# Official Journal C 242/2017

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 242 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6027 July 2017 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 242

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6027 July 2017

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| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Information |
| | INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2017/C 242/01 | Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2017/C 242/02 | Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca SpA | 2 |
| 2017/C 242/03 | Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA | 3 |

Notice No

Contents

page

II   Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2017/C 242/01

Non-opposition to a notified concentration (Case M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo) (
  1
  )

1

1

2017/C 242/02

Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca SpA

2

2017/C 242/03

Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA

3

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| | IV   Notices |
| --- | --- |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2017/C 242/04 | Euro exchange rates | 4 |
| 2017/C 242/05 | Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  ) | 5 |
| | NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA |
| | EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| 2017/C 242/06 | Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice on potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts | 6 |

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2017/C 242/04

Euro exchange rates

4

2017/C 242/05

Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) (Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)
   (
  1
  )

(Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006)

1

5

NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

2017/C 242/06

Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice on potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

6

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| | V   Announcements |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES |
| | European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) |
| 2017/C 242/07 | Notice of open competitions | 17 |
| | PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY |
| | European Commission |
| 2017/C 242/08 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  ) | 18 |
| 2017/C 242/09 | Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  ) | 19 |
| | OTHER ACTS |
| | European Commission |
| 2017/C 242/10 | Information Notice — Public Consultation — Geographical indications from Japan | 20 |
| 2017/C 242/11 | Notice for the attention of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa whose names were added to the list referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, by virtue of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 | 22 |

V   Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)

2017/C 242/07

Notice of open competitions

17

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

2017/C 242/08

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett) — Candidate case for simplified procedure (
  1
  )

1

18

2017/C 242/09

Prior notification of a concentration (Case M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon) (
  1
  )

1

19

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

2017/C 242/10

Information Notice — Public Consultation — Geographical indications from Japan

20

2017/C 242/11

Notice for the attention of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa whose names were added to the list referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, by virtue of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390

22

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text with EEA relevance. |

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(1)   Text with EEA relevance.

1

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN

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II Information

INFORMATION FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/1

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Non-opposition to a notified concentration

(Case M.8500 — Central/SIGNA Prime/JVCo)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2017/C 242/01)

On 14 July 2017, the Commission decided not to oppose the above notified concentration and to declare it compatible with the internal market. This decision is based on Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1). The full text of the decision is available only in English and will be made public after it is cleared of any business secrets it may contain. It will be available:

| — | in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes, |
| --- | --- |

—

in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

| — | in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8500. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law. |
| --- | --- |

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8500. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

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(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/2

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Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Veneto Banca SpA

(2017/C 242/02)

On 23 June 2017, the Single Resolution Board decided not to place Veneto Banca SpA under resolution. This decision was based on the conclusion that the condition of Article 18(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (1) was not met. The main elements of this decision are as follows:

| Date of adoption of the decision: | 23 June 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Decision No: | SRB/EES/2017/11 |
| Addressee: | Banca d'Italia |
| Institution: | Veneto Banca SpA |
| Application of the write-down and conversion of capital instruments power: | No |
| Resolution action: | No |
| Fund aid: | No |

Date of adoption of the decision:

23 June 2017

Decision No:

SRB/EES/2017/11

Addressee:

Banca d'Italia

Institution:

Veneto Banca SpA

Application of the write-down and conversion of capital instruments power:

No

Resolution action:

No

Fund aid:

No

More information about this decision can be found on the SRB's official website: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

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(1)  OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/3

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Decision concerning the assessment of the conditions for resolution in respect of Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA

(2017/C 242/03)

On 23 June 2017, the Single Resolution Board decided not to place Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA under resolution. This decision was based on the conclusion that the condition of Article 18(1)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (1) was not met. The main elements of this decision are as follows:

| Date of adoption of the decision: | 23 June 2017 |
| --- | --- |
| Decision No: | SRB/EES/2017/12 |
| Addressee: | Banca d’Italia |
| Institution: | Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA. |
| Application of the write-down and conversion of capital instruments power: | No |
| Resolution action: | No |
| Fund aid: | No |

Date of adoption of the decision:

23 June 2017

Decision No:

SRB/EES/2017/12

Addressee:

Banca d’Italia

Institution:

Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA.

Application of the write-down and conversion of capital instruments power:

No

Resolution action:

No

Fund aid:

No

More information about this decision can be found on the SRB’s official website: https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banca-popolare-di-vicenza-veneto-banca

---

(1)  OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1.

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IV Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/4

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Euro exchange rates (1)

26 July 2017

(2017/C 242/04)

1 euro =

| | Currency | Exchange rate |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US dollar | 1,1644 |
| JPY | Japanese yen | 130,26 |
| DKK | Danish krone | 7,4368 |
| GBP | Pound sterling | 0,89275 |
| SEK | Swedish krona | 9,5705 |
| CHF | Swiss franc | 1,1152 |
| ISK | Iceland króna | |
| NOK | Norwegian krone | 9,2893 |
| BGN | Bulgarian lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Czech koruna | 26,047 |
| HUF | Hungarian forint | 305,57 |
| PLN | Polish zloty | 4,2613 |
| RON | Romanian leu | 4,5632 |
| TRY | Turkish lira | 4,1406 |
| AUD | Australian dollar | 1,4717 |
| CAD | Canadian dollar | 1,4576 |
| HKD | Hong Kong dollar | 9,0959 |
| NZD | New Zealand dollar | 1,5678 |
| SGD | Singapore dollar | 1,5850 |
| KRW | South Korean won | 1 303,91 |
| ZAR | South African rand | 15,1998 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,8646 |
| HRK | Croatian kuna | 7,4128 |
| IDR | Indonesian rupiah | 15 507,48 |
| MYR | Malaysian ringgit | 4,9889 |
| PHP | Philippine peso | 58,948 |
| RUB | Russian rouble | 69,7050 |
| THB | Thai baht | 38,996 |
| BRL | Brazilian real | 3,6806 |
| MXN | Mexican peso | 20,6644 |
| INR | Indian rupee | 74,9375 |

Currency

Exchange rate

USD

US dollar

1,1644

JPY

Japanese yen

130,26

DKK

Danish krone

7,4368

GBP

Pound sterling

0,89275

SEK

Swedish krona

9,5705

CHF

Swiss franc

1,1152

ISK

Iceland króna

NOK

Norwegian krone

9,2893

BGN

Bulgarian lev

1,9558

CZK

Czech koruna

26,047

HUF

Hungarian forint

305,57

PLN

Polish zloty

4,2613

RON

Romanian leu

4,5632

TRY

Turkish lira

4,1406

AUD

Australian dollar

1,4717

CAD

Canadian dollar

1,4576

HKD

Hong Kong dollar

9,0959

NZD

New Zealand dollar

1,5678

SGD

Singapore dollar

1,5850

KRW

South Korean won

1 303,91

ZAR

South African rand

15,1998

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,8646

HRK

Croatian kuna

7,4128

IDR

Indonesian rupiah

15 507,48

MYR

Malaysian ringgit

4,9889

PHP

Philippine peso

58,948

RUB

Russian rouble

69,7050

THB

Thai baht

38,996

BRL

Brazilian real

3,6806

MXN

Mexican peso

20,6644

INR

Indian rupee

74,9375

---

(1)  Source: reference exchange rate published by the ECB.

