SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3233-17T2

RODNEY FREENEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GUY J. CARNAZZA, 

CINEMACAR LEASING, INC.

and CINEMACAR II, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

LAMBROS MOTITIS, KILLER

CARZ, LLC and SAM SANKAR,

Defendants.

_____________________________

Argued telephonically May 30, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-5178-14.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 18, 2019
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Thomas A. Lodato argued the cause for appellants

(Alampi & DeMarrais, attorneys; Thomas A. Lodato, on 

the briefs).

Andrew R. Wolf argued the cause for respondent (The 

Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Lisa R. Bouckenooghe, 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellants Guy J. Carnazza, Cinemacar Leasing, Inc. (Cinemacar Leasing),

and Cinemacar II, Inc. (Cinemacar) appeal from a Law Division order awarding 

plaintiff Rodney Freeney attorney's fees and costs pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-19, the 

fee-shifting section of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20. We 

affirm. 

I.

In August 2012, plaintiff and his uncle travelled to defendant Killer Carz, LLC 

(Killer Carz) to inspect a 2006 Acura TL with an advertised sales price of $12,900. 

Plaintiff expressed interest in purchasing and financing the Acura. Plaintiff made a 

$500 down payment and signed a payment receipt. The sales representative also 

offered plaintiff a vehicle service contract, which plaintiff accepted. Plaintiff did 

not receive or sign any document at the sales lot, other than the down payment 

receipt. Plaintiff then completed a credit application and was denied. He was 
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referred to defendant Lambros Motitis, a representative of defendant Cinemacar to 

obtain financing for the purchase of the Acura.

Upon plaintiff's arrival at Cinemacar, Motitis arranged the financing through 

an agreement whereby Capital One Auto Finance would accept assignment of a 

Retail Installment Sale Contract (RISC) between Cinemacar and plaintiff. Motitis 

prepared the RISC, the agreement was executed, and it was assigned to Capital One 

Auto Finance. A down payment of $3500 was agreed upon. Motitis provided 

plaintiff with a Bill of Sale that stated a sales price of $15,000; sales tax of $1190; 

"Doc Prep Fee" of $345; "Tag & Title Fee" of $250; and a "Svc Contract/Warranty" 

for $2000. The Bill of Sale stated the total price was $18,785, a down payment of 

$3500 had been paid, and a balance of $15,285 remained. 

The RISC prepared by Motitis listed the amount financed as $15,285; a 

finance charge of $4761.72; a down payment of $3500; and a total sale price 

(inclusive of down payment) of $23,546.72. The RISC itemized the financed 

$15,285 as follows: (1) the outstanding balance for the purchase of the vehicle of 

$12,690,1 plus (2) the total other charges paid to others on the plaintiff's behalf, in 

 

1

 $15,000 paid to Cinemacar, for the Acura at Killer Carz, plus $1190 in sales tax, 

for a total sale price of $16,190, minus the $3500 down payment, yielding an unpaid 

balance of $12,690. 
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the amount of $2595, comprised of the $2000 service contract fee to "AUL 

Administrators," $250 "Government Certificate of Title Fees," and a $345 "Doc Prep 

Fee" paid to Cinemacar II. The sales price reflected in the RISC was thus $2100 

greater than the $12,900 price stated in the Killer Carz advertisement. 

Plaintiff then returned to Killer Carz to pay the remainder of the down 

payment before travelling to Cinemacar. The next day, Cinemacar issued a 30-day 

temporary license plate for the Acura. The temporary tag displayed Cinemacar's

dealer identification number, despite Killer Carz still holding title to the Acura. 

Plaintiff took possession of the Acura the same day. 

When plaintiff subsequently attempted to pick up his license plates and 

registration from Killer Carz, he was asked to pay $300 despite the RISC indicating 

$250 for official government title fees. As a result, he went to Cinemacar to collect 

his plates and registration. Cinemacar paid $46.50 to the Motor Vehicle 

Commission (MVC) for plaintiff's registration, $85 to the MVC for plaintiff's title, 

and $5 to the MVC for plaintiff's temporary plates.2 The total cost of $136.50 

 

2

 The receipt from the MVC only indicates the registration and title fees, but at the 

time, the agency charged dealerships $5 for a temporary license plate issued to a 

New Jersey resident. 
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differed from $250 charge by $113.50. Plaintiff did not receive a refund. Neither 

the Bill of Sale nor the RISC itemized the $345 document preparation fee. 

