Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Deborah Markisohn

Marion County Public Defender Agency

Appellate Division

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General

Lyubov Gore

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

K.K.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Petitioner

April 9, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1710-JV-2274

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores,

Judge 

The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1703-JD-395

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 2 of 10

Case Summary

[1] K.K. appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for committing acts that 

would constitute level 4 felony burglary and level 6 felony theft if committed by 

an adult. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting 

fingerprint evidence. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2016, Jesus Morales returned to his home and found it in 

disarray; some of his possessions had been moved and opened shoe boxes were 

scattered in the hallway. He discovered that jewelry, a television, electronic 

game systems, and electronic games had been stolen. It appeared that someone 

might have entered the home through the rear bedroom window because it was

unlocked and the blinds were raised. 

[3] Indianapolis Police Officer Brian Wills photographed the crime scene and 

inspected it for fingerprints. He recovered three fingerprints from a television in 

the master bedroom using fingerprint tape and attached the tape to a latent print 

card, subsequently identified at K.K.’s denial hearing as State’s Exhibit 10.

Officer Wills also recovered two fingerprints from the outside sill of the window 

believed to be the point of entry and created another latent print card, 

subsequently identified as State’s Exhibit 11. Officer Wills logged Exhibits 10 

and 11 in the latent print database1 with the case information (when, where, 

 

1

 The record does not otherwise identify the database in which Officer Wills logged Exhibits 10 and 11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 3 of 10

and by whom the latent prints were recovered). The database generated a latent 

print number for each card, which he recorded on the back of the cards. He 

placed the cards in a locked box used to store latent print cards, which was kept

in a secure room.

[4] Rochella O’Neil, an Indianapolis Police Department latent print examiner, was

assigned to examine the latent fingerprints on Exhibits 10 and 11 for 

identification. She had been a latent print examiner for thirteen and a half years 

and had received training in basic latent print identification, complex latent 

print identification, and analysis of distortion in latent prints. To identify the 

fingerprints, she used the ACE-V method (analysis, comparison, evaluation, 

and verification). Pursuant to that method, she searched for comparable 

fingerprints in the Marion County Automatic Fingerprint Identification System

(AFIS), but the search did not yield any matches. She then searched Indiana’s

database and found what she perceived to be a match. She requested a hard 

copy of the fingerprints (“the Database Fingerprints”) from the State so that she 

could perform a manual comparison. Based on her evaluation, she concluded 

that fingerprints on Exhibits 10 and 11 matched the Database Fingerprints. The 

Database Fingerprint card provided the name, date of birth, race, sex, height, 

weight, and state identification number of the individual who was fingerprinted

and identified the fingerprints as those of K.K. The Database Fingerprint card

did not contain any other information.

[5] On March 16, 2017, the State filed, and the trial court subsequently approved, a 

delinquency petition alleging that sixteen-year-old K.K. committed acts that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 4 of 10

would constitute level 4 felony burglary and level 6 felony theft if committed by 

an adult. On May 9, 2017, the State filed a motion to require K.K. to submit to 

fingerprinting, which the trial court granted.

[6] On August 15, 2017, a denial hearing was held. That morning, O’Neil 

fingerprinted K.K., who was now seventeen years old, and this fingerprint card 

was subsequently identified as State’s Exhibit 12. Officer Wills testified at the 

hearing, and the trial court admitted Exhibits 10 and 11. O’Neil also testified at 

the hearing. When the State began to question O’Neil about Exhibit 12, the 

trial court permitted K.K.’s counsel to question her as to whether she knew 

anything about the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Database 

Fingerprints. O’Neil testified that she had “absolutely no knowledge of what 

happened when [K.K.] was printed or why he was printed.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. 

