Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 1 of 26

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

Mark R. Waterfill

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Kevin S. Smith 

Brent R. Borg 

Church, Church, Hittle & Antrim

Fishers, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Christian Methodist Episcopal 

Church and Second Episcopal 

District of the Christian 

Methodist Episcopal Church, 

Inc.,

Appellants-Defendants,

v.

Kevin P. Grimes, Sr.,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 26, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-PL-2346

Appeal from the

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

John M.T. Chavis II, Judge 

Trial Court Cause No.

49D05-1211-PL-43306

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 2 of 26

[1] Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (“CME”) and Second Episcopal District 

of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. (“Second District”) 

(together, “the Church”) appeal the trial court’s order granting a motion filed by 

Kevin P. Grimes, Sr. (“Grimes”) requesting enforcement of a settlement 

agreement and entering judgment against the Church in the amount of 

$80,000.00. The Church raises the following restated issues on appeal:

I. Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

over Grimes’s claims against the Church;

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

denied CME and Second District’s motion to vacate the 

trial court’s previous order enforcing the alleged settlement 

agreement between the parties; and

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it 

awarded $6,456.71 in appellate attorney fees to Grimes.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Between June 2007 through June 2012, CME and Second District appointed 

Grimes to five consecutive one-year terms as pastor of Stewart Memorial CME 

Corporation (“Stewart Memorial”). Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 132. CME is a 

not-for-profit religious corporation organized into eleven districts in the United 

States and Africa including Second District, which is a separate corporation. 

Appellants’ App. Vol. III at 5; Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 22. Stewart Memorial is 
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an Indianapolis church within the Second District. Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 

22. 

[4] Under CME’s structure, a pastor’s salary is established by the local church’s 

steward board and approved by the Quarterly Conference of Second District, 

which is presided over by a CME Elder. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 212; 

Appellants’ App. Vol. III at 83. For each year of Grimes’s employment, financial 

accountings and pastoral reports contained information stating that Grimes’s 

salary was $600.00 per week and that Grimes was entitled to 12% of his salary 

as a pension. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 142-51, 230-47. This information was

also indicated in the minutes of the Quarterly Conference. Id. at 152-53. 

[5] When Grimes accepted his appointment, Stewart Memorial was in significant 

financial trouble. Id. at 132, 140, 185. Stewart Memorial paid one of its 

previous pastors $600.00 per week before she left to organize her own church

and took much of Stewart Memorial’s membership with her, which is when 

Stewart Memorial’s downward financial spiral began. Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 

133, 139-40, 236. The $600.00 per week salary figure remained in place for the 

pastor who served after her and before Grimes; however, that pastor never was 

paid due to Stewart Memorial’s poor financial situation. Id. at 205-06. On 

August 6, 2007, Grimes reportedly wrote a letter to Second District Bishop E. 

Lynn Brown in which Grimes stated: “[D]ue to the extreme and severe 

financial conditions[,] I[,] as the Sr. Pastor[,] have made the temporary decision 

to defer the church pastoral salary obligations, until at such time I determine we 

can recover from this desperate financial situation.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at
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80. Grimes and Stewart Memorial’s Board of Stewards understood Grimes was 

not working for free and would eventually be paid his deferred salary. Id. at 

132-33, 140, 188, 192-93. Although Grimes claimed years later that he entered 

into a single oral agreement with Stewart Memorial’s Board of Stewards in 

2007 to pay him $600.00 weekly, church officials with CME and Second 

District denied any such agreement ever existed. Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 42, 

44-45; Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 5.

[6] On October 30, 2011, the Quarterly Conference was chaired by Reverend 

Charles King (“Reverend King”), a presiding elder of CME and Second 

District. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 92. At that Quarterly Conference, Reverend 

King stated it was Stewart Memorial’s duty to pay Grimes his salary and 

pension. Id. at 93, 167-70, 221. Reverend King was aware of Stewart 

Memorial’s financial condition but stated that Stewart Memorial should set a 

salary and keep a record of the amounts owed to Grimes. Id. at 221; Appellants’

App. Vol. III at 14. After the Quarterly Conference, Grimes instructed Stewart 

Memorial staff to draft checks to Grimes in amounts Grimes specified for his 

services dating back to his first appointment. Appellants’ App. Vol. III at 120-21;

Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 9-10. Grimes and his brother-in-law, who was a 

steward of Stewart Memorial, maintain that, at the October 2011 Quarterly 

Conference, Reverend King directed Stewart Memorial to write checks to 

Grimes for his services as a promise to pay, and their position was supported by 

purported minutes of the Quarterly Conference drafted by Grimes. Appellants’

App. Vol. II at 92, 133-34, 167-68. Reverend King challenged the accuracy of 
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the minutes and reported receiving the minutes only after Grimes’s departure 

from Stewart Memorial. Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 41-42.

