RAL PH SC HOENMAN ,

Plaintiff,
v.
FED ERALBU REAU OF I NVESTI GATI ON, e t al

. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 04-2202 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (Mar ch 31, 2009) Plaintiff, Ralph Schoenman, a political a ctivist and author, filed the above- captioned action pursua

nt to the Fre edom of Information Ac t (“F OIA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Privacy Act of 1974 ( “Privac y

Act” or “PA”) , 5 U.S.C. § 552a, seekingacc ess to an ar ray of re cords perta ining to himself, L ord B ertra nd Russell, and six org anizations, from a total of ten diff ere nt named a g encie s and a numbe r of unna med ag encie s to which the name d ag encie s might re fer do c ume nts fo r a

de te rm inatio n a s to re le a sa bil ity (i de nti fi e d a s “ JohnDo e Ag e nc ie s 1 -1 0” in Plaintiff’s Complaint). Pl aintiff’s Complaint named a s Defe ndants: the Fe dera l Bure au of Investig ation (“F BI ”), the Central Intellige nce A g ency (“CIA”) , the Def

ense I ntellige nce A g ency (“D I A”) , the Depa

rtment of the Air

For ce ( “Air F orce ”), the Depa rtment of Just ice ( “DOJ”), the Depa rtment of the Ar

my (“A rmy”), the Depa

rtment of the Na

vy (“N avy”), the Depa

rtment of State (“State D epar

tment”), the N ational Arc hives and Rec ords Administration “NARA” ), the National Secur ity

Ag ency (“N SA”), a

nd J ohn Doe Ag encie s 1-10. Compl. at 1 & ¶ 13. In a Me mor and

um O pin ion

and Or de r d a te d M arc h 3 1, 20 06 , th e Court dis mis se d c e rt a inThis Court previously g rante d summary

judgme nt in favor of

Def endants a s to Pl aintiff’s 1 claims ag ainst the DIA, the Air F orce , the Army , the Navy , and the Criminal Division of the DOJ. See Sc hoenman v . FBI , 5 75 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 36 (D .D .C. 20 08 ); Schoenm an v. FBI , 5 75 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2008). In addition, the Court gr anted summary judgme nt in favor of Def endant State De partment a s to Pl aintiff’s c laims ag ainst the State Depa rtment. See Schoenm an v. FBI

, 5 73 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 19 (D .D .C. 20 08 ); Schoenm an v. FBI
. , 576 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2008). The Court also g rante d-in-par t and held-in-a

bey ance -in-par

t Defe ndant CI A’s motion for summary

judgme nt, and denied- in-part a nd held-in-a

bey ance -in-par

t Plainti ff’ s partial motion for summary

judgme nt as to Plainti ff’ s claims ag ainst the CI A, with the re maining issues to be re solved pendingsupplemental brief ing a s to the adequa cy

of ce rtain aspe cts of the CIA’s sear ch. Schoenm an v. FBI , Civ. Act. No. 04-2202, 2009 WL763065 (D.D.C. Mar . 16, 2009).

2 portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint aga inst Defenda nts CI A, NARA, NSA, Air F orce , Army , and Na vy be c a us e Pla int if

f e ith e r c ou ld n ot s ho w that th e a g e nc ie s h a d r e c e ive d h is F OIA/ PA
re qu e sts or

c ou ld n ot s ho w that he ha d e xha us te d h is a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s a s to tho se ag encie s. See ge nerally Schoe nman v. FBI , Ci v. A. No . 0 4- 22 02 , 2 00 6 WL 11 26 81 3 ( D. D. C. Mar. 31, 2006) . By

a Memora

ndum Opinion and Orde r date d J une 5, 2006, the Court dismissed wi tho ut p re

jud ic e c e rt a in p or

tio ns of Pla int if f’ s Co mpl a int

a g a ins t th e F B Iand

the State De pa rtme nt. See ge nerally Schoe nman v. FBI , Ci v. A. No . 0 4- 22 02 , 2 00 6 WL 15 82 25 3 ( D. D. C. Jun. 5, 20 06 ). Th e De fe nd ants wi th r e ma ini ngob lig a tio ns to p ro c e ss d oc ume nts in r e sp on se to Plaintiff’s reque st did so. Those Defe ndants, alongwith the ag encie s to whom they have r efe rre d documents for

rele asability

deter minations, have now be g un moving f or summary

judgme nt, and Plaintiff has filed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. This Memorandum Opinion addr esses

1 the [73] Motion for Summary J udg ment filed by

the FB Iand the [92] C ross-Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment filed by

Plaintiff. I n addition, this Memorandum Opinion addresse s Pla int if f’ s r e c e ntl y

fi le d [10 5] Mo tio n f

or an O rd e r R e qu ir ingthe F B Ito P ro vid e a Com ple te Vaughn Index, as it pertains directly to the issues raised in the pa rties’ pe nding c ross-motions for
summa ry jud g me nt.3

T h e C o urth a s c o n d

u c t e d a s e ar c h i n g r e v i e wo f

th e F B I’ s P r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn Index, the F B I ’s Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt, Pla int if

f’ s Cr os s- Mo tio n f

or Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt/ Op po sit ion , th e F B I ’s Op po sit ion /Re ply , Pl a int if

f’ s Re ply , th e F B I ’s Sup ple me nta l Vaughn Index, P laintiff’s Motion for a n Orde r Requiringthe FB Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn In d e x, Plaintiff’s Marc h 24, 2009 Notice to the Court, and the FB I ’s Partial Opposition to Pl aintiff’s Motion for an Or der Requir ing the FB Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn Index, as well as the exhibi ts attache d to those filings, the r eleva nt statutes and ca se law, a nd the entire rec ord her ein. Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the Court shall: (1) GRANT-I N-PART the F BI ’s [73] Motion for Summary J udg ment, finding in favor of the FB Iwith respec t to the rea sonablene ss of the F BI ’s
sear ch for responsive r ecor ds; (2) DENY -I N-PART the F BI ’s [73] Motion for Summary Judg me nt a

nd GR AN T- I N- PAR T Pl a int if

f’ s [92 ] Cro ss- Mo tio n f

or Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt, wi th res pectto th e FBI ’s d eni al o f P lai nt if f’s requ est s fo r a fu ll fee wai ver, fi nd in g that th e FBI improperly

denied Plaintiff’s r equests; and ( 3) GRANT Plaintiff’s [105] Mot ion for an O rder Requiring the FB Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn Index. Finally , in light of the Court’s deter mination that the FB Imust submi t a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn ind e x, the Court sh a ll DENY WI THOUT PREJ UDI CE the parties’ cross-motions as they perta in to the merits of the FB I ’s withholdings a

nd Plaintiff’s reque st that the FB Ibe re quired to re proce ss all responsive documents. The Court c annot re solve the merits of these issues until an adequate Vaughn index is c omp ile d. Up on

su bmi ssi on of the F B I ’s fi na l Vaughn ind e x, the pa rt ie s ma y re -f ile the ir cross-motions as to the mer its of the FB I ’s withholdings, a s appropr iate.Har dy aver s that he is the Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination 2 Section (“RI DS”), Rec ords Mana g ement Division, at FB I HQ in Washington, D.C. Second Har dy Dec l. ¶ 1. He e x plains that RI DS’ mission i s to effe ctively plan, deve lop, direct, a

nd manag e re sponses to reque sts for ac cess to F BI rec ords and infor

mation pursuant to both the FOIA and the PA. Id. ¶ 2. Ha rdy submits hi s decla

rations to addre ss the FB I ’s handlingof Plaintiff’s FOIA/PA reque sts, and to provide a Vaughn index of P laintiff’s sele ction of documents fr om which the F BI withheld information. Id. ¶ 4. The six orga

nizations are as follows: (1) B ertra nd Russell P eac e F oundation; (2) 3 Be rtrand Russell Peac e F oundation, New Y ork; (3) I nternational War Crimes Tribunal; (4) The Who Kill ed Ke nnedy

Commi ttee; (5) B ertra

nd Russell Researc h Center; and ( 6) Citiz ens Commi ttee of Inquiry . Second Ha rdy Dec l., Ex . A. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the pr ocedur al fa cts included he rein a re taken 4 primarily from the se cond dec laration of David M. Har dy , submitt ed in support of the F BI ’s Motion for Summary

J udg ment. See Second Ha rdy Dec l. The F BI

has also provide d, as re quired 4 I. BACKG ROUND A. Plain tif

f’ s F OI A/ PA Re qu ests By letters date d J uly

24, 2001, and Jul y , 27, 2001, Plaintiff, throug h counsel, filed FOIA/PA reque sts with the Paris L eg al Attache and the L ondon L eg al Attache (“L eg at”) of the FB Ias we ll as with the L os Ang eles, Ne w York City , and San F ranc isco Fie ld Office s. See Second De cl. of Da

vid M. Hardy , Section Chief of the Rec ord/Information Dissemination Section, Records Ma

nag ement Division, at the F BI Hea dquarte rs (“ FB I HQ”) (her einaf ter “Second H ardy

Dec l.”), submitted in support of the F BI ’s Motion for Summary J udg ment, ¶¶ 5, 28, 41, 49, 61. Eac h of Plaintiff’s F OIA/PA reque sts is i dentical a nd soug ht acc ess to rec ords 2 perta ining to himself, L ord B ertra nd Russell, and six org anizations —and all re cords on a ny 3 confide ntial source or

informant who supplied infor mation on any

of the for eg oing subje cts as
we ll a s a ll “ ind e x re fe re nc e s” to t he fo re g oin g su

bje c ts, a ll p re vio us F OIA r e qu e sts pe rt a ini ngto those subjects, and a ll recor ds used by the FB Iin its searche s in response to Plaintiff’s re quests. Id., Ex . A In addition, Plainti ff r equeste d a fe e wa iver of a ll duplication fees. See id.

4by

L ocal Civil Rules 56.1 and 7(h), a Statement of Mater ial Fa cts as to Which There is No Genuine I ssue; howeve r, bec ause that Statement ge nera lly summarizes Hardy ’s dec laration, the Court instead cites dire ctly to Hardy ’s dec laration. Se e ge ne ra lly FB IStmt . Plaintiff has responde d to the FB I ’s Statement with a re sponsive Statement as we ll as a Statement of Material Fa cts Not in Dispute. SeePl. ’s Re sp . Stmt. and Pl. ’s Stmt . In h is r e sp on siv e State me nt, ho we ve r, Pla int if

f a dmi ts a ll o f t

he F B I ’s a sse rt ion s, save on e , f or wh ic h h e state s o nly

that: “Plaintiff is without information or knowledg e suff icient to admit or deny

and ther efor e denie s the first sentenc e. The second a nd third sentence are denied.” See Pl.’s Resp. St mt. As Plaintiff’s sole denial is not supported by fac ts contradictingHar dy ’s dec larations, the Court acc epts Har dy ’s sworn state ments in his second dec laration—which are supported by the re cord of cor responde nce be tween the FB Iand Plaintiff—as unc ontroverte d and re lies upon them he re in. As to P la int if

f’ s o wn State me nt o f M a te ri a l F a c ts, Pla int if f p ro ff e rs on ly fi ve “ fa c tua l” asser tions, three of which ar e not supported by citations to the rec ord, as is re quired. See generally Pl.’s St mt. The Court theref ore c ites primarily

to Hardy ’s sec ond decla

ration for the fac tual background in this case. 5 Id. Th e re le va

nt f a c ts c on c e rn ingthe F B I ’s re sp on se to e a c h o f P la int if f’ s r e qu e sts are se t f

or th below. 1. Paris L eg at B y le tte r d ate d July

31 , 2 00 1, the Pari s L e g a t no tif ie d Pl a int if

f t hat it ha d f or wa rd e d h is reque st to FBI HQ. Id. ¶ 6 . F B I HQ the re a ft e r a c kn ow le dg e d r e c e ipt of Pla int if f’ s F OIA/ PA reque st, and advised Plaintiff that it was ope ning a separ ate r equest for

eac h subject of Plaintiff’s FOIA/PA reque st. Id. ¶¶ 6- 7. As an initial matter, the Court notes that, by Orde r date d J une 5, 20 06 , it fo un d th at Pla int if

f h a d f a ile d to e xha

us t hi s a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s a s to c e rt a in portions of his FOIA/PA reque st to the FB IParis L eg at and ther efor e dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim to the extent it concerne d his request to the Paris L eg at for r ecor ds relating to the Who Killed Kenne dy Commi ttee and the Citi zens Comm ission of I nquiry
. See Schoenm an v. FBI

, Civ. Act. N. 04-2202, 2008 WL1582253, *9-12 (D.D .C. J un. 5, 2006) (C KK). Ac c or din g ly , th e on ly a sp e c ts o f P la int if

f’ s c la im a g a ins t th e Pari s L e g a t th a t r e ma in
re late to h is r e qu e st f

or re c or ds pe rt a ini ngto h ims e lf , L or d B e rt

ra nd Rus se ll, the B e rt

ra nd Rus se llTh e Court no te s th at Pla int if

f i s n ot c ha lle ng ingthe a de qu a c y of the F B I ’s se arc h in

his 5 cross-motion for pa

rtial summary

judgme nt, see ge nerally Pl.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n, Doc ket No. [92] , and ther efor e the F BI ’s “no r ecor ds” dete rminations are not at issue in this Memorandum Opinion. 6 Resear ch Center , and the B ertra nd Russell P eac e F oundation (includingthe New York off ice) , the International War Crimes Tribunal.

a. FOIA Request Number 947852 (Schoenma

n) P l a i n t i f f ’ s r e qu e s tt o th e P ar i s Le g a tf o r r e c o r d s p e rt a i n i n g t o h i m s e l f w a s a s s i g n e d

F O IA Re qu e st Numb e r 9 47 85 2. Se c on d H ard y De c l. ¶ 7. F B I HQ su

bs e qu e ntl y

c on so lid a te d th is reque st with P laintiff’s re quest to the L os Ang eles F ield Offic e (“ L AFO ”), discusse d below. See infra pp. 10-12. Ac cording ly , the Court shall consider Plaintiff’s c halleng es to this request as part of its discussion conce rningthe re quest to L AFO
.