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| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/5

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Summary of European Commission Decisions on authorisations for the placing on the market for the use and/or for use of substances listed in Annex XIV to Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH)

(Published pursuant to Article 64(9) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006
   (1)
  )

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2017/C 242/05)

Decisions granting an authorisation

| Reference of the decision (2) | Date of decision | Substance name | Holder of the authorisation | Authorisation number | Authorised use | Date of expiry of review period | Reasons for the decision |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C(2017) 5025 | 20 July 2017 | Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether
  EC No 203-924-4
  CAS No 111-96-6 | Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Ireland | REACH/17/8/0 | Use of diglyme as solvent in the manufacturing process of an intermediate for further conversion into a pharmaceutical compound used in medicinal products for treatment of respiratory diseases | 22 August 2024 | — | In accordance with Article 60(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, the risks to human health arising from the use of the substance are adequately controlled. |

Reference of the decision (2)

Date of decision

Substance name

Holder of the authorisation

Authorisation number

Authorised use

Date of expiry of review period

Reasons for the decision

C(2017) 5025

20 July 2017

Bis(2-methoxyethyl)ether

EC No 203-924-4

CAS No 111-96-6

Novartis Ringaskiddy Limited, Ringaskiddy, County Cork, Ireland

REACH/17/8/0

Use of diglyme as solvent in the manufacturing process of an intermediate for further conversion into a pharmaceutical compound used in medicinal products for treatment of respiratory diseases

22 August 2024

—

In accordance with Article 60(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006, the risks to human health arising from the use of the substance are adequately controlled.

| — | There are no suitable alternatives at present and search for them is ongoing under a 7-year replacement programme. |
| --- | --- |

—

There are no suitable alternatives at present and search for them is ongoing under a 7-year replacement programme.

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(1)  OJ L 396, 30.12.2006, p. 1.

(2)  The decision is available on the European Commission website at: http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/chemicals/reach/about/index_en.htm

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NOTICES CONCERNING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA

EFTA Surveillance Authority

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/6

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Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice on potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(2017/C 242/06)

By means of Decision No 085/17/COL of 3 May 2017, reproduced in the authentic language on the pages following this summary, the EFTA Surveillance Authority initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 1(2) in Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. The Icelandic authorities have been informed by means of a copy of the decision.

By means of this notice the EFTA Surveillance Authority gives the EFTA States, EU Member States and interested parties notice to submit their comments on the measure in question within one month of the date of publication to:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| 35, Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

35, Rue Belliard/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

The comments will be communicated to the Icelandic authorities. The identity of the interested party submitting the comments may be withheld following a request in writing stating the reasons for the request.

Summary

Procedure

In an email dated 24 March 2015, the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (1).

Following requests, the Authority received information on the measure concerned from the Icelandic authorities by letters of 11 February 2016 and 22 March 2016. Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications. By an email dated 31 October 2016, the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

Facts

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury. Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe.

The Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank of Iceland. The Central Bank of Iceland is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state.

Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk.

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on certain derivatives contracts at least since 2013. The decision concerns GDM’s guarantees on the following derivatives contracts: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps.

Under point 3.2 of the state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (2), the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

| (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

Secondly, the guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

Thirdly, under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps, FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. As regards the GDM guarantees on interest rate swaps, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays an appropriate guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun. However, the Authority has not received sufficient information on what methodology and was used to conclude the premium level and accordingly whether this premium level can be considered as market price.

Assessment

The Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision may constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. In addition, the measure appear to be selective in nature and liable to distort competition and affect intra-EEA trade. Accordingly, the Authority cannot exclude that the measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. The Icelandic authorities have not at this stage put forward any arguments demonstrating that the potential state aid involved could be considered compatible on the basis of Article 59(2) or 61(3) of the EEA.

Conclusion

In light of the above considerations, the Authority has decided to open the formal investigation procedure in accordance with Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice. Interested parties are invited to submit their comments within one month from publication of this notice in the Official Journal of the European Union.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 085/17/COL

of 3 May 2017

to initiate the formal investigation procedure into potential state aid granted to Landsvirkjun through state guarantees on derivatives contracts

(Iceland)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

Having regard to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61 and Protocol 26,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to 4(4), 6 and 13(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In an email dated 24 March 2015 (3), the Icelandic authorities asked the Authority to clarify whether Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations from derivatives contracts could be guaranteed under Iceland’s existing state guarantee scheme. That scheme was the subject matter of the Authority’s decision No 159/13/COL (4).

| (2) | Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Following the Authority’s letter of 13 April 2015 (5) and email of 20 April 2015 (6) asking for additional information, the Icelandic authorities responded in a letter dated 11 February 2016 (7).

| (3) | In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9). |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In a letter dated 24 February 2016 (8), the Authority requested additional information from the Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic authorities replied to the information request in a letter dated 22 March 2016 (9).

| (4) | Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Moreover, the matter was discussed during a meeting between the Icelandic authorities and the Authority in Reykjavík on 31 May 2016. Following the meeting, the Authority sent a letter to the Icelandic authorities, recording the content of the meeting and requesting additional clarifications (10). By an email dated 31 October 2016 (11), the Icelandic authorities responded to the Authority’s letter and submitted some additional documents.

2.   Description of the measure

2.1.   
  The beneficiary: Landsvirkjun

| (5) | Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Landsvirkjun is a public partnership company regulated by Act No 42/1983 on Landsvirkjun, as amended. As of 1 January 2007, the State Treasury took over the full ownership in Landsvirkjun. The company remained a partnership company with joint liability of the owners. Landsvirkjun is jointly owned by the State Treasury (99,9 %) and Eignarhlutir ehf. (0,1 %). The latter is a limited liability company wholly owned by the State Treasury (12).

| (6) | After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

After the introduction of competitive power markets in Iceland in 2003, Landsvirkjun has focused on marketing and operations rather than construction of new power plants (13). Landsvirkjun is currently the largest electricity generator in Iceland, holding over 75 % market share in domestic electricity generation, and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe. The company produces electricity from hydro (96 %) and geothermal (4 %) sources, and operates 18 power stations (14).

