[Cite as Durben v. Malek, 2014-Ohio-2611.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ANITA DURBEN, et al. 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants 

-vsROXANNE MALEK 

 Defendant-Appellee 

JUDGES: 

Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. 

Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2012CV010072 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 17, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendant-Appellee 

BRETT H. HILLYER DAVID C. HIPP 

201 North Main Street, P.O. Box 272 300 East High Avenue, P.O. Box 90 

Uhrichsville, Ohio 44683 New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 2

Wise, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal the July 5, 2013, decision of the Tuscarawas 

County Court of Common Pleas finding judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee 

Roxanne Malek following a bench trial on Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims of conversion and 

replevin and Defendant-Appellee’s counter-claims of waste and conversion. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} In 1995, Plaintiffs-Appellants Anita and Bill (George) Durben purchased 

certain real estate on Keiser Hill Road from the estate of Anita's parents. The property 

consists of approximately 130 acres with a house and outbuildings. 

{¶3} Subsequently, the Durbens began to experience serious financial 

problems related to Mrs. Durben's physical and mental health issues. (T. at 197). Mrs. 

Durben had accumulated credit card balances of approximately $30,000.00 due in part 

to extensive purchases from various cable TV shopping channels. (T. 107-108). Mrs. 

Durben was receiving social security income of approximately $500.00. The Durbens' 

mortgage was in default and they were experiencing considerable difficulty in meeting 

expenses. 

{¶4} When the Durbens could no longer hold off their creditors, DefendantAppellee Roxanne Malek, Anita's niece, and her husband Jim agreed to purchase the 

property for $100,000.00. This money was used to satisfy the mortgage balance of 

approximately $80,000.00 and provide the Durbens with approximately $20,000.00 in 

cash. (T. at 76, 202-203). The purchase agreement provided that the Durbens would 

have a life estate on 30 acres, including the house and outbuildings located on the 

property. By terms of the agreement, the Durbens were not to commit waste on the land 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 3

and the buyer, Roxanne Malek, would have the benefit of any leases. The Durbens 

would, however, continue to receive the benefit of existing leases. 

{¶5} Even after the purchase price was paid, the Durbens continued to have 

serious financial problems. Roxanne Malek and her husband gave the Durbens an 

additional $30,000.00, $10,000.00 yearly for three years. (T. at 45, 203-204). 

{¶6} When Roxanne Malek purchased the property in 2007, she did so sight 

unseen. She was aware of the condition of the property on or around the time the 

Durbens had originally acquired title. George Durben testified that beginning in 2007, 

Roxanne Malek and her husband would visit the property periodically. (T. at 44). After 

acknowledging that the condition of the property was getting worse, George Durben 

testified that the Maleks were going to arrange for "Mexicans" to come up and help 

them clean things up. (T. at 35). 

{¶7} Finally, in 2009 after the Durbens had ceased residing in the house due to 

Health Department determinations that the property became uninhabitable, Roxanne 

Malek informed the Durbens that they had to clean up the property. 

{¶8} When Malek took possession of the property, the furnace was not 

working. There was no water service because the pump had stopped working. The 

rooms of the house were filled with debris, sometimes piled to the ceiling. The house 

was littered with broken furniture, and the appliances were not working. The bathroom 

plumbing fixtures were inoperable and bottles of yellow fluid, believed to be urine, were 

scattered throughout the house. There were broken floor joists resulting from the 

amount and weight of the trash on the floor above. The yard was littered with broken 

furniture and other trash. There were inoperable vehicles on the property. 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 4

{¶9} The trial court admitted photographs of the property showing the condition 

when Roxanne Malek went on to the property. (See Defendant's Trial Exhibits C, D, JQ). 

{¶10} Plaintiff George Durben agreed that the condition of the property had 

worsened from 2007 until 2011 because of the accumulation of trash and failure to 

maintain the property. (T. at 99-104). 

{¶11} The Durbens moved from the house, first to a motel and then to an 

apartment. (T. at 46-47). However, George Durben claimed to have stayed overnight in 

a camper located on the property to allow him to keep an eye on the house. (T. at 49). 

His testimony varied from a month or two to "off and on" until 2011. He also testified that 

while staying in the camper, he was feeding the horses, dogs, and cats which had been 

left on the property. (T. at 13-15). Despite his presence on the property, there were 

break-ins to the home and thefts of property. (T. at 71-72). 

{¶12} In October, 2011, Roxanne Malek retained counsel who notified the 

Durbens to vacate the property within two weeks. When the agreed upon deadline for 

removing property passed, Malek removed whatever items appeared to have any value 

and stored the items in a storage facility. (T. at 217-219). Those items were later 

appraised at approximately $1,098.00. (T. at 123). 

