IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2013 WY 15

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2012

February 6, 2013

IN THE INTEREST OF RB,

STATE OF WYOMING, by and

through the office of the PARK

COUNTY ATTORNEY,

Appellant

(Objector),

v.

WYOMING STATE HOSPITAL,

Appellee

(Petitioner),

and 

RB,

Appellee

(Respondent).

S-12-0141

Appeal from the District Court of Park County

The Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

William K. Struemke, Deputy Park County Attorney, Park County Attorney’s 

Office, Cody, Wyoming

Representing Appellee Wyoming State Hospital:

Gregory A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy 

Attorney General
Representing Appellee RB:

No appearance.

Before KITE, C.J., and HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, and DAVIS, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building,

Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be

made before final publication in the permanent volume.
1

DAVIS, Justice.

[¶1] The Fifth Judicial District Court involuntarily hospitalized RB, a middle-aged 

man, at the Wyoming State Hospital after a period of emergency detention at West Park 

Hospital in Cody, Wyoming. He was detoxified of opiates and other controlled 

substances and eventually stabilized on psychotropic medications. The State Hospital 

gave notice that it intended to discharge RB, and the Park County Attorney’s Office filed 

an objection with the district court, claiming a right to a hearing on the merits of the State 

Hospital’s decision. The district court found that Park County had no statutory right to 

object to RB’s discharge, and therefore had no standing to do so. We find that the 

involuntary hospitalization statutes do not provide authority for a county attorney to 

object to the proposed discharge of a patient from involuntary civil commitment, and we 

therefore affirm.

I. ISSUE

[¶2] Does a county attorney1have authority to object to a patient’s discharge from

involuntary civil commitment under Chapter 10 of Title 25 of the Wyoming Statutes?

II. FACTS

[¶3] In late November of 2011, a mental health examiner filed an application to 

involuntarily hospitalize RB in the Fifth Judicial District Court for Park County. The 

application stated that RB was being emergently detained as a suicide risk pending a 

hearing on whether he should be involuntarily hospitalized at the Wyoming State 

Hospital. The district court appointed counsel for RB and set a hearing on both 

involuntary hospitalization and continued emergency detention. A deputy Park County 

attorney appeared on behalf of the State at that hearing, which took place before a court 

commissioner. The commissioner made findings of facts and recommended that RB be 

hospitalized at the State Hospital in Evanston, Wyoming. The district court adopted the 

commissioner’s recommendations and entered an appropriate order. 

[¶4] RB had a history of opiate dependence and opiate-induced depression beginning in 

2000. The record suggests that RB had an injury or illness which was treated with 

opiates. This evidently led to addiction and subsequent drug-seeking behavior involving 

efforts to persuade health care providers that his condition required treatment with the 

substances to which he was addicted. Dr. Robert Hartmann, RB’s treating psychiatrist at 

the State Hospital, found that other health care providers had in fact inappropriately 

 

1 The statute involved in this case refers to both county and district attorneys. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-

116(b) (LexisNexis 2011). For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to county attorneys in this

decision.
2

prescribed opiates and other controlled substances in 2011, resulting in depression and

suicidal ideation which led to RB’s involuntary hospitalization. 

[¶5] After RB was detoxified and stabilized on psychotropic medications to address 

mental illness, the State Hospital gave notice to the district court, RB’s attorney, a 

community health center, and the Park County Attorney that conditions justifying 

involuntary hospitalization no longer existed, and that it therefore intended to discharge 

him in about eight days. Although it was not expressly stated in the notice, the 

conclusion that hospitalization was no longer justified implied a finding that RB was no 

longer a danger to himself or others as he had been when involuntarily hospitalized. 

[¶6] The Park County Attorney filed an objection to the State Hospital’s medical 

determination, asserting that the district court should order RB’s continued 

hospitalization because he had several prior emergency detentions and involuntary 

hospitalizations. Park County is obligated to pay for the first seventy-two hours of 

emergency detention, and believes that it should not be required to incur the expense of 

doing so repeatedly without an opportunity to demonstrate that the patient should not be

discharged. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-112(a)(i)(A) (LexisNexis 2011). It appears 

from the record that Park County’s interest in objecting to RB’s discharge was largely if 

not entirely financial.