K.K. then objected to the admission of Exhibit 12 and moved to suppress any 

testimony based on it. In support, K.K. argued that the Database Fingerprints 

were illegally obtained and retained “as far as we know” because the State had 

not demonstrated that they complied with the applicable statutes, and thus any 

evidence obtained from using the Database Fingerprints was the “fruit of the 

poisonous tree.” Id. at 30-31. The trial court overruled K.K.’s objection and 

denied his motion to suppress and allowed O’Neil to testify over K.K.’s 

continuing objection. O’Neil testified that based on her experience as an expert 

in the field, three fingerprints on Exhibit 10 matched K.K.’s left thumb print on

Exhibit 12, and one of the fingerprints on Exhibit 11 matched K.K.’s right 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 5 of 10

thumbprint on Exhibit 12. Id. at 39. The State did not seek to admit the 

Database Fingerprints. 

[7] After the State rested, K.K. moved for involuntary dismissal of both counts. 

The trial court denied his motion and entered true findings on both counts. 

K.K. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] K.K. argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the State’s 

fingerprint evidence. We review a trial court’s decision on the admission of 

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Burnett v. State, 815 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004). A trial court abuses its discretion where its decision is clearly 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In 

determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we do not reweigh 

the evidence, and we consider only evidence favorable to the ruling or 

unrefuted evidence favorable to the respondent. Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 

1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016). “[A] claim of error in the admission or exclusion of 

evidence will not prevail on appeal unless a substantial right of the party is 

affected.” Burnett, 815 N.E.2d at 204.

[9] Specifically, K.K. asserts that Exhibit 12 and O’Neil’s testimony based thereon

were inadmissible because the State was unable to establish that the Database 

Fingerprints were taken in compliance with Indiana Code Sections 31-39-5-

1(a), -3, -4, and -5 (“the Juvenile Fingerprinting Statutes”). Indiana Code 

Section 31-39-5-1(a) permits law enforcement to take and file the fingerprints or 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 6 of 10

photographs of a child if “(1) the child is taken into custody for an act that 

would be a felony if committed by an adult; and (2) the child was at least 

fourteen (14) years of age when the act was allegedly committed.” Section 31-

39-5-3 states that if “(1) latent fingerprints are found during the investigation of 

an offense; and (2) a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that 

the latent fingerprints belong to a certain child; the officer may fingerprint that 

child and compare the child’s fingerprints with the latent fingerprints.” Section

31-39-5-4(a) provides that upon written request, the law enforcement agency 

shall destroy or deliver to the child the child’s fingerprints or photographs if “(1) 

the child was taken into custody and no petition was filed against the child; (2) 

the petition was dismissed because of mistaken identity; (3) the petition was 

dismissed because no delinquent act was actually committed; or (4) the petition 

was dismissed for lack of probable cause.” Under Section 31-39-5-4(b), the law 

enforcement agency does not have to destroy the child’s fingerprints or 

photographs if the child has a record of prior arrests or has another charge 

pending. And Section 31-39-5-5 requires law enforcement agencies to provide 

written notice to the child and the child’s parent or guardian at the time the 

child’s fingerprints or photographs are taken of the child’s right under Section 

31-9-5-4 and to “comply with any request for destruction or surrender of the 

records not later than sixty (60) days of the request.”

[10] At the denial hearing, O’Neil testified that she had “absolutely no knowledge of 

what happened when [K.K.] was printed or why.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27. K.K. is 

correct that the State did not present evidence to establish that the Database 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 7 of 10

Fingerprints were taken in compliance with the Juvenile Fingerprinting 

Statutes. However, K.K. does not dispute that the fingerprints in Exhibit 12 

were taken in accordance with the Juvenile Fingerprinting Statutes. Also,

O’Neil’s testimony was based on a comparison of the fingerprints on Exhibit 12 

with those on Exhibits 10 and 11, and K.K. does not dispute the admissibility of 

Exhibits 10 and 11. 

[11] K.K.’s sole challenge to the admissibility of Exhibit 12 and O’Neil’s testimony 

is based on the Database Fingerprints. The Database Fingerprints were 

instrumental in establishing probable cause to charge him. His argument that 

Exhibit 12 and O’Neil’s testimony are inadmissible conflates the admissibility

of evidence at trial with evidence of probable cause. We reject his unsupported

assumption that the use of the Database Fingerprints to establish probable cause 

requires, as a matter of law, that the State present evidence to prove that they 

were taken in compliance with the Juvenile Fingerprinting Statutes as a 

prerequisite for the admissibility for Exhibit 12 and testimony based on it 

(which in all other respects constitute admissible fingerprint evidence). 

