### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: HO A G U R GEN TC A R E-TU STIN, IN C .; C Y PR ESS U R GEN T C A R E, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN T C A R E-A N A HEIM HILLS, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN TC A R E-HU N TIN GTO N HA RB O U R

, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN T C A R E-O RA N GE, IN C .; LA GU N A -DA N A U R GEN T C A R E, IN C .,

Deb to rs. HO A G U R GEN TC A R E-TU STIN, IN C .; C Y PR ESS U R GEN T C A R E, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN T C A R E-A N A HEIM HILLS, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN TC A R E-HU N TIN GTO N HA RB O U R

, IN C .; HO A G U R GEN T C A R E-O RA N GE, IN C .; LA GU N A -DA N A U R GEN T C A R E, IN C .,

A p pellants,

v. O PU SBA N K

, A p pellee. BA P N o s . C C -18-1075-FLS Bk. N o s. 8:17-b k-13077-TA

8:17-b k-13078-TA 8:17-b k-13079-TA 8:17-b k-13080-TA 8:17-b k-13089-TA 8:17-b k-13090-TA

M E M ORA ND U M * 

# FIL ED

OCT 11 2018
SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. BKCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE NI NT H CI RCUI T

*Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi cati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.A rgued and Sub m itted o n Septemb er 27, 2018 at Lo s Angeles, C a lifo rnia Filed – O c tob er 11, 2018 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia Ho no rab le Theo d o r C . A lb ert, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

A ppearanc es: A s hley M. Mc Do w o f Fo ley & Lardner LLP argued on

b ehalf o f appellants C ypress U rgent C are, Inc . and Laguna-Dana U rgent C a re, Inc

.
Befo r e: FA R IS, LA FFERTY, and SPRA K ER , Bankruptcy Judges. INT ROD U CT I ON Deb to rs Ho ag U rgent C are - Tustin, Inc ., Ho ag U rgent C are - A naheimHills, Inc

. , Ho ag U rgent C are - Huntingto n Harb o ur, Inc ., Ho ag U rgent C are - O range, Inc ., C ypress U rgent C are, Inc ., and Laguna-Dana U rgent C are, Inc . (c o llec tively, “Deb to r s”) appeal the b ankruptc y c o urt’s denial o f their m o tio n to extend the exc lusivity perio d to file their c hapter 11 1 plan.

1 Unless specifi ed other wi se, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e. 2The b ankruptc y c o urt’s o rder is no t a final, appealab le o rder. W e also

deny the Deb t o rs leave to a p peal b ec ause this appeal is m o o t. Therefo re, we DISMISS this appeal fo r lac k o f jurisdic tio n. FA CT U A L BA CK GROU ND 2 A . T he M otion to E xtend O n A u gust 2, 2017, the Deb to rs filed chapter 11 b ankruptc y petitio ns. The b ankruptc y c o urt appro ved jo int adm inistratio n o f the six Deb to rs’
c ases. Under § 1121(b ), the 120-day perio d during which o nly the Deb to rs
c o u ld file a plan (the “exc lusivity perio d”) expired o n N o vemb er 30, 2017. The fo llo wing afterno o n, the Deb to rs filed a m o tio n to extend the
exc lusivity perio d (“Mo tio n to Extend”) to March 31, 2018 pursuant to § 1121(d)(1). They did no t address the tardiness o f their m o t io n. C redito rO pus Bank objec ted o n the b asis that the Mo tio n to Extend was untim ely. It argued that a m o t io n to extend the exc lusivity perio d must b e filed b efo re that perio d expires. In their reply, the Deb to rs fo r the first tim e asserted that their c o unsel was prepared tofile the Mo t io n to Extend elec tro nic ally b y m idnight o n N o vemb er 30. Ho wever, they realized to o late that the b ankruptc y c o urt’s

2 The Debtor s’ r eci tati on of facts and excer pts of r ecor d ar e incomplete. We hav e exer c i sed ourdi scr eti on to r ev i ew the bankr uptcy cour t’s docket, as appr opr i a te. See Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.) , 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Ci r . BAP 2008). 3C M/EC F elec tro nicfiling systemwas undergo ing a planned o utage fro m

