In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 07-3137

FREDERICK MOORE and TOMMIE GRADY

as Co-Administrators and Personal Representatives

of the Estate of FREDERICK GRADY, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

DONALD TULEJA, DEMETRIUS WILLIAMSON,

JOSEPH PALMSONE, and DENNIS BOYLE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 2545—Ruben Castillo, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 29, 2008—DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 2008

Before CUDAHY, POSNER and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. On the evening of April 8, 2003,

Frederick Grady was involved in a major traffic accident.

Although Grady escaped without serious injury, his van

rolled over on its side and was severely damaged. Later

that night, Grady was arrested when he trespassed on the
2 No. 07-3137

private lot where his damaged van was being held. He

was taken to a Chicago police station and placed in a

holding cell. In the early morning hours of April 9, 2003,

Grady was found unconscious and unresponsive in his

cell. Attempts by paramedics to revive Grady were unsuccessful, and Grady tragically died. An autopsy conducted

by the Cook County Office of the Medical Examiner

concluded that Grady had suffered a fatal heart attack.

Although the autopsy concluded that Grady died from

natural causes, injuries found on Grady’s body raised

suspicion in the minds of his family and friends. They

believe that Grady had been beaten in his cell by jail

personnel and that this beating precipitated the fatal

heart attack. The plaintiffs, co-administers of Grady’s

estate, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

that the defendant police officers and jail personnel

deprived Grady of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force and denying

him medical care.

The case was tried before a jury. The trial lasted seven

days; the jury heard all of the plaintiffs’ evidence and

returned a verdict in favor of the defendants in just over

an hour. The plaintiffs made a motion for a new trial but

the district court denied the motion, noting that the jury’s

verdict was reasonable in light of the “weak liability case”

presented by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs now appeal the

denial of their motion for a new trial. We AFFIRM.
No. 07-3137 3

I. 

Grady was involved in two separate car accidents on

April 8, 2003. The first was relatively minor. The second,

which occurred at roughly 6:30 p.m., was more serious. In

that accident, Grady’s van crossed out of its lane and

struck another vehicle, causing both vehicles to flip over.

Officer Andrew Lucca of the Chicago Police Department

responded to the scene, as did paramedics Renee

Sanchez and John Kaveney. Grady was wearing his seat

belt and escaped the crash with only minor bumps and

bruises. He initially refused medical treatment and

refused to be taken to the hospital. Grady, who worked as

a carpenter, told Sanchez that he had to go back to get his

carpentry tools out of his van. Sanchez warned Grady that

he should stay away from the van because “there was

broken glass and stuff.” Despite the warning, Grady

reached into the van, cutting his right hand rather

seriously in the process. The paramedics bandaged

Grady’s hand—a fact that they recorded in their log—and

replaced the dressing once more after Grady bled through

the first bandage. Grady again refused to be taken to

the hospital. Instead, he was released.

At 8:45 p.m. that evening, Grady trespassed on the lot

where his van was being stored in an attempt to retrieve

his tools. The lot owner called the Chicago Police Department. Officers Leo Morales and Luis Garza arrived at the

scene and arrested Grady. As Officer Morales placed

Grady in handcuffs, he noticed the bandage on Grady’s

hand. Officers Morales and Garza confiscated Grady’s

tools and took him back to the station. They handcuffed
4 No. 07-3137

Grady to a bench in the police station while they filled

out the arrest report. At that point, Officer Garza noticed

the bandage and asked Grady what had happened. Grady

told him that he had a car accident but did not elaborate;

Grady also declined medical assistance. The arrest report,

which focused on the facts surrounding the alleged

criminal trespass, did not mention the injury to Grady’s

hand.

Officers Morales and Garza then uncuffed Grady and

turned him over to lockup personnel. There was a strict

policy against handcuffs in the lockup, and Officer

Morales stated that he took the handcuffs with him. Grady

was processed by Officer Donald Tuleja, who did a quick

medical check of Grady while he sat behind a desk. He did

not observe any active bleeding, and Grady denied that he

needed medical care. The intake report did not note

the bandage on Grady’s hand. Palmsone took Grady’s

photograph; Williamson took his fingerprints. The photograph reveals that Grady had no injuries to his head when

he entered the jail. Although neither Palmsone nor Williamson noticed the bandage on Grady’s hand, no fingerprint was taken of Grady’s right hand. Grady was apparently cooperative with jail personnel, who allowed

him to make a phone call. Grady called his longtime

companion, Kathryn Tierno, and told her that he was “very

concerned about his tools.” Grady was then walked to

his cell, which contained a toilet, a sink and a metal

bench. Robert Gonzales, who was in the cell next to

Grady, saw Grady being taken to his cell and noticed the

bandage on his hand.
No. 07-3137 5

Personnel at the jail made rounds of the lockup every

fifteen minutes. Grady was calm and courteous. On one

occasion, Grady asked Williamson about his tools.