b. F OIA R e qu e st Numb e r 9 48 77 4 ( L or d B e rt ra nd Rus se ll) Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st t o th e Pari s L e g a t f or re c or ds pe rt a ini ngto L or d B e rt ra nd Rus se ll Center wa s assig ned F OIA Request Number 948772. Id . ¶ 24. F BI HQ subseque ntly advised Plaintiff that no rec ords wer e found r esponsive to his reque st. Id. Plaintiff therea fter a ppeale d FB I HQ’s “ no rec ords” de termination, which de termination was subseque ntly aff irmed by the Of fi c e of Inf or matio n a nd Pr iva c y (“ OI P” ), the e nti ty

wi thi n D OJ th a t a dju dic a te s F OIA a pp e a ls of the va ri ou s D OJ c omp on e nts . Id. ¶¶ 11, 25- 27. 5
c. FOIA Request Number 948772 (B ertra

nd Russell Center) Plaintiff’s reque st to the Paris L eg at for r ecor ds pertainingto the Be rtrand Russell Center
wa s a ssi g ne d F OIA R e qu e st Numb e r 9 48 77 2. Se c on d H ard y De c l. ¶ 19 . F B I HQ su

bs e qu e ntl y advised Plaintiff that no re cords we re f ound responsive to this reque st. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff there afte r appe aled F BI HQ’s “ no rec ords” de termination, which wa s subsequently aff irmed byHar dy notes that four doc uments responsive to this FOIA Request we re r efe rre d to the 6 State Depa

rtment. Second Ha

rdy Dec l. ¶ 11. The F BI

reda cted c erta in information from one pag e of the ref

err ed docume nts pursuant to FOIA Exempti on 7(C). Id. When the Depa rtment of State rele ased the documents to Plaintiff, he wa s advised of his rig ht to appeal the F BI ’s reda ctions to those documents. Id. I t appea rs, howeve r, that Plaintiff has not appe aled the reda ctions made by

the FB Ion this refe rra l. Id. 7 OI P on appeal. Id. ¶¶ 20- 22.

d. FOIA Request Number 948768 (B ertra

nd Russell P eac e Foundation) By letter dated August 21, 2001, FB I HQ ac knowledg ed re ceipt of Plaintiff’s r equest for
rec ords per

taining to the B ertra

nd Russell P eac e F oundation (includingspecific to the New Y ork office ) and a dvised Plaintiff that the reque st had bee n assig ned F OIA Request Number 948768. Id. ¶ 9 . T he re a ft e r, F B I HQ inf or me d Pl a int if

f t hat it ha d lo c a te d 3 72 pa g e s r e sp on siv e to h is
r e qu e s tan d

w a s r e l e a s i n g 2 7 0 o f

th o s e p a g e s , w i thr e d a c t i o n s m a d e p ur s u an tt o F O IA Ex emptions 1, 2, 3, 7(C), and 7(D ). Id. ¶ 10. F BI HQ also infor med Plaintiff that responsive documents had be en re fer red to other

ag encie s for re view and dir ect r esponse to Plaintiff. Id. 6 Fin all y , FBI Q ad vi sedP lai nt if f t hathi s re qu est for

a fee wa iv er was den iedbecau se t he FBI “conc luded that [P laintiff’s] interest in these re cords is per sonal in nature a nd that the information per

tains primarily

to him,” and that he ha d there fore been a ssessed duplication fe es totaling $17. Id. and Ex. F. Plaintiff subsequently

appea led the withholdings a nd denial of his fe e wa iver to OI P. Id. ¶ 11. Specific to the fee waiver issue, Plaintiff argued that the F BI had wr ong ly

conclude d that his int e re st i n th e re c or ds is p e rs on a l in natur e and

that th e inf

or matio n p e rt a ins pr ima

ri ly to h im,
no tin g that th e re qu e st at is su e re late s to the B e rt ra nd Rus se ll Pe a c e F ound a tio n— no t to Schoenman himself. Id. , E x. G. In a dd iti on , Pl a int if f s tate d th a t:8

Th e mate ri a ls c on ta ine d in the fi le d e a l w ithpo lit ic a l op po sit ion to t he wa r i n Vietnam. The fac t that the FB Icompiled a r ather large file in its Paris office reg ardingthe anti-wa

r ac tiv i t i es o f t his org anization certa inly sheds light on the ‘oper ations and ac tiviti es’ of the Gover

nment. Mr. Schoenman, a published author, i n t en d s t o u s e t h es e m at er i al s i na p o l i t i ca l m em o i r h e i s wr i t i n g. Id. By

letter dated Novembe r 18, 2003, OI P made a suppleme ntal rele ase of additional portions of six pag es pre viously rele ased to Plaintiff but aff irmed all other w ithholdings by the FB I
. Id. ¶ 14. In addition, OI P affirme d the FB I ’s denial of a fe e wa iver. Id. OI P concede d that Plaintiff had “amply

demonstrated that [ he] has the ca pacity to disseminate the re quested information and that he does not appe ar to have an ove rridingcommerc ial interest in the
rec ords.” Id. , Ex . I . Howeve r, OI P contended that Plaintiff had not shown that disclosure of the
rec ords is likely

to contribute sig nificantly to public understandingof the ope rations and activities of the g overnme nt and conc luded that the re lease d materia l larg ely consisted of information that would not contribute to the public unde rstandingof the F BI ’s oper ations and activities bec ause: (1) 200 of the 270 pa g es of r elea sed mater ials are copies of publications by the Be rtrand Russell Peac e F oundation and ther efor e orig inate outside of the g overnme nt; (2) an additional portion of the mater ials contain biog raphic al information about or public statements by pe rs on s a ff

ili ate d w iththe F ound atio n; a nd (3 ) a sma ll p or

tio n o f t he re le a se d mate ri a l c on ta in only administrative mater ials that do not include substantive content. Id. Acc ording ly , the imposit ion of $17.00 in duplication fee s was upheld. Id.

e. FOIA Request Number 948769 (International War Crimes Tr ibu na l) Plaintiff’s reque st pertainingto the International War Crimes Tribunal was a ssigne d FOIA Request Number

948769. Id. ¶ 15. B y

letter dated Novembe r 3, 2003, F BH I Q advised9

Plaintiff that 775 pag es of 1,458 pa g es of r esponsive mater ial wer e beingrele ased a nd that the rele vant withholdings ha d been ma de pursua nt to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 3, 7(C) and 7( D). Id. ¶¶ 15- 16. FB I HQ also infor med Plaintiff that ref

err als of re sponsive documents had be en made to other ag encie s. Id. ¶ 16. F inally , FB I HQ advise d Plaintiff that his request for a fe e wa iver wa s denied be cause Plaintiff had “not demonstrate[d] the ability to disseminate information to the public at larg e” a

nd Plaintiff was there fore assessed duplicating f ees totaling$67.50. Id. & E x. K. By

letter dated Novembe r 8, 2003, Plaintiff appe aled the F BI ’s withholdings a nd fee wavier decision to OI P. Id. ¶ 17. Specific to the denial of his re quest for a fee waiver , Plaintiff argued that the F BI ’s deter mination that he had not demonstrate d his ability to disseminate the information wrong ly

ignor ed that Plaintiff is a published author, a s expl ained in his orig inal FOIA/PA reque st. Id. , E x . M
. InJ u l y o f 2 0 0 8 , d ur i n g th e p e n d e n c y

o f th e i n s t an tl i t i g a t i o n , O IP finally informed Plaintiff that it had dete rmined Plaintiff was e ntitled to a partial fe e wa iver a nd reduc ed the duplicating f

ees c harg ed by

15%, to $57.00. Id. ¶

1 8 an d E x . N
. A l th o u g hO IP ag ree d that Plaintiff does not appea r to have an over

riding commerc ial interest in the re cords a nd that, contra

ry to the FB I ’s orig inal statement, Plaintiff has shown that he could disseminate the information to the public at lar g e, it admonished Plaintiff for not providinga more particula r showing that disclosure of the rec ords is likely to contribute sig nificantly to public understanding of the ope rations and a ctivities of the g overnme nt. Id. , Ex . N. Nonethe less, OI P reviewe d the materia l at issue and dete rmined that a por tion of the rele ased r ecor ds (15%) “ do[es] conce rn the operations or activities of the F BI ,” and thus found that Plainti ff is entitled to a pa rtial fee waiver
. Id. OI P determined, howe ver, that the rema ining por tion of the materia ls (85%) c onsists of10

information that would not contribute to the public unde rstandingof the F BI ’s oper ations and activities. Specifica lly , OI P concluded that a pproxi mately

60% of the r elea sed mater ials do not qualify for a fee waiver

beca use: (1) the materia ls contain substantive content that ha s been deter mined exempt under one or mor e of the FOIA Exempti ons; (2) the mate rials ar e duplicate s of re cords a lrea dy

rele ased to Plaintiff; (3) the materia ls are r epetitive of infor mation alrea dy rele ased to Plaintiff; and (4) the mater ials contain only administrative information. Id. In addition, approxim ately

25% of the r elea sed mater ials orig inate fr om outside the g overnme nt ( e.g. , transcr ipt of a broa dcast fr om Hanoi, North Vie tnam, a re port from the I nternational War Crimes Tribunal, var ious published articles and ne wsletters, a s well as copie s of newspa per article s). Id. Acc ording ly , OI P gr anted only a 15% r eduction of the duplication fee s, thereby reduc ing the fee s owed to $57.00. Id.

2. L ondon L eg at By letter dated September

22, 2001, the L ondon L eg at conf irmed re ceipt of Plaintiff’s FOIA/PA reque st and advised Plaintiff that it was for war ding the reque st to FBI HQ. Id. ¶ 61. FB I HQ subseque ntly

located 275 pa g es of r esponsive mater ial and, on January 31, 2007 ( i.e. , afte r this liti g ation had commenc ed), r elea sed (through OI P) 260 pag es with reda ctions made pursuant to FO I A Exempti ons 1, 2, 6, 7(C), and 7( D). Id. ¶ 62.

3. L os Ang eles F ield Offic e Init ia lly , th e L os An g e le s F ie ld O ff ic e (“ L AF O” ) a dv ise d Pl a int if f, by le tte r d a te d Augus t 14, 2001, that a priva cy

waiver or proof of death was nee ded bef

ore it could c onduct a se arc h for
rec ords per

taining to L ord B ertra

nd Russell, but t hat as to Plaintiff’s other r equests, no responsive r ecor ds had bee n located upon initial re view. Id. ¶ 2 9. Pla int if f s ub se qu e ntl y11

pr ov ide d p ro of

of de ath a s to L or d B e rt

ra nd Rus se ll a nd a pp e a le d th e L AF O’ s “ no re c or ds ” deter mination to OI P. Id. ¶¶ 30- 31. L AFO subsequently informed Plaintiff that it had located
rec ords re g ardingboth Plainti ff himself a nd L ord B ertra

nd Russell and that those rec ords wer e beingforwa

rded to F BI HQ for

proce ssing. Id. ¶ 33. LAFO advised, howe ver, that no responsive
rec ords as to the other

subjects of his re quest had be en located. Id. On J une 5, 2006, the Court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff’s c laim ag ainst L AFO , to the extent it related to his request for rec ords re lating to L ord B ertra nd Russell. Schoenm an v. FBI , Civ. Act. No. 04-2202, 2006 WL1582253, *13 (Jun. 5, 2006) (CKK). Acc ording ly , the only responsive r ecor ds located by L AFO that rema in at issue are those perta ining to Plaintiff himself, which the Court now turns to. Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st t o LAF O f

or re c or ds pe rt a ini ngto h ims e lf wa s a ssi g ne d F OIA R e qu e st Number 954768. Id. ¶ 34. As stated a bove, LAFO located r ecor ds reg ardingPlaintiff himself, and informe d Plaintiff that those rec ords wer e beingforwa rded to F BI HQ for

proce ssing. Id. ¶ 33. On April 26, 2005, F BI HQ informe d Plaintiff that it had located 752 pa g es of r esponsive
m a t e r i a l an d

w a s r e l e a s i n g 5 5 2 o f

th o s e p a g e s , w i thr e d a c t i o n s m a d e p ur s u an tt o F O IA Ex emptions 1, 2, 7(C) and 7(D ) and PA Exemption j(2). Id. ¶ 37. F BI HQ also infor med Plaintiff of consultations and re fer rals made to other ag encie s. Id. Finally , FB I HQ asse ssed Plaintiff $42.50 in duplication fees, whic h Plaintiff subsequently paid. Id. FB I HQ subseque ntly

rele ased a dditional pag es upon consultation with other g overnme nt ag encie s. First, by

letter dated Novembe r 29, 2005, F BI HQ informe d Plaintiff that an additional three pag es of r esponsive mater ial was be ing r elea sed af ter c onsultation with t he De partment of the Army
. Id. ¶ 38. Redac tions were ma de by the FB Ipursuant to FO I A Exempti ons 1, 2, 6,12

7(C) and 7( D) a s well as PA Exempti on j(2), while r edac tions were ma de by the Army

pursuant to FOIA Exempti on 6. Id. Second, by another letter dated that same da

y , November

29, 2005, FB I HQ advise d Plaintiff that an additional 90 pag es of r esponsive mater ial was be ing r elea sed afte r consultation with the State Depa rtment. Id. ¶ 39 . R edact io ns were m ade b y th e FBI purs ua nt t o F OIA E xemp tio ns 1, 2, 6, 7( C) and 7( D) a s w e ll a s PAExe mpt ion j( 2) , w hil e reda ctions were made by

the State Depa

rtment pursuant to F OIA Exempti ons 1 and 6. Id. Third and fina lly , by

a letter sent on May

22, 2006, FB I HQ informe d Plaintiff that an additional 79 pag es of r esponsive mater ial (out of 90 pag es re viewed in c onsultation with t hat ag ency ) we re beingrele ased, w ith withholdi ng s made pursua nt to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 7(C) and 7( D). Id. ¶ 40. 4. New Y ork City Field Of fice By letter dated May

