J-S04028-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: F.H., Z.H. 

(MINOR CHILDREN)

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

: No. 1116 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Orders entered on June 26, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County,

Orphans' Court Division, No(s): 63-15-0241; 63-15-0242 

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2016

M.H. (“Father”) appeals from the orders1 dated June 25, 2015, and 

entered on June 26, 2015, granting the petitions filed by the Washington 

County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to 

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his dependent, special needs

children, F.H., a female born in September of 2003, and Z.H., a male born in 

 

* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On November 16, 2015, this Court, acting sua sponte, dismissed Father’s 

appeal at Docket No. 1117 WDA 2015 as duplicative, and preserved the right 

for him to assert issues properly raised at that docket number in the present 

appeal.
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September of 2005 (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).2 We affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant history of this case in its

opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 1-14. We adopt the trial 

court’s recitation for purposes of this appeal. See id.

On July 20, 2015, Father timely filed a notice of appeal along with a 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

In his brief on appeal, Father raises two questions for this Court’s 

review, as follows:

I. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s 

parental rights where [F]ather was compliant with the courtordered services but was unable to obtain employment or 

housing that was outside of his control pursuant to § 2511(b)[?] 

II. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s 

parental rights where testimony indicated that [F]ather had a 

close bond with the [C]hild[ren] and that severing the bond 

would have a detrimental effect on the [] [C]hildren[?]

Father’s Brief at 6.

In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

 

2 C.K., the natural mother of the Children, (“Mother”), died in June of 2011. 

N.T., 6/25/15, at 12.
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findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 

Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. 

As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result 

merely because the reviewing court might have reached a 

different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia 

Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 

2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 

630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at 

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could 

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency 

and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained:

[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under sections 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See Trial Court Opinion, at 9/2/15, at 1. 

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 
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time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the 

date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of 

a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights 

under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but, under section 2511(b), the 

focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. 

Super. 2008) (en banc). 

We could find that Father waived any challenge to the trial court’s 

findings as to section 2511(a) and the subsections thereof by failing to 
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challenge specifically that section in his concise statement and brief. See

Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not 

raised in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

and the Statement of Questions Involved in his or her brief on appeal). 

However, given the broad language used by Appellant in his concise 

statement and brief and, under an abundance of caution, we will review the 

trial court’s holdings under section 2511(a). We will focus on subsection 

2511(a)(2), and adopt the trial court’s discussion in its opinion as this 

Court’s own.3 See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 15-20.

The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as 

follows:

[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for 

termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by 

clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent 

has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by 

the parent.” . . . 

[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity sufficient for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2): 

A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be 

made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the 

parent, can seldom be more difficult than when 

termination is based upon parental incapacity. The 

 

3 We note that the trial court relied on its discussion of the facts in relation to 

section 2511(a)(1) to support its analysis under section 2511(a)(2). 
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legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, 

concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing 

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who 

refuses to perform the duties. 

In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986), 

quoting In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 

1978). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 326-327, 47 A.3d at 827.

This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts 

towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. 

In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to 

cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity 

or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or 

disingenuous. Id. at 340.

The trial court assessed the evidence regarding Father’s repeated 

incapacity to parent the Children, and his inability to remedy the conditions 

and causes of his incapacity to parent the Children, at length, which we 

adopt herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/15, at 9-12. 

The trial court found that the repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal of Father has caused the Children to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or 

mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Father. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 8/26/15, at 19.
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Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as

a matter of law in terminating his parental rights when CYS failed to provide 

him with reasonable efforts to promote reunification between him and the 

Children prior to filing the termination petitions. Father’s Brief, at 9-10. 

Specifically, Father complains that he lacked employment, despite applying 

for jobs, and that he lacked housing and a vehicle, until his mother, 

(“Paternal Grandmother”), gave him a vehicle at the time of the termination 

hearing. Father asserts that CYS did not contact Paternal Grandmother to 

inquire whether she would move back with Father when he obtained housing 

or independently become a placement resource for the Children. Id. at 10. 

Father states that Paternal Grandmother later moved to the Poconos to care 

for an elderly friend. He complains that CYS never contacted her as a 

placement resource for the Children, despite Father’s request to consider 

her.

Our Supreme Court held, however, that the trial court is not required 

to consider reasonable efforts in relation to a decision to terminate parental 

rights under section 2511(a)(2). In the Interest of: D.C.D., ___ Pa. ___, 

___, 105 A.3d 662, 675 (2014). Thus, we find his argument lacks merit.

The facts, as found by the trial court, nevertheless, support the 

conclusion that CYS made reasonable efforts to reunify the Children with 

Father, and Father failed to make sufficient progress with the services 

offered to him. The trial court stated:
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[T]he [C]hildren were placed in foster care in 2011 due to the 

parents’ drug use as well as their failure to provide appropriate 

medical care and safe and appropriate housing for the 

[C]hildren. Again in 2014, the [C]hildren were placed in foster 

care because [Father] failed to comply with his own treatment, 

failed to provide appropriate medical care, and failed to provide 

[a] safe and appropriate home for the [C]hildren. For the past 

thirteen (13) months [Father] proved unable to remedy these 

circumstances. Furthermore, he did not consistently comply 

with his own services while the [C]hildren were in placement. 

For these and all of the above reasons, the [c]ourt found that 

the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that 

grounds for termination under Subsection [2511] (a)(2) existed.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 19-21. 

Although a reasonable efforts inquiry is not an element to a 

termination decision under section 2511(a)(2), our review of the record 

shows that there is ample evidence to support a determination that CYS 

made reasonable efforts, yet Father failed to make sufficient progress with 

the services provided to successfully be capable of parenting the Children. 

As the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of 

discretion, we affirm the trial court’s orders with regard to subsection 

2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27. 

Next, we review the termination of Father’s parental rights under 

section 2511(b). Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 
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love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791.

In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-629, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).

Father asserts that there was no expert testimony regarding the bond 

between the Children and him, and no evidence of a true bonding 

assessment. He also asserts that the evidence presented at the hearing 

indicated that there is a close bond between the Children and him. Father’s 

Brief at 14. For these reasons, Father claims the trial court failed to properly 

conduct its bond analysis under section 2511(b). Id. 

We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social 

workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010). This Court has also observed that no bond worth preserving is 

formed between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in 

foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the 

natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 

2008). It is appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her foster 

parent. See In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 629-630, 71 A.3d at 268.

In addition, in In re: T.S.M., our Supreme Court set forth the process 

for evaluating the existing bond between a parent and a child, and the 
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necessity for the court to focus on concerns of an unhealthy attachment and 

the availability of an adoptive home. The Supreme Court stated the 

following:

[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether termination 

will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has a strong but 

unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering 

the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive family. 

As with dependency determinations, we emphasize that the law 

regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 

mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. 

See, e.g., R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)] (holding that 

statutory criteria of whether child has been in care for fifteen of 

the prior twenty-two months should not be viewed as a “litmus 

test” but rather as merely one of many factors in considering 

goal change). Obviously, attention must be paid to the pain that 

inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological 

parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh that 

injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact. 

Similarly, while termination of parental rights generally should 

not be granted unless adoptive parents are waiting to take a 

child into a safe and loving home, termination may be necessary 

for the child’s needs and welfare in cases where the child’s 

parental bond is impeding the search and placement with a 

permanent adoptive home.

[The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89] 

ASFA[,] was enacted to combat the problem of foster care drift, 

where children . . . are shuttled from one foster home to 

another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate their ability to 

care for the children. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1186; In re 

Adoption of S.E.G., [901 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. 2006)]. This 

drift was the unfortunate byproduct of the system’s focus on 

reuniting children with their biological parents, even in situations 

where it was clear that the parents would be unable to parent in 

any reasonable period of time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania 

adopted a dual focus of reunification and adoption, with the goal 

of finding permanency for children in less than two years, absent 

compelling reasons. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6351(f)(9) (requiring courts to determine whether an agency 
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has filed a termination of parental rights petition if the child has 

been in placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two months).

In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 631-632, 71 A.3d at 268-269.

In the present matter, the trial court considered the needs and welfare 

of the Children, and set forth its bond-effect analysis. The trial court also 

provided an explanation of why its termination decision was not based on 

matters that were outside of Father’s control. We adopt the trial court’s 

discussion herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 21-26. The trial 

court properly considered the best interests of the Children in rendering its 

decision that, although there was evidence of a bond between the Children 

and Father, it was in their best interests to sever that bond. See id.; In re: 

T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 631-632, 71 A.3d at 268-269.

Father testified that he loves the Children very much. N.T., 6/25/15, 

at 121. As we stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on 

hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic 

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon 

the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have 

proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, 

healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 

2004). Again, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to 
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section 2511(b). In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 

826-27. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating Father’s 

parental rights. As we have adopted portions of the trial court’s opinion as 

our own, the parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion 

of August 26, 2015 to any future filings with this Court.

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/5/2016
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6391(1) and (5). 

9/10/03) and Z.H. (D.0.B. 9/11/05) dependent children pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 

Agency (((The Agency") filed a petition with the Court to adjudicate F.H. (D.0.B. 

On March 21, 2011, the Washington County Children & Youth Services 

Procedural History 

minor children. 

been severed because of the detrimental effect such termination will have on the 

stable housing. Father asserts that his dose bond with his children should not have 

services he faced environmental challenges including the lack of employment and 

rights terminated. Father contends that despite his compliance with court ordered 

Appellant M.H., Father, claims that the Court erred when it ordered his parental 

The Court provides its opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(A)(2)(ii). 

;· .) 

._ ) 

'•· . OPINION 

- ) 

. 

. ) 

Minor children. 

Appeal of M.H., Father 

· Dt-63-15-241 

OC..-63-15-242 

1116 WDA 2015 

1117 WDA 2015 

Z.H. 

F.H., 

In re: Adoption of 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 

Circulated 01/29/2016 01:10 PM
2 

1 Prior to the March 29 hearing the children were temporarily placed in foster 

care pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement between the Agency and the 

parents. The voluntary placement agreement was set to expire before a 

rescheduled adjudicatory hearing could be heard. 

family since September of 2010. The Agency alleged that M.H. was abusing 

Mr. Paluso's findings indicated the Agency had been involved with the 

children pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. 6302 (1). 

hearing, the parties stipulated to finding both Z.H. and F.H. to be dependent 

care hearing was converted into an adjudicatory and disposition hearing. At the 

parties appeared represented by counsel. By agreement of the parties, the shelter 

On April 5, 2011, Mr. Paluso held the emergency shelter hearing. Both 

Paluso.1 

for C.I(., and scheduled the shelter care hearing for April 5, 2011 before Mr. 

temporarily placed pending a shelter care hearing. He also appointed legal counsel 

Petition that was granted by Judge DiSalle. Judge DiSalle ordered the children 

hearing be set. On April 1, 2011, the Agency presented an Emergency Shelter 

counsel. Mr. Paluso granted this request and recommended to the court that a new 

scheduled hearing Mother C.I(. requested a continuance in order to acquire private 

29, 2011 at 3:45 p.m. before Juvenile Hearing Office Dennis R. Paluso. At the first 

The Honorable John F. DiSalle scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for March 

I. Adjudication 
3 

prescription drugs and methadone and that C.I(., who was also abusing drugs, had 

left the home in July of 2010 only to return in February 2011. The family had been 

unsuccessfully discharged from Justice Works Youth Care in-home services and 

in-home Homemaker Services in the fall of 2010. The children's' school nurse had 

complained that the children appeared malnourished and filthy in school. 

Following the referral, the Agency caseworker went to the home to speak with 

M.H., after which M.H. reportedly left the home with the children and broke 

contact with the Agency. The Agency located M.H. outside a methadone clinic 

approximately one month later. M.H. permitted the caseworker to see the children, 

whom he was keeping in a hotel room, and at that time signed a voluntary 

placement agreement. The caseworker referred the parents to the Justice Works 

Parenting Education program, but again, the parents did not successfully follow 

through with participating in the program. 

F.H. suffers from holoprosencephaly-based cerebral palsy, a cephalic/cranial 

birth defect that causes developmental delays and significant motor dysfunction. 

She is wheelchair-bound, has required in-home nursing care, and is learning to 

speak. At the time of the hearing, her parents had failed to seek medical treatment 

to assist or mitigate her illness. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, Z.H. had an 

untreated eye condition. In March 2011, M.H. tested positive for benzodiazepine, 

an anti-anxiety medication for which he lacked a prescription. M.H. admitted to 
4 

purchasing this drug illegally. At the same time, C.K. participated in drug testing 

and tested positive for benzodiazepine and opiates. At that time, she had a 

prescription for Vicodin and Xanax. At the time of the drug test, C.I(. showed 

empty bottles of both to the agency caseworker, and she admitted that she had sold 

her medication. 

As of the hearing, Z.H. had missed twenty four (24) days of preschool since 

November 12, 2010 and F.H. had missed eighty-eight (88) days of school for that 

school year. 

As part of Mr. Paluso's Adjudication and Disposition Order, he ordered 

M.H. and C.I(. to each submit to random drug and alcohol testing, participate in 

drug and alcohol evaluations, mental health evaluations, and a Justice Works 

Youth Care Nurturing Parenting Program. He further ordered M.H. and C.I(. to 

maintain safe and appropriate housing. Both parents were granted supervised 

visitation two (2) hours every other week. 

II. Permanency Hearings 

C.K. died unexpectedly on June 7, 2011. Mr. Paluso held the initial 

permanency review hearing on July 5, 2011. Since that time, M.H. had begun and 

followed through on some of his ordered services, including gaining prescriptions 

for his medication and attending parenting education classes. At the time of the 
5 

2 A review hearing was set for December 9, 2013. However, F.H. required hip surgery in December. On 

November 26, 2013, the Agency, with consent of M.H., requested a continuance in order to provide F.H. 

time to recuperate. The Honorable Katherine Emery granted this motion. The review hearing was pushed 

to January 27, 2014. 

unable to meet the physical and medical needs of both children and because he was 

were placed first in kinship care and then in foster care because M.H. had become 

Following the January 27, 2014 permanency review hearing, the children 

home with M.H., who received in-home services, until January 31, 2014. 

the Court granted a consented-to motion presented by the Agency. They remained 

year and one month, until they were returned home to M.H. on May 11, 2012 when 

adjudicatory/shelter hearing. They remained in placement for approximately one 

Z.H. and P.H. were placed in Agency foster care after the April 5, 2011 

III. Placement 

total of eighteen (18) permanency review hearings were conducted. 

8, 2014, November 3, 2014, January 5, 2015, March 9, 2015, and June 8, 2015. A 

2013, June 7, 2013, January 27, 20142, April 4, 2014, August 4, 2014, September 

held permanency review hearings on October 12, 2011, January 11, 2013, March 8, 

The case was then transferred to Juvenile Hearing Officer Jessica Roberts, who 

January 3, 2012, March 6, 2012, April 3, 2012, May 1, 2012, and June 12, 2012. 

Mr. Paluso held further permanency review hearings on October 4, 2011, 

parents, with a concurrent plan of adoption. 

hearing, the permanency plan's primary goal was to return the children to their 
6 

facing eviction from his residence. The children remained in foster care placement 

until the termination proceeding, having moved between several placement 

providers due to their special treatment needs. Compliance with court ordered 

services and the degree to which progress in alleviating the circumstances 

necessitating placement greatly influenced these placement decisions. 

IV. Compliance and Progress 

As of the initial permanency review hearing on July 5, 2011, M.H. had been 

moderately compliant with the permanency plan but had made little progress 

towards aileviating the circumstances that had necessitated the original placement. 

He had begun medication management and had undergone an intake appointment 

for his mental health assessment but not followed up. He had a significant amount 

of missing prescription medication. He had been inconsistent with attending 

parenting education and the children's doctor appointments, but he began 

consistently attending parenting education after C.K. 's death. 

By the second permanency review hearing in October 2011, M.H. was 

moderately compliant, participating in services, displaying a sanitary home, and 

attending his mental health assessment, but was still missing medication. 

By the third permanency review hearing on January.S, 2012, M.H.'s 

progress and compliance had improved. He was attending almost all visitations and 

doctors' appointments for the children. He had been successfully discharged from 
7 

several services and was taking part in drug and mental health treatment. At each 

successive permanency review hearing, his visitation was increased. At the March 

3, 2012 permanency review hearing, behavioral problems in Z.H. required further 

services in the home of his foster parents. 

On March 30, 2012, the Agency presented an emergency motion to the 

Honorable Paul Pozonsky to move the children from one foster care placement to 

another. The Agency's motion stated an original intent to return the children home 

at that time, but due to a disagreement with the Guardian ad Litem requested 

transfer to a different placement provider. Judge Pozonsky granted the motion. The 

March and April 2012 permanency review hearings primarily concerned Z.H., who 

was showing significant behavioral problems in his foster home. At both hearings, 

M.H. was noted to be fully complying and making significant progress: He was 

participating in medication management treatment, regularly attending methadone 

treatment with notably good progress, attending the children's medical 

appointments, keeping a clean and appropriate home, utilizing the parenting skills 

taught by his previously discharged parenting education services, and attending 

increased visitation. At that time, the Washington Communities Mental Health 

program indicated they would advance M.H. to blended case management services 

upon the return of the children to his home. M.H. was permitted overnight 

visitation with the children. 
8 

At the March and April hearings, the issue of Z.H. 's compliance and 

progress held back reunification. He had been displaying serious behavior 

problems in his foster homes: in addition to verbal threats and physical aggression 

directed towards his foster mother, Z.H. had to be restrained in a helmet to prevent 

head injuries when he would repeatedly bang bis head into walls. A psychological 

evaluation recommended Clonodine and Atomoxetine, both medications 

commonly used to treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), as 

well as wrap-around services to include twenty (20) hours per week of therapeutic 

staff support, two (2) hours per week of mobile therapy, and four ( 4) hours per 

week with a behavioral specialist. The recommended services with the behavioral 

specialist were to be reduced to four ( 4) hours after the first month, and then Z.H. 

was recommended to be further evaluated after six (6) weeks to determine if he 

had a diagnosis on the autism spectrum. 

