Filed 9/20/13 P. v. Vaughan CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRIAN FRED VAUGHAN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

 G047263

 (Super. Ct. No. 02WF1202)

 O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, David 

A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.

Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Lilia E. Garcia and 

Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Following a jury trial, the trial court extended appellant’s involuntary 

commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). Appellant contends reversal is 

required because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the permissible use of 

circumstantial evidence and improperly shifted the burden of proof on his medication 

defense. He also contends the court erred in denying his request for outpatient treatment. 

Finding no basis to reverse, we affirm the judgment. 

FACTS

On May 25, 2002, Albert Harnder withdrew $40 from an ATM in 

Huntington Beach. As he was walking away, appellant grabbed him from behind and 

pressed a screwdriver against his back. He told Harnder he would kill him if he didn’t 

give him the money. Harnder offered the money to appellant and told him to take it, but 

before appellant could do so, security guards arrived on the scene and detained him. 

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery with a deadly weapon and 

making a criminal threat. While he was in prison, he was prone to agitated and angry 

outbursts and once threw a trash can at a guard. He also insisted the food was poisoned 

and he had discovered a cure for AIDS. 

Following his parole in 2008, appellant lived with his mother. One day, 

they got into a disagreement, and appellant became violent. Appellant’s parole officer 

was summoned, and when he arrived he noticed appellant’s mother had a black eye. She 

reported appellant had choked her until she had become unconscious.

As a result of that incident, appellant’s parole was revoked and he was 

returned to prison. In December 2010, he was committed to Atascadero State Hospital 

(Atascadero) as an MDO, and in January 2012, the state petitioned to extend his 

commitment. Appellant opposed the petition, in July 2012, trial on the matter began. 

Dr. Phillip Kelly, a staff psychiatrist at Atascadero, testified he evaluated 

appellant on November 17, 2011. Based on the evaluation, as well as appellant’s records, 

he determined appellant suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which is a 
3

severe mental disorder. The disorder causes appellant to exhibit “thought disorder 

symptoms,” such as delusions, hallucinations and paranoia. There are times when he 

hears voices in his head, and sometimes he feels everyone is out to get him. He has 

reported seeing dead people. 

Appellant’s mental disorder also causes “mood symptoms,” such as 

depression, agitation, irritability and anger. Because appellant is bipolar, his symptoms 

are not always present. Rather, they tend to “wax and wane” over time. Dr. Kelly 

explained that’s “just part of [appellant’s] illness. That’s what mood disorders do.” 

That’s also what makes appellant’s condition very difficult to treat. 

As part of his treatment plan, appellant has been prescribed a variety of 

antipsychotic and antidepressant drugs. He also has a prescription for Lorazepam, a 

sedative, which he is supposed to take “as-needed.” Dr. Kelly testified these medications 

are generally effective in controlling appellant’s symptoms. However, appellant has not 

always taken them on a consistent basis. While he is inclined to ask for them and take 

them when he is feeling bad, he tends not to do so when he is feeling good. And when he 

stops taking them, that makes his symptoms worse, increasing the risk he will engage in 

violent behavior. He has refused medication on several occasions, most recently in June 

2011. 

 Over all, however, appellant has made good progress since arriving at 

Atascadero. He has been cooperative and well behaved, participated in his treatment 

programs and worked a variety of jobs. In speaking with Dr. Kelly, he seemed to 

understand there is a positive correlation between taking his medication and his mental 

health. Yet he also tended to minimize some of his symptoms and past behavior. For 

instance, he blamed his commitment offenses on drug use and claimed his mother only 

had a “spot on her neck” after he assaulted her, which was not true. And although 

appellant said he felt much better now than in the past, he did express a paranoid ideation 
4

about “people defeating him.” Still, at the time he evaluated appellant in November 

2011, Dr. Kelly felt his mental illness was pretty much under control. 