The RISC was assigned to Capital One on September 5, 2012. Capital One 

paid $14,995 to Cinemacar Leasing3for assignment of the RISC, and charged 

Cinemacar a $295 "Dealer Fee" in conjunction therewith. At this time, however, 

Cinemacar did not hold title to the vehicle. 

Plaintiff alleged Cinemacar obtained title through the following process. 

About a month after the purchase, Cinemacar submitted a "Reassignment of 

Certificate of Ownership by New Jersey Car Dealership" to the MVC, which stated 

Cinemacar purchased the Acura from Killer Carz the same day. Six days later, 

Cinemacar filed a "Reassignment of Certificate of Ownership by New Jersey Car 

Dealership" that stated Cinemacar sold the Acura to plaintiff on October 4, 2012. 

Plaintiff never received a valid service contract. He alleged defendants did 

not remit the funds necessary to purchase the service contract from a third-party for 

which plaintiff was charged $2000. In June 2013 the Acura developed transmission 

troubles and was towed. Plaintiff then learned he did not have a valid service 

contract and that Auto Service of America, Killer Carz's service contractor, and AUL 

 

3

 Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges Capital One paid Cinemacar Leasing, yet 

appellants argue Cinemacar Leasing was not involved in this transaction. 
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Administrators, the company listed on the RISC, did not have the Acura's Vehicle 

Identification Number in their systems, nor any processed paperwork. The Killer 

Carz sales representative who sold plaintiff the Acura claimed he did not process the 

service contract because plaintiff owed still $300. Another Killer Carz 

representative informed plaintiff that Cinemacar was responsible for processing the 

service contract. Plaintiff paid for the transmission repairs out-of-pocket. 

Plaintiff retained counsel and filed suit against defendants. The 135 

paragraph, four count amended complaint alleged numerous violations of the CFA;

the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act, N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 

(TCCWNA); the Automotive Sales Practices Regulations (ASP Regulations), 

N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26B.1 to -26B.4; and the Motor Vehicle Advertising Practices 

Regulations (MVAP Regulations), N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26A.4(a)(1). Plaintiff alleged 

he suffered an ascertainable loss comprised of: (1) the $2100 difference between the 

advertised sale price and the final sale price; (2) the overcharge for the title and 

registration fees; (3) the unitemized $345 documentation preparation fee; (4) the 

$2000 charge for the service contract plaintiff never received; (5) the amount 

financed that plaintiff remains obligated to pay; (6) the damages caused by the 

knowingly false statements filed with the MVC; and (7) the out-of-pocket repair 

costs due to the lack of a service contract.
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Plaintiff alleged defendants' fraudulent activity included: (1) fraudulently 

representing that Cinemacar was selling a vehicle to plaintiff and inducing him to 

obtain financing when Cinemacar did not hold title to that vehicle; (2) filing 

documents with the MVC that contained knowingly false statements, including 

inaccurate odometer readings and representations of sales that never took place, 

causing plaintiff's title to contain false and unreliable information thereby reducing 

the resale value of the vehicle; (3) charging plaintiff $2100 more than the advertised 

price in violation of the bait-and-switch prohibitions in the MVAP Regulations; (4) 

charging plaintiff $2000 for a service contract without providing any such coverage; 

(5) overcharging plaintiff for MVC fees and charging an unitemized documentary 

service fee in violation of the ASP Regulations; and (6) unlawfully allowing a 

business to use the licenses of another individual or business to sell vehicles and 

offer credit. Plaintiff sought joint and several liability against defendants for 

monetary relief, including treble damages available under the CFA, statutory and 

actual damages under the TCCWNA, declaratory and injunctive relief, and 

reasonable attorney's fees and costs as authorized by those statutes. 

