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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 12-3754

T H OMA S K UZ NAR

, as Admini str ator of The Estate of E MI L I A P I A S T OWS K

A K UZ NAR

, Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v
. A NNA K UZ NAR

, Defendant-Appellant

.

A ppea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co u rt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no is, Ea stern Di v i si o n
. No . 1 1 C 9 2 2 9 — Joa n Humphre y Le f kow, Judg e
.

S UB MI TT E D D E C E MB E R 5 , 2013 *

— D E C I D E D J ANUAR Y 5, 2015

B e f o r e W O OD, Chief Judge, and S YKE S and T I ND E R , Cir cuit Judges

.

* A fter ex a m i ni ng the pa rti es’ b ri efs a nd the reco rd, w e co n cl uded tha t ora l
a rgument w a s u nnecessa ry
. The a ppea l w a s therefo re s ub mi tted o n the b ri efs a nd the reco rd. SeeF E D

. R

. A PP

. P . 3 4 (a )(2 )(C).2 No. 12-3754
S YKE S , Cir cuit Judge

. Mi eczyslaw (“Mi tchell”) Kuznar left hi s nati v e P oland and mov ed to the Uni ted S tates, leav ing hi s wi fe Emi li a and thei r son Thomas behind. Once in Amer i ca, he met and mar r i ed Anna. But he nev er di v or ced Emi l i a, so h i s death i n testate i n 1995 set off a long-r unnin g legal battle ov er sur v i v or shi p ri ghts to hi s pensio n
. Anna began collecting spousal b enefi ts in 1995. Li ti gati on commenced in 1997 when Thomas—now gr own and also li v ing in the Un it ed States— opened a pr obate cas e in Illi noi s state cour t seeki n g j udi ci al admini str ati on of Mi tchell’s es t a te. Thomas w as actin g on hi s mother ’s behalf; Emi li a r emained in P oland. T h e pr obate cour t ev entually r uled in E mi li a’s fa v o r , gr anti n g Thoma s ’ s moti on f or summar y j udgment and
or der ing Anna to pay Emi li a the a mou n t sh e had collected fr om Mi tchell’s p ensi on fund. But E mili a d i ed befor e thi s j udgment w a s enter ed, so the Illi noi s Appellate Cour t v acated and r emanded for entr y of a new j udgment. In 2 0 1 1 T ho mas opened a new cas e in p r obate cour t for the admini str ati on of Emi li a’s estate and then r enew ed hi s moti on f or summar y j udgment in the 1997 case, thi s ti me on b ehalf of hi s mother ’s estate. T o stav e o f f near -cer tai n defeat in the pr oceedi ngs on
r emand, Anna tr i ed a pr ocedur a l gambi t: S he fi led a noti ce of
r emov al. Jur i s di c ti onal an d pr ocedur al wr angli n g ensued. A nn a ’ s r e mov al noti ce li sted the 2011 pr obate case but attache d Thomas’s r enew ed moti on for summar y j udgment, whi ch s he clai m ed w as “in the natur e of a c omplaint fi led by the r ecently opened estate” but w as mi stakenly fi l ed in the 1997 case.No. 12-3754 3
Whi le the d i str i ct cour t tr i ed to sor t out the mor ass, Thomas si mpli fi ed matter s by fi ling a noti ce of v oluntar y di smi ssal under Rule 41(a)(1)( A ) (i ) of the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. The cour t held the di smi ssal noti ce in a b e y a n ce to deter mine what exactly had b een r emov ed. At thi s poi nt, and per haps r eali zing that she had b een outmaneuv er ed, Anna di d
an about-face, telli ng the j udge that she h ad actually r emov ed the 1997 case, n ot the 2011 case, and that no di smi ssal could be