2.2.   
  The aid granting authority

| (7) | In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

In Iceland, the Ministry of Finance (‘Ministry’) is responsible for the central government’s debt management, sets the strategy and makes decisions regarding debt issues. This is done in cooperation with the Central Bank of Iceland (‘Central Bank’) (15).

| (8) | The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The Central Bank is an independent public institution, owned by the Icelandic state. The principal objective of the Central Bank is to promote price and financial stability. The Central Bank was established by an act of Parliament in 1961, although the history of central banking in Iceland is much longer. The current Central Bank Act is No 36/2001, as amended (16).

| (9) | According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

According to the information available on the Central Bank’s web page the Central Bank is ultimately under the administration of the Prime Minister and a Supervisory Board. The Parliament elects all of the seven members to the Supervisory Board after each parliamentary election. The Prime Minister appoints the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank for a five-year term. Decisions on applying the Central Bank’s monetary policy control mechanisms are taken by the Monetary Policy Committee. In other respects, the Bank’s direction is in the hands of the Governor (17).

| (10) | In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

In the letter dated 11 February 2016 (18), the Icelandic authorities explained that the Government Debt Management (‘GDM’) is a unit within the Central Bank under Treasury and Market Operations which operates in accordance with an agreement made with the Ministry. According to that agreement, the Ministry entrusts the GDM with tasks related to Government guarantees and relending.

2.3.   
  Derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun

| (11) | According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the email from the GDM of 24 March 2015 (19), Landsvirkjun has for some time hedged its risks from exposure to shifts in aluminium prices through derivatives.

| (12) | According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

According to the Icelandic authorities (20), Landsvirkjun’s three largest customers operate in the aluminium industry and total sales to these customers constitute around 70 % of Landsvirkjun’s annual sales of electricity. Landsvirkjun’s exposure to risk due to possible aluminium price fluctuations is substantial as around 30 % of Landsvirkjun income is linked to the price of aluminium.

| (13) | The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

The functional currency of Landsvirkjun is the US dollar (USD). Landsvirkjun is exposed to foreign currency exchange (‘FX’) risk as well as interest rate risk on its debt portfolio. Landsvirkjun uses various forms of derivatives contracts to control and manage its market risk (21).

| (14) | The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The Authority is currently, in connection with the GDM guarantees, looking into the following types of derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun: FX swaps, FX options and interest rate swaps. The Icelandic authorities have not presented to the Authority the different derivatives contracts entered into by Landsvirkjun. The below description of these derivatives contracts is based on the explanations of the Icelandic authorities (22).

2.3.1.   FX swaps

| (15) | An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

An FX swap is a contract for a currency exchange between two parties. FX swap contracts swap one loan (principal and interest payments) in one currency, e.g., a loan in EUR, into a ‘new’ loan in another currency, e.g. USD. Thereby, the contract creates an asset that exactly mirrors the EUR debt thereby transferring currency risk of the loan from EUR over to USD. The principal amount is traded on FX markets. The interest rate part of the contract is often decided by the financial corporation offering to do the deal (counterparty) depending on market condition at any given time.

2.3.2.   FX options

| (16) | An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

An FX option is a financial instrument that gives the right, but not the obligation, to exchange money into another currency at a pre-agreed exchange rate on a specified date. FX options trading is mostly done over the counter. Future payments that are hedged using this kind of contracts involve payments on loans already taken.

| (17) | The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Authority notes that there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun is a buyer or also a seller of FX options.

2.3.3.   Interest rate swaps

| (18) | An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

An interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement between two parties where one stream of future interest payments (e.g. interest payments based on fixed interest) is exchanged for another (e.g. interest payments based on floating interest) based on a specified notional principal amount.

| (19) | The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The notional principal is not exchanged between parties and the currency is the same for both interest payments. IRS contracts are used to limit or manage exposure to fluctuations in interest rates. Landsvirkjun uses these derivatives for loans that have already been entered into, e.g. to swap USD floating interests to USD fixed interest without swapping the principal.

2.4.   
  GDM guarantees on Landsvirkjun’s derivatives contracts

| (20) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23). |
| --- | --- |

(20)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of facts, at least since 2013 GDM has granted guarantees to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above. During the meeting with the Authority on 31 May 2016, GDM explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative agreements without the underlying state guarantee (23).

| (21) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25). |
| --- | --- |

(21)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the loans underlying the FX swaps and option (24). However, there is no information on whether Landsvirkjun pays any premium at all for the guarantees on the derivatives contracts. The Authority notes that paying a premium for a guarantee on a loan underlying a derivative transaction is not equal to paying a premium for a guarantee on the derivative transaction itself (25).

| (22) | As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26). |
| --- | --- |

(22)

As regards the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities have explained that IRS contracts have a net position, i.e. there is either a gain or a loss for Landsvirkjun from these contracts. Contracts that show loss for Landsvirkjun are on the liability side of the balance sheet and therefore enjoy a state guarantee. According to the Icelandic authorities, the same guarantee premium should be paid for these net liability positions as is paid for the guarantee on loans (26).

| (23) | According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29). |
| --- | --- |

(23)

According to the Icelandic authorities, Landsvirkjun already pays a guarantee premium for loans the interests of which are swapped. The Icelandic authorities also submit that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (27). In connection with the latter premium the Icelandic authorities also explained the following: ‘The guarantee fee is based on a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa ehf. “Premium for guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun”. In discussing the conclusion of the report Summa
   (28)
  concludes “In the referenced reports the premiums, 48 bp, is estimated by assessing the advantage that LV enjoys in the credit market due to a guarantee from the state or the municipality. Consequently, an appropriate premium should eliminate the advantage the company enjoys in the credit markets due to the guarantee, i.e. a competitor that does not receive a guarantee should not be at a competitive disadvantage.” The guarantee premium of each individual derivative contract is in line with the fee paid on the corresponding loan that the derivative is based on. Therefore, the premium can change if derivative contracts are based on new guaranteed loan contracts that have a lower or higher guarantee fee than previous ones’ (29).

| (24) | The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

The Authority notes that several aspects necessary for the state aid assessment of the GDM guarantees to Landsvirkjun on derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above remain unclear. In particular, insufficient information has been provided to assess whether the guarantees are limited, how GDM’s exposure to potential liabilities could be quantified and how the value of the guarantees (30) and the guarantee premium for IRS related guarantees is calculated.

2.5.   
  The previously closed procedure on existing aid measures as regards state aid granted through unlimited state guarantees

| (25) | By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

By a letter dated 26 September 2006 (Document No 280834), the Authority initiated the procedure on existing aid measures provided for in Article 17(2) of Part II of Protocol 3 with respect to certain measures in favour of electricity utilities in Iceland, including unlimited state guarantees to Landsvirkjun. In that letter, the Authority informed the Icelandic authorities of its preliminary view that these measures involved existing state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (26) | After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

After several exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority concluded in its Decision of 8 July 2009 No 302/09/COL (Document No 465443) (31) that the unlimited state guarantees constituted existing state aid. The Authority found that this state aid was not in line with the Authority’s Guidelines on the application and interpretation of Articles 61 and 62 of the EEA Agreement, in particular with the then applicable Chapter on state guarantees (32). Therefore, these guarantees were incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (27) | More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

More precisely, according to the Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, the public owners of Landsvirkjun were liable for all of its obligations. The main guarantor, the State Treasury, was not subject to bankruptcy rules. Therefore, Landsvirkjun would never be excluded from the market by means of an insolvency procedure, since the State guarantees all of its liabilities and accordingly assures the continuation of the company in the market.

