PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________________

KIMBERLY GRAHAM,

 Petitioner - Appellee, 

v.

TAMIKA WHITE, Warden, 

 Respondent - Appellant.

No. 23-5069

__________________________________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

(D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00164-CVE-SH)

_________________________________

Jennifer L. Crabb, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 

General for the State of Oklahoma (Gentner F. Drummond, Attorney 

General for the State of Oklahoma, with her on the briefs), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Respondent-Appellant. 

T. Richard O’Carroll, O’Carroll & O’Carroll, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Petitioner-Appellee.

_________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.

_________________________________

This appeal addresses due process when a state district court

modifies an order after the controlling precedent changes. Here a state 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

May 17, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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district court relied on existing precedent to vacate a defendant’s 

convictions. But the state appellate court then overruled that precedent. 

With this change in precedent, could the state district court modify its 

prior ruling and reinstate the convictions without violating the defendant’s 

right to due process? The state appeals court answered yes, but the federal 

district court answered no and granted habeas relief to the defendant. 

We reverse the grant of habeas relief. Regardless of whether the state 

appeals court had erred, its rejection of the due process claim was at least 

reasonable based on the facts and Supreme Court precedent.

Background

1. The state district court vacates the defendant’s convictions based 

on existing precedent.

This appeal grew out of Ms. Kimberly Graham’s state convictions for 

committing first-degree manslaughter and leaving the scene of a fatal 

accident. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 711; Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 10-102.1. 

After the convictions became final, Ms. Graham applied for postconviction relief on grounds that she was a Native American and the events 

took place on a reservation. While this application was pending, the 

Supreme Court held in McGirt v. Oklahoma that

• Congress had not disestablished the reservation and 

• the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 

committed by Native Americans within this reservation.

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140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020). 1

But did McGirt apply to defendants (like Ms. Graham), whose 

convictions had already become final? The Oklahoma Court of Criminal

Appeals initially answered yes in Bosse v. State, 484 P.3d 286 (Okla. Crim. 

App. 2021). The day after Bosse took effect, 2 the state district court 

granted post-conviction relief to Ms. Graham and vacated her convictions.

2. The state district court reinstates the convictions after the state 

appeals court changes its precedent.

The next day, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recalled its 

mandate in Bosse. Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 90–91. Despite recall of the 

Bosse mandate, the State declined to appeal the vacatur of Ms. Graham’s 

convictions. After the appeal deadline expired, the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals overruled Bosse and decided that McGirt didn’t apply 

1 First-degree manslaughter is punishable in federal court under the 

Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). See United States v. Budder, 76 

F.4th 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 2023) (“Under the Major Crimes Act, 18 

U.S.C. § 1153, . . . manslaughter allegedly committed by an Indian in 

Indian country (which includes Indian reservations . . .) in Oklahoma must 

be tried in federal court rather than state or tribal court.”). The charge of 

leaving the scene of a fatal accident is punishable in federal court under 

the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, and the Indian Country 

Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. See United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 

1195, 1196–97 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that state crimes committed in 

Indian country are assimilated into federal law). 

2 The court’s opinion could be used as authority upon issuance of the 

mandate or placement of the court’s seal upon filing with the clerk. Okla. 

Crim. App. R. 3.13(B). The mandate in Bosse was issued on April 7, 2021. 

See Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 88. 

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retroactively to convictions that had become final. State ex rel. Matloff v. 

Wallace, 497 P.3d 686, 689 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021). 3

Given the new decision, could the state district court modify its initial 

order and reinstate Ms. Graham’s convictions? The State thought so and 

asked the state district court to

• rescind the initial order (vacating the convictions) and 

• reinstate the convictions.

Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 150–60. The state district court granted these 

requests. Id. at 82–85. 

With the convictions reinstated, Ms. Graham asked the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of prohibition, arguing that a liberty 

interest had arisen from the order vacating her convictions. Id. at 80; see 

Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[A] liberty 

3 After deciding Matloff, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals abrogated its 

prior opinion in Bosse and upheld the denial of post-conviction relief

because McGirt no longer applied retroactively. Bosse v. State, 499 P.3d 

771, 774–75 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021).

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interest inherent in the Due Process Clause arises upon an inmate’s release 

from confinement.”). The resulting question was whether the State could 

deprive her of that liberty interest based on the state appellate court’s 

change in precedent. Ms. Graham urged the state appeals court to answer 

no, arguing that reinstatement of her convictions would arbitrarily deprive 

her of a liberty interest. 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with Ms. Graham

and denied her request for a writ of prohibition. Graham v. Priddy, No. 

