alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-40351

Summary Calendar

 

KENNETH I. GANTHER, REVEREND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LESLIE WOODS,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-94-CV-405

- - - - - - - - - -

March 2, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kenneth Ivory Ganther, Texas inmate #610862, challenges the

judgment for the defendant following a jury trial in his suit

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ganther argues that the

district court abused its discretion when it set aside a default

judgment against Woods. Woods showed good cause for the delay,

and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it set

aside the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c); In re Dierschke,

975 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1992). 
No. 97-40351

-2-

Ganther argues that the district court erred when it denied

his motion for summary judgment. Ganther, however, did not meet

his initial burden of identifying those portions of the record

which he believed demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986). 

Ganther also challenges the district court's refusal to

appoint counsel. Ganther was not entitled to the appointment of

counsel. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.

1982). Last, Ganther's arguments about the district court's

refusal to grant a new trial are without merit. See Weaver v.

Amoco Prod. Co., 66 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir. 1995). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED and Ganther’s

request for attorneys’ fees and costs is DENIED.
**Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Eighth Chamber) of 18 June 2009 – LIBRO v OHIM – Causley (LiBRO)**

**(Case T-418/07)**

Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the Community figurative mark LiBRO – Earlier Community figurative mark LIBERO – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009) – Partial refusal of registration – Application for annulment brought by the intervener – Article 134(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance – Signature of the pleading setting out grounds of appeal before the Board of Appeal – Admissibility of the appeal before the Board of Appeal

1.                     *Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition
by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services – Likelihood
of confusion with the earlier mark (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b)) (see paras 49-50, 59, 70-73)*

2.                     *Community trade mark – Procedure before OHIM bodies – Transmission of communications to OHIM – Transmission by fax – Illegible
signature (Commission Regulation No 2868/95, Art. 1, Rule 80(3) (see para. 30)*

**Re:**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | ACTION brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 3 September 2007 (Case R 1454/2005-4) concerning opposition proceedings between Dagmar Causley and LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH. |

**Information relating to the case**

| | |
| --- | --- |
| Applicant for the Community trade mark: | LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH |
| Community trade mark sought: | Word and figurative mark LiBRO for goods and services in classes 2, 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 28, 35, 38, 41 and 42 – Application No 2616753 |
| Proprietor of the mark or sign cited in the opposition proceedings: | Dagmar Causley |
| Mark or sign cited in opposition: | Figurative mark LIBERO for goods and services in classes 9, 38 and 42 – Community trade mark No 401141 |
| Decision of the Opposition Division: | Partial dismissal of the application |
| Decision of the Board of Appeal: | Partial annulment of the decision of the Opposition Division |

**Operative part**

The Court:

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. | | Dismisses the action; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2. | | Dismisses the application of Dagmar Causley; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 3. | | Orders LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH to pay the costs, save for those of Dagmar Causley; |

| | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 4. | | Orders Dagmar Causley to bear her own costs. |
# Official Journal C 24I/2021

| | ISSN 1977-091X |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 024I |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 6422 January 2021 |

ISSN 1977-091X

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 024I

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 6422 January 2021

---

| Contents | page |
| --- | --- |
| | IV   Notices |
| | NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES |
| | European Commission |
| 2021/C 24 I/01 | Commission Decision of 11 January 2021 on public holidays in 2022 for staff of the European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg | 1 |

Contents

page

IV   Notices

NOTICES FROM EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, BODIES, OFFICES AND AGENCIES

European Commission

2021/C 24 I/01

Commission Decision of 11 January 2021 on public holidays in 2022 for staff of the European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
STATE v. Calvin Steven BROOKS

212P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 17, 2017

Mr. Dylan J. C. Buffum, Attorney at Law, Mr. Calvin Steven Brooks, for Brooks, Calvin Steven.

Ms. Melissa H. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, Mr. R. Andrew Murray, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*157The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 26th of June 2017 by Defendant to Appoint Counsel:

"Motion Dismissed as moot by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of August 2017."
STATE of North Carolina. v. Indo Ferrell EURE.

No. 175P15.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Aug. 20, 2015.

Kirby H. Smith, III, New Bern, for Eure, Indo Ferrell.

Creecy C. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for State of North Carolina.

