alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.2
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of NACO Industries, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form  10-QSB  for the  Quarter  Ended  August  31,  2004 as  filed  with  the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Jeffrey
J. Kirby, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.  1350,  as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,
that, to the best of my knowledge:

          (1) The Report fully complies with the  requirements  of section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2) The information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.

/s/ Jeffrey J. Kirby
---------------------------
Jeffrey J. Kirby
Chief Financial Officer
October 13, 2004

A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating,  acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 2002, as amended.
JOHNSON v. JOHNSON

111P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

Glenwood F. Johnson, for Johnson, Glenwood F.

Whitney Williams, Attorney at Law, John C. Fitzpatrick, Attorney at Law, Durham, for Johnson, Grace Justice.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 7th of April 2017 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."
Exhibit 32.0
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company. The undersigned
have executed this Certificate as of the
5th day of May 2011.
 /s/ Paul Wright

Paul WrightPrincipal Executive Officer/s/ Salesh Balak

Salesh BalakPrincipal Financial Officer
 
 *
    
    This certification is being furnished as required by Rule 13a-14(b)
under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
Exchange Act), and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the
United States Code, and shall not be deemed filed for purposes of
Section 18 of the Exchange Act or otherwise subject to the liability
of that section. This certification shall not be deemed to be
incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Act of
1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except to the extent such
certification is explicitly incorporated by reference in such filing.
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

October 23, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 08-11660

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 07-80714-CV-PCH

REGINALD HILL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

KATHLEEN ARCHER,

MARILU MACHIN,

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS,

General Counsel,

CHALENE SZABO, Medical Center Director, Department

of Veteran Affairs,

Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_________________________

(October 23, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Hill appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims against the

United States, finding that they were barred by the statute of limitations. He also

appeals an adverse summary judgment in favor of Kathleen Archer and Marilu

Machin on Hill’s claims against these defendants. We affirm.

A suit against the federal government is barred “unless action is begun

within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice

of the final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28

U.S.C. § 2401(b). However, statutes of limitation are generally subject to

equitable tolling. Cook v. Deltona Corp., 753 F.2d 1552, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985).

Here, the district court did not clearly err by finding that the final denial of claim

letter was mailed on February 7, 2007 and that there was no basis for equitable

tolling. Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing Hill’s claims against

the United States as time-barred.

We also conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Hill’s

constitutional claims against Kathleen Archer and Marilu Machin were barred by

the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388-

90, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2416-17, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (holding that the CSRA

2
precluded an action brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971));

Stephens v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 901 F.2d 1571, 1576-78 (11th

Cir. 1990) (noting the CSRA is an adequate remedy and precludes all Bivens

actions for personnel actions that allegedly violate the Constitution). Moreover,

the district court did not err in granting Archer and Machin’s motion for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because there was no constitutional

violation here.

Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, we

find no reversible error.

AFFIRMED

3
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 10-Q/A
 (AMENDMENT NO. 1)
 þ
    
    QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED June 30, 2008
 OR
 o
    
    TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD FROM  TO
 Commission file number 001-32980
 BMP SUNSTONE CORPORATION
 (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
 Delaware
    
    20-0434726(State or other jurisdiction of
    
    (I.R.S. Employerincorporation or organization)
    
    Identification No.)600 W. Germantown Pike, Suite 400Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania
    
    19462(Address of principal executive offices)
    
    (Zip Code)
 610) 940-1675
 (Registrants telephone number, including area code)
 þ o
  Large accelerated filer o
    
    Accelerated filer þ
    
    Non-accelerated filer   o
(Do not check if a smaller reporting company)
    
    Smaller reporting company o
 o þ




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##### 



TABLE OF CONTENTS  PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATIONITEM 4. Controls and ProceduresPART II. OTHER INFORMATIONItem 6. ExhibitsSIGNATURESEXHIBIT INDEX EXPLANATORY NOTE
  
 PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION
 
 ITEM 4. Controls and Procedures
 (a) Evaluation of Disclosure Controls and Procedures




---



##### 



(b) Changes in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
  
 PART II. OTHER INFORMATION
 
 Item 6. Exhibits
  ExhibitNumber
    
    Description31.1
    
    Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)31.2
    
    Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
  BMP Sunstone CorporationDate: January 23, 2009
    /s/ David GaoDavid GaoChief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)Date: January 23, 2009
    /s/ Fred M. PowellFred M. PowellChief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)




