COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Clements 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER RICHMOND COLEMAN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 2021-07-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 OCTOBER 14, 2008 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Beverly W. Snukals, Judge 

 Catherine French, Assistant Public Defender (Karen L. Stallard, 

Supervising Appellate Defender; Office of the Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 J. Robert Bryden, II, Assistant Attorney General (Robert F. 

McDonnell, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Christopher Richmond Coleman (appellant) appeals from his bench trial convictions for 

possession of oxycodone, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm 

while in possession of heroin, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and obstruction of a 

law enforcement officer in the performance of his duty. On appeal, he argues the trial court 

erroneously denied his motion to suppress because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest or, 

alternatively, that if they had probable cause, they were required to release him on a summons. 

He also contends he was authorized to resist the arrest because it was unlawful and that, even if it 

was not unlawful, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for obstruction. 

 We hold the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because, even 

assuming the arrest and search violated state law requiring release on a summons, the officers 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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had probable cause to believe appellant committed the misdemeanor of possessing a concealed 

weapon and, thus, the arrest and search did not run afoul of the United States or Virginia 

Constitution. We also hold the evidence supported appellant’s conviction for obstructing a law 

enforcement officer in the performance of his duties. Accordingly, we affirm the challenged 

convictions, subject to remand solely for correction of a clerical error in the conviction and 

sentencing orders.1

I. ANALYSIS 

A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

On appeal of a ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party, here the Commonwealth. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 

666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004). “In so doing, we must discard the evidence of the 

accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all . . . evidence favorable 

to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Cirios v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1988). “[W]e are bound by the trial 

court’s findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them[,] 

 1

 Appellant was indicted on the ground that he did “unlawfully, without just cause, 

knowingly obstruct a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties or fail[ed] or 

refuse[d] without just cause to cease such obstruction when requested to do so.” This behavior is 

proscribed by Code § 18.2-460(A), whereas the indictment erroneously cites Code 

§ 18.2-460(B), which proscribes “knowingly attempt[ing] to intimidate or impede,” through 

“threats or force,” a law enforcement officer “lawfully engaged in his duties.” The sentencing 

order also erroneously cites subsection (B). Both offenses are Class 1 misdemeanors. 

“Error in the citation of the statute . . . that defines the offense or prescribes the 

punishments therefor, or omission of the citation, shall not be grounds . . . for reversal of a 

conviction, unless the court finds that the error or omission prejudiced the accused in preparing 

his defense.” Rule 3A:6(a); see also Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 713, 324 S.E.2d 

682, 686 (1985). Appellant has posed no objection to this error and has not alleged any 

prejudice. 

Because the conviction and sentencing orders erroneously cite subsection (B), we remand 

to the trial court solely for the correction of these clerical errors. See Tatum v. Commonwealth, 

17 Va. App. 585, 592, 440 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1994). 
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and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 

enforcement officers.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 

(1997) (en banc). However, we review de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal 

standards, such as whether the police had reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a search or 

seizure. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 

920 (1996); see also, e.g., Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275 

n.1 (1985) (explaining that protections under Virginia’s Constitution and statutes are 

“substantially the same as those contained in the Fourth Amendment”). 

 Here, the trial court implicitly found the officers had first reasonable suspicion and then 

probable cause to believe appellant possessed a weapon that was concealed in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-308, and the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom supported that finding. 

Pursuant to Code § 18.2-308, 

 If any person carries about his person, hidden from 

common observation, (i) any pistol, revolver, or other weapon [as 

defined in the statute] . . . , he shall be guilty of a Class 1 

misdemeanor. . . . For the purpose of this section, a weapon shall 

be deemed to be hidden from common observation when it is 

observable but is of such deceptive appearance as to disguise the 

weapon’s true nature. 

Code § 18.2-308(A). We have held that where the handle of a weapon protruded from an 

individual’s back pocket but was largely obscured by a duffel bag hanging from the individual’s 

shoulder, “the weapon was hidden from common observation.” Main v. Commonwealth, 20 

Va. App. 370, 372-73, 457 S.E.2d 400, 401-02 (1995) (en banc); see also Slayton v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 106-07, 582 S.E.2d 448, 450-51 (2003) (discussing the 

existence of probable cause to support the arrest of an individual where “a ‘couple of inches’ of 

the butt of [a] handgun protrud[ed] from [the defendant’s coat] pocket”). Although that statute 
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provides for the issuance of a “permit to carry a concealed handgun,” it states that only persons 

“21 years of age or older may apply” for such a permit. Code § 18.2-308(D). 