[12] There may be circumstances that would require the State to prove that 

fingerprints used to establish probable cause were taken and stored in 

compliance with the Juvenile Fingerprinting Statutes, for example, if the 

juvenile came forward with some evidence that raised a question regarding 

whether the fingerprints were obtained and stored in compliance with them. 

Although our courts have rarely had occasion to address these Statutes, in J.B. 

v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, another panel of 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 8 of 10

this court addressed a juvenile’s specific challenge to the State’s compliance 

with Section 31-39-5-2.2 

[13] The facts in J.B. are similar to ours, although the case is procedurally different. 

A house was burglarized and the police recovered latent fingerprints. O’Neil 

examined the latent fingerprints and found a matching set of prints on AFIS, 

which belonged to J.B. The State then filed a delinquency petition alleging that 

J.B. had committed an act that would constitute burglary if committed by an 

adult. The State filed a motion seeking permission to fingerprint J.B., who

moved to suppress any fingerprint evidence. After a hearing, the trial court 

denied his motion and granted the State permission to fingerprint him. J.B. 

sought and obtained the trial court’s certification of the order for interlocutory 

appeal.

[14] On appeal, J.B. argued that the State failed to adhere to the requirement of 

Section 31-39-5-2 that fingerprint and photograph files of children be 

“separated” from those of adults. The J.B. court concluded that “juvenile 

records must be stored such that persons authorized to access adult records but 

not juvenile records will not be able to access the latter while accessing the 

former.” 868 N.E.2d at 1200. The J.B. court then concluded that there was no 

evidence in the record that the State maintained AFIS, which held both juvenile 

and adult fingerprints, so that juvenile records were accessible only to 

 

2

 The other case involving the Juvenile Fingerprinting Statutes is Turner v. State, 508 N.E.2d 541 (Ind. 1987), 

but that case did not involve the use of juvenile fingerprints that were already in a database. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 9 of 10

authorized persons, and therefore the State failed to prove that it had stored 

J.B.’s fingerprints in compliance with Section 31-39-5-2. Id. at 1201. 

Ultimately, the J.B. court determined that the State’s noncompliance did not 

require reversal because O’Neil was authorized to access juvenile records and 

would have discovered the fingerprints anyway. Id. at 1201-02. J.B. also 

argued on appeal that the State failed to comply with Section 31-39-5-1, but the 

J.B. court found that argument waived because it was not presented to the trial 

court. Id. at 1202.

[15] Significantly, in J.B., the State stored juvenile and adult records together on the 

AFIS database, raising the potential that the juvenile records were not stored in 

compliance with Section 31-39-5-2. It was then incumbent upon the State to 

prove that unauthorized persons would not be able to access the juvenile 

records, and the State had not produced that evidence. Here, K.K. has not 

come forward with any evidence that the State actually violated the Juvenile 

Fingerprinting Statutes in some respect and there are no circumstances that call 

into question the State’s compliance with the Statutes.

3

 Accordingly, we cannot 

say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 12 and 

 

3 We observe that K.K. has a history of juvenile arrests and adjudications beginning when he was thirteen

years old. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 37-38. When he was fifteen, K.K. was arrested for committing acts that 

would have been level 6 felony theft and level 4 felony burglary if committed by an adult. Because he was 

taken into custody for acts that would have been felonies and had committed those acts when he was at least 

fourteen years old, the State would have had the authority under Section 31-39-5-1(a) to take and file his 

fingerprints. Because K.K. had a history of prior arrests, the State would not have been required to destroy 

his fingerprints pursuant to Section 31-39-5-4(b).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1710-JV-2274 | April 9, 2018 Page 10 of 10

O’Neil’s fingerprint testimony.4 Therefore, we affirm the true findings for 

burglary and theft.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.

 

4

 K.K. raises a sufficiency of the evidence argument based solely on the inadmissibility of the fingerprint 

evidence. Because we have found the fingerprint evidence admissible, we need not address this argument.