[Cite as Briskey v. KAF Properties, 2019-Ohio-4563.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

RICHARD A. BRISKEY, : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff - Appellant : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

KAF PROPERTIES LLC, : Case No. 19 CAE 07 0042 

 : 

 Defendant - Appellee : O P I N I O N 

 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

17 CVH 100661 

 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: November 4, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

DAVE LACKEY PATRICK H. BOGGS 

Sybert, Rhoad, Lackey & Swisher, LLC JOHN P. MILLER 

153 S. LIberty St. Onda, LaBuhn, Rankin & Boggs Co., LPA 

Powell, Ohio 43065 35 North Fourth Street, Suite 100 

 Columbus, Ohio 43215-2511 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Richard A. Briskey, appeals the decision of the Delaware County 

Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for summary judgment and granting Appellee 

KAF Properties, LLC’s motion for summary judgment. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 

{¶2} Gregory Filbrun and his company, AHV Construction, LLC defaulted on a 

loan made to them by Appellant, Richard A. Briskey. Mr. Filbrun filed for bankruptcy 

protection, so Appellant attempted to collect the debt from Appellee, relying upon Gregory 

Filbrun's signature on a cognovit note, purportedly signing on behalf of Appellee. Kathleen 

Filbrun, wife of Greg Filbrun and owner of KAF Properties objected, claiming that Greg 

Filbrun had no authority to sign on behalf of her company. Appellant argued that Mr. 

Filbrun was authorized as an agent to bind KAF, but the trial court disagreed and found 

that the Appellee was entitled to summary judgment. 

{¶3} AHV Construction, LLC, Gregory Filbrun's company was suffering financial 

distress. Appellant had the resources to provide a loan and attorney Brian Duncan was 

a mutual acquaintance of both parties who was aware of financial status of the parties. 

While the details are not clear, Attorney Duncan did concede that he was part of the 

reason that Appellant and Gregory Filbrun began discussing a loan from Appellant to AHV 

Construction, LLC. 

{¶4} Appellant and Mr. Filbrun reached an agreement regarding the terms of a 

loan and reported the same to Attorney Duncan, and he drafted a cognovit note for $132, 

000.00 dated January 24, 2017. The terms of this note and the following two notes were 

negotiated by Appellant and Mr. Filbrun and then relayed to Attorney Duncan for drafting. 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 3 

{¶5} Mr. Filbrun failed to make timely payments on the January 24, 2017 note, 

and he and Appellant negotiated a second cognovit note in the amount of $242,500.00, 

dated July 5, 2017. Mr. Filbrun again defaulted and a third note was issued in the amount 

of $255,000.00, dated August 29, 2017. The parties agreed that the final note replaced 

the first two notes and represented the total amount of principal and interest on the date 

of the execution of the note. 

{¶6} The second and third notes included a signature line captioned KAF 

Properties, LLC, Gregory A. Filbrun, Authorized Representative. In his deposition, 

Attorney Duncan contended this addition was negotiated between the parties to the note 

and was incorporated at their request. Mr. Filbrun stated in an affidavit that Attorney 

Duncan included it without consulting with him. Regardless of who was responsible, Mr. 

Filbrun signed the notes in the space reserved for the authorized representative of 

Appellee, KAF Properties, LLC. 

{¶7} The note was not paid in a timely fashion and Appellant filed a complaint 

and entry confessing judgment on the note and began foreclosure on real estate held by 

Appellee. Kathleen Filbrun, principal of Appellee and the sole member of its parent 

company, F-Holdings, LLC first received notice of Appellee’s purported involvement as a 

borrower on the cognovit note and its inclusion in the judgment when she received notice 

of the complaint. Appellee sought and was granted relief from judgment, based upon its 

contention that Gregory Filbrun was not an authorized agent and Appellee did not receive 

any consideration for the loan or the note. 

{¶8} Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment repeating the same argument 

that it presented in its motion for relief from judgment. Appellee contended that it had no 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 4 

knowledge of the transactions and had not authorized Gregory Filbrun to sign on its 

behalf. Further, Appellee contended that it had done nothing that could reasonably be 

interpreted as granting Mr. Filbrun apparent agency to bind it. Finally, it contended that 

it had not received any consideration for the loan and thus the note did not create a 

binding contract. 

{¶9} Appellant responded that Mr. Filbrun did have apparent authority to bind the 

company based upon his actions in litigation. Mr. Filbrun appeared at an environmental 

court hearing regarding problems with a property titled to Appellee and signed a pleading 

allegedly on behalf of Appellee. Appellee's principal, Kathleen Filbrun, was aware of the 

litigation and her husband's appearance, but believed he was investigating what repairs 

were to be completed on the property. She was not notified of any settlement and did not 

authorize him to bind the company. 