[¶7] The State Hospital then submitted a discharge plan which reiterated that RB had 

stabilized and that he was fully capable of managing his own affairs. The court set a 

hearing in which RB, his treating psychiatrist Dr. Hartmann, and the Wyoming Attorney 

General’s Office participated by telephone. 

[¶8] Dr. Hartmann, who was called by the Attorney General’s Office, was the only 

witness at the hearing. He testified that RB was almost completely detoxified when he 

arrived at the State Hospital on December 6, 2011, and that he was therefore essentially 

physically and mentally normal at that time. RB gave Dr. Hartmann a history of opiate 

dependence, including a relapse in late September of 2011. Instead of being detoxified 

and released from other health care facilities after his relapse, he was unfortunately given 

even larger doses of opiates and benzodiazepines by those care providers, and as a result 

became suicidal. 

[¶9] Dr. Hartmann testified that RB indicated that he had never attempted suicide, and 

that he always sought help when he was in trouble. He concluded that RB’s current 

problems were caused by medications supplied by professional healthcare providers. RB 

was a cooperative patient, although he did engage in drug-seeking behavior consistent 

with his addiction. Dr. Hartmann concluded that continued involuntary hospitalization at 

the State Hospital was inappropriate because the patient had been detoxified and was no 

longer suicidal. He testified that the State Hospital does not treat substance abuse
3

problems, including addiction to opiates, and therefore had nothing to offer RB in that

respect.

[¶10] In cross-examination, the deputy county attorney sought to establish that persons 

at risk for suicide may not be forthright about prior suicide attempts. Dr. Hartmann 

admitted that he had not seen all of RB’s medical and psychological records or 

interviewed his family. He reiterated his conclusion that RB spoke of committing suicide 

only when intoxicated with opiates. 

[¶11] Although it conducted the hearing described above, the trial court found that the 

statute governing discharge from involuntary hospitalization did not allow a county 

attorney to object to the State Hospital’s decision to discharge an involuntarily 

hospitalized patient, or to obtain an evidentiary hearing concerning that decision. The 

evidence just described was not therefore significant to its ruling. This appeal was timely 

perfected.

[¶12] RB did not participate in this appeal. In criminal cases, a county attorney or 

district attorney represents the State of Wyoming. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-1-801, 804 

(LexisNexis 2011) (delineating the judicial districts in which the district attorney 

prosecutes criminal cases on behalf of the State, as opposed to the county attorney); Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 18-3-301 (LexisNexis 2011) (“In judicial districts in which the office of 

district attorney has not been created there shall be elected in each county a county and 

prosecuting attorney . . . .”). In this case, however, it is clear that the Park County 

Attorney represents the interests of Park County. We will therefore refer to those interests 

as those of the county attorney or Park County rather than of the State. The State 

Hospital is, of course, a sub-agency of the State of Wyoming. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶13] The district court framed its decision in terms of standing, and the parties also 

identified standing as an issue in their briefs. The concept of standing limits a private 

citizen or organization’s right to challenge the actions of government in the courts to 

those cases in which the challenger presents a justiciable controversy, among other

things. See, e.g., Miller v. Wyoming Dep’t of Health, 2012 WY 65, ¶ 17, 275 P.3d 1257, 

1261 (Wyo. 2012). 

[¶14] As a political subdivision of the State, a county has no powers other than those 

granted by Wyoming’s constitution or its statutes, as well as those powers which can 

reasonably be implied from expressly granted powers. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Sublette 

Cnty. v. Exxon Mobil Corp, 2002 WY 151, ¶ 22, 55 P.3d 714, 721 (Wyo. 2002) (citing 

River Springs Ltd. Liability Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Teton, 899 P.2d 

1329, 1335 (Wyo. 1995); Dunnegan v. Laramie Cnty. Comm’rs, 852 P.2d 1138, 1142 

(Wyo. 1993)).
4

[¶15] The parties agree that the ability of Park County to challenge a discharge from the 

State Hospital and to obtain an evidentiary hearing on the propriety of that discharge 

depends on whether or not it has statutory authority to do so. It is more fitting to speak of 

the authority granted to counties under the involuntary hospitalization statutes than to 

frame the issue as one of standing. It is appropriate for this Court to review controversies 

like this in which a political subdivision and a State agency seek a construction of 

applicable statutes and a determination of their correlative rights. Carbon Cnty. Sch. 

