1

Filed 3/10/22 Veeva Systems v. Medidata Solutions CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VEEVA SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

MEDIDATA SOLUTIONS, INC. et 

al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 A158736, A159062

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. No. RG17868081)

Veeva Systems, Inc. (Veeva) sued Medidata Solutions, Inc. (Medidata) 

and Sparta Systems, Inc. (Sparta) (collectively defendants) for declaratory 

and injunctive relief, alleging that defendants’ use and enforcement of 

noncompete and nondisclosure agreements (NCA/NDAs) against their former 

employees violate Business and Professions Code section 16600.1 Defendants 

moved to strike Veeva’s operative complaint under the anti-SLAPP law (Code 

Civ. Proc., § 425.16)2 on the grounds that Veeva’s claims (1) targeted their 

protected acts of enforcing the NCA/NDAs in litigation, and (2) lacked 

1 Business and Professions Code section 16600 provides in pertinent part 

that “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 

profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.”

2 Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

specified otherwise.
2

probable success on the merits. The trial court struck two of Veeva’s seven 

causes of action—the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief and the 

seventh cause of action under the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. 

Code, § 17200 et seq.)—but denied the motions as to the remaining claims, 

which the court found did not arise from protected activity. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We take the following facts from the pleadings and evidentiary 

submissions on the anti-SLAPP motions.

Veeva is a cloud-computing software technology company 

headquartered in Pleasanton. Medidata is a New York-based software-as-aservice technology company. New Jersey-based Sparta provides quality 

management solutions to the life sciences industry. The three are

competitors in the life sciences technology industry and compete for 

employees. Defendants require their employees to enter into NCA/NDAs 

prohibiting them from disclosing defendants’ confidential information during 

and after their employment, and from directly or indirectly engaging in 

competition with defendants for a restricted period of time after their 

employment ends.3 Veeva does not require its employees to sign noncompete 

agreements. 

In January 2017, Medidata filed suit against Veeva and several former 

Medidata employees in the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York (hereafter the federal action). Medidata alleged that 

Veeva induced former employees Alan Mateo, Jason Rizzo, Sondra Pepe, 

Michelle Marlborough, and Richard Young to join Veeva and disclose 

3 The restricted period under the Medidata NCA/NDA is one year. For 

former Sparta employees, the restricted period is nine months. 
3

Medidata’s trade secrets in violation of their obligations under the 

NCA/NDAs.4

Around the same time that Medidata filed the federal action, Sparta 

filed suit against Veeva and former Sparta employee Scott Mitreuter in New 

Jersey state court, alleging that Veeva induced Mitreuter to leave Sparta and 

disclose Sparta’s proprietary information to Veeva. Sparta filed a similar 

lawsuit in New Jersey state court against Veeva and former Sparta employee 

Joby George. We will refer to these suits as the New Jersey actions.

In July 2017, Veeva filed the instant action against defendants5 in 

California, alleging that their NCA/NDAs were unenforceable restraints on 

trade in violation of Business and Professions Code section 16600. Veeva 

alleged that its efforts to recruit defendants’ employees to work for Veeva in 

California was made more difficult and expensive due to defendants’ 

NCA/NDAs. It also alleged that defendants “threaten to and actively attempt 

to enforce these unlawful agreements in order to prevent employees from 

leaving Defendants for a better employment opportunity with a Californiabased employer.” 

Medidata responded to Veeva’s complaint by filing a demurrer and 

anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Veeva’s claims arose from protected 

4 In March 2017, Medidata voluntarily dismissed the individual 

defendants from the federal action. 

5 Veeva also named Quintiles IMS Incorporated (IMS) as a defendant. In 

a prior unpublished opinion, we reversed a judgment in favor of IMS after the 

trial court sustained IMS’s demurrer to Veeva’s first amended complaint. 

(Veeva Systems Inc. v. Quintiles IMS, Inc. (Oct. 31, 2019, A155603) (Quintiles 

IMS).) The parties dispute whether Quintiles IMS operates as the “law of the 

case” as to defendants here, but we need not resolve that question, as the 

particular merits issues addressed in our analysis of the second anti-SLAPP 

prong simply do not overlap with those discussed in Quintiles IMS.
4

activity—e.g., Medidata’s efforts to protect its trade secrets by filing the 

federal action. The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend

and “dropped” the anti-SLAPP motion as moot. Veeva filed a first amended 

complaint, to which defendants each demurred and filed anti-SLAPP 

motions. After defendants elected to have the demurrers heard first, the trial 

court sustained the demurrers with leave to amend and again “dropped” the 

anti-SLAPP motions as moot. Veeva filed a second amended complaint. 

Defendants again demurred and filed anti-SLAPP motions. At a 

hearing in December 2018, the trial court did not rule on the pending 

motions. Rather, the court found that Veeva’s second amended complaint 

suffered from technical issues and did not comply with the order granting 

leave to amend. The court continued the matter to March 2019 and 

instructed Veeva to either file a motion for leave or omit the improper 

allegations. 

In February 2019, Veeva filed a “Corrected Second Amended 

Complaint” (CSAC) to address the deficiencies identified by the trial court. 

Veeva also filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, which 

was granted. In May 2019, Veeva filed its “Supplemental Complaint to the 

Corrected Second Amended Complaint” (hereafter the supplemental 

complaint). We now summarize the material allegations.

Veeva alleges that it conducts its principal corporate activities and 

recruitment of employees at its Pleasanton headquarters, and that a 

significant number of its employees and customers are based in California. 