PR-2021-1332, slip op. at 4 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2023) 

(unpublished). In denying the request, the court reasoned that 

• the new precedent had prevented application of McGirt to 

convictions that had already become final and

• the initial order (vacating the convictions) had been 

“unauthorized under Oklahoma law.”

Id. at 3–4.

3. The federal district court concludes that reinstatement of 

Ms. Graham’s convictions was an arbitrary deprivation of her 

liberty interest.

Ms. Graham sought habeas relief, claiming that 

• the initial order (vacating the convictions) had created a liberty 

interest and

• the reinstatement of her convictions had arbitrarily stripped her 

of that liberty interest.

The federal district court agreed with Ms. Graham and granted habeas 

relief. The State appeals, arguing that

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• habeas relief isn’t available because the alleged defects involve 

only state law and post-conviction procedures and 

• the federal district court should have deferred to the state 

appeals court because it had acted reasonably.

We reject the State’s arguments about the availability of a habeas 

claim. Ms. Graham is asserting federal claims, not state-law claims, and 

she’s challenging the reinstatement of her convictions rather than defects 

in post-conviction procedures. But we agree with the State on the 

reasonableness of the state appellate court’s decision. Because that 

decision rested on a reasonable application of the facts and Supreme Court 

holdings, the federal district court should have deferred to the state appeals 

court. With that deference, we reverse the grant of habeas relief.

Availability of Habeas Relief

The State argues that Ms. Graham couldn’t obtain habeas relief even 

if she were right on the merits because the claim involves only a violation 

of state law and misapplication of post-conviction procedures. We disagree 

with the State. 

1. Ms. Graham alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

not just state law.

Habeas relief is available for a violation of the federal constitution, 

but not for a violation of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 

(1991). The State points out that Ms. Graham alleges a misapplication of 

Oklahoma law. If Ms. Graham had stopped there, her claim wouldn’t 

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support habeas relief. But Ms. Graham also alleges a denial of due process 

from the misapplication of state law. These allegations involve a violation 

of not only state law but also the federal constitution.

Granted, the theories involving state law and the federal constitution 

are intertwined. But “in rare circumstances, a determination of state law 

can be so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due 

process violation.” Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1237 (10th Cir. 

2007) (alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 

497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)).

Ms. Graham not only labels her claim as constitutional, but also 

alleges that it was arbitrary for the state court to jettison the initial order 

(vacating the convictions). Though this allegation turns on an antecedent 

question of state law, an arbitrary application of state law could impinge 

on the right to due process. See id. So the claim isn’t confined to a 

violation of state law.

2. The claim involves a challenge to convictions rather than postconviction procedures.

Habeas corpus generally involves challenges to the fact or duration 

of confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973); McIntosh 

v. U. S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997). These 

challenges typically involve defects in the underlying conviction.

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From time to time, however, prisoners seek habeas relief based on 

perceived errors in a state’s corrective processes. Many states, like 

Oklahoma, provide post-conviction remedies even though they’re not 

constitutionally required. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556–

57 (1987) (concluding that states have no constitutional obligation to 

provide post-conviction relief). Given the availability of these remedies, a 

defendant might seek habeas relief based on a state court’s errors in the

post-conviction proceedings. But habeas relief is unavailable when the 

error involves only the post-conviction procedures rather than the

imposition of the conviction or sentence. See Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 

1333, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause the constitutional error [the 

petitioner] raises focuses only on the State’s post-conviction remedy and 

not the judgment which provides the basis for his incarceration, it states no 

cognizable federal habeas claim.”).

The State characterizes Ms. Graham’s claim as a challenge to postconviction procedures. But Ms. Graham isn’t complaining about those 

procedures. She is instead complaining about the reinstatement of her 

convictions through the state district court’s grant of post-conviction relief 

to the State. 

Typically, a conviction comes after a trial or guilty plea. Here the 

convictions were reinstated through post-conviction relief to the State. But 

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the impact on Ms. Graham was the same. With the convictions reinstated, 

Ms. Graham could seek habeas relief just like any other prisoner. 4

Error in Granting Habeas Relief

Though a writ of habeas corpus could be available for a 

constitutional violation, we must determine whether the federal district 

court was correct in issuing the writ. In issuing the writ, the court 

concluded that it could decide in the first instance whether reinstatement of 

the convictions had violated the Constitution. The State argues that the 

federal district court should have deferred to the state appeals court’s 

conclusions. We agree with the State. 

