United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

S.S., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, Warwick, RI, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Docket No. 13-1919 

Issued: May 16, 2014 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

RICHARD J. DASCHBACH, Chief Judge 

MICHAEL E. GROOM, Alternate Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On August 19, 2013 appellant filed a timely appeal from an April 25, 2013 merit decision 

of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) denying his claim for compensation 

and an August 7, 2013 nonmerit decision denying his request for reconsideration. Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over merits of this case. 

ISSUES 

The issues are: (1) whether appellant met his burden of proof to establish that his 

hypertension condition was caused or contributed to by employment factors commencing 

October 7, 2012; and (2) whether OWCP properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for further 

review of the merits pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On October 11, 2012 appellant, then a 55-year-old administrative officer, filed an 

occupational disease claim alleging an increase in his blood pressure over several days. 

Appellant described receiving an e-mail from a former employee on Sunday, October 7, 2012. 

The former employee had resigned on February 7, 2011 following an investigation into sensitive 

security information he posted on an internet site. The October 7, 2012 e-mail, received 

20 months later, read: 

“The proceedings of the illegal meeting, bullying/lying that preceded firing were 

audial recorded (yes, really) and will be sent to Gov’t agencies in the hope that 

your illicit career will end in an even more un-illustrious manner than all those 

others you bullied, lied and intimidated in the course of firing. 

“Lying is frowned upon in the Fed. Govt. particularly when its revealed by 

opposing govt agencies and particularly on on-line social internet site. 

“There is also a whistle-blower clause that will be pursued. 

“DIAF.” 

Appellant noted that the acronym DIAF meant “Die in a Fire.” He contacted the 

employing establishment about the e-mail and submitted information from online sources 

concerning threats to government officials. Appellant stopped work on October 12, 2012, noting 

a constant headache and his blood pressure rose to dangerous levels despite medication. He 

stated that officials of the employing establishment did not adequately investigate the matter. 

In an October 12, 2012 report, Dr. Kim J. Crawford, a family practitioner, noted that 

appellant has been her patient since 2001 and that his hypertension worsened over the years 

resulting in increases and modifications to his medication. Of particular concern has been 

appellant’s diastolic pressure. Dr. Crawford stated that his blood pressure could be attributed to 

his “stressful work environment” and “scope of professional responsibilities.” She opined that 

appellant should be out of work indefinitely and consider a less stressful position. In an 

October 25, 2012 report, Dr. Crawford diagnosed benign hypertensive heart disease without 

heart failure and a generalized anxiety disorder. She noted that appellant’s blood pressure 

continued to spike and that his headaches continued. Dr. Crawford reiterated that he should be 

out of work indefinitely and consider a less stressful position. 

In a November 29, 2012 letter, OWCP advised appellant of the deficiencies in his claim. 

It requested that he submit additional factual and medical evidence to support his claim. 

On December 19, 2012 appellant responded that his claim pertained to an aggravation of 

his preexisting hypertension caused by work-related events and not to any psychological injury. 

He contended that the employing establishment did not make a required federal response to the 

threat he received, as it had not sent out any appropriate warnings or an official visit to the 
3

perpetrator.2

 Appellant submitted a copy of the employing establishment workplace violence 

program and a copy of an American Heart Association article on hypertensive crises. 

In a December 14, 2012 report, Pamela Lowell, a licensed social worker in the Employee 

Assistance Program noted seeing appellant commencing October 24, 2012 as he was out on sick 

leave. Appellant experienced workplace stress and post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms 

resulting from two threating e-mails from a former contact and no immediate or subsequent 

response from the employing establishment. After five sessions his blood pressure had returned 

to normal and he was back at work full time. 

By decision dated February 21, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim. It accepted that 

he received an e-mail from the former employee but found that the medical evidence was 

insufficient to establish that his medical condition was causally related to factors of his federal 

employment. 

On March 15, 2013 appellant requested reconsideration. He argued that the events of 

October 7 through 12, 2012 aggravated his preexisting hypertension and caused a hypertensive 

crisis, for which he sought treatment with Dr. Crawford. Appellant stated that the accepted 

work-related events drove him into a hypertensive crisis and were the sole cause of his medical 

and physical reactions. He stated that the American Heart Association article pertained to his 

specific condition as the base level of a hypertensive crisis was the level of severity he 

experienced. 