[7] Stewart Memorial drafted checks to Grimes totaling $165,276.00. Appellants’

App. Vol. II at 134, 157-66. Grimes knew Stewart Memorial’s accounts did not 

contain sufficient funds to cover the checks at the time they were issued. 

Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 14-16. Stewart Memorial did not intend for the checks 

to be cashed, and the recording steward kept the checks in her desk until 

Grimes requested that she give them to him. Appellants’ App. Vol. III at 121; 

Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 141-42. 

[8] In July 2012, prior to the expiration of Grimes’s fifth term as pastor of Stewart 

Memorial, Reverend King offered Grimes pastor positions at two different 

churches, another Indianapolis church and a Cincinnati church. Appellants’

App. Vol. V at 2,17. Grimes rejected those positions, was not reappointed as 

pastor of Stewart Memorial, and left his employment at Stewart Memorial on 

July 27, 2012. Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 44, 249; Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 17. 

On July 20, 2012, Grimes cashed one of the checks written to him by Stewart 

Memorial for $600.00, and on July 30, 2012, he cashed another for $600.00. 

Appellants’ App. Vol. IV at 238. An overdraft occurred as a result of the 

processing of those checks, and Stewart Memorial stopped payment on the 

other checks issued to Grimes. Id. at 161, 222. 

[9] On November 2, 2012, Grimes filed a complaint against CME, Second District, 

and Stewart Memorial, alleging breach of contract and violation of Indiana’s 
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Wage Payment Statute and Wage Claims Statute. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 36-

39. CME and Second District filed separate motions to dismiss Grimes’s

complaint, alleging that the Wage Payment Statute and Wage Claims Statute 

did not apply because Indiana’s minimum wage laws do not apply to pastors 

and the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Grimes’s claims 

because if the trial court adjudicated those claims, it would infringe the First 

Amendment rights of CME and Second District to adjudicate matters 

concerning ecclesiastical law. Id. at 47-54. The trial court denied the motions 

to dismiss. On April 23, 2013, Grimes filed an amended complaint to add an 

unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 71-75. 

[10] In September 2014, Grimes filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all 

claims except unjust enrichment. Id. at 115-16. Grimes argued, among other 

things, that his claims were not barred by the First Amendment. Id. at 126-28. 

On November 21, 2014, CME and Second District filed separate cross motions 

for summary judgment, again arguing that Grimes’s claims were barred by the 

First Amendment. Appellants’ App. Vol. III at 4-10. On June 8, 2015, the trial 

court denied all of the motions for summary judgment, specifically stating that 

“the Court can apply neutral principles of law without becoming excessively 

entangled in religious affairs in violation of the First Amendment.” Appellants’

App. Vol. V at 52-54. Grimes, CME, and Second District each filed motions for

permissive interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order, and this court denied 

the motions. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 21-23. 
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[11] The trial court set a jury trial for May 23, 2017. Id. at 24. Three weeks before

the trial date, counsel for the Church and Grimes met in a settlement 

conference with their clients available by phone. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 55-

56. On June 9, 2017, Grimes filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement 

and a motion to set the matter for a hearing. In the motion, Grimes alleged the 

following occurred at the settlement conference. After initial discussion, 

Grimes offered to settle his claims against the Church for $90,000.00. Id. at 56. 

The Church counteroffered for $40,000.00 and a confidentiality provision. Id. 

Grimes agreed to the confidentiality provision and counteroffered for 

$80,000.00 paid via an initial reasonable lump-sum payment followed by a 

reasonable payoff of the balance over time, and an attorney fee provision 

should the Church fail to pay. Id. The Church agreed to the $80,000.00 

settlement payment and the attorney fee provision and proposed that the initial 

payment be $15,000.00 with semi-annual payments of the balance over four 

years. Id. Grimes’s counsel then called Grimes to convey the parties’ 

agreement and confirm his approval of the payment terms the Church had 

recommended. Id. As Grimes’s counsel was preparing to return to the 

conference room to convey Grimes’s approval of their proposed payment terms, 

the Church’s counsel attempted to rescind the parties’ agreement, stating that 

he only had authority to offer $50,000.00. Id. 