{¶10} Appellant included his affidavit with his motion for summary judgment 

stating: 

I no reason(sic) to doubt whether Greg had the authority to sign Note 2 and 

Note 3 on behalf of KAF. I relied upon the fact that those notes were 

prepared by an attorney (Brian Duncan) who purported to represent the 

makers on those notes, as well as Greg's signatures purporting to be an 

authorized agent for AHV and KAF. 

{¶11} The trial court found that Appellee was entitled to summary judgment 

because there were no material questions of fact remaining to be resolved and the single 

legal issue, whether Gregory A. Filbrun had authority to execute the notes on behalf of 

Appellee, must be decided in favor of Appellee. Appellant dismissed the claims against 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 5 

AHV and Gregory A. Filbrun that were not decided by the motion for summary judgment 

and filed a timely notice of appeal with four assignments of error: 

{¶12} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT GREG FILBRUN 

LACKED EXPRESS OR ACTUAL AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE PROMISSORY NOTES 

ON BEHALF OF KAF.” 

{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT GREG FILBRUN 

LACKED APPARENT AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE PROMISSORY NOTES ON BEHALF

OF KAF.” 

{¶14} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT KAF COULD NOT 

BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTES UNDER THEORIES OF 

WAIVER AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.” 

{¶15} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT KAF COULD NOT 

BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTES AS AN ACCOMMODATION 

PARTY BECAUSE IT RECEIVED NO CONSIDERATION.” 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

{¶16} We review cases involving a grant of summary judgment using a de novo 

standard of review. Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-

Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24. A de novo review requires an independent review of 

the trial court's decision without any deference to the trial court's determination. Brown v. 

Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 87 Ohio App.3d 704, 711, 622 N.E.2d 1153 (4th Dist.1993) 

as cited in State v. Standen, 9th Dist., 173 Ohio App.3d 324, 2007-Ohio-5477, 878 N.E.2d 

657, ¶ 7. “Thus, viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the [appellant], we 

must determine whether [appellee] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Civ.R. 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 6 

56(C). Troyer v. Janis, 132 Ohio St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 6 (2012). 

Accordingly, we apply the same standard as the trial court and court of appeals in this 

case. *771 Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 24 (2002). “* * * we afford no deference to the trial court's 

decision and independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment 

is appropriate.” Tornado Techs., Inc. v. Quality Control Inspection, Inc., 8th Dist., 2012-

Ohio-3451, 977 N.E.2d 122, ¶ 13. 

ANALYSIS 

{¶17} This case is before us on the accelerated calendar which is governed by 

App.R. 11.1. Subsection (E), Determination and Judgment on Appeal, provides in 

relevant part: “The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall be 

sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason for the court's 

decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.” 

{¶18} One of the important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable an 

appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case on 

the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated. 

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th 

Dist.1983). 

{¶19} This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned 

rules. 

{¶20} Appellant has listed four assignment of error, but resolution of each 

assignment is dependent on the determination of whether Gregory Filbrun was an agent 

of Appellee and therefore we will focus on that issue. 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 7 

{¶21} Appellant asserts Gregory Filbrun was an express agent of Appellee acting 

with apparent authority. The creation of an agency relationship may be express or 

implied. “The relationship of principal and agent, and the resultant liability of the principal 

for the acts of the agent, may be created by the express grant of authority by the principal. 

Absent express agency, the relation may be one of implied or apparent agency.” Master 

Consolidated Corp. v. BancOhio Natl. Bank, 61 Ohio St.3d 570, 574, 575 N.E.2d 817 

(1991). Apparent agency exists “where one who is assuming to act as an agent for a party 

in the making of a contract but in fact has no actual authority to do so, such party will 

nonetheless be bound by the contract ‘if such party has by his words or conduct, 

reasonably interpreted, caused the other party to the contract to believe that the one 

assuming to act as agent had the necessary authority to make the contract.’” Scott v. 

Kindred Transitional Care & Rehab., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103256, 2016–Ohio–495 

¶13 quoting Master Consolidated, 61 Ohio St.3d at 576, 575 N.E.2d 817 quoting Miller v. 

Wick Bldg. Co., 154 Ohio St. 93, 93 N.E.2d 467 (1950). 

