J o h n T . B o y d , C h i e f J u s ti c e (R e t.), S e v e n th C o u rt o f A p p e a l s , s i tti n g b ya s s i g n m e n t. T EX . G OV ’ T1 C OD E A NN . § 7 5 .0 0 2 (a )( 1 ) (V e rn o n 2 0 0 5 ).

T hough one w oul d t hi nk t hatA r i z ona l aw w oul d appl yt o t he t r ansact i on a nd t he i nt er pr et at i on o ft he 2 deed gi v en i t s pl ace o for i gi n an d t he p r oper t y ’ s l ocat i on, t he par t i es st i pul at ed t o t he use ofT exas l aw i nst ead. G i v e n th i s u n i q u e s c e n a rio , w e re s tri c t t h e o u tc o m e o f th e c a s e to th e s p e c i fic c i rc u m s ta n c e s b e fo re u s . NO. 07-07 -011 3-CV IN THE CO URT OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL E NO VEM BER12, 2008

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___ In t he M atter

of the M ar ri ag e of PATRI CI A L. SMIT H and ST ANLEY K. SMIT H

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______ FRO M T HE COU NT Y COUR TAT LAW NO. 2 O F RA NDA L L COU NT Y; NO. 56, 306 -L2; HON. RONALD W ALK ER, JR., PRESIDING

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____ Memorandum Opinion

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____ Before QUINN, C.J., CAMPBEL L, J., an d BOYD, S.J. 1 The di sput e before us co ncer ns the d iv is ion of the n et proceed s a ri si ng from t he sal e of a ranch in Ar iz ona w hic h ranch was acq uired dur ing the marr iag e of St a n ley and Pat ricia Smith. According to Stan ley, the trial court erred in div iding them a s it did beca use i t effecti v el y

d i v es te d hi m o f hi s s ep arat e prop er ty
. W e affi r m. 2 Back ground Stanl ey a n d P a tr ici a were mar ri ed on Ma y 10, 1997. Pr ior

to marr iag e, t hey execut ed a pre- nupti al ag re ement. H owev er , bot h s ig nator iesanti cipa te d the pos si bil ity2

that “t hey

may , as a matter

of conveni ence, des ig nate some o f their proper ty as mar it al or joi nt proper

ty .” C onseq uently, a p ro v is ion was inc lud ed i n the doc ument s peci fyi ng that “[ o]nl y proper ty w hic h i s t it led to the p arti es in both of t hei r names shal l be cons ide re d as mari tal proper

ty
. . . [and ] s uch mari tal property sh all not be s ubj ectto the t er ms and cond itions of

this agreeme nt.” Discus sion Stan ley argues tha t the trial court erred in divi ding the pro perty in q uest ion be cause itdi d notabi de by

the pre- nupti al ag re ement. W e di sag re e. As prev iou sl y

menti oned, Stanl ey

and Patr ic ia spec ified , i n t h e ir ag re ement, that “o nly proper ty w hic h i s t it led to the p arti es in both of thei r names shal l be c onsi dered as ma rital prope rty” and such “property shall not be subjectto the terms an d con dition of” their agreem ent . In oth er words, th eir agreem ent did not enco mp ass prop erty titled in bo th th eir names. An d, be caus e the tit le to the ranch was pla ced in both thei r names as “j oin t tenants w it h the r ig ht of s ur v ivorshi p,” ac q uis it ion and ow nershi p of the ranch fell outs ide the scope of

the pre ma rital accord, as d id distributio n of the sale procee ds. Next, w hen one sp ouse usesse p a rate proper ty to acq uire real ty

and ti tl e to that re a l ty i s p l a c e d i n t h e n a me o f b o t h sp o u s e s , i ti s pre s u me d th a tth e fo r me r i n t e n d e d t o g i ft an i nteresti n the proper ty to the l atter
. Cocker