1. Federal law restricts the availability of habeas relief when the 

state appeals court rejects a constitutional claim on the merits.

If a state appeals court has not ruled on the merits of a constitutional 

claim, a federal district court must conduct de novo review over the claim. 

Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 303 (2013). Ms. Graham thus urges 

de novo review, contending that the state appeals court never grappled with 

the constitutional aspect of her claim. We disagree.

4 In its reply brief, the State argues that Ms. Graham is challenging 

only the process for reinstating her judgment. But Ms. Graham challenges 

reinstatement of the judgment itself as arbitrary. 

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As noted above, Ms. Graham’s constitutional claim is intertwined 

with a state-law claim: In the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, 

Ms. Graham alleged a deprivation of due process involving

• “a liberty interest protected by a clear, specific, and exclusive 

method under Oklahoma law for the State to seek relief from 

the district court’s order freeing her” and 

• “a substantial and legitimate expectation [that the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals] will follow its own rules and laws.” 

Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 80. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

rejected these allegations. But the court’s opinion didn’t refer to the 

Constitution or the right to due process. We thus consider whether the state 

appeals court overlooked the constitutional aspect of Ms. Graham’s claim.

In answering that question, we generally presume that the state 

appeals court considered the constitutional claim. Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). The petitioner can rebut that presumption by 

showing that some other explanation was more likely. Id. at 99–100. But 

the petitioner can’t satisfy that burden by pointing to 

• an ambiguity in the state appeals court’s opinion or 

• the state appeals court’s failure to mention the federal basis of 

her claim. 

See Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896, 925–26 (10th Cir. 2017) (ambiguity); 

Fairchild v. Trammell, 784 F.3d 702, 712 (10th Cir. 2015) (failure to 

mention the federal basis of the claim). To the contrary, the petitioner must 

rebut the presumption with evidence that “very clearly” shows the state 

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appeals court’s failure to consider the constitutional claim. Johnson v. 

Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 303 (2013).

At most, an ambiguity existed in the state appeals court’s opinion. 

Ms. Graham had based her constitutional claim on the finality of her relief 

when the State failed to appeal. Appellant’s App’x vol. 1, at 80. The 

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected that claim, reasoning that 

Oklahoma law allowed reinstatement of the convictions even though the 

State hadn’t appealed. Graham v. Priddy, No. PR-2021-1332, slip op. at 3–

4 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2023) (unpublished). 

Ms. Graham points out that this reasoning didn’t refer to the 

Constitution or due process. But Ms. Graham premised her constitutional 

claim on the state court’s inability to modify its earlier order (vacating the 

convictions) based on a subsequent change in the law. The state appeals 

court rejected that premise without referring to the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. By rejecting the premise, the court 

presumably rejected the entirety of the constitutional claim. See Bell v. 

Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the petitioner 

didn’t rebut the presumption when the state-law claim had been intertwined 

with a constitutional claim).

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2. The state appeals court didn’t unreasonably apply the facts or a 

Supreme Court holding.

Because the state appeals court presumptively rejected the 

constitutional claim on the merits, the federal district court couldn’t 

consider granting habeas relief unless the state appeals court had acted 

unreasonably in determining the facts or in applying a Supreme Court

holding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Ms. Graham argues that the state appeals 

court acted unreasonably in both ways. 

a. The state appeals court didn’t unreasonably determine the 

facts. 

In rejecting Ms. Graham’s claim, the state appeals court said that the 

initial order (vacating the convictions) had been “unauthorized under 

Oklahoma law.” Graham v. Priddy, No. PR-2021-1332, slip op. at 4 (Okla. 

Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2023) (unpublished). This statement led to different 

interpretations of the phrase unauthorized under Oklahoma law. 

Ms. Graham has argued that this language reflects a factual mistake about 

the timing of the mandate in Bosse, and the federal district court credited 

this argument when declining to stay its grant of habeas relief. 5

For this ruling, we conduct de novo review. Byrd v. Workman, 645 

F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2011). For purposes of that review, Ms. Graham

5 The State did not appeal the denial of a stay. But Ms. Graham 

continues to argue that the state appeals court made an unreasonable 

determination of fact. 

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bears the burden to show that the state appeals court based its decision on 

an unreasonable determination of fact. Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 

1002, 1012 (10th Cir. 2015). That burden is “‘daunting’” and “will be 

satisfied in relatively few cases.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Taylor 

v. Maddux, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)).

To determine whether Ms. Graham has satisfied this burden, we 

consider “the context and language” in the state appellate opinion. 