 An officer may effect an investigatory detention upon reasonable suspicion that the 

detainee is “‘subject to seizure for violation of the law.’” Murphy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 

139, 143, 384 S.E.2d 125, 127 (1989) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 

1391, 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673 (1979)). In order to justify an investigatory detention, an 

“officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

“hunch,”’” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 

576 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 909 

(1968)), but the articulable suspicion “need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and 

it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard,” United States 

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S. Ct. 744, 751, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740, 750 (2002). 

An officer who develops such reasonable suspicion concerning a person may “detain him 

briefly[] while attempting to obtain additional information” in order to confirm or dispel his 

suspicions. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 1647, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705, 711 

(1985). Even “[b]rief, complete deprivations of a suspect’s liberty, including handcuffing, ‘do 

not convert [an investigative detention] into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are 

reasonable to the circumstances.’” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 857, 434 

S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993) (quoting United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989)), 

aff’d on reh’g en banc, 18 Va. App. 454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994). 

 Probable cause, although requiring a higher quantum of evidence than reasonable 

suspicion, nevertheless 

relates to probabilities that are based upon the factual and practical 

considerations in everyday life as perceived by reasonable and 

prudent persons. The presence or absence of probable cause is not 

to be examined from the perspective of a legal technician. Rather, 
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probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the 

officer’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy 

information, alone are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable 

caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. 

Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1981). “‘The substance of all 

the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for the belief of guilt. And this means 

less than evidence which would justify condemnation or conviction.’” Slayton, 41 Va. App. at 

107, 582 S.E.2d at 451 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 

1310, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1879, 1890 (1949) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, 

evidence sufficient to provide probable cause to arrest for a crime need not be evidence sufficient 

to convict for that offense. Id. 

The evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth, support a finding that when the officers forcibly removed appellant from 

the vehicle, they had reasonable suspicion to believe he was carrying a weapon that was 

concealed within the meaning of the statute. When the officers first turned onto the street where 

the car was improperly parked and observed the argument taking place, appellant was wearing a 

flight jacket that came down to “waist level,” and none of the officers observed the weapon in 

appellant’s rear pocket. Officer Neville testified he first saw what he thought was the butt of a 

firearm protruding from appellant’s rear pants pocket “[a]s [appellant] got into the back [of the 

improperly parked car], as he sat down.” (Emphasis added). A reasonable inference from this 

evidence is that the handle of the firearm was partially obscured by appellant’s jacket until he 

began to climb into the back seat of the vehicle. Officer Neville relayed to Officers Verbena and 

Fitzpatrick what he thought he had seen. Only after Officer Verbena examined appellant’s 

identification, which indicated appellant was eighteen years old, did Officers Verbena and 

Neville remove appellant from the vehicle. Thus, when the officers seized appellant to remove 
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him from the vehicle, they knew he was eighteen years old, and they had reasonable suspicion to 

believe he was carrying a concealed weapon without a permit in violation of the statute. 

This reasonable suspicion justified their removing appellant from the vehicle by force in 

order to permit them to investigate further, and once they did so, Officer Neville immediately 

saw a semiautomatic handgun where appellant had been sitting.2

 At that time, the officers had 

probable cause3

 to believe appellant had been carrying a weapon that was concealed within the 

meaning of the statute.4

 We need not consider whether appellant’s arrest violated Code § 19.2-74, which requires 

that an individual arrested for a Class 1 misdemeanor be released on a summons unless one of 

several statutory conditions applies. Even assuming the terms of Code § 19.2-74 entitled 

appellant to be released on a summons, this alleged violation of state law did not entitle appellant 

to invoke the search and seizure provisions of the United States or Virginia Constitution to 

2

 We need not address whether reasonable suspicion of illegal possession of a firearm, 

absent evidence of dangerousness, justifies a frisk. Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion 

of illegal firearm possession and developed probable cause for arrest based on that belief before 

any frisk or search took place. 

3

 Contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion, we hold appellant preserved for appeal his 

argument that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for carrying a concealed weapon. 