Defendants likewise conduct significant business in California and recruit

Veeva’s current and former employees. According to Veeva, defendants’ 

NCA/NDAs are unlawful under Business and Professions Code section 16600 

and make Veeva’s efforts to recruit employees more difficult. For instance, in 
5

2017, a “Medidata employee declined to even consider working for Veeva 

because of the Medidata non-compete/NDA,” and in 2018, after Veeva began 

recruiting Medidata employee Justin Zacchone, Medidata sent a letter to 

Zacchone in which it advised Zacchone of his continuing obligations under the 

NCA/NDA, and reserved its rights and remedies thereunder. 

Veeva alleges there is an actual controversy “over the legality and 

enforceability of the Medidata non-compete as it relates to Veeva’s 

recruitment and/or employment of Mateo, Rizzo, Pepe, and Zacchone” and 

“other current and former employees of Medidata for employment in 

California within the meaning of California law.” As “[e]vidence” of this 

controversy, Veeva describes Medidata’s federal action, including the 

allegation that Veeva tortiously interfered with Medidata’s employees’ 

NCA/NDA obligations by hiring and employing them. Veeva alleges it has 

lost money and property within the meaning of the UCL by “paying its 

employees’ defense costs” in the federal action, and spending “attorney time 

and management time in analyzing and providing advice concerning the 

unlawful agreement,” which “has resulted in the diversion of resources and 

economic injury.” 

As to Sparta, Veeva alleges it hired a number of former Sparta 

employees, including Sanjay Goswami in January 2017, John Marshall in 

May 2017, and Joby George in February 2018. Veeva also offered a job to 

former Sparta employee “Jane Roe,” who accepted but later withdrew due to 

Sparta’s NCA/NDA. Veeva alleges there is an actual controversy over the 

legality and enforceability of the Sparta NCA/NDA as it relates to Veeva’s 

recruitment and/or employment of former and current Sparta employees. As 

“[e]vidence” of this controversy, Veeva alleges that Sparta has “accused Veeva 

of intentionally interfering with the Sparta non-compete/NDA by stating that 
6

it will defend and indemnify employees accused of violating [Sparta’s] 

unlawful agreement by working for Veeva.” Veeva further alleges that 

Sparta sent letters to Veeva’s CEO claiming that Veeva’s employment of 

Marshall and George would violate the NCA/NDAs, and threatening to 

enforce its rights under the NCA/NDAs. 

Veeva alleges that in light of the Sparta NCA/NDA, Veeva did not 

assign Marshall to any of his former Sparta clients, including those based in 

California, which made Marshall less productive than he otherwise would 

have been. Veeva also incurred attorney fees and costs in response to 

Sparta’s litigation threats concerning Marshall and George and Sparta’s 

filing of the New Jersey actions. Veeva further alleges “the diversion and 

loss” of “economic resources,” including “valuable management time and 

other resources recruiting Jane Roe,” and “additional management time and 

. . . recruiting costs in finding and hiring a different candidate.” 

The CSAC asserts four causes of action for declaratory relief and three 

causes of action under the UCL. In the first cause of action, Veeva alleges

there is an actual controversy “concerning Veeva’s right to recruit 

Defendants’ current and former employees,” notwithstanding “the employees’ 

place[s] of residence or the existence of a non-compete/NDA.”6 Veeva seeks a 

declaratory judgment that it had the right to solicit and recruit Mateo, Pepe, 

Rizzo, Zacchone, Goswami, George, and Roe, as well as “other current and 

former employees” of defendants.

6 It is implied in the CSAC that Mateo, Rizzo, Marshall, and George do 

not reside in California, as Veeva alleges these individuals are “employed in 

California within the meaning of California law” because they travel 

regularly to California, report to California-based executives, regularly 

interact with Veeva personnel in California and/or clients with operations in 

California. 
7

The second cause of action for declaratory relief alleges an actual 

controversy “over Veeva’s right and obligation to indemnify and/or defend 

former Medidata and Sparta employees who face threatened or actual 

litigation arising from their employment with Veeva in alleged violation of 

the Medidata or Sparta non-compete/NDA.” Veeva alleges it has an 

obligation under Labor Code section 2802 as well as the right and desire to 

defend and indemnify its employees when faced with threatened or actual 

litigation from defendants arising from posttermination NCA/NDAs, but 

defendants consider this to be illegal “ ‘interference.’ ”

The third cause of action alleges an actual controversy over 

“[d]efendants’ right to require employees to sign non-compete/NDAs that 

include in their scope the provision of services in California within the 

meaning of California law, as well as the enforceability of these Agreements 

as to employees employed ‘in California’ within the meaning of California 

law.” Veeva seeks declaratory judgments that defendants violate California 

law when they enter into NCA/NDAs that include within their scope the 

provision of services in California to a California-based employer.

The fourth cause of action alleges an actual controversy “over 

Defendants’ right to seek enforcement of their standard non-compete/NDAs 

that include in their scope the provision of services in California to a 

California-based employer. Such efforts at enforcement include threatened 

and actual litigation against Veeva for interference with these noncompetes/NDAs.” 