{¶22} For a principal to be bound by the acts of his agent under the theory of 

apparent authority, evidence must affirmatively show the existence of an express agency 

relationship and : (1) that the principal held the agent out to the public as possessing 

sufficient authority to embrace the particular act in question, or knowingly permitted him 

to act as having such authority, and (2) that the person dealing with the agent knew of 

those facts and acting in good faith had reason to believe and did believe that the agent 

possessed the necessary authority. Master Consolidated Corp., supra at syllabus. The 

burden of proving that apparent authority exists rests upon the party asserting the agency. 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 8 

Scott supra at ¶ 15 quoting Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co., 16 Ohio App.3d 191, 

475 N.E.2d 127 (2nd Dist.1984). 

{¶23} The Appellant has not presented evidence that supports the existence of an 

express grant of authority by Appellee to Gregory Filbrun. We have reviewed the record 

before us and find insufficient evidence to establish an express agency relationship 

between Appellee and Gregory Filbrun and, therefore, we hold that the record contains 

no evidence of apparent authority. 

{¶24} Appellant describes past litigation and offered copies of pleadings in support 

of his contention that an agency relationship arose from the actions of Appellee. We have 

reviewed the record and the litigation cited by Appellant and, whether reviewed 

individually or considered collectively, these facts do not support a conclusion that 

Gregory Filbrun was an agent of Appellee for the purpose of executing the cognovit notes 

that are the subject of this litigation. 

{¶25} Appellant suggests that the filing of a notice of a bankruptcy filing by 

Gregory Filbrun in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Carolyn Filbrun, et al., 

Montgomery County Common Pleas 2007 CV 09793 should be construed as evidence 

of an agency relationship, but the pleading offered by Appellant lists Gregory Filbrun as 

a defendant in that matter. Neither Mrs. Filbrun nor Appellant provide any context 

regarding the nature of that litigation or the purpose of the attached filing. We will not 

speculate regarding the circumstances regarding that pleading. 

{¶26} Appellant refers to an allegation in a complaint filed on Gregory Filbrun's 

behalf that states that Appellee was a holding company created by Mr. Filbrun and 

interprets that statement as an admission by Appellee that Appellant was an owner of the 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 9 

company. We cannot stretch the language of that allegation to mean anything more than 

what is alleged--that Mr. Filbrun claims that he allegedly created Appellee. Ownership 

and control of Appellee is not addressed. 

{¶27} Appellant offers a copy of an answer filed in a lawsuit against Appellant, 

Kathleen Filbrun and Appellee, and argues that because only Mr. Filbrun signed the 

document, he was acting on behalf of Appellee and Mrs. Filbrun. That pleading expressly 

lists all three defendants as acting pro se, and there is nothing in the document indicating 

that Mr. Filbrun was acting on behalf of Appellee, refuting any argument that Appellant 

was acting on behalf of any of the parties. 

{¶28} Appellant points to another action filed in Franklin County's Environmental 

Court involving Appellee's property. Mrs. Filbrun retained counsel to represent Appellee 

and, though she was aware that Mr. Filbrun was attending hearings, she assumed his 

role was only to discover the nature of the complaint and make repairs. In that case, the 

City of Columbus asked to have Mr. Filbrun joined as a party because he "may claim an 

interest in the real estate which is the subject matter of this action" and further alleged 

that Mr. Filbrun was "an owner/occupant and/or interested party in this case pursuant to 

Columbus City Code Section 4703.01(E)(5) and (6) by virtue of being an agent and/or 

manager and /or having care and control of the property." The trial court in that case 

granted the motion without any finding regarding Appellant's status. We cannot draw any 

conclusion regarding the status of Mr. Filbrun from the allegations, though Mrs. Filbrun 

did admit that Mr. Filbrun did "handywork" on the property, suggesting that he was seen 

by the City of Columbus as a person who held himself " out to be in charge, care or control 

of the premises as evidenced by performing maintenance or repairs on the premises ***" 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 10 

Columbus City Code 4703.01(E)(6). The record provided does not contain sufficient 

explanation of the facts of the environment court action to rely on the allegations of the 

City as evidence of an express grant of authority by Appellee to Mr. Filbrun. 

{¶29} Appellant contends that "At some point, Greg and/or Katie decided to hire 

attorney Brian Duncan ("Attorney Duncan") to represent KAF. (See Katie tr. p. 29, lines 

11-19 and Duncan tr. page 15, line 13 through page 16, line 1)." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9) 

However, Mrs. Filbrun (Katie) denied that she knew Attorney Duncan and instead 

referenced an attorney who she only remembered as "Andy" who she believed may have 

worked at the same firm. She never spoke to Attorney Duncan regarding this litigation. 