Dist. No. 2 v. Wyo. State Hosp., 680 P.2d 773, 775 (Wyo. 1984). 

[¶16] District court decisions interpreting statutes involve questions of law, requiring de 

novo review by this Court. Exxon Mobil Corp., ¶ 7, 55 P.3d at 718 (citing Sellers v. 

Dooley Oil Transp., 2001 WY 44, ¶ 10, 22 P.3d 307, 309 (Wyo. 2001)). The basic rules 

of statutory construction are well established:

We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the 

Legislature’s intent. We begin by making an inquiry

respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 

employed according to their arrangement and connection.

When the court determines, as a matter of law, that a

statute is clear and unambiguous, it must give effect to the

plain language of the statute and should not resort to the rules

of statutory construction. If, on the other hand, the Court

determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic

aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the 

legislature’s intent.

Basin Elec. Power Co-op. v. Bowen, 979 P.2d 503, 506 (Wyo. 1999) (internal quotation

marks omitted) (ellipsis omitted).

[¶17] “[L]egislative intent, manifested in the plain language of the statutes, is the 

controlling consideration” in our interpretation of them. In re Osenbaugh, 10 P.3d 544, 

550 (Wyo. 2000). This intent is the “vital part, and the essence of the law.” Rasmussen v. 

Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). In keeping with the legislature’s intent, 

we endeavor to give statutes a “reasonable, practical construction.” KP v. State, 2004 WY 

165, ¶ 22, 102 P.3d 217, 224 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Story v. State, 755 P.2d 228, 231 

(Wyo. 1988)). We do not construe statutes “in a manner producing absurd results.” Id.

Put another way, “[w]hen a statute is as clear as a glass slipper and fits without strain, 

courts should not approve an interpretation that requires a shoehorn.” Demko v. United 

States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
5

[¶18] We do not construe statutes in a way that renders any part of them meaningless.

Osenbaugh, 10 P.3d at 550; see State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue v. Hanover 

Compression, LP, 2008 WY 138, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2008) (“Moreover, we 

must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 

another interpretation.” (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2005 WY 

60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005))). We will not “extend a statute to matters that 

do not fall within its express provisions,” Hanover Compression, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d at 784 

(quoting BP Am. Prod. Co., ¶ 15, 112 P.3d at 604), nor “expand the plain language of a 

statute to encompass requirements beyond those clearly set out by the legislature.” Miller 

v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 888 (Wyo. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by In re Crago,

2007 WY 158, 168 P.3d 845 (Wyo. 2007). As part of our analysis, we construe all 

statutes relating to the same subject matter together:

All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in

ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating

to the same subject or having the same general purpose must

be considered and construed in harmony. . . . We construe the

statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and

sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari

materia.

Hanover Compression, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d at 784 (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co., ¶ 15, 112 P.3d at 

604).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Background – Involuntary Hospitalization Proceedings in Wyoming

[¶19] Title 25, Chapter 10 of the Wyoming Statutes governs the involuntary 

hospitalization of mentally ill persons who pose a danger to themselves or others. See 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-10-101–127 (LexisNexis 2011). The State exercises its parens 

patraie powers under Title 25 to care for those who cannot care for themselves. Robert B. 

Keiter, A Constitutional Analysis of Involuntary Civil Commitment in Wyoming, 15 Land 

& Water L. Rev. 141, 151–52 (1980). The involuntary hospitalization (also referred to as 

civil commitment) statutes provide a judicial process to protect both the mentally ill and 

the communities in which they reside. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S. 

Ct. 1804, 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its 

parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of 

emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police 

power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally 

ill.”); Moore v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531, 1538–39 (D. Wyo. 1993) (describing 

how Wyoming’s emergency detention statute “constitutes a reasonable attempt by the 

state legislature to balance the interests of the mentally ill individual against the interests
6

of the state”). We have previously described our civil commitment statutes as “wellintentioned,” and “meant to protect people who are thought to be mentally ill.” Holm v. 

State, 404 P.2d 740, 741 (Wyo. 1965). 

