*

District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by

designation.

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

____________________

No. 99-40824

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PATRICIO CONTRERAS VASQUEZ, etc.

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

_______________________________________________________________________

June 22, 2000

Before JONES and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges, COBB, District Judge*

COBB, District Judge

In this case, we address an issue explicitly left open by this

court in United States v. Echegollen-Barrueta, 195 F.3d 786, 790 (5th

Cir. 1999)(“[W]e decline to reach the closer question of whether [the

defendant] is entitled to reversal on a Rule 32(c)(3)(B) error to which

he failed to object.”). That is, whether a district court’s failure to

comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(B), which requires the court

during sentencing to afford the defendant’s counsel an opportunity to

speak on his behalf, is amenable to plain error analysis under Fed. R.
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Crim. P. 52(b). We find that it is and affirm the district court’s

sentence.

BACKGROUND

Appellant, Patricio Contreras Vasquez, pled guilty to illegal reentry into the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a)&(b). Under the terms of the plea agreement, the government

agreed to recommend Vasquez be sentenced to the lower end of the

guidelines range. 

The presentence investigation report [PSR] calculated Vasquez’s

imprisonment range to be from 77 to 96 months. At sentencing, the

district court first noted that there were no objections to the PSR, and

then invited Vasquez to address the court before the sentence was

imposed. Vasquez admitted he had violated the statute by illegally reentering the United States. Vasquez, however, claimed that he was

unaware that he would be subject to an enhanced sentence because of his

previous convictions. The court then explained the effect of prior

convictions to Vasquez under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. After

explaining the effect of the prior convictions, the district court

ordered Vasquez to serve 90 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised

release. At no point during the sentencing hearing did the district

court expressly invite Vasquez’s counsel to speak on his behalf.

Vasquez’s counsel did not object to this oversight. Moreover, Vasquez’s

counsel never asked the court’s permission to speak on behalf of her

client, or brought it to the trial court’s attention. This appeal
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The plea agreement included a waiver-of-appeal provision but the government

has specifically waived any reliance on it because the district court failed to

admonish Vasquez concerning this waiver and the court advised Vasquez that he could

appeal his sentence. Hence, this court need not decide whether Vasquez’s appeal

falls within the scope of the appeal waiver. See United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d

459, 460 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998).

2

The right of allocution refers to the defendant’s right to address the court

and not his counsel’s. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1990) (“formality of

court’s inquiry of defendant as to whether he has any legal cause to show why

judgment should not be pronounced against him on verdict of conviction”). 

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followed.1

DISCUSSION

Vasquez argues that his sentence must be vacated and remanded

because the district court failed to afford his counsel an opportunity

to speak on his behalf before sentencing in accordance with Rule

32(c)(3)(B). We review de novo whether a district court complied with

Rule 32. See United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459, 461 (5th Cir. 1998).

This court has before ruled that a district court’s failure to

communicate unequivocally to a defendant that he has the right to

address the court before sentencing is imposed mandates a re-sentencing

and is not subject to plain-error review. See Echegollen-Barrueta, 195

F.3d at 789-90; Myers, 150 F.3d at 463. The practice of allowing a

defendant a chance to speak before sentencing is referred to as the

right of allocution.2 The right of allocution dates back to 1689. See

Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B. 1689) (finding the

failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before sentence

was imposed required reversal). 

In Myers, we explained that the right of allocution is one “deeply

embedded in our jurisprudence” which weighs against applying a harmless

error analysis. Myers, 150 F.3d at 463. The “bright line” rule
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established in Myers, requiring remand whenever a defendant is denied

the right to personally allocute in accordance with Rule 32(c)(3)(C),

vindicates the important policy concerns embodied in the rule and

“forecloses . . . chancy inquiries” into whether a defendant’s

allocution might have resulted in a different sentencing decision. Id.

at 464-65.

Vasquez maintains that the right to have counsel speak on behalf

of the defendant is equally as important as the right to personally

allocute before sentencing. Vasquez relies on the reasoning in Myers

and concludes that the district court’s failure to have his counsel

address the court is not subject to plain-error review because of the

importance of having counsel speak on behalf of their clients, and the

uncertainty of the effect counsel’s statements might have on the

sentence imposed by the district court.