[12] The trial court set the motion for a hearing on August 9, 2017. On June 29, 

2017, after nineteen days had passed without the Church filing a response to the 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement, Grimes filed a motion to vacate 
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the hearing, contending that no hearing was needed because the Church’s lack 

of response demonstrated the facts alleged in Grimes’s motion were undisputed 

and the trial court could rule on the motion based on the evidence Grimes had 

submitted. Id. at 71-72. After fifteen days passed without the Church filing any 

response or objection to Grimes’s motion to vacate hearing, the clerk filed an 

order from the court granting Grimes’s motion and vacating the August 9 

hearing. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 26; Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 79. The Church

did not file an objection or response to this ruling. See Appellants’ App. Vol. II at

26. On August 10, 2017, the trial court granted Grimes’s motion to enforce 

settlement agreement and entered judgment against the Church in the amount 

of $80,000.00 and ordered reasonable attorney fees in enforcing the judgment. 

Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 80. Grimes’s claims against Stewart Memorial 

remained pending in the trial court. 

[13] On September 9, 2017, the Church filed a motion to correct error, arguing the 

trial court’s August 10 order entering judgment “for a set amount does not 

properly include the terms that were part of the settlement conference and does 

not accurately set the terms of the deal.” Id. at 123-24. On September 15, 2017, 

Grimes filed a “Statement in Opposition to Motion to Correct Error,” in which 

he argued that the motion to correct error did not satisfy Trial Rule 59(D)

because it did not state the alleged error in specific terms. Id. at 126-27. Grimes 

also argued that the Church had waived any challenge to the motion to enforce 

settlement agreement because “‘[w]hen a [party] does not properly bring an 

objection to the court’s attention so that the court may rule on it at the 
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appropriate time, he is deemed to have waived that possible error.’” Id. at 127 

(quoting Ingram v. State, 547 N.E.2d 823, 829 (Ind.1989)). Grimes continued:

If [the Church] disputed the Motion to Enforce, [it] had no fewer 

than three opportunities to object: first, when the undersigned 

sent a letter demanding [it] honor the terms of the agreement; 

second, via standard motion practice by filing an objection to the 

Motion to Enforce; and third, when Grimes moved to vacate the 

hearing. [The Church has] had many bites at the apple and 

declined each opportunity.

Id. On September 19, 2017, the Church’s motion to correct error was denied. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 53. 

[14] On October 31, 2017, the Master Commissioner conducted proceedings 

supplemental, at which the Church argued that the trial court’s judgment for the 

entire $80,000.00 was inconsistent with the terms of the parties’ settlement 

agreement and asked the matter be sent “back to the trial court for 

clarification.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 32-36. The Master Commissioner granted their 

request and continued the hearing. Id. at 37-38. On November 13, 2017, the 

trial court issued an order, stating in pertinent part, “[T]here is no legitimate 

dispute regarding the terms of the settlement agreement or the Court’s order 

enforcing said settlement agreement. The Court stands by and reaffirms its 

order denying [the Church’s] Motion to Correct Error.” Appellants’ App. Vol. V

at 135. The order scheduled another proceedings supplemental for December 

15, 2017 and ordered the Church to appear in person. Id. The Church failed to 

appear at the proceedings supplemental. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 29-30. The 
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trial court issued “Final Orders in Garnishment” to two garnishee/defendant 

banks, and from those orders, Grimes collected $56,693.20, which is being held 

in his attorney’s trust account. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 137-41; Appellee’s App.

Vol. II at 57, 61. 

[15] On January 25, 2018, the Church appealed the trial court’s “Final Orders in 

Garnishment” and stated in their notice of appeal that this court had 

jurisdiction because the “Final Orders in Garnishment” were final judgments. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 30. A month later, through its new appellate counsel, 

the Church filed an amended notice of appeal that again stated our court had 

jurisdiction because the court’s “Final Orders in Garnishment” were final 

judgments. Id. at 38. On May 11, 2018, the Church filed a motion seeking to 

dismiss its appeal because, it asserted that the trial court’s “Final Orders in 

Garnishment” were not “final judgments” and argued the garnishment orders 

were improper because the trial court’s order enforcing the parties’ settlement 

agreement did not constitute a final judgment and proceedings supplemental 

“necessarily require a final judgment to execute.” Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 148-

50. 

