irrespective of where they live. The digital revolution should close the persistent gaps that emerged during the industrial revolution and which have become more acute in some Member States that joined the EU after the iron curtain fell. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | This is even more important now because we need all EU Member States and regions to be independent from third countries which, as the war in Ukraine, the ongoing energy crisis and chip shortage show, are not always reliable and, in any event, are not aligned with European core values. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s focus on closing the so-called ‘scale-up’ and deep tech gaps in comparison with third states where growth-stage tech businesses are more common. It suggests that the Commission put more emphasis on the role played by businesses, SMEs, startups and the innovation networks that they lead in delivering the green and digital transition, promoting their competitiveness (1). It is also important to promote initiatives designed to transform traditional companies into innovative ones. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | In the EESC’s view, deeper and more even digitalisation could start a virtuous circle: enhancing citizens’ welfare; achieving sustainability goals; reinforcing economic and social cohesion in the EU; and reducing industrial and economic dependency on third countries which do not share the same values. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | For all the reasons above, the EESC fully welcomes and supports the Commission’s initiative on the basis of its merits. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC also welcomes the initiative’s architecture which is focused around five flagship initiatives. It would be advisable to provide for tools for the regular verification and monitoring of results in order to prepare corrective and improvement measures, where needed. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC welcomes the proposal to set up an Innovation-Friendly Regulations Advisory Group within public services and suggests that an EESC representative be a full member of the group. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

4.   The flagship on funding for deep tech scale-ups

| 4.1. | The EESC strongly welcomes all the proposed measures which are aimed at reducing the cost of new equity across the EU. These include allowing the use of IP rights as collateral, and proposing a new listing law that will simplify and ease both initial and ongoing listing requirements for certain types of companies, with a view to reducing costs and increasing legal certainty for issuers while safeguarding investor protection and market integrity. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC notes the need for Europe to have an IP regime that adequately balances open science and intellectual property. In this respect, many startups own (or use) standard essential patents (SEPs). The imposition of legal obligations, at least on SMEs, to carry out checks on sets of standard essential patents they intend to licence, should be avoided. Such an obligation could be detrimental to innovation since it could prolong negotiations, leading to disputes at a stage when the prospects of revenue from licensing are still uncertain. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC welcomes the emphasis on women and data collection on women and less represented groups in order to develop tailored policies to bridge gender and other gaps, which also affect start-ups. Promoting the employment of women in the innovation sector is central for ensuring European competitiveness, while establishing an index on gender and less represented groups provides a useful knowledge tool for dealing with this issue. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | The EESC points out that established SMEs and midcaps must also innovate in order to deliver the green and digital transition; for this reason, measures to assist SMEs and midcaps in this endeavour and promote their competitiveness should be included in the agenda. More generally, it is important to create an ecosystem that allows for the transformation of traditional companies into innovative ones. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Given that — as the Commission points out — bank products are the main source of companies’ financing, the EESC stresses the relevance of public-funded guarantees and invites the Commission to evaluate the possibility of replicating in this field what was already provided for by the Temporary Frameworks for COVID-19 and the Ukraine war. In this regard it is conceivable that public-backed guarantees could attract long-term and more risk-adverse investors (such as pension and sovereign funds) whose funding is underused in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The EESC urges the Commission, in the implementation of this flagship, to prioritise cross-border research labs and spin-off startups from different universities. Extensive collaboration among universities can in fact foster innovation with practical applications, under a bottom-up approach which seems more appropriate in order to stimulate creativity. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC also urges the Commission to focus EU support on individual sectors (e.g. chips, renewables, etc.) in order to promote applied research where it is actually needed to pursue EU strategic goals. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | Besides reducing equity costs and harmonising tax systems, the EESC invites the Commission to evaluate the introduction of specific EU ‘scale-up funding’ intended to assist certain strategic startups in their growth. This can also reduce the attractiveness of killer acquisitions or of moving abroad since founders could nurture their companies without selling or moving them. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | The EESC urges the Commission to evaluate the creation of a European digital marketplace for startups so that they can engage with potential investors from all across the EU. Such a marketplace could overcome the difficulty that startups, especially in smaller Member States, could have finding investors locally and accessing significant liquidity in a timely manner. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The EESC underlines the relevance of technology infrastructures for scaling up deep-tech startup technologies. Accordingly, such access should be further promoted and facilitated. Open and non-discriminatory access obligations could be provided for publicly funded infrastructures and data. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

5.   The flagship on enabling deep tech innovation through experimentation spaces and public procurement

| 5.1. | The EESC welcomes the issuance of a guidance document on regulatory sandboxes, test beds and living labs as a tool to attract experimentation in the EU. It also welcomes the dissemination of best practices across Member States in order to promote harmonisation. |
| --- | --- |

5.1.

| 5.2. | The EESC also welcomes the introduction of a new provision in the state aid framework for RDI, which will allow Member States to fund more testing and experimentation infrastructures. In this context, the EESC suggests setting a maximum cap for admissible national public funding to avoid penalising smaller/poorer Member States or, alternatively, to focus EU funding in a complementary way on Member States which cannot compete in a race on state aid. The EESC also suggests the issuance of EU guidelines to harmonise national interpretation in cases where it may diverge. |
| --- | --- |

5.2.

| 5.3. | The EESC points out the importance of funding experimentation and testing infrastructures in order to help startups scale up their technologies and to close the gap between labs and commercial applications. In this regard, the introduction of the new concept of ‘testing and experimentation infrastructures’ in the draft revised GBER on state aid is welcome. In particular, the concept of testing and experimentation infrastructures (TEIs) should be distinguished from those commonly referred to as ‘technology infrastructures’ (TIs). In this respect, the predominantly economic use may be the distinguishing factor. In addition, notification thresholds should be equalised to EUR 21 million for both TEIs and TIs, and favourable terms provided for companies contributing to at least 5 % of TEI investment costs. |
| --- | --- |

5.3.

| 5.4. | The EESC also welcomes the initiative linked to public procurement. In this context, the EESC suggests considering the possibility of introducing a mechanism to ensure the participation of at least one startup in innovation procurement procedures. |
| --- | --- |

5.4.

| 5.5. | The EESC underlines the importance of a sound IP regime applicable to startups’ inventions in order to promote continuous research development. Once exclusivity is asserted for early-stage scientific results by commercial partners (which requires exclusivity to support and partner with scientific labs), there is a risk that such research results will not be further developed by scientific labs as they no longer have an economic interest. |
| --- | --- |

5.5.

6.   The flagship on accelerating and strengthening innovation in European innovation ecosystems across the EU and addressing the innovation divide

| 6.1. | The EESC urges the Commission to encourage the interregional dimension of investments. In particular it welcomes the prioritisation of certain interregional innovation projects linked to the key EU priorities (such as sustainability), with the joint participation of less and more innovative regions. |
| --- | --- |

6.1.

| 6.2. | The EESC underlines that innovation draws on the entire research and development chain. This ranges from curiosity-driven research to applied research and development activities, as well as the sphere of education and training, and depends on capabilities and resources for innovation uptake determined by political, cultural and socioeconomic systems. In this connection, the EESC underlines that, in order to have structural innovation and to nurture new applied ideas, public support should also benefit higher education, including vocational education (which is key for accelerating innovation) and innovation labs, not only projects that have already reached the market phase. A number of pilot universities can be used by the Commission to pursue this goal. |
| --- | --- |

6.2.

| 6.3. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s support for Member States in taking forward significant cross-border projects of common European interest, stressing the importance of also sustaining the research phase because innovation is a local process that should be supported from scratch under a bottom-up scenario, in line with the ‘Future for Europe’ final report (proposals 12 and 35). Accordingly, both research work and the professional development of researchers should be funded. Research results, which are publicly supported, should be open to further development by innovators, possibly through Innospace. |
| --- | --- |

6.3.

| 6.4. | The EESC welcomes the issuance of a guidance document in order to assist interested authorities in opting for the most appropriate EU policy programme. The EESC also emphasises the importance of not designing policy programmes as ‘closed silos’, but rather of taking into account their complementarity and, where possible, applying them in a horizontal way. |
| --- | --- |

6.4.

7.   The flagship on fostering, attracting and retaining deep tech talents

| 7.1. | The EESC welcomes this initiative aimed at increasing opportunities and matching talents across Europe. |
| --- | --- |

7.1.

| 7.2. | The EESC particularly welcomes the idea of exploring the possibility of more favourable tax treatment of stock options in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

7.2.

| 7.3. | The EESC urges the Commission to consider the fiscal situation of talented individuals moving across borders in order to ensure that this does not restrict free movement of talent. |
| --- | --- |

7.3.

| 7.4. | The EESC invites the Commission to coordinate the national initiatives aimed at nurturing talents. |
| --- | --- |

7.4.

8.   The flagship on improving policy making tools

| 8.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s intention of developing more robust, comparable databases and a common data taxonomy, as well as of disseminating best practices in a structured way through the European Innovation Council Forum. |
| --- | --- |

8.1.

| 8.2. | The EESC also welcomes the Commission’s plans to share best practices in order to gather good examples of regulatory sandboxes and flexible legal frameworks from across the EU and to issue guidelines for governments on how to use them. The EESC encourages the Commission to make use of these tools in order to overcome regulatory fragmentation and differences across Member States. |
| --- | --- |

8.2.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Digital Innovation Hubs and SMEs (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 75, 2023.2.28, p. 82).

1

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/95 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/95

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on:

(a) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Single Market Emergency Instrument and repealing Council Regulation No (EC) 2679/98

(COM(2022) 459 final — 2022/0278 (COD))

(b) Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2016/424, (EU) 2016/425, (EU) 2016/426, (EU) 2019/1009 and (EU) No 305/2011 as regards emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency

(COM(2022) 461 final — 2022/0279 (COD))

(c) Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2000/14/EC, 2006/42/EC, 2010/35/EU, 2013/29/EU, 2014/28/EU, 2014/29/EU, 2014/30/EU, 2014/31/EU, 2014/32/EU, 2014/33/EU, 2014/34/EU, 2014/35/EU, 2014/53/EU and 2014/68/EU as regard emergency procedures for the conformity assessment, adoption of common specifications and market surveillance due to a Single Market emergency

(COM(2022) 462 final — 2022/0280 (COD))

(2023/C 100/14)

| Rapporteur: | Andrej ZORKO |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Janica YLIKARJULA |

Rapporteur:

Andrej ZORKO

Co-rapporteur:

Janica YLIKARJULA

| Referral | a) | European Parliament, 9.11.2022 |
| --- | --- | --- |

Referral

a)

European Parliament, 9.11.2022

| a) | Council of the European Union, 11.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |

a)

Council of the European Union, 11.11.2022

| b) | European Parliament, 21.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |

b)

European Parliament, 21.11.2022

| b) | Council of the European Union, 24.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |

b)

Council of the European Union, 24.11.2022

| c) | European Parliament, 21.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |

c)

European Parliament, 21.11.2022

| c) | Council of the European Union, 30.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |

c)

Council of the European Union, 30.11.2022

Legal basis

| a) | Articles 114, 21, 45 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

a)

Articles 114, 21, 45 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

| b) | Articles 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

b)

Articles 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

| c) | Articles 91, 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| --- | --- |

c)

Articles 91, 114 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

10.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

208/0/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC supports the Commission’s aim to establish a Single Market Emergency Instrument (hereinafter SMEI) to combat future crises that might affect the functioning of the Single Market and its businesses, as well as the welfare of the EU’s citizens. The EESC supports the measures to ensure the free movement of goods, services, and persons and prevent intra-EU restrictions also during a crisis. The SMEI should prioritise information-sharing, cooperation, communication, and solidarity among Member States. Better administrative cooperation and transparency measures for Member States are essential, but the EESC regrets that there are no consequences in the event that Member States do not meet the requirements. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | A crisis response must be fast, temporary, properly targeted and coordinated at the EU level to ensure a common approach. It should consider the effects of a crisis on businesses and the welfare of the EU’s citizens, and establish conditions for a more resilient society and economy in the future. The focus should be clearly on the free movement of goods, services and persons in times of crisis, and on mitigating the crisis’s effects on people’s welfare, rather than intervention in producing and providing goods and services and in their supply chains. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | Crisis mitigation requires a clear legal framework to avoid divergent interpretations, fragmented measures and unnecessary litigation. The EESC finds that the definitions of the terms ‘crisis’, ‘strategically important areas’, ‘goods and services of strategic importance’ and ‘crisis-relevant goods and services’ are too vague to address these concerns and recommends that the Commission define them further. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | Emergency measures should not infringe on the fundamental rights of European citizens, nor should the exercise of those rights, including the right to strike, in any sector, warrant a crisis response. The Commission should make it clear that, if a strike or other industrial action is undertaken under national legislation, it cannot constitute a crisis under the SMEI. Similarly, all crisis-mitigation measures must meet the principles of necessity and proportionality where companies are concerned, which is not the case in the proposal. Moreover, the autonomy of the social partners must be respected. The measures risk creating unnecessary further barriers, restrictions, and burdens, which need to be avoided, especially in times of crisis. The Single Market should be kept accessible, with safeguards against social and fiscal dumping. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC believes that an emergency requires a fast and efficient response. Therefore, the EESC recommends that the Commission reconsider the proposal in view of an appropriately fast and effective approach to tackling a crisis. The EESC is concerned that the step-by-step approach proposed may be too burdened by administration to be effective. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC recommends establishing close cooperation between the SMEI Advisory Group and existing EU strategic foresight instruments, with the purpose of foreseeing crisis events based on the continuous monitoring and risk assessment of global and regional events. Civil society representatives should be closely involved in this process, to channel their insights and the results of their work into the EU’s foresight activities. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC proposes that representatives of the social partners and a relevant civil society organisation be included as observers of the SMEI Advisory Group. The EESC also calls for clarification of the role of the proposed Advisory Group, especially in relation to other bodies of a similar nature. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The delegation of powers to the Commission under the proposal should be reconsidered, in order to strike a balance between effective crisis response and the inclusion of Member States in the decision-making process. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | There is a danger that the interventionist powers granted to the Commission in the proposal, such as the prioritisation of orders and the contract-override clause that can be targeted at specific businesses, could prove detrimental to the functioning of the Single Market. By their very existence, they introduce an element of unpredictability. The EESC therefore recommends that the Commission carefully reconsider the proposal, also in light of the question of which companies would be targeted and who would bear the costs of a potential reorganisation of production lines. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | It is vital to limit the collection of data from companies by the Commission or the Member States by following principles of extreme necessity and proportionality. Some of the proposals pose risks to the level playing field, such as establishing lists of ‘the most relevant economic operators’ before an emergency is announced. The EESC is concerned about the signals this may send to the market and the overall impact on competition. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | Swift, easy-to-understand and open communication for the public, businesses and other actors is a key for Single Market crisis management. A dedicated online information interface should be immediately operational in the event of a crisis. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

