IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-10765

Summary Calendar

ROBERT WALTER BONNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

BOB ALFORD, Johnson County Sheriff,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:10-CV-2556

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM:*

Robert Walter Bonner, Texas prisoner # 1561662, moves for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to appeal the district court’s sua sponte

dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Bonner’s motion is a

challenge to the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in good

faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). For the reasons

detailed below, Bonner’s motion for IFP is GRANTED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 24, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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In his complaint, Bonner alleged that Sheriff Alford violated his due

process rights when, without a hearing, he was placed in administrative

segregation and was required to wear a shock belt during trial. Bonner contends

that the district court’s determination that the restraints were reasonably

related to Sheriff Alford’s interest in maintaining order and security is not

supported by the record. He asserts that there was no evidence that he was a

threat to security so as to engender these restrictions.

Because the district court dismissed Bonner’s complaint as frivolous,

pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), our review is de novo. 

See Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005). The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from being subjected

to conditions of confinement that constitute punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The Bell test applies “when a pretrial detainee attacks

general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.” Hare

v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). If a pretrial

detainee bases his claim upon a jail official’s “episodic acts or omissions,” the

standard of subjective deliberate indifference enunciated in Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825 (1994), is the measure of culpability. Id.

The district court dismissed the suit on the basis of Bonner’s complaint,

which included his prison grievance and a short excerpt from his state trial

proceedings where the trial court explained to defense counsel why additional

security personnel were present in the courtroom. Although Bonner stated in

his grievance that he had been “told” that he was placed in administrative

segregation because he was a security threat to the jail, the excerpt from his

trial testimony contains no discussion relating to any need for Bonner to be held

in administrative segregation. There is no evidence in this limited record

indicating that Bonner committed any offenses or infractions or otherwise

engaged in any behavior that posed a threat to security so as to justify his

placement in administrative segregation. Though the district court, apparently

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drawing from the trial court’s comments regarding security measures at trial,

also found that Bonner’s placementin administrative segregation may have been

necessitated by a “threat of danger” to Bonner while in jail, the district court’s

reliance on those comments was misplaced. The trial court’s comments were

directed at the disruptive behavior of audience members during trial and were

not related to any threats against Bonner while in jail. On this record, there was

no indication that Bonner had been threatened with harm while in jail so as to

necessitate his placement in administrative segregation on that basis.

The district court’s finding that the utilization of the shock belt was

reasonably related to Sheriff Alford’s interest in maintaining security and order

is similarly unsupported by the current record. A fair reading of the state trial

court colloquy reveals that there was no discussion, and the trial court stated no

reasons, as to why Bonner was fitted with a shock belt, only that he wore one. 

The trial court’s comments focused on the obstreperous behavior of audience

members, not on any disobedient or disorderly conduct on the part of Bonner.

As the record currently stands, the district court erred in dismissing

Bonner’s complaint. The district court’s dismissal is VACATED, and the matter

is REMANDED for further proceedings. Whether the facts ultimately establish

a due process violation is not a question to be answered at this stage of the

proceedings. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983).

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