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CANO v. WALKER

Cite as 297 Neb. 580

Eric Cano, appellee, v. Michael Walker, appellant, 

and Billy E. Claborn, Jr., appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 1, 2017. No. S-16-634.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does 

not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a 

matter of law.

2. Contracts. Contract interpretation presents a question of law.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts independently review 

questions of law decided by a lower court.

4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues 

presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine 

whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

5. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2016), there are three types of final orders which may be 

reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects a substantial right and 

which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order 

affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) 

an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an 

action after judgment is rendered.

6. ____: ____. Numerous factors determine when an order affects a substantial right for purposes of appeal. Broadly, these factors relate to the 

importance of the right and the importance of the effect on the right by 

the order at issue. It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the 

effect of the order on that right must also be substantial. Whether the 

effect of an order is substantial depends on whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter.

7. Jurisdiction: Time: Notice: Appeal and Error. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 25-1912 (Reissue 2016), to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, a 

party must timely file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment, 

decree, or final order from which the party is appealing.

8. Debtors and Creditors: Releases. The voluntary release of one joint 

debtor operates as a release of his or her codebtors.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

09/15/2017 09:10 AM CDT
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9. Promissory Notes: Releases. The unconditional release of one of several makers of a joint and several promissory note, without the consent 

of the other makers thereof, operates as a release of all.

10. Contracts: Releases. Under the common-law rule as it has developed in 

Nebraska, the qualifiers that releases must be “voluntary” and “unconditional” require consideration of general principles of contract interpretation when determining whether the common-law rule is applicable. 

Generally, the question is whether the language of the release at issue is 

unqualified such that it amounts to a complete satisfaction of the debt, 

or whether the language of the release is qualified such that it operates 

as merely a partial satisfaction of the debt.

11. Releases. The general rule of law is that a promise to release does not 

take effect until the agreed promise is completed.

12. Judgments: Debtors and Creditors: Releases. A judgment creditor 

may make a valid and binding agreement, either at the time a judgment 

is entered or later, to release and satisfy the judgment on terms other 

than receiving full payment of its amount. If the agreement to release or 

satisfy is executory, there is no release of the judgment until it is performed. The corollary to this rule is that once the relevant promises are 

performed, the agreement to release becomes effective.

13. Courts. The doctrine of stare decisis forms the bedrock of Nebraska’s 

common-law jurisprudence.

14. Courts: Appeal and Error. The doctrine of stare decisis does not 

require appellate courts to blindly perpetuate a prior interpretation of 

the law if it was clearly incorrect, but it is entitled to great weight and 

requires that the courts adhere to their previous decisions unless the 

reasons therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly wrong and mischievous or unless more harm than good will result 

from doing so.

15. Courts: Public Policy: Appeal and Error. The doctrine of stare decisis 

is grounded in the public policy that the law should be stable, fostering 

both equality and predictability of treatment. By requiring appellate 

courts to adhere to their previous decisions in most circumstances, the 

doctrine of stare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and 

consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial 

decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the 

judicial process.

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Shelly

R. Stratman, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Warren R. Whitted, Jr., and Keith A. Harvat, of Houghton, 

Bradford & Whitted, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
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Larry R. Forman, of Hillman, Forman, Childers & 

McCormack for appellee Eric Cano.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, 

Kelch, and Funke, JJ.

Stacy, J.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to discharge judgment filed by one of two judgment debtors who 

were co-obligors on a promissory note. The issues raised 

by the parties require us to consider the applicability, and 

continued viability, of the common-law rule in contracts that 

“‘[t]he unconditional release of one of several makers of a 

joint and several promissory note, without the consent of 

the other makers thereof, operates as a release of all.’”1 We 

conclude the rule represents settled law in Nebraska, and we 

find it should have been applied by the district court in this 

case. Accordingly, we reverse, and remand with directions to 

discharge the judgment.

I. FACTS

Eric Cano filed suit against Michael Walker and Billy E. 

