IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 71 / 06–0319 

Filed September 12, 2008 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LAURA LYNNE BECKER 

AND FRED HAROLD BECKER 

Upon the Petition of 

LAURA LYNNE BECKER, 

 Appellant, 

And Concerning 

FRED HAROLD BECKER, 

 

 Appellee. 

 On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Alan L. 

Pearson, Judge. 

Both parties seek further review of a court of appeals decision 

regarding their dissolution decree. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

 Alexander R. Rhoads of Babich, Goldman, Cashatt & Renzo, P.C., 

Des Moines, for appellant. 

 Daniel L. Bray and Chad A. Kepros of Bray & Klockau, P.L.C., Iowa 

City, for appellee. 

 
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WIGGINS, Justice. 

Both parties sought further review of the court of appeals decision 

regarding their dissolution decree. In exercising our discretion on 

further review, we decide to address only the spousal support issue 

raised by the wife in her application for further review. Accordingly, in 

this decision we must determine the adequacy of the spousal support 

award made by the trial court. Because we disagree with the spousal 

support award made by the district court, as affirmed by the court of 

appeals, we vacate in part and affirm in part the decision of the court of 

appeals, and affirm as modified the judgment of the district court. 

I. Prior Proceedings. 

 The district court dissolved the marriage of Laura and Fred Becker. 

In its decree, the court awarded joint legal custody of the minor children 

to Laura and Fred, with Fred having primary physical care of the 

children. The court awarded Laura reasonable and liberal visitation 

rights. Laura was required to pay child support. The court valued the 

assets of the parties, split the assets equally, and awarded each party a 

little less than 3.2 million dollars in assets. The court ordered Fred to 

pay Laura spousal support in the sum of $5000 for forty-eight months, 

with the support terminating if Laura dies or remarries prior to the 

expiration of forty-eight months. The support will also terminate if Fred 

dies prior to the expiration of forty-eight months. The court also required 

Fred to pay a portion of Laura’s legal fees. 

 Both parties appealed. We transferred the appeal to the court of 

appeals. The court of appeals revalued some of the assets and ordered 

that each party receive a little more than 3.3 million dollars in assets. 

The court of appeals affirmed the spousal support award, modified the 
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trial attorney fee award, and awarded Laura $2500 in appellate attorney 

fees. 

Laura filed an application for further review. In her application 

she alleges the valuation of certain of the parties’ assets was too low, the 

spousal support award should be increased, and the award of appellate 

attorney fees was inadequate. Fred also sought further review alleging 

the valuation of the parties’ assets was too high. We granted both 

applications for further review. 

II. Issue. 

In considering an application for further review, “we have the 

discretion to review any issue raised on appeal regardless of whether 

such issue is expressly asserted in an application for further review.” In 

re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005). We also have the 

discretion not to review any of the issues the parties raised in their 

applications for further review. In re Marriage of McKenzie, 709 N.W.2d 

528, 530–31 (Iowa 2006). In exercising our discretion, we choose only to 

review the court-ordered spousal support. Accordingly, we affirm the 

court of appeals decision in all other respects. See id. at 535 (affirming 

the court of appeals decision on all matters not considered on this 

court’s further review). 

III. Scope of Review. 

The standard of review is de novo because this is a dissolution 

case. Olson, 705 N.W.2d at 313. Although we give weight to the fact 

findings of the district court, we are not bound by the district court’s 

findings of fact. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). 

IV. Findings of Fact. 

We find the following facts concerning the spousal support issue. 

Laura and Fred Becker were married on July 9, 1983. The couple was 
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married twenty-two years at the time of their divorce. They had four 

children. One child was 20 years of age. The other children had not 

reached their majority at the time the court filed the decree. Two of the 

children were twins and 17 years of age. The youngest child was 16 

years of age. 

Fred attended college but did not complete his degree. Fred began 

working for his father’s limestone quarry business at a young age and 

eventually formed a partnership called Becker & Becker Stone Co. with 

his father in 1976. At that point, he and his father shared a 50/50 

interest in the company and in a quarry known as the Maquoketa Quarry 

or the Baldwin property. Eventually Fred obtained more quarry property. 

