* Under 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and

is not precedent except in the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

2 Waller v. Dixieland Food Store

, Inc, 492 So.2d 283, 285 (Miss. 1986).

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-60652

Summary Calendar

JOYCE M. BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

K MART CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

(5:96-CV-2-BrN)

August 17, 1998

Before WISDOM, WIENER, AND DENNIS, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM: *

Following a jury trial, Joyce Brown was awarded $300,000 in damages for back injuries she

sustained in a slip and fall accident at the Kmart store in Natchez, Mississippi. Kmart filed motions

for a judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, for a new trial or remittitur on the issue of

damages. The district court denied those motions. Kmart appeals.

Under Mississippi law, a store owner owes its customers a duty of ordinary care to keep its

premises in a reasonably safe condition. 2 Kmart argues that it kept its store in a reasonably safe3 “A jury verdict must be upheld unless ‘there is no legally sufficient evident iary basis fo r a

reasonable jury to find’ as the jury did.” Harrington v. Harris

, 118 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1997)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)).

4 Williams v. Briggs Co.

, 62 F.3d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1995); Tramonte v. Fibreboard Corp

., 947

F.2d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 1991).

5 Brown’s actual medical expenses were $10,322. The award of $300,000 was reduced by 40%

due to Brown’s comparative share of fault. Her total recovery, then, was $180,000.

6 Marcel v. Placid Oil Co. , 11 F.3d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1994).

7 Id

.

2 condition and that it warned Joyce Brown of the condition of its floor. We find, however, that there

is ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict holding Kmart sixty percent at fault in the accident. 3

The evidence showed that it was raining on the day of the accident and that Kmart employees were

aware of the water in the store’s entry-way. Joyce Brown, Amy Davis, and Margaret Gray testified

that there were no signs warning that the floor was slippery, nor were there any carpets to absorb the

water. Although Kmart argues that the testimony of its employees shows that Kmart met its duty of

ordinary care by warning Brown of the slippery conditions, we find that the jury’s verdict, based on

the testimony of Brown, Davis, and Gray, is reasonable. The dist rict court did not err in deny ing

Kmart’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

Kmart also argues that the district court erred in allowi ng Brown to cal l Margaret Gray

outside of Brown’s case in chief. We review the district court’s decision to allow Gray to testify as

a rebuttal witness for abuse of discretion. 4 We find no abuse. Gray’s testimony was offered to rebut

the testimon y o f Kmart employees on two critical points. She testified that Kmart did not place

warn i ng cones, mop buckets, and carpets in the entry-way as the employees alleged. She also

testified that Brown’s pants were wet, a fact disputed by Mary Jo Britt, a Kmart employee.

Finally, Kmart argues that the jury’s award of $300,000 in damages is excessive. 5 We review

the district court’s denial of a motion for new trial or remittitur for abuse of discretion. 6 When a jury

award is so excessive that it is contrary to “right reason” that verdict is subject to remittitur, not a

new trial. 7 In reviewing this damage award, we recognize that “the determination of the extent of8 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La , 767 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1985).

9 In assessing a jury’s verdict, we ofte n compare that verdict wi th those approved by other

courts in the jurisdiction in similar cases. Marcel , 11 F.3d at 568. In the present case, we, like the

district court, have not found any Mississippi cases that are sufficiently similar to compare with the

present case. The cases we have found are factually distinguishable based upon the extent of the

plaint iff’s injuries.

10 In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La , 767 F.2d at 1155.

3 damages is for the trier of fact, and in this area the appellate court should step light ly or not at all”. 8

A jury’s award of damages for pain and suffering is dependent upon the facts of the particular case. 9

Because t he jury has observed the parties and has heard the evidence while “we have only read

papers,” we do not overturn a jury’s award except upon the “strongest of showings”. 10 In this case,

we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering judgment in the amount of

$300,000 based upon the jury’s verdict. Although this award may be high, we “cannot say that the

jury’s verdict is excessive or unreasonable”. After three years of treatment, Brown still suffers from

a back injury that has not responded to treatment. Her doctors have confirmed this point.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.