Defendants Carnazza and Cinemacar filed an answer with defenses and crossclaimed for contribution and indemnity from the remaining co-defendants under 

common law and the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to -48, 
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and the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-51 to -58. Killer Carz did not 

answer the complaint and plaintiff filed a request to enter default against them. 

On December 3, 2014, plaintiff sent a settlement offer, inclusive of attorney's 

fees and costs, to counsel for defendants Cinemacar and Carnazza. The offer was 

not accepted. Shortly thereafter, the court issued a Mediation Referral Order 

appointing a mediator.

In early 2015, counsel for defendants Cinemacar and Carnazza relayed the 

existence of another necessary party to plaintiff's counsel. This led to plaintiff filing

an amended complaint naming Sam Sankar, Motitis, and Cinemacar Leasing as 

additional defendants. Defendants Sankar and Motitis did not answer the amended 

complaint and plaintiff entered default against them. 

The parties engaged in substantial pretrial discovery. Plaintiff served

interrogatories, requests for production of documents and deposition notices on 

appellants, but did not receive timely responses. Killer Carz, Sankar, and Motitis 

(collectively, the Killer Carz defendants), requested plaintiff's consent to vacate 

default against the Killer Carz defendants. Plaintiff granted the request and served 

interrogatories and a document demand on each of the Killer Carz defendants. 

Plaintiff subsequently moved to extend discovery and compel depositions of 

appellants. On October 1, 2015, plaintiff withdrew his motion to compel depositions 
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and the court entered an order extending the discovery end date to January 11, 2016. 

On the same day, plaintiff sent counsel for all defendants a global settlement demand 

inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. 

On October 6, 2015, plaintiff moved to compel appellants to answer plaintiff's 

interrogatories and document demands, or in the alternative, to suppress their 

answers. The court entered an order compelling appellants to provide discovery 

responses by a date certain. 

Thereafter, the mediation conducted by the court-appointed mediator was 

unsuccessful. Plaintiff then moved to compel the Killer Carz defendants to answer 

interrogatories and provide documents, or in the alternative, to suppress their answer. 

The court entered an order suppressing the answer filed by the Killer Carz defendants

without prejudice. At the same time, plaintiff served all defendants with requests 

for admissions. 

On December 22, 2015, plaintiff moved to suppress the appellants' answer for 

failing to abide by the prior order compelling discovery responses by a date certain. 

While the motion was pending, appellants served plaintiff with responses to 

discovery, an opposition to plaintiff's motion, and a motion to extend the discovery 

end date. Plaintiff subsequently withdrew the motion to suppress the answers of 

appellants. However, the Killer Carz defendants remained delinquent in answering 
10 A-3233-17T2

discovery. On February 2, 2016, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to suppress 

the answer filed by the Killer Carz defendants with prejudice. 

Following several adjournments, trial was ultimately scheduled for May 16, 

2016. Leading up to trial, plaintiff discussed settlement with appellants several times 

without success. Moments before trial was to begin, plaintiff reached a settlement 

agreement as to damages with all defendants. The terms of the settlement were set 

forth in a handwritten agreement signed by all parties. The agreement provided:

1) By no later than May 27, 2016 Defendants shall pay 

Rodney Freeney $6,000 via a check made payable to him 

and delivered to the Wolf Law Firm. If the payment is not 

received by May 27, 2016, Plaintiff shall be entitled to 

obtain an entry of judgment against Defendants in the sum 

of $13,500.

2) After payment is received, Plaintiff will file a motion 

for an award of attorney's fees and costs. Defendants agree 

to pay the amount awarded by the Court, and Defendants 

shall not contest Plaintiff's counsel's entitlement to 

reasonable attorney's fees and costs but may contest the 

reasonableness of the time and rates.