hamv. C ock

er ham , 527 S.W .2d 1 62, 1 68 (Te x . 197 5); In re Marri

age of Morris , 12 S.W .3d 877, 881 ( Tex . Ap p.–Texar kana 2000, no pet.) ; In r e T hur m ond , 888 S.W .2d 269, 273 (Tex
. App.–A mari ll o1994, pet. deni ed)
. And, w hil e thi s pres umpti on may be s ubj ectto re butta l, Cocker ham , 527 S.W .2d a t 168 ; Bahr v. Kohr , 980 S.W .2d 723 , 727 (Tex. App. –Sa n Ant onio 1 998 , no pet .), t hatis nott rue in allS ta n le y a n d P a tr ic ia s ig n e d t h e d e e d b y w h ic h t h e y a c q u ir e d t h e p r o p e r ty. T h e d e e d c o n ta in s th is 3 l angua ge: “ T he gr ant ees bysi gni ng t he accept ance bel ow evi dence t hei ri nt ent i on t o acq ui r e sai d pr em i ses a s jo i n t t e n a n ts w i th th e ri g h t o f s u rv i v o rs h i p , a n d n o t a s c o m m u n i typ ro p e rty o r a s te n a n ts i n c o m m o n .” 3 cas es. F or

i nst ance, w hen t he w ri ti ng ( or deed in thi s c ase)was int ended t o be a compl eted memori al of a leg al transacti on, parol ev ide nce canno t be admitted t o al ter that int ent. Bahr

v. Kohr , 980 S.W .2d a t 727 ; Ma ss ey v. Ma ss ey, 8 0 7 S
. W
. 2 d 3 9 1 , 4 0 5 (T e x. App–H oust on [1 D is t.] 1991, w ri t den ied ). N or may a s pouse us e parol ev iden ce to st cont ra dict ex pressreci tal s i n a d eed w it hout firs t tender ing ev ide nce of f ra ud, a cc ide nt, or mis tak e. Hen ry

S. Mi ller C o. v . Ev ans , 4 5 2 S .W .2d 4 26, 4 31 ( Tex . 197 0) ; John son v. Dr iv er , 198 S.W .3d 3 59, 3 63- 64 ( Tex . Ap p.–Ty ler 2006, no p et.) ; Ma ss ey v. Ma ss ey, 807 S.W .2d a t 405
. There are no is sueso f f ra ud, mi sta ke, or ac ci dent before u s. R ather , we have a w ri ti ng thatdi d much more than simpl y desig nate Stanl ey

and Patr ic ia as g ra ntees
. The 3 language act ually utiliz ed (tha t is, joint ten ancy w ith rig ht of surv ivorship) is a term of art creatin g a s p e cific leg al re lat ion shi p between t hem. Theytook ca re to av oid l eadi ng anyone t o bel ieve tha t it was someth ing el se g iven th e addi ti onal referenc es spec ify ing that they di d notwant t o hol d the lan d as tenants i n c ommon or as benefic iar iesof a c ommunity prop erty esta te. Moreover, the rights of each party arising from thatl egal relationsh ip became absol ute and f ixed upon execut ion of the d eed. Calver t v . Wall ra th , 457 S.W .2d 376 , 376 -79 (Te x . 197 0) citi ng In reT

il ley ’ s E sta te , 166 App. D iv . 240 , 151 N .Y .S. 79, 8 0- 81 (19 15) a f

f ’d , 215 N .Y . 620 , 1 0 9 N.E. 1094 ( 1915)
. In ot her words, the par

ti es inc or porated an unambi g uous ter m of arti nto t he deed, w hic h term w ro ug ht a spec ificend. Al low in g S ta nle y

to int ro duce the e v ide nce he wanted to i ntroduce woul d have been4

tan tam oun t to granting him the opp ortun ity to cont radict the legal relatio nship specif ically sta ted i n and created by the deed. So, i n keepi ng w it h the r ule of law des cr ibe d i n Henry S. M il ler , Bahr , and Ma ss ey, t he tr ial co urt had no c hoi ce but t o excl ude t he te sti mony proffered by

Sta nle y as a v iol ati on of the parol ev ide nce ru le. Acc ordin g ly , we aff ir m the jud g ment of the tr ial co urt.

Per C ur iam