Hancock, 798 F.3d at 1012. The context involved a disagreement over the 

state court’s power to modify the initial order (vacating the convictions) 

based on a later change in precedent. Given that context, the state appeals 

court’s phrase (unauthorized under Oklahoma law) was ambiguous. 

This phrase could refer to the timing of the mandate in Bosse. That 

mandate was in place when the state district court vacated Ms. Graham’s 

convictions. The vacatur of the convictions was thus arguably valid under

Oklahoma law in effect at the time. So the state appeals court’s statement 

(that the vacatur was “unauthorized under Oklahoma law”) could reflect a 

factual mistake about the timing of the mandate in Bosse.

But that’s not necessarily what the state appeals court meant. The 

court might have been referring to its later conclusion that Bosse had been 

incorrectly decided. See State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686, 694 

(Okla. Crim. App. 2021). After all, the state appeals court ultimately 

concluded that the state district court could modify an order based on a 

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subsequent change in case law. Graham v. Priddy, No. PR-2021-1332, slip 

op. at 3–4 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2023) (unpublished). So the term

Oklahoma law (in the phrase unauthorized under Oklahoma law), might 

have referred to the new opinion overruling Bosse (Matloff). Under this 

interpretation, the state appeals court made a legal determination rather 

than a factual mistake.

Given the ambiguity of the state appellate opinion, Ms. Graham has 

not satisfied her burden to establish an unreasonable determination of fact. 

See Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1012–16 (10th Cir. 2015)

(concluding that the petitioner hadn’t satisfied his burden to show an 

unreasonable determination of fact given the ambiguity in the state appeals 

court’s opinion). 

b. The state appellate court didn’t unreasonably apply a 

Supreme Court holding. 

Because Ms. Graham didn’t satisfy that burden, we must defer to the 

state appellate court unless it had unreasonably applied a Supreme Court 

holding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We gauge reasonableness based on 

the specificity of the Supreme Court rule. Andrew v. White, 62 F.4th 1299, 

1311 (10th Cir. 2023). The more general the Supreme Court’s rule, the 

greater the leeway afforded the state appeals court. Id. Even with a specific 

rule, however, we regard a state appeals court’s conclusion as unreasonable 

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“only if ‘every fairminded jurist’ would ‘reach a different conclusion.’” Id. 

(quoting Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 144 (2022)). 

For this argument, Ms. Graham relies on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 

U.S. 343 (1980). Hicks applied a general rule on the arbitrariness of a state 

court’s decision. So we afford leeway to the state appeals court on how it 

applied this rule.

In Hicks, an Oklahoma trial court had imposed a mandatory minimum 

sentence of 40 years; and the state appeals court concluded that the trial 

court shouldn’t have applied the mandatory minimum of 40 years. Id. at 

345. But the state appeals court affirmed the sentence anyway, reasoning 

that the jury might have chosen to impose a sentence of 40 years. Id.

The United States Supreme Court reversed because the state appeals 

court had allowed the imposition of a 40-year sentence without a jury 

deciding that this sentence would have been appropriate. Id. at 346–47. 

The Supreme Court concluded that this outcome was arbitrary because state 

law “ha[d] provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the 

discretion of the trial jury.” Id. at 346. Given the state-law right for a jury 

to determine the sentence, the Court reasoned that the state appeals court’s 

affirmance had arbitrarily disturbed the defendant’s expectation that a jury 

would select the sentence. Id. 

Here we’re not addressing the arbitrary deprivation of a state-law 

right (like the one in Hicks); we’re instead addressing whether the 

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Constitution prevents a state court from applying its own law to modify an 

order after the appeal deadline expired. Neither the Supreme Court nor our 

court has ever applied Hicks in a similar situation. See, e.g., Ross v. 

Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 90–91 (1988) (concluding that Hicks doesn’t 

support a claim involving due process because the petitioner “received all 

that Oklahoma allowed him”); Johnston v. Luebbers, 288 F.3d 1048, 1053 

n.3 (8th Cir. 2002) (concluding that Hicks doesn’t support habeas relief

because the state supreme court concluded that the ruling hadn’t violated 

state law). 

The state appeals court concluded that Oklahoma law allowed a trial 

court to modify an order when it had stemmed from a precedent later 

abrogated. Graham v. Priddy, No. PR-2021-1332, slip op. at 3 (Okla. Crim. 