21, 2002, the New

York City

Field Of fice (“N YFO ”) infor

med Plaintiff that rec ords wer e located re g ardingPlaintiff himself and the Citiz ens Commissi on of Inquiry and that those re cords we re be ing f orwa rded to F BI HQ for

proce ssing. Id. ¶ 42. No
rec ords wer e found r esponsive to the other subjects of Plaintiff’s F OIA/PA reque st. Id. The Court no te s it dis mis se d w ith out pr e

jud ic e Pla int if

f’ s c la im a g a ins t N YF O f or fa ilure to e xha

us t
a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s to the e xtent it c on c e rn e d N YF O’ s “ no re c or ds ” de te rm inatio n a s to a ll subjects, save Plaintiff and the Citiz ens Commissi on of Inquiry
. See Sc hoenman v . FBI , Civ. Act. No. 04- 2202, 2006 WL1582253, *14-15 (D.D .C. J un. 5, 2006) (CKK) . Acc ording ly , the only Plaintiff’s claim as it conc erns his re quest to NYF O for r ecor ds reg ardingthe Citiz ens Commi ssion of Inquiry

and himself re main at issue.13 a . F O IA R e qu e s tN u mb e r 9 6 3 7 0 7 ( C i t i z e n s C o m m i s s i o no f In qu i r y) B y le tte r d ate d Augus t 16 , 2 00 2, F B I HQ a c kn ow le dg e d r e c e ipt of Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st
conce rningthe Citiz ens Commissi on of Inquiry and assig ned it FOIA Request Number 963707. Id. ¶ 43. Ther eaf

ter, on Mar ch 24, 2004, F BI HQ notified Plaintiff that it had located 818 pag es of re sponsive materia ls and was r elea sing 736 pa g es to Plaintiff, with withholdi ng s made pursuant to FO I A Exempti ons 1, 2, 7(C) and 7( D). Id. ¶ 45. F BI HQ also infor med Plaintiff that it had ref err ed re sponsive materia ls to other ag encie s. Id. Finally , FB I HQ asse ssed Plaintiff $63.60 in duplications fees, a lthough it neither expli citly

stated that it was deny

ing Plaintiff’ s fee waiver reque st nor provided a

rea son for doingso. Id. , Ex . OO. Plaintiff therea fter a

ppeale d the withholdings a nd denial of the fee waiver
. Id. ¶ 4 6
. In July of 20 08 , d ur ingthe pe nd e nc y

of the ins tant l iti g a tio n, OI P f ina lly inf or me d Pl a int if

f t hat it had dete rmined he is entitled to a pa rtial fee wavier

and re duced the duplicating fee s char g ed by 25%, to $47.70. Id. ¶ 48 & Ex . RR. Although OI P ag ree d that Plaintiff does not appea r to have
an o ve rr idi ngc omm e rc ia l inte re st i n th e re c or ds and that Pla int if

f h a s sh ow n th a t he c ou ld d i s s em i n at e t h e i n fo rm at i o nt o th e p u b l i c a tl ar ge, i tad m o n i s h edP l ai n t i ff fo r n o tp ro v i d i n g a
mor e pa rt ic ula r s ho wi ngthat di sc los ur e of the re c or ds is l ike ly

to c on tr ibute signif

ic antl y to public understandingof the ope rations and a ctivities of the g overnme nt. Id. , Ex . RR. Nonethele ss, OI P reviewe d the mater ial at issue and de termined that a portion of the re lease d
rec ords (25%) “do[es] concern the operations or activities of the F BI ,” and thus found that Plaintiff is entitl ed to a pa rtial fee waiver
. Id. OI P determined, howe ver, that the rema ining po rt ion of the mate ri a ls ( 75 %) c on sis ts o f i nf or matio n th a t w ou ld n ot c on tr ibute to t he pu bli c understandingof the F BI ’s oper ations and ac tiviti es. Specific ally , OI P concluded that14

approximately

50% of the r elea sed mater ials do not qualify for a fee waiver

beca use: (1) the materia ls contain substantive content that ha s been de termined e x empt under one or more of the FOIA Exempti ons; (2) the mate rials ar e duplicate s of re cords a lrea dy rele ased to Plaintiff; (3) the
mate ri a ls a

re re pe tit ive of

inf or matio n a lr e a dy

re le a se d to Pla int if

f; and (4 ) t he mate ri a ls c on ta in only administrative information. Id. In a dd iti on , a pp ro ximate ly

25 % o f t he re le a se d mate ri a ls
or ig inate fr om o uts ide the g ov e rnme nt ( e.g. , tr ans c ri pt o f a br oa dc a st f

ro m H ano i, N or

th Vietnam, a r eport fr om the International War Crimes Tribunal, var ious published articles and newsletter s, as well as c opies of new spaper article s). Id. Acc ording ly , OI P gr anted only a 25% reduc tion of the duplication fee s, thereby reduc ing the fee s owed to $47.70. Id. b. FOIA Request Number 951311-001 (Plaintiff himself) By letter dated Fe bruar

y 9, 2007— i.e. , d

uri n g th e i n s t an tl i t i gat i o n
—FBIHQ (t h ro u gh OI P) advised Plaintiff that it had locate d 102 pag es of r esponsive mater ials and wa s relea sing 94 pag es, with reda ctions made pursua nt to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 3, 6, 7(C) and 7( D), a s well as PA Ex emption j(2). Id. ¶ 63.

5. San Fr ancisc o Field Of fice By letter dated August 16, 2001, the FB I ’s San Fr ancisc o Field Of fice (“SF FO” ) advised Plaintiff that no responsive re cords ha d been loc ated r eg ardingPlaintiff himself, the Be rtrand Russell P eac e F oundation - Ne w York, the Who Kill ed Ke nnedy Commi ttee, the B ertra

nd Russell Researc h Center a nd the Citiz ens Commissi on of Inquiry
. Id. ¶ 50. Plaintiff there afte r appea led this “no rec ords” de termination. Id. ¶ 52. OI P subsequently aff irmed the F BI ’s “no
r e c o r d s ” d e t e r

m i n at i o ne x c e p ta s t o th e C i t i z e n s C o m m i s s i o no f In qu i r y , c o n c e r n i n g w h i c hO IP deter mined that four pa g es of mate rial should be re lease d in full to P laintiff. Id
. ¶ 6 0
. T h e F B I15

ha s n ot i nd ic ate d th at it

loc ate d a ny a dd iti on a l mate ri a l r e sp on siv e to a ny of the a bo ve su bje c ts. As conc erns Plaintiff’s r equests for rec ords re lating to the B ertra nd Russell Foundation, the International War Crimes Tribunal, and L ord B ertra nd Russell, however, SF FO a dvised Plaintiff that responsive re cords ha d been loc ated a nd proce ssed, as discussed be low. Id. ¶ 50.
a. FOIA Request Number 190-SF-130542 ( Be rtrand Russell Peac e Foundation) By letter dated Novembe r 5, 2001, SFF O notified Plaintiff that 16 pag es of r esponsive materia l had bee n located a nd that it was rele asingto Plainti ff 16 pa g es, with reda ctions being made pur suant to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 7(C) and 7( D). Id . ¶ 53. Plaintiff there afte r appe aled this determination to OI P. Id. ¶ 55. OI P affirme d the FB I ’s dec ision. Id. ¶ 60.

b. FOIA Request Number 190-SF-130541 ( International War Crimes Tr ibu na l) The SFF O also notified Plaintiff on Novembe r 5, 2001, that it had located 50 pag es of responsive material a

nd that it was rele asing48 pag es to Plaintiff, with redac tions made pursuant to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 3, 7(C) and 7( D). Id. ¶ 5 4. Pla int if f t he re a ft e r a

pp e a le d th is deter mination to OI P. Id. ¶ 55. OI P affirme d the FB I ’s dec ision. Id. ¶ 60.

c . F OIA R e qu e st Numb e r 1 90 -S F -1 30 54 0 ( L or d B e rt ra nd Rus se ll) By letter dated Fe bruar

y 27, 2002, SFFO notified Plaintiff that it had located 21 pa g es of
re sp on siv e mate ri a l and

wa s r e le a sin g 19 pa g e s to Pla int if f, wi th r e da c tio ns ma de purs ua nt t o FOIA Exempti ons 1, 2, 3, 7(C) and 7( D). Id. ¶ 5 7. Pla int if f t he re a ft e r a

pp e a le d th is deter mination to OI P. Id. ¶ 58. OI P affirme d the FB I ’s dec ision. Id. ¶ 60. B. Pr oc e du ra l H

istor y Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on Dec ember 20, 2004. See Com

pl. , D oc ke t N o. [1]. A s16

is releva nt to the parties’ c ross-motions, the FB Ifiled a pa rtial motion to di smiss, which the Court subsequently

g rante d-in-par

t and denied- in-part. See Sc hoenman v . FBI , Civ. Act. N. 04- 2202, 2008 WL1582253, *9-12 (D.D .C. J un. 5, 2006). As discussed a bove, the Court dismissed wi tho ut p re

jud ic e Pla int if

f’ s c la im a g a ins t th e F B Ito t he e xtent it

c on c e rn e d: ( 1) his re qu e st t o the Paris L eg at for r ecor ds relatingto the Who Kill ed Ke nnedy Commi ttee and the Citi zens Commis sio n o f I

nq uir y ; ( 2) his re qu e st t o LAF O f or re c or ds re latin g to L or d B e rt ra nd Rus se ll; and (3) his request to NYF O for r ecor ds pertainingto the Be rtrand Russell Peac e F oundation (includingthe New

York off ice) , the International War Crimes Tribunal, the Who Killed Kenne dy Commi ttee, the B ertra

nd Russell Researc h Center, a nd L ord B ertra

nd Russell. See id. at *9-15. In addition, the Court notes that the parties a g ree d to proce ed with their c ross-motions fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt b a se d u

po n a sampl e —to be se le c te d b y Pla int if f— of the do c ume nts withheld in full or in part by the FB I
. See3/21/07 J oint St atus Report, Doc ket No. [34] at 4; 10/24/07 J oint St atus Report, Doc ket No. [41] at 2. B y letter dated Octobe r 10, 2007, Plaintiff pr ov ide d th e F B Iwi th a

lis t of 17 0 it e ms t o b e the su

bje c t of the F B I ’s Vaughn index. See F ir st H ar dy D e c l
. , E x . A
. T h e F B I f i l e d i t s P r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn Index on J une 30, 2008, Doc ket No. [68] , and its Motion for Summary J udg ment on J uly

29, 2008, Docke t No. [73] . Plaintiff filed his Cross-Motion/ Opposition on S eptember 25, 2008. See Do c ke t N o. [92]. Th e F B Ifi le d it s Reply /Opposition on October 23, 2008, see Do c ke t N os . [97 ] & [98], and Pla int if f f ile d h is Reply on November

19, 2008, see Docke t No. [100]
. There afte r, in response to issues raised in Plaintiff’s Reply , the FB Ifiled an unoppose d mot ion to s up ple me nt i ts Vaughn index, see Docke t No. [101] , which the Court g rante d, see17

12 /15 /08 Min . O rd e r. Th e F B Isu bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d it s su

pp le me nta l Vaughn index on M arc h 6, 20 09 . D oc ke t N o. [103 ]. In r e sp on se , Pl a int if f f ile d a Mo tio n f or an O rd e r R e qu ir ingthe F B Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn Index, see Docke t No. [105] , as we ll as a Notice , submitt ed at the
re qu e st o f t

he Court , c lari fy

ingthe re lie f h e c ur

re ntl y se e ks , see Doc ketNo. [ 10 8] . T he FBI the re a ft e r f

ile d a Part ia l O pp os iti on

to P la int if

f’ s Mo tio n f

or an O rd e r R e qu ir ingthe F B Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn Index. See Do c ke t N o. [109 ]. A c c or din g ly , th e pa rt ie s’ c ro ssmo ti on s fo r su mm ary

ju dgmen t, as w ell as P lai nt if f’s mo ti on requ est in g the C ou rtord er t he FBI to submita complete Vaugh n index, are now ripe for r eview. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A. FOIA In revie wing a motion for summary judgme nt under F OIA, the Court must conduct a de
novo revie w of the r ecor d. See5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4) (B ). In the FO I A context, “ de novo revie w require s the Court to ‘asce rtain whe ther the a g ency has sustained its burden of demonstratingthat the documents re quested . . . a re e x empt from disclosure under [] FOI A.’” Assassinati on Arc hiv es &Re

se arc h Ct r. v. CIA , 3 3 4 F. 3 d

5 5 , 5 7 (D
. C
. C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Summers v . DOJ , 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 ( D.C. Cir. 1998)). Summary judgme nt is proper whe n “the plea dings, the discovery [i f any] and disclosure mater ials on file, and a ny aff idavits show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t and that the movant is entitled to judgme nt as a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts only

when ther e is sufficie nt evidenc e such that a re asonable juror could f ind for the pa

rty opposing the motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Un de r F OIA, a ll und e rl yingfa c ts a nd inf e re nc e s a re ana ly zed in t he lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble18

to the FOIA re quester; a s such, only afte r an a g ency

seekingsummary

judgme nt proves that it has fully discharg ed its FOIA obligations is s ummary judgme nt appropriate. Mo or e v . A sp in , 9 16 F. S u p p 3 2 , 3 5 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g W eisberg v. D OJ

, 7 0 5 F
. 2 d 1 3 4 4 , 1 3 5 0 ( D
. C
. C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) )
. In opposing a

motion for summary

judgme nt, a par

ty must offer mor e than c onclusory statements. See B roaddrick v. E

xec . Office of President , 139 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D .C. 2001) (citing Laningham v. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 ( D.C. Cir. 1987)), aff’d 38 Fe d. Appx. 20 (D.C. C ir. 2002). Indeed, a

plaintiff pursuingan ac tion under F OIA must establish that the ag ency has improperly

claimed a

n exemption as a matter of la w or that the a g ency

has fa iled to seg reg ate a

nd disclose all non-e x empt information in the re quested doc uments. See P erry- Torres v. Dep’ t of Sta te , 404 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D.D .C. 2005). Congr ess ena cted F OIA for the purpose of introducingtranspar ency to gove rnment activities. See Ste rn v. FBI , 737 F.2d 84, 88 ( D.C. Cir. 1984). Congr ess re mained sensitive, howeve r, to the nee d to achieve balanc e betwe en this objective a nd the vulnera

bility of “leg itimate gove rnmental a nd private inter ests [t hat] could be harme d by rele ase of

cer tain ty pes of information.” Criti cal Mass Energy Project v. Nuc lear Regulatory Comm’n , 975 F.2d 871, 87 2 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 2) ; se e als o S um me rs , 140 F.3d at 1079. Accor dingly , FOIA provides nine exemptions pursuant to which a n ag ency may withhold requested inf

ormation. See5 U.S.C. §§ 55 2( a )( 4) (B ), (b )( 1) -( 9) . T he a g e nc y mus t de mon str a te the va lid ity of any e xemp tio n th a t it
asser ts. See id. ; Bec k v. D OJ

, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 ( D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[c]onsist ent with the purpose of

the Act, the bur den is on the ag ency t o j u s t i f y w i th h o l d i n g r e qu e s t e d

d o c u m e n t s ” )
. In addition, summary

judgme nt may

be g rante d on the basis of the a g ency ’s ac company ing
a ff ida vit s o r d e c laratio ns if

the y de sc ri be “ the jus tif

ic a tio ns fo r n on dis c los ur e wi th r e a so na bly19

specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld log ically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not c ontroverte d by either c ontrary

evidenc e in the re cord nor evidenc e of ag ency bad fa ith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 6 56 F .2 d 7 24 , 7 38 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 1) . T he se aff idavits may

be submitted by

an off icial who coor dinated the se arc h, and nee d not be from e ach individual who participate d in the sear ch. See Safe Card Servs. v. Se c. &Exc h. Comm’n , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). An ag ency

also has the bur den of de tailing what proportion of the infor mation in a document is non-exempt and how that mater ial is dispersed throug hout the document. Mead Data Cent. Inc. v . Dep’ t of Air Force , 566 F.2d 242, 261 ( D.C. Cir. 1977). Any non-exempt information that is rea sonably seg reg able f

rom the re quested re cords must be disclosed. Oglesby v. Army , 79 F.3d 1172, 1178 ( D.C. Cir. 1996). In addition, district courts are require d to consider
se g re g a bil ity iss ue s su a s

po nteeven when the pa

rties have not specifica lly raised suc h claims. Trans-Pac. Policing Agree ment v. Customs Serv
. , 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 ( D.C. Cir. 1999). B. Privacy