2.   Basis for the opinion

| 2.1. | A well-functioning Single Market is one of the greatest assets of the EU and is vital for its economy and for ‘improving welfare through socioeconomic convergence and ensuring that social imbalances do not end up becoming serious obstacles to European integration’ (1). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | Recent crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have demonstrated a degree of vulnerability in the Single Market and its supply chains in the event of unforeseen disruptions. The lockdown during the pandemic stopped many businesses operating, borders were closed, supply chains were interrupted, demand was disrupted and workers and service providers were unable to move across Europe, reminding people that the free movement of persons is highly interlinked to the free movement of goods and services. Often, a crisis impacts MSMEs and low-income households in particular. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | A lack of transparency in the measures that various Member States undertook to combat crises caused uncertainty about their justification and proportionality. This weakened mutual trust and solidarity and presented obstacles to the functioning of the Single Market. On the other hand, the importance of cooperation, openness and dialogue between the Member States and the value of diversified value chains was clearly shown. A coordinated response to ensure that EU internal borders remain open via ‘green lane’ border crossings has proven to be key to avoiding disruptions to essential travel and supply chains. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The SMEI complements other EU legislative measures or proposals for crisis management that concern, for example, health, semiconductors, food security and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s effort to introduce the SMEI to combat the negative effects of existing and potential crises on the Single Market, its people and businesses, and appreciates the confirmation that the SMEI will apply without prejudice to existing crisis management instruments, which will be treated as lex speciali. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC underlines that the SMEI should ensure better coordination of measures between Member States, enhance solidarity, uphold the effectiveness of the four freedoms and leverage the Single Market to address urgent and unexpected crises. The Committee points out that a well-functioning single market is an efficient tool and an asset for preparedness and for addressing crises. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | A crisis that can affect the functioning of the Single Market can inhibit businesses but also greatly affect people’s lives across the EU. The proposed measures to combat any crisis should therefore consider both perspectives and take into account a path forward to the digital, green and fair transition to better prepare the Single Market for future shocks and crises. The future Single Market can only be based on marrying a sound economic basis with a strong social dimension (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC points out that a crisis response must be fast, temporary, proportionate and properly targeted, setting the stage for a more resilient society and economy in the future. It must also be coordinated at the EU level to prevent divergent national measures, which could impede the functioning of the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EU will face new challenges in future crises. Crisis-mitigation measures should be transparent and readily available — within a limited scope and following strict criteria — and swiftly applied, which requires a clear legal framework at the EU level. The instrument should protect the businesses and residents of the EU and the freedoms of the Single Market in the event of a widespread and serious crisis, should control national and EU anti-crisis measures to meet the basic principles of necessity, proportionality and non-discrimination and should ensure real-time administrative cooperation and access to information for businesses and individuals. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC is concerned that a step-by-step crisis response procedure, as set out under the SMEI, will take too much time and slow down the decision-making process, instead of responding quickly to the crisis. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | It is impossible to foresee the scope and type of a particular future crisis. At the same time, a crisis response is most effective and least invasive if it is triggered in the early stages of a crisis. The EESC stresses the importance of strategic foresight in the EU and continues to strongly welcome the inclusion of the foresight methodology in the EU’s policy-making process. The instruments proposed in the SMEI should be complemented by close cooperation between the Advisory group and the existing EU strategic foresight mechanisms in order to foresee future crises based on ongoing global and regional events that have the ability to greatly disrupt the working of a Single Market in a way that cannot be considered to be a normal functioning of a market. The Advisory Group should not only be tasked with the assessment of incidents that the Member States alert the Commission to, but should continuously cooperate with the EU’s strategic foresight executors in the task of carrying out the monitoring and risk-assessment of global and regional incidents. As Strategic Foresight is a participatory process, the EESC expects both synergies and the structural involvement of all EU institutions, including the EESC, to prosper on this basis (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The proposal aims to cover all significant crises affecting the single market and its supply chains, with a few exceptions, for which the EU has or is preparing its own measures. The broad scope causes significant challenges. The EESC highlights that the SMEI requires a clearer definition of a crisis, which must not be subject to divergent interpretations. Also, the definitions of ‘strategically important areas’, ‘goods and services of strategic importance’ and ‘crisis-relevant goods and services’ are very broad. The EESC is of the opinion that these definitions should be unequivocal, to ensure the proportionality and proper targeting of the emergency measures. The lack of clear and precise definitions risks creating legal uncertainty and litigation within the Single Market. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Any definition and crisis response under the SMEI must be proportionate and must not lead to unnecessary administrative burdens. In particular, the instrument should only be triggered when there is an urgent and temporary crisis in the Single Market, including regional crises that affect the four freedoms. Correspondingly, use of the instrument should be limited in time and not allowed to become permanent in nature. The proposal gives the Commission delegated powers regarding the crisis protocols, which should be carefully reconsidered and a balance sought between an effective crisis response and a full commitment to joint measures by the Member States. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The ability to recognise that a situation requires a crisis response and to properly target the issues arising from emergencies is crucial. Any emergency measures should not impede the fundamental rights of European citizens, especially those recognised in international agreements and conventions. Even in times of crisis, the EU must remain committed to upholding fundamental human rights. Similarly, all crisis-mitigation measures must meet the basic principles of necessity and proportionality where companies are concerned, which is not the case in the proposal. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The recognition and regulation of crisis-relevant goods can itself create uncertainties in the Single Market that limit its functioning, since it is impossible to know what the crisis-relevant goods will be in any future crisis. The EESC understands the intent of delegating certain powers to the Commission as part of the proposal, but at the same time must express concern at the interventionist Commission powers set out in the proposal, including the disclosure of commercially sensitive information and the prioritisation of orders, including the contract-overriding clause. The production and provision of goods and services and their supply chains are mainly a matter for market players and part of regular contingency planning and preparedness by companies and governments. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | The EESC is convinced that the introduction of intra-EU barriers and restrictions in times of crisis must be avoided. To succeed in this, the instrument should guarantee more information-sharing, coordination and solidarity between the Member States when adopting crisis-related measures, while respecting national competencies. The EESC fully supports listing prohibited restrictions to the freedoms of the Single Market. However, the EESC regrets that there are no clear consequences in cases when Member States do not meet the requirements. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | The production and supply of specific goods that might be essential in combating any given crisis are unevenly distributed across the Single Market. Depending on the crisis, businesses and individuals across the EU might also be impacted with differing degrees of severity, even in the case of an EU-wide crisis. When dealing with such situations, solidarity between Member States is crucial. The crisis-response toolbox should therefore aim to discourage protectionism, which would fragment the Single Market and impede the flow of critical goods and services to the businesses and residents of the EU. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | The EESC recommends that the Commission evaluate the lessons learned from recent crises to use them as a blueprint for the future. During the pandemic, the introduction of ‘green lanes’ alleviated many costly bottlenecks related to the intra-EU flow of goods in particular, but also of services. In addition, the relatively swift adoption of the common EU Digital COVID-19 Certificate helped restore mobility within the Single Market for cross-border service providers, migrant workers and business travellers. The technical assistance provided by the EU has also helped ensure a more uniform implementation of measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The EESC agrees with the Commission that the measures at the EU level should be coordinated together with the Member States. A common approach must be applied throughout the Member States wherever possible. A fragmented approach would present additional barriers to the Single Market, hindering innovation, investment and job creation, as well as social cohesion and quality of life. Even in times of crisis, it is important to keep the Single Market accessible to all, with effective safeguards against social and fiscal dumping (4). |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | Businesses and individuals should also be given incentives to adapt the way they operate to the post-crisis reality of higher energy costs and the effects of climate change as much as possible. Any emergency measure should be in line with the EU’s climate objectives and the path towards climate neutrality and, when applied, should set a path towards achieving them, as well as making the Single Market more resilient. An emergency response must also bear in mind that there is always a chance of a crisis resulting in differences between EU countries in terms of economic development, social guarantees, and levels of prosperity (5), and must be designed to avoid such effects. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | Swift, easy-to-understand and open communication for the public, businesses and other actors is a key part of Single Market crisis management. To help actors on the ground, the EESC recommends that a common dedicated online information interface should be immediately operational when a crisis strikes, updated regularly and include reliable information on the crisis and the measures taken. The instrument should ensure transparency for people and businesses regarding measures across the Member States to support their continued free movement. Any emergency measures should be clearly communicated in order not to cause confusion or additional obstacles to the functioning of the Single Market. The EESC believes that the social partners and civil society could play an important role in this. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | Close cooperation with stakeholders is also necessary for the implementation of the instrument, considering that it is in practice civil society actors who carry out the measures. They also have the best knowledge of the measures and procedures that work. Single Market governance infrastructure must be reinforced, with the proactive inclusion of organised bodies representing citizens, consumers and enterprises (6). The EESC calls on the Commission to include the social partners, civil society organisations and experts in the processes of risk assessment and monitoring, as well as in the development and coordination of crisis measures. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The measures should build on existing instruments as much as possible regarding notifications, standards, etc. They should focus on clarifying and facilitating their swift and efficient use for preserving the functioning of the Single Market whenever a crisis erupts. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The instrument should consider fast-track conformity assessment, coordination of public procurement and market surveillance for goods and services that are critical to that crisis. However, it should also consider that existing EU directives already offer several options that allow for very rapid procurement in emergencies. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | Emergency measures should not be allowed to limit the fundamental rights of the citizens of the EU, nor should the exercise of those rights, including the right to strike, in any sector, represent a circumstance warranting a crisis response under the SMEI. The EESC is convinced that the legal regulation of strikes falls within the jurisdiction of Member States, and that if a strike or other industrial action is undertaken under national legislation it cannot constitute a crisis under the terms of the SMEI. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | It is vital to limit the collection of data from companies by the Commission or Member States by adhering to the principles of extreme necessity and proportionality. Mandatory obligations on businesses to disclose commercially sensitive information, the prioritisation of orders and the contract-override clause, must not be adopted, as they are counterproductive to proactive action to find solutions for addressing the crises. Some of the proposals pose risks to the level playing field, such as establishing lists of ‘the most relevant economic operators’ before an emergency is announced. The EESC is concerned about the signals this may send to the market and the overall impact on competition. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The EESC believes that the advisory group, as set out in Article 3 of the proposal, should make full use of the knowledge and experience of the social partners and a relevant civil society organisation, who are most in touch with the daily ‘on the ground’ conditions in the Single Market. While it is important that the Advisory Group comprise all relevant EU and Member State-level policymakers, competent authorities and agencies, the EESC believes that the social partners are inextricably linked to the Single Market and should be included as observers in the advisory group by default, together with a relevant civil society organisation such as a consumers’ organisation to advise on, implement and monitor the practical measures undertaken under the SMEI. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | In accordance with Article 13, the EESC believes that it is necessary to establish solidarity between Member States, for example when securing strategic reserves. Therefore, the EESC supports the Commission’s recommendation that the Member States distribute strategic reserves in a targeted way, where possible. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | The EESC calls on the Commission to reconsider the possibility of restricting the free movement of workers proposed in Article 17 when it comes to frontier workers, as limiting their free movement may have adverse effects on the Single Market, as has already been pointed out. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | The EESC believes that the interplay between the Advisory group in the proposal and the already established crisis-management groups, such as the Single Market Enforcement Task Force, the Single Market Information Tool and food crisis platforms is not clearly set out in the proposal. The Commission should avoid any duplication in the jurisdictions of different crisis-management bodies, which would create unnecessary administration and slow down a crisis response. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A New Industrial Strategy for Europe’ (COM(2020) 102 final) (OJ C 364, 28.10.2020, p. 108).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘A Single Market for All’ (Exploratory opinion) (OJ C 311, 18.9.2020, p. 19).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — 2021 Strategic Foresight Report — The EU’s capacity and freedom to act (COM(2021) 750 final) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 35).

3

(4)  See footnote 2.

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on: (a) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Long term action plan for better implementation and enforcement of single market rules’ (COM(2020) 94 final); (b) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — Identifying and addressing barriers to the Single Market’ (COM(2020) 93 final) (OJ C 364, 28.10.2020, p. 116).

5

(6)  See footnote 2.

6

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/101 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/101

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/1020’

(COM(2022) 454 final — 2022/0272 (COD))

(2023/C 100/15)

| Rapporteur: | Maurizio MENSI |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Marinel Dănuț MUREŞAN |

Rapporteur:

Maurizio MENSI

Co-rapporteur:

Marinel Dănuț MUREŞAN

| Referral | European Parliament, 9.11.2022
  Council of the European Union, 28.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Single Market, Production and Consumption |
| Adopted in section | 10.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 177/0/0 |

Referral

European Parliament, 9.11.2022

Council of the European Union, 28.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Single Market, Production and Consumption

Adopted in section

10.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

177/0/0

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) aimed at setting higher cybersecurity standards and thus creating a reliable system for economic operators while guaranteeing EU citizens that all products on the market can be used safely. This initiative forms part of the European data strategy, which strengthens the security of data, including personal data, and fundamental rights, which are essential requirements for our digital society. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC considers it essential to strengthen the collective response to cyber attacks and to consolidate the process of harmonising national-level cybersecurity in terms of operational rules and tools, to prevent different national approaches creating legal uncertainties and obstacles. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s initiative, which will not only help to reduce the significant costs for businesses caused by cyber attacks, but will also enable citizens/consumers to benefit from better protection of their fundamental rights, such as privacy. In particular, the Commission shows that it is taking account of the specific needs of SMEs when it comes to the services provided by the certification authorities; however, the EESC points to the need to clarify the criteria that apply here. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC considers it important to point out that, while it is commendable that the CRA covers virtually all digital products, the practical application of the CRA might be problematic given the considerable and complex monitoring and oversight it entails. Hence the need to strengthen the monitoring and oversight tools. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC points to the need to clarify precisely the material scope of the CRA, with particular reference to products with digital elements and software. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC notes that manufacturers will be obliged to report both vulnerabilities in their products and any security incidents, informing the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). In this regard, it will be important that ENISA be provided with the necessary resources to carry out effectively and in a timely manner the important and sensitive tasks entrusted to it. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | To avoid any uncertainty when it comes to interpretation, the EESC suggests that the Commission draw up guidelines to guide manufacturers and consumers on the exact rules and procedures that apply in practice, since it appears that a number of products within the scope of the proposal are also subject to other legislation on cybersecurity. In this regard it would be also important that in particular SME and MSME have access to qualified expert support, able to provide specific professional services. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC notes that the relationship between the certification authorities under the CRA and other bodies authorised to certify cybersecurity under other legislation is not entirely clear. The same problem may also arise when it comes to operational coordination between the surveillance authorities provided for in this proposal and those already operating in accordance with other legislation applicable to the same products. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC points out that, under the proposal, the certification authorities will have to shoulder a considerable amount of work and responsibility. It must be ensured that they are fully operational in practice, not least in order to prevent the CRA adding to the existing administrative burden and thus penalising manufacturers that will have to comply with a number of additional certification requirements to be able to continue to operate on the market. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

2.   Analysis of the proposal

| 2.1. | With the proposal for a CRA, the Commission is seeking to rationalise and reshape the current cybersecurity legislation in a comprehensive and cross-cutting manner, while updating it in the light of technological innovations. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | The CRA essentially pursues four objectives: ensure that manufacturers improve the security of products with digital elements at the design and development phase and throughout the whole life cycle; ensure a coherent cybersecurity framework, facilitating compliance for hardware and software producers; enhance the transparency of the security properties of products with digital elements; and enable businesses and consumers to use these products securely. In essence, the proposal introduces a CE marking for cybersecurity, which is to be affixed to all products covered by the CRA. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | This is a horizontal intervention, through which the Commission intends to regulate the whole area in a systemic way, as it covers virtually all products with digital elements. It excludes products of a medical nature, products related to civil aviation, vehicles and products for military purposes. The proposal also excludes SaaS (cloud) services, unless they are used to develop products with digital elements. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The definition of ‘products with digital elements’ is very broad and includes any software or hardware product, as well as software or hardware not embedded in the product but placed on the market separately. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | The legislation introduces mandatory cybersecurity requirements for products that have digital elements, covering their entire life cycle, but does not replace those already in place. Rather, products that have already been certified as complying with pre-existing EU standards will also be considered ‘valid’ under the new Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | The basic general principle is that only ‘secure’ products are placed on the market in Europe, and that their manufacturers ensure that these products remain secure throughout their life cycle. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | A product is considered ‘secure’ if it is designed and manufactured in such a way that it has a level of security appropriate to the cyber risks that its use entails, has no known vulnerabilities at the time it is sold, has a secure default configuration, is protected from unlawful connections, protects the data it collects, and ensures that the data collected is limited to what is needed for its operation. |
| --- | --- |

2.7.

| 2.8. | A manufacturer is considered fit to place its products on the market if it makes available a list of the various software components in its products, quickly issues remedies free of charge in the event of new vulnerabilities, makes public and details the vulnerabilities it detects and resolves, and regularly checks the ‘robustness’ of the products it places on the market. These actions and the other requirements imposed by the CRA must be carried out throughout the product’s life cycle, or for at least five years after it has been placed on the market. The manufacturer is required to ensure that vulnerabilities are eliminated through regular software updates. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | In accordance with a general principle applied in various sectors, the obligations are also imposed on importers and distributors. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | The CRA provides for a ‘default’ category of products and software for which a self-assessment by the manufacturer can be relied upon, as is already the case for other types of CE marking certification. According to the Commission, 90 % of the products on the market fall within this category. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | The products in question may be placed on the market following a self-assessment of their cybersecurity by the manufacturer, which must provide the appropriate documentation established in the regulatory guidelines. The manufacturer is required to repeat the assessment if the product is modified. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | The remaining 10 % of products are divided into two other categories (Class I, lower-risk, and Class II, higher-risk), which require more vigilance when placed on the market. These are known as ‘critical products with digital elements’, the failure of which can lead to other dangerous and wider security breaches. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | For products in these two categories, the basic self-assessment is only permitted if the manufacturer demonstrates that it has complied with specific market standards and security specifications or cybersecurity certification schemes already provided for by the EU. If that is not the case, it may obtain product certification from an accredited conformity assessment body, and this is mandatory for Class-II products. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | Such a system for classifying products in risk categories is also contained in the Proposal for a Regulation on AI (artificial intelligence). To avoid doubts about the applicable provisions, the CRA covers products with digital elements that are simultaneously classified as ‘high-risk AI systems’ under the AI proposal. Such products will generally have to comply with the conformity assessment procedure set out in the AI Regulation, except for ‘critical products with digital elements’, for which the CRA’s conformity assessment rules will apply in addition to the CRA’s ‘essential requirements’. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

| 2.15. | In order to ensure compliance with the CRA, each Member State is to designate a national authority to carry out market surveillance. In line with the legislation regarding the safety of other products, if a national authority finds that a product’s cybersecurity features are no longer valid, it may be withdrawn from the market in the State in question. ENISA has the power to carry out detailed evaluations of notified products, and its evaluations, where a product is found to be unsafe, may lead to it being withdrawn from the EU market. |
| --- | --- |

2.15.

| 2.16. | The CRA includes a series of penalties — corresponding to the seriousness of the infringement — which, in the event of a breach of the essential cybersecurity requirements for these products, can amount to EUR 15 million or 2,5 % of turnover for the preceding financial year. |
| --- | --- |

2.16.

3.   Comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s initiative aimed at inserting a key element into the wider patchwork of cybersecurity regulation, in coordination with and in addition to the NIS Directive (1) and in addition to the Cybersecurity Act (2). High cybersecurity standards have a key role to play in creating a robust EU cybersecurity system for all economic operators, aimed at guaranteeing EU citizens that all products on the market can be used safely and increasing their confidence in the digital world. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The Regulation therefore addresses two issues: the low level of cybersecurity of many of the products and, above all, the fact that many manufacturers do not provide updates to address vulnerabilities. While manufacturers of products with digital elements sometimes suffer reputational damage when their products fall short on security, the cost of the vulnerabilities is mainly borne by professional users and consumers. This reduces the incentive for manufacturers to invest in the design and development of secure products and to provide security updates. Moreover, businesses and consumers are often insufficiently and inaccurately informed when it comes to choosing secure products and often do not know how to make sure that the products they buy are securely configured. The new rules address these two issues by tackling the question of updates and the provision of up-to-date information to customers. The EESC believes that, in this sense, where properly applied, the proposed regulation could become an international benchmark and model for cybersecurity. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC welcomes the proposal aimed at introducing cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. It will be important, however, to avoid overlaps with other existing regulatory provisions on this issue, such as the new NIS 2 Directive (3) and the AI Act. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC considers it important to point out that, while it is commendable that the CRA covers virtually all digital products, the practical application of the CRA might be problematic given the considerable monitoring and oversight it entails. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The material scope of the CRA is broad and covers all products with digital elements. According to the proposed definition, all software and hardware products and related data processing solutions are covered. The EESC suggests that the Commission clarify whether all software falls within the scope of the proposed regulation. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Manufacturers will be obliged to report both actively exploited vulnerabilities and security incidents. They will be required to inform ENISA of any actively exploited vulnerabilities contained in the product and (separately) of any incident that has an impact on product security, in both cases within 24 hours of becoming aware of it. The EESC points here to the need for ENISA to be provided with sufficient resources — both in numerical terms and in terms of professional training — if it is to be able to carry out effectively the important and sensitive tasks entrusted to it under the Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The fact that a number of products falling within the scope of the proposal are also subject to other cybersecurity legislation might lead to uncertainty as to which rules apply. Although the CRA is designed to be consistent with the current EU product regulatory framework and other proposals currently in the pipeline under the EU Digital Strategy, rules such as those for high-risk AI products, for example, overlap with those in the Regulation on the processing of personal data. In this regard, the EESC suggests that the Commission draw up guidelines for manufacturers and consumers on how it should be applied correctly. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC notes that the relationship between the certification authorities under the CRA and any other bodies authorised to certify cybersecurity under other equally applicable regulations does not seem entirely clear. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | In addition, those certification authorities will have a considerable burden of work and responsibility. It must be verified and ensured that they are fully operational in practice, in order to prevent the CRA leading to an increase in the administrative burden already imposed on manufacturers operating on the market. In this regard it would be also important that in particular SME and MSME have access to qualified expert support, able to provide specific professional services. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The CRA requires the certification authorities to take into account the specific needs of SMEs when performing their services; however, the EESC points to the need to clarify the criteria that apply here. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | A problem may also arise when it comes to coordination between the surveillance authorities provided for in this Regulation and those already operating in accordance with other rules applicable to the same products. The EESC therefore suggests that the Commission call on the Member States to monitor the situation and, where appropriate, take action to prevent this happening. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (OJ L 194, 19.7.2016, p. 1)

1

(2)  Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 (Cybersecurity Act) (OJ L 151, 7.6.2019, p. 15).