[16] Grimes objected to the motion to dismiss the appeal based on his contentions 

that, under Indiana law, an order issued as a result of proceedings supplemental 

is a “final judgment” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction and a “final 

judgment” against all parties is not required for a plaintiff to seek proceedings 

supplemental on a judgment entered against some of the parties. Appellants’

App. Vol. VI at 7-19. Alternatively, Grimes requested that this court award 
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appellate attorney fees because it would be unfair for Grimes to bear the 

financial costs of the Church’s tactical mistake in filing an appeal, especially 

when Grimes was prepared to defend the garnishment orders on appeal and 

because the trial court’s order allowed for reasonable attorney fees in enforcing 

the judgment. Id. at 20. On June 6, 2018, this court issued an order granting 

the Church’s motion to dismiss and granting Grimes’s request for appellate 

attorney fees, ordering the trial court to determine the amount to be awarded. 

Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 51-52. 

[17] On July 5, 2018, Grimes filed a motion with the trial court for reasonable 

attorney fees, requesting $6,456.71. Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 2-4. The Church

filed a motion in opposition, arguing that the attorney fees should be reduced to 

$2,594.95. Id. at 43-44. The trial court granted attorney fees in the full amount 

requested by Grimes, stating “Court finds that the amount of appellate attorney 

fees is reasonable for the services provided and made necessary by [the 

Church’s] initiating an appeal that they later sought and were granted dismissal 

without prejudice by the Indiana Court of Appeals.” Id. at 99. 

[18] On July 24, 2018, the Church filed a motion to vacate, requesting that the trial 

court vacate the August 10, 2017 order enforcing the settlement agreement. Id. 

at 45-49. In its motion, the Church contended the trial court’s judgment should 

be vacated because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the alleged 

settlement agreement never occurred, the alleged settlement agreement was 

unenforceable, and the judgment was erroneously entered without hearing and 

was inconsistent with Grimes’s allegations of an agreement. Id. at 45-75. On 
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August 29, 2018, the trial court denied the Church’s motion to vacate and 

entered final judgment against the Church. Id. at 100-01. The Church now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

[19] The Church initially argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over Grimes’s claims. The Church contends that the First Amendment 

precluded Grimes’s claims against it because the determination of such issues 

would require inquiry into ecclesiastical law, doctrine, or polity. The Church

claims that Grimes’s claims cannot be resolved without interpretation of 

religious, doctrinal, and ecclesiastical principles, specifically contained in the 

Book of Discipline of the Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (“the 

Discipline”). As support for its claim, the Church notes that the Discipline 

provides the procedures under which pastors receive wages and benefits and 

how salary disputes are resolved. 

[20] It has long been held that the First Amendment to the United States 

Constitution requires civil courts to refrain from interfering in matters of church 

discipline, faith, practice, and religious law. Stewart v. Kingsley Terrace Church of 

Christ, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 542, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 

U.S. 679, 727 (1871)). “Thus, civil courts are precluded from resolving disputes 

involving churches if ‘resolution of the disputes cannot be made without 

extensive inquiry . . . into religious law and polity . . . .’” Id. (quoting Serbian E.
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Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)). However, the First 

Amendment does not entirely prohibit courts from deciding issues related to 

religious organizations. Id. (citing Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450, 455 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1996)). Instead, courts can apply neutral principles of law to churches 

without violating the First Amendment. Id. (citing Konkle, 672 N.E.2d at 455).

The First Amendment only prohibits the court from determining underlying 

questions of religious doctrine and practice. Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend 

Diocese, Inc., 714 N.E.2d 253, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. 

[21] In Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne-South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003), 

our Supreme Court held that a court with general authority to hear matters like 

employment disputes is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction because the 

defendant pleads a religious defense. Id. at 290. Here, Indiana courts, 

including the Marion Superior Court and this court, have the general authority 

to hear matters such as Grimes’s claims regarding breach of contract and unjust 

enrichment in an employment dispute. The First Amendment claims of the 

Church did not deprive the trial court of its subject matter jurisdiction over 

Grimes’s claims. 

[22] The Church asserts that determination of whether Grimes was an employee

and, therefore, the resolution of his claims, would require a prohibited inquiry 

into the Discipline because the Discipline contains procedures regarding a 

pastor’s compensation. However, the Discipline’s provisions that the Church 

point to as support for their arguments are procedural and administrative and 

do not concern church doctrine or religious law. Grimes’s claims did not hinge 
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on a review of his performance as a pastor or an interpretation of ecclesiastical

law and polity, but only on whether a contract existed that required CME, 

Second District, and Stewart Memorial to pay Grimes wages or whether unjust 

enrichment occurred when Grimes was not paid for his services as a pastor. 

We, therefore, conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over 

Grimes’s claims, and it properly rejected the Church’s challenges to the 

contrary.1

II. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement

[23] The Church next argues that the trial court erred when it entered judgment on 

Grimes’s motion to enforce settlement agreement without having first held an 

evidentiary hearing. It contends that Grimes’s motion was erroneously granted 

based on a flawed interpretation of Marion County Local Rule LR49-TR5-203. 