Claborn, Jr., in October 2012, alleging they had failed to pay 

amounts due on a promissory note executed in April 2007. 

Cano prayed for judgment against them “jointly and severally” 

in the amount of $299,500, plus interest and penalties. All 

parties agree the promissory note imposed joint and several 

liability on Walker and Claborn.

Cano moved for summary judgment in October 2013. 

The matter was heard on November 12. At the hearing, 

Cano represented that the amounts due on the note were 

$299,500 in principal, a late charge of $14,975, and interest 

of $72,958.20, for a total of $387,433.20. On November 20, 

1 Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Ohrt, 131 Neb. 858, 862, 270 N.W. 497, 500 

(1936). See, Coleman v. Beck, 142 Neb. 13, 5 N.W.2d 104 (1942); Lamb v. 

Gregory, 12 Neb. 506, 11 N.W. 755 (1882); 3’s Lounge v. Tierney, 16 Neb. 

App. 64, 741 N.W.2d 687 (2007).
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the court entered summary judgment in favor of Cano and 

against both Walker and Claborn for $387,433.20.

Cano did not tell the court at the summary judgment hearing that he and Claborn had entered into a “Stipulation” on 

November 11, 2013, without Walker’s knowledge. According 

to the terms of the stipulation, Claborn agreed to entry of 

judgment against him for the full amount due on the note, 

and agreed to pay $40,000 immediately and an additional 

$127,000 by June 2, 2014. Claborn also agreed to provide a 

new furnace and an air-conditioning unit for Cano’s residence 

in Omaha, Nebraska, on or before December 13, 2013. The 

parties later agreed this was worth approximately $10,000. 

In exchange for these payments and services, Cano agreed 

not to execute on the judgment against Claborn so long as he 

complied with the stipulation, and further agreed that “[u]pon 

satisfaction by Claborn with the terms [of the stipulation], 

Cano shall forthwith release Claborn completely from such 

judgment . . . .”

After the court entered judgment on the promissory note, 

Cano attempted to execute on the judgment against Walker in 

various ways, representing that Walker owed the full amount of 

the judgment. Walker actively avoided the execution attempts 

and was held in contempt of court at least once.

On July 17, 2014, Cano filed what he captioned a 

“Satisfaction” in the case, which stated in full: “COMES 

NOW the Plaintiff and shows the Court that the Defendant 

Billy E. Claborn, Jr. has fully satisfied the Judgment against 

him in the above-captioned case, provided that the Judgment 

entered herein against Defendant Michael Walker remains 

unsatisfied.” After filing this satisfaction, Cano continued his 

attempts to collect the judgment from Walker, and Walker continued to evade collection efforts.

In November 2015, Cano attempted once again to collect the judgment against Walker by seeking an order in aid 

of execution from the court. Walker filed an objection, raising for the first time the argument that satisfaction of the 
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judgment against Claborn operated to satisfy the judgment 

against Walker as well.

During the hearing on Walker’s objection to Cano’s request 

for an order in aid of execution, the parties argued about the 

legal effect of the satisfaction Cano had filed. Cano argued 

the satisfaction operated only as against Claborn, because it 

stated the judgment “remain[ed] unsatisfied” as against Walker. 

Walker relied on Nebraska case law holding that “‘[t]he unconditional release of one of several makers of a joint and several 

promissory note, without the consent of the other makers 

thereof, operates as a release of all.’”2

The court commented that based on the court record, it 

appeared the entire judgment had been paid. In response to 

this comment, Cano’s counsel, for the first time, informed the 

court and Walker he had made a “deal” with Claborn to pay 

$167,000 “in exchange for a release.” Upon learning of the 

agreement and release, the court informed Cano that the order 

in aid of execution would be denied and that further proceedings were necessary.

Thereafter, Walker filed a motion to discharge the judgment, 

premised on the common-law rule that the release of one joint 

obligor on a promissory note operates to release all. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court overruled Walker’s 

motion for discharge, but exercised its inherent authority to 

reduce the amount of the judgment by $40,000—the amount 

the record showed Claborn had paid to Cano before the summary judgment was entered on the full amount of the promissory note.

