United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

T.S., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST 

SERVICE, Albuquerque, NM, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 14-807 

Issued: June 10, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Steven E. Brown, Esq., for the appellant 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO, Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On February 26, 2014 appellant, through counsel, filed a timely appeal from a January 9, 

2014 merit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to 

the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the 

Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

On appeal, counsel contends that appellant submitted sufficient evidence to establish an 

emotional condition arising from a compensable factor of employment. He further contends that 

even if some alleged events were not related to her employment, there is no apportionment under 

FECA. Thus, if any of the events discussed occurred and were within the performance of duty, 

the entire condition would be covered under FECA. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq. 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On February 12, 2013 appellant, then a 48-year-old administrative support clerk, filed an 

occupational disease claim (Form CA-2) alleging an emotional condition due to ongoing stress at 

the workplace. She stated that she experienced shortness of breath, panic attacks, anxiety, and 

stress at work related to her new supervisor and financial hardship. 

In a February 15, 2013 letter, OWCP notified appellant of the deficiencies of her claim 

and afforded her 30 days to submit additional evidence and respond to its inquiries. 

In response, appellant submitted a position description and a March 14, 2013 narrative 

statement explaining that in May 2012 she was asked to do extra duties of the supervisor’s 

position before the new supervisor, Tabatha Dubanski, arrived. She was allegedly told that a 

temporary detail or possible promotion was available for her if she performed the extra duties. 

Appellant performed the duties of her job and the duties of the supervisory position for a few 

months until the new supervisor came in July 2012. She was informed, however, that she would 

not get a promotional detail or any opportunity to apply for the job. Appellant alleged that 

Ms. Dubanski did not know her supervisory duties and appellant kept doing them for her. She 

stated that Ms. Dubanski prohibited her from obtaining authorizations for National Finance 

Center (NFC) and Financial Management Modernization Initiative (FMMI) which caused 

appellant stress. Appellant had difficulty communicating with Ms. Dubanski and went to 

Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counseling. The union and EAP advised appellant to take 

five weeks off in September 2012 which she did. 

When appellant returned to work she alleged that Ms. Dubanski was still not coming into 

work regularly. She alleged that there was no supervision and work was piling up, which caused 

stress to her and her coworkers. Appellant did her best to accommodate her coworkers’ requests 

while at the same time doing her own job. She indicated that the financial system was going 

through a transition during that time and the deposits were being delayed. Appellant alleged that 

Ms. Dubanski directed her to do a spreadsheet despite the fact that she was under a deadline for 

another assignment. Ms. Dubanski insisted that the spreadsheet be completed so appellant 

stayed at her desk for over six hours working on the spreadsheet causing a complete panic attack 

and she ended up in the emergency room. 

Not being able to communicate with Ms. Dubanski, trying to do her own job, and being 

micromanaged by a supervisor who was unavailable was very stressful and caused ongoing 

severe anxiety to appellant at the workplace. Appellant stated that because her supervisor was 

gone most of the time, she had to communicate with her by text messages. When appellant tried 

to speak with Ms. Dubanski she acted rude and unavailable. 

Ms. Dubanski kept a dry erase board outside appellant’s cubicle to keep track of her 

whereabouts. Appellant stated that Ms. Dubanski did not want appellant to do her duties but to 

direct employees to her, but Ms. Dubanski was never available so appellant ultimately had to 

cover for her. 

Appellant further noted that she was experiencing financial hardship as she was unable to 

afford to pay for a mortgage on her home in Trinity County and rent in Detroit, as well as her 
3

monthly bills and groceries on her salary. She was also unable to pay for the gas to go to the 

doctors’ appointments she needed for her medical condition. Appellant noted that she was on 

leave without pay for over 12 weeks and it caused her extreme stress and anxiety resulting in 

frequent panic attacks because she was not working. Additionally, in June 2012, she received a 

threatening note on her vehicle and was afraid for her safety. Appellant reported it to the district 

ranger and her coworkers but no action was taken. The note was written by another coworker 

and the coworker thought it was a funny joke. Appellant was terrified that someone was going to 

hurt her. She was ridiculed at work and this caused her more stress at that time. 