The Church asserts that LR49-TR5-203 does not expressly require a written 

response, but merely established a deadline for filing a written response if the 

opposing party decides to file one. It further claims that, because the rule did 

not require a written response to Grimes’s motion, LR49-TR5-203 did not 

 

1 Grimes also raised claims under the Indiana Wage Claims Statute and Wage Payment Statute. Grimes 

concedes that, had his case gone to trial rather than being settled, his claim under the Wage Claims Statute 

would have failed because he did not first file a claim with the Indiana Department of Labor and exhaust his 

administrative remedies as required. See Alexander v. Linkmeyer Dev. II, LLC, 119 N.E.3d 603, 620 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2019). As to his claim under the Wage Payment Statute, the Church argues that the trial court did not 

have subject matter jurisdiction because the Wage Payment Statute only applies to current employees and 

those who have voluntarily left employment, see Indiana Code § 22-2-5-1, and Grimes was not a current 

employee at the time he filed his complaint, and he claimed that he was terminated, not that he voluntarily 

left his employment. Rather than showing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Church’s arguments are a 

challenge to the legal sufficiency of Grimes’s claims. Therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction 

over Grimes’s claim under the Wage Payment Statute.
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provide any basis for the trial court’s entry of judgment against it, and the trial 

court’s entry of judgment without allowing the Church to present arguments at 

a hearing amounted to the functional equivalent of a default judgment, for 

which the local rule does not provide a basis. Because the trial court erred in 

granting Grimes’s motion to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, the 

Church maintains that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny 

their motion to vacate that judgment. 

[24] The Church is actually appealing from a denial of its motion to vacate the order 

enforcing the settlement agreement, not the previously entered judgment on 

Grimes’s motion to enforce settlement agreement. When reviewing a trial 

court’s denial of a motion to vacate its judgment, we review for an abuse of 

discretion. Kolbet v. Kolbet, 760 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing

In re Marriage of Bates, 474 N.E.2d 140, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). An abuse of 

discretion occurs where the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and inferences supporting the judgment. Id. 

[25] Here, Grimes filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement, which detailed

what transpired during the parties’ settlement conference and evidence of the 

parties’ agreement and requested a hearing. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 55-68. 

The trial court set it for a hearing. Id. at 70. The Church filed no written 

response. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 26. After the deadline to file a response had 

passed, see generally Marion County Circuit and Superior Court Civil Rule 
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LR49-TR5-203,2 Grimes filed a motion to vacate the hearing date, contending 

that there was no need to conduct a hearing because the Church’s lack of 

response showed that Grimes’s evidence was undisputed and the trial court 

could rule on his motion to enforce the settlement agreement based on the 

evidence Grimes submitted. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 71-72. The Church did 

not object to this motion and again filed no response. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 

26. Fifteen days later, the clerk filed an order from the trial court granting 

Grimes’s motion to vacate the hearing. Id.; Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 55. The 

Church did not file any objection to this order vacating the hearing, nor did it

file anything requesting that the hearing be rescheduled so that it could present 

evidence and argument. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 26. On August 10, 2017,

several weeks later, the clerk filed an order from the court granting Grimes’s 

motion to enforce settlement agreement and entering judgment against the 

Church for $80,000.00. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 74. 

[26] Thirty days later, the Church filed a motion to correct error, requesting that the 

August 10 order be set aside and requesting that a hearing be set because the 

trial court’s order enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement entered judgment 

“for a set amount” and “[did] not properly include the terms that were part of 

the settlement conference and [did] not accurately set the terms of the deal.” Id. 

 

2 LR49-TR5-203 states in pertinent part: “If the statement regarding the position of the opposing party(ies) 

required under subsection A herein indicated that objection to the granting of said motion may ensue, said 

objecting party shall have 15 days from the date of filing to file a response to said motion.” LR49-TR5-

203(B).
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at 123-24. No other errors were alleged in the motion. Id. The trial court 

denied the motion to correct error on September 19, 2017. Appellants’ App. Vol. 

II at 29. On July 24, 2018, the Church filed a motion to vacate the trial court’s 

order enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement, raising ten arguments, none 

of which had been presented in response to Grimes’s motion to enforce 

settlement agreement, and only two of which had been presented in the motion 

to correct error, specifically, that the judgment should have awarded payment 

in installments rather than a lump-sum, and the trial court should have held a 

hearing. Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 45-75. 