2

(3)  Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80).

3

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/105 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/105

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation’

(COM(2022) 245 — final)

(2023/C 100/16)

| Rapporteur: | Ionuţ SIBIAN |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Ionuţ SIBIAN

| Referral | European Commission, 27.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 23.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 208/0/2 |

Referral

European Commission, 27.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

23.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

208/0/2

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The proposed Directive correctly responds to the need to broaden the scope of the confiscation mechanisms, strengthens the competences of national authorities and establishes cross-border cooperation mechanisms to increase the rate of asset recovery. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | When expanding the scope of the confiscation mechanisms with a new set of crimes, the EESC encourages the European Commission to clarify and make sure that migrant smuggling and illicit tobacco trade fall under the scope of the proposed Directive. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC calls on the European Commission to consider how to apply the proposed Directive to violations of EU restrictive measures and it believes that separate legislation is needed in this area. The proposed Directive should allow Asset Recovery Offices to strengthen their capacity to operate without adding additional competences. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | Public access to information without prejudice to ongoing asset recovery proceedings should be guaranteed. The EESC suggests that the proposed Directive explicitly state that national authorities and the European Commission are obliged to regularly publish comprehensive statistics on the measures taken under the Directive and ensure public access to information. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC calls on European Commission to ensure that the Member States adopt national strategies on asset recovery with full consideration of transparency and accessibility. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC strongly encourages the European Commission to take all necessary precautions during the transposition process to prevent abuses in case of non-conviction-based confiscation measures in asset recovery proceedings. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | The newly introduced mechanism ensuring the confiscation of assets not directly linked to a crime listed in the Directive, but based on a suspicion of unlawful property/resulting from criminal activities requires stronger standards for defendants’ procedural rights and safeguards. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC urges the Commission to reconsider the provision on social reuse in the proposed Directive and to encourage the Member States to devise mechanisms that would include civil society organisations as a priority in managing and disposing of confiscated assets. The Commission should set targets by including a minimum percentage for the social reuse of confiscated assets. Public interest should not be understood to mean only actions under the remit of public entities. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC considers it very important that the Commission be more precise in laying down victims’ right to compensation and giving victims priority in the ranking of creditors. |
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1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC supports the Commission’s proposal for the proposed Directive to require at least one Asset Recovery Office to be established in each Member State, which must be given the resources it needs to efficiently and effectively fulfil its role. To ensure a minimum standard for the functioning of Asset Recovery Offices throughout the EU, the European Commission should require regular reporting of the resources allotted in each Member State. |
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1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC acknowledges the aim of increasing the use of the interlocutory sales mechanism by introducing a reference definition and specifying the conditions under which it should be used. At the same time, ‘non-readily available expertise’ is a standard that could be improved, becoming ‘expertise that is unreasonably difficult to procure’. The sale should remain the last resort with respect to social reuse, considering that the confiscated funds can be allocated to the compensation of the victims. |
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1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC encourages the European Commission to complete the mandate of the Asset Recovery and Management Offices by introducing relevant provisions on asset-sharing agreements in the proposed Directive. |
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1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC considers it necessary to include more concrete tools for assisting third countries’ officials and to actively encourage Member States to develop cooperation with these countries in order to maximise the asset recovery mechanisms provided for in the proposed Directive. The same is true for the implementation of the legal tools and instruments needed to ensure that victims of criminal offences have the full right to compensation in third countries. |
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1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC recommends that the Commission issue guidelines comparing the legislation to be replaced and the new Directive to be enacted in order to encourage the adoption of measures facilitating the forthcoming transposition of the proposed Directive in national jurisdictions, and to enable national authorities to swiftly align it with their own legislation. |
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1.14.

| 1.15. | The EESC recommends that the European Commission make use of the comparative data collection instruments introduced in the proposed Directive to establish transparent monitoring mechanisms with the participation of civil society and to conduct an evaluation process on the impact of the proposed Directive no later than three years after its adoption. |
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1.15.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | Asset recovery is key to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, i.e. activities related to organised crime. Organised crime relies on obtaining profits that would be further laundered and introduced into the licit economy, hence creating more victims, distorting market rules and perpetuating the capacity to undermine financial markets and trigger losses for individuals and businesses. The asset recovery legal frameworks and the cross-border cooperation instruments need further revision and enforcement as only around 2 % of criminal assets are frozen and 1 % confiscated (1) in the EU. |
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2.1.

| 2.2. | The first dedicated EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime (2) was adopted in April 2021 and addresses the threat that organised crime poses to European citizens, state institutions and the economy as a whole. One of the strategy’s pillars is to eliminate profits generated by organised crime and prevent their infiltration into the legal economy and legal businesses (follow-the-money approach), and the Commission was called on to take action upon the revision of the Confiscation Directive (3) and the Council Decision on Asset Recovery Offices (4). |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | The EESC has been fully aware of and preoccupied by the increase in organised crime and its significant economic, political and social costs for some time. The work of the EESC has been consistent with its mission and the opinions (5) issued on topics relevant to combating organised crime have helped European lawmakers give citizens power and relevance via organised civil society. Asset recovery is part of the larger EU legislative ecosystem that is intended to contribute to the restorative justice that communities need in order to reduce the harm caused by criminal offences. |
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2.3.

| 2.4. | The evaluation (6) of the current asset recovery legal framework mentioned that, despite a general improvement by the Member States, the overall results in terms of assets confiscated are not satisfactory and the confiscation rates in the EU remain very low. The ability to trace and identify assets is a key factor in improving the success rate and freezing and confiscating more illegal assets. The revision of the legislation should expand the scope of illegal asset recovery and increase the number of corresponding instruments, along with enhancing the capacity of national recovery offices (7). |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | The policy options for the revision of the asset recovery framework were subject to public consultation in 2021. An inception impact assessment (8) was published for feedback in March 2021, followed by a public consultation carried out between 21 June and 27 September 2021 to gather the views of the general public and stakeholders. Four policy options were analysed and presented in the impact assessment report (9):






  — | Option 1: consisting of non-legislative measures to support the exchange of experiences, knowledge and good practices among competent authorities. |
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2.5.

—

Option 1: consisting of non-legislative measures to support the exchange of experiences, knowledge and good practices among competent authorities.

| — | Option 2: these measures would consist primarily of targeted amendments to the Council Decision on Asset Recovery Offices and the Confiscation Directive to specify the scope of existing general requirements and make them more effective. These measures would include requirements for the Member States to adopt a national strategy for asset recovery and to ensure that the competent authorities have the necessary skills and resources. Furthermore, it would entail measures aimed at improving cross-border cooperation among Asset Recovery Offices, including access to databases and extended freezing powers. |
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—

Option 2: these measures would consist primarily of targeted amendments to the Council Decision on Asset Recovery Offices and the Confiscation Directive to specify the scope of existing general requirements and make them more effective. These measures would include requirements for the Member States to adopt a national strategy for asset recovery and to ensure that the competent authorities have the necessary skills and resources. Furthermore, it would entail measures aimed at improving cross-border cooperation among Asset Recovery Offices, including access to databases and extended freezing powers.

| — | Option 3: would contain, in addition to the measures envisaged in option 2, more detailed requirements for the Member States for all phases of the recovery process, and the scope of the Confiscation Directive would be expanded to include a wider range of crimes. |
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—

Option 3: would contain, in addition to the measures envisaged in option 2, more detailed requirements for the Member States for all phases of the recovery process, and the scope of the Confiscation Directive would be expanded to include a wider range of crimes.

| — | Option 4: these measures would build upon those under option 3, but the scope of the provisions would be extended to all crimes and entail more extensive requirements when it comes to the launch of investigations. Furthermore, more concrete conditions concerning urgent freezing orders and the exchange of information between Asset Recovery Offices would be set out. |
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—

Option 4: these measures would build upon those under option 3, but the scope of the provisions would be extended to all crimes and entail more extensive requirements when it comes to the launch of investigations. Furthermore, more concrete conditions concerning urgent freezing orders and the exchange of information between Asset Recovery Offices would be set out.

| 2.5.1. | The impact assessment found that option 3 was the most suitable as it provides the best balance between effectiveness, efficiency and proportionality on the one hand, and the various economic, social and environmental impacts anticipated on the other. |
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2.5.1.

| 2.6. | On 25 May 2022, the Commission proposed a new Directive on asset recovery and confiscation that would replace the current Confiscation Directive, the Council Decision on Asset Recovery Offices and Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA (10). The set goal is to establish common standards for asset tracing and identification, freezing, management and confiscation in a single instrument that would further ensure a more coherent and strategic approach for all actors in the asset recovery system. |
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2.6.

2.   General and specific comments

| 3.1. | The proposed Directive’s general approach is consistent with its aims to strengthen competent authorities’ abilities to, firstly, identify, freeze and manage illicit assets; secondly, reinforce and extend illicit asset confiscation capabilities; and, lastly, improve cooperation between all authorities involved in asset recovery. |
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3.1.

| 3.2. | The proposed Directive is likely to make asset recovery mechanisms more efficient and effective by imposing a core set of minimum rules on the tracing and identification, freezing, confiscation and management of property in criminal matters, and to facilitate the implementation of EU restrictive measures where necessary. However, additional legislation and measures on violations of EU restrictive measures should accompany the proposed Directive and the Commission should carefully assess the possibility of preventing the weakening of the Asset Recovery Offices’ capacity to fulfil their core mandate. |
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3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC believes that the proposed provision that each Member State adopt a national strategy on asset recovery will establish a more strategic approach in this area, promote greater cooperation between the relevant authorities and provide a clear overview of the results of asset recovery. |
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3.3.

| 3.4. | The broadened scope of the confiscation mechanisms will allow national judicial authorities to apply extended confiscation to a larger set of crimes than under the Confiscation Directive currently in place. The EESC welcomes the proposed Directive’s broader scope as it fills a gap in the Confiscation Directive as regards a significant list of crimes, including environmental crimes, organ trafficking, trafficking of cultural goods, kidnapping, illegal restraint or hostage-taking, and trafficking in stolen vehicles to the extent that the offence is committed by a criminal organisation. At the same time, the proposed Directive does not explicitly include migrant smuggling and illicit tobacco trade despite the significant annual revenues of these criminal markets (an estimated EUR 289,4 million and EUR 8 309,3 million respectively (11)). |
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3.4.

| 3.5. | Giving the relevant authorities immediate and direct access to the information of other national authorities such as tax and fiscal offices or national real estate registers will enhance Asset Recovery Offices’ capacity to act and react effectively and in a timely manner. At the same time, public access to information should also be ensured without prejudice to ongoing proceedings at both national and EU level. |
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3.5.

| 3.6. | The proposed Directive extends the list of situations for non-conviction-based confiscation measures grounded in criminal proceedings to other cases in which a criminal conviction is not possible due to objective circumstances with immunity, amnesty and lapse of a statute of limitations. The EESC recognises the efforts made by the Commission in imposing limits on these cases as they might be abused or used for the purposes of harassment or persecution. |
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3.6.

| 3.7. | The proposed Directive includes a new confiscation mechanism ensuring the confiscation of assets not directly linked to a crime listed in the Directive but based on a suspicion of unlawful property/resulting from criminal activities. Despite the mandatory judicial procedure preceding the confiscation order and the burden of proof for the prosecution to link the asset in question to criminal activity, more guarantees are required to exclude any possible abuses during the procedure. National jurisdictions follow different routes varying from confiscation under civil law to criminal law. The proposed Directive should include standards for defendants’ procedural rights and safeguards, and make sure that appropriate training is available for judges and prosecutors. |
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3.7.

| 3.8. | The limited impact of the social reuse provision in the Confiscation Directive would require more encouragement for the Member States to include adequate measures to ensure the provision’s effectiveness. The EESC asks the European Commission to be more ambitious in its efforts to make the social reuse of confiscated assets effective and set a minimum percentage for social reuse for Member States. It is of paramount importance for social cohesion that affected communities get restorative damages directly and benefit from the returns from these damages. Moreover, communities need better assistance to help enhance their resilience to organised crime and civil society has to be involved in managing and disposing of confiscated assets. |
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3.8.

| 3.9. | As also stated in the Confiscation Directive, victims’ right to compensation will not be affected by the confiscation measures. However, the proposed Directive still does not safeguard the prioritisation of victims’ compensation in the ranking of creditors. At the same time, citizens of third countries are insufficiently protected by the proposed Directive and other EU legislation as their focus is on EU citizens. |
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3.9.

| 3.10. | The impact assessment report points out the following shortcomings: a lack of details on the roles of the Asset Recovery Offices, and insufficient human, financial and technical resources allocated to asset tracing. The proposed Directive responds to these findings and requires at least one recovery office to be established in each Member State. The explicit obligation to provide adequate resources to ensure that Asset Recovery Offices are efficient and effective is welcome. However, this obligation should be accompanied by regular reporting from the national level to the Commission regarding the resources allotted so that the Commission can evaluate whether there is any fragmentation or lack of balance between the various Asset Recovery Offices. |
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3.10.

| 3.11. | The costs associated with the management of frozen and/or confiscated assets may be significant or even exceed the value of the relevant asset. The proposed Directive includes an obligation for the competent authorities to assess the costs before issuing a freezing order. The EESC welcomes this measure as an efficient and useful instrument meant to reduce the necessary costs and maximise the subsequent value of the asset. |
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3.11.

| 3.12. | The interlocutory sales mechanism may be applied in limited cases, which are now listed in the proposed Directive, and is likely to contribute to more effective management of the frozen assets. Despite the fact that the mechanism is available in most Member States, it is used on a small scale and with great variation. The proposed Directive is likely to enhance the use of this mechanism by introducing a single definition and the conditions under which it should be used. |
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3.12.

| 3.13. | The absence of comprehensive and comparable statistics was found to be a major shortcoming in making the asset recovery system more effective. In this respect, the proposed Directive requires each Member State to establish an asset recovery registry that will collect encoded information from competent authorities throughout the asset recovery process. |
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3.13.

| 3.14. | The EESC believes that unifying all relevant legal provisions for asset recovery in a single Directive is in line with the Commission’s Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme (REFIT) and will help the relevant authorities and stakeholders understand the rules better and help improve the implementation and effectiveness of measures meant to increase the illicit asset recovery rate in national jurisdictions. |
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3.14.

| 3.15. | Asset Management Offices will be specialised bodies set up or designated in each Member State to ensure the efficient management of frozen and confiscated property, and to cooperate with other competent authorities responsible for tracing, identifying, freezing, confiscating and managing either at national level or in cross-border cases. The proposed Directive is more precise in laying down the offices’ roles and tasks and provides more clarity to the Member States in defining their asset recovery infrastructure. |
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3.15.

| 3.16. | Asset disposal or return in cross-border proceedings should be subject to asset-sharing agreements to be signed by the relevant Member States. National systems may vary significantly in terms of the type of authorities and procedures needed to engage in such agreements. The proposed Directive does not entail specific provisions in this matter. Therefore, it should explicitly give Asset Recovery and Management Offices relevant competences in this regard. |
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3.16.

| 3.17. | Cooperation with third countries is particularly important as organised crime also exists beyond the EU and poses significant risks to the EU’s internal security. As organised crime has become more interconnected, international and digital, it is important to ensure that authorities in third countries are able to cooperate with their peers in the Member States. Various assistance and support instruments should be considered in order to further enforce the proposed Directive. |
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3.17.

| 3.18. | The consultation instruments used by the Commission prior to the proposed Directive were inclusive and suited to the variety of stakeholders — in particular, the relevant authorities, professionals, business organisations, civil society organisations and the general public — in terms of duration and methods. The EESC recognises the Commission’s efforts to make available reliable data and information on the state of affairs and progress of the Member States and of the EU as a whole in the field of illicit asset recovery. Similar efforts are expected to be undertaken while the Directive is being transposed into national legislation and while its implementation is being evaluated. |
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3.18.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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(1)  Europol, Does crime still pay? Criminal Asset Recovery in the EU — Survey of statistical information 2010-2014, 2016.

1

Does crime still pay? Criminal Asset Recovery in the EU

(2)  Commission Communication on the EU Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (COM(2021) 170, 14.4.2021).

2

(3)  Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ L 127, 29.4.2014, p. 39).

3

(4)  Council Decision 2007/845/JHA of 6 December 2007 concerning cooperation between Asset Recovery Offices of the Member States in the field of tracing and identification of proceeds from, or other property related to, crime (OJ L 332, 18.12.2007, p. 103).

4

(5)  Some of the relevant EESC opinions: opinion on the Security Union Package (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 69), the series of opinions on the legislation on anti-money laundering, the most recent being the opinion on the 2021 Anti-Money Laundering Legislative Package (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 89), the opinion on the Strategy to tackle Organised Crime 2021-2025 (OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 91), the opinion on Strengthening of Europol’s mandate (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 66), the opinion on controls on cash entering or leaving the Union (OJ C 246, 28.7.2017, p. 22), the opinion on the European Agenda on Security (OJ C 177, 18.5.2016, p. 51) and the Opinion on An open and secure Europe (OJ C 451, 16.12.2014, p. 96).

5

(6)  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council, Asset recovery and confiscation — Ensuring that crime does not pay, COM(2020) 217 final.

6

(7)  In line with the Council conclusions on enhancing financial investigations to fight serious and organised crime Council document 8927/20, 17 June 2020.

7

Council conclusions on enhancing financial investigations to fight serious and organised crime

(8)  Have your say: Fighting organised crime — strengthening the mandate of EU Asset Recovery Offices.

8

(9)  European Commission, IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on asset recovery and confiscation (2022).

9

(10)  Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property (OJ L 68, 15.3.2005, p. 49).

10

(11)  European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, Mapping the risk of serious and organised crime infiltrating legitimate businesses: final report, Disley, E. (editor), Blondes, E. (editor), Hulme, S. (editor), Publications Office, 2021.

