2015 IL 116223

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 116223) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. JOSE GAYTAN,

Appellee. 

Opinion filed May 21, 2015.

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Chief Justice Garman and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Karmeier, and 

Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant, Jose Gaytan, was a passenger in a car that had a rear-mounted, 

ball-type trailer hitch. Police officers stopped the car, believing that the trailer hitch 

obstructed the vehicle’s license plate in violation of section 3-413(b) of the Illinois 

Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)). During the stop, the officers 

recovered cannabis belonging to defendant and he was subsequently charged with 

unlawful possession of cannabis and unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to 

deliver. 

¶ 2 In the circuit court of McLean County, defendant filed a motion to suppress 

evidence, arguing that the trailer hitch was not prohibited under section 3-413(b) 
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and, therefore, the police officers had no reasonable, articulable suspicion that an 

offense was being committed when they stopped the car. The motion was denied 

and defendant was found guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to 

deliver. 

¶ 3 The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction, holding that the circuit 

court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress. 2013 IL App (4th) 120217. 

We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 

2013); R. 612(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the 

judgment of the appellate court. 

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The car in which defendant was riding was stopped by police officers because

the car had a ball-type trailer hitch which the officers believed obstructed the car’s 

rear license plate in violation of section 3-413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 

ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)). When the driver of the car rolled down her window, 

the officers detected an odor of cannabis. A subsequent search of the car revealed a 

diaper bag containing cannabis, which the driver indicated belonged to defendant. 

Police asked defendant about the cannabis, and he nodded in agreement that it was 

his. The officers then arrested defendant. 

¶ 6 A McLean County grand jury indicted defendant for unlawful possession of 

cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful 

possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). Prior to trial, defendant 

filed a motion to suppress evidence in which he contended that the trailer hitch was 

not prohibited by section 3-413(b) and, therefore, there was no reasonable, 

articulable suspicion that an offense was being committed when the officers 

conducted the traffic stop. Thus, defendant argued that the stop was an invalid 

seizure and the cannabis had to be suppressed. 

¶ 7 At the hearing on defendant’s motion, Chenoa police officer Karl Ladtkow 

testified that he and Officer Dan Crowley were on stationary radar detection patrol 

on Interstate 55 near Chenoa, Illinois. Ladtkow’s attention was drawn to a purple 

Lincoln Mark V because of “the color of the vehicle and the big tires on the 

vehicle.” As the car drove past, Ladtkow observed it “had a trailer hitch on the back 
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and there was a ball on the back that obscured the license plate.” The officers 

decided to follow the vehicle. 

¶ 8 Ladtkow testified that, from his perspective while following the vehicle, “the 

hitch was covering some of the numbers on the plate.” Therefore, according to 

Ladtkow, the officers were unable to run a computer check of the license plate 

numbers to identify the owner. On cross-examination, Ladtkow explained that, as 

he followed behind the Lincoln, he could not see all the numbers on the plate 

“unless I got right up on to the bumper of the vehicle and [could] look over that and 

see, you know, what number that was.” Ladtkow acknowledged that once he had 

stopped the Lincoln and walked up to it, he could see the license plate clearly

despite the trailer hitch. 

¶ 9 Defendant submitted into evidence a photograph of the Lincoln from a vantage 

point behind the vehicle, showing the license plate and the trailer hitch. (A copy of 

the photograph appears at the conclusion of this opinion.) According to defendant, 

the photo showed that while the trailer hitch “may partially obscure the bottom of 

the license plate,” it did not obscure “any part of the numbers.” Thus, because there 

was no material obstruction of the plate, defendant contended that the officers 

lacked a lawful basis for the traffic stop.

¶ 10 The circuit court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. With regard to the 

photograph, the circuit court stated: 

“I certainly understand and agree that looking at the photograph, the ball hitch 

in the photograph is not obstructing any of the numbers. The only thing it’s 

obstructing is the little thing on the bottom that says Land of Lincoln or 

whatever it is it says down there. It doesn’t obstruct the numbers. However, the 

photo is also obviously taken by someone who is standing right at the rear of the 

vehicle, and certainly the officer testified that he was further back and that the 

angle, therefore, was different and the ball was obstructing one of the 

numbers.” 

