UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4339

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CEDRICK TYLER ARMSTRONG, a/k/a Squeeze,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00450-D-1)

Submitted: June 28, 2023 Decided: August 14, 2023

Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: W. Michael Dowling, THE DOWLING FIRM PLLC, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Ashley H. Foxx, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 1 of 9
2

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Cedrick Tyler Armstrong of possession of a firearm and 

ammunition after having been convicted of a felony offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018).

1

 The district court sentenced Armstrong to 120 months’ 

imprisonment. Armstrong appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence and the admission of a statement made by Armstrong’s coconspirator. We affirm.

During the hearing on Armstrong’s motion to suppress, Investigator Todd Williams 

of the Wendell, North Carolina Police Department testified that, on October 12, 2018, he 

observed Armstrong driving a Jeep. Williams had prior knowledge from numerous prior 

interactions with Armstrong that Armstrong’s driver’s license had been indefinitely 

suspended in 2007 and had remained suspended during the eight years that Williams had 

been a police officer in Wendell. Williams had last checked Armstrong’s license status in 

June 2018. Williams testified that, upon observing Armstrong driving the Jeep, he had 

reason to believe that Armstrong was committing a traffic violation by driving without a 

valid license.

Williams observed Armstrong drive the Jeep into the driveway of a house that 

Williams had under surveillance due to reports of drug activity at that location. Williams 

1 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g) 

convictions; the new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory 

maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer 

Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-

year statutory maximum does not apply in this case, however, because Armstrong’s offense 

was committed before the June 25, 2022, amendment to the statute.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 2 of 9
3

was familiar with the occupants of the house and their vehicle. Williams observed a man 

pacing in the front yard of the house. This man was not known to Williams to be an 

occupant of the residence, and Williams had not previously seen this man at that residence. 

Williams also noted that the occupant’s vehicle was not visible, leading him to conclude 

that the occupants of the residence were not home.

As Williams continued to observe, Armstrong approached the man in the yard and

the two men entered the residence. Minutes later, Williams watched the men carry a flat 

screen television out of the house and place it in the Jeep. The men went back into the 

house. When they again emerged, Williams saw that the other man was carrying a bag or 

a bundle and that Armstrong did not appear to be carrying anything. The unknown man 

got into the driver’s seat of the Jeep, Armstrong got into the passenger seat, and the men 

drove away from the residence.

Williams had previously arrested Armstrong on robbery and drug charges, and he 

had knowledge that Armstrong had been implicated in a robbery of a house in this same 

area earlier in the year. Although Williams did not see burglary tools or any evidence that 

the men forced their way into the house, he was aware from an incident report from earlier 

that week that entry into this house could be gained by the use of a stiff card, like a credit 

card or an identification card. Williams testified that he believed the two men were 

committing a crime and, as the Jeep left the house, he followed and initiated a traffic stop.

During the traffic stop, the driver, who was identified as Michael Lee Kent, opened 

the glove compartment, and Williams observed a white powdery substance in a baggie in 

the glove compartment. When Williams inquired what it was, Armstrong denied that there 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 3 of 9
4

were drugs in the vehicle and handed the baggie to Williams. Williams field tested the 

substance, which tested positive for cocaine. Williams then informed Kent that the 

substance was positive for cocaine and asked him to step out of the vehicle. Kent initially 

started to comply, and Williams started to place handcuffs on Kent. When Armstrong 

protested, Kent resisted Williams’ efforts, put the Jeep into gear, and drove off—dragging 

Williams for 25 to 30 feet and running over Williams’ foot. Kent and Armstrong engaged 

law enforcement in a high speed chase, during which shots were fired from their vehicle at 

the pursuing officer. That officer backed off and eventually lost sight of the Jeep. The 

officers subsequently learned that Kent had been living at the house Williams had under 

surveillance and that the television and other property he removed was his.

The officers tracked Armstrong and Kent to an address in Raleigh, North Carolina, 

from which the officers recovered a firearm and ammunition matching a shell casing that 

was found along Kent and Armstrong’s flight route and a live round of ammunition that 

was found in the Jeep.

Armstrong was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition 

by a felon. He asserted that the traffic stop was unlawful and moved to suppress evidence 

discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the search of 

the house that resulted in the discovery of the firearm and ammunition. The district court 

determined that the traffic stop was valid and was supported by Williams’ reasonable 

suspicion that Armstrong had committed a traffic violation and, alternatively, by Williams’ 

reasonable suspicion that Armstrong and Kent had committed a burglary of the residence 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 4 of 9
5

from which they removed the television and other property. The court therefore denied 

Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.

On appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s 

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Sueiro, 

59 F.4th 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2023). We may find clear error “only if we are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. 