11

Mapping the risk of serious and organised crime infiltrating legitimate businesses: final report

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/111 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/111

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market (European Media Freedom Act) and amending Directive 2010/13/EU’

(COM(2022) 457 final — 2022/0277 (COD))

(2023/C 100/17)

| Rapporteur: | Christian MOOS |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Tomasz Andrzej WRÓBLEWSKI |

Rapporteur:

Christian MOOS

Co-rapporteur:

Tomasz Andrzej WRÓBLEWSKI

| Referral | European Parliament, 17.10.2022
  Council of the European Union, 28.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 23.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 155/0/3 |

Referral

European Parliament, 17.10.2022

Council of the European Union, 28.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

23.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

155/0/3

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | Media freedom and diversity are of fundamental importance for the rule of law and liberal democracy. The EESC deplores worrying developments within in the EU. Therefore, it welcomes the European Commission’s initiatives for media freedom. |
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1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC is concerned about whether the completion of the internal media market is a sufficient approach for protecting media freedom and pluralism. The main goal should be to preserve or restore media freedom and diversity, without forgetting that economic well-being is connected to media freedom. |
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1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC welcomes the European Commission’s acknowledgement that media market concentration leading to monopolies can be a massive threat to media freedom and plurality. However, market concentration can be meaningful, and does not have to have such negative effects. |
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1.3.

| 1.4. | Mere recommendations and a soft-law approach are not enough. Free and independent media must be a binding criterion for the rule of law report and mechanism. |
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1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC welcomes proposals to strengthen and defend editorial independence. It stresses the need for upholding journalist and publishers’ independence. |
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1.5.

| 1.6. | Public media only make sense if they are impartial and entirely independent of political influence. Adequate and stable financial resources are a crucial safeguard in this respect, if an effective system of controls guarantees the effectiveness of spending. |
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1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC considers binding requirements for transparency of media ownership important. For small media outlets the established requirements must not lead to an excessive administrative burden. |
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1.7.

| 1.8. | The EESC is concerned about the lack of independence of some national regulatory bodies, and calls for a framework ensuring their independence. |
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1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC welcomes the creation of a European board for media services, but insists on its full independence, as the EU should act as a best-practice example with a view to achieving the full independence of national regulatory bodies. The participation of national regulatory bodies that are not independent is ill-advised. |
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1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC underlines the importance of transparency in all processes related to content moderation on very large online platforms. |
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1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC recommends defining EU-wide minimum standards in accordance with the EU’s current anti-concentration law provisions. It calls upon legislators to adopt binding regulations with due respect to entrepreneurial freedom and to avoiding unnecessary bureaucracy and costs. |
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1.11.

| 1.12. | Where national regulators fail to sufficiently assess the media market concentration, the European Commission should react in accordance with the existing provisions of EU anti-concentration law. |
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1.12.

| 1.13. | The EESC welcomes binding transparency requirements with regard to the allocation of State advertising. |
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1.13.

| 1.14. | The EESC welcomes annual monitoring and calls for relevant stakeholders and civil society to be consulted. It proposes widening the monitoring scope and including any other aspect relevant to the protection of media freedom and plurality. |
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1.14.

2.   General comments

| 2.1. | The EESC reiterates its recent position on the importance of media freedom and diversity for liberal democracy and the rule of law, to which all Member States are committed by the ratification of the EU Treaties as laid down in the comprehensive own-initiative opinion on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (1), in its opinion on the European democracy action plan (2) and in that on strategic lawsuits against public participation (3). |
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2.1.

| 2.2. | European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen correctly stated in her 2021 State of the Union address (4) that information is a public good. Without free access to independent and reliable information, EU citizens cannot exercise their right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, guaranteed by Article 10 TEU. |
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2.2.

| 2.3. | In general, Europe remains a continent with free and diverse media. However, recent developments within the EU are alarming. The protection of journalists, most notably due to the lack of anti-SLAPP instruments, remains a major concern with regard to effective regulatory safeguards protecting media freedom. The Media Pluralism Monitor 2022 (5) also found that market plurality faces the highest level of risks of all areas covered by the study. As political independence has not made any progress in recent years, the monitor highlights the lack of efficient mechanisms to protect editorial autonomy in most countries as a major obstacle to improvements in this area. |
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2.3.

| 2.4. | In addition to internal threats to media freedom, the EU is confronted with external interference trying to manipulate public debates in Europe. Against the backdrop of rising geopolitical tensions, the protection of media freedom and media pluralism is an important contribution to the EU’s resilience against external threats. |
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2.4.

| 2.5. | However, a few positive developments also show that EU legislation can make a difference. The Media Pluralism Monitor 2022 found a positive development with regards to the indicator ‘Protection of the right to information’ in four countries, attributing this improvement to the transposition of EU Directive 2019/1937 (6) on the protection of whistleblowers. |
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2.5.

| 2.6. | Therefore, the EESC welcomes in principle the Commission initiative for a European Media Freedom Act (7) and the Commission recommendation on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector (8) as the next consequential step towards protecting media freedom and media pluralism, and thus liberal democracy in the EU. |
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2.6.

| 2.7. | The EESC underlines the importance of the European Media Freedom Act being a regulation with direct effect, while questioning whether the soft-law approach of the recommendation is an effective way to achieve its objectives. Mere recommendations are not enough to guarantee media freedom and diversity in the Member States. Free and independent media must be binding criteria for the rule of law report and for triggering the mechanism in Member States where governments violate media freedoms and independence. |
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2.7.

| 2.8. | The legal basis for the regulation is Article 114 TFEU, which allows for the approximation of national laws aimed at the establishment and functioning of the internal market. Since the underlying problems and shortcomings are highly political in nature and related to the functioning of democratic systems based on the rule of law, the EESC is concerned about whether the completion of the internal media market is a sufficient approach to protecting media freedom and pluralism. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

| 2.9. | The proposal for a regulation has five distinct objectives: a) to harmonise national rules and procedures to overcome obstacles that hinder media companies from operating and investing in the internal market; b) to remove glass ceilings that restrict foreign publishers from investing in local national markets; c) to strengthen editorial freedom of all media, without at the same time restricting the rights of private publishers; d) to guarantee the independence of public media by a construction of permanent mechanisms free from the influence of politicians; and e) to regulate the allocation of economic resources, i.e. state advertising. The EESC questions the hierarchy of the listed objectives. It believes that the main goal should be to preserve or restore media freedom and diversity, rather than focusing on economic issues unless they are clearly related to media freedom. |
| --- | --- |

2.9.

| 2.10. | It is clear from the regulation that the Commission wants to focus on the ‘distortions’ of the internal market and open up the media market to greater cross-border competition, especially for audiovisual media services and video exchange. Therefore, the actual scope of the regulation is much narrower than its title suggests. The EESC believes this approach to be insufficient to effectively defend and where necessary restore media freedom and plurality which is under attack in almost all Member States and basically abolished in some severe cases with all the devastating consequences this entails for the work and security of journalists and the integrity of public debate and information. With the opening of the market, it is necessary to ensure the same standards of protection of free speech to ensure that wider market access does not entail monopolisation of the market by foreign players, particularly in the case of poorer countries. |
| --- | --- |

2.10.

| 2.11. | The EESC welcomes proposals to strengthen and defend editorial independence. It also stresses the need for upholding journalists’ and publishers’ independence, i.e. the right of publishers to formulate an editorial line of publication. The EESC has observed more and more political and economic influence in several EU countries, both in public media and in private media with close links to power. This is incompatible with the role of the media as the fourth estate. The regulation does not specify how editorial independence can be reconciled with the legitimate rights and interests of publishers/private media owners. |
| --- | --- |

2.11.

| 2.12. | The EESC supports measures enhancing resilience against foreign information manipulation and interference, as long as this does not affect freedom of expression inside the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

2.12.

| 2.13. | The European Media Freedom Act identifies the need for funding of the media sector, as suggested by the EESC in its opinion on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (9). However, the given tools are as yet insufficient to secure quality journalism and media diversity in the Member States. At the same time, the EESC believes that the best conditions for media freedom are a regulatory framework that allows media outlets to finance themselves through their offer on the market. Public media only make sense if they are impartial and entirely independent of political influence, otherwise public financing can lead to all sorts of abuses and government manipulations. Any media financing project should be based on very transparent rules and guarantees of political independence for journalists. |
| --- | --- |

2.13.

| 2.14. | The EESC supports the final report of the Conference on the Future of Europe (10) and its strong plea for the promotion of media independence and pluralism (proposals 27(1) and 37(4)), which the Commission quotes without following the prioritisation these proposals entail. |
| --- | --- |

2.14.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | The EESC welcomes the right of the recipients of media services and media service providers ‘to receive a plurality of news and current affairs content, produced with respect for editorial freedom of media service providers, to the benefit of the public discourse’, as laid down in Article 3. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The EESC questions the narrow scope of Article 4(2)(c) addressing only the deployment of spyware (only ‘product[s] with digital elements’), and proposes to prohibit the deployment of any device or technology which can be used for surveillance. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC underlines the importance of safeguards for the independence of public service media providers and adequate and stable financial resources for them (Article 5), however, there should be an effective system of controls safeguarding the effectiveness of spending the resources. The EESC considers an independent body the best option to define the adequate amount of funding which is necessary to allow public service media providers to fulfil their mission, provided it may not be politically appointed. Current tendencies to politicise the question of funding for public service media providers is a considerable threat to media freedom. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC considers that the duties of media service providers as defined in Article 6(1) fall short of providing transparency of media ownership. Intransparency in media ownership is an important reason for lack of editorial freedom and quality journalism (in line with journalistic standards). Media service providers as well as online platforms must make their ownership transparent to the media users. The protection of data and of privacy must not hinder media ownership transparency. For small media outlets the established requirements must not lead to an excessive administrative burden. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC recommends complementing the binding transparency requirements mentioned in No 20 of the Commission Recommendation with additional requirements mentioned in No 4.1 to 4.6 of the appendix to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership (11). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC sees some danger of the soft-law approach of the Commission Recommendation resulting in a regulatory patchwork undermining the integrity of the common market and the objectives of the directive. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC considers the reference of Article 7 to the requirements set out in Article 30 of Directive 2010/13/EU (12) as too vague to ensure the independence of national regulatory authorities or bodies. Therefore, recommends defining a framework ensuring the independence of national regulatory bodies and instruments to remedy any lack of independence of a national regulatory body. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | The EESC considers it unacceptable for a representative of a national authority or body, which is not fully independent, to participate in the decision-making of the proposed European Board for Media Services. In order to assess the independence of national authorities or bodies, clear criteria need to be defined in the regulation. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | The EESC does not consider the proposed European Board for Media Services to be independent from the European Commission, and calls upon the European legislator to ensure full independence of the board. If the board is not fully independent of the European Commission, it may not exercise any supervisory or regulatory tasks. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC recommends reformulating Article 10(5) as follows: ‘The Commission shall designate a representative to the Board. The representative of the Commission can participate in the meetings of the Board, without voting rights’. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | The EESC recommends reformulating Article 10(6) as follows: ‘The Board may invite experts and observers to attend its meetings’. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | With regard to Article 11, the EESC rejects the Commission’s decision for sub-option A to establish the European Board for Media Services supported by a Commission secretariat. Only sub-option B to establish the European Board for Media Services, assisted by an independent EU office, can guarantee the board’s independence. |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | The EESC welcomes the structured dialogue with all stakeholders and explicitly civil society, as mentioned in Article 12(l). The EESC, representing the most important sectors of civil society (including the social partners), can contribute with its expertise to this structured dialogue. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | The EESC welcomes structured cooperation, including mutual assistance, between national regulatory authorities and bodies. However, the EESC recommends broadening the scope of Article 13(2) beyond risks to the functioning of the internal market for media services and public security and defence, and also include other risks to the freedom and diversity of media, as well as risks to the political independence of the regulatory authorities and bodies. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The EESC welcomes efforts for better protection of the content of media service providers on very large online platforms as laid down in Article 17, and underlines the importance of transparency in all processes related to content moderation on very large online platforms, providing that the obligations referred to in this paragraph do not disturb the functioning of the large online platforms. The EESC welcomes the structured dialogue provided for in Article 18, and underlines the importance of involving civil society in the review of the application of Article 17. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | The EESC welcomes users’ right to customise audiovisual media default settings, as laid down in Article 19. To put this right into practice, the user-friendliness of devices and/or user interfaces is of crucial importance. However, the operational ability of the manufacturers and developers should not be infringed, or their future development limited. They have to be designed in a user-friendly way, in simple language. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | The EESC proposes also granting the European Board for Media Services (under Article 20(4)) the right to draw up an own-initiative opinion where a national legislative, regulatory or administrative measure is likely to affect the functioning of the internal market for media services. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

| 3.18. | The EESC reiterates its previously expressed concern that a purely market-based approach to securing the plurality and freedom of media in Europe is not sufficient. While acknowledging that the size of companies in the market for media services can contribute to the economic sustainability of media service providers, the EESC welcomes the European Commission’s acknowledgment that media market concentration can be a substantial threat to media freedom and plurality. |
| --- | --- |

3.18.

| 3.19. | The EESC welcomes the measures proposed in Article 21 to increase the transparency of market concentration as a first step to containing threats to media freedom and media pluralism resulting from concentration in the media market. Market concentration does not necessarily have a negative effect on media freedom and diversity where, for example, it helps smaller media outlets to survive, but it is necessary to act against concentration where it leads to information monopolies. The EU must take action in particular against media capture by media moguls and oligarchs who are often in close relations with leading politicians in the country, or even governments of third countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.19.

| 3.20. | The EESC reminds of the fact that media markets remain highly fragmented, and calls for measuring market concentration not only in reference to the national market for media services, but also for fragmented markets on the subnational or district level. Media market concentration in districts with only one regional media outlet poses a substantial threat to media freedom and pluralism. |
| --- | --- |

3.20.

| 3.21. | The EESC considers Commission guidelines ‘on the factors to be taken into account when applying the criteria for assessing the impact of media market concentrations’ as insufficient for ensuring the comparability of assessments across the whole EU. The EESC recommends defining EU-wide minimum standards for the assessments, which need to be respected in all Member States. Member States are invited to provide more detailed and in-depth assessments in addition to EU minimum requirements. |
| --- | --- |

3.21.

| 3.22. | However, non-binding transparency requirements fall short regarding the current threat posed by market concentration to media freedom and media plurality. Therefore, the EESC calls upon European legislators to adopt binding regulations concerning the concentration of media, with due respect to the freedom of entrepreneurial decisions. This cannot, however, burden media or media institutions with additional bureaucracy and costly procedures. |
| --- | --- |

3.22.

| 3.23. | The EESC recommends also granting the European Board for Media Services (under Article 22) the right to draw up an own-initiative opinion ‘[i]n the absence of an assessment or a consultation pursuant to Article 21’. It is insufficient to delegate the task of market concentration assessment to the Member States, since some governments are actively supporting market concentration in order to silence critical voices and oppositional media outlets. |
| --- | --- |

3.23.

| 3.24. | The EESC reminds of the fact that distortions in the internal market for media services also affect the freedom and plurality of media, if these distortions are limited to specific parts of the common market, on national, regional or even district level. In all these cases, the Board must have the right to initiate an assessment of the media concentration if national regulatory authorities or bodies fail to do so. |
| --- | --- |

3.24.

| 3.25. | The EESC recommends assigning the European Board for Media Services the task to conduct assessments addressing other threats to media freedom and pluralism if national regulatory authorities or bodies fail to do so. |
| --- | --- |

3.25.

| 3.26. | The EESC welcomes the binding transparency requirements of Article 24 with regard to the allocation of state advertising. However, it considers the exemption for territorial entities of more than 1 million inhabitants from the requirements as a loophole to avoid transparency. Acknowledging the fact that the administrative burden related to reporting requirements has to be proportionate, the EESC proposes defining a minimum threshold for the amount of spending by one national, regional, or local government. If the total annual spending on state advertising by one entity remains below the threshold, transparency requirements are not applicable. |
| --- | --- |

3.26.

| 3.27. | The EESC welcomes the annual monitoring provided for in Article 25, and calls for the consultation of relevant stakeholders and civil society during the monitoring exercise. Limiting the subject of the monitoring exercise to the functioning of the internal market for media services is, however, insufficient. Therefore, the EESC proposes widening the scope of the monitoring exercise to also cover any other aspect relevant to the protection of media freedom and plurality. The EESC recommends assigning the European Board for Media Services the task to develop a set of indicators for the monitoring exercise. |
| --- | --- |

3.27.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (Own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 9).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the European Democracy Action Plan’ (COM(2020) 790 final) (OJ C 341, 24.8.2021, p. 56).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation”)’ (COM(2022) 177 final — 2022/0117 COD)) (OJ C 75, 28.2.2023, p. 143).

3

(4)  European Commission, 2021, State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen, Strasbourg, 15 September 2021.

4

(5)  European University Institute, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the year 2021, San Domenico di Fiesole 2022.

5

Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the year 2021, San Domenico di Fiesole 2022

(6)  Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019, pp. 17).

6

(7)  COM(2022) 457.

7

(8)  Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/1634 of 16 September 2022 on internal safeguards for editorial independence and ownership transparency in the media sector (OJ L 245, 22.9.2022, p. 56).

8

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Securing media freedom and diversity in Europe (Own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 517, 22.12.2021, p. 9).

9

(10)  Conference on the Future of Europe, Report on the final outcome, May 2022.

10

Report on the final outcome

(11)  Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1[1] of the Committee of Ministers to member States on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership, 7 March 2018, https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=0900001680790e13

11

(12)  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) (OJ L 95, 15.4.2010, p. 1).

12

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/118 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/118

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on working towards an asbestos-free future: a European approach to addressing the health risks of asbestos’

(COM(2022) 488 final)

and on ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/148/EC on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work’

(COM(2022) 489 final — 2022/0298 (COD))

(2023/C 100/18)

| Rapporteur: | Ellen NYGREN |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Ellen NYGREN

| Referral | European Parliament, 6.10.2022
  Council of the European Union, 7.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 153(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted in section | 23.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 155/9/49 |

Referral

European Parliament, 6.10.2022

Council of the European Union, 7.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 153(2)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted in section

23.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

155/9/49

1.   Summary and recommendations

| 1.1. | The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) welcomes the Commission’s ambition to reduce the incidence of cancer, and its specific efforts to minimise exposure to asbestos at work. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Science shows that there is no level of asbestos exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. The EESC, like the European Parliament, therefore recommends that the technical limit value for asbestos exposure under the Directive on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work should ultimately be set at a lower level than the Commission is currently proposing, and that a roadmap of complementary measures over and above the Commission’s proposals should be drawn up in order to achieve that objective. The roadmap should include financial support for businesses and regions that need it in order to meet the targets. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC proposes a broad public information campaign on asbestos and its deadly risks. There is also a need for training for all workers at risk of exposure to asbestos, provided in the worker’s native language or another language in which they are proficient. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC recommends that all workers suspected of being at risk of asbestos exposure should undergo checks, and that a log/passport documenting asbestos exposure should accompany workers when they change their place of work, in order to monitor workers’ health. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | International regulatory cooperation is needed to effectively address the risks posed by asbestos. The EESC draws particular attention to ILO Convention No 162 and the Rotterdam Convention. In the context of their discussion and implementation, the EU and its Member States should play an active and leading role in promoting better developments in all countries of the world and in international trade chains. EU free trade agreements with other countries and regions should include requirements to step up efforts to ban the use of asbestos and reduce its harmful effects in all countries of the world. The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to actively promote an international ban on the use of asbestos and protection for workers dealing with existing asbestos during activities such as renovation, demolition and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

2.   Background and general comments

2.1.   Asbestos ban in the EU

| 2.1.1. | Asbestos is a hazardous substance that causes cancer; this has been known for decades. Over the last 40 years, the EU has taken various measures to restrict, and subsequently completely ban, the use of asbestos. In 1999 it banned asbestos fibres of all kinds; this ban entered fully into force in 2005, and applies both to goods produced in the EU and to goods imported into the EU. Directive 2009/148/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) codified the existing rules on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.1.

| 2.1.2. | As asbestos has been used in the construction industry for a relatively long time, there are still a large number of buildings containing asbestos. Depending on the type of work being carried out, these hazardous substances may be activated during renovations and demolitions. Asbestos is also present in other sectors, such as mining and extractive industries, waste management and vehicle maintenance. Thus, despite the current ban on the use of new asbestos, there are still large amounts of work where workers are exposed to asbestos. In addition to the workers reported in official statistics, there are also an unrecorded number of third-country nationals who are not always covered by EU and national public statistics. The Commission states that the 2009 Directive on the protection of workers from exposure to asbestos at work is still relevant for the most part, but proposes to update it in the light of the latest scientific knowledge in this field. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.2.

| 2.1.3. | The EESC has adopted two opinions on related topics: CCMI/130 on Freeing the EU from asbestos (2) and CCMI/166 on Working with asbestos in energy renovation (3). It argues that the total removal of all used asbestos and all asbestos containing products has to be a priority target of the European Union, and encourages the EU to work with the social partners and other stakeholders, including relevant civil society organisations, at European, national and regional level to develop and share action plans for asbestos removal and management. However, in the current circumstances, it is still difficult to reach an ‘asbestos free’ objective rapidly. Therefore, in some EU countries or regions, decision-makers have opted for an ‘asbestos-safe’ strategy. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.3.

| 2.1.4. | The current Commission proposal reduces the technical limit for airborne asbestos from 0,1 fibres per cm3 to 0,01 fibres per cm3 as an 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA). |
| --- | --- |

2.1.4.

