56542 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 121 

[Docket No. FAA–2002–13464–2; 

Amendment No. 121–315] 

RIN 2120–AC84 

Improved Seats in Air Carrier 

Transport Category Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This final rule amends the 

FAA’s regulations on the 

crashworthiness of passenger and flight 

attendant seats on transport category 

airplanes used in part 121 passengercarrying operations. This final rule 

requires those transport category 

airplanes type-certificated after January 

1, 1958 which have not yet been 

manufactured that are used in part 121 

passenger-carrying operations to have 

passenger and flight attendant seats that 

meet the current improved 

crashworthiness standards. This action 

is necessary because research, accident 

data, and analysis show that these 

improvements provide increased 

occupant protection in airplanes 

involved in impact-survivable 

accidents. 

DATES: This amendment becomes 

effective October 27, 2005. Transport 

category airplanes manufactured on and 

after October 27, 2009 used in part 121 

passenger carrying operations must 

comply with this final rule. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Hal 

Jensen, Aircraft Engineering Division, 

AIR–100, Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; 

telephone (202) 267–8807; facsimile 

(202) 267–5340, e-mail 

hal.jensen@faa.gov. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in Title 

49, Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, 

Section 44701, General requirements, 

and Section 44705, Air carrier operating 

certificates. Under section 44701(b), the 

FAA may prescribe minimum safety 

standards for an air carrier to which the 

agency issues a certificate under section 

44705. Under section 44705, the FAA 

issues an operating certificate to a 

person desiring to operate as an air 

carrier if the FAA finds, after 

investigation, that the person properly 

and adequately is equipped and able to 

operate safely under Part A and the 

regulations and standards prescribed 

under it. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

section 44701 because it establishes new 

minimum safety standards that the seats 

in transport category airplanes that are 

used in part 121 passenger-carrying 

operations must meet to protect 

occupants of that airplane if it is 

involved in an impact-survivable 

accident. The regulation also is within 

the scope of section 44705 since the 

section requires that the person to 

whom the FAA issues an air carrier 

operating certificate be properly and 

adequately equipped to operate safely. 

The improved seats mandated by this 

regulation will increase the safety of air 

carrier operations. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Availability of Rulemaking Documents 

You can get an electronic copy of this 

final rule using the Internet by: 

(1) Searching the Department of 

Transportation’s electronic Docket 

Management System (DMS) Web page 

(http://dms.dot.gov/search); 

(2) Visiting the Office of Rulemaking’s 

Web page at http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/; or 

(3) Accessing the Government 

Printing Office’s Web page at http:// 

www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/ 

aces140.html. 

You can also get a copy by filing a 

request with the Federal Aviation 

Administration, Office of Rulemaking, 

ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue, 

SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by 

calling (202) 267–9680. To facilitate a 

prompt response, please make sure to 

identify the amendment number, notice 

number or docket number of this 

rulemaking in your request. 

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act 

The Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 

1996 requires the FAA to comply with 

small entity requests for information or 

advice about compliance with statutes 

and regulations within its jurisdiction. If 

you are a small entity and you have a 

question about this document, you may 

contact your local FAA official, or the 

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out 

more about SBREFA on the Internet at 

our Web page, http://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies/rulemaking/ 

sbre_act/, or by e-mailing us at 9–AWA– 

SBREFA@faa.gov. 

Background 

A. History 

1. Pre-SNPRM 

This final rule is in response to 

Section 303(b) of the Airport and 

Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion 

Act of 1987 (Pub. L. 100–223) (the Act 

of 1987) and follows a notice of 

proposed rulemaking published in 1988 

and a supplemental notice of proposed 

rulemaking published in 2002 (SNPRM). 

The Act of 1987 directed the Secretary 

of Transportation to: 

‘‘* * * initiate a rulemaking proceeding to 

consider requiring all seats onboard all air 

carrier aircraft to meet improved 

crashworthiness standards based upon the 

best available testing standards for 

crashworthiness.’’ 

In 1988 the FAA concurrently 

published a final rule, ‘‘Improved Seat 

Safety Standards’’ (53 FR 17640, May 

17, 1988)(Amendment 25–64) and a 

notice of proposed rulemaking, ‘‘Retrofit 

of Improved Seats In Air Carrier 

Transport Category Airplanes’’ (53 FR 

17650, May 17, 1988) (Notice 88–8). 

Amendment 25–64 upgraded the 

certification standards for occupant 

protection during emergency landing 

conditions in transport category 

airplanes from only a 9g static standard 

to an upgraded 9g static standard and a 

new 16g dynamic standard. Notice 88– 

8 proposed to prohibit, after June 16, 

1995, the operation of transport category 

airplanes under parts 121 and 135 that 

were type-certificated after January 1, 

1958 unless all seats onboard met the 

certification requirements of § 25.785 in 

effect on June 16, 1988. These 

certification requirements include the 

16g standard created by Amendment 

25–64. 

The FAA received 70 comments to 

Notice 88–8. Based on these comments, 

we decided that we needed more 

information to determine the impact of 

Notice 88–8 on the aviation community. 

Even though much research and 

development on the dynamic testing of 

seats had been done to support the 16g 

standard, the process of certifying seats 

to the 16g standard was still new. The 

dynamic testing requirements for 16g 

seats represented an increase in 

sophistication and complexity over the 

simpler static testing used for 9g seats. 

Industry needed time to work out the 

technical problems of meeting the 16g 

seat standard, and we needed time to 

evaluate specific problems presented by 

industry and to develop proper 

guidance material for obtaining 16g seat 

certification. 

As these issues were addressed by 

industry and the FAA, our standards 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56543 

and guidance material evolved. This 

helped the aircraft seat manufacturing 

industry transition from producing 9g 

seats to 16g seats that could meet the 

new requirements. During this time, we 

never lost sight of the goal of improving 

the crashworthiness of seats in transport 

category airplanes. The significant 

actions taken during this time included: 

• On March 6, 1990, we published an 

advisory circular (AC) to provide 

industry guidance on the dynamic test 

process. This was AC 25.562–1, 

‘‘Dynamic Evaluation of Seat Restraint 

Systems & Occupant Protection on 

Transport Airplanes.’’ AC 25.562–1A 

superseded AC 25.562–1 on January 19, 

1996. 

• We worked with industry through 

the Society of Automotive Engineers 

SEAT Committee to develop a standard 

that would detail the requirements for 

dynamic testing of a 16g seat. That 

standard (Aerospace Standard (AS) 

8049, Performance Standard for Seats in 

Civil Rotorcraft, Transport Aircraft and 

General Aviation Aircraft) was 

incorporated in Technical Standard 

Order (TSO)–C127 (Rotorcraft, 

Transport Airplane, and Normal and 

Utility Airplane Seating Systems) in 

1992 and revised in 1998 (TSO–C127a). 

• We held a public meeting on 

October 23 and 24, 1995, in Seattle, 

Washington, to gather information on 

challenges the industry had in meeting 

our 16g dynamic seat certification 

requirements for new programs and for 

existing airplanes that would be affected 

by the proposed rulemaking. We 

presented our views and listened to 

comments from the aviation industry at 

that meeting. The information gained 

during this public meeting led us to 

reconsider the original rule proposed in 

Notice 88–8. 

From the mid-to-late 1990s, although 

industry and the FAA continued to 

address significant 16g seat issues 

primarily related to occupant 

protection, enough progress had been 

made that 16g seats were being 

produced and approved regularly. 

Therefore, we determined it was 

suitable to move forward with our 

proposed rulemaking to improve seats 

on transport category airplanes. As a 

result, we held a public meeting on 

December 8 and 9, 1998. The goals of 

this meeting were to discuss our 

proposed revisions to Notice 88–8 and 

to get current information and 

viewpoints. In addition to seeking 

comments at the public meeting, we 

reopened the docket for comments. We 

received approximately 40 additional 

comments by the close of this comment 

period. 

The above is a summary of the events 

leading up to the publication of the 

SNPRM. For a more detailed discussion, 

please read the ‘‘Background’’ section of 

the SNPRM. 

2. SNPRM 

On October 4, 2002, the FAA 

published a supplemental notice of 

proposed rulemaking (SNPRM), 

‘‘Improved Seats in Air Carrier 

Transport Category Airplanes’’ (67 FR 

62294, October 4, 2002). The SNPRM 

proposed the following: 

• For all airplanes manufactured on 

or after four years after the effective date 

of the final rule, all passenger and flight 

attendant seats on the airplane must 

meet the requirements of § 25.562 in 

effect on June 16, 1988 (proposed 

§ 121.311(j)(1)); 

• For all airplanes manufactured 

before four years after the effective date 

of the final rule, all passenger and flight 

attendant seats on the airplane must 

meet the requirements of § 25.562 in 

effect on June 16, 1988, after any 

passenger seat or any flight attendant 

seat in that airplane is replaced 

(proposed § 121.311(j)(2)); and 

• On or after fourteen years after the 

effective date of the final rule, no person 

could operate a transport category 

airplane type-certificated after January 

1, 1958, in passenger-carrying 

operations under this part unless all 

passenger and all flight attendant seats 

on the airplane meet the requirements of 

§ 25.562 in effect on June 16, 1988 

(proposed § 121.311(k)). 

In preparing the SNPRM, the FAA 

hired a consultant to conduct an 

analysis of the benefits of 16g seats over 

9g seats in transport category airplanes. 

This consultant, R.G.W. Cherry & 

Associates Limited (Cherry), performed 

this analysis and produced a report 

entitled ‘‘A Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 

16g Dynamic Seats’’ (Report DOT/FAA/ 

AR–00/13/April 2000)(the Cherry 

Report). 

The Cherry Report studied those 

transport category airplane accidents 

that occurred from 1984 to 1998 and 

predicted the benefits to the occupants 

if 16g seats had been installed in those 

airplanes. It predicted: 

• A range in the reduction of serious 

injuries to occupants in impactsurvivable accidents if they were in 16g 

seats instead of 9g seats; and 

• A range in the reduction of fatalities 

to occupants in impact-survivable 

accidents if they were in 16g seats 

instead of 9g seats. 

Since publication of the SNPRM, 

Cherry completed an addendum report 

entitled ‘‘A Benefit Analysis for Aircraft 

16-g Dynamic Seats Configured Without 

Enhancements to Head Injury Criteria’’

(DOT/FAA/AR–04/27, March 2003)(the 

Cherry Report Addendum). The Cherry 

Report Addendum assessed the 

incremental benefits resulting from the 

enhanced Head Injury Criteria. 

B. Seat Classifications—9g/16g/16g 

‘‘Compatible’’

Currently, there are several 

classifications of seats in transport 

category airplanes used in part 121 

operations. They are as follows: 

1.9g Seats 

a. What is a 9g seat? 

A 9g seat is tested to different load 

factors in different directions. The 

highest load factor is in the forward 

direction at 9g’s. This is why these seats 

are commonly referred to as 9g seats. 

The testing procedure is typically 

accomplished by applying a force to the 

seat through the safety belt by means of 

a cable and winch system. The 

minimum force that the seat must be 

capable of reacting in the forward 

direction without structural failure is 9 

times the combined weight of the seat 

and a 170 pound occupant in each seat 

place. As an example, if a seat had three 

places and the seat weighs 100 pounds, 

then the seat must be capable of reacting 

5490 pounds ((170 pounds per occupant 

times 3 seat places plus 100 pounds of 

seat weight) times 9). 

b. Regulations and the TSO for 9g Seats 

In 1952, the regulations for transport 

category airplane seats were revised to 

increase the emergency landing 

condition forward load factor from 6g’s 

to 9g’s. Five years later, the FAA issued 

TSO–C39 (‘‘Aircraft Seats and Berths’’) 

that included guidance on static testing 

to 9g’s for seats that would be used in 

transport category airplanes. It is 

important to note that obtaining 

TSO C39 approval for a seat does not 

mean that the seat is approved for 

installation in an airplane. A separate 

approval, known as an installation 

approval, is necessary to show the seat’s 

compliance with all the applicable 

regulations of the FAA. However, 

because TSO C39 was closely aligned 

with the other applicable regulations 

then in effect, installation approval was 

easy to attain if the seat had TSO C39 

approval. This was generally the process 

for getting a 9g seat approved for use in 

an airplane until 1988. 

2.16g Seats 

a. What is a 16g seat? 

For transport category airplanes, a 16g 

seat is one that meets the 9g 

requirements of § 25.561 and the 

56544 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

dynamic requirements of § 25.562. A 

16g seat is tested in a manner that 

simulates the loads that could be 

expected in an impact-survivable 

accident. Two separate dynamic tests 

are conducted to simulate two different 

accident scenarios: one in which the 

forces are predominantly in the vertical 

downward direction and one in which 

the forces are predominantly in the 

longitudinal forward direction. The 

highest load factor is in the forward 

direction at 16 g’s. This is why these 

seats are commonly referred to as 16g 

seats. The test procedure requires ‘‘crash 

testing’’ the seat (i.e., rapidly 

decelerating the seat in accordance with 

the criteria in § 25.562(b)). For the 16g 

test, this means deceleration must go 

from a minimum of 44ft/sec to 0 ft/sec 

in not more than 0.09 seconds with a 

peak deceleration of at least 16g’s. The 

seats are tested with seat floor tracks 

that are representative of those that will 

be used in the airplane installation. 

The seats are also tested with test 

dummies in each seat position. The 

reaction of the test dummies during the 

dynamic test imparts loads into the seat 

restraints and seat structure more 

accurately than the cable and winch 

system used in the 9g seat static pull 

test. The test dummies are instrumented 

to measure data like forces and 

accelerations that are then used for 

evaluating occupant protection criteria. 