The court concluded that, when viewed by the police officers from their position 

some distance behind the vehicle, the trailer hitch obstructed at least one of the 

numbers on the license plate and that this obstruction violated section 3-413(b). 

Therefore, according to the circuit court, the police officers had reasonable grounds 

to detain the car. 
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¶ 11 Defendant moved to reconsider and to reopen the evidence to introduce the 

police squad car video of the traffic stop. The circuit court granted defendant’s 

motion to reopen the evidence, and permitted introduction of the video recording. 

¶ 12 The court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider. At the hearing, 

defendant argued for the first time that section 3-413(b) prohibits only materials 

“on the plate or attached to the plate” such as decals, stickers and license plate 

covers and that objects such as trailer hitches simply were not “thought about when 

the statute was written.” Defendant further emphasized that, because the trailer 

hitch was not a material attached to the plate itself, it was possible to see the 

numbers on the plate just by moving “over a little bit to the left or the right.” For 

these reasons, defendant maintained the trailer hitch was not unlawful and that the 

motion to suppress should have been granted. The circuit court, although finding 

the interpretation of section 3-413(b) to be a “very interesting question of law,” 

nevertheless rejected defendant’s statutory argument.

¶ 13 Regarding the video recording, the court stated it appeared to confirm “the 

officer[’s]” testimony that the trailer hitch “partially blocked one of the letters or 

numbers of the plate.” However, that confirmation was “not crystal clear.” 

Describing the video as “grainy” and “hard to see,” the court explained: 

“[I]t really doesn’t clear up for me one way or the other whether this thing 

blocked part of the letters or not. It does appear that maybe it blocks a little 

piece of one of them on the video, but I can’t tell if it really does or if it’s just 

grainy from the video itself.” 

¶ 14 The court ultimately found the video unhelpful, concluding it “didn’t add a 

whole lot *** to the evidence.” The court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider. 

¶ 15 The circuit court subsequently held a stipulated bench trial and found defendant 

guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The court 

sentenced defendant to 30 months’ probation, with the condition that he serve 120 

days in the county jail. 

¶ 16 On appeal, the appellate court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion that the 

police officers had a lawful basis for stopping the car. 2013 IL App (4th) 120217. 

The appellate court determined that section 3-413(b) prohibits only “objects 

obstructing the registration plate’s visibility that are connected or attached to the 

plate itself” (emphasis in original) (id. ¶ 38), and not obstructions such as a trailer 
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hitch that are not attached to the license plate (id. ¶ 2). Accordingly, the court 

concluded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation 

that would justify the traffic stop and, as a result, the motion to suppress should 

have been granted. Because the cannabis should have been suppressed, the 

appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction outright. Id. ¶ 47. This appeal 

followed. 

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The ultimate issue in this case is whether the circuit court correctly denied 

defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. When reviewing a circuit court’s ruling 

on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply the two-part test adopted by the 

Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). People v. 

Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (2011). First, this court will uphold the circuit court’s 

factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

Second, we review de novo the circuit court’s ultimate legal conclusion as to 

whether suppression is warranted. Id. 

¶ 19 Here, the relevant facts are not in dispute. The parties agree that the police 

officers stopped the car in which defendant was riding because, when viewed by 

the officers from behind the car at a certain distance and from a certain angle, a 

trailer hitch attached to the car partially obstructed at least one number of the rear 

license plate. Thus, our analysis focuses on the correctness of the circuit court’s 

legal conclusion that the stop was lawful and that suppression of the evidence 

obtained as a result of the stop was therefore unnecessary. 

¶ 20 Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to 

the states via the fourteenth amendment (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)), and 

article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, guarantee Illinois citizens 

the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. 

IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. Generally, stopping a vehicle based on a suspected 

violation of the law constitutes a seizure, even if the stop is for a brief period and for 

a limited purpose. People v. Jones, 215 Ill. 2d 261, 270 (2005) (citing Whren v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996)). For a traffic stop to comport with the 

reasonableness requirement of the constitutional guarantees, the police officers 

must have at least “ ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ ” that a violation of law has 

occurred. People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20. This means that police officers 
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must have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 

stopped” was violating the law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prado 

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). If 

reasonable suspicion is lacking, the traffic stop is unconstitutional and evidence 

obtained as a result of the stop is generally inadmissible. See People v. Sutherland, 

223 Ill. 2d 187, 227 (2006). Thus, to decide whether the circuit court properly 

denied defendant’s motion to dismiss in this case, we must determine whether the 

officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion that a violation of the law occurred at 

the time the vehicle was detained. 

¶ 21 Construction of Section 3-413(b) 

¶ 22 Before this court, the State first argues that the ball-type trailer hitch on 

defendant’s vehicle violated section 3-413(b) and this violation provided the police 

officers with the lawful justification for the traffic stop. According to the State, the 

appellate court, in reaching a contrary result, misconstrued section 3-413(b). As a 

result, the State contends that the circuit court was correct to deny defendant’s 

motion to suppress and, therefore, the judgment of the appellate court should be 

reversed. 

¶ 23 In construing a statute, the primary objective is to give effect to the legislature’s 

intent, presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient or 

unjust results. People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (2008). The best 

indication of that intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary 

meaning. People v. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d 176, 179 (2005). Further, in determining 

legislative intent, a court may consider the purpose and necessity for the law as well 

as the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the 

other. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011). The construction of a statute is 

a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Ramirez, 214 Ill. 2d at 179. 

¶ 24 At the time of defendant’s arrest, section 3-413(b) stated:

 “(b) Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a 

horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate 

from swinging and at a height of not less than 5 inches from the ground, 

measuring from the bottom of such plate, in a place and position to be clearly 

visible and shall be maintained in a condition to be clearly legible, free from 
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any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not 

limited to, glass covers and plastic covers.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010). 

A violation of section 3-413(b) is a petty offense (625 ILCS 5/16-104 (West 

2010)), punishable by fine only (730 ILCS 5/5-1-17 (West 2010)). 

¶ 25 Defendant initially points out that section 3-413(b) does not mention trailer 

hitches, let alone prohibit them. Instead, the only reference to any prohibited items 

in section 3-413(b) appears in the clause, “free from any materials that would 

obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not limited to, glass covers and 

plastic covers.” Defendant notes that this clause requires the “registration plate” to 

be “free from” materials. In addition, the clause specifically lists, as forbidden 

“materials,” only glass and plastic covers, items which physically attach to the 

plate. Based on these observations, defendant maintains that the most natural 

reading of the clause is that it refers to materials that are connected to the license 

plate itself, such as glass and plastic covers, decals, paint or other similar 

materials.1

¶ 26 Further, defendant emphasizes that, although the “materials clause” appears 

immediately after the word “legible,” the clause itself specifically refers to the 

“visibility of the plate.” Thus, defendant contends that the “materials clause” 

defines or limits not only the requirement that the plate be “clearly legible” but also 

the requirement that the plate be “clearly visible.” In this way, according to 

defendant, the statute prohibits only those items affecting the visibility or legibility 

of the plate which are physically attached to the plate itself. Other items, which are 

attached to the vehicle but not the license plate, such as the trailer hitch at issue 

here, are not, defendant contends, within the scope of section 3-413(b). 

¶ 27 Alternatively, defendant asserts that section 3-413(b), which is a penal statute,

is ambiguous as to whether it prohibits objects that are not physically attached to 

the license plate. And if the statute is ambiguous, defendant maintains it should be 

 1In 2013 (Pub. Act 97-743 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)), the legislature removed the language “including,

but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers” from section 3-413(b) and added a separate 

subsection (g), which provides, in relevant part: “A person may not operate any motor vehicle that is 

equipped with registration plate covers.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(g) (West 2012). As amended, section 

3-413(b) provides that every license plate shall be “in a place and position to be clearly visible and 

*** in a condition to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of 

the plate.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2012). 
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construed narrowly in his favor under the rule of lenity. Thus, defendant contends 

that, in either case, section 3-413(b) does not prohibit trailer hitches. 

