IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 97 / 07–0508 

Filed September 26, 2008 

CAPITAL PROMOTIONS, L.L.C.,

 Appellant, 

vs. 

DON KING PRODUCTIONS, INC., 

 Appellee, 

and 

DON KING and BILLY BAXTER, 

Defendants. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. 

Novak, Judge. 

 Further review of court of appeals’ decision affirming summary 

judgment for appellee based on lack of personal jurisdiction. DECISION 

OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT 

AFFIRMED.

 Kenneth R. Munro of Munro Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, and 

Joseph G. Bertogli, Des Moines, for appellant. 
 2 

 Mariclare Thinnes Culver of Duncan Green Brown & Langeness 

PC, Des Moines, and Gerald G. Saltarelli and James A. Morsch of Butler 

Rubin Saltarelli & Boyd LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for appellee. 
 3 

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

 The appellant, Capital Promotions, L.L.C., sued the appellee, Don 

King Productions, Inc., for intentional interference with Capital’s 

contractual relationship with boxer Tye Fields. The district court granted 

King Productions’ motion for summary judgment, ruling Iowa courts did 

not have personal jurisdiction over King Productions. The court of 

appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of King Productions, and 

we granted Capital’s application for further review. After reviewing the 

record and considering the applicable legal principles, we agree with the 

district court and the court of appeals that King Productions did not have 

sufficient contacts with this state to support personal jurisdiction in 

Iowa. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the 

judgment of the district court. 

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

 Capital Promotions, L.L.C. is an Iowa limited liability company with 

its principal place of business in Iowa. In 2000, it entered into a 

promotional rights agreement with boxer Tye Fields. Fields, whose 

hometown is Des Moines, Iowa, resided in Missouri when the contract 

was signed. By the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, he 

resided in Nevada. Billy Baxter became Fields’ manager sometime in 

2003. Baxter also resided in Nevada. 

 Under the promotional rights agreement between Capital and 

Fields, Capital had the exclusive right to promote Fields’ professional 

boxing contests, including staging and selling tickets for such contests 

and all marketing and merchandizing rights. By its terms, this 

agreement was to be governed by the law of Iowa and was to terminate 

on February 4, 2005. During the term of the contract, Capital arranged 
 4 

numerous fights for Fields. Several bouts were in Iowa, but the majority 

of Fields’ fights were in other states. 

Don King Productions, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its 

principal place of business in Florida. Like Capital, King Productions is 

in the business of promoting boxing matches. King Productions has 

never promoted a fight in Iowa. It has never owned or rented property in 

Iowa, has never had a bank account in Iowa, has never had an employee 

located in Iowa, and has never had a registered agent in Iowa. 

In January 2004, King Productions employee Eric Botcher called 

Capital’s Des Moines office and spoke with Capital employee Bill McGee. 

Botcher told McGee that King Productions was interested in taking over 

the promotional rights for Fields. McGee advised Botcher that Capital 

was Fields’ promoter and had no interest in relinquishing its rights. 

A few months later, in the spring of 2004, Bobby Goodman, 

another King Productions employee, called Capital in Des Moines and 

spoke with Capital’s president, Paul Scieszinski. The purpose of this call 

was to offer Fields an International Boxing Federation (IBF) world 

heavyweight title fight with a King Productions fighter, Chris Byrd, who 

was the reigning IBF heavyweight champion. One of the terms of the 

proposed fight was that, if Fields beat Byrd, King Productions would be 

allowed to assume Fields’ promotional rights. Scieszinski turned down 

the offer and advised Goodman that Capital was not interested in 

relinquishing its promotional rights to Fields. 

In the summer of 2004, Goodman called Capital to negotiate a 

fight between another King Productions fighter, Henry Akiwande, and 

Fields. This conversation was prompted by the fact Fields had won the 

United States Boxing Association (USBA) world heavyweight title in 

September 2003. After this win, in December 2003, the chair of the 
 5 

IBF/USBA office had written to Scieszinski, with a copy to Goodman, 

stating Fields’ mandatory defense of his title was due by September 2, 

2004, and suggesting Akiwande was the leading available contender. 

The Akiwande/Fields bout was not scheduled, however, because Fields 

had suffered an injury in late spring 2004 and was unable to fight. 

