IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA 

No. 95 / 07–0158 

Filed October 24, 2008 

STATE OF IOWA, ex rel. ALICIA CLAYPOOL, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

MICHAEL EVANS, MTE PROJECT 

DEVELOPMENT, and ANDERSON-BOGERT 

ENGINEERS & SURVEYORS, INC., 

 Appellees. 

----------------------------------------------------------- 

STATE OF IOWA, ex rel. JEFF FRANK, 

 Appellant, 

vs. 

MICHAEL EVANS, and 

MTE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT, 

 Appellees, 

and 

BLUE JAY RIDGE CONDOMINIUM 

OWNERS ASSOCIATION, 

 Defendant. 

 Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Amanda 

Potterfield, Judge. 

 Plaintiffs appeal the district court decision granting the defendants’ 

motions for summary judgment on the grounds their claims are barred 

by the statutes of limitations. AFFIRMED. 
2

 Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Teresa Baustian, 

Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. 

 Richard S. Fry, Theresa C. Davis, and Sarah J. Gayer of 

Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees Evans and 

MTE Project Development. 

 Webb L. Wassmer of Simmons Perrine PLC, Cedar Rapids, for 

appellee Anderson-Bogert Engineers & Surveyors, Inc. 

 
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WIGGINS, Justice. 

 In this case the plaintiffs claim the district court erred in finding 

the statutes of limitations for unfair or discriminatory practices in 

housing under the Iowa Civil Rights Act barred their claims. Because we 

find the statutes of limitations apply to the plaintiffs, including the State, 

and in one action the statutes of limitations begins to run on the date 

when the unit was purchased, and in the other action the statutes of 

limitations begins to run when the defendants sold the last unit, we 

affirm the decision of the district court granting the defendants’ motions 

for summary judgment. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

We find the undisputed facts as follows. In August 1999, Jeff 

Frank and his wife purchased a condominium at Blue Jay Ridge 

Condominiums in Coralville from Michael T. Evans Construction, a 

corporation registered as Chael Design and Development, Inc. Chael 

designed, developed, constructed, and sold Blue Jay Ridge 

Condominiums. Frank was the first purchaser of a unit in the 

development. The development included seven buildings, each having 

four units on the ground floor. 

Frank suffers from osteoarthritis and progressive degeneration of 

the joints in his hips and knees. This condition forces him to use a cane, 

crutches, and a walker depending upon the current state of his 

symptoms. The doctors have said Frank will likely need to use a 

wheelchair in the future. The design and construction of the 

condominium development included obstructed sidewalks that caused 

Frank difficulty accessing his unit from the parking area. About two to 

three months after moving in, Frank complained to Evans about the 
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obstructed sidewalks, but Evans ignored the complaints, so Frank’s 

accessibility problem continued for the duration of his occupancy. 

On April 8, 2002, he filed a complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights 

Commission against West Winds Management Company, Wendell Miller, 

an employee of West Winds Management Company, Blue Jay Ridge 

Condominium Owners Association, and Michael Evans, alleging the 

construction and design of the condominium development blocked 

access to his unit in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. West Winds 

managed the condominium development. On November 6, 2003, the 

commission received a report describing Blue Jay Ridge as highly 

inaccessible. In July 2003, prior to the time the commission received the 

report, Frank moved out of the development. 

Frank elected not to file his own lawsuit, but chose to have the 

commission file a civil rights petition on his behalf under Iowa Code 

section 216.17A(1)(a) (2003). On December 10, 2004, in a proceeding 

separate from Frank’s, Alicia Claypool, the Iowa Civil Rights 

Commissioner, filed a complaint on behalf of the commission pursuant to 

Iowa Code section 216.15(1). She filed the complaint against Michael 

Evans, MTE Project Development, and Anderson-Bogert Engineers & 

Surveyors, Inc. alleging the condominium development was highly 

inaccessible and violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Anderson-Bogert 