Act The Privac y

Act of 1974 r egulates the c ollection, maintenanc e, use, a nd dissemination of an individual’s per sonal information by ag encie s within the feder al g overnme nt. See5 U.S.C. § 552a(e ). The PA pr ovides that any ag ency that reta ins a sy stem of re cords “ shall maintain . . .
on ly su c h in fo rm atio n a

bo ut a n in div idu a l a s is re le va

nt a nd ne c e ssa ry to a c c omp lis h a

purp os e of the a g ency

require d to be ac complished by statute or executive or der of the President.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1). To pr ovide for ope nness and a ccounta bility , the PA ensure s that “upon
re qu e st b y

any ind ivi du a l to g a in a c c e ss t o h is r e c or d o r t o a ny inf or ma tio n p e rt a ini ngto h im which is containe d in the sy stem,” the a g ency shall provide the individual with acc ess to revie w20

such re cords. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (1). F inally , subject to ce rtain exceptions, the Privacy Act state s th a t di sc los ur e of

re c or ds sh a ll b e lim ite d. 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (b ) ( “ [n]o a g e nc y sh a ll d isc los e any rec ord which is conta ined in a sy stem of re cords by any means of c ommunication to any person, or to another a g ency , except pursuant to a wr itten reque st by , or with the prior written
c on se nt o f, the ind ivi du a l to wh om t he re c or d p e rt a ins ” ). On e of the se e xce pti on s, ho we ve r, is that an a g e nc y

sh a ll d isc los e su c h r e c or ds that w ou ld b e re qu ir e d to be dis c los e d p ur su ant t o FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)( 2). In actions see king doc uments under both F OIA and the Priva cy Act, a de fenda

nt ag ency must show that the information is properly subject to both FOIA and Privacy Act exemptions. See M

artin v. Off. of Special Counsel , 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). III . D ISC USS ION In consideringthe par

ties’ cr oss-motions and Plainti ff’ s motion for an orde r re quiring the FB Ito provide a c omplete Vaughn index, t he Court first addr esses Plaintiff’s c halleng e to the FB I ’s denial of

his requests for

a fe e wa iver. The Court then turns to Plainti ff’ s challeng es to the
a de qu a c y of the F B I ’s Vaughn index and his request that the F BI be re quired to provide a complete index, before finally consideringthe re asonable ness of the F BI ’s sea rch. A. Pu bli c In te re

st F e e W aiv e r R e qu est In g ener al, “a

FOIA re quester must pay rea sonable c osts for the sea rch, r eview, a

nd duplication of the re cords soug ht.” Judicial W atch, Inc . v. De

p’t of Transp. , Civ. No. 02-566, 2005 WL1606915, at *3 (D.D .C. J uly 7, 2005) (he reina fter “

Judicial W

atch I ” ) ( c iti ng5 U .S. C. § 552(a) (4)( A)(ii)( I )). How ever , an ag ency must waive or r educe fee s for sea rch, r eview, or du pli c a tio n o f d oc ume nts if (1 ) “ dis c los ur e of

the inf or matio n is in t

he pu bli c int e re st b e c a

us e it21

is likely to contribute sig nificantly to public understandingof the ope rations or a ctivities of the g overnme nt” and ( 2) “is not primarily in the commerc ial interest of the reque ster.” 5 U .S.C. § 55 2( a )( 4) (A )( iii ). Th e F OIA r e qu e ste r b e ars the ini tia l bu rd e n o f p ro vin g that it

me e ts b oth prong s. Judicial W

atch I , 2 0 0 5 W L1 6 0 6 9 1 5 at* 3 (c i t i n g Larson v. CIA , 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). Ac cordingto leg islative history , the FO I A fe e wa iver provision “‘ is to be liberally construed in f

avor of waiver s for nonc ommercia l reque sters.’” McClellan Ecological SeepageSituation v. Carl ucci , 835 F.2d 1282, 1284 ( 9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 132 Cong . Rec. 27, 90 (1986) ( Sen. L eahy

)). In r e v i e w i n g ana g e n c y’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o no na

f e e w a i v e r i s s u e , a d i s tr i c tc o urtmu s ta

p p l y a de novo standard of

revie w and look only

to the administrative re cord that was bef ore the ag ency
a t th e tim e of

its de c isi on . 5 U. S.C. § 5 52 (a )( 4) (A )( vii ); D.C. Technical Assistance Org. v . Dep’ t of Hous. & Urban Dev

. , 85 F. Supp. 2d 46, 48 (D.D .C. 2000). “The rec ord bef ore the ag ency ‘consists of, inte r a lia , the initial FOIA re quest, the ag ency ’s re sponse, and a ny subsequent materia ls related to the a dminist rative a ppeal.’ ” Jarvik

v. CIA , 4 95 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 7, 71 (D .D .C. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Forest Guardians v. De p’t of the Interior , 416 F.3d 1173, 1177 ( 10th Cir. 2005)). In addition, fee waiver

reque sts mustbe made with ‘rea sonable spec ificity ,’ Larson , 843 F.2d at 1483, and conta in more than ‘c onclusory alleg ations,’ Nat’l Tr easury Em ployee s Un. v. Griff

in, 811 F.2d 644, 647 ( D.C. Cir. 1987). At issue in the instant cross-motions are the FB I ’s deter minations that P laintiff is not entitled to a full fee waiver as re quested re g arding : (1) F OIA Request Number 948768 to the Paris L eg at re g ardingthe B ertra nd Russell P eac e F oundation; (2) F OIA Request Number 948769 to t he Pari s L e g at r e g ard ingthe Inte rn a tio na l War C ri me s T ri buna l; a nd (3 ) F OIA R e qu e stPlaintiff is not challeng ing the FB I ’s denial of his request for

a fe e wa iver for

duplication 7 fee s relatingto his FOIA/PA reque st to L AFO for r ecor ds pertainingto himself. Given the F BI ’s deter

mination that Pl aintiff is entitled to a par tial fee waiver

in two of 8 the three instances at issue, the Court understands that the F BI has also conc eded that Plainti ff’ s reque st was ade quate on its fac e— i.e. , that the only issue in dispute is whether c erta in relea sed re c or ds in f

a c t qu a lif y fo r t he fe e wa ive r, no t w he the r P la int if f h a s su ff ic ie ntl y se t f or th t he pu bli c interest nec essar

y to be elig ible for a

fee waiver

in the first place . Although the FB I ’s brief ing contains some languag e sug g esting that it believes Plaintiff may have in f act f ailed to provide the nece ssary deg ree of “r easona

ble spec ificity ” re quired to wa rra nt a fe e wa iver in the fir st instance, this argument, if asser

ted, is puzz ling in lig ht of the F BI ’s deter mination that the Plainti ff’ s 22 Number 963707 to the N YFO reg ardingthe Citiz ens Commissi on of Inquiry
. As discussed 7 above, Plaintiff made the identical r equest for a fe e wa iver in all three instances. See supra p. 4. Th e F B Iult imate ly

c on c e de s th at Pla int if

f h a s d e mon str a te d th a t he ha s th e c a pa c ity to disseminate the re quested infor mation and that he doe s not have a n overr iding c ommercia l int e re st i n th e re c or ds , b ut d isp ute s w he the r a ll o f t he mate ri a l so ug ht i s li ke ly to c on tr ibute signific antly

to public understandingof the ope rations or a ctivities of the g overnme nt. See S e c o n d H ar dy D e c l
. , E x s . I, N & R R
. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a s t o tw o o f

th e th r e e r e qu e s t s a ti s s u e ( F O IA Request Number s 948769 and 963707), the F BI g rante d Plaintiff a par

tial fee waiver

(of 15% and 25 % r e sp e c tiv e ly

), ba se d u po n it s d e te rm inatio n th a t on ly so me of the mate ri a l r e le a se d to Plaintiff is li kely

to contribute sig nificantly to public understanding
. See id. ¶¶ 18, 48. As to the third reque st (FOIA Request Number 948768), the F BI

deter mined that none of the materia l rele ased to Plaintiff is likely to contribute sig nificantly to public understandingof the F BI ’s operations and activities and ther efor e denie d Plaintiff’s reque st in full. See id., Ex . I
. Acc ording ly , the primary issue in dispute is whether the F BI (throug h OI P) corr ectly

deter mined that di sc los ur e of

the ma jor ity of the re le a se d mate ri a ls w ou ld n ot s ig nif ic antl y fu rt he r p ub lic
un de rs tand inga

bo ut t he F B I ’s op e ratio ns and

a c tiv iti e s. 8reque st should be gr anted, at least in part, in two of the thre e instance s at issue—that is, that

Pla int if f h a s me t hi s ini tia l burden of identifying the public interest ser ved in those instance s. Notably , the FB Iis not arguing that the Court should find that Pl aintiff’s r equest for fee waiver s in those instances should have been de nied in full. Moreove r, as the la ng uag e in ea ch of the re qu es t s ati s s u e i s i d en t i ca l an d as th e F BIh as n o tp ro v i d edan y re as o nfo r t re at i n g th e l an gu age differ ently

betwee n the Plaintiff’s three reque sts, there is no support for the contention that Plaintiff’s reque st to the Paris L eg at is sufficient on its fac e as to F OIA Request Number 948769 (whic h w a s p art ia lly

g ra nte d) , b ut n ot a s to F OIA R e qu e st Numb e r 9 48 76 8 ( wh ic h w a s d e nie d in fu ll) . A c c or din g ly , g ive n th at “ un if or mity in F OIA i nte rp re tatio ns wi thi n a g ive n a g e nc y ” is a desired g oal , see O

glesby v . Dep’ t of Army , 920 F.2d 57, 64 ( D.C. Cir. 1990), the Court proce eds wi th t he un de rs tand ingthat th e F B Iha s c on c e de d th a t Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st i n a ll thr e e ins tanc e s is su ff ic ie ntl y de ta ile d to e sta

bli she lig ibi lity

a s a n in iti a l matte r a

nd that th e on ly

iss ue in d isp ute is whether cer tain cate g ories of r elea sed re cords do not spec ifically qualify for the f ee w aiver
. 23 Specifica lly , in denying Plaintiff’ s reque sts for a f ull fee w aiver , the FB Irevie wed the information re lease d to Plainti ff a nd deter mined that various categ ories of material do not qualify for a waiver of duplication fe es. Althoug h the per centa g e of the materia l at issue varie s betwee n
eac h of the thre e F OIA re quests, the FB Iuniformly identified the followingcate g ories of information as inelig ible for a waiver of duplication fe es: (1) material c ontaining substantive content that has be en dete rmined exempt under one or more of the FOIA Exempti ons; (2) materia l that is repetitive of infor mation alrea dy

rele ased to Plaintiff; (3) material that c ontains
on ly a dmi nis tr ativ e inf

or matio n; ( 4) mate ri a l th a t or ig inate s o uts ide the g ov e rnme nt a nd /or is alre ady in the public domain; and (5) material that c ontains information duplicative of material alre ady provided to Plaintiff. See Second Ha rdy Dec l., Ex s. I , N & RR. The FB Ithere fore denied Plaintiff a f

ull waiver of

duplication fee s in all three instanc es. See id. The Court conclude s that the FB I ’s deter mination, however , is based on seve ral fla wed a ssumptions
. First, the F BI

alleg es that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee waiver for duplication of
mate ri a l th a t “ c on sis ts o f r e c or ds the su bs tanti ve c on te nt o f whic h— and the ve ry po rt ion mos t likely to be consider ed for

a fe e wa iver if not exempt—has bee n deter mined to be exempt under24

on e or mor e F OIA e xemp tio ns .” Se c on d H ard y De c l., Ex. Na t 3. Th e Court a g re e s w ith Plaintiff, however , that a re quester’ s FOIA re quest “should be e valuated ba sed on the fa ce of the
re qu e st a nd the re a so ns g ive n b y

the re qu e sto r i n s up po rt

of the wa vie r, ’ n ot o n th e po ssi bil ity that the re cords may

ultimately

be dete rmined to be e x empt from disclosure .” Judicial W atch I, 2005 WL1606915, *5 (interna l quotation marks omitted). The Court is persua ded that “a defe ndant ag ency

cannot ba se a f

ee w aiver deter mination upon anticipated re dactions to the reque sted rec ords . . . bec ause suc h a mane uver ‘ clea rly place s the ca

rt befor e the hor se.’” So. Ut ah W ild e rn ess A lli an c e v . U

.S . B ur e au of L an d M

gm t. , 402 F. Supp.2d 82, 90 (D.D .C. 2005) (q u o t i n g Project on Military Procure ment v. Nav y , 7 10 F . Su

pp . 3 62 , 3 67 (D .D .C. 19 89 ); see also Judicial W

atch, Inc . v. De

p’t of Energy , 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 295 (D.D .C. 2004) (her einaf ter “ Judicial W

atch II ” ) ( “ I t w ou ld b e c on tr ary

to t he e xpre ss p ro vis ion s o f t he F OIA t o ‘invert the bur den of pr oof’ a nd forc e a pla intiff not only to demonstrate that it satisfies the public interest exception ana ly sis and is entitled to a fee waiver , but also to demonstrate that the defe ndant ag ency ’s contemplate d withholdings ar e not prope rly claimed.” ), rev’d in part on other grounds , 412 F.3d 125 ( D.C. Cir. 2005). The F BI urg es that the Court should find to the contra ry beca use, in this inst ance , the FB Ihas alre ady made the w ithholdings in question, and the inv oc a tio n o f c e rt a in F OIA E xemp tio ns is the re fo re no t “ anti c ipate d, ” a s th a t te rm wa s u se d in Southern Utah W

ilderness Alliance and Project on Miliary Procure ment . FB I ’s Opp’n/Reply at 11. First, this distinction i s not one that courts have nec essar ily relied on. See, e .g., Judicial W atch I , 2 00 5 WL

16 06 91 5, at *5 (r e

je c tin g a g e nc y ’s de nia l of fe e wa ive r b a se d o n it s deter mination that most of the re quested doc uments would be exempt, even thoug h exemptions had alr eady

been ma de and pr esente d to the Court for litigation). More importantly , howeve r, theAlthough the DOJ’s own regulations provide that “[t] he disclosure of information that 9 alre ady is in the public domain, in either a duplicative or a substantially identical for

m, would not be as likely

to contribute to such under standing wher e nothing new would be added to the public’s under standing ,” 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(k) (2)( ii), this C ircuit does not def er to a n ag ency ’s interpre tation of the F OIA fe e wa iver provision, Tax Analysts v. IRS, 1 17 F .3 d 6 07 , 6 13 (D .C. Cir. 1997) (dec laringthat “we will not defer to a n ag ency ’s view of

FOIA’s mea

ning . . . [because] the mea

ning of FOIA should be the same no matter whic h ag ency is asked to produc e its re c or ds ” ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ); se e als o J ud ic ial W atc h v . R os so tti , 3 26 F .3 d 1 30 9, 13 13 (D .C. Cir. 2003) (“w e empha siz e that we owe no pa rticular de fer ence to the I RS’s int erpr etation of FOIA”) . Acc ording ly , wher e, as he re, the ag ency ’s re g ulations contradict e stablished prec edent in this C ircuit, the Court is bound to apply the D.C. Circuit’s ca se law—not the a g ency ’s own regulation. 25 fac t that the withholdings in this case w ere made pr ior to the FB I ’s final de cision on the fee waiver reque st is due larg ely

to the FB I ’s sig nificant de lay in ruling on Plaintiff’s a

ppeal, wa iting until J uly of 2008 to issue a de cision as to two of the thre e fe e wa iver re quests. See supra pp. 9- 10, 13-14. The Court is not persua ded that the F BI should benefit fr om its own delay
. Ac c or din g ly , th e Court

fi nd s th at, i n th is i ns tanc e , th e F B Iimp ro pe rl y de te rm ine d th a t c e rt a in
re c or ds are no t qu a lif

ie d f or a fe e wa ive r b e c a

us e the y c on ta in e xemp t mate ri a l. Second, the F BI

alleg es that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee waiver for duplication of materia l that is repetitive of infor mation alrea dy

rele ased to Plaintiff. The D .C. Circuit, however, has made clea

r that an a g ency

may not deny a fe e wa iver for

the copy ing of repe titive, nonduplicative mater ial. Campbell v. DOJ , 1 64 F .3 d 2 0, 36 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 8) . “ A s c ho lar h a s a strong interest in re viewingeac h repe tition of a g iven topic within a file or se t of files to explore the nuanc es and a ssess the manner in which the g overnme nt handled the infor mation.” Id. Acc ording ly , the Court conclude s that the FB Iimproperly deter mined that cer

tain rec ords ar e not qu a lif ie d f or a fe e wa ive r b e c a

us e the y c on ta in r e pe tit ive mate ri a l. 9 Third, the F BI

alleg es that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee waiver for duplication ofAlthough the D.C. Circuit left open the possibility that “[a] differe nt standard mig ht 10 apply to rec ords or files that are uncommonly larg e or that contain only a fe w substantive documents re lative to the volume of a dminist rative infor mation,” Cam

pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 36, n. 16, the FB Ihas not argued that either situation applies here nor does the Court f ind that the files at issue ar e uncommonly

larg e or c ontain relatively littl e substantive information. 26 c e rt a in p a g e s th at c on ta in o nly a dmi nis tr a tiv e inf

or matio n. To the c on tr ary , h ow e ve r, the D. C. Cir c uit ha s o bs e rv e d th at “ the pr e se nc e of a dmi nis tr a tiv e mate ri a l w ith in f ile s th a t a lso c on ta in substantive documents does not justify char g ing f

ees f or copy ing the non-substantive clutter.” Id.