2.2.   The EU’s ambition to fight cancer

| 2.2.1. | Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan was presented in 2021 as a multifaceted way to fight cancer. In its opinion SOC/677 (4), the EESC welcomed the plan, an important part of which is action for the primary prevention of cancer. In this vein, it should be seen as an effective option to take action against exposure to asbestos, a subject that is already well known, as such action specifically reduces the risk of new cancer cases and existing research has already identified asbestos exposure as the main cause of work-related cancer. As the risk factors of mesothelioma are multicausal (e.g. nanofibers beside asbestos) EESC proposes that people working in asbestos exposure should receive a document about the fact of exposure. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.1.

| 2.2.2. | In this context, it is worth pointing out that even the general public may be exposed to asbestos without being workers, for example by being in a place close to an ongoing refurbishment or demolition. It may also be the case for private individuals who renovate their own homes without having the expertise or knowledge of the risks involved. In addition, asbestos may be released in ventilation systems and cause people to be exposed without their knowledge. The EESC therefore recommends educating the public through all possible channels, including the media, which have a high degree of responsibility here. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.2.

2.3.   General comments

| 2.3.1. | The EESC supports the Commission’s ambition to combat cancer in various ways. Limiting the risks of exposure to asbestos is a concrete step towards reducing cancer cases. We have extensive scientific knowledge about the dangers of asbestos and the direct link between asbestos exposure and cancer. Based on the latest scientific knowledge that the Commission has gathered in this area, it is now proposed to proceed with updating the legal framework accordingly. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.1.

| 2.3.2. | Every case of cancer entails costs for society, as well as suffering and loss for individuals. By limiting exposure to asbestos at work, a significant number of cancer cases can be avoided. The EESC therefore calls on all stakeholders to make every effort to combat exposure to asbestos. This applies in particular to protecting workers who are exposed to asbestos exposure in the course of their work, but also to disseminating general knowledge in order to raise public awareness of the risks posed by asbestos. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.2.

3.   Specific comments

| 3.1. | Lowering the technical limit for tolerated quantities of airborne asbestos fibres is the most ambitious measure the EU can take when amending the Directive. The EESC welcomes the Commission’s initiative and believes that it provides a good basis for moving forward in the longer term towards zero tolerance of exposure to asbestos at work. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.1.1. | The Commission proposes to amend Article 8 to reduce the limit from 0,1 fibres per cm3 as an eight-hour time-weighted average (TWA). The directive also states that the exposure of workers to dust arising from asbestos or materials containing asbestos at the place of work must be reduced to a minimum and in any case to as low a level as is technically possible below the limit value laid down in in Article 8. In this context, the EESC points out that the social partners can go beyond the new limit that will apply under the Directive and take appropriate measures to further reduce the presence of asbestos fibres in workplaces. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.1.

| 3.1.2. | According to the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)), there is no level of exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. At the EESC hearing on 31 October 2022, Prof. Jukka Takala showed that about 90 370 people die each year in the EU from asbestos-related cancer, demonstrating the need for a reduced limit value. Therefore, the EESC believes that the EU should go beyond what is proposed by the Commission and that the technical limit should ultimately be set at 0,001 fibres/cm3, after a reasonable transition period. A roadmap to achieve this should be established, containing proposed measures — including financial ones — to support businesses and regions that need such measures to meet the targets. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.2.

| 3.2. | Before starting renovation or demolition work, the employer is expected to identify which materials may contain asbestos. This requires the employer to be able to access and use sources of information from the property owner and other available sources, or alternatively screening the building. The EESC advocates the introduction of registers to gather information on each property in this respect, starting with those that are undergoing renovation with a view to gradually expanding to include other buildings. This information should be organised by the Member States in a manner agreed jointly within the EU in order to obtain comparable data on where asbestos is deemed to be present (country/locality/functionality of a building/part of a building) and in what quantities (approximation of asbestos forms and quantity per square meter), etc. The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) could be asked to contribute to the development of a harmonised regulatory framework for the property register. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Training of workers at risk of exposure to asbestos is important. The EESC highlights that it is of the utmost importance for such training to be given in the worker’s native language or another language in which they are proficient, including in cases where the workers come from a country other than where they work and may therefore not have a good command of the language of their country of work. This applies both to EU citizens and to workers from non-EU countries. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC also recommends informing the general public more broadly about asbestos and its risks in order to raise awareness of this among both workers and commissioners of work that may involve the handling of asbestos, as well as individuals and authorities lacking more in-depth knowledge of the topic. The EESC calls on the Commission to organise an information campaign on asbestos and its deadly risks, in cooperation with the Member States, the social partners and relevant civil society organisations. The EESC could be the platform for an international conference to raise awareness of asbestos and its harmful effects and how these can be avoided. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | Occupational health services have the duty to effectuate work ability examinations (preliminary, periodically and final) of workers exposed to asbestos, and these certificates are presented to the employer. When asbestos exposure is over, the result of the final examination is presented both to employer and employee and a special documentation, log/passport documenting asbestos exposure that follows the workers throughout their whole life in order to monitor their health and to be able to identify cases of work-related illness, of the possible late effects of the asbestos exposure where necessary. This documentation must be presented to both employers and workers, and it must also cover undocumented and migrant workers, and it is given to the worker, in order to be presented in all further medical examination to ensure lifetime follow up of the possible late effects of the asbestos exposure. The EESC calls on the EU and the Member States to promote access to occupational health services specialised in this field. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Occupational injury insurance must cover cases of illness arising from exposure to asbestos. The EESC recommends that the EU and the Member States work to ensure that cancer cases arising from suspected exposure to asbestos are treated with a presumption of correlation when assessing entitlement to compensation from occupational injury insurance, as there is extensive and clear scientific evidence of the relationship between asbestos exposure and cancer. An international solidarity fund should be raised up to ensure the right to compensation. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | It is advisable for the Member States to cooperate, via the labour inspectorates to verify that adequate training is given to workers at risk of asbestos exposure in construction, mining and extractive industries, transport, road and tunnel construction, and waste management. Cooperation can ensure that relevant registers of buildings containing asbestos are maintained and made available nationally and within the EU. The EESC points out that there must be enough labour inspectors (i.e. health and safety inspectors) to carry out these tasks. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | International regulatory cooperation is needed to effectively address the risks posed by asbestos. In this context, we would point out that ILO Convention No 162 and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade are examples of existing regulatory frameworks within which the EU and its Member States can and should play an active and leading role in promoting better developments with regard to asbestos in all countries of the world and in international trade chains. EU free trade agreements with other countries and regions should include requirements to step up efforts to ban the use of asbestos and reduce its harmful effects in all countries of the world. The EESC calls on the EU and its Member States to actively promote an international ban on the use of asbestos and protection for workers dealing with existing asbestos during activities such as renovation, demolition and waste management. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Directive 2009/148/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2009 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to asbestos at work (OJ L 330, 16.12.2009, p. 28).

1

(2)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Freeing the EU from asbestos’ (OJ C 251, 31.7.2015, p. 13).

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Working with Asbestos in Energy Renovation’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 240, 16.7.2019, p. 15).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions — Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan (OJ C 97, 28.2.2022, p. 17).

4

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ANNEX

The following amendments, which received at least a quarter of the votes cast, were rejected during the discussion (Rule 43(2) of the Rules of Procedure):

Amendment 1

Point 3.1.2

Amend as follows:

| Section opinion | Amendment |
| --- | --- |
| According to the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)), there is no level of exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. At the EESC hearing on 31 October 2022, Prof. Jukka Takala showed that about 90 370 people die each year in the EU from asbestos-related cancer, demonstrating the need for a reduced limit value. Therefore, the EESC
  believes that the EU should go beyond what is proposed by
  the Commission and that the technical limit should
  ultimately
  be
  set at 0,001 fibres/cm 3,
  after a reasonable transition period. A roadmap to achieve this should be established, containing proposed measures — including financial ones — to support businesses and regions that need such measures to meet the targets. | According to the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)), there is no level of exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. At the EESC hearing on 31 October 2022, Prof. Jukka Takala showed that about 90 370 people die each year in the EU from asbestos-related cancer, demonstrating the need for a reduced limit value. Therefore, the EESC
  welcomes
  the Commission
  proposal
  and
  believes
  that the technical limit should be
  further reduced
  after a reasonable transition period. A roadmap to achieve this should be established, containing proposed measures — including financial ones — to support businesses and regions that need such measures to meet the targets. |

Section opinion

Amendment

According to the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)), there is no level of exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. At the EESC hearing on 31 October 2022, Prof. Jukka Takala showed that about 90 370 people die each year in the EU from asbestos-related cancer, demonstrating the need for a reduced limit value. Therefore, the EESC
  believes that the EU should go beyond what is proposed by
  the Commission and that the technical limit should
  ultimately
  be
  set at 0,001 fibres/cm 3,
  after a reasonable transition period. A roadmap to achieve this should be established, containing proposed measures — including financial ones — to support businesses and regions that need such measures to meet the targets.

According to the International Commission on Occupational Health (ICOH)), there is no level of exposure that can be considered safe without the risk of cancer. At the EESC hearing on 31 October 2022, Prof. Jukka Takala showed that about 90 370 people die each year in the EU from asbestos-related cancer, demonstrating the need for a reduced limit value. Therefore, the EESC
  welcomes
  the Commission
  proposal
  and
  believes
  that the technical limit should be
  further reduced
  after a reasonable transition period. A roadmap to achieve this should be established, containing proposed measures — including financial ones — to support businesses and regions that need such measures to meet the targets.

Outcome of the vote:

| In favour: | 68 |
| --- | --- |
| Against: | 106 |
| Abstention: | 16 |

In favour:

68

Against:

106

Abstention:

16

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/123 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/123

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Skills 2023’

(COM(2022) 526 final — (2022)0326 (COD))

(2023/C 100/19)

| Rapporteur: | Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ |
| --- | --- |

Rapporteur:

Tatjana BABRAUSKIENĖ

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 21.10.2022
  European Parliament, 20.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 149 & 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship |
| Adopted at plenary | 15.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 547 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 155/0/1 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 21.10.2022

European Parliament, 20.10.2022

Legal basis

Article 149 & 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship

Adopted at plenary

15.12.2022

Plenary session No

547

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

155/0/1

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC welcomes the declaration of 2023 as the European Year of Skills (EYS). The EYS has to provide pathways towards effective solutions and educational benefits for young people and adults, the unemployed and employed irrespective of the contractual situation, level of qualifications or gender, in line with the goal to equip the ‘workforce with the right skills’, stated by President von der Leyen to increase the competitiveness of the European economy, especially that of SMEs. The EESC is looking forward to engaging positively with the EYS 2023 in order to produce concrete outcomes and is therefore ready to contribute as facilitator for networking and debates. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | Against the background that in some parts of the EU there is unequal access to educational opportunities, while educational attainment is all too often still passed from one generation to the next, the EYS 2023 should initiate further debates and activities to prevent discrimination in all educational fields and help people obtain skills that will guarantee for them upward career paths and quality life. Special attention has therefore to be given to the socioeconomically disadvantaged groups of people as regards accessing quality and inclusive training of re- and upskilling. The Council recommendation on upskilling pathways aimed at supporting low skilled and low-qualified adults to be upskilled and integrated to the labour market, needs to be enforced and implemented as an important objective of the EYS. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC believes that there is a need for efficient financing mechanisms, which mobilise European and national resources and involve adequate sharing of costs between public authorities and private entities, as well as individuals and other relevant stakeholders (social partners, training providers, NGOs). Empowering workers to take up training is also key to establish a culture of life-long learning. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC expects that the EYS will issue this question of responsibility to safeguard necessary resources for upskilling and reskilling, which is important to mitigate the risk of social exclusion, including channelling the financing with special attention. This includes the question of social partners’ shared responsibility at sectoral and company level in terms of investing in the forward-looking education and training of the employed workforce. This includes also the employers’ engagement in making the necessary arrangements to support any workers they have made redundant to benefit from support schemes. The EESC calls on and encourages the social partners to take effective steps to engage in social dialogue to ensure that all workers have equal access to quality and inclusive training in line with the EPSR. Moreover, consultation mechanisms between education institutions, authorities and companies and trade unions should be strengthened as this can contribute in the drafting of realistic and effective education-to-work strategies. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | In this view the EESC proposes to finally implement the idea of a skills guarantee to offer the right to access quality and inclusive training for all, and to promote the engagement in collective bargaining and capacity building to lay down the provisions and conditions for paid educational leave, allowing people to participate fully in society and successfully manage transitions in society and in labour markets. Training in this view should include key competences, basic skills and professional skills development for people of all skills levels. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The Commission calls on Member States to appoint a national coordinator for the EYS to ensure the coordination of relevant activities at national level. The EESC suggests that the national coordination point should work in a transparent and inclusive manner and have relevant competences as well as adequate financial resources provided by EU and national sources. All stakeholders in the field of education and training (notably education and training providers, public and private employment services, social partners, and other relevant civil society organisations) should have voice in the selection of this national coordination point in order to ensure that these stakeholders be part of it and play a leading role both in planning and implementation of activities throughout the year as well as in its evaluation. The same principle on coordination should apply also at EU-level. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC reiterates its recommendations from earlier opinions on previous declarations of European Years that these should go beyond mere promotional activities and instead contribute to the implementation of clear plans and real engagement. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | Recalling previous opinions on such thematic years, amongst which calling for appropriate EU funding and significant dialogue with civil society in the development of these years as well as for specific measures to ensure a link between the different thematic years and an enduring outcome, the EESC reminds that it is crucial for the success of the concept of the ‘European Years’ to announce them in a timely manner for allowing a proper preparation and to create robust ownership (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

2.   The legislative Proposal

| 2.1. | Following the announcement by President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2022 State of the Union address, the Commission has adopted its proposal to make 2023 the European Year of Skills. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | With the EYS, in cooperation with the European Parliament, Member States, social partners, public and private employment services, chambers of commerce and industry, education and training providers, and workers and companies all together, the Commission proposes to give a fresh impetus to lifelong learning by:






  — | Promoting increased more effective and inclusive investment in training and upskilling to harness the full potential of the European workforce, and to support people in changing from one job to another. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

Promoting increased more effective and inclusive investment in training and upskilling to harness the full potential of the European workforce, and to support people in changing from one job to another.

| — | Making sure that skills are relevant for labour market needs, by also cooperating with social partners and companies. |
| --- | --- |

—

Making sure that skills are relevant for labour market needs, by also cooperating with social partners and companies.

| — | Matching people’s aspirations and skill sets with opportunities on the job market, especially for the green and digital transition and the economic recovery. |
| --- | --- |

—

Matching people’s aspirations and skill sets with opportunities on the job market, especially for the green and digital transition and the economic recovery.

| — | A special focus will be given to activate more people for the labour market, in particular women and young people, especially those not in education, employment or training. |
| --- | --- |

—

A special focus will be given to activate more people for the labour market, in particular women and young people, especially those not in education, employment or training.

| — | Attracting people from third countries with the skills needed by the EU, including by strengthening learning opportunities and mobility and facilitating the recognition of qualifications. |
| --- | --- |

—

Attracting people from third countries with the skills needed by the EU, including by strengthening learning opportunities and mobility and facilitating the recognition of qualifications.

| 2.3. | To meet these objectives, the Commission will






  — | Promote upskilling and reskilling opportunities, for instance by highlighting relevant EU initiatives, including EU funding possibilities, to support their take-up, implementation and delivery on the ground. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.3.