[¶20] There are limits to the State’s power to impose involuntary hospitalization on a 

citizen. The Wyoming and Federal Constitutions both provide that no person shall be 

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. 5; 

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6. Civil commitment is a significant deprivation of an individual’s 

liberty. Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d 586, 592 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting 

Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3048, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 

(1983)). It involves both a loss of freedom and the possibility of adverse social 

consequences. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 1263, 63 L. Ed. 2d 

552 (1980) (citation omitted). Due process therefore requires the State to have a 

constitutionally adequate purpose for the confinement. Reiter, ¶ 19, 36 P.3d at 592 

(quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 361, 103 S. Ct. at 3048).

[¶21] The general purpose of civil commitment “is to treat the individual’s mental 

illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 

368, 103 S. Ct. at 3052. Wyoming’s civil commitment statues require a showing of

mental illness to justify involuntary hospitalization.2 An individual must be shown to be

a present danger to himself or others and to require treatment. See § 25-10-101(a)(ix) 

(defining mental illness). The head of a hospital or other medical professionals make this 

determination. See id. at (a)(iv)–(v) (defining “examiner” and “head of hospital”); § 25-

10-103 (“Subject to the rules and regulations of the hospital, the head of a hospital may 

admit persons who have symptoms of mental illness pursuant to W.S. 25-10-106, 25-10-

109 or 25-10-110.”).

[¶22] Due process also limits the duration of involuntary hospitalization--it must bear 

“some reasonable relation” to the purpose of the commitment. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 

U.S. 715, 738, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 1858, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972)). Once a patient “has 

recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,” he is entitled to release. Jones, 463 U.S. 

at 368, 103 S. Ct. at 3052 (citation omitted). 

B. Involuntary Hospitalization Procedure and Examinations

 

2 Keiter, supra, at 152 (“The [civil commitment] statutes almost uniformly require a showing of mental

illness . . . .”); see, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-106 (allowing the head of the hospital to admit a person 

with symptoms of mental illness upon a voluntary application for admission); § 25-10-109 (providing a 

process for emergency and continued detention of mentally ill persons); § 25-10-110 (allowing 

involuntary hospitalization of mentally ill persons). See also § 25-10-114 (giving the Department of 

Corrections authority to transfer mentally ill inmates to the State Hospital if correctional facilities cannot 

provide adequate treatment).
7

[¶23] It is worth reviewing the process by which involuntary hospitalization begins and

proceeds before discussing its termination by discharge from the State Hospital. A law

enforcement officer or examiner (generally a mental health professional) who believes

that a patient is mentally ill--meaning that he is a danger to himself or others and needs

treatment--may initiate emergency detention in a local hospital or other suitable facility. 

§ 25-10-109(a); § 25-10-101(a)(iv), (ix). An examiner is required to conduct a 

preliminary examination of the patient within twenty-four hours of the initial detention. § 

25-10-109(b). If the examiner determines that the patient is mentally ill, he may be 

detained a maximum of seventy-two hours, during which time a hearing must be held to 

determine whether or not detention should continue pending proceedings for involuntary 

hospitalization. Id. at (h). An attorney must be appointed to represent the patient. Id. 

[¶24] Proceedings for involuntary hospitalization are commenced by the filing of a 

written application with the district court. § 25-10-110(a). The court must expedite the 

proceedings, and the county attorney appears in the public interest. Id. at (c). An 

additional examination is required, after which a hearing is to be set within five days if 

the examination indicates that the patient is mentally ill and in need of involuntary 

hospitalization. Id. at (e)–(f). If the patient is found by clear and convincing evidence to 

be mentally ill, the district court may order treatment at the “least restrictive and most 

therapeutic” alternative, which may be the State Hospital. Id. at (j), (h).

[¶25] As can be seen from this brief summary, the involuntary hospitalization statutes 

require the county attorney to participate in civil commitment proceedings, at least to the 

point at which the patient is actually hospitalized. After the patient is hospitalized,

Wyoming Statute § 25-10-116(a)3requires the head of the hospital or his designee to

 

3 This section, titled “Periodic examinations of patients; determination of discharge or continued

hospitalization; notice; hearing,” provides as follows:

(a) Three (3) months after each patient’s admission to the hospital, the 

head of the hospital shall evaluate the progress of each patient and shall 

reevaluate the treatment and progress every six (6) months thereafter.