As an example, accelerometers in the 

heads of the test dummies measure 

accelerations that are used in 

calculating the Head Injury Criteria 

(HIC). Limitations on an acceptable 

level of HIC serve to protect the 

occupant from serious head injury 

where head contact with seats or other 

structure can occur. 16g seats also: 

• Protect the occupant from 

debilitating leg and spine injuries; 

• Improve the attachment to the 

airframe; 

• Protect crewmembers from serious 

chest injury when upper torso restraints 

are used; and 

• Ensure occupants do not become 

trapped in their seats due to excessive 

seat deformation. 

b. Regulations and the TSO for 16g Seats 

In 1988, the emergency landing 

conditions were revised to include 

dynamic landing conditions to improve 

occupant protection. Four years later, 

TSO–C127 (‘‘Rotorcraft, Transport 

Airplane, Normal and Utility Airplane 

Seating Systems’’) was issued and 

included guidance on dynamic testing 

of 16 g’s for seats that would be used in 

transport category airplanes. As 

previously stated, TSO seat approval is 

not installation approval. Although 

TSO C127 is the basis for getting most 

16g seats approved for use in transport 

category airplanes, installation approval 

is not as easy as it is for a 9g seat. 

The 16g seat installation approval 

process is more complicated than the 9g 

seat installation approval process 

because the dynamic standard includes 

several occupant protection criteria not 

required for the 9g seat. These occupant 

protection criteria can only be 

completely evaluated when the seat is 

considered in relationship to how and 

where it is installed in the airplane. For 

example, the dynamic test will cause a 

test dummy’s upper torso and head to 

swing forward in an arcing motion since 

the test dummy is constrained only at 

the pelvis by the safety belt. A record of 

the motion of the test dummy’s head 

through the arc, called a headpath trace, 

can be recorded during the testing for 

the TSO approval. The headpath trace is 

used during the installation approval 

process to ensure there is enough 

clearance from objects, like bulkheads 

or equipment mounted to partitions, to 

reduce the possibility of a head strike. 

Because airplane interior arrangements 

differ by airplane model—and even 

from operator to operator for the same 

airplane model—the headpath trace 

must be evaluated for each unique 

installation. This illustrates one reason 

why installation approval cannot rely 

solely on the TSO approval. 

3. 16g ‘‘Compatible’’ Seats 

Transport category airplanes designed 

between 1952 and 1988 were required to 

have seats that met the 9g emergency 

landing conditions in § 25.561. These 

standards were met by the static testing 

described above in the section entitled 

‘‘Regulations and TSO for 9g seats.’’

Typically, the seats approved in those 

airplanes were also approved to TSO–

C39. When Amendment 25–64 went 

into effect in 1988, any transport 

category airplane design submitted for 

approval was required to have seats that 

met both the 9g static standard in 

§ 25.561 and the 16g dynamic standard 

in § 25.562. 

However, Amendment 25–64 applied 

only to new airplane designs like the 

Boeing B–777. Airframe manufacturers 

occasionally redesign an existing 

airplane design to meet marketing 

demands rather than develop a new 

design from scratch. These redesigned 

airplanes are referred to as derivative 

models, since they are based largely on 

a previously approved airplane design. 

An example of this is the Boeing B–

737NG models (737–600, –700, –800, 

–900), which are based on the 

previously approved B–737 airplane 

design. The basis for a derivative model 

design approval is the regulations in 

place at the time of the original design 

approval. However, for a variety of 

reasons, the derivative model design 

will be approved to regulations more 

current than those in existence when 

the original design was approved, but 

not quite to the level of the regulations 

current at the time of application for a 

derivative model design approval. 

There are numerous derivative 

transport category airplane models 

approved after 1988 whose original 

design was approved before 1988. These 

airplane models’ seats do not meet all 

the requirements of § 25.562 (16g seats), 

but meet more than the requirements of 

§ 25.561 (9g seats). The dynamic 

standard in § 25.562 includes criteria to 

evaluate the seat’s structural integrity 

and occupant protection during 

dynamic testing. Most of the derivative 

models meet the seat structural integrity 

requirements in § 25.562 but none or 

only a few of the occupant protection 

requirements in § 25.562. Seats that 

have been approved to meet the 9g 

requirements in § 25.561 and the seat 

structural integrity requirements in 

§ 25.562 are commonly called 16g 

‘‘compatible’’ seats. 

Discussion of Comments 

A. Request for Extension 

Based on requests for an extension of 

the comment period from the Aerospace 

Industries Association, Airbus, the 

Aviation Technical and Safety 

Committee Cabin Safety Working 

Group, The Boeing Company, the 

General Aviation Manufacturers 

Association and the Regional Airline 

Association, the FAA extended the 

SNPRM’s comment period from 

December 3, 2002 to March 3, 2003. 

B. General Summary 

In addition to the requests for 

extension, the FAA received forty-six 

comment submissions in response to the 

SNPRM. Two of these comment 

submissions are duplicates and one is 

an attachment from another comment, 

from which it had been separated. In 

addition, two individual commenters 

address issues about passengers with 

disabilities and are directed at other 

rulemaking initiatives. We will not 

address these two comment submissions 

in this discussion of comments. 

Of the remaining forty-one comment 

submissions, twelve commenters either 

express support for the proposed rule or 

their support can be implied from their 

comments. Another ten commenters 

generally support the proposed rule, but 

suggest changes. These twenty-two 

commenters are mostly individuals and 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56545 

1 Group I covered those seats in airplanes 

manufactured before 1992 having seats installed 

before 1992. While 16g seats were being installed 

before this date, the majority of these seats are 9g. 

Group II covered those seats in airplanes 

manufactured before 1992 having replacement seats 

installed after 1991. Some (unknown) proportion of 

seats in this group may have partial 16g 

performance although no airplane model in this 

group is 16g certificated. 

companies that provide aircraft interior 

components. Among the reasons given 

for their support: 

• The results of the cost-benefit 

analysis are reasonable and the 

amortized cost of seat upgrades will be 

offset by increased ticket prices; 

• Any safety increase justifies any 

rise in ticket prices; 

• Economies of scale will make safety 

improvements economical; 

• The deaths and injuries being 

avoided far outweigh the issue of cost to 

conform to the proposed rule; and 

• The safety of passengers and their 

ability to survive an impact-survivable 

accident is very important. 

Six of these commenters also favor 

shorter implementation periods than 

those proposed in the SNPRM. 

Fourteen commenters oppose the 

proposed rule. These commenters are 

mostly air carriers and airframe 

manufacturers. These commenters base 

their opposition on a belief that: 

• The cost-benefit analysis is flawed 

because it fails to adequately address 

issues like how the costs would impact 

an industry struggling in a post-9/11 

travel economy or whether the 

industry’s limited resources would be 

better spent on other safety initiatives 

that would result in bigger dividends; 

• The proposed rule is contrary to the 

Safer Skies and Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team (CAST) initiatives; and/or 

• No convincing accident data exists 

to support the need for 16g seats and, 

therefore, a convincing safety benefit 

case cannot be made for requiring 16g 

seats. 

The remaining five commenters 

recommend one or more of the 

following actions in addition, or as 

alternatives, to the proposed rule: 

• Requiring the use of rearward facing 

seats; 

• Making child restraint 

improvements and setting up regulatory 

changes that would mandate securing 

all children in safety seats; 

• Requiring the use of three-point 

harness restraints or shoulder harnesses; 

• Requiring the use of air bags; 

• Requiring the use of a standardized 

seat belt latching mechanism or, 

without such standardization, telling 

passengers of any variations among seat 

belt latching mechanisms; 

• Improving seat belt security, using 

fewer seats or changing seating 

configuration; and 

• Focusing the FAA’s attention on 

flight crew safety and health issues. 

Some of those commenters expressing 

support or opposition for the proposed 

rule also recommend some of the above 

actions as possible alternatives. 

C. Acronyms 

In this Discussion of Comments 

section, we use the following acronyms 

or abbreviated company names to 

identify the associated commenters: 

• Air Transport Association (ATA) 

• AMSAFE Aviation (AMSAFE) 

• Association of Asia Pacific Airlines 

(AAPA) 

• Association of European Airlines 

(AEA) 

• Association of Flight Attendants 

(AFA) 

• Association of Professional Flight 

Attendants (APFA) 

• Aviation Technical and Safety 

Committee Cabin Safety Working Group 

(ATASCO) 

• B/E Aerospace, Inc. (B/E) 

• The Boeing Company (Boeing) 

• The International Brotherhood of 

Teamsters (IBT) 

• National Air Disaster Alliance/ 

Foundation (NADA/F) 

• RECARO Aircraft Seating 

(RECARO) 

• Regional Airline Association (RAA) 

• Sicma Aero Seat Services (Sicma) 

D. Removal of Retrofit Requirements 

As stated in the regulatory evaluation 

supporting the SNPRM, the FAA 

believed there were two viable options 

to improve seats in transport category 

airplanes operating under part 121 at 

that time: 

• Requiring full 16g seats in newly 

manufactured airplanes only (Option 2 

in the SNPRM’s regulatory evaluation); 

and 

• Requiring full 16g seats in newly 

manufactured airplanes and 

replacement with full 16g seats for all 

other in-service airplanes (Option 5 in 

the SNPRM’s regulatory evaluation). 

While Option 2 was projected to have 

a benefit-to-cost ratio greater than 1.0 at 

that time, it also averted fewer fatalities 

and serious injuries than Option 5. 

Therefore, we decided to move forward 

with Option 5. 

Based on the comments received to 

the SNPRM, we decided to re-evaluate 

the retrofit requirements of proposed 

§§ 121.311(j)(2) and 121.311(k). After 

detailed consideration, we now believe 

the final rule should not contain these 

retrofit requirements and that we should 

proceed with the requirement for newly 

manufactured airplanes only. 

There are several reasons why the 

FAA’s current analysis of Options 2 and 

5 has resulted in a different conclusion 

from that in the SNPRM. All of these 

reasons are the result of the dramatic 

changes in the airline industry since the 

publication of the SNPRM. 

1. Accelerated Retirement of Pre-1992 

Manufactured Airplanes 

Initially, the terrorist events of 

September 11, 2001 significantly 

impacted the airline industry because 

many people were less likely to fly. 

Rather than flying airplanes with empty 

seats, many airlines choose to ‘‘park’’ or 

‘‘retire’’ their older airplanes. While the 

impact of the terrorist attacks on 

passenger boardings has passed, the 

industry remains in poor shape 

financially for reasons including, but 

not limited to, high fuel prices and 

increased competition from low-cost 

carriers. Therefore, those older airplanes 

that are inefficient to operate remain 

‘‘retired.’’

Since 9/11, part 121 operators have 

‘‘retired’’ over 1,360 airplanes. This 

represents 23.6% of the pre-9/11 part 

121-fleet. The majority of these 

airplanes were manufactured before 

1992 (for example, B–727, B–737–100/ 

200/300, B–747–100/200, DC–9, F–100, 

DC–10, L–1011, MD–80) and were 

certified for 9g seats. Due to the high 

operating costs associated with these 

airplanes, it is unlikely that many of 

these ‘‘retired’’ airplanes will find their 

way back into the part-121 fleet. 

The retirement of these pre-1992 

manufactured airplanes has occurred at 

a rate far faster than that projected in the 

SNPRM’s regulatory evaluation. In that 

regulatory evaluation, those seats 

installed on airplanes manufactured 

prior to 1992 fell into one of two 

categories: Group I or Group II seats.1 In 

1999, the seats in Groups I and II totaled 

477,991 and comprised approximately 

66% of the total seats in the part 121- 

fleet. For 2004, the projected seat total 

barely changed (477,707) and comprised 

approximately 54% of the part 121-fleet. 

The decrease from a projected 66% to a 

projected 54% was based on more 

airplanes with 16g seats entering the 

part 121-fleet. For the last forecast year 

in the SNPRM’s regulatory evaluation 

(2020), these seats were projected to still 

make-up approximately 20% of all seats 

in the part 121-fleet. Therefore, with 

such a significant percentage of 

potential 9g seats projected to be in the 

part 121-fleet over the course of the 

forecast period (1999–2020), the need 

56546 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

2Figures from the Regional Air Service Initiative 

(http://www.regionalairservice.org). 

for the retrofit requirement was more 

apparent. 

However, the accelerated retirement 

of so many pre-1992 manufactured 

airplanes alters this conclusion. These 

airplane retirements mean 

approximately 155,000 Group I and 

Group II seats were removed from the 

part-121 fleet. By comparison, for the 

last forecast year of the SNPRM’s 

regulatory evaluation (2020), only 

109,020 Group I and Group II seats were 

projected to have been removed from 

the part-121 fleet. The removal of these 

155,000 seats also has a dramatic affect 

on the percentages discussed before. 

The percentage of Group I and Group II 

seats in the 2004 part-121 fleet drops 

from a projected 54% to an actual 36%. 

These seats are now at a level 

previously projected to occur in 2011. 

Based on this accelerated retirement 

of pre-1992 manufactured airplanes, the 

FAA believes the level of occupant 

protection has increased dramatically 

over the past few years in the part-121 

fleet. The FAA also believes the 

accelerated retirement of pre-1992 

manufactured airplanes will continue to 

occur as airlines strive to increase the 

efficiency of their operations. 

