alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 (as adopted pursuant to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002), I, the undersigned, hereby certify that to the best of my
knowledge the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Titan Technologies, Inc. for
the quarterly period ended October 31, 2002 (the "Report") fully complies
with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.





Date:  March 26,  2003  Ronald L. Wilder
                        ----------------------------
                        Ronald L. Wilder,  President
                        (Chief  Executive  Officer)
                        (Chief  Financial  Officer)
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4265 

To direct the Secretary and the Attorney General to promptly take all steps 

necessary or appropriate to execute and implement the San Luis Rey 

settlement agreement, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MARCH 14, 2014 

Mr. HUNTER (for himself, Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California, Mr. CALVERT, 

Mr. PETERS of California, Mr. VARGAS, and Mr. COLE) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary and the Attorney General to promptly take all steps necessary or appropriate to execute 

and implement the San Luis Rey settlement agreement, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SAN LUIS REY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IM4 PLEMENTATION. 

5 The San Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement 

6 Act (Public Law No. 100–675) is amended by adding at 

7 the end the following: 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4265 IH

1 ‘‘SEC. 112. IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT. 

2 ‘‘Congress finds that the City of Escondido, Cali3 fornia, the Vista Irrigation District, the San Luis Rey 

4 River Indian Water Authority, and the Bands have ap5 proved in principle a settlement agreement, dated April 

6 23, 2012, that conforms to the requirements of this Act. 

7 Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Sec8 retary and the Attorney General shall promptly take all 

9 steps necessary or appropriate to— 

10 ‘‘(1) execute and implement that agreement on 

11 behalf of the United States, and 

12 ‘‘(2) secure the entry of stipulated judgments or 

13 other final dispositions in the proceedings among 

14 these parties presently pending before the United 

15 States District Court for the Southern District of 

16 California and the Federal Energy Regulatory Com17 mission.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
**EXHIBIT 31.1****Certification Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**     I, William R. Wolff, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-KSB of MakeMusic! Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin the annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperation and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15(d)-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared;     b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and     c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscalquarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the smallbusiness issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and     b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.     Date:March 17, 2006 By: /s/ William R. Wolff    Chief Executive Officer
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-20-00100-CV

__________________

IN THE INTEREST OF T.R.H. JR.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CV0901264

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The appellant, Desireé Heller, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s 

temporary order, which the trial court signed on February 12, 2020. We questioned 

our jurisdiction over the appeal and instructed the appellant to respond by identifying 

the statute or rule that she was relying upon to authorize an appeal from an 

interlocutory order. In the same letter, we warned the parties the Court would dismiss 

the appeal unless we could determine that jurisdiction existed over Heller’s appeal.
2

Heller responded by filing an amended notice of appeal. In her amended 

notice, she stated she wants to appealfrom an order the trial court signed on March 

12, 2020. In that order, the trial court denied Heller’s motion to enforce her right to 

have visitation with the child who is the subject of the proceedings. After filing the 

amended notice, Heller filed a response to this Court’s earlier request, claiming she 

was appealing from the order the trial court signed in March and not from the one 

the trial court signed in February

Generally, courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review final judgments and 

interlocutory orders that the Legislature made appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. 

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Heller’s response fails to establish 

she is seeking to appeal from an order that she has the right to appeal. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 42.3(a)

For these reasons, we dismiss Heller’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Tex. 

R. App. P. 43.2(f).

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

PER CURIAM

Submitted on April 15, 2020

Opinion Delivered April 16, 2020

Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 189 (Friday, September 30, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57364-57365]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-19569]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board


Release of Waybill Data

    The Surface Transportation Board has received a request from the 
Association of American Railroads (WB463-8, September 21, 2005) for 
permission to use certain data from the Board's Carload Waybill 
Samples. A copy of this request may be obtained from the Office of 
Economics, Environmental Analysis, and Administration.
    The waybill sample contains confidential railroad and shipper data; 
therefore, if any parties object to these requests, they should file 
their objections with the Director of the Board's Office of Economics, 
Environmental Analysis, and

[[Page 57365]]

Administration within 14 calendar days of the date of this notice. The 
rules for release of waybill data are codified at 49 CFR 1244.9.
    Contact: Mac Frampton, (202) 565-1541.

Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 05-19569 Filed 9-29-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20-2234

PATRICIA RICHARD; RICHARD F. TALLANT,

Petitioners - Appellees,

v.

