[Cite as Seymour v. Hampton, 2012-Ohio-5053.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

PIKE COUNTY 

IN THE MATTER OF: : 

 : 

WILLIAM SEYMOUR, : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 11CA821 

 : 

 vs. : Released: October 16, 2012 

 : 

VALORIE HAMPTON, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT

 : ENTRY

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

APPEARANCES: 

Richard E. Wolfson, Portsmouth,Ohio, for Appellant.

William S. Seymour, Appellee Pro Se. 

McFarland, J.: 

{¶1} Appellant Valorie Hampton appeals the trial court’s entry designating 

Appellee William Seymour the legal custodian and residential parent of S.W.S. 

Appellant assigns the following error for our review: 

“THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 

AWARDING CUSTODY TO THE APPELLEE-FATHER; ITS 

DECISION WAS CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.” 

{¶2} Upon review of the record, we find the award of custody in this matter 

is supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 2 

Accordingly, the assignment of error is without merit, and is overruled. The 

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

FACTS 

{¶3} Appellant Valorie Hampton and Appellee William Seymour were never 

married. They are the biological parents of S.W.S., born on July 9, 2009. Since 

birth, S.W.S. has resided with Appellant-mother. On January 26, 2010, Appellee 

filed a complaint for custody and a supplementary motion for change of residential 

parent and legal custodian. On the same date, Appellee filed the required 

Declaration under Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, i.e. 

the UCCJEA affidavit. On February 25, 2010, Appellant responded with an answer 

and counter-claim, requesting that the complaint be dismissed and that she be 

granted legal custody. 

{¶4} The matter came on for a pretrial hearing on April 6, 2010. On May 

20, 2010, Appellant filed a motion to terminate parenting time, alleging that 

Appellee had assaulted their child. On May 27, 2010, an agreed entry establishing 

the mother as custodian and residential parent and granting the father supervised 

parenting time was filed. 

{¶5} On June 2, 2010, the court heard the motion to terminate parenting 

time. Appellant and one friend testified on her behalf. The Court denied the 

motion in open court. On June 17, 2010, the court appointed a guardian ad litem, 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 3 

(hereinafter “GAL”). On June 22, 2010 the court filed its entry denying the motion 

to terminate parenting time based on the alleged assault. The court also modified 

the temporary orders as to the father’s parenting time. Later, the parties signed a 

memorandum entry filed August 3, 2010, continuing appellant’s custodial status 

and Appellee’s visitation. 

{¶6} On August 9, 2011, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw 

from representation, based on the client’s written request. The motion was 

granted. A final hearing on the motion for custody was originally scheduled for 

August 31, 2011. The hearing was continued until September 27, 2011. 

{¶7} At the final hearing, the parties proceeded to act as their own counsel. 

The GAL presented her report to the parties just prior to the hearing. The trial 

court gave the parties approximately ten minutes to review the report before the 

hearing started. The report was filed on the same date. 

{¶8} At the final custody hearing, Appellee testified. Appellee is currently 

unemployed but in the process of re-starting a lawn service and applying for 

factory work. He resides in Wellston, Ohio with his wife. Appellee acknowledged 

that he went to jail for ten days for domestic violence and that an order bars him 

from being on Appellant’s premises. Appellee also called his mother, Candis 

Estep, and his father, William Arthur Seymour. Appellee’s parents are not married 

and do not live together, but have assisted Appellee with child custody exchanges. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 4 

Ms. Estep resides in Waverly. Mr. Seymour resides in Chillicothe. Appellee also 

called his current wife Chantal Seymour, to testify on his behalf. Chantal Seymour 

is a Navy veteran, honorably discharged, with three children of her own. 

{¶9} Appellant also testified. S.W.S. is her only child. She receives 

governmental financial assistance for depression and anxiety disability. She 

resides in Metropolitan Housing in Pike County. She called the GAL and Glenn 

Schoolcraft, her fiancé, as witnesses. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Schoolcraft 

had lived with Appellant and S.W.S. for four months. He was in the process of 

applying for Social Security Disability. Mr. Schoolcraft also testified that he 

attended counseling with Appellant and that he had never seen her using drugs or 

alcohol. 