| (28) | The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL provided that the Icelandic authorities should take appropriate measures to abolish the unlimited state guarantees. The Authority proposed that the guarantees be abolished with effect from 1 January 2010.

| (29) | After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

After subsequent exchanges with the Icelandic authorities, the Authority recorded Iceland’s acceptance of the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL with regard to the existing state aid scheme to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur (33).

| (30) | The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:






  — | Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(30)

The amended legislative framework for state guarantees included, inter alia, the following conditions for ruling out the presence of state aid:

—

Landsvirkjun must pay a state guarantee premium which covers the benefits it enjoys due to the state guarantee. The premium is determined annually by an independent party and the adequacy of the premiums will be reviewed at least once a year;

| — | Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation. |
| --- | --- |

—

Landsvirkjun cannot obtain a guarantee which covers more than 80 % of either an outstanding loan or financial obligation.

| (31) | Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Furthermore, in line with Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees and point 3.4 of the currently applicable state aid guidelines on state guarantees (‘Guarantee Guidelines’) (34), it has to be possible to measure the extent of the guarantees when they are granted. The guarantees must be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (32) | The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/l09/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Authority notes that the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, derivatives do not constitute debt securities according to the definition in Directive 2004/l09/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market (35). This form of financial transaction would therefore not be exempted from the 80 % guarantee limitation.

| (33) | However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

However, the guarantees issued by GDM to Landsvirkjun on the derivatives contracts referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 above do not appear to comply neither with the conditions of the amended legislative framework for state guarantees nor with the Guarantee Guidelines. In particular, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay a premium covering the benefits it enjoys due to the guarantees; the guarantees appear to cover more than 80 % of any outstanding obligations; and the guarantees do not appear to be linked to specific financial transactions, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time.

| (34) | For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

For these reasons, the Authority is currently of the opinion that the guarantees in question are not covered by Iceland’s legislative framework for state guarantees as amended to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (35) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (36) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: the measure (i) is granted by the state or through state resources; (ii) is selective; (iii) confers an economic advantage on the beneficiary; and (iv) is liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.1.1.   State resources

| (37) | State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36). |
| --- | --- |

(37)

State resources within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are not limited to direct grants via the budget of the state. Guarantees given by the State may also constitute state aid (36).

| (38) | Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37). |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Where the state forgoes all or part of a guarantee premium, there is both a benefit for the undertaking and a drain on the resources of the state. Thus, even if it turns out that no payments are ever made by the state under a guarantee, there may nevertheless be state aid under Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (37).

| (39) | The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

The guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun by GDM. GDM is a part of the Central Bank and the latter is a part of the Icelandic public administration. Thus, the granting of guarantees by GDM is imputable to the state (38).

1.1.2.   Selectivity

| (40) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement requires that a measure, in order to be defined as state aid, favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The Authority has previously found that even if an aid measure concerns a whole economic sector, it does not prevent it from being covered by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement (39). The Authority maintained that position in its recently adopted Guidelines on the notion of state aid (‘NoA Guidelines’) (40).

| (41) | According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

According to the Authority’s current understanding of the facts, the guarantees in question are granted to Landsvirkjun only. Thus, the measure is selective within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

1.1.3.   Economic advantage

| (42) | An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41). |
| --- | --- |

(42)

An advantage, within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, is any economic benefit which an undertaking could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the absence of State intervention (41).

| (43) | The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42). |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The benefit of a state guarantee is that the risk associated with the guarantee is carried by the state. Such risk-carrying by the state should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium (42).

| (44) | The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The aid is granted at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee. Whether or not a guarantee constitutes state aid, and, if so, what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given (43).

| (45) | Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:






  (a) | The borrower is not in financial difficulty; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Under point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines, the fulfilment of the following cumulative conditions is sufficient to rule out the presence of state aid elements in an individual guarantee:

(a)

The borrower is not in financial difficulty;

| (b) | The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

The extent of the guarantee can be properly measured when it is granted;

| (c) | The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and |
| --- | --- |

(c)

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation; and

| (d) | A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

A market-oriented price is paid for the guarantee.

| (46) | The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

The Authority is of the preliminary view that the guarantees granted by GDM to Landsvirkjun on derivatives transactions referred to in sections 2.3.1-2.3.3 of part I above do not fulfil the conditions (b), (c) and (d). Accordingly, at this stage the presence of state aid elements cannot be ruled out on the basis of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines.

Proper measurement of the extent of the guarantee

| (47) | This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

This condition means that the guarantee must be linked to a specific financial transaction, for a fixed maximum amount and limited in time (44).

| (48) | The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

The Icelandic authorities have so far not been able to explain whether the guarantees are linked to specific obligations, what the maximum amount of the guarantees is, and whether the guarantees are limited in time. Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (b) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

The guarantee does not cover more than 80 % of the outstanding loan or other financial obligation
   (45)

| (49) | The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The guarantees appear to cover all of the financial obligations that Lansdsvirkjun has under the respective derivatives contracts. The Icelandic authorities have so far not provided any information that would allow to assess further whether the guarantee is limited to 80 % of the outstanding financial obligations. Also, there is no information allowing to quantify Landsvirkjun’s financial obligations under the derivatives contracts that are guaranteed by GDM.

| (50) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that condition (c) of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines is not met.

A market-oriented price for the guarantee

| (51) | Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46). |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Under the Guarantee Guidelines, risk-carrying should normally be remunerated by an appropriate premium on the guaranteed or counter-guaranteed amount. When the price paid for the guarantee is at least as high as the corresponding guarantee premium benchmark that can be found on the financial markets, the guarantee does not contain aid. If no corresponding guarantee premium benchmark can be found on the financial markets, the total financial cost of the guaranteed loan, including the interest rate of the loan and the guarantee premium, must be compared to the market price of a similar non-guaranteed loan (46).

| (52) | As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48). |
| --- | --- |

(52)

As regards the guarantees related to the IRSs, the Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a 0,48 % p.a. guarantee premium on net liabilities of derivatives contracts that show a net loss for Landsvirkjun (47). The Icelandic authorities also refer to a report made for the Icelandic State Guarantee Fund by Summa that should allegedly rule out any advantage Landsvirkjun enjoys in the credit market due to guarantees from the State or from a municipality (48).

| (53) | However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

However, it is not clear to the Authority why the guarantee premium level described above should be considered as market-oriented.

| (54) | Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Firstly, the Icelandic authorities have not submitted the Summa report to the Authority. It is therefore not clear what methodology and arguments were used in concluding that the premium level of 0,48 % p.a. corresponds to the market price for guaranteeing Landsvirkjun’s derivatives exposure.

| (55) | Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Secondly, from the brief explanations of the Icelandic authorities provided so far, it appears that this premium level covers all types of guarantees granted to Landsvirkjun (by the State or by a municipality) (49). The Authority has doubts whether a premium level that could be seen as appropriate for certain guarantees would necessarily also be market level on other occasions. The Authority further doubts whether the premium of 0,48 % p.a. is appropriate for the IRSs, as the guarantee seems to cover all of Landsvirkjun’s financial liabilities under the IRS contracts and the risks to GDM are therefore potentially unlimited. In any event, the information submitted by the Icelandic authorities so far does not contain any meaningful explanations on why that premium level corresponds to market price, taking into account the characteristics of the guarantee, the underlying IRS contracts and the beneficiary.