2. Increased Appeal and Use of Regional 

Jets 

One factor that assisted in the 

accelerated retirement of pre-1992 

manufactured airplanes is the continued 

appeal of regional jets and the new ways 

airlines are using these airplanes. As 

pointed out in the comment from RAA, 

within the last 10 years, the U.S. 

regional fleet has rapidly transitioned 

from a mostly turboprop fleet to a 

majority regional jet fleet. As of October, 

2004, almost 1,600 regional jets were in 

operations with part 121 carriers, with 

over 600 more on firm order and options 

and conditional orders for over 1,700 

more.2

Most of these regional jets are newer 

designs that must meet the requirements 

of Amendment 25–64. According to 

RAA, in 2004, about 77% of the entire 

regional fleet was capable of meeting at 

least the structural requirements of 

Amendment 25–64. 

The effects of 9/11 on the airline 

industry have increased the appeal of 

the regional jet. Whereas, in the past, 

the regional jet was primarily used to 

replace turboprops or open new 

markets, several airlines are now using 

it as a tool to replace inefficient larger 

jets on certain routes. In addition, 

JetBlue and USAirways have placed 

large orders for regional jets that will be 

used in their own operations. 

Based on developments such as these, 

the FAA expects that regional jets will 

play an even larger role in the part 121- 

fleet than considered for the SNPRM. As 

a result, this will further increase the 

percentage of 16g seats in the part 121- 

fleet. 

3. Effect of Certification Costs 

Based on the dramatic changes in the 

part-121 fleet over the past 3 years, 

which are expected to continue for the 

foreseeable future, the FAA believes the 

resource expenditure associated with 

retrofitting seats on existing airplanes 

would no longer be cost beneficial. 

As stated before, the installation 

approval process for a 16g seat is more 

complicated than the installation 

approval process for a 9g seat because 

the dynamic standard includes 

occupant protection criteria not 

required for the 9g seat. The occupant 

criteria can only be completely 

evaluated when the seat is considered in 

relationship to how and where it is 

installed in the airplane’s cabin. A seat’s 

installation in relationship to other seats 

and other objects in the airplane affects 

the number of dynamic tests that must 

be successfully completed. If all seats 

were uniformly installed at the same 

distance from one row to the next in 

every airplane, only a few forward tests 

would be required: perhaps one to show 

structural adequacy and one or two to 

demonstrate occupant protection. 

However, this is not the case. Cabin 

configurations vary from airplane to 

airplane and also from operator to 

operator. Some operators even have 

different configurations within the same 

airplane model in their fleets. 

Therefore, different tests are required 

to determine the effect of such things as 

seatback video monitors, bulkheads, 

partitions, seat pitch and seat angle 

(seats installed in tail sections where the 

fuselage tapers are frequently installed 

at an angle relative to the other rows). 

These examples represent some of the 

installation issues that result in 

numerous forward dynamic testing for a 

single airplane configuration. The 

testing and resultant seat approval can 

be used for other airplanes of the same 

model that have identical 

configurations. However, even if 

another operator uses the same seating 

configurations, if it uses seats from a 

different seat manufacturer or a different 

seat model from the same manufacturer, 

a new series of tests will be required. 

Because approval to § 25.562 is 

largely dependent on the airplane’s 

interior, considerable effort is expended 

by the seat manufacturer and the 

airframe manufacturer to ensure the seat 

design will work with the airplane 

design prior to any seat testing. If failure 

to meet § 25.562 becomes evident 

during testing, there are several options 

available to resolve the non-compliance: 

the seat can be redesigned, the seat can 

be reconfigured within the airplane, or 

the airplane can be redesigned. Usually 

redesigning the airplane is the last 

option chosen due to expense and time 

needed to integrate the change. But, if 

required, the design change can be 

accomplished at less expense in 

airplanes manufactured in the future 

than in existing airplanes. Upgrading 

existing airplanes to meet § 25.562 may 

require modification and substantiation 

of a range of seat pitches, changes to 

bulkheads to which flight attendant 

seats are mounted, increasing seat 

setbacks from bulkheads, partitions, and 

emergency exits, and removal of seats in 

some circumstances. All of these 

concerns can be handled more 

effectively when time is allowed for 

proper planning of the redesign and 

integration in airplanes manufactured in 

the future. Resolving the same noncompliances in existing airplanes 

require more costly modifications to the 

interiors and is more likely to result in 

the loss of revenue-generating seats. 

4. Conclusion 

Based on the above, the FAA decided 

to mandate improved seats for only 

those airplanes type-certificated after 

January 1, 1958 which have not yet been 

manufactured. While this requirement 

may require airframe manufacturers to 

make design modifications, we believe 

that the four-year compliance period 

provides sufficient time for them to 

develop efficient solutions. 

The FAA still believes that this final 

rule is necessary to improve occupant 

protection in impact-survivable 

accidents. We believe that these types of 

accidents can still occur and this rule 

focuses on protecting occupants when 

these accidents do occur. Although we 

recognize that most of the seats in the 

current part-121 passenger carrying fleet 

are capable of meeting the dynamic 

testing structural criteria, we want to 

ensure that all occupant protection 

criteria ‘‘ including HIC ‘‘ are met. In 

addition, the airplanes covered by this 

final rule include several models that 

have hundreds of outstanding orders. 

These airplanes will remain in the part121 passenger carrying fleet the longest 

and should, therefore, offer the best 

level of occupant protection available 

for seat certification. Finally, as we 

discuss below in more detail, this final 

rule is also cost-beneficial, with a 

benefits-to-costs ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56547 

2.15 to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when underlying 

estimates are in present value at 3% and 

7%. respectively). 

We acknowledge that, for some yet-tobe manufactured airplanes, the 

requirement of this final rule will have 

no practical effect as 16g seats are 

already mandated as a result of the 

airplane’s certification basis. 

Specifically, the requirements of 

Amendment 25–64 are applicable to 

those airplanes for which an application 

for a type certificate was made on or 

after June 16, 1988. Therefore, no action 

should be necessary to bring those 

airplanes into compliance with this 

final rule assuming that they comply 

fully with § 25.562. In general, this final 

rule will require compliance action for 

those new production airplane models 

that were type-certificated after January 

1, 1958 and before June 16, 1988 and 

derivatives of such models for which an 

application for an amended typecertificate was made after January 1, 

1958. 

We do not believe that the removal of 

the retrofit requirement will cause an 

increase in the use of 9g seats. There is 

no incentive for seat manufacturers and 

operators to reverse the current trend 

away from 9g seats. Both domestic and 

foreign seat manufacturers have 

changed the way they manufacture seats 

in order to meet the requirements for 

16g ‘‘compatible’’ and 16g seats. It 

currently does not make financial sense 

for them to run a separate 9g seat 

manufacturing line to meet a declining 

need. While some seats are sold with a 

9g label, it is our belief that these seats 

are the same seats that are sold as 16g 

‘‘compatible.’’ We see no reason why 

this situation would change. However, 

we will continue to monitor this issue. 

If we see an increase in the use of 9g 

seats, we will consider taking action to 

stop this development. 

E. Discussion of Non-Retrofit Comments 

Since the retrofit requirements have 

been removed from this final rule, the 

comments that address only those 

provisions (i.e., proposed 

§§ 121.311(j)(2) and 121.311(k)) are no 

longer relevant to this rulemaking action 

and will not be addressed in detail in 

this final rule. We discuss the other 

comments received about the SNPRM in 

the following order: 

• General comments about the costbenefit analysis; 

• Comments about the cost side of the 

cost-benefit analysis; 

• Comments about the benefit side of 

the cost-benefit analysis; 

• General comments about flight 

attendant seats; 

• Comments about the cost-benefit 

analysis for flight attendant seats; 

• General technical comments; and 

• Other comments. 

In the following discussion of 

comments, we use the term ‘‘newly 

manufactured airplanes.’’ This means 

those transport category airplanes type 

certificated after January 1, 1958 and 

manufactured on or after October 27, 

2009, that are used in part 121 

passenger-carrying operations. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis—General 

Proposed Rule Will Result in Increased 

Ticket Prices 

A commenter states that the proposed 

rule would result in increased ticket 

prices. The commenter believes these 

higher prices would then force some of 

the traveling public to drive instead of 

fly, thereby increasing their risk of 

injury or death. This commenter 

suggests that we perform further 

analysis on this issue. 

FAA Response: The FAA has greatly 

reduced the scope of this rulemaking 

from that proposed in the SNPRM. This 

change produces a reduction in 

predicted costs from $519 million to 

$34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and 

$13.3 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively). 

Based on historical evidence and the 

vastly lower predicted costs of this 

rulemaking, we do not expect that this 

final rule will result in an increase in 

ticket prices. 

Cost-Benefit Ratio Does Not Justify the 

Change 

A commenter believes the cost-benefit 

ratio does not justify the proposed rule. 

FAA Response: For the base case 

scenario presented in the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule 

(i.e., using accident rates for the 1984–

1998 period), the total costs of this 

rulemaking, over the analysis period, 

are $34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and 

$13.3 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively). The total benefits 

of installing fully compliant 16g seats 

are $78.9 million (or, $47.9 million and 

$26.4 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively). Therefore, this 

rulemaking is cost-beneficial, with a 

benefit-to-cost ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 2.15 

to 1 and 1.98 to 1 when underlying 

estimates are in present value at 3% and 

7%, respectively). 

While the final rule in its entirety is 

cost-beneficial, the FAA notes that, 

separately, the requirements for 

passenger seats and flight attendant 

seats are each cost-beneficial. For 

passenger seats, the benefits of installing 

fully compliant 16g seats are 

approximately $76.3 million (or, $46.4 

million and $25.5 million in present 

value at 3% and 7%, respectively), as 

compared to the costs of $33.7 million 

(or, $21.5 million and $12.8 million in 

present value at 3% and 7%, 

respectively). 

For flight attendant seats, the benefits 

of installing fully compliant 16g seats 

are $2.5 million (or, $1.5 million and 

$850,000 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively), as compared to 

the costs of approximately $954,000 

($731,000 and $529,000 in present value 

at 3% and 7%, respectively). 

A copy of this regulatory evaluation is 

in the docket for this final rule. You can 

get a copy of this analysis by using any 

of the methods listed above in the 

‘‘Availability of Rulemaking 

Documents’’ section of this final rule. 

Analysis Fails to Accurately Account for 

Impact on Small Businesses 

RAA states that the FAA fails to 

accurately account for the proposal’s 

impact on small business operators. 

FAA Response: The FAA performed a 

regulatory flexibility analysis for both 

the proposed rule and this final rule. 

Both assessments showed no significant 

impact on small businesses. A detailed 

discussion of this determination is 

located later in this document in the 

section entitled ‘‘Regulatory Flexibility 

Analysis’’ and in the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule. 

Analysis Fails to Consider Differences 

Between Regional Transport Category 

Airplanes and Very Large Transport 

Category Aircraft 

RAA believes the cost-benefit analysis 

does not consider the differences 

between regional transport category 

airplanes and very large transport 

category airplanes. RAA argues that the 

benefit methodology assumes there will 

be 100 occupants per accident, while 

the average number of seats on regional 

transport category airplanes is well 

below 50 occupants. 

FAA Response: The Cherry Report 

does not assume there will be 100 

occupants per accident. The 

methodology in the Cherry Report used 

100 occupants as an example to explain 

the concept of ‘‘survivability chains.’’ Of 

the 25 accidents that provided enough 

information for analysis, the number of 

passenger and flight attendant seats 

ranged from 38 to about 350. 

Analysis Fails to Account for Fewer 

Flight Attendants in Regional Transport 

Category Airplanes 

RAA states that regional transport 

category airplanes typically have only 

one flight attendant, not two. According 

56548 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

to RAA, this difference further skews 

the cost-benefit analysis. 

FAA Response: Based on the FAA’s 

flight attendant requirements as 

specified in § 121.391, the SNPRM’s 

regulatory evaluation assumed one 

flight attendant per 50 passengers 

regardless of the aircraft size. Therefore, 

the cost and benefit calculations were 

normalized between regional transport 

category airplanes and larger transport 

category airplanes. This assumption 

remains in the regulatory evaluation 

supporting this final rule. We believe 

this assumption is conservative as air 

carriers often provide more flight 

attendants than the number required by 

regulation. 

Rulemaking Does Not Provide the Most 

Safety Value for the Economic 

Investment 

Boeing states the proposed rule does 

not provide the most safety value for the 

economic investment. Boeing states that 

since the aircraft manufacturing and 

airline industries have been reeling from 

some of the worst economic conditions 

in their histories, it is now more 

important than ever to invest in the 

safety initiatives that provide the best 

return. Therefore, Boeing believes we 

should reexamine the cost-benefit 

analysis. 

FAA Response: As discussed above, 

based, in part, on comments received, 

the FAA reconsidered the proposed rule 

and removed requirements from the 

final rule to upgrade seats in existing 

airplanes. However, it still requires 

improved seats in newly manufactured 

airplanes. As a result, the costs of this 

final rule are substantially less than 

those of the proposed rule (from $519 

million to $34.7 million). As noted 

above, this rulemaking is now cost 

beneficial with a benefits to costs ratio 

of 2.27 to 1. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis—Costs 

Costs Too Low 

ATA believes the FAA’s cost-benefit 

analysis is faulty because we: 

(1) Failed to consider the high costs 

of upgrading monument walls to 

support flight attendant seats; 

(2) Failed to consider the high costs 

associated with removing seats to meet 

the front-row head injury criteria (HIC); 

and 

(3) Failed to consider the cost of 

demonstrating compliance with the 

more complex requirements than were 

discussed in previous 16g seat retrofit 

comment periods (1998, 1988). 

ATASCO agrees that the FAA’s cost 

forecast is ‘‘too low’’ and ‘‘far from the 

realistic cost.’’ ATASCO would like the 

FAA to perform the cost-benefit analysis 

again based on the comments received. 

