Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:

PATRICK ALLEN DUFF

Evansville, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

T.H. b/n/f SONJA LYNETTER (WALLS) )

FITZGERALD,

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 82A01-1109-JP-438

)

TROY HUTCHISON, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, Judge

The Honorable Renee Ferguson, Magistrate

Cause No. 82D01-9608-JP-765

March 15, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Respondent, Troy Hutchinson (Father), appeals the trial court’s order 

suspending his parenting time with his minor child, T.H., and granting a protective order.

We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

ISSUES

Father raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it suspended Father’s 

parenting time with T.H. for thirty (30) days and modified Father’s parenting 

time thereafter to be subject to T.H.’s discretion; and

(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father the 

opportunity to testify and present witnesses in a hearing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts, as best as we can surmise from the sparse record before us, are as 

follows: Mother and Father were not married when Mother gave birth to T.H. on March 

19, 1996. On January 21, 1997, the trial court issued an order establishing Father’s 

paternity of T.H. The order also established that Mother would have custody of T.H., 

while Father would pay $67 per week in child support and would have reasonable 

visitation.

On April 25, 2006, Mother filed a petition to modify T.H.’s custody, requesting 

that: (1) the trial court modify Father’s child support requirements to reflect his changed

income; (2) any child support obligation be withheld from Father’s wages and paid 
3

directly to the clerk of the court; (3) the trial court issue an order requiring Father to 

immediately provide insurance and other health care information as requested by Mother; 

(4) the trial court amend its order concerning visitation to conform to the actual visitation 

being exercised by Father; and (5) the trial court award Mother reasonably attorney fees. 

On May 3, 2006, Father also filed a petition to modify T.H.’s custody, requesting joint 

legal custody and notification before Mother left town.

On July 18, 2006, the trial court issued an order requiring Father to pay $74 per 

week in child support, each party to pay his or her own attorney fees, and Father to have 

parenting time every Wednesday overnight beginning at 8:00 p.m. and every other 

weekend, from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Monday morning. The trial court also 

established that Father would have parenting time every Thanksgiving, while Mother 

would have parenting time every Christmas.

On September 13, 2010, Mother petitioned the trial court to modify its order. She 

requested, among other things, that the trial court order Father to contribute to the 

expenses of T.H.’s early college program she was taking through her high school and that 

the trial court order Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees. On February 9, 2011, the trial 

court held a hearing on the petition. On February 11, 2011, the trial court issued an order 

increasing Father’s child support obligations to $115 per week and requiring Father to 

pay Mother’s attorney fees in the amount of $750 on or before July 1, 2011.

On April 25, 2011, Father filed an Information for indirect contempt, claiming that 

Mother had failed to allow him parenting time and had attempted to alienate T.H. from 
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Father by (1) calling the police; (2) making numerous phone calls to T.H. while she was 

with Father; (3) undermining Father’s parental decision-making regarding T.H.; (4) 

making derogatory comments regarding Father in T.H.’s presence; (5) filing successive 

protective orders against Father; and (6) involving T.H. in issues between Mother and 

Father. The trial court set the matter for a hearing on August 3, 2011. In the meantime, 

on June 20, 2011, Father filed a second Information for contempt, again alleging that 

Mother would not allow him to have his parenting time with T.H. as ordered by the trial 

court on July 18, 2006. Then, on July 6, 2011, Father filed a third Information for 

contempt, asserting that he had filed a small claims suit requesting the payment of his 

attorney fees. He asked the trial court to stay its February 11, 2011 order requiring him 

to pay Mother’s attorney fees until both parties’ fees could be reevaluated in light of the 

small claims suit. 

On July 25, 2011, Mother filed a complaint in proceedings supplemental to 

execution, requesting that the trial court order Father to appear and answer concerning his 

property, profits, and income, as he had not paid the $750 he owed her for reimbursement 

for her attorney fees. She also filed an Information for contempt against Father for 

failing to pay the $750. At some point Mother filed one or more petitions requesting 

protective orders against Father on behalf of herself and possibly T.H. However, neither 

Father nor Mother has provided these documents on appeal.1

 

1

Father’s counsel referred to “both” protective orders, which indicates that there was more than one 

protective order, but we do not know the nature of this additional protective order. (Transcript p. 18).
5

On August 3, 2011, the trial court held a hearing concerning the multiple 

Informations for contempt and the petition for a protective order on behalf of T.H. At the 

beginning of the hearing, Father’s counsel requested that the trial court reset the hearing 

on the protective order for mediation, but the trial court denied his request. The trial 

court conducted an in camera interview of T.H. and then found that Mother was not in 

contempt of court. The trial court also granted the protective order, at which point Father 

requested a contested hearing on “both” of the protective orders. (Transcript p. 18). The 

trial court denied Father’s request. The trial court also included as a condition of the 

protective order that Father was not allowed to contact T.H. for thirty days. Thereafter, 

Father could contact T.H. about parenting time, but T.H. was not required to see Father.

Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION

I. Modification of Parental Visitation

First, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying his 

visitation rights because there was not sufficient evidence to support such a modification.

Initially, we note that Mother did not file an appellee’s brief. When the appellee fails to 

file a brief, we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument for the appellee. 

