IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 41

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019

March 24, 2020

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF LARAMIE COUNTY 

d/b/a LARAMIE COUNTY FAIR BOARD OF 

TRUSTEES,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF 

LARAMIE COUNTY and LARAMIE COUNTY,

Appellees

(Defendants).

S-19-0192

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge

Representing Appellant:

Gay Woodhouse and Christopher Brennan, Woodhouse Roden Nethercott, LLC, 

Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Woodhouse.

Representing Appellees:

Steven Freudenthal, Freudenthal & Bonds, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument 

by Mr. Freudenthal.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] The Board of County Commissioners of Laramie County (Commissioners) passed 

a resolution dissolving the Laramie County Fair Board of Trustees (Fair Board) and 

assigning a new entity, the “Laramie County Events Department” (Events Department) the 

task of “operati[ng] and carrying forward” the county fair. The Fair Board sought a 

declaration that the Commissioners had no authority to dissolve the Fair Board, or to

reallocate tax money originally collected for the Fair Board’s use. On motions for 

summary judgment, the district court concluded that the Commissioners had authority to 

dissolve the Fair Board and entered declaratory relief in their favor. We reverse and 

remand. 

ISSUES

[¶2] The parties raise various issues that we consolidate and rephrase:

1. Does the Fair Board have standing to maintain this 

declaratory judgment action?

2. Do the Commissioners have implied authority to 

dissolve the Fair Board?

FACTS

[¶3] For many years, the Fair Board has been responsible for running the annual Laramie 

County Fair, “one of the oldest and largest fairs in the state of Wyoming.” The county fair 

hosts various events, including “Mutton Bustin’, Pig Wrestling, demolition derby, wagon 

rides,” and prize animal showcases. More recently, the Fair Board has been tasked with 

overseeing operations beyond these traditional county fair events, including an RV 

campground, a rodeo arena, meeting halls, and a disc golf course, among others. One such 

development is the ongoing “Archer Complex” project, a multiuse facility designed to host

a variety of events, including “trade shows, expositions, sporting events, RV rallies, 

concerts, [and] horse and stock shows[.]” 

[¶4] In November 2018, the Commissioners passed a resolution dissolving the Fair 

Board (Resolution). In its place, the Commissioners created the “Laramie County Events 

Department,” tasked with managing and “carrying forward . . . the Laramie County Fair”

and other Laramie County recreational activities, grounds, and facilities. It also created 

the “Laramie County Events Advisory Board,” which was to “function in an advisory 

capacity” to the Events Department. According to the Commissioners, the “decision was 

driven by our need to consolidate our recreational and event-related activities and 

operations throughout the county.” During the public hearing on the Resolution, the

Commissioners maintained that the fair would “continue to be the best fair in the country, 
2

certainly the best fair in Wyoming”; that funding for the fair would not be cut; and that 

they “want[ed] the fair to succeed [and] to grow.” 

[¶5] The Fair Board filed this action shortly after the Commissioners passed the 

Resolution, seeking a declaration “whether or not the Laramie County Commissioners have 

the authority to dissolve the Laramie County Fair Board of Trustees and substitute in its 

place an ‘Events Advisory Board.’” It also sought a declaration whether the

Commissioners had authority to reallocate tax money originally collected for the Fair 

Board’s use. Following the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court

concluded that the Commissioners had implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board and, 

because it had been dissolved, that the Fair Board lacked standing to challenge reallocation 

of collected tax money. The Fair Board timely appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

[¶6] Our standard of review of a district court’s summary judgment ruling is wellestablished: 

We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment 

de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. 

Thornock v. PacifiCorp, 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 

(Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses 

the same legal standard as the district court. Id. The record is 

assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion, and we give a party opposing summary 

judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly 

be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one that would 

have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element

of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id. 

In re Estate of Weeks, 2018 WY 112, ¶ 15, 427 P.3d 729, 734 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting White 

v. Wheeler, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Wyo. 2017)). Whether a party has 

standing to maintain a declaratory judgment action is a question of law that we review de 

novo. Williams v. State ex rel. Univ. of Wyo. Bd. of Trs., 2019 WY 90, ¶ 7, 448 P.3d 222, 

226 (Wyo. 2019). Likewise, whether the Commissioners have authority to dissolve the 

Fair Board raises a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Delcon 

Partners LLC v. Wyo. Dep’t of Rev., 2019 WY 106, ¶ 7, 450 P.3d 682, 684 (Wyo. 2019). 