ELIZABETH S. TALLANT,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Statesville. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (5:20-cv-00129-KDB-DCK)

Submitted: November 18, 2021 Decided: November 19, 2021

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elizabeth S. Tallant, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmy Ray Summerlin, Jr., YOUNG, MORPHIS, 

BACH & TAYLOR, L.L.P., Hickory, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Elizabeth S. Tallant (“Tallant”) seeks to appeal the district court’s October 2020 

order granting Richard Tallant and Patricia Richard’s (“Petitioners”) motion to remand the 

case to the state court from which it was removed on the ground that removal was untimely

under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and denying Tallant’s pending motions as moot. Tallant also 

seeks to appeal the district court’s September 2020 order denying in part her motion to 

electronically file documents. 

Generally, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was 

removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Supreme 

Court has instructed that “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with [28 U.S.C.] 

§ 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from 

review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). 

Thus, § 1447(d)’s proscription against review applies only to remand orders “based on (1) a 

district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in removal other than lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction that was raised by the motion of a party within 30 days after 

the notice of removal was filed.” Doe v. Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Petitioners moved to remand within 30 days of Tallant’s notice of removal and the 

district court remanded on the basis that removal was untimely. Under the cited authorities, 
3

we are without jurisdiction to review the remand order.∗ Accordingly, we dismiss the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

∗ Because the district court’s remand order is unreviewable and the case is no longer 

before the district court, we dismiss as moot Tallant’s appeal of the intermediary order 

denying in part her motion to electronically file documents. See Catawba Riverkeeper 

Found. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 843 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[A] case is moot when 

our resolution of an issue could not possibly have any practical effect on the outcome of 

the matter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-1687

KEITH BRUNDIGE, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant, 

 v. 

THE PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 

 Defendants – Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:08-cv-00037-GBL-TCB) 

Submitted: October 14, 2008 Decided: October 16, 2008 

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Keith Brundige, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Keith Brundige appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing his civil action brought pursuant to Title II of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2000)). We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. 

Brundige v. Prince William County Police Dep’t, No. 

1:08-cv-0037-GBL-TCB (E.D. Va. filed Feb. 29, 2008; entered 

Mar. 4, 2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED
STATE of North Carolina v. Herbert Lee STROUD

No. 118P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 8, 2017

Daniel Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Stroud, Herbert Lee.

Sandra Wallace-Smith, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ernie Lee, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the notice of appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals, filed by the Defendant on the 11th of April 2017 in this matter pursuant to G.S. 7A-30, and the motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of substantial constitutional question filed by the State of NC, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals: the motion to dismiss the appeal is

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 11th of April 2017 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."
In the MATTER OF: A.P.

No. 145PA17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 28, 2017

Anne C. Wright, Attorney at Law, Boone, for Powell, Kylah.

Christopher C. Peace, Keith T. Roberson, Attorneys at Law, for Mecklenburg County DSS.

Matthew Wunsche, Attorney at Law, Durham, for GAL.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Petitioners on the 9th of May 2017 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of September 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 23rd of May 2017 by Petitioners in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

*538"Allowed by order of the Court in conference, this the 28th of September 2017."
fs12010ex10xi_chinawood.htm


Exhibit 10.9


 


 


Lease Agreement







          Party A: Linyi Xintai Construction Co. Ltd.


          Party B: Linyi Chan Tseng Wood Co., Ltd.







          This LEASE AGREEMENT (“Agreement”) is entered into by and between Linyi Lanshan Xintai Construction and Installation Co. Ltd. (“Party A”) and Linyi Chan Tseng Wood Co., Ltd. (“Party B”).







WITNESSETH







          WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to enter into this Agreement to define and set forth the terms and conditions of the leasing cooperation between Party A and Party B;







          NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements as set forth below, and in compliance with the “Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China,” it is hereby covenanted and agreed by both parties as follows:


 


    1.  Party B hereby agrees to lease from Party A four (4) rooms, with a total coverage of 14,886 square meters, located at Daizhuang Industrial Zone, Yitang Town, Lanshan District, Linyi City (the “Leased Building”).







    2.  The term of this Agreement (“Term”) is twenty (20) years commencing from July 18, 2006 to March 20, 2014.  Party B shall take possession of the Leased Building on July 18, 2006 and vacate on March 20, 2014.


 


    3.   The annual rent for the Leased Building is RMB 651, 000, payable in equal installment each quarter.


 


    4.  The Leased Building shall be used for the purpose of processing and manufacturing plywood and Engineered Wood.







    5.  Party B shall be responsible for the utility bills, including water, electricity, gas, telephone, cable, cleaning and maintenances.







    6.   Party B shall not demolish, rebuild or newly construct any projects without Party A’s permission. Any purposeful or negligent damages done to the building by Party B shall be repaired by Party B.







