alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit
      32.1**





CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the quarterly report of FermaVir Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending July 31, 2005 as filed with
      the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on September 14, 2005 (the "Report"), I,
      Geoffrey W. Henson, Chief Executive and Financial Officer of the Company,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of
      the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)
            The Report fully complies
              with the
              requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
              of
              1934; and(2)
            The information contained
              in the
              Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
              and result of operations of the Company.








/s/
              Geoffrey W. HensonGeoffrey
                W. Henson
              Chief
                Executive and Financial Officer
              September
                15, 2005






A
      signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and
      will
      be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
      Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 31.1

SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION



I, Brian Cheston, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Rapa Mining Inc.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The small business issuers other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:



a)

designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiary, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)

evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about  the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c)

disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The small business issuers other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuers board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)

all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)

any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuers internal control over financial reporting.



Date: December 3, 2004



/s/ Brian Cheston

Name: Brian Cheston

Title: President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Secretary, Treasurer and Director
**EXHIBIT 31.3**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO**

**SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RULES 13a-14(a) AND 15(d)-14(a), AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO **

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Elchanan Maoz, certify that: 

 

|   | 1.     | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2022 (the “Report”) of Metro One Telecommunications, Inc. (the “Company”) and                                                                                               |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|   | 2.     | Based on my knowledge, this Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this Report. |

| Dated: May 1, 2023 | /s/ Elchanan Maoz                                                        |   |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|  

      | Elchanan Maoz **

Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer) |   |
AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
                       ---------------------------------


         Subsection  (b) of  Section  8 of the  Employment  Agreement  made  and
entered into as of July 14, 1994 by and between  Penn  Federal  Savings Bank and
Lucy T. Tinker is hereby amended to read as follows:

               (b)  Definitions.  For  purposes  of Sections 8, 9 and 11 of this
         Agreement, "Date of Termination" means the earlier of (i) the date upon
         which the Bank gives notice to the Employee of the  termination  of his
         employment  with  the Bank or (ii) the date  upon  which  the  Employee
         ceases to serve as an Employee of the Bank,  and "change in control" is
         defined solely as any acquisition of contro (other than pursuant to the
         Conversion or by a trustee or other fiduciary holding  securities under
         an employee  benefit plan of the Holding Compnay or a subsidiary of the
         Holding  Company),  as defined in 12 C.F.R. SS. 574.4, or any successor
         regulation,  of the Bank or Holding  Company  which  would  require the
         filing of an application for acquisition of control or notice of change
         in  control  in a manner as set forth in 12 C.F.R.  SS.  574.3,  or any
         successor regulation.

         IN WITNESS  WHEREOF,  the parties have  executied  this Amendment as of
this 13th day of October, 1998.

                                                      PENN FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK

                                                 By:  /s/William C. Anderson
                                                      ----------------------
                                                      William C. Anderson
                                                      Chairman of the Board

                                                      EMPLOYEE


                                                 By:  /s/Lucy T. Tinker
                                                      ---------------------
                                                      Lucy T. Tinker
STATE of North Carolina, v. Steven Levern BATTLE, Defendant.

No. COA16-533

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 7, 2017

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
STATE v. Allen Ray WEST

193P15-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 1, 2018

William V. Conley, Special Deputy Attorney General, James R. O'Neill, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Allen Ray West, for West, Allen Ray.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 15th of November 2017 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of March 2018."
#### STATE ex rel. Alan MAISE v. STATE of Louisiana.

No. 2002-KH-2334.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Sept. 19, 2003.

In re Maise, Alan; — Plaintiff; Applying for Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District *628Court Div. E, No. 98-3444; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 02-KH-763.

Denied.
**Exhibit 23.2**
**Note Regarding Consent of Arthur AndersenLLP.**
     After reasonable efforts, we have been unable toobtain Arthur Andersen’s consent to the incorporation byreference of their report for our fiscal year endedJune 30, 2001 into our previously filed registrationstatements under the Securities Act of 1933, and we have notfiled that consent with this Annual Report on Form 10-K/Ain reliance upon Rule 437a under the Securities Act.Because we have not been able to obtain Arthur Andersen’sconsent, you may not be able to recover against Arthur Andersenunder Section 11 of the Securities Act for any untruestatements of a material fact contained in our financialstatements audited by Arthur Andersen or any omission to state amaterial fact required to be stated therein.
89
CONSENT OF EXPERT


I hereby consent to the use of and reference to my name, R. Bruce Kennedy, P.E., and report, NI 43-101 Technical Report on the Pirquitas Mine, Jujuy Province, Argentina dated December 23, 2011 (the “ Report ”), and the information contained in my Report, as described or incorporated by reference in (i) Silver Standard Resources Inc.’s Annual Report on Form 40-F for the year ended December 31, 2016, and (ii) Silver Standard Resources Inc.’s Registration Statements on Form S-8 (File No. 333-185498, 333-196116 and 333-198092), filed with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.


