IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 23, 2008 Session

LISA MARIE WALLS ALTMAN v. BENJAMIN ALTMAN

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Washington County

No. 36562 G. Richard Johnson, Chancellor

No. E2008-00081-COA-R3-CV - FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2008

The Trial Judge awarded the wife a divorce in this case and ordered the husband to pay periodic

alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 a month. The husband has appealed and we affirm the

Judgment of the Trial Court, as modified. 

Tenn. R. App. P.3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed, as Modified.

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS,P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whichCHARLES D.SUSANO,

JR., J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., joined.

L. Caesar Stair, III., and Margo J. Maxwell,, Knoxville, Tennessee, for appellant.

Robert D. Arnold, Johnson City, Tennessee, for appellee.

OPINION

In this divorce action, the sole issue on appeal is whether the Trial Court erred in

awarding the wife periodic alimony in the amount of $5,000.00 a month.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court entered a Decree granting

the wife a divorce on the statutory grounds of inappropriate marital conduct as defined by Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-4-101(11). 

The husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro of $5,000.00 a month, and

in justification of this award of alimony, the Trial Court explained that the earning capacity of the
Watters references Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101, which was amended by deleting the 1

section in its entirety and substituting § 36-5-121 by 2005 Tenn. Laws Pub. Ch. 287 (S. B. 2091).

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husband of $26,500.00 a month far surpassed the earning capacity the Court assigned to the wife of

$1,500.00 a month. The Court further noted that the wife had devoted herself to being a homemaker

and to taking care of the children. The Court stated the wife already had her B.S. degree and that she

“cannot have further education or training to improve her earning capacity, because she is a mama

and for fourteen years, she has taken care of those two children and she is a homemaker, and that’s

her job and that’s what takes up most of her time . . . . It would be undesirable for the Plaintiff to

seek employment outside the home, because she is the custodian of the children, and they are very

active and . . . They need her there”. 

The wife was designated as the primary residential parent and the husband was

ordered to pay $2,549.00 per month for child support and $850.00 per month to cover the costs of

the son’s private school tuition, music lessons and summer camp fees. 

The sole issue on appeal as stated by the husband is: “Did the Trial Court err in

awarding permanent alimony of $5,000.00 per month to wife, where wife did not demonstrate any

need for long term spousal support and is college educated, capable and willing to obtain full time

employment?”

The husband contends the Trial Court erred when it awarded permanent rather than

rehabilitative alimony based on a finding the wife could not be rehabilitated and that her “job” was

taking care of the children. The Trial Court made findings of fact that it would be undesirable for

the wife to work outside the home as the children were very active with school, sports and

extracurricular activities and needed their mother with them. But the wife testified that she intended

to work and to support herself and her children and that she planned on getting a job that would be

“conducive to my kids’ schedule as well as to our lifestyle.” She discussed the possibility of

substitute teaching, which would allow her to be available for the children after school, on weekends

and during vacations. 

A trial court has broad discretion regarding the amount and type of alimony awarded.

A determination of alimony is factual and requires a balancing of factors including those listed in

§ 36-5-121(i)(2005). Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 593 (Tenn. Ct App. 1997). A trial

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court’s decision on alimony will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion.

Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tenn. 2002)(citing Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d

356, 360 (Tenn. 2000)); Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). This

Court in Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Tenn.Ct. App. 1994) discussed the trial court’s

broad discretion concerning the amount and duration of alimony, and observed that alimony is

factually driven and requires a balancing of the factors contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-

101(d)(1), [now § 36-5-121(i)(2005)]. Id. (citing Williams v. Williams, 146 Tenn. 38, 46, 236 S.W.

938, 940 (Tenn. 1922); Stone v. Stone, 56 Tenn. Ct. App. 607, 615-16, 409 S.W.2d 388, 392-93

(1966). The Brown Court noted that this Court is generally not inclined to alter a trial court's
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decision on alimony unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policy

embodied in the applicable statutes. Id. (citing Gilliam v. Gilliam, 776 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tenn. Ct.

App.1988); Ingram v. Ingram, 721 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 (2005) establishes several different classes

of alimony, and reflects a statutory preference for rehabilitative alimony and transitional alimony

over periodic alimony. See also Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 605 (Tenn. 2004); Perry v.

Perry, 114 S.W.3d 465, 467 (Tenn. 2003); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000).

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(2) states that “[i] t is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse,

who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse, be rehabilitated, whenever possible”.

The purpose of such an award is to encourage and aid the economically disadvantaged spouse in

becoming more self-sufficient. Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 471(Tenn. 2001). However, this

statutory preference does not displace other forms of spousal support, such as periodic alimony,

when the circumstances warrant long-term or more open-ended support. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-

121(d)(3). See also Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.1995); Anderton v. Anderton, 988

S.W.2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App.1998). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(3) provides that when the

disadvantaged spouse is not capable of economic rehabilitation sufficient to support a reasonable

standard of living under the circumstances, the court may award long-term spousal support.

There are no hard and fast rules for making spousal support decisions and such

determinations require a “careful balancing’ of the relevant factors. Miller v. Miller, No. M2002-

02731-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22938950 at*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 2003)(citing Anderton.

Trial courts are to consider all the factors outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i) in determining

whether a spouse should receive support, the amount of support and what type of alimony is proper.

Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W. 3d 337, 338 (Tenn. 2002). Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)

the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he two most relevant factors in determining the amount of

alimony awarded are the economically disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability

to pay.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 222 (Tenn.2006); see also Loyd v. Loyd, 860

S.W.2d 409 (Tenn. Ct. App.1993); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 976 S.W.2d 175 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The

concept of relative economic disadvantage incorporates the principles of need and ability to pay. Of

these two factors the disadvantaged spouse’s need is the threshold issue and the next consideration

is the ability of the other spouse to furnish support. Miller v. Miller.

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121 requires the courts to take into consideration

the different roles spouses may have in a marriage when considering an award of alimony. The

statute provides that “[t]he contributions to the marriage as homemaker or parent are of equal dignity

and importance as economic contributions to the marriage. Further, where one (1) spouse suffers

economic detriment for the benefit of the marriage, ... the economically disadvantaged spouse's

standard of living after the divorce should be reasonably comparable to the standard of living

enjoyed during the marriage or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the

other spouse, considering the relevant statutory factors and the equities between the parties”. Tenn.

Code Ann. § 36-5-121(c)(2). Pursuant to the statute, the courts must consider the parties’ standards

of living during the marriage and post-divorce where one spouse, as the homemaker or parent, has
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concentrated his or her efforts on the family, while the other spouse has followed a career. Jackson

v. Jackson, No. W2006-00182-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 529928 at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App., Feb. 22,

2007)(citing Goodman v. Goodman, No. M2004-02781-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 47359 at *4, 5 n.

2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.9, 2006); see also Morrow v. Morrow, No. M2003-02448-COA-R3-CV, 2005

WL 1656825 at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2005).

The Trial Court, in its ruling from the bench, meticulously reviewed the applicable

factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i) and the applied facts presented at trial to the factors.

Of significance was the Trial Court’s findings that the husband’s monthly earning capacity was

greater than the wife’s predicted monthly earning capacity by almost 18 fold ($26,500.00 vs.

$1,500.00), that it was undesirable for the wife to work outside of the home as long as the children

needed her, that the Altmans’ standard of living during the marriage was high and that the fault for

the divorce lay with the husband. The evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s

findings. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Both the husband and wife testified regarding the children’s sports

and other activities and the traveling associated with the competitive soccer tournaments they are

involved with. The husband also testified that his work schedule is not always conducive to his

attending out of town games. Both parents were supportive of the children’s active lives and wanted

the children to be able to continue to pursue their interests. 

The wife’s ability to establish a career will be curtailed until the children are grown

and no longer need their mother to accompany them to various activities and events. The evidence

established that the wife is the economically disadvantaged spouse and that her standard of living

after the divorce should be “reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the

marriage” or to the post-divorce standard of living expected to be available to the husband if alimony

was awarded. 

The husband argues the Trial Court did not properly evaluate the wife’s need for

alimony. The wife submitted a Rule 9 Statement which listed her and the children’s monthly

expenses as $6,270.00. She did not list the amount she received in child support or the $750.00 a

month she received in wages from her part time job. According to the husband’s calculations, the

wife had no need for additional income in the way of alimony as she received child support payments

from the husband and she could invest and receive income from the approximately $400,000.00 she

received in the property distribution. However, the husband fails to factor in to his argument the

evidence presented at trial regarding the lifestyle enjoyed by the Altman family during the marriage.

The wife shared with the husband in a lifestyle that included an estate worth 1.2 million dollars,

private schools and special lessons for the children, several horses, travel, cruises and purchases of

fine art and furniture and an average monthly income of more than $26,500.00. The wife is clearly

the economically disadvantaged spouse and her standard of living after the divorce should be

reasonably comparable to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage or to the post-divorce

standard of living expected to be available to the other spouse. The alimony award of $5,000.00 a

month, which is less than one fifth of Husband’s average monthly income, was not an abuse of

discretion by the Trial Court. 
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However, the Trial Court’s ruling was based on the circumstances as existed at the

time of the divorce and the Trial Court emphasized that themother’s role as custodian of the children

was a significant factor in his award of alimony to the wife. Lucas, the youngest child, was ten years

old at the time of the divorce. In eight years he will be eighteen and presumably move on to pursue

a university education and career of his own. At that time, the wife will be in a position to start to

support herself in a more substantial way, and not continue the role as existed at the time of the

divorce. 

We do not disagree with the Trial Court’s finding that the wife’s role in caring for the

children during the marriage should continue after the divorce. But she will presumably be relieved

of this role when the youngest child, Lucas, completes the school year following his eighteenth

birthday. Since the award of alimony was based in large part on the wife’s role in caring for the

children, vis a vis joining the workforce, we conclude that alimony will no longer be needed to

support that role when the youngest child turns eighteen. We modify the Trial Court’s Judgment to

terminate the award of alimony upon the youngest child attaining his majority. In this connection

see, Blankenship v. Blankenship, No. M2000-01483-COA-R3-CV, 2001WL 401585 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Apr. 23, 2001).

In sum, we hold the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony in

the amount of $5,000.00 and this amount is in keeping with the lifestyle the Altman family enjoyed

before the divorce, and for her continued role as a mother. However, the evidence does not support

continuing the award of alimony after the youngest child attains the age of eighteen, and we modify

the Judgment to terminate the alimony upon that event.

The Trial Court’s Judgment is affirmed, as modified, and the cause remanded. In our

discretion, the costs of this appeal are taxed to the husband, Dr. Benjamin Altman.

______________________________

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.