Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1602-CR-399 | February 22, 2017 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Hilary Bowe Ricks

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Angela N. Sanchez

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James Jenkins,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 22, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1602-CR-399

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Grant Hawkins, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G05-1410-MR-46576

Brown, Judge.
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[1] James Jenkins appeals his conviction for murder. Jenkins raises one issue 

which we revise and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in 

admitting certain evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the early morning hours of October 1, 2014, Raul Castaneda-Martinez, 

Emmanuel Phillips, and others were gathered at a bonfire behind a house on 

Minnesota Street in Indianapolis. After obtaining methamphetamine, they 

went across the street to the home of Emmanuel’s aunt, Kim Phillips. While 

there, Castaneda-Martinez decided to purchase more methamphetamine, and 

another person phoned Jenkins for that purpose. 

[3] Jenkins arrived at Kim’s house and sold methamphetamine to CastanedaMartinez. Before Jenkins left, Castaneda-Martinez told Jenkins that he also 

was interested in purchasing cocaine. Jenkins later returned to the house, but 

Castaneda-Martinez informed him that he no longer wanted to buy the cocaine. 

Jenkins asked Castaneda-Martinez to speak outside. Emmanuel followed the 

two men out onto the porch, but Jenkins told Emmanuel that he wanted to 

speak to Castaneda-Martinez alone. Jenkins and Castaneda-Martinez then

walked down the street while Emmanuel stayed outside on the front porch. 

[4] A few minutes later, Emmanuel heard gunshots. Kim, who was inside, heard 

two gunshots that sounded like they were right in front of the house, and she 

quickly locked the front door and crouched on the floor. Emmanuel ran to the 

edge of the porch and looked in the direction that Castaneda-Martinez and 
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Jenkins had walked, and he saw two men run to a white SUV. In front of a 

house a couple of doors down, he observed Jenkins standing over the top of 

Castaneda-Martinez, who was on the ground. Jenkins faced Emmanuel,

looked directly at him, and fired two more shots down into CastanedaMartinez. He then ran to the white SUV and left with the other two men. 

Castaneda-Martinez died as a result of the gunshot wounds.

[5] Emmanuel went to Castaneda-Martinez and observed that he was not 

breathing. Emmanuel then returned to Kim’s house. He was terrified, 

trembling, and kept saying that “Jay,” as he knew Jenkins, had shot his friend. 

Transcript at 188. Emmanuel called the police tip line and told them what had 

happened. Later that night, Emmanuel, Kim, and another person spoke with 

police, told them that “Jay” shot Castaneda-Martinez, provided a physical 

description of Jenkins, including his distinctive face and neck tattoos, and 

identified Jenkins in photo arrays. Id. at 218. 

[6] Later, Jenkins called Emmanuel and asked to meet him at a convenience store, 

but Emmanuel did not go because he was afraid that something would happen

to him. The next time that Emmanuel saw Jenkins, Jenkins told him that he 

“better keep it solid and, uh, if I don’t something will happen to me and my 

family.” Id. at 136. 

[7] Also, a few days prior to the murder of Castaneda-Martinez, someone crashed 

a car into a gun store and stole twenty-five handguns. Jenkins became a suspect 

in the burglary investigation after someone reported that he was attempting to 
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sell handguns stolen in the burglary. Officers conducting that investigation 

obtained his cell phone number and applied for a court order to determine the 

current location and historical locations of the phone. The affidavit detailed 

information to establish probable cause to believe that Jenkins was in 

possession of and trying to sell guns obtained in the burglary and that locating 

him would likely be achieved by locating the phone that was the target of the 

order. The affidavit was sworn to and submitted by Detective Ronald Gray of 

the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. 

[8] The court ruled that probable cause existed to believe that Jenkins had 

committed theft or receiving stolen property and that he could be apprehended 

by locating the phone “through the use of Precision Location by way of GPS 

technology to determine the location of the user of the Target Phone.” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 216. The court ordered that the service provider 

would give the police “GPS Precision Location for the Target Phone to 

determine the movements of the Target Phone for a period of thirty (30) days.”

Id. The court ordered the service provider to supply the police with subscriber 

identifying information, information to identify the phone, and cell site and 

GPS location information from September 28, 2014, to the present. The order

states that, pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 3124: 

the Indiana State Police shall be authorized to initiate a signal to 

determine the location of the subject’s mobile device on the 

service provider’s network or with such other reference points as 

may be reasonably available, Global Position System Tracing 

and Tracking, Mobile Locator tools, R.T.T. (Real Time Tracking 

Tool), Precision Locations and any and all locations, without 
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geographical boundaries, and such provider shall initiate a signal 

to determine the location of the subject’s mobile device on the 

service provider’s network or with such other reference points as 

may be reasonably available and at such intervals and times as 

directed by the law enforcement agent / agencies serving the 

Order.

Id. at 218.

