1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United Stated District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable

John M. Mason, late a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-1847

___________

Robert Venetucci, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Minnesota.

*

Constance C. Reese; Kathleen Hawk- * [UNPUBLISHED]

Sawyer; Colin Powell; United States *

Parole Commission, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: September 6, 2002

 Filed: September 11, 2002 (corrected 9/13/02)

___________

Before LOKEN, BYE, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Federal prisoner Robert Venetucci appeals the district court’s1

 dismissal of his

28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition and the denial of his motion to reconsider. We affirm.
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In 1983 Venetucci was extradited from the United States to Italy to face

charges of extortion. Thereafter, he was charged in Italy with complicity to commit

murder. In March 1986 Venetucci was sentenced to life imprisonment by a court in

Italy, and began to serve his sentence there. In 1998, pursuant to his request and

consent, Venetucci was transferred to the United States to serve his life sentence.

Venetucci’s presumptive parole date was calculated to be November 1, 2013. After

Venetucci filed an unsuccessful section 2241 petition, claiming his extradition was

unlawful, he filed the instant section 2241 petition, arguing that (1) his extradition,

during which the United States allowed the additional charge of complicity to commit

murder to be asserted against him, violated the Constitution and certain extradition

treaties; and (2) the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has miscomputed his

sentence in that his presumptive parole release date is mandatory, not discretionary,

and the BOP should have counted his Italian “good-time” credit toward that date.

The district court initially dismissed the entire petition as successive, but on

Venetucci’s motion for reconsideration, reviewed (and rejected) the merits of the

sentence-computation claim.

We need not reach the more complicated issue of the successiveness of the

extradition claim, because the record plainly demonstrates that the claim is without

merit. At the 18 U.S.C. § 4108 hearing to verify his consent to transfer, and in a

subsequent written and signed affirmation, Venetucci agreed that any legal

proceeding challenging his conviction or sentence had to be brought in Italy--an

agreement which is consistent with federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3244; see also

Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 615 F.2d 873, 876 (9th Cir.) (requirement

that offender sentenced by foreign sovereign not challenge conviction in United

States court is not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 908 (1980). Given the

representations that Venetucci made at the consent-to-transfer hearing, we reject his

content that his consent was not voluntary. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of
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verity.”); Pfeifer, 615 F.2d at 876 (considerations in determining validity of consentto-transfer waiver). 

Venetucci’s sentence-computation claim is also without merit. The paroleeligibility statute clearly vests discretion in the Parole Commission to deny parole

under specified circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206(d) (repealed 1987)

(“Commission shall not release [parole-eligible] prisoner if it determines that he has

seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or that there is a

reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State, or local crime”); United

States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47 (1978) (release to parole is conditioned on review

by Parole Commission). We also agree with the district court that Venetucci’s Italian

good-time credit did not alter his presumptive parole date: good-time credit

deductions apply to a definite term of years, and not to a life sentence. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 4161 (repealed 1987) (prisoner confined “for a definite term other than for life . . .

shall be entitled to a deduction [for good-time credit] from the term of his sentence

beginning with the day on which the sentence commences to run”). 

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.