In a November 9, 2012 e-mail message to Ms. Dubanski, Grady McMahan, a district 

ranger, noted that he had just met with appellant and she was happy to serve as the unit 

collection officer. Mr. McMahan forwarded a message he had written to appellant outlining the 

duties of the job, which included the collection and deposit of funds and handling Christmas tree 

permits and mineral permits. 

Appellant submitted hospitals records from her visit to the emergency room on 

December 6 and 12, 2012 for adjustment disorder with anxiety and substance abuse. 

The record contains e-mail correspondence to appellant from Ms. Dubanski for the period 

July 31 through December 6, 2012, including a message dated November 29, 2012 regarding a 

spreadsheet that appellant was required to update by close of business on November 30, 2012. In 

a December 3, 2012 e-mail message, Ms. Dubanski stated that she went over the spreadsheet 

with appellant to make sure she understood how to complete the project and directed her to make 

it a priority and complete it by close of business on December 4, 2012, noting that it should not 

take more than six hours to complete. On December 6, 2012 she e-mailed appellant stating that 

she still had not received a copy of the spreadsheet and requested the time frame in which it 

would be complete. 

Appellant received a “Fully Successful” rating from Ms. Dubanski on her performance 

review for the period October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2013. In the November 7, 2012 

performance review follow-up memorandum, Ms. Dubanski reported that she had discussed with 

appellant expectations for conduct in the workplace. Appellant was to be courteous to all 

employees and coworkers within the office and not make verbal comments directed at any 

employee which were accusatory or negative. Regarding appellant’s daily duties and 

responsibilities, Ms. Dubanski summarized that she had expressed her agreement that the dry 

erase board in appellant’s cubicle was a good organizational tool which would be updated 

weekly with current job duties that were to be completed and in prioritized order. 

Dr. Amy Sutkus, a Board-certified family practitioner, in reports dated December 7, 2012 

and March 15, 2013, diagnosed anxiety disorder and opined that it had been exacerbated by 

appellant’s work situation. On January 21, 2013 she noted that appellant was being treated for 

anxiety with medication and counseling, as well as a leave of absence from work as her 

condition was severe enough to affect her ability to function. On April 15, 2013 Dr. Sutkus 

stated that appellant’s current work situation exacerbated her anxiety to the point where she may 

have been at risk of harming herself and advised that she only return to work if she was 

transferred to a different worksite and working with different people. She indicated that 
4

appellant would need six to eight weeks for her new medications to take effect before attempting 

to return to any location for work. 

Mr. McMahan in his February 25, 2013 statement acknowledged that there was an added 

workload during the two-week transition period between appellant’s supervisors in July 2012, 

and that there was also some added workload during the time Ms. Dubanski was learning the 

duties of her position. However, he noted that appellant’s disappointment over not being 

selected for the supervisory position, along with having to work with Ms. Dubanski, was very 

stressful. He noted that appellant’s position, assistant to the support services supervisor, 

coordinating operations for a 48 person office was not a high stress position. 

On April 2, 2013 Dr. S. Michael Sasser, a forensic psychiatrist, diagnosed adjustment 

disorder with anxiety and general anxiety disorder. He related that appellant presented with “a 

tendency to be somewhat of a worry wart and [took] on burdens that perhaps [were] beyond her 

responsibility or authority.” Dr. Sasser stated that she was “vulnerable to some anxiety and 

apprehension that worsened with the stress in the workplace and burdens that have been imposed 

upon her and some of the statements about her potential movement up the ladder that gave her 

false hope and then bottomed out.” 

In an April 9, 2013 e-mail message to Mr. McMahan, one of appellant’s coworkers stated 

that appellant called to ask the coworker advice on some administrative procedures and “was 

very upset and crying saying that she was under so much stress at work and home that she didn’t 

know how much more she could take and also stated that sometimes she didn’t even want to 

live.” 

George Regas, a health, safety, and wellness leader, indicated in an April 10, 2013 

statement that appellant shared her difficulty in dealing with the remoteness of her workplace 

and the subsequent stress that caused her to become so emotionally distraught that she gave 

thoughts of committing suicide. He believed she was a person who needed close mental health 

support. 