[27] We conclude that it was proper for the trial court to issue an order on Grimes’s 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement without holding a hearing. 

Initially, the trial court was not required to conduct a hearing on Grimes’s 

motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Under LR49-TR5-203(C), “any 

oral argument requested may be heard at the discretion of the Court.” 

Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion to make a ruling on Grimes’s 

motion without first conducting oral argument or a hearing on the motion.

[28] Secondly, the Church’s lack of action regarding the motions filed by Grimes 

and the actions taken by the trial court weaken its arguments. The Church

failed to file a response in opposition to Grimes’s motion, and then again failed 

to file a response or objection when Grimes filed a motion to vacate the hearing 

set for the initial motion to enforce the settlement agreement. These failures to 

respond or object to Grimes’s motions created an inference that the Church did 

not oppose those motions, particularly considering the statements in the motion 
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to vacate the hearing, which contended that there was no need to conduct a 

hearing because the Church’s lack of response showed that Grimes’s evidence 

was undisputed and the trial court could rule on his motion to enforce the 

settlement agreement based on the evidence Grimes submitted. Appellants’ App. 

Vol. V at 71-72. Fifteen days passed before the trial court granted Grimes’s 

motion to vacate the hearing,3 and then several weeks passed before the trial 

court issued its order granting Grimes’s motion to enforce the settlement 

agreement. At no time from June 9, 2017, when Grimes filed his motion to 

enforce the settlement agreement, until August 10, 2017, when the trial court 

granted the motion and entered judgment against the Church, did the Church

file any responses or objections to the motions filed. Although the Church’s 

contentions appear to indicate that they did not believe it was necessary to file a 

response to Grimes’s motions because it planned to argue its position at the 

scheduled hearing, if this were true, the trial court’s order vacating the hearing 

should have prompted them to file an objection. The Church did not file any 

sort of objection to the enforcement of the settlement agreement or vacation of 

the hearing until it filed a motion to correct error on September 8, 2017. Id. at 

123-24. The Church failed to raise its contentions before the trial court until 

after a ruling on the motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement had 

been made. A party may not raise an issue for the first time in a motion to 

 

3 Although the Church argues that the trial court did not comply with LR49-TR5-203 because it granted 

Grimes’s motion to vacate hearing on the same date that the motion was filed, the order granting the motion 

was not actually filed by the clerk until July 14, 2017, fifteen days after the motion was filed. Appellants’ App. 

Vol. II at 26. 
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correct error or on appeal. Christmas v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship, 952 

N.E.2d 872, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d 745, 

752 (Ind. 2000)). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it ruled on Grimes’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement without 

conducting a hearing.

[29] The Church also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted 

Grimes’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement because no settlement 

agreement existed. Specifically, the Church contends that (1) the purported oral 

settlement agreement is unenforceable because it violates the Statute of Frauds,

(2) the evidence of the settlement agreement presented by Grimes’s counsel was 

inadmissible because the statements of counsel are not evidence, and counsel 

should have withdrawn under Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct 3.7, 

which states that a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial where the 

lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness, (3) no settlement agreement existed 

because there was no evidence that the required meeting of the minds occurred

or evidence to demonstrate agreement on the essential terms of the purported 

settlement agreement, and (4) the trial court’s judgment contravened the terms 

of the alleged settlement agreement. We note that all of these issues, except for 

(4), were raised for the first time by the Church in its motion to vacate on July 

24, 2018. Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 45-49. 

[30] In its order enforcing the settlement agreement, the trial court found that the 

parties had reached an agreement and entered judgment in favor of Grimes and 

against the Church in the amount of $80,000.00. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 80. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 20 of 26

The Church asserts that the allegations by Grimes’s counsel showed that it had, 

in fact, rejected Grimes’s last counteroffer and had presented a new 

counteroffer to Grimes, and before Grimes could accept such counteroffer, the 

Church revoked the counteroffer, leaving no offer accepted and no settlement 

terms still pending. The Church thus maintains that no offer and acceptance 

occurred, and no enforceable settlement agreement existed. We disagree and,

as we explain below, conclude that the evidence presented by Grimes in his 

motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement was sufficient to support 

the judgment by the trial court. 

[31] “Indiana strongly favors settlement agreements and if a party agrees to settle a 

pending action, but then refuses to consummate his settlement agreement, the 

opposing party may obtain a judgment enforcing the agreement.” MH Equity 

Managing Member, LLC v. Sands, 938 N.E.2d 750, 757 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 

(citing Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind. 2003)), trans. denied.

