THIRD DIVISION

DOYLE, P. J.,

GOBEIL, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received in our clerk’s office within ten

days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

December 1, 2023

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A23A1336. MOHR v. THE STATE.

FULLER, Senior Judge.

A jury found Stuart James Mohr guilty of aggravated assault. Following the

denial of his motion for new trial, Mohr appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in

denying a motion to suppress and in precluding the introduction of certain testimony.

Mohr also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For reasons that

follow, we affirm.

Viewed favorably to the verdict,

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the evidence shows that, on the night of

March 16, 2017, Mohr – who owns a bar – was celebrating the fact that his bar had

been approved as a Keno retailer. Mohr offered drinks to his patrons, including the

victim. The victim and Mohr “developed a mutual attraction” and began kissing.

1 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
According to Mohr, he thought the victim would be spending the night with him.

However, a second bar patron, Brian S., inserted himself into the conversation. Mohr

believed the victim “was welcoming [Brian S.] into [their] situation.” 

Later that night, after the bar had closed, Brian S. began shooting pool with the

victim. According to Mohr, the two were playing “strip pool,” and Brian S. removed

his shirt. Mohr came out of a back room and stood for a moment watching the victim

play pool with a shirtless Brian S. Mohr then walked behind the bar, at which point

the victim approached him. The two apparently talked before the victim went back

to her pool game. Less than two minutes later, the victim returned to the bar; as soon

as she reached the bar, Mohr hit her in the face with such force that she toppled over

a bar stool and fell to the ground. After a few seconds, the victim stood up and turned

her back to Mohr. Mohr then picked up a trash can from behind the bar and threw it

at the victim. He also threw two other bar items at her. Several minutes later, Mohr

walked from the bar area to the pool table where he stood in front of the victim. The

victim began to walk away, but Mohr grabbed her arm, pulled her back, and slammed

her face-first into the pool table. As the victim rose, she turned toward Mohr, who

slammed her back into the pool table. Mohr then lifted the victim up and again threw

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her onto the pool table. While holding the victim on the pool table, Mohr began to

pull at her pants. At this point, Brian S. approached Mohr, who walked away. 

Sheriff’s deputies were called to the scene and discovered the victim with “a

large amount of blood on the front of her clothing, her shirt and her pants, and over

her face.” The victim was taken by ambulance to a hospital where she remained for

five days. According to the victim, she sustained a concussion and continuesto suffer

from memory problems. 

Mohr was arrested and charged with simple battery. The next day, deputies

went to the bar to get the surveillance video. A deputy spoke with the bar’s manager,

who voluntarily provided the recording system. Mohr gave an investigator the

password to access the system, but the investigator obtained a search warrant prior

to watching the video. Thirteen days after the warrant was issued, it was executed.

After the investigator watched the video, the charge against Mohr was upgraded to

aggravated assault. 

At trial, the surveillance video was played for the jury, and it showed Mohr

striking the victim, throwing things at her, and slamming her onto the pool table.

Based on the evidence, the jury found Mohr guilty of aggravated assault.

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1. Mohr moved to suppressthe surveillance video, arguing among other things

that the manager of the bar lacked authority to consent to the search. The trial court

denied the motion, finding that police were authorized to seize the recording

equipment to prevent the destruction of the video and, in the alternative, the search

was permissible under the “independent source doctrine” because the “subsequent

acquisition of a search warrant to view the contents of the DVR system render[ed]

any issues with the initial seizure moot.” The trial court also found that the manager

had the apparent authority to give the deputies the recording equipment. Mohr

challenges the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal. 

In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an

appellate court generally must (1) accept a trial court’s findings unless

they are clearly erroneous, (2) construe the evidentiary record in the

light most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial

court, and (3) limit its consideration of the disputed facts to those

expressly found by the trial court. But this Court reviews de novo the

trial court’s application of law to the undisputed facts.

Lopez-Lopez v. State, 367 Ga. App. 834, 837 (888 SE2d 631) (2023) (citations,

footnotes and punctuation omitted). We will uphold a trial court’s ruling on a motion

to suppress if it is right for any reason. Chambers v. State, 351 Ga. App. 389, 391 (1)

(831 SE2d 11) (2019).

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A search and seizure is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to

a valid search warrant or with consent from (1) the individual whose

property is searched; (2) a third party who has common authority over

the property; or (3) if a police officer could have reasonably believed

that a third party had common authority over the property. Common

authority rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally

having joint access or controlfor most purposes.In some circumstances,

a third party who purports to consent to a search lacks the actual

authority to do so, but law enforcement may rely on that individual’s

apparent authority to give consent, if such reliance is reasonable.

Massey v. State, 350 Ga. App. 427, 431 (2) (b) (827 SE2d 921) (2019) (citations and

punctuation omitted). 

Here, the manager testified that she had a key to the office where the video

equipment was kept and that she was in charge of the bar when Mohr was not there.

