United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

B.W., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 

Long Beach, CA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 15-0991 

Issued: September 18, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On March 30, 2015 appellant timely appealed a November 6, 2014 merit decision and a 

March 6, 2015 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). 

Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 

501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the claim.2

ISSUES 

The issues are: (1) whether appellant was disabled during the period July 6 through 

September 28, 2012 as a result of her March 11, 2008 employment injury; and (2) whether 

OWCP properly denied appellant’s January 2, 2015 request for reconsideration under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 8128(a). 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 

2

 The record on appeal contains evidence received after OWCP issued its March 6, 2015 decision. However, the 

Board is precluded from considering evidence that was not in the case record at the time OWCP issued its final 

decision. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c)(1) (2014). 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

Appellant, a 62-year-old revenue officer, has an accepted claim for temporary 

aggravation of somatization disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and migraine which arose on 

or about March 11, 2008. In accepting appellant’s emotional condition claim, OWCP found, 

inter alia, that her revenue officer position was a stressful job, with many responsibilities, 

demands, and daily deadlines. After a period of temporary total disability, appellant resumed her 

regular duties effective March 23, 2009. 

In July 2013, appellant filed several claims (Form CA-7) for intermittent wage-loss, 

including one that covered the period July 6 through September 28, 2012.3

 She returned to work 

on October 1, 2012. 

Medical evidence relevant to the claimed period included a June 13, 2012 return to work 

certificate from Dr. Hélène Saad, a family practitioner. Dr. Saad advised that appellant would be 

able to resume work on June 25, 2012. In a June 20, 2012 report, Dr. Saad indicated that 

appellant was unable to work as a revenue officer due to severe headaches. She further noted 

that appellant was disabled from June 11 through July 9, 2012. Dr. Saad referred appellant to a 

neurologist for further evaluation. 

Dr. Zhanna Rapoport, a neurologist, examined appellant on July 2, 2012 and advised that 

she should remain off work until July 29, 2012. She reexamined appellant on July 25, 2012 and 

reported that she was unable to work due to severe headaches. According to Dr. Rapoport, 

appellant had been disabled since July 2, 2012 and was expected to return to work on 

September 1, 2012. 

In an August 14, 2012 attending physician’s report, Dr. Priti Sahgal, a psychiatrist, 

diagnosed major depressive disorder, panic disorder without agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Dr. Sahgal identified 

March 11, 2008 as the date of injury. The reported history of injury was “[s]evere stress and 

anxiety.” Dr. Sahgal noted that she first examined appellant on February 3, 2009. Current 

examination findings included depressed mood, anxiousness, inability to focus, low energy, lack 

of motivation, hopelessness, and a daily feeling of being overwhelmed. Dr. Sahgal checked the 

appropriate box indicating her belief that appellant’s condition was caused or aggravated by 

employment activity; but did not elaborate. Appellant’s current treatment consisted of 

medication management and supportive psychotherapy. Dr. Sahgal advised that appellant could 

return to work only if she was transferred to another supervisor. In the remarks section, she 

noted that appellant was previously on disability for mental and/or physical problems due to 

work-related stress. Dr. Sahgal reiterated that under no circumstances should appellant continue 

working with her current supervisor/manager. 

In an August 22, 2012 report, Dr. Rapoport indicated that appellant had been under her 

care since July 2, 2012 for chronic migraine headaches. Appellant’s symptoms included severe 

headache and an inability to concentrate, which first arose on June 11, 2012. Dr. Rapoport 

advised that appellant could not yet return to work because her headaches were currently 

 3

 Appellant stopped working on June 11, 2012. Her leave status between June 11 and July 6, 2012 is unclear. 
3

uncontrollable. She further noted that there was severe stress at work that complicated the 

outcome of treatment. Dr. Rapoport anticipated a return to work on October 1, 2012, but for 

now appellant remained disabled. 

On September 20, 2012 Dr. Rapoport advised that appellant was “[released] back to work 

[October 1, 2012].” 

Appellant resumed her regular employment duties on October 1, 2012. 