W. Clark Everett, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

*ORDER*

Upon consideration of the petition filed on the 26th of May 2015 by Defendant in this matter for discretionary review of the decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals pursuant to G.S. 7A-31, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the North Carolina Court of Appeals:

> "Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 20th of August 2015."
## F I LED United States C ourt of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### M ar c h16,2007 Elisab eth A. Shumaker C lerk of C ourt UNI TED S TATES CO URT O F AP PEALS

T E N T H C IR C U IT P UB L I C S E RV I CE CO M P ANY OF CO L OR ADO, P lain tiff - C o u n ter -D e fe n d a n t - A ppel l ee, v. BO AR D O F COU NTY CO M M I S S I ONE RS OF S AN M I G U E L C O U N T Y , St at e of C ol or ado; E L A I N E FI SH E R , San M i guel C ountyC om m i s s i oneri n her offi c i a l c apa c i ty ; A RT G O O D TI M ES, S a n M ig u e l C o u n tyC o m m iss io n e r in h i s o ffi c i a l c ap a c i ty ; VE RN ON E B E R T , S a n M ig u e l C o u n ty C o m m i s s i o n e ri n h i s o ffi c i a l c ap a c i ty; THE SAN M I GU EL CO UN TY PL A N N I N G D E PA R T M E N T , St at e of C ol or ado; M I C H A E L R O Z Y C K I , San M ig u e l C o u n tyP lan n in g D ire c to r, in h i s o ffi c i a l c ap a c i ty, D efen dan t s - A pp el l ees, PATH FIND ER D EVELO PM ENT, IN C ., D e fe n d a n t - C o u n ter -C laim a n t - A ppel l ee, W I LLAR D F. J AN KE, In ter v e n o r - A p p e llan t. N o. 06- 1187 ( D . C. N o. 1: 04 - CV - 18 28 - RB - CB S)

(D . C o lo .)T hi s or derand j udgm enti s notbi ndi ng pr ece dentexce ptunderthe * doctr i nes of l aw of the ca s e, r es j udi cat a and c ol l at er al es t oppel . I tm aybe ci t ed, how ever , fori t s per s uas i ve val ue cons i s t entw i th Fed. R . A pp. P. 32. 1 ( eff. D ec. 1 , 2 0 0 6 ) an d 1 0 th C ir . R . 3 2 . 1 (eff. Jan . 1 , 2 0 0 7 ). -2- OR DER AND J UDGM EN T * B efor e B RI S CO E , HOLL OW AY , and LU CE RO , C i rcui tJudg es. W ill a rd F . Ja n k e ap p e a ls th e d istric t co u rt’s d e n ial o f h is m o tio n to i nt ervene i n Pub. Serv. C o. of C ol o. v. B d. of C ountyC om m ’ r s , N o. 04- R B - 1828 ( D . C ol o. Sept . 2, 2004) . B ecaus e w e det erm i ned thatcas e i s m oot , w e r emanded w i th instruct i on s t o d i sm i ss. P ub . S erv. C o. of C olo. v. B d. of C ou ntyC om m ’r s, N o s. 0 5 -1 2 9 5 & 0 5 -1 3 2 1 (1 0 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ). A c c o rd in g ly , Ja n k e ’s a p p e a l is DI S M I S S ED a s m o o t.

ENT ERE D FOR T HE COURT

C arlos F . L u ce ro C i r cui tJ udge
STATE v. Patrick Shane WILLIAMS

170P15-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

August 17, 2017

Patrick Shane Williams, for Williams, Patrick Shane.

Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorney General, Tom Horner, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

Morgan, J.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 26th of July 2017 by Defendant for Notice of Appeal:

"Motion Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 17th of August 2017."

Ervin, J., recused
STATE of North Carolina, Plaintiff, v. Bradford Lee BRADSHAW, Defendant.

No. COA17-196

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 17, 2017

NO ERROR.
Patrick Courtney ULI, Plaintiff, v. Rhetta Parkman ULI, Defendant.

No. COA16-1301

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: September 5, 2017

REVERSED. REMANDED.
----

REPORT

on the annual accounts of the European Medicines Agency for the financial year 2004 together with the Agency's replies

(2005/C 332/02)

CONTENTS

Tables 1 to 4

The Agency's replies

INTRODUCTION

THE COURT'S OPINION

Reliability of the accountsThe Agency's accounts for the financial year ended 31 December 2004 are, in all material respects, reliable.Legality and regularity of the underlying transactionsThe transactions underlying the Agency's annual accounts, taken as a whole, are legal and regular.The observations which follow do not call the Court's opinion into question.

OBSERVATIONS

This Report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 5 October 2005.

For the Court of Auditors

Hubert WEBER

President

----

(1)OJ L 214, 24.8.1993, p. 1 and OJ L 136, 30.4.2004, p. 1. Pursuant to the latter Regulation the Agency's original name, European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, was changed to European Medicines Agency.

(2)OJ L 248, 16.9.2002, p. 1.

(3)  These accounts were drawn up on 29 September 2005 and received by the Court on 29 September 2005.

(4)  Article 53(3).

(5)  See paragraph 7 of the Report for the financial year 2003 (OJ C 324, 30.12.2004, p. 31).