v ali d unless i t di smi ssed the 1997 case in i ts enti rety

. The di s tr i ct judge w asn’t i mpr essed by thi s ar gument and nei ther ar e w e. Anna’s ini ti al submi ssi ons in the di str i ct cour t make i t clear that she w as attempti ng to r emov e a “new acti on” that she c lai med w as fi led in the r ecently opened 2011 pr obate
case. That w as a doubtful char a c t e r i zati on of Thomas’s
r enewed moti on f or summar y j udgment, but he w as enti tled to accept it and v oluntar i ly di smi ss the s upposed “new acti on”
r a ther than di spute An n a ’s shi fti ng char acter i zati on of hi s fi lings.
I. Background The compli cated stor y of thi s unfor tunate l i ti gati on begi ns in 1953, w h e n Mi eczyslaw Kuznar (known as “Mi tchell”)
m a r r ie d Emi li a Pi astowska in P oland. Th e couple had a son named Thomas. At some poi nt

— w e don’t know when— Mi tchell mov ed to the Uni ted S tat es, leav ing Emi li a and T h o m as behin d. Mi tchell later mar r i ed Anna, although hi s mar r i age to Emi li a w as n e v er annulled or other wi se ter mi

nated. When Mi tchell di ed intestate in 1995, Anna be g an4 No. 12-3754
collecting spousal sur v i v or shi p b enefi ts under hi s pensio n plan. Emi li a, sti ll l i v ing in P oland, thought that s he w as enti tled to the be n e fit s. Thomas, now an a dult and li v ing in Illi noi s, took hi s mother ’s si de in the di spute. In 1997 he opened a fi le in Illinoi s pr obate cour t s eeki ng j udi c i al admin i str ati on of Mi tchell’s estate on hi s mother ’s behalf. Thr ee y e a r s later he
w on a r uli ng that Emi li a w a s Mi tchell’s sur v i v ing s pouse. Li ti gati on conti nued for a nother decade, a nd the pr obate cour t ev entually gr anted Thomas’s moti on for summar y j udgment,
or der ing Anna to pay Emi li a the amount she had r ecei v ed fr om Mi tchell’s pensi on fund. But Emi li a d i ed b efor e the j udgment w as enter ed. Based on thi s pr ocedur a l er r or

— enter ing j u dgment in f av or of a d e a d plainti ff—the Illi noi s Appellate Cour t v acated and r emanded. Thomas, sensing that v i ctor y w as near , tr i ed agai n. In 2011 he opened a new case in pr obate c our t for the admin istr ati on of Emi li a’s estate. Then, as admini str ator of hi s m other ’s estate, he r enew ed hi s moti on for summar y judgment in the 1997 c ase, only thi s ti me on behalf of E m i l i a’s estate r ather than E m i l i a her s elf. Anna i mmedi ately fi led a noti ce of remov al li s ti ng the 2011
case number in the cap t io n of her noti ce a nd attachi ng the pleadings in the ne w l y o p ened pr obate fi le. But she also attached Thomas’s r enew ed moti on for summar y judgment in the 1997 c ase, ar gui ng that the moti on w as r ea l l y “the fi r st pleading fi led on behalf of a n e w enti ty”—i

. e., Emi li a ’s estate—and “[a]lthough er roneously fi led as a motio n ( and
er r oneously fil e d under a c ase number and capti on in whi chNo. 12-3754 5 [Emi li a's] Estate i s not a par ty), th[e] pleading i s in the natur e of a complaint fi led by the r ecently opened estate.” The stated j ur i sdi cti o n a l b asi s f or r emov al w as d i v er si ty of ci ti zenshi p and the pr esence of a feder al questi on underERIS A. The d ay after fi ling her noti ce of r emov al, Anna went back to the state cour t and asked for r eli ef in the 1 9 9 7 case. After enter ing j udgment, the pr obate cour t had at t a ched some of Anna’s pr oper ty because she w as unable to post a b o nd pending appeal. Wi th the j udgment now v acated and the case
r etur n ed to the p r obate cour t, Anna asked the j udge to r elease her pr oper ty fr om the atta chm e nt o r der