Dated this 22nd day of March, 2017.


Yours very sincerely,





/s/ R. Bruce Kennedy


R. Bruce Kennedy, P.E.
Exhibit 13.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of
Telefônica Brasil S.A. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015, as filed with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Amos Genish, Chief Executive Officer,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to
the best of my knowledge:



| | (i) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------











|Date: February 26, 2016
|-----------------------
|                       
|                       
|By:                    
|                       
|
#### Daniel J. BOGAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D02-2244.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Aug. 22, 2003.

*445James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Meghan Ann Collins, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee and Lamya A. Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

PALMER, J.

Daniel Bogan appeals his judgments and sentences which were entered by the trial court after he pled guilty to the charges of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury, driving under the influence causing damage or injury, and driving under the influence.1 Bogan alleges that these convictions violate double jeopardy. We affirm.

Under rule 9.140(b) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, a defendant who pleads guilty has no right to file a direct appeal, except when he expressly reserves the right to appeal a prior dispositive order or when he raises matters as would invalidate the plea itself. Here, Bogan pled guilty to the charges and did not reserve his right to appeal any issue. Therefore, any direct appeal on his guilty plea must be based on one of the reasons enumerated in Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140(b)(2)(A)(ii).2 Bogan’s argument based on double jeopardy is not a basis for a direct appeal because he failed to file a motion to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, we affirm without prejudice to Bogan’s right to seek collateral relief in the trial court. *See Byrd v. State,*419 So.2d 725 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

AFFIRMED.

SHARP, W. and PLEUS, JJ., concur.

1

. *See*§ 316.193; 316.193(3)(a), (b), (c), 2.; 316.193(3)(a), (b), (c), 1., Fla. Stat. (1997).

2

. Rule 9.140. Appeal Proceedings in Criminal Cases

> 

> (b) Appeals by Defendant.

> 

> (2) Guilty or Nolo Contendere Pleas.

> (A) Pleas. A defendant may not appeal from a guilty or nolo contendere plea except as follows:

> (i) Reservation of Right to Appeal. A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo con-tendere may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal, identifying with particularity the point of law being reserved.

> (ii) Appeals Otherwise Allowed. A defendant who pleads guilty or nolo conten-dere may otherwise directly appeal only

> a. the lower tribunal's lack of subject matter jurisdiction;

> b. a violation of the plea agreement, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea;

> c. an involuntary plea, if preserved by a motion to withdraw plea;

> d. a sentencing error, if preserved; or

> e. as otherwise provided by law.
JACKSON v. The STATE.

A15A1855

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

January 11, 2018

Russell Knighton Walker, for Appellant.

Marie R. Banks, Asst. Dist. Atty., George Herbert Hartwig III, Dist. Atty., for Appellee.

Miller, Presiding Judge.

*237In *Jackson v. State* , 335 Ga. App. 597, 782 S.E.2d 499 (2016), this Court (1) held that the trial court properly denied Prentiss Ashon Jackson's general demurrer; and (2) affirmed Jackson's conviction because it was supported by the evidence. In *Jackson v. State* , 301 Ga. 137, 800 S.E.2d 356 (2017), the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed this Court's decision and found that the indictment was not sufficient to withstand a general demurrer and was therefore void. Accordingly, we vacate the prior decision, and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court.

Moreover, we recognize

> [t]he general rule is that retrial of the defendant is not barred where reversal of the conviction results from trial *238error rather than evidentiary insufficiency. *Williams v. State* , 258 Ga. 305, 311, 369 S.E.2d 232 (1988). Reversal based upon a faulty or flawed indictment is a reversal based upon "trial error." *Burks v. United States* , 437 U.S. 1, 13-14 [98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1] (1978).

*Samuel v. State* , 190 Ga. App. 539, 540 (1), 379 S.E.2d 571 (1989). The Supreme Court's ruling solely addressed the sufficiency of the indictment, which is void. Since the Court did not reach the issue of evidentiary sufficiency, double jeopardy does not bar retrial in this case.