DISCUSSION

I. The Fair Board has standing to maintain this declaratory judgment action

[¶7] The Commissioners argue the Fair Board lacks standing to bring this declaratory 

judgment action because: 1) neither it nor its members suffered financial harm because of 
3

the dissolution; 2) a judgment from this Court “cannot operate effectively upon the question 

of who controls the monies, means and methods of managing the various recreation and 

entertainment assets of Laramie County”; 3) a judicial determination from this Court will 

not have the force and effect of a final judgment; and 4) the members of the Fair Board 

have no property or liberty interest in their positions on the Fair Board. 

[¶8] “A party generally has standing if it is ‘properly situated to assert an issue for 

judicial determination.’” In re Estate of Stanford, 2019 WY 94, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 861, 864 

(Wyo. 2019) (quoting Gheen v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Health, Div. of Healthcare 

Financing/EqualityCare, 2014 WY 70, ¶ 16, 326 P.3d 918, 923 (Wyo. 2014)). The 

existence of standing does not hinge on a party having a property or liberty interest. Those 

inquiries are relevant to whether a party has been deprived of procedural due process, an 

issue not before the Court. See Crofts v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Game & Fish, 2016 WY 4, 

¶ 27, 367 P.3d 619, 626 (Wyo. 2016) (“In order to establish a procedural due process claim, 

[a litigant] must first demonstrate that she possessed a property or liberty interest.”). 

Instead, our four-part test from Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974),

determines whether a party has standing.

First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing 

and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or 

interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the 

judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished 

from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 

administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, 

it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which 

will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or 

decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal 

relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, 

wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public 

moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. 

Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in 

character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with 

sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and 

analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking these 

elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly 

before the courts for solution. 

Allred v. Bebout, 2018 WY 8, ¶ 37, 409 P.3d 260, 270 (Wyo. 2018). 

[¶9] Here, the Fair Board has an existing or genuine right at stake because resolution of 

this action will determine whether it continues to exist. The Fair Board has a genuine 

interest in its existence, regardless of whether it or any of its members might suffer financial 

harm by its dissolution. A judgment declaring whether the Commissioners have authority 

to dissolve the Fair Board will effectively operate on that interest and have the force and 
4

effect of law because it will finally determine the legal status of the Fair Board. Finally, 

the parties’ divergent positions and arguments convince us that this proceeding is genuinely 

adverse in character. This controversy satisfies the Brimmer test. 

II. The Commissioners do not have the implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board 

in these circumstances

[¶10] The district court concluded that the Commissioners “possess the implied power to 

dissolve a board that they were granted the power to create,” citing “their express power to 

create the Board in the first instance” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101(a)(iii). On appeal, 

the Fair Board argues the district court’s conclusion is contrary to the plain language of 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-9-101 and 102. Section 18-9-101 states:

(a) Each board of county commissioners may:

(i) Acquire lands and other property for fairgrounds, 

airports, parks and pleasure grounds;

(ii) Construct, maintain and operate a public 

auditorium, athletic fields, civic center or other 

community building, which may be designated as a 

memorial to the war veterans of the United States of 

America; 

(iii) Appoint a board of trustees to control, maintain 

and manage the fairgrounds, airports, parks and 

pleasure grounds and to conduct agricultural, industrial 

and other fairs and exhibitions; 

(iv) Levy taxes, issue bonds or incur indebtedness as 

then authorized by law for other county purposes. The 

taxes shall be levied and collected as are other county 

taxes and the taxes collected, together with other monies 

received shall be expended as authorized under this 

section. Monies in the fund shall be expended only by 

the board of trustees. 

. . . . 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101 (LexisNexis 2019). The following section, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 18-9-102, states in pertinent part: 

(a) The board of trustees provided by W.S. 18-9-101(a)(iii) 

shall be composed of not less than five (5) nor more than nine 
5

(9) competent citizens of the county appointed by the board of 

county commissioners. Trustees shall serve five (5) year terms 

which shall be staggered. The board of county commissioners 

shall annually appoint a successor to the trustee whose term 

expires. . . . 