1:00 pmuntil 8:30 amthe fo llo wing m o rning. Thus, they were unab le to file the Mo tio n to Extend until the fo llo w ing day. They c laim ed that the o utage was “unantic ipated” 3 and that a “technic al failure” o f C M/EC F allo wed them to file upo n the resum ptio n o f servic e. O pus Bank filed a surreply, arguing that the Deb to rs c o uld have filed the Mo tio n to Extend m anually while the elec tro nicfiling systemwas unavailab le. It alsorepresented that, during the two weeks b efo re the expiratio n o f the exc lusivity perio d, the b ankruptc y c o u rt sent at least fo ur prio r no tific a tio ns o f the planned o u t age that the three atto rneys representing the Deb to rs, all o f who m are C M/EC F users, sho uld have
rec eived. It further po inted o ut that the c lient’s dec laratio n was no t dated until Dec emb er 1, which b elied the Deb t o rs’ explanatio n that the Mo tio n to Extend was ready tofile o n N o vemb er 30. The b ankruptc y c o urt held a hearing o n the Mo tio n to Extend. It was skeptic al o f the Deb to rs’ explanatio n o f events, b ut o rdered supplem ental b riefing. A fter a c o ntinued hearing, the c o urt issued an o rder denying the Mo tio n to Extend (“O rder”). C iting o ut-o f-c ircuit c ases, it held that R ule 9006(b )(1) c anno t extend a statuto ry deadline fo r exc usab le neglec t after the

3 The Debtor s’ counsel attached a copy of an e-mai l r ecei v ed fr om the bankr uptcy cour t that adv i s ed user s of the CM/ECF system upgr ade beginnin g at 1:00 pm. The emai l was r ecei v ed by counsel at 7:01 am on Nov ember30, 2017. 4deadline has passed. R ather, it ado pted the “m ajo rity rule” that Rule

9006(b ) do es no t apply to untim ely filings under § 1121(d). Bec ause the b ankruptc y c o urt determ ined that it had no disc retio n to grant the untim ely m o tio n, it dec lined to reach the questio n whether the Deb to rs’ neglec t was “excusab le” o r c o nstituted “c ause.” The Deb t o rs filed a tim ely no tic e o f appeal fro mthe O rder. B. Other relev a nt ev ents The Deb t o rs failed to apprise the Panel o f num ero us signific ant events. First, the Deb to rs filed a plan while the Mo tio n to Extend was pending. A s far as the b ankruptc y c o urt’s do c ket sho ws, the c o urt never appro ved a disc lo sure statem ent fo rthat plan and never c o nfirm ed it. Sec o nd, o n June 29, 2018, the b ankruptc y c o urt c o nverted to chapter 7 the c ases o f fo ur o f the Deb to rs: Ho ag U rgent C are - Tustin, Inc ., Ho ag U rgent C are - A naheimHills, Inc ., Ho ag U rgent C are - Huntingto n Harb o ur, Inc ., Ho ag U rgent C are - O r ange, Inc . (c o llec tively, “Ho ag Deb to rs”). Third, the rem aining c hapter 11 deb to r s, C ypress U r gent C are, Inc

. and Laguna-Dana U rgent C are, Inc . (c o llec tively, “C hapter 11 Deb t o rs”), filed ano ther plan o n A ugust 8. Fo urth, no o ne o ther than the Deb to rs has ever filed a plan.

5JU RISD ICT ION

The b ankruptc y c o urt had jurisdic tio n pursuant to28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(1). W e m u st satisfy o urselves that we have jurisdic tio n to c o nsider this appeal, even if no party raises the issue o f o ur jurisdic t io n. S ee O z enne v. Cha se Ma nha tta n Ba nk

(In re O z enne) , 841 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, a federal c o urt must first determ ine whether it has jurisdic tio n b efo r e reaching the m erits o f a c ase.” (c itatio n o m itted)); W illia m so n v. U N U M Life Ins. Co . o

f Am

. , 160 F.3d 1247, 1250 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The issue o f appellate jurisdic tio n m ust always b e reso lved b efo re the m erits o f an appeal are exam ined o r addressed.” (citatio n o m itted)). A . T he Order isnot a final, appealable order. W e m a y o nly review “final judgm ents, o rders, and dec rees[.]” 28 U .S.C . § 158(a)(1). W e generally lac k jurisdic t io n to hear appeals fro m interlo cuto ry o rders. S ee Giesbrecht v. Fitzgera ld (In re Giesbrecht), 429 B.R

