This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1560 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Theron Dean Ibarra, Appellant Filed August 29, 2016 Affirmed Worke, Judge Martin County District Court File No. 46-CR-14-502 Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Elizabeth W. Bloomquist, Fairmont City At torney, Fairmont, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Pu blic Defender, Jennife r L. Lauermann, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Randall, Judge. *

* Retired judge of the Minnes ota Court of Appeals, servin g by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N WORKE , Judge Appellant challenges the district cour t’s determination that a reasonable, articulable suspicion of crimin al activity justified the stop of his vehicle. We affirm. FACTS On May 12, 2014, Officer Craig Fowler observed a vehicle enter and accelerate through a mall parking lot. Officer Fowler be lieved that the vehicle was traveling faster than 15 mph. The officer followed the