—

Promote upskilling and reskilling opportunities, for instance by highlighting relevant EU initiatives, including EU funding possibilities, to support their take-up, implementation and delivery on the ground.

| — | Events and awareness-raising campaigns will also be organised across the EU to support mutual learning of partners in up- and reskilling. |
| --- | --- |

—

Events and awareness-raising campaigns will also be organised across the EU to support mutual learning of partners in up- and reskilling.

| — | The proposed Year also aims to help to further develop skills intelligence tools and promote tools and instruments for increased transparency and easier recognition of qualifications, including qualifications awarded outside the EU. |
| --- | --- |

—

The proposed Year also aims to help to further develop skills intelligence tools and promote tools and instruments for increased transparency and easier recognition of qualifications, including qualifications awarded outside the EU.

| 2.4. | To ensure the coordination of relevant activities at national level, the Commission calls on Member States to appoint a national coordinator for the European Year of Skills. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The EESC agrees that an engaged citizenry that contains a skilled and qualified workforce is one of the main assets of the European social and economic model and that support for training for people of all ages must be used as a lever to boost societal participation as well as long-term and sustainable growth, since it helps to increase innovation, productivity and competitiveness. It is also key to supporting people in the context of achieving a just transition because moving towards a more sustainable way of living, producing and consuming has become a necessity to tackle climate change and its negative repercussions globally, while ensuring no one is left behind. At the same time, it agrees that the holistic personal development of each learner is crucial for adapting to the transitions and challenges ahead, considering the fast-paced nature of the current societies. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | The shortage of skilled workers, due to demographic challenges and structural change, as well as, due to digitalisation and decarbonisation, is of the decisive factors affecting the European economy. In addition to obtaining new skills, the aim must also be to ensure that qualified workers can carry out a number of qualified tasks and occupations under changing circumstances (2), while their training leads towards decent employment opportunities and safeguards for preventing precarious employment. |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | Additionally, the challenge and anticipation of skills needs is of paramount importance to succeed in reaching the EU headline targets set by the EPSR Action Plan of at least 60 % of adults participating in training every year and an employment rate of at least 78 % by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC welcomes that the European Commission put the focus on skills, with the declaration of the European Year of Skills in 2023, following the Year of Youth in 2022. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | This confirms the Committee’s view– expressed in numerous opinions — that quality basic education, as well as high-standard and effective training, lifelong learning (LLL) as well as vocational up- and re-skilling will be the necessary tools for successfully adapting to societal changes, boosting active citizenship, as well as grasping the job opportunities of the future and fostering entrepreneurial learning (3). |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | Lifelong learning and skills development is the key to the social and economic progress in our societies. However, in the EESC’s view this is not only about imparting knowledge that can be ‘marketed’, but also about competences and skills that enable people to actively participate in social life. Studies show that critical thinking, communication, teamwork, creativity, initiative, and many other transversal skills are increasingly needed for the labour market and for the society. In addition to these, freedom, tolerance, critical spirit, European values and democratic citizenship are essential assets for the future of Europe so as to fight the increasing intolerance and emerging radical movements. Therefore, we ask to include social skills and transversal skills also among the ‘right skills’ during the actions under the EYS 2023 that citizens, including workers and future workers, need to obtain (4). This is directly in line with the implementation of the Council Recommendation on Key Competences for Lifelong Learning while also being consistent with the European Framework for Personal, Social and Learning to Learn Key Competence (LifeComp) and the European sustainability competence framework (GreenComp). |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | In the EESC view, education begins in infancy and accompanies us throughout our lives. In line with the Council Resolution on a New European Agenda for Adult Learning 2021-2030 the EESC underlines that adult education must be more than just the development of employment-relevant skills. It is equally important to promote increased public awareness of the importance and benefits of participation in LLL in a holistic way (5). |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | For the EESC, it is therefore clear that all activities in the framework of the EYS 2023 must be aimed at the best possible progress in all fields of education and training (elementary education, initial and advanced vocational, life-long-leaning: formal, non-formal and informal). At all levels of education, it is therefore above all a matter of providing equal opportunities for all, free from discrimination. The parents’ income or education levels must no longer significantly influence a person’s educational career. |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Against the background that in some parts of the EU there is unequal access to educational opportunities, while educational attainment is still too often passed from one generation to the next, it should be anywhere imperative to offer chances and possibilities as well as to promote competences and capabilities to the greatest extent. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | LLL for all must become a reality in Europe and all Europeans should have access to quality and inclusive learning and training. Equal access to upskilling and reskilling stating that additional up-skilling opportunities need to be provided for all people, regardless of gender, origin and age (6). This focus on inclusiveness of the skills agenda has furthermore to include in particular all workers regardless of their employment situation, the size of companies and the type of their work contract, including low-qualified/skilled adults and people with a migrant background, vulnerable groups should be offered special attention and policies since they are experiencing more difficulties. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

| 3.11. | Despite its support for the EYS 2023 and the focus on boosting vocational training and LLL, the EESC is concerned that the agenda and priorities of the year appear to be overcrowded. They contain a very large number of commitments, references to all initiatives, budget lines and policy areas outlined in the European Skills Agenda. This runs the risk that the year will be more about high-profile political announcements, than long-term systematic development. |
| --- | --- |

3.11.

| 3.12. | To prevent the trap that a long list of existing policies areas and shared responsibilities can obscure a clear focus on outcomes, it would be crucial to have clarity and focus on the proposal, by focusing on a number of strategic priorities. The EESC reiterates its demand from existing opinions regarding previous declarations of European Years that it should go beyond mere promotional activities and should contribute towards clear plans and engagement (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.12.

| 3.13. | Social partners and civil society organisations also have an important role to play in governance of the education and training system, including anticipating and delivering skills. Effective involvement of social partners and relevant civil society organisations at European and national level and effective actions to consolidate efficient governance in all fields of vocational education and training and of adult learning policy, including active labour market policies and on the management of EU and national funds for skills would be key to succeed to provide effective solutions for all. |
| --- | --- |

3.13.

| 3.14. | It is important to take into consideration to increase dialogue in existing stakeholder groups and networks, also via established online platforms, particularly boosting the Strategic Dialogue process over 2023, developing Stakeholder Fora connected to the flagship events of 2023, but also via new processes akin to civil dialogue to ensure that education and training stakeholders can meaningfully take part in policy and decision-making considering their expertise on the ground, their capacity to express learners’ needs and their close connection with different national and regional authorities responsible for the implementation of the education and training recommendations. |
| --- | --- |

3.14.

| 3.15. | The EESC expects that the EYS should in this view issue the question of social partners’ shared responsibility at sectoral and company level in terms both of investing in the forward-looking education and training of their employed workforce. This includes also the employers’ engagement in making the necessary arrangements to support any worker they have made redundant to benefit from the support schemes. In this view the EESC calls on the social partners to take effective steps to engage in social dialogue to ensure that all workers have equal access to quality and inclusive training in line with the EPSR. |
| --- | --- |

3.15.

| 3.16. | Teachers and trainers play an important role in developing learners’ skill sets in line with labour market needs, by teaching and training not only occupational skills but also transversal skills, such as basic and socio-emotional skills. They support the school-to-work transition of students with diverse backgrounds, including adults in need of new, updated, or improved skills. In the face of the unprecedented challenges created by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, their commitment and creativity have been central to sustaining teaching and learning in schools and workplaces. |
| --- | --- |

3.16.

| 3.17. | VET teacher shortages are significant in many EU countries, caused also by factors related to the limited attractiveness of the VET teaching profession, including employment conditions, salaries, and a lack of financial incentives and career support. Attracting industry professionals into the teaching profession should be one of the key strategies for ensuring an adequate supply of VET teachers with relevant skills and knowledge, and this requires providing good and attractive working conditions, decent wages and flexible pathways into the profession and mechanisms to ensure that these professionals have the right mix of skills — including pedagogical skills. |
| --- | --- |

3.17.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC welcomes the approach of discussing training needs from the perspective of socially fair and just green and digital transition of the labour market. However, it appeals for the clear message, that the responsibility of upskilling and reskilling should always be put in a fair way as shared responsibility. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

4.2.   Shared responsibility

| 4.2.1. | To succeed in ongoing transitions, the individuals shall be supported to get prepared for changes in order to be successful. There is a need for financing mechanisms, which mobilise European and national resources and involve adequate sharing of costs and non-financial contributions (for example time spent on training) between public authorities, employers, individuals and other relevant stakeholders (e.g. social partners, training providers, NGOs). The EESC, in many previous opinions (8), has emphasised the crucial need for strong commitments from companies as well as from public authorities most notably to safeguard sufficient resources, including sufficient financing for education and training. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.1.

| 4.2.2. | The EESC proposes that the EYS should prominently promote social responsibility in the field of comprehensive upskilling and reskilling and in this context, the idea of a Skills Guarantee to offer the right to access quality and inclusive training for all, including engagement in collective bargaining and capacity building to lay down the provisions and conditions on paid educational leave in order to participate fully in society and manage successfully transitions in society and in the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.2.

| 4.2.3. | This also includes the question of social partners’ shared responsibility at sectoral and company level in terms of investing in the forward-looking education and training of their employed workforce. Collective bargaining at all levels — in line with national law and practices — and workers’ participation mechanisms at firm level are relevant tools in order to address the changes in skills and training needs and in order to help anticipate these changes and increase innovation. It would be useful to start developing during the EYS an EU quality framework for employee training as a social partners’ action. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.3.

4.3.   Boost investment in education and training

| 4.3.1. | The EESC already stressed the need for a qualification offensive to underpin the growing digitalisation of our labour markets, to provide incentives for investing both at company level and in the public sector, to promote public and private investment in vocational education and training. Public investment in lifelong, and particularly adult, learning needs to be increased in every Member State (9). |
| --- | --- |

4.3.1.

| 4.3.2. | The EESC calls on the European Commission and the Member States to take effective action towards the implementation of the first and the fourth principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights, to ensure quality and inclusive LLL as a right for all citizens in Europe at workplaces and beyond and to support the implementation of these principles with sustainable public funding agreed with the social partners and civil society. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.2.

| 4.3.3. | As Member States bear the main responsibility for sustainable investment to guarantee training, not least to unemployed and low-qualified people but also to obtain certified basic skills, professional skills and key competences leading to qualifications, the EYS should highlight the need for adequate and sufficient public investment in all fields of education and training. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.3.

| 4.3.4. | The EESC demands in this view that sustainable investment in adult participation in LLL and employee training should be highlighted as priorities within the European Semester process and get more support of EU funds, in particular of the European structural and investment funds, to upskilling and reskilling provisions. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.4.

4.4.   Right of access to lifelong learning opportunities irrespective of the level and type (formal, informal and non-formal)

| 4.4.1. | The EESC calls for the full implementation of the first principle of the EPSR to ensure that access to quality and inclusive training and LLL is the right for all VET learners, workers and employees, to enable them to participate fully in society and successfully manage transitions in the labour market. Such a right must support also the unemployed and the low qualified adults to receive the necessary skills for the labour market. We call on the European Commission to conduct research on how to achieve such a right and introduce a stronger monitoring mechanism, which requests the EU countries to set up national action programmes and to present regular national reports on how this right is being ensured. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.1.

| 4.4.2. | In this view the EESC calls on the Commission, Member States and social partners to use the EYS to take effective steps to engage in joint actions to promote work based learning, to boost investment to quality apprenticeship provisions, adult participation in LLL and employee training, by ensuring all workers equal access to quality and inclusive training as a right. The European Quality and Effective Framework for Apprenticeships will celebrate its 5th anniversary in 2023 and needs to be evaluated and re-enforced. It would be high time to ask the apprentices, the young ones and the adults, to what extent the quality conditions in the framework were met in practice in the workplace. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.2.

4.5.   Stakeholder involvement

| 4.5.1. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s explicit commitment to strengthening skills relevance by closely cooperating with social partners, public and private employment services, companies, education and training providers. The EESC considers in this context that it is also crucial






  — | to stimulate active worker involvement in LLL schemes and in in-work training is an essential condition for the growth and competitiveness of enterprises, for the employability of workers and for securing quality jobs (10). |
| --- | --- | --- |

4.5.1.

—

to stimulate active worker involvement in LLL schemes and in in-work training is an essential condition for the growth and competitiveness of enterprises, for the employability of workers and for securing quality jobs (10).

| — | to improve the participation of all in LLL and to determine, together with education and training providers, decision-makers the content of learning in a way that will bring benefits to each learner and to the community and society as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

—

to improve the participation of all in LLL and to determine, together with education and training providers, decision-makers the content of learning in a way that will bring benefits to each learner and to the community and society as a whole.

| — | to support collective bargaining and social dialogue, in line with national industrial relations systems, in order to be able to anticipate and adapt the skills to technological and digital developments and develop on-the-job training, but also to support civil dialogue for a comprehensive view on the needs of each learner. |
| --- | --- |

—

to support collective bargaining and social dialogue, in line with national industrial relations systems, in order to be able to anticipate and adapt the skills to technological and digital developments and develop on-the-job training, but also to support civil dialogue for a comprehensive view on the needs of each learner.

4.6.   Strengthen efficient employment services

| 4.6.1. | For a fair transition and for active labour market policies to work, there is a need for equally efficient employment services, capable not only of managing demand and job supply, but also of offering guidance and counselling to job-seekers. The EESC calls on the Member States to invest more resources in the enhancement of the effectiveness, efficiency but also of the capacity of employment services and their staff, as well as in the design of tools to support those who are not yet in the labour market. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.1.

4.7.   Individual learning accounts and micro-credentials

| 4.7.1. | The EESC welcomes the initiative on Individual Learning Accounts (ILA) by the Commission, because the learning providers need financial support for supplying learners. The pressure on qualification is constantly increasing but ILA should not intend to replace existing funding structures, but to supplement them, especially where ILA does not yet exist. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.1.

| 4.7.2. | ILA is an important building block for financing continuing education. ILA should be differentiated depending on the target group, and it must in any case be continuously evaluated and, if necessary, adapted. Above all: Working-age people should have direct access to their ILA and be able to decide for themselves for which further training they use it personally. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.2.

| 4.7.3. | Within the proposal on the ‘European approach to lifelong learning and employment’ microcredentials should better manage the problems of training and retraining people. This would make it easier and better for people to acquire all the skills needed to cope with the current societal upheavals and transitions in the labour market. At the same time, the approach is also aimed at providers to make their offers more transparent and flexible through microcredentials. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.3.

| 4.7.4. | In the view of the EESC, microcredentials for the recognition of informal learners can be quite practicable and reasonable but it is at the same time important that microcredentials should not be aimed to weaken or replace formal initial education, higher education, vocational education and training or traditional skills. |
| --- | --- |

4.7.4.

4.8.   Attracting non-EU nationals

| 4.8.1. | The focus on attracting non-EU nationals with the skills needed for the EU should be balanced by mitigating the ‘brain-drain’. The EESC advocates for more regular channels for labour migration, but the first priority of skills policies should be to ensure the skills development for European workers, as well as for the unemployed and undocumented migrants already present and working in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.1.

| 4.8.2. | Developing an EU talent pool (available to Ukrainian refugees only) is also to be handled with care. The EESC encourages the Commission to draw up actions ensuring that every single refugee and asylum-seeker be given the same opportunity as citizens to validate their skills and competences and be offered apprenticeships and re- and upskilling, to be integrated into the labour market, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.2.

| 4.8.3. | Furthermore, a simpler, faster and easier recognition of qualifications of non-EU nationals must in any case be discussed or promoted independently of their recruitment. However, it seems clear that, in the case of regulated professions, only the application of the rules of the EU Qualification Directive to third-country nationals can speed up or facilitate the recognition of their qualifications. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.3.

4.9.   Coordination of the European Year

| 4.9.1. | The Commission calls on Member States to appoint a national coordinator for the EYS to ensure the coordination of relevant activities at national level. As this appointment of national coordinators and respective meetings is the key of the articles on coordination at national and Union level, this appears very minimalist. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.1.

| 4.9.2. | The EESC calls that these national coordination points should have relevant competences as well as adequate financial resources provided by EU and national sources and facilities to effectively involve representatives form a wide network of stakeholders in the field of education, training and skills at national and EU-level. These stakeholders (notably social partners, public and private employment services, education and training providers, and other relevant civil society organisations) should be part of the coordination and play a leading role both in planning and implementation of activities throughout the year as well as in its evaluation. The main focus should be laid on sustainable outcomes that can be reached during the year. For funding amounts the European Year of Development can be taken as good practice. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.2.

4.10.   Skills mismatch

| 4.10.1. | While some sectors may suffer from a lack of skilled workers, the so-called mismatch is often more linked to bad working conditions (low wages, precarious contracts, disrespect, working time incompatible with work-life balance, lack of employee training and career development) and lack of anticipation tools as an early warning system for forecasting labour market changes. If the EYS does not look at that side of the coin, it will be clear that the burden is unequally placed on workers and society as such, without insisting on the shared responsibility of companies. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.1.

| 4.10.2. | Skills strategies in this view cannot be separated from quality job creation and strategies. Indeed, training, reskilling or upskilling programmes will not be of use if people live in an economically deserted area that does not offer alternative job opportunities. Quality jobs, fair wages and decent working conditions are the prerequisite for long-term and sustainable growth, productivity and innovation, and skills development and LLL is one of the tools to achieve these goals. In this view effective social dialogue with the trade unions, respect and enforcement of labour rights, and information and consultation with workers on employee training and apprenticeship in company levels are fundamental. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.2.

Brussels, 15 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122).

1

(2)  LMO study: The work of the future: ensuring lifelong learning and training of employees | European Economic and Social Committee (europa.eu)

2

(3)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Adult learning (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Slovenian Presidency) (OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to promote, based on education and training, from a lifelong learning perspective, the skills needed for Europe to establish a more just, more cohesive, more sustainable, more digital and more resilient society’ (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Portuguese presidency) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 27); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — European skills agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020) 274 final) and on ‘Proposal for a Council recommendation on vocational education and training (VET) for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020) 275 final) (OJ C 10, 11.1.2021, p. 40); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability’ (COM(2021) 770 final) — ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts’ (COM(2021) 773 final) (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 62); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on a European strategy for universities (COM(2022) 16 final) and the Proposal for a Council Recommendation on building bridges for effective European higher education cooperation (COM(2022) 17 final) (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 109).

3

(4)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — European skills agenda for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020) 274 final) and on ‘Proposal for a Council recommendation on vocational education and training (VET) for sustainable competitiveness, social fairness and resilience’ (COM(2020) 275 final) (OJ C 10, 11.1.2021, p. 40).

4

(5)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Adult learning (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Slovenian Presidency) (OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16).

5

(6)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Adult learning (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Slovenian Presidency) (OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16).

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a European Year of Youth 2022’ (COM(2021) 634 final — 2021/0328(COD)) (OJ C 152, 6.4.2022, p. 122).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on a European approach to micro-credentials for lifelong learning and employability’ (COM(2021) 770 final) — ‘Proposal for a Council Recommendation on individual learning accounts’ (COM(2021) 773 final) (OJ C 323, 26.8.2022, p. 62); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Adult learning (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Slovenian Presidency) (OJ C 374, 16.9.2021, p. 16); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘How to promote, based on education and training, from a lifelong learning perspective, the skills needed for Europe to establish a more just, more cohesive, more sustainable, more digital and more resilient society’ (Exploratory opinion at the request of the Portuguese presidency) (OJ C 286, 16.7.2021, p. 27).

8

(9)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Sustainable funding for lifelong learning and development of skills, in the context of a shortage of skilled labour (exploratory opinion requested by the Croatian Presidency) (OJ C 232, 14.7.2020, p. 8).

9

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Future of work — acquiring of appropriate knowledge and skills to meet the needs of future jobs’ (Exploratory opinion requested by the Bulgarian Presidency) (OJ C 237, 6.7.2018, p. 8).