FAA Response: As for the issue of 

removing seats to comply with frontrow HIC, the FAA notes that reasonable 

solutions and alternatives, like air-bag 

technology, exist and/or can be 

developed to prevent the need for 

removing a row of seats. Since this final 

rule does not require compliance for 

four years from its effective date, we 

believe that this compliance date 

provides industry with enough time to 

carry out cost-effective solutions. 

As for ATA’s concerns about 

compliance costs, we have included 

estimates of compliance costs in our 

cost-benefit analysis for this final rule. 

Finally, our analysis includes 

estimates of the costs associated with 

strengthening monument walls to 

support 16g flight attendant seats. We 

based our estimates on data provided by 

an airframe manufacturer. 

Analysis Fails to Consider Increase in 

Certification Costs 

Boeing asserts that the FAA’s cost 

analysis does not consider the added 

complexity of the new certification 

requirements. Boeing maintains that 

certification to the dynamic 

requirements of § 25.562 is more 

complex and time consuming than 

certification to the static testing 

requirements. This added complexity 

takes more time and resources for the 

airframe manufacturer, as well as the 

seat suppliers and the airlines. Boeing 

believes this ‘‘complexity-factor’’ is 

overlooked by our cost analysis. 

ATA agrees with Boeing. 

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that 

dynamic testing is more complex and 

time consuming than static testing. In 

addition, we acknowledge that we did 

not include this ‘‘complexity-factor’’ in 

the SNPRM’s regulatory evaluation. 

However, to ensure the accuracy of 

our estimates of the certification costs in 

the regulatory evaluation supporting 

this final rule, we obtained updated cost 

information from Boeing on this subject 

and have included it in our analysis. 

Since our estimates are now in-line with 

Boeing’s cost information, we believe 

that the regulatory evaluation 

supporting the final rule does consider 

the complexity of certification to the 

dynamic requirements of § 25.562. 

Cost-Benefit Analysis—Benefits 

Analysis Fails to Consider Declining 

Accident Rate 

Boeing believes the cost-benefit 

analysis fails to account for declining 

accident rates over the past decade. 

Boeing claims the accident statistics 

used by the FAA to support the 

proposed rule ignore impressive 

improvements made in aviation safety. 

Based on these improvements, Boeing 

maintains that the benefits analysis does 

not consider a declining future accident 

rate that is consistent with the Safer 

Skies goals. Boeing believes the FAA 

should revise the regulatory analysis to 

match FAA published safety goals. 

RAA agrees with Boeing, stating that 

the Commercial Aviation Safety Team 

(CAST) projects an 80% reduction in 

accidents by 2007 through 

implementing a terrain awareness and 

warning system (TAWS) retrofit, 

implementing constant descent 

approach and other safety enhancement 

procedures. RAA states that the FAA’s 

cost-benefit analysis should account for 

these safety improvements when 

forecasting the accident rate for the next 

20 years. 

ATA and AAPA agree with RAA and 

Boeing. 

FAA Response: In the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule, the 

FAA has performed sensitivity tests of 

our accident rate using multiple time 

periods. In each case, the predicted 

benefits exceed the predicted costs of 

this final rule. 

Considerable progress has been made 

under CAST and Safer Skies to reduce 

the accident rate. However, we believe 

that impact-survivable accidents can 

still occur and this rule focuses on 

protecting occupants when these 

accidents do occur. 

Analysis Fails to Consider Impact of 

September 11 

Boeing comments that the FAA 

enplanement estimates do not account 

for the slowing world economy and the 

effects of the September 11, 2001 

terrorist attacks. Boeing recommends 

that the FAA update the benefit analysis 

to reflect future estimated enplanements 

using 2001 or, preferably, 2002 data. 

ATA agrees, stating that forecasts for 

future enplanements have decreased 

and this should impact the cost-benefit 

analysis. 

FAA Response: The FAA 

acknowledges that we based the 

proposed rule’s regulatory evaluation on 

pre-9/11 information. At that time, the 

long-term effects of 9/11 on 

enplanements were difficult to predict. 

However, for the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule, we 

based our enplanement estimates on the 

data in ‘‘FAA Aerospace Forecasts for 

Fiscal Years 2003–2014’’ (FAA–APO–

03–1, March 2003). This forecast 

accounts for recent world events, 

including the events of September 11, 

2001. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56549 

Analysis Fails to Consider U.S. Fleet 

Changes 

Boeing states the benefit analysis does 

not account for changes in fleet capacity 

and fleet age resulting from recent world 

events. Boeing argues that the current 

part 121-fleet has changed dramatically 

since the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001. Boeing states that many 

airlines are retiring their oldest aircraft 

because of system overcapacity and 

most of these retired aircraft have 9g 

seats. Boeing recommends that the FAA 

revise the benefit analysis to reflect this 

change. 

FAA Response: Since, in the final 

rule, the FAA is no longer requiring 

existing seats to be retrofitted, changes 

in fleet capacity resulting from recent 

world events have only a negligible 

effect on the cost-benefit analysis. 

However, as we stated above, part 121- 

fleet changes since 9/11 are a factor in 

our decision to remove the retrofit 

provisions from the final rule. In 

particular, the retirement of old 

airplanes and the addition of new 

airplanes since 9/11 result in a younger 

fleet with more airplanes that are fully 

or partially compliant with § 25.562. We 

believe that newly manufactured seats 

used for replacement seats in existing 

airplanes—even when labeled as 9g 

seats—have, in general, the capability of 

meeting the 16g structural requirements. 

Based on this, when operators replace 

9g seats with newly manufactured seats, 

the level of occupant protection 

improves. These factors support our 

decision for not going forward with 

rulemaking that affects the existing fleet. 

‘‘Double Counting’’ of Benefits 

Boeing believes the FAA gave credit 

to seat improvements for lives already 

saved by other safety initiatives. Boeing 

states that a subset of accident scenarios 

used to justify 16g seats includes 

accidents involving controlled flight 

into terrain (CFIT), wind shear, takeoff 

with improper flap/slat setting, and 

approach and landing accidents. Boeing 

believes we are ‘‘double counting’’

benefits already realized through other 

safety actions. Therefore, Boeing 

believes we should remove such 

accidents from the Cherry Report and 

recalculate the benefits. 

FAA Response: Even though the 

accident rate has declined, impactsurvivable (as well as non-survivable) 

accidents will still occur. For these 

impact-survivable accidents, installation 

of 16g seats in new airplanes will 

reduce the number of fatalities and 

serious injuries. 

Further, the FAA reassessed the 

accidents used in the Cherry Report to 

determine if any of the accidents 

studied would not have happened today 

based on any regulatory change since 

their occurrence. We found that none of 

these regulatory changes would have 

directly affected the outcome of the 

accidents in the Cherry Report. Of 

further note, 10 of the 25 accidents 

studied yielded no reduction of 

fatalities or serious injuries due to using 

improved seats. This attests to the nonbias of the assessment. 

Safety Analysis Inadequate 

ATA states that the FAA’s safety 

analysis is inadequate. 

FAA Response: The FAA has 

continued to assess the merits of 16g 

seats since this rule was first proposed 

in 1988. During that time, we examined 

many options available to improve seats 

in transport category airplanes. 

Based on this review, we believe there 

is a clear need to improve safety for 

passengers and flight attendants in the 

event of an impact-survivable accident. 

The Cherry Report demonstrates this 

need. Based on the predicted benefits of 

16g seats over 9g seats in the Cherry 

Report and in the regulatory evaluation 

supporting this final rule, this final rule 

should achieve that goal. 

Accidents Studied not Appropriate for 

this Analysis and No Proof 16g Seats 

Would Have Reduced Fatalities and 

Serious Injuries in Accidents Studied 

Boeing states the benefit analysis was 

not well correlated with the types of 

accidents where 16g seats would have 

been an influence in saving lives. For 

example, Boeing claims the Cherry 

Report cited accidents where survival 

was a matter of chance. Boeing argues 

that such accidents are atypical of those 

used to justify part 25 standards. 

According to Boeing, it is inappropriate 

to use such accidents to justify the need 

for equipment that was not specifically 

designed to be effective in these severe 

events. Boeing believes that the FAA 

should not use these accidents in the 

benefit analysis. 

In addition, Boeing believes the 

assessment of whether the use of 16g 

seats would have actually reduced the 

number of fatalities and serious injuries 

is ‘‘inadequate.’’ Boeing believes the 

Cherry Report’s assessment approach is 

nothing more than ‘‘guesswork.’’

FAA Response: The FAA believes that 

the accidents studied were appropriate. 

The Cherry Report looked at only those 

impact-survivable accidents that had 

sufficient textural data from NTSB 

accident reports to make a 

determination whether a 16g seat would 

have made a difference in occupant 

survivability. The resulting 25 accidents 

were then studied to determine the 

difference in fatalities and serious 

injuries to occupants had 16g seats been 

in place. The assessment of these 

accidents was then used to make a more 

general assessment on similar impactsurvivable accidents that lacked 

adequate textural information in the 

accident reports to make an individual 

finding. 

The FAA also disagrees with Boeing’s 

negative assertion about the Cherry 

Report’s assessment approach. The 

Cherry Report used a logical three-stage 

assessment approach that eliminated 

any ‘‘guesswork.’’ First, as stated above, 

the Cherry Report determined which 

accidents were valid to study to 

evaluate the effect of 16g seats. The 

Cherry Report then looked at each space 

within the accident aircraft that 

exhibited a similar threat to the 

occupants. This prevented making gross 

assumptions about the effect of 16g seats 

on occupant survivability for the entire 

aircraft based on the worst-case area of 

the aircraft for each accident. Finally, 

for each space that posed a similar 

threat to the occupants, the Cherry 

Report then examined that space on a 

seat-by-seat basis to determine the effect 

a 16g seat would have made had it been 

in place. The FAA believes this 

assessment approach is the best analysis 

to date to predict the benefits of 16g 

seats. Nonetheless, as we stated before, 

we reevaluated the Cherry Report to see 

if any of the accidents studied would 

not have happened today based on any 

regulatory change since their 

occurrence. We found that none of these 

regulatory changes would have directly 

affected the outcome of the accidents in 

the Cherry Report. Therefore, we believe 

that these accidents remain valid 

candidates for evaluating the effect of 

16g seats and provide sufficient proof of 

the benefits of such seats. 

While survival for each occupant in 

an accident may be a matter of chance 

to some extent, the Cherry Report’s 

analysis determined that the use of 16g 

seats would have increased those 

chances of survival for occupants in 

those accidents evaluated. 

Analysis Overstates Benefits of 

Streamlined Seat Certification Process 

ATA states the cost-benefit analysis is 

inaccurate and overstates the benefits of 

the FAA-Industry Seat Certification 

Streamlining activities. More 

importantly, ATA points out that this 

streamlining process does not yet exist. 

ATA believes we should not include 

efficiencies from streamlining the seat 

certification process in the cost-benefit 

analysis until they have been 

demonstrated. 

56550 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

AAPA agrees, claiming that our 

analysis takes credit for undemonstrated 

certification streamlining. 

Boeing concurs, stating that the efforts 

to improve the seat certification process 

over the past several years have not 

materially improved the cost or flow 

time to certify seats. Therefore, Boeing 

argues that before the FAA can take the 

benefit from these activities, there must 

be demonstrated results. 

FAA Response: The regulatory 

evaluation supporting the SNPRM did 

not quantify any benefits from the 

effects of the Seat Certification 

Streamlining efforts. The regulatory 

evaluation only stated that potential 

unclaimed benefits exist due to the 

efforts made by both industry and the 

FAA under the Seat Certification 

Streamlining program. This is the same 

approach used in the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule. 

To try to reduce certification costs 

and simplify the seat certification 

process, we will continue to work with 

industry under the Seat Certification 

Streamlining program. In the past, this 

cooperation has resulted in the FAA 

implementing many of industry’s 

recommendations to improve the seat 

certification process and reduce costs. 

Analysis Overestimates Performance of 

16g Seats 

Boeing states the benefits analysis 

vastly overestimates the expectation of 

16g seat performance in past accident 

scenarios. Boeing believes we should 

recalculate the benefits to reflect this 

more accurately. 

FAA Response: The performance 

expectation of 16g seats is based on 

long-standing FAA/industrycoordinated research. The genesis of the 

16g seat standard came from recognition 

that many deaths or serious injuries in 

general aviation airplanes could be 

avoided if the crashworthiness of the 

airplane was improved. Additional 

research showed this also applied to 

transport category airplanes. Please refer 

to the ‘‘Background’’ section above for 

more information on the development of 

the 16g standard. The FAA viewed the 

new dynamic seat standards as a 

necessity and major improvement over 

existing static seat standards. While it is 

difficult to precisely quantify the 

improvements of seats that meet the 

dynamic standard over seats that meet 

only the static standard, we believe the 

estimates used to develop the regulatory 

evaluation are reasonable, justified and 

the best available data. No commenter 

provided data or expert opinion to 

dispute our assessment of 16g seat 

performance during the comment 

period. 

Use of High Benefit Estimates in Error 

Boeing is concerned that, in the 

FAA’s benefit analysis, we used the 

Cherry Report’s ‘‘high’’ benefit estimate 

of the decrease in fatalities and serious 

injuries because of the possible 

unmeasured benefits of ‘‘better than 9g 

seats.’’ Boeing believes that, of the 

accidents analyzed, it is likely that 

many of the accidents did not involve 

aircraft with ‘‘better than 9g seats.’’

According to Boeing, only five of the 

accidents studied definitely involved 

aircraft with ‘‘better than 9g seats.’’

Therefore, any unmeasured benefit of 

‘‘better than 9g’’ seats should be specific 

to those 5 accidents. 