| (56) | As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

As regards the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options, Landsvirkjun does not appear to pay any premium at all. The Icelandic authorities claim that Landsvirkjun pays a premium for the state guarantee on the original loans underlying the FX swaps and options (50). However, paying a premium for a guarantee on the transaction underlying the derivative contract does not equal to paying a premium for the guarantee covering the derivative contract itself. The Authority therefore doubts that the GDM guarantees on FX swaps and FX options are remunerated at market level.

| (57) | In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In addition, the Icelandic authorities have explained that Landsvirkjun would not be able to enter into the hedging derivative contracts without the state guarantees (51). However, the Icelandic authorities have not explained what would be the market price for such guarantees.

| (58) | Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Therefore, the Authority is currently of the view that the guarantees addressed in this decision do not meet the terms of point 3.2 of the Guarantee Guidelines and constitute an advantage within the meaning of the state aid rules.

1.1.4.   Distortion of competition and effect on trade

| (59) | The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The aid measure must be liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties to the EEA Agreement.

| (60) | According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53). |
| --- | --- |

(60)

According to the case law of the Court of Justice and the EFTA Court, whenever state aid strengthens the position of an undertaking compared with other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, the latter must be regarded as affected by that aid (52). There is no threshold or percentage below which it may be considered that trade between the Contracting Parties is not affected (53).

| (61) | The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55). |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Authority found already in its Decision No 302/09/COL that in an EEA-wide liberalised electricity sector, measures foreclosing a national market from competitors have an effect on trade (54). This is in particular so as Landsvirkjun is the largest electricity generator in Iceland and one of the ten largest renewable energy companies in Europe (55).

| (62) | The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The GDM guarantees covering the derivatives transactions of Landsvirkjun have a twofold effect on competition and trade. On the one hand, they strengthen the company and support the conditions under which it can compete with other companies active in energy markets throughout Europe, as well as in the provision of related services to these markets. On the other hand, the state guarantee in favour of Landsvirkjun also strengthens the financial capacities of the company with respect to the home market and has the indirect effect of foreclosing the Icelandic electricity market not only to foreign but also to national competitors. In addition, the guarantees support the conditions under which Landsvirkjun can compete with other companies active in trading derivatives in Europe. Therefore, the guarantees in question is liable to distort competition and to affect trade between the Contracting Parties.

| (63) | On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

On this basis, the Authority reaches the preliminary conclusion that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above may constitute aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

2.   Existing aid

| (64) | The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57). |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The Court of Justice has consistently held that the question of whether an aid is new or existing must be answered by reference to the legal provisions laying down the measure (56). According to the Guarantee Guidelines, whether a guarantee constitutes state aid and what the amount of that state aid may be, must be assessed at the moment when the guarantee is given, not when the guarantee is invoked nor when payments are made under the terms of the guarantee (57).

| (65) | The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Authority’s current understanding of the facts is that the guarantees in question were granted after the entry into force of the EEA Agreement, and also after 1 January 2010, i.e. the date by which Iceland agreed to implement the appropriate measures proposed by the Authority in its Decision No 302/09/COL. The guarantees in question do not appear to be covered by Iceland’s amended legislative framework for state guarantees (58). Therefore, the Authority currently considers that the guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I of the decision qualify as new aid under Article 1(c) rather than existing aid under Article 1(b) of Part II of Protocol 3.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (66) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘The EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.’

| (67) | Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Point 3.2 (c) of the Guarantee Guidelines provides that if an EFTA State wishes to provide a guarantee above the 80 % threshold and claims that it does not constitute aid, it should duly substantiate the claim, for instance on the basis of the arrangement of the whole transaction, and notify it to the Authority so that the guarantee can be properly assessed with regard to its possible state aid character.

| (68) | The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Icelandic authorities have not notified the guarantees in question to the Authority. The Authority therefore reaches the preliminary conclusion that the Icelandic authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, and that the granting of the aid in the form of guarantees referred to in section 2.4 of part I above is therefore unlawful.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

| (69) | Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Measures caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement are generally incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, unless they qualify for an exemption under Article 61(2) or (3) of the EEA Agreement. The Authority notes that Iceland so far has not provided any arguments regarding the potential compatibility of the measure under these provisions.

| (70) | The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

The Authority considers that the exemptions under Article 61(2) of the EEA Agreement are not applicable to the aid measure under assessment since it is not designed to achieve any of the aims listed in this provision.

| (71) | The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The aid also cannot be justified under Article 61(3)(a) of the EEA Agreement, which provides for regional support, as Iceland does not have any regions that are eligible under this provision. As the state guarantee was not given to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest nor to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Iceland, the Authority considers that Article 61(3)(b) of the EEA Agreement is not applicable either.

| (72) | Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c). |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Furthermore, the Authority notes that the aid in question is not linked to any investment. It just reduces the costs which companies would normally have to bear in the course of pursuing their day-to-day business activities and is consequently to be classified as operating aid. Operating aid is only rarely considered suitable to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain regions as provided for in Article 61(3)(c) of the EEA Agreement. It is only permissible in special circumstances, normally in accordance with the Authority’s state aid guidelines. None of these guidelines apply to the aid in question. The Authority therefore doubts that the aid measure could be declared compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c).

| (73) | Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement does not seem to be applicable to the case at hand since there is no public service obligation justifying the grant of an unlimited state guarantee.

5.   Conclusion

| (74) | As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

As set out above, the Authority considers at this stage that the state guarantee on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun may constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (75) | The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

The Authority has doubts as to whether the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (76) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure does not constitute state aid or that it is state aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (77) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Icelandic authorities to submit, by 6 June 2017 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of these measures in light of the state aid rules.

| (78) | The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

The Authority requests the Icelandic authorities to forward a copy of this decision to the potential aid recipient.

| (79) | The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

The Authority must remind the Icelandic authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless (exceptionally) this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the guarantees on derivatives contracts referred to in section 2.4 of part I above granted by Iceland to Landsvirkjun.

Article 2

The Icelandic authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 6 June 2017.

Article 3

The Icelandic authorities are requested to provide by 6 June 2017, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to Iceland.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2017.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

For Frank J. BÜCHEL

College Member

---

(1)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24.4.2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

1

(2)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

2

(3)  Document No 753626.

3

(4)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL of 24 April 2013 to close the case concerning existing aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur through unlimited state guarantees (OJ C 237, 15.8.2013, p. 3 and EEA Supplement No 45, 15.8.2013, p. 28).

4

(5)  Document No 753593.

5

(6)  Document No 754498.

6

(7)  Document No 793116.

7

(8)  Document No 793783.

8

(9)  Document No 798576.

9

(10)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

10

(11)  Document No 824636.