“ Th e fe e wa

vie r p ro vis ion s im

pli c itl y a ssume that va lua

ble g ov e rnme nt i nf

or matio n te nd s n ot t o b e f re e s t an d i n g . . . [ an d ] C o n gre s s p re s u m ab l y d i d n o ti n t en d

age n ci es t o p i ckth ro u gh responsive r ecor ds to determine the pe rce ntag e of the rec ord that conta ins interesting morsels and to deem the r emainder

of the re cords irr eleva

nt to public understanding .” Id. Acc ording ly , the

“ mor e pla us ibl e re a din g of

the statut e is that on c e a

g ive n r e c or d is de e me d to c on ta in inf or matio n w arr anti nga

wa vie r, a ll o f t

he re late d p a g e s w ith in t

hat r e c or d th a t are re sp on siv e to the F OIA r e qu e st f

a ll und e r t

he wa ive r e ve n if

e a c h in div idu a l pa g e wo uld no t in de pe nd e ntl y qualify .” Id. 10 Four th, the FB Ialleg es that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee waiver for duplication of materia l that orig inates outside the g overnme nt, such as var ious published newspape r ar ticles and
ne ws le tte rs , c op ie s o f p ub lic atio ns pr od uc e d b y the or g anizatio ns a t is su e , tr ans c ri pts of a No rt h Vietnamese radio broa dcast, a s well as public stateme nts made by members of

the targ et
o r g an i z a t i o n s , t o n am e a

f e we x amp l e s . B e c a

u s e th e i n f

o r m a t i o no r i g i n a t e s , n o tf

r o mth e F B I, but from outside the g overnme nt, the FB Iurg es the Court to categ orica lly find that the information ca

nnot contribute sig nificantly to the understandingof the F BI ’s oper ations and activities. Plaintiff counters that a categ orica l rule re nderingall documents orig inating f rom27

outside the g overnme nt is il logic al and that in this case , the mater ials do show what information was tar g eted by

the FB Iin its i nvestig ations and how such inf ormation was c ollected. See Pl.’s Reply at 9-10. The Court ultimately

ag ree s with Pl aintiff, as the FB Ihas not direc ted the Court to any persua sive leg al support for its position that all documents orig inating f rom outside the g ov e rnme nt a

re c ate g or ic a lly

ine lig ibl e fo r a

fe e wa ive r, and

the Court

fi nd s th a t su c h a

ru le would be in contra

vention of Cong ress’ ma

ndate that the F OIA’s fe e wa iver provisions should be liberally construed in f

avor of fee waiver s, se e Citi

ze ns for Re sp on sib ili ty

an d E thi cs in W as hingto n v . D e

p’ t of He alt h a nd Hu ma n S e rv s. , 481 F. Supp. 2d 99, 113 (D.D .C. 2006). As
su pp or t f or its a sse rt ion , th e F B Ic ite s to thr e e c a se s, e a c h o f whic h th e Court fi nd s in a pp os ite to the situation at hand. F irst, the FB Icites to Brown v . P ate nt a nd Tra de ma rk

Of f. , 445 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1358-59 (M.D. F la. 2006), in which the plaintiff filed a FOIA re quest seekinga copy of the log kept of a ll lawsuits that had been br oug ht ag ainst the ag ency since a cer tain date. The court de termined that “ [l ]awsuit allegations brought a g ainst the USPTO are not relate d to the USPTO’s identifiable oper ations and ac tiviti es in a c lear and dire ct manner .” Id. at 1359. A listi ngof lawsuits broug ht by third-par ties ag ainst a g overnme nt ag ency is, however , a fa

r cr y from mater ial that, althoug h produce d by a third-pa

rty , was spec ifically

g ather ed and se lected by the FB I . The Court is unpersua ded that this decision has pa rticular r eleva

nce to the material at hand, or that the case supports a categ orica l rule that mater ial orig inating f rom outside the g overnme nt cannot aid public unde rstandingas to g overnme ntal activities. Second, the F BI cites to Judicial W

atch, Inc . v. Re no , No. Civ. A. 00-0723, 2001 WL1902811, *10 (D.D.C. Mar . 20, 2001), in which the c ourt upheld the DO J ’s denial of a fe e wa iver for

repr oduction of letters28

written by

the public to the ag ency

conce rningits handling of the Elian Gonzales matter, f inding that “the letter s themselves do not shed any light on the ope rations and a ctivities of the g overnme nt.” Id. Ag ain, howeve r, the Court is unpersua ded that unsolicited letters from thirdparties to a g overnme nt ag ency are compar able to the mate rials at issue in this case, which wer e dir e c tly targ e te d a

nd c oll e c te d b y

the F B I . N or

do e s th e Court

a g re e that th e de c isi on

su pp or ts a
c a te g or ic a l r

ule de nyinga

fe e wa ive r f

or mate ri a l or ig inatin g fr om o uts ide the g ov e rnme nt. Finally , the FB Icites to S.A. Ludsin & Co. v. SBA , No. Civ. A. 96-2146, 1997 WL337469, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 19, 1997), in which the court uphe ld the denial of a fee waiver

for duplication fee s relatingto rec ords appr aising the value of the ag ency

proper ty . As the subject matter

did not
conce rn the ope rations and a ctivities of the ag ency , the cour t determined the materia ls did not qualify for a fee waiver
. Id. Th e F B Ido e s n ot e xpla in h owthe mate ri a ls at is su e are sim ila r t o
a pp ra isa ls o f g ov e rnme nt p ro pe rt y , n or c an th e Court

se e a log ic a l c onne c tio n b e tw e e n p ro pe rt y appra isals and the mater ials at issue here . Put si mply , none of the case s cited by the FB Isupport its claim that a blanket de nial of a f ee w aiver reque st is appropriate ba sed solely on the fa ct that the mater ials did not originate from the g overnme nt itself. To the contra

ry , the fa ct that re lease d materia l includes various ne wspape rs or broc hures orig inating f

rom third-par

ties does not nece ssarily

prec lude an a g ency

from g rantinga fe e wa iver. Cf. Cam pb e ll , 1 64 F .3 d at 36 (“ [T]he fa c t th a t F B Iwo rk -p ro du c t in c or po ra te s p ub lic ly

ava ila ble inf or matio n d oe s n ot d e tr a c t f

ro m it s v a lue ind e pe nd e nt o f t he so ur c e mate ri a l.” ); Ctr. for Reproce ss Advocac

y, Inc
. v . D e

p’ t of He alt h a nd Hu ma n S e rv s. , 577 F. Supp. 2d 221, 240 (D.D.C. 2008) ( conclusion that information sought conc erne d activities and ope rations undertaken by

the g overnme nt “is not altered by fac t that some of the re lease d documents we re29

brochur es and pa

mphlets submit ted by

private pa

rties”) . In this case, the materials at issue we re
c o l l e c t e d b y th e F B I be c au sethe y

or ig inate fr om t

hir d- pa rt y e nti tie s a nd ind ivi du a ls— i.e. , the
ve ry or g anizatio ns and

ind ivi du a ls the F B Iwa s inve sti g a tin g . T he Court is p e rs ua de d th a t, i n th is instance, infor

mation targ eted a

nd collecte d by

the FB Ias par

t of its investigations into the “pea ce/a nti-war move ment of the 1960’s,” see Th ir d H ard y De c l. ¶ 15 , c an p ro vid e ins ig ht i nto the manner

in which the F BI

conducte d its investigations of these various org anizations and entities. Cf. Ct r. for Medicare A dvocac y , 5 77 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 24 0- 41 (f

ind ingthat th ir d- pa

rt y materia l solicited by

an ag ency

“ca n there fore provide insig ht on the operations and fac tors under
c o n s id e r a ti o nb y

th e a g e n c y ” )
. N o r

d o e s “ th e me r e f

a c t t h a t m a te r ia l i s in

th e p u b li c d o ma in

[] justify denying a

fee wavier ; only

materia l that has met a thre shold level of public dissemination will not further ‘public unde rstanding ’ within the meaningof the fe e wa iver provisions.” Cam pb e ll , 1 64 F .3 d at 37 . A c c or din g ly , th e Court fi nd s th a t, i n th is i ns tanc e , th e F B Iimp ro pe rl y de te rm ine d th at c e rt a in r e c or ds are no t qu a lif ie d f or a fe e wa ive r s ole ly

be c a us e the y c on ta in
mate ri a l or ig inatin g fr om o uts ide the g ov e rnme nt. Finally , the FB Ialleg es that Plaintiff is not entitled to a fee waiver for r eproduc tion of
m at er i al th atco n t ai n s i n fo rm at i o nd u p l i ca t i v e o f m at er i al al re ad y p ro v i d edt o P l ai n t i ff

. Al th o u gh the D.C. Circuit has sug g ested that de nial of a f ee w aiver for c opying duplicate documents may be leg itimate, se e Cam

pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 37, n.17, the Court is not persuaded that the prese nce of du pli c a te mate ri a ls j us tif

ie s th e de nia l of

a fe e wa ive r i n th is i ns tanc e . A s th e D. C. C ir c uit observe d in that same ca se: Con g re ss p re suma

bly did no t inte nd a g e nc ie s to pic k thr ou g h r e sp on siv e re c or ds to deter mine the perc entag e of the re cord that contains interestingmorsels and to dee m the re ma ind e r of the re c or d ir re le va nt to pu bli c un de rs tand ing
. Th e mor e pl aus ib le rea ding of

the statute is that o n ce a gi v en re cord is dee med to contain information30

wa rr anti nga wa ive r, a ll of the re late d pa g e s with in that re c or d that ar e re sp on siv e to the FO I A re quest fal l u n d er t he wa iver e ven if e ach individual pag e would not i n d e p e n d e n t l y qu a l i f

y. Id. at 36. Her e, the F BI

did just what the D.C. Circuit stated Congr ess did not intend— i.e. , conducte d a pag e-by -pag e re view of the materia ls at issue, picking throug h the re cords a nd deter mining which pa

rticular pa g es did and did not qualify for a fee waiver . The Court has alre ady found that the majority

of those dete rminations are based on f alse a ssumptions
. Acc ording ly , the FB Iwrong ly conclude d that most of the materia l at issue does not qualify for a fe e wa ive r, and , g ive n th at c on c lus ion , th e Court do e s n ot a g re e that th e me re pr e se nc e of so me du pli c a tiv e mate ri a ls j us tif

ie s a de nia l of Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st f

or a c omp le te fe e wa ive r i n th is instance. A lthough a

n ag ency may be justified in parsingthroug h the mater ials when the r ecor ds
are “ un c omm on ly

la rg e ” or c on ta in o nly

a fe w s ub sta

nti ve do c ume nts c omp arativ e to t he ov e ra ll volume, see id. at 36, n.16, the mater ials at issue in eac h of these thr ee r equests ar e neither unusually voluminous nor do they

contain only

a fe w substantive documents (pa rticularly g iven the Court’s re

jection of the F BI ’s re asoningas to the other c ateg ories of materials above ). As the leg islative history

of the 1986 F OIA amendme nts make cle ar, the amende d fee waiver provisions should be liberally

construed in f

avor of fee waiver s. See Citizens for Responsibilit y and Ethics in W ashington , 4 81 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 11 3. Ac c or din g ly , “ [t]he pla int if f’ s f e e wa ive r r e qu e st s ho uld have be en eva luated base d on the potential contribution the re quested infor mation would have on the public’s under standing ,” and not on the possibility that some of the doc uments may have been duplicative. See Ctr. for MedicareAdvoc acy, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 240. The Court theref ore denies De fenda

nt FB I ’s Motion for Summary J udg ment and grants Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary J udg ment as to the F BI ’s denial of Plaintiff’s fee waiver

reque sts, and finds thatGi ven th e C ou rt ’s r eso lu ti on of t hi s i ss ue i n fav or o f P lai nt if f on th e bas is th at t he FBI 11 wr on g ly c on c lud e d th at c e rt a in c ate g or ie s o f m a te ri a l are ine lig ibl e fo r a fe e wa ive r i n th is ins tanc e , th e Court

ne e d n ot r e so lve Pla int if f’ s a lte rn a tiv e argume nt t hat O I P ma

y no t ba se its de c isi on on a pp e a l a ff ir min g a de nia l of a fe e wa ive r r e qu e st o n g ro un ds no t pr e vio us ly ra ise d to the re quester. See Pl.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 11. 31 Plaintiff is entitl ed to a c omplete fe e wa iver a s to FOIA Request Number s 948768, 948769, and 963707. 11 B. TheFB

I’ s V au gh n I nd e xis I na de qu ate Pla int if f n e xt ch a lle ng e s th e a de qu a c y of the F B I ’s Vaughn index. Befor e turningto the substance of