provided design services for Blue Jay Ridge Condominiums. On June 2, 

2005, the executive director of the commission filed a written request 

with the attorney general asking him to file suit under Iowa Code section 

216.17A(9) claiming the design and construction of the condominium 

development led to a denial of housing rights that raised an issue of 

general public importance. 
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On November 28, 2005, the attorney general filed separate actions 

on behalf of Frank and Claypool. Both petitions alleged the defendants 

discriminated in the sale or made housing unavailable under Iowa Code 

section 216.8A(3)(a)(1), (c)(3), discriminated in terms, conditions or 

privileges of sale and also in providing services or facilities according to 

section 216.8A(3)(b)(1), (c)(3), and failed to design and construct the 

dwelling in compliance with accessibility and adaptability features 

according to section 216.8A(3)(c)(3). The State filed Frank’s action based 

on the discriminatory sale of the unit to him, while the State filed 

Claypool’s action based on the discriminatory sale of the condominium 

units to the public. 

Anderson-Bogert moved for summary judgment in the Claypool 

case, stating the State’s claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of 

limitations for civil rights actions, and the requirement that a civil rights 

complaint be filed with the commission within 180 days of the 

discriminatory practice. A few weeks later MTE and Evans also filed 

motions for summary judgment against the State in both the Claypool 

and the Frank cases. These motions for summary judgment stated the 

claims were time-barred by the 180-day complaint period and the 

applicable statute of limitations. 

Frank purchased his unit more than 180 days prior to the filing of 

his complaint with the commission and more than two years prior to the 

attorney general filing the petition in the district court on his behalf. The 

sale of the last unit in the condominium development occurred more 

than 180 days prior to Claypool filing her complaint with the commission 

and more than two years prior to the attorney general filing the Claypool 

petition in the district court. 
6

The district court combined the cases for a hearing on the motions 

for summary judgment. During the hearing, the parties agreed there was 

essentially no dispute as to the facts in the case; thus, the dispute 

concerned the application of the statutes of limitations to the facts. The 

district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 

The State dismissed, without prejudice, the remaining defendant that 

had not filed a motion for summary judgment, Blue Jay Ridge 

Condominium Owners Association. The State appeals. 

II. Scope of Review. 

The case is on appeal from a motion for summary judgment. The 

district court enters summary judgment when there is no genuine issue 

of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981; Robinson v. Fremont County, 744 N.W.2d 

323, 325 (Iowa 2008). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, our job 

is to determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. 

Kragnes v. City of Des Moines, 714 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2006). 

Because no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the facts 

surrounding the statutes of limitations, our decision will turn on the 

construction of the statutes of limitations contained in the Iowa Civil 

Rights Act. We review questions of statutory construction for correction 

of errors at law. Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 745 

N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 2008). 

III. Statutory Framework. 

Chapter 216 of the Code, The Iowa Civil Rights Act, defines a 

“person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, 

corporations, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, and the state of 

Iowa and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof.” Iowa Code 
7

§ 216.2(11). The relevant parts of the Act define unfair or discriminatory 

housing practices as follows: 

 3a. A person shall not discriminate in the sale or 

rental or otherwise make unavailable or deny a dwelling to a 

buyer or renter because of a disability of any of the following 

persons: 

(1) That buyer or renter. 

. . . 

 b. A person shall not discriminate against another 

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 

of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities in 

connection with the dwelling because of a disability of any of 

the following persons: 

(1) That person. 

. . . 

 c. For the purposes of this subsection only, 

discrimination includes any of the following circumstances: 

. . . 

 (3) In connection with the design and 

construction of covered multifamily dwellings for first 

occupancy after January 1, 1992, a failure to design 

and construct those dwellings in a manner that meets 

the following requirements: 

 (a) The public use and common use 

portions of the dwellings are readily accessible to 

and usable by persons with disabilities. 

 (b) All doors designed to allow passage 

into and within all premises within the dwellings 

are sufficiently wide to allow passage by persons 

with disabilities in wheelchairs. 

 (c) All premises within the dwellings 

contain the following features of adaptive design: 

 (i) An accessible route into and 

through the dwelling. 

