Filed 8/12/22 Yingling v. Fercu CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

KIMLAI YINGLING,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIAN FERCU,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B308330

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. 

 No. LS029357)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michael R. Amerian, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Michael Labrum and Michael Labrum for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Beaumont Tashjian, Tara M. Radley and Kumar S. Raja for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2017 Kimali Yingling obtained a civil harassment 

restraining order against her neighbor in a condominium 

complex, Adrian Fercu. Three years later, Yingling sought to 

renew the restraining order. The trial court granted the request, 

and Fercu appealed. 

We conclude, contrary to Fercu’s assertions, the trial court 

did not (1) err in precluding Fercu from introducing evidence he 

claimed would undermine the basis of the original restraining 

order or (2) abuse its discretion in finding there was a reasonable 

likelihood Fercu would harass Yingling in the future. Therefore, 

we affirm the trial court’s order renewing the restraining order. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Yingling Obtains a Restraining Order Against Fercu

Yingling and Fercu lived in different units near each other 

in a condominium cooperative managed by a board of directors. 

Since at least 2017 Yingling has served on the cooperative’s board 

and regularly attended board meetings. Fercu, though not a 

member of the board, attended board meetings in 2017. 

In April 2017 Yingling filed a request for a civil harassment 

restraining order against Fercu. Yingling alleged Fercu had

harassed her in various ways, including threatening her in text 

messages, slandering her in front of vendors and other residents, 

posting defamatory “signs” about her, and “displaying forceful 

and intimidating behavior” that caused her “to feel fear and 

anxiety in his presence.” She stated: “His presence is unsettling 

to the point where I’m afraid to leave my unit for fear he will be 
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waiting for me. I sense that he is extremely unpredictable.” 

Yingling asked for a temporary restraining order without giving 

Fercu notice because she was afraid “violence would reoccur” if 

she gave notice and she believed that, if she gave notice, Fercu 

would “demonstrate unpredictable [and] irrational behavior and 

possibly retaliate.”

In April 2017 the superior court issued a temporary 

restraining order enjoining Fercu from contacting, harassing, 

intimidating, or threatening Yingling. The court also ordered 

Fercu to stay at least 100 yards from Yingling, her home, 

workplace, and vehicle, and at least 20 feet away from her at 

board meetings. 

In May 2017 the superior court held a hearing on Yingling’s 

request for a permanent restraining order. Fercu did not attend 

the hearing, although he was served with notice of the hearing.

The trial court granted Yingling’s request and issued a 

permanent restraining order enjoining until May 2020 the same 

conduct the temporary restraining had enjoined. Fercu did not 

appeal from the order granting Yingling’s request for a 

restraining order.

B. The Trial Court Renews the Restraining Order 

In May 2020 Yingling filed a timely request to renew the 

restraining order. Yingling stated that Fercu “still . . . resides in 

close proximity to me” and that the “current restraining order 

against Adrien Fercu is the only thing that has caused him to 

keep his distance from me over the past few years and to allow 

me to continue to live my life.” She stated that, “[b]efore the 

permanent restraining order was issued, Fercu was stalking me 

at my apartment, leaving threatening/vulgar notes on my 
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apartment door and carport and screaming obscenities at me in 

the common areas” and that she feared “he will resume this 

conduct if the order is not renewed.” She also stated: “I am still 

president of my cooperative’s Board of Directors and remain very 

active in the community. I need to be able to freely traverse the 

cooperative’s property, communicate with residents and vendors, 

conduct board meetings and oversee management of the 

cooperative. Fercu is still a shareholder and resident of the 

cooperative and resides in close proximity to me (our units are 

located within the same complex). A renewed restraining order is 

necessary to keep Fercu from continuing to harass me and to 

allow me to be present in my community without his interference, 

threats and stalking.” 

In July 2020 the trial court (a different judge) held a 

hearing on the request to renew the restraining order. At the 

hearing, counsel for Yingling asked the court to renew the 

restraining order because “the circumstances regarding the 

parties’ living conditions” had not changed. Counsel for Yingling 

also argued Yingling is “still the board president. She still needs 

to conduct board meetings. She still needs to be able to walk the 

property” and “to be able to do that free of Mr. Fercu’s 

harassment.” Yingling did not submit any evidence of new 

harassment by Fercu. 