11

(12)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL of 24 October 2016 on the sale of electricity to Norðurál (OJ C 26, 26.1.2017, p. 7, and EEA Supplement No 7, 26.1.2017, p. 2), paragraphs 4 and 6.

12

(13)  The Authority’s Decision No 193/16/COL, paragraph 5.

13

(14)  Information from Landsvirkjun’s website and the 2015 Annual report, available in English at: http://annualreport2015.landsvirkjun.com/

14

(15)  Information on the webpage of the Central Bank of Iceland, available in English at: http://www.cb.is/about-the-bank/central-bank-of-iceland/

15

(16)  Ibid.

16

Ibid.

(17)  Ibid.

17

Ibid.

(18)  Document No 793116.

18

(19)  Document No 753626.

19

(20)  Document No 793116.

20

(21)  For the avoidance of doubt, the current decision does not concern derivatives contracts for hedging risks due to aluminium price fluctuations.

21

(22)  Ibid.

22

Ibid.

(23)  Follow-up letter of the Authority of 27 June 2016 (Document No 806762), Annex 9.

23

(24)  Document No 793116.

24

(25)  Ibid.

25

Ibid.

(26)  Ibid.

26

Ibid.

(27)  Documents No 793116 and 798576.

27

(28)  According to the Icelandic authorities, Summa is an independent financial company regulated by the FSA.

28

(29)  Document No 798576.

29

(30)  The Authority notes that the Commission has accepted in the past methodologies for assessing the value of 100 % hedging guarantees where it was not possible to calculate in advance the final amount that would be effectively covered by the guarantees. See Commission decision of 24 April 2002 in case N706/2002, paragraph 48 and 76 et seq.

30

et seq

(31)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL of 8 July 2009 to propose appropriate measures with regard to state aid granted to Landsvirkjun and Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, available on the Authority’s website: http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=17084&1=1.

31

(32)  Chapter of the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s State Aid Guidelines on state guarantees (OJ L 274, 26.10.2000, p. 29, and EEA Supplement No 48, 26.10.2000, p. 45).

32

(33)  The Authority’s Decision No 159/13/COL.

33

(34)  OJ L 105, 21.4.2011, p. 32 and EEA Supplement No 23, 21.4.2011, p. 1.

34

(35)  According to article 2(1)(b) of the Directive 2004/l09/EC: ‘“debt securities” means bonds or other forms of transferable securitised debts, with the exception of securities which are equivalent to shares in companies or which, if converted or if the rights conferred by them are exercised, give rise to a right to acquire shares or securities equivalent to shares’.

35

(36)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

36

(37)  Ibid.

37

Ibid.

(38)  The role of GDM is further described in section 2.2 in part I.

38

(39)  The Authority’s decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.2.2 of part II.

39

(40)  The Authority’s Guidelines on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement, paragraph 118, available in English at: www.eftasurv.int/state-aid/legal-framework/state-aid-guidelines/

40

(41)  See for instance judgments in SFEI and Others, C-39/94, EU:C:1996:285, paragraph 60 and Spain v Commission, C-342/96, EU:C:1999:210, paragraph 41.

41

SFEI and Others

Spain v Commission

(42)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

42

(43)  Ibid.

43

Ibid.

(44)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2

44

(45)  The Authority notes that under the Guarantee Guidelines the 80 % limitation does not apply to guarantees covering debt securities. However, that exception is not applicable. See paragraph 32 of the decision.

45

(46)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 3.2.

46

(47)  See paragraph 23.

47

(48)  Ibid.

48

Ibid.

(49)  Document 798576.

49

(50)  See paragraph 21.

50

(51)  See paragraph 20.

51

(52)  Case E-6/98 The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority [1999] EFTA Ct. Rep. 74, paragraph 59; Judgment in Philip Morris v Commission, Case 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11.

52

The Government of Norway v EFTA Surveillance Authority

Philip Morris v Commission

(53)  Judgments in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 81 and Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck, C-172/03, EU:C:2005:130, paragraph 32.

53

Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Wolfgang Heiser v Finanzamt Innsbruck

(54)  The Authority’s Decision No 302/09/COL, section 1.3 of Part II.

54

(55)  See section 2.1 of Part I.

55

(56)  Judgments in Alzetta a.o. v Commission, Joined Cases T-298/97-T-312/97 EU:F:2000:151, Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State Case, C-44/93 EU:C:1994:311, P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen, C-51/74 EU:C:1975:9.

56

Alzetta a.o. v Commission,

Namur-Les Assurances du Crédit SA v Office National du Ducroire and the Belgian State

P.J. van der Hulst’s Zonen v Produktschap voor Siergewassen

(57)  Guarantee Guidelines, point 2.1.

57

(58)  See section 2.5 of part I.

58

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V Announcements

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO)

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/17 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/17

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NOTICE OF OPEN COMPETITIONS

(2017/C 242/07)

The European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO) is organising the following open competitions:

| | ADMINISTRATORS AND ASSISTANTS IN THE BUILDINGS SECTOR |
| --- | --- |

ADMINISTRATORS AND ASSISTANTS IN THE BUILDINGS SECTOR

| | EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Building management engineers (including environmental and services engineers) |
| --- | --- |

EPSO/AD/342/17 (AD 6) — Building management engineers (including environmental and services engineers)

| | EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3): | Profile 1. Building construction coordinators/technicians |
| --- | --- | --- |

EPSO/AST/141/17 (AST 3):

Profile 1. Building construction coordinators/technicians

| | Profile 2. Building coordinators/technicians in air conditioning and electromechanical and electrical engineering |
| --- | --- |

Profile 2. Building coordinators/technicians in air conditioning and electromechanical and electrical engineering

| | Profile 3. Occupational safety/building safety assistants |
| --- | --- |

Profile 3. Occupational safety/building safety assistants

The competition notice is published in 24 languages in
  Official Journal of the European Union C 242 A of 27 July 2017.

Further information can be found on the EPSO website: https://epso.europa.eu/

---

PROCEDURES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION POLICY

European Commission

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/18

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Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett)

Candidate case for simplified procedure

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2017/C 242/08)

| 1. | On 18 July 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Letterone Investment Holdings SA (‘Letterone Investment’, Luxembourg) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Holland & Barrett International Limited (‘Holland & Barrett’, the UK) by way of a purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 18 July 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Letterone Investment Holdings SA (‘Letterone Investment’, Luxembourg) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of the undertaking Holland & Barrett International Limited (‘Holland & Barrett’, the UK) by way of a purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:
  —   for Letterone Investment: international investment targeting investments in the telecoms and technology, healthcare and retail sectors,
  —   for Holland & Barrett: retail of health and wellbeing products, such as, for example, vitamin supplements and health foods, through its network of high street shops and online. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for Letterone Investment: international investment targeting investments in the telecoms and technology, healthcare and retail sectors,

—   for Holland & Barrett: retail of health and wellbeing products, such as, for example, vitamin supplements and health foods, through its network of high street shops and online.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8582 — Letterone/Holland & Barrett, to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

(2)  OJ C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

---

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/19

---

Prior notification of a concentration

(Case M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific/Patheon)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2017/C 242/09)

| 1. | On 19 July 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. (‘Thermo Fisher’, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the undertaking Patheon N.V. (‘Patheon’, The Netherlands) by way of a purchase of shares. |
| --- | --- |

1.