Settlement agreements are governed by the same general principles of contract 

law as other agreements. Id. Generally, a settlement agreement is not required 

to be in writing. Id. (citing Estate of Skalka v. Skalka, 751 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2001)). The existence of a contract is a question of law, and the basic 

requirements are “offer, acceptance, consideration, and ‘a meeting of the minds 

of the contracting parties.’” Id. (quoting Batchelor v. Batchelor, 853 N.E.2d 162, 

165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). The intention of the parties to a contract is a factual 

matter that must be determined from all the circumstances. Zimmerman v. 

McColley, 826 N.E.2d 71, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). To be valid and enforceable, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 21 of 26

a contract must be reasonably certain and definite. Zukerman v. Montgomery, 

945 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “All that is required to render a 

contract enforceable is reasonable certainty in the terms and conditions of the 

promises made, including by whom and to whom; absolute certainty in all 

terms is not required.” Id. Only essential terms are necessary for a contract to 

be enforceable. Id.

[32] Here, the evidence4in Grimes’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement 

established that after initial discussion, Grimes offered to settle his claims 

against the Church for $90,000.00. Id. at 66. The Church counteroffered for 

$40,000.00 and a confidentiality provision. Id. Grimes agreed to the 

confidentiality provision and counteroffered for $80,000.00 paid via an initial 

reasonable lump-sum payment followed by a reasonable payoff of the balance 

over time, and an attorney fee provision should the Church fail to pay. Id. The 

Church agreed to the $80,000.00 settlement payment and the attorney fee 

provision and proposed that the initial payment be $15,000.00 with semi-annual 

payments of the balance over four years. Id. Grimes’s counsel then called 

 

4 As to the Church’s arguments that there was no admissible evidence presented to establish that an 

agreement has occurred, we disagree. When Grimes filed his motion to enforce the settlement agreement, he 

included two exhibits, a letter that he had sent to counsel for the Church, outlining what had transpired 

during the settlement conference and emails between counsel discussing whether the Church would honor 

the agreement. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 62-67. Additionally, we disagree with its contention that Grimes’s 

counsel was required to withdraw under Indiana Professional Conduct Rule 3.7(a), which states that a 

lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. If the 

Church believed that Grimes’s counsel was prohibited from acting as both an advocate and a witness as to 

what transpired at the settlement conference, it should have moved to disqualify him at the time the motion 

to enforce the settlement agreement was filed. If the Church had done so, then a hearing could have been 

held to determine if the attorney should have been disqualified from arguing the motion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 22 of 26

Grimes to convey the parties’ agreement and confirm his approval of the 

payment terms the Church had recommended. Id. As Grimes’s counsel was 

preparing to return to the conference room to convey Grimes’s approval of its 

proposed payment terms, the Church’s counsel attempted to rescind the parties’ 

agreement, stating that he only had authority to offer $50,000.00. Id. A followup conversation between the parties occurred, during which Grimes’s counsel 

reserved the right to enforce the settlement agreement reached at $80,000.00, 

and counsel for the Church acknowledged Grimes’s right to do so. Id. From 

this evidence, the parties had reached a reasonable certainty on the essential 

terms of the settlement agreement, $80,000.00 in a reasonable initial lump sum 

and reasonable installments thereafter, a confidentiality clause, and an attorney 

fee provision in favor of Grimes should the Church fail to pay. We conclude 

that, from the undisputed evidence, the trial court was within its discretion to 

determine that the parties had agreed to settle the case for $80,000.00 and, 

therefore, did not abuse its discretion in granting Grimes’s motion to enforce 

the settlement agreement.5 

[33] The Church also argues that there was no enforceable agreement under the 

Statute of Frauds because the agreement could not be performed within one 

 

5 The Church also contends that the trial court’s judgment contravened the terms of the settlement 

agreement. However, as we have concluded that the parties had reached a reasonable certainty on the 

essential terms of the settlement agreement, $80,000.00, in a reasonable initial lump sum, and reasonable 

installments thereafter, a confidentiality clause, and an attorney fee provision in favor of Grimes should the 

Church fail to pay, the trial court was within its discretion to enter judgement in favor of Grimes in the 

amount of $80,000.00. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 23 of 26

year of the agreement. Indiana Code section 32-21-1-1 provides in pertinent 

part:

(b) A person may not bring any of the following actions unless 

the promise, contract, or agreement on which the action is based, 

or a memorandum or note describing the promise, contract, or 

agreement on which the action is based, is in writing and signed 

by the party against whom the action is brought or by the party's 

authorized agent:

. . . .