¶ 28 The State, in response, argues that the statute has a broader scope. The State 

contends that the word “materials” in section 3-413(b) refers to any object 

whatsoever, whether connected to the license plate itself or whether attached to the 

vehicle. Thus, a ball-type trailer hitch is a “material” within the meaning of section 

3-413(b) and if it reduces the visibility or legibility of the license plate, it is 

prohibited. In the alternative, the State contends that, even if the word “materials” 

refers solely to something attached to the license plate, the “materials clause” 

should be read as regulating only the legibility of the plate. The visibility of the 

license plate, according to the State, is a separate statutory requirement. Therefore, 

the State contends, if a trailer hitch obstructs the visibility of a license plate, it 

violates the statute, which requires that the plate be “clearly visible.” 

¶ 29 Notably, the State does not assert that section 3-413(b) can be read in such a 

way so as to permit objects which create only a de minimis obstruction of the plate. 

That is, the State asserts that section 3-413(b) prohibits any obstruction of a license 

plate, however minor the obstruction may be. In addition, the State does not 

contend that section 3-413(b) can be read so that only those objects which obstruct 

the plate when viewed from a particular angle or distance are prohibited. Cf. Fla. 

Stat. Ann. § 316.605(1) (West 2010) (requiring that a license plate be visible at a 

distance of 100 feet). Thus, the reading of section 3-413(b) proposed by the State is 

that the statute prohibits any obstruction of a license plate, however minor, by any 

object attached to the vehicle, when viewed from any distance or angle. Applying 

that rule here, the State maintains that the circuit court properly held that the trailer 

hitch partially obstructed the license plate when viewed by the police officers and, 

therefore, the officers had a lawful basis for the traffic stop. 

¶ 30 Neither the State’s nor the defendant’s interpretation of section 3-413(b) is 

conclusively supported by the text of that provision. On the one hand, defendant’s 

contention that the word “materials” refers solely to items attached to the license 

plate carries weight because “a word is known by the company it keeps” (Jarecki v. 

G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)), and the only examples of prohibited 

materials noted in the statute are license plate covers—items which are attached to 

the plate itself. On the other hand, the word “materials” is not defined in the statute 

and, as the appellate court below noted, the word “materials” can, in a literal sense, 

mean a physical object such as a trailer hitch. 2013 IL App (4th) 120217, ¶¶ 37-38. 
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¶ 31 Similarly, defendant’s contention that the “materials clause” limits or defines 

the statutory requirement that the license plate be “clearly visible” as well as the 

requirement that the plate be “clearly legible” has force because the “materials 

clause” expressly refers to the “visibility of the plate” and it is axiomatic that, in 

interpreting a statute, we may not simply ignore statutory language. Best v. Best, 

223 Ill. 2d 342, 350 (2006). However, the State’s contention that the visibility of 

the plate should be considered a separate statutory requirement also has some force 

because different words in a statute, such as “visible” and “legible,” are generally 

presumed to have different meanings. Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming 

Board, 346 Ill. App. 3d 18, 35 (2003). In short, as is often the case in disputes 

which reach this court, the language of the statute at issue is unclear.

¶ 32 Other aids to interpretation do not clarify the meaning of section 3-413(b). For

example, one canon of construction holds that where the meaning of a word or 

portion of a statute is uncertain it is appropriate to refer to the purpose of the statute 

as a whole to help clarify the meaning of the contested language. Harvel v. City of 

Johnston City, 146 Ill. 2d 277, 283-84 (1992). If a portion of a statute is susceptible 

to two constructions, one of which will carry out the purpose of the statute as a 

whole and another which will defeat it, the disputed portion will receive the former 

construction. Id. at 284. The best indication of the purpose of a statute is found in 

the statute’s language. People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 268 (2008). 