. 682, 687 (9th C ir. BA P 2010). The O r der challenged in this appeal m erely dec lined to adjust a deadline. Such o rders are generally no t appealab le. S ee T ra vers v. D ragul (In re Tra vers) , 202 B.R . 624, 625 (9th C ir. BA P 1996) (stating that the appeal is interlo cuto ry b ec ause “the o rder allo wing an extensio n o f the filing deadline determ ined o nly an intervening m atter o f the Plaintiffs’ c laim s against the Deb to r ”); H ea vrin v. S chilling

, C ase N o . 3:13-C V-6-S, 2013 WL

63166175, at *2 (W .D. Ky. June 20, 2013) (“Fro ma func tio nal standpo int,

there is no thing final in an o rder which extends a deadline. Indeed, the extensio n o f a deadline is antithetic al to the c o m pletio n o f a pro c eeding.”); In re Plaz a Fa m ily P’ship, 95 B.R . 166, 170 (E.D. C al. 1989) (“[A ]n o r der sho rtening tim e is no t a final o rder and therefo r e no t appealab le”). The O rder denying the Mo tio n to Extend is no t final and appealab le. The Deb t o rs c o ntend that appellate jurisdic tio n exists under 28 U .S.C

. § 158(a)(2), which pro vides that we have jurisdic tio n o ver appeals “fro m interlo cuto ry o rders and dec rees issued under sec t io n 1121(d) o f title 11 inc reas ingor reduc ing the tim e perio ds referred to in sec tio n 1121 o f such title[.]” (Em phasis added.) The plain language o f sec tio n 158(a)(2) do es no t suppo rt the Deb to rs’ argum ent. The O rder neither extended no r reduc ed the exc lusivity perio d; it sim ply left the exc lusivity perio d unaltered. The Deb t o rs argue that we sho uld no t read the statute o r the O rder literally. They c o ntend that the O rder denying the Mo tio n to Extend was “a de fac t o reduc tio n o f the exc lusivity perio d, in that the Deb t o rs were prevented fro mfiling either a c hapter 11 plan o f reo r ganizatio n o r a m o tio n to extend the exc lusivity perio d o n the 120th day o f exc lusivity.” This argum ent is unpersuasive. W e m ust read jurisdictio nal statutes narro wly and c anno t expand themb eyo nd what C o ngress intended. S ee Kuca na v. H o l der , 558 U .S. 233, 252 (2010) (“A statute affec t ing federal jurisdic tio n

7‘must b e c o nstrued b o th with prec isio n and with fidelity to the term s b y

which C o ngress has expressed its wishes.’” (citatio n o m itted)); P a trick so n v. D o l e Fo o dCo . , 251 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2001), a ff’d in pa r t, cert. dism issed in pa rt, 538 U .S. 468 (2003) (“[F]ederal c o u rts must b e hesitant ‘to expand the jurisdic tio n o f the federal c o urts thro ugh a b ro a d reading o f jurisdic tio nal statutes.’” (citatio n o m itted)). This Panel has no t ed (in dic ta) that “[e]xc lusivity adjustm ents are unique am o ng b ankruptc y appeals b ec ause they c o m p rise the so le c atego ry
o f interlo c uto ry o rders that m ay b e appealed as o f right. A ll o ther interlo cuto ry o rders ( inc ludingrefus als to adjus t exc lus iv ity ) require leave o f c o urt to have interlo c uto ry appellate review.” O fficia l Co m m ittee o

f Unsecured Credito rs v. H enry Mayo N

ewha ll Mem ’l H

o sp. (In re H

enry Mayo N ewha ll Mem ’l H

o sp.) , 282 B.R . 444, 448 (9th C ir. BA P 2002) (c itatio ns
o m itted) (em phasis added). Adistric t c o urt has soheld. In Ahern R enta ls, Inc. v. Go ldm a n S a chs Pa l m etto S ta te C redit F und, L.P. (In re Ahern R enta ls, Inc.) , N o . 3:12-C V-0676-LRH-VPC, 2013 WL 150489, at *2 (D. N ev. Jan. 14, 2013), the distric t c o urt held that 28 U .S.C . § 158(a)(2) did no t c o nfer appellate jurisdic tio n where the b ankruptc y c o urt o nly dec lined to extend the exc lusivity perio d : the b ankruptc y c o urt’s denial o f the m o t io n is no tan o rder “reduc ing” the exc lusivity tim e perio ds under Sec tio n 158(a)(2) b ec ause the o rder did no t reduc e the statuto rily identified 120- day o r 180-day tim e perio ds. Instead, the b ankruptc y c o urt’s