{¶10} On October 4, 2011, the trial court filed its entry designating the 

Appellee-father as the custodian and residential parent. This appeal ensued. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

I. “THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 

CUSTODY TO THE APPELLEE-FATHER; ITS DECISION WAS CONTRARY 

TO LAW AND EVIDENCE.” 

LEGAL ANALYSIS 

{¶11} We apply the same standard to a trial court’s decision to award a party 

legal custody of a child that we apply to all child custody disputes-that is, we 

afford the utmost deference to a trial court’s child custody decision. See In re 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 5 

E.W., 4th Dist. Nos. 10CA18, 10CA19, 10CA20, 2011-Ohio-2123, ¶ 18, citing 

Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). Consequently, 

absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s 

decision regarding child custody matters. See, e.g. Bechtol v. Bechtol, 49 Ohio 

St.3d 21, 550 N.E.2d 178, (1990), syllabus. Thus,when “an award of custody is 

being supported by a substantial amount of credible and competent evidence, such 

an award will not be reversed as being against the weight of the evidence by a 

reviewing court.” Bechtol at syllabus; see also, Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 

415, 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159, (1997). 

{¶12} In Davis, the court explained the abuse of discretion standard that 

applies in custody proceedings: 

‘Where an award of custody is supported by a substantial 

amount of credible and competent evidence, such an award will not 

be reversed as being against the weight of the evidence by a 

reviewing court. (Trickey v. Trickey, [1952]158 Ohio St. 9, 470 

O.O.481,106 N.E. 2d 772, approved and followed.)’ 

The reason for this standard of review is that the trial judge 

has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and 

credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on 

the written page. As we stated in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 

(1984),10 Ohio St. 3d 77, 80-81, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276-1277: 

‘The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings 

of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best 

able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and 

voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the 

credibility of the proffered testimony.*** 

***A reviewing court should not reverse a decision simply 

because it holds a different opinion concerning the credibility of the 

witnesses and evidence submitted before the trial court. A finding of 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 6 

an error in law is a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of 

opinion on credibility of witnesses and evidence is not. The 

determination of credibility of testimony and evidence must not be 

encroached upon by a reviewing tribunal, especially to the extent 

where the appellate court relies on unchallenged, excluded evidence 

in order to justify its reversal.’ This is even more crucial in a child 

custody case, where there may be much evident in the parties’ 

demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well. “ 

Id. at 418-419. 

Thus, reviewing courts should afford great deference to trial court 

custody decisions. Pater v. Pater (1997) 63 Ohio St.3d 393, 396, 

588 N.E.2d 794. 

{¶13} Appellant asserts that in awarding custody, the trial court failed to 

properly consider the evidence pursuant to O.R.C. 3109.04 and the GAL’s report. 

More specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider: (1) 

Appellee’s prior history of domestic violence; (2) Appellee’s failure to cooperate 

with the GAL; and (3) Appellee’s failure to make child support payments and 

arrearages. This analysis necessitates review of the legal custody standard and the 

statutory factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F). 

A. LEGAL CUSTODY STANDARD 

{¶14} In determining which of two parents would better meet a child’s best 

interests, a trial court must follow R.C. 3109.04. Under the “best interests of the 

child” standard of R.C. 3109.04(E), R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) requires a trial court to 

consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 7 

 (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s 

care; 

 (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers 

pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes 

and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and 

responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the 

child, as expressed to the court; 

 (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the 

child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child’s best interest; 

 (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and 

community; 

 (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in 

the situation; 

 (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate courtapproved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship 

rights; 

 (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support 

payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent 

pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an 

obligor; 

 (h)Whether either parent or any member of the household of 

either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to 

any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being 

an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case 

in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected 

child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the 

abuse or neglectful act that is the basis for the adjudication; whether 

either parent or any member of the household of either parent 

previously has been convicted or of pleaded guilty to a violation of 

section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense 

involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense 

was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the 

current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the 

household of either parent previously has been convicted of or 

pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of 

the commission of the offense was a member of the family or 

household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused 

physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 8 

whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a 

manner resulting in a child being an abused or neglected child; 

 (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject 

to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied 

the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order 

of the court; 

 (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is 

planning to establish a residence, outside this state. 

We are not convinced that in ascertaining what would be in the best interests of 

S.W.S., the trial court failed to properly consider the factors enumerated in R.C. 