Fercu attempted to challenge the validity of the original 

restraining order. He testified that Yingling “slapped [him] in 

the face” in April 2017 and that he had not been served with the 

original petition for a restraining order. The trial court, however,

precluded Fercu from introducing evidence he claimed would 

show that the court in 2017 should not have issued the 

restraining order. The trial court said it did not want “to 
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relitigate and rehear the facts of the hearing that gave rise to the 

restraining order three years ago. So it sounds like you want to 

retry the case. I’m not doing that.” The trial court stated that 

“all of this needed to be dealt with three years ago. It’s too late 

for me to look back at why the restraining order was issued 

initially.” Fercu stated, “Okay.”

The trial court explained it was “focused on whether or not 

there’s a reasonable likelihood of future harassment” and asked 

Fercu to address whether he and Yingling still lived in the same 

complex and attended board meetings in person. Fercu 

acknowledged that he still lived near Yingling, but stressed that,

since the court issued the restraining order, there had been no 

new incidents of harassment. The trial court found that there 

was “a reasonable likelihood of future harassment” and that 

there was “good cause to renew the restraining order” because 

both parties “still live in the same location and there’s no 

indication that either side’s going to be moving out any time 

soon.” 

Fercu argued that he never harassed Yingling and that the 

court was violating his rights. The trial court stated that “the 

request to renew doesn’t have me go back and look at the reason 

. . . the original restraining order [was] issued. It doesn’t require 

there to be any new activity that is harassing. What I have to 

look at is whether there’s a reasonable likelihood of future 

harassment.” The trial court also stated: “The fact that you’re 

still living at the same complex leads me to conclude that there 

is. So, I understand that you may not be happy with my decision, 
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but that’s my decision.” The trial court renewed the restraining 

order for five years. Fercu filed a timely notice of appeal. 

DISCUSSION

Fercu argues the trial court erred in relying exclusively “on 

the fact that the parties resided in the same condominium 

complex” and in refusing to consider “evidence mitigating the 

initial allegations” in Yingling’s 2017 petition for a restraining 

order. Neither argument has merit.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 governs civil 

harassment restraining orders.1 A court may issue a restraining 

order if the petitioner shows “by clear and convincing evidence 

that unlawful harassment exists.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) Section 

527.6 defines “harassment” as “unlawful violence, a credible 

threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct 

directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or 

harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” 

(§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) The court can issue a restraining order for 

up to five years. (§ 527.6, subd. (j)(1).) We review an order 

granting a request to renew a restraining order for an abuse of 

discretion. (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 

396; Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 77, 90.)

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Relying on the Fact 

That Yingling and Fercu Still Lived Near Each Other

Fercu argues that the “trial court’s reliance on the fact that 

the parties resided in the same condominium complex is 

insufficient evidence to support that granting of the request to 

renew the restraining order” and that the court erred by 

“automatically grant[ing] the renewal request without any 

further showing by” Yingling.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in renewing the 

restraining order. A restraining order “may be renewed, upon 

the request of a party, for a duration of no more than five 

additional years, without a showing of any further harassment 

since the issuance of the original order . . . .” (§ 527.6, 

subd. (j)(1).)2 “A restraining order should be renewed only when 

the trial court finds a reasonable probability that the defendant's 

wrongful acts would be repeated in the future.” (Cooper v. 

Bettinger, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 90; see Harris v. 

Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495.) “[R]enewal under 

section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1), is not automatic; instead the trial 

court has discretion to renew the restraining order and the 

duration of the restraining order.” (Cooper, at p. 89.) 

Fercu does not argue the court erred in considering how 

close the parties lived to each other. Section 526.7 does not limit 

the factors a court can consider in deciding whether to renew a 

restraining order, instead authorizing the court to consider “any 

evidence showing a likelihood of future harassment, including 

evidence of conduct that might not itself constitute harassment.”

(Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 501; see 

§ 527.6, subd. (i) [at the hearing on a petition for a restraining 

2 Fercu does not argue the five-year renewal was too long. 
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order, “the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and 

may make an independent inquiry”].) Fercu argues only that the 

“mere fact that the parties live in the same condominium complex 

is not a reasonably sufficient basis for the finding that the 

restrained activity is likely to recur.” 

Fercu provides no authority for his assertion that evidence 

a restrained party and a protected party continue to live in the 

same vicinity is insufficient to support an order renewing a 

restraining order. Indeed, the law is to the contrary: To renew a 

restraining order, the protected party need not present any 

evidence at all. (See Cooper v. Bettinger, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 91 [section 527.6 “grants the trial court discretion to renew a 

restraining order based on its review of the record of the past 

harassment underlying the original issuance of the restraining 

order and without the protected party presenting any new 

evidence”].) 

Moreover, additional evidence supported the trial court’s 

order. Yingling stated not only that Fercu still lived near her, 

but also that she was still president of the cooperative board and

that her duties required her to interact with other residents and 

supervise the business of the cooperative. She stated the 

restraining order was the only reason she was able to fulfill her 

duties as president. For his part, Fercu testified he had a right to 

attend board meetings, thus creating additional opportunities for 

him to encounter and harass Yingling. (See R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 

202 Cal.App.4th 181, 190 [“Behavior that may not alone 

constitute an intentionally harassing course of conduct logically 

still might show an intention to resume or continue an alreadyestablished course of harassing conduct.”].) Fercu also denied he 

had ever done anything wrong. He testified he “didn’t do 
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anything to this lady” and said, “What evidence? I didn’t do 

anything, your honor, please.” The trial court could reasonably

infer from this testimony Fercu lacked remorse for his past 

harassment of Yingling, or even understood his past conduct

constituted harassment, an inference that further supported 

renewing the restraining order. (See In re L.O. (2021) 

67 Cal.App.5th 227, 240 [denial of past conduct is evidence of a 

continuing risk]; In re Marriage of Emilie D.L.M. & Carlos C.

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 876, 882 [“‘[o]ne cannot correct a problem 

one fails to acknowledge’”].)

C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Prohibiting Fercu 

from Introducing Evidence Challenging the Validity 

of the Original Restraining Order

Fercu also contends the trial court erred in precluding him 

from introducing evidence challenging the court’s decision in 

2017 to issue a restraining order. According to Fercu, by 

precluding him in 2020 from introducing evidence that would 

show his conduct in 2017 did not justify a restraining order, the 

court violated his due process rights and was unable “to consider 

all surrounding circumstances of the case to determine the 

likelihood of future harm.” 

The trial court did not err in denying Fercu’s attempts to 

challenge the validity of the original restraining order. “[W]here 

a protected party seeks a renewal of a restraining order and the 

restrained party has either failed to appeal . . . or has lost on 

appeal, the restrained party cannot challenge the findings and 

evidence underlying that original order [or] the validity of that 

order.” (Cooper v. Bettinger, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 92.) 

Fercu did not appeal from the original restraining order. Thus, 
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as Fercu concedes, he cannot “challenge the evidence, findings, 

and validity of the original restraining order.” Yet, that is what 

Fercu argues the trial court should have allowed him to do. The 

trial court properly precluded Fercu from presenting evidence 

and testimony that he claimed undermined the original 

restraining order.

Fercu also argues the court should have considered that 

“the original request for a restraining order did not allege 

violence.” But Yingling did not have to allege or prove violence to 

obtain a restraining order; she had to allege and prove 

harassment, which can be nonviolent. (See § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) 

In any event, there was evidence Fercu’s pre-restraining order 

conduct was violent. As discussed, Yingling stated in support of 

her request for the original restraining order that Fercu “used or 

threatened to use violence against” her. After issuing the 

original restraining order, the court ordered the sheriff to serve 

the order without charge because the order was “based on 

unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or stalking.” 
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DISPOSITION

The order renewing the restraining order is affirmed. 

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

WISE, J.*

* Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.