Filed 7/29/22 In re M.A. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re M.A., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

 B318030

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00318)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHELLE M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge Pro Tempore. 

Conditionally affirmed and remanded with directions.
2

Patricia K. Saucier, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________

In these dependency proceedings Michelle M. (mother)

appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental 

rights over M.A., her two-year-old son, contending the court erred 

in finding the lack of a complete inquiry under the Indian Child 

Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) to be 

nonprejudicial. We agree, and thus reverse with directions to 

order a further ICWA inquiry.

BACKGROUND

We will limit the presentation of facts to those pertinent to 

the only disputed issue on appeal: Whether the failure of the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the 

department) to make inquiries under ICWA requires reversal.

Mother was involved in two prior dependency cases 

pertaining to M.A.’s half siblings, the second of which was open 

when the instant proceeding was filed. In the second proceeding 

mother filed Parental Notification of Indian Status forms (ICWA020) stating she had no Indian ancestry as far as she knew. At 

the May 21, 2018, detention hearing in the second proceeding, 

the juvenile court found it had no reason to know the children 

were Indian children as defined under ICWA, and ordered the 

parents to keep DCFS, their counsel, and the juvenile court 

aware of any new information relating to possible ICWA status. 

On May 27, 2020, the department filed a petition alleging 

mother’s newborn son, M.A., was at substantial risk of harm 
3

pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (j).1The petition alleged M.A. was at 

risk of harm due to (1) mother’s open dependency case with his

half siblings, (2) mother’s history of substance abuse and current 

abuse of methamphetamine, (3) mother’s “mental and emotional 

problems,” (4) M.A.’s father’s (father’s) history of substance abuse 

and current abuse of substances, (5) mother’s prior inappropriate 

discipline of M.A.’s half siblings, and (6) mother’s failure to 

protect the half siblings from the physical abuse by an unrelated 

adult. (Father is not a party to this appeal.) Attached to the 

petition was an ICWA-010 form stating M.A. had no known 

Indian ancestry. 

Mother reported that she received support from father’s 

parents, i.e., the paternal grandparents, and her cousin, and the 

maternal grandfather monitored her visits with M.A.’s half

siblings. Father reported he was adopted by his aunt at the age 

of 14.

On April 28, 2020, mother and father denied knowledge of 

any Native American ancestry. 

On June 2, 2020, mother filed an ICWA-020 form stating 

she had no Indian ancestry as far as she knew. Father never 

filed an ICWA-20 and declined to participate in the hearings, 

post.

At the detention hearing on June 2, 2020, the juvenile court 

found there was no reason to know the ICWA applied as to 

mother. At the permanency hearing on December 21, 2020, the 

court made the same finding as to father. 

1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
4

The matter proceeded through detention hearings,

jurisdiction and disposition hearings, and review and 

permanency hearings, at the last of which the juvenile court 

terminated mother’s parental rights. 

Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in terminating 

her parental rights because no evidence in the record indicates 

DCFS asked any maternal or paternal relatives about M.A.’s 

possible Indian child status, in derogation of state law (§ 224.2)

implementing ICWA and contrary to the requirement that the 

department make and document such inquiries and any 

responses. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481, subd. (a)(5) 

[burden on child welfare agency to provide detailed requirements 

of the ICWA have been satisfied is appropriate]; In re A.M. (2020) 

47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) Therefore, mother argues, the juvenile 

court lacked the power to terminate her parental rights. 

Respondent essentially concedes that section 224.2 was not 

followed but argues any error was harmless because the parents 

denied any Native American ancestry. 

Our prior decisions make clear that the department’s error 

in failing to make required ICWA inquiries does not result in per 

se reversal. (See In re S.S. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575, 581; In re 

Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502; In re A.C. (2022) 75 

Cal.App.5th 1009.) Instead, we must examine the record and 

reverse or remand only if that review shows prejudice because 

“there was readily obtainable information that was likely to bear 

meaningfully upon whether the child is an Indian child.” (S.S. at 

p. 582.) Applying that test here, we find the error was prejudicial 

and thus will remand for further inquiry.
5

Father may not be aware of Indian ancestry because he 

was removed from his biological mother and placed in foster care 

when he was three, and thus “may not . . . know[] [his] cultural 

heritage.” (In re A.C., supra 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1016.) Because 

other family members are likely to have information bearing 

meaningfully on whether M.A. was an Indian child, we conclude 

that the department’s failure to make inquiries of them was 

prejudicial.

We will therefore remand the matter for a further ICWA 

inquiry.

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally 

affirmed. We remand to the juvenile court for DCFS and the 

court to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA 

and California law consistent with this opinion. If the court finds 

the minor is an Indian child, it shall conduct further proceedings 

in compliance with ICWA and related California law. If not, the 

court’s original order terminating parental rights will remain in 

effect.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. KELLEY, J.*

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.