 (ii) Light switches, electrical outlets, 

thermostats, and other environmental 

controls in accessible locations. 
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 (iii) Reinforcements in bathroom 

walls to allow later installation of grab 

bars. 

 (iv) Usable kitchens and bathrooms 

so that a person in a wheelchair can 

maneuver about the space. 

Id. § 216.8A(3). 

 The Act contains two statutes of limitations. The first statute of 

limitations provides, “[a] claim under this chapter shall not be 

maintained unless a complaint is filed with the commission within one 

hundred eighty days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice 

occurred.” Id. § 216.15(12). The Code defines the person that can file 

the claim as “[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or 

unfair practice . . . .” Id. § 216.15(1). The second statute of limitations 

provides: 

 2. a. An aggrieved person may file a civil action in 

district court not later than two years after the occurrence of 

the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing or real 

estate practice, or the breach of a mediation agreement 

entered into under this chapter, whichever occurs last, to 

obtain appropriate relief with respect to the discriminatory 

housing or real estate practice or breach. 

 b. The two-year period does not include any time 

during which an administrative hearing under this chapter 

is pending with respect to a complaint or charge based on 

the discriminatory housing or real estate practice. 

Id. § 216.16A(2)(a), (b). 

IV. Analysis. 

Section 216.15(12) requires a person to file a complaint with the 

commission “within one hundred eighty days after the alleged 

discriminatory or unfair practice occurred.” Id. § 216.15(12). Section 

216.16A(2) requires a person to file a civil action “not later than two 

years after the occurrence of the termination of an alleged discriminatory 
9

housing or real estate practice.” Id. § 216.16A(2)(a). To determine 

whether Frank and Claypool timely filed their complaints with the 

commission under section 216.15(12), we must determine when the 

alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice occurred. To 

determine whether Frank and Claypool timely filed their petitions in the 

district court under section 216.16A(2), we must determine when the 

termination of an alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice 

occurred. 

In construing the statutes involved, we must determine legislative 

intent. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 

2004). We determine legislative intent from the words chosen by the 

legislature, not what it should or might have said. State v. Dohlman, 725 

N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 2006). Under the guise of construction, we may 

not extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the meaning of a statute. Auen,

679 N.W.2d at 590. 

The State and Claypool, acting on behalf of the commission, 

contend the statutes of limitations do not apply to them. The Iowa Civil 

Rights Act defines a “person” as an individual, the state of Iowa, and all 

of its agencies. Iowa Code § 216.2(11). Therefore, the limitations of 

actions contained in sections 216.15(12) and 216.16A(2) apply to the 

Claypool complaint and petition. 

Under sections 216.15(12) and 216.16A(2), we must first determine 

the alleged discriminatory housing or real estate practice upon which 

Frank and Claypool base their claims. They both claim the defendants 

discriminated in the sale or made housing unavailable under Iowa Code 

section 216.8A(3)(a)(1), (c)(3), discriminated in terms, conditions or 

privileges of sale and in providing services or facilities according to 

section 216.8A(3)(b)(1), (c)(3), and failed to design and construct the 
10

dwelling in compliance with accessibility and adaptability features 

according to section 216.8A(3)(c)(3). 

Section 216.8A(3) prohibits discrimination in the “sale” of a 

dwelling. Iowa Code § 216.8A(3)(a), (b). Section 216.8A(3)(c) defines the 

“discrimination” referred to in subsection (3) of section 216.8A as “the 

design and construction” of an inaccessible dwelling. Id. § 216.8A(3)(c). 

Therefore, the crux of these claims is that the defendants provided design 

and construction services for the development that made it inaccessible 

to a person with disabilities, then sold it to Frank and the other 

residents. Because the alleged discriminatory practice complained of is 

the sale of a housing unit designed and constructed to be inaccessible to 

a person with disabilities, it is clear the alleged discriminatory housing or 

real estate practice occurred and terminated at the time of the sale of the 

relevant units. See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 461–64 (9th Cir. 

2008) (construing a similar federal statute of limitations in a similar 

fashion). 