She was responsible for scheduling, inventory, deliveries, banking, opening and

closing the bar. Given the breadth of the manager’s responsibilities at the bar, it was

not unreasonable for the deputies to believe that the manager had the authority to

provide the recording equipment. See Massey, 350 Ga. App. at 432 (2) (b).

Accordingly, the seizure of that equipment was lawful.

Nevertheless, Mohr contends the subsequent search was unlawful because the

deputies did not execute the warrant within ten days asrequired by OCGA § 17-5-25.

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However, it does not appear that Mohr invoked OCGA § 17-5-25 below, and the trial

court made no ruling as to whether suppression was warranted based on the State’s

failure to comply with the time requirements of OCGA § 17-5-25. And “in

challenging a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, a defendant may not argue

on appeal grounds that he did not argue (and obtain a ruling on) below.” Maxwell v.

State, 367 Ga. App. 302, 306 (1) (885 SE2d 39) (2023) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

2. At trial, Mohr attempted to question the victim about prior false allegations

she had made that he contends were “substantially similar to the accusation[s]” the

victim made against Mohr.

2 The trial court ruled that Mohr could not introduce

evidence of the victim’s prior bad act without complying with OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)

and providing notice to the State. On appeal, Mohr contends that the trial court erred

in requiring notice.

Under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible

either to prove the character of a person or to show that the person acted in

conformity with the prior bad acts; however, such evidence may “be admissible for

2 At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Mohr made a proffer that the

victim had previously accused a bar manager of punching her when she, in fact,

punched herself and falsely accused the manager. 

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other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” With

regard to criminal cases, the statute provides:

The prosecution in a criminal proceeding shall provide reasonable notice

to the defense in advance of trial, unless pretrial notice is excused by the

court upon good cause shown, of the general nature of any such

evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Notice shall not be required

when the evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove

the circumstances immediately surrounding the charged crime, motive,

or prior difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim.

OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). 

As noted by Mohr, the notice requirement in OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) applies

only to the prosecution in a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court erred to

the extent it precluded Mohr from questioning the victim about her prior false

allegations based on lack of notice. But this error does not entitle Mohr to reversal.

Here,surveillance video showed Mohr beating the victim; the case did not turn on the

victim’s credibility. Under these circumstances, it is highly probable that the trial

court’s error had no bearing on the verdict. See Smith v. State, 356 Ga. App. 211, 213

(1) (844 SE2d 869) (2020) (trial court’s error in admitting evidence under OCGA §

24-4-404 (b) was harmless where surveillance video established defendant’s guilt).

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3. At trial, Mohr took the stand and his attorney questioned him about his

interaction with the victim. Four times, Mohr began to testify as to what the victim

said to him, and the State objected on hearsay grounds. The trial court sustained the

objections. On appeal, Mohr contends that the trial court erred in excluding the

testimony because the statements were being offered to show their effect on Mohr and

not for the truth of the matter asserted. See OCGA § 24-8-801 (c) (defining hearsay

as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted”).

With regard to three of the sustained hearsay objections, Mohr did not argue

below that he was offering the testimony for a non-hearsay purpose. Accordingly, he

has waived any error with respect to those two rulings. See Payne v. State, 273 Ga.

App. 483, 487 (6) (615 SE2d 564) (2005). 

With regard to the fourth hearsay objection, Mohr testified that he slapped the

victim. Counsel asked why he slapped her, and Mohr responded: “It was supposed to

be a joke. . . . She had made a reference to me asking —” At that point, the State

objected; Mohr’s attorney responded “I think this maybe could go . . . to the effect of

the hearer,” but the trial court sustained the objection. After the ruling, Mohr did not

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seek to proffer what the rest of his testimony would have been, and he made no such

proffer at the hearing on his motion for new trial.

“The burden is on the party alleging error to show it affirmatively by the

record. This court cannot determine the propriety of the trial court’s ruling without

a proffer of the excluded evidence or testimony.” Bearfield v. State, 305 Ga. App. 37,

41 (2) (699 SE2d 363) (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted). Because Mohr has

not shown what his testimony would have been, he has not met his burden of

demonstrating error.

4. Finally, Mohr contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 

[I]n general, when a defendant claims that his trial counsel was

ineffective, he has the burden of establishing that (1) his attorney’s

representation in specified instances fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. And when a trial court determines, asthe court below did

here, that a defendant did not receive ineffective assistance, we will

affirm that decision on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. 

Pepe-Frazier v. State, 331 Ga. App. 263, 269 (3) (770 SE2d 654) (2015) (citations

and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, if a defendant failsto establish one of the two

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prongs, we do not need to examine the other. Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 553 (3)

(842 SE2d 54) (2020). 

(a) Mohr contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce the

victim’s medical records at trial. The attorney assumed the State would be tendering

the records and thusfailed to provide notice of his intent to have the records admitted.

See OCGA §§ 24-8-803 (6) (business records exception to hearsay); 24-9-902 (a)

(11) (certification and notice requirements for admission of business records).

According to Mohr, those records would have shown both the victim’s level of

intoxication and that she did not, in fact, have a concussion. He claims the absence

of the medical evidence hampered his ability to impeach the victim’s credibility

regarding the extent of her injuries. 