Palmsone, who made the majority of rounds, said that

Grady slept most of the night. Gonzales, who was in the

cell next to Grady, remembered hearing nothing but

coughing and snoring coming from Grady’s cell. When

Palmsone made his rounds at 1:30 p.m., he noticed Grady

sitting up on his bench. Approximately ten minutes later,

Gonzales stated that he heard a “thump” in Grady’s cell

followed by silence. When Palmsone made his rounds at

approximately 1:45 p.m., he found Grady unconscious

and unresponsive on the floor of his cell. Palmsone ran to

get Officer Tuleja, who called Sergeant Dennis Boyle and

Captain Raymond Miller for help. A log reflects that the

fire department and paramedics were called at 1:45 p.m.

Sanchez and Kaveney arrived to find Grady in a state

of cardiac arrest on the cell floor. They were unable to

resuscitate him. Grady was taken to the hospital, where

he was pronounced dead. An autopsy conducted by

Dr. Eupil Choi determined that Grady had died naturally

of a heart attack. The autopsy also revealed that Grady

had a number of injuries to his body, including a hand

laceration, two abrasions on his head and scrapes on his

wrist and neck. Sergeant Boyle examined the cell and

found no signs of struggle; investigators from the office

of internal affairs arrived later and also examined the

cell. They too found no evidence of wrongdoing.

The plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

action on April 8, 2004. They alleged that Williamson and

Palmsone used excessive force on Grady, that Officer
6 No. 07-3137

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 1

Officers Morales and Garza. The plaintiffs do not appeal this

decision.

During the trial, the district court granted judgment as a 2

matter of law as to Captain Miller. The plaintiffs do not appeal

this decision. 

Tuleja failed to intervene and that Sergeant Boyle and

Captain Miller denied Grady medical care. The plaintiffs

also alleged that Officers Morales and Garza had arrested

Grady without probable cause. The plaintiffs’ theory was 1

that Grady angered Palmsone and Williamson by constantly complaining about his tools. Palmsone and Williamson had finally “snapped,” striking Grady—who the

plaintiffs believe was still handcuffed—with a baton. As

Grady raised his hands to defend himself, the baton

lacerated his hand and the force of the blow knocked the

handcuffs into Grady’s wrists and against his head,

causing abrasions. The plaintiffs claim that Officer Tuleja

saw the beating take place but failed to intervene. Further,

they claim that Sergeant Boyle and Captain Miller

delayed calling the paramedics until after the defendants

had finished cleaning the cell and concealing evidence

of the use of excessive force. The plaintiffs’ case focused

2

almost entirely on inferences based on the nature of the

injuries found on Grady’s body; they claimed that the

only reasonable medical conclusion was that Grady had

been struck with a blunt object in his cell.

The jury trial lasted seven days. The jury heard testimony

from almost all of the individuals who came into contact
No. 07-3137 7

We decline to review the denial of the Rule 50(b) motion

3

because the plaintiffs did not file a motion for directed verdict

before the jury returned its verdict. See Van Bumble v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 407 F.3d 823, 827 (7th Cir. 2005). 

with Grady that day, including Officer Morales, Officer

Garza, Officer Tuleja, Palmsone, Williamson and Gonzales. They all denied that any wrongdoing had taken place.

Dr. Choi, who conducted the original autopsy of Grady,

testified at trial that he believed that Grady’s death was

natural. The plaintiffs retained Dr. Michael Kaufman to

reexamine Dr. Choi’s work but, after conducting his own

autopsy, Dr. Kaufman also concluded that Grady’s death

was natural. The plaintiffs’ case was based almost entirely

on testimony of Dr. Besant-Matthews, who did not have an

opportunity to examine Grady’s body but reviewed the

medical evidence in the case. The jury returned a verdict in

favor of the remaining defendants in a little more than an

hour. The plaintiffs moved for judgment as a matter of law

under Rule 50(b) or a new trial under Rule 59(a) but the

district court denied the motions. The plaintiffs now appeal

the denial of their post-trial motions.3

II.

The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in

denying their motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a). See

FED. R. CIV. PRO. 59(a). We review the denial of a motion

for a new trial for abuse of discretion. See Kapelanski v.

Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2004). “A party seeking

to reverse a district court’s denial of a motion for a new
8 No. 07-3137

The plaintiffs insist that Dr. Kaufman violated a pre-trial 4

ruling when he stated that Grady had a stressful day. Some

background is in order here. Before trial, the plaintiffs intended

to have Dr. Besant-Matthews testify that Grady, who carried his

(continued...)

trial bears a particularly heavy burden.” Smith v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 569 (7th Cir. 2004). A verdict

will be set aside as contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence only if “no rational jury” could have rendered

the verdict. See King v. Harrington, 447 F.3d 531, 534 (7th

Cir. 2006). Jury verdicts deserve particular deference in

cases with “simple issues but highly disputed facts.” Latino

v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310, 314 (7th Cir. 1995). We conclude

that there was a reasonable basis for the jury’s verdict in

this case.

We begin with the common ground. Each of the medical

experts that testified at trial (Dr. Choi, Dr. Kaufman and

Dr. Besant-Matthews) diagnosed Grady with severe

valvular heart disease. Dr. Choi and Dr. Kaufman also

diagnosed him with severe coronary atherosclerosis. All

of the experts agreed that these conditions had gone

undiagnosed and were already very advanced. Thus, the

parties agree that Grady suffered a fatal heart attack.

The disputed issue concerns the trigger for the heart

attack. Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Choi both testified that

Grady died a natural death. Grady already suffered from

two serious heart diseases that were highly advanced. Any

stress he experienced, whether physical or emotional,

would increase the likelihood of a fatal heart attack.4
No. 07-3137 9

(...continued) 4

own drum set to blues concerts and worked long hours as a

carpenter, was better able to endure the stress of an accident and

an arrest than an average person would be. The defendants

moved to bar this line of questioning. The district court agreed,

ruling that “no one can testify about what was stressful to Mr.

Grady.” The essence of this ruling was that, while the experts

could discuss stress in general, they could not speculate about

whether Grady had a particular resistance to stress. 

Our review of the transcripts makes clear that when Dr.

Kaufman testified that the accidents and arrest were stressful to

Grady, he meant that such events would have been stressful to

anyone. Indeed, when asked by defense counsel whether he was

“speculating that these issues caused stress to Mr. Grady,” Dr.

Kaufman responded, “Any one, yes.”

Indeed, Grady could have suffered the heart attack without

any apparent triggering event at all. Many individuals

who suffer from this type of advanced heart condition

simply die in their sleep. Dr. Kaufman emphasized that

Grady was “living on borrowed time” and could have

simply “dropped dead suddenly and unexpectedly.” Dr.

Besant-Matthews, however, testified that the nature of

the injuries to Grady—a hand laceration, two head abrasions and scrapes on his wrists—indicated that all of the

injuries occurred at the same time and that Grady had

most likely been beaten with a baton by jail personnel.

We turn first to the hand laceration. The plaintiffs assert

that this injury was sustained while Grady was fending

off the alleged attack in the cell. But they face an uphill

battle in their attempt to prove that there is no reasonable
10 No. 07-3137

The plaintiffs argue that Gonzales contradicted himself on this 5

point. Specifically, they note that Gonzales testified that he saw

the bandage on Grady’s hand but later testified that Grady did

not appear injured. This semantic argument hinges on the

meaning of “injury.” The extent to which Gonzales was

actually impeached on this point was for the jury to determine.

basis to conclude otherwise. Paramedics Sanchez and

Kaveney both testified at trial that they were present when

Grady injured his hand reaching into his van and their

log reflects that they treated this wound at the scene of the

accident. Officers Garza and Morales, as well as fellow

arrestee Gonzales, testified that they saw the bandage on

Grady’s hand before he entered his cell. Nevertheless,

5

the plaintiffs argue that this testimony may be disregarded

because it is contrary to “indisputable” laws of nature. See,

e.g., Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co. v. Shepard, 184 F.2d 945, 947

(10th Cir. 1950). They contend that Grady could not

have cut himself on broken glass because the autopsies

revealed “bridging,” or intact intermediate tissue, in the

hand laceration. Bridging is a common sign of blunt

force trauma, and the plaintiffs claim that it is fundamentally inconsistent with the defendants’ theory that Grady

cut his hand on a sharp object. Contrary to the plaintiffs’

assertions, however, Sanchez and Kaveney never claimed

to have seen exactly how Grady’s hand was “cut.” Sanchez

testified that “the doors were bent because of the accident” and that Grady “either grabbed the door or

grabbed something on the seat and cut his hand.” When

pressed on this question, Sanchez stated, “All I know is

that Mr. Grady went to his car . . . and he went to reach
No. 07-3137 11

The plaintiffs also argue that the lack of clotting in the wound 6

indicates that it could not have been sustained seven hours

earlier. But both Dr. Kaufman and Dr. Choi concluded that

Grady received the bandage at least an hour before his

death, and Dr. Kaufman concluded that the injury had been

sustained at the scene of the accident. 

for something, [and] ended up cutting himself.” This

testimony is thus consistent with that of Dr. Kaufman,

who testified that the hand laceration could have

resulted from moving the hand over a fixed, jagged

object—like the bent metal door of the van. Because we

cannot determine exactly how Grady’s hand was lacerated,

we cannot say Sanchez’s testimony was contrary to the

“indisputable” laws of nature. Thus, there is a reasonable 6

basis in the record for the conclusion that Grady’s hand

was injured at the scene of the accident.