In a March 13, 2013 report, Dr. Crawford reiterated the diagnoses of benign hypertensive 

heart disease without heart failure and generalized anxiety disorder. She indicated that appellant 

presented in September and October 2012 with an awareness of an increase in his blood pressure 

and a recently developed trouble with anxiety and trouble with sleeping. Appellant related that 

he was dealing with job stressors, including intimidation and threats resulting from his doing due 

diligence in the performance of his duties. Dr. Crawford stated that “[appellant’s] duty-related 

events were likely the cause of his dangerously elevated blood pressure” and the reason she took 

him off work for three weeks to allow the supplementary medication to have effect. 

In an April 12, 2013 letter, Steven M. Stone, a human resource specialist, stated that he 

had reviewed appellant’s reconsideration statement and concurred with the facts describing the 

events of October 7 through 11, 2012. He noted working with appellant on a daily basis, who 

complained of headaches. 

In an April 19, 2013 statement, appellant noted that his supervisor and Mr. Stone had 

personally witnessed the effects of the hypertensive crisis on his ability to perform his job and 

the facts following the threat from the former employee. He contended that Dr. Crawford’s 

reports supported causal relationship. 

 2

 The record indicates that, after review, the employing establishment advised appellant that since the matter 

involved a former employee, it should be considered as a state or local issue. Appellant was advised to make a 

report to the Rhode Island State Police. 
4

By decision dated April 25, 2013, OWCP denied modification of its February 21, 2013 

decision. It determined that the reports of Dr. Crawford were not sufficiently rationalized to 

establish causal relation. 

On May 7, 2013 appellant requested reconsideration. In a May 7, 2013 letter, he noted 

that his request was based on newly discovered legal information. He cited to Board case law in 

support of the proposition that “where a person has a preexisting condition which is not disabling 

but which becomes disabling because of aggravation causally related to the employment, then 

regardless of the degree of such aggravation, the resulting disability is compensable. If the 

medical evidence reveals that an employment factor contributes in any way to the employee’s 

condition, the condition is considered to be employment related.” Appellant contended that 

Dr. Crawford clearly opined that his work events were the likely cause of his dangerously 

elevated blood pressure and the reason why he stopped work. 

By decision dated August 7, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s request for reconsideration 

without further merit review. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim, including the fact that the individual is an employee of the 

United States within the meaning of FECA, that the claim was filed within the applicable time 

limitation, that an injury was sustained while in the performance of duty as alleged and that any 

disability and/or specific condition for which compensation is claimed are causally related to the 

employment injury.3

 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim 

regardless of whether the claim is predicated on a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.4

 

To establish that a condition was sustained in the performance of duty in an occupational 

disease claim, a claimant must submit: (1) medical evidence establishing the presence or 

existence of the disease or condition for which compensation is claimed; (2) a factual statement 

identifying the employment factors alleged to have caused or contributed to the presence of 

occurrence of the disease or condition; and (3) medical evidence establishing that the diagnosed 

condition is causally related to the employment factors identified.5

The claimant has the burden of establishing by the weight of reliable, probative and 

substantial evidence that the condition for which compensation is sought is causally related to a 

specific employment incident or to specific conditions of employment.6

 An award of 

compensation may not be based on appellant’s belief of causal relationship. Neither the mere 

fact that a disease or condition manifests itself during a period of employment nor the belief that 

 3 C.S., Docket No. 08-1585 (issued March 3, 2009); Bonnie A. Contreras, 57 ECAB 364 (2006). 

4 S.P., 59 ECAB 184 (2007); Joe D. Cameron, 41 ECAB 153 (1989). 

5 See Gary M. DeLeo, 56 ECAB 656 (2005); Michael R. Shaffer, 55 ECAB 386 (2004). 

6

 Roma A. Mortenson-Kindschi, 57 ECAB 418 (2006); Katherine J. Friday, 47 ECAB 591 (1996). 
5

the disease or condition was caused or aggravated by employment factors or incidents is 

sufficient to establish a causal relationship.7 

Causal relationship is a medical issue. The medical evidence generally required to 

establish causal relationship is rationalized medical opinion evidence.8

 Rationalized medical 

opinion includes a physician’s opinion addressing the causal relationship between the 

employee’s diagnosed condition and the compensable employment factors.9

 The opinion of the 

physician must be based on a complete factual and medical background of the employee, must be 

one of reasonable medical certainty and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the 

nature of the relationship between the diagnosed condition and the specific employment factors 

identified by the employee.10 

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1 

OWCP accepted that appellant received an e-mail from a former employee of the 

employing establishment on October 7, 2012 and that he stopped work on October 12, 2012. It 

denied his claim, finding that the medical evidence was insufficient to establish that his 

diagnosed condition resulted from or was contributed to by the accepted work factors. Appellant 

alleged that the receipt of the e-mail constituted a threat against a government official and was 

not adequately investigated or responded to by the employing establishment. He claimed an 

aggravation of his preexisting hypertension and a hypertensive crisis. 