. The judge gr anted thi s
r equest and v acated the attachment. Thomas r esponded to all these ev ents by askin g the feder al
cour t to remand the case and v oi d the state cour t’s postr emov
al or der v acating the pr oper ty a ttachment. Anna fought back,
ar guing that the attachment pr oceedings in the 1997 case had “absolutely nothi ng to do wi th the legal pr oceedi ngs ini ti ated [in 2 011] by the Estate of Emi li a Pi astowska.” S he conti nued to insi st that Thomas had “inexpli cably fi l ed what h a s t o be

v i ew ed as a new ‘complaint’ wi th a n e w p ar ty and sought to ‘place the complaint’ under the old case number —and i t i s thi s new acti on whi ch w as r emov ed and whi ch belongs in feder al
cour t.” Accusin g Thomas of “cr afty p leadin g,” she r ei ter ated that she had r emov ed only the “new acti on” h e ini ti ated in 2011 in t h e newly opened pr obate fi le, so the state judge w as fr ee to r ev i si t the attachment or der in the 1997 case inv olv ing Mi tchell’s estate. The di str i c t j udge w as under standably flummoxed by all of these fi lings and asked for s u p plemental br i efing to clar i fy6 No. 12-3754
what had h appened in the state cour t. Instead of r espondin g to the c our t’s r equest and conti nuing to fi ght ov er the pr opr i ety of remov al, Thomas cho s e a n easi er r oute: H e v oluntar i ly di smi ssed the “new acti on” that Anna clai med h e w a s br ingi ng on behalf of Emi li a’s estate. T h e j udge or der ed the di smi ssal noti ce “held in ab ey ance” to sor t ou t the j ur i s d i cti onal and pr ocedur al quagmi r e. Anna v i gor ously challenged Thomas’s maneuv er
. Completely changing her tune, she now insi sted that the only case befor e the feder al co u r t w a s the 1997 case, not the 2011 c ase. After all, she p oi nted out, T h omas had fi led hi s r enew ed moti on for summar y j udgment in the 1997 case, and “hav ing select e d wher e and under what capti on to fi le [the estate’s] clai m, [ he] cannot be hear d to ar gue now that the [1997] case i s not befor e thi s Cour t.” S he c onti nued that i f Thomas’s v oluntar y di smi s sal w as v ali d, then i t must be constr ued to di smi ss the 1997 case in its entirety

. The di str i ct j udge r ej ected Anna’s ar guments, accepted Thomas’s v oluntar y d is m i ssal of the 2 011 “new acti on,” and ter min a t e d the case. Anna’s moti on for reconsi der a ti on also fai led, a nd she has a ppealed, tr yi ng to keep the fi ght in feder al
cour t. 2

2 A nna fi l ed her no ti ce o f a ppea l wi thi n 3 0 da ys o f the di stri ct co urt’s o rder
a ccepti ng Tho ma s’s v o l unta ry di s mi ssa l a n d t ermi n a t ing th e ca se b ut o utsi de the 3 0 -da y a ppea l dea dl i ne i f mea sured fro m the da te Tho m a s fi l ed the no ti ce o f v o l u nta ry di s mi ssa l

. Ordi na ri l y a v o l unta ry di smi ssa l under Rul e 4 1 (a )(1 )(A ) o f the Federa l Rul es o f Ci v i l Pro c e d u r e i s sel f-ex ecuti ng a nd termi na tes the ca se wi tho ut the n eed fo r a n o rder fro m the co urt. See (co nti nued...)No. 12-3754 7
II. Discussion The fi r s t and most obv i ous flaw in Anna’s e ffor t to secur e a feder al for um f or thi s pr otr acted di spute i s h er attemp t to
r emov e a m oti on for summar y j udgment. Moti ons a r en’t
r emov able; the r emov al statute per mi ts the remov al of “ci v i l
a c ti ons.” 28 U.S .C. § 1441. Anna’s ini ti al fi lings make i t c l e a r that she w as a sking the feder al cour t to c onstr u e Thomas’s
r enewed moti on for summar y judgment a s a “new acti on” commenced in the 2011 case in v o lv ing Emi li a’s estate. S he clai m ed that thi s “new acti on” w as cunningly—or at best, mi stakenly—fi led in the 1997 case, but ur ged the feder al cour t to i gnor e the mi sfi ling and constr ue the moti on as a c omplaint in the 2011 case. Anna now insi s ts, as s he di d in r e s p o n se to Thomas’s di smi ssal noti ce, that she w as really tr ying to r emov e the 1997
case inv olv ing Mi tchell’s estate, so th e v oluntar y di smi ssal ei ther ( 1) fai l s b ecause i t pur por ts to d i s mi ss a 2 011 c ase that i sn’t in feder al cour t; or ( 2) actually ter min ates the enti r e 1997
case in whi ch Thoma s h a s been so s uccessful. Thi s ar gument contr adi c ts Anna’s ini ti al submi ssi ons in the di str i ct cour t.