Walker filed this timely appeal, and we moved the case 

to our docket on our own motion pursuant to our statutory 

authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts of 

this state.3

2 Id.

3 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2016).
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II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Walker assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district 

court erred in (1) finding the stipulation between Cano and 

Claborn did not release both Walker and Claborn from the 

judgment; (2) finding the satisfaction filed in July 2014 did 

not satisfy the judgment entered against both Walker and 

Claborn; (3) determining it had the inherent power to change 

the amount of the judgment entered on November 20, 2013; 

and (4) failing to discharge the judgment against Walker.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter 

of law.4

[2] Contract interpretation presents a question of law.5

[3] Appellate courts independently review questions of law 

decided by a lower court.6

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Jurisdictional Arguments

[4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it 

is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has 

jurisdiction over the matter before it.7 Cano presents two jurisdictional challenges in his brief. He argues that Walker has not 

appealed from a final order under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 

(Reissue 2016), and he argues that the appeal was untimely 

filed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1931 (Reissue 2016). We 

address each argument in turn.

4 Ginger Cove Common Area Co. v. Wiekhorst, 296 Neb. 416, 893 N.W.2d 

467 (2017).

5 Beveridge v. Savage, 285 Neb. 991, 830 N.W.2d 482 (2013); Blakely v. 

Lancaster County, 284 Neb. 659, 825 N.W.2d 149 (2012).

6 Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632, 895 N.W.2d 284 

(2017).

7 In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Barnhart, 290 Neb. 314, 859 

N.W.2d 856 (2015); Despain v. Despain, 290 Neb. 32, 858 N.W.2d 566 

(2015).
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(a) Finality Under § 25-1902

[5] Under § 25-1902, there are three types of final orders 

which may be reviewed on appeal: (1) an order which affects 

a substantial right and which determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting a substantial right 

made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order affecting 

a substantial right made on summary application in an action 

after judgment is rendered.8 Walker filed this appeal from the 

district court’s May 26, 2016, order overruling his motion to 

discharge the judgment. That order is properly characterized 

as one made on summary application after judgment is rendered, and we focus on whether that order affected a substantial right.9

[6] Numerous factors determine when an order affects a 

substantial right for purposes of appeal. Broadly, these factors 

relate to the importance of the right and the importance of the 

effect on the right by the order at issue.10 It is not enough that 

the right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on that 

right must also be substantial.11 Whether the effect of an order 

is substantial depends on “‘“‘whether it affects with finality 

the rights of the parties in the subject matter.’”’”12

Cano argues that because the order denying discharge also 

resulted in the judgment against Walker being reduced by 

$40,000, it was actually beneficial to Walker and therefore 

did not affect a substantial right. This argument ignores the 

nature of the relief Walker was seeking—to be fully discharged from the judgment. To the extent the district court 

denied that relief in overruling Walker’s motion for discharge, 

we find the order affected a substantial right and was a final, 

appealable order.

8 In re Interest of Noah B. et al., 295 Neb. 764, 891 N.W.2d 109 (2017).

9 § 25-1902.

10 In re Interest of Noah B. et al., supra note 8.

11 Id.

12 Id. at 774, 891 N.W.2d at 119.
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(b) Timeliness of Appeal

[7] Cano presents two arguments that Walker’s appeal was 

untimely. Both arguments misstate the record, and addressing 

them in detail is unnecessary. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 

(Reissue 2016), to vest an appellate court with jurisdiction, 

a party must timely file a notice of appeal within 30 days of 

the judgment, decree, or final order from which the party is 

appealing.13 Here, Walker filed his notice of appeal within 30 

days of the court’s order overruling his motion to discharge the 

judgment. This appeal was timely filed, and Cano’s arguments 

to the contrary are meritless.