He argued at the suppression hearing that when the traffic stop had concluded, he should have 

been allowed to decline the officers’ request to step out of the vehicle and permitted to leave the 

scene. Implicit in this argument is the assertion that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause to detain or arrest him for carrying a concealed weapon before they pulled him 

out of the car and saw the firearm. 

4

 We need not consider whether the evidence would have been sufficient to convict

appellant for carrying a concealed weapon because after the officers determined they had 

sufficient evidence to charge him with felony firearm and drug offenses, they opted not to charge 

him for the misdemeanor concealment offense. See Slayton, 41 Va. App. at 109, 582 S.E.2d at 

452 (noting the fact that Slayton was ultimately arrested for more serious drug and firearms 

offenses and not charged for possession of a concealed weapon “does not preclude the concealed 

weapon basis for Slayton’s search incident to arrest” because the validity of an arrest is 

“‘normally gauged by an objective standard’” (quoting Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 

532, 538, 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989) (en banc))). 
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suppress the fruits of the search conducted incident to arrest. See Janis v. Commonwealth, 22 

Va. App. 646, 651, 472 S.E.2d 649, 652 (holding that exclusion is not an appropriate remedy 

when a state statute is violated “‘absent an express statutory provision for suppression’” (quoting 

Troncoso v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 942, 944, 407 S.E.2d 349, 350 (1991))), aff'd on reh’g 

en banc, 23 Va. App. 696, 479 S.E.2d 534 (1996). The United States Supreme Court recently 

held, subsequent to the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress, that as long as “an officer 

has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minor crime in his presence, . . . [t]he 

arrest is constitutionally reasonable,” even if it violates state law. Virginia v. Moore, ___ U.S. 

___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559, 567 (2008). “When officers have probable 

cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth Amendment 

permits them to make an arrest,” and “while States are free to regulate such arrests however they 

desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Id. at ___, 128 S. Ct. 

at 1607, 1608, 170 L. Ed. 2d at 571, 572. Thus, even if the search of appellant incident to arrest 

violated state law, appellant was not entitled under federal or state constitutional law to 

suppression of the fruits of his arrest and the related search. 

 Accordingly, we hold the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress was not 

error. 

B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO PROVE OBSTRUCTION 

 In ruling on appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, like in 

ruling on the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth, granting to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. E.g. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 

(1975). 
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 Code § 18.2-460 provides in relevant part as follows: 

If any person without just cause knowingly obstructs . . . any 

law-enforcement officer in the performance of his duties as such or 

fails or refuses without just cause to cease such obstruction when 

requested to do so by such . . . law-enforcement officer, he shall be 

guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. 

Code § 18.2-460(A). To constitute a violation of the statute, “‘it is not necessary that there be an 

actual or technical assault upon the officer.’” Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79, 

126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925) (quoting Brill’s Cyclopedia of Criminal Law § 1156). The record must 

contain evidence of statements or acts 

“clearly indicating an intention on the part of the accused to 

prevent the officer from performing his duty, as to ‘obstruct’ 

ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action and 

forcible or threatened means. It means to obstruct the officer 

himself and not merely to oppose or impede the process by which 

the officer is armed.” 

Id. at 479, 126 S.E. at 77 (quoting Brill’s, supra, § 1156). 

Applying these principles in Jones, the Court held evidence that the accused, who was in 

a car being pursued by the police, “sought to escape the officer by merely running away was not 

such an obstruction as the law contemplates.” Id. at 478, 126 S.E. at 77. “[F]light,” held the 

Court, “is not such an offense as will make a person amenable to the charge of resisting or 

obstructing an officer . . . , as there is a broad distinction between avoidance and resistance or 

obstruction.” Id. at 478, 126 S.E. at 76-77. The Court also held that the defendant’s act of 

“throw[ing] a two and a half bushel bag of barley into the road [in front of the police car 

pursuing him] does not of itself constitute an obstruction” because that act did not prove “an 

intention . . . ‘to obstruct the officer himself,’” as opposed to an effort “‘merely to oppose or 

impede the process with which the officer is armed.’” Id. at 479, 126 S.E. at 77 (quoting Brill’s, 

supra, § 1156). Defendant Jones’s act of throwing the barley out the window could have 

demonstrated an effort to dispose of evidence tending to show he was involved in the illegal 
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manufacture of “ardent spirits” rather than an intent “to obstruct the officer himself.” Id. at 

478-79, 126 S.E. at 76-77. 

In Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 544-45, 580 S.E.2d 454, 457 (2003), 

by contrast, the defendant engaged in a physical struggle with officers who were attempting to 

strip search him. That struggle included the defendant’s “‘fighting and thrashing around so 

dramatically that it was impossible’ for the officers to conduct the search” for a period of several 

minutes. Id. Applying the standard adopted in Jones and reiterated in Ruckman v. 

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429, 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998), we held, inter alia, that 

Craddock’s “physically resist[ing] a lawful search” was “obstructive behavior” that was 

“sufficient to demonstrate Craddock’s intent to prevent the officers from performing their 

duties.” Craddock, 40 Va. App. at 553, 580 S.E.2d at 461. 

Similarly, in appellant’s case, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s 

finding that appellant, knowingly and without just cause, obstructed the officers in the 

performance of their duties within the meaning of the statute. Appellant not only refused the 

officers’ order to him to get out of the vehicle in which he was a passenger; he also attempted to 

flee by breaking away after they had placed their hands on him to remove him from the car, and 

he physically resisted their efforts to put his hands behind his back and handcuff him in order to 

effect an arrest for the offense of carrying a concealed firearm. Officers Neville and Fitzpatrick 

“had to physically take [appellant] to the ground,” put their weight “on top of him,” and 

“struggle with him” for some period of time “to put his hands behind his back” in order to 

handcuff him. Only by working together were the two officers “eventually able” to “get 

[appellant’s] hands behind his back” and “place him into custody.” This evidence was sufficient 

to prove appellant “obstruct[ed] . . . any law-enforcement officer in the performance of his duties 

as such,” as required to support his conviction for violating Code § 18.2-460. 
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C. CLAIMED UNLAWFULNESS OF ARREST AS EXCUSING OBSTRUCTION 

 Appellant nevertheless contends he was entitled to resist the arrest because it “was made 

in contravention of a state statute,” Code § 19.2-74, under which he claims he was entitled to be 

released on a summons. Appellant concedes he did not make this argument in the trial court but 

contends the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 permits him to raise it for the first time on 

appeal. 

We conclude the ends of justice exception does not apply because the claimed error is not 

“clear, substantial and material.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8, 

11 (1989). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establishes 

that when appellant’s refusal to cooperate began, the police had reasonable articulable suspicion 

to believe appellant was carrying a concealed weapon, and they were entitled to investigate their 

suspicion further by detaining appellant briefly and requiring him to step out of the vehicle. 

Although Officer Neville testified at the suppression hearing that he intended, when he asked 

appellant to step out of the car, to frisk appellant for weapons, the record contains no indication 

that he communicated this intention to appellant before appellant attempted to flee. See Whren 

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 97-98 (1996) 

(noting that an officer’s “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment 

analysis”); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 n.7, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 n.7, 100 

L. Ed. 2d 565, 573 (1988) (recognizing that an officer’s subjective intentions are “relevant to an 

assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct . . . to the extent that that 

intent has been conveyed to the person confronted” (emphasis added)). 

Once appellant attempted to flee, which occurred immediately before Neville saw the gun 

in the car, the officers could conclude appellant would fail to appear if issued a summons for the 

concealed weapon offense. In ruling on the motion to suppress, the trial court made an express 
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finding that appellant’s attempt to flee gave the officers “reason to believe,” for purposes of 

Code § 19.2-74, “that he was . . . a flight risk.” Thus, the evidence supported a finding that when 

the officers subdued and handcuffed appellant, their taking him into custody rather than releasing 

him on a summons was lawful under Code § 19.2-74. 

Accordingly, the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18 does not excuse appellant’s 

failure to raise in the trial court the argument that he could not be convicted of obstructing justice 

because he was authorized to resist an unlawful arrest. 

II. 

 For these reasons, we hold the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress was not error and 

that the evidence supported appellant’s conviction for obstructing justice. Thus, we affirm the 

challenged convictions, subject to remand only for correction of a clerical error in the conviction 

and sentencing orders. See supra footnote 1. 

Affirmed and remanded with instructions.