---



##### 



EXHIBIT INDEX
  ExhibitNumber
    
    Description31.1
    
    Certification of Principal Executive Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)31.2
    
    Certification of Principal Financial Officer Pursuant to Section
302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002/SEC Rule 13a-14(a)
# C_2008171EN.01001102.xml

| 5.7.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 171/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

5.7.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 171/11

---

Order of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 10 April 2008 (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia (Italy)) — Termoraggi SpA v Comune di Monza

(Case C-323/07) (1)

1

(Public procurement - Public service and public supply contracts - Award without call for tenders - Award by a local authority to an undertaking whose capital it controls)

(2008/C 171/19)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia

Parties

Applicant: Termoraggi SpA

Applicant:

Defendant: Comune di Monza

Defendant:

Intervener: Acqua Gas Azienda Municipale (AGAM)

Intervener:

Re:

Reference for a preliminary ruling — Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per la Lombardia — Interpretation of Article 6 of Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts (OJ 1992 L 209, p. 1) — Scope — National provisions attributing, outside of the procedures for the award of public works contracts laid down in the directive, the management of heating installations of certain buildings in a commune to a municipal undertaking

Operative part of the order

Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts and Council Directive 93/36/EEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts do not apply to a contract concluded between a local authority and a person legally distinct from it, where the local authority exercises over the person concerned a control which is similar to that which it exercises over its own departments and, at the same time, that person carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling local authority or authorities.

Article 6 of Directive 92/50 is applicable only if there are legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions published which grant the beneficiary an exclusive right concerning the subject-matter of the contract awarded.

---

(1)  OJ C 235, 6.10.2007.

1

---
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 

March 14, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

135881 Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

IN RE SZANTO KADO-DESHAWN BROWN, 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

Minor. 

________________________________________ 

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v SC: 135881 

 COA: 277791

 Oakland CC

LINDA NICKSON, 

Respondent-Appellant, 

 Family Division: 06-727652-NA 

and 

KENNETH BROWN,

Respondent. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 29, 2008 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

d0311 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

March 14, 2008 

 Clerk
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-60680

Summary Calendar

MIRNA LIZETH RODRIGUEZ

Petitioner

v.

MICHAEL B MUKASEY, U S ATTORNEY GENERAL

Respondent

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A95 328 626

Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Mexican citizen Mirna Lizeth Rodriguez petitions for review of the decision

ofthe Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order of removal entered

by the Immigration Judge (IJ). Rodriguez contends that the BIA and IJ erred

by refusing to afford her the benefit of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I), which

excludes time spent in the United States by a minor from the calculation of a

period of unlawful presence.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 27, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-60680

2

The plain language of § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I) limits its application to

§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). Cf. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242

(1989) (looking first to plain language in interpreting statute). Rodriguez was

deemed inadmissible under another provision, § 1182(a)(9)(C), which sets forth

more culpable conduct than does subsection (a)(9)(B). See Mortera-Cruz v.

Gonzales, 409 F.3d 246, 255-56 (5th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing subsections).

Further, § 1182(a)(9)(C) has its own exception and waiver provisions, which do

not include any exception for minors. See § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) & (iii). The

inclusion of some waivers implies the exclusion of others. See Thompson v.

Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 499 (5th Cir. 2003). 

In addition,the Ninth Circuit has held that, although “unlawful presence”

has the same general meaning in subsections (a)(9)(B) and (a)(9)(C), there is no

presumption “that the waiver provisions are also incorporated, particularly

where they are contained in separate provisions and not within the definition

itself.” Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 557 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that

“hardship” waiver of § 1182(a)(9)(B) was not incorporated into § 1182(a)(9)(C)).

Rodriguez was properly held to be removable under § 1182(a)(9)(C). Her

petition for review is DENIED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

PATRICK JOSHUA COFFEY,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 20

- 30052

D.C. No. 2:17

- cr

- 00179

- BLW

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 9, 2020 * *

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, TASHIMA and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Patrick Joshua Coffey appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 21

- month sentence imposed following his third revocation of

supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Coffey contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

NOV 17 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 20

- 30052

his difficult childhood, the nature of his violations

, and the alleged harshness of his

prior custodial placements. The district court did not abuse its discretion

. See G all

v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The above

- G uidelines sentence is

substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and

the totality of the circumstances , including Coffey’s repeated violations and his

demonstrated unsuitability for supervised release

. See Gall , 552 U.S. at 5 1

.