There was no discussion of Capital’s promotional rights in Fields during 

this phone conversation. 

In the fall of 2004, Scieszinski spoke with Don King personally via 

telephone. Scieszinski informed King that Capital had a promotional 

rights contract with Fields and was not interested in sharing its rights 

with King or King Productions. Capital does not contend this call was 

initiated by King. 

In January 2005, King Productions employee Botcher placed a 

telephone call to a Capital fighter, Josh Gutcher, who was in Iowa at the 

time. Botcher offered Gutcher a fight through King Productions and 

mentioned King Productions was involved in negotiations for a February 

2005 fight with another Capital fighter, Tye Fields. Gutcher rejected the 

offer, telling Botcher he was a Capital fighter, as was Fields, and Botcher 

would have to speak to Scieszinski regarding any fights. 

After Gutcher talked to Botcher, Gutcher called Scieszinski and 

told Scieszinski of the conversation. Scieszinski then called King 

Productions employee Goodman and informed Goodman that Capital was 

the exclusive promoter for Fields and Gutcher and that any attempts to 

offer either man a fight would be viewed as an interference with Capital’s 

promotional rights agreements with those fighters. 

In February 2005, Scieszinski arranged a fight between Fields and 

Vaughan Bean to take place on February 25, 2005, in Kansas City. The 

proposed fight was canceled, however, after King Productions and 
 6 

Baxter, Fields’ manager, arranged a February 5, 2005 boxing bout 

between Fields and Ray Luncsford in St. Louis. The record shows Baxter 

had approached Don King in Las Vegas, Nevada, with a request to put 

Fields on the undercard of the Spinks v. Judah II event being promoted 

by King Productions and scheduled to take place in St. Louis on 

February 5, 2005. King agreed to do so, and on February 3, 2005, in St. 

Louis, Missouri, Fields signed a bout agreement for the February 5 fight. 

In that agreement, he represented that he was not under contract with 

any other promoter. There is no evidence in the record showing that any 

communication regarding this bout agreement occurred in the state of 

Iowa. 

On April 7, 2006, Capital filed this action against King 

Productions, Don King, and Baxter, alleging they intentionally interfered 

with its contractual relationship with Fields. Subsequently, King 

Productions filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the Iowa 

district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it and that an exercise of 

jurisdiction by the Iowa court would violate due process. Capital 

resisted. After a hearing, the district court granted King Productions’ 

motion for summary judgment. 

Capital filed this appeal. As noted earlier, the court of appeals 

affirmed the district court’s ruling. We then granted Capital’s application 

for further review. 

II. Scope of Review.

King Productions raised the issue of personal jurisdiction in a 

motion for summary judgment, rather than by a motion to dismiss. The 

parties submitted this issue to the district court and on appeal under the 

principles governing motions for summary judgment, including the rule 

that the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
 7 

party, Capital. See Kelly v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 637, 641 

(Iowa 2000). 

Ordinarily, however, issues of personal jurisdiction are raised in a 

motion to dismiss, and the district court would make the necessary 

factual findings to determine whether the court had personal jurisdiction 

over the defendant. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Fidata Trust Co. N.Y., 452 

N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 1990) (stating “the hearing and disposition of a 

motion involving personal jurisdiction is a special proceeding requiring 

[the district court] to find facts and draw conclusions of law in its 

decision”). See generally Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 

1187, 1192–93 (Colo. 2005) (discussing trial court procedure for 

resolving issues of personal jurisdiction). Accordingly, those findings 

would be binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. 

Hodges v. Hodges, 572 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa 1997); Percival v. Bankers 

Trust Co., 450 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Iowa 1990). 

Due to the manner in which the jurisdictional issue was raised in 

this case, the district court made no factual findings. Nonetheless, our 

review of the record reveals no genuine dispute with respect to the 

relevant facts. Therefore, we proceed to decide the legal issue: whether 

the undisputed facts allow personal jurisdiction over King Productions. 

We are not bound by the district court’s application of legal principles in 

deciding whether personal jurisdiction is permissible. Hammond v. Fla. 

Asset Fin. Corp., 695 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2005). 