3109.04(F). Initially, we note the trial judge stated at the close of the hearing that 

he would be reviewing the entire record. His statement was as follows: 

BY THE COURT: Nothing additional. Okay. Alright. I will take 

the matter under advisement which means that I will consider 

everything that I’ve heard plus what I’ve heard in the past and review 

the record and I will uh, draft an Entry and be sending it to all of you 

and uh, as I indicated earlier, uh, you each would have the right to 

appeal if you don’t like what my decision is. Okay? Any questions? 

{¶15} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider the 

Appellee’s history of domestic violence, and that said history was completely 

ignored. The guardian ad litem’s report states as follows: 

“When asked about his relationship with Valorie, he was honest with 

me about the relationship in regards to the domestic violence that had 

occurred between the two of them. He was also forthcoming with the 

domestic violence that had occurred between him and his other 

children’s mother. He explained to me the classes and counseling that 

he was ordered to undergo for his anger management.” 

The GAL’s report contained references to documents she reviewed, but were not 

attached, regarding instances of reported domestic violence in 2008 and 2010. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 9 

Appellant also highlights a confrontation at Walmart between Appellee and 

Appellant’s fiancé, Glenn Schoolcraft. 

{¶16} The evidence the trial court had before it also established violent 

behavior on the part of the Appellant. The trial court was in the best position to 

view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness. The court’s entry of 

October 4, 2011, does not ignore the issue of violence, but states “Both parents 

seem to have anger management issues.” 

{¶17} A review of the record reveals Appellee’s mother, Candis Estep, 

testified that the visitation exchanges were going well, with no problems, for a 2-3 

months period. The visitation exchanges occurred at the local sheriff’s department 

because of a restraining order Appellant obtained against Appellee. At some point, 

Ms. Estep called Appellant regarding the visits and a man answered the telephone. 

At first, the chatter in the background indicated that Appellant did not wish to take 

the call, but then she did and began cussing Ms. Estep. There was a verbal 

argument and Ms. Estep did not try to make contact again. 

{¶18} Ms. Estep also testified regarding the domestic violence incident 

which occurred at her house. Appellant questioned Ms. Estep about calling the 

authorities because of what she characterized as Appellee’s domestic violence 

towards her. Ms. Estep characterized the incident as an “argument.” According to 

the testimony, Appellee was taken to jail. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 10 

{¶19} Appellee’s current wife Chantal Seymour also gave testimony 

regarding violent behavior on the part of the Appellant. Ms. Seymour testified that 

on one occasion, Appellee and she went to pick up S.W.S. together. An hour or so 

later, Appellant “burst” into Candis Estep’s home and tried to attack Chantal 

Seymour, who did not respond to the “attack.” Appellee’s father corroborated this 

testimony. 

{¶20} In this matter, the witnesses presented by both sides can be 

considered self-serving. Most convincing may have been the testimony of the 

GAL. During her testimony, the GAL was given a final chance to clarify or 

expand on any issue she deemed important and for whatever reason, she chose not 

to expand on topic of Appellee-father’s history of domestic violence. The GAL 

did articulate that she had “concerns with the way the two act toward each other.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶21} Here, the trial court had competent and credible evidence before it of 

violent behavior from both parties competing for custody of their minor child. 

Even the testimony of the guardian ad litem indicated that there were anger issues 

on both sides. The trial court was in the best position to assess the demeanor of the 

parties and the credibility of the other witnesses. Given these facts, we cannot say 

that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in its consideration of the 

evidence of violent behavior of the mother, as well as the father. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 11 

{¶22} Appellant also contends the trial court failed to properly consider the 

Appellee’s lack of cooperation with the GAL. The GAL testified that neither she 

nor the child had visited Appellee’s current home. She also testified that she had 

concerns about the child living with Appellee and his new family. Appellant 

asserts that Appellee was never able to arrange a home visit with the GAL.

{¶23} The transcript reveals that the GAL visited the mother’s home twice. 

The GAL considered the home to be comfortable, large enough, and appropriate. 

Id. She noted that the child seemed comfortable there. The GAL testified that she 

had concerns with the child being in an unfamiliar environment. She testified to 

concerns that Appellee was not returning her phone calls to arrange a visit until the 

last minute. She acknowledged that construction on Appellee’s home was ongoing 

and that he seemed proud of the home. 