2. Nebraska Common Law Regarding Release

of Joint Debtors in Contract

[8,9] In the area of contracts, Nebraska has long followed 

the common-law rule that the “‘voluntary release’” of one 

joint debtor operates as a release of his or her codebtors.14

It is well settled that “‘[t]he unconditional release of one of 

several makers of a joint and several promissory note, without 

the consent of the other makers thereof, operates as a release 

of all.’”15

The question presented in this appeal is whether, on the 

facts of this case, the common-law rule applies. The answer 

to that question turns on whether the stipulation between 

Cano and Claborn, and/or the subsequent satisfaction of judgment, represented an unconditional and voluntary release of 

Claborn. If so, then under the common-law rule, Walker was 

also released.

Over the years, this court has used the terms “voluntary” 

and “unconditional” when referencing the common-law rule 

13 Clarke, supra note 6.

14 Coleman, supra note 1, 142 Neb. at 17, 5 N.W.2d at 106. Accord Lamb, 

supra note 1.

15 Bankers Life Ins. Co., supra note 1, 131 Neb. at 862, 270 N.W. at 500. 

See, Farmers State Bank v. Baker, 117 Neb. 29, 219 N.W. 580 (1928); 

Huber Mfg. Co. v. Silvers, 85 Neb. 760, 124 N.W. 148 (1910).
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regarding releases of co-obligors,16 but we have not defined 

those terms. Our use of these terms in describing the commonlaw rule appears to be unique; general sources citing the 

common-law rule do not contain the qualifiers “voluntary” or 

“unconditional.”17 Instead, the common-law rule is simply that 

a release of one joint obligor releases all.18

[10] We understand the qualifiers in our recitation of the 

common-law rule to require consideration of general principles of contract interpretation when determining whether 

the common-law rule is applicable. Generally, the question 

is whether the language of the release at issue is unqualified 

such that it amounts to a complete satisfaction of the debt, 

or whether the language of the release is qualified such that 

it operates as merely a partial satisfaction of the debt.19 We 

review our prior decisions to illustrate the application of the 

common-law rule as it has developed in Nebraska.

We first applied the common-law rule in 1882, in Lamb 

v. Gregory.

20 There, the plaintiff obtained a deficiency judgment against two debtors. One of the debtors moved to have 

the judgment set aside as to him because it was discharged in 

bankruptcy. The plaintiff agreed “‘to the setting aside of the 

judgment’” against that debtor, and it was set aside.21 Later, 

the other debtor moved to be discharged from the judgment, 

arguing the release of the first debtor operated as a release 

of both from liability on the judgment. We agreed, citing the 

rule that “‘[i]f two or more are jointly bound, or jointly and 

16 See, Coleman, supra note 1; Bankers Life Ins. Co., supra note 1; Lamb, 

supra note 1.

17 See, generally, Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1420 (1928).

18 Id. See, also, Schiffer v. United Grocers, Inc., 329 Or. 86, 989 P.2d 10 

(1999).

19 See Bankers Life Ins. Co., supra note 1. See, generally, 53 A.L.R., supra 

note 17 (noting that courts will look at parties’ intentions when construing 

release and that express reservation of rights can avoid common-law rule).

20 Lamb, supra note 1.

21 Id. at 507, 11 N.W. at 755.
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severally bound, and the obligee releases one of them, all are 

discharged.’”22

In Huber Mfg. Co. v. Silvers,

23 the plaintiff sued on five 

promissory notes, signed jointly by three debtors. The notes 

were given by the debtors for the purchase from the plaintiff 

of a steam thresher separator. After the notes were executed, 

one of the three debtors, John Silvers, went to the plaintiff and 

represented that he had sold his interest in the threshing outfit 

to the others and that they had assumed and agreed to pay the 

notes. The plaintiff, without investigating the veracity of this 

claim, agreed to release Silvers from the notes and sell him 

another threshing machine. The terms of the release were that 

Silvers was “‘“released without recourse”’” from the notes.24

Noting the record was unclear as to Silvers’ veracity, we 

applied the common-law rule to hold, with “great reluctance,” 

that the release of Silvers operated as a release of all debtors 

on the notes.25

In Farmers State Bank v. Baker,

26 four parties were jointly 

liable on promissory notes. Through a complicated arrangement, one of the parties was released from liability on the 

notes. Although that release did not appear to contemplate or 

intend any release of the others, we nevertheless held that the 

release of one of several makers of a joint and several promissory note, without the consent of the others, operated as a 

release of all.

In Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Ohrt,

27 the holder sued five makers of a note and mortgage. At the beginning of the trial, 

the holder stated that he “‘waive[d] personal liability of the 

22 Id. at 508, 11 N.W. at 755.

23 Huber Mfg. Co., supra note 15.

24 Id. at 761, 124 N.W. at 148.

25 Id. at 765, 124 N.W. at 149.

26 Farmers State Bank, supra note 15.

27 Bankers Life Ins. Co., supra note 1.
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defendant Rosa Oft’” on the note and mortgage.28 Later, counsel withdrew that waiver on the record. On appeal, the other 

four makers argued this was an unconditional release of Rosa 

Oft and operated as a release of all of them as well. We disagreed, and found the release did not apply to all. We reasoned 

the evidence did not show the release was unconditional, 

because the statement was not that Oft was “released from all 

effects of the note and mortgage,” but merely that the plaintiff 

had waived Oft’s “personal liability.”29 We also found it significant that the waiver had been withdrawn.

In Coleman v. Beck,

30 a husband and wife executed a promissory note and a mortgage. They later sold the real property 

encumbered by the mortgage to Lyle Trumbley, who assumed 

payment of the mortgage. The real estate was foreclosed upon, 

and a deficiency judgment was entered against the husband, 

the wife, and Trumbley. The bank then released the husband 

and wife from the judgment, and Trumbley argued on appeal 

that the release operated to release him as well. We held the 

common-law rule did not apply, because Trumbley, who had 

assumed the promissory notes, was not a joint debtor on the 

notes with the husband and wife. Rather, he was the surety 

on the mortgage debt, and we concluded that a release of the 

husband and wife did not affect his liability.

With these holdings in mind, we consider the relevant documents in the present case.

3. Release Documents

(a) Stipulation

The stipulation between Cano and Claborn provided in relevant part:

Notwithstanding entry of the judgment against Claborn as 

aforesaid, Cano covenants that he shall take no steps to 

28 Id. at 862, 270 N.W. at 500.

29 Id.

30 Coleman, supra note 1.
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execute on such judgment and that he shall take no action 

against Claborn with respect to said judgment so long 

as Claborn complies with the terms of this Stipulation. 

Upon satisfaction by Claborn with the terms hereof, 

Cano shall forthwith release Claborn completely from 

such judgment and from any liability for any amounts 

in excess of the amounts required from Claborn as set 

forth herein.

[11] The plain language of this stipulation provided that 

Cano would not take any action on the judgment against 

Claborn while Claborn’s promise to pay the agreed amounts 

remained executory, but that once Claborn’s promise was completed, Claborn would be released “completely.” This interpretation is consistent with the general rule of law that a 

promise to release does not take effect until the agreed promise 

is completed.31

We find the plain and unambiguous language of this stipulation operated as an unconditional and voluntary release of 

Claborn as soon as he satisfied its terms. Our record does not 

reveal the precise date on which Claborn satisfied the terms of 

the stipulation, but there is no dispute that he did so, prompting Cano to file the satisfaction of judgment which we consider next.

(b) Satisfaction

The satisfaction Cano filed in this case recited that Claborn 

had “satisfied the Judgment against him” and further recited 

that “the Judgment entered herein against . . . Walker remains 

unsatisfied.” Cano argues that the qualifying language of 

the satisfaction reserved Walker’s liability and prevented the 

unconditional release of Claborn from operating as a release 

of Walker.

