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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49018

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CHELSEA MARIE JOHNSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: August 2, 2022

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin, possession of a controlled 

substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge

Chelsea Marie Johnson appeals from her judgment of conviction for trafficking in heroin

(twenty-eight grams or more), Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(6)(C), possession of a controlled 

substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. Johnson 

alleges the district court erred by denying her motion for mistrial. A denial of a motion for mistrial 

is reviewed for reversible error. Because the effect of the error was minimal given the probative 

force of the trial record as a whole establishing Johnson’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: there

is no reversible error; the district court did not err, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed on appeal. While on patrol one evening, Officer 

Canfield saw a car parked in a gas station parking lot. A records check of the car’s license plate 
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indicated that Johnson was the owner of the car and there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest. 

Officer Canfield followed the car and made contact with Johnson after she parked and exited the 

vehicle. Johnson denied her identity to Officer Canfield, claiming instead to be her sister, Deniese. 

A drug-detection dog positively alerted on Johnson’s car. A subsequent search of the car resulted 

in the discovery of drug paraphernalia and suspected heroin in a blue-topped container. 

Additionally, drug paraphernalia was found in Johnson’s purse. Although Johnson continued to 

claim to be Deniese, she eventually admitted her true identity. Johnson was arrested and

transported to jail where three baggies of suspected methamphetamine and heroin were taken from

her person.

The State charged Johnson with trafficking in heroin (twenty-eight grams or more),

possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trafficking in 

heroin charge was based on aggregating the heroin found in Johnson’s car in the blue-topped 

container with the heroin taken from Johnson’s person at the jail. 

The State disclosed the exhibits it intended to introduce at trial, which included Officer 

Canfield’s body camera footage of his encounter with Johnson on the night of her arrest. In the 

video footage, Johnson, while assuming the identity of Deniese, told Officer Canfield about her 

criminal history: 

Officer Canfield: Have you ever been arrested before?

Johnson: Um, no. I did get a grand theft charge one time, but it was like, 

it was, uh, dismissed. It was, I did, um--

Officer Canfield: You on probation or parole?

Johnson: No, sir.1

In response to the State’s disclosures, Johnson moved to redact multiple portions of audio from 

Officer Canfield’s body camera footage. The district court granted some of Johnson’s redaction 

requests, including Johnson’s statements to Officer Canfield that she (while posing as Deniese) 

had previously been arrested for grand theft, that charge was dismissed, and she was not on 

probation or parole.

The case went to trial. In her opening argument, Johnson conceded to possessing 

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, but argued that she was not guilty of trafficking heroin 

because she did not own or knowingly possess the heroin found in the blue-topped container. 

 

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Johnson has transcribed this portion of the video for purposes of the appeal. There is no 

separate transcript of the video footage.
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During its presentation of evidence, the State moved to admit Officer Canfield’s body camera 

footage. The district court admitted the video exhibit and it was played for the jury. Johnson’s 

statements about the grand theft charge and probation or parole status had not been redacted. 

The district court ordered a recess, during which Johnson moved for a mistrial. The State 

acknowledged that it had forgotten to redact the statements at issue. The district court noted that 

although the statements at issue should have been redacted pursuant to the court’s order, the 

prejudicial value of the statements might be low; the statements were “transient,” made while 

Johnson was impersonating her sister; and the statements concerned an arrest and dismissal, not a 

conviction, for the grand theft charge. The district court took the matter under advisement, 

reserving its decision on the motion until after the conclusion of evidence when the court could 

better analyze the effect of the statements against the entirety of the trial record. 

The district court ordered the State to prepare a new exhibit with the ordered redactions

and the trial resumed. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the district court instructed the 

jury to disregard the statements at issue:

Ladies and Gentlemen, before the break, you were listening to an 

audio recording. At the very end of that audio recording, there was a 

statement made by the defendant referencing a prior arrest. Apart from the 

fact that it was made referring to another individual, I am going to instruct 

you now to disregard that statement in its entirety. Do not--if you did make 

a note about it, cross it out. Do not consider it or refer to it or rely on it in 

any way in your deliberations.