In the fifth, sixth, and seventh UCL causes of action, Veeva alleges that 

defendants engage in unfair competition when they: “require employees to 

enter into the standard non-compete/NDAs that inhibit Veeva’s ability to 

recruit their employees to provide services in California to a California 
8

employer within the meaning of California law” (fifth cause of action); “enter 

into post-termination non-compete agreements with employees that include 

in their scope the provision of services in California for a California-based 

employer” (sixth cause of action); and “threaten to or actively seek to enforce 

their standard non-competes/NDAs that include in their scope the provision 

of services in California” (seventh cause of action). In each of these claims, 

Veeva alleges it has suffered an injury in fact as a result of defendants’ unfair 

competition by incurring defense and litigation costs, diverting resources, 

incurring recruiting and administrative costs, and spending excessive 

management and attorney time as a result of Defendants’ unfair 

competition.7

In September 2019, the trial court overruled defendants’ demurrers to 

the CSAC and supplemental complaint. 

The hearing on the anti-SLAPP motions (pending since August 2018) 

was continued several times until the matter was finally heard on October 

23, 2019. The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motions in part as to the 

fourth cause of action for declaratory relief and seventh cause of action under 

the UCL, finding that these claims arose from protected activity because they 

targeted defendants’ enforcement of the NCA/NDAs, and that the claims 

were barred by the litigation privilege. The court denied the anti-SLAPP 

motions as to the remaining causes of action. 

7 The supplemental complaint contains new allegations regarding events 

in the New Jersey actions, including Sparta’s dismissal of its New Jersey 

complaint against Veeva and George with prejudice, and modifications that 

Medidata made to its standard NCA/NDA after the filing date of this action, 

including a “California Exclusion” and a “Non-Competitive Activities 

Exception.” 
9

Defendants appealed from the partial denial of their anti-SLAPP 

motions, while Veeva cross-appealed from the partial granting of the motions. 

The appeals were consolidated for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and 

decision.

DISCUSSION

Section 425.16 authorizes a special motion to strike causes of action 

that arise from any act in furtherance of the moving defendant’s “right of 

petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California 

Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The 

anti-SLAPP law “allows defendants to request early judicial screening of 

legal claims targeting free speech or petitioning activities” (Wilson v. Cable 

News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 880–881), and its provisions must 

be construed broadly (§ 425.16, subd. (a)).

Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves potentially a two-prong

inquiry. First, the moving defendant must make a prima facie showing that 

the challenged claim or claims arise from the defendant’s constitutionally 

protected free speech or petition rights. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 

376, 381–382, 396 (Baral).) If the defendant makes this showing, the burden 

shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the claim’s merit by establishing a 

probability of success. (Id. at p. 396.) We review de novo a trial court’s 

decision to grant or deny an anti-SLAPP motion. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 

Cal.4th 299, 325–326 (Flatley); Navellier v. Slatten (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

763, 768.) We do not weigh the evidence, and we accept “ ‘ “ ‘as true the 

evidence favorable to the plaintiff’ ” ’ ” and evaluate “ ‘ “ ‘the defendant’s 

evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff 

as a matter of law. ’ ” ’ ” (Feldman v. 1000 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 

Cal.App.4th 1467, 1478 (Feldman).)
10

A. Timeliness of Hearing

Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we first consider Veeva’s 

procedural argument that the anti-SLAPP motions were not timely heard by 

the trial court. Section 425.16, subdivision (f) (425.16(f)), specifies that an 

anti-SLAPP motion “shall be scheduled by the clerk of the court for a hearing 

not more than 30 days after service of the motion unless the docket 

conditions of the court require a later hearing.” As set forth above, 

defendants filed and served their motions in August 2018, and the hearing on 

the motions was continued several times to October 23, 2019. In its October 

24 order, the trial court rejected Veeva’s argument that the anti-SLAPP 

motions should be denied as untimely, stating “[t]he Court routinely hears 

anti-SLAPP motions outside of the 30-day window due to the conditions of 

the Court’s docket.” 

Veeva relies on Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 

1572 (Greka) for the position that defendants have the burden of showing 

that docket conditions required a later hearing. But Greka relied on a former 

version of section 425.16(f) that has since been amended, as well as decisional 

authority that was explicitly overruled by the amendment. (Greka, at 

pp. 1577–1578, citing Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 

1382 (Decker) and Fair Political Practices Com. v. American Civil Rights 

Coalition, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1171 (Fair Political Practices Com.); 

see Stats. 2005, ch. 535, § 3 [expressing Legislature’s intent to overrule 

Decker and Fair Political Practices Com.].) As of 2005, section 425.16(f) 

places the burden on the court clerk, rather than the movant, to schedule the 

hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion within the 30-day window. (Chitsazzadeh 

v. Kramer & Kaslow (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 676, 685, fn. 7 (Chitsazzadeh). 

Accordingly, section 425.16(f) does not justify denial of an anti-SLAPP motion 
11

solely because the moving party failed to ensure the timely scheduling of a 

hearing. (Hall v. Time Warner, Inc. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349

(Hall).)

Veeva next argues it is “self-evident” that the delay in this case was not 

justified by the trial court’s docket conditions. According to Veeva, the delay 

is attributable to the court making various other orders such as instructing 

Veeva to correct the deficiencies in the second amended complaint and ruling 

on Veeva’s motion to file a supplemental complaint. Medidata responds that 

these delays were due to Veeva’s decision to add factual allegations to its 

second amended complaint that went beyond the scope of leave to amend. 

The point is well-taken. We are not inclined to find in Veeva’s favor on the 

docket conditions exception due to delays occasioned by Veeva’s own pleading 

deficiencies and the trial court’s willingness to allow their correction.