We turn now to the head abrasions. It is undisputed that

Grady sustained these injuries while he was in police

custody; photographs taken when Grady was originally

processed revealed no visible injuries to his head. All of

the medical experts agreed that the head abrasions were

minor: there was no evidence of fractures, trauma or

hemorrhaging. There was also very little bleeding, which

suggested to all of the experts that the abrasions occurred

around the time of death. Dr. Besant-Matthews theorized

that the abrasions were defensive wounds sustained

during the alleged beating. He claims that the force of

the baton blow must have knocked Grady’s handcuffs

into his head. As numerous witnesses testified, however,

Grady was not wearing handcuffs at the time. Officer
12 No. 07-3137

The plaintiffs claim that Dr. Kaufman contradicted himself on 7

this point. In fact, Dr. Kaufman originally assumed that Grady

had received the head abrasions during the car accident. When

he learned that the two abrasions were sustained in the cell, he

was initially skeptical that they could have resulted from a fall.

When he learned that there was a metal bench in the cell,

however, Dr. Kaufman concluded that the two abrasions

could have been incurred during one fall.

Morales specifically remembers taking his handcuffs

with him, and there was a strict policy against handcuffs

in the lockup. Dr. Kaufman testified that Grady had most

likely fallen unconscious and struck his head—first on the

corner of the metal bench and then on the ground. This 7

testimony is consistent with the testimony of Gonzales,

who was in the cell next to Grady and claimed that he

never heard a struggle in Grady’s cell, only a loud

“thump” followed by silence. Dr. Kaufman’s testimony, as

corroborated by Gonzales, provides a reasonable basis

for the jury to have concluded that the head abrasions

occurred as Grady fell to the floor after the heart attack.

Finally, we turn to the scrapes on Grady’s wrists. Dr.

Besant-Matthews concluded that these scrapes were also

sustained during the alleged beating, when the baton

blows forced the handcuffs into Grady’s wrists. As we

have already explained, however, there is no evidence

that a beating took place and no evidence that Grady

was in handcuffs at the time. Dr. Kaufman testified that the

scrapes likely occurred while Grady was handcuffed to

the bench in the police station. For all we know, the
No. 07-3137 13

scrapes could have been sustained during the car accident.

This argument provides no basis for a new trial.

We do not overturn jury verdicts lightly. All of the

plaintiffs’ evidence was presented to a jury over the

course of a seven-day trial. Our role is a narrow one: we

must simply determine whether a “reasonable basis exists

in the record to support the verdict.” Trzcinski v. American

Cas. Co., 953 F.2d 307, 315 (7th Cir. 1992). The testimony

given by the police officers, jail personnel, paramedics

and, most importantly, his fellow arrestee established

that Grady was not beaten in his cell. This testimony

was corroborated by two medical experts who had performed full autopsies of Grady’s body, Dr. Choi and Dr.

Kaufman. Given the speculative nature of the plaintiffs’

theory in this case, the record certainly provides a reasonable basis for the jury’s decision.

III.

The plaintiffs also argue that defense counsel made

inappropriate remarks at closing argument that require

reversal. When explaining that the City of Chicago would

indemnify the defendants in the event that they could not

pay damages, defense counsel made the following statement: “The city is not a random amorphous entity. It’s you.

We’re talking about tax dollars here.” Closing remarks

that appeal to jurors’ pecuniary interests as taxpayers

are, of course, generally improper. Cf. United States v.

Schimmel, 943 F.2d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2001).

But the plaintiffs did not object to this statement at trial.

While the plain error doctrine is often applied in criminal
14 No. 07-3137

cases; it is rarely applied in civil cases. See Stringel v.

Methodist Hosp. of Ind., Inc., 89 F.3d 415, 421 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plain error is only available in civil cases if a party can

demonstrate that: (1) exceptional circumstances exist;

(2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage

of justice will occur if plain error review is not applied.

See, e.g., Estates of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747, 756 (7th

Cir. 2005). Because the plaintiffs have made no attempt—either in their briefs or at oral argument—to show

that these elements have been satisfied, we decline to

review for plain error. See Ammons-Lewis v. Metro. Water

Reclamation Dist., 488 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2007).

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

10-6-08