* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

1 Kaufman files this appeal pro se. As indicated by the style of the case, her daughter Debrah

filed the original complaint in the district court. Debrah has power of attorney, but is not licensed to

practice law, so the district court prohibited Debrah from representing her mother.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-60018

Summary Calender

GLO KAUFMAN, by & through her daughter & Attorney-in-Fact Debrah

Kaufman

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

ROBINSON PROPERTY GROUP LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, doing business

as Horseshoe Casino & Hotel

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Mississippi

No. 2:07-CV-48

Before DAVIS, GARZA, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

On January 31, 2003, Glo Kaufman1 dined at the Horseshoe Casino &

Hotel in Tunica, Mississippi. Walking to the buffet, she stepped in “some oily

type of liquid” and fellto the floor, suffering significantinjuries. Instead of filing

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 15, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-60018

2

suit, Kaufman began communicating with Robinson Property Group (“Robinson

Property”) to settle her injury claim. These communications continued over the

next three years without resolution. Kaufman filed the instant case in the

district court, based on diversity jurisdiction, on March 26, 2007. The district

court granted Robinson Property’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, finding that

the statute of limitations for Kaufman’s claim had expired. 

We review a district court’s granting of a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss de

novo, asking “whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every

doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief.” See

Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004).

Only where it seems beyond doubt that plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts

entitling her to relief should we uphold the dismissal. Id. at 288 (internal

citations and quotations omitted). However, plaintiff’s factual allegations must

provide more than just a speculative right to relief. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).

Under Mississippi state law, the statute of limitations period for a

personal injury claim is three years. See Brown v. Winn-Dixie, 669 So. 2d 92, 94

(Miss. 1996) (citing MISS.CODEANN. § 15-1-49). It is undisputed that Kaufman’s

action accrued on the date of the accident, January 31, 2003, and that she filed

the instant action on March 26, 2007. Thus, she filed suit nearly fourteen

months after the statute of limitations ran. She claims that Robinson Property

purposely misrepresented to her that it would enter into a settlement

agreement, and that she relied on this misrepresentation by not filing suit,

which should allow her claim to proceed despite the statute of limitations.

We construe a pro se appellant’s briefs liberally. See Price v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988). Although the district court

correctly determined that Kaufman failed to state a claim for tolling the statute
No. 08-60018

2 Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-67 provides that if a person “liable to any personal action

shall fraudulently conceal the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the

cause of action shall be deemed to have first accrued at, and not before, the time at which such fraud

shall be, or with reasonable diligence might have been, first known or discovered.” We agree with the

district court that in this case, no evidence exists that Robinson Property concealed, or even could have

concealed, the cause of action))which unquestionably accrued when Kaufman slipped and fell. 

3

of limitations due to fraudulent concealment under § 15-1-67,2 we find that

Kaufman has also pled an equitable estoppel claim. In her original complaint

and appellate brief, she argues that equitable estoppel should prevent Robinson

Property from relying on the statute of limitations, citing to Izard v. Mikell, 173

Miss. 770 (1935) (applying equitable estoppel to prevent defendant from

asserting a statute of limitations defense). In Izard, the Mississippi Supreme

Court found that where a debtor makes a promise to pay that induces the

creditor to let the statute of limitations run, and the creditor forgoes filing suit

in reliance on that promise, equitable estoppel prevents the debtor from

maintaining a statute of limitations defense. 

In a more recent explication of equitable estoppel,the Mississippi Supreme

Court held that “Equitable estoppel requires a representation by a party,

reliance by the other party, and a change in position by the relying party. . . .

[W]here there is inequitable conduct, in order to avoid a serious injustice,

equitable estoppel should be applied.” Trosclair v. Mississippi DOT, 757 So. 2d

178, 181 (Miss. 2000) (reversing summary judgment based on the statute of

limitations on equitable estoppel grounds) (internal citations omitted). Where

evidence exists indicating plaintiff reasonably relied on defendant’s actions to

her detriment in determining whether to file suit, whether equitable estoppel

should prevent defendant from prevailing on a statute of limitations defense is

a question for the trier of fact. See id. Although equitable estoppel originated

in the context of contract disputes, it has been extended to apply to tort plaintiffs

as well. See id.

Affording Kaufman’s briefs the liberal interpretation warranted to a pro
No. 08-60018

4

se party, we find that she has adequately raised an equitable estoppel claim.

She alleges that Robinson Property repeatedly represented to her that a

settlement was forthcoming. Moreover, Robinson Property continually prevailed

on Kaufman for more time to complete settlement while it dealt with changes in

risk management companies, and the effects of Hurricane Katrina (which

Robinson Property told her had devastated its risk management offices and

damaged her claim files). Kaufman continued to comply with Robinson

Property’s requests, and relied on its representations of an imminent settlement

by notfiling suit, counting on its good faith offer to settle and sympathizing with

its plight during the hurricane. Despite the allegedly continued assurances of

settlement, as soon as the statute of limitations ran Robinson Property informed

Kaufman that she no longer had a valid claim. Kaufman claims that she relied

on these assurances, and as a consequence lost the right to recover on her

personal injury claim.

Kaufman has presented evidence stating a valid claim under equitable

estoppel, constituting more than mere speculation. Because the district court

limited its analysis to fraudulent concealment and did not consider equitable

estoppel, we find that the 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss was improperly granted.

Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s order of dismissal,

REMANDING for proceedings consistent with this opinion.