[12] But we conclude the relevant and operative release 

language is found in the stipulation, not the satisfaction. A 

31 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 892 (2009).
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judgment creditor may make a valid and binding agreement, 

either at the time a judgment is entered or later, to release and 

satisfy the judgment on terms other than receiving full payment of its amount.32 If the agreement to release or satisfy is 

executory, there is no release of the judgment until it is performed.33 The corollary to this rule is that once the relevant 

promises are performed, the agreement to release becomes 

effective.34 So, once the terms of the stipulation were met in 

this case, Claborn was fully and unconditionally released. The 

qualifying language recited later in the satisfaction of judgment was irrelevant.

4. Releases of Joint Tort-feasors Are

Governed by Different Rules

In his briefing on appeal, Cano relies rather extensively on 

Nebraska law addressing joint liability in tort and the effect of 

releasing one of several joint tort-feasors. Because Nebraska 

statutes and case law treat joint tort-feasors differently than 

co-obligors on a contract or judgment, the rules governing 

release of joint tort-feasors are not instructive in the present case.

5. Continued Viability of

Common-Law Rule

Cano urges this court to abolish the common-law rule that 

the unconditional release of one of several co-obligors on a 

note, without the consent of the others, operates as a release of 

all. Nebraska is among a minority of jurisdictions to continue 

applying the common-law rule. Of those jurisdictions that have 

abolished the rule, most have done so through legislative action 

rather than judicial decision.35

32 Id.

33 Id.

34 See id.

35 See, e.g., Schiffer, supra note 18 (including appendix listing how each 

state treats issue).
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[13-15] The doctrine of stare decisis forms the bedrock of 

our common-law jurisprudence.36 While it does not require us 

to blindly perpetuate a prior interpretation of the law if we conclude it was clearly incorrect,37 it is entitled to great weight38

and requires that we adhere to our previous decisions “unless 

the reasons therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly wrong and mischievous or unless more 

harm than good will result from doing so.”39 The doctrine “is 

grounded in the public policy that the law should be stable, 

fostering both equality and predictability of treatment.”40 By 

requiring appellate courts to adhere to their previous decisions 

in most circumstances, the doctrine of stare decisis “promotes 

the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of 

legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 

contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”41

The common-law rule in contracts—that an unconditional 

release of one joint obligor without the consent of the others operates to release all—has governed business decisions 

and contractual arrangements in Nebraska for more than a 

century. The rule is predictable, easy to understand, and easy 

to apply. Moreover, at least as it has developed in Nebraska, 

the common-law rule includes the unique requirements that 

a release of one joint debtor must be both “voluntary” and 

“unconditional” before the rule operates to release all joint 

debtors. So if individuals and businesses want to structure 

releases in a way that avoids the consequences of the rule, it is 

clear how to do so.

36 Holm v. Holm, 267 Neb. 867, 678 N.W.2d 499 (2004).

37 Id.

38 Edwards v. Hy-Vee, 294 Neb. 237, 883 N.W.2d 40 (2016).

39 Id. at 247, 883 N.W.2d at 47-48.

40 State v. Hausmann, 277 Neb. 819, 828, 765 N.W.2d 219, 226 (2009).

41 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 

2036, 188 L. Ed. 2d 1071 (2014) (citations omitted).
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We see no principled reason to depart from this settled 

precedent, and we decline Cano’s invitation to abolish the 

common-law rule in Nebraska. If the settled common law is to 

be amended or abolished, that action should be undertaken by 

the Legislature rather than the judiciary.

V. CONCLUSION

Under settled Nebraska contract law, the unconditional 

release of one of several joint obligors on a promissory note, 

without the consent of the other obligors, operates as a release 

of all. Walker and Claborn were co-obligors on a promissory 

note that was reduced to a judgment. Without the consent of 

Walker, Cano and Claborn entered into a stipulation which 

operated as an unconditional release of Claborn once he satisfied the terms of the stipulation.

As such, under the common-law rule in Nebraska, the 

unconditional release of Claborn from the judgment operated as a release of Walker. Because the district court erred 

in denying Walker’s motion to discharge the judgment against 

him, we reverse, and remand with directions to grant the 

requested discharge.

Reversed and remanded with directions.