Plaintiff’s arguments, howeve r, the Court first pause s to clarify the re lief Plaintiff seeks at this j uncture —an issue that has be en complicated by the FB I ’s re cent suppleme ntation of its Vaughn index. P laintiff, in his moti on for pa rtial summary

judgme nt, initi ally

argued that the
err or rate evidenc ed in the sample Vaughn index demonst rate s that the FB Ilikely made similar
e rr or s in the pr oc e ssi ngof

no n- sampl e do c ume nts , a nd that th e F B Imus t th e re fo re be re qu ir e d to repr ocess a ll responsive docume nts. This argument was ba sed solely on the number of

err ors
e v i d e n c e d

i nth e F B I’ s p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. See Pl.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 15-16. As discussed in more de tail below, howeve r, the pa rties subsequently

deter mined that
sever al categ ories of doc uments that Plainti ff ha d intended to be include d in the Vaughn index had in fa ct, bee n omitted from the index. Se e inf ra pp. 42-43. Ac cording ly , the par ties ag ree d,
w i thth e c o n s e n to f

th e C o urt , th atth e F B I w o u l d f i l e a s u p p l e m e n t ar

y Vaughn index addressing those documents that had be en excluded fr om the preliminary index. See Docke t No. [101]
. Sig nif ic antl y , in fi lin g its su

pp le me nta l Vaughn index, t he F BI acknow ledg ed that it had located additional responsive r ecor ds, but did not i nclude a ll such documents in the supplemental Vaughn index. See id. In response , Plaintiff filed a motion reque sting that the Court re quire the32

FB Ito provide Plaintiff with a complete Vaughn index t hat included a ll additional material
a dd re sse d in the su pp le me nta l Vaughn ind e x, arguin g that he wa s una ble to a de qu a te ly

a dd re ss the merits of the F BI ’s re sponse to his FOIA/PA reque sts without a complete Vaughn index t hat includes all docume nts at issue. See Pl.’s Mot. for Complete Vaug hn Index, Docket No. [105]
. Given that Plaintiff’s motion for an or der r equiringthe FB Ito provide a c omplete Vaughn index appea red to re quest relief

that conflicte d with the relief initially soug ht in his m otion for par tial
summa ry jud g me nt— i.e. , an orde r re quiring the FB Ito reproc ess all re sponsive rec ords—the Court reque sted that Plaintiff clarif y the pre cise re lief he se eks at this juncture in the litig ation. See 3/20/09 Min. Order. Spec ifically , the Court reque sted that Plaintiff clarif y whether he
curr ently seeks: (1) an orde r re quiring the FB Ito re-submit a c omplete Vaughn index t hat includes and a ddresse s all material Plaintiff intended to be included in the sample inde x ; or (2) an orde r re quiring the FB Ito reproc ess all re sponsive rec ords. 3/20/09 Min. Order. A s order ed, Plaintiff subsequently

filed a N otice, in which he advised the Court that, be cause “[t] he mer its of the pa rt ie s’ pe nd ingc ro ss- mot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt c ann ot b e fu lly a dd re sse d unti l a ll
rec ords selec ted for the Vaughn index have either be en vaughned or disclosed,” Plaintiff prese ntly seeks a n order requiringthe FB Ito provide a f ull and complete Vaughn index. See Pl.’s Notice, Docke t No. [108]
. The F BI there afte r filed a

partial opposition to Pl aintiff’s motion for a n order requiring the FB Ito provide a c omplete Vaughn index. See FB I ’s Partial Opp’n, D ocket No. [109]. The FB Iasser ted that, althoug h it does not oppose filing a third Vaughn index t o addre ss the
rema ining doc uments at issue, it does oppose Plaintiff’s re quest to re- submit an index for documents alre ady

addre ssed in the FB I ’s pre vious submis sions. Id. a t 1- 2. Withthi sThe Court notes that it does not intend to prec lude the F BI from providingany 12 additional rele ased doc uments to Pl aintiff in a piec emea l fashion— i.e. , th e F B Imay c on tin ue to rele ase the documents as they are revie wed a

nd proce ssed by

the re levant ag encie s. 33 understandingof the unique pr ocedur al posture of this case, the Court now tur ns to the merits of the par ties’ ar g uments as set for

th in both their cross-motions for summary judgme nt and brief

ing reg ardingPlaintiff’s reque st for a c omplete Vaughn index. Ultimately , the Court conclude s that the Vaughn ind e x sub mitte d b y the F B Iis utte rl y inadequate. As is explained in gr eat de tail below, the F BI has fa iled to provide a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn index t hat ac counts for a ll sample documents Plaintiff intended to be inc lud e d in

the ind e x an d th at a de qu ate ly e xpla ins the F B I ’s wi thh old ing s. Th e Court sh a ll there fore require the FB Ito re-submit a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn ind e x that su ff ic ie ntl y pe rm its bo th t

he Court and Pla int if f t o e va luate the F B I ’s re sp on se s to Pla int if f’ s F OIA/ PA reque sts. The Court firmly reje cts the F BI ’s re quest that it be permitted to submit y et another
su pp le me ntatio n to its Vaughn index. As i s made a bundantly clea r below, the piece meal natur e of the F BI ’s submissions i n this case ha s unnece ssarily confuse d and complicated the matter s at hand. Perha

ps a fur ther supplementation of the Vaughn index would be permissible if the Court ’s on ly

c on c e rn wi th t he F B I ’s Vaughn index was its failure to include the a dditional do c ume nts a t is su e . B ut, a s e xpla ine d b e low , th e F B I ’s pr e vio us ly su bmi tte d in dic e s a

re wh oll y inadequate and f

urther pie ceme al submissions cannot resolve the Court’ s conce rns with the FB I ’s Vaughn index. According ly , the Court shall g rant Plaintiff’s motion for a n order requiring Plaintiff to re-submit a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn in d e x. 12 Mo re ov e r, the Cou

rt a g re e s th a t, u

nti l th e F B Ipr ov ide s a

fi na l Vaughn index, neither the34

Court no r P la int if

f i s in a po sit ion to e va luate the va lid ity

of the F B I ’s wi thh old ing s o r t o proper ly assess whe ther the F BI

must reproc ess all re sponsive rec ords. Acc ording ly , the Court shall deny

without prejudice the parties’ cross-motions for summar y judgme nt as to the repr ocessingof all re sponsive rec ords and the va lidity of the F BI ’s withholdings. Upon
su bmi ssi on of the F B I ’s fi na l Vaughn ind e x, the pa rt ie s ma y , if a pp ro pr iate , r e -f

ile the ir c ro ssmot ion s f or summa ry jud g me nt a s to the se dis c re te iss ue s. 1. L eg al Standard f

or Ade quacy

of Vaughn Index “B eca use of its unique evide ntiary configuration, the ty

pical F OIA ca se ‘distorts the traditional adve rsar

y nature of our leg al sy stem’s form of dispute r esolution.’” Judicial W atch, Inc. v . FDA , 449 F.3d 141, 145- 46 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (he reina fter “ Judicial W

atch III ”) ( quoting King v. DOJ

, 8 30 F .2 d 2 10 , 2 18 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 7) ). “ Whe n a pa rt y su bmi ts a F OIA r e qu e st, it fa c e s an ‘ a sy

mme tr ic a l di str ibutio n o f k no wl e dg e ’ whe re the a g e nc y a lon e po sse sse s, re vie ws , discloses, and withholds the subject matter of the re quest.” Id. (qu o t i n g King , 830 F.2d at 218). Ac c or din g ly , th e F OIA p la c e s th e burd e n o n th e a g e nc y to e sta bli shits ri g ht t o w ithho ld information under

one of the enumer ated F OIA Exempti ons. Id. Anage n cy m ay d o s o th ro u gh producinga Vaughn ind e x, wh ic h is an a ff ida vit that in de xes a

nd sp e c if ic a lly de sc ri be s w ithhe ld
or re dacte d documents and e x plains why eac h withheld rec ord is exempt from disclosure. King , 830 F.2d at 219. The index thus helps restore the nor mal adver sarial ba lance by “for c[ing] the g ov e rnme nt t o a

na ly ze c are fu lly

any mate ri a l w ithhe ld, ” the re by e na bli ng“ the tr ia l c ourt

to f ulf ill its duty of ru lin g on the a pp lic a bil ity of the e xemp tio n” and

e na bli ng“ the a dv e rs ary

sy ste m to operate by

g iving the r equeste r as much inf ormation as possible, on the basis of which he c an prese nt his case to the tria l court.” Keys v. D OJ , 830 F.2d 337, 349 ( D.C. Cir. 1987) (interna l35

quotation marks and c itation omit ted). As the D. C. C ir c uit

ha s ma de c le ar, “ it i s th e fu nc tio n, no t th e fo rm , o f t

he ind e x that is important.” Id. “Any

measure will adequate ly

aid a c ourt if it ‘provide[s] a re latively detailed justification, specifica lly

identif[ies] the re asons why a par ticular e x emption is relevant a nd
corr elat[es] t hose cla ims with t he par ticular pa rt of a w ithheld document to which they apply .’” Judicial W

atch III , 4 4 9 F. 3 d at1 4 6 (qu o t i n g Me ad

Da ta , 566 F.2d at 251). Whil e ther e is no set form for a Vaughn ind e x, the D. C. C ir c uit ha s n ote d thre e imp or

tant e le me nts fo r a

n a de qu a te Vaughn ind e x: (1 ) t

he ind e x sho uld

be on e do c ume nt t

hat is c omp le te in i tse lf

, ( 2) the ind e x must adequately

descr ibe the withheld docume nts or deletions, (3) the index m ust state the par ticular FOIA exemption, and expl ain why the exemption applies. Founding Church of Scientology v. Be ll , 603 F.2d 945, 949 ( D.C. Cir. 1979). As is p art ic ula

rl y re le va nt h e re , “ [r]e pr e se ntativ e sampl ingis a n a pp ro pr iate pr oc e dure to test an ag ency ’s FO I A exemption claims when a lar g e number of docume nts are involved.” Bo nn e r v . D e

p’ t of Sta te , 928 F.2d 1148, 1151 ( D.C. Cir. 1991). “Repre sentative sampling
a llo ws the c ourt

and the pa rt ie s to re du c e a

vo lum ino us F OIA e xemp tio n c a se to a mana g e a ble number of items that c an be e valuated individually throug h a Vaughn index or an in c am e ra ins pe c tio n. I f t

he sampl e is w e ll- c ho se n, a c ourt c an, wi th s ome c on fi de nc e , ‘ e xtra po late its conclusions from the r epre sentative sample to the la rg er group of withheld mate rials.’” Id. (q u o t i n g Fensterwald v. CIA , 4 43 F . Su pp . 6 67 , 6 69 (D .D .C. 19 77 )) ; se e als o M e e ro po l v . M e ese , 790 F.2d 942, 958 ( D.C. Cir. 1986). Howeve r, the D.C. Circuit has c autioned that “the technique will y ield satisfac tory

results only

if . . . the docume nts in the sample are treated in a consistent
manner .” Bonner , 928 F.2d at 1151
.36 2. Ad e qu a c y

of the F B I ’s Vaughn Index Th e F B I ’s Vaughn index i s, in a word, inade quate. As e x plained above , the par ties ag ree d to proce ed with their c ross-motions for summary judgme nt based upon a sample—selec ted by

Plaintiff—of the docume nts withheld in full or in part by the FB I
. See 3/21/07 J oint St atus Report, Doc ket No. [34] at 4; 10/24/07 J oint St atus Report, Doc ket No. [41]
a t2
. O nJ un e 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 , th e F B I f i l e d w h a ti tc h a

r a c t e r i z e d a s i t s p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn in d e x, which consists of: (1) H ardy ’s first dec laration, in which he explains the ge nera l coded f ormat
e mpl oy e d in

the ind e x; an d ( 2) 20 0- plu s p a g e s o f r e da c te d mate ri a l pr e vio us ly re le a se d to Plaintiff ( i.e. , th e mate ri a l se le c te d b y Pla int if f f or inc lus ion in t he ind e x, pe r t

he pa rt ie s’ ag ree ment). See Prelim. Vaughn Index, Docket No. [68] . The F BI did not, however , provide a ny
c o mp r e h e n s i v e l i s t i n g o f

th e p a g e s i n c l u d e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index nor corre late the d o c u m e n t s p r o v i d e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index wit h the documents sele cted by Plaintiff. Acc ording ly , there was no wa y to independently

confirm that a ll of the documents sele cted by Pla int if f a re , in fa c t, i nc lud e d in

the ind e x, a

bs e nt a pa g e -b y -p a g e re vie w o f t he do c ume nts in conjunction with the Plaintiff’s orig inal letter indicating whic h documents had be en sele cted f or inclusion in the index . Compounding this difficulty is the fac t that, although the majority of the
m a t e r i a l i nth e p r e l i m i n ar y Vaughn index i s bates stamped, a minority of the pa g es ar e not numbere d and the index itself often skips sever al pag es without expl anation ( e.g. , the index ski ps from docume nt numbered “ S-69” to document number ed “S-75” with no indication of what pag es ar e not included or why such pag es have been omitted). A s will be discussed in g reater detail below, it is now evident that the F BI had, in fa ct, inadver

tently omitted documents from th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaugn ind e x—a

fa c t th a t w a s n ot i mme diate ly a pp are nt, ho we ve r, du e larg e ly to37

the index’s unstructured org anization. In f i l i n g th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn i n d ex , th e F BIex p l ai n edth ati two u l d b e p ro v i d i n g a “fina l and complete” Vaughn index wit h its mot ion for summary judgme nt. See id., Att. 1 (Notice of F iling). When the F BI filed its Motion on J uly

29, 2008, howeve r, it did not provide a compre hensive index as promised. Rather, the FB Iprovided the Court with a se cond dec laration f r o mH ar dy, w h i c hm e r e l y r e f e r s b a c k t o an d i n c o r p o r a t e s th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. See Second Ha

rdy Dec l. The Court may

have pe rhaps ove rlooked the F BI ’s fa ilure to provide a single , compre hensive index, as is require d under Founding Church of Scientology , so long a s the documents tog ether

fulfilled the nec essar

y functions of a Vaughn index—t hat is, “ena ble[d] the cour t and the opposingparty

to understand the w ithheld information in order to a ddress the merits of the c laimed exemption.” Judicial W atch III , 4 49 F .3 d at 15 0. Th e F B I ’s Vaughn index, however, fa ils to do so for severa l rea sons. Most significa

ntly , Har dy ’s sec ond decla ration provides no f

unctional desc ription of the materia ls withheld, other than re fer encingthe Court and Plaintiff bac k to the reda cted ve rsions of th e m a t e r i a l p r o v i d e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. Alt houg h the D.C. Circuit has appr oved the use of similarly

structure d Vaughn indices, in which a n ag ency submits copies of the re dacte d materia ls in coded for

mat supplemented by

ag ency aff idavits, the Circuit has cautioned that ag encie s must keep in mind the functional purpose of the Vaughn index, as discussed above. See id. at 146-47, 150. Indeed, a s the D.C. Circuit observed in e valuatinga similarly -structure d Vaughn in d e x: Utiliz ation of re productions o f mater ial rele ased to supply contextual information a bo ut m ate ri a l w ithhe ld i s c le arl y per mis sib le , b ut c a

uti on sh ou ld b e e xer c ise d in re so rt ingto t

his me tho d o f d e sc ri pti on . Su c h a sy ste m is on ly a s g oo d a s it s r e su lts ,As will be discussed below, the FB Ilater e x plains that the bates stampe d numbers used 13 i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index do not nece ssarily corr espond with the bate s stamped numbers used in Har dy ’s sec ond decla ration. See infra pp. 39-41. He re, it is appar ent upon re view of the p a g e s a ti s s u e th atth e F B I i nf a c tm e an tp a g e s 7 7 , 7 8 , an d 7 9 o f th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index, as pag e 80 does not indicate that any materia l has bee n withheld pursuant to FO I A Exempti on 1.