Veeva also complains that the delay was caused by the trial court 

ruling on defendants’ demurrers before the anti-SLAPP motions. But Veeva 

cites no authority requiring trial courts to prioritize an anti-SLAPP motion 

before a demurrer, particularly where, as here, the moving defendant elects 

to proceed with the demurrer first. (See Oakland Bulk & Oversized 

Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 751 [trial court 

did not err in sustaining demurrer with leave to amend even though antiSLAPP motion was pending but hearing was scheduled for after demurrer 

hearing].) Indeed, the anti-SLAPP statute’s timing requirements are 

generally intended to provide a speedy remedy to moving defendants. (See 

Chitsazzadeh, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.) 

We acknowledge the delay of over a year between defendants’ service of 

the anti-SLAPP motions and the hearing on said motions was significant. 

We also do not endorse any invocation of the docket conditions exception 
12

based on the trial court’s “routine[]” practice as opposed to actual conditions 

that reasonably preclude a timely hearing. That said, we do not lightly 

question the trial court’s inherent authority to manage its own docket (see 

Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 267), and based on the 

arguments and record before us, we conclude Veeva fails to show an abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s refusal to deny the anti-SLAPP motions as 

untimely. We now proceed to our de novo review of the anti-SLAPP motions.

B. First Prong—Arises from Protected Activity

To satisfy the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant must

demonstrate “that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff claims to have been injured 

falls within one of the four categories described in subdivision (e) [of section 

425.16]’ [citation], and that the plaintiff’s claims in fact arise from that 

conduct [citation].” (Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 

610, 620.) As relevant here, the categories of protected conduct include

statements made before a judicial proceeding and those in connection with an 

issue under consideration by a judicial body. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1), (2).)

There appears to be no dispute that defendants’ statements, writings, 

and pleadings in the New Jersey and federal actions constituted protected 

activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), or that defendants’ 

prelitigation correspondences such as the letter to Zacchone were “made ‘in 

anticipation of litigation “contemplated in good faith and under serious 

consideration” ’ ” to merit anti-SLAPP protection. (See Neville v. Chudacoff

(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268.) The dispute concerns whether Veeva’s 

causes of action are actually based on this protected activity.

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or 

forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act 

underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in 
13

furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] . . . ‘[T]he 

focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to 

his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected 

speech or petitioning.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 

University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1063 (Park).) “In deciding whether a 

lawsuit is a SLAPP action, the trial court must distinguish between speech or 

petitioning activity that is mere evidence related to liability, and liability that 

is based on speech or petitioning activity.” (Gotterba v. Travolta (2014) 228 

Cal.App.4th 35, 42 (Gotterba).) “In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, 

courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions 

by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for 

liability.” (Park, at p. 1063.) When relief is sought based on allegations of 

protected and unprotected activity, the allegations of unprotected activity are 

disregarded at the first stage, as are allegations of protected conduct that are 

“ ‘merely incidental’ or ‘collateral’ ” or “that merely provide context, without 

supporting a claim for recovery[.]” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.)

1. Declaratory Relief Causes of Action

“An anti-SLAPP motion lies against a complaint for declaratory relief, 

among other types of causes of action.” (Gotterba, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 40.)8 “In order to state a claim for declaratory relief, there must be an 

‘actual controversy’ relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.” 

8 We reject Veeva’s contention that its declaratory relief claims are 

outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP law because the statute targets “causes 

of action,” not remedies. Marlin v. Aimco Venezia, LLC (2007) 154 

Cal.App.4th 154 (Marlin) provides no assistance to Veeva, as it merely held 

that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to a “prayer for an injunction,” and 

the court otherwise addressed the merits of an anti-SLAPP motion against a 

declaratory relief cause of action. (Marlin, at pp. 160–162.)
14

(Country Side Villas Homeowners Assn. v. Ivie (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1110, 

1118, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)

a. First, Second, and Third Causes of Action

As set forth above, the first cause of action alleges a controversy 

between the parties concerning Veeva’s right to recruit defendants’ current 

and former employees, notwithstanding the NCA/NDAs and the employees’ 

places of residence outside California. The third cause of action alleges a 

controversy over defendants’ right to require employees to sign NCA/NDAs 

that include in their scope the provision of services in California within the 

meaning of California law. These claims are not based on defendants’ 

protected litigation activities, but rather, on the effect and scope of 

defendants’ NCA/NDAs as to Veeva, a California-based employer, who wants 

to recruit and hire defendants’ employees.

Defendants urge a contrary conclusion, highlighting repeated 

references in the CSAC and supplemental complaint to the federal and New 

Jersey actions. However, we agree with Veeva that these allegations of 

litigation conduct merely point to evidence that the alleged controversies 

exist. (See Gotterba, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 42 [attorney’s letters 

threatening litigation over contract dispute were merely evidence that 

controversy existed].)

Park is instructive in this regard. The Supreme Court held that a 

discrimination claim brought by a university professor who was denied 

tenure did not arise from the university’s protected statements and 

communications during the official tenure process. Employing an elementsfocused approach, Park held that the elements of the discrimination claim 

“depend not on the grievance proceeding, any statements, or any specific 

evaluations of him in the tenure process, but only on the denial of tenure 
15

itself and whether the motive for that action was impermissible.” (Park, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) The university’s protected statements “may 

supply evidence of animus, but that does not convert these statements 

themselves into the basis for liability.” (Ibid.) In so holding, Park approved 

of a formulation by the trial court in that case that the plaintiff “ ‘could have 

omitted allegations regarding communicative acts or filing a grievance and 

still state the same claims.’ ” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69 (City of 

