NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STANFORD COLLINS, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, 

Defendant/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0733

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2013-000300-001

The Honorable Crane McClennen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Stanford D. Collins, Phoenix

Plaintiff/Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael Raine

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
COLLINS v. AZDWM

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Stanford Collins appeals the superior court’s 

judgment affirming the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ), 

which found Collins: (1) operated a taxi without a license; (2) failed to 

obtain and use taxi license plates; (3) failed to maintain commercial 

insurance on a taxi; (4) failed to post fare rates inside or outside a taxi; 

(5) failed to post driver identification in a taxi; and (6) failed to obtain and 

use a taxi meter, all in violation of Arizona law regulating operation of a 

livery vehicle. Collins’ sole argument on appeal is that insufficient evidence 

supports the ALJ’s finding that he was operating a taxi. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In December 2012, the Phoenix Police Department received a

report of an illegal taxi operating outside the Wal-Mart at 16th Avenue and 

Bethany Home Road. Another taxi driver reportedly saw Collins soliciting 

rides at the entrance of the Wal-Mart, and heard him negotiate with a 

prospective passenger regarding the price of a ride. 

¶3 Upon arrival, the officer found Collins standing on the 

passenger side of a 1987 Chevrolet Celebrity sedan marked with the word 

“taxi” on the back, while a man climbed into the back seat. The officer did 

not observe a license plate indicating the vehicle was a taxi, a “taxi” sticker 

on the vehicle’s rear window, signage on the vehicle’s exterior or interior 

containing rates, or a meter. 

¶4 The officer asked the man if he was getting into a taxi, and

when he answered in the affirmative, the officer advised that the vehicle 

 

1 When reviewing an administrative decision, we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to upholding the decision of the ALJ. Special 

Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm’n, 182 Ariz. 341, 346, 897 P.2d 643, 648 (App. 1994). 
COLLINS v. AZDWM

Decision of the Court

3

was not a valid taxi. The man removed his belongings from the vehicle’s 

trunk and left the scene. 

¶5 When requested, Collins was unable to provide the officer 

with proof of commercial insurance. He explained to the officer that he was 

not operating a taxi, but was giving rides for free. 

¶6 An investigator from the Arizona Department of Weights and 

Measures (DWM), who was called to the scene, informed Collins of his 

rights under the Regulatory Bill of Rights, and performed a taxi cab 

inspection. The investigator observed the words “STANFORD TAXI” and 

“TAXI” on the rear and both sides of the vehicle’s exterior. However, there 

was no taxi license plate or fare rates on the exterior. Additionally, there 

was no driver’s identification or rates posted inside the vehicle; nor did the 

investigator observe a taxi meter. 

¶7 Based upon its investigation, DWM issued a Notice of 

Violation to Collins, which found numerous violations of state law and 

assessed civil penalties as follows: (1) $300 penalty for operating a taxi 

without a license, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 

41-2113(B)(4);2 (2) $300 penalty for operating a taxi without a taxi meter, in 

violation of A.R.S. § 41-2091(C); (3) $300 penalty for operating a taxi without 

displaying interior signage containing fare information, in violation of 

A.R.S. § 41-2096(A); (4) $300 penalty for operating a taxi without displaying 

exterior signage containing fare information, in violation of A.R.S. § 41-

2096(C); (5) $300 penalty for operating a taxi without displaying driver’s 

identification, in violation of A.R.S. § 41-2096(B); (6) $500 penalty for 

operating a taxi without displaying taxi license plates, in violation of A.R.S.

§ 41-2091(K); and (7) $500 penalty for operating a taxi without proper 

insurance, in violation of A.R.S. § 41-2091(K). 

¶8 Collins appealed the Notice of Violation, and DWM 

conducted a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings. At the 

hearing, DWM presented the evidence obtained from the investigation. 

Collins testified he had not been operating a taxi, but rather “selling his 

image” and promoting a future taxi business. 

¶9 The ALJ specifically “deemed [Collins’ testimony] not 

credible given the totality of the evidence of the record,” and concluded 

DWM had proven each violation by a preponderance of the evidence. It 

 

2 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes cited refer 

to the current version.
COLLINS v. AZDWM

Decision of the Court

4

therefore affirmed the total civil penalty of $2,500 assessed against Collins. 

DWM subsequently adopted the ALJ’s findings and conclusions as a final 

administrative decision. 

¶10 Collins thereafter filed a complaint for review with the 

superior court pursuant to the Administrative Review Act. See A.R.S. 

§§ 12-901 to -914. The superior court affirmed DWM’s conclusions, and 

Collins timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-913 

and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 In reviewing an agency decision, the superior court “shall 

affirm the agency action unless after reviewing the administrative record 

and supplementing evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing the court 

concludes that the action is not supported by substantial evidence, is 

contrary to law, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion.” 

A.R.S. § 12-910(E). On appeal, we review the superior court’s judgment de 

novo, “independently examin[ing] the record to determine whether the 

evidence supports the judgment.” Webb v. State ex rel. Ariz. Bd. of Med. 

Exam’rs, 202 Ariz. 555, 557, ¶ 7, 48 P.3d 505, 507 (App. 2002) (citing Carley v. 

Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 153 Ariz. 461, 463, 737 P.2d 1099, 1101 (App. 1987)). 

¶12 Thus, “our respective roles begin and end with determining 

whether there was substantial evidence to support the administrative

decision,” Havasu Heights Ranch & Dev. Corp. v. Desert Valley Wood Prods., 

Inc., 167 Ariz. 383, 387, 807 P.2d 1119, 1123 (App. 1990) (citing Plowman v. 

Ariz. State Liquor Bd., 152 Ariz. 331, 335-36, 732 P.2d 222, 226-27 (App. 1986), 

and Sundown Imports, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 115 Ariz. 428, 431, 565 

P.2d 1289, 1292 (App. 1977)). Substantial evidence exists even if the record 

also supports a different conclusion. DeGroot v. Ariz. Racing Comm’n, 141 

Ariz. 331, 336, 686 P.2d 1301, 1306 (App. 1984) (citing Webster v. State Bd. of 

Regents, 123 Ariz. 363, 365, 599 P.2d 816, 818 (App. 1979)). The superior 

court errs when it substitutes its own judgment for that of the fact finder —

here, the administrative law judge — and may not re-weigh the evidence 

upon which the decision was based. Richard E. Lambert, Ltd. v. City of Tucson 

Dep’t of Procurement, 223 Ariz. 184, 187, ¶ 9, 221 P.3d 375, 378 (App. 2009). 

An agency’s determination may be overturned only if it “‘is without any 

evidence to support it, or is absolutely contrary to uncontradicted and 

unconflicting evidence upon which it purports to rest.’” Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. 

Safety v. Dowd, 117 Ariz. 423, 426, 573 P.2d 497, 500 (App. 1977) (quoting E. 

Camelback Homeowners Ass’n v. Ariz. Found. for Neurology & Psychiatry, 18 

Ariz. App. 121, 126, 500 P.2d 906, 911 (1972)).
COLLINS v. AZDWM

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¶13 Collins does not dispute the physical attributes of the vehicle

or the lack of commercial insurance. Rather, he argues only that there was 

insufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that he was operating a 

taxi. We disagree, as we find there is substantial evidence in the record to 

support this determination. Collins was observed soliciting taxi rides at the 

entrance of Wal-Mart. His vehicle displayed the word “taxi” in three 

locations, and at least one person — his purported passenger — believed 

him to be lawfully operating as a taxi. 

¶14 Although Collins presented his own testimony to controvert 

these facts,

3 the ALJ did not find it credible in light of the other evidence. 

Therefore, nor do we. State v. Alawy, 198 Ariz. 363, 365 n.2, ¶ 7, 9 P.3d 1102, 

1104 (App. 2000) (noting “it is not for [the appellate] court but for the trier 

of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses”); see Ritland v. Ariz. State 

Bd. of Med. Examn’rs, 213 Ariz. 187, 190, ¶ 10, 140 P.3d 970, 973 (App. 2006) 

(explaining the “‘predicate upon which our deference is given to the finder 

of fact is the assumption that he has indeed had the opportunity to look the 

witness in the eye and reach a conclusion with respect to his veracity or lack 

thereof.’” (quoting Adams v. Indus. Comm’n, 147 Ariz. 418, 421, 710 P.2d 

1073, 1076 (App. 1985))).

¶15 Alternatively, Collins argued below that the taxi was not 

“operational” in that “[n]o one moved an inch in [his] car.” Collins 

presented no authority for the position that, as long as an unlicensed 

commercial vehicle is not in motion, it is not being “operated.” To the 

 

3 Collins argues the ALJ “totally disregarded or ignored” testimony 

from his fiancé, “a witness to this issue.” The record reflects Collins was 

the only witness offered on his behalf at the hearing. There is no indication 

Collins attempted to, or was denied the opportunity to, present his fiancé’s 

testimony. Moreover, Collins failed to provide a transcript of the hearing 

to this Court. See State ex. rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Burton, 205 Ariz. 27, 30, 

¶ 16, 66 P.3d 70, 73 (App. 2003) (noting appellant’s responsibility to ensure 

complete record on appeal and holding “[w]hen a party fails to do so, we 

assume the missing portions of the record would support the [ALJ]’s 

findings and conclusions” (citing Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73, 900 P.2d 

764, 767 (App. 1995))). On this record, we do not find any error. Even 

assuming the record was complete, the ALJ is within his discretion to 

disregard or ignore testimony from an interested witness that is contrary to 

other credible evidence. See Stanley v. Moan, 71 Ariz. 359, 361, 227 P.2d 389, 

391 (1951).
COLLINS v. AZDWM

Decision of the Court

6

contrary, A.R.S. § 41-2114 creates a rebuttable presumption that a 

commercial device is “regularly used” for a business purpose if it “is in or 

about any place in which or from which buying or selling is commonly 

carried on.” Here, evidence was presented that Collins was preparing to 

provide passenger services for a fare outside a busy Wal-Mart, where at 

least one other taxi driver was available to provide transportation. Collins 

offered nothing to rebut the presumption that his vehicle was “in use,” and 

we therefore reject this argument.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm the superior court’s order upholding DWM’s 

determination that Collins operated a taxi without a license and without 

required equipment and insurance, and imposing a civil penalty for these 

violations.