2 (...co nti nued) Sm ith v
. Potter, 5 1 3 F .3 d 7 8 1 , 7 8 2– 8 3 (7 th C i r
. 2 0 0 8 ); Jenkins v
. V illag e of May wood , 5 0 6 F .3 d 6 2 2 , 6 2 4 (7 th Ci r
. 2 0 0 7 ). H ere, ho w ev er , th e di stri ct co urt ex pressl y hel d Tho ma s’s no ti ce o f v o l unta ry di smi ssa l i n ab ey ance i n o rder to cl a ri fy whi ch ca s e ha d b een remo v ed. O n ce tha t a mb i gui ty w a s remo v ed, the co urt a ccepted the v o l u n ta ry di smi s sa l and termi na ted the ca se, a nd A nna a ppea l ed wi thi n 3 0 da ys o f tha t da t e. The a ppea l i s ti mel y and o u r j uri sdi cti o n i s secure.8 No. 12-3754
In h er n o t i c e of r emov al, Anna clai med that Thomas’s
m o t ion d i dn’t b elong in the 1997 c ase a t all, but inste a d h a d been “er r oneously fi led u nder a ca s e n u m b er and c apti on in whi ch [Emi l i a’s] Estate i s not a par ty .” Thi s w as a cr uci al poi nt in t he p ar ti es’ ear ly j ur i sdi cti onal ski r mi sh whi le the di s tr i ct j udge w as tr yi ng to sor t out wha t e x a c t ly had been remov ed. An y a t t e m pt to r emov e the 1997 c ase w ould hav e b een unti mely by mor e than a decade; r emov a l i s per mi tted wi thi n 30 days a fter the fi ling of the fi r st paper s h owin g the b asi s for
r emov al, see 28 U.S .C. § 1446(b)(1), (3), and Anna’s stated j ur i sdi cti onal basi s for remov al—di v er si ty of ci ti zenshi p and the p r esence of a feder al questi on u nder ERIS A—w as known fr om the star t. Inde e d , i n her memor andum in r esponse to Thomas’s
mo ti on to r emand, Anna explained that her r emov al noti ce
w as ti mely pr eci sely because Th omas’s summar y-j udgment moti on w a s in fact a “new acti on” in the 2011 ca s e b u t w as mi stakenly capti oned and fi l ed in the 1997 case: The Plain ti ff Estate (Cook County Case No. 11P 6624) w as cr eated on December 8, 2 0 1 1 a n d i ts fi r st pleading s t ati ng a clai m agai nst the Defendant w as fi led on December19, 2011. ... It i s the Plainti f f wh ic h has opened an estate