In a letter dated April 15, 2013, Elizabeth Trevino de Tosca, a human resources 

specialist, advised that appellant was to report to work on April 1, 2013 but she failed to inform 

her supervisor of a medical appointment on April 2, 2013 with Dr. Sasser, which was located 

approximately five hours away in Medford, Oregon. 

Ms. Dubanski provided an April 15, 2013 statement in which she stated that appellant 

relayed to her on many occasions that she felt overwhelmed with various projects she needed to 

complete and that she did not know where to start. Appellant shared that “some days she would 

just stare at the computer and felt like she was having an anxiety attack.” Ms. Dubanski 

indicated that she always used a dry erase board with all her positions to keep track of “to do” 

items and deadlines and appellant had indicated to her that it would be a good idea for her. It 

was not until the end of October when appellant started making negative verbal comments under 

her breath at her desk that she learned that the technique was causing appellant stress. She stated 

that the duties appellant performed were normal expectations of an administrative clerk. 

Ms. Dubanski stated that appellant had not been performing the duties of the support services 

supervisor when Ms. Dubanski began working and did not understand what was so stressful 
5

about her own duties as assistant. Regarding appellant not being allowed to obtain NFC and 

FMMI authorizations, she explained to appellant that it was the responsibility of the support 

services supervisor to have the NFC access. Ms. Dubanski had approved appellant’s “Super 

User” authorization for Paycheck 8, which is what she needed to work on employees’ timesheets. 

She had also sent appellant the link for her to get remote access to start the process for virtual 

private network (VPN) several times, but she never followed through with the process. On 

November 29, 2012 Ms. Dubanski sent appellant an e-mail and discussed with appellant inperson how to complete the spreadsheet. The spreadsheet had been created and any required 

formulas had already been entered. The spreadsheet was a priority and, aside from appellant’s 

unit collections officer duties, appellant was expected to complete this task. Appellant did not 

call to ask any questions nor did she complete the task timely. Ms. Dubanski also related that 

appellant’s regular duties were not being completed in a timely manner and that she received emails from staff stating that appellant was not replying to their e-mails or telephone calls and not 

providing the needed documents they required. 

In an April 22, 2013 report, Barbara Alexander, a licensed professional counselor, 

provided a provisional diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder and explained that appellant 

would be receiving both therapy and psychiatric treatment. She stated that she could not predict 

when appellant would be able to return to work at that time. 

By decision dated June 25, 2013, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that the 

evidence had failed to establish any compensable factors of employment and thus denied her 

emotional condition claim. It accepted that the following events occurred, but were not found to 

be compensable factors of her federal employment: (1) in the interim between the transfer out of 

her old supervisor and the arrival of her new supervisor, appellant temporarily assumed some 

extra duties; (2) she believed she had been promised a promotion if she temporarily performed 

some supervisory job functions; (3) when Ms. Dubanski began work, she asked appellant to stop 

performing any jobs that she had been performing in the absence of any supervisor and appellant 

felt manipulated by not being allowed to finish those activities which she had begun; 

(4) appellant believed that Ms. Dubanski assigned her additional work that was not within the 

scope of her job responsibilities, including completing a spreadsheet in the midst of performing 

her tasks as a unit collection officer; (5) her supervisor was away from the office much of the 

time; (6) appellant’s counselors were far away from her residence and it was difficult to get there 

because gas was so expensive; (7) she became stressed when she became backed up in making 

bank deposits in December 2012 when the system for making deposits changed; and 

(8) appellant began experiencing financial hardship due in part to paying a mortgage on a house 

in California and rent for a residence near her workplace. OWCP further found that the 

following alleged incident had not been established: a threatening note was left on her vehicle in 

June 2012.2

 

On November 1, 2013 appellant, through counsel, requested reconsideration and 

submitted an October 24, 2013 narrative statement reiterating her allegations and an October 11, 

2013 report from Dr. Sutkus who indicated that her anxiety was “definitely worsened by her 

 2

 On July 1, 2013 appellant, through counsel, requested an oral hearing before an OWCP hearing representative. 

On October 22, 2013 appellant, through counsel, withdrew her request for an oral hearing. By decision dated 

November 1, 2013, the hearing representative accepted appellant’s request for withdrawal of the hearing. 
6

work duties,” which included collecting monies from lockboxes and campgrounds and 

depositing this money, purchasing office supplies, coordinating living quarters for staff and 

making sure rent was paid in her role as an administrative support clerk. 

