FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE EULALIO BALAM-CHUC, 

Petitioner, No. 06-72887

v. Agency No. 

M A79-806-794 ICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

August 27, 2008—Seattle, Washington

Filed October 24, 2008

Before: Thomas G. Nelson, Michael Daly Hawkins, and

Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion By Judge Bybee

14941
COUNSEL

Carol L. Edward, Eric P. Lin, and Shannon M. Underwood,

Law Offices of Carol L. Edward & Associates, P.S., Seattle,

Washington, for the petitioner.

Peter D. Keisler, Stephen J. Flynn, and Dalin R. Holyoak,

U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C.,

for the respondent.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge: 

Petitioner Jose Eulalio Balam-Chuc (“Balam-Chuc”) seeks

review of a dismissal of his appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Balam-Chuc argues that the BIA

improperly decided that the April 30, 2001, filing deadline in

§ 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8

U.S.C. § 1255(i), is a statute of repose, and is thus not subject

to equitable tolling for a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. He further claims that his counsel’s ineffective assisBALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14943
tance constitutes a due process violation under the Fifth

Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we deny his

petition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The LIFE Act and Amendments

The Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (“LIFE Act”),

INA § 245 (1999) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1999)), was

enacted, in part, to provide a mechanism whereby the spouses

and minor children of lawful permanent residents could apply

more quickly for immigrant visas. See 146 CONG. REC.

S11851 (Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).1 Congress established a system of temporary visas in order to provide “a speedy mechanism for the spouses and minor children

of U.S. citizens to obtain their immigrant visas in the U.S.,

rather than wait for long periods of time outside the U.S.” Id.

The LIFE Act also provided a method whereby an alien that

had entered the United States without inspection or parole, but

who was otherwise eligible for an immigrant visa, could apply

to the Attorney General for an adjustment of status. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255(i) (1999). This adjustment of status—to that of alien

lawfully admitted for permanent residence—would allow the

alien to remain in the United States, thus avoiding the undesirable alternative of forcing aliens to leave their families in

the United States while they applied for a visa abroad. To

qualify for this status adjustment, the alien had to file a petition for classification under 8 U.S.C. § 1154 on or before January 14, 1998, and pay a $1000 fee. Id.

1Because the LIFE Act amendments were created outside of the ordinary Committee process, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary—

Senators Abraham and Kennedy—provided a joint memorandum concerning the amendments. Much of the legislative history referenced here

comes from this joint memorandum, as introduced by Senator Kennedy.

14944 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY
In 2000, Congress amended the LIFE Act to expand the

class of beneficiaries who could apply for adjustment of status

under INA § 245(i). Among other things, Congress moved the

deadline for filing a visa petition from January 14, 1998, to

April 30, 2001, for all aliens present in the United States as

of the statute’s date of enactment. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).

Members of Congress encouraged the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to “ensure that all potentially eligible persons have an opportunity to qualify for 245(i).” 146

CONG. REC. at S11851 (Dec. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen.

Kennedy). Senator Kennedy recommended that, if necessary,

“INS should accept petitions and applications before the April

30, 2001 sunset date that do not contain all necessary supporting documents, and allow additional documents to be filed

after the deadline.” Id. Thus, while members of Congress

encouraged flexibility, for an alien to take advantage of the

adjustment of status provision of INA § 245(i) after the

amendment—and avoid returning to his or her country of

citizenship—the alien must have been present in the United

States on December 21, 2000, and must have petitioned the

Attorney General for an immigration visa prior to April 30,

2001. 

B. Balam-Chuc’s Application

Balam-Chuc is a native citizen of Mexico who entered the

United States without inspection or parole around August

1997 at or near San Ysidro, California. On May 8, 2000, in

Tacoma, Washington, he married Rebekah A. Hinman (“Mrs.

Balam-Chuc”), a United States citizen. The Balam-Chucs

have two children, both U.S. citizens, currently ages six and

three. 

In 2001, Balam-Chuc worked to solidify his immigration

status in the United States. Mrs. Balam-Chuc hired the

DeDamm Law Firm to file a family visa petition and application for adjustment of status on behalf of her husband.2

 She

2Many of the events summarized here come from facts laid out in a letter dated February 19, 2003, from Mrs. Balam-Chuc to the Department of

BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14945
signed and dated an Immediate Relative Visa Petition, Form

I-130, on March 20, 2001, and submitted it to her attorney

with the appropriate documents and fees. Mindful of the April

30th deadline, Mrs. Balam-Chuc called the law firm on March

30, 2001, and she was assured that the petition would be

hand-delivered on time. 