ATA states that by using the ‘‘high’’

benefit estimate from the Cherry Report, 

we inaccurately stated the true costs/ 

benefits of the proposed rule. ATA 

believes the use of the Cherry Report’s 

‘‘high’’ benefit estimate is not 

reasonable because of the number of 16g 

compatible seats in the fleet. 

FAA Response: Based on our review 

of the comments received and a reexamination of the Cherry Report, the 

FAA agrees that the ‘‘median’’ benefit 

estimate from the Cherry Report 

represents a better estimate based on the 

available data. For the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule, we 

have reassessed the benefits using the 

Cherry Report’s ‘‘median’’ benefits 

estimate of the decrease in fatalities and 

serious injuries. 

Flight Attendant Seats—General 

Inclusion in Rule—General—Support 

Goodrich Aircraft Interior Products 

strongly supports the inclusion of the 

16g standard for flight attendant seats in 

the proposed rule. This support is based 

on the potential for additional passenger 

lives being saved by flight attendants 

who would not be injured due to their 

being seated in 16g seats during an 

accident. 

IBT concurs, stating that the FAA has 

recognized the critical role of cabin 

crews in evacuating airplanes in 

survivable accidents. 

An individual commenter also 

supports the inclusion of flight 

attendant seats in the proposed rule, 

stating there is little value in increasing 

passenger survivability without 

providing an equal increase for flight 

attendants. 

A second individual commenter 

agrees, stating that cabin crews should 

be afforded the best crash protection 

against incapacitating injuries that 

could prevent them from performing 

their role during emergency 

evacuations. 

FAA Response: The FAA agrees and 

is requiring flight attendant seats and 

passenger seats in newly manufactured 

airplanes to meet all the requirements of 

§ 25.562. In this manner, the 

requirements for passenger and flight 

attendant seats are the same. 

Inclusion in Rule—General—Opposition 

An individual commenter states that 

the link between flight attendants and 

passengers being safely evacuated seems 

very tenuous at best and does not justify 

the high cost of the proposed rule. 

A second individual commenter 

believes we have not fully developed 

the argument for flight attendant seat 

upgrades. This individual states that 

this issue should be the subject of an 

independent proposal. This individual 

also points out that variations in seat 

mounting add complexity and expense 

to the proposal and that we need to 

recognize this in our analysis. 

AAPA also recommends that we 

exempt cabin attendant seats from this 

final rule. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes 

sufficient information exists to support 

how important flight attendants are in 

passenger evacuation. However, we 

acknowledge the decision to upgrade 

flight attendant seats was not based on 

an independent study. Historically, 

NTSB reports have not consistently 

addressed the role of flight attendants in 

passenger evacuation in every accident. 

Under the best of circumstances, this 

information can be subjective and 

difficult to assess accurately. In the 

qualitative assessment of the benefits 

gained by including flight attendant 

seats in the proposal, we recognized the 

effect that trained personnel have on the 

successful evacuation of passengers who 

survive an accident’s impact because of 

improved seats. We carefully analyzed 

the Cherry Report’s findings and 

determined there were sufficient 

accident cases where the flight 

attendant would have survived with a 

16g seat. We believe the flight 

attendants who would have survived an 

accident as a result of being restrained 

in a 16g seat would have helped these 

passengers to safety, thereby avoiding 

these fatalities. Our regulatory 

evaluation shows that the final rule is 

cost-beneficial for the inclusion of both 

passenger and flight attendant seats. 

Inclusion in Rule—Need Testing 

Specific to Flight Attendant Seats 

APFA strongly opposes including 

flight attendant seats in the rule. APFA 

believes testing specific to cabin 

attendant seats should be undertaken to 

adequately determine the safety of these 

seats before changes are mandated. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56551 

APFA claims that the assumption 

cannot be made that such seats will 

perform in a manner similar to 

passenger seats. Therefore, APFA 

concludes that flight attendant seats 

should meet the 16g standard, but 

stresses the differences between 

different seat types and configurations. 

FAA Response: The dynamic standard 

of § 25.562 is suitable for all seats used 

in transport category airplanes and the 

FAA does not intend to delay this rule 

by undertaking a new study. Although 

accident reports have shown that flight 

attendant seats typically withstand a 

crash better than passenger seats in the 

same area and we recognize that 

passenger seats and flight attendant 

seats are mounted differently, we do not 

believe that those differences warrant 

any further performance analysis. 

Inclusion in Rule—Costs Too High 

ATASCO asserts that we should 

exclude flight attendant seats because of 

the high costs required to make flight 

attendant seats comply with § 25.562. 

FAA Response: One reason the FAA 

decided to proceed with this rulemaking 

for newly manufactured airplanes only 

was the high cost of mandating the 

upgrade of flight attendant seats on 

existing airplanes. 

However, for newly manufactured 

airplanes, we contend that the 

incremental costs of changing current 

designs to address seat mounting issues 

is justified by the benefits (i.e., lives 

saved by flight attendants in impactsurvivable accidents). In addition, we 

believe that manufacturers will be able 

to accomplish and implement these 

design changes prior to October 27, 

2009. 

Rule Should Apply to Newly 

Manufactured Aircraft Only 

With 55% ($285.7 million) of the 

overall undiscounted upgrade costs 

related to flight attendant seats, Airbus 

questions the need for their 

replacement. Airbus believes the 

accident data does not support the 

assumption that cabin attendants would 

be ‘‘less safe’’ in 9g seats than 

passengers in 16g seats. Airbus also 

states that, to justify this cost, it is 

assumed that each cabin attendant who 

does not suffer fatal or serious injuries 

due to the introduction of 16g seats 

would then take actions to avert further 

passenger fatalities. Airbus believes this 

assumption is an uncertain estimate. 

Airbus recommends that we apply the 

16g standard of § 25.562 only to new 

aircraft programs. 

FAA Response: The high costs 

associated with replacing flight 

attendant seats in existing airplanes was 

part of the reasoning that led the FAA 

to revise the proposal so that this final 

rule applies to newly manufactured 

airplanes only. 

However, we disagree with Airbus’

comment about the role of flight 

attendants during emergency 

evacuations. As we stated above, we 

contend that a review of aircraft 

accidents indicates that the presence of 

flight attendants during an evacuation 

after an impact survivable accident 

improve passenger survivability. The 

Cherry Report specifically refers to cases 

where flight attendants assisted 

passengers to safety. Therefore, we 

contend it is reasonable to expect that 

surviving flight attendants trained in 

emergency procedures will save lives in 

an impact survivable accident. 

Allow for TSO–C127 Compliant Flight 

Attendant Seat Installation 

Boeing states that this final rule 

should allow for the installation of 

TSO–C127 compliant flight attendant 

seats because full compliance with 

§ 25.562 requires upgrades to the 

monuments on which flight attendant 

seats are mounted. Boeing believes this 

violates the assumption in the SNPRM 

about minimizing the impact to the 

aircraft structure. Therefore, Boeing 

recommends that any implementation of 

flight attendant seat upgrades should 

exclude upgrade requirements for 

galleys, lavatories, partitions, or other 

items on which these seats are mounted. 

FAA Response: The FAA is requiring 

one level of safety for seats throughout 

the cabin of newly manufactured 

airplanes. How a seat is secured to the 

airframe is crucial to ensuring that flight 

attendants are adequately protected. 

Therefore, the mounting structures for 

flight attendant seats that have been 

dynamically tested must be capable of 

supporting the seats consistent with 

current airworthiness requirements. 

Dynamically tested flight attendant seats 

have been successfully certified on 

numerous aircraft with many different 

mounting configurations. We contend 

that providing industry with a four-year 

period in which to comply with this 

rule provides enough time for industry 

to develop cost-effective solutions for 

any unique installation issues that 16g 

flight attendant seats may present. 

Separate Rulemaking for Flight 

Attendant Seats 

An individual commenter 

recommends placing the provisions 

affecting flight attendant seats in a 

separate rulemaking project. In this way, 

the complications and costs associated 

with covering flight attendant seats can 

be thoroughly examined. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes we 

have conducted a thorough examination 

of the costs and other implications 

associated with applying the 16g 

standard to flight attendant seats. This 

analysis supports our decision to 

include flight attendant seats in the final 

rule. A separate rulemaking would 

result in a delay in providing the same 

crash protection for flight attendants as 

would be afforded passengers under this 

rule. 

Flight Attendant Seats—Cost-Benefit 

Analysis 

Analysis Fails to Consider Impact on 

Aircraft Structure and Monuments 

Boeing states that the FAA’s cost 

analysis fails to consider the impact of 

including flight attendant seats on the 

aircraft structure and monument design. 

Boeing believes we did not include the 

costs resulting from increased 

monument weight needed to support 

seats with higher loading capability in 

the cost analysis. In addition, Boeing 

states that because windscreens, 

partitions, and flight attendant seats are 

tested as a system, a change to the seats 

will require added testing and 

certification costs. Boeing argues that 

we do not account for these costs in our 

analysis. 

ATA agrees with Boeing and believes 

that we also did not include the high 

costs to upgrade monument walls for 

flight attendant seats in the cost 

analysis. 

Airbus states we did not consider the 

cost to modify the support structure for 

wall-mounted seats or to replace their 

components if the new dynamic test 

criterion is applied. 

Finally, ATASCO states that 

compliance with § 25.562 will require 

potential cabin interior re-design and 

additional certification activities. 

FAA Response: While the regulatory 

analysis supporting the SNPRM did not 

specifically break down the costs for 

testing and certification of improved 

flight attendant seats, these costs were 

included in that analysis and 

considered the use of monuments, 

partitions and wind screens, consistent 

with current policy. The regulatory 

analysis for this final rule also includes 

such costs. However, to ensure the 

accuracy of our estimates of the 

certification costs in the regulatory 

evaluation supporting this final rule, we 

obtained updated cost information from 

Boeing on this subject and have 

included it in our analysis. Our 

estimates are now in-line with Boeing’s 

cost information. 

As for any increased aircraft weight 

associated with improving flight 

56552 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

attendant seats, the FAA expects that 

any changes that might be required of 

monuments will not significantly 

increase airplane weight. However, we 

did include weight increases of 13 

pounds per airplane for flight attendant 

dynamic seats and 36 pounds per 

airplane for passenger seats in our 

analysis. We recalculated costs based on 

this new data supplied by Boeing. 

Finally, as for other impacts 

associated with improving flight 

attendant seats, the FAA has provided 

industry with adequate time to develop 

cost effective solutions to this rule. 

Impact on Seating at Monument 

Locations 

Boeing comments that our cost 

analysis did not examine the impact on 

seating arrangements at monument 

locations and the cost of new 

technologies to mitigate this impact. 

ATASCO agrees, stating that 

compliance with § 25.562 will require 

the possible loss of an entire seat row 

due to configuration changes. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes that 

new technologies, like inflatable 

restraints, provide low-cost solutions 

that will prevent the loss of a seat row 

and the associated revenue. In fact, we 

re-evaluated the issue, and, in the final 

rule’s regulatory evaluation, estimated 

the acquisition/installation costs for 

seat-belt air bags necessary to meet the 

front row HIC requirement. The 

regulatory evaluation for this final rule 

estimates that about four percent of all 

seats will require such restraints. Use of 

these restraints is less costly than 

removing a row of seats to meet front 

row HIC requirements. 

Technical Comments 

Structural Requirements of § 25.562 

Sufficient 

AEA believes the structural 

requirements of § 25.562 provide a 

significant increase in safety. However, 

the extra requirements for occupant 

protection (e.g., HIC) would require 

costly recertification programs and 

changes in seat layout. AEA argues that 

a safety case is missing for those extra 

requirements since the cost-benefit 

analysis does not specify the percentage 

of fatalities and injuries because of 

unfulfilled HIC and front-row rules. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes it is 

necessary to propose a rule that ensures 

one level of safety for all occupants. HIC 

is an important aspect of occupant 

protection criteria. Therefore, we 

believe that a rule that requires 

compliance with only the structural 

requirements of § 25.562 is not meeting 

the intent or gaining the maximum 

benefit of Amendment 25–64. 

We acknowledge that the cost to 

ensure HIC is met increases the cost of 

seat certification. However, we believe 

that this cost increase is justified by the 

benefits of HIC compliance. 

Exclusion of 16g Seat Compliance From 

§ 25.785 

IBT objects to the exclusion of 16g 

seat compliance from § 25.785, as was 

originally outlined in the 1988 NPRM. 

IBT believes this omission weakens the 

rule. 

AMSAFE agrees, remarking that 

proposing compliance with § 25.562 

while excluding the requirements of 

§ 25.785 weakens the proposed rule. 

FAA Response: The FAA does not 

agree that the exclusion of the 

requirements of § 25.785 weakens this 

final rule. We believe the intent of this 

final rule is to improve seats in 

transport category airplanes based on 

dynamic testing. We also believe that 

§ 25.562 accomplishes that goal without 

creating the extra burden of requiring 

compliance with the provisions of 

§ 25.785. 

AC 25.562–1A ‘‘Exemption’’ From Head 

Injury Protection Requirements 

IBT raises concerns over what it terms 

as an exemption from the head injury 

protection requirements of § 25.562(c)(5) 

afforded by AC 25.562–1A. IBT states 

that this AC permits the extension of 

seat pitch away from a vertical hazard 

as a method of compliance with 

§ 25.562. IBT believes that such an 

extension of seat pitch introduces a 

potential head injury hazard from the 

occupant of such a seat striking his own 

legs and/or the aircraft floor. IBT 

concludes that requiring a 16g seat 

without requiring HIC testing and 

adherence to HIC standards does not 

promote an acceptable safety level. 