(6)  See paragraph 10 of the Report for the financial year 2003).

----

Table 1

European Medicines Agency (London)

Table 2

European Medicines Agency — Implementation of the budget for the financial year 2004

Table 3

European Medicines Agency — Revenue and expenditure account for the financial years 2004 and 2003

Table 4

European Medicines Agency — Balance sheet at 31 December 2004 and 31 December 2003

----

(1)  Including subsidies received from the European Economic Area.

Source: The Agency's data — This table summarises the data provided by the Agency in its annual accounts.

(2)  The data for the financial year 2003 have been reprocessed to make them comparable to those of 2004.

Source: The Agency's data — This table summarises the data provided by the Agency in its annual accounts.

----

THE AGENCY'S REPLIES

----
Exhibit 10.2.1


 


 


AMENDMENT
No. 1 TO


 


MACROCURE LTD.


 


 


 


 




 



2013
SHARE INCENTIVE PLAN



 




 




 


 


 




 



 


Adopted:
July 14, 2014



 


 




 


 


 

    	 



    	 



    




 


Section
5 of the Plan shall be deleted and replaced in its entirety with the following:


 


“5.       SHARES.


 


The number of Shares reserved
for the grant of Awards under the Plan shall initially be 24,094 Shares, or such number as may be reserved for such purpose from
time to time, all of which may be granted as Incentive Stock Options. Effective as of January 1 of each year (commencing on January
1, 2015), the number of Shares reserved for the grant of Awards under the Plan shall automatically increase by the lesser of the
following: (i) two percent (2%) of the outstanding Ordinary Shares on the last day of the immediately preceding year; and (ii)
an amount determined by the Board. The class of said Shares shall be designated by the Board with respect to each Award and the
notice of grant shall reflect such designation. Any share underlying an Award granted hereunder which has expired, or was cancelled
or terminated or forfeited for any reason without having been exercised, shall be automatically, and without any further action
on the part of the Company or any Grantee, returned to the “pool” of reserved Shares hereunder and shall again be available
for grant for the purposes of this Plan (unless this Plan shall have been terminated) or unless the Board determines otherwise.
The Board may, subject to any other approvals required under any Applicable Law, increase or decrease the number of Shares to be
reserved under the Plan. Such Shares may, in whole or in part, be authorized but unissued Shares, or Shares that shall have been
or may be reacquired by the Company (to the extent permitted pursuant to the Companies Law) or by a trustee appointed by the Board
under the relevant provisions of the Ordinance, the Companies Law or any equivalent provision. Any Shares which are not subject
to outstanding options at the termination of the Plan shall cease to be reserved for the purpose of the Plan, but until termination
of the Plan, the Company shall at all times reserve a sufficient number of Shares to meet the requirements of the Plan.”


 


*       *       *


 



    	2
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



I, David M. Bronson, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of PSS World Medical, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify that the Companys
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended April 1, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                                                    
|----------------------------------------------------
|/s/ David M. Bronson                                
|David M. Bronson                                    
|Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
|                                                    
|June 13, 2005
Unassociated Document


 







Surge Global  Energy, Inc.


990 Highland Drive, Suite 206


Solana Beach, CA 90275







November  30, 2010


Mr. E. Jamie Schloss


990 Highland Drive, Suite 206


Solana Beach, CA 90275







RE:  AMENDED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT







Dear Mr. Schloss:







This letter confirms the revised terms of your amended employment agreement with Surge Global Energy, Inc. (hereafter “Surge), as follows:








	
1.  

	
The term of your amended Employment Agreement will be extended by four months from January 1, 2011 until April 30, 2011.








	
2.  

	
For the balance of the term of your employment contract, your base salary shall remain at $10,500 per month, of which $8,000 per month will be paid in paid in cash on a semi-monthly basis and $2,500 per month shall be deferred, with such deferral retroactive to September 1, 2010 under the terms set forth below.  If Surge receives additional financing or availability of cash resources from any source (a "Liquidity Event") Surge has the right to pay you such deferred amount in cash in lieu of stock, at Surge’s election.  All deferred salary not paid in cash can be converted by you to shares of Andora Energy, Inc. common stock at $0.60 per share at any time the deferred amount remains unpaid. For the four months ended December 31, 2010, a total of 16,667 shares of Andora Energy stock will be transferred to you or your designee and the Company will promptly take all steps necessary to effect this transfer prior to December 31, 2010, unless Surge elects to pay the deferred amount in cash.  Surge’s notice to pay this deferred amount in cash, in lieu of Andora stock, shall be in writing by Surge to you prior to the end of each calendar month.








	
3.  