On 19 July 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. (‘Thermo Fisher’, USA) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the undertaking Patheon N.V. (‘Patheon’, The Netherlands) by way of a purchase of shares.

| 2. | The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:






  — | Thermo Fisher is a manufacturer and supplier of laboratory equipment, analytical instruments, diagnostics, and related products and services. It is headquartered in the US and active internationally. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—

Thermo Fisher is a manufacturer and supplier of laboratory equipment, analytical instruments, diagnostics, and related products and services. It is headquartered in the US and active internationally.

| — | Patheon is a contract development and manufacturing organisation, offering active pharmaceutical ingredients and finished drug product services. It is headquartered in the Netherlands and active internationally. |
| --- | --- |

—

Patheon is a contract development and manufacturing organisation, offering active pharmaceutical ingredients and finished drug product services. It is headquartered in the Netherlands and active internationally.

| 3. | On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. |
| --- | --- |

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved.

| 4. | The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.
  Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., to the following address:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8541 — Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc./Patheon N.V., to the following address:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

---

(1)  OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’).

---

OTHER ACTS

European Commission

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/20

---

INFORMATION NOTICE — PUBLIC CONSULTATION

Geographical indications from Japan

(2017/C 242/10)

Within the on-going negotiations with Japan for a Free Trade Agreement (hereafter ‘the Agreement’) including a chapter on Geographical Indications, the Japanese authorities have presented, for protection under the Agreement, the attached list of Geographical Indications. The European Commission is currently considering whether these Geographical Indications shall be protected under the Agreement as Geographical Indications within the meaning of Article 22(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

The Commission invites any Member State or third country or any natural or legal person having a legitimate interest, resident or established in a Member State or in a third country, to submit oppositions to such protection by lodging a duly substantiated statement.

Statements of opposition must reach the Commission within two months of the date of this publication. Statements of opposition should be sent to the following email address: AGRI-A4@ec.europa.eu

Statements of opposition shall be examined only if they are received within the time-limit set out above and if they show that the protection of the name proposed would:

| (a) | conflict with the name of a plant variety or an animal breed and as a result is likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

conflict with the name of a plant variety or an animal breed and as a result is likely to mislead the consumer as to the true origin of the product;

| (b) | be wholly or partially homonymous with that of a name already protected in the Union under Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), or contained in the agreements the Union has concluded with the following countries:






  — | SADC EPA States (comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa) (2) |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

be wholly or partially homonymous with that of a name already protected in the Union under Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), or contained in the agreements the Union has concluded with the following countries:

—

SADC EPA States (comprising Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa) (2)

| — | Switzerland (3) |
| --- | --- |

—

Switzerland (3)

| — | Korea (4) |
| --- | --- |

—

Korea (4)

| — | Central America (5) |
| --- | --- |

—

Central America (5)

| — | Colombia, Peru and Ecuador (6) |
| --- | --- |

—

Colombia, Peru and Ecuador (6)

| — | Montenegro (7) |
| --- | --- |

—

Montenegro (7)

| — | Bosnia and Herzegovina (8) |
| --- | --- |

—

Bosnia and Herzegovina (8)

| — | Serbia (9) |
| --- | --- |

—

Serbia (9)

| — | Moldova (10) |
| --- | --- |

—

Moldova (10)

| — | Ukraine (11) |
| --- | --- |

—

Ukraine (11)

| — | Georgia (12) |
| --- | --- |

—

Georgia (12)

| (c) | in the light of a trade mark’s reputation and renown and the length of time it has been used, be liable to mislead the consumer as to the true identity of the product; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

in the light of a trade mark’s reputation and renown and the length of time it has been used, be liable to mislead the consumer as to the true identity of the product;

| (d) | jeopardise the existence of an entirely or partly identical name or of a trade mark or the existence of products which have been legally on the market for at least five years preceding the date of the publication of this notice. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

jeopardise the existence of an entirely or partly identical name or of a trade mark or the existence of products which have been legally on the market for at least five years preceding the date of the publication of this notice.

| (e) | or if they can give details from which it can be concluded that the name for which protection is considered is generic. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

or if they can give details from which it can be concluded that the name for which protection is considered is generic.

The criteria referred to above shall be evaluated in relation to the territory of the Union, which in the case of intellectual property rights refers only to the territory or territories where the said rights are protected. The possible protection of these names in the European Union is subject to the successful conclusion of these negotiations and subsequent legal act.

List of Geographical Indications
   (13)

| Protected name in Japan | Transcription (for information purposes only) | Product category and description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ‘

  ’/‘Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi’ | Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi | Fresh fish, crustaceans, molluscs and products derived therefrom — shellfish |
| ‘

  ’/‘Tsurajima Gobou’ | Tsurajima Gobou | Fruit, vegetables and cereals, fresh or processed — burdock |
| ‘

  ’ | Yamagata | Other products of Annex I of the Treaty (spices etc.) – other fermented beverages — seishu (sake) |
| ‘

  ’/‘Maesawa Beef’ | Maesawa Gyu | Fresh meat (and offal) – beef |
| ‘

  ’/‘Yonezawagyu’ | Yonezawa Gyu | Fresh meat (and offal) – beef |
| ‘

  ’/‘Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi’ | Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi | Fresh meat (and offal) – beef |
| ‘

  ’/‘Nishio Matcha’ | Nishio no Matcha | Other products of Annex I of the Treaty (spices etc.) – green powdered tea |

Protected name in Japan

Transcription (for information purposes only)

Product category and description

Image

Jusankosan Yamato Shijimi

Fresh fish, crustaceans, molluscs and products derived therefrom — shellfish

Image

Tsurajima Gobou

Fruit, vegetables and cereals, fresh or processed — burdock

Image

Yamagata

Other products of Annex I of the Treaty (spices etc.) – other fermented beverages — seishu (sake)

Image

Maesawa Gyu

Fresh meat (and offal) – beef

Image

Yonezawa Gyu

Fresh meat (and offal) – beef

Image

Tokusan Matsusaka Ushi

Fresh meat (and offal) – beef

Image

Nishio no Matcha

Other products of Annex I of the Treaty (spices etc.) – green powdered tea

---

(1)  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

(2)  Council Decision (EU) 2016/1623 of 1 June 2016 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union and provisional application of the Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the SADC EPA States, of the other part (OJ L 250, 16.9.2016, p. 1).

(3)  Decision 2002/309/EC, Euratom of the Council and of the Commission as regards the Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation of 4 April 2002 on the conclusion of seven Agreements with the Swiss Confederation (OJ L 114, 30.4.2002, p. 1) and in particular the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Federation on trade in agricultural products – Annex 7.