However, by the time of trial, eight months later, Dr. Kelly’s opinion about 

appellant had changed. In reviewing appellant’s records during the interim, he noticed 

appellant’s attendance at his various treatment groups had dropped off sharply, to about 

50 percent. Also, during a May 2012 interview with the staff at CONREP, a conditional 

release program, appellant insisted he did not have a mental illness and did not need his 

medication. Thus, the staff did not believe appellant was suitable for their program. 

Appellant has also told staff at Atascadero he does not think he needs to take his 

medication. 

Dr. Kelly testified appellant has always been somewhat ambiguous about 

his mental illness and need for treatment. He’s often complained his medications make 

him tired, and he would be better off without them. But Dr. Kelly disputed this. He 

believed the cause of appellant’s tiredness was his depression, not his medication, and his 

failure to realize this was proof he lacks insight into his condition. Dr. Kelly also 

expressed concern about appellant’s lack of coping skills and a solid outpatient plan. He 

did not believe appellant could safely transition into the community on his own. 

Testifying further, Dr. Kelly opined appellant’s mental illness was not 

currently in remission, as reflected by the continued presence of his symptoms. Nor 

could he ever get his illness under control if he did not take his medication on a regular 

basis. Asked what he thought would happen if appellant were released into the 

community, Dr. Kelly surmised he would not take his medication, which would cause his 

symptoms to increase, and he would become violent. Therefore, Dr. Kelly believed 

appellant met the criteria for continued confinement at Atascadero as an MDO. While 

conceding appellant is considered a “low risk” for engaging in assaultive behavior at 

Atascadero, Dr. Kelly felt that without a structured support system, he would pose a 

substantial risk of physical harm to others. 
5

Dr. Veronica Thomas echoed Dr. Kelly’s opinions in this regard. A 

psychologist in private practice, she examined appellant while he was in jail before trial. 

Although appellant was polite and cooperative during the interview, he said he gets 

“zombified” when he’s on his medication and it seems to “rain more” when he doesn’t. 

His chart also showed he had “elements of ongoing delusions,” indicating to Dr. Thomas 

that his mental illness was not in remission. Moreover, Dr. Thomas felt appellant was not 

entirely forthright about the prevalence of those delusions. She stated, “[T]here’s a 

secretive and paranoid component [to appellant] that suggests he’s not at a place yet 

where he [has a] good grip of his severe mental illness.” 

Dr. Thomas explained appellant’s records show he goes “back and forth” in 

terms of “accepting and rejecting the concept that he has a severe mental illness that 

requires treatment,” and there have been periods when he has refused to take his 

medication altogether. At times, appellant has recognized he needs treatment for his 

mental illness, but in July 2011, about a year before trial, he stated, “They’re all crazy.” 

“There’s nothing wrong with me.” Dr. Thomas said this shows appellant “is ambivalent 

and doesn’t quite understand or accept the magnitude of [his] mental illness.” In 

particular, he doesn’t understand how his mental illness affects his behavior. Thus, Dr. 

Thomas did not believe appellant was suitable for outpatient treatment. 

In Dr. Thomas’ opinion, this lack of insight also makes appellant a threat to 

others. While appellant has not been violent at Atascadero, Dr. Thomas was concerned 

that, outside that setting, he would not do well because he does not fully understand his 

condition or appreciate the need to stay on his medication. In fact, appellant told her that 

he could manage his symptoms without his medication, just by asking people around him 

for help and staying away from alcohol and street drugs. However, Dr. Thomas felt that 

if appellant stopped taking his medication, his symptoms would increase and there would 

be a greater likelihood of him using those substances. And if he did that, his symptoms 

“would probably increase dramatically,” making him a serious danger to others. 
6

Testifying on his own behalf, appellant stated he has suffered from 

depression for about 10 years and was diagnosed with bipolar schizoaffective disorder in 

2010. However, he stated there are times when he feels he is not mentally ill. It depends

on how he is feeling; sometimes he feels “really good,” and sometimes he feels “really 

the opposite.” When he’s feeling “the opposite,” he gets tired and fatigued. His 

symptoms also include “occasional voices, occasional hallucinations, insomnia,” loss of 

appetite and mood fluctuation. And when he is experiencing those symptoms, he is not 

always aware they are the product of his mental illness. 