Cotati) the Supreme Court held that a state court declaratory relief action 

filed by the City of Cotati alleging a controversy with mobilehome park 

owners over the constitutionality of a rent stabilization ordinance did not 

arise out of protected activity even though it was filed in response to the 

owners’ prior federal court declaratory relief action challenging the 

constitutionality of the same ordinance. (City of Cotati, at p. 71.) As the 

court explained, “the mere fact an action was filed after protected activity 

took place does not mean it arose from that activity. The anti-SLAPP statute 

cannot be read to mean that ‘any claim asserted in an action which arguably 

was filed in retaliation for the exercise of speech or petition rights falls under 

section 425.16, whether or not the claim is based on conduct in exercise of 

those rights.’ ” (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 76–77.) “[A] claim 

filed in response to, or in retaliation for, threatened or actual litigation is not 

subject to the anti-SLAPP statute simply because it may be viewed as an 

oppressive litigation tactic. [Citation.] That a cause of action arguably may 

have been triggered by protected activity does not entail that it is one arising 

from such.” (Id. at p. 78.)

Park and City of Cotati clearly illustrate why Veeva’s first and third 

causes of action do not arise from defendants’ protected activity in the federal 
16

and New Jersey actions. While these claims may have been in response to or 

triggered by defendants’ prelitigation letters and lawsuits, the claims 

themselves arise not from those activities but from the underlying dispute 

over whether Business and Professions section 16600 applies to defendants’ 

NCA/NDAs when California-based Veeva recruits and hires from defendants’ 

employee pool. Indeed, had Veeva and the named employees been so 

inclined, they could have brought such declaratory relief claims preemptively. 

(See, e.g., Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 697, 

701 [preemptive declaratory relief suit by employee and California-based 

employer against former Minnesota employer to declare noncompete 

agreement void under Business and Professions Code section 16600].) Or 

viewed another way, Veeva could simply have “ ‘omitted allegations 

regarding [defendants’ litigation activities] and still state the same claims’ ”

for declaratory relief regarding the effect and scope of defendants’ NCA/NDAs

when their former employees are recruited and hired by a California-based 

employer. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.)

Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459 (Lunada) and 

CKE Restaurants, Inc v. Moore (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 262 (CKE) do not 

persuade us otherwise. In Lunada, a consumer and her attorneys served 

notice on the manufacturer of a dietary supplement, alleging the company 

violated the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) 

through false and misleading advertising. (Lunada, at pp. 465–466.) The

manufacturer then filed a complaint against the consumer and her attorneys 

seeking a judicial declaration regarding the accuracy and legality of the 

manufacturer’s advertising. (Id. at p. 467.) The consumer and her attorneys 

filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court granted. (Id. at p. 468.)
17

In affirming, the appellate court rejected the manufacturer’s argument 

that its declaratory relief claim arose not from the CLRA notice and 

correspondences between counsel, but from the dispute as to whether the 

company had violated the CLRA. (Lunada, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 471–478.) The court reasoned that not only did the company’s 

“declaratory relief action refer[] extensively to the CLRA Notice and 

[counsel’s] letter (id. at p. 472), but “the CLRA Notice was required under the 

CLRA before an action for damages could be filed and thus is part of the 

litigation process. But for the CLRA Notice and demand letters, there would 

be no dispute. . . . In construing the anti-SLAPP statute broadly, as we must 

do [citation], we believe that the CLRA Notice and correspondence not only 

preceded and triggered the declaratory relief action, but they were also the 

basis of the cause of the action.” (Id. at p. 473.) 

CKE similarly held that a plaintiff’s declaratory relief action arose from 

the defendant’s service of a statutorily-required notice. There, the defendant 

and her attorneys served a restaurant (CKE) with a 60-day notice under the 

Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Proposition 65) 

claiming the restaurant’s french fries contained a cancer-causing chemical

that the restaurant failed to disclose as required by law. (CKE, supra, 159 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266.)9 CKE responded by threatening to file a 

declaratory relief action unless the 60-day notice was withdrawn, and then 

filing a complaint for a declaratory judgment that none of its food products 

reached the risk threshold for required notice under Proposition 65. (CKE, at 

9 Proposition 65 generally requires businesses to provide notice of 

knowingly exposing an individual to a chemical known to cause cancer. 

(CKE, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 265–266.) A potential violator must be 

given 60 days’ notice of a suspected violation before a lawsuit can be filed. 

(Ibid.)
18

p. 266.) The trial court granted the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and the 

appellate court affirmed. In concluding the action arose from protected 

activity, the appellate court reasoned, “CKE directly challenged the merits of 

the 60-day notice by referring to and quoting from the 60-day notice. CKE 

requested a judicial determination that its food products complied with 

Proposition 65. Instead of using the 60-day period to avoid litigation, CKE 

used it to commence litigation. Moreover, CKE threatened to sue 

respondents unless they withdrew their notice. CKE’s action arose entirely

from the filing of the Proposition 65 notice. The trial court recognized this, 

stating, ‘without the Notice, there would have been no actual, present 

controversy, and no controversy at all.’ ” (CKE, at p. 271.)

To the extent Lunada and CKE suggest that a complaint’s “extensive[]” 

references to a defendant’s protected litigation conduct are enough to satisfy 

the first anti-SLAPP prong (Lunada, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 472; CKE, 

supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 271), we respectfully disagree. We do not think 

such references, however extensive they may be, dispense with the first prong 

inquiry of determining what conduct actually underlies the basis for the 

challenged claims. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068 [although 

discrimination complaint alleged university’s comments and statements 

during grievance proceeding and tenure process, complaint arose from 

decision to deny tenure, not communications leading to it]; San Ramon Valley 

Fire Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn.

