NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MINGMEI DING, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 20-72822 

Agency No. A216-269-716 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 14, 2023**

Before: SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Mingmei Ding, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an 

immigration judge’s decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAR 17 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 20-72822 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the 

agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility 

determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-

40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review. 

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination 

based on Ding’s omission from her credible fear interview that she lost

consciousness while being interrogated, and inconsistencies between her credible 

fear interview and testimony regarding the frequency and duration of the 

interrogation and when she began practicing Christianity. See id. at 1048 (adverse 

credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”); see 

also Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n adverse 

credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not details, but 

new allegations that tell a much different—and more compelling—story of 

persecution than [the] initial application[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicia of 

reliability for asylum officer’s notes). Ding’s explanations do not compel a 

contrary conclusion. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2021)

(agency not compelled to accept explanations for discrepancies). Substantial 

evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Ding did not present 

corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish her eligibility for relief. See 
3 20-72822 

Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner’s documentary 

evidence was insufficient to independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of

credible testimony, Ding’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See 

Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Ding’s CAT claim

because it was based on the same testimony found not credible, and the record does 

not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be 

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to 

China. See id. at 1157.

In light of this disposition, we do not reach Ding’s remaining contentions 

regarding her eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 

(9th Cir. 2004) (courts are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results 

they reach).

We do not consider the materials Ding references in her opening brief that 

are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64 

(9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to the administrative record).

The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.