Unfortunately for Vasquez, the language of 32(c)(3)(B) does not

dictate the result this court reached in Myers with regard to the right

of allocution. A review of the Rule reveals the significant differences

between the right of a defendant to allocute and the right of the

defendant to have counsel speak on his behalf. Rule 32(c) states in

pertinent part:

(3) Imposition of Sentence. Before imposing sentence,

the court must:

(B) afford defendant’s counsel an opportunity to

speak on behalf of the defendant;

(C) address the defendant personally and determine

whether the defendant wishes to make a statement

and to present any information in mitigation of

the sentence;

Rule 32(c)(3)(C) directs the court to “address the defendant personally”

and determine whether the defendant wishes to speak and present
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information to mitigate the sentence. The rule “envisions a personal

colloquy between the sentencing judge and the defendant.” Myers, 150

F.3d at 461 (citing United States v. Anderson, 987 F.3d 251, 261 (5th

Cir. 1993). The burden of complying with the right of allocution,

32(c)(3)(C), rests with the court and not the defendant. Id. at 464;

United States v. Dominguez-Hernandez, 934 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 1991).

In direct contrast to this, Rule 32(c)(3)(B) directs the court to

“afford defendant’s counsel an opportunity to speak” prior to

sentencing. (emphasis added). Thus, the language of the Rule

demonstrates that the court does not have the same burdens in affording

defense counsel an opportunity to speak as it does personally with the

defendant. Consequently, it follows defense counsel should bear the

burden of objecting if no opportunity is afforded.

Vasquez’s counsel never objected to nor called the apparent

oversight to the district court’s attention. The court is confident

that competent members of the bar will speak up during a sentencing

hearing on behalf of their clients when counsel has a matter they would

like to bring to the court’s attention. The right of allocution

embodied in 32(c)(3)(C) reflects the principle that “the court, the

prosecutor, and the defendant must at the very least interact in a

manner that shows clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew he

had a right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the

imposition of sentencing.” Myers, 150 F.3d at 462 (quoting United

States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 1994)). Thus, the

burden rests with the court to make sure the defendant understands that

he has the right to say anything he wants before the sentence is
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imposed. There is no need for this rationale to be applied to counsel’s

right to speak, since attorneys already know they have the right to

speak on behalf of their clients. All a district court must do under

Rule 32 is “afford” defense counsel the “opportunity” to address the

court. 

Since defense counsel did not object to the court’s failure to give

her an opportunity to address the court, Rule 52(b) plain-error analysis

applies. Under this standard, reversal is not required unless there is

(1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affects the

defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35 (1993); see also Johnson

v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997). In this case, Vasquez has

shown no prejudice from his attorney not being “afforded” the

“opportunity” to address the court. The sentence imposed on Vasquez was

within the court’s discretion, and Vasquez has not alleged what

additional argument his counsel would have provided which may have

persuaded the court to impose a lower sentence. Accordingly, there is

no basis to conclude that Vasquez’s substantial rights were affected.

We note that it is in a district court’s best interests to inquire

of all defense counsel whether they have anything to add during

sentencing hearings, because defense counsel could be able to articulate

points more clearly than individual defendants. See Powell v. Alabama,

287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). It does not necessarily follow, however,

that the failure of a district court automatically to “afford” counsel

the “opportunity” to speak requires remanding for re-sentencing.
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Usually, a court’s oversight in this regard can easily be corrected at

the sentencing hearing by requiring counsel to simply notify the court

they have something to add. See United States v. Dominguez-Hernandez,

934 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 1991) (remanding for resentencing “[w]ith

misgivings” where defense counsel failed to object to denial of

defendant’s right to personally allocute). While a clear and

affirmative denial of defense counsel’s right to speak could well

require us to vacate and remand for re-sentencing, the defense counsel’s

failure to object here is viewed under the plain error analysis. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.