In a July 29, 2013 recurrence development letter, OWCP advised appellant that the 

reports from Drs. Saad, Rapoport, and Sahgal (June 13 through September 20, 2012) were 

insufficient to establish her claimed disability during the period July 6 through 

September 28, 2012. It advised appellant to submit additional medical evidence in support of her 

claimed recurrence of disability. Additionally, OWCP requested a more detailed account of the 

circumstances surrounding appellant’s June/July 2012 work stoppage, including information 

regarding the type of work she performed on or after March 23, 2009, and why she believed her 

current disability was due to her original injury/illness. 

In an undated response received on September 9, 2013, appellant advised OWCP that, 

shortly after returning to work in March 2009, the employing establishment blindsided her with a 

series of letters regarding a purported overpayment of approximately $15,000.00, which she had 

been trying to resolve ever since. The employing establishment reportedly garnished appellant’s 

wages, which caused financial stress. 

Appellant also reported difficulties with her supervisor with whom she began working in 

April 2010. The supervisor allegedly “continued to heap stress” on appellant by not accepting 

her work, and belittling her with a negative tone. Appellant also claimed that she refused to 

listen to her point of view and made her feel worthless. She stated that the supervisor nit-picked 

her work. Appellant also alleged that her actions were driven by her relationship with 

appellant’s estranged husband. She provided examples of various mid-year reviews, 

performance improvement counseling, annual appraisals, and other personnel actions that 

occurred during the period December 2010 and December 2012. 

Since resuming work in March 2009, appellant noted having been diagnosed with carpal 

tunnel syndrome, undergoing bladder surgery, and having a breast biopsy. She further indicated 

that her brother suffered a stroke in August 2010, and passed away on December 14, 2010. 

Appellant reportedly took a total of four weeks’ annual leave related to her brother’s illness and 

subsequent death. Another brother also suffered a stroke in October 2011, and her supervisor 

reportedly was reluctant to approve appellant’s leave request because she had fallen behind at 

work. Lastly, appellant noted that when she arrived at work on June 11, 2012 she was already 

suffering a migraine. Appellant went to the nurse’s office and learned that her blood pressure 

was high. Also, by then, she had a full-blown migraine. Consequently, appellant left work and 

went to her own doctor, who reportedly took her off work that same day. She also indicated that, 

within a few days, her physician had referred her to a neurologist, who kept her off work from 

June through September 2012. 

In an August 7, 2013 attending physician’s report (Form CA-20), Dr. Rapoport identified 

March 11, 2008 as the date of injury, and noted a June 11, 2012 history of recurrent severe 
4

migraines. Her findings included severe headaches and frequent pain upon returning to work. 

Dr. Rapoport diagnosed employment-related PTSD and severe migraines. She explained that 

appellant was feeling worse because of stress she experienced at work, was disabled from 

June 11 through September 28, 2012, and was able to resume regular work as of 

October 1, 2012. Dr. Rapoport recommended that appellant continue to see a psychiatrist. 

In an August 13, 2013 note, Dr. Rapoport indicated that, since October 2012, appellant 

suffered frequent, severe migraines exacerbated by stress. 

By decision dated December 2, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim for wage-loss 

compensation for the period July 6 through September 28, 2012. It found the evidence 

insufficient to establish that appellant was temporarily totally disabled as a result of her accepted 

work injury. 

On August 8, 2014 appellant requested reconsideration. She stated that her July 6, 2012 

recurrence was the result of an accumulation of stressful, work-related events that caused severe 

anxiety, depression, and migraines. Appellant explained that she went from receiving a 

performance award to being placed on a performance improvement letter and having to meet 

with her manager daily/weekly. She claimed that work-related stressors aggravated her 

preexisting condition to the point that she was no longer able to perform her duties as a revenue 

officer. Appellant further indicated that her supervisor made the work environment unbearable 

with her micromanaging and daily monitoring. She noted that her supervisor demanded they 

have weekly caseload meetings to set deadlines, follow-ups, and action dates. However, this was 

a two-hour process and the weekly meetings made it impossible for appellant to meet her 

deadlines. Appellant accused her supervisor of making derogatory remarks and threats. She also 

noted that her request for a reasonable accommodation had been denied. Appellant claimed that 

her supervisor’s tyrannical actions caused her condition to worsen. Lastly, appellant noted 

having filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint prior to returning to work on 

October 1, 2012 and, as a result of the EEO filing, appellant had since been transferred. 