8o rder sim ply o perated as a refusal toextend the exc lusivity

perio ds. In the N inth C irc uit, refusals toadjust the exc lusivity perio ds c o nstitute interlo c uto ry o rders under Sec tio n 158(a)(3), which require leave o f c o urt prio rto filing the appeal. In re Ahern R enta ls, Inc. , 2013 WL 150489, at *2. The O r der denying the Mo tio n to Extend did no t inc rease o r reduc e the 120-day exc lusivity perio d. It m erely dec lined to extend the perio d. The b ankruptc y c o urt’s O rder was thus interlo cu to ry and no t appealab le. W e have disc r etio nary po wer to c o nsider appeals fro m interlo c uto ry
o rders. S ee28 U

. S.C . § 158(a)(3); Berta in v. M itchell (In re Berta in) , 215 B.R

. 438, 441 (9th C ir. BA P 1997) (“[W ]e m ay, at o ur disc retio n, grant leave to appeal an interlo c uto ry o rder.”). The Ahern R enta ls c o urt instruc ts that, “[w]hen an appeal is im pro per b ec ause a party failed tofile the requisite
m o tio n fo r leave to appeal, a distric t c o urt is lim ited to three o ptio ns: (1) grant leave to appeal; (2) direc t that a m o tio n fo r leave to appeal b e filed; o r (3) deny leave to appeal, b ut in do ing so the distric t c o urt must
c o nsider the no tic e o f appeal as a m o t io n fo r leave to appeal.” 2013 WL 150489 at *2. W e cho o s e the third o ptio n: we will treat the no tic e o f appeal as a
m o tio n fo r leave to appeal. 28 U .S.C

. § 1292(b ) pro vides that leave is appro priate o nly where the underlying o rder “invo lves a c o ntro lling questio n o f law as to which there is sub stantial gro und fo r differenc e o f
o pinio n and that an im m ediate appeal fro mthe o rder m a y m aterially
9advanc e the ultim ate term inatio n o f the litigatio n.” But even tho ugh we

have disc retio nary po wer to hear interlo c uto ry appeals, we have no po wer to c o nsider m o o t appeals. A s the fo llo wing sec tio n explains, this appeal is
m o o t. W e thus deny leave to appeal. B. T his appeal ism oot. If we c a nno t grant effec tive relief to the Deb to rs, we must dism iss the appeal as m o o t . “W e c anno t exerc ise jurisdic tio n o ver a m o o t appeal.” Ellis v. Yu (In re Ellis) , 523 B.R . 673, 677 (9th C ir. BA P 2014) (c iting United S ta tes v. Pa ttullo (In re Pa ttullo ) , 271 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001); G TE Ca l., Inc. v. F C C , 39 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1994)). “Ac ase is m o o tif it has lo st its
charac t er as a present live c o ntro versy. If events sub sequent to the filing o f an appeal m o o tthe issues presented in a c ase, no justic iab le c o ntro versy is presented. This c o urt has no jurisdic tio n to hear a c ase that c anno t affec t the litigant’s rights.” Alla rd v. D eLo rea n , 884 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1989) (c itatio ns o m itted); see Pila te v. Burrell (In re Burrell), 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th C ir. 2005) (“Ac ase is m o o t if the issues presented are nolo nger live and there fails to b e a ‘c ase o rc o ntro versy’ under A rtic le III o f the C o nstitutio n.”). Determ ining c o nstitutio nal m o o tness turns o n whether “the appellate c o urt c an give the appellant any effec tive relief in the event that it dec ides the m atter o n the m erits in [its] favo r.” In re Burrell, 415 F.3d at 998.

10Even tho ugh O pus Bank has no t partic ipated in this appeal, 4 we

address the issue o f m o o tness sua sponte, “b ec a use, if ‘events change such that the appellate c o u r t c an no lo nger grant “any effec tual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” any resulting o pinio n wo uld b e m erely adviso ry,’ and the c o urt wo uld lac k subjec t m atter jurisdic tio n.” United S ta tes v. S print Co m m c’ns, Inc. , 855 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2017) (quo ting S hell O ffsho re Inc. v. Greenpea ce, Inc. , 815 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2016)); see In re Ellis , 523 B.R . at 677 (“If an issue b ec o m es m o o t while the appeal is pending, an appellate
c o u rt m ust dism iss the appeal.”).