Appellant testified he doesn’t remember much about his commitment 

offenses back in 2002. He said he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the 

time, and the whole episode seems like a dream to him now. Back then, he was having 

“extreme paranoid thoughts” and visual hallucinations and voices were telling him to 

break the law. He followed the voices and ended up going to prison as a result of what he 

did. While in custody, he felt like bugs were crawling all over him and people were 

trying to take his tears and his feces. He also told prison officials he had a highlycontagious disease that would shut down the prison. 

Appellant testified he also has a hard time remembering when he attacked 

his mother in 2010. In the wake of the attack, after she called his parole officer, he felt 

like she was betraying him for wanting to send him back to prison. He also felt like she 

was the one who was mentally ill, not him. He admitted he sometimes has a hard time 

telling the difference between what is real and what is not. 

When appellant was initially admitted to Atascadero in December 2010, he 

didn’t want to eat the food because he thought it was contaminated. There have also been 

times when he did not want to take his medication because it makes him tired and gives 

him migraines. In February 2011, he told his psychiatrist the more medications he takes, 

the more homosexuals “were walking in the door.” In addition, he has told staff that 

sometimes he hears voices telling him not to take his medication. Appellant has also 
7

asserted the belief that lack of education is the cause of his symptoms, and they can be 

sufficiently controlled by therapy, exercise and eating right. 

Nevertheless, appellant conceded at trial that when he stops taking his 

medication, his condition worsens. He said he may feel better for awhile, but then he 

gets headaches, insomnia and becomes emotionless, like he’s “numb.” Therefore, if he 

were released from Atascadero, he would take his medication regularly. Although he 

doesn’t believe in medication, it usually makes him feel better when he takes his pills, 

and the benefits are worth the negative side effects. He said he now understands that 

medication is an essential component of his treatment regimen. However, he admitted he 

hasn’t always been honest with his doctors, and sometimes he simply tells them what 

they want to hear. 

Appellant also admitted he sometimes forgets to take his medication, and 

he has to be reminded to do so. Moreover, his medication isn’t always 100 percent 

effective. In fact, even though he was on his medication at the time of trial, he felt the 

symptoms of his mental illness two days before he testified. He conceded, “The 

medication doesn’t work all the way all the time. It helps for . . . most of the symptoms 

[but] [i]t doesn’t help all of them.” 

For example, in November 2011, appellant had a hallucination about 

zombies, even though he was on his medication. And in the spring of 2012, in the 

months leading up to trial, he was experiencing difficulty sleeping, racing thoughts and 

rapid speech. He also reported hearing voices in his head. At trial he described the 

voices as fast and scrambled and said they don’t have any meaning to him. 

Explaining what he would do if he were released from Atascadero, 

appellant said he would try to get into an outpatient treatment program or possibly live 

with his mother. She could help him pay for his medication, but he would also look for 

work and try to keep himself occupied. Getting a job, going back to school, and 

attending substance abuse classes are all things he would like to do. His ultimate goal is 
8

to live independently and not have to take any medication. However, he understands the 

need to do so and will take his medication as long as his doctors tell him to. Although he 

has acted violently in the past, he does not think he is currently a danger to society. 

In closing argument, appellant’s attorney argued appellant could keep his 

mental illness under control by taking his medication and thus he was not a threat to 

others. However, the jury found appellant met the criteria for commitment as an MDO, 

in that he 1) has a severe mental disorder; 2) his disorder is not in remission or cannot be 

kept in remission without treatment; and 3) by reason of his disorder, he represents a 

substantial danger of physical harm to others. Thereupon, the court extended appellant’s 

commitment for one year. 

I

Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua 

sponte with CALCRIM Nos. 223 and 224. Respondent concedes the error but claims it 

was harmless. We agree with respondent. 