The Board finds that appellant did not submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that 

his hypertension or hypertensive crisis was causally related to the accepted work events. 

Appellant submitted several brief treatment records from Dr. Crawford, a family 

practitioner. On October 12, 2012 Dr. Crawford advised that he had been a patient since 2001 

and noted generally his work as an administrator in Homeland Security. As to the history, she 

noted that appellant had kept her abreast of handling intimidation and threats from employees 

and managers during the past 10 years. Dr. Crawford stated that his hypertension had been 

worsening over the years, resulting in modifications to his medication. As to causal relation, she 

stated that appellant’s hypertension “can be attributed to his stressful work environment and 

scope of professional responsibilities.” An October 25, 2012 treatment note listed several 

diagnoses without any further narrative from Dr. Crawford; who noted only that he should be out 

of work for two more weeks. On October 26, 2012 she stated that appellant’s diastolic blood 

pressure continued to spike with headaches. Dr. Crawford noted that Ms. Lowell recommended 

that he remain off work for another week, through November 2, 2012. She stated that, after 

seeing appellant for 10 years, her opinion remained that he be off work and consider a less 

stressful position. Dr. Crawford recommended that he find less stressful employment. The 

 7 P.K., Docket No. 08-2551 (issued June 2, 2009); Dennis M. Mascarenas, 49 ECAB 215 (1997). 

8 Y.J., Docket No. 08-1167 (issued October 7, 2008); A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006); D’Wayne Avila, 57 ECAB 

642 (2006). 

9 J.J., Docket No. 09-27 (issued February 10, 2009); Michael S. Mina, 57 ECAB 379 (2006). 

10 I.J., 59 ECAB 408 (2008); Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345, 352 (1989). 
6

Board finds that the records of her are summary in nature and do not provide any extensive 

history of her hypertension condition, medical treatment nor specifically address the events at 

work commencing on October 7, 2012. Rather, Dr. Crawford listed a 10 years history of 

handling intimidation and threats from employees and managers which does not pertain to the 

specifics of appellant’s claim regarding an e-mail from a former employee of October 7, 2012 or 

subsequent work events. 

On March 13, 2013 Dr. Crawford submitted another note, listing the diagnosis from prior 

records. She stated: 

“[Appellant] has been known to me for over five years and he impresses me with 

his depth of [commitment] and sensitivity to his health and work situations. He 

presented to me in September [2012] and then again in October [2012] relating 

that he was aware of an increase in his blood pressure and a recently developed 

trouble with anxiety and trouble with sleep. [Appellant] related to me that he was 

dealing with stressors of the job including intimidation and threats resulting from 

doing due diligence in the performance of his duties. I believe that his 

duty[-]related events were likely the cause of his dangerously elevated blood 

pressure and that they were the reason to put him out of work for three weeks to 

allow time for the supplementary medication to have effect.” 

The Board finds that Dr. Crawford’s opinion on causal relation is vague and couched in 

speculative terms. Dr. Crawford did not address specifics of the October 7, 2012 e-mail that 

appellant stated constituted a threat by a former employee. She noted that he was seen in 

September 2012, prior to the October 7, 2012 e-mail, for complaint of elevated blood pressure. 

Further, Dr. Crawford’s opinion on causal relation is not stated to a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty but that duty-related events “were likely” the cause of his elevated blood pressure.11

Dr. Crawford did not attribute his condition or the worsening thereof or the inability to 

work to the events of October 7 through 12, 2012, which diminishes the probative value of her 

opinion.12 Medical reports consisting solely of conclusory statements without supporting 

rationale are of diminished probative value.13 In the absence of a rationale opinion by 

Dr. Crawford on the issue of causal relationship to the specific employment factors accepted, the 

Board finds that her opinion fails to support appellant’s claim. 