AMSAFE agrees, recommending 

removal of what it terms as the AC 

25.562–1A ‘‘loophole’’ that allows an 

applicant to move or extend seat pitch 

away from a vertical hazard. By so 

moving or extending the seat, the 

occupant can strike his or her own legs 

or the floor of the airplane. The 

resulting HIC from this impact is not 

considered in this process. AMSAFE 

believes that removing the ‘‘loophole’’

will also reduce the potential for 

liability losses. 

FAA Response: The FAA disagrees 

with the comments of IBT and 

AMSAFE. AC 25.562–1A provides 

acceptable methods for complying with 

§ 25.562. This can include avoidance of 

the hazard by locating the seat such that 

the occupant’s head cannot strike an 

object. Also, we do not believe the 

measurements obtained when a test 

dummy strikes itself are accurate for use 

in calculating HIC and predicting injury. 

Without an accurate means of 

measuring this phenomenon, we do not 

believe this situation should be 

evaluated as part of the criteria for 

determining compliance with § 25.562. 

We also do not believe that a head strike 

with the airplane floor occurs to an 

extent that it should be added to the 

§ 25.562 criteria or evaluated under 

§ 25.785. We believe this phenomenon 

is rare, if it does occur. Testing of this 

nature would require a representative 

floor structure be included in the 

dynamic test and this would 

dramatically increase the test’s 

complexity. 

Seat Track Failures 

RECARO asks how we will handle 

situations in which a seat track fails, 

resulting in a failed 16g certification 

test. 

FAA Response: Since seat track 

‘‘crowns’’ are tested and approved 

under 16g dynamic standards, failures 

of the seat track crowns will be 

unacceptable. Traditionally, these types 

of failures require a redesign of the seat 

track fitting to lessen loads to the seat 

track crowns. This usually results in a 

change or replacement of the seat track 

fitting. Since the dynamic testing 

standard was developed in correlation 

with 9g static floors and seat tracks, the 

FAA does not expect this to be an issue 

in a 16g certification test. 

Finally, we do not intend to provide 

new guidance on how seat tracks are 

evaluated under dynamic testing in this 

final rule. 

Exemption for New Aircraft Configured 

With Either TSO–C127a Seats or Seats 

Partially Compliant With § 25.562 

B/E recommends that FAA consider 

modifying the proposed rule to allow 

new aircraft configured with TSO–

C127a seats or seats that are partially 

compliant with § 25.562 to be delivered 

as currently certified if the procurement 

time frame extends more than four years 

past the effective date of this final rule. 

B/E believes that it should be a goal not 

to interrupt existing aircraft 

procurement programs or add to the 

certification and logistical costs for 

upgrades. Therefore, B/E believes an 

airplane, such as a B737NG, should 

continue to be deliverable up to and 

beyond the effective date of the final 

rule, as long as seat part numbers and 

aircraft configuration remain 

unchanged. Beyond the four-year time 

frame, B/E recommends that 9g seats be 

upgraded to partial 16g compliance, 

similar to the seats on the B737NG. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56553 

FAA Response: The FAA disagrees 

with B/E’s recommendation. We believe 

that seats in newly manufactured 

airplanes should meet all the 

requirements of § 25.562 by the 

compliance date. The four-year time 

frame after the effective date of this rule 

should allow industry enough time to 

set up cost-effective measures for 

meeting the rule and to adjust their 

procurement programs accordingly. 

Nominally Compliant 16g Seats 

B/E recommends that nominally 

compliant 16g seats keep the 

compliance baseline of their original 

certification. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes that 

seats in newly manufactured airplanes 

should meet all the requirements of 

§ 25.562 by the compliance date. This 

rule does not affect existing airplanes 

that already have ‘‘nominally compliant 

16g’’ or partially compliant 16g seats 

since it applies only to newly 

manufactured airplanes. However, 

airplanes with those same certification 

bases that have not yet been 

manufactured must comply with all the 

requirements of § 25.562 by the 

compliance date. 

‘‘Full-up’’ Amendment 25–64 

Configurations 

B/E recommends that for ‘‘full-up’’

Amendment 25–64 configurations, any 

new seat or cabin configuration be 

certified to the same requirements. 

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that 

airplanes with Amendment 25–64 in 

their certification basis must be ‘‘fullup’’ (i.e., meet all the requirements of 

§ 25.562). We also contend that newly 

manufactured airplanes, regardless of 

their certification basis, should meet all 

the requirements of § 25.562 by October 

27, 2009. 

Pre-Amendment 25–64 Aircraft 

Airbus states that requiring 16g seats 

on pre-Amendment 25–64 aircraft 

would force many changes in the 

surrounding cabin, as well as the 

supporting structure. Airbus states that, 

for aircraft not having § 25.562 in their 

certification basis, there is no easy ‘‘take 

out’’ and ‘‘fit in a new part’’ solution, as 

their cabin interiors are not designed to 

address the new requirement. Airbus 

recommends that FAA provide guidance 

on how installation criteria have to be 

considered for pre-Amendment 25–64 

aircraft programs. 

FAA Response: The FAA 

acknowledges that requiring 16g seats 

on pre-Amendment 25–64 airplanes will 

require airframe manufacturers to make 

changes to these airplanes. However, 

this rule provides enough time for 

airframe manufacturers to determine the 

best way to comply with this final rule, 

whether it be through the use of new 

seating arrangements, seat and/or cabin 

interior design modifications and/or 

new, cost-effective technologies (both 

for the seats and the cabin interior). 

Certification Costs 

Boeing states that seat certification 

streamlining activities have not 

materially improved the cost or time 

needed to certify seats. Boeing believes 

the use of a single seat track for dynamic 

testing would help. 

FAA Response: The FAA received 

information from industry in June of 

2003 that set forth practices that would 

result in considerable savings in both 

costs and time associated with certifying 

seats. This information was developed 

partly as a result of activities initiated 

under the seat certification streamlining 

efforts. However, in both the regulatory 

evaluation supporting the SNPRM and 

the regulatory evaluation supporting 

this final rule, we made no use of 

anticipated or realized reductions in 

cost from the results of the seat 

certification streamlining efforts. 

As to Boeing’s comment about the use 

of a single seat track for dynamic 

testing, this proposal can be addressed 

under the policy review process in Part 

1 of the Seat Certification Streamlining 

Effort or discussed with the Transport 

Airplane Directorate outside the 

Streamlining Effort. 

Compliant Installation Not Possible for 

Certain Seats 

Airbus believes there might be cases 

where a compliant installation is not 

possible for a given seat. For example, 

swivel cabin attendant seats arranged in 

cabin zones restricted in space might 

not be certifiable to the new standard. 

This scenario would require Airbus to 

install fixed cabin attendant seats under 

the rule. 

ATASCO agrees, stating that cabin 

interior re-design may decrease the 

number of passenger seats. 

FAA Response: While the FAA 

acknowledges that some seats may 

present more difficulties than others to 

comply with this final rule, we believe 

that only one standard should apply to 

all seats in the passenger cabin. We also 

believe this rule provides enough time 

for airframe manufacturers to address 

this concern by using new seat 

arrangements, design modifications, and 

cost-effective new technologies, both for 

seats and the cabin interior. 

Average/Standard Track Crown 

Boeing states that we should define an 

average track crown. Boeing believes 

that this is consistent with other 

conventions used in the dynamic testing 

and certification of seats. 

In addition, Boeing recommends that 

FAA allow a specific seat track crown 

section to be used as a ‘‘standard track’’

for all certification testing and 

compliance findings. Boeing states that 

this would reduce the number of 

required tests for certifying seats, while 

still allowing the seat to be fully 

substantiated for the dynamic loads. 

ATA concurs, stating that, for 

streamlining seat approval, the FAA 

should allow the use of a new industrystandard seat track in the dynamic 

testing of seats in conjunction with 

TSO–C127 or § 25.562. The specific 

configuration of this standard track 

could be defined by a joint industryFAA initiative. 

FAA Response: The FAA disagrees 

that this rule should address the issue 

of allowing for the use of a generic track 

crown. The current dynamic standard 

requires that the seat remain attached to 

the floor throughout dynamic testing. 

This requires that a seat track 

representative of the one installed on 

the airplane be used for dynamic 

testing. As such a proposal would 

require a change to § 25.562, it is 

outside the scope of this rulemaking 

action. 

We would welcome adoption by 

industry of a standardized seat track 

that meets all of the requirements for 

dynamic testing. Industry proposals of 

this nature can be submitted to the FAA 

and evaluated under the policy review 

process in Part 1 of the Seat 

Certification Streamlining Effort or 

discussed with the Transport Airplane 

Directorate outside the Streamlining 

Effort. 

Full-Scale Dynamic Tests Preferable to 

Component Tests 

AFA states that a migration from fullscale dynamic testing to component 

tests should be resisted, as it will likely 

lead to a proposal to eliminate the 

former. AFA’s comments praise the 

virtue of full-scale dynamic tests, as 

they evaluate how the seat, restraint, 

occupant, and the near-vicinity aircraft 

interior interact. 

FAA Response: The FAA does not see 

component testing as a substitute for 

full-scale dynamic testing for first time 

approvals. We have said that component 

testing can be accepted only for design 

changes to seats that have been 

previously approved using the full-scale 

dynamic tests required by § 25.562. We 

believe that component testing can be 

utilized effectively to integrate design 

changes that may improve safety but 

that would otherwise not be integrated 

56554 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

if full-scale testing were required for 

every change. We share AFA’s concern 

about the fidelity of component testing 

and the extent that it could be used in 

the future for seat approvals. There are 

no current policies that allow 

component testing without confirmation 

of the original design using full-scale 

dynamic testing. 

Track Failure During Testing 

Sicma recommends that seats tested 

to a ‘‘16g compatible’’ standard be 

accepted and not subject to more 

testing. Sicma states that dynamic 

testing has already been accomplished, 

and it has never had a track failure on 

a 14g down test. 

FAA Response: The FAA does not 

agree with Sicma’s recommendation. 

We note that track failures are most 

likely to occur during the 16g 

longitudinal test and that track failures 

during a 14g down test are extremely 

rare. Also, we believe that, for newly 

manufactured airplanes, full compliance 

to § 25.562 is readily achievable due to 

the current knowledge and capabilities 

in dynamic seat design and certification. 

The four-year period before compliance 

with the rule is required provides 

enough time to develop feasible 

solutions to meeting all the occupant 

protection criteria of § 25.562. 

Flawed Testing 

An individual commenter states that 

flaws exist in the tests used to gather 

supporting data for the HIC portion of 

§ 25.562. Based on these flaws, the HIC 

test can be proven to have no technical 

merit and could lead to designs with 

lower levels of safety. This individual 

recommends we remove the criterion 

from future regulations involving 

aircraft seating. 

FAA Response: The commenter did 

not offer any specifics as to why he 

believes flaws exist in the tests. The 

FAA issued Amendment 25–64 based 

on the recommendations of GASP. 

These recommendations have been the 

foundation for technical standards 

developed by industry and guidance 

developed by us with public 

participation. We continue to review 

these standards and policies with 

industry groups and make appropriate 

changes, when necessary. So far, these 

standards and policies have served the 

aviation community well. We welcome 

any valid data to support the 

commenter’s concerns. 

TSO–C127 

ATA and Boeing recommend that new 

seats installed on new production 

aircraft should meet TSO–C127, 

ensuring dynamic seat testing. They 

would like to see this requirement 

become effective four years from the 

rule’s effective date. ATA and Boeing 

believe that installation limitations 

relative to seat dynamic testing should 

be consistent with the airplane’s type 

certificate. For example, airplanes that 

have partial § 25.562 compliance as part 

of their certificate basis would continue 

to contain TSO–C127 compliant seats, 

while fully compliant airplanes would 

continue to contain fully compliant 16g 

seats. 

FAA Response: For newly 

manufactured airplanes, the FAA 

believes that flight attendant and 

passenger seats should comply with all 

the requirements of § 25.562. Allowing 

installation limitations consistent with 

the airplane’s original type certificate 

would undermine the intent of the rule 

and would result in only limited or no 

compliance with § 25.562. We seek to 

establish the highest level of safety for 

passenger and flight attendant seats that 

is currently practicable throughout the 

part 121-fleet. The commenters’

proposal would do little more than 

allow partially compliant 16g seats to be 

accepted in newly manufactured 

airplanes and would not significantly 

alter the current configuration of seats 

in the existing fleet. 

Ability of Tracks To Withstand Loads 

Imposed by 16g Seats 

ATASCO questions the ability of 

existing seat tracks to withstand the 

loads imposed by 16g seats. The group 

goes on to recommend that FAA 

examine the strength of seat tracks in 

airplane models other than the B–777. 

FAA Response: When the 

performance requirements currently in 

§ 25.562 were developed, the strength of 

tracks then on airplanes was evaluated. 

Using analysis and testing, we 

determined that track strengths were 

satisfactory when coupled with a seat 

designed to meet the dynamic criteria. 

Based on this previous analysis and 

testing, we do not consider any further 

testing to be required. 

General Comments 

No Accident Data To Support Need for 

16g Seats 

Based on recent safety improvements, 

RAA believes it is reasonable to project 

that there will be no more than 2 or 3 

impact-survivable accidents within the 

next 20 years. Since RAA also projects 

that 80% of the seats will be 16g 

compliant in the next three years 

without a rule mandate, RAA believes 

that the impact-survivable accident rate 

in regional airplanes without 16g 

compliant seats will be less than one 

accident in the next 20 years. Therefore, 

RAA believes that the proposed rule 

will not make any difference in 

reducing the fatalities or serious injuries 

that may occur in the regional fleet. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes the 

Cherry Report accurately determines the 

fatalities and serious injuries that could 

have been averted had 16g seats been 

installed in those airplanes studied. 