    7.  Party A shall be responsible for repairing any damages caused by or arising out of construction defeats, acts of God or natural wearing.


 


    8.   Party B shall agree to sell to Party A any fixtures added on the building or on the land during the term of this Agreement at a price agreed upon by both Parities, or remove such fixtures at Party B’s expense.







 


 


1


 




  





  











  











           IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed and become effective as of the date first above written upon the signature and seals by both parties.







 


           Party A:  Linyi Lanshan Xintai Construction and Installation Co. Ltd.







 


           Party B:  Linyi Chan Tseng Wood Co., Ltd.












2
# STATE OFLOUISIANA

COURTOFAPPEAL, FIRSTCIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA NO. 

### 2021 KW 1505 VERSUS JEREMY GRINER 

### FEBRUARY 25, 2022

In Re: 

### Jeremy Griner, applying for 

### supervisory writs, 21st

Judicial District Court, Parish of Livingston, No. 

### 35, 185.
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C. J., PENZATO AND HESTER, JJ.

WRIT DENIED. Relator failed to meet 

### his burden of proving that relief should be granted. See La. 

### Code Crim. P. art. 930. 2. VGW AHP CHH



### COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST CIRCUIT 

# p / 11' ; 

# 1a Ai

# u

# t

DEPU Y CLERK OF COURT

FOR THE COURT
##### 



Exhibit 21.1 WINSTON HOTELS, INC.
List of Subsidiaries Jurisdiction ofIncorporation of
    
    Other Names UnderName
    
    Organization
    
    Which Doing Business1. Winston Manager Corporation
    
    Virginia
    
    N/A2. Winston Manager II LLC
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A3. WINN Limited Partnership **
    
    North Carolina
    
    WINN Limited Partnership ofNorth Carolina (Florida)WINN Operating LimitedPartnership (Texas)North Carolina WINN LimitedPartnership (Arizona)4. Barclay Hospitality Services Inc. *
    
    North Carolina
    
    N/A5. Winston SPE LLC *
    
    Virginia
    
    N/A6. Winston SPE II LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A7. Winston Finance LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A8. Evanston Hotel Associates, LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A9. Marsh Landing Hotel Associates, LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A10. Windsor Hotel Associates, LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A11. Windsor Lessee Company LLC *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A12. Chapel Hill Associates, LLC *
    
    North Carolina
    
    N/A13. Winston Opportunity Management, LLC *
    
    North Carolina
    
    N/A14. Winston Kansas City, LP *
    
    Delaware
    
    N/A
   *
    
    These entities are subsidiaries of WINN Limited Partnership.**
    
    Winston Hotels, Inc. was the sole general partner, and owned 95.31%, of WINN Limited Partnership
as of December 31, 2004. 1
# C_2009312EN.01002702.xml

| 19.12.2009 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 312/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.12.2009

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 312/27

---

Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 29 October 2009 — Peek & Cloppenburg v OHIM — Redfil (Agile)

(Case T-386/07) (1)

1

(Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for the Community figurative mark Agile - Earlier Community and national word marks Aygill’s - Relative ground for refusal - Likelihood of confusion - Similarity of the signs - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

2009/C 312/44

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Peek & Cloppenburg (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: T. Dolde, A. Renck and V. von Bomhard, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (represented: initially by S. Laitinen, and subsequently by R. Pethke, Agents)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance: Redfil, SL (Barcelona, Spain) (represented by: C. Hernández Hernández, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of OHIM intervening before the Court of First Instance:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of OHIM of 26 July 2007 (Case R 1324/2006-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Peek & Cloppenburg and Redfil, SL.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 26 July 2007 (Case R 1324/2006 2). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of 26 July 2007 (Case R 1324/2006 2).

| 2. | Orders OHIM to pay the costs incurred by Peek & Cloppenburg. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders OHIM to pay the costs incurred by Peek & Cloppenburg.

| 3. | Orders Redfil, SL to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders Redfil, SL to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 297, 8.12.2007.

1

---
Order filed, September 20, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00652-CR

____________

DAVID JASON MENA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1098254

ORDER

The reporter’s record in this case was due September 10, 2012. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 35.1. The court has not received a request to extend time for filing the record. The 

record has not been filed with the court. Because the reporter’s record has not been filed 

timely, we issue the following order.

We order Pamela Knobloch, the official court reporter, to file the record in this 

appeal within 30 days of the date of this order. 

PER CURIAM
STATE of North Carolina v. Travis Xavier THOMAS

No. COA17-140

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: September 19, 2017

AFFIRMED.