(2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 354 [“fact that a complaint alleges that a public 

entity’s action was taken as a result of a majority vote of its constituent 

members does not mean that the litigation challenging that action arose from 

protected activity, where the measure itself is not an exercise of free speech 

or petition”], cited with approval in Park, at p. 1064.)
19

In any event, Lunada and CKE are distinguishable in that they 

involved prelitigation notices that were statutory prerequisites to filing suit. 

Indeed, Lunada distinguished City of Cotati on this basis, observing that in 

City of Cotati, “the protected activity amounted only to a prior lawsuit, 

[while] the protected activities here included a CLRA Notice, without which 

there would be no controversy.” (Lunada, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 475.) 

“The typical prelitigation demand letters involving liability are not 

prerequisites to filing lawsuits seeking damages.” (Lunada, at pp. 476–477.) 

Here, the alleged protected acts “amounted only to . . . prior lawsuit[s]” (id. at 

p. 475) and “typical prelitigation demand letters,” not statutorily-required 

acts that created the controversies alleged in the first and third causes of 

action (id. at p. 476).

The second cause of action presents a closer call, but we ultimately 

conclude it, too, does not arise from protected activity. In alleging a 

controversy over Veeva’s right and obligation to indemnify and defend its 

employees “who face threatened or actual litigation” from defendants, the 

second cause of action may very well have been brought “in response to”

defendants’ litigation conduct. But that is not sufficient to trigger antiSLAPP protection. (City of Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 78.) The claim 

itself arises not from any controversy over defendants’ protected litigation 

conduct, but from a controversy regarding Veeva’s statutory obligations and 

rights pursuant to Labor Code section 2802.

For these reasons, we conclude the trial correctly found that the first, 

second, and third causes of action do not arise from protected activity.

b. Fourth Cause of Action

The fourth cause for declaratory relief alleges an actual controversy 

“over Defendants’ right to seek enforcement of their standard non-
20

compete/NDAs” as to the identified employees and other current or former 

employees. The allegations regarding defendants’ “enforcement” efforts are 

reasonably construed as referring to defendants’ prelitigation and litigation 

statements as detailed throughout the CSAC. This means the fourth cause of 

action is based on defendants’ enforcement of the NCA/NDAs in prelitigation 

and litigation statements and writings. The claim accordingly arises from 

protected activity.

Veeva attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the “principal 

thrust” or “gravamen” of the fourth cause of action is not defendants’ 

enforcement efforts but their use of illegal NCAs/NDAs.10 The alleged 

enforcement efforts, Veeva contends, are merely “evidence of Defendants’ 

anti-competitive scheme.” We are not persuaded, as Veeva simply cannot 

allege an actual controversy in the fourth cause of action without the 

allegations of defendants’ enforcement efforts. If we omit such allegations, 

there would be no controversy alleged. (See Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at

p. 1068.) The enforcement efforts are not simply evidence of another 

controversy; rather, the alleged controversy is whether defendants have the 

right to engage in those very efforts. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 

found that the fourth cause of action arises from protected activity.

10 In supplemental briefing, defendants contend the Supreme Court in 

Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 (Bonni) rejected the 

“gravamen” approach on the first stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. 

Defendants read Bonni too broadly. The high court rejected a narrower 

contention that where a single cause of action alleges multiple factual bases, 

a court may consider whether the gravamen of the entire cause of action is 

based on protected activity rather than engage in the “claim-by-claim” 

approach employed by most appellate courts since Baral. (Bonni, at 

pp. 1010–1012.) Here, Veeva does not seek to use the gravamen approach in 

the manner rejected in Bonni.
21

2. UCL Causes of Action

To state a claim under the UCL, the plaintiff must allege that the 

defendant committed an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or 

practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) The UCL “ ‘ “borrows” violations of 

other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition 

law makes independently actionable.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los 

Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180.) Standing to sue 

under the UCL “extends to ‘a person who has suffered an injury in fact and 

has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition[.]” (Kwikset 

Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 321.)

We conclude the seventh cause of action arises from protected activity. 

Veeva alleges that defendants violate the UCL “when they threaten to or 

actively seek to enforce their standard non-competes/NDAs that include in 

their scope the provision of services in California.” Without the allegations of 

defendants’ enforcement efforts, there would be no act of unfair competition 

alleged in the seventh cause of action. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063, 

1068.)

For the remaining UCL claims, however, we reach a different 

conclusion. Neither the fifth nor sixth cause of action is based on defendants’ 

protected activities. Rather, these claims allege that defendants engage in 

unfair competition by requiring employees to enter NCA/NDAs that include 

the provision of services to a California-based employer.

Defendants contend the first prong is met because Veeva alleges that 

its injury in fact for purposes of UCL standing consists of “defense fees and 

costs to date” incurred in the New Jersey and federal actions. Veeva 

responds that the injury in fact requirement is not an “element” of a UCL 

claim for purposes of the Park test. We think Veeva has the better position
22

here. Assuming, without deciding, that the UCL’s injury in fact requirement 

is germane to Park’s elements-based approach, Veeva’s allegation of incurred

defense costs is not essential to state a UCL claim because Veeva alleges 

other forms of injury in fact, e.g., diverted resources, recruiting and 

administrative costs, decreased productivity. Thus, Veeva’s fifth and sixth 

causes of action do not depend on the allegations of protected litigation 

conduct to state a claim. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1068.) Nor are the 

discrete allegations of incurred defense costs subject to being stricken under 

the Baral approach, as they do not independently support a right to relief—

that is, Veeva does not seek to recover its defense costs incurred in the 

federal and New Jersey actions as restitution in the UCL causes of action.