INS, however, did not receive the I-130 petition until June

13, 2001, almost a month and a half after the statutory deadline. The Balam-Chucs learned that the petition had been filed

late when Balam-Chuc appeared for his adjustment interview

in July 2002. Balam-Chuc turned to the DeDamm Law Firm,

but no one could provide proof that the petition had been submitted prior to the deadline. Gabriel Banfi, who supervised

the preparation of the I-130, claims that a DeDamm paralegal

submitted the application to the INS (now the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”)) prior to April 30, 2001. However, he acknowledges that the application might have been

returned because it was not accompanied by the appropriate

filing fee, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(a)(1). Regardless

of Banfi’s claims, neither the Balam-Chucs nor anyone at the

firm could provide proof that the petition had been submitted

prior to the deadline, and on appeal, Balam-Chuc apparently

concedes that he cannot provide evidence of a timely filing.

Although the INS eventually approved the I-130 petition on

October 14, 2002, it ultimately denied Balam-Chuc’s application for adjustment of status based on the untimely filing of

the corresponding petition. 

C. Removal Proceedings

Two years later, on May 10, 2004, DHS served BalamChuc with a Notice to Appear, charging that he was subject

Immigration—a letter written almost two years after the deadline for filing

the visa petition. Although the letter was attached as an exhibit to BalamChuc’s appeal to the BIA, it was not submitted in the form of an affidavit

or sworn statement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. The accuracy of these events

may be in dispute. For purposes of this opinion, we relate the background

facts as Balam-Chuc has presented them. 

14946 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY
to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien who

was present without having been admitted or paroled. On

August 18, 2004, Balam-Chuc appeared with new counsel

before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Seattle. At the hearing,

Balam-Chuc admitted to the allegations lodged by DHS and

conceded removability. He argued, however, that he should

be eligible for an adjustment of status under the LIFE Act

amendment because he had in fact filed the petition on time,

and in the alternative, the statute of limitations should have

been tolled due to the ineffective assistance of his prior counsel. 

On January 20, 2005, the IJ decided that Balam-Chuc had

failed to establish that he had timely filed the appropriate

application and filing fee. Citing our decision in Munoz v.

Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2003), the IJ held that

because INA § 245(i) was a statute of repose—and not a statute of limitations—the deadline was not subject to equitable

tolling due to ineffective counsel. Because he failed to file his

petition on or before April 30, 2001, Balam-Chuc was thus

ineligible for adjustment of status under INA § 245(i).

Accordingly, the IJ sustained the charge of removability. 

Balam-Chuc appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, arguing

that the IJ incorrectly classified the deadline as a statute of

repose instead of a statute of limitations and that the statute

should be tolled due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He

further argued that the BIA should adjudicate the application

nunc pro tunc. The BIA rejected these arguments, finding that

the IJ properly determined that INA § 245(i) was a statute of

repose not subject to equitable tolling. The Board noted that

the IJ and the BIA might also lack the authority to toll the filing deadline, as only DHS currently has jurisdiction over visa

petitions. It further held that nunc pro tunc relief was

improper and dismissed the appeal. 

BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14947
II. ANALYSIS

Balam-Chuc argues on appeal that the BIA erred in determining that the April 30, 2001, deadline was a statute of

repose not subject to equitable tolling. He asserts that the

deadline is a statute of limitations which should be equitably

tolled due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He further

argues that the ineffective assistance of his counsel violated

his due process rights.3 Finally, Balam-Chuc challenges the

BIA’s statement that it might lack authority to toll the statute

of limitations merely because DHS now oversees the agency

process for accepting visa petitions. 

“On a petition for review, the BIA’s decisions regarding

purely legal questions are reviewed de novo, ‘giving deference to the BIA’s interpretation unless that interpretation is

contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute.’ ”

Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir.

2004)). “We review the BIA’s findings of fact, including

credibility findings, for substantial evidence and must uphold

the BIA’s finding unless the evidence compels a contrary

result.” Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.

2003). We review due process claims de novo. Lara-Torres

v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). 

As discussed below, our precedent compels the conclusion

that the deadline imposed by Congress under INA § 254(i)

constitutes a statute of repose, not subject to equitable tolling.

We also find that ineffective assistance of counsel in preparing and filing a petition does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. Because we find no error in the merits of the BIA’s

decision, we do not discuss the remedies among DHS and

INS that were otherwise available to the BIA. 

3Balam-Chuc does not contest the BIA’s finding that it could not adjudicate his application nunc pro tunc. 

14948 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY
A. Statute of Limitations or Statute of Repose 

[2] “There is a crucial distinction in the law between ‘statutes of limitations’ and ‘statutes of repose.’ Statutes of repose

are not subject to equitable tolling.” Munoz v. Ashcroft, 339

F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2003). Whether INA § 245(i) is a statute of repose or a statute of limitations subject to equitable

tolling is a question of first impression for the federal circuits.