CALCRIM No. 223 explains the difference between direct and 

circumstantial evidence, and CALCRIM No. 224 provides that if two or more reasonable 

conclusions can be drawn from circumstantial evidence, the jury must accept the one that 

points in favor of the defendant. However, the instruction also states the jury must accept 

only reasonable conclusions and reject those that are unreasonable. 

In this case, neither side requested that CALCRIM Nos. 223 and 224 be 

given. While initially stating he was going to give the instructions anyway, the trial 

judge eventually changed his mind. In the end, he decided not to give them because he 

felt they would confuse the jury and the case was really more about credibility than 

circumstantial evidence. 

However, as the Attorney General concedes, CALCRIM Nos. 223 and 224 

should have been given sua sponte because expert testimony is generally considered to be 

circumstantial evidence (People v. Jones (1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222; People v. Gentry
9

(1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 607, 611), and the instructions apply in civil commitment 

proceedings (People v. Contreras (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 587; Conservatorship of 

Walker (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1082). The only question is whether the failure to give 

them was prejudicial, i.e., whether it is reasonably probable appellant would have 

obtained a more favorable verdict had CALCRIM Nos. 223 and 224 been given. (People 

v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274-1275; People v. Goldstein (1956) 139 

Cal.App.2d 146, 156.) Considering this question in light of the issues and evidence 

presented, we believe the answer is no. 

 The first issue the jury had to decide, whether appellant suffers from a 

severe mental disorder, was not in dispute. Even appellant admitted he suffers from 

schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which qualifies as such a disorder.

The second issue, whether the disorder was in remission and whether it 

could be kept in remission without continued treatment, was in dispute. But those issues 

turned largely on direct evidence. For example, appellant’s failure to take his medication 

and attend his treatment programs was direct evidence he was not following his treatment 

plan, and the fact he was having hallucinations, delusions and other symptoms up until 

the time of trial was direct evidence his disorder was not in remission. Therefore, the 

instructions on circumstantial evidence would not have had much bearing on the second 

issue before the jury. 

The third issue, in contrast, did depend primarily on circumstantial 

evidence. The jury had to decide, based on everything they knew about appellant, 

whether he posed a substantial risk of physical harm to others. Despite the unanimous 

expert testimony on this issue, appellant claims it is unlikely the jurors would have found 

this element true had they been instructed to interpret the circumstantial evidence in his 

favor. However, under CALCRIM No. 224, a jury is only required to construe 

circumstantial evidence in the defendant’s favor when two or more reasonable
10

conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. That is not the case with respect to the 

issue of appellant’s dangerousness. 

Within the last 10 years leading up to trial, appellant attempted to commit 

robbery with a screwdriver, he gave his mother a black eye, and he choked her to the 

point she became unconscious. He was unruly, paranoid and delusional in prison, and his 

mental illness did not relent following his commitment as an MDO. While his behavior 

improved at Atascadero, his symptoms and mental state “waxed and waned” with time. 

This created a dangerous cycle in which appellant tended to scorn his medication when 

he felt good, but by going off his medication, he virtually guaranteed he would 

decompensate, due to the up and down nature of his disorder. It was quite clear from the 

evidence that appellant needed to follow his treatment plan all the time. However, 

history shows that would be a tall order for him, especially if he was on his own. 

Appellant testified that if he were released from Atascadero, he would in 

fact take his medication. However, he also stated that he really doesn’t believe in the 

concept of medication and that he thinks his symptoms can be controlled without it. 

Also, when his symptoms do appear, he is not always aware of their cause. They distort 

his sense of reality, and he has difficulty knowing what is real and what is not. And 

sometimes he hears voices in his head that tell him not to take his medication and to do 

bad things. The danger, of course, is that appellant could easily be overcome with his 

delusional thoughts and act on them, just as he did during his prior episodes of violent 

behavior. 

