56344 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

static torque loads. However, the size, 

configuration, and failure modes of jet 

engines have changed considerably from 

those envisioned when the engine 

seizure requirement of § 25.361(b) was 

first adopted. Current engines are much 

larger and are now designed with large 

bypass fans capable of producing much 

larger torque, if they become jammed. 

Relative to the engine configurations 

that existed when the rule was 

developed in 1957, the present 

generation of engines is sufficiently 

different and novel to justify issuance of 

special conditions to establish 

appropriate design standards. The latest 

generation of jet engines is capable of 

producing, during failure, transient 

loads that are significantly higher and 

more complex than those produced by 

the generation of engines in existence 

when the current regulation was 

developed. 

In order to maintain the level of safety 

envisioned in § 25.361(b), more 

comprehensive criteria are needed for 

the new generation of high bypass 

engines. The proposed special condition 

would distinguish between the more 

common failure events involving 

transient deceleration conditions with 

temporary loss of thrust capability and 

those rare events resulting from 

structural failures. Associated with 

these events, the proposed criteria 

establish design limit and ultimate load 

conditions. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 25–05–03–SC for the Airbus Model 

A318 airplanes equipped with Pratt and 

Whitney PW6000 engines, was 

published in the Federal Register on 

April 11, 2005 (70 CFR 18321). No 

comments were received. However, the 

FAA has reconsidered the inclusion of 

auxiliary power units in these special 

conditions. While § 25.361(b) is 

interpreted to apply to auxiliary power 

units, the novel or unusual design 

features identified above do not apply to 

them. Therefore, auxiliary power units 

are excluded from those special 

conditions and would continue to be 

treated under the current § 25.361(b). 

Except for the removal of auxiliary 

power units, these special conditions 

are adopted as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to Airbus 

Model A318–121 and A318–122 

airplanes equipped with Pratt and 

Whitney PW6000 engines. Should 

Airbus apply at a later date for a change 

to the type certificate to include other 

type designs incorporating the same 

novel or unusual design feature, these 

special conditions would apply to that 

model as well under the provisions of 

§ 21.101. 

Condition 

This action affects certain novel or 

unusual design features on the Airbus 

Model A318 airplane equipped with 

Pratt and Whitney PW6000 engines. It is 

not a rule of general applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Airbus Model 

A318 airplane equipped with Pratt and 

Whitney PW6000 engines. 

For turbine engine installations other 

than auxiliary power units, in lieu of 

compliance with § 25.361(b), the 

following special condition applies: 

(a) The engine mounts, pylons and 

adjacent supporting airframe structure 

must be designed to withstand 1g level 

flight loads acting simultaneously with 

the maximum limit torque loads 

imposed by each of the following: 

(1) Sudden engine deceleration due to 

a malfunction which could result in a 

temporary loss of power or thrust. 

(2) The maximum acceleration of the 

engine. 

(b) For engine supporting structure, 

an ultimate loading condition must be 

considered that combines 1g flight loads 

with the transient dynamic loads 

resulting from each of the following: 

(1) The loss of any fan, compressor, or 

turbine blade. 

(2) Where applicable to a specific 

engine design, and separately from the 

conditions specified in paragraph (b)(1), 

any other engine structural failure that 

results in higher loads. 

(c) The ultimate loads developed from 

the conditions specified in paragraphs 

(b)(1) and (b)(2) above are to be 

multiplied by a factor of 1.0 when 

applied to engine mounts and pylons 

and multiplied by a factor of 1.25 when 

applied to adjacent supporting airframe 

structure. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 14, 2005. 

Kalene C. Yanamura, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–19206 Filed 9–26–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–22483; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–236–AD; Amendment 

39–14292; AD 2005–19–27] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A330–200 Series Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Model A330–200 series 

airplanes. This AD requires inspecting 

to determine the serial numbers and 

flight cycles of the fuel jettison valves 

and removing certain valves as 

applicable. This AD also requires doing 

a one-time inspection for cracks of the 

remaining jettison valves and removing 

any cracked valves. This AD also 

requires modifying the diameters of the 

six attachment holes in the wing bottom 

skin panel before installing a new or 

serviceable jettison valve. This AD 

results from reports of fuel leaks in the 

fuel jettison system located on the 

wings. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent fuel leaks from the fuel jettison 

outlets, which could result in fuel 

vapors coming into contact with 

ignition sources, and consequent fire or 

explosion. 