We find no reversible error. Mohr was not charged with aggravated assault for

concussing the victim; he was charged with assaulting the victim with his hands, “by

striking [the victim] and slamming the head of [the victim] into a table causing a

laceration of the chin and swelling and bruising to the face[.]” The surveillance video

shows what appearsto be a brutal assault, and the deputies called to the scene saw the

bloodied victim. The medical records – which were proffered at the hearing on the

motion for new trial – showed that the victimsuffered “significant trauma to her face”

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and was hospitalized for several days. Under these circumstances, Mohr has not

demonstrated that he was harmed by his attorney’sfailure to have the medicalrecords

admitted. See Harrell v. State, 253 Ga. App. 691, 698 (5) (c) (560 SE2d 295) (2002)

(no reasonable probability that obtaining the victim’s medical records would have

affected the outcome at trial).

(b) Mohr contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing

to properly advise him of the State’s plea offer for twelve years or for “an open, blind

plea” in which the prosecutor would play the surveillance video for the trial court

before sentencing. After discussing the potential plea agreement with trial counsel,

Mohr rejected the offer. According to Mohr, at the time he did so, he thought his

attorney would be able to introduce evidence of the post-traumatic stress he suffered

following his military service and the victim’s medical records, both of which he

believed would have been favorable to his defense. Mohr argues that his attorney

should have known the “evidence was clearly inadmissible” and advised him to

accept the plea offer, which he claims he would have taken. 

“If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective

assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.” State v. Dorsey, 364 Ga.

App. 731, 733 (1) (875 SE2d 900) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

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A defendant claiming ineffective assistance based on rejecting a plea

offer because of counsel’s deficient advice must establish prejudice by

showing: (1) that but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a

reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to

the court, meaning that the defendant would have accepted the plea and

the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening

circumstances; (2) that the trial court would have accepted the terms of

the negotiated plea; and (3) that the conviction or sentence, or both,

under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.

Yarn v. State, 305 Ga. 421, 426-427 (4) (826 SE2d 1) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted). 

Here, Mohr has notshown prejudice. As a threshold matter, it is not clear from

the record either that the plea offer was still on the table after the hearing on the

motion to suppress or that the trial court would have accepted the plea. Furthermore,

to the extent the plea offer remained viable after the suppression hearing, Mohr

rejected that plea with knowledge that the surveillance video would be shown to the

jury. Given Mohr’s willingness to proceed to trial in the face of such damning

evidence, the trial court was not required to believe his post-conviction claim that he

would have accepted the plea deal had he been aware of other evidentiary limits in

the case. See Dresbach v. State, 308 Ga. 423, 426 (2) (841 SE2d 714) (2020)

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(credible evidence isrequired to establish a reasonable probability that the defendant

would have accepted a plea deal).

(c) Finally, Mohr argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

challenge the execution of the search warrant under OCGA § 17-5-25. Mohr suggests

that, had his attorney sought suppression of the surveillance video on this basis, the

evidence would have been suppressed.

“When trial counsel’sfailure to file a motion to suppressisthe basisfor a claim

of ineffective assistance, the defendant must make a strong showing that the

damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion.”

Calhoun v. State, 327 Ga. App. 683, 686 (2) (a) (761 SE2d 91) (2014) (citation and

punctuation omitted). OCGA § 17-5-25 provides that a search warrant shall be

executed within ten days and that “[a]ny search warrant not executed within ten days

from the time of issuance shall be void and shall be returned to the court of the

judicial officer issuing the same as ‘not executed.’” Although a trial court is

authorized to suppress evidence seized if a warrant is not executed within ten days,

see State v. Hillman, 146 Ga. App. 418, 418 (246 SE2d 434) (1978), we are unaware

of any case holding that a trial court must suppress such evidence. To the contrary,

“[a] violation of the statutory warrant requirements does not necessarily authorize

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evidence suppression.” State v. Stafford, 277 Ga. App. 852, 853 (627 SE2d 802)

(2006). Under OCGA § 17-5-31, “[n]o search warrant shall be quashed or evidence

suppressed because of a technical irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of

the accused.”

Here, Mohr’s substantial rights were not affected. At the time the warrant was

issued, the authorities already had lawful possession of the recording equipment, and

it appearsthat Mohr gave his password to the investigator voluntarily.The authorities

also obtained a search warrant for the contents of the recording equipment. The fact

that authorities waited 13 daysfrom the issuance of the warrant to accessthe contents

of the recording equipment was, at most, a technical violation. See, e. g., Nelson v.

State, 312 Ga. 375 (863 SE2d 61) (2021) (delay of over two years between the seizure

of electronic devices and the search of those devices did not violate the Fourth

Amendment). Under these circumstances, we do not believe Mohr was entitled to

suppression of the evidence, and he has thus failed to establish the prejudice

necessary for a claimofineffective assistance. See Calhoun, 327 Ga. App. at 686-687

(2) (a).

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.

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