(b) As soon as the original board has been appointed they 

shall organize by electing a chairman, secretary and treasurer 

of the board. As soon as they organize they shall file without 

fee a certificate showing their organization with the county 

clerk and the secretary of state. Upon filing the certificate the 

board of trustees is a body corporate, empowered to sue and be 

sued . . . . 

(c) No member of the board of trustees shall be personally 

liable for any action or procedure of the board. The board has 

perpetual existence and it is not necessary to file any certificate 

other than that filed upon the original organization. 

(d) Each year when a new member of the board is appointed 

the trustees shall meet and again organize by electing a 

chairman, secretary and treasurer. Each member of the board 

shall serve without compensation . . . .

[¶11] The parties agree these statutes give the Commissioners the express authority to 

create a Fair Board; they have conflicting views on whether the law also provides the 

implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board. The issue is subject to our general rules of 

statutory interpretation: 

[O]ur goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and 

we “attempt to determine the legislature’s intent based 

primarily on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used 

in the statute.” Where legislative intent is discernible a court 

should give effect to the “most likely, most reasonable, 

interpretation of the statute, given its design and purpose.”

We therefore construe each statutory provision in pari 

materia, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence 

according to their arrangement and connection. To ascertain 

the meaning of a given law, we also consider all statutes 

relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose 

and strive to interpret them harmoniously. We presume that 

the legislature has acted in a thoughtful and rational manner 
6

with full knowledge of existing law, and that it intended new 

statutory provisions to be read in harmony with existing law 

and as part of an overall and uniform system of jurisprudence. 

When the words used convey a specific and obvious meaning, 

we need not go farther and engage in statutory construction. 

Herrick v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 118, ¶ 20, 452 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Wyo. 

2019) (quoting Wyo. Jet Ctr., LLC v. Jackson Hole Airport Bd., 2019 WY 6, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 

910, 915 (Wyo. 2019)). 

[¶12] The role of the county in the administration of state government also guides our 

analysis. “A county is a political subdivision of the state, created to aid in the 

administration of government.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs for Sublette Cty. v. Exxon Mobil 

Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d 714, 721 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Dunnegan v. Laramie 

Cty. Comm’rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Wyo. 1993); accord Laramie Cty. Comm’rs v. Albany 

Cty. Comm’rs, 92 U.S. 307, 308-312, 23 L.Ed. 552 (1875) (explaining that counties, cities, 

and towns “are but subdivisions of the State, deriving even their existence from the 

legislature”); Carter v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Laramie Cty., 518 P.2d 142, 144 (Wyo. 

1974) (“[T]he legislature may delegate a part of its power over local subjects to municipal 

corporations, county boards, and other public bodies . . . for the purpose of local selfgovernment.”) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Mem’l Hosp. of Sheridan Cty. v. Pratt, 262 P.2d 682, 

687 (Wyo. 1953)). Accordingly, counties “have no sovereignty independent from that of 

the state, and the only power available to them is the power that has been delegated to them 

by the state.” Seherr-Thoss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2014 WY 82, ¶ 24, 329 

P.3d 936, 946 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting Ahearn v. Town of Wheatland, 2002 WY 12, ¶ 14, 39 

P.3d 409, 416 (Wyo. 2002)). “As an arm of the state, the county has only those powers 

expressly granted by the constitution or statutory law or reasonably implied from powers 

granted.” Ford v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Converse Cty., 924 P.2d 91, 95 (Wyo. 1996) 

(quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Laramie Cty. v. Dunnegan, 884 P.2d 35, 40 (Wyo. 1994)). 

Specifically, those powers include: 

First, those granted by express words; second, those 

necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers 

expressly granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment 

of the declared objects and purposes not simply convenient, but 

indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt 

concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts 

against the [county], and the power is denied. Dillon on 

Municipal Corp., 5th ed., [§ 237.] The rule of strict 

construction does not apply to the mode adopted by the 

[county] to carry into effect powers expressly or plainly 

granted, where the mode is not limited or prescribed by the 

legislature, and is left to the discretion of the [county] 
7

authorities. In such a case the usual test of validity of the act 

of a [county] is whether it is reasonable. Id. § 239. 