... cr eati ng a new enti ty wi th i ts own case n u m ber

. ... [T]he only w ay such an enti ty can pur sue a c l ai m agai nst a thi r d par ty i s by f iling a new acti on agai nst that par ty ... . I n o ther w or ds, the 2011 acti on, not the 1997 case, w as t he subj ect of the r emov al.No. 12-3754 9
S he w as e v e n clear er in her memor andum in r esponse to Thomas’s moti on t o v acate the or der enter ed by the pr obate j udge r eleasing her pr oper ty fr om a ttachment. That or der , s he explai ned, w as enter ed in the 1997 case and h ad “absolutely nothi ng to do wi th the new legal pr oceedi ngs ini ti ated by the Estate of Emi li a Pi astowska [ in 2011], whi ch new pr oceedi ngs
w er e summar i ly r emov ed to feder al Cour t.” S he i mplor ed the di str i ct j udge to i gnor e Thom a s ’s “cr afty p leading” and insi sted that the sta t e j udge’s postr emov al or der w as v ali d because i t w a s enter ed in the 1 9 9 7 c a s e, not the 2011 case that
w as the subj ect of her r emov al noti c e. Whether Thomas’s moti on w as pr oper ly fi led in the 1997
case i s a questi on of state pr ocedur e, n ot feder a l law , and w e need not deci d e i t. B y v oluntar i l y di smi ssin g the “new acti on” that Anna insi sted she had r emov ed, Thomas acqui esced in her dubi ous char acter i zati on of hi s moti on. At the ti me he fi led hi s no t ic e of v oluntar y di smi ssal, ev er y one agr eed that the 1997
case had not be e n r emov ed. The capti on of Anna’s r emov al
n oti ce l i sted the 2011 pr obate-cour t c ase number —the fi le Thomas had opened for the admini str ati on of hi s mother ’s estate—a n d the d i smi ssal n oti ce li kewi se i denti fi ed the
r emov ed case using the 2011 state-cour t case number

. Thomas’s acqui escence in Anna’s char a c ter i zati on of hi s moti on could n ot hav e supp l i e d the feder al cour t’s j ur i sdi cti on, of cour se. S ubj ect-matter j ur i sdi cti on cannot be cr eated b y agr eement. See, e.g. , B e n d er v
. W illiamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S

. 534, 541 (1986). But th e dis t r ict cour t doesn’t need j ur is d icti on ov er a case for a v oluntar y di smi ssal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i ) to b e effecti v e; the r ule allows t he plainti ff10 No. 12-3754

t o di smi ss an acti on wi thout cour t or der by fi ling a noti ce of di smi ssal befor e the opposi ng par ty fi les an answer or a moti on for summar y judgment. See Nelson v

. Napolitano , 657 F

. 3d 586, 587 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (explaining that a Rule 41(a)(1)(A) noti ce of di smi ssal i s self-executin g and effecti v e w i thout fur ther acti on fr om the cou r t ) ; Smith v
. Potter , 5 13 F .3d 7 81, 782–83 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (same); Univ

. o

f S

. Al a. v
. A m. T

obacco Co. , 1 6 8 F .3d 405, 409 (11th C ir

. 1999) (explaining that a v oluntar y di smi ssal “may p r ecede any analysi s of subj ect matter j ur is di cti on because i t i s self-executing”). Thomas si mply accepted Anna’s char acter i zati on of the “new acti on” she sai d s he had r emov ed and v o l u n t a r i ly di smi ssed i t rather than conti nuin g to fi ght
ov er the pr opr i ety of r emov a l

. Anna now ar gues that she couldn’t hav e r emov ed the 2011
case because nothi ng had been fi led agai nst her under that case number

. Thi s a r gument confli cts wi th the posi ti on she took to get the case into feder al cour t in the fi r st place. Th omas w as enti tled to a ccept Anna’s ini ti al asser ti on that s he had r emov ed
a “ new act ion” fi led in the 2011 case, how ev er untenable that
a s s e r ti on mi ght hav e been. After he fi led hi s noti ce of v olu n tar y d i s mi ssal, i t w as too l ate f o r A n n a t o change c our se and
ar gue that she r eally had r emov ed the 1997 case after a l l, whi ch
w ould hav e been gr ossly unti m ely in any ev ent. A c c o r d in g l y

, Th o m a s ’ s v o l u n t a r y dis m is sa l un d e r Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i ) w as effecti v e and ter m inated the case. A F F I R M E D

.