(b) When the head of a hospital determines after the examination 

required by subsection (a) of this section or by W.S. 25-10-113 that the 

conditions justifying hospitalization of involuntary patients no longer 

exist, he shall report his determination to the court, the county attorney, 

the district attorney, family members and the mental health center which 

were involved in the initial proceedings. Unless, within three (3) days 

after the notice is sent, the court upon motion orders a hearing on 

continuing the patient’s hospitalization, the head of the hospital shall 

discharge the patient. The hearing shall be held as soon as practicable 

and shall follow the procedures in W.S. 25-10-118. Notice of the hearing 

shall conform with W.S. 25-10-116(c).
8

conduct periodic examinations of patients. Id.; § 25-10-101(a)(v). See also § 25-10-113 

(requiring preliminary examinations of newly-admitted patients). This case followed the 

usual pattern of civil commitment proceedings in Wyoming. However, it presents a 

question as to whether, having acted in the public interest to obtain an order of 

involuntary hospitalization, the county attorney has the right to: (1) object to a proposed 

discharge by the State Hospital; (2) compel an evidentiary hearing; and (3) obtain a court 

order requiring the hospital to continue hospitalization after it has determined that the 

patient should be discharged. 

C. Right to Objection to Proposed Discharge Decisions

[¶26] Park County asserts that it has statutory authority to object to a proposed discharge 

because Wyoming Statute § 25-10-116(b) requires the State Hospital to give county 

attorneys notice of a proposed discharge. That subsection provides as follows:

(b) When the head of a hospital determines after the

examination required by subsection (a) of this section or by

W.S. 25-10-113 that the conditions justifying hospitalization

of involuntary patients no longer exist, he shall report his

determination to the court, the county attorney, the district

attorney, family members and the mental health center which

were involved in the initial proceedings. Unless, within three

(3) days after the notice is sent, the court upon motion orders

a hearing on continuing the patient’s hospitalization, the head 

of the hospital shall discharge the patient. The hearing shall 

be held as soon as practicable and shall follow the procedures 

in W.S. 25-10-118. Notice of the hearing shall conform with 

W.S. 25-10-116(c).

 

(c) When the head of a hospital determines after an evaluation required 

by subsection (a) of this section or by W.S. 25-10-113 that the conditions 

justifying hospitalization continue to exist, he shall send to the court 

notice of his determination and a detailed statement of the factual basis 

for the determination. The court may order a hearing to review the 

determination. The head of the hospital shall also send notice of his 

determination to the patient and the person responsible for his care or 

custody. The notice shall include:

(i) The patient’s right to contest the determination;

(ii) The patient’s right to a hearing; and

(iii) The patient’s right to counsel.

§ 25-10-116.
9

§ 25-10-116(b). The foregoing provision contemplates that a hearing may be held after 

notice of intent to discharge is given. The question then becomes “who has a statutory 

right to the hearing?” Although we find the involuntary hospitalization statutes 

ambiguous in some respects, we believe they are clear on the issue of the statutory 

authority of a county attorney to object to and prevent discharge. 

[¶27] Section 116(b) provides that notice of a discharge hearing shall be governed by 

Section 116(c), which in turn governs the notice required when the hospital determines 

that continuing hospitalization is required. Section 116(c) provides that notice of a 

hearing on continuing hospitalization (or discharge) is sent only to the patient and the 

person responsible for his care or custody. Id. at (b)–(c). The notice includes: (1) the 

patient’s right to contest the determination; (2) the patient’s right to a hearing; and (3) the 

patient’s right to counsel. Id. at (c). Section 116(b) also refers to Section 118, which 

requires that: 

(a) A hearing shall be conducted in accordance with this

section when a patient contests one (1) of the following

actions:

(i) Transfer pursuant to W.S. 25-10-114 or 25-10-

115;

(ii) Continuing hospitalization pursuant to W.S. 25-

10-116; or

(iii) Repealed by Laws 1989, ch. 147, § 2.

(iv) (iv) Revocation of convalescent status release

pursuant to W.S. 25-10-127.

(b) Unless otherwise provided, an objection shall be filed

with the court within five (5) days of receipt of notice of the

intended action. The court shall set a hearing date which shall

be within fourteen (14) days of receipt of the objection. If an

objection is not filed within five (5) days, or if the patient

consents to the action, the court may enter an ex parte

order authorizing the action.