After the settlement was reached, plaintiff's joint counsel filed a fee 

application, which appellants opposed. The application stated The Wolf Law Firm 

expended a total of 90.9 hours billed at the rate of $310 to $710 per hour, yielding a 

lodestar (Time Spent x Hourly Rate) of $36,357.50. The firm incurred costs and 

expenses totaling $2359.69. Co-counsel Christopher J. McGinn expended 35.9 
11 A-3233-17T2

hours at an hourly rate of $460 for a total of $16,514. Plaintiff also sought a lodestar 

enhancement.

Appellants did not object to plaintiff's entitlement to an award of reasonable 

attorney's fees and costs under the settlement agreement. Notably, appellants did 

not object to the hourly rates sought or the time entries claimed by plaintiff's counsel. 

Instead, appellants limited their opposition to reducing the fee award to an amount 

proportionate to the conduct attributable to them, which they claim was no more than 

"failing to itemize the motor vehicle fees charged to plaintiff." In that regard, 

appellants asserted they were not liable for the conduct alleged in counts three and 

four. They further claim they became involved only after plaintiff's initial credit 

application was denied. Appellant's opposing papers admit that the sale they 

"completed" "included a twelve month, twelve thousand mile service warranty" 

effective September 1, 2012. 

The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs on June 

22, 2017. In its written opinion, the court framed the issue as "whether a prevailing 

plaintiff under a multi-defendant . . . settlement is entitled to all of its fees from a 

solvent settling party, under a theory of joint and several liability, or whether each 

defendant should bear the burden of costs for the claims against it." First, the judge 

analyzed whether the settlement agreement was an enforceable contract capable of 
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binding each settling defendant to all fees incurred. The court found the agreement 

did not expressly "ascribe to [any defendant] the joint liability asserted by plaintiff 

[nor the] several liability asserted by defendant." Accordingly, the court was 

"constrained to allocate costs based upon general principles of law." To that end, 

the court concluded, "the nexus between the fee award and the litigation is 

determined neither by the amount of recovery, nor the percentage of liability, but 

ought to reflect the costs of pursuing the claims against each and all defendants." 

The court stated it was "obvious . . . that defendant Killer Carz would likely have 

been solely responsible for counts three and four, and the trier of fact would have 

determined if either, neither, or both defendants were responsible for counts one and 

two." After noting the settlement agreement was silent as to allocation of liability 

or responsibility for payment of legal fees, the court determined the reasonable costs 

imposed under the statue by analyzing "the costs attendant to commencing and 

maintaining the litigation against each and every party." The court concluded:

For those costs solely attributable to Killer Carz, they 

should be severally liable, and no costs should be imposed 

on [Cinemacar]. For those costs solely attributable to 

[Cinemacar], they should be severally liable, and no costs 

should be imposed on Killer Carz. An example of several 

liability would be for communications solely with one 

defendant, which would not have any direct relevance to, 

or impact on, the other parties to this litigation. 
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For those costs that cannot be fairly segregated to 

be attributable to either defendant solely, they shall be 

allocated to all defendants, and each party should therefore 

be jointly and severally liable for such costs. An example 

of such costs would be for the preparation and research of 

the complaint, and all costs of litigation and settlement. 

Although arguably [Cinemacar and Cinemacar Leasing]

may have played no role in counts III and IV, the entire 

complaint had to be prepared, filed and litigated. Much 

like the duty to defend versus the duty to indemnify, to the 

extent that a party is alleged to have violated a fee-shifting 

statute, until such time as those allegations are dismissed 

against it, it would be jointly and severally liable for such 

costs as may be reasonably necessary to prosecute the 

claims asserted. 

With regard to the hourly rates sought, the trial court determined the rates 

charged were "within the upper limit of what the court finds reasonable." The court

reasoned that, since the hourly rates charged were "well above median rates, the 

lodestar enhancement frequently used to compensate for risk of non-payment" was 

reflected in the rates charged. Thus, as there was no "significant issue of difficulty 

in the underlying litigation," the lodestar enhancement was denied. 

The order granted the following attorney's fees and costs: (1) $854.00 against 

defendants the Killer Carz defendants; (2) $1190.00 against defendants Carnazza, 

Cinemacar Leasing, and Cinemacar; and (3) $53,187.19 against all defendants 

jointly and severally.
14 A-3233-17T2

This appeal followed. The Killer Carz defendants did not join in the appeal. 

