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a mily ) , and C ourt2 reversed the Division Director’s Decision and vacated the withhol ding order. The Division timely appeals. 1 On appeal, we review the administrative agen cy’s decision rather than the judgment of the circuit court; however, we affirm or reve rse the circuit court’s judgment based upon our review of the admini strative decision. Schumer v. Lee , 404 S.W.3d 443, 445 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and order that th e Division Director’s Decision and the corresponding wit hholding order be reinstated. Facts and Procedural History 2 The Circuit Court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Father and Cynthia Tetzner (“Mother”) on March 5, 1984 (“Dissolution Decr ee”). Mother was awarded custody of the parties’ child born March 27, 1982; Father was ordered to pay $150 per month child support to Mother. Without obtaining a modification of legal custody, Mother relinquished physical custody of the child to Dorothy Tetzner, the ch ild’s paternal grandmot her (“Grandmother”). Grandmother raised the child and drew AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) financial assistance from the State of Missouri. On or about October 9, 1996, the Division sent a Notification to Circuit Clerk (“Notification”). The Notification identified Father as an “absent parent,” the child as being raised by a “NCPR [Non-Parent Care taker Relative],” and state fina ncial assistance in the form of AFDC benefits. The Notificat ion directed the Circuit Clerk to send child support payments to the Division.

1 Father, as the party aggrieved by the agency decision, is the Rule 84.05(e) appellant. 2 In reviewing an administrative ag ency’s decision, we look to the whole record, not merely at that evidence that supports the agency ’s decision, and we no longer view the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision. Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Comm’rs , 136 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Mo. banc 2004).3 On June 4, 1997, the Division issued an Ad ministrative Order on an Existing Order (“administrative order”). The administrative order indicated that as of May 30, 1997, Father owed $8440.21 in child support arrearages. On August 7, 2007, the Division issued a withholding order to Father’s employer to enforce the administrative order, with Grandmother as obligee. Father requested an administrative hearing, which was held on July 2, 2009. Thereafter, on August 11, 2009, the Division’s Di rector issued a Decision affirming the withholding order. Father filed a petition for review of administrative deci sion in the Circuit Court on September 22, 2009. The Circuit Court issued its judgment on June 19, 2013, reversing the Division Director’s Decision a nd vacating the withholding orde r. The Division appeals. Standard of Review In an appeal following judicial review of an agency’s administrative action, this court reviews the decision of the agen cy, not the circuit court. Lajeunesse v. State, Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Dir., Family Support Div. , 350 S.W.3d 842, 844 (Mo. App. W. D. 2011). Our scope of review is limited to whether the agency’s decision: (1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) Is in excess of the statutory auth ority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) Is unsupported by competent and subs tantial evidence upon the whole record; (4) Is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law; (5) Is made upon unlawful proced ure or without a fair trial; (6) Is arbitrary, caprici ous or unreasonable; (7) Involves an a buse of discretion.4 § 536.140.2. 3 While we defer to the agency’s findi ngs of fact, we review the agency’s interpretation, applicatio n, or conclusions of law de novo
. Lajeunesse , 350 S.W.3d at 844 (citing § 536.140.3). Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo
. Spradling v. SSM Health Care St. Louis , 313 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Mo. banc 2010). Analysis Father raises four points on appeal challe nging the Division’s authority to issue the withholding order. Father cha llenges: (1) The Divi sion’s jurisdiction to issue the withholding order; (2) the Division’s lack of authority to enforce child support ri ghts where Grandmother never acquired such rights; (3) th e Division’s lack of authority to assert rights it purportedly acquired via an alleged assignment of rights from Grandmother; and (4) the Division’s lack of authority to enforce child support rights barred by application of section 516.350.2. I. In his first point on appeal, Father argues that the Division erred in issui ng the August 7, 2007 withholding order because it was without subject matter jurisdiction to do so. “As a basic tenet of administrative law, an administrative agency has only such jurisdiction as may be gran ted by the legislature.” St. Charles Cnty. Ambulanc e Dist., Inc. v. Mo. Dep’t of Health & Senior Servs. , 248 S.W.3d 52, 54 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). “If the agency lacks statutory authority to consider a matter, it is without subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. The Division had subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because the legislature has granted it statutory authority to enforce court orders of supp ort. Section 454.505.1 provides that “if a support order has been entere d, the director shall issue an order directing any employer or