In a December 10, 2013 statement, Mr. McMahan indicated that there was only a twoweek vacancy period between supervisors and when Ms. Dubanski arrived “she moved as 

quickly as possible to take appropriate duties back from [appellant] and other members of the 

department that had taken on added duties during the transition.” He stated that appellant was 

stressed that Ms. Dubanski would not allow her to obtain authorizations, but these authorizations 

were needed by the supervisor, not appellant. Mr. McMahan indicated that to require her to get 

the authorizations would be “expanding her position description beyond the position she was 

hired into.” He further indicated that in December 2012 there was a nationwide change to a new 

financial system, which posed a problem for every collection officer, not just appellant. 

In a statement dated December 13, 2013, Ms. Dubanski reiterated that her previous 

statements. 

By decision dated January 9, 2014, OWCP denied modification of the June 25, 2013 

decision. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

In providing for a compensation program for federal employees, Congress did not 

contemplate an insurance program against any and every injury, illness, or mishap that might 

befall an employee contemporaneous or coincidental with his or her employment. Liability does 

not attach merely upon the existence of an employee-employer relationship. Instead, Congress 

provided for the payment of compensation for disability or death of an employee resulting from 

personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty.3 The phrase while in the 

performance of duty has been interpreted by the Board to be the equivalent of the commonly 

found prerequisite in workers’ compensation law of arising out of and in the course of 

employment. 

In Lillian Cutler,

4

 the Board noted that workers’ compensation law is not applicable to 

each and every injury or illness that is somehow related to an employee’s employment. There 

are situations when an injury or illness has some connection with the employment, but 

nonetheless does not come within the coverage of workers’ compensation as they are found not 

to have arisen out of the employment. When an employee experiences emotional stress in 

carrying out her employment duties, or has fear and anxiety regarding his or her ability to carry 

out his or her duties, and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from her 

emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury 

arising out of and in the course of employment. This is true when the employee’s disability 

resulted from her emotional reaction to her day-to-day duties. The same result is reached when 

 3 See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). 

4

 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 
7

the emotional disability resulted from the employee’s emotional reaction to a special assignment 

or requirement imposed by the employing establishment or by the nature of the work.5 

In contrast, a disabling condition resulting from an employee’s feelings of job insecurity 

per se is not sufficient to constitute a personal injury sustained in the performance of duty within 

the meaning of FECA. Thus, disability is not covered when it results from an employee’s fear of 

a reduction-in-force, unhappiness with doing inside work, desire for a different job, brooding 

over the failure to be given work she desires, or the employee’s frustration in not being permitted 

to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position.6 Board case precedent 

demonstrates that the only requirements of employment which will bring a claim within the 

scope of coverage under FECA are those that relate to the duties the employee is hired to 

perform.7

 

To the extent that disputes and incidents alleged as constituting harassment by coworkers 

are established as occurring and arising from a claimant’s performance of his or her regular 

duties, these could constitute employment factors.8

 However, for harassment to give rise to a 

compensable disability under FECA there must be evidence that harassment did, in fact, occur. 

Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable under FECA.9 

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.10 However, the Board 

has held that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing 

establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.11 

In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will 

examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted 

reasonably.12 

A claimant has the burden of proof to establish by the weight of the reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence that the condition for which he or she claims compensation was caused 

or adversely affected by employment factors.13 This burden includes the submission of a 

 5 Id. at 130. 

6 See supra note 4. 

7 See Anthony A. Zarcone, 44 ECAB 751 (1993). 

8 See David W. Shirey, 42 ECAB 783, 795-96 (1991); Kathleen D. Walker, 42 ECAB 603, 608 (1991). 

9 See Jack Hopkins, Jr., 42 ECAB 818, 827 (1991). 

10 See Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990), reaff d on recon., 42 

ECAB 556 (1991). 