Appellant also submitted a December 14, 2012 report from Ms. Lowell, a licensed 

clinical social worker. It is well established, however, that medical evidence must be from a 

 11 See James R. Taylor, 56 ECAB 537 (2005). 

12 See M.D., 59 ECAB 211 (2007); Vitaliy Y. Matviiv, 57 ECAB 193 (2005). 

13 See T.M., Docket No. 08-975 (issued February 6, 2009); Roma A. Mortenson-Kindschi, supra note 6; 

William C. Thomas, 45 ECAB 591 (1994) (a medical report is of limited probative value on the issue of causal 

relationship if it contains a conclusion regarding causal relationship which is unsupported by medical rationale). 
7

qualified physician.14 A licensed clinical social worker is not a physician as defined under 

FECA. An opinion from a social worker is of no probative medical value.15 

Appellant submitted an article from the American Health Association regarding 

hypertension. The Board has held that newspaper clippings, medical texts and similar excerpts 

from publications are of no evidentiary value in establishing causal relationship, as they are of 

general application and are not determinative of whether the specific condition claimed was 

caused by the particular employment events of activities raised in a claim.16 The article on 

hypertensive crises is, therefore, insufficient to establish causal relationship. Neither the fact that 

his condition became apparent during a period of employment nor the belief that his condition 

was caused or contributed to by his employment is sufficient to establish causal relationship.17 

Causal relationship must be established by rationalized medical opinion evidence from a 

physician. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2 

To require OWCP to reopen a case for merit review under section 8128(a) of FECA, 

OWCP’s regulations provide that a claimant must: (1) show that OWCP erroneously applied or 

interpreted a specific point of law; (2) advance a relevant legal argument not previously 

considered by OWCP; or (3) constitute relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously 

considered by OWCP.18 To be entitled to a merit review of an OWCP decision denying or 

terminating a benefit, a claimant also must file his or her application for review within one year 

of the date of that decision.19 When a claimant fails to meet one of the above standards, OWCP 

will deny the application for reconsideration without reopening the case for review on the 

merits.20 

 14 See Vickey C. Randall, 51 ECAB 357 (2000); Arnold A. Alley, 44 ECAB 912 (1993). 

15 See Sedi L. Graham, 57 ECAB 494 (2006); see also 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2), which provides that the term physician 

includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors and osteopathic 

practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by State law. 

16 Gaetan F. Valenza, 35 ECAB 763 (1984); Kenneth S. Vansick, 31 ECAB 1132 (1980). 

17 Id. 

18 20 C.F.R. § 10.606(b)(3). See J.M., Docket No. 09-218 (issued July 24, 2009); Susan A. Filkins, 57 ECAB 

630 (2006). 

19 Id. at § 10.607(a). See S.J., Docket No. 08-2048 (issued July 9, 2009); Robert G. Burns, 57 ECAB 657 (2006). 

20 Id. at § 10.608(b). See Y.S., Docket No. 08-440 (issued March 16, 2009); Tina M. Parrelli-Ball, 57 ECAB 

598 (2006). 
8

While the reopening of a case may be predicated solely on a legal premise not previously 

considered, such reopening is not required where the legal contention does not have a reasonable 

color of validity.21

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2 

Appellant’s May 7, 2013 request for reconsideration did not allege or demonstrate that 

OWCP erroneously applied or interpreted a specific point of law. He cited to Board case law in 

support of the general proposition that a preexisting condition which becomes disabling because 

of an aggravation causally related to the employment is compensable. Appellant’s contention 

was not sufficient to require OWCP to reopen his case for further merit review. The underlying 

basis for the denial of his claim was that causal relationship had not been established due to 

deficiency in the medical reports submitted to the record. Causal relationship is a medical issue 

and only evidence from a physician addressing the claim can establish causal relationship.22 

Appellant did not submit any new medical evidence; rather, he argued that Dr. Crawford’s 

medical reports were sufficient to establish his claim. As noted, they were found deficient by 

OWCP. Additionally, appellant did not advance a relevant legal argument not previously 

considered. The Board finds that he is not entitled to a review of the merits of his claim based on 

the first and second requirements under section 10.606(b)(3). 

Appellant also failed to submit relevant and pertinent new evidence not previously 

considered by OWCP. Thus, he is not entitled to a review of the merits of his claim based on the 

third requirement under section 10.606(b)(3). As appellant did not satisfy any of the regulatory 

criteria, OWCP did not abuse its discretion by denying merit review. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant did not establish that his hypertension was caused or 

contributed to by employment factors, as alleged. The Board further finds that OWCP properly 

denied his request for reconsideration under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a). 

 21 Vincent Holmes, 53 ECAB 468 (2002); Robert P. Mitchell, 52 ECAB 116 (2000). 

22 Mary J. Briggs, 37 ECAB 578 (1986). 
9

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the August 7 and April 25, 2013 decisions of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed. 

Issued: May 16, 2014 

Washington, DC 

 

 Richard J. Daschbach, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Michael E. Groom, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board