(c) The hearing shall be before the court, without a jury. If the

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:

(i) The transfer or continuing hospitalization is

justified, the court shall enter an order
10

authorizing the transfer or continuing

hospitalization; or

(ii) The transfer or continuing hospitalization is not

justified, the court shall enter an order

prohibiting the transfer or continuing

hospitalization.

§ 25-10-118 (emphasis added).

[¶28] We must read these statutes in pari materia, as they are part of a statutory scheme, 

and in this case, because they refer to each other. See Hanover Compression, ¶ 8, 196 

P.3d at 784 (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co., ¶ 15, 112 P.3d at 604) (explaining how we read 

statutes relating to the same subject matter in pari materia). We review statutes in 

context, and attempt to harmonize statutory provisions with other provisions relating to 

the same subject matter. State of Wyo. Dep’t of Corr. v. Watts, 2008 WY 19, ¶ 23, 177 

P.3d 793, 799 (Wyo. 2008). If given a choice between reading a statute as to render part 

of it meaningless, or of harmonizing related statutory provisions to give effect to all of 

the statutory provisions, we choose the latter. See Hanover Compression, ¶ 8, 196 P.3d 

at 784 (explaining why we do not interpret statutes to render them meaningless if the 

statutes are “susceptible of another interpretation” (quoting BP Am. Prod. Co., ¶ 15, 112 

P.3d at 604)).

[¶29] Reading these statutes in pari materia, as we are required to do, we are compelled 

to conclude that only the patient may object to a proposed discharge under Section 116. 

The statutes can hardly be read otherwise, as they consistently refer to the patient’s 

consent, the patient’s right to contest actions taken, and the patient’s right to counsel. It 

is especially telling that the notice provided to the patient under Section 116(c) includes 

notice of the patient’s right to contest a determination and to a hearing. See § 25-10-

116(c). Although one would be inclined to assume that a patient would normally be in 

favor of discharge, counsel for the State Hospital indicated at oral argument that patients 

who feel they need more treatment do indeed object to discharge occasionally, which 

seems a plausible reason for the legislature to have chosen the language it did. 

[¶30] Park County asserts that the requirement of notice in Section 116(b) implies a 

right for county attorneys to object to a proposed discharge. It further asserts that any of 

the other listed persons or entities may also object to a proposed discharge under Section 

116(b), obtain a hearing, and perhaps persuade the court to order continued 

hospitalization of the patient despite the State Hospital’s determination. Why else, it 

asks, would the statute require notice?

[¶31] To allow the county attorney, community mental health center, and family 

members to delay a discharge by requiring a hearing on the State Hospital’s decision
11

would make little sense in light of the statutory scheme. It is true that these persons or

entities may be essential to identifying individuals who are a danger to themselves or

others, initiating emergency detention, and pursuing involuntary hospitalization. They

must perform these functions at the local level because of the very nature of the process

designed by the legislature. Local law enforcement officers and mental health care

providers are in the best position to identify individuals requiring involuntary

hospitalization. Local district judges are well-situated to provide due process, and local

county attorneys who routinely practice before those judges are a logical choice to

represent the public interest in securing involuntary hospitalization.

[¶32] However, after involuntary hospitalization has been ordered, these same persons 

or entities, with the possible exception of family members, are unlikely to have 

meaningful contact with a patient or access to his treatment records, particularly when 

hospitalization is at the Wyoming State Hospital. They generally receive no detailed 

information regarding the current state of the patient’s mental health, and thus have little 

or no information to provide a legitimate medical basis upon which to object to 

discharge, at least without some process to obtain the necessary information. 

[¶33] On the other hand, patients involuntarily hospitalized at the State Hospital are 

cared for by mental health professionals who specialize in the treatment of mental illness, 

including assessment of the threat a patient poses to himself and others. As the 

psychiatrist here believed to be the case, a threat that the patient may harm himself can be 

the result of substance abuse or the failure to take psychotropic medications, and that 

threat may disappear when these problems are addressed. The State Hospital’s decision 

that an individual is no longer dangerous to himself or others is a medical determination. 