¶ 33 Looking to statutory purpose is unhelpful here, however, because the purpose 

of section 3-413(b) is the very thing that is contested by the parties. Defendant 

asserts that the purpose of section 3-413(b) is only to regulate how a plate must be 

attached to a vehicle and how the plate itself must be maintained. According to 

defendant, the statute is not intended to regulate or prohibit separate accessories or 

equipment such as trailer hitches and similar items. The State, in contrast, contends 

that the purpose of section 3-413(b) is to ensure the complete visibility of the 

license plate at all times, when viewed from any angle or distance. Thus, in the 

State’s view, the statute prohibits any obstruction of the plate, however minor, by 

any object attached to the vehicle. The statutory language, because it is unclear, 

does not resolve this dispute. 

¶ 34 Considering the consequences or real world applications of the statute is also an 

appropriate aid to interpretation. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill. 2d 416, 421 (2011). 

However, this canon, too, is unhelpful. Defendant’s contention that the purpose of 

section 3-413(b) is to regulate only the condition of the license plate itself would 
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mean, as a consequence, that there would be instances when the license plate is not 

completely visible, at least when viewed from certain vantage points. It is not 

unreasonable to give this consequence weight and, therefore, to favor the State’s 

interpretation of the statute.

¶ 35 However, the State’s understanding of the statute raises consequential 

difficulties of its own. The State’s broad interpretation of section 3-413(b) would 

have the effect of rendering a substantial amount of otherwise lawful conduct 

illegal in Illinois. For example, consider a physically disabled Illinois resident who 

is unable to afford a vehicle, such as a cargo van, that is large enough to hold her 

wheelchair or electric scooter inside the vehicle itself. If she uses a carrier which is 

attached to a trailer hitch at the rear of her car to transport her wheelchair or scooter, 

she obstructs the visibility of her license plate and, according to the State, violates 

section 3-413(b). If, however, she removes the plate from her car and mounts it on 

the frame of the carrier so that the plate is no longer obstructed, she violates that 

portion of section 3-413(b) which states that the plate must be “securely fastened” 

“to the vehicle for which it is issued.” In short, no matter what she does, she will 

violate the law. She cannot lawfully use a wheelchair or scooter carrier.

¶ 36 The same scenario holds true for other widely used objects such as bicycle 

racks and rental trailers. A rental trailer obstructs the plate that is attached to the 

towing vehicle, and while the trailer must have a license plate, that plate belongs to 

the rental company and provides no identifying information about the vehicle 

pulling the trailer. And even a public bus equipped with a bicycle rack on its front 

would be unlawful under the State’s reading of section 3-413(b) if the rack were to 

obstruct the license plate. See, e.g., http://www.transitchicago.com/bikeandride/ 

(last accessed on May 4, 2015) (describing a “Bike & Ride” program which equips 

buses operated by the Chicago Transit Authority with bike racks). Thus, under the 

State’s reading of section 3-413(b), ball-type trailer hitches, such as the one at issue 

here, wheelchair and scooter carriers, bicycle racks and rental trailers would all be 

illegal. These consequences reasonably counsel against the broad reading of the 

statute proposed by the State. 

¶ 37 Finally, we note, as did the appellate court, that relevant legislative history 

contains no mention of trailer hitches or other similar objects. See 2013 IL App 

(4th) 120217, ¶¶ 42-43. 
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¶ 38 Having considered the foregoing, we are unable to say with certainty whether 

the purpose of section 3-413(b) is a broad one, i.e., to prohibit all objects 

obstructing any view of the license plate, or a narrow one, i.e., to prohibit only 

objects attached to the license plate itself. The State’s interpretation of the statute is 

certainly one possibility, as it furthers the reasonable goal of ensuring the visibility 

of license plates. But it is equally reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly 

did not intend to put companies who rent trailers out of business and did not intend 

to further burden the physically disabled by making it illegal for them to use 

wheelchair and scooter carriers—particularly when the statute says nothing about 

these matters. We conclude, therefore, that section 3-431(b) is ambiguous. See, 

e.g., People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 292 (2011) (a statute is ambiguous if it is 

“capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more 

different ways”).