{¶13} The Durbens claimed that the property which was taken by Roxanne 

Malek was valued in excess of $200,000.00. The Durbens claimed that there was 

valuable furniture on the property, including two end tables worth $100,000.00, three 

dressers worth $25,000.00 to $30,000.00 and jewelry valued at more than $100,000.00. 

(T. at 108-118, 126-162, 188-189). They further alleged that various items purchased 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 5

from the shopping channel QVC were valued at amounts into the thousands of dollars. 

(T. at 19-31). The Durbens acknowledged that all of the valuable property was left in the 

home after they vacated the property, and that they had never made any effort in two 

years to remove those items. The Durbens further claimed that Roxanne Malek also 

removed appliances, tools, guns, equipment, and valuable furniture which had been left 

on the property. 

{¶14} After December, 2011, Roxanne Malek spent thousands of dollars in 

cleanup and repairs just to stabilize the house. (T. at 220-228). 

{¶15} After the Malek purchase of the property, the Durbens executed a lease 

with another cell phone company to locate equipment on an existing tower. The 

Durbens received and retained the rental payments from this lease. (T. at 230-232).

This lease was entered into without the knowledge of Roxanne Malek.

{¶16} On December 14, 2011, the Plaintiffs-Appellants Anita and Bill Durben 

filed a Complaint in the Tuscarawas County Court against the Roxanne Malek for 

replevin and for conversion of furniture and other property. 

{¶17} Defendant-Appellee Roxanne Malek answered denying the PlaintiffsAppellants' allegations and asserted counter-claims for damages resulting from waste 

committed by Plaintiffs-Appellants, nuisance, and conversion of communication antenna 

rentals. As Defendant-Appellee's counterclaim sought damages in a monetary amount 

exceeding the County Court's monetary jurisdiction, the case was transferred to the 

Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court. 

{¶18} Plaintiffs-Appellants subsequently filed an amended complaint to add a 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm.
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{¶19} Following Defendant-Appellee's motion for partial summary judgment, the 

trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee on Plaintiffs-Appellants 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm.

{¶20} On April 25, 2013, the matter proceeded to trial before the court. 

{¶21} On July 5, 2013, the trial court rendered judgment against the PlaintiffsAppellants on their claims for conversion and replevin and in favor of the DefendantAppellee on her claims for waste and conversion. 

{¶22} Appellants now appeal, assigning the following errors for review: 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶23} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPELLANT IN 

THIS MATTER ABANDONED THE CHATTEL PROPERTY. 

{¶24} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DAMAGES WERE 

APPROPRIATE IN THE ABOVE CAPTIONED CASE AS THE APPELLEE WAS 

UNABLE TO SPECIFY THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO TAKING 

OWNERSHIP. 

{¶25} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ANY PROCEEDS FOR 

CONVERSION ON THE COMMUNICATIONS TOWERS ON THE PREMISES.” 

I.

{¶26} In their First Assignment of Error, Appellants argue the trial court erred in 

finding that they abandoned any personal property left at or on the real property in 

question, and that Appellee did not convert the chattel property. We disagree. 

{¶27} “Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to the 

exclusion of the rights of the owner, or withholding it from his possession under a claim 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 7

inconsistent with his rights.” State ex. rel Toma v. Corrigan (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 

592, 752 N.E.2d 281, quoting Joyce v. General Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 

96, 551 N.E.2d 172. 

{¶28} Abandoned property has been defined as “property over which the owner 

has relinquished all right, title, claim, and possession with the intention of not reclaiming 

it or resuming its ownership, possession or enjoyment.” Doughman v. Long, 42 Ohio 

App.3d 17, 21, 536 N.E.2d 394 (12th Dist.1987). 

{¶29} Here, the trial court found that Appellants abandoned any personal 

property remaining at or on the real property in this matter and that, consequently, 

Appellee is not liable for conversion. We agree. 

{¶30} “Abandonment requires affirmative proof of the intent to abandon coupled 

with acts or omissions implementing the intent.” Village of New Richmond v. Painter,

12th Dist. No CA2002-10-080, 2003-Ohio-3871 at ¶ 9, citing Davis v. Suggs (1983), 10 

Ohio App.3d 50, 52, 460 N.E.2d 665. Intent to abandon “must be shown by unequivocal 

and decisive acts indicative of abandonment.” Erie Metroparks Bd. of Commrs. v. Key 

Trust Co. of Ohio, 145 Ohio App.3d 782, 790, 2001-Ohio-2888 at ¶ 47 (Citations 

omitted). Mere non-use is not sufficient to establish the fact of abandonment, absent 

other evidence tending to prove the intent to abandon.” Long v. Noah's Lost Ark Inc.,

158 Ohio App.3d 206, 814 N.E.2d 555, 2004-Ohio-4155, ¶ 35 (7th Dist.) (quoting Davis 

v. Suggs, 10 Ohio App.3d 50, 52, 460 N.E.2d 665 (12th Dist.1983)). 