In 1986 Fred purchased his father’s interest in the company and in the 

quarry. In 1999 Fred reorganized the partnership into a subchapter “S” 

corporation and renamed the company Becker & Becker Stone Co., Inc. 

He was, and still is, the sole shareholder of the company. Since 

reorganizing the business, Fred receives all the corporation’s income, and 

he reports the corporation’s income on his personal tax returns. At the 

time of the marriage, Fred’s premarital assets had a value of $30,000. 

Fred’s primary responsibility during the marriage was to concentrate on 

making the quarry business a success. Fred’s average after-tax income 

for the five years preceding the dissolution was in excess of $500,000. 

Laura had just completed her junior year of college when she 

married Fred. She completed her degree in business at Loras College in 

1984. She became pregnant shortly after the marriage. She worked 

part-time outside the home as a bank teller until the doctors put her on 

medical leave. After the birth of their first child she resumed working 

outside the home on and off until the birth of the twins. After their 

fourth child started preschool, she again worked part-time outside the 
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home for a credit union. This job did not last very long. After her stint 

at the credit union, the only work she did outside the home during the 

marriage was assisting Fred in the business. Laura’s primary 

responsibility during the marriage was to care for the household and the 

couple’s children. 

When Fred and Laura separated, Laura began working part-time at 

a department store earning $8.00 per hour. Laura testified she could not 

find full-time employment and most jobs she interviewed for offered 

salaries between $20,000 and $30,000 per year. Laura would like to 

obtain a job in marketing. In order to obtain an entry-level job in this 

field she would have to obtain her master’s degree. She believes this will 

require her to take thirty-six hours of classes if some of her 

undergraduate courses would transfer. 

V. Applicable Legal Principles. 

The payment of alimony is not an absolute right; rather, whether a 

court awards alimony depends on the particular circumstances of each 

case. In re Marriage of Fleener, 247 N.W.2d 219, 220 (Iowa 1976); see

Iowa Code § 598.21(3) (2005). Our prior cases are of little value in 

determining the appropriate alimony award, and we must decide each 

case on its own peculiar circumstances. Fleener, 247 N.W.2d at 220. 

The legislature has listed certain factors a court should consider 

when deciding whether to award alimony. Iowa Code § 598.21(3)(a)–(j). 

These factors include: 

a. The length of the marriage. 

b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties. 

c. The distribution of property. . . . 

d. The educational level of each party at the time of 

marriage and at the time the action is commenced. 
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e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, 

including educational background, training, employment 

skills, work experience, length of absence from the job 

market, responsibilities for children under either an award of 

custody or physical care, and the time and expense 

necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to 

enable the party to find appropriate employment. 

f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming 

self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably 

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the 

length of time necessary to achieve this goal. 

g. The tax consequences to each party. 

h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning 

financial or service contributions by one party with the 

expectation of future reciprocation or compensation by the 

other party. 

i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement. 

j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an 

individual case. 

Id. 

In applying these factors, we have discussed three types of spousal 

support—traditional, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. In re Marriage 

of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63–64 (Iowa 1989). Each type of spousal 

support has a different goal. Traditional spousal support is “payable for 

life or so long as a spouse is incapable of self-support.” Id. at 64. 

Rehabilitative spousal support is “a way of supporting an economically 

dependent spouse through a limited period of re-education or retraining 

following divorce, thereby creating incentive and opportunity for that 

spouse to become self-supporting.” Id. at 63. The goal of rehabilitative 

spousal support is self-sufficiency and for that reason “such an award 

may be limited or extended depending on the realistic needs of the 

economically dependent spouse.” Id. at 64. Reimbursement spousal 

support allows the spouse receiving the support to share in the other 
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spouse’s future earnings in exchange for the receiving spouse’s 

contributions to the source of that income. Id. at 63. 