Schoeller v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Park Cty., 568 P.2d 869, 876 (Wyo. 1977) (quotation 

marks omitted). We have also stated that “the powers of a county are usually more 

restricted than those of a municipal corporation.” Vandehei Developers v. Public Serv. 

Comm’n of Wyo., 790 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 875). 

[¶13] The plain language of section 101(a)(iii) grants the Commissioners authority to 

create a board of trustees with the power “to control, maintain and manage the fairgrounds” 

and “to conduct . . . fairs[.]” See Anderson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Teton Cty., 2009 WY 

122, ¶ 22, 217 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo. 2009) (“[T]he permissive word ‘may’ authorizes the 

specified action, but does not require it.”). The Fair Board claims the language in section 

102(c) stating that the “board has perpetual existence” expressly prohibits the 

Commissioners from dissolving the Fair Board. Read in context, however, that section 

merely excuses the Fair Board from filing requirements typically imposed on Wyoming 

corporations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-102(b) (“Upon filing the certificate the board of 

trustees is a body corporate.”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-102(c) (“The board has perpetual 

existence and it is not necessary to file any certificate other than that filed upon the original 

organization.”) (emphasis added). Neither section 101 nor section 102 provide the 

Commissioners express authority to dissolve the Fair Board. Thus, the issue is whether the 

power to dissolve the Fair Board can be “necessarily or fairly implied in” the 

Commissioners’ permissive authority to establish it. 

[¶14] In concluding that section 18-9-101(a)(iii) granted the Commissioners implied 

authority to dissolve the Fair Board, the district court reasoned: 

The County Commissioners possess the implied power 

to dissolve a board that they were granted the power to create. 

This is necessarily and fairly implied from, and incident to, 

their express power to create the Board in the first instance. 

W.S. § 18-9-101(a)(iii). In addition, the entire section read as 

a whole evidences the legislature’s intent to grant broad 

authority to the Commission to create, fund, and manage fair 

and other recreational resources. The County Commissioners 

are responsible for, and must approve, acquisitions of land and 

are empowered to establish and collect taxes through mil levy 

to fund those responsibilities.

One of the ways, though not the only way, a county can 

carry out those functions is to create a Fair Board, though they 

are not required to do so. The Fair Board being a mechanism 

available to the Commission, it is a reasonable reading of the 

statute that it is essential they have the authority to dissolve 
8

that mechanism and continue to meet their obligations by other 

means. 

(Emphasis added.) 

[¶15] The district court relied on State ex rel. Wyoming Agr. Coll. v. Irvine, 84 P. 90 (Wyo. 

1906) and Wright v. City of Florence, 93 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1956) for its conclusion that the 

Commissioners “possess the implied power to dissolve a board that they were granted the 

power to create.” But both of those cases pertain to bodies with broader authority than 

counties have been granted. In Irvine, we considered the legislature’s authority to dissolve 

an institution that it had created and held: “Having all the power that exists anywhere to 

establish an institution, [the legislature] necessarily has the power to dissolve it, unless the 

doing so involves the violation of some constitutional provision.” 84 P. at 107. Irvine’s 

holding does not apply here because this case does not concern the legislature’s authority 

to dissolve a legislatively created institution. Irvine relied heavily on the principle that, 

subject to constitutional limitations, “the power of the Legislature over [public institutions] 

is unrestrained, and its authority supreme,” stating: 

The Legislature is vested with all legislative powers of the 

state; it may do anything within the domain of legislation 

which is not repugnant to the state or federal Constitutions; and 

constitutional restrictions upon the Legislature are not to be 

enlarged by construction beyond their terms. Moreover, the 

power of establishing public institutions is by the Constitution 

expressly vested in the Legislature. 

Id. at 106. The same is not true of counties. As noted, counties “are purely auxiliaries of 

the state . . . and the statutes confer upon them all the powers they possess[.]” State ex rel. 

Bd. of Comm’rs of Goshen Cty. v. Snyder, 212 P. 771, 781 (Wyo. 1923). In contrast to the 

legislature, counties 

are governments of enumerated powers, acting by delegated 

authority, so that while the State legislature may exercise such 

powers of government coming within a proper designation of 

legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly prohibited, 

the local authorities can exercise only those which are 

expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such 

regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant.

Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 876 (citing Lakota Oil & Gas Co. v. City of Casper, 116 P.2d 861 

(Wyo. 1941)). Thus, Irvine is not relevant to the scope of a county’s more limited authority. 

[¶16] Likewise, Wright does not discuss the scope of a county’s statutorily delegated 

authority. Instead, it considered a municipality’s authority to repeal an ordinance that it 
9

had enacted. Wright, 93 S.E.2d at 216. The Court’s analysis was guided by the statute 

granting the municipality authority to adopt the ordinance at issue, which stated its intent 

“to extend and enlarge the powers of such municipalities[.]” Id. No such language exists 

in the statute at issue here. Moreover, we have explained that “the powers of a county are 

usually more restricted than those of a municipal corporation,” Vandehei Developers, 790 

P.2d at 1286, which is particularly true in relation to a municipality’s broad local “police 

powers” exercised via municipal ordinance. See Dunnegan, 852 P.2d at 1142 (“The county 

enforces state statutes and laws. It does not enact laws. A municipality may, on the other 

hand, enact ordinances with criminal penalties which it enforces through its police 

departments and municipal courts.”); see also Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Local 

Government Law § 6 Distinction Between Public (or Municipal) Corporations and Public 

Quasi-Corporations, at 19-20 (2d. ed. 2001) (explaining that municipalities typically have 

broader powers of local government than counties); E. George Rudolph, Wyoming Local 

Government Law § 4.1, at 119 (1985) (describing municipalities’ very broad “police power 

. . . to adopt and enforce regulatory ordinances”). 

[¶17] Another case relied on by the Commissioners in this appeal is no more persuasive. 

In Mariano & Assoc., P.C. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of the Cty. of Sublette, 737 P.2d 323, 

329 (Wyo. 1987), we stated that “a board, officer or governing body should not contract 

away either the discretion of future decision makers or more importantly the fiscal welfare 

of the citizens that they were elected or appointed to serve.” The Commissioners rely on 

this statement for the proposition that a board of county commissioners should not be 

“bound by the legislative or policy decisions of its predecessors.” However, Mariano 

concerned whether “a contract with a governmental entity which extends beyond the 

contracting official’s term of office” was voidable by subsequent officials. Id. at 324. We 

are not confronted with the question of whether the Commissioners have had their 

discretion contracted away by previous county officials. Instead, our task is to determine 

what discretion to dissolve the Fair Board, if any, the legislature has granted the 

Commissioners. 

[¶18] The district court concluded that appointment of a board of trustees is merely one

way in which the Commissioners can conduct a county fair. The plain language of section 

18-9-101 leads to the opposite conclusion: appointment of a board of trustees is the only 

way in which the Commissioners can conduct a county fair. Section 101 authorizes the 

Commissioners to “[a]cquire lands and other property for fairgrounds”; “[c]onstruct, 

maintain and operate” various recreational structures; and raise funds to be expended as 

statutorily authorized for operation of the fair. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101(a)(i)-(iv). The 

legislature vested the authority “to control, maintain and manage the fairgrounds . . . and 

to conduct agricultural, industrial and other fairs and exhibitions” in the board of trustees.1

 

1 The legislature similarly vests authority to manage and control county hospitals in boards of trustees. 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-104 (LexisNexis 2019); see also Pratt, 262 P.2d at 688 (“[T]he management of the 

[county] hospital is in the hands of the board, and the county, as such, plays but a minor part in that 
10

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101(a)(iii)-(iv). The legislature has identified a board of trustees 

as the means by which a county must conduct a county fair.2 It is true that the 

Commissioners are not required to appoint a board of trustees (just as they are not required 

to acquire fairgrounds, construct and maintain recreational structures, or raise money or 

incur indebtedness for the fair). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101(a)(iii) (“Each board of county 

commissioners may . . . [a]ppoint a board of trustees.”) (emphasis added). But if the 

Commissioners exercise that permissive authority by choosing not to appoint a board of 

trustees, no entity with authority to conduct the county fair exists. 