{¶24} The trial court also heard evidence that Appellee and his wife were 

purchasing their house and it would be paid for in eight months. Candis Estep 

testified that she had visited her son’s home and that there would be room for the 

child there. Chantal Seymour also testified that there is room for the child to live 

with them and that she would “love” to have Appellee’s child live with them. 

Although it is of legitimate concern that the GAL did not visit the Appellee’s home 

where, potentially six children could be living under one roof, again we defer to 

the judgment of the trial court in observing the witnesses and weighing credibility. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 12 

It would appear from the testimony that living with the father, S.W.S. would be 

able to develop relationships with his grandparents, father and step-mother, and 

several other children. Although the mother’s home was described in favorable 

terms, it may be the child would have very little exposure to other persons except 

for his mother and her fiancé. Given apparently credible testimony that the 

Appellee-father has an acceptable home to provide to S.W.S., we cannot say that 

the trial court erred and failed to somehow consider the Appellee’s lack of 

cooperation with the GAL. Again, we decline to find an abuse of discretion on 

this basis. 

{¶25} Finally, Appellant argues the trial court failed to properly consider the 

Appellee’s failure to pay child support. We note at the beginning of the hearing, 

the trial court recited the statutory factors and, although not verbatim, did mention 

the issue of whether or not a parent has paid child support and arrearages. It does 

not appear the court ignored this issue but recognized in its entry of October 4, 

2011: “The father has not paid court ordered child support as required. The father 

has not had any significant income for sometime, but has not asked for a support 

re-determination.” 1

 

{¶26} As noted above, the trial judge advised the parties he would be 

reviewing the entire record before he made his decision. The trial court’s entry was 

 

1

 The transcript is devoid of evidence on this issue, yet Appellant indicated in her closing statement that 

Appellee made a child support payment in July 2011. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 13 

filed approximately one week later. The entry made reference to a majority of the 

statutory factors and did contain the opinion that the mother had “routinely denied 

visitation.” On the issue of visitation, the record reveals Appellant requested the 

August 3, 2010 visitation order terminated while Appellee was in jail, but the 

request was never granted. Mr. Schoolcraft testified that Appellee had never shown 

a desire to visit the child since he [Schoolcraft] had been living with Appellant. 

Appellee and his parents testified that Appellant failed to bring the child to the 

sheriff’s department for custody exchanges and that she refused phone calls. 

Appellee concluded that since he was not allowed on her premises and she 

wouldn’t return his parents’ phone calls or show up, he would “give up” until the 

custody matter could be resolved in court. 

{¶27} While both psychological experts and guardians ad litem play 

important roles in child custody matters and in evaluating the interest of children, 

their recommendations are not binding upon a trial court. In re RN, 10th Dist. No. 

04AP-130, 2004-Ohio-4420, ¶4. The trial court must be free to evaluate all of the 

evidence and determine, based upon the entire record, the children’s best interest. 

Id. (See also Walton v. Walton, 3rd Dist. No. 14-10-21, 2011-Ohio-2487, 

disagreeing that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the 

testimony and report from a psychologist.) Here, we have no reason to believe that 

the trial court failed to properly consider the statutory factors as relates to the all 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 14 

the evidence adduced at hearing. To expect that the trial court was bound by the 

guardian’s report alone would require that the guardian’s judgment be substituted 

for that of the trial judge. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 3rd Dist. No. 1-81-60, 1982 

WL 6842. With regard to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to 

properly consider the GAL’s report, we note again that the report, whether or not it 

was admitted as an exhibit at the hearing, was part of the lower court’s record once 

it was filed. As discussed at length above, the trial court advised the parties at the 

end of the hearing that he would take the matter under advisement and review the 

record. That record would have included the GAL’s report. 

{¶28} Based on the transcript, it appears the trial court was faced with a 

difficult set of factors to evaluate. Here, we recognize that “child custody 

decisions involve some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions that trial 

courts are required to decide, [and that] courts must have wide latitude to consider 

all of the evidence....” In re E.W., at ¶19. See Davis,77 Ohio St. 3d 418; Bragg v. 

Hatfield, 152 Ohio App.3d 174, 2003-Ohio-1441, 787 N.E.2d,44, ¶24; Hinton v. 

Hinton, 4th Dist. No. 02CA54, 2003-Ohio-2785 at ¶ 9; Ferris v. Ferris, 4th Dist. 