10

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/132 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/132

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and the way forward’

(JOIN(2022) 24 final)

(2023/C 100/20)

| Rapporteur: | Panagiotis GKOFAS |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Jan PIE |

Rapporteur:

Panagiotis GKOFAS

Co-rapporteur:

Jan PIE

| Referral | European Commission, 28.6.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Consultative Commission on Industrial Change |
| Adopted in section | 11.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 202/6/4 |

Referral

European Commission, 28.6.2022

Legal basis

Article 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Consultative Commission on Industrial Change

Adopted in section

11.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

202/6/4

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The EESC supports the initiatives proposed in the Joint Communication on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and way forward. The Joint Communication is an important step towards fostering defence cooperation between Member States, which is necessary for reducing costly duplications of military capabilities and avoiding fragmentation of the EU defence market. The EESC stresses the following main points of the opinion. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.1.1. | An EU defence industry strategy should stem from a strong European defence and security policy. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.1.

| 1.1.2. | Low investment volumes and lack of coordination between Member States in R & D, production and procurement create capability gaps, and fragment the European defence technological industrial base (EDTIB). |
| --- | --- |

1.1.2.

| 1.1.3. | The EESC supports the concrete measures proposed by the EC — the EDIRPA and the EDIP — and calls for more coordination between Member States on defence policies and procurement at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.3.

| 1.1.4. | National defence budgets should be reviewed in order to foresee annually the quota that is allocated for consolidating the common European defence investments. In this way, they will contribute to assessing the financial base for concrete EU coordinated actions that are dedicated to boosting the European defence capabilities. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.4.

| 1.1.5. | There should be a special focus on modern forms of warfare (such as cyberattacks, digital wars and fake news propaganda). |
| --- | --- |

1.1.5.

| 1.1.6. | The European Parliament must develop a monitoring mechanism for implementing the European defence policy (contracts, procurement, investment), and must acquire appropriate technical and institutional tools to do so. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.6.

| 1.1.7. | The European Commission is encouraged to present an ambitious proposal that goes beyond a possible VAT waiver and includes strong measures to help industry adjust to new strategic challenges. |
| --- | --- |

1.1.7.

| 1.2. | The EESC shares the Joint Communication’s assessment of defence investment gaps in the European Union. This underinvestment has weakened Europe’s security, undermined NATO and weakened the Union’s position vis-à-vis other global powers. At the same time, gaps persist in defence investment inside the European Union. This goes against the principle of solidarity between Member States and enhances centrifugal political powers that distort efforts to develop a common security culture and defence policy in Europe. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | The EESC welcomes the announcement of several Members States to increase their defence budgets and calls upon them to stick to their commitment to invest not only more, but also better, addressing the need to deepen European citizens’ solidarity and urgent-situation-preparedness culture. It is of utmost importance to coordinate national defence efforts at European level that do not cause collateral damage to recent EU initiatives or stifle ongoing or planned European development projects. This increased European coordination should be seen as a way to also strengthen NATO’s overall capacities. The EESC supports the idea of enhancing the European defence cooperation framework, especially through joint procurement. In this regard, the EESC fully supports the immediate establishment of the Defence Joint Procurement Task Force as a means to coordinate Member States’ responses to very short-term urgent needs — notably the replenishment of stocks — at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The EESC calls for further technical exploration on how to achieve a European interface optimising the output of national defence expenditure at EU level. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The EESC welcomes the proposed short-term EUR 500 million instrument over two years (2022-2024) to incentivise joint procurement. Based on the work of the Joint Procurement Task Force, the instrument can help to structure and coordinate the current demand for urgently needed defence products and prevent crowding-out effects. |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The EESC also welcomes the announcement of a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) for jointly developed defence projects and encourages the Commission to rapidly present an ambitious proposal that goes beyond a possible VAT waiver and includes strong measures to help industry adjust to new strategic challenges. The European Union needs to develop investment initiatives that will enable industry cooperation through start-ups and SMEs (following the EU Small Business Act), and fully utilise the defence sector’s highly skilled workforce, while also upgrading and creating new skills via specific R & D programmes and European projects that allow national industries to collaborate. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | The EESC welcomes the Commission’s announcement on putting forward a critical raw materials (CRM) initiative, including legislative measures, to strengthen the EU’s resilience and security of supply related to CRMs. The EESC believes that this initiative must take into consideration the strategic importance of the defence sector. |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | The integration of a common defence policy would allow for more autonomous industrial innovation, more technological spillovers between military and civil sectors, and more effective and independent defence and EU energy policies. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | The EESC recognises the importance of building a strong cybersecurity nexus that will tackle new hybrid warfare. Given its role in tackling new hybrid warfare, it should be a main focus in future cybersecurity investments. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | The EESC believes that the joint communication does not provide sufficient strategic guidance to further develop the EDTIB. In response to the new security challenges that threaten the European solidarity framework, a comprehensive European defence industrial strategy is needed that aligns all industrial policy measures towards strengthening EDTIB performance on its core functions. In this respect, the joint communication is only one step in the right direction. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The EESC recommends creating a scientific committee/agency, under the political supervision of European Parliament, that continuously monitors and assesses key aspects of defence investment and provides guidance for efficiently allocating financial and military resources. Results and recommendations should be made available for each Member State. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | The EESC believes that the European Defence sector can incentivise synergies and cooperation between many economic sectors, actors and stakeholders. Particular attention should be given to the SMEs in line with the Small Business Act. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | At the meeting in Versailles in March 2022, EU Heads of State or Government expressed their commitment to boosting European defence capabilities in light of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. They committed to 1) increasing defence expenditures; 2) stepping up cooperation through joint projects; 3) mitigating shortfalls and meeting capability objectives; 4) boosting innovation, including through civil/military synergies; and 5) strengthening and developing our defence industry, including SMEs. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | In addition, EU Heads of States or Government invited the European Commission, in cooperation with the European Defence Agency, ‘to put forward an analysis of the defence investment gaps by mid-May and to propose any further initiative necessary to strengthen the European defence industrial and technological base’. |
| --- | --- |

2.2.

| 2.3. | In response to this tasking, the European Commission and the High Representative/Head of the European Defence Agency (EDA), submitted to the European Council a set of actions and recommendations with the aim of ensuring that the announced increases in defence spending by Member States do not lead to further fragmentation of the European defence sector, and that they result in a stronger EU defence technological and industrial base. These recommendations include, in particular, measures to foster joint procurement, upgrade defence programming and ramp-up manufacturing capabilities. A special reference is also made to enhancing financing opportunities for the defence sector. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | The recommendations of the Joint Communication are based on an assessment of current investment and capability gaps. Despite the increased European defence expenditure in 2020, only 11 % of investment was spent in a collaborative way — far below the 35 % benchmark agreed by Member States in the EDA framework and set within the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) — compared to 89 % spent on a national basis. It is worth noting that EU Member States face different risks and have different capacities to respond to military or other crises that require differentiated defence resources. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | In addition, Member States’ combined defence research and technology (R&T) spending (EUR 2,5 billion) amounts to only 1,2 % of their total defence spending; far below the 2 % benchmark agreed in the EDA framework and set as a more binding commitment within PESCO. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | Moreover, the European defence sector still experiences significant inefficiencies: low economies of scale, market and production fragmentation, duplication and multiplication of defence systems of the same kind, etc. The lack of cooperation between Member States weakens the industrial and technological capabilities necessary to preserve the EU’s defence capacity and meet its current and future security needs. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | Investments in the defence sector should work pre-emptively and act as a factor of deterrence and stability, seeking to increase security and reduce conflict risks, rather than inducing further arms races and increasing the probability of new conflicts, be they regional or global. |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | Diplomacy should ideally always prevail in conflict prevention and resolution. The use of military force should remain an ultimate deterrent tool and last resort. Development prospects and economic welfare should be used to defend European values of peace, democracy, solidarity and stability before any military action is taken. The EESC supports all international attempts to achieve peaceful, fair and concrete resolutions of conflicts, disputes and/or illegal acts (invasion, occupation, threats against state sovereignty, intimidation), within the framework of the UN Charter parameters and the Council of Europe resolution, (for example, in situations such as those in Ukraine, Cyprus, the Western Balkans and elsewhere). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | The EESC is convinced of the need for close coordination between EU and NATO. Both organisations have their own specific tools and strengths that must be used in a complementary way with the common objective to guarantee Europe’s security. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | The EESC regrets that years of severe underinvestment in defence have led to industrial and capability gaps in the EU. It also recognises that the EDTIB is currently sized for peacetime operations (i.e. low production cadence) and calls for measures to help the EDTIB meet the sudden increase of demand triggered by the war against Ukraine. |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | The EESC supports the Joint Communication’s calls to Member States to buy the necessary defence equipment and material in a collaborative way. Joint procurement of urgently needed products would provide greater value for money, enhance interoperability and avoid the most exposed Member States facing the inability to obtain what they need because of conflicting demands on the defence industry, which cannot respond to such a demand surge in the short term. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | The EESC also supports the proposal to incentivise common procurement via the EU budget through a dedicated short-term instrument. The EU financial support brought through this instrument should stimulate cooperative defence procurement by Member States and benefit the EDTIB, while ensuring the European armed forces’ ability to act, their security of supply, and increased interoperability. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | The EESC also looks forward to the proposal for an EDIP. At the same time, we question whether it will be sufficient to incentivise the joint procurement of jointly developed projects through a VAT waiver. What is needed is to enable the EDTIB to support European armed forces, also for and during long, large-scale conflicts. This would require the systematic use of different industrial policy tools to strengthen supply chains, foster skills, establish strategic stocks, etc. The EDIP should therefore follow a comprehensive approach to support the necessary transformation of the EDTIB. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | At the same time, the Joint Communication lacks ambition in other initiatives, such as the EDF. The EESC recommends using the flexibility of the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to significantly increase the EDF budget to a level that matches the announced increases of Members States’ defence spending. This is necessary to ensure the EDF’s leverage and power to incentivise cooperation. The EDF is supposed to play a crucial role in overcoming the fragmentation of European defence systems and in reducing the defence investment gap. The EESC believes that the EDF could potentially fulfil this role if the Member States significantly improve their cooperation. The EDF should be evaluated regularly and strengthened if this effectively contributes to more cohesion and efficiency in European defence spending. The added European value is of utmost importance to justify this tool. In addition, the EESC suggests making it a priority to make the EDF more strategic (identifying a limited number of adequately funded flagship projects), more reactive (increasing the budget line for SMEs and disruptive technologies, organising open calls to speed up reactions to innovative ideas, defining fast-track procedures for urgent projects, etc.) and more efficient (optimising defence transfers for EDF projects, harmonising the IP framework, defining sustainable solutions for handling classified data, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Moreover, the EESC believes that a holistic and strategic raw materials/CRM policy is now crucial for reducing Europe’s strategic dependencies on autocratic regimes. In the EESC’s view, this strategy should be based on three pillars: 1) free and open global access to raw materials/CRM; 2) strengthening European/domestic raw materials/CRM exploitation and processing, tax incentives, stockpiling initiatives; and 3) recycling raw materials/CRM, improving framework conditions for a circular economy. |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

| 3.10. | The EESC believes that the EDTIB’s primary mission is to support European armed forces in fulfilling their tasks. To this end, the EESC is convinced that the EDTIB must be able to perform four core functions: 1) deliver at all times and under any circumstances the required defence equipment and related services; 2) improve key defence technologies and their applications and develop new, enhanced versions and the next generations of those; 3) react to newly emerging technological trends and breakthroughs by competitors and potential adversaries; and 4) challenge competitors and potential adversaries by developing innovative concepts, disruptive technologies and totally new applications. Starting from the Joint Communication, the Commission and Member States should urgently develop a comprehensive defence industrial strategy aimed at enhancing the EDTIB’s performance on these core functions. |
| --- | --- |

3.10.

4.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | The EESC also recognises the importance of building a strong cybersecurity nexus that will tackle new hybrid warfare, such as cyber-attacks and digital malpractices in recent international non-military or military conflicts. Therefore, there should be a special focus on cybersecurity investments, a sector that has grown rapidly over the last decade and seems to rapidly alter international and domestic affairs and policy considerations. |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The EESC emphasises that the European Union needs to develop investment initiatives that will enable industry cooperation through start-ups and SMEs, and fully utilise the highly skilled defence sector workforce, while also upgrading and creating new skills via European cooperative programmes. |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | The EESC reiterates its proposal to establish an online one-stop shop for SMEs and start-ups — an online ‘EU SME corner’ — offering the possibility to enter predefined data and receive in return tailor-made information about the best-suited EU programmes that can provide support. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Regarding the measures to support critical technologies and industrial capacities, reducing critical dependencies along defence value chains remains vital. This ranges from access to critical raw materials to the supply of critical components, subsystems, etc. It also includes the financial and economic stability of the industrial supply chain and the availability of sufficient skills to meet current and future capability and technological requirements. The EESC would also like to emphasise its views and recommendations already outlined in its opinion on the Roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence (CCMI/189). |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | The design of a new defence investment paradigm in Europe should also take into account social and environmental criteria, meeting the need to effectively integrate reliable and transferable tools into the Green Deal and the sustainability objectives (SDGs), and thus responding to major European priorities and risks, such as the circular economy, civil protection, natural disasters, emergency management and maritime terrorist actions. Crisis management and climate crisis phenomena require immediate complementary actions and modern tools. A separate collaboration scheme should be discussed with DG ECHO. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

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| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/137 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/137

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the sustainable use of plant protection products and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/2115’

(COM(2022) 305 final — 2022/0196 (COD))

(2023/C 100/21)

| Rapporteur: | José Manuel ROCHE RAMO |
| --- | --- |
| Co-rapporteur: | Arnold PUECH D’ALISSAC |

Rapporteur:

José Manuel ROCHE RAMO

Co-rapporteur:

Arnold PUECH D’ALISSAC

| Referral | European Parliament, 14.7.2022
  Council, 6.7.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 192(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Plenary Assembly decision | 22.2.2022 |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted in section | 24.11.2022 |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 157/01/04 |

Referral

European Parliament, 14.7.2022

Council, 6.7.2022

Legal basis

Articles 192(1) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Plenary Assembly decision

22.2.2022

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted in section

24.11.2022

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

157/01/04

1.   Conclusions and recommendations

| 1.1. | The proposal for a Regulation on the sustainable use of plant protection products introduces a range of new developments and measures to address certain deficiencies identified in the application and implementation of the Directive on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides (1). |
| --- | --- |

1.1.

| 1.2. | The EESC acknowledges the need for this revision and is pleased that many of the limitations identified in the current Directive and many of the initiatives planned under this new proposal had already been mentioned in the observations and recommendations made in its evaluation report (2). Some examples of issues this Regulation seeks to address include: the need to better harmonise the implementation of national action plans, the differences in circumstances between the Member States, suitable training for users and the importance of promoting new technologies such as precision farming. |
| --- | --- |

1.2.

| 1.3. | In line with the objectives set out in the Farm to Fork and 2030 Biodiversity strategies, the proposal for a Regulation on the sustainable use of pesticides aims to improve the environmental, economic and social sustainability of food systems. In this connection, the EESC welcomes the inclusion of these objectives, while recognising the benefits this brings in improving the health of citizens and consumers as well as the environment. |
| --- | --- |

1.3.

| 1.4. | The new EU strategy introduces quantitative targets to reduce the use and risk of pesticides by 2030. These targets are certainly ambitious, making it necessary to establish reasonable transition periods that take into account (3) historical reduction in use and the geographical, agronomic and socioeconomic circumstances of the various Member States, and during which farmers are able to access new alternative products. Bearing in mind that current low-risk tools have taken an average of 10 years to arrive on the market, the legislators should be especially careful when setting the timetable for achieving these targets, leaving enough flexibility to ensure that ‘no one is left behind’. Moreover, the Commission proposal provides for far-reaching restrictions on the use of plant protection products in ‘sensitive areas’. The EESC points out that large swathes of the EU’s agricultural production areas are covered by the proposed definition and the scope of the provisions for ‘sensitive areas’. Such a requirement has far-reaching consequences and should therefore only be implemented on the basis of a sound scientific and agronomic impact assessment. |
| --- | --- |

1.4.

| 1.5. | The harmonised risk indicators (HRIs) require clear guidelines and suitable indicators. As only limited data are currently available, especially on the use of chemical pesticides, extreme care must be taken with regard to the method used. This is particularly important when it comes to using commercial sales as a baseline (HRI 1). Equally, special attention must be paid to the time period used to calculate it. In this respect, pesticide marketing estimates could be improved, for example by distinguishing between authorisations for commercial use and for ‘domestic and garden use’ (i.e. for agricultural and non-agricultural purposes respectively). |
| --- | --- |

1.5.

| 1.6. | The negative effects of the most recent crises — from the pandemic to the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent war, through to the sharp increase in the effects of climate change (droughts, fires, floods, new pests, heat waves, etc.) — make food production and food security one of the top priorities on the EU’s political agenda. |
| --- | --- |

1.6.

| 1.7. | However, the EU should continue to develop the roadmap in order to achieve its commitments on climate action and sustainability. Bearing in mind that Europe must continue to deliver on the actions set out under the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, the impacts and effects of the current context on agri-food systems also need to be taken into account. In this regard, and in view of the current crisis scenario, consideration should be given to the possibility of applying certain derogations on a purely ad hoc and time-limited basis (4). |
| --- | --- |

1.7.

| 1.8. | This crisis should also be seized as an opportunity to address the structural causes of global instability and reshape the dynamics of supply chains, bringing lasting improvements for people and the planet. In particular, there is an urgent need to launch an in-depth debate and reflection on the agri-food system that the EU needs to establish for the decades to come. |
| --- | --- |

1.8.

| 1.9. | At the same time, the EU has an obligation and a responsibility to include food production and food security as a major strategic objective. In this regard, the objectives of the Green Deal and the Farm to Fork Strategy, which include this proposal, must always be based on scientific evidence that is accompanied by corresponding impact assessments to ensure that the objectives are properly aligned, respecting the principle of proportionality. |
| --- | --- |

1.9.

| 1.10. | In this respect, various studies (5) have warned of the possible adverse effects that a drastic increase in food prices — caused by reduced harvests and lower yields — would cause at global level. Reducing agricultural production could make the European Union more dependent on food imports from third countries, resulting in environmental, social and economic damage. |
| --- | --- |

1.10.

| 1.11. | The proposal’s ultimate aim must therefore be to focus on alternative solutions (toolbox), prioritising better implementation and enforcement of integrated pest management (IPM), which must continue to be the cornerstone of the proposal, increasing and supporting the use of alternative pest controls such as low-risk or bio-based plant protection products. For now, however, these solutions cannot replace the use of chemical pesticides. The Member States must promote the use of this toolbox as soon as possible, while ensuring that they have suitable systems of incentives. |
| --- | --- |

1.11.

| 1.12. | This toolbox should focus on the use of various solutions and measures based on science and innovation. The use of more resistant varieties, certified seed, conservation agriculture, integrated production, new breeding techniques (NBTs), organic farming, crop rotation, digital techniques and the use of minor crops must serve as a guide for successfully moving towards a model based on reduced use of plant protection products. |
| --- | --- |

1.12.

| 1.13. | This requires sustainable, science-based, efficient, safe and affordable plant protection systems that can give farmers the tools they need to stay competitive. In this regard, the Commission must demand reciprocity of rules so that imports of products from third countries that are treated with products that are not allowed on the EU market are subject to rules that are at least equivalent to those applicable in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

1.13.

| 1.14. | At the same time, it is essential to avoid a disproportionate increase in the bureaucratic burden on farmers, which would have an even greater impact on small and medium-sized farms, which are less resistant to this type of situation due to economies of scale. |
| --- | --- |

1.14.

| 1.15. | Moreover, the managing bodies in charge of disseminating statistical data need to be very scrupulous in the way they process these data and, in particular, need to fully respect people’s privacy rights and data ownership as the information is often confidential. |
| --- | --- |

1.15.

| 1.16. | The EESC welcomes the decision to opt for an impartial, professional and independent advisory model, which will enable farmers to continue implementing sustainable practices in their fields. The role that agricultural organisations and cooperatives can play in this regard will be key in ensuring that farmers benefit as much as possible in terms of both production and, potentially, collective marketing (e.g. agricultural cooperatives). |
| --- | --- |

1.16.

| 1.17. | The EESC also welcomes the introduction of a specific measure to provide financial support to compensate farmers for the costs incurred. However, it believes that it is still necessary to more fully explain how this fits in with the common agricultural policy (CAP), in particular with regard to the timetable and implementation, bearing in mind that the new CAP and corresponding strategic plans from the Member States need to be approved by 1 January 2023 and should enter into force on this date. |
| --- | --- |

1.17.