It is certainly true that appellant has had periods of good behavior and full 

compliance with his treatment plan. But the nature of his mental illness is such that it 

will never go away completely. Even during the “good times,” appellant must remain 

vigilant to prevent a meltdown when things turn dark. Appellant’s admissions that he 

sometimes forgets to take his medication and that he thinks his illness can be controlled 

without it is strong evidence he remains a serious danger to society. 
11

The efficacy of appellant’s medicine is also a legitimate concern. 

Appellant testified his medication is not always effective, and despite being on it at the 

time of trial, he was still experiencing symptoms of his disorder. So, there is a very real 

danger appellant could decompensate and become violent, even if he were to continue to 

comply with his medication regimen. 

Of course, all of appellant’s challenges would likely be much greater if he 

were not receiving around-the-clock supervision from mental health professionals and 

instead had to fend for himself in the outside world. The expert witnesses were very 

clear on this point, and they also were unanimous in their opinion that appellant would 

have serious difficulty controlling his mental disorder if he were released from 

Atascadero. Given appellant’s history, it is simply not reasonably likely he would have 

obtained a more favorable verdict had the jury been instructed on circumstantial 

evidence. Therefore, the failure to give CALCRIM Nos. 223 and 224 was harmless. 

II

Appellant also contends the trial court improperly shifted the burden of 

proof with respect to his so-called “medication defense.” This claim also fails.

On appeal, we consider the trial court’s instructions as a whole and in favor 

of the judgment below. (People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1111-1112.) We 

also “‘“assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and 

correlating all jury instructions which are given. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 

1111.) If the record shows the jury was properly instructed on all elements of the state’s 

case, we reverse only if there is a “‘reasonable likelihood’ that the jury misconstrued or 

misapplied the law in light of the instructions given, the entire record of trial, and the 

arguments of counsel.” (People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 276.)

Here, the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the state’s case. 

To wit, the trial court instructed, “The petition alleges [appellant] is a mentally disordered 

offender. [¶] To prove this allegation, the petitioner must prove beyond a reasonable 
12

doubt that: [¶] One, he has a severe mental disorder; [¶] Two, the severe mental disorder 

is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment; and [¶]

Three, because of his severe mental disorder, he presently represents a substantial danger 

of physical harm to others.” 

In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that remission means the 

symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled by medication or psychosocial 

support. And, a severe mental disorder cannot be kept in remission without treatment if, 

within a year of trial, the person engaged in violent or threatening behavior or did not 

voluntarily follow his treatment plan.

Consistent with appellant’s defense, the trial court also instructed the jurors, 

“If you find [appellant] is in remission and thus not dangerous to others while medicated, 

the petitioner has the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that, if released, 

[appellant] will not take his . . . prescribed medication and in an unmedicated state [he] 

represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” 

Appellant argues inclusion of the italicized phrase shifted the burden to him 

to prove his mental disorder was in remission. But the phrase does not so state, and 

nothing about it suggests that. It speaks to the issue of remission, and the court 

specifically instructed the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

appellant’s mental disorder was not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without 

continued treatment. This instruction immediately preceded, and was given in 

conjunction with, the challenged instruction on appellant’s medication defense. 

Moreover, state’s counsel readily conceded in closing argument that she had the burden 

to prove appellant’s mental disorder was not in remission. Under these circumstances, it 

is not reasonably likely the jury shifted that burden to appellant. The instructions simply 

do not lend themselves to such a construction when considered as a whole. 
13

III

Lastly, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his request to be 

transferred to an outpatient treatment program. He argues the court applied the standard 

of proof incorrectly, and its decision is not supported by substantial evidence, but the 

record shows otherwise. 

Following the jury’s verdict, the trial judge issued a lengthy ruling on 

appellant’s request to be released into the CONREP program. He explained, “I have read 

[People v. Gregerson (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 306 (Gregerson)], and all along it was my 

impression that this was a reasonable cause standard, fairly low standard, to obtain 

outpatient treatment. [¶] [Appellant] must raise a strong suspicion in a person of ordinary 

prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and effective. And that’s the way I’ve 

been looking at it throughout the trial, asking myself, do I have a strong suspicion that 

outpatient treatment would be safe and effective? I don’t need to have clear and 

convincing evidence of that point. I don’t even need to have a preponderance of the 

evidence on that point.