On reconsideration appellant resubmitted the August 14, 2012 report (Form CA-20) from 

Dr. Sahgal and the August 7, 2013 report (Form CA-20) from Dr. Rapoport. 

Appellant also submitted a copy of Dr. Sahgal’s November 14, 2011 reasonable 

accommodation request. Dr. Sahgal diagnosed ADHD, major depressive disorder, and 

generalized anxiety disorder found that appellant’s symptoms had worsened as a result of work 

stress. Dr. Sahgal noted that appellant had difficulty completing tasks, had a sad mood, low 

energy, lack of motivation, a sense of helplessness and hopelessness, loss of interest, and that her 

activities of daily living took tremendous effort. Additionally, she commented that appellant’s 

severe anxiety worsened her physical symptoms, especially pain and migraines. Dr. Sahgal 

explained that this was an ongoing condition and would likely persist as long as appellant 

continued to work with her current supervisor. She noted that appellant’s supervisor was friends 

with appellant’s exhusband, and the supervisor was influenced by the exhusband to escalate the 

pressure at work, thus making appellant’s symptoms worse. Dr. Sahgal recommended a transfer 

to a new department and advised that appellant should be allowed additional time to complete 
5

tasks. She reiterated that appellant’s symptoms had significantly worsened as a result of 

escalating pressure from her supervisor.4

OWCP reviewed the merits of appellant’s recurrence claim, but denied modification. In 

a November 6, 2014 decision, it noted that several of appellant’s current diagnoses (ADHD, 

PTSD, and major depressive disorder) were not accepted conditions. Additionally, OWCP noted 

that appellant attributed her current disability to incidents that allegedly occurred after she 

returned to work in March 2009. Accordingly, it denied appellant’s claimed recurrence because 

the record failed to establish disability beginning July 6, 2012 causally related to the March 11, 

2008 employment injury.5

 

Appellant timely requested reconsideration of the November 6, 2014 merit decision. She 

also filed a notice of recurrence (Form CA-2a) claiming lost wages beginning July 6, 2012. 

Appellant submitted additional medical evidence, which included a May 21, 2014 report 

from Dr. Caryn I. Bernstein, a Board-certified psychiatrist with the DVA. Dr. Bernstein advised 

that appellant had been under her care since April 25, 2014, and she had seen her on two 

occasions. She further noted that appellant had been seeing a DVA psychologist on a weekly 

basis since April 16, 2014. Dr. Bernstein reported that appellant was being treated for major 

depressive disorder, PTSD, and generalized anxiety disorder. She further noted that despite 

appellant’s commitment to treatment and adherence to medications, she was suffering from 

debilitating symptoms, which included mood instability, poor concentration and attention, 

depressed mood, and poor sleep. Dr. Bernstein advised that appellant was currently incapable of 

working. Additionally, she indicated that stress at work would further destabilize appellant, and 

returning to work would be an additional threat to her health. 

OWCP also received a May 27, 2014 report from Dr. Sahgal, which was an almost 

verbatim reiteration of Dr. Bernstein’s May 21, 2014 report. She too noted that appellant had 

been seeing a DVA psychologist weekly since April 16, 2014. Dr. Sahgal also reported that 

appellant was being treated for major depressive disorder, PTSD, and generalized anxiety 

disorder, and that she was currently unable to work. 

In a March 6, 2015 decision, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1 

A recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has returned to 

work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition, which resulted from a previous 

injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment that 

caused the illness.6 Recurrence of disability also means an inability to work that takes place 

when a light-duty assignment made specifically to accommodate an employee’s physical 

 4

 Dr. Sahgal’s reasonable accommodation request predated appellant’s June/July 2012 work stoppage, and thus, 

did not specifically address appellant’s claimed disability beginning July 6, 2012. 