Under Baral, only allegations of protected activity that “support[] a claim for 

recovery” are subject to the anti-SLAPP statute. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 

p. 394.) Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the fifth and sixth 

causes of action do not arise from protected activity.

To summarize, the trial court correctly found that the first, second,

third, fifth, and sixth causes of action did not arise from protected activity, 

and that the fourth and seventh causes of action did. Thus, the burden shifts 

to Veeva to show a probability of success on the fourth and seventh causes of 

action.

C. Second Prong—Probability of Success

“To demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, the plaintiff 

must show that the complaint is legally sufficient and must present a prima

facie showing of facts that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a 

judgment in the plaintiff’s favor.” (Hall, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.) 

“Only a ‘ “minimum level of legal sufficiency and triability” ’ is needed to 

satisfy the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citation.] The evidence 
23

favorable to the plaintiff is accepted as true, while the defendant’s evidence is 

evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law, 

e.g., on grounds of privilege or immunity.” (Castleman v. Sagaser (2013) 216 

Cal.App.4th 481, 490.)

Defendants raise a host of challenges to Veeva’s ability to show 

probable success on its claims. Medidata argues there is no case or 

controversy because (1) Veeva lacks standing to seek a judicial determination 

on NCA/NDAs to which it is not a party, (2) Medidata has not prevented any 

former employee from working for Veeva, and (3) Medidata already complies 

with California law. Medidata further contends that for purposes of the UCL

Veeva did not suffer any economic injury because of Medidata, and that there 

are no exceptional circumstances to support an antisuit injunction that 

extends to defendants in a foreign jurisdiction. For its part, Sparta contends 

that Veeva’s attempt to apply Business and Professions Code section 16600 

beyond California’s borders is at odds with recent Supreme Court decisions

addressing the applicability of Labor Code section 226’s wage statement 

requirements for employers of flight attendants who do not perform a 

majority of their work in any one state. (See Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.

(2020) 9 Cal.5th 732; Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 762.) 

Additionally, both defendants contend that Veeva’s claims are barred by the 

litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). We need not 

address each and every one of these contentions, as we agree that Veeva’s 

fourth and seventh causes of action are barred by the litigation privilege.

Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part that 

“[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [i]n any (1) legislative 

proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding 

authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding 
24

authorized by law[.]” The privilege is “relevant to the second step in the antiSLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must 

overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 

Cal.4th at p. 323.) “This privilege is absolute in nature, applying ‘to all

publications, irrespective of their maliciousness.’ ” (Action Apartment Assn., 

Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) “Any doubt about 

whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Kashian v. 

Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913 [Kashian].)

“The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any 

communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by 

litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of 

the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the 

action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) The

privilege has been held to cover the filing of pleadings (Contreras v. Dowling 

(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415; see Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 920–921), and prelitigation demand letters (see Blanchard v. DIRECTV, 

Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 903, 920–922).

Veeva contends the litigation privilege does not apply here because 

Veeva asserts only declaratory relief and UCL claims that do not seek to hold 

defendants liable in tort. While courts have generally stated that the 

litigation privilege bars “ ‘ “tort actions based on privileged communications, 

excepting only the tort of malicious prosecution” ’ ” (Lunada Biomedical, 

supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 479, some italics added, citing McClintock v. 

West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 540, 554), application of the privilege has not 

been limited to tort actions. (See Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 1495–1498 [applying litigation privilege to breach of contract and UCL 

claims].) As the Supreme Court explained in Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 
25

1187, “[i]f the policies underlying [Civil Code] section 47(b) are sufficiently 

strong to support an absolute privilege, the resulting immunity should not 

evaporate merely because the plaintiff discovers a conveniently different 

label for pleading what is in substance an identical grievance from identical 

conduct as that protected by [Civil Code] section 47(b).” (Rubin, supra, 4 

Cal.4th at pp. 1202–1203 [applying litigation privilege to UCL claim].)

Here, if we look past the labeling of the fourth and seventh causes of 

action, it is clear the litigation privilege would apply. These claims are based 

on defendants’ efforts to enforce the NCA/NDAs, which include their 

communicative acts of serving prelitigation letters demanding that 

defendants’ former employees honor the NCA/NDAs and their filing of 

pleadings in the federal and New Jersey actions alleging violations of the 

NCA/NDAs. All of these communicative acts were made to achieve the 

objects of litigation and have some connection or logical relation to the federal 

and New Jersey actions. (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 212.) Moreover, the 

policies underlying the privilege (e.g., allowing access to courts without fear 

of harassing derivative actions) would be furthered by application of the 

privilege. (Feldman, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1485–1486.) Simply 

labeling these claims as brought under the UCL and Declaratory Judgment 

Act does not avoid the litigation privilege. Because we must resolve any 

doubts in favor of applying the litigation privilege (Kashian, supra, 98 

Cal.App.4th at p. 913), we conclude it applies to Veeva’s declaratory relief 

and UCL claims.

Veeva further contends the privilege should not apply to the UCL 

claims based because the litigation privilege arguably conflicts with

California’s pro-competition laws like the UCL. In support of this contention, 

Veeva observes that courts have found exceptions to the litigation privilege 
26

based on “irreconcilable conflicts between the privilege and other coequal

state laws.” (People v. Persolve, LLC (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1274 

(Persolve).) “The recognition of these exceptions has been guided by the 

‘ “rule of statutory construction that particular provisions will prevail over 

general provisions.” ’ [Citation.] If a statute is more specific than the 

litigation privilege and would be significantly or wholly inoperable if the 

privilege applied, the privilege will not shield violations of that statute.” 

(Persolve, at p. 1274.)

In Persolve, the court recognized an exception to the litigation privilege 

for UCL claims based on California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (Civ. Code, § 1788 et seq.) and the federal Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.), both of which prohibit unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts. In so doing, 

Persolve reasoned that “[a]pplying the privilege to unlawful practices based 

on specific violations of the California Act and the Federal Act would 

effectively render the protections afforded by those acts meaningless.” 

(Persolve, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1276–1277.) Persolve distinguished 

two cases, Rubin, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1187, and People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pacific 

Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950 [UCL action by district attorney 

alleging lumber company committed fraud during administrative 

proceedings]), because in those cases, “application of the litigation privilege 

did not render the prohibitions underlying the unfair competition claims 

significantly or wholly inoperable.” (Persolve, at p. 1277.)

Unlike the borrowed consumer debt statutes in Persolve, which 

specifically prohibited the very conduct underlying the UCL claims, the 

borrowed statute here—Business and Professions Code section 16600—does 

not specifically prohibit prelitigation and litigation activities to enforce 
27

noncompete agreements. Furthermore, application of the litigation privilege 

would not render Business and Professions Code section 16600 “significantly 

or wholly inoperable” (Persolve, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277), and

Veeva’s surviving claims in the CSAC demonstrate that the two can be 

reconciled. That is, a California-based employer who recruits or hires an 

individual subject to an NCA/NDA executed in another state and who wishes 

to challenge the agreement on the grounds that it illegally includes within its 

scope the provision of services in California can allege declaratory relief and 

UCL claims based on the dispute over the legality and scope of the 

NCA/NDA, while avoiding any challenge to the former employer’s 

prelitigation or litigation efforts to enforce that agreement.

On the record before us, there appears no irreconcilable conflict 

between the Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), litigation privilege and 

Business and Professions Code section 16600, and thus, no exception to the 

privilege for the fourth and seventh causes of action. Accordingly, Veeva fails 

to show a probability of success on these claims.

D. Attorney Fees and Costs

Veeva requests an award of attorney fees and costs against defendants 

for prosecuting a frivolous appeal. According to Veeva, even if this court 

partially affirms the trial court’s decision as to the fourth and seventh causes 

of action, it should still award Veeva its attorney fees and costs for 

defendants’ frivolous appeal as to the court’s ruling on the remaining claims.

Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), provides in pertinent part that “[i]f 

the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended 

to cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable 

attorney’s fees to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 

128.5.” “ ‘Frivolous in this context means that any reasonable attorney would 
28

agree the motion was totally devoid of merit.’ ” (L.A. Taxi Cooperative, Inc. v. 

The Independent Taxi Owners Assn. of Los Angeles (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 

918, 932 (L.A. Taxi); see § 128.5, subd. (b)(2) [“ ‘Frivolous’ means totally and 

completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing 

party”].)

While appellate attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c), are 

recoverable (Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47 

Cal.App.4th 777, 785), Veeva’s request, presented in its respondent’s brief 

and not by motion with a supporting declaration, does not comply with 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1).11 (See FEI Enterprises, Inc. v. 

Yoon (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 790, 807 [declining to consider sanctions request 

on appeal for failure to comply with rule 8.276(b)(1)].) 

Veeva’s citation to Changsha Metro Group Co., Ltd. v. Peng Xufeng

(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1 (Changsha Metro) does not persuade us that rule 

8.276 is inapplicable to a request for fees for a frivolous anti-SLAPP appeal. 

In Changsha Metro, the court held it was proper for a plaintiff to request 

sanctions for a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion in its opposition brief because 

the interplay between the 21-day safe harbor requirement for section 128.5 

sanctions motions, the time limits for opposition briefs (§ 1005, subd. (b)), and 

the 30-day clock for hearings on anti-SLAPP motions (§ 425.16, subd. (f))

made the separate motion requirement impracticable. That rationale simply 

has no application here.

Veeva further contends that rules 8.278 (costs on appeal) and 3.1702 

(claims for statutory and contractual attorney fees), not rule 8.276, govern a 

request for attorney fees arising from a frivolous anti-SLAPP appeal. We are 

not convinced, as rule 8.276 explicitly governs appeals that are frivolous or 

11 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
29

solely to cause delay. (Rule 8.276(a).) Meanwhile, rule 3.1702 provides no 

assistance to Veeva, as it also requires the filing of a motion to claim attorney 

fees on appeal. (Rule 3.1702(b), (c).)

In any event, even assuming a separate motion was not required, 

Veeva fails to demonstrate its entitlement to sanctions under section 425.16, 

subdivision (c). We see no basis to conclude the appeals were brought “solely” 

to cause “unnecessary” delay (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1)), nor do we find that 

defendants’ appeals were “totally and completely without merit” from the 

standpoint of a reasonable attorney. (§ 128.5, subd. (b)(2) [defining 

“frivolous”]; L.A. Taxi, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 932.) Defendants’ 

arguments were objectively sound and rooted in published—albeit 

distinguishable—authorities. Accordingly, we deny Veeva’s request for 

attorney fees.

DISPOSITION

The order on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions is affirmed. Veeva’s 

request for appellate attorney fees under section 425.16, subdivision (c) is 

denied. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its own costs on 

appeal.
30

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A158736, A159062