Appellants concede plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and 

costs, but argue the attorney's fees awarded were disproportionate to the amount of 

the settlement and did not address the respective liability of the defendants.

II.

Our review of a trial court's fee award is limited. A.W. v. Mount Holly Twp. 

Bd. of Educ., 453 N.J. Super. 110, 118 (App. Div. 2018). "A reviewing court should 

not set aside an award of attorneys' fees except 'on the rarest occasions, and then

only because of a clear abuse of discretion.'" Garmeaux v. DNV Concepts, Inc., 448 

N.J. Super. 148, 155 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 

317 (1995)). "An abuse of discretion in the award of counsel fees may be 

demonstrated 'if the discretionary act was not premised upon consideration of all 

relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, 

or amounts to a clear error in judgment.'" Heyert v. Taddese, 431 N.J. Super. 388, 

444 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. 

Div. 2005)).

"The CFA is a remedial statute which encourages its use by, among other 

things, reasonably compensating those who prevail through fee shifting." 

Garmeaux, 448 N.J. Super. at 159 (citing Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc., 113 N.J. 594, 
15 A-3233-17T2

598 (1989)). "[T]he CFA's fee-shifting provision advances the statute's policy of 

ensuring that plaintiffs with bona fide claims are able to find lawyers to represent 

them and encourages counsel to take on private cases involving an infringement of 

statutory rights." Id. at 156 (citing Coleman, 113 N.J. at 598). Prevailing CFA 

plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees because of the "strong legislative 

policy in favor of fees both to make whole the victims of consumer fraud and to 

deter unconscionable practices." Coleman, 113 N.J. at 599 n.1.

"When fee shifting is permissible, a court must ascertain the 'lodestar'; that is, 

the 'number of hours reasonably expended by the successful party's counsel in the 

litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'" Garmeaux, 448 N.J. Super at 159 

(quoting Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372, 386 (2009)). First, the 

trial court "should evaluate the rate of the prevailing attorney in comparison to rates 

'for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 

reputation' in the community." Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 22 (2004) 

(quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337). "Second, a trial court must determine whether 

the time expended in pursuit of the 'interests to be vindicated,' the 'underlying 

statutory objectives,' and recoverable damages is equivalent to the time 'competent 

counsel reasonably would have expended to achieve a comparable result. . . .'" Ibid.

(alteration in original) (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336). If the trial court finds 
16 A-3233-17T2

"that the hours expended 'exceed those that competent counsel reasonably would 

have expended to achieve a comparable result, a trial court may exercise its 

discretion to exclude excessive hours from the lodestar calculation.'" Szczepanski 

v. Newcomb Med. Ctr., Inc., 141 N.J. 346, 367 (1995) (quoting Rendine, 141 N.J. 

at 336). Third, the trial court should decrease the lodestar if the plaintiff achieved 

only limited success in relation to the relief sought. Furst, 182 N.J. at 23 (citing 

Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336). 

"The trial court's responsibility to review carefully the lodestar fee request is 

heightened in cases in which the fee requested is disproportionate to the damages 

recovered." Szczepanski, 141 N.J. at 366. "However, there need not be 

proportionality between the damages recovered and the attorney-fee award itself." 

Furst, 182 N.J. at 23 (citing Rendine, 141 N.J. at 336). When the fees sought are 

disproportionate to the damages recovered, "the trial court should evaluate not only 

the damages prospectively recoverable and actually recovered, but also the interest 

to be vindicated in the context of the statutory objectives, as well as any 

circumstances incidental to the litigation that directly or indirectly affected the extent 

of counsel's efforts." Szczepanski, 141 N.J. at 366-67.

