alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4101 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4101

    To amend title 10, United States Code, to ensure that a TRICARE 
beneficiary receives written notice of any change to benefits received 
 by the beneficiary under the TRICARE program, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2014

 Mrs. Ellmers introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend title 10, United States Code, to ensure that a TRICARE 
beneficiary receives written notice of any change to benefits received 
 by the beneficiary under the TRICARE program, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Timely Information Management 
Enforcement Act'' or the ``TIME Act''.

SEC. 2. PROVISION OF WRITTEN NOTICE OF CHANGE TO TRICARE BENEFITS.

    (a) In General.--Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is 
amended by inserting after section 1097c the following new section:
``Sec. 1097d. TRICARE program: notice of change to benefits
    ``(a) Provision of Notice.--(1) If the Secretary changes any 
benefits provided by the TRICARE program to covered beneficiaries, the 
Secretary shall provide individuals described in paragraph (2) with 
written notice explaining such changes.
    ``(2) The individuals described by this paragraph are covered 
beneficiaries and providers participating in the TRICARE program who 
may be affected by a change covered by a notification under paragraph 
(1).
    ``(3) The Secretary shall provide notice under paragraph (1) 
through both mail and electronic means.
    ``(b) Timing of Notice.--The Secretary shall provide notice under 
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) by the earlier of the following dates:
            ``(1) The date that the Secretary determines would afford 
        individuals described in paragraph (2) of such subsection 
        adequate time to understand and respond to the change covered 
        by the notification.
            ``(2) 90 days before the date on which the change covered 
        by the notification becomes effective.
    ``(c) Delegation.--The Secretary may not delegate the authority 
under this section to any individual who is not an officer or employee 
of the Federal Government.''.
    (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of 
such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
1097c the following new item:

``1097d. TRICARE program: notice of change to benefits.''.
                                 <all>
```
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-41183

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JULIO CESAR GODOY-JIMENEZ

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:07-CR-626-ALL

Before KING, BARKSDALE, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Julio Cesar Godoy-Jimenez appeals the 34-month sentence imposed by the

district court following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Godoy-Jimenez contends that the district court erred in

applying an eight-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) based

on his two prior state convictions for possession of a controlled substance. Citing

Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006), Godoy-Jimenez argues that the eight-level

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 21, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 07-41183

2

enhancement was not warranted because he was not convicted as a recidivistfor

the second state conviction for possession of a controlled substance and therefore

that the offense did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Sentencing

Guidelines.

Lopez has not altered our holding in United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos,

412 F.3d 572 (5th Cir.2005), that a second state conviction for simple possession

qualifies as an aggravated felony sufficient to support the imposition of the

eight-level enhancement under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). United States v. Cepeda-Rios,

530 F.3d 333, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2008). Thus, regardless of how Godoy-Jimenez’s

state possession offense would be characterized under state law, his second state

conviction for possession is punishable as an aggravated felony for sentencing

purposes. See id; Sanchez-Villalobos, 412 F.3d at 577.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ABR INFORMATION SERVICES, INC. ANNUAL 10-K AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUL-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             AUG-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                      33,322,734
<SECURITIES>                               108,499,196
<RECEIVABLES>                                8,426,059
<ALLOWANCES>                                   130,175
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           152,713,120
<PP&E>                                      32,285,025
<DEPRECIATION>                               4,494,671
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             222,016,848
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       24,873,848
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       273,763
<OTHER-SE>                                 193,821,994
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               222,016,848
<SALES>                                     50,078,842
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            50,078,842
<CGS>                                       28,178,925
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                9,765,500
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           7,081,238
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             19,215,655
<INCOME-TAX>                                 6,987,003
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         12,228,652
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                12,228,652
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .44
        

</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4130 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4130

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to encourage mixed-income 
                          housing development.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 28, 2014

 Mr. Jeffries introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to encourage mixed-income 
                          housing development.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Low and Moderate Income Housing Act 
of 2014''.

SEC. 2. MIXED-INCOME HOUSING TEST FOR LOW-INCOME HOUSING CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (B) of section 42(g)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended to read as follows:
                    ``(B) 50-50-120 test.--The project meets the 
                requirements of this subparagraph if 50 percent or more 
                of the residential units in such project are both rent-
                restricted and occupied by individuals whose income is 
                at least 50 percent, but not more than 120 percent, of 
                area median gross income.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to determinations under section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986 with respect to housing credit dollar amounts allocated from 
State housing credit ceilings after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
# C_2008022EN.01002701.xml

| 26.1.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 22/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.1.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 22/27

---

Appeal brought on 16 November 2007 by Philip Morris Products SA against the judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) delivered on 12 September 2007 in Case T-140/06 Philip Morris Products v OHIM

Philip Morris Products

OHIM

(Case C-497/07 P)

(2008/C 22/52)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Philip Morris Products SA (represented by: T. van Innis and C. S. Moreau, lawyers)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Other party to the proceedings:

Form of order sought

| — | Set aside the judgment under appeal; |
| --- | --- |

—

Set aside the judgment under appeal;

| — | Order the Office to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Office to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of First Instance infringed Articles 4 and 7(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (1). In this respect, it complains, first, that the Court of First Instance based its assessment on a bias against the category of marks in which the mark applied for falls. In finding that consumers are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of goods on the basis of their shape or of the shape of their packaging, the Court of First Instance made a factual finding which has no scientific foundation whatsoever and misconstrues the human perception of signs in general, and of shapes in particular.

1

Second, the appellant complains that the Court of First Instance carried out an incorrect legal analysis of the relevant public's perception of the mark. That error arises, on the one hand, from the fact that the Court envisaged use of the mark only through its incorporation into a packet of cigarettes, although the shape of packaging for a given product can be perceived by the public in a multitude of other forms, such as graphic or three-dimensional representations of the mark in advertising material. The error of assessment arises, on the other hand, from the fact that the Court of First Instance reduced the concept of a mark to its part which is perceptible by a prospective purchaser at the moment immediately prior to his purchase, whilst the public concerned by a mark is composed of all those who may be faced with it in the course of normal use of the mark, which occurs both during the advertising of the product before it has been purchased and during use or consumption of the product after it has been purchased.

The appellant claims, thirdly and lastly, that the grounds of the judgment under appeal are contradictory.

---

(1)  OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1.

1

---
#### Eric O’DELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 62052.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Sept. 2, 2003.

Vanessa Caleb, Kansas City, MO for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, III, Shaun J. Mackel-prang, Jefferson City, MO for Respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, Jr., P.J., ROBERT G. ULRICH and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ.

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

Eric O’Dell appeals the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. He contends that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly, involuntarily, and unintelligently because his plea counsel failed to advise him that a jury would not hear about his prior criminal record if he chose not to testify. The judgment of the motion court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-08-00287-CR

TONY LEE JOHNSON,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 54th District Court

McLennan County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2006-1683-C2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Tony Lee Johnson seeks to appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea to capital murder. Johnson was sentenced to life without 