{¶31} After Appellee served Appellants with an eviction notice, Appellants, upon 

request, were granted two weeks to retrieve any belongings from the property. 

Appellants did in fact retrieve a number of personal items, leaving behind many others. 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 8

{¶32} The trial court found an intention to abandon the property. That finding is 

supported by some competent, credible evidence and will, therefore, not be reversed. 

Indeed, Appellants were given ample opportunity to remove their property. Appellants 

chose to leave many items behind. Because Appellants abandoned their property, 

Appellee did not convert the property to her own use. 

{¶33} Accordingly, Appellants’ First Assignment of Error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶34} In their Second Assignment of Error, Appellants argue the trial court erred 

in awarding damages on Appellee’s counter-claim for waste. We disagree. 

{¶35} “Waste has been defined as an unlawful act or omission of duty on the 

part of a tenant which results in a permanent injury to the real estate. Waste has been 

divided into two categories, to wit: voluntary and permissive. Voluntary waste is willful 

waste conducted by a tenant and permissive waste arises from the neglect, omission, 

sufferance or permission of the tenant in failing to preserve or protect the estate.” 

Morelli Realty v. Quik Shops Food Mart (July 8, 1981), Stark App. No. CA-5549. 

{¶36} “[I]t is the life tenant, and not the remainderman, who must preserve the 

property during the life estate by undertaking repairs made necessary by normal wear 

and tear.” Reams v. Henney (1950), 88 Ohio App. 409, 410-414, 97 N.E.2d 37. 

{¶37} In the case sub judice, the purchase agreement provides that Appellee 

would grant Appellants a life estate in the property subject to Appellants not committing 

waste upon the property, 

{¶38} At trial, Appellee testified that when she purchased the property in 2007, 

she did so without ever having seen the interior of the house. (T. at 250). She 
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explained that the last time she had been inside the house was sometime in the late 

1990’s. (T. at 251-252). 

{¶39} She went on to testify that by 2009, it was apparent that the condition of 

the house and premises were deteriorating: 

{¶40} “There was a lot more trash, there was a deterioration of the buildings. I 

believe at some point the tractor in 2008 stopped working so the property wasn’t being 

mowed or maintained, the fields were growing in excess, burrs and weeds taller than 

myself, fencing knocked down, a lot of trash. 

{¶41} “*** 

{¶42} “I think the front porch. You couldn’t use the front porch any longer.” (T. at 

207). 

{¶43} More specifically, Appellee described the condition of the house in 2009: 

{¶44} “Q: And would you just briefly describe the general condition of the house 

when you went in in 2009 at the time they were leaving? 

{¶45} “A: It was – it was pretty bad. But I – I wasn’t all over the house. You 

couldn’t get to parts of the house. 

{¶46} “Q: The outdoor pictures show more and more accumulation of trash. Did 

you notice it getting worse and worse? 

{¶47} “A: Yes, yes. 

{¶48} “Q: And did you have some concern about the health and well being of 

your aunt and uncle? 

{¶49} “A: Absolutely because they didn’t have heat and they didn’t have any 

running water. 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 10

{¶50} “Q: When you went on the property in 2009 after they left was there 

running water? 

{¶51} “A: No, no. 

{¶52} “Q: How was water supplied to the house? 

{¶53} “A: I believe my Uncle Bill brought bottles of water to the home.” (T. at 

209). 

{¶54} Appellee also testified that the well pump was not working and none of the 

sinks or toilets were operational. (T. at 210). She testified that Appellants had been 

using “hospital type potty chairs.” Id. She further testified that the bedroom and the 

hallways were full of bottles and jugs containing yellow substances which she believed 

to be urine based on the color and the odor. (T. at 211). She further testified that there 

were also bottles outside, like they had been thrown out of the windows. (T. at 212). 

{¶55} Appellee testified that the floor of the living room had sunken two feet 

under the weight of the trash piled there. (T. at 224). She stated that seven of the floor 

joists had split and the only reason the floor had not caved in was because of the coal 

furnace directly underneath which had managed to keep it propped up. (T. at 224, 234). 

{¶56} Appellant George Durben readily admitted that the situation had gotten 

worse after Appellee purchased the property. (T. at 101). George Durben testified that 

they did nothing to prevent the condition of the property from deteriorating or worsening. 