5

 OWCP advised appellant to file a new emotional condition claim. 

6

 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x). 
6

limitations due to his or her work-related injury or illness is withdrawn or when the physical 

requirements of such an assignment are altered so that they exceed his or her established physical 

limitations.7 Generally, a withdrawal of a light-duty assignment would constitute a recurrence of 

disability where the evidence established continuing injury-related disability for regular duty.8

 A 

recurrence of disability does not apply when a light-duty assignment is withdrawn for reasons of 

misconduct, nonperformance of job duties or other downsizing or where a loss of wage-earning 

capacity determination is in place.9

 

Absent a change or withdrawal of a light-duty assignment, a recurrence of disability 

following a return to light duty may be established by showing a change in the nature and extent 

of the injury-related condition such that the employee could no longer perform the light-duty 

assignment.10

Where an employee claims a recurrence of disability due to an accepted employmentrelated injury, he or she has the burden of establishing that the recurrence is causally related to 

the original injury.11 This burden includes the necessity of furnishing evidence from a qualified 

physician who concludes that the condition is causally related to the employment injury.12 The 

physician’s opinion must be based on a complete and accurate factual and medical history and 

supported by sound medical reasoning.13

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1 

The current emotional condition claim is accepted for temporary aggravation of 

somatization disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and migraine, which arose on or about 

March 11, 2008. OWCP found that appellant’s revenue officer position was a stressful job, with 

many responsibilities, demands, and daily deadlines. It also accepted that prior to March 2008, 

appellant had been working long hours in an attempt to meet various deadlines. She had also 

experienced some workload management problems while on a 120-day detail because of the 

quantity of work assigned. These accepted employment incidents/factors were unique to the preMarch 11, 2008 timeframe.14 

 7 Id.

8 Id.; see also Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, Part 2 -- Claims, Recurrences, Chapter 2.1500.6a(4) 

(June 2013). 

9

 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.5(x), 10.104(c), and 10.509; see id. at Chapter 2.1500.2b (June 2013). 

10 Theresa L. Andrews, 55 ECAB 719, 722 (2004). 

11 20 C.F.R. § 10.104(b); see Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 8 at Chapter 2.1500.5 and 2.1500.6 

(June 2013). 

12 See S.S., 59 ECAB 315, 318-19 (2008). 

13 Id. at 319. 

14 OWCP’s December 18, 2008 statement of accepted facts (SOAF) identified four employment events that were 

factually established and considered within the performance of appellant’s duties. The SOAF also identified another 

four events that were factually established, but did not occur within the performance of duty. Lastly, the 

December 18, 2008 SOAF identified another five alleged events that were unsubstantiated. 
7

Appellant was off work for approximately one year prior to returning to her regular 

revenue officer duties on March 23, 2009. She stopped work again on June 11, 2012, and 

claimed wage-loss compensation for temporary total disability for the period July 6 through 

September 28, 2012. Appellant resumed her regular duties effective October 1, 2012. 

As noted, a recurrence of disability means an inability to work after an employee has 

returned to work, caused by a spontaneous change in a medical condition, which resulted from a 

previous injury or illness without an intervening injury or new exposure to the work environment 

that caused the illness.15

Based on appellant’s September 9, 2013 statement, her June/July 2012 work stoppage 

was due to accumulated stress from a variety of workplace events that allegedly occurred after 

she returned to work in March 2009. Appellant identified a personal overpayment issue that she 

had reportedly been fighting since April 2009, but most of her complaints and alleged workplace 

stressors involved her relationship with her supervisor with whom she first worked in 

April 2010. She variously described her supervisor as a micromanager and a tyrant. 

Ms. White’s reported animus towards appellant reportedly stemmed from her relationship with 

appellant’s exhusband. 

By her own account, appellant’s accepted conditions did not spontaneously change. 