2.   Background

| 2.1. | Originally scheduled for 23 March 2022 and postponed due to the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on 22 June 2022, the European Commission published its proposal for a Regulation on the sustainable use of plant protection products as part of the revision of the Directive on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides. The Regulation was published in the ‘Nature protection package’ together with the Nature Restoration Regulation. The package is a decisive step in the implementation of the European Green Deal, the Farm to Fork Strategy and the Biodiversity Strategy. |
| --- | --- |

2.1.

| 2.2. | In line with the Farm to Fork Strategy, the main objectives of the Commission proposal are to:






  — | reduce the overall use and risk of chemical pesticides by 50 % by 2030 (reduction target 1) and reduce the use of more hazardous pesticides by 50 % by 2030 (reduction target 2) compared to the average for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.2.

—

reduce the overall use and risk of chemical pesticides by 50 % by 2030 (reduction target 1) and reduce the use of more hazardous pesticides by 50 % by 2030 (reduction target 2) compared to the average for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017;

| — | increase the implementation and enforcement of integrated pest management; |
| --- | --- |

—

increase the implementation and enforcement of integrated pest management;

| — | increase the use of less hazardous and non-chemical alternatives to chemical pesticides for pest control; |
| --- | --- |

—

increase the use of less hazardous and non-chemical alternatives to chemical pesticides for pest control;

| — | improve the availability of monitoring data on the application, use and risk of pesticides for health and the environment; |
| --- | --- |

—

improve the availability of monitoring data on the application, use and risk of pesticides for health and the environment;

| — | improve the implementation and enforcement of legal provisions in all Member States to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policies; and |
| --- | --- |

—

improve the implementation and enforcement of legal provisions in all Member States to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policies; and

| — | promote the adoption of new technologies such as precision farming in order to reduce the overall use of pesticides and the risk they entail. |
| --- | --- |

—

promote the adoption of new technologies such as precision farming in order to reduce the overall use of pesticides and the risk they entail.

| 2.3. | Member States may reduce their national target for the use and risk of plant protection chemicals by means of a weighting system that takes into account the figure for intensity of use and the figure for use and risk. In no case may this percentage reduction be less than 35 % or more than 70 % by 2030. |
| --- | --- |

2.3.

| 2.4. | To achieve these results, the proposal put forward by the Commission sets reduction targets that are legally binding in the EU. The new rules also state that Member States must adopt binding targets to help achieve the overall EU target. The Regulation states that Member States will have the flexibility to take account of their national situation. In particular, attention should be paid to historical developments and the intensity of pesticide use in each Member State. |
| --- | --- |

2.4.

| 2.5. | Each year, the Commission will measure the use and risk of chemical pesticides on the basis of the sales data for plant protection products reported by the Member States to the Commission. The baseline for calculating the 50 % reduction will be sales for the years 2015, 2016 and 2017. |
| --- | --- |

2.5.

| 2.6. | All active substances placed on the market in the form of plant protection products will be classified in one of the four groups and will be given a weighting, with the more dangerous groups being given a higher weighting. |
| --- | --- |

2.6.

| 2.7. | In short, the main new developments set out in the revision are as follows:






  — | the adoption of a Regulation that is directly binding and uniformly applicable in all Member States; |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.7.

—

the adoption of a Regulation that is directly binding and uniformly applicable in all Member States;

| — | legally binding targets: a 50 % reduction in the use and risk of chemical pesticides and in the use of more hazardous pesticides by 2030; |
| --- | --- |

—

legally binding targets: a 50 % reduction in the use and risk of chemical pesticides and in the use of more hazardous pesticides by 2030;

| — | streamlined National Action Plans (NAPs) and annual reports supporting the legally binding targets; |
| --- | --- |

—

streamlined National Action Plans (NAPs) and annual reports supporting the legally binding targets;

| — | environmentally friendly pest control, ensuring that all farmers practise integrated pest management where chemical pesticides are used only as a last resort; |
| --- | --- |

—

environmentally friendly pest control, ensuring that all farmers practise integrated pest management where chemical pesticides are used only as a last resort;

| — | a new register to support the inspection of pesticide application equipment; |
| --- | --- |

—

a new register to support the inspection of pesticide application equipment;

| — | a commitment to revise harmonised risk indicators (HRI) in the light of statistics on agricultural inputs and outputs (SAIO); |
| --- | --- |

—

a commitment to revise harmonised risk indicators (HRI) in the light of statistics on agricultural inputs and outputs (SAIO);

| — | incentives for farmers to reduce pesticides under the new common agricultural policy (CAP): exceptional funding to support compliance for five years; |
| --- | --- |

—

incentives for farmers to reduce pesticides under the new common agricultural policy (CAP): exceptional funding to support compliance for five years;

| — | new periods of validity for training certificates and proof of training required for certain activities; |
| --- | --- |

—

new periods of validity for training certificates and proof of training required for certain activities;

| — | a ban on all use of pesticides in sensitive areas and within 3 metres of such areas; |
| --- | --- |

—

a ban on all use of pesticides in sensitive areas and within 3 metres of such areas;

| — | stricter criteria for exemptions for aerial spraying. |
| --- | --- |

—

stricter criteria for exemptions for aerial spraying.

| 2.8. | A package of key policies will support farmers and other users in the transition to more sustainable food production systems, in particular: i) an increase in the range of organic and low-risk alternatives on the market; ii) incentives for farmers to reduce pesticide use under the new CAP; iii) research and development under Horizon 2030; and iv) the Organic Action Plan. |
| --- | --- |

2.8.

3.   General comments

| 3.1. | The current crisis scenario, from the pandemic to the invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent war, through to the sharp increase in the effects of climate change (droughts, fires, floods, new pests, heat waves, etc.), is putting significant pressure on European and global agri-food systems. Nevertheless, these barriers should not constitute an impediment to the EU’s determined commitment to further developing actions aimed at achieving a just transition, as set out in the 2030 Agenda (6). |
| --- | --- |

3.1.

| 3.2. | In many of its opinions, the EESC has called for a comprehensive EU food policy that provides: i) economic, environmental and social and cultural sustainability; ii) integration across sectors, policy areas and levels of governance; iii) inclusive decision-making processes; and iv) a combination of mandatory measures (such as regulations and taxes) and incentives (such as price premiums and access to credit, resources and insurance) to speed up the transition to sustainable food systems (7). |
| --- | --- |

3.2.

| 3.3. | In order to achieve these objectives, there is a need for greater harmonisation and coherence across the various EU policies and pieces of legislation: the European Green Deal, the Farm to Fork Strategy, the Biodiversity Strategy, the Zero Pollution Action Plan, the sustainable use of plant protection products, etc. |
| --- | --- |

3.3.

| 3.4. | Furthermore, the CAP budget should not be reduced or kept at the current level, but should be increased and support the transition. Approval of CAP Strategic Plans should also be conditional on Member States adopting comprehensive plans to reshape the food environment and link incentives for healthy and sustainable food production with the creation of new markets for those products (8). |
| --- | --- |

3.4.

| 3.5. | In this respect, the Committee welcomes the decision to prioritise funding under the new CAP for voluntary practices aimed at complying with the sustainable use of plant protection products, without the way such aid is allocated ever penalising or harming income from the use of alternative practices that are equally legal and authorised under European legislation. Generally, funding such as environmental plans and rural development initiatives has only been accessible for initiatives that go beyond the legal requirements. The new framework will allow all Member States to fund farmers to meet all their obligations concerning the sustainable use of plant protection products for five years. |
| --- | --- |

3.5.

| 3.6. | In the same vein, the Committee appreciates the efforts made to increase the efficiency of the NAPs for the sustainable use of plant protection products. While these NAPs could be quite varied and the objectives were voluntary and could cover different areas of interest, they have more streamlined content, including a detailed list of initiatives and their links to the objectives of the Farm to Fork Strategy. All Member States will be asked to list financial and other measures to promote integrated pest management and non-chemical alternatives. They will have to summarise trends in the annual progress and implementation reports across all objectives, streamlining quantitative data on compliance with the sustainable use of plant protection products. The Commission will produce an analysis of the annual progress and implementation reports every two years. |
| --- | --- |

3.6.

| 3.7. | However, it is essential that this new governance model ‘leaves no one behind’: this means ensuring that all Member States can implement the sustainable use of plant protection products as well as possible, despite their different starting points. |
| --- | --- |

3.7.

| 3.8. | To achieve this goal, organised civil society, and in particular organisations with expertise in the area of pesticides, should be closely involved in the design, monitoring and future evaluation of the new Regulation. The quality of information to the general public, and especially to consumers, on the role of pesticides, as well as training and information for pesticide users, must be improved (9). |
| --- | --- |

3.8.

| 3.9. | Fair food prices (reflecting the true cost of production for the environment and society) are crucial to achieving sustainable food systems in the long term. It is essential that, even during the current crisis, the EU ensures genuine reciprocity of rules in preferential trade agreements (10). |
| --- | --- |

3.9.

3.   Specific comments

| 4.1. | Improving access to, as well as the availability and cost-effectiveness of, alternative solutions and new technologies is essential for the sustainable use of plant protection products. Integrated pest management, as well as other low pesticide input pest management practices, which form part of integrated production and organic farming, was one of the key components of the Directive and is at the core of the new Regulation (11). |
| --- | --- |

4.1.

| 4.2. | The proposal for a Regulation provides as a general rule that professional users, including farmers, use non-chemical measures before resorting to the use of chemical plant protection products. This includes actions such as crop rotation, pest surveys, integrated pest management and the application of non-chemical pest control methods and other lower-risk pesticides (12). |
| --- | --- |

4.2.

| 4.3. | This does not mean that the use of pesticides is not possible or necessary under certain circumstances. On the contrary, in some cases it is only possible to control pests satisfactorily — in commercial food production — by using pesticides, in accordance with the key principle of integrated pest management, as a last resort. By way of example, the importance of its application for small-scale uses should be highlighted. |
| --- | --- |

4.3.

| 4.4. | Climate change is accelerating the spread of pests that require the availability of pesticides when all other control tools have been exhausted. This need is becoming even clearer at a time when all estimates suggest that the world’s population will increase by more than two billion over the next 30 years. This scenario should be properly taken into account to ensure a stable food production system capable of supplying an ever-growing world population. |
| --- | --- |

4.4.

| 4.5. | Furthermore, the increasing occurrence of droughts, floods and heat waves and the dramatic temperature changes that have been seen in recent years are damaging farmers’ food production capacity and harvests. Against the current backdrop of crises caused first by the pandemic, then by the invasion of Ukraine, and by the aforementioned effects of climate change, stable yields in agricultural production must therefore be maintained in order to supply the world with high-quality products in sufficient quantities to safeguard food security. |
| --- | --- |

4.5.

| 4.6. | The Regulation also highlights the key role that must be played by independent advisers, who will provide professional advice in line with the applicable crop-specific rules and with the principles of integrated pest management. In this regard, it is essential to strengthen and promote the advisory role of professional agricultural organisations and cooperatives who have been providing direct support as field agents on the ground. In Spain, for example, it is mandatory to have the opinion of an adviser on the vast majority of crops, which has boosted the number of officially certified advisers to over 20 000. |
| --- | --- |

4.6.

| 4.7. | In its previous evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive, the EESC highlighted the importance of improving the monitoring system and of ensuring compliance between the Directive and the NAPs. With regard to the sustainable use of pesticides, professional users will have to record the reasons for any intervention (chemical, biological, physical or cultural, etc.). |
| --- | --- |

4.7.

| 4.8. | In this respect, particular importance should be given to the concept of protected or sensitive areas in the proposal for a Regulation. The use of plant protection products will no longer be possible in certain protected or sensitive areas (urban green areas, including public parks and gardens, playgrounds, recreational and sporting areas, paths for public use, Natura 2000 protected areas and any ecologically sensitive areas that may be preserved for endangered pollinators) unless certain conditions are met and only once the professional using the products provides detailed justification of the products to be used, and how, when and for how long they will be used. To this end, it is essential that the competent approval authorities have sufficient qualified staff to avoid delays resulting in the late application of pest control and preventing timely action against the emergence of pests. |
| --- | --- |

4.8.

| 4.9. | On the other hand, specific geographical and climatic conditions in the Member States should be taken into account, to ensure that there will not be too excessive restriction of use of plant protection products imposed on agricultural land in ecologically sensitive areas that would otherwise not be able to cope with the emergence of new pests. For example, the Natura network covers 27 % of the territory of Spain, which includes thousands of hectares of agricultural crops and land for livestock management. A good strategy may involve zoning the different areas by demarcating and distinguishing those areas that constitute an integral reserve from other areas. Ultimately, the decision to limit use in sensitive areas should be determined by sound scientific and agronomic evidence to support the classification of a given area as protected. |
| --- | --- |

4.9.

| 4.10. | The threshold to be reached prior to chemical intervention will be set out in detail in crop-specific rules and the competent authorities of the Member States will be responsible for establishing an electronic Integrated Pest and Plant Protection Product Management register, ensuring that professional users enter their data. |
| --- | --- |

4.10.

| 4.11. | Furthermore, given that lack of knowledge of the optimal use of pesticides was one of the main obstacles to implementation of the Directive on the Sustainable Use of Pesticides (13), the EESC is pleased to note that the Commission has taken on board many of its recommendations on training and capacity building. |
| --- | --- |

4.11.

| 4.12. | A new central electronic register for training certification will be created. It will contain detailed information on the period of validity of training certificates (five years for an adviser and 10 years for a distributor or professional user). A training test will be required before users can purchase or use plant protection products authorised for application equipment for professional use and before an adviser can give advice. Distributors will have to have a sufficient number of trained staff. |
| --- | --- |

4.12.

| 4.13. | Privacy in the use of agricultural data by the administration must be guaranteed and, above all, resources for digital skills and broadband must be made much more accessible to farmers to avoid greater burdens and work for farmers, who often lack the technical and human resources to send the required information to the electronic register. |
| --- | --- |

4.13.

| 4.14. | Greater awareness on the part of the general public, and in particular consumers, of the role and use of pesticides, in line with national and European legislation, would benefit implementation of the Regulation. Awareness-raising and publicity campaigns aimed at better informing the general public and policy-makers would be essential. Information should be disseminated, for example, on the factors involved in food pricing, and on issues more closely related to product labelling or certification (14). |
| --- | --- |

4.14.

| 4.15. | A level playing field for international trade must also be maintained. Consistency between different EU policies means that great care must be taken to ban the import of food products treated with products that are banned in the EU. |
| --- | --- |

4.15.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides (OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71).

1

(2)  EESC information report Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.

2

(3)  Eurostat, Pesticides sales in the EU.

3

(4)  Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on the war in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 1).

4

(5)  FAO, Hunger Hotspots — FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity.

5

(6)  Resolution of the European Economic and Social Committee on the war in Ukraine and its economic, social and environmental impact (OJ C 290, 29.7.2022, p. 1).

6

(7)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A From Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020) 381) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 268).

7

(8)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A From Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020) 381) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 268).

8

(9)  EESC information report Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.

9

Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive

(10)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions — A From Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020) 381) (OJ C 429, 11.12.2020, p. 268).

10

(11)  Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Integrated Production in the European Union’ (own-initiative opinion) (OJ C 214, 8.7.2014, p. 8).

11

(12)  EESC information report Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.

12

Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive

(13)  EESC information report Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.

13

Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive

(14)  EESC information report Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive.

14

Evaluation of the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Directive

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/145 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/145

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 as regards the exchange of information maintained in the electronic registers concerning economic operators who move excise goods between Member States for commercial purposes’

(COM(2022) 539 final — 2022/0331 (CNS))

(2023/C 100/22)

| Referral | Council of the European Union, 27.10.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| Legal basis | Articles 113 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 209/0/3 |

Referral

Council of the European Union, 27.10.2022

Legal basis

Articles 113 and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

209/0/3

Since the Committee endorses the content of proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EU) No 389/2012 as regards the exchange of information maintained in the electronic registers concerning economic operators who move excise goods between Member States for commercial purposes (1) and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided, at its 574th plenary session of 14 and 15 December 2022, (meeting of 14 December 2022), by 209 votes with 3 abstentions, to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---

(1)  COM(2022) 539 final.

1

---

| 16.3.2023 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 100/146 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2023

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 100/146

---

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Area covered under the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA)’

(COM(2022) 563 final — 2022/348 (COD))

(2023/C 100/23)

| Referral | European Parliament, 9.11.2022 |
| --- | --- |
| | Council, 10.11.2022 |
| Legal basis | Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
| Section responsible | Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment |
| Adopted at plenary | 14.12.2022 |
| Plenary session No | 574 |
| Outcome of vote
  (for/against/abstentions) | 202/0/3 |

Referral

European Parliament, 9.11.2022

Council, 10.11.2022

Legal basis

Articles 43(2) and 304 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Section responsible

Section for Agriculture, Rural Development and the Environment

Adopted at plenary

14.12.2022

Plenary session No

574

Outcome of vote

(for/against/abstentions)

202/0/3

Since the Committee unreservedly endorses the content of the proposal and feels that it requires no comment on its part, it decided to issue an opinion endorsing the proposed text.

Brussels, 14 December 2022.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Christa SCHWENG

---