[9] Officers from the burglary investigation assisted homicide detectives in locating 

Jenkins’s phone during the midmorning hours of October 1, 2014, the day 

Castaneda-Martinez had been shot and killed. Utilizing an electronic 

surveillance device, police narrowed the location to a home on South State 

Avenue, and the police setup surveillance around the house, were provided a 

photograph of Jenkins, and watched for approximately an hour or more to see 

if they could locate him. At some point, police observed Jenkins and another 

man exit the house and begin walking down the street, and Jenkins nervously 

looked over his shoulder several times. After a detective recognized and 

positively identified Jenkins, officers decided to make an arrest, and after an

officer activated his emergency lights Jenkins and the other man started 

running. Following a foot chase of approximately fifteen or twenty minutes, 

the police ultimately apprehended Jenkins. Police also recovered a silver and 

black handgun, in which subsequent testing showed that the handgun was the 

same gun used to kill Castaneda-Martinez, as well as Jenkins’s cell phone 

which had been used to track him and contained a photograph of Jenkins 

holding a gun similar to the handgun recovered at the scene. 
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[10] On October 6, 2014, the State charged Jenkins with murder. On October 19, 

2015, the court held a jury trial which ended in a mistrial. A second jury trial 

commenced on December 14, 2015. At trial, Jenkins objected to any and all 

evidence obtained by accessing the GPS for his cell phone, and the court 

overruled his objections but stated that a full hearing on the suppression claims 

would be held following the trial if he was convicted on the murder charge. On 

December 16, 2015, the jury found Jenkins guilty. 

[11] On December 30, 2015, Jenkins filed a Brief of Motion to Suppress Evidence, 

and the State filed its response on January 12, 2016. On January 20, 2016, the 

court held a hearing and denied Jenkins’s motion, ruling that “Whether the 

information provided to our Magistrate here was enough, in my view it was, 

but you’re kind of saying, maybe he didn’t understand it. And I can’t rule 

based on what he understands. Just on what sense it makes to me and whether 

his actions were reasonable.” Transcript at 1250.

[12] On February 5, 2016, the trial court sentenced Jenkins to sixty-three years in the 

Department of Correction. 

Discussion

[13] The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in admitting certain 

evidence. Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission or 

exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 

1115, 1134 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. We reverse only where the decision is 

clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Joyner v. 
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State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied. Also, “[w]hen a trial 

court’s evidentiary ruling depends on the interpretation of a statute, case law, or 

a rule of evidence and not an ‘application [of those] to any particular set of 

facts’, it presents a legal question we review de novo.” Patchett v. Lee, 60 N.E.3d 

1025, 1028 (Ind. 2016). Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of 

discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Fox 

v. State, 717 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

[14] Jenkins argues that the cell tower simulator, or “Stingray,” used by officers is 

neither a pen register nor a trap and trace device, which are devices 

contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 3124. Appellant’s Brief at 24. He asserts that that 

Ind. Code § 35-33-5-15(a)(1)(A),1 read in conjunction with definitions provided 

by Ind. Code § 35-33-5-0.5, “make it clear that GPS communications from a 

cell phone must be considered telephonic communications that fall under Title 

35, Article 33.5.” Id. at 22. Jenkins makes a number of arguments for the 

proposition that the State failed to comply with Title 35, Article 33.5 of the 

Indiana Code.

[15] The State argues that Jenkins waived appellate review of his statutory claims 

because such claims are being raised for the first time on appeal, and that, 

waiver notwithstanding, the police complied with Ind. Code § 35-33-5-12, 

which governs the use of tracking devices. It maintains that Jenkins’s statute-

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-33-5-15 became effective on March 21, 2016, when it was added by Pub. L. No. 57-2016, § 

3.
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based arguments are “premised on assumptions about the nature of the 

technology employed in this case that is not supported by the record and, even 

if it was true, would be irrelevant to this case.” Appellee’s Brief at 16. The 

State asserts that, in the event police action did not comply with the court’s 

order, both the good faith exception and attenuation doctrine apply, and in any 

event any possible error in the court’s evidentiary ruling is harmless. 

[16] We begin with the State’s assertion of waiver. At trial, the following exchange 

occurred during the direct examination of Detective Gray:

Q Okay. And – now what – what specific action did you 

take to assist?

A Uhm, I’d contacted some other people in our unit with the 

Indiana State Police and asked them to assist us with 

electronic surveillance.

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. May we approach.

THE COURT: You may.

(THE FOLLOWING BENCH CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT 

SIDE BAR OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY)

[Defense Counsel]: (Indiscernible.)

THE COURT: (Indiscernible) about the machinery or just 

the (indiscernible.)
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[Defense Counsel]: The fact that he’s referencing the joint 

surveillance was through my client’s (indiscernible.) I suspect 

that will be coming up next. I could ask him a few questions to 

supplement the motion if – if the Court likes.

THE COURT: Response.

[Prosecutor]: I just want to say there’s nothing. There’s no 

improper influence here.

THE COURT: This is something – this is what I said you 

could argue about if there’s an adverse verdict.