11 See William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998). 

12 See Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994). 

13 See Pamela R. Rice, 38 ECAB 838, 841 (1987). 
8

detailed description of the employment factors or conditions which she believes caused or 

adversely affected a condition for which compensation is claimed and a rationalized medical 

opinion relating the claimed condition to compensable employment factors.14 

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working 

conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its 

adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are 

deemed compensable work factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when 

providing an opinion on causal relationship and which working conditions are not deemed 

compensable factors of employment and may not be considered.15 If a claimant does implicate a 

factor of employment, OWCP should then consider whether the evidence of record substantiates 

that factor. As a rule, allegations alone by a claimant are insufficient to establish a factual basis 

for an emotional condition claim; the claim must be supported by probative evidence.16 Where 

the matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record 

established the truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the 

medical evidence.17 

The Board has held that a variety of work factors are compensable under FECA. Among 

them, overwork is a compensable factor of employment if appellant submits sufficient evidence 

to substantiate this allegation.18 Also, in certain circumstances, working overtime is sufficiently 

related to regular or specially assigned duties to constitute a compensable employment factor.19 

Additionally, conditions related to stress resulting from situations in which an employee is trying 

to meet his or her position requirements are compensable.20 

ANALYSIS 

Appellant alleged that she developed an emotional condition due to ongoing stress at the 

workplace related to Ms. Dubanski, her new supervisor, a new financial system, and financial 

hardship. OWCP found these to be noncompensable employment factors. Therefore, the Board 

must review whether the alleged incidents are covered employment factors under FECA.21 

OWCP accepted that the following events occurred, but were not factors of appellant’s 

federal employment: (1) in the interim between the transfer out of her old supervisor and the 

arrival of her new supervisor, appellant temporarily assumed some extra duties; (2) she believed 

 14 See Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470, 473-74 (1993). 

15 See Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001). 

16 See Charles E. McAndrews, 55 ECAB 711 (2004). 

17 See Jeral R. Gray, 57 ECAB 611 (2006). 

18 See Bobbie D. Daly, 53 ECAB 691 (2002). 

19 See Ezra D. Long, 46 ECAB 791 (1995). 

20 See Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001). 

21 See P.E., Docket No. 14-102 (issued April 1, 2014). 
9

she had been promised a promotion if she temporarily performed some supervisory job 

functions; (3) when Ms. Dubanski began work, she asked appellant to stop performing any jobs 

that she had been performing in the absence of any supervisor and appellant felt manipulated by 

not being allowed to finish those activities which she had begun; (4) appellant believed that her 

supervisor assigned her additional work that was not within the scope of her job responsibilities, 

including completing a spreadsheet in the midst of performing her tasks as a unit collection 

officer; (5) her supervisor was away from the office much of the time; (6) appellant’s counselors 

were far away from her residence and it was difficult to get there because gas was so expensive; 

(7) she became stressed when she became backed up in making bank deposits in December 2012 

when the system for making deposits changed; and (8) appellant began experiencing financial 

hardship due in part to paying a mortgage on a house in California and rent for a residence near 

her workplace. 

Appellant attributed her emotional condition to the temporary assumption of some extra 

duties for a two-week vacancy period between supervisors, with the belief that she would be 

promoted if she temporarily performed some supervisory job functions, and then not being 

allowed to finish those activities which she had begun. 

In Trudy A. Scott,

22 the claimant alleged that she suffered from an emotional break down 

when she was required to take on extra duties, such as staff scheduling, when a supervisor left 

her job. The record, consisting of a performance evaluation and the affidavit of a witness, 

established that the employee had a heavy and demanding workload, in part due to understaffing 

and hiring delays within the employing establishment. The Board found that the claimant’s 

increased workload, with the requirement that she take over scheduling duties of a departed 

employee, was a condition of her specially assigned duties and was to be considered a 

compensable factor of employment. 

In this case, however, appellant was not required to take over supervisory job functions. 

She volunteered to assume some extra duties for a two-week period between supervisors. 