See § 25-10-116(b) (requiring the discharge of involuntarily committed patients “[w]hen 

the head of a hospital determines . . . that the conditions justifying hospitalization of 

involuntary patients no longer exist . . . .” ; § 25-10-101(a)(v) (“When this act requires or 

authorizes the head of a hospital to perform an act which involves the practice of 

medicine, the act shall be performed by a physician . . . .”). The legislature delegated the 

responsibility for such decisions to the head of a hospital or other attending physicians, 

and we have no choice but to abide by the plain language of the statute “viewed in light 

of its object and purpose.” See Terex Corp. v. Hough, 2002 WY 112, ¶ 9, 50 P.3d 317, 

321 (Wyo. 2002) (“Wyoming law requires that legislative intent be ascertained, as nearly 

as possible, from the language of the statute viewed in the light of its object and 

purpose.” (quoting Streeter v. Amerequip Corp., 968 F. Supp. 624, 629 (D. Wyo. 1997))). 

[¶34] We have consistently held that the legislature is presumed to enact statutes with 

full knowledge of the law:

All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with

full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference

thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed in harmony
12

with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform

system of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be

determined in connection, not only with the common law and

the constitution, but also with reference to the decisions of the

courts.

Hall v. Park County, 2010 WY 124, ¶ 19, 238 P.3d 580, 586 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting 

Hannifan v. American Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶ 7, 185 P.3d 679, 683 

(Wyo. 2008)). 

[¶35] We must therefore credit the legislature with knowledge that an involuntarily 

hospitalized patient has a right to be released when he is no longer a danger to himself or 

others. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 368, 103 S. Ct. at 3052 (describing when, as a matter of 

due process, a patient has a right to release from commitment); see also Kansas v. 

Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (“[W]e 

have traditionally left to legislators the task of defining terms of a medical nature that 

have legal significance [in civil commitment statutes].”) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 365 

n.13, 103 S.Ct. at 3050 n.13).

[¶36] The hearing conducted in this case provides a good illustration of why the remedy 

sought by Park County was not what the Wyoming Legislature intended. The county 

attorney called no expert witness to contradict the State Hospital psychiatrist’s expert 

opinion that RB no longer posed a threat to himself or others after detoxifying and being 

established on a psychotropic medication regimen. Cross-examination established only 

that he had suffered from similar problems in the past, and that perhaps the psychiatrist 

had not seen all of the existing prior treatment records. Dr. Hartmann found none of this 

information significant to his determination that RB had ceased to be a danger to himself 

or others. 

[¶37] RB may in fact suffer from periods of mental illness requiring emergency 

detention or involuntary hospitalization in the future, as the county attorney claims. 

Nonetheless, there is no legal basis for continuing involuntary hospitalization based only 

on a possibility that a patient who is not currently mentally ill as that term is defined by 

statute will in the future become ill again based on his past behavior. If further episodes 

occur, the patient’s liberty may be restrained through involuntary hospitalization only 

upon proof of mental illness by clear and convincing evidence, not on the basis of 

speculation or possibilities. See Keiter, supra, at 170 n.182 (“The objectives of the 

Wyoming State Hospital are to . . . return treated and rehabilitated patients to society at 

the earliest practicable date.” (quoting 1978 Report from the Wyoming State Hospital, at 

*1 n.38, in 1978 Annual Report of the Board of Charities and Reform 30 (1978))). 

[¶38] In the words of our own Justice Potter, “[c]ourts are not at liberty to depart from 

that meaning [of a statute] which is plainly declared.” Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 128, 50 P. at
13

821. The statutes here do not contain direct language to the effect that a county attorney

may object to discharge on behalf of the State, and the legislature could easily have

included that language if that had been its intent. It has done so in other statutes.

[¶39] For example, if the State Hospital decides that a person previously found not 

guilty of a crime because of mental illness or deficiency is no longer affected by mental 

illness or deficiency, or that he no longer presents a substantial risk of danger to himself 

and others, the applicable statute requires application to the district court for an order to 

allow him to be released. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(e) (LexisNexis 2011). It mandates 

that the court hold a hearing on the application as soon as possible, clearly recognizes the 

State’s right to object to release, and allocates to it the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the State Hospital’s conclusion is incorrect. Id. The 

interests implicated by an involuntary civil commitment and a finding of not guilty by 

reason of mental illness are obviously quite different, and we must presume that the 

legislature chose not to create an explicit right to a hearing in Section 116(b) in 

recognition of those differences.