Despite recent improvements made in 

accident prevention, we strongly believe 

that the potential for impact-survivable 

accidents still exists. The use of 16g 

seats will improve passenger 

survivability in such accidents in the 

future irrespective of the type of aircraft 

in which these seats are installed. 

As for regional carriers who operate 

smaller transport category airplanes, 

these airplanes have less energy 

absorbing structure below the floor than 

larger transport category airplanes. 

Therefore, we believe that these carriers 

might benefit even more from the 

installation of seats that meet the 

dynamic testing requirements than their 

counterparts that operate larger 

transport category airplanes. 

Lack of a Convincing Safety Argument 

AEA believes that some aspects of the 

proposed rule have not been fully 

thought through since they are missing 

a convincing safety case and impact 

assessment. AEA also believes that the 

FAA does not give credit for 

investments in improved seats already 

made by airlines. 

FAA Response: The FAA did consider 

and give credit for airplanes that used 

seats that complied with parts of 

§ 25.562 or were simply later production 

seats believed to perform better than 

traditional early model 9g seats. The 

study, ‘‘Improved Seats in Transport 

Category Airplanes: Analysis of 

Options,’’ prepared by the FAA’s Office 

of System Safety (ASY)(November 2000) 

grouped the current fleet into 5 

categories. These categories included 

aircraft with seats ranging from early 9g 

seats to fully compliant 16g seats. 

The 2003 Cherry Report Addendum 

updated their data and concludes that 

fully compliant 16g seats could have 

averted 45 fatalities and 40 serious 

injuries over the analysis period. HIC 

improvement accounts for 39% of the 

averted fatalities and 46% of the averted 

serious injuries. 

Suggested Alternatives 

Several commenters recommend the 

following in addition or as an 

alternative to the proposed rule to 

increase survivability in impactsurvivable accidents: 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56555 

(1) Using rearward facing seats (five 

commenters); 

(2) Making child restraint 

improvements and regulatory changes 

that would mandate securing all 

children in safety seats (six 

commenters); 

(3) Using three-point harness 

restraints (one commenters) or shoulder 

harnesses (one commenter); 

(4) Using air bags (one commenter); 

(5) Improving seat belt security, using 

fewer seats or changing seating 

configuration (one commenter); and 

(6) Using standardized seat belt 

latching mechanisms or, without such 

standardization, telling passengers 

about any variations (one commenter). 

Finally, one commenter states that the 

FAA should focus our attention on 

flight crew safety and health issues 

rather than on improving seats. 

FAA Response: While the FAA 

accepts that some of these alternatives 

may improve accident survivability, 

these commenters do not offer any 

persuasive evidence why we should 

abandon the approach contained in the 

SNPRM to adopt a suggested alternative. 

We have performed extensive research 

on the subject of improving 

survivability in impact-survivable 

accidents and have explored many 

options. We believe the approach taken 

in this final rule is the most effective 

and efficient way to improve 

survivability in impact-survivable 

accidents. 

As for the comment about flight crew 

safety and health issues, we believe our 

attention should be on both improving 

seats and flight crew safety and health 

issues. We have several offices that deal 

with flight crew safety and health issues 

and these offices are continuously 

analyzing ways to further improve these 

areas. However, improving seats in 

transport category aircraft is also an 

important issue. Our focus on this issue 

does not detract in any way from our 

continuing commitment to address 

flight crew safety and health issues. 

Rule Not Consistent With Safer Skies 

Partnership or Commercial Aviation 

Safety Team (CAST) Objectives 

Boeing and ATA believe the proposed 

rule is not consistent with the Safer 

Skies partnership or Commercial 

Aviation Safety Team (CAST) 

objectives, which are intended to direct 

safety investment where it has the most 

leverage. 

FAA Response: The FAA started the 

16g seat initiative in response to a 

directive from Congress before the 

existence of CAST. We believe that we 

need to complete the 16g seat initiative 

since the safety concerns that led to its 

initial development are still valid. 

We also recognize that considerable 

progress has been made under CAST to 

reduce the accident rate. In fact, we 

used a lower accident rate in predicting 

the benefits of this final rule in addition 

to the rate used for the SNPRM. CAST 

goals are to dramatically reduce 

accidents through accident prevention. 

However, we recognize that impactsurvivable accidents can still occur, and 

this rule focuses on protecting 

occupants when these accidents do 

occur. 

Rule Will Not Influence Types of 

Accidents With Most Fatalities 

Boeing states the proposed rule will 

not influence the types of accidents that 

have the most fatalities. 

In addition, Boeing contends that 

other safety initiatives will serve to 

reduce the number of accidents, further 

reducing the benefits of the proposed 

rule. 

FAA Response: While this rulemaking 

action does not necessarily address 

those accidents that result in the most 

fatalities, it does improve survivability 

for passengers and crewmembers when 

impact-survivable accidents occur. 

Regardless of improvements in accident 

prevention, there is still a need to 

improve passenger and crewmember 

survivability since other accident 

prevention measures have not 

eliminated all impact-survivable 

accidents. 

HIC Compliance 

AMSAFE recommends requiring HIC 

compliance in all situations, regardless 

of strike hazard fidelity. 

FAA Response: The FAA is using 

existing policy for meeting HIC 

requirements and does not intend to 

expand the scope or definition of 

compliance with HIC. 

Inclusion of HIC 

ATA states that most of the benefits 

of improved seats are achieved through 

structural criteria, not HIC. Adding HIC 

only creates significant costs without 

commensurate benefits. 

ATA also argues that the FAA has not 

accurately projected the cost of front 

row HIC. HIC requirements, especially 

front row HIC, are expensive and have 

not been proven to have a significantly 

higher value. 

FAA Response: The FAA agrees that 

most of the benefits of improved seats 

come from compliance with the 

structural requirements. While the 

Cherry Report (upon which the 

SNPRM’s benefits were based) does not 

assess the specific safety benefits from 

HIC improvements, the Cherry Report 

Addendum concludes that 39% of the 

fatalities and 46% of the serious injuries 

averted by installing fully compliant 16g 

seats can be attributed to HIC 

improvements. 

In our regulatory evaluation 

supporting this final rule, the cost of 

seat certification included HIC for all 

seats, front row as well as row-to-row. 

The FAA recognizes that front row HIC 

requirements can lead to compliance 

alternatives that cost the operator more 

than row-to-row HIC compliance 

alternatives. However, we do not agree 

that the value for the front row 

alternative must be commensurate with 

the row-to-row alternative. To do so 

implies that passengers in the front row 

should be given a lower protection level 

than passengers in the following rows 

simply because it may cost more to 

protect those passengers in the front 

row. We do not agree with this 

reasoning. 

Quarterly Reports 

NADA/F supports the proposed rule. 

It also recommends that airlines file 

quarterly public reports updating their 

progress in complying with the rule. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes 

NADA/F was directing this comment at 

seat replacement on existing airplanes. 

Because the final rule will not require 

seats on the existing fleet to be 

upgraded, the comment is no longer 

relevant. When mandating actions 

similar to that set forth in this rule, we 

typically mandate only compliance time 

frames and do not require progress 

reports. 

Applicability to Part 135 Operators, 

Flight Deck Seats, and Cargo-Only 

Airplanes 

IBT states that the rule should address 

part 135 operators, flight deck seats and 

seats on cargo-only aircraft. IBT states 

that the omission of these seats is not 

consistent with our stated philosophy of 

‘‘one level of safety’’ and should be 

remedied. 

NADA/F also recommends that part 

121 air cargo aircraft meet the new 

standards within three years of this final 

rule. 

FAA Response: Regarding flight deck 

seats, the FAA’s review of the accidents 

studied showed that the existing seats 

performed well in impact-survivable 

accidents. Therefore, we do not see any 

need to mandate any crashworthiness 

improvements to these seats. 

As for cargo-only airplanes, the final 

rule does not apply to these airplanes 

because they do not carry passengers for 

compensation or hire. However, 

transport category aircraft manufactured 

56556 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

four (4) years after the effective date of 

this final rule that have convertible or 

combination configurations will have to 

meet the same standards required for 

all-passenger carrying transport category 

airplanes operated under part 121 

because those airplanes carry 

passengers. 

As for transport category airplanes 

operated under part 135, at the time 

Notice No. 88–8 was published, a 

significant number of transport category 

airplanes were operated under part 135. 

Accordingly, Notice 88–8 proposed that 

seats on transport category airplanes 

operated under part 135 in air carrier 

operations or scheduled intrastate 

common carriage meet the same 

standards as seats on transport category 

airplanes operated under part 121. In 

1995, we issued Amendment Nos. 119, 

121–251, and 135–58, ‘‘Commuter 

Operations and General Certification 

and Operations Requirements;’’ Final 

Rule (60 FR 65832; December 20, 

1995)(the Commuter Rule). The 

Commuter Rule requires all operators 

conducting scheduled passengercarrying operations in airplanes that 

have passenger-seating configurations of 

10 through 30 seats (excluding 

crewmember seats) and in turbojet 

airplanes regardless of seating 

configuration that formerly conducted 

operations under part 135, to conduct 

those operations under part 121. As a 

consequence of the Commuter Rule, the 

operation of virtually all transport 

category airplanes previously operated 

under part 135 now comes under part 

121. Only nonscheduled, on-demand 

operations remain in part 135. Since the 

scope of this final rule is limited to 

transport category airplanes, it is no 

longer necessary to apply to this rule to 

part 135 operations. 

Expedited Final Rule Issuance 

NADA/F recommends that we issue 

the final rule by January 31, 2003. 

FAA Response: Because the comment 

period did not close until March 3, 

2003, the FAA was unable to meet the 

commenter’s requested issue date. Also, 

after a comment period closes, we must 

analyze and address each comment. 

Other considerations, such as reviewing 

alternatives based on public comments, 

can further lengthen that process. 

Although we understand the 

commenter’s intent, we must develop a 

final rule in accordance with all 

statutory and procedural requirements. 

Rule Should Not Apply to Certain 

Aircraft 

ATA recommends this rule not apply 

to aircraft that do not have § 25.562(c)(5) 

in their original certification basis. 

FAA Response: The FAA contends 

that all flight attendant and passenger 

seats in newly manufactured airplanes 

should meet the requirements of 

§ 25.562, including § 25.562(c)(5). 

Occupants must be protected from head 

trauma as accident investigations have 

shown it to be a primary cause of 

serious injuries and fatalities in impactsurvivable aviation accidents. In 

addition, in developing the 

recommendation that led to 

§ 25.562(c)(5), GASP made it a primary 

goal to reduce the likelihood of fatal or 

serious head trauma, concussion, and 

unconsciousness to airplane occupants. 

We found this goal to be appropriate for 

all of civil aircraft, and it has therefore 

been addressed in the new emergency 

landing dynamic conditions applicable 

to aircraft certificated under parts 23, 

25, 27 and 29. 

Expedited Compliance Date 

Several commenters recommend an 

expedited compliance date: 

(1) NADA/F recommends that all 

newly constructed aircraft be equipped 

with ‘‘safer’’ seats by June 30, 2003, or 

sooner; 

(2) RECARO recommends a shortened 

compliance period of two years to 

replace the proposed four-year period 

for newly manufactured airplanes; 

(3) IBT believes the four-year 

compliance period for newly 

manufactured aircraft is problematic 

considering the industry’s current 

economic situation. 

FAA Response: For newly 

manufactured airplanes, we believe the 

current compliance time frame of four 

years after the effective date of the final 

rule is reasonable. We believe this time 

frame provides enough time for industry 

to adjust to this new requirement while 

still ensuring that an improved safety 

level is reached in the near future. 

Although we would like to see the 

improved seats installed as quickly as 

possible, shortening that compliance 

time frame will drive costs up 

disproportionate to the benefits. 

Concept of 16g Compatible Seats 

ATA believes the proposed rule 

ignores 16g compatible seats. 

FAA Response: Although the concept 

of 16g compatible seats was recognized 

in the 1998 Public Meeting, it applied 

only to the existing fleet. Since the final 

rule will not apply to the existing fleet, 

the commenters’ concerns no longer 

apply. However, the FAA wants to 

clarify that the 1988 rulemaking 

initiative did not recognize the concept 

of 16g compatible seats. The 1988 

NPRM would have required seats to 

meet all the requirements of § 25.562 for 

part 121 and part 135 operations, 

including all cargo operations. 

Additionally, the SNPRM and the 

Options Study did give credit for having 

partially compliant seats installed. 

Joint Aviation Authorities Technical 

Standard Order (JTSO) Approval 

Sicma recommends that the FAA 

consider accepting JTSO approval for 

determining compliance with the 

proposed rule. Sicma believes that this 

would streamline the certification 

process, as the requirement to have an 

FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO) in 

addition to the JTSO approval is 

redundant. 

FAA Response: The FAA does not 

recognize a JTSO or a European 

Aviation Safety Agency Technical 

Standard Order (ETSO) approval on its 

own. A separate FAA Letter of TSO 

Design Approval is required. When the 

JTSO/ETSO is identical to the FAA 

TSO, the FAA Letter of TSO Design 

Approval can be issued with a 

minimum of review. Also, an approval 

to TSO–C127a is only an approval to a 

standard. It is not approval for 

installation. Installation approval is 

based on an airplane’s type design and 

can vary depending on the specific 

airplane model. This rule serves to make 

one standard, that contained in § 25.562, 

applicable to all newly manufactured 

airplanes. TSO approval of a seat does 

not necessarily ensure compliance with 

§ 25.562, although it is generally the 

basis for that certification. 