*Judgment reversed.*

Andrews and Branch, JJ., concur.
STATE of North Carolina v. Justin Savon DIXON

No. COA17-25

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: December 19, 2017

VACATED. REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 21 (Wednesday, February 2, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Page 5483]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-1978]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Antitrust Division


Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and 
Production Act of 1993--Door & Access Systems Manufacturers 
Association, International

    Notice is hereby given that, on September 20, 2004, pursuant to 
section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 
1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''), Door & Access Systems 
Manufacturers Association, International (``DASMA'') has filed written 
notifications simultaneously with the Attorney General and the Federal 
Trade Commission disclosing (1) the name and principal place of 
business of the standards development organization and (2) the nature 
and scope of its standards development activities. The notifications 
were filed for the purpose of invoking the Act's provisions limiting 
the recovery of antitrust plaintiffs to actual damages under specified 
circumstances.
    Pursuant to section 6(b) of the Act, the name and principal place 
of business of the standards development organization is: Door & Access 
Systems Manufacturers Association, International, Cleveland, OH. The 
nature and scope of DASMA's standards development activities are: to 
date, more than fourteen standards for garage doors, rolling doors, 
fire doors, grilles, counter shutters, sheet doors, high performance 
doors, garage door and gate operators, and remote controls for garage 
door and gate operators, many prepared and updated in coordination with 
the American National Standards Institute.

Dorothy B. Fountain,
Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division.
[FR Doc. 05-1978 Filed 2-1-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
#### Andrea Lavon GREEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 5D03-2781.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Sept. 2, 2003.

Andrea Lavon Green, Polk City, Pro Se.

No appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED. *See Mack v. State,*823 So.2d 746 (Fla.2002).

GRIFFIN, PLEUS and MONACO, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-6588 

FELIBERTO DIAZ,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

CHRISTOPHER MILLER; DEAN PRICE; ALVIN DANIELS;

HENRY WILLIAMS; CAPTAIN STONE; FRED B.

MURCHISON; HATTIE PIMPONG,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,

District Judge. (5:04-ct-00492-BO)

Submitted: September 28, 2006 Decided: October 6, 2006

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Feliberto Diaz, Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth F. Parsons, NORTH

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for

Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Feliberto Diaz appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. We have reviewed

the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm

for the reasons stated by the district court. Diaz v. Miller, No.

5:04-ct-00492-BO (E.D.N.C. Mar. 17, 2006). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

     We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the following
Registration Statements of MetaCreations Corporation on Form S-8 (Registration
Nos. 333-3070, 333-17209, 333-20939, 333-26557, 333-28403, 333-67223 and
333-86817) of our reports dated February 2, 2000 relating to the financial
statements and financial statement schedule, which appear in this Annual Report
on Form 10-K.

/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Woodland Hills, California
March 27, 2000

                                       70
In the MATTER OF WARE, Claim for Compensation Under the North Carolina Eugenics Asexualization and Sterilization Compensation Program, Claimant-appellant.

No. COA15-909-2

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 21, 2017

AFFIRMED.
[— NYS2d —]

#### 301 East 69th Street Associates, Respondent, v Diane Eskin, Appellant, et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

April 20, 1993

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Rudes, Lax, Berkowitz & Mittman, P. C.,*New York City *123*(Morrell I. Berkowitz*and *Kamran Moattar*of counsel), for appellant. *Belkin Burden Wenig & Goldman,*New York City *(Sherwin Belkin, Magda L. Cruz*and *David M. Skaller*of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Final judgment entered February 18, 1992 affirmed, with $25 costs.

At the trial of this nuisance holdover, five tenants gave unrebutted testimony detailing repeated instances of tenant’s antisocial and abusive behavior, and the detrimental impact this conduct had upon their tenancies. Tenant, who suffers from schizophrenia, did not testify. Her psychiatrist described tenant’s course of treatment and medication; while he stated that, in his opinion, tenant was not violent, he did indicate that tenant was prone to "outbursts” which are characteristic of the illness, and that he "would expect past behavior to continue in the future”.

The determination at nisi prius that tenant’s conduct "does interfere substantially with the comfort and safety of her neighbors” finds ample support in the record. The numerous complaints of other tenants who have witnessed the disturbances caused by tenant in the building’s public areas, and who have been threatened by her, portray a pattern of objectionable conduct likely to recur *(see, Frank v Park Summit Realty Corp.,*175 AD2d 33, *mod*79 NY2d 789). The Rent Stabilization Code permits an owner to recover possession of a housing accommodation where, as here, it has been established that the tenant is committing a nuisance in the premises (9 NYCRR 2524.3 [b]). Tenant’s argument that "unintentional” conduct precipitated by a mental illness cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a nuisance is not persuasive. Even assuming that tenant’s actions were involuntary, the dispositive issue in this proceeding is not tenant’s state of mind, but the nature of tenant’s conduct and its effect upon the comfort and safety of other tenants and building staff.

Parness, J. P., Miller and McCooe, JJ., concur.