38 and the vital re sult must be an a dequate repr esentation of context which, when combined with desc riptions of deletions, enable s de novo re view of the propriety of wi thhol di ng. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , th e sy ste m is ina de qu a te be c a us e we are le ft

wi th no c on te xtua l de sc ri pti on fo r d oc ume nts or

su bs tant ia l po rt ion s o f d oc ume nts w it h h e ld in th e ir e n ti r e ty , anim

p e r mi s s ib le r e s u lt

a s lo n g a s r e v e lati o n o f th e c o n te xt w o u l d n o ti t s e l f h ar mth e n at i o n a l s e c ur i ty. King , 830 F.2d at 221. Her e, howe ver, the Vaughn index does not uni formly provide suff

icient contextual inf or matio n a bo ut t he mate ri a l w ithhe ld. F ir st, wh e re the F B Iha s w ithhe ld d oc ume nts in t he ir entirety , the Vaughn index fails to provide any descr iption of such documents. F or example, H ar dy e x p l a i n s th atc e rt a i np a g e s h av e b e e nw i th h e l d i nth e i r e n t i r e ty p ur s u an tt o F O IA Ex emption 1 beca

use they contain information classified “se cre t” by a for eig n g overnme nt. See S e c o n d H ar dy D e c l
. ¶

9 0
. B u tth e s e p a g e s ar e n o ti n c l u d e d i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index (as they are withheld in full), and Ha rdy ’s sec ond decla

ration does not provide any functional descr iption of the documents themselves. See id. Acc ording ly , both the Court and Plaintiff are le ft wi tho ut s uf

fi c ie nt i nf or matio n to de te rm ine wh e the r t he mate ri a l is pr op e rl y

wi thh e ld i n f

ull or whe ther re asonably

seg reg able por

tions of non-exempt information could be re lease d. Second, eve n wher e information has been only partially withheld, such that the F BI has provided a

partially reda cted doc ument for r efe renc e, the r elea sed text of the documents does not alway s provide suff

icient context to evaluate the w ithheld material. F or example, Har dy explains th a tth e F B I h a s w i th h e l d m at e r i a l f

r o mp a g e s 7 8 , 7 9 , an d

8 0 o f th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index 13SeePrelim. Vaughn Index, “S-77 through S-79.” 39 pursuant to FO I A Exempti on 1 beca use the mate rial conta ins information naming intelligenc e components of a

specific fore ign g overnme nt and/or information provided by those components. See Second Ha

rdy Dec l. ¶ 88. Refe renc e to those pag es, howe ver, shows only that larg e swaths of information have bee n withheld. SeePrelim. Vaughn Index, “S-77 through S-79.” Indeed, pag es 78 and 79 c ontain no substantive unreda cted infor mation at all. See id. Acc ording ly , mere
re fe re nc e to t

he do c ume nts do e s n ot, in t his ins tanc e , p ro vid e the Court or Pla int if f w ith sufficie nt information as to the ac tual materia l withheld. Nor ca n the Court deter

mine whether any rea sonably

seg reg able por

tions of non-exempt information could be re lease d. On top of the F B I ’s fa ilure to a de qu a te ly de sc ri be the do c ume nts a t is su e , th e F B Ia lso
a c kn ow le dg e s in

its Mo tio n f

or Summary

Judg me nt t

hat, i n r e -r e vie wi ngthe sampl e do c ume nts for pr epar ation of the Vaughn ind e x, the F B Ide te rm ine d th a t po rt ion s o f 2 5 p a g e s o f p re vio us ly rele ased material ha d been imprope rly reda cted, a

nd that such mater ials must therefor e be r erele ased to Plaintiff with the cor rec t withholdings. See FB I ’s MSJ at 10
. Sig nif ic antl y , d e sp ite admitting that it had invoked imprope r F OIA exemptions i n the first instance , the FB Idoes not provide a ny explanation in it s openingmemorandum a s to why the orig inal reda ctions were incorre ct. See id. Indeed, it wa s Plainti ff, r ather than the F BI , who first provided the Court with information reg ardingthe nature of the re -re lease d materia l at issue. In his Cross-Motion, P laintiff desc ribes
sever al examples of the mater ial that the FB Ihad orig inally reda cted in er

ror a nd which wa s rerele ased to Plaintiff. See Pl.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n at 15-17

. For example, Plainti ff e x plains that40

in s ome of

the do c ume nts re -r e le a se d b y the F B I , th e F B Iha d c ha ng e d it s w ithho ldi ng s to re le a se the name s o f p e op le lis te d in pu bli sh e d p amph le ts o r who we re lis te d a s p ub lic sp e ake rs a t pu bli c events. Id. at 16 . A s ano the r e xamp le , Pl a int if f n ote s th a t th e F B Ire -r e le a se d a do c ume nt i n which it had orig inally

withheld Plaintiff’s own name f rom rele ase. Id. Finally , in perha ps the
mos t pu zzlin g inc ide nt, Pla int if f e xpla ins that th e F B Ire -r e le a se d a do c ume nt t

hat ha d o ri g ina lly been pr ovided to Plaintiff with almost all i nformation re dacte d, save f or two lines of text in t he middle of the docume nt; when the F BI re- rele ased the document to Plaintiff, howeve r, it relea sed the entire document, but for the two lines that had initially been r elea sed and which ar e now reda cted. Id. I t w a s o nly

a ft e r P la int if

f h ig hli g hte d th e se e rr or s th a t th e F B Ima de a ny a tte mpt to explain it s rea sons for re -re leasingadditional portions of the 25 pag es of mate rial discussed
a b o v e . S p e c i f

i c a l l y, i n f i l i n g i t s O p p o s i t i o n/ R e p l y, th e F B I a t t a c h e d a th i r d d e c l ar a t i o nb y H ar dy, in which Har dy

aver s that the FB I“conduc ted additional re sear ch of third- party names whic h appea red in the doc uments, and conc luded that ce rtain of these individuals were e ither dec ease d
or we re a tte nd e e s at la

rg e c onve nti on s o r m e e tin g s, and a s a re su lt, dis c los ur e wo uld

no t vi olate the ir pe rs on a l pr iva c y .” Th ir d H ard y De c l. ¶ 6. Sig nif ic antl y , h ow e ve r, Ha

rd y do e s n ot e xpla in why thi s in fo rm atio n w a s n ot p re vio us ly ava ila ble or wh e the r f

ur the r r e se arc h w ou ld b e lik e ly to
uncover additional improper r edac tions of third-party names in other doc uments. In addition, Har dy does not offe r any

explanation or discussion of the other spe cific mistakes a nd inconsistencies identified by Plaintiff as examples in his C ross-Motion/Opposition ( i.e. , withholding er

rors that did not relate to third-par ty names). Finally , on top of these e rror s, Hardy ’s third dec laration highlig hts severa l additional41

mistakes and inconsistencie s. First, Ha rdy admits that the FB Ialso made se vera l additional
e rr or s in its or ig ina l r e da c tio ns ( i.e. , over a nd above those identified in the 25 pag es of r erele ased material), see Th ir d H ard y De c l. ¶ 18 , n . 5 & 6, but a g a in f

a ils to a de qu a te ly

e xpla in why the orig inal reda ctions were in error . For example, Hardy

states that, “[a]fter fur

ther re view, i th as al s o b ee nd et erm i n edth at[ FO I A E x em p t i o n7 (D )] n o l o n ger ap p l i es t o Ba t es s t am p edp age 13,” but he pr offe rs no explanation as to why that exemption no l ong er a pplies. See id. , ¶ 18, n. 6. Second, Ha

rdy admits that the FB Ihad inadve rtently omitted certa in documents from the justification portion of his second dec laration and that the FB Ihas bee n unable to locate seve ral bates stamped pa g es that ar e listed in Hardy ’s sec ond decla ration. See id. , ¶ 18, n. 7, n. 8. Third, Har dy explains t hat “tec hnologic al and a dminist rative g litches” in proc essing the re sponsive documents cr eate d discrepa ncies be tween the bates number s in the reda cted doc uments produce d t o P l a i n t i f

f ( an d w h i c hw e r e i n c l u d e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn ind e x), a

nd the bate s numb e rs in the ver sion of the documents re lied upon by Har dy in his second dec laration. See Third Har dy Dec l. ¶ 18 & n. 4. As a re sult, the bates numbers use d on the documents in the pre liminary Vaughn index do not nece ssarily corr espond to the bate s numbers re fer ence d in Hardy ’s sec ond decla ration. See id. In other wor ds, when Ha rdy explains i n his second dec laration that i n f o r m a t i o ni s w i th h e l d

f r o m , f o r e x amp l e , p a g e 3 9 o f

th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn ind e x pur su ant t o F O IA E x e mp t i o n7 ( D ) , h e i nf a c ti s r e f e r e n c i n g p a g e 3 2 o f

th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. See id. ¶ 18. In an appa

rent e ffor t to address this issue, Har dy provides a c hart in his third decla ration th a tc o r r e l a t e s th e b at e s nu mb e r s u s e d i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn ind e x with

tho se us e d in

his second de clar ation. See id. The proble m with this char t, however , is twofold. First, Har dy provides this information only for those doc uments for whic h withholdings we re ma de pursua nt42

to FOIA Exempti on 7(D). See id. No similar information is provided for withholdings made pursuant to the other

FOIA Exempti ons, such that the Court has no wa y of knowingwhat documents the F BI

is in fact re fer

ringto in the second Ha

rdy decla ration whe n it discusses other F OIA E xemp tio ns . Se c on d, in o rd e r t o u se the F B I ’s Vaughn ind e x, the Court mus t c ro ssr e f e r e n c e th e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index wit h Har dy ’s sec ond and third dec larations—and even then the Court ca

nnot be sure it is ref

ere ncingthe cor

rec t documents. That is, rathe r than resubmit a compr ehensive and cor rec tly labeled Vaughn index, t he F BI mere ly provides y et another supplemental dec laration, improperly shifting the bur den of sor ting through the abunda

nt inconsistencies in the F BI ’s submissions t o the Court and Plaintiff. As c on fu sin g a s th e F B I ’s ple a din g s a re a t th is p oint, t

he sit uatio n d e te ri or a te s f

ur the r s til l when Plaintiff files his Reply and (be latedly

) advises the FB Ithat not all of the docume nts he had selec ted for inc lusion in t he Vaughn i n d e x ar e , i nf a c t , i n c l u d e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. Pl.’s Reply

at 15-16. Plaintiff identifies seve ral c ateg ories of doc uments that he intended to be included in the index, but which were not. See id. For ex amp le, P lai nt if f no tes th at t he FBI i n c l u d e d c o p i e s o f th e o u t s i d e o f

v ar i o u s e n v e l o p e s i ni t s p r e l i m i n ar y Vaughn index, but that Plaintiff had ac tually

intended the F BI

to include—not the enve lopes themselves (which do not contain any

reda cted infor

mation)—but rather

the classifie d enclosure s contained inside the envelope s. See id. at1 5 ( r e f e r e n c i n g p a g e s S
- 1 3 1 , S
- 1 6 4 , an d S
- 1 7 5 i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index). In r e sp on se , th e F B Ifi le d a n uno pp os e d mo tio n to su pp le me nt i ts Vaughn index, i n which th e F B I a c kn o w l e d g e d

th atc e rt a i nd o c u m e n t s w e r e n o ti n c l u d e d i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn indexTh e Court no te s th at, i n a dd iti on

to t ho se do c ume nts no te d b y Pla int if f, the F B Ia lso 14 indicates that it discover ed, upon its own revie w, that an a dditional “12 pag es we re [also] un int e nti on a lly

omi tte d f ro m it s Vaughn index.” Fourth Ha rdy Dec l. ¶ 13. 43 as Plaintiff had a

ppare ntly intended. See F B I ’s Un op po se d M ot. to S up ple me nt Vaughn In d e x,

14 Docke t No. [101] . The F BI asser ts, however , that the fa

ult lies with P laintiff, bec ause he did not initially make c lear

what docume nts he wante d included in the sample Vaughn index, waiting until his Reply

to clarify his intentions. Id. at 2-3. Althoug h fault for this mi sunderstandingmay lie with both parties, the Court emphasizes that it should have bee n immediately appar ent to the F B Ithat so me thi ngwa s amis s w he n it inc lud e d c op ie s o f e nv e lop e s ( and oth e r m a te ri a l) in i ts p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index t hat contain no r edac ted mater ial—as it makes little sense to include a fully rele ased doc ument in a Vaughn ind e x, wh ic h p ur po se is t o e xpla in w ithho ldi ng s ma de in documents that have been r edac ted pursuant to var ious FOIA Exempti ons. Ultimately , the FB I —not Plainti ff—ha s the burden of producingan ade quate Vaughn ind e x, and the F B Iwo uld have be en better

serve d to have pr oactively resolved a

ny potential miscommunications over the
sampl e c on te nt pr ior to s ub mis sio n o f t he ind e x to th e Court . N o n e th e l e s s , b e c a

u s e th e p art i e s a g r e e d

th a tth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index ex cludes
cer tain documents that Plaintiff had intende d be included, the Court permitted the F BI to file a
c or re c te d in de x, wh ic h w a s su bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d o n M arc h 6 , 2 00 9, a lon g wi th H ard y ’s fi ft h decla ration. See F B I ’s Sup ple me nta l Vaughn Ind e x, Do c ke t N o. [103 ]. Signif ic antl y , in so do ing , th e F B Iinf

or me d th e Court

that it ha d r e vie we d 2 55 pa g e s o f m a te ri a l r e sp on siv e to Plaintiff’s reque st. Fifth Har dy Dec l. ¶ 5. Of those 255 pa g es, Ha rdy explains t hat the F BI

had de c ide d to : ( 1) re le a se to P la int if f a n a dd iti on a l 92 pa g e s, out of wh ic h 2 1 p a g e s w e re re le a se d in44

full and 71 pag es we re r elea sed in part with information withheld pursuant to FOIA Exempti ons 1, 6, 7(C) and 7( D); (2) withhold one pag e in its entirety ; (3) re fer three pag es to another g overnme nt ag ency

for dire ct re sponse to Plaintiff; and (4) r efe r 159 pag es to other g overnme nt ag encie s for c onsultation. Id. The Court is particula rly troubled by

this belated announc ement that—months after the principal brie fingon the par ties’ cr oss-motions was completed—a substantial amount of materia l is now being rele ased w ith redac tions to P laintiff and/or r efe rre d to o the r a g e nc ie s f

or pr oc e ssi ng . M or e tr ou

bli ngsti ll i s th e F B I ’s fa ilure to a de qu a te ly e xpla in why the additional mater ial is just now being pr ocesse d and re lease d. For example, it appear s that the FB Ideter

mined that some of this material should be r elea sed bec ause it is no longe r proper ly classified a s “Top Secr et.” See Fifth Ha rdy Dec l. ¶¶ 8, 9. Ha