parole on February 14, 2008, and the trial court apparently gave Johnson permission to 

appeal the motion to withdraw’s denial, but Johnson’s notice of appeal was not filed 

until August 7, 2008. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1) (providing that notice of appeal must 

be filed within 30 days after date sentence imposed or 30 days after entry of appealable 

order).
Johnson v. State Page 2

The Clerk of this Court warned Johnson that his appeal might be dismissed 

because his notice of appeal was not timely filed unless, within 21 days, a response was 

filed showing grounds for continuing the appeal. Johnson’s response essentially 

requests an out-of-time appeal. We lack jurisdiction to grant an out-of-time appeal; that 

authority belongs exclusively to the Court of Criminal Appeals through a writ of habeas 

corpus. See Parr v. State, 206 S.W.3d 143, 144-45 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.). 

Because Johnson’s notice of appeal is untimely, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss his 

appeal.

PER CURIAM

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Vance, and

Justice Reyna

Appeal dismissed

Opinion delivered and filed October 1, 2008

Do not publish

[CRPM]
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND

CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350

The following statement is provided by the undersigned to accompany the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period
ended December 29, 2007 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed pursuant to any provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or any other
securities law.

Each of the undersigned certifies that the foregoing Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a), or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sensus Metering
Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus Metering Systems Inc.



|                      |  |                                                                           |  |                          |  |                                                                          
|--------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ------------------------ |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ DANIEL W. HARNESS |  |                                                                           |  | /s/ ALFRED C. GIAMMARINO
|Name:                 |  | Daniel W. Harness                                                         |  | Name:                    |  | Alfred C. Giammarino                                                     
|Title:                |  | Chief Executive Officer & President                                       |  | Title:                   |  | Chief Financial Officer                                                  
|Company:              |  | Sensus Metering Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus Metering Systems Inc. |  | Company:                 |  | Sensus Metering Systems (Bermuda 2) Ltd. and Sensus Metering Systems Inc.
|Date:                 |  | February 4, 2008                                                          |  | Date:                    |  | February 4, 2008
George BURNS, Mack McCann, and Charles Bartlett, Trustees of Park's Chapel Free Will Baptist Church v. KINGDOM IMPACT GLOBAL MINISTRIES, INC.

No. 76P17

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 3, 2017

James H. Locus, Jr., Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, for Kingdom Impact Global Ministries, Inc.

J. Thomas Neville, Attorney at Law, for Burns, George, et al.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 13th of March 2017 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 3rd of May 2017."
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-1334
NATIONAL GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff - Appellee, and WOW, INCORPORATED, t/a Insurance Center of Williamsburg; DEBORAH BRESNAHAM, Third Party Defendants - Appellees, versus RICHARD LYNWOOD CHISMAN, a/k/a Bay; JOYCE ANN CHISMAN, Defendants - Appellants.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge. (CA-99-362-3) Submitted: December 20, 2000 Decided: January 8, 2001 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.2Kenneth L. Roberts, ROBERTS & ROBERTS, P.C., Newport News, Virginia, for Appellants. Robert Tayloe Ross, Michael L. Rigsby, MIDKIFF MUNCIE & ROSS, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Douglas M. Palais, MCCANDLISH, KANE & GRANT, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM: Richard Lynwood Chisman and Joyce Ann Chisman appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees in this action in which National Grange Mutual Insurance Company sought a declaration that the insurance policy it issued to the Chismans was void. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, the supplemental joint appendix, and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chisman , No. CA-99-362-3 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2000).We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 08-7078

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WILL HAMILTON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District 

Judge. (3:96-CR-00679-MBS-2) 

Submitted: October 14, 2008 Decided: October 20, 2008 

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Will Hamilton, Appellant Pro Se. Jane Barrett Taylor, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Will Hamilton appeals the district court’s order 

denying his motion for sentence reduction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. United 

States v. Hamilton, No. 3:96-cr-00679-MBS-2 (D.S.C. June 19, 

2008). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED
STATE of North Carolina v. Javonta Marquez ELLIS and Stephon Deandre Jennings

No. 197P16

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

September 22, 2016

Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Jennings, Stephon Deandre.

Craig M. Cooley, Attorney at Law, Cary, for Ellis, Javonta Marquez.

Daniel P. O'Brien, Special Deputy Attorney General, Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant Attorney General, Peter A. Regulski, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew Delbridge, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 23rd of May 2016 by Defendant (Stephen Deandre Jennings) in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

"Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 22nd of September 2016."
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-40355

Summary Calendar

REGINALD DONELL RICE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GREG BREWER, Judge, 366th Judicial District Court,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

No. 4:08-CV-36

Before SMITH, STEWART, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Reginald Rice applies for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in this

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 10, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-40355

2

appeal from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint. “Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a), a federal court may refuse to certify an appeal for in forma pauperis

status if it is not taken in good faith.” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th

Cir. 1983). Rice’s IFP motion is construed as a challenge to the refusal to certify.

See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). The inquiry into whether the appeal is taken in good faith “is limited to whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous).” Id. at 220

(quotation marks omitted). 

Rice has not shown that the district court erred in determining that the

only named defendant is absolutely immune from suit. The motion for leave to

proceed IFP on appeal is denied. Rice’s motion for injunctive relief is denied.

The appeal is without arguable merit and is dismissed as frivolous. See 5TH CIR.

R. 42.2; Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).

All motions are DENIED. The appeal is DISMISSED.
# C_2012258EN.01002701.xml

| 25.8.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 258/27 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.8.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 258/27

---

Order of the General Court of 11 July 2012 — Romania v Commission

(Case T-484/07) (1)

1

2012/C 258/49

Language of the case: Romanian

The President of the Third Chamber has ordered that the case be removed from the register.

---

(1)  OJ C 51, 23.2.2008.

1

---
Charlene HOGUE, Plaintiff, v. BROWN & PATTEN, PA, Donald N. Patten, Defendants.

No. COA17-103

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: July 18, 2017

AFFIRMED.
STATE of North Carolina v. Michael FARROW, Defendant.

No. COA16-450

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: November 15, 2016

REMANDED.