III. Discussion. 

A. Governing Principles. “The Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution limits the power of the 

state to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to a 

lawsuit.” Ross v. First Sav. Bank, 675 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 2004). 
 8 

Iowa’s jurisdictional rule provides: “Every corporation, individual, 

personal representative, partnership or association that shall have the 

necessary minimum contact with the state of Iowa shall be subject to the 

jurisdiction of the courts of this state. . . .” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.306. This 

rule authorizes the widest jurisdictional parameters allowed by the Due 

Process Clause. Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 5. 

Before a defendant can be made to defend a lawsuit in a foreign 

jurisdiction, his or her contacts with the forum state must be such that 

the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 

100 S. Ct. 559, 567, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980). “The minimum 

contacts must show ‘a sufficient connection between the defendant and 

the forum state so as to make it fair’ and reasonable to require the 

defendant to come to the state and defend the action.” Ross, 675 N.W.2d 

at 815 (quoting Hodges, 572 N.W.2d at 551). 

 A sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum state 

can exist as a general matter or merely with respect to the specific cause 

of action. These two grounds for personal jurisdiction are known as 

general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction: 

“Specific jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction over causes of 

action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within 

the forum state,” while “[g]eneral jurisdiction . . . refers to 

the power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action 

involving a particular defendant, regardless of where the 

cause of action arose.” 

Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Sondergard v. Miles, Inc., 985 F.2d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir. 1993)). 

Capital contends Iowa courts have specific jurisdiction over King 

Productions for purposes of its intentional-interference-with-contractualrelationship claim. 
 9 

 Many of our cases rely on a five-factor test for the exercise of 

specific jurisdiction, including the quantity of the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum state, the nature and quality of those contacts, the source 

of those contacts and their connection to the cause of action, the interest 

of the forum state, and the convenience of the parties. See, e.g., 

Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 5; Cascade Lumber Co. v. Edward Rose Bldg. 

Co., 596 N.W.2d 90, 92 (Iowa 1999); Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785, 

788 (Iowa 1980). It appears the five-factor test first appeared in Iowa in 

Douglas Machine & Engineering Co. v. Hyflow Blanking Press Corp., 229 

N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1975), and was borrowed from the Eighth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. See Douglas Mach., 229 N.W.2d at 789 (stating “the 

Eighth Circuit gleaned from the above cases five factors to be considered 

in determining whether ‘fair play and substantial justice’ requirements 

are satisfied” (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th 

Cir. 1965))). In Aftanase, the Eighth Circuit culled these factors from five 

United States Supreme Court cases decided between 1945 and 1958. 

343 F.2d at 195–96. Obviously, the parameters of specific jurisdiction 

have continued to evolve since 1958. Although these five factors retain 

their relevancy, they no longer provide a useful analytical framework for 

determining personal jurisdiction under current case law. 

 More recently, in discussing the contact that will subject a 

defendant to the jurisdiction of a state’s courts, the United States 

Supreme Court has stated two requirements that must be shown by the 

plaintiff: 

Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction 

over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit 

there, [due process] is satisfied if the defendant has 

“purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum 

and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out 

of or relate to” those activities. 
 10 

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 

2182, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 540–41 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler 

Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed. 2d 

790, 797 (1984) (first quoted material); Helicopteros Nacionales de 

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L. 

Ed. 2d 404, 411 (1984) (second quoted material)); accord Archangel 

Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1194; see also Hammond, 695 N.W.2d at 6 

(stating “[t]here may be no specific jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant absent a claim arising from that defendant’s activities in this 

state”). 

 Once the plaintiff has established the required minimum contacts, 

the court must “determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction 

would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King 

Corp., 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543 (quoting 

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90 

L. Ed. 95, 104 (1945)). In making this determination, a court may 

consider 

“the burden on the defendant,” “the forum State’s interest in 

adjudicating the dispute,” “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining 

convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate judicial 

system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 

controversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States 

in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” 

Id. at 477, 105 S. Ct. at 2184, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 543 (quoting World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 

498). “These considerations sometimes serve to establish the 

reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum 

contacts than would otherwise be required.” Id. On the other hand, 

“jurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make 

litigation ‘so gravely difficult and inconvenient’ that a party unfairly is at 
 11 

a ‘severe disadvantage’ in comparison to his opponent.” Id. at 478, 105 

S. Ct. at 2185, 85 L. Ed. 2d at 544 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1917, 32 L. Ed. 2d 513, 525 

(1972) (first quoted material); McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 

223, 78 S. Ct. 199, 201, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223, 226 (1957) (second quoted 

material)). 