rdy does not explain, ho we ve r, the re a so ns fo r t he F B I ’s de te rm inatio n th a t th e inf or matio n is no lon g e r p ro pe rl y withheld under F OIA or a ssure the Court that other documents re viewed do not c ontain simil ar classification error s. Although the rele ase of

so much additional materia l, without adequate e x planation, is the most troubling deve lopment, other examples of worr isome inconsistencies abound in Ha rdy ’s fifth dec laration. For e x ample, ac cordingto Hardy ’s fifth dec laration, the FB Ihas now re lease d te n a dd iti on a l pa g e s o f m ate ri a l ( la be le d p a g e s “ S2- 18 1 thro ug h S2 -1 90 ” ) r e late d to do c ume nt S
91 (otherw ise ref

err ed to as doc ument number 42), which was or igina lly included in the p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index. See Fifth Ha rdy Dec l. ¶ 6. In turn, ref

ere nce to the pr eliminary Vaughn index demonst rate s that S-91 is a “dele te shee t” that was or igina lly provided to Plaintiff t o a dv i s e h i mth ato n e p a g e o f i n f o r m a t i o ni s b e i n g w i th h e l d

b y th e F B I p ur s u an tt o F O IA Ex emption 1. See Prelim. Vaughn Ind e x (S- 91 ). Gi ve n th a t S- 91 or ig ina lly ind ic a te d th a t on ly45

one under lying pa g e of infor mation was withheld, the fa ct that the F BI has now re lease d an
a dd iti on a l te n p a g e s o f m ate ri a l th at it a sse rt s r e late to t

his do c ume nt—

wi tho ut e xplanatio n— is
conce rning
. As a fi na l no te on

the F B I ’s su

pp le me nta l Vaughn index, t he Court observe s that the index, i n its “final and c omplete” f orm, is spread out ove r five se parate filing s. In an appa rent eff ort to aid the Court and Plaintiff, Ha rdy ’s fifth dec laration provides y et another char t
c o r r e l a t i n g th e b at e s s t amp e d p a g e nu mb e r s a s u s e d

i nth e p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn ind e x with

tho se
us e d in the Marc h 6 , 2 00 9 s up ple me nta l Vaughn ind e x, and wi th t he do c ume nts or ig ina lly selec ted by

Plaintiff for inclusion in the Vaughn index. See id. ¶¶ 6, 12 . A c c or din g ly , in

or de r t o fully utiliz e the F BI ’s index, the Court and Plainti ff must g ather all five de clar ations, the p r e l i m i n ar

y Vaughn index and the corre lation char ts provided by

Har dy as we ll as Plainti ff’ s initial letter to the FB Ilisti ng out which documents he wanted inc luded in the Vaughn index, and then attempt to asce rtain what documents the F BI ref ers to in its discussions. I t is not, however, the Court ’s duty

to s if t thro ug h mu lti ple fi lin g s a nd inc on sis te nt b a te s st ampe d d oc ume nts in
or de r t o d e te rm ine wh at in fo rm atio n th e F B Iwi thh e ld a nd why . T he F B I ’s su g g e sti on that it pr ov ide y e t ano the r p ie c e me a l su pp le me ntatio n o f i ts Vaughn index i s simply unacc eptable. Rather, the F OIA place s the burden on the ag ency to establish its right to withhold information under one of the e numerated FO I A exemptions. Judicial W atch III , 449 F.3d at 145-46. “ Whil e the cour t understands that these require ments are an administrative bur den on the a g ency , any le sse r s tand ard

of c omp lia nc e wo uld

no t satis fy

thi s c ir c uit ’s re qu ir e me nts and F OIA’ s p oli c y

‘i n favor of the fullest possible disclosure of g overnme nt rec ords.’” Cam pa ign for Re sp on sib le Transplant ation v. Fed. Drug Adm in. , 219 F. Supp. 2d 106, 116 (D.D .C. 2002) (quoting46

Founding Church of Scientology , 603 F.2d at 949). The Court nee d not burden itself fur ther cata logingthe litany

of unexplained inconsistencies a nd err ors evidenc ed in the F BI ’s filing s and Vaughn ind e x, a s th e po int is c le ar—

the ind e x is w ho lly

ina de qu a te and

ri dd le d w ithc ountl e ss examples of mistakes and other incong ruities. Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant Plaintiff’s motion and shall re quire the F BI to provide both the Court and Plaintiff with a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn ind e x that c omp lie s w iththi s Court ’s Me mor and

um O pin ion

and , in pa rt ic ula r, the g uid e lin e s se t f

or th b e low . In a dd iti on , in light of the Court’s deter

mination that the FB Imust provide a complete Vaughn index before either the Court or Plaintiff can pr operly evaluate the F BI ’s withholdings a nd its processingof the sample re cords, the Court sha ll deny without prejudice the parties’ cross-motions as they pe rt a in t o th e me ri ts o f t

he F B I ’s wi thh old ing s a

nd Pla int if f’ s r e qu e st t

hat th e F B Ibe re qu ir e d to repr ocess a ll responsive docume nts. Finally , the par ties are require d to meet and c onfer and submit a joint status report, by no later tha

n April 17, 2009, sug g esting a sche dule for the FB I ’s
su bmi ssi on of a fi na l Vaughn index and, as appropr iate, for the subsequent f

iling of dispositive motions wit h respe ct to the merits of the F BI ’s withholdings.

3. Inf

or matio n to be Inc lud e d in

the F B I ’s Vaughn Index Although the Court does not rea ch the mer its of the FB I ’s withholdings in lig ht of the dis po sit ion

of the c ur re nt c ro ss- mot ion s, the Court no te s se ve ra l is su e s th a t th e F B Iis a dv ise d to
c on sid e r whe n s ub mittin g its fi na l Vaughn ind e x. F ir st, the F B I ’s fi na l Vaughn ind e x must fu lly
acc ount for all sample doc uments at issue and must include all docume nts in a single, compre hensive index that is complete in itself. See Founding Church of Scientology , 603 F.2d at 949. To the extent any

confusion re mains over the e x act doc uments that Plainti ff intends to be47

included in the Vaughn index, t he par ties are advised to conf

er pr ior to the submission of a final Vaughn index t o ensure that all documents ar e, in fa ct, ac counted f or in the index. The index must also adequate ly

descr ibe the withheld docume nts or deletions, as we ll as state the par ticular FOIA exemption, and expl ain why the exemption applies. Id. Se c on d, the fi na l Vaughn index m ust adequately explain all inconsist encie s and er rors identified in the proc essing of the sample doc uments. In particula r, for any documents that ar e a part of the repr esentative sample and that were orig inally withheld but have since been r elea sed (whe ther in par

t or in whole), the F BI

“should explain why

the once withheld portions were excised at the time of the a g ency ’s initial review.” Se e Bo nn e r v . D e p’ t of Sta te , 928 F.2d 1148, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Third, as this Court has previously explained, “[u] nder D .C. Circuit prece dent, an a g ency invoking F OIA Exempti on 7(C) [or Ex emption 6] must make ‘a r easona ble ef fort to asc erta in life status,’ and the a g ency ’s ef forts in that respe ct speak to the rea sonablene ss of its response to a FOIA re quest.” Schoenm an v. FBI , 5 7 5 F. S u

p p . 2 d 1 6 6 , 1 7 7 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Schrec ker v. DOJ , 349 F.3d 657, 662 ( D.C. Cir. 2003) (her einaf ter “ Schrec ker I

I ” )) ; see also Schoe nman v. FBI , 576 F. Supp. 2d 3, 10 (D.D .C. 2008) (ag ency “is requir ed to make e ffor ts to ascer tain an ind ivi du a l’ s li fe status be fo re inv ok inga pr iva c y int e re st i n c onne c tio n w ithF OIA E xemp tio ns 6
and 7( C) ” ). Ind e e d, a lth ou g h th e F B I ’s Vaughn index currently does not speak to this issue, the FB Iappar ently

conce des the life status of an individual is releva nt, give n the fa ct that it rerele ased por

tions of materials base d upon its conclusion, after additional rese arc h, “that ce rtain of these individuals wer e [] dece ased . . ., a nd as a r esult, disclosure would not violate their pe rsonal privac y .” Third Ha

rdy Dec l. ¶ 6. Acc ording ly , the Court advises the F BI that it must , in theBy contra st, so long as a

n ag ency amply explains i ts reasoning , an ag ency may reda ct 15 the identity

of an individual under

FOIA Exempti ons 1 and 7(d) reg ardle ss of whethe r the individual is alive. Se e Sc hr e c k e r I , 1 4 F . Su pp . 2 d at 11 8; see also Schre cke r II , 254 F.3d at 376. 48 future, a ddress its eff

orts to asce rtain “life status” in invoking F OIA Exempti ons 6 and 7(C). 15 F ourt h, a s th e F B Ia c kn ow le dg e s, in o rd e r t o invo ke F OIA E xemp tio n 7 , it mus t f ir st demonstrate that the rec ords at issue we re c ompiled for law e nforc ement purpose s. See Schoenm an v. FBI

, 575 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.D .C. 2008) (CKK). A dmittedly , wher e an
a g e nc y “ sp e c ia lize s in

law e nf or c e me nt, its de c isi on

to i nv ok e e xemp tio n 7 is e nti tle d to defe renc e.” Cam

pb e ll , 164 F.3d at 32. Never theless, the “de fer ential” standa rd of r eview that the Court applies to this determination is not “vacuous.” Id. Instead, the a g ency ’s dec larations “must establish a rational ‘nexus between the inve stigation and one of the ag ency ’s law
e nf or c e me nt d

uti e s, ’ a nd a c onne c tio n b e tw e e n a

n ‘ ind ivi du a l or

inc ide nt a

nd po ssi ble se c ur ity risk or violation of fe dera l law.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Pratt v. W ebster , 673 F.2d 408, 420- 21 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). As the D.C. Circuit ex plained in Cam pb e ll , “[t] he fa ct that information is stored in a [doc ume nt] w ithan o ff

ic ia l- so un din g la

be l is ins uf

fi c ie nt s tand inga lon e to u ph old nondisclosure;” “ [a] t a minimum, t he [ag ency] m ust demonstrate the r elationship betwee n a
rec ord and its label a

nd betwee n the label a

nd a law e nforc ement purpose .” Id. The Court thus adv is es t hat , al th ou gh it has pro vi dedso me e x pl anat io n as to th is th res ho ldqu est io n, th e FBI would benef

it from a more detailed e x planation in line with D.C. Circuit case law
. F if th a nd fi na lly , th e Court

no te s th a t, d e sp ite Pla int if f’ s r e pe a te d r e qu e sts fo r a c omp le te
acc ounting of

all materia l refe rre d to other ag encie s for re sponse, the F BI has not y et ac counted for a ll refe rre d materia l. Although the F BI submitt ed an a ccountingin Hardy ’s third dec laration,49

the ac counting does not indicate when the r efe rra ls were made, what documents wer e re fer red, and what documents have not y et bee n proce ssed. See T h i r d H ar dy D e c l
. ¶

¶ 8
- 1 2
. A c c o r d i n g l y, the F B Imus t pr ov ide a

c omp le te a c c ounti ngof

a ll r e fe rr a ls m a de and

ind ic a te wh e the r a ll documents so re fer

red ha ve bee n proce ssed and r elea sed to Plaintiff, as appr opriate. C. The Reasonablene ss of the FBI’s Se arch Finally , the FB I , in its Mot ion for Summary J udg ment, also moves for summar y judgme nt as to the ade quacy

of its searc h, arguing that the FB Iconducte d a re asonable sear ch for responsive r ecor ds. See De f. ’s MSJ at 11 -1 3. Pla int if

f h a s n ot r e sp on de d to thi s a rgume nt i n
e ith e r h is C ro ss- Mo tio n f or Part ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt o r h is R e ply , n or ha s Pla int if

f o the rw ise disputed the ade quacy

of the F BI ’s sea

rch. Se e ge ne ra lly

Pl.’s Cross-MSJ /Opp’n; Pl.’s Reply
. Plaintiff has there fore conce ded the issue. Franklin v. Potter , __ F.2d ___, Civ. Act. No. 07- 1205, 2009 Wl 533071, *13 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2009) (tr eatingdefe ndant’s ar g ument in motion for
summa ry jud g me nt a s c on c e de d w he re pla int if f f a ile d to a dd

re ss i n h is r e sp on se ); Hopkins v. W omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es, 28 4 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 5, 25 (D .D .C. 20 03 ) ( “ I t is well under stood in thi s Circuit that when a pla intiff files an opposition to a dispositi ve motion
and a dd re sse s o nly

c e rt a in a rgume nts ra ise d b y

the de fe nd ant, a

c ourt may tr e a t th os e argume nts that the plaintiff fa iled to addre ss as conc eded.” ), aff’d 98 Fe d. Appx. 8 (D.C. C ir. 2004). Acc ording ly , the Court shall g rant the F BI ’s motion for summary judgme nt with respec t to the
rea sonablene ss of the F BI ’s sea rch. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, the Court sha ll: (1) GRANT-I N-PART the F BI ’s [73] Motion for Summary

J udg ment, finding in favor of the FB Iwith respec t to the rea sonablene ss of50

the FB I ’s sea

rch f or re sponsive rec ords; (2) DENY-I N-PART the F BI ’s [73] Motion for Summary J udg ment and GRANT- I N-PART Plaintiff’s [92] Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judg me nt w ithre sp e c t to the F B I ’s de nia l of Pla int if f’ s r e qu e sts fo r a

fu ll f e e wa ive r, fi nd ingin favor of Plaintiff that the F BI

improperly

denied his fe e wa iver re quests; and (3) G RANT Plaintiff’s [105] Motion for an Or der Requir ing the FB Ito Provide a Complete Vaughn Index. The F BI is theref ore r equire d to submit a fina l and complete Vaughn ind e x that a c c ounts fo r a ll documents in the sample identifie d by Plaintiff and that fully

complies with this Memorandum Opinion. I n addition, in light of the Court’s de termination that the F BI must submi t a sing le, compre hensive Vaughn ind e x, the Court sh a ll D EN Y WI TH OU T PR EJUD I CE t he pa rt ie s’ cross-motions as they

perta in to the merits of the F BI ’s withholdings a nd Plaintiff’s reque st that the F B Ibe re qu ir e d to re pr oc e ss a ll r e sp on siv e do c ume nts . T he Court c ann ot r e so lve the me ri ts of these issues until an a dequate Vaughn index i s compiled. Upon submission of the FB I ’s final Vaughn index, t he par

ties may re- file their c ross-motions as to the merits of the F BI ’s withholdings, as a

ppropriate . Acc ording ly , the par ties are require d to meet and c onfer and submit a joint status report, by no later tha

n April 17, 2009, sug g esting a sche dule for submission of a fi na l Vaughn ind e x an d, a s a pp ro pr iate , f

or the fi lin g of

dis po sit ive mot ion s w ithre sp e c t to the merits of the F BI ’s withholdings. Date: Marc h 31, 2009 /s/ C O LLE E N K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge