Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed October 2, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D22-2239, 3D22-2240 & 3D22-2241

Lower Tribunal Nos. 20-169-P, 20-226-P, 20-170-P

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Incident365 Florida, LLC,

Appellant,

vs.

Ocean Pointe V Condominium Association, Inc., et al.,

Appellees.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Timothy J. Koenig, 

Judge.

Ferencik, Libanoff, Brandt, Bustamante & Goldstein, P.A., and Ira 

Libanoff (Plantation); and Buchanan, Ingersoll, & Rooney PC, and Hala 

Sandridge (Tampa), for appellant.

Abrams Law Firm, P.A., and Ryan A. Abrams (Fort Lauderdale); Scott 

J. Edwards, P.A., and Scott J. Edwards (Boca Raton), for appellees.

Shannin Law Firm, P.A., and Nicholas A. Shannin (Orlando), for the 

Restoration Industry Association, as amicus curiae.

Before SCALES, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ. 
2

GORDO, J.

In these appeals, the plaintiff below, Incident365 Florida, LLC 

(“Incident”), appeals from separate final summary judgments entered in favor 

of Ocean Pointe III Condominium Association, Ocean Pointe IV 

Condominium Association and Ocean Pointe V Condominium Association 

(collectively, “Associations”). We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 

9.030(b)(1)(A). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The underlying action stems from several Service Agreements 

(“Agreements”) that Incident, a disaster mitigation service company, entered 

into with each of the condominium associations following Hurricane Irma in 

2017. Buildings and units within each condominium association sustained

water intrusion during the storm. The Agreements listed seven specific 

“Disaster Recovery Tasks” that Incident would perform at the Associations’ 

buildings: (1) water damage mitigation; (2) general dehumidification; (3) 

structural dehumidification; (4) structural removal of affected substrates; (5) 

disposal of removed materials off property location; (6) anti-microbial 
3

application; and (7) mold remediation, as necessary.1 Neither Incident, nor 

its agents, possessed a contractor’s license when the Agreements were 

entered into or while the work was performed. 

Following the execution of the Agreements, Incident began to perform 

work at the Associations’ buildings. The scope of work completed by 

Incident, which amounted to approximately $1.4 million, included extracting 

water by placing removable machines within the buildings; laying plastic 

sheeting; removing unsalvageable drywall, ceiling materials, flooring

(carpets and vinyl plank tiles), cabinetry, and popcorn texture on ceilings;

providing and operating equipment to dry out wet building materials and 

units, including industrial grade fans, blowers and dehumidifiers; applying 

anti-microbial solutions on surfaces for sanitation; and disposing of removed 

materials. 

After the Associations failed to remit the remaining balance due of 

approximately $1 million under the Agreements, Incident filed suit against 

each condominium association. Incident’s operative complaints asserted 

four claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) open account, (3) account stated, and 

(4) unjust enrichment. In their answers and affirmative defenses, the 

1 It is undisputed that Incident did not ultimately provide any “mold 

remediation” services.
4

Associations raised numerous affirmative defenses, including unlicensed 

contracting under section 489.128, Florida Statutes, and unlicensed mold 

remediation under section 468.8419, Florida Statutes.

The Associations filed amended motions for summary judgment based 

on their affirmative defenses of unlicensed contracting and unlicensed mold 

remediation, asserting that each defense serves as a complete bar to

recovery. Specifically, the Associations argued that Incident engaged in 

significant interior demolition and other disaster mitigation work throughout

the Associations’ buildings, “to repair and/or improve damage” without a

contractor’s license. As a result, the Associations argued Incident could not

enforce the Agreements “in law or in equity” as an unlicensed contractor, as 

provided by section 489.128(1). 

Incident argued in response that the work it completed does not require 

a contractor’s license pursuant to section 489.128(1), the statute is not 

applicable and the Agreements are enforceable. Further, Incident argued

that if some of the contracted-for services required a license, then those 

portions of the Agreements should be severed, and Incident should be 

awarded damages for the services it performed that did not require a 

contractor’s license.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court entered final orders granting 
5

the Associations’ amended motions for summary judgment. In doing so, the 

court found that under section 489.128(1), the Agreements were 

unenforceable because the contracted-for scope of work and the work 

completed by Incident required a building contractor’s license, which Incident 

did not possess. 

The trial court noted that under section 489.105(3), “contractor” is

defined as a (1) “person who, for compensation, undertakes to, submits a 

bid to, or does himself or herself or by others construct, repair, alter, remodel, 

add to, demolish, subtract from, or improve any building or structure, 

including related improvements to real estate, for others,” and (2) “whose job 

scope is substantially similar to the job scope described in one of the 

paragraphs of this subsection,” which includes the paragraph defining a 

“building contractor” in section 489.105(3)(b).2

 

The trial court then addressed whether Incident is a “building 

contractor,” which is defined, in part, as follows:

“Building contractor” means . . . a contractor whose services are 

limited to remodeling, repair, or improvement of any size building 

if the services do not affect the structural members of the 

building.

2 The trial court’s order provides that the “paragraph[] of this subsection” 

relating to a “general contractor” in section 489.105(3)(a), Florida Statutes,

is not applicable. In this appeal, the parties do not dispute this determination.
6

§ 489.105(3)(b). The trial court noted it was undisputed that Incident’s 

services did not “affect the structural members of the [Associations’] 

building[s]” making the only issue before it whether Incident’s “services are 

limited to remodeling, repair, or improvement” so as to make Incident’s job 

scope substantially similar to that of a “building contractor.” 

Because certain words were not defined in the relevant statutes, the 

trial court relied on “dictionary definitions” to determine the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the words. In doing so, the trial court relied on the MerriamWebster Dictionary for definitions of “remodel,” “repair” and “improve.” As 

reflected in the trial court’s order, “remodel” was defined as “to alter the 

structure of”; “repair” was defined as “to restore by replacing a part or putting 

together what is torn or broken”; and “improve” was defined as “to enhance 

in value or quality: make better” and “to increase the value of (land or 

property) by making it more useful for humans.” 

After considering the dictionary definitions, the trial court concluded 

that each of the “Disaster Recovery Tasks” referenced in the Agreements

and all services actually performed by Incident constitute a “repair” or an

“improvement.” In doing so, the trial court noted that the “primary function of 

Incident’s service proposal in this case is to make the property damaged by 

a natural disaster ‘better’ and ‘restore it to a sound or healthy state.’” Further, 
7

in finding that the definition of “contractor” was satisfied, the trial court 

concluded: “The record establishes that Incident undertook to repair or 

improve a building or structure for compensation and its job scope is 

substantially similar to the job scope of a ‘building contractor[.]’ Thus, 

Incident is clearly a contractor under § 489.105(3)(b), Fla. Stat.” The trial 

court also acknowledged that its ruling results in a “harsh outcome,” but that 

it “must apply the applicable statutes without considerations of fairness.” 

Finally, the trial court concluded that Incident could not enforce the 

Agreements, stating: 

Here, the Court finds that a contractor’s license was required for 

the scope of work to be performed under the Agreement[s], and 

the scope of work performed, and that Incident[]did not have the 

required license. The Court concludes that there is no genuine 

dispute of material fact and there is no issue requiring 

presentation to a jury related to whether Incident[] was engaged 

in unlicensed contracting, and that it is therefore, prohibited from 

enforcing its claims “in law or in equity.” § 489.128(1), Fla. Stat.

Following entry of the final summary judgments, Incident moved for 

rehearing, which the trial court denied. Incident’s timely appeal followed.

II.

An appellate court reviews de novo the granting of summary judgment. 

See Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 

(Fla. 2000). “In performing this task, we must view the record and 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant.” 
8

Navarro v. Borges, 388 So. 3d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). “When 

considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must determine 

that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled 

to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Rahimi v. Glob. Discoveries, Ltd., 

LLC, 252 So. 3d 804, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting Mesa v. BMW of N. 

Am., LLC., 904 So. 2d 450, 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)). Further, “[a] trial court's 

entry of summary judgment based on its interpretation of a statute is 

reviewed de novo.” Id.; see also Ibarra v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 350 So. 

3d 465, 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (providing that an order entering final 

summary judgment is reviewed de novo); Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, 

Inc. v. Easton, 894 So. 2d 20, 23 (Fla. 2004) (“The construction of a statute 

is an issue of law subject to de novo review."). 

III.

The issue for review in this appeal centers on the trial court’s 

determination that all the contracted-for work and all the work Incident 

actually performed at the Associations’ buildings required a building 

contractor’s license. 

In addressing whether the “Disaster Recovery Tasks” and the work by 

Incident require a license, the definitions of “contractor” in section 489.105(3)

and “building contractor” in section 489.105(3)(b), and specific words within 
9

those statutes are at issue.

The Florida Legislature “deem[ed] it necessary in the interest of the 

public health, safety, and welfare to regulate the construction industry.” § 

489.101, Fla. Stat. In doing so, the Legislature defined the term “contractor” 

in section 489.105(3), and enacted legislation stating that “[a]s a matter of 

public policy, contracts entered into on or after October 1, 1990, by an 

unlicensed contractor shall be unenforceable in law or in equity by the 

unlicensed contractor.” § 489.128(1), Fla. Stat. Section 489.105(3) defines 

“contractor,” in relevant part, as follows:

“Contractor” means . . . the person who, for compensation, 

undertakes to, submits a bid to, or does himself or herself or by 

others construct, repair, alter, remodel, add to, demolish, 

subtract from, or improve any building or structure, including 

related improvements to real estate, for others or for resale to 

others; and whose job scope is substantially similar to the job 

scope described in one of the paragraphs of this subsection. . . .

(emphasis added).3

 As recently recognized by the Sixth District Court of 

Appeal in Marlin Constr. Grp., LLC v. Bollinger, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D751 (Fla. 

6th DCA Apr. 3, 2024), “[t]he semicolon in the above definition separates the 

two prongs that must be analyzed to determine if one meets the definition of 

‘contractor.’” Id. at *2; see also Sg 2901, LLC v. Complimenti, Inc., 323 So. 

3 The term “demolish” is defined within section 489.105(3) but the scope of 

work performed by Incident does not fall within the definition.
10

3d 804, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (interpreting the definition of “contractor” 

under section 489.105(3) as requiring a two-prong analysis). 

First, pursuant to section 489.105(3), the person, “for compensation” 

must “undertake[] to, submit[] a bid to, or does himself or herself or by others 

construct, repair, alter, remodel, add to, demolish, subtract from, or improve 

any building or structure, including related improvements to real estate, for 

others or for resale to others.” Second, the person’s “job scope” must be 

“substantially similar to the job scope described in one of the paragraphs of 

this subsection.” Here, the “job scope” at issue is that of a “building 

contractor” as defined in section 489.105(3)(b) as follows:

“Building contractor” means . . . a contractor whose services are 

limited to remodeling, repair, or improvement of any size building 

if the services do not affect the structural members of the 

building.

In Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594 (Fla. 2022), the Florida 

Supreme Court made clear that in reviewing the plain meaning of words 

utilized in a statute, courts cannot do so in isolation. Instead, courts must 

consider “the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 

context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 598 (citation omitted). More 

specifically, the Court explained as follows:

The United States encourages us to use an approach that is 

often linked to a passage from our Court’s decision in Holly v. 

Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, 
11

Inc. v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). 

There we said that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear 

and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, 

there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory 

interpretation and construction.” In practice, following this maxim 

often leads the interpreter to focus on a disputed word or phrase 

in isolation; the maxim also leaves the interpreter in the dark 

about how to determine whether a particular word or phrase has 

a clear meaning.

We believe that the Holly principle is misleading and outdated. 

More recently our Court has said that judges must “exhaust ‘all 

the textual and structural clues’ “that bear on the meaning of a 

disputed text. Alachua County v. Watson, 333 So. 3d 162, 169 

(Fla. 2022) (quoting Niz-Chavez v.Garland, --- U.S. ----, 141 S.Ct. 

1474, 1480, 209 L.Ed.2d 433 (2021)). That is because “[t]he 

plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 

reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that

the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 

whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 

843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).

Viewed properly as rules of thumb or guides to interpretation, 

rather than as inflexible rules, the traditional canons of statutory 

interpretation can aid the interpretive process from beginning to 

end . . . . It would be a mistake to think that our law of statutory 

interpretation requires interpreters to make a threshold 

determination of whether a term has a “plain” or “clear” meaning 

in isolation, without considering the statutory context and without 

the aid of whatever canons might shed light on the interpretive 

issues in dispute.

Conage, 346 So. 3d at 598 (footnote omitted). See State v. Crose, 378 So. 

3d 1217, 1234 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024) (stating that since the decision in Conage, 

the Florida Supreme Court’s “marching orders for interpreting legislation 

have been clear: to derive the meaning of statutes, we are to look to the text 
12

itself, as understood in its context, not to any purported intent underlying the 

text”); see also Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The 

plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to 

the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and 

the broader context of the statute as a whole.”); Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S.Ct. 

2355, 2378 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (“[T]he meaning of a word 

depends on the circumstances in which it is used. To strip a word from its 

context is to strip that word of its meaning.”); Alachua Cnty. v. Watson, 333 

So. 3d 162, 170 (Fla. 2022) (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common 

than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial 

interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the 

physical and logical relation of its many parts.” (quoting Antonin Scalia & 

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 

(2012))). 

With these principles in mind, we address the trial court’s determination

that all the contracted-for work and all the work actually performed by 

Incident at the Associations’ buildings required a building contractor’s 

license. In the order under review, the trial court focused on the words 

“remodel,” “repair” and “improve.” In doing so, the trial court relied on broad

dictionary definitions of those terms in isolation, without considering “the 
13

specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of 

the statute as a whole.” Conage, 346 So. 3d at 598. In considering the terms 

in their “specific context” and not in “isolation,” we disagree with the trial 

court’s determination that a building contractor’s license is necessary for the 

undisputed scope of work completed in six of the seven “Disaster Recovery 

Tasks” labeled here between the parties as: water damage mitigation; 

general dehumidification; structural dehumidification; disposal of materials 

off property location; anti-microbial application; and mold remediation, as 

necessary.4 Stated differently, we find the words “remodel,” “repair” and 

“improve” within this particular statute are tethered to the words “building or 

structure.” When read in the appropriate context, these terms are tied

directly to the buildings or structures themselves.

Here, we find these six contracted-for tasks are not tethered to the 

Associations’ buildings or structures, as contemplated by the statute. While 

these contracted-for tasks relate to the buildings and are to be performed 

within the buildings, they do not involve the physical buildings or structures

themselves. When the statute is considered as a whole, it would be absurd 

to interpret it as requiring a building contractor’s license to lay plastic 

4 As stated earlier, mold remediation is addressed in a separate statute, and 

it is undisputed that Incident did not ultimately perform any mold remediation 

services at the Associations’ buildings.
14

sheeting, plug in electric fans to dry out a wet building, to apply anti-microbial 

solutions for sanitation and to dispose of materials.

We also recognize the arguments raised in the amicus brief submitted 

by the Restoration Industry Association (“RIA”), an established trade 

association for the disaster remediation and cleaning industry. In its brief, 

RIA contends the trial court’s broad interpretation of the statute would have 

a severe and draconian impact on the restoration industry not intended by 

the Legislature. Specifically, it would impose a barrier to entry—requiring a 

building contractor’s license—for basic cleaning services or water extraction 

or mitigation activities, which is not textually supported by the plain language 

of the statute. We agree. 

If we were to accept the trial court’s ruling as to these six tasks and 

related services, practically any work performed for a homeowner for 

compensation would require a building contractor’s license. For example, if 

a homeowner hired someone for compensation to clean their home, and 

during the cleaning process, the individual scrubbed the toilets and 

vacuumed and cleaned the floors, the first prong of section 489.105(3) would 

be satisfied because this process resulted in the “subtract[ion]” of dirt and 

dust from the building. The second prong would also be satisfied because 

the cleaning resulted in an “improvement” to the building. Likewise, if this
15

same individual sprayed the counters with antibacterial spray, the statute

would be satisfied because the disinfectant was technically “add[ed] to” to 

building, resulting in an “improvement” to the building. An even more 

extreme example would be if a homeowner hired someone to hang air 

fresheners throughout their home. The first prong would be satisfied 

because the air fresheners were technically “add[ed] to” the building. The 

second prong would also be satisfied because the introduction of a pleasant 

fragrance to the interior space resulted in an “improvement” to the building. 

Put simply, requiring a building contractor’s license for applying sanitizers or 

conducting any of the above-referenced activities would result in an absurd 

reading of the statute that cannot logically stand. See Biden, 143 S.Ct. at 

2379 (“Context also includes common sense, which is another thing that 

‘goes without saying.’”); State v. Atkinson, 831 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 2002) 

(“A basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute 

so as to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable . . . or absurd 

consequences.”); Amente v. Newman, 653 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1995) 

(“If possible, the courts should avoid a statutory interpretation which leads to 

an absurd result.”); Brock v. Garner Window & Door Sales, Inc., 187 So. 3d 

294, 295 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (stating courts “are duty-bound to avoid an 

absurd, illogical or unreasonable construction of a statute”). 
16

That said, we focus on the other “Disaster Recovery Task[]”—

“structural removal of [a]ffected substrates” and the scope of work performed 

by Incident under that task at the Associations’ buildings. Here, the record 

reflects that certain materials that were permanently affixed to the 

Associations’ buildings were removed by Incident. For example, Incident

removed unsalvageable or damaged drywall, ceiling materials, cabinetry, 

carpets, vinyl plank tiles and the popcorn texture from the ceilings. We 

recognize that unlike applying sanitizers, detaching and disposing of a 

kitchen cabinet, for instance, is an activity which might arguably require a 

license.

In this case, both parties provided competing interpretations of the 

services undertaken within this job scope. They also provided conflicting 

analysis on whether, in the industry, some of these services affected the 

structure of the building and whether these services fall within the definition 

of “building contractor” pursuant to the statute. Based on our independent 

review of the record, we conclude there are genuine issues of material fact

as to whether the scope of work the parties have labeled “structural removal 

of [a]ffected substrates” and the removal of materials affixed to the buildings 

fall within the scope of work performed by a “building contractor,” thus 

requiring a building contractor’s license. As such, these issues bar entry of 
17

final summary judgment as to that work and the issues must be submitted to 

a trier of fact for determination. See Mobley v. Homestead Hosp., Inc., 291 

So. 3d 987, 990 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact precludes summary judgment.”). We therefore reverse the 

orders entering final summary judgment in favor of the Associations and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

5

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

5 As we are reversing the orders under review and remanding for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion, we decline to address in the first 

instance (1) whether section 489.128(1) completely bars an unlicensed 

contractor from recovering under a contract even if only a portion of the work 

performed requires a contractor’s license; and (2) whether, based on the 

Agreements’ severability provisions, it is permissible to sever from the 

Agreements those portions relating to services requiring a contractor’s 

license, thereby allowing recovery for services not requiring a contractor’s 

license. 
18

Incident365 Florida, LLC v. Ocean Point V Condo. Ass’n, Inc., et al. 

3D22-2239, 3D22-2240 & 3D22-2241

SCALES, J., concurring.

I concur in the opinion and write only to discuss severability of the 

parties’ disaster mitigation contracts, an important issue that remains 

unadjudicated in this case and appears to be one of first impression in 

Florida.6

In the challenged judgment, the trial court determined, as a matter of 

law, that each of the “Disaster Recovery Tasks” provided by Incident under 

the parties’ disaster mitigation contracts constituted a “repair” or an 

“improvement” to the Associations’ “building[s] or structure[s]” as 

contemplated by sections 489.105(3) and 489.105(3)(b) of the Florida 

6 The parties cite several cases in which the severability issue is tangentially 

mentioned. See Earth Trades, Inc. v. T & G Corp., 108 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 

2013); ABA Interior Inc. v. Owen Grp. Corp., 338 So. 3d 264 (Fla. 4th DCA 

2022); Vacation Beach, Inc. v. Charles Boyd Constr., Inc., 906 So. 2d 374 

(Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Sterner v. Phillips, 721 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). 

None of the cited cases, though, squarely adjudicates the issue of whether 

– in light of section 489.128(1) of the Florida Statute’s language prohibiting 

the enforcement of contracts entered into by an unlicensed contractor – a 

severability provision contained in an otherwise unenforceable contract 

would allow an unlicensed contractor to enforce provisions of a contract for 

work not requiring licensure.
19

Statutes, such that each task could be performed only by a licensed building 

contractor. Thus, the trial court did not reach, or otherwise address, 

Incident’s alternate argument that, pursuant to the contracts’ express 

severability provisions,7 the trial court should sever those tasks requiring 

licensure (i.e., the contracts’ unenforceable provisions) from the contracts, 

permitting Incident to enforce the contracts as to those tasks not requiring 

licensure. 

We have now reversed the trial court’s legal determination as to all but 

one of those tasks, concluding that because these tasks are not sufficiently 

tethered to the Associations’ “building[s] or structure[s]” as contemplated by 

sections 489.105(3) and 489.105(3)(b), such work did not require Incident to 

possess a building contractor license. Because we have determined that a 

fact issue exists as to whether the remaining task –“structural removal of 

effected substrates” – requires licensure, the thorny issue of severability 

remains.8

7 The contracts’ severability provisions read as follows: “6. Administrative 

Provisions . . . (g) Severability. If any provision of this Agreement is 

deemed unenforceable, the remaining provision shall remain in full force and 

effect.”

8 Indeed, the severability issue is mooted only if it is ultimately determined 

that the remaining task does not require licensure. If, however, it is 

determined that the remaining task does require licensure, then Incident can 
20

In its appeal, Incident argues that this Court should reach and decide 

the severability issue in the first instance. We have declined Incident’s 

invitation to do so.9 See Akers v. City of Miami Beach, 745 So. 2d 532, 532 

(Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“Because the trial court based its judgment solely on [a 

different basis] and this court should not ordinarily decide issues not ruled on 

by the trial court in the first instance, we reverse the summary judgment and 

express no opinion as to the legal merits of appellee’s alternative ground at 

this time.”).

On remand, for purely practical reasons, the trial court may wish to 

adjudicate the legal issue of severability before conducting proceedings on 

the fact issue we have identified in this opinion (i.e., whether the contracts’ 

“structural removal of effected substrates” task constitutes a “repair” or an 

“improvement” to the Associations’ “building[s] or structure[s]” as 

contemplated by sections 489.105(3) and 489.105(3)(b) so as to require a 

building contractor license), and any attendant fact issues that may derive 

therefrom. Indeed, the outcome of the trial court’s severability determination 

might affect settlement negotiations, jury instructions and the verdict forms.

enforce the contracts for the other tasks only if the contracts’ severability 

provisions are enforceable.

9 See footnote 5 of majority opinion.