Appellants elected not to challenge the hourly rates sought by plaintiff's 

counsel. They also did not object to any specific hours expended or services 
17 A-3233-17T2

performed as being unnecessary, duplicative, or otherwise excessive. The party 

opposing a counsel fee application must identify specific areas of factual dispute in 

a contested fee application, rather than a generalized objection. Chattin v. Cape May 

Greene, Inc., 243 N.J. Super. 590, 615 n.8 (App. Div. 1990). Instead, appellants 

limit their argument to the disproportionality of the fee award to the amount of the 

settlement, and the claimed failure to apportion responsibility for the fees in accord 

with the respective responsibility of the parties. 

Our review of the record reveals that unlike in many instances, plaintiff did 

not achieve limited success in relation to the relief sought. None of plaintiff's claims 

were dismissed pretrial. Indeed, appellants did not move to dismiss any of plaintiff's 

claims. Moreover, the settlement reached did not allocate responsibility between 

appellants and the Killer Carz defendants. 

Our review further reveals that plaintiff's counsel did not engage in prolix or 

repetitious legal maneuvering, unnecessary discovery, or unsuccessful motion 

practice. On the contrary, some of the motion practice is directly attributable to 

appellants' failure to timely provide discovery. We further note appellants moved to 

extend discovery. 

Despite plaintiff's proposed settlement offers and participation in courtordered mediation, defendants rejected those attempts to resolve the matter until the 
18 A-3233-17T2

morning of trial, when the settlement agreement was reached. This course of action 

required plaintiff to complete discovery and prepare for trial. In addition, this 

litigation served not only to vindicate plaintiff's rights under the CFA, but also to 

deter defendants and other used car dealers from engaging in deceptive sales 

practices and failing to provide service warranties required by the sales contract.

In assessing appellants' argument that the fee award is disproportionate to the 

settlement amount, we are mindful the trial court declined to award a lodestar 

enhancement because of the hourly rates awarded. Ordinarily, the trial court "should 

consider whether to increase [the lodestar] fee to reflect the risk of nonpayment in 

all cases in which the attorney's compensation entirely or substantially is contingent 

on a successful outcome." Rendine, 141 N.J. at 337. Such "contingency 

enhancements in fee-shifting cases ordinarily should range between five and fiftypercent of the lodestar fee, with the enhancement in typical contingency cases 

ranging between twenty and thirty-five percent of the lodestar." Id. at 343. The trial 

court noted the hourly rates claimed were at the upper end of reasonableness and 

counterbalanced that observation by declining to award the lodestar enhancement.

We find no merit in appellants' argument that the trial court erred by not 

allocating the fee award in relation to the respective liability of the defendants. 

Cogar v. Monmouth Toyota, 331 N.J. Super. 197, 211 (App. Div. 2000). Plaintiff's 
19 A-3233-17T2

damage claims were settled as to all defendants without allocation of fault. The 

"denial of fee apportionment" is "faithful to the legislative intent under the feeshifting provision of the CFA to 'encourage attorneys to take small claims in order 

to serve the important public policy behind the statue.'" Grubbs v. Knoll, 376 N.J. 

Super. 420, 446 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Cogar, 331 N.J. Super. at 211). The 

imposition of "a limitation on the amount of fees recoverable based on allocation 

would dilute the significant policy underpinnings of the fee provision of the

legislation.'" Ibid. (quoting Cogar, 331 N.J. Super. at 211). 

Appellants claim their role in the sales scheme was limited, and they are not 

liable for the claims asserted in counts three and four of the amended complaint. It 

is clear, however, that they were the seller of the vehicle according to the MVC 

documents. The RISC that they prepared included provision of the service warranty. 

Moreover, even if we accepted appellants' argument their role in the underlying 

transaction was limited as compared to the Killer Carz defendants, we concur with 

the trial court's finding that, with few exceptions, the services rendered by plaintiff's 

counsel were necessary to pursue "the 'interests to be vindicated,' the 'underlying 

statutory objectives,' and recoverable damages." Furst, 182 N.J. at 22 (quoting 

Rendine, 141 N.J. at 335-36).
20 A-3233-17T2

In sum, the trial court properly considered the claims made, the results 

obtained, the time records submitted by counsel, and the relevant factors in reaching 

its decision. We find no clear abuse of discretion or error in judgment by the trial 

court. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court's ruling.

Affirmed.