(5) An action involving any agreement that is not to be 

performed within one (1) year from the making of the agreement.

Ind. Code § 32-21-1-1(b)(5). The one-year clause of the Statute of Frauds 

applies “only to contracts which, by the express stipulations of the parties, were 

not to be performed within a year, and not to those which might or might not 

upon a contingency, be performed within a year.” Tobin v. Ruman, 819 N.E.2d 

78, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Wallem v. CLS Indus., Inc., 725 N.E.2d 880, 

887 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied. In other words, “it is apparent that only 

if it is impossible for an oral contract to be completed within one year does it fall 

within the Statute of Frauds.” Id. (emphasis in original).

[34] Here, the essential terms of the settlement agreement between the parties was 

for $80,000.00, in a reasonable initial lump sum, and reasonable installments 

thereafter, a confidentiality clause, and an attorney fee provision in favor of 

Grimes should the Church fail to pay. Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 66. Although 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 24 of 26

the attorneys thereafter discussed what the “reasonable lump-sum payment” 

and “reasonable payoff of the balance over time” would be, those specifics were 

not material terms, which is clear from the trial court’s judgment, which only 

ordered a judgment in favor of Grimes in the amount of $80,000.00. Id. at 80. 

While the Church did not expect to pay the settlement amount in less than one 

year, such an expectation is not sufficient to cause the agreement to be 

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. See Tobin, 819 N.E.2d at 85. We, 

therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied the Church’s motion to vacate the order enforcing the settlement 

agreement.

III. Attorney Fees

[35] The Church lastly argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

awarded attorney fees. It initially claims that the attorney fee award was an 

abuse of discretion because the award was based on a provision in the order 

enforcing the settlement agreement that authorized attorney fees expended in 

Grimes’s enforcement of the judgment, and it maintains that the judgment was 

void. However, if we find that the judgment was not void, as we have in this 

opinion, the Church further contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

because the attorney fee award was unreasonable for the services provided, and 

the appellate attorney fees requested by Grimes were not made necessary by the 

Church’s initiation of the previous premature appeal. Therefore, the Church

requests that we reduce the attorney fee amount to $2,594.98.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 25 of 26

[36] We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees, and the amount of any such 

award, for an abuse of discretion. R.L. Turner Corp. v. Wressell, 44 N.E.3d 26, 38 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Franklin, 814 N.E.2d 281, 

286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the 

trial court’s award is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before the court. Id. “‘An award of attorney’s fees will be 

reversed on appeal as excessive only where an abuse of the trial court’s 

discretion is apparent on the face of the record.’” Id. (quoting Daimler Chrysler, 

814 N.E.2d at 287. We do not reweigh the evidence, but instead, we determine 

whether the evidence before the trial court can serve as a rational basis for its 

decision. Id. (citing DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown, 29 N.E.3d 729, 732 (Ind.

2015)). 

[37] In the present case, although the trial court included in its order enforcing the 

settlement agreement an order that Grimes “shall be entitled to recover his 

reasonable attorney fees in enforcing said judgment,” Appellants’ App. Vol. V at 

80, the attorney fees at issue in this appeal were ordered pursuant to this court’s 

order dismissing the appeal filed by the Church in January 2018 and dismissed 

in June 2018. Appellee’s App. Vol. II at 51. Thereafter, Grimes submitted his 

request for reasonable appellate attorney fees to the trial court, asking for 

$6,456.71. Appellants’ App. Vol. VI at 2-5. His request set out the work done in 

association with the appeal filed by the Church, including conducting research 

and preparation in anticipation of responding to arguments on appeal, 

responding to and researching the motion to dismiss their own appeal filed by 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PL-2346 | August 26, 2019 Page 26 of 26

the Church, preparing a motion to strike filed by Grimes, and preparing the 

motion for attorney fees, totaling 26.25 hours at $245.97 per hour. Id. 

[38] Grimes contends that the attorney fee award was reasonable because in the 

previous appeal, his counsel not only opposed the motion to dismiss the appeal 

based on a contention that the Church’s legal arguments were wrong, but that 

his counsel also expended time preparing a defense of the garnishment orders 

that he argues were ripe for appeal. Appellee’s Br. at 42 (citing Appellants’ App. 

Vol. VI at 17). He also asserts that it was reasonable to spend time preparing the 

motion to strike a reply that the Church had no right to file and that raised a 

new argument and that such a motion was not frivolous just because it was not 

granted. Id. at 42-43. We agree and conclude that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it awarded appellate attorney fees in the amount of 

$6,456.71. 

[39] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Najam, J., concur.