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 NOT PRECDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 12-3960

____________

ODISE CARR,

 Appellant

v. 

CITY OF CAMDEN; 

CITY OF CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

JOHN SOSINAVAGE; SCOTT THOMSON;

MARIO ORTIZ; JOHN DOES 1-10

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D. C. No. 1-09-cv-04717)

District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

on November 7, 2013

Before: GREENAWAY, Jr., VANASKIE and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 13, 2013)

O P I N I O N 

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
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Odise Carr appeals the District Court‟s order granting summary judgment to the 

defendants, the City of Camden, the City of Camden Police Department, John 

Sosinavage, Scott Thomson, and Mario Ortiz, on Carr‟s claim of First Amendment 

retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.1

On July 29, 2008, Carr testified under oath at a disciplinary proceeding in support 

of two other officers. In his complaint, Carr alleges that the defendants retaliated against 

him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of this testimony by launching 

an investigation into his role in a 2005 arrest of a minor. At the conclusion of this 

investigation, Carr was administratively charged with “conduct unbecoming an employee 

in the public service” for his role in the 2005 arrest and was eventually terminated from 

his position with the police department. Approximately one year after his dismissal, a 

New Jersey administrative law judge ordered that Carr be reinstated with full back pay 

and seniority because the police department had not met its burden of proving that Carr

had engaged in unbecoming conduct. 

The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 

and 1367, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The sole 

issue on appeal is whether Carr submitted sufficient evidence of causation to preclude 

summary judgment on his retaliation claims. We hold that he did not.

 

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The parties stipulated to the dismissal of Carr‟s appeal with respect to the municipal 

entities, which we granted. As a result, we review the District Court‟s decision only 

insofar as it relates to claims against the individual defendants: Sosinavage, Thomson, 

and Ortiz. 
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We employ “a de novo standard of review to grants of summary judgment, 

„applying the same standard as the District Court.‟” Montone v. City of Jersey City, 709 

F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d 

Cir. 1995)). Under this standard, a court must “view the underlying facts and all 

reasonable inferences there from in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A court “shall grant summary judgment 

if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Carr submitted no evidence in response to defendants‟ motion for summary 

judgment that would even arguably link the decision to investigate the 2005 arrest with 

his 2008 testimony. With respect to Thomson and Ortiz, Carr failed to submit any nonspeculative evidence that either defendant was personally involved in the alleged 

retaliatory conduct. See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 

F.3d 60, 72 (3d Cir. 2011). Although Carr argues that Thomson was the chief of the 

Camden Police Department at the time of the investigation, § 1983 “liability cannot be 

predicated solely on the operation of respondent superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 

347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Similarly, Carr‟s argument that certain statements made by 

Ortiz are evidence of an intent to retaliate does not raise a genuine issue of material fact 

because there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Ortiz played any role in the 

decision to investigate the 2005 arrest. 

Although it is undisputed that Sosinavage made the decision to investigate Carr‟s 

role in the 2005 arrest—which ultimately resulted in his termination—Carr again fails to 
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point to any evidence that would causally link this decision to his 2008 testimony. 

Instead, Carr argues that the mere temporal proximity of the investigation to his 

testimony raises an inference of retaliation that is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 2007). We 

disagree. 

As the District Court noted, the only evidence in the record indicates that 

Sosinavage made the decision to conduct a further investigation into the 2005 arrest 

weeks before Carr‟s testimony. The Camden Police Department was prohibited from 

administratively investigating the 2005 arrest prior to this time because it was operating 

under a stay requested by the Camden prosecutors‟ office while it pursued a criminal case 

against certain of the officers involved in the incident. Based on this timeline, there is 

nothing “unusually suggestive” about the timing of the Internal Affairs‟ investigation into 

Carr‟s role in the 2005 arrest. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 280 (3d 

Cir. 2000). In addition, the nearly three month gap between Carr‟s testimony and his 

termination is not itself unusually suggestive. LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233.

As a plaintiff opposing summary judgment, Carr had the burden to “produce 

evidence that, when considered in light of [his] burden of proof at trial, could be the basis 

for a jury finding in” his favor. SEC v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 

1997) (citing Kline v. First Western Gov’t Sec., 24 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 1994)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Because he failed to produce any evidence of causation, Carr 

has failed to meet his burden. For this reason, we will affirm the District Court‟s order 

granting summary judgment to the defendants.