Crawford, 734 F.3d 339, 342 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, “[w]hen reviewing factual findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a 

district court’s credibility determinations, for it is the role of the district court to observe 

witnesses and weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.” United 

States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, we “must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party and give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and law 

enforcement officers.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

“An officer may stop and briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal 

activity.” United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). For such an investigative stop to be lawful, the “police officer must be 

able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 5 of 9
6

A police officer may conduct a traffic stop of a vehicle based upon the officer’s 

reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 

1183, 1187-88 (2020). Such a stop is lawful even for a minor traffic violation, such as 

driving with a revoked license. Id. at 1190.

Armstrong contends that Williams’ failure to verify the status of Armstrong’s 

driver’s license prior to initiating the traffic stop renders the stop unlawful. Based on our 

review of the record and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district 

court did not clearly err in finding that Williams’ belief that Armstrong had committed a 

traffic violation was reasonable and that the traffic stop was lawful.

2

 See Sueiro, 59 F.4th 

at 139 (providing standard); Glover, 140 S. Ct. at 1188 (stating that courts must permit 

officers to make “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” (citation 

omitted)). Accordingly, the district court properly denied Armstrong’s motion to suppress 

evidence discovered as a result of the traffic stop and the subsequent events, including the 

2 Armstrong contends that the district court did not account for Williams’ testimony 

in the state court that he had checked Armstrong’s driving status just prior to the traffic 

stop. He asserts that the failure to have verified that Armstrong’s license was suspended 

contemporaneously with the traffic stop defeats reasonable suspicion. During the 

suppression hearing, when asked about his state court testimony, Williams admitted that 

he “misspoke during that testimony” and explained that at that time, it was his “recollection 

that [he] ran [the report] that day. [He] did run [the report] that day, just not at that 

moment.” We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Williams 

credible and in ruling that he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation justifying the 

traffic stop. See Pulley, 987 F.3d at 376 (requiring deference to district court’s credibility 

determinations).

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 6 of 9
7

firearm and ammunition discovered during the search of the house at which Armstrong and 

Kent were arrested.3

Armstrong also contends on appeal that the district court erred by admitting into 

evidence a portion of a recorded jail phone conversation in which Kent described the events 

of October 12, 2018. Armstrong concedes that most of Kent’s statement describing the 

events is admissible. He contends, however, that “the discrete statement that Kent made 

during this call that ‘Bruh star[t]s shooting’ was not against Kent’s penal interest” and 

therefore the district court erred in admitting that statement.

We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of 

discretion, viewing the “evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent[ and] 

maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” Burgess v. 

Goldstein, 997 F.3d 541, 559 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we

“will overturn an evidentiary ruling only if it is arbitrary and irrational.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). And we will not overturn a conviction due to an erroneous 

evidentiary ruling if the error is harmless—that is, if we “can say with fair assurance, after 

pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the 

judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” Id. at 561 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

3 In light of our ruling, we need not consider the district court’s alternative bases for 

denying Armstrong’s motion to suppress evidence.

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 7 of 9
8

Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows the admission of an out of 

court statement by an unavailable declarant if (1) a “reasonable person in the declarant’s 

position would have made [the statement] only if the person believed it to be true because, 

when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so 

great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the 

declarant to civil or criminal liability” and (2) the statement “is supported by corroborating 

circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as 

one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).

Rule 804(b)(3) only allows the admission of the self-inculpatory portions of a 

hearsay statement. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599, 604 (1994). It does 

not permit the admission of statements concerning the roles of other individuals in the 

alleged crime. Id. at 599-600. Whether a statement is “self-inculpatory” requires an 

analysis of the statement in the context and may be a matter of interpretation. Id. at 603. 

“A declarant’s statement is not magically transformed from a statement against penal 

interest into one that is inadmissible merely because the declarant names another person or 

implicates a possible codefendant.” Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., concurring).

In ruling that the entirety of Kent’s statement, including the reference to Armstrong 

shooting at the police officers, was admissible, the district court found that the reference to 

Armstrong shooting “directly implicate[d] and inculpate[d] Kent in criminal conduct.” We 

agree with the district court’s reasoning that Kent’s statement that Armstrong shot at the 

police was “also inculpatory as to Kent based on either a conspiracy theory or an aiding 

and abetting theory.” The shooting took place as Kent and Armstrong were engaged in 

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 8 of 9
9

joint criminal activity of attempting to flee from the police. Accordingly, the district court 

did not clearly err in finding that Kent’s statement about Armstrong’s criminal actions in 

furtherance of that joint activity was against Kent’s penal interest. See Burgess, 997 F.3d 

at 559; see also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (stating standard 

for coconspirator liability).

In any event, our review of the record establishes that overwhelming evidence—

outside of this challenged statement—supported the jury’s determination that Armstrong 

was in possession of a firearm and ammunition on October 12, 2018. Accordingly, we 

conclude that any error in the admission of this portion of Kent’s statement was harmless.

We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Armstrong’s motion to suppress 

and affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4339 Doc: 34 Filed: 08/14/2023 Pg: 9 of 9