[¶19] The Commissioners’ Resolution clearly contemplates that the county fair will

continue without a board of trustees. See, e.g., Resolution at ¶ II (stating that the newly 

created Events Department would be responsible for “the operations and carrying forward 

of the Laramie County Fair”).3

 Although we appreciate the Commissioners’ desire to 

consolidate and streamline management of county recreational activities, the legislature 

has identified the means by which a county must conduct a county fair, and deviation from 

that procedure is beyond its authority. Schoeller, 568 P.2d at 877 (“When the statutory 

delegation of power to a local government entity specifies a procedure to be followed in 

the exercise of that power, the procedure becomes a condition of and restriction upon the 

grant.”). The rules of statutory construction, along with the restrictive approach our 

precedent takes to county powers, compel the conclusion that the Commissioners lack the 

implied authority to dissolve the Fair Board under these circumstances.4

 

[¶20] Having concluded that the Commissioners did not have authority to dissolve the 

Fair Board, we must also conclude that the district court erred in holding that the Fair Board 

connection.”). The Fair Board argues that the statutory section in the chapter governing memorial hospitals 

entitled “Dissolution,” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-109, and the lack of a similar “Dissolution” section in the 

chapter governing fairgrounds, evidences “that the legislature did not intend for the boards of county 

commissioners to dissolve the county fair boards of trustees once created.” This argument ignores that 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-8-109 does not concern a board of county commissioners’ authority to dissolve the 

board of trustees of a county hospital. Instead, it grants the board of trustees authority to dissolve the 

hospital itself, subject to approval by the commissioners. Id. (“[T]he trustees of a memorial hospital may 

vote to dissolve and terminate the county memorial hospital.”). 

2 Prior to 1977, the statutes authorized county commissioners to maintain, manage and conduct fairs. See

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 26-801 (1951); 1915 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 54, § 1, at 45. When the legislature recodified statutes relating to counties in 1977, see generally 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws, pp. 294-399, county 

commissioners retained their authority to acquire lands for fairgrounds, but the legislature removed the 

commissioners’ prior express authority to “maintain, manage and conduct agricultural, industrial and other 

fairs.” Compare 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 388 (current version at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-101 (2019))

(granting no such authority) with Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 26-801 (1951) (granting such authority), and 1915 

Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 54, § 1, at 45 (same). 3 The Events Department is not a board of trustees and operates “under the direct supervision of the Laramie 

County Commissioners.” See Resolution at I. Further, the newly appointed “Laramie County Events 

Advisory Board” functions only in “an advisory capacity.” Id. at VI. 

4 We do not decide whether the Commissioners have authority to dissolve the Fair Board in the event they 

choose to discontinue the county fair.
11

lacked standing to challenge the reallocation of tax money originally collected for the Fair 

Board’s use. The district court reasoned that the Fair Board lacked standing to seek 

declaratory relief on this issue because it had been dissolved. However, the Commissioners 

lacked authority to dissolve the Fair Board, and their Resolution is void. Crouthamel v. 

Bd. of Albany Cty. Comm’rs, 951 P.2d 835, 839 (Wyo. 1998) (holding county board’s 

“[f]ailure to follow the statutory requirements in adopting a freeze resolution results in a 

void, or invalid, freeze resolution”); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, Carbon Cty. v. White, 547 P.2d 

1195, 1200 (Wyo. 1976) (holding county agreements purporting to vacate established

county road by methods other than those provided by statute null and void); accord 20 

C.J.S. Counties § 106 (Feb. 2020 Update) (“Acts done outside the authority of the county 

board are void.”); 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 179 (Feb. 2020 Update) 

(“any act by a county in excess of [its] authority . . . is null and void as an ultra vires act”). 

Thus, the Fair Board was not dissolved, and it has standing to challenge the use of tax 

money to which it was assertedly entitled. Because the district court found the Fair Board 

lacked standing, it made no findings on the allocation of tax money. We remand for further 

proceedings.5

[¶21] Reversed and remanded. 

5 The Commissioners filed a “Motion Suggesting Mootness” with this Court, asserting this issue is moot 

because “[a]ll current funds arguably collected for the benefit of the fair have been expended on the fair.” 

The record does not contain the facts necessary for us to make that determination.