DATES: Effective October 12, 2005. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of October 12, 2005. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by November 28, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56345 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France, 

for service information identified in this 

AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2125; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The Direction Ge ́ne ́rale de l’Aviation 

Civile (DGAC), which is the 

airworthiness authority for France, 

notified us that an unsafe condition may 

exist on certain Airbus Model A330–200 

series airplanes. The DGAC advises that 

there have been several reported cases 

of fuel leaks in the fuel jettison system 

located on the wings. These leaks were 

observed during refueling and during 

maintenance. Inspection of the system 

revealed the presence of cracks and, in 

certain cases, breaks at the jettison 

valve. The inspection also revealed 

several partial disconnects of the valve 

inlet and/or outlet pipe. Analysis of the 

inspection data showed that the use of 

maximum tolerances in production 

when attaching the jettison valve to the 

wingbox bottom skin can cause cracks 

due to static overloading. These cracks 

can grow under the effect of fuel 

pressure loads during refueling 

operations and cause the valve to 

rupture. A ruptured valve could cause 

the fuel pipes to disconnect from the 

jettison valve and consequent fuel leaks 

from the fuel jettison outlets, which 

could result in fuel vapors coming into 

contact with ignition sources, and 

consequent fire or explosion. 

Relevant Service Information 

Airbus has issued Service Bulletin 

A330–57–3078, Revision 01, dated 

August 4, 2004. The service bulletin 

specifies that operators should discard 

any fuel jettison valve with certain 

serial numbers, or that has accumulated 

more than 5,200 flight cycles since it 

was first installed. The service bulletin 

describes procedures for doing a visual 

inspection for cracks of the external 

surfaces of the mounting flange of any 

remaining jettison valve, and an eddy 

current inspection for cracks if the 

visual inspection shows no cracks. If 

any crack is detected in the mounting 

flange during either inspection, the 

service bulletin specifies that the 

jettison valve should be removed and 

discarded. If no crack is detected after 

the eddy current inspection, the service 

bulletin specifies that the jettison valve 

may be re-installed. The service bulletin 

also describes procedures for modifying 

the diameters of the six attachment 

holes in the wing bottom skin panel 

before installing the same, uncracked, 

jettison valve after the inspections, or 

before installing a new jettison valve 

after the previous jettison valve has 

been discarded. The service bulletin 

also describes procedures for an 

operational test of the fuel jettison 

system to ensure that there are no fuel 

leaks. This test is done during the 

installation of the jettison valve. 

Accomplishing the actions specified 

in the service information is intended to 

adequately address the unsafe 

condition. The DGAC mandated the 

service information and issued French 

airworthiness directive F–2004–127, 

dated August 4, 2004, to ensure the 

continued airworthiness of these 

airplanes in France. 

The service bulletin refers to FRHiTemp Service Bulletin HTE900169–

28–1, Revision 1, dated November 8, 

2004, as an additional source of service 

information for doing a visual 

inspection of the mounting flange of the 

jettison valve. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

This airplane model is manufactured 

in France and is type certificated for 

operation in the United States under the 

provisions of section 21.29 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

21.29) and the applicable bilateral 

airworthiness agreement. Pursuant to 

this bilateral airworthiness agreement, 

the DGAC has kept the FAA informed 

of the situation described above. We 

have examined the DGAC’s findings, 

evaluated all pertinent information, and 

determined that we need to issue an AD 

for products of this type design that are 

certificated for operation in the United 

States. 

Therefore, we are issuing this AD to 

prevent fuel leaks from the fuel jettison 

outlets. This AD requires accomplishing 

the actions specified in the service 

information described previously. 

Clarification of Inspection Language 

Although the French airworthiness 

directive specifies that operators 

‘‘inspect visually’’ for cracks of the 

external surfaces of the mounting flange, 

this AD refers to that inspection a 

‘‘detailed inspection.’’ We have 

included the definition for a detailed 

inspection in a note in the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

None of the airplanes affected by this 

action are on the U.S. Register. All 

airplanes affected by this AD are 

currently operated by non-U.S. 

operators under foreign registry; 

therefore, they are not directly affected 

by this AD action. However, we 

consider this AD necessary to ensure 

that the unsafe condition is addressed if 

any affected airplane is imported and 

placed on the U.S. Register in the future. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs to comply with this AD 

for any affected airplane that might be 

imported and placed on the U.S. 