No. 02CA4, 2003-Ohio-1284 at ¶ 20. Given that the trial court was in the best 

position to view witnesses, weigh credibility and make an obviously difficult 

decision, we decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion or committed 

plain error in awarding custody to the Appellee. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 15 

B. THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM’S REPORT 

{¶29} Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion with regard to the 

report “filed immediately before the final hearing, and for not allowing its proper 

consideration by the parties.” Appellant also contends that the trial court 

committed plain error by failing to admit the report sua sponte. We disagree. 

The “Rules of Superintendence are designed (1) to expedite the disposition of both 

criminal and civil cases in the trial courts of this state, while at the same time 

safeguarding the inalienable rights of litigants to the just processing of their causes; 

and (2) to serve that public interest which mandates the prompt disposition of all 

cases before the courts.” State v. Singer,(1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 109-110, 362 

N.E.2d 1216. Courts have interpreted the Rules of Superintendence as general 

guidelines for the conduct of the courts that do not create substantive rights. See 

Id. at 110 (stating that the Rules of Superintendence are not meant “to alter basic 

substantive rights”); see, also, In re K.G. Wayne App. No. 10CA16, 2010-Ohio4399, at ¶11; Allen v. Allen, Trumbull App. No. 2009-T-0070, 2010-Ohio-475, at ¶ 

31; Sultaana v. Giant Eagle, Cuyahoga App. No. 90294, 2008-Ohio-3658, at ¶45. 

“They are not the equivalent of rules of procedure and have no force equivalent to 

a statute. They are purely internal housekeeping rules which are of concern to the 

judges of the several courts but create no rights in individual defendants.” State v. 

Gettys, (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 241,243, 360 N.E.2d 735. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 16 

{¶30} In all juvenile and domestic relations proceedings, Sup.R. 48(F) 

outlines the guardian ad litem’s duties when preparing a final report. The rule 

requires that the guardian ad litem’s report be filed no less than seven days prior to 

the hearing, unless the time is extended by the court. Sup.R. 48(F)(1)(c). In 

analyzing Appellant’s argument with regard to the late receipt of the GAL’s report, 

we initially observe that Appellant did not object to proceeding with the September 

27, 2011 hearing due to the guardian’s failure to comply with Sup.R. 48(F)(1)(c). 

{¶31} It is well-settled that failing to object at the trial court level to a 

complained of error results in a waiver of that error on appeal. See, e.g. Goldfuss 

v. Davidson, (1997),79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099; Gallagher v. 

Cleveland Browns Football Co., (1996),74 Ohio St. 3d 427, 436-437, 659 N.E.2d 

1232. Thus, an appellate court may recognize an error that an appellant waived 

only if it constitutes plain error. See e.g. In re Etter (1998), 134 Ohio App.3d 484, 

492, 731 N.E.2d 694. Courts should exercise extreme caution when invoking the 

plain error doctrine, especially in civil cases. Courts should therefore limit 

applying the doctrine to cases “involving exceptional circumstances where error, to 

which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process***.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d 

at 122-123; see, also, In re Alyssa C, 153 Ohio App.3d 10, 2003-Ohio-2673 at ¶35, 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 17 

790 N.E.2d 803; In re Curry, Washington App. No. 03CA51, 2004-Ohio-750, at ¶ 

42 (applying plain error doctrine, overruled on other grounds). 

{¶32} Sup.R. 48 became effective in March 2009, and, thus, there is little 

case law interpreting its application. In re E.W., 4th Dist.Nos. 10CA18, 

10CA19,10CA20, 2011-Ohio-2123, ¶14. See In re J.L.R., 4th Dist.No. 08CA17, 

2009-Ohio-5812, at ¶ 50 (noting scarcity of case law interpreting Sup.R.48). As 

we previously explained in In re E.W., at least two appellate courts have examined 

the rule, and both courts concluded that the guardian ad litem’s failure to comply 

with the rule did not constitute grounds for reversal. See In re. K.G., supra; Allen, 

supra. In Allen, for example, the guardian ad litem did not attend the final day of 

hearings, in contravention of Sup.R. 48(D)(4), and did not make the written report 

available to the parties until the day before the final hearing, in violation of Sup.R. 

