IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-60425

Summary Calendar

LINDA BOURGEOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MISSISSIPPI VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No: 3:11-CV-126

Before KING, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Linda Bourgeois appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment

to Mississippi Valley State University (“MVSU”) in this Title VII action. We

AFFIRM.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

MVSU hired Bourgeois as its Director of Campus Diversity in November

2007. On January 12, 2009, Bourgeois, who is white, filed a racial

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 11, 2013

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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discrimination claim against MVSU with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that she had been discriminated against on

account of her race in a number of ways, including that she was not assigned a

secretary, that she was kept under surveillance by MVSU, that she was required

to call her supervisor every time she left her office, and that she was issued a

number of written warnings in a single day. Bourgeois and MVSU agreed to

settle this claim.

On January 12, 2010, Bourgeois filed a second claim with the EEOC,

alleging racial and age discrimination and retaliation. On May 31, MVSU

informed Bourgeois that her contract for employment would not be renewed. 

This termination was part of a reduction-in-force recommended by a committee

assembled by MVSU to find avenues for cost savings in light of projected

budgetary shortfalls. After receiving word of this decision, Bourgeois filed a

third claim with the EEOC, alleging that the non-renewal of her employment

was unlawfully retaliatory. On November 23, 2010, the Civil Rights Division of

the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued right-to-sue notices with respect to

Bourgeois’s second and third complaints. 

Bourgeois timely filed suit for racial discrimination and retaliation under

Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in Mississippi

state court. MVSU then removed the case to the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi. On MVSU’s motion, the district court

granted summary judgment against Bourgeois, finding that she had failed to

plead a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation. Bourgeois

appeals, challenging the district court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim only.

DISCUSSION

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same legal standards as the district court.” Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Moreno, 667

F.3d 539, 549 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is warranted where “there is

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no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting FED R. CIV. P. 56(c)). We analyze

Title VII retaliation claims under the burden-shifting framework set out by the

Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which

requires a plaintiff first to set out a prima facie case of retaliation, before

shifting the burden to the defendant to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory

reason for its action, before finally requiring a plaintiff to show that the reason

articulated by the defendant is pretext for retaliation. See Septimus v. Univ. of

Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 607-08 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying the McDonnell Douglas

framework in a Title VII retaliation case).

To set out a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show

“(1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse

employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the

protected activity and the adverse action.” Ikossi-Anastasiou v. Bd. of

Supervisors of La. State Univ., 579 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gee v.

Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002)). The district court held that

Bourgeois had failed to show that there was the requisite causal link between

her EEOC complaints and her termination because the committee that

recommended her termination was unaware of her prior EEOC complaints. On

appeal, Bourgeois contends that this holding was in error because it was the

MVSU administration, and not the committee, that made the ultimate decision

to terminate her after the committee’s recommendation, and MVSU was aware

of her prior complaints. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Bourgeois

has satisfied the causal nexus requirement of setting out a prima facie case of

retaliation, MVSU would still be entitled to summary judgment.

Bourgeois was terminated as part of a reduction-in-force. A reduction-inforce “is itself a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge.” E.E.O.C.

v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1181 (5th Cir. 1996). The burden

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therefore falls on Bourgeois to show that MVSU’s reliance on the reduction-inforce to justify her termination was pretextual. “To establish pretext,

[Bourgeois] must show that [MVSU’s] ‘proffered explanation is false or unworthy

of credence.’” Vaughn v. Woodforest Bank, 665 F.3d 632, 637 (5th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)).

The only item in the record that Bourgeois alleges shows pretext is the fact

that an MVSU official she deposed, Frank Sowell, testified that he did not know

why MVSU did not implement certain other budgetary reduction measures

recommended by the same committee that recommended Bourgeois’s dismissal. 

As a result, Bourgeois contends that “a jury could reasonably infer that [MVSU]

is denying any knowledge of the decision to select [Bourgeois] for termination as

it had no valid reason other than retaliation.”

However, Sowell testified extensively as to the budgetary shortfall faced

by MVSU, the causes of that shortfall, and the various actions MVSU took to

remedy it, including Bourgeois’s termination. He explained how Bourgeois’s

termination saved MVSU a significant amount of money and how her position

was one of a number that was eliminated. The mere fact that he was unaware

of the reason why other recommended budgetary reductions were not

implemented does not show that the proffered explanation for Bourgeois’s

dismissal was “false or unworthy of credence.” Id. (quoting Laxton, 333 F.3d at

578). Bourgeois has therefore failed to meet her burden under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, and MVSU is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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