United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

P.P., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Washington, DC, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 15-0753 

Issued: November 3, 2016 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On February 18, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal from a February 2, 2015 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant established that he sustained an emotional condition in the 

performance of duty on October 27, 2014, as alleged. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On October 28, 2014 appellant, then a 36-year-old air traffic control specialist, filed a 

traumatic injury claim alleging that, following an October 27, 2014 “close call” he was unable to 

sleep and was “mentally not with it.” 

By letter dated December 16, 2014, OWCP requested that appellant submit additional 

information to support his claim. 

In a January 12, 2015 statement, appellant noted that on October 27, 2014 he worked at 

Potomac “TRACON” and was training a coworker, on the “OJAAY” position. He noted that 

another coworker was feeding them aircraft within close proximity of each other with fast 

speeds. Appellant stated that he took the position over from E.K. because she felt she had lost 

the overall picture. He noted that they had far more airplanes in their airspace then they should 

have, and he did his best to work the airplanes. Appellant discussed a situation wherein an 

aircraft was following another to DCA airport and was switched to the tower with last 

instructions to keep the turn in tight to follow the aircraft. He noted that no supervisor was 

watching and they asked for an extra set of eyes, but this did not happen until it was too late. 

The plane following the arrival to runaway 19 made a 90-degree turn toward the next arriving 

airplane, so he called traffic to the aircraft and tried to direct the plane out of the way of the 

tower-switched aircraft. Appellant noted that the planes came very close together and loss of 

separation standards occurred. He opined that most of the emotional stress to this situation was 

supervisor induced, and that, if the supervisor had been watching the area, the position would 

have split and this situation probably would never have happened. Appellant noted that he was 

upset and mentally exhausted at the time of the situation. He specifically stated that he was upset 

over how the controller was delivering airplanes to them and that he was disappointed that no 

one was watching them. Appellant noted that he had not been under the care of a psychiatrist or 

psychologist for counseling, had not been hospitalized for an emotional condition, and had not 

taken any medication for an emotional condition. 

In a January 15, 2015 memorandum, Stephen L. Smith, air traffic manager for Potomac 

“TRACON,” noted that to the best of his knowledge appellant’s statement appeared to be 

accurate with regard to appellant’s reaction to the event. He noted that appellant stated that he 

was having a conflict with another controller working an arrival feeder position who was 

delivering airplanes without sufficient amount of spacing for him to perform his job during a one 

hour period. Appellant stated that staffing in the operation area was adequate, but that the 

supervisor did not utilize his resources which may have assisted with this complex arrival period. 

Mr. Smith noted that appellant had been assigned to train an employee and the position quickly 

was overwhelmed with airplanes. Appellant was upset with the feeder position controller and 

the situation elevated distracting him from performing his duties. Mr. Smith noted that this 

dissention caused appellant to miss some critical turns that caused a loss of standard separation. 

By decision dated February 2, 2015, OWCP denied appellant’s claim as he had not 

submitted sufficient medical evidence to establish a medical condition in connection to the 

accepted factors of employment. It also noted that, even if he had submitted medical evidence, 

he had not established an event that occurred within the performance of duty. 
3

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of establishing the essential 

elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, 

including the fact that the individual is an employee of the United States within the meaning of 

FECA, that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of FECA, that 

an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any disability or specific 

condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment injury.3 

These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of whether the 

claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4 To establish a claim that 

he sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty, an employee must submit the 

following: (1) medical evidence establishing that he has an emotional or psychiatric disorder; 

(2) factual evidence identifying employment factors or incidents alleged to have caused or 

contributed to his condition; and (3) rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing that the 

identified compensable employment factors are causally related to her emotional condition. 

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment.5 There are situations where an injury or an 

illness has some connection with the employment but nevertheless does not come within the 

concept or coverage of workers’ compensation.6 Where the disability results from an 

employee’s emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a 

requirement imposed by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.7

 

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that when working 

conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its 

adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are 

deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when 

providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed 

factors of employment and may not be considered.8 If a claimant does implicate a factor of 

employment, OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that 

factor.9 When the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of 

 2 Id. 

3 Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383, 388 (1994). 

4 Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989). 