3 All statutory references are to the Revised Statut es of Missouri 2000, as updated through the 2013 Cumulative Supplement.5 other payor of the parent to withhold and pay ove r to the division . . . money due.” The child support obligor’s income is subject to such withholding on the date the obligor becomes one month delinquent in chil d support payments. § 454.505.1. At the administrative hearing to contest th e withholding order, “the certified copy of the court order and the sworn or cer tified statement of arrearages shall constitute prima facie evidence that the director’s order is valid and enforceable.” § 454.505.3. At the administrative hearing in this case, the hearing officer admitt ed into evidence the Division’s hearing packet, which included the Dissolution Decree that or dered Father to pay $1 50 per month in child support, the Division’s child suppo rt arrearage calculation summ ary, and Circuit Court payment records showing that Father paid $335.94 on Ma rch 17, 1999. Thus, the Division established its prima facie case. “If a prima facie case is established, the ob ligor may only assert mistake of fact as a defense.” Id. A “mistake of fact” is defined as “an error in the amount of the withholding or an error as to the identity of the obligor.” Id. As obligor, Father had th e burden of proof on these issues. Id. Father did not present a ny factual evidence on these issues at the administrative hearing. Thus, Father did not rebu t the Division’s prima facie case. Father contends that the Di vision did not have jurisdiction because an existing court order setting a determinable amount of child support pr ecludes the Division fr om establishing new support orders pursuant to section 454.470. Th e Division did not, however, issue an administrative order establishing child support or entering a “new ” support order. Instead, the Division’s order merely enforced the existing court order, as the Divisi on is statutorily authorized and directed to do pur suant to section 454.505.1. 4

4 Father, currently a resident of Iowa, also cites to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), which Missouri has adopted and codified in sections 454.850 to 454.997. The UIFSA does not aid Father’s6 Point I is denied. II. and III. The issues in Father’s second and thir d points are whether Grandmother properly acquired rights to be enforced by the Division an d, if not, whether any purported assignment of rights by Grandmother to the Division was a legal nul lity. Father asserts that the Division acted without authority in bringing an action in the name of the Grandmother because the Circuit Court did not enter an order directing a change in the payee from Mother to Grandmother and the Division had not acquired child sup port rights via valid assignment. The Circuit Court agreed with Father , explaining its judgment as follows: [Grandmother] is a caretaker relative that raised [the child]. Apparently, the custodial parent in the or iginal divorce judgment, [M other], relinquished custody to [Grandmother]. There is no evidence in the record to suggest this custodial transfer was done by Court order. Pu rsuant to R.S.Mo. § 454.455.3, “If an order for child support has been entered, no assignment of s upport has been made , and the legal custodian and ob ligee under the order relinquishes physical custody of the child to a caretaker relative wit hout obtaining a modification of legal custody . . . the division may, thirty days after the transfer of custody and upon notice to the obligor and obligee, direct th e obligor or other payor to change the payee to the caretaker relative or appropria te state agency.” The statute’s use of the term “direct” contemplates [an] orde r as the next sentence states, “An order changing the payee to a caretaker relativ e shall terminate when the caretaker relative no longer has physical custody of the child . . .” In the present case, no order was entered by the agency directing a change in payee from [Mother] to [Grandmother].

. . . The issue is not whether the Division ha d authority, the issue is whether the designated obligee, [Grandmother], ever pr operly acquired rights to be enforced by the Division. The Court finds that pursuant to § 454.455.3 she never properly
argument. By issuing the original child support order in the 1984 Dissolution Decree, Missouri established continuing, exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the order. State ex rel. Brantingham v. Grate , 205 S.W.3d 317, 320 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). Missouri would lose its subject matter jurisdiction over the support order only if certain criteria in section 454.867(a)(1) were met. Id. Father has not alleged, and there is no evidence in the record, that any such statutory criteria have been met. Thus, there is nothing in the UIFSA preventing the Division from enforcing the Missouri support order; instead, the UIFSA expressly authorizes the withholding order in question. § 454.932.7 acquired the rights of [Mother] to receiv e support as caretaker relative because there was no order changing the payee. (Emphasis added.) Were this a situation in which Grandmother had never applied for and received AFDC benefits from the State of Mi ssouri, the Circuit Cour t’s reliance upon section 454.455.3 would be well taken. However, wh ere, as here, the caretaker relative has applied for and received AFDC benefits, section 454.455.1 provi des the applicable st atutory link for the caretaker relative to acquire chil d support rights that are deemed to have been assigned to the Division by operation of law, § 208.040.2(2). In other words, the Circuit Court improperly concluded that “no assignment of support has been made,” whic h led to its improper reliance upon section 454.455.3, instead of section 454.455.1. Section 454.455.1 presupposes both the relinquishment of phys ical custody by the child support obligee to a non-pa rent caretaker relative and an assignment of support rights to the Division by the caretaker relative in order to receive state assistance. Section 454.455.1 provides, in pertinent part: In any case wherein an order for child support has been entered and the legal custodian and obligee pursuant to the or der relinquishes physical custody of the child to a caretaker relativ e without obtaining a modi fication of legal custody, and the caretaker relative makes an assignment of support rights to the division of family services in order to receive aid to families with dependent children benefits, the relinquishment and the assi gnment, by operation of law, shall transfer the child support obligation purs uant to the order to the division in behalf of the state
. (Emphasis added.) Here, the undisputed facts reflect that both a relinquishment of custody and an assignment of child support rights have occurred:

 Mother, as the legal custodian and child support obligee pursuant to the Dissolution Decree, relinquished physical custody of the child to Grandmother without obtaining a modification of legal custody;8  Grandmother is a careta ker relative. § 208.040.1(2);

 Grandmother applied for and received AFDC benefits from the State of Missouri;

 Grandmother’s application for AFDC constitu ted an assignment of support rights from Mother to Grandmother to th e Division, by operation of law. [E]ach applicant for or recipient of assist ance: . . . [s]hall assign to the family support division in behalf of the state any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have in the applicant’ s own behalf or in behalf of any other person for whom the applicant is appl ying for or receiving assistance. An application for benefits made under this s ection shall constitute an assignment of support rights which shall take effect, by operation of law , upon a determination that the applicant is eligible for assistance under this section. § 208.040.2(2) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to section 208.040.2(2) and section 454.455.1, Grandmother, as the caretaker relative of the child via relinquishment of custody by Mother, was entitled to seek AFDC benefits from the Stat e of Missouri and, upon doing so, by operation of law , the Division acquired the collection rights of the child support obligation set forth in the Dissolution Decree. Points II and III are denied. 5 IV. For his fourth and final point, Father assert s that the Division’s claims are barred in whole or in part because the und erlying support order is deemed sa tisfied in whole or in part by application of section 516.350. The Division responds that Father’s payment of ch ild support in March 1999 revived the child support judgment un til March 2009; therefore, the presumption of payment did not bar the Division’s withholding or der issued in June 2007. We agree with the Division.

5 The Division also argues that Fa ther does not possess standing to challenge the validity of an assignment of his child support obligations, citing State ex rel. Williams v. Williams , 647 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. App. W.D. 1983). Given our ruling today, we need not and do not address the Division’s alternative argument in defense of the propriety of the withholding order.9 Section 516.350.2 provides that periodic paymen ts of child support “shall be presumed paid and satisfied after the expi ration of ten years from the da te that periodic payment is due, unless the [child support] judgment has been othe rwise revived as set out in [section 516.350.1].” In Ferguson v. Ferguson , 636 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Mo. banc 1982), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the ten-year period of limitation starts to run separately for each periodic child support payment when it is due. Therefore, pursuant to section 516.350.1, each ti me Father failed to make a monthly child support payment after the entry of the Dissolu tion Decree in March 1984, a ten-year period of limitation for that particular payment obligati on commenced. The period of limitation for each unpaid monthly child support obligation began to e xpire in March 1994. Further, the period of limitation as to all of the periodic child support obligations expired as of March 27, 2010, ten years after the final child support payment was due, when the child was emancipated 6 when she turned eighteen on March 27, 2000, unless the Dissolution Decree wa s revived pursuant to section 516.350.1. The obligation to remit period ic child support payments ordere d by a judgment, order, or decree may be revived by the obligor’s paymen t on the judgment “duly entered upon the record thereof.” § 516.350.1. “Thus, the ten year period of limitations for each unpaid periodic child support obligation will begi n anew if . . . revival occurs befo re the original ten year period of limitations has expired.” Martin v. Martin , 334 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (M o. App. W.D. 2011). It is not disputed that Father made a child support payment “duly entered upon the record” on March 17, 1999. That payment operated to revive the Dissolution Decree for all arrearages

6 “Unless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provi ded in the judgment, provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child.” § 452.370.4. “Unless the circumstances of the child manifestly dictate otherwise and the court specifically so provides, the obligation of a parent to make child support payments shall terminate when the child: . . . [r]eac hes age eighteen . . . .” § 452.340.3(5).remaini n installm e B Dissolut i action f o expirati o § 516.35 capture t h P

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