48(F)(2). Allen, supra at ¶ 30; see also, In re K.G. at ¶ 13 (determining that alleged 

violation of Sup.R. 48 either did not exist or that the mother could not demonstrate 

any prejudice resulting from the alleged violations). In E.W., supra at ¶15, this 

Court held that Appellant did not have any substantive right to enforce under 

Sup.R.48. , and concluded as follows: 

“[T]he rule is a general guideline that does not have the force of 

statutory law. Moreover, beyond a general assertion that she could 

have conducted a further examination of the guardian ad litem’s 

report, appellant has failed to demonstrate how the guardian ad litem’s 

failure to file the report at least seven days before the hearing caused 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 18 

her any prejudice. Thus, we do not find any plain error that the trial 

court should have noticed.” Id. at ¶15. 

{¶33} In the case at bar, Appellant cites Sup.R. 48 and demonstrates that 

there was not compliance with the rule. Appellant urges this Court to find plain 

error because the GAL’s report was not made available to the parties until just 

before the hearing. We interpret Appellant’s argument that the parties “were not 

allowed its proper consideration” to mean that the parties being pro se se litigants, 

they may not have realized they should request a continuance of the hearing to 

review the report or to obtain counsel to review the report. With regard to pro se 

litigants, it is well-established that pro se litigants are held to the same rules, 

procedures, and standards as litigants who are represented by counsel. Crown Asset 

Management, LLC, v. Gaul, 4th Dist. No. 08CA30, 2009-Ohio-2167, ¶15, citing 

Selvage v. Emnett, 4th Dist. No. 08CA3239, 2009-Ohio-940,¶ 13. Litigants who 

choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the law and correct procedure, and 

are held to the same standards as other litigants. Capital One Bank, v. Rodgers, 5th 

Dist. No. CT2009-0049, 2010-Ohio-4421, ¶31. A pro se litigant cannot expect or 

demand special treatment from the judge, who must be impartial. Id, supra, citing 

Frew v. Frew, 5th Dist. No. 2007-CA-17, 2008-Ohio-4203,¶ 11. 

{¶34} We decline to find plain error occurred herein. In this case, both 

Appellant and Appellee were not entirely unfamiliar with the courtroom setting. 

Appellant had prior counsel in the instant matter until approximately two weeks 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 19 

prior to the originally scheduled hearing date. Prior counsel had represented 

Appellant in a contempt hearing. Appellee alluded to having counsel represent 

him with regards to obtaining custody of his other children. At the beginning of 

the September 27, 2011 hearing, the trial judge noted that the parties had just 

received the GAL’s report and that they’d be taking a ten (10) minute break to read 

and possibly discuss “how we’re going to continue today’s trial.” At this point in 

the hearing would seem to be the logical time to object to the presentation of the 

report as being untimely or unfair, or to request more time to review the report or 

discuss with an attorney. Appellant herein failed to lodge any semblance of 

objection, at any point during the hearing, which could be construed as taking issue 

with the timeliness of the report. Appellant chose to proceed unrepresented. She 

discharged counsel several weeks before the hearing and she was not placed in any 

sort of unfair situation by her counsel declining representation at the last minute. 

Appellant is held to the strategic decisions she made throughout the hearing. 

{¶35} Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court should have admitted the 

report sua sponte. We find no error in this regard. The report was filed with the 

court on the same date and was part of the record which the court reviewed in 

arriving at its decision, regardless of the lack of any request to file it as an exhibit. 

{¶36} The GAL was able to testify that her recommendation was for legal 

custody to the Appellant. Presumably this is exactly Appellant wanted to 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 20 

emphasize. The GAL’s report was part of the lower court’s record by virtue of its 

filing on September 27, 2011, and did become part of the trial court’s consideration 

upon review of the record. As in In re E.W. supra, Appellant fails to demonstrate 

how the trial court’s failure to admit the report as an exhibit, sua sponte, caused her 

any prejudice. Therefore, we decline to find any abuse of discretion by the trial 

court or any plain error below. Having found Appellant’s sole assignment of error 

without merit, we overrule it. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Pike App. No. 11CA821 21 

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and that the Appellee 

recover of Appellant costs herein taxed. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pike 

County Common Pleas Court Juvenile Division to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Exceptions. 

Harsha, J. and Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 

For the Court, 

 

BY: _________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.