* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30257

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

WEBSTER DETILLIER

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:04-CR-360-1

Before WIENER, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Webster Detillier appeals the 18-month sentence

imposed following revocation of his second term of supervised release. He

contends that imposition of the statutory maximum sentence on revocation of

supervised release was procedurally unreasonable because it was based on the

erroneous policy of imposing the statutory maximum term of imprisonment and

deviating from the statutory maximum in only “very rare cases.” As Detillier did

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

October 23, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
No. 08-30257

1 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

2

not raise this argument in the district court, our review is for plain error. See

United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 792 (5th Cir. 2007). To show plain error,

Detillier must demonstrate that (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear

or obvious; and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. See United States

v. Izaguirre-Losoya, 219 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2000). For an error to affect

substantial rights, it must have been prejudicial, that is, it must have affected

the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734

(1993). In addition, we will not correct the forfeited error unless it seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Izaguirre-Losoya, 219 F.3d at 441.

Following a revocation of supervised release,the district court may impose

any sentence that falls within the maximum term of imprisonment allowed by

statute for the revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In doing so, the

district court is to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the

advisory policy statements found in Chapter Seven of the Guidelines. United

States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 90 (5th Cir. 1994). Although Detillier asserts that

the district court procedurally erred in sentencing him based on a policy of

imposing the statutory maximum as a matter of course in revocation

proceedings, the record does not clearly show that the district court based

Detillier’s revocation sentence on such a policy. “[E]ven before Booker,

1

the

policy statements in § 7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines were recognized as

advisory only.” Jones, 484 F.3d at 792 (citation omitted). The record reflects

that the district court considered but rejected the guidelines range set forth in

those policy statements for reasons it detailed during the revocation hearing.

See id.

Contrary to Detillier’s assertions,the record reflects thatthe district court

considered his argument that he had complied with all of the conditions of
No. 08-30257

3

supervised release exceptfor the completion ofthe Odyssey House program. The

district court determined that an 18-month sentence was appropriate because

Detillier had “been given two opportunities to rehabilitate himself through

treatment and supervision, and ha[d] not effectively availed himself of those

opportunities.” Detillier’s sentence was authorized, and the district court

implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors. We will not reweigh those factors.

See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Detillier’s sentence was not

unreasonable, plainly or otherwise, and he has not shown plain error. See Jones,

484 F.3d at 792.

AFFIRMED.