B. Sufficiency of King Productions’ Contacts with Iowa. In 

determining whether King Productions had sufficient minimum contacts 

with Iowa to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the Iowa 

courts, we look for any purposeful conduct by King Productions directed 

to Iowa. King Productions initiated four contacts with Iowa: (1) the 

January 2004 phone call from Botcher to McGee in which Botcher 

indicated King Productions’ interest in Fields’ promotional rights; (2) the 

spring 2004 phone call from Goodman to Scieszinski in which Goodman 

offered Capital a fight for Fields with the condition that, if Fields won, 

King Productions would assume Fields’ promotional rights; (3) the 

summer 2004 phone call from Goodman to Scieszinski in which 

Goodman attempted to negotiate a fight between Fields and King 

Productions fighter Akiwande; and (4) the January 2005 phone call from 

Botcher to Capital fighter Gutcher in which Botcher offered Gutcher a 

fight through King Productions.1 There was no discussion of Fields’ 

promotional rights in the summer 2004 Goodman/Scieszinski phone 

conversation, so it has no connection to Capital’s cause of action. The 

remaining three contacts relate to Capital’s cause of action insofar as 

they could be used as evidence to establish King Productions’ knowledge 

 1We do not consider the two phone calls to King Productions initiated by the 

plaintiff, as only the defendant’s purposeful forum-state contacts matter. Archangel 

Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1194; Tabor, Chhabra & Gibbs, P.A. v. Med. Legal 

Evaluations, Inc., 237 S.W.3d 762, 772 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
 12 

that Capital held the promotional rights to Fields at the time of those 

phone calls. These calls did not, however, constitute the interference of 

which Capital complains in this lawsuit. Consequently, although these 

calls have some relevancy to Capital’s cause of action, we cannot say that 

Capital’s injuries arose out of or are related to those contacts so as to 

support specific jurisdiction over King Productions. See IMO Indus., Inc. 

v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 267–68 (3d Cir. 1998) (“a few calls or letters 

into the forum may be of only marginal import if the dispute is focused 

outside the forum”); Far W. Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076 

(10th Cir. 1995) (holding, in case claiming breach of contract and 

intentional interference with contractual relationships, defendant’s fax to 

plaintiff in forum state soliciting business relationship was too remote to 

establish specific jurisdiction because it occurred three years before final 

phase of negotiations leading to contract). 

 Capital contends that, even if King Productions’ telephone contacts 

with the state of Iowa are not sufficient alone to support personal 

jurisdiction, those contacts combined with the injuries sustained by 

Capital in Iowa do support Iowa’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

King Productions. Capital relies on the United States Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 

804 (1984). In Calder, Shirley Jones brought suit in California against 

the National Enquirer, its distributor, its editor, and a National Enquirer

reporter who wrote an allegedly libelous article concerning the plaintiff. 

465 U.S. at 784–86, 104 S. Ct. at 1484–85, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 809–10. The 

editor and reporter, who were residents of Florida and who had worked 

on the article in Florida, challenged the California court’s exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over them. Id. at 785–86, 104 S. Ct. at 1485, 79 

L. Ed. 2d at 809–10. The editor had been in California only twice, both 
 13 

times for purposes unrelated to the article. Id. at 786, 104 S. Ct. at 

1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 810. The reporter traveled to California frequently, 

but the only contacts related to this article were phone calls to sources in 

California for the information contained in the article and to the 

plaintiff’s husband seeking comment on the article. Id. at 785–86, 104 

S. Ct. at 1485, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 809–10. 

 In determining the individual defendants had sufficient minimum 

contacts with California to support personal jurisdiction over them, the 

Court relied on the following facts: 

Here, the plaintiff is the focus of the activities of the 

defendants out of which the suit arises. 