Attorney Duncan was hired by Gregory Filbrun (Duncan Deposition, p. 8, lines 12-17) and 

he did not represent that Gregory Filbrun was an agent of KAF, though he assumed that 

was true. (Duncan Deposition, p. 84, lines 9-11; p. 94 lines 1-4). The fact that Mr. Filbrun 

appeared at hearings, hired Attorney Duncan and the litigation involved both Mr. Filbrun 

and Appellee does not support the existence of an express grant of authority by Appellee 

to Mr. Filbrun. 

{¶30} The fact that legal bills for representation of KAF may have been paid by 

Mr. Filbrun's company also falls short of demonstrating an express agency. 

{¶31} Because Appellant did not demonstrate Gregory Filbrun was an agent of 

Appellee as a result of express grant of authority by Appellee, we need not consider 

Appellant's argument that Mr. Filbrun had apparent authority to bind KAF to the obligation 

in the cognovit note. We noted in Globalcor Assoc. v. Law Office of Robert Soles, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00090, 2019-Ohio-2208, ¶¶ 57-58, "that [a]pparent authority” and 

“apparent agency” are sometimes referred to interchangeably but are in fact two different 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 11 

theories. “Apparent agency is a distinct concept from apparent authority; while the first 

works to create an agency relationship between two parties, the second expands the 

authority of an actual agent, and thus, apparent authority is relevant only if actual agency 

has already been established.” To establish liability premised upon apparent authority, 

evidence of a principal/agent relationship is a prerequisite. Mr. Filbrun and Appellee did 

not have a principal/agent relationship when Appellant executed the cognovit notes. Thus, 

the doctrine of “apparent authority” is inapplicable. 

{¶32} Appellant's reliance on the holding of Master Consol. Corp. v. Bancohio 

Natl. Bank, 61 Ohio St.3d 570, 570, 575 N.E.2d 817, (1991) is misplaced as that case is 

dealing with an established relationship of principal and agent and the question was 

whether the agent had the authority to act. That express agency relationship does not 

exist in this case, so further analysis of apparent authority is unnecessary. 

{¶33} If we were to consider whether the facts support an apparent agency, we 

would come to the same conclusion. "To establish liability premised upon apparent 

agency, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant made representations leading the 

plaintiff to reasonably believe that the wrongdoer was operating as an agent under the 

defendant's authority, and (2) the plaintiff was thereby induced to rely upon the ostensible 

agency relationship to his detriment. See Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co. (1943), 141 

Ohio St. 584, 26 O.O. 161, 49 N.E.2d 925, paragraph four of the syllabus. Shaffer v. 

Maier, 68 Ohio St.3d 416, 1994-Ohio-134, 627 N.E.2d 986 (1994). Appellant did not 

provide evidence that he relied upon representations of the Appellee. Instead, within his 

affidavit he states: 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 12 

I no reason (sic) to doubt whether Greg had the authority to sign Note 2 and 

Note 3 on behalf of KAF. I relied upon the fact that those notes were 

prepared by an attorney (Brian Duncan) who purported to represent the 

makers on those notes, as well as Greg's signatures purporting to be an 

authorized agent for AHV and KAF. 

{¶34} All of the Appellant's argument regarding the allegation that Gregory Filbrun 

was an agent as a result of his involvement in litigation is made moot by this statement, 

as Appellant did not rely on this information to conclude that Mr. Filbrun had authority to 

sign the note nor did he rely on any representations or actions of Appellee. 

{¶35} We find that there were no material issues of fact that remained to be 

resolved and, even construing the evidence most strongly to favor the Appellant, the trial 

court did not err in finding that no agency relationship was created authorizing Mr. Filbrun 

to execute notes on behalf of Appellee and that Appellee was entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. 

{¶36} The Appellant's first and second assignments of error are denied. 

{¶37} Appellant's third and fourth assignments of error, that the "trial court erred 

when it held that KAF could not be held liable under the promissory notes under theories 

of waiver and equitable estoppel" and that “KAF could not be held liable under the 

promissory notes under theories of waiver and equitable estoppel” are rendered moot by 

our denial of the first two assignments of error. As Gregory Filbrun did not have any 

authority to bind the Appellee to pay the notes, we need not decide whether it waived any 

defense, was bound by equitable estoppel or signed as an accommodation party. 
Delaware County, Case No.19 CAE 07 0042 13 

{¶38} Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error are denied and the 

decision of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Wise, Earle, J. concur.