The Board finds that the medical evidence of record fails to demonstrate a causal 

relationship between appellant’s June/July 2012 work stoppage and her original injury of 

March 11, 2008. 

In a June 20, 2012 report, Dr. Saad, a family practitioner, indicated that appellant was 

unable to work as a revenue officer due to severe headaches, and had been disabled since 

June 11, 2012. However, she did not specifically relate appellant’s disability to her March 11, 

2008 employment injury. Dr. Saad referred appellant to Dr. Rapoport, a neurologist, who 

examined appellant on July 2, 2012, and similarly found that she was unable to work due to 

severe headaches. At the time, Dr. Rapoport did not specifically address the cause of appellant’s 

chronic migraine headaches. 

In an August 14, 2012 report (Form CA-20), Dr. Sahgal, a psychiatrist, diagnosed PTSD, 

ADHD, major depressive disorder, and panic disorder without agoraphobia. She identified 

March 11, 2008 as the date of injury, with a reported history of “[s]evere stress and anxiety.” 

Dr. Sahgal noted that she first examined appellant on February 3, 2009, and had treated her on a 

regular basis (every one to three months) since then. Although she attributed appellant’s 

diagnosed conditions to her employment, Dr. Sahgal did not provide an explanation. She also 

did not identify any specific period(s) of disability, either partial or total. 

Dr. Sahgal’s August 14, 2012 Form CA-20 is deficient for several reasons. First, the 

report does not specifically address the claimed period of disability beginning July 6, 2012. 

Second, Dr. Sahgal did not explain why she believed appellant’s diagnosed conditions were 

employment related. The Board has consistently held that merely placing a mark in the “Yes” 

 15 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(x). 
8

box on question 8 (Form CA-20) will not suffice for purposes of establishing causal 

relationship.16 Third, Dr. Sahgal noted that under no circumstance should appellant work with 

her current supervisor, which suggests a different, more recent cause for appellant’s 

June/July 2012 work stoppage. Finally, none of the diagnosed conditions have been accepted 

under the current claim. 

In an August 22, 2012 report, Dr. Rapoport again diagnosed chronic migraine headaches, 

with a June 11, 2012 date of onset. She noted that appellant was currently unable to work 

because her headaches were not under control. With respect to appellant’s prognosis, 

Dr. Rapoport noted that there was severe stress at work that complicated the outcome of 

treatment. She anticipated a return to work on October 1, 2012. Again, Dr. Rapoport did not 

specifically address whether appellant’s current disability was causally related to her March 11, 

2008 employment injury. Moreover, her comment about severe stress at work complicating 

appellant’s treatment suggests more recent events. 

On July 29, 2013 OWCP properly advised appellant that the above-noted reports from 

Drs. Saad, Rapoport, and Sahgal were insufficient to establish her claimed disability during the 

period July 6 through September 28, 2012. OWCP provided appellant additional time to submit 

evidence in support of her claim. 

In response, appellant submitted an August 7, 2013 attending physician’s report (Form 

CA-20) from Dr. Rapoport. She noted a March 11, 2008 date of injury and a June 11, 2012 

history of severe recurring migraines. Dr. Rapoport diagnosed PTSD and severe migraines. She 

further noted that appellant had been disabled from June 11 through September 28, 2012, and 

was able to resume regular work as of October 1, 2012. Dr. Rapoport answered “Yes” to 

question 8 (Form CA-20) indicating her belief that appellant’s condition was caused or 

aggravated by an employment activity. However, she did not provide an explanation. In the 

“Remarks” section (No. 25), Dr. Rapoport noted that appellant “is feeling worse because of 

stress that she experiences at work.” She did not elaborate on the work-related stress appellant 

reportedly “experiences.” The Board finds that Dr. Rapoport failed to explain how appellant’s 

disability during the claimed period was causally related to her March 11, 2008 employment 

injury. Also, PTSD is not an accepted condition under the current claim. 

Appellant also provided an August 13, 2013 note from Dr. Rapoport, wherein she advised 

that, since October 2012, appellant suffered frequent, severe migraines exacerbated by stress. 