4 On May 25, 2018, counsel for Opus Bank infor med the BAP that i t would not fi le an answer ing br i ef but r equested leav e to appear at or al ar gument. The BAP moti ons panel r esponded in no uncer tai n ter m s that Opus Bank would not be allowed to appear at ar gument i f i t di d not fi le an answer ing br i ef. It per mi tted Opus Bank to fi le an answer ing br i ef by July 30. On August 3, counsel forOpus Bank infor med the BAP that i t would not submi t an answer ing br i ef. Nev er theless, two days befor e or al ar gument in thi s matter, counsel forOpus Bank submi tted a letter , ar guing that thi s case was moot for the same r easons we di scuss inthe text. He also fi led a noti ce of appear ance and offer ed to appear at or al ar gument and answerthe Panel’s questi ons, despi te the moti ons panel’s ear li er admoni ti on that Opus Bank could not appear unless i t fi led a br i ef. Counsel’s letter was unauthor i zed and i mpr oper . He knew all of the per ti nent facts well befor e the July 30 deadline to fi le an answer ing br i ef: (1) the fact that no one pr oposed a plan wi thin the extended exclusi v i ty per i od that the Debtor s r equested, and (2) the conv er si on of the Hoag Debtor s’ cases to chapter7. He consci ously chose to r emain si l ent on these per tin ent (and di sposi ti ve) i s sues and for ced us to r esear ch the legal i ssues and scour the bankr u ptcy cour t’s dockets i ndependently. Because Opus Bank’s counsel deci ded that i t was not wor th hi s ti me to appr i se us of the facts and ar guments in the nor mal cour se, counsel’s letterwas useless to us and we di d not allow counsel to ar gue at or al ar gument. 11This appeal is m o o t as toall o f the Deb to rs.

1. No one c a n file a plan in the Hoag D ebtors ’ c as es bec aus e they are no long er c hapter 11 debtors . O n June 29, 2018, the b ankruptc y c o u rt granted the Ho ag Deb to rs’ request to c o nvert their c hapter 11 c a se to o ne under chapter 7. A c c o rdingly, an extensio n o f the exc lusivity perio d wo uld b e m eaningless, b ec ause no o ne c an file a chapter 11 plan in a chapter 7 c ase. Their appeal is
m o o t. 2. T here isno liv e c ontrov ers y c onc erning the Chapter 11 D ebtors ’ exc lus iv e rig ht to propos e a plan. The rem aining C hapter 11 Deb to rs’ appeal is alsom o o t . The C hapter 11 Deb to rs so ught an extensio n o f the exc lusivity perio d to March 31, 2018. The o nly effec t o f the denial o f the Mo tio n to Extend was toperm it o ther parties in interest to file their o wn plans b efo re that date. But that date passed m o nths ago, and no o ne o ther than the Deb to rs has ever pro po sed a plan. Even if the b ankruptc y c o urt sho uld have extended the exc lusivity perio d to March 31, 2018, it would m ake no differenc e. “A n unqualified expiratio n o f exc lusivity prob ab ly wo uld b e an event that renders it im po ssib le to fashio n effec tive relief.” In re H enry Mayo N

ewha ll Mem ’l H o s p. , 282 B.R . at 450; s ee i d. at 449 (“Exc lusivity o rders are inherently transito ry and are easily m o o ted either b y the passage o f tim e o r b y the
o c currenc e o f further events that m a ke it im po ssib le to fashio n effec tive

12appellate relief.”).

A t o ral argum ent, c o unsel fo r the Deb to rs argued that the appeal is
no t m o o t b ec a use, if we reverse the O rder, the C hapter 11 Deb to rs c o uld seek a further extensio n o f the exc lusivity perio d and prevent c redito rs fro mfiling plans in the future. W e dec line the invitatio n to speculate that (1) upo n rem a nd, the C hapter 11 Deb to rs c o u ld file a m o tio n to extend the
exc lusivity perio d even tho ugh the tim e extensio n that they requested has lo ng sinc e expired, and (2) the b a nkruptc y c o u rt wo uld grant that m o tio n. W e will no t issue an adviso ry o pinio n o n the o ff c hanc e that so m eo ne
m ight file a c o m peting plan in the undefined future. A c c o rdingly, there is no “justic iab le c o ntro versy,” and the o utc o m e o f this appeal wo u ld no t “affec t the litigant[s’] rights.” CONCL U SION Therefo re, we DISMISS this appeal.

13