 The allegedly libelous story concerned the California 

activities of a California resident. It impugned the 

professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was 

centered in California. The article was drawn from California 

sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of [the 

plaintiff’s] emotional distress and the injury to her 

professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, 

California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm 

suffered. 

Id. at 788–89, 104 S. Ct. at 1486, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 811–12. The court 

concluded jurisdiction over the defendants was “proper in California 

based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” Id. at 789, 

104 S. Ct. at 1486–87, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 812 (citing World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297–98, 100 S. Ct. at 567–68, 62 L. Ed 2d 

at 501–02). 

Calder did not “carve out a special intentional torts exception to 

the traditional specific jurisdiction analysis.” IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d 

at 265; accord Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527, 535 (Minn. 2002). The 

Calder “effects” test, as it has come to be known, “is but one facet of the 

ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full 

range of the defendant’s contacts within the forum.” Revell v. Lidov, 317 
 14 

F.3d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, a majority of courts have 

interpreted Calder to require “more than a finding that the harm caused 

by the defendant’s intentional tort is primarily felt within the forum.” 

IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265; accord Revell, 317 F.3d at 473 (stating 

“the plaintiff’s residence in the forum, and suffering of harm there, will 

not alone support jurisdiction under Calder”); Far W. Capital, Inc., 46 

F.3d at 1079 (stating “the mere allegation that an out-of-state defendant 

has tortiously interfered with contractual rights [and] allegedly injured a 

forum resident does not necessarily establish . . . the constitutionally 

required minimum contacts”); Percival v. Bankers Trust Co., 494 N.W.2d 

658, 659–60 (Iowa 1993) (stating minimum-contacts requirement is “not 

satisfied from a mere ‘effect’ felt by a plaintiff within his or her state of 

residence”); Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 533 (“[C]ourts have consistently 

refused to find jurisdiction based on Calder merely because the plaintiff 

was located in the forum state and therefore felt the effects of the alleged 

intentional tortious conduct there.”). As one court has noted, basing 

jurisdiction solely on the fact the plaintiff felt harm in the forum 

jurisdiction would make jurisdiction “depend on a plaintiff’s decision 

about where to establish residence,” rather than “grounding jurisdiction 

on a defendant’s decision to ‘purposely avail[] itself of the privilege of 

conducting activities within the forum [s]tate,’ or on a defendant’s 

activities ‘expressly aimed’ at the forum state.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. 

Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 625–26 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Hanson v. 

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 

1298 (1958) (first quoted material); Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S. Ct. at 

1487, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 812 (second quoted material)). 

Thus, even under the Calder effects test, “a court must undertake 

a particularized inquiry as to the extent to which the defendant has 
 15 

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the forum’s laws.” Far W. 

Capital, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1079. A defendant will be found to have met this 

standard if the plaintiff shows 

(1) the defendant’s acts were intentional; (2) these actions 

were uniquely or expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) 

the brunt of the harm was suffered in the forum state, and 

the defendant knew the harm was likely to be suffered there. 

Roquette Am., Inc. v. Gerber, 651 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002); 

accord IMO Indus., Inc., 155 F.3d at 265–66; Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 

F.3d 85, 90 (1st Cir. 1998); Principal Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Big Fin. & Ins. 

Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1060 (S.D. Iowa 2006). 

 Although the present case alleges an intentional tort and the 

plaintiff claims to have suffered economic harm in Iowa, we do not think 

the plaintiff has established that King Productions expressly aimed its 

tortious activities at Iowa. The defendant is alleged to have interfered 

with a contract between an Iowa company, Capital, and a Missouri 

resident, Fields. But the acts alleged to constitute the interference were 

directed toward Fields, who was by then a resident of Nevada, and 

Baxter, his Nevada manager. These allegedly tortious acts took place in 

Nevada and Missouri and were centered on a fight to take place in 

Missouri. Thus, Iowa was not the focal point of the alleged tort. See 

ESAB, Inc., 126 F.3d at 625 (stating the defendant’s actions “must be 

directed at the forum state in more than a random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated way”); Wolk v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 491, 506 