¶ 39 Because section 3-413(b) is ambiguous, it is appropriate to invoke the rule of 

lenity. Under the rule of lenity, we adopt the “more lenient interpretation of a 

criminal statute ‘when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction, 

we are left with an ambiguous statute.’ ” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 

Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1336 (2011) (quoting United 

States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994)). See also, e.g., People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 

2d 569, 581 (2006); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (the rule of 

lenity provides a “time-honored interpretive guideline when the congressional 

purpose is unclear”). Applying the rule here, we hold that section 3-413(b) 

prohibits only those objects that obstruct the visibility and legibility of the license 

plate which are physically connected or attached to the plate itself.

¶ 40 Having concluded that section 3-431(b) is ambiguous, we encourage the 

General Assembly to revisit this statute. It would be helpful if the legislature would 

clarify to what extent, if any, equipment and accessories which are attached to a 

vehicle near a license plate are prohibited.

¶ 41 Reasonable Mistake of Law 

¶ 42 The State next argues that, even if section 3-413(b) does not prohibit trailer 

hitches, the traffic stop was, nonetheless, valid. The State contends that the police 

officers’ understanding of section 3-413(b) was an objectively reasonable mistake 
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of law and, further, that this understanding of the statute, although mistaken, 

provided the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the vehicle. 

¶ 43 The appellate court below rejected, in passing, the proposition that an 

objectively reasonable mistake of law may provide the reasonable suspicion 

necessary to justify a traffic stop. 2013 IL App (4th) 120217, ¶ 18 (citing People v. 

Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d 960, 968 (2007), and People v. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d 539, 

543 (2009)). However, after the appellate court issued its opinion in this case, the 

United States Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in Heien v. North 

Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014). 

¶ 44 In Heien, the defendant was a passenger in a car that was stopped by a North 

Carolina police officer because the car had only one working brake light. Cocaine 

was recovered from the defendant during the stop and he was subsequently 

convicted of attempted trafficking in cocaine. On appeal in the North Carolina 

Supreme Court, the defendant contended that driving with only one brake light was 

not prohibited under North Carolina law and, thus, there was no legal basis for the 

traffic stop under the fourth amendment and the cocaine should have been 

suppressed. The court disagreed. The court concluded that, even if the defendant’s 

interpretation of the governing traffic law was the correct one, the law was unclear 

at the time of the stop, and it was objectively reasonable for the officer who stopped 

the car to think that a violation had occurred. According to the court, this objective, 

albeit mistaken, belief provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the 

stop. State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 357 (N.C. 2012). 

¶ 45 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether, under 

the fourth amendment, “reasonable suspicion can rest on a mistaken understanding 

of the scope of a legal prohibition.” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. at ___, 135 

S. Ct. at 536. The Court concluded that it could, holding that the fourth amendment 

is not violated when a police officer pulls over a vehicle based on an “objectively 

reasonable, although mistaken, belief” that the traffic laws prohibited the conduct 

which was the basis for the stop. The Court explained: 

 “As the text indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, ‘the ultimate 

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.” ’ Riley v. California, 

573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5) (some internal quotation marks 

omitted). To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment 

allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair 
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leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’ Brinegar v.

United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). *** 

 *** Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer’s 

understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer 

may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be 

not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result 

is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under 

the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result 

should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but 

not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.” Id. at ___, 

135 S. Ct. at 536. 

¶ 46 In so holding, the Court emphasized that the standard for determining whether a 

reasonable mistake of law has been made is an objective one, and that courts “do 

not examine the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved.” Id. at 

___, 135 S. Ct. at 539. See also id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring, 

joined by Ginsburg, J.) (“If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that 

overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer 

has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.”). 

¶ 47 Citing Heien, the State maintains that in this case, even if, as we have held 

today, section 3-413(b) prohibits only those items which are physically connected 

or attached to the plate itself, the stop in this case was nonetheless justified because 

the police officers’ objectively reasonable mistake of law provided the reasonable 

suspicion necessary to justify the stop under the fourth amendment. We agree. 