However, we have analyzed a number of other deadlines

imposed by Congress to determine whether or not they constitute statutes of limitation or repose. Compare, Albillo-De

Leon v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that § 203(c) of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central

American Relief Act (“NACARA”) was a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling), with Munoz, 339 F.3d at

956-57 (finding that § 203(a) of NACARA was a statute of

repose not subject to equitable tolling), and Carrillo-Gonzalez

v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that

equitable tolling did not apply to the congressionallymandated, one-year deadline of the Diversity Immigration

Visa Lottery Program for 1997). 

“Statutes of limitation are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants and to promote the theory that even if one

has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice

to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to

be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right

to prosecute them.” Albillo-De Leon, 410 F.3d at 1095 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In essence, “such limitations relieve courts of the burden of adjudicating stale claims

when a plaintiff has slept on his rights.” Id. 

[2] On the other hand, a statute of repose is a “fixed, statutory cutoff date, usually independent of any variable, such as

claimant’s awareness of a violation.” Munoz, 339 F.3d at 957.

“A statute of repose cuts off a cause of action at a certain time

irrespective of the time of accrual of the cause of action.”

Weddel v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 100 F.3d 929,

BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14949
931 (9th Cir. 1996). Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of a statute of repose is that it establishes “an outer

date for bringing an action” instead of a variable period of

time during which a plaintiff must assert her claim. Id. Thus,

we have noted that statutes of repose act “ ‘as the endpoint of

the definite time period in which Congress would permit a

specific class of potential annuitants to file applications,’ ”

which function “ ‘as a condition defining and closing the

class.’ ” Id. (quoting Iacono v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 974

F.2d 1326, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 

For example, in Munoz we decided that deadlines imposed

by NACARA § 203(a) constitute a statute of repose. 399 F.3d

at 957. That statute imposed an April 1, 1990, cutoff date for

asylum applications from Guatamalan nationals and a December 31, 1991, cutoff date for special rule cancellation applications from Guatamalan nationals who had registered for

certain settlement benefits. NACARA § 203(a), Pub. L. No.

105-100, 111 Stat. 2160. We held that § 203(a) constituted a

statute of repose because the deadlines at issue were “fixed by

statute and unrelated to any variable” and through the “retroactive cutoff dates, Congress closed the class via a statute of

repose.” Munoz, 339 F.3d at 957. 

[3] As in NACARA § 203(a), here Congress has created a

fixed statutory cutoff date, independent of any variable, and

the deadline effectively closes the class of individuals entitled

to special treatment under a statutory initiative. The statute

requires aliens to file a visa petition “on or before April 30,

2001” to qualify for adjustment of status. INA § 245(i). This

is a specific date that marks the close of a class, not a general

period based on discovery of an injury or accrual of a claim.

Our decision in Munoz compels the conclusion that INA

§ 245(i) is a statute of repose. 

Balam-Chuc relies on our decision in Albillo-De Leon v.

Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2005), to support his position that § 245(i) is a statute of limitations. In Albillo-De

14950 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY
Leon, we interpreted § 203(c) of NACARA—not to be confused with § 203(a) discussed above—and found that the

deadline constituted a statute of limitations. 410 F.3d at 1098.

Section 203(c) provides a period for aliens to file a motion to

reopen removal or deportation proceedings if they become eligible for relief under NACARA’s other provisions. NACARA

§ 203(c), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160. The statute

provides that “[t]he period shall begin not later than 60 days

after the date of the enactment of [NACARA] and shall

extend for a period not to exceed 240 days,” giving the Attorney General final discretion to fix the date. Id. In Albillo-De

Leon we distinguished Munoz based on a combination of

three unique factors: (1) section 203(c) served a limited purpose and applied to a specific, small group of people that had

already complied with the deadlines imposed by § 203(a), (2)

the time deadline did not “identify a specific cutoff date by

which a petitioner must file his or her motion to reopen proceedings,” and (3) the legislative history specifically indicated

an intent to subject the soft deadline to equitable tolling principles. 410 F.3d at 1097-98. 