Moreover, appellant received a “Fully Successful” rating from Ms. Dubanski on her performance 

review for the period October 1, 2012 through September 30, 2013. In his December 10, 2013 

statement, Mr. McMahan indicated that when Ms. Dubanski arrived “she moved as quickly as 

possible to take appropriate duties back from [appellant] and other members of the department 

that had taken on added duties during the transition.” He further indicated that, although she was 

stressed that Ms. Dubanski would not allow her to obtain certain authorizations, to require 

appellant to get these authorizations would be “expanding her position description beyond the 

position she was hired into.” Additionally, there is no evidence to establish that appellant was 

promised a promotion if she temporarily performed some supervisory job functions. The Board 

finds that her feelings of stress and manipulation from not being able to finish certain activities 

and her disappointment in not receiving a promotion must be construed to be self-generated. As 

appellant’s increased workload was not a condition of her specially assigned duties, she has 

failed to establish a compensable factor of employment.23 

 22 Supra note 20. 

23 See H.C., Docket No. 12-457 (issued October 19, 2012). 
10

Appellant further attributed her emotional condition to her belief that Ms. Dubanski 

assigned her additional work that was not within the scope of her job responsibilities, including 

completing a spreadsheet in the midst of performing her tasks as a unit collection officer, and 

becoming backed up in making bank deposits in December 2012 when the system for making 

deposits changed. Assignment of work pertains to an administrative matter. The standard under 

McEuen is whether the evidence of record establishes error or abuse by the employing 

establishment in an administrative matter.24 There is no evidence to establish that Ms. Dubanski 

assigned appellant additional work that was not within the scope of her job responsibilities. The 

Board has held that a manager or supervisor must be allowed to perform his or her duties and 

that the employees will disagree with actions taken. Mere disagreement or dislike of actions 

taken by a supervisor will not be compensable absent evidence establishing error or abuse.25 An 

employee’s reaction to an administrative or personnel matter is not covered under FECA, unless 

there is evidence that the employing establishment acted unreasonably.26 Because appellant has 

not presented sufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Dubanski acted unreasonably or that the 

employing establishment engaged in error or abuse, she has failed to identify a compensable 

work factor. 

Appellant further attributed her emotional condition to her allegation that Ms. Dubanski 

was away from the office much of the time. The Board has held that mere allegations, in the 

absence of factual corroboration, are insufficient to meet a claimant’s burden of proof.27 As 

appellant failed to provide evidence to establish a compensable factor of employment, the Board 

finds that she has not met her burden of proof. 

Finally, appellant’s counselors being far away from her residence and her financial 

hardship due to paying a mortgage on a house in California and rent for a residence near her 

workplace are not factors of her federal employment. There is no evidence to establish that she 

was unable to attend meetings with her counselors or alleviate her financial hardship. The Board 

finds that appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to support that the employing 

establishment acted erroneously or abusively regarding her counseling or financial situation. 

Thus, appellant has not established a compensable work factor. 

OWCP further found that the following alleged incident did not occur: (1) a threatening 

note was left on her vehicle in June 2012. A claimant must establish a factual basis for her 

allegations with probative and reliable evidence.28 Appellant did not submit probative evidence, 

such as a witness statement, corroborating her allegations of a threatening note. The absence of 

such documentation diminishes the validity of her contention in this case, where there is no 

 24 See Thomas D. McEuen, supra note 10. 

25 Linda Edwards-Delgado, 55 ECAB 401 (2004). 

26 See Alfred Arts, 45 ECAB 530 (1994). 

27 See Bonnie Goodman, 50 ECAB 139 (1998). 

28 Supra note 13. 
11

evidence to document that she received a threat in June 2012. Thus, appellant has failed to 

establish a compensable factor of employment.29 

Furthermore, it is unnecessary to address the medical evidence of record as appellant has 

failed to establish a compensable factor of employment.30 

On appeal, counsel contends that appellant submitted sufficient evidence to establish an 

emotional condition arising from a compensable factor of employment. Based on the findings 

and reasons stated above, the Board finds his argument is not substantiated. 

Counsel further contends that even if some events alleged were not related to appellant’s 

employment, there is no apportionment under FECA, thus, if any of the events discussed 

occurred and were within the performance of duty, the entire condition would be covered under 

FECA. In this case, however, no compensable employment factors have been established. 

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish an emotional 

condition in the performance of duty. 

 29 See supra note 23. 

30 See Garry M. Carlo, 47 ECAB 299, 305 (1996). 
12

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the January 9, 2014 decision of the Office of 

Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: June 10, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Colleen Duffy Kiko, Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board