Accordingly, Frank’s 180-day period for filing his complaint with 

the commission and two-year period to file his petition with the district 

court began in August of 1999 when he purchased his unit. He filed his 

complaint in April of 2002 and his petition in November of 2005. 

Consequently, Frank’s complaint and petition were untimely, and the 

statutes of limitations bar his action. 

In Claypool’s action, the undisputed facts are that the sale of the 

last unit in the condominium development occurred more than 180 days 

prior to the filing of the Claypool complaint, and more than two years 

prior to the filing of the Claypool petition. Thus, Claypool’s complaint 

and petition were also untimely, and the statutes of limitations bar her 

action. 
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Claypool and Frank suggest an interpretation known as the 

encounter theory should apply to this case. Under the encounter theory, 

“a disabled homeseeker’s cause of action does not become complete until 

he personally encounters the defendant’s inaccessible building.” Robert 

G. Schwemm, Barriers to Accessible Housing: Enforcement Issues in 

“Design and Construction” Cases under the Fair Housing Act, 40 U. Rich. 

L. Rev. 753, 850 (2006). The plain language of the Iowa statute is not 

consistent with such a reading. The plain language of the statute defines 

the discriminatory practice as the sale of a housing unit designed and 

constructed to be inaccessible to a person with disabilities. Therefore, 

the statutes of limitations begin to run on the sale of the unit as to 

Frank, and on the last sale of the units as to Claypool. The encounter 

theory is more consistent with a tort theory, whereas Frank and Claypool 

have brought statutory claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Tort law 

cannot “trump statutory provisions that deal expressly with the statute 

of limitations.” Garcia, 526 F.3d at 464. 

Finally, Frank and Claypool argue that the alleged discriminatory 

practice continued after the sale of the units; therefore, under a 

continuing violation theory the statutes of limitations did not run. The 

Supreme Court defines a continuing violation as one in which the 

plaintiff “challenges not just one incident of conduct violative of the Act, 

but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period.” 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 381, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 

1125, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214, 230 (1982). However, we must distinguish the 

continuing violation theory from the continuing ill effects suffered from 

the original violation. 

A recent Supreme Court decision focused on the issue of 

continuing violation versus continuing effect. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire 
12

& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, ______, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167–69, 167 L. 

Ed. 2d 982, 990–93 (2007). There the plaintiff made a Title VII pay 

discrimination claim. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2165, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 

988. The issue decided by the Court was when the discriminatory act 

occurred. Id. The plaintiff claimed the discriminatory act occurred when 

she received lower pay. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2166, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 

988. The employer claimed the discriminatory act occurred at the time 

the plaintiff received low performance scores, the cause for her receiving 

lower pay. Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2166, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 989. The 

Supreme Court found that the giving of low performance scores was the 

discriminatory act, and the lower pay she received as a result of those 

low scores was a continuing effect of those low scores. Id. at _____, 127 

S. Ct. at 2169, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 992–93. In Ledbetter, the Court noted it 

is necessary for a court to identify the specific discriminatory practice at 

issue when applying a statute of limitations. Id. at _____, 127 S. Ct. at 

2167, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 989. Accordingly, the Supreme Court stated the 

“charging period ran from the time when the discrete act of alleged 

intentional discrimination occurred, not from the date when the effects of 

this practice were felt.” Id. at ____, 127 S. Ct. at 2168, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 

992. 

In this case the specific discriminatory practice was the sale of a 

housing unit designed and constructed to be inaccessible to a person 

with disabilities. This discriminatory practice was complete upon the 

sale. The lack of accessibility of the non-compliant development was a 

continuing effect of the discriminatory practice rather than a continuing 

violation. Garcia, 526 F.3d at 462–63; Moseke v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 202 

F. Supp. 2d 492, 507 (E.D. Va. 2002). Had the legislature wanted 

developers and designers of the unit to be liable after the sale, it could 
13

have expressly provided for continuing liability in the Iowa Civil Rights 

Act. 

V. Disposition. 

Because Frank’s and Claypool’s actions are barred by the statutes 

of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the district court granting the 

defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 

AFFIRMED.