Moreove r, c ontrary to Coffey’s contention s , the record reflects that the district

court considered hi s mitigating arguments

, relied on only proper sentencing

factor s, and thoroughly explained its reasons for imposing the sentence

. See

United States v. Carty

, 520 F.3d 984, 99 1

- 9 2 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (explaining

sentencing court’s procedural obligations) ; United States v. Simtob , 485 F.3d 1058,

1062 (9th Cir. 2007) ( seriousness of underlying offense “may be considered to a

lesser degree as part of the crim inal history of the violator”).

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 23.1**

**Consent ofIndependent Registered Public Accounting Firm**

We consent to theincorporation by reference in the following Registration Statements:

1)               Form S-8and the Post-Effective Amendment No. 1 to the Form S-8(Registration No. 333-07295) pertaining to the 1993 Stock OptionPlan, 1996 Director’s Stock Option Plan and Employees and Consultants StockOption Agreement/Plan

2)               Form S-8(Registration No. 333-58303) pertaining to the 1993 Stock OptionPlan, and 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan

3)               Form S-8(Registration No. 333-87369) pertaining to the 1993 Stock OptionPlan, the Form S-8 (Registration No. 333-44736)pertaining to the 1993 Stock Option Plan

4)               Form S-8(Registration No. 333-86644) pertaining to the 1996 Directors’ StockOption Plan and 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan

5)               Post-EffectiveAmendment No. 6 on Form S-3 to Form SB-2(Form SB-2 No. 333-476-LA) for the registration of4,477,402 shares of common stock and 328,500 warrants to purchase common stock

6)               Form S-3(Registration No. 333-88051) for the registration of 2,014,036shares of common stock

7)               Form S-3(Registration No. 333-52326) for the registration of 697,533 sharesof common stock

8)               Form S-3(Registration No. 333-95177) for the registration of 136,130 sharesof common stock

9)               Form S-3(Registration No. 333-100707) for the registration of 3,930,800shares of common stock

10)        Form S-3(Registration No. 333-104255) for the registration of 11,549,219shares of common stock

11)        Form S-3(Registration No. 333-107301) for the registration of 5,004,000shares of common stock

12)        Form S-8(Registration No. 333-110152) pertaining to the 2003 Stock Plan andrelated prospectuses

13)        Form S-3(Registration No. 333-113858) for the registration of 6,153,454shares of common stock

14)        Form S-3(Registration No. 333-120502) for the registration of 4,400,000shares of common stock

15)        Form S-8(Registration No. 333-120505) pertaining to the 1998 Employee StockPurchase Plan,

16)        Form S-3(Registration No. 333-123819) for the registration of $100,000,000of various securities, including common stock, preferred stock, depositaryshares, warrants, or debt securities, and

17)        Form S-8(Registration No. 333-127073) pertaining to the 2003 Stock Plan.

of our reports datedMarch 15, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial statements ofSuperGen, Inc., SuperGen, Inc. management’s assessment of theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, and theeffectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of SuperGen, Inc.,  included in the Annual Report on Form 10-Kfor the year ended December 31, 2006.

|                        | /s/ Ernst & Young LLP |   |
|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------|
| Palo Alto,  California |
| March 15,  2007   |

 

----
STATE of North Carolina v. Kenrick J. BATTLE

No. 144P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 8, 2017

William D. Spence, Attorney at Law, Kinston, for Battle, Kenrick J.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, Robert A. Evans, Jr., District Attorney, for State of North Carolina

***ORDER***

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 5th of May 2017 by State of NC for Temporary Stay:

"Motion Dissolved by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed by State of NC on the 5th of May 2017 for Writ of Supersedeas of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 5th of May 2017 by State of NC in this matter for discretionary review of the decision *873of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 8th of June 2017."
**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 23 April 2008 – Leche Celta v OHIM – Celia (Celia)**

**(Case T-35/07)**

Community trade mark – Opposition – Application for Community figurative mark Celia – Earlier national word mark CELTA – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94

Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services
– Likelihood of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see para. 49)

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 5 December 2006 (Case R 294/2006-4) concerning opposition proceedings between Leche Celta, SL and Celia SA. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | Celia SA |
| Community trade mark sought: | Figurative mark Celia for goods and services in Classes 16, 29 and 38 – Application No 2977221 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Leche Celta, SL |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | National word mark CELTA for goods in Class 29 |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Opposition dismissed |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Appeal dismissed |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Orders Leche Celta, SL to pay the costs. |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Petitioner

v.

GERALD NEAL,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 378 MAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 1st day of November, 2023, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.