Register in the future. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts cost Cost per airplane 

Inspection to determine serial number ........... 1 $65 None ............................................................... $65 

Modification ..................................................... 13 65 No Charge ...................................................... 845 

FAA’s Determination of the Effective 

Date 

No airplane affected by this AD is 

currently on the U.S. Register. 

Therefore, providing notice and 

opportunity for public comment is 

unnecessary before this AD is issued, 

and this AD may be made effective in 

less than 30 days after it is published in 

the Federal Register. 

56346 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements that affect flight safety and 

was not preceded by notice and an 

opportunity for public comment; 

however, we invite you to submit any 

relevant written data, views, or 

arguments regarding this AD. Send your 

comments to the address listed under 

the ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket 

No. FAA–2005–22483; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–236–AD’’ at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

the AD that might suggest a need to 

modify it. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact with FAA 

personnel concerning this AD. Using the 

search function of that Web site, anyone 

can find and read the comments in any 

of our dockets, including the name of 

the individual who sent the comment 

(or signed the comment on behalf of an 

association, business, labor union, etc.). 

You may review the DOT’s complete 

Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 

Register published on April 11, 2000 

(65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit 

http://dms.dot.gov. 

Examining the Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov, or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. The Docket 

Management Facility office (telephone 

(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza 

level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 

street address stated in the ADDRESSES

section. Comments will be available in 

the AD docket shortly after the Docket 

Management System receives them. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the National Government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that the regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD and placed it in the AD docket. 

See the ADDRESSES section for a location 

to examine the regulatory evaluation. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 

by adding the following new 

airworthiness directive (AD): 

2005–19–27 Airbus: Amendment 39–14292. 

Docket No. FAA–2005–22483; 

Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–236–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD becomes effective October 12, 

2005. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330–

201, –202, –203, –223, and –243 airplanes, 

certificated in any category; equipped with 

fuel jettison valve part number (P/N) 

HTE900169. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of fuel 

leaks in the fuel jettison system located on 

the wings. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

fuel leaks from the fuel jettison outlets, 

which could result in fuel vapors coming 

into contact with ignition sources, and 

consequent fire or explosion. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Service Bulletin Reference 

(f) For the purposes of this AD the term 

‘‘service bulletin’’ means the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus 

Service Bulletin A330–57–3078, Revision 01, 

dated August 4, 2004. 

Note 1: The service bulletin refers to FRHiTemp Service Bulletin HTE900169–28–1, 

Revision 1, dated November 8, 2004, as an 

additional source of service information for 

doing a visual inspection of the mounting 

flange of the jettison valve. 

Inspection to Determine Serial Number and 

Flight Cycles 

(g) Within 40 months after the effective 

date of this AD, do the actions in paragraphs 

(g)(1) and (g)(2) of this AD in accordance 

with the service bulletin. 

(1) Inspect the fuel jettison valves, P/N 

HTE900169, to determine whether any of the 

following serial numbers are installed: 

FR092BC to FR099BC inclusive, FR001BD to 

FR030BD inclusive, FR031BE to FR058BE 

inclusive, and M151VB292. A review of 

airplane maintenance records is acceptable in 

lieu of this inspection if information can be 

conclusively determined from that review. If 

any affected serial number is installed: Before 

further flight, remove the jettison valve and 

do the modification in paragraph (i) of this 

AD. 

(2) Review airplane records to determine 

the number of flight cycles accumulated on 

the fuel jettison valves since first installation 

on the airplane. If any jettison valve has 

accumulated 5,200 total flight cycles or more, 

or if the number of flight cycles cannot be 

determined: Before further flight, remove the 

jettison valve and do the modification in 

paragraph (i) of this AD. 

Detailed and Eddy Current Inspections for 

Cracks of the Mounting Flange 

(h) Within 40 months after the effective 

date of this AD, for any jettison valve that 

was not removed in accordance with 

paragraph (g) of this AD, do a detailed 

inspection for cracks of the mounting flange 

of the jettison valve in accordance with the 

service bulletin. 

(1) If no crack is found during the detailed 

inspection: Before further flight, do an eddy 

current inspection for cracks of the mounting 

Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 27, 2005 / Rules and Regulations 56347 

flange of the jettison valve in accordance 

with the service bulletin and, whether a 

crack is found or not, before further flight, do 

the modification required by paragraph (i) of 

this AD. If no crack is found during the eddy 

current inspection, the inspected jettison 

valve may be reinstalled during the 

modification required by paragraph (i) of this 

AD. 