(E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding no personal jurisdiction when nonresident 

defendants “did not aim their conduct at [the forum state and the forum 

state] was not the focal point of the alleged tortious interference with 

prospective contracts”); see also Percival, 494 N.W.2d at 659–60 (stating 

“[t]he minimum contacts requirements demand conduct having to do 
 16 

with the state itself”). Capital’s location in Iowa was unrelated to King 

Productions’ allegedly tortious conduct, and consequently, Iowa played a 

fortuitous role in the alleged interference with Capital’s contractual 

rights. See Tabor, Chhabra & Gibbs, P.A. v. Med. Legal Evaluations, Inc., 

237 S.W.3d 762, 775–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (holding no specific 

jurisdiction when defendant’s acts of tortious interference occurred 

outside forum state and forum state was not the focal point of those 

acts). 

The present case is distinguishable from a similar case decided by 

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the court found specific 

jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant in a suit alleging intentional 

interference with a contract. See Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 260 

(3d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff in Remick was a Pennsylvania attorney who 

sued his former client, Angel Manfredy, who was a professional boxer, 

and Manfredy’s Illinois agent. Id. at 252. The plaintiff had contracted 

with Manfredy to represent Manfredy “in the procurement and 

negotiation of high profile and lucrative fights.” Id. at 252–53. Manfredy 

later terminated the contract, claiming the plaintiff had not delivered on 

his contractual promises. Id. at 253. In the subsequent lawsuit, the 

plaintiff claimed Manfredy’s agent, the defendant, had intentionally 

interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to perform his contractual obligations 

to Manfredy, causing Manfredy to terminate the contract. Id. at 260. 

The exact nature of the interference was not clear, although it included 

the dissemination of defamatory information regarding the plaintiff’s 

skills and ability. Id. The court of appeals concluded the defendant’s 

alleged tortious conduct was expressly aimed at the plaintiff in 

Pennsylvania, noting the majority of the plaintiff’s services under the 

contract were rendered out of his Philadelphia office. Id. The court 
 17 

distinguished its prior decision in IMO Industries, Inc., noting the object 

of the interference in that case was not the resident plaintiff, but the 

other party to the contract, a French company. Id. 

The case before us is also distinguishable from the Remick case. In 

Remick, the contractual interference was conduct by the defendant that 

made it difficult for the resident plaintiff to render his services in the 

forum state. In comparison, the nature of the alleged interference here is 

the negotiation and scheduling of a Missouri fight for Fields, activity that 

did not involve or focus on Capital or Iowa. Consequently, we cannot 

say, as did the court of appeals in Remick, that the defendant expressly 

aimed his tortious activity at the forum state. See also Hicklin Eng’g, Inc. 

v. Aidco, Inc., 959 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding no jurisdiction 

over out-of-state defendant alleged to have intentionally interfered with 

Iowa plaintiff’s prospective business advantage and contractual relations 

by sending allegedly defamatory correspondence to the plaintiff’s 

customers, noting none of the correspondence was published in Iowa 

and it did not appear that the defendant’s actions “were targeted to have 

an effect in Iowa”); Keystone Publishers Serv., Inc. v. Ross, 747 F.2d 

1233, 1234 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding defendants did not have sufficient 

minimum contacts with Iowa when their alleged interference with the 

resident plaintiff’s contractual relations occurred outside Iowa, 

notwithstanding that the defendants’ actions caused injury in Iowa); 

Drayton Enters., L.L.C. v. Dunker, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1183–85 

(D.N.D. 2001) (holding Oklahoma defendant’s alleged out-of-state 

interference with plaintiff’s confidentiality contract with former employee 

did not support personal jurisdiction over defendant in North Dakota, 

even though contract was entered into in North Dakota and injury was 

sustained in North Dakota); cf. Noonan, 135 F.3d at 91 (holding no 
 18 

specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who was alleged to have 

misappropriated plaintiff’s image when defendant’s intentional acts were 

not directed toward forum state). 

IV. Conclusion. 

Viewing the record made below most favorably to the plaintiff, we 

conclude the defendant did not have the required minimum contacts 

with Iowa to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this 

state. The district court did not err in granting King Productions’ motion 

for summary judgment, dismissing it from this lawsuit. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGMENT OF 

DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.

All justices concur except Appel and Baker, JJ., who take no part.