Harmonization 

ATASCO CSWG asks the FAA to 

consider issues of worldwide 

harmonization when moving forward 

with these regulatory changes. 

NADA/F agrees, recommending that 

we do all that is possible to promote the 

safest seats as a harmonization standard 

with the JAA. 

FAA Response: Although the FAA 

supports harmonization when 

appropriate, we believe that aviation 

safety will improve significantly by 

issuing this final rule and, therefore, do 

not want to further delay its 

implementation while undertaking 

harmonization efforts. We also note that 

the seat certification streamlining effort 

is addressing harmonization issues. 

Impact on Seating 

Airbus comments that applying 

§ 25.562 to all passenger seats would 

compel changes in aircraft seating 

configurations. For example, it may 

create one row of seating without the 

ability to recline. Airbus believes that 

FAA has not considered the economic 

impact of these changes. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56557 

FAA Response: The FAA 

acknowledges that this is a possibility. 

However, we believe there is enough 

time from the effective date of the rule 

for industry to develop cost-effective 

solutions that will not require changes 

in aircraft seating configurations, or 

actions such as installing seat belt air 

bags. 

As for the comment about the ability 

of seats to recline, we are aware that, as 

of today, many seats located at or near 

overwing exits do not recline. Airbus 

did not present any data to show that 

this has created an economic impact. 

Tax Incentives 

A commenter proposes tax incentives 

to accelerate compliance with the 

proposed rule. 

FAA Response: It is beyond the scope 

of the FAA’s authority to effectuate such 

changes. 

Inclusion of Military Aircraft 

NADA/F recommends that the 

military be directed by Executive Order, 

or whatever rulemaking is available, to 

have all military aircraft upgraded with 

safer seats. NADA/F believes the 

compliance standards should be as high 

as, or higher than, those for commercial 

aircraft. 

FAA Response: This request is outside 

the scope of this proposal. 

Expedited Testing 

NADA/F recommends that we 

expedite any testing needed to proceed 

with safer seats for all aircraft. 

FAA Response: The FAA believes the 

standards set forth in current emergency 

landing dynamic conditions adequately 

improve seat safety over 9g static seats. 

These standards were developed after 

extensive research and testing by the 

FAA, NASA, and industry. The 

standards were developed to provide 

improved safety for passenger and 

crewmembers based on the seat 

technology of the day. Because we 

consider these standards to be adequate, 

no additional testing is needed at this 

time. 

Air Bag TSO 

AMSAFE recommends the timely 

issuance of an air bag TSO as an 

acceptable means of compliance with 

§ 25.562. 

FAA Response: Currently, the Society 

of Automotive Engineers (SAE) Seat 

Committee is working on an Aerospace 

Standard for inflatable restraint systems. 

Once the SAE issues that document, the 

FAA may consider issuing a TSO for 

inflatable restraint systems that 

incorporates that document. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

There are no current or new 

requirements for information collection 

associated with this amendment. 

International Compatibility 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

comply with International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards 

and Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has determined that there are no ICAO 

Standards and Recommended Practices 

that correspond to these regulations. 

Economic Assessment, Regulatory 

Flexibility Determination, Trade Impact 

Assessment, and Unfunded Mandates 

Assessment 

Changes to Federal regulations must 

undergo several economic analyses. 

First, Executive Order 12866 directs 

each Federal agency to propose or adopt 

a regulation only upon a reasoned 

determination that the benefits of the 

intended regulation justify its costs. 

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act 

of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531–2533) 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, this Trade Act also requires 

agencies to consider international 

standards and, where appropriate, use 

them as the basis of U.S. standards. 

Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform 

Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) requires 

agencies to prepare a written assessment 

of the costs, benefits, and other effects 

of proposed or final rules that include 

a Federal mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of $100 million or more 

annually (adjusted for inflation). 

In conducting these analyses, FAA 

has determined this rule (1) has benefits 

that justify its costs, is a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action’’ as defined in section 

3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and is 

‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) 

will not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities; (3) will not reduce barriers to 

international trade; and (4) does not 

impose an unfunded mandate on state, 

local, or tribal governments, or on the 

private sector. These analyses, available 

in the docket, are summarized below. 

Total Costs and Benefits of This 

Rulemaking 

This final rule amends FAA 

regulations dealing with improved 

crashworthiness standards for passenger 

and flight attendant seats on new 

transport category airplanes used in part 

121 passenger-carrying operations. The 

rule requires all such airplanes typecertificated after January 1, 1958 

(starting with those manufactured four 

years after this rule’s effective date) to 

comply with all the requirements of 14 

CFR 25.562, which is applicable to 

airplane models for which an 

application for a type-certificate is made 

on or after June 16, 1988. Therefore, no 

action should be necessary to bring 

those airplanes into compliance with 

this final rule assuming that they 

comply fully with § 25.562. Essentially, 

from an incremental cost/benefit 

standpoint, the new production 

airplanes to be affected by this rule are 

those models that were type-certificated 

after January 1, 1958 and before June 16, 

1988 and derivatives of such models for 

which an application for an amended 

type-certificate was made after January 

1, 1958. 

Total Costs of This Rulemaking 

The total costs of this rulemaking, 

over the analysis period, are $34.7 

million (or, $22.3 million and $13.3 

million in present value at 3% and 7%, 

respectively). These costs are composed 

of seat belt air bags costs of $19.3 

million (or, $12.4 million and $7.5 

million in present value at 3% and 7%, 

respectively), additional fuel burn costs 

of $12.6 million (or, $7.7 million and 

$4.2 million in present value at 3% and 

7%, respectively), and certification and 

testing of the improved seats of $2.7 

million (or $2.2 million and $1.6 

million in present value at 3% and 7%, 

respectively). 

Total Benefits of This Rulemaking 

The total benefits of this rulemaking 

are $78.9 million (or, $47.9 million and 

$26.4 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively). The benefits 

were calculated by estimating the 

number of fatalities and serious injuries 

that could be averted as a result of 

installing the improved seats beginning 

in 2009; averted casualties are based on 

estimated future enplanements of newproduction airplanes now to be covered 

by improved seat standards. 

Total Costs and Benefits of This 

Rulemaking 

In summary, the total costs of this 

rulemaking, over the analysis period are 

$34.7 million (or, $22.3 million and 

$13.3 million in present value at 3% 

56558 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

3We have assumed the cost associated with this 

rule based on the cost of installing a seat belt 

equipped with an air bag (inflatable restraints). 

Other options, such as shoulder harnesses, y-belts, 

padding to the bulkhead or increasing the distance 

between the bulkhead and the seat back, may also 

be sufficient to meet the HIC requirements of this 

rule and may be less costly. We believe the costs 

of this rule could be much lower when a 

combination of options is used. For a complete 

explanation of the estimated costs of this rule, 

please read the final regulatory evaluation located 

in the docket. 

and 7%, respectively). The total benefits 

of installing fully compliant 16g seats 

are $78.9 million (or, $47.9 million and 

$26.4 million in present value at 3% 

and 7%, respectively). This rulemaking 

is cost-beneficial with a benefits to cost 

ratio of 2.27 to 1 (or, 2.15 to 1 and 1.98 

to 1, when underlying estimates are in 

present value at 3% and 7%, 

respectively). Therefore, the FAA 

contends that the quantifiable benefits 

of the rule adequately justify the costs 

of the rule. 

Who Is Potentially Affected by This 

Rulemaking? 

This rulemaking affects anyone who 

operates transport category airplanes 

used in part 121 passenger-carrying 

operations on or after October 27, 2009. 

Our Cost Assumptions and Sources of 

Information 

• Discount rate—3% and 7%. 

• Period of Analysis 2005–2034. 

• Monetary values expressed in 2004 

dollars. 

• Cost of certificating and installing 

a fully compliant 16g passenger seat 

instead of a 9g passenger seat, $212. 

• Cost of certificating and installing a 

fully compliant 16g passenger seat 

instead of a partially compliant 16g (i.e., 

without HIC) passenger seat, $126 ($32 

non-recurring and $94 recurring). 

• Cost of certificating and installing a 

fully compliant 16g flight attendant seat 

instead of a partially compliant flight 

attendant seat, $302 ($135 nonrecurring, and $167 recurring). 

• Acquisition cost of installing a seat 

belt air bag, for front-row HIC 

requirement, $722 ($700 seat belt, $22 

certification).3

• Annual maintenance cost and onetime overhaul cost of seat belt air bag, 

$150, and $388, respectively. 

• Increased weight per aircraft, for 

passenger seat requirements, 36 pounds. 

• Increased weight per aircraft, for 

flight attendant seat requirements, 13 

pounds. 

• Fuel costs are based on FAA’s 

forecast data. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility 

Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the Act requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The Act covers a wide-range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations, 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule will have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the determination is that it 

will, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the Act. However, if an 

agency determines that a proposed or 

final rule is not expected to have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

section 605(b) of the 1980 act provides 

that the head of the agency may so 

certify and a regulatory flexibility 

analysis is not required. The 

certification must include a statement 

providing the factual basis for this 

determination, and the reasoning should 

be clear. 

The rule will affect manufacturers of 

part 25 transport category airplanes 

type-certificated after January 1, 1958 

and manufactured after four years 

following the effective date of this final 

rule. It will also affect air carriers 

conducting operations under part 121. 

For manufacturers and part 121 

operators, a small entity is one with 

1,500 or fewer employees. No part 25 

airframe manufacturer has 1,500 or 

fewer employees. Consequently, the rule 

will not have a ‘‘significant economic 

impact on a substantial number’’ of 

small part 25 manufacturers. 

There are approximately 100 part 121 

operators in the potential pool of small 

entities. In the regulatory evaluation for 

the SNPRM, the FAA performed a 

detailed analysis of the economic 

impacts on 33 of these operators who 

clearly: (1) Had less than 1,500 

employees (the size threshold for 

classification as a small entity); (2) were 

not subsidiaries of larger organizations; 

and, (3) reported operating revenue to 

the Department of Transportation. The 

FAA believed these 33 were 

representative of the affected small 

firms. The FAA performed a detailed 

analysis of potential small-entity 

impacts on the small operators and 

determined that the proposed rule 

would not have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. The FAA invited comments on 

this assessment from interested and 

affected parties. Though no comments 

were received on FAA’s small-entityimpact methodology, the FAA did 

receive comments on the significant 

costs for all operators (whether small or 

not) to retrofit the existing fleet—

especially in light of the difficult 

financial condition of operators in 

recent years. The FAA removed the 

SNPRM’s retrofit requirement, therefore 

eliminating improved seat costs for the 

existing fleet. 

Consequently, the Administrator 

certifies that the rule will not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities 

(manufacturers or operators). 

International Trade Impact Assessment 

The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 

prohibits Federal agencies from 

establishing any standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 

safety, are not considered unnecessary 

obstacles. The statute also requires 

consideration of international standards 

and, where appropriate, that they be the 

basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has 

assessed the potential effect of this final 

rule and determined that it will impose 

the same costs on domestic and 

international entities and thus have a 

neutral trade impact. 

Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among 

other things, to curb the practice of 

imposing unfunded Federal mandates 

on State, local, and tribal governments. 

Title II of the Act requires each Federal 

agency to prepare a written statement 

assessing the effects of any Federal 

mandate in a proposed or final agency 

rule that may result in an expenditure 

of $100 million or more (adjusted 

annually for inflation) in any one year 

by State, local, and tribal governments, 

in the aggregate, or by the private sector; 

such a mandate is deemed to be a 

‘‘significant regulatory action.’’ The 

FAA currently uses an inflationadjusted value of $120.7 million in lieu 

of $100 million. 

This final rule does not contain such 

a mandate. The requirements of Title II 

do not apply. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56559 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We 

determined that this action will not 

have a substantial direct effect on the 

States, or the relationship between the 

national Government and the States, or 

on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and therefore does 

not have federalism implications. 

Regulations Affecting Intrastate 

Aviation in Alaska 

Section 1205 of the FAA 

Reauthorization Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 

3213) requires the FAA, when 

modifying its regulations in a manner 

affecting intrastate aviation in Alaska, to 

consider the extent to which Alaska is 

not served by transportation modes 

other than aviation, and to establish 

appropriate regulatory distinctions. In 

the NPRM, we requested comments on 

whether the proposed rule should apply 

differently to intrastate operations in 

Alaska. We didn’t receive any 

comments, and we have determined, 

based on the administrative record of 

this rulemaking, that there is no need to 

make any regulatory distinctions 

applicable to intrastate aviation in 

Alaska. 

Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 312d and involves no 

extraordinary circumstances. 

Regulations That Significantly Affect 

Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use 

The FAA has analyzed this final rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We 

have determined that it is not a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order because it is not a 

‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under 

Executive Order 12866, and it is not 

likely to have a significant adverse effect 

on the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 121 

Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, 

Safety, Transportation. 

The Amendment 

■ In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

amends Part 121 of Chapter I of Title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 121—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, 

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 121 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 

44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711, 

44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, 44903–

44904, 44912, 46105. 

■ 2. Amend § 121.311 by adding 

paragraph (j) to read as follows: 

§ 121.311 Seats, safety belts, and shoulder 

harnesses. 

* * * * * 

(j) After October 27, 2009, no person 

may operate a transport category 

airplane type certificated after January 

1, 1958 and manufactured on or after 

October 27, 2009 in passenger-carrying 

operations under this part unless all 

passenger and flight attendant seats on 

the airplane meet the requirements of 

§ 25.562 in effect on or after June 16, 

1988. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on September 

20, 2005. 

Marion C. Blakey, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 05–19208 Filed 9–26–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P