App. Apr. 18, 2023) (unpublished). For this conclusion, the court relied on 

In re Application of Anderson, 803 P.2d 1160, 1162–63 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1990) and Harris v. Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cnty., 750 P.2d 1129, 1130–31 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 

In both cases, an Oklahoma district court ordered release of a 

defendant and the State sought to vacate the release order. Harris, 750 

P.2d at 1130–31; In re Application of Anderson, 803 P.2d at 1162–63. In 

Harris, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the state 

district court had acted within its jurisdiction in vacating the release order. 

See Harris, 750 P.2d at 1130–31 (“If an order issued by a district court is 

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clearly erroneous under a current statute the court can modify or vacate its 

judgment.”). In Application of Anderson, a state district court reduced a 

sentence and ordered release of the defendant. 803 P.2d at 1161–62. The 

State didn’t appeal in time and failed to show a valid excuse for the delay. 

Id. Despite the State’s failure to timely appeal, the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals reinstated the original sentence, reasoning that the state 

district court had lacked authority to reduce the sentence. Id. at 1163. 

The state appeals court applied these precedents here, concluding 

that they had allowed the state district court to modify its initial order

(vacating Ms. Graham’s convictions). Graham v. Priddy, No. PR-2021-

1332, slip op. at 3–4 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 18, 2023) (unpublished). We

generally lack authority to question the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 

Appeals’s determination of the trial court’s authority under Oklahoma law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991). 6

6 Granting habeas relief, the federal district court criticized the state 

appeals court for misapplying its own laws:

• “[T]he [Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals] arbitrarily 

disregarded the crushing weight of the state law and its own 

procedural rules governing postconviction review.”

• “[S]tate law created a substantial and legitimate expectation 

that the [Tulsa County District Court’s] final judgment granting 

postconviction relief would remain final absent a timely 

postconviction appeal by the state.”

• “Bosse I was an authoritative decision on April 7, 2021, when 

the mandate issued, and the [Tulsa County District Court] could 

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A narrow exception exists, allowing a federal habeas court to 

consider whether the state court’s application of state law results in a 

denial of due process. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) 

(stating that California’s selection of an applicable rule doesn’t prevent 

consideration of a possible denial of due process from the application of 

that rule in a given case). For example, a state court’s determination of 

state law might be arbitrary or capricious enough to create a denial of due 

process. Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007).

Ms. Graham claims that the state appeals court arbitrarily deprived 

her of the liberty interest created in the initial order (vacating the 

convictions). The federal district court agreed with Ms. Graham, pointing 

to the state district court’s reliance in the initial order on precedent that 

had governed at the time (Bosse). The federal district court pointed out that 

the State’s appeal time had expired before the state appeals court abrogated 

Bosse. See State ex rel. Matloff v. Wallace, 497 P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim App. 

2021). 

rely on that decision on April 8, 2021, one day before the 

[Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals] recalled the mandate.”

Graham v. White, No. 23-CV-0164-CVE-SH, 2023 WL 4141662, at *17 

(N.D. Okla. June 22, 2023) (unpublished). But the federal district court 

elsewhere acknowledged that it couldn’t “second-guess” the Oklahoma 

Court of Criminal Appeals’s conclusion that state law had empowered the 

trial court to vacate its initial order despite the State’s failure to appeal. 

Id. at *17 n.20.

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The resulting constitutional issue is whether the state appeals court 

acted arbitrarily under Oklahoma law in allowing the state district court to

modify the initial order after the State’s appeal time had expired. 

Ms. Graham suggests that this application of state law was arbitrary. 

The Court of Criminal Appeals might or might not have been right in 

upholding the state district court’s power to reinstate the convictions. But 

at least some fair-minded jurists could reasonably credit the state appeals 

court’s application of Harris and Application of Anderson. So the state 

appeals court had leeway to reject Ms. Graham’s characterization of its 

approach as arbitrary. Given that leeway, “fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] 

Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). So 

we reverse the federal district court’s issuance of habeas relief. 7

Conclusion

The State presents two arguments for reversal of the federal district 

court’s issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. 

First, the State argues that Ms. Graham rested on state law and 

defects in post-conviction procedures. We disagree, concluding that 

Ms. Graham asserted a federal constitutional claim. 

7 The State also argues that the federal district court’s application of 

Hicks violated the retroactivity principles set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 

U.S. 288, 310 (1989). We need not address this argument because we 

reverse on other grounds.

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Second, the State argues that the state appellate court acted 

reasonably in determining the facts and applying Supreme Court holdings. 

We agree and remand with instructions to deny habeas relief.

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