5 L.D., 58 ECAB 344 (2007). 

6 A.K., 58 ECAB 119 (2006). 

7

 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. See also Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

8 D.L., 58 ECAB 217 (2006). 

9 K.W., 59 ECAB 271 (2007); David C. Lindsey, Jr., 56 ECAB 263 (2005). 
4

record establishes the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of 

the medical evidence.10 

ANALYSIS 

Appellant alleged that he sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty on 

October 27, 2014 due to a sequence of events that occurred while he was working as an air 

traffic controller and was training another employee. He noted that another controller was 

feeding aircraft to them within close proximity of each other and at fast speeds, that he took over 

for a trainee as she had lost the overall picture. They had a situation in which an aircraft was 

following another into DCA airport, that this plane was switched to the tower with the last 

instructions to keep the turn in tight to follow the aircraft, that the plane following the arrival to 

runway 19 made a 90-degree turn toward the next arriving airplane. He called traffic to the 

aircraft, the planes came very close together, and loss of separation standards occurred. 

Appellant also alleged that most of his emotional stress was supervisor induced, arguing that, if 

the supervisor had been watching the area, the position would have been split and this situation 

would probably never have happened. 

The Board must first determine whether there was a compensable factor of employment. 

Initially, the Board notes that appellant’s opinions with regard to his supervision are not relevant 

with regard to establishing a compensable factor of employment. The assignment of work and 

monitoring of performance are administrative functions of the supervisor.11 The manner in 

which a supervisor exercises his or her discretion falls outside FECA’s coverage. This principle 

recognizes that supervisors must be allowed to perform their duties, and at times employees will 

disagree with their supervisor’s actions. Mere dislike or disagreement with certain supervisor 

actions will not be compensable absent error or abuse on the part of the supervisor.12 There is no 

evidence of abuse or error by appellant’s supervisor. 

Where an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his or her employment 

duties and the medical evidence established that the disability resulted from an emotional 

reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of 

and in the course of employment.13 In this case, appellant alleged that planes were being fed into 

the position he was monitoring at a fast pace and that an error was made that resulted in a loss of 

separation standards. This would be a compensable factor of employment as appellant was 

performing his duties as an air traffic controller when the loss of standard separation occurred. 

The Board found a compensable factor in the performance of duty in A.C.,14 in which appellant 

was working on radar and became aware of a potential conflict with two aircraft converging on 

 10 Robert Breeden, 57 ECAB 622 (2006). 

11 Donney T. Drennon-Gala, 56 ECAB 469, 475 (2005); Beverly R. Jones, 55 ECAB 411, 416 (2004); Charles D. 

Edwards, 55 ECAB 258, 270 (2004). 

12 Linda J. Edwards-Delgado, 55 ECAB 401, 405 (2004). 

13 Cutler, supra note 7; see also J.W., Docket No. 15-66 (issued March 24, 2015). 

14 Docket No. 12-1050 (issued December 28, 2012). 
5

radar. The employee took action to separate them. The Board noted the potential for a collision 

based on the speed and direction of two planes and the employee’s responsibility for monitoring 

live aircraft traffic on radar. In the instant case, appellant alleged an incident involving an 

improper distance of separation between two aircraft on October 27, 2014 while he was 

monitoring the situation. His allegation is supported by a January 15, 2015 memorandum from 

the air traffic control manager. Appellant was performing his regular duties as an air traffic 

control under Cutler when the potential collision arose, a situation he took effort to remedy. A 

reaction to regularly or specially assigned duties is a compensable factor of employment under 

FECA. It is undisputed that appellant had operational control and responsibility of a continual 

and steady flow of aircraft being handed off at very close intervals to his sector. While handling 

these fast moving aircraft traveling at high rates of speed in close proximity, he was assigned to 

train a fellow employee on this sector. While performing these tasks, appellant became 

overwhelmed without the support of others until things had reached a critical mass where a loss 

of separation had occurred. The Board finds that totality of this incident gives rise to a reaction 

to his regular assigned duties that would constitute a compensable factor. 

As appellant has established a compensable factor of employment, the Board must now 

proceed to evaluate the medical evidence. However, he has not submitted any medical evidence 

in support of his claim. In fact, appellant specifically noted that he had not been under the care 

of a psychiatrist or psychologist for counseling, had not been hospitalized for an emotional 

condition, and had not taken any medication for an emotional condition. As he failed to provide 

rationalized medical opinion evidence establishing a consequential emotional condition as a 

result of the October 27, 2014 accepted incident of employment, he failed to meet his burden of 

proof.15

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument as part of a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not established an emotional condition in the 

performance of duty on October 27, 2014, as alleged. 

 15 C.G., Docket No. 14-453 (issued November 4, 2014). 
6

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the decision of the Office of Workers’ 

Compensation Programs dated February 2, 2015 is affirmed.16

Issued: November 3, 2016 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 16 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge, participated in the original decision but was no longer a member of the 

Board effective November 16, 2015.