At the close of evidence, the district court again instructed the jury not to consider the 

statements during deliberations because it was not to be considered evidence in the case: 

You’re to decide the facts from the evidence presented in this case . . . .

There are certain things that you may have heard or seen which 

arenot evidence . . . .

. . . not evidence is any testimony that has been excluded or stricken 

or which you have been instructed to disregard. And you may recall that I 

gave an instruction to disregard a comment that you heard at the end of an 

audio tape. It should not come into your deliberations or be referred to or 

relied on by you in any fashion. 

After the jury began deliberations, the district court formally denied Johnson’s motion for 

mistrial, finding that given the weight of the evidence presented, the erroneous introduction of a 

“stray comment at the end on which the jury has now been instructed twice to disregard would not 

have any influence on their final verdict.” 
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The jury found Johnson guilty of all three charges. The district court sentenced Johnson 

to a unified term of twenty-five years, with fifteen years determinate, for trafficking in heroin; 

three determinate years for possession of a controlled substance; and one year of jail for possession 

of drug paraphernalia, with the sentences to run concurrently. Johnson timely appeals. 

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. A 

mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an error 

or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial 

to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1(a). Our standard for 

reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for mistrial is well established:

[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised his 

discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. 

Rather, the question must be whether the event which precipitated the motion for 

mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. 

Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of 

discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of 

reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident 

that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial will 

be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible 

error.

State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983).

III.

ANALYSIS

Johnson alleges the district court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial because the 

State’s failure to redact Johnson’s statements, made while impersonating her sister, about a prior 

arrest record and probation status resulted in prejudicial evidence being presented to the jury and, 

accordingly, constituted reversible error. In response, the State alleges the district court did not 

err. 

In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that 

“[a] mistrial may be declared on motion of the defendant when there occurs during the trial, either 

inside or outside the courtroom, an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct that is 

prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” The threshold inquiry on 

appeal in evaluating the denial of a motion for a mistrial is whether the State introduced error. 
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State v. Richardson, 168 Idaho 25, 30, 478 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2020). It is undisputed, both 

before the district court and on appeal, that the State introduced the error by failing to make the 

ordered redaction to Officer Canfield’s body camera footage before it was admitted into evidence 

and played for the jury.

However, a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect trial. State v. Enno, 119

Idaho 392, 408, 807 P.2d 610, 626 (1991); State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 428, 725 P.2d 128, 133 

(1986). Accordingly, error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 

830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error based on a 

contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the standard of review is one of 

harmless error. This standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while 

excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of 

the error. Richardson, 168 Idaho at 31, 478 P.3d at 760. If the error’s effect is minimal compared 

to the probative force of the record establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, 

then the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered and is harmless. Id. at 33, 478 P.3d at 762. 

The reviewing court must take into account what effect the error had, or reasonably may have had, 

on the jury in the context of the total setting and in relation to all else that happened, which 

necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).

We first consider the probative force of the admission of the statements. It is well 

established that the admission of improper evidence does not automatically require a mistrial. 

State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 

625, 631, 97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004); see also State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 269, 869 

P.2d 583, 586 (Ct. App. 1994). A district court’s curative instruction is a factor to consider when 

determining the probative force of the error. Richardson, 168 Idaho at 31, 478 P.3d at 760. Where 

improper evidence is introduced into a trial and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to 

disregard such evidence, we presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions. See State v. 

Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 

481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). This presumption may be overcome if there is an 

overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the trial court’s instructions and a 

strong likelihood that the evidence would have a devastating effect to the defendant. Grantham, 

146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136. 
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Johnson acknowledges the district court instructed the jury to disregard the statements at 

issue, but argues the admission of the statements was nonetheless “prejudicial and deprived her of 

a fair trial,” and “influenced the jury’s evaluation of her credibility, regardless of the curative 

instructions.” We disagree. Johnson fails to establish that this Court should set aside the 

presumption that the jury followed the district court’s instruction. Johnson does not point to 

evidence in the record establishing an overwhelming probability that the jury was unable to follow 

the district court’s instruction and that there was a strong likelihood the statements had a 

devastating effect on Johnson’s defense. The statements came towards the end of a nearly twentytwo minute video, during which Johnson made multiple contradictory claims and assumed the 

identity of her sister. Because Johnson made the statements while she claimed to be her sister, the 

statements did not relate to an admission that Johnson had a previous criminal arrest or was not on 

probation but instead that her sister had a previous criminal arrest and was not on probation. 

Because the statements, in context, purported to relate to Johnson’s sister, the record does not 

demonstrate the statements had a devastating impact on Johnson’s defense. Moreover, the jury 

was instructed to ignore the statements and there is nothing that indicates the jury was unable to 

do so. As such, we presume that the jury disregarded Johnson’s statements that she made, while 

pretending to be her sister, denying a probation, parole, or arrest record. 

Next we consider the probative force of the statements when weighed against the evidence 

in the case, excluding the statements. Officer Canfield testified that inside a car registered to and 

driven by Johnson, he found a hypodermic needle containing a dark-colored liquid substance, two 

small plastic baggies, a broken pipe, and a blue-topped container of suspected heroin. Officer 

Canfield testified that on Johnson’s passenger seat inside a bucket, he found a blue-topped 

container which held various personal items and female toiletries. Officer Canfield stated that 

Johnson admitted that many of the personal items in the bucket were hers, although she did not 

claim ownership of the blue-topped container. A photo of the bucket admitted during trial showed 

the blue-topped container sat towards the top of the open bucket and was clearly visible when 

looking inside the bucket. In body-camera footage admitted at trial, Johnson admitted there was 

never anyone else in the car that evening. 

Officer Canfield testified he also found several unused plastic baggies that were consistent 

with those typically used to store illegal substances, tinfoil, and a small digital scale with brown 

or black heroin on it that was consistent with the heroin inside Johnson’s purse. Officer Canfield 
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stated that in a search conducted prior to transporting Johnson to jail, officers found $1,200 in the 

back-pocket of Johnson’s jeans and at the jail, baggies containing suspected controlled substances

were taken from Johnson’s person. 

A detective who interviewed Johnson at the jail testified that Johnson admitted that the 

plastic baggies, broken pipe, and scale were hers and a portion of the money recovered on her 

person was from the sale of drugs. The detective testified that although Johnson never claimed 

ownership of the blue-topped container and she suggested that a friend may have lost it in 

Johnson’s car, Johnson also told the detective that she knew the container was in her car and that 

it contained a substantial amount of heroin. The detective testified that State’s Exhibit 4 was the 

substance found in the blue-topped container and State’s Exhibit 5 was one of the substances found 

during the search of Johnson at the jail. A forensic scientist testified that after analyzing State’s

Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 5, she determined that they contained 16.85 grams and 12.5 grams of heroin

respectively. 

Weighing the probative value of Johnson’s erroneously admitted statements against the 

probative value of the record as a whole without the statements, we conclude Johnson’s statements

about a prior arrest and probation status made while she was pretending to be her sister, did not 

have a continuing effect on the trial. Rather, those statements were unimportant in relation to all 

the other evidence presented to and considered by the jury, including Johnson’s other contradictory 

statements that undermined her credibility. This Court is satisfied that the error was minimal when 

compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without 

the error, and the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Thus, the district court did not err 

in denying the motion for a mistrial. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

Playing the unredacted video for the jury did not constitute reversible error. Accordingly, 

the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s motion for mistrial and the judgment of 

conviction is affirmed. 

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.