Tisdial v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Rather, we will reverse the 

trial court’s judgment if the appellant presents a case of prima facie error. Id.at 785. 

“Prima facie error in this context is defined as, at first sight, on first appearance, or on the 
6

face of it.” Id. (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 

2006)). Where an appellant does not meet this burden, we will affirm. Id. 

We review a trial court’s modification of a non-custodial parent’s visitation rights

for an abuse of discretion, with a “preference for granting latitude and deference to our 

trial judges in family law matters.” Kicken v. Kicken, 798 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2003) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). We set 

aside judgments only when they are clearly erroneous, and we will not substitute our own 

judgment if any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment. Id. 

Pursuant to Ind. Code section 31-17-4-2, a trial court may modify an order 

granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best 

interests of the child. The trial court should not restrict a parent’s parenting time rights 

unless it finds that the parenting time might endanger the child’s physical health or 

significantly impair the child’s emotional development. I.C. § 31-17-4-2. In order to 

assist it in determining the child’s perception of whether parenting time by the 

noncustodial parent might endanger the child’s physical health or significantly impair the 

child’s emotional development, the trial court may interview the child in chambers. I.C. 

§ 31-17-4-1(b). However, a judgment based solely upon an extra-judicial inquiry can not 

stand. Truden v. Jacquay, 480 N.E.2d 974, 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).

During Mother and Father’s August 3, 2011 hearing, neither party testified before 

the trial court. Instead, the trial court interviewed T.H. in its chambers prior to making its 

decision. This interview is not a part of the record, so we do not know what evidence the 
7

trial court obtained from T.H. or how that evidence supported its decision to suspend 

Father’s parenting time for 30 days and modify Father’s parenting time thereafter. As we 

stated above, a judgment based solely upon extra-judicial inquiry can not stand. See id.

Therefore, we conclude that there was not sufficient evidence for the trial court to find 

that Father might endanger T.H.’s physical health or significantly impair her emotional 

development. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in modifying Father’s visitation 

rights.

II. Hearing

Next, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Father 

the opportunity to testify and present witnesses in a hearing on all of the issues—the 

protective order, Father’s Informations for contempt, and the modification of his 

visitation rights. As we have already addressed the issue of the modification of Father’s 

visitation rights, we will only address Father’s argument with respect to the protective 

order and Father’s Informations for contempt. 

A. Protective Order

Under the Civil Protection Order Act (CPOA), codified at I.C. § 34-26-5, a trial 

court may “upon notice and after a hearing, whether or not respondent appears, issue or 

modify an order for protection.” I.C. § 34-26-5-9(a)(2) (emphasis added). In Essany v. 

Bower, 790 N.E.2d 148, 152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), we held that the minimum 

requirements for a hearing under the CPOA include the opportunity to testify, as well as 
8

call and cross-examine witnesses. A trial court errs if it issues a protective order absent 

these safeguards. See id. at 153.

Here, the trial court interviewed T.H. in camera, then immediately issued its legal

conclusions; in doing so, the trial court denied Father’s request to hold a contested 

hearing at which he could testify and present witnesses. In light of our holding in Essany, 

we conclude that the August 3, 2011 hearing did not meet the minimum requirements of 

I.C. § 34-26-5-9. The trial court therefore erred in issuing a protective order against 

Father. 

B. Contempt of Court

With respect to Father’s contempt of court claims, we note that the decision to find 

a party in contempt of court is within the trial court’s discretion. In re Paternity of M.F., 

956 N.E.2d 1157, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We will reverse the trial court’s decision 

only upon finding that it has abused its discretion. Id. As noted above, a trial court has 

abused its discretion when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court or is contrary to law. Id.

Contempt of court “involves disobedience of a court which undermines the court’s 

authority, justice, and dignity.” Id. at 1163 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 919 

N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). There are two types of contempt: direct and 

indirect. Id. Direct contempt involves actions occurring near the court that interfere with 

the business of the court and of which the judge has personal knowledge.” Id. Contempt 

is indirect if it involves actions outside of the trial court’s personal knowledge. Id. 
9

Willful disobedience of any lawfully entered court order of which the offender had notice 

is indirect contempt. Id. In order to be held in contempt for failing to comply with a 

court order, 

a party must have willfully disobeyed the order. The order must have been 

so clear and certain that there could be no question as to what the party 

must do, or must not do, and so there could be no question regarding 

whether the order is violated. A party may not be held in contempt for 

failing to comply with an ambiguous or indefinite order.

Id. at 1164-65.

As Father requested the trial court declare Mother in contempt of court for 

allegedly disobeying a lawfully entered court order, indirect contempt is at issue in this 

case. However, Father has not developed any arguments or provided any evidence to 

support his assertion that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to find 

Mother in contempt. Instead, Father devotes the section of his brief relating to the trial 

court’s failure to provide him with an appropriate hearing to the issue of the protective 

order. We therefore cannot evaluate whether Mother willfully disobeyed the order. 

Accordingly, we will not address Father’s argument any further and we find that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that: (1) the trial court erred in modifying 

and suspending Father’s parenting time and issuing a protective order against Father; and 

(2) did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Mother in contempt of court.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
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FRIEDLANDER, J. and MATHIAS, J. concur