	
All loan advances made by you to Surge to date totaling $47,000.00, or as increased from time to time hereafter, shall all be promptly repaid to you from funds received from a Liquidity Event. If a Liquidity Event does not occur by December 17, 2010, you will have the right, but not the obligation, to convert all or part of any advances owed to you into Andora shares at $0.60 per Andora share on the same terms as set forth in Paragraph 2.








	
4.  

	
All other terms and conditions not amended herein shall be the same as your prior amended employment agreement.







 


Yours truly,




 



	/s/Charles V. Sage	 
	Surge Global Energy, Inc.	 
	By its:	 
	 	 
	AGREED AND ACCEPTED:	 
	 	 
	/s/ E. Jamie Schloss	 
	E. Jamie Schloss
DISMISSED; Opinion Filed February 19, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-01511-CV

HARRIS HOSPICE, INC., Appellant

V.

GLEN JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 

OF RUTH JONES, DECEASED, Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-12742

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Partida-Kipness, and Carlyle

Opinion by Justice Carlyle

Before the Court is appellant’s February 14, 2019 unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal 

for mootness. In the motion, appellant states the parties have resolved their issues. We grant the 

motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a).

We dismiss this appeal.

181511F.P05

/Cory L. Carlyle/

CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

HARRIS HOSPICE, INC., Appellant

No. 05-18-01511-CV V.

GLEN JONES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 

THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 

ESTATE OF RUTH JONES, DECEASED, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-12742.

Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. 

Justices Bridges and Partida-Kipness 

participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED.

Subject to any agreement of the parties, we ORDER that appellee Glen Jones, 

Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Ruth Jones, Deceased recover his costs of 

this appeal from appellant Harris Hospice, Inc..

Judgment entered this 19th day of February, 2019.
IN RE: Bruce BUNTING

No. 240P17-2

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December 7, 2017

Bruce Edward Bunting, for Bunting, Bruce.

Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, Ben R. David, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

***ORDER***

Upon consideration of the petition filed by Petitioner on the 18th of October 2017 in this matter for a writ of mandamus, the following order was entered and is hereby certified to the Superior Court, Pender County:

"Dismissed by order of the Court in conference, this the 7th of December 2017."
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 20

- 2234

PATRICIA RICHARD; RICHARD F. TALLANT , Petitioners

- Appellees ,

v.
ELIZABETH S. TALLANT , Respondent

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina , at Statesville

. Kenneth D. Bell , District Judge. ( 5:20

- cv - 00129

- KDB

- DCK )

Submitted : November 18, 2021 Decided: November 19, 2021

Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Elizabeth S. Tallant, Appellant Pro Se. Jimmy Ray Summerlin, Jr., YOUNG, MORPHIS, BAC H & TAYLOR, L.L.P., Hickory, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Elizabeth S. Tallant (“ Tallant ”) seeks to appeal the district court’s October 2020
order granting Richard Tallant and Patricia Richard’s (“Petitioners”) motion to remand the

case to the state court from which it was removed on the ground that removal was untimely
under 28 U.S.C. § 144 6 ( b ) and denying Tallant’s pending motions as moot . Tallant also seeks to appeal the district court’s September 2020 order denying in part her motion to electronically file documents. Generally, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Supreme Court has instructed that “§ 14 47(d) must be read in pari materia with [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca , 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). Thus, § 1447(d)’s proscr iption against review applies only to remand orders “based on (1) a district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in removal other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction that was raised by the motion of a party within 30 days after
the notice of removal was filed.” Doe v. Blair , 819 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners moved to remand within 30 days of Tallant ’s notice of removal and the
district court remanded on the basis that removal w as untimely. Under the cited authorities ,3 we are without jurisdiction to review the remand order. ∗ Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presen ted in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED

∗ Because the district court’s remand order is unreviewable and the case is no longer before the district court , we dismiss as moot Tallant’s appeal of the intermediary order denying in part her motion to electronically file documents

. See Catawba Riverkeeper Found. v. N.C

. Dep’t of Transp. , 843 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[A] case is moot when
o ur resolution of an issue could not possibly have any practical effect on the outcome of the matter.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
14 

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSTIN 
c _-- I :’ I a3 
-a Jg&Yata dvla6#2U. 

aetrj, . . . maoi ovrpu 

in aaranob t3 tk0 5wrotaxy 0s aate, a8 

from that time down tu wad Inoluding the 30th da of April n4xt rollowia&. only .?UQ!l propextionate Dart of ts mllnoal 
It 1s to be noted, under the abow statutu, 

t&at the trsnahise tnx le oauaod to so&m and become due 

II ttw corporatlon's hwxhhis4 and rigriti undez. tte or rather than 

xapan its legal right to Co busineo~ thereunder. In this ecumotion the oourt sarldr