VI. Analysis. 

Although Fred had $30,000 worth of assets at the time the parties 

entered the marriage, neither party had substantial income or wealth at 

that time. Fred was attempting to grow the quarry business, while Laura 

was obtaining a bachelor’s degree in business. When the parties’ 

children were born, an express or implied decision was made between 

the parties that Fred would spend his time growing the quarry business 

and Laura would be responsible for maintaining the home and raising 

the children. This arrangement became very successful financially. The 

family lived in a half-million-dollar home, belonged to the country club, 

and took numerous vacations. By the time the couple separated, Fred 

and Laura had accumulated assets in excess of 6.6 million dollars, and 

after taxes Fred was earning over one-half million dollars a year. 

In recognition of both parties’ contribution to the financial success 

of their marriage, Fred and Laura each received more than 3.3 million 

dollars in assets as a property settlement. Fred argues Laura should not 

be entitled to spousal support because the substantial income she can 

earn from the property settlement will allow her to live comfortably. 

Laura’s property settlement may allow her to live comfortably; however, 

we must consider that during the twenty-two years of this marriage, Fred 

was able to develop an after tax earning capacity in excess of $500,000 

while Laura’s gross earning capacity is $30,000 at best. Fred and 

Laura’s decision to have Laura abandon her work outside the home 

hindered her ability to maximize her earning capacity during the 

marriage. 
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Applying the factors under Code section 598.21(3), we believe 

Laura is entitled to an award of spousal support. Laura’s expenses to 

maintain a standard of living reasonably comparable to that she enjoyed 

during the marriage are $6980. Therefore, the appropriate spousal 

support award should include three years of support in the sum of 

$8000 per month. This support obligation shall begin when the first 

support payment was due under the decree. Fred shall have a credit for 

all the support he has paid under the decree. If the back support is paid 

within sixty days after issuance of the procedendo, it shall be paid 

without interest. If not paid within that time frame, it shall bear interest 

at the legal rate for judgments from the date each payment was due. 

Our intent in granting this award is to allow Laura to use this 

support to return to school and obtain her master’s degree, if she so 

chooses. Twenty years ago, when she abandoned her career outside the 

home, a bachelor’s degree would have allowed her to obtain an entrylevel job in the field of marketing. The trial testimony indicated that in 

today’s market a person needs a master’s degree for an entry-level job in 

the field of marketing. These three years of support will allow Laura to 

obtain the education necessary to resume the career she abandoned. 

After the third year, spousal support will continue for a period of 

seven additional years at $5000 per month. Our intent in providing this 

award is to give Laura time to develop her earning capacity past an 

entry-level position. At that time, her earning capacity together with the 

return on her investments should allow her to become self-supporting at 

a standard of living reasonably comparable to the standard of living she 

enjoyed during the marriage. 

Spousal support shall terminate if Laura dies or remarries prior to 

the expiration of 120 months. The support will also terminate if Fred 

dies prior to the expiration of 120 months. 
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We cannot characterize the support we are awarding Laura as 

strictly rehabilitative or traditional spousal support. Factually, the 

support award may be a combination of both because this spousal 

support award will allow Laura to maintain the same standard of living 

she enjoyed during the marriage throughout the period of time it will 

take her to become self-sufficient at her maximum earning capacity. 

Once Laura reaches her maximum earning capacity, she will be able to 

maintain the same standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage 

without the necessity of a spousal support award. However, there is 

nothing in our case law that requires us, or any other court in this state, 

to award only one type of support. What we are required to do is to 

consider the factors mandated by the legislature contained in section 

598.21(3) when considering a spousal support award. Therefore, even if 

we cannot characterize the support award as purely rehabilitative or 

traditional, under the facts of this case the spousal support award we 

make to Laura best reflects the factors found in section 598.21(3). 

VII. Disposition. 

Because we believe it is necessary to modify the spousal support 

ordered by the district court, we vacate the decision of the court of 

appeals and reverse the judgment of the trial court on the issue of 

spousal support only. We otherwise affirm the decision of the court of 

appeals. Accordingly, we vacate in part and affirm in part the decision of 

the court of appeals, and affirm as modified the judgment of the district 

court. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND 

AFFIRMED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AS 

MODIFIED.

All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.