At the May 1, 2012 permanency review, Mr. Paluso indicated that upon 

Z.H.'s acceptance by Pressley Ridge for Family Based Therapy, the children could 

return home to M.H. by way of motion. The children were returned on May 11, 

2015 after the Honorable John F. DiSalle granted the Agency's motion to return 

the children to M.H.'s home. 

The July 10, 2012, October 12, 2012, and January 11, 2013 permanency 

review hearings indicated improving outcomes: in addition to M.H. 's continued 
9 

full compliance and significant progress, Z.H. was responding well to his treatment 

and the family had begun taking part in blended case management services. F.H.'s 

pediatrician prescribed in-home nursing services to assist M.H. in caring full-time 

for F.H. which began between the July and October hearings. Juvenile Hearing 

Officer Jessica Roberts took over the case for Mr. Paluso on October 12, 2012. 

At the March 8, 2013 permanency review hearing, Mrs. Roberts noted that 

recently provided in-home service providers had resulted in "a great deal of 

improvement" in the home. However, the children's truancy began to be a notable 

problem, with F.H. missing thirteen (13) of the previous thirty eight (38) days of 

school. The June 7, 2013 permanency review hearing similarly indicated 

compliance on M.H. 's part and significant progress, indicating that while Z.H. and 

F.H. had missed increasing amounts of school days, M.H. was handling Z.H. 's 

refusal to attend school in an improved and appropriate manner. 

A review hearing was set for December 9, 2013. However, F.H. required hip 

surgery in December. On November 26, 2013, the Agency, with consent of M.H., 

requested a continuance in order to provide F.H. time to recuperate. The Honorable 

Katherine Emery granted this motion. The review hearing was pushed to January 

27, 2014. 

At the January 27, 2014 hearing, the trajectory of the case changed 

significantly. While M.H. had continued to participate in his medication 
10 

management and methadone treatment, he had failed to keep the children up to 

date on their medical appointments and was no longer consistently attending 

mental health therapy. Try-Again Homes terminated the in-home Family 

Preservation services due to M.H. 's noncompliance. P.H. 's home nurse had been 

reassigned to a different home and was not replaced by the service provider. 

M.H. 's insurance company, before terminating his insurance, refused to cover the 

cost of an in-home nurse for P.H. following her surgery. M.H. was also 

inconsistent in ensuring F.H.'s follow-up care. She missed follow-up appointments 

at a nutrition clinic and with her pediatrician. Z.H. 's absences had increased to 

thirty (30) for the school year, and M.H. did not keep a mental health assessment 

appointment for Z.H. 

Furthermore, Mrs. Roberts indicated that it was an issue at the hearing 

whether or not the home had sufficient food for the children and whether or not the 

home continued to be a clean, safe, and appropriate environment for the children. 

M.H. had sufficient income to afford his rent at that time. See H.T. 53, In. 3, H.T 

78, In. 23. However, he was delinquent on several months' rent by January of 

2014. See H.T. 46 In. 4. M.H. admitted that he was to be evicted on January 31, 

2014. His apartment was provided to him fully furnished. See H.T. 53, In. 9. Much 

of this furniture was missing at the time of his eviction. H.T. 53, ln. 14. M.H. 

procured some additional replacement furniture without contacting the Agency 
11 

Due to the convergence of issues, M.H. asked the court to place the children 

at that time. See Termination Hearing Transcript, pages 109, 132. 

Mrs. Roberts ordered the children to be placed in kinship care with Patty 

Papa, on January 30, 2014. After the hearing, the Agency discovered that Ms. Papa 

could not take the children and requested via emergency motion to place the 

children in foster care. The Court granted this motion on January 30, 2014. The 

Agency requested joint signatory rights on February 27, 2014 in the event that 

M.H. could not be located to provide consent for the children's medical care. The 

Court granted this motion. 

M.H.'s compliance and progress did not recover to the levels that existed in 

2013. At the next permanency review hearing, on May 5, 2014, Mrs. Roberts 

found M.H. 's compliance and progress to be minimal. He had been attending the 

children's medical appointments and continuing with his methadone treatment, but 

had only attended 6 of the previous twelve (12) mental health treatment sessions. 

providers that assisted him in originally furnishing the apartment. See H.T. 53, 54. 

Instead, he rented furniture through Rent-A-Center. See H.T. 104, 105. He 

explained at the termination proceeding that this was due to F.H. being sick and 

ruining the existing furniture. Id. The Court did not find this explanation credible. 