The Board notes that this latest submission from Dr. Rapoport does not address appellant’s 

disability during the claimed period July 6 through September 28, 2012. 

In light of the foregoing analysis, OWCP properly denied appellant’s claimed recurrence 

of disability beginning July 6, 2012. The various reports from Drs. Saad, Rapoport, and Sahgal 

are insufficient to establish that appellant’s work stoppage during the period July 6 through 

September 28, 2012 was causally related to her March 11, 2008 employment injury. 

 16 See D.D., 57 ECAB 734, 739 (2006); Deborah L. Beatty, 54 ECAB 340, 341 (2003). 
9

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2 

Section 8128(a) of FECA does not entitle a claimant to review of an OWCP decision as a 

matter of right.17 OWCP has discretionary authority in this regard and has imposed certain 

limitations in exercising its authority.18 One such limitation is that the application for 

reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one year of the date of the decision for which 

review is sought.19 A timely application for reconsideration, including all supporting documents, 

must set forth arguments and contain evidence that either: (i) shows that OWCP erroneously 

applied or interpreted a specific point of law; (ii) advances a relevant legal argument not 

previously considered by OWCP; or (iii) constitutes relevant and pertinent new evidence not 

previously considered by OWCP.20 When a timely application for reconsideration does not meet 

at least one of the above-noted requirements, OWCP will deny the request for reconsideration 

without reopening the case for a review on the merits.21

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2 

OWCP received appellant’s January 2, 2015 request for reconsideration on 

January 20, 2015. Appellant submitted the appeal request form that accompanied the 

November 6, 2014 merit decision. She did not specify the grounds for her request. Appellant 

merely checked the appropriate space on the form indicating reconsideration. The Board finds 

that appellant’s January 2, 2015 request for reconsideration neither alleged nor demonstrated that 

OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law. Additionally, appellant did not 

advance any relevant legal arguments not previously considered by OWCP. Accordingly, she is 

not entitled to a review of the merits based on the first and second requirements under section 

10.606(b)(2).22

Appellant also failed to submit any “relevant and pertinent new evidence” with her latest 

request for reconsideration. Although newly submitted, the May 2014 reports from 

Drs. Bernstein and Sahgal did not specifically address appellant’s claimed disability during the 

period July 6 through September 28, 2012. Both physicians reported that appellant was currently 

being treated for at least one of her accepted conditions (generalized anxiety disorder). 

However, neither physician commented on whether she was disabled during the claimed period. 

 17 This section provides in pertinent part: “[t]he Secretary of Labor may review an award for or against payment 

of compensation at any time on his own motion or on application.” 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). 

18 20 C.F.R. § 10.607 (2014). 

19 Id. at § 10.607(a). The one-year period begins on the date of the original decision, and an application for 

reconsideration must be received by OWCP within one year of OWCP’s decision for which review is sought for 

merit decisions issued on or after August 29, 2011. Federal (FECA) Procedure Manual, supra note 8 at Chapter 

2.1602.4 (October 2011). Timeliness is determined by the document receipt date of the request for reconsideration 

as indicated by the “received date” in the Integrated Federal Employees’ Compensation System (iFECS). Id. at 

Chapter 2.1602.4b. 

20 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3). 

21 Id. at §§ 10.607(b), 10.608(b). 

22 Id. at § 10.606(b)(2)(i) and (ii). 
10

Consequently, the May 2014 reports from Drs. Bernstein and Sahgal are insufficient to warrant 

further merit review. Because appellant did not provide any “relevant and pertinent new 

evidence,” she is not entitled to a review of the merits based on the third requirement under 

section 10.606(b)(2).23 Accordingly, OWCP properly declined to reopen appellant’s case under 

5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant failed to establish a recurrence of disability beginning 

July 6, 2012, causally related to her March 11, 2008 employment injury. The Board further finds 

that OWCP properly denied appellant’s January 2, 2015 request for reconsideration. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the March 6, 2015 and November 6, 2014 

decisions of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed. 

Issued: September 18, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 23 Id. at § 10.606(b)(2)(iii).