(4)  Council Decision 2011/265/EU of 16 September 2010 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application of the Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Korea, of the other part (OJ L 127, 14.5.2011, p. 1).

(5)  Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and Central America on the other (OJ L 346, 15.12.2012, p. 3).

(6)  Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part (OJ L 354, 21.12.2012, p. 3) and Protocol of Accession to the Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part, to take account of the accession of Ecuador (OJ L 356, 24.12.2016, p. 3).

(7)  Council Decision 2007/855/EC of 15 October 2007 concerning the signing and conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part (OJ L 345, 28.12.2007, p. 1).

(8)  Council Decision 2008/474/EC of 16 June 2008 on the signing and conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part (OJ L 169, 30.6.2008, p. 10. – Protocol 6).

(9)  Council Decision 2010/36/EC of 29 April 2008 concerning the signing and conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part (OJ L 28, 30.1.2010, p. 1).

(10)  Council Decision 2013/7/EU of 3 December 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova on the protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 10, 15.1.2013, p. 1).

(11)  Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part (OJ L 161, 29.5.2014).

(12)  Council Decision 2012/164/EU of 14 February 2012 on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the protection of geographical indications of agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 93, 30.3.2012, p. 1).

(13)  List provided by the Japanese authorities in the framework of negotiations, registered in Japan.

---

| 27.7.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 242/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.7.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 242/22

---

Notice for the attention of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa whose names were added to the list referred to in Articles 2, 3 and 7 of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations, by virtue of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390

(2017/C 242/11)

| 1. | Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 (1) calls upon the Union to freeze the funds and economic resources of the members of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisation and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list drawn up pursuant to UNSCR 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) to be updated regularly by the UN Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1267(1999).
  The list drawn up by this UN Committee comprises:






  — | ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida; |
| --- | --- | --- |

1.

Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 (1) calls upon the Union to freeze the funds and economic resources of the members of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisation and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list drawn up pursuant to UNSCR 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) to be updated regularly by the UN Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1267(1999).

The list drawn up by this UN Committee comprises:

—

ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida;

| — | natural or legal persons, entities, bodies and groups associated with ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida; and |
| --- | --- |

—

natural or legal persons, entities, bodies and groups associated with ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida; and

| — | legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by, or otherwise supporting, any of these associated persons, entities, bodies and groups. |
| --- | --- |

—

legal persons, entities and bodies owned or controlled by, or otherwise supporting, any of these associated persons, entities, bodies and groups.

Acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, undertaking, or entity is ‘associated with’ ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida include:

| (a) | participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of ISIL (Da’esh) and Al Qaida, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

| (b) | supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to any of them; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to any of them;

| (c) | recruiting for any of them; or |
| --- | --- |

(c)

recruiting for any of them; or

| (d) | otherwise supporting acts or activities of any of them. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

otherwise supporting acts or activities of any of them.

| 2. | The UN Security Council Committee approved on 20 July 2017 the addition of the entries of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s list.
  Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa may submit at any time a request to the UN Ombudsperson, together with any supporting documentation, for the decision to include them in the UN list referred to above, to be reconsidered. Such request should be sent to the following address:





  United Nations — Office of the Ombudsperson |
| --- | --- |
| Room TB-08041D |
| New York, NY 10017 |
| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Tel: +1 2129632671 |
| Fax: +1 2129631300/3778 |
| Email: ombudsperson@un.org |

2.

The UN Security Council Committee approved on 20 July 2017 the addition of the entries of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’s list.

Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa may submit at any time a request to the UN Ombudsperson, together with any supporting documentation, for the decision to include them in the UN list referred to above, to be reconsidered. Such request should be sent to the following address:

United Nations — Office of the Ombudsperson

Room TB-08041D

New York, NY 10017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Tel: +1 2129632671

Fax: +1 2129631300/3778

Email: ombudsperson@un.org

See for more information at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/procedures-for-delisting

| 3. | Further to the UN decision referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission has adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 (2), which amends Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations (3). The amendments, made pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) and Article 7a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, add the names of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa to the list in Annex I of that Regulation (‘Annex I’).
  The following measures of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 apply to the individuals and entities included in Annex I:






  (1) | the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to the individuals and entities concerned, or owned or held by them, and the prohibition (on everyone) on making funds and economic resources available to any of the individuals and entities concerned or for their benefit, whether directly or indirectly (Articles 2 and 2a); and |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Further to the UN decision referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission has adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 (2), which amends Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida organisations (3). The amendments, made pursuant to Article 7(1)(a) and Article 7a(1) of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, add the names of Alexanda Amon Kotey, Elshafee El Sheikh, Muhammad Bahrum Naim Anggih Tamtomo, Malik Ruslanovich Barkhanoev, Murad Iraklievich Margoshvili, OMAN ROCHMAN, HANIFA MONEY EXCHANGE OFFICE (BRANCH LOCATED IN ALBU KAMAL, SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC), SELSELAT AL-THAHAB, Jaysh Khalid Ibn al Waleed, Jund Al Aqsa to the list in Annex I of that Regulation (‘Annex I’).

The following measures of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 apply to the individuals and entities included in Annex I:

(1)

the freezing of all funds and economic resources belonging to the individuals and entities concerned, or owned or held by them, and the prohibition (on everyone) on making funds and economic resources available to any of the individuals and entities concerned or for their benefit, whether directly or indirectly (Articles 2 and 2a); and

| (2) | the prohibition on granting, selling, supplying or transferring technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities to any of the individuals and entities concerned, whether directly or indirectly (Article 3). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

the prohibition on granting, selling, supplying or transferring technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities to any of the individuals and entities concerned, whether directly or indirectly (Article 3).

| 4. | Article 7a of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 provides for a review process where observations on the grounds for listing are submitted by those listed. Individuals and entities added to Annex I by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 may make a request for the grounds for their listing to the Commission. This request should be sent to:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| ‘Restrictive measures’ |
| Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Article 7a of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 provides for a review process where observations on the grounds for listing are submitted by those listed. Individuals and entities added to Annex I by Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 may make a request for the grounds for their listing to the Commission. This request should be sent to:

European Commission

‘Restrictive measures’

Rue de la Loi/Wetstraat 200

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

| 5. | The attention of the individuals and entities concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth and sixth paragraphs of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The attention of the individuals and entities concerned is also drawn to the possibility of challenging Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/1390 before the General Court of the European Union, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the fourth and sixth paragraphs of Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

| 6. | For good order, the attention of the individuals and entities included in Annex I is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities in the relevant Member State(s), as listed in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds and economic resources for essential needs or specific payments in accordance with Article 2a of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

6.

For good order, the attention of the individuals and entities included in Annex I is drawn to the possibility of making an application to the competent authorities in the relevant Member State(s), as listed in Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, in order to obtain an authorisation to use frozen funds and economic resources for essential needs or specific payments in accordance with Article 2a of that Regulation.

---

(1)  OJ L 255, 21.9.2016, p. 25.

(2)  OJ L 195, 27.7.2017, p. 11.

(3)  OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9.

---