See H.T. 80. 
12 

The Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate M.H.'s parental rights 

on February 25, 2015. 

At the March 9, 2015 Permanency Review hearing, Mrs. Roberts found 

M.H.'s compliance and progress to be minimal. M.H.'s blended case manager 

indicated that he had not seen M.H. in a considerable amount of time, and he 

remained unemployed and without housing. He had not been regularly visiting the 

children, particularly F.H. 

At the June 8, 2015 permanency hearing, Mrs. Roberts again found M.H. 's 

compliance and progress to be minimal, again through minimal and inconsistent . 

He had not yet secured safe and appropriate housing. He was no longer 

communicating with his blended case manager. 

M.H. 's compliance and progress did not increase at the August 4, September 

8, and November 3, 2014 permanency review hearings. He was not able to procure 

safe and appropriate housing and he continued to be inconsistent in both drug and 

mental health treatment. He began visiting the children less regularly. 

At the January 5, 2015, Mrs. Roberts found M.H. to have moderately 

complied with the permanency plan, by re-engaging in his services and treatment. 

However, he had not managed to procure housing and had no family members 

willing or able to assist in caring for the children's needs. As such, his progress 

remained minimal. 
13 

Standard of Review 

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, "[the Superior Court 

is] limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence." In the Interest of S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

appeal denied, 586 Pa. 751, 892 A.2d 824 (2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 

1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)). "We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence 

capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence." In re M. G., 855 A.2d 

68, 73 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting In re Diaz, 447 Pa. Super. 327, 669 A.2d 372, 

375 (1995)). The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the 

responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any 

conflicts in the testimony. Id. at 73-74; In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 

228 (Pa. Super. 2002). In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free 

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In re M. G., 855 A.2d at 73- 7 4. When 

the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will 

affirm "even if the record could also support an opposite result." In the Interest of 

mental health treatment and visitation. She wrote "The Master believes that [M.H.] 

has a strong desire to be reunited with his children and love for his children; 

however, he puts forth minimal effort in obtaining reunification." 
14 

The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines certain 

irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide for their 

children. A parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements within a 

reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be considered 

unfit and may properly have his or her rights terminated. In re. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 

753 (Pa. Super. 2003), citing In re B.L.L, 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

2015. 

Termination 

The Agency filed its petition to Terminate M.H. 's parental rights on 

February 25, 2015. The Court originally scheduled the proceeding for May 13, 

2015, but rescheduled the proceeding to May 6, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the Court 

rescheduled the proceeding for June 25, 2015, to provide M.H. an opportunity to 

participate in Termination of Parental Rights consultation services. 

The Court held the termination of parental rights proceeding on June 25, 

C.A1.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or 

insufficient evidentiary support, the trial court's terniination order must stand. In re 
15 

definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the 

Pennsylvania appellate courts have observed that there is no simple or easy 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). 

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or 

more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the child. 

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the 

court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at 

least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement 

of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy 

those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or 

assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child 

within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being 

and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child 

or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

enumerated below: 

pursuant to Subsections 1, 2, 5, and 8 of chapter 2511 of the Adoption Act, 

The Agency requested the Court to terminate M.H. 's parental rights 
16 

M.H. has a clear commitment and love for his children, but the record 

indicated that M.H. did not have a commitment to reunification. [The Superior 

Court has] held that a parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, 

needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the 

development of the child. A parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to 

maintain communication and association with the child. In re J.T.1 983 A.2d 771 

(Pa. Super. 2009), citing In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (1977). 

Pursuant to Subsection (a)(l), the Court must determine if the Agency 

established by clear and convincing evidence that for at least the six months prior 

to the filing of the termination petition, M.H. failed to perform his parental duty or 

evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. § 2511(a)(1), see also 

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2006). Furthermore, in 

examining the parent's conduct, the court must look not only to the six (6) months 

before the petition but also examine the totality of the circumstances of the case, 

including the parent's explanation and overall circumstances. In re B., NM.1 856 

A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. 2004), citing In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 

1999). 
17 

do not prevent termination of parental rights. In. re T.111. T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), citing In reL.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). Z.H. and 

F.H. have spent only twenty-one (21) of the preceding fifty (50) months in M.H. 's 

care. The children were in foster care placement for the six months preceding the 

filing of the petition. 

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the 

child with his or her physical and emotional needs. In re B., N.111., 856 A.2d 847, 

855, citing In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999). A parent must 

utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 

exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of 

maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re B., N.A1., 856 A.2d at 855, citing In 

re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

The children were placed into foster care in 2011 due to M.H. and C.K.'s 

drug abuse, unsafe and inappropriate home environment, and inability to meet the 

children's needs. Since the second placement of the children in January of 2014, 

M.H. made little to no progress in alleviating similar circumstances. He did not 

regularly participate in all of his drug or mental health treatment, he failed to 

regularly attend doctor's appointments and visitation, and he could not procure 
18 

M.H. admitted his own concerns with his ability to care for Z.H. and P.H. 

during a hearing before Mrs. Roberts in August of 2014. H.T. 28, ln. 19, H.T. 109, 

In. 13. Furthermore, M.H. testified that he had applied for approximately "40 plus" 

or "50" jobs. See H.T. 114. He did not elaborate on what jobs he had applied for or 

where he had done so. The Court did not find this testimony credible. 

This is not a case where the children were simply returned home to M.H. 

with no services or support. The Agency did not seek termination because M.H. 

lacked the financial resources to care for the children. Significant resources were 

expended to provide M.H. in-home care so that he could provide for F.H. and 

Z.H.'s special needs. He gained his housing with assistance from the Agency. He 

was provided furniture. Z.H. had multiple service providers and P.H. had in-home 

nursing care. Ultimately, M.H. did not comply with his drug or mental health 

treatment, he did not ensure his children received all necessary medical care, and 

he did not maintain a safe and appropriate home for the children. These 

circumstances were entirely within his control. For these reasons, the Court found 

that the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to prove that 

grounds existed for termination pursuant to Subsection (a)(l). 

employment or safe and appropriate housing necessary to meet the children's 

needs. 
19 

Pursuant to Subsection (a)(2), the Court must determine that 1) M.H.'s lack 

of parenting ability (the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 

refusal of the parent) caused the children to be without essential parental care and 

control, 2) that the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by M.H. 

"(A] parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as 

parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties." In re Adoption of S.P., 

616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), citingAdoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515 

A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986). As discussed above, the children were placed in foster 

care in 2011 due to the parents' drug use as well as their failure to provide 

appropriate medical care and safe and appropriate housing for the children. Again 

in 2014, the children were placed in foster care because M.H. failed to comply with 

his own treatment, failed to provide appropriate medical care, and failed to provide 

safe and appropriate home for the children. For the past thirteen (13) months M.H. 

proved unable to remedy these circumstances. Furthermore, he did not consistently 

comply with his own services while the children were in placement. For these and 

all of the above reasons, the Court found that the Agency met its burden by clear 

and convincing evidence that grounds for termination under Subsection (a)(2) 

existed. 
20 

Pursuant to Subsection (a)(S)) the court must determine if 1) the conditions 

that led to the removal or placement of the children continue to exist after the 

passage of six (6) months, 2) M.H. cannot or will not remedy those conditions 

within a reasonable period of time, and 3) the services that are available to the 

parents are not likely to remedy the conditions that led to removal. 

As set forth above, the Court found that the conditions that led to the 

placement of F.H. and Z.H. continued to exist and that l\1.H. failed to remedy these 

conditions since placement. The services made available to M.H. have not 

remedied these conditions and are not likely to do so. M.H. has been in 

uninterrupted Methadone treatment for approximately seven and a half years. See 

H.T. 31, 34. Testimony at the hearing indicated that his medical providers 

recommended indefinite Methadone treatment. See H.T. 41.The conditions that led 

to placement in 2014 were similar to those that led to placement in 2011. This 

relapse indicates that despite his genuine intent to alleviate the circumstances that 

necessitated placement, he is unable to correct these problems in a timely fashion. 

Four years and three months is simply too long a period of time for Z.H. and F.H. 

to wait. 

Finally, pursuant to Subsection (a)(8), the Court must determine if 1) the 

conditions that led to the removal or placement of the children continue to exist 

after the passage of twelve (12) months. Once the 12-month period has been 
21 

established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the 

children's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of 

[the Agency] supplied over a realistic time period. In re T.111.T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), quoting In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

As of the filing of the petition, thirteen months had elapsed from the 

placement of the children. The Court notes that while there have been varying 

findings of minimal and moderate compliance since January 2014, such findings 

are not as important as the findings on progress. A case may readily exist where a 

party is minimally compliant but makes progress in alleviating the circumstances. 

However, M.H. has made only minimal progress since January of 2014. For this, 

and for all of the above mentioned reasons, the conditions that led to placement 

continue to exist. It is on this basis the Court found that the Agency met its burden 

under Subsection (a)(8). 