[¶40] On the other hand, the Wyoming Legislature might reasonably have concluded 

that a patient’s family, the mental health center involved in his emergency detention and 

involuntary hospitalization, and the county attorney could benefit from notice of 

discharge. Notice may enable the patient’s family members and the local mental health 

center to secure housing, to schedule counseling, and to arrange for medication 

management. The county attorney may also benefit from notice for a variety of reasons--

he or she may have withheld criminal charges that will be pursued when the patient is 

released, may see fit to notify victims in past criminal cases, or may distrust the State 

Hospital’s conclusions and notify local law enforcement to be aware that in the county 

attorney’s opinion the patient may pose a threat to the community despite the State 

Hospital’s conclusions.

[¶41] Park County also argues that it is entitled to object to discharge from involuntary 

hospitalization because county attorneys represent the interests of the public in initial 

proceedings for involuntary hospitalization under Section 25-10-110(c). That subsection 

reads as follows:

Proceedings under this section shall be entitled “In the 

Interest of . . . .”. The county attorney of the county where the 

application is filed shall appear in the public interest. The 

court shall expedite the proceedings.

§ 25-10-110(c). Park County contends that this statute imposes a duty to ensure that a 

patient’s discharge is in the public interest. 
14

[¶42] The statute does not provide the breadth of authority claimed by Park County.

The introductory phrase “[p]roceedings under this section” limits the county attorney’s 

duty to appear in the public interest to proceedings to initiate involuntary hospitalization.

Those procedures are defined by § 25-10-110. The provisions pertaining to discharge 

from involuntary hospitalization are contained in a separate section, § 25-10-116. As 

already noted, if the legislature had intended to authorize county attorneys to represent 

the public interest at all phases of the process, it could and would have done so, for 

reasons already discussed.

[¶43] In essence, Park County argues that the legislature intended for county attorneys to 

provide a check against erroneous discharge decisions by the State Hospital. The Court 

does not minimize the important role county attorneys play in obtaining orders of 

involuntary hospitalization. However, the legislature created and funded a state 

institution staffed with professionals specializing in the care of the involuntarily 

hospitalized, and in the assessment of the danger they pose to themselves and others as 

they are treated for mental illness. It is difficult to conceive of a reason that the 

legislature, having created this specialized institution, would choose to empower oftenoverworked local county attorneys without staffs qualified to evaluate mental illness to 

assess and challenge a discharge decision made by the specialists employed by that

institution.4

V. CONCLUSION

[¶44] Park County’s frustration with a system in which counties are required to pay for 

repeated emergency detention for certain patients is understandable. Many who suffer 

from mental illness or addiction never completely vanquish the demons controlling their 

lives, but instead manage only to hold them at bay for what may be discouragingly brief 

periods of time. Some therefore require episodic care at considerable expense to both the 

State and the counties. 

[¶45] However, the plain language of Wyoming Statute § 25-10-116(b) does not give 

Wyoming county attorneys the authority to object to a patient’s discharge from 

involuntary civil commitment or to obtain review of the State Hospital’s decision to 

release a patient from involuntary hospitalization. Their statutory authority is limited to 

 

4

Park County also points out that Department of Health regulations allow county attorneys to object to

convalescent leave under Title 25. Dep’t of Health, State Hospital, Rules & Regs. For Convalescent 

Leave From Involuntary Hospitalization, ch. 10, § 4(c)(ii), (iii) (filed 7/3/12); see also § 25-10-105(a)(i) 

(requiring the Department of Health to adopt standards governing the State Hospital). This regulation has 

not been challenged by either party, and does not apply because RB was not placed on convalescent 

leave. Whether the regulation is authorized by statute is not an issue raised by this appeal, and we do not 

consider it, but do note that the county’s interests when a patient who has improved, but who has not been 

found to no longer be a danger to himself or others, may differ from those involved when that finding has 

been made.
15

representing the public in initial proceedings for involuntary hospitalization under § 25-

10-110. A reasonable, practical construction of the civil commitment statutes is that they 

were written to ensure that the head of the hospital or other medical professionals 

determine a patient’s eligibility for discharge, and to provide that only the patient may 

object and obtain a hearing as provided in § 25-10-118. Whether the current statutory 

scheme in which counties must pay for repeated expensive periods of emergency 

detention imposes an unfair financial burden on the counties is an issue more properly 

addressed with the Wyoming Legislature. Affirmed.