¶ 48 Although we have held above that section 3-413(b) prohibits only those 

materials which are attached to a license plate and, accordingly, a trailer hitch does 

not violate section 3-413(b), we reached that holding by finding the statute 

ambiguous and then applying the rule of lenity. An ambiguous statute, by its very 

nature, is one that it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed 

persons in two or more different ways. Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C., 235 Ill. 2d 1, 

11 (2009). Further, we note that, as was the case in Heien (574 U.S. at ___, 135 S.

Ct. at 540), no prior appellate case had addressed the scope of section 3-413(b) with 

respect to trailer hitches. Thus, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this 

case, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to have believed that the trailer 
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hitch was in violation of section 3-413(b). Consequently, we find that the vehicle 

stop initiated in this case was constitutionally valid under the fourth amendment. 

¶ 49 Defendant further argues, however, that we should not adopt the holding of 

Heien as a matter of state law and we should, therefore, hold that the stop was 

unlawful under article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 6). Accordingly, we must determine whether we should interpret our 

state constitution’s search and seizure clause in conformity with the Supreme 

Court’s interpretation of the fourth amendment in Heien. 

¶ 50 As we explained in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 304-14 (2006), this 

court has adopted a “limited lockstep” approach to interpreting our search and 

seizure clause. This approach recognizes that the drafters of the 1970 constitution 

and the delegates to the constitutional convention intended the phrase “search and 

seizure” in article I, section 6, to mean, in general, what the same phrase means in 

the federal constitution. Id. at 314. At the same time, however, we do not surrender 

our state sovereignty or abandon our judicial function. Id. The limited lockstep 

doctrine allows for the consideration of “state tradition and values” (id.) and, thus, 

there may be instances where the meaning of our state search and seizure clause 

differs from that of the federal constitution. 

¶ 51 Defendant contends that this is such an instance. Defendant observes that 

Illinois’s exclusionary rule has traditionally been interpreted more broadly than its 

federal counterpart. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 175 Ill. 2d 60 (1996) (declining to 

follow Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), which recognized a good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule when a search was conducted pursuant to a 

statute later held unconstitutional). Defendant maintains that, because this court

“has historically been disinclined to extend the good-faith exception [to the 

exclusionary rule] to the same degree as the Supreme Court,” we should decline to 

adopt “the extended good-faith exception created by Heien.” To do so, defendant 

argues, “would drastically change Illinois constitutional law.”

¶ 52 There is a fundamental flaw in defendant’s reasoning. As the State points out, 

Heien did not address whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of 

evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure. That is a question that goes to the 

issue of the proper remedy for a fourth amendment violation. See, e.g., People v. 

Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 227 (2006) (“The question of whether to exclude 

evidence, however, is a separate question from whether the search is legal.”). 
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Rather, Heien held that the seizure, itself, was reasonable because the police officer 

initiated the vehicle stop based on an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, 

belief that the defendant’s conduct was illegal. Thus, there was no constitutional 

violation to begin with. Heien, 574 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (where a seizure is 

supported by an objectively reasonable mistake of law, there is “no violation of the 

Fourth Amendment in the first place”). Heien did not extend the good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule. Therefore, the fact that Illinois’s exclusionary

rule is broader than its federal counterpart, or that this court has previously declined 

to recognize certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, provides no basis for 

departing from Heien. 

¶ 53 Defendant has failed to demonstrate why the holding of Heien is contrary to any 

long-standing state traditions or values, and we are persuaded by the Heien court’s 

analysis. We conclude, therefore, that an objectively reasonable, though mistaken, 

belief as to the meaning of a law may form the basis for a constitutionally valid 

vehicle stop under our state constitution. For the reasons noted previously, it was 

objectively reasonable for the officers in this case to believe that the trailer hitch 

violated section 3-413(b). Consequently, we find that the traffic stop in this case 

was constitutionally valid under both the state and federal constitutions. For this 

reason, we must reverse the appellate court’s judgment and affirm the circuit 

court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. 

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. 

Because the circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, 

defendant’s convictions are reinstated. 

¶ 56 Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 57 Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
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