In addition to establishing one of the enumerated grounds for termination, 

the Court must also determine by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

parental rights best meets the needs and welfare of the children. 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 

2511(b ). The law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 

mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and 

welfare of the particular children involved. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251 

(Pa. 2013), citing In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010). 
22 

(There] was no evidence presented during the hearing that 

Child is bonded with his current foster family. Further, there was no 

testimony as to whether or not Child's current foster placement is preadoptive. However, these concerns are outweighed in the instant case 

by Mother's repeated failure to remedy her parental incapacity, and by 

Child's need for permanence and stability. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 

910, 920-23 (Pa Super. 2008); In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 

325 (Pa. Super. 2010), quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Clearly, it would not be in Child's best interest 

for his life to remain on hold indefinite! y in hopes that Mother will 

one day be able to act as his parent. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003) ("A child's life simply cannot be 

put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.") 

Superior Court recently held: 

find in favor of an existing but unhealthy bond in this circumstance. A panel of the 

placement. However, the best interests of the children do not require the Court to 

care placement providers and are not in a potentially permanent pre-adoptive 

In the present case, the children have not yet formed a bond with their foster 

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269. 

weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact. In re 

child's bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must 

Attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a 

severance of that bond. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

must examine the nature and strength of the parent-child bond and the effect of the 

In determining if termination best meets the needs of the children, the Court 
23 

The Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for 

permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future. 

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Both F.H. and Z.H. are special needs children. Z.H. is diagnosed with 

A.D.H.D., an autism spectrum disorder, and nystagmus. He has been undergoing 

treatment since 2012 with a variety of therapies and medications. See H.T. 61, 62. 

P.H. has cerebral palsy and has been diagnosed with a "failure to thrive" condition. 

She requires in-home care, handicap accessible housing, an enhanced diet, and 

several medications. See H.T. 59, 60. M.H. 's inability to provide the children with 

even the minimum of parental care underscores their need for permanence. 

M.H. testified that he loved his children and that they loved him. The 

evidence on the matter of the strong emotional bond between M.H. and his 

children was essentially undisputed. But M.H. proved over the past several years 

that even with extensive assistance, he struggled and failed to meet their needs. 

Given their needs and welfare, preserving this bond will only serve to harm the 

best interests of Z.H. and F.H. The Court could not, out of an effort at mercy or 

eternal optimism, prolong the instability that Z.H. and F.H. have experienced in 

their lives. The Court could not subject them to further uncertain temporary foster 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 2015 PA Super 54, 111 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 

2015) 
24 

M.H. was consistently noted as having minimally complied with courtordered services and having made minimal progress towards alleviating the 

circumstances that led to placement. These findings were made at seven (7) 

permanency review hearings since the children were placed into foster care. M.H. 

had an opportunity to challenge these findings at each hearing, or appeal the 

Court's Orders, and did not. 

"Other considerations." 

M.H.'s Compliance and Circumstances 

M.H., in his concise statement of errors, claims that the Court terminated his 

parental rights improperly on grounds that were outside of M.H. 's control. The 

termination of parental rights may not occur "solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing and furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) 

placements in the hope that M.H. will eventually be able to acquire safe and stable 

housing, provide for their needs, and provide for his own. 

It was for these reasons that the Court found that the Agency met its burden 

by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for involuntary termination of 

parental rights existed pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511. 
25 

Parental Bond 

In his concise statement of errors, M.H. claims that the Court improperly 

terminated his parental rights where testimony indicated that he had a close bond 

with the children and that severing the bond would have a detrimental effect on the 

minor children. "Attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from 

breaking a child's bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and 

we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact." 

In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013). 

Testimony regarding M.H. 's bond with his children was essentially 

undisputed. While this bond was strong, the court considered this bond in relation 

to the best needs of Z.H. and F.H. and determined that the best interests of the 

As discussed above, the circumstances that led to termination of M.H. 's 

parental rights were within his control. M.H. had begun making progress to 

alleviate the circumstances that resulted in the original placement when he was 

complying with all court-ordered services. However, despite all of the services 

placed in his home, M.H. was unable to keep up with the needs of his children, 

could not provide a safe and appropriate home, and could not remain consistent 

with his own treatment. As the record indicates that M.H. 's parental rights were 

terminated for reasons that were within his control, the Court did not err. 
26 

Conclusion 

At the termination proceeding, M.H. attempted to present this case as one 

within the confines of§ 2511(b ); that the Agency sought to separate him from his 

children due to his poverty. This is simply not the case. The Court found clear and 

convincing evidence in favor of termination due to M.H. 's reoccurring, prolonged, 

and irreparable inability to meet the multifaceted needs of his children. 

It is for these reasons that this Court's order of termination should be 

affirmed. 

children still required the termination of M.H. 's parental rights. As the record 

supported this finding, the Court did not err.