“And this standard, as I understand it, is less than preponderance of the 

evidence. It’s very much like the standard that the court [utilizes] in a preliminary 

examination. And as I said, all along that’s been what I’ve been thinking about. [¶] I am 

going to deny the request for outpatient treatment or CONREP or community treatment. 

I simply don’t have that strong suspicion. In fact, I strongly suspect that it would not be 

safe and effective.” 

In so ruling, the judge surmised appellant might be suitable for outpatient 

treatment at some point, but, like Dr. Thomas, the judge did not believe appellant was 

ready for CONREP at this time. While recognizing appellant was “well motivated” and 

had “made great strides” at Atascadero, the judge felt his condition was “too fragile” to 

change his placement. Particularly, the judge was concerned “that in community 

confinement there would be less supervision and a likelihood that when [appellant] feels 
14

better, he will decide that he doesn’t need the medication. . . . [A]nd that then he will 

present very differently than he does today and become agitated and possibly act out.” 

Appellant concedes the trial judge articulated the correct legal standard of 

reasonable cause in denying his request for outpatient care. That is, the judge correctly 

determined appellant had the burden to raise a strong suspicion he could be safely and 

effectively treated on an outpatient basis. (Pen. Code, § 2972, subd. (d); Gregerson, 

supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 316-319.) However, appellant argues the court 

“misunderstood” that standard in applying it to the facts, and properly understood, the 

standard compels reversal of the court’s ruling. 

In so arguing, appellant contends that just because the judge strongly 

suspected he could not be safely and effectively treated at CONREP, there was still room 

for him to entertain a strong suspicion that he could. In other words, the presence of 

some evidence of nonsuitability does not necessarily mean there was not some evidence 

of suitability. However, the question was not whether there was “some evidence” 

appellant was suitable for outpatient treatment. Rather, appellant had to “raise a strong 

suspicion in a person of ordinary prudence that outpatient treatment would be safe and 

effective” for him. (Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 319, fn. omitted.) By 

stating he strongly suspected outpatient treatment would not be safe and effective for 

appellant, the judge impliedly found appellant failed to carry his burden of proof in that 

regard. And to make the matter perfectly clear, the judge stated, “I simply don’t have [a] 

strong suspicion” that outpatient care would be safe and effective for appellant. We are 

convinced by this that the judge applied the correct standard of proof in denying 

appellant’s request. 

The record also contains substantial evidence to support the trial court’s 

ruling. (See Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 319-320 [substantial evidence 

standard applies in reviewing trial court’s ruling on request for outpatient treatment].) As 

to that issue, appellant plays up all the evidence that was favorable to him at trial. But in 
15

applying the substantial evidence rule, we presume “in support of the judgment the 

existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. 

Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) Reversal is not warranted unless upon no hypothesis 

whatsoever is there substantial evidence to support the ruling below. (People v. Gaut

(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430.)

At trial, Dr. Kelly testified appellant’s failure to follow his treatment plan 

caused the CONREP staff to have concerns about accepting him into their program. In 

fact, when the staff interviewed appellant shortly before trial in May 2012, he told them 

he did not have a mental illness and did not need any medication. Dr. Kelly said this lack 

of insight was a troubling theme of appellant’s mental illness. And Dr. Thomas went so 

far as to say that appellant’s enduring ambivalence about his mental illness made him 

unsuitable for CONREP at this time. She opined, “[T]here’s a secretive and paranoid 

component [to appellant’s thinking] that suggests that he’s not at a place yet where he 

[has a] good grip of his severe mental illness.” 

Based on this evidence, the trial judge could reasonably find appellant was 

not a suitable patient for CONREP. There is substantial evidence to support the judge’s 

decision to deny appellant’s request for outpatient treatment. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BEDSWORTH, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

THOMPSON, J.