[Defense Counsel]: Well, but I still – I still have to object at the 

time that the reference is taking place (indiscernible.)

THE COURT: Are you satisfied the record’s been –

[Prosecutor]: He made his objection.

THE COURT: Anything else?

[Prosecutor]: I probably want to cite case law on 

(indiscernible) and give a specific reference of that in Article 1, 

Section 11 in the Indiana Constitution for (indiscernible.)

THE COURT: We’re agreeing that you’ve made the record 

you need to make to preserve the issue. I think the State’s agreed 

that the procedure I recommended which is if the verdict is 

adverse to you, you can have that full blown hearing prior to 

sentencing. . . .
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Transcript at 271-273. The parties agreed to hold a motion to suppress hearing 

following the trial if Jenkins was found guilty. 

[17] In Jenkins’s Brief of Motion to Suppress Evidence, he moved the court for an 

order of suppression “based on the 4th and 14th Amendments to the United 

States Constitution and Article 1 Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution . . . .” 

Appellant’s Appendix at 192. In support thereof, he asserted that “[t]he 

application for the search warrant did not include any reference to the use of 

cell tower simulators and the court order did not authorize such a device,” 

noting that IMPD officers “used an electronic device (‘Stingray’) to search for 

the cellular phone with the [Target Phone number] which led to” Jenkins’s 

location. Id. He asserted that a cell tower simulator such as a Stingray 

“simulates a cell site” which “causes or forces cell phones in an area to send 

their signals – with all the information contained therein – to the cell-site 

simulator,” and that the device “captures a vast array of information, including, 

but not limited to, the cell phones’ electronic serial number (‘ESN’) or 

international mobile subscriber identification (‘IMSI’).” Id. at 193. He argued 

that the “law enforcement officer failed to disclose the use of ‘Stingray’ in the 

application for the warrant effectively making it invalid,” and that the good 

faith exception did not apply. Id. at 195. The State argued in its response that 

the court’s order authorized the police activity and that “the type of device 

employed is irrelevant, so long as law enforcement complied with the existing 

law by obtaining prior judicial approval to activate its equipment.” Id. at 206. 
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At no point did Jenkins mention Title 35, Article 33.5 of the Indiana Code or 

make any argument related to any other violations of Indiana statute.

[18] Based upon our review of Jenkins’s objection and brief in support of his motion 

to suppress, we find that he did not raise an objection at the trial court level 

concerning purported violations of Indiana statute. Accordingly, we conclude 

that he has waived his statutory arguments on appeal. See Moore v. State, 669 

N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ind. 1996) (“Where a defendant fails to object to the 

introduction of evidence, makes only a general objection, or objects only on other 

grounds, the defendant waives the suppression claim.”) (emphasis added), reh’g 

denied. Moreover, we agree with the State that the record is incomplete to 

attempt to address Jenkins’s claims on the merits.

[19] We also observe that, even if Jenkins did not waive his arguments that the use 

of the Stingray device violated the Indiana Code, the officers did not rely upon 

the court’s order in good faith, and the attenuation doctrine did not apply under 

these circumstances, we would find that any such error was harmless. On the 

night of the shooting, Emmanuel Phillips, Kim Phillips, and another person 

spoke with police, told them that “Jay” shot Castaneda-Martinez, provided a 

physical description of Jenkins, including his distinctive face and neck tattoos, 

and identified Jenkins in photo arrays. Transcript at 218. At trial, Emmanuel 

testified that he and Castaneda-Martinez left a bonfire to go to Kim’s home, 

that someone phoned Jenkins so that Castaneda-Martinez could obtain 

methamphetamine, that when Jenkins arrived he sold methamphetamine to 

Castaneda-Martinez, who indicated that he was also interested in purchasing 
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cocaine, and that when Jenkins returned with cocaine Castaneda-Martinez told 

him he was no longer interested in purchasing it. Following this exchange, 

Jenkins and Castaneda-Martinez left to speak outside, Emmanuel attempted to 

follow, but Jenkins told Emmanuel that he wanted to speak to CastanedaMartinez alone. He testified that a few minutes later he heard gunshots, he 

looked in the direction that Castaneda-Martinez and Jenkins had walked, saw 

two men run to a white SUV and soon after observed Jenkins standing over the 

top of Castaneda-Martinez, who was on the ground. Emmanuel testified that 

Jenkins faced Emmanuel, looked directly at him, fired two more shots down 

into Castaneda-Martinez, and ran to the white SUV and left with the other two 

men. Accordingly, we conclude that any error was at most harmless. See 

Tolliver v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 

regardless of the admissibility of certain evidence, “two independent 

eyewitnesses . . . whose testimony was wholly unrelated to and unaffected by” 

the questioned evidence, “identified Tolliver as the shooter, and [one 

eyewitness] connected Tolliver to a gun like the one used to kill [the victim],” 

and that accordingly any alleged error in admitting the evidence was harmless), 

trans. denied.

Conclusion

[20] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jenkins’s conviction for murder.

[21] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.