(2) If any crack is found during the detailed 

inspection: Before further flight, do the 

modification in paragraph (i) of this AD and 

do not reinstall the jettison valve. 

Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a 

detailed inspection is: ‘‘An intensive 

examination of a specific item, installation, 

or assembly to detect damage, failure, or 

irregularity. Available lighting is normally 

supplemented with a direct source of good 

lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. 

Inspection aids such as mirror, magnifying 

lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface 

cleaning and elaborate procedures may be 

required.’’

Modification 

(i) At the applicable time specified in 

paragraph (g) or (h) of this AD: Modify the 

diameters of the six attachment holes in the 

wing bottom skin panel, and install a new 

fuel jettison valve, or reinstall a previously 

installed fuel jettison valve that has been 

inspected and found to have no crack in 

accordance with paragraph (h) of this AD. Do 

all actions in accordance with the service 

bulletin. 

Parts Installation 

(j) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install, on any airplane, a fuel 

jettison valve, P/N HTE900169, unless it has 

been inspected and had corrective actions 

done in accordance with paragraphs (g) and 

(h) of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(k)(1) The Manager, ANM–116, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, has the authority 

to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

in accordance with the procedures found in 

14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) Before using any AMOC approved in 

accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to 

which the AMOC applies, notify the 

appropriate principal inspector in the FAA 

Flight Standards Certificate Holding District 

Office. 

Related Information 

(l) French airworthiness directive F–2004–

127, dated August 4, 2004, also addresses the 

subject of this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(m) You must use Airbus Service Bulletin 

A330–57–3078, Revision 01, dated August 4, 

2004, to perform the actions that are required 

by this AD, unless the AD specifies 

otherwise. The Director of the Federal 

Register approved the incorporation by 

reference of this document in accordance 

with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

Contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France, for a 

copy of this service information. You may 

review copies at the Docket Management 

Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., room PL–401, 

Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the 

Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at the NARA, 

call (202) 741–6030, or go to http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

September 15, 2005. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 05–18910 Filed 9–26–05; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2005–22482; Directorate 

Identifier 2003–NM–009–AD; Amendment 

39–14291; AD 2005–19–26] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited Model 

ATP Airplanes and Model HS 748 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited Model 

ATP airplanes and Model HS 748 

airplanes. This AD requires doing a 

detailed inspection of the drain pipes of 

the fuel cross feed system and certain 

electrical cables for chafe damage; doing 

an inspection to determine the clearance 

between the cable loom and the cross 

feed drain pipe; and doing corrective 

actions if necessary. This AD results 

from a fire in the dry area of the wing 

due to severe chafe damage between an 

electrical cable and the fuel cross feed 

drain pipe. We are issuing this AD to 

prevent chafe damage of the electrical 

cable and fuel cross feed drain pipe that 

could lead to fuel leakage from the drain 

pipe and an ignition source from the 

electrical cable, which could result in a 

fire in the dry area of the airplane wing. 

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

October 12, 2005. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of October 12, 2005. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by November 28, 2005. 

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following 

addresses to submit comments on this 

AD. 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to 

http://dms.dot.gov and follow the 

instructions for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Government-wide rulemaking Web 

site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the instructions for sending 

your comments electronically. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility; 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., Nassif Building, 

room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

Contact British Aerospace Regional 

Aircraft American Support, 13850 

Mclearen Road, Herndon, Virginia 

20171, for service information identified 

in this AD. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–1175; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), 

which is the airworthiness authority for 

the United Kingdom, notified us that an 

unsafe condition may exist on all BAE 

Systems (Operations) Limited Model 

ATP airplanes and Model HS 748 

airplanes. The CAA advises that an 

operator reported finding a fire in the 

dry area of the wing on a Model ATP 

airplane before takeoff. Severe chafe 

damage between an electrical cable and 

the drain pipe of the fuel cross feed 

system caused a small leakage of fuel 

from the drain pipe. Electrical sparks 

from the damaged electrical cable most 

likely ignited the fuel leakage. Chafe 

damage of the electrical cable and fuel 

cross feed drain pipe, if not prevented, 

could result in a fire in the dry area of 

the airplane wing. 

The fuel cross feed pipe drain on 

certain Model ATP airplanes is identical 

to those on the affected Model HS 748 

airplanes. Therefore, all of these models 

may be subject to the same unsafe 

condition. 

Relevant Service Information 

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited 

has issued Alert Service Bulletin ATP–