(T. at 100-101). He admitted that they failed to repair the plumbing, the furnace, or 

anything else when it broke. Id. He admitted that they never cleaned the sinks or the 

bath tubs Id. He further admitted that outside of a failed attempt trying to clean the front 

porch, no repairs were made to the property. (T. at 104). 
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{¶57} Appellee provided the trial court with numerous photographs which 

depicted the deplorable state of the residence. The trial court summarized: 

{¶58} “The residence in question was inundated and overrun with junk and trash 

creating a deplorable condition, the likes of which have not been observed by the 

undersigned in any legal case during his thirty-two (32) years of judicial service in 

Tuscarawas County, Ohio. 

{¶59} “The weight of the trash and accumulated junk items in the living room of 

the residence caused the floor joists to sag and fracture. The plumbing and fixtures 

were in disrepair and not workable. Animal feces and bottles of what appeared to be 

urine were located throughout the house. Broken and discarded items of furniture, other 

household items and miscellaneous trash items were scattered throughout the entire 

residence. *** ”. (Judgment entry, July 5, 2013). 

{¶60} Appellee testified that it cost approximately $30,000.00 to put the house 

and property back to the kind of condition it should have been in had Appellants 

maintained the premises. (T. at 227). She also provided the court with a spreadsheet 

documenting estimates she had received for repair work, including repairing the floor, 

remediation, cleaning, trash removal, labor, etc. (T. at 239). 

{¶61} While Appellee admits she does not know the exact condition of the 

interior of the house in 2007 when she purchased it, from the above stated facts 

including Appellants own admissions that they did nothing to try to clean or maintain the 

property, it is evident that Appellants, even accounting for normal wear and tear, did not 

return the building to Appellee in the condition it was in when she purchased the 

property in 2007. 
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{¶62} Based on the foregoing, we find the record supports the trial court’s 

judgment amount of $40,000.00 on Appellee’s claim for waste. 

{¶63} Appellants’ Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶64} In their Third Assignment of Error, Appellants argue that the trial court 

erred in granting damages on Appellee’s counter-claim for conversion. We disagree. 

{¶65} The trial court found Appellant did not have the right to retain the rental 

receipts for the second cell tower lease Appellant entered into after the sale of the 

property to Roxanne Malek. 

{¶66} A person possessing a life estate in specified property can lease the 

property to someone else for the duration of the life estate. See Noble v. Tyler (1900), 

61 Ohio St. 432, 56 N.E. 191 and Fruth v. Schulz (May 12, 1995), Wood App. No. WD94-052, unreported. As the court noted in Fruth, supra., the power to rent is inherent in 

a life estate absent a specific prohibition in the granting clause of a will providing 

otherwise. Douglas v. Stackhouse, 5th Dist. Stark App. 1999CA00130. 

{¶67} “The scope of the life tenant's power is broad. It includes a power to sell, 

to give away, to mortgage, or to lease the land for a period not greater than the duration 

of the transferor's estate. * * * Leases given by the life tenant expire on the death of the 

original measuring life.” 2 Powell on Real Property (1994), 15-57, 15-58, Paragraph 

203[3]. See also Winters Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. Shawen (1964), 95 Ohio Law Abs. 

337, 347 (life estate without power to rent constitutes tenancy at will); 1 McDermott's 

Ohio Real Property (4 Ed.1988) 433, 11-63A; see, generally, 41 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d 

(1983) 480-481, Estates, Powers, and Restraints on Alienation, Section 56. 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 13

{¶68} Accordingly, Appellants in this case would have received an inherent 

power to rent or lease the property in which they were granted a life estate which could 

only be defeated by specific language in the granting clause defeating that power. 

{¶69} Here, there does exist limiting language in the purchase agreement 

entered into between the parties in this case on September 13, 2007, which provided: 

{¶70} “[t]he Buyer (Appellee) shall become the owner of any leases relating to 

gas, minerals, and cell towers etc. with the Seller (Appellants) receiving the benefit of 

certain of the proceeds from the leases with the consent and approval of the Buyer.” 

{¶71} Evidence was presented at trial that Appellants entered into the second 

cell tower lease contract without the prior knowledge or consent of Appellee and that 

they received $1,250.00 in rental payments for said lease. (T. at 252-253). We therefore 

find the trial court was correct in finding that by keeping the rental receipts in 

contravention of the purchase contract, Appellant converted the property rightfully 

belonging to Appellee. 

 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 14

{¶72} Appellants’ Third Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶73} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, 

Tuscarawas County, Ohio, is affirmed. 

By: Wise, J. 

Gwin, P. J., and 

Delaney, J., concur. 

 

JWW/d 0529 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 08 0032 15