None of these three circumstances is present here. Rather,

§ 245(i) applies to all aliens who filed a visa petition before

April 30, 2001, and were present in the United States on the

statute’s date of enactment. This can hardly be characterized

as a statutory provision with a “limited purpose” that applies

to a specific, small group of people. See Albillo De-Leon, 410

F.3d at 1097. Unlike NACARA § 203(a), which did not

impose a specific cutoff date, INA § 245(i) requires all aliens

who wish to apply for an adjustment of status to submit a visa

petition by a hard deadline—April 30, 2001. Finally, there is

no indication in the legislative history that Congress specifically intended the courts to apply tolling principles to

§ 245(i). Rather, the legislative history appears to recommend

that the agencies responsible for enforcing the statute should

accept petitions filed after the deadline in the exercise of their

executive discretion. See 146 CONG. REC. S11851 (Dec. 15,

2000) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). A brief reference in the

BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14951
legislative history recommending agency discretion does not

give this court authority to construe a strict cutoff deadline as

a statute of limitations. Thus, Albillo-De Leon does not apply

here, and we are bound by our decision in Munoz. 

B. Due Process Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel

[4] Balam-Chuc also argues that his counsel’s ineffective

assistance in preparing and filing his visa petition constitutes

a deprivation of due process. “Ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process

under the Fifth Amendment if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably

presenting his case.” Lopez v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1985). 

[5] However, we have established that due process rights to

assistance of counsel do not extend beyond the fairness of the

hearing itself. Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 973-76

(9th Cir. 2004). For example, in Lara-Torres, the petitioners

faced removal because their attorney had taken an erroneous

legal strategy and given faulty legal advice. Id. at 973. The

petitioners brought a challenge based on ineffective assistance

and a violation of due process. Id. We dismissed the petition

because 

[n]one of [Petitioner’s] purported deficiencies pertain to the actual substance of the hearing (e.g., evidence presented or omitted, arguments raised or

overlooked), let alone call the hearing’s fairness into

question. The basic “unfairness” of which the Petitioners complain is that they never would have been

subject to removal proceedings had it not been for

their reliance on [their lawyer’s] unfortunate

immigration-law advice. This “unfairness,” however,

did not taint the “fairness” of the hearing. 

14952 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY
Id. at 973. Indeed, in order to find ineffective assistance of

counsel in this context we held that the legal services must be

rendered “while proceedings were ongoing.” Id. at 974. 

[6] Here, Balam-Chuc’s attorney failed to properly file a

visa petition within the statutorily required deadline. This

deficiency does not relate to the substance of an ongoing hearing; in fact, no proceedings had begun at the time the alleged

attorney misconduct took place. Thus, as in Lara-Torres, we

reject Balam-Chuc’s attempt “to cast such an expansive and

amorphous Fifth Amendment due process right that encompasses legal assistance removed from the actual process

itself.” Id. at 975. Although the failings of Balam-Chuc’s

attorney in this case have resulted in terrible consequences for

him and his family, the Fifth Amendment simply does not

apply to the preparation and filing of a petition that does not

relate to the fundamental fairness of an ongoing proceeding.

III. CONCLUSION

Balam-Chuc filed a petition for an immigrant visa after

April 30, 2001, the deadline imposed by Congress to receive

an adjustment of status under the LIFE Act amendments. The

BIA properly concluded that the deadline imposed by Congress operates as a statute of repose, for which equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance of counsel is not available.

In addition, the failure of Balam-Chuc’s counsel to comply

with the statutory filing requirements did not implicate the

Fifth Amendment because they did not affect the fundamental

fairness of any ongoing hearing. Balam-Chuc has no remedy

in this court. 

We recognize that this is a tragic result for Balam-Chuc and

his family. We echo our observations from Munoz, where a

statute of repose forced the petitioner to return to his country

of origin to obtain a visa. 

We deny [the] petition because that is the proper

conclusion under the statute and relevant precedent.

BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY 14953
But the result . . . appears pointless and unjust. . . .

We are unable to grant [the] petition, but we hope

that appropriate officials within the executive

branch, or possibly Congress, will take a careful look

at this case and, if the facts are truly as they appear

to us, consider whether removal of [the petitioner] is

really the just and proper result here. 

339 F.3d at 958-59. 

Similarly, as a result of the statute and relevant precedent

in this case, Balam-Chuc will be forced to leave his wife and

two young children to return to Mexico, where he must start

the process of applying for a visa through the Mexican consulate, all because his attorney failed to take appropriate

action in filing his application with the INA. It seems especially counterintuitive that DHS would insist on bringing

charges against Balam-Chuc when Congress’s specific directive in passing the statute was to encourage agencies to allow

these very families to stay together. We hope that DHS will

look past any technical flaws in Balam-Chuc’s application

and follow Congress’s guidance to exercise its discretion in

an equitable manner. However, it is not within our prerogative

to ignore our prior precedent, unilaterally amend a statute

duly passed by the legislative branch, or interfere with the

legitimate exercise of executive discretionary power, even to

provide Balam-Chuc with an avenue for remaining with his

family. 

Despite the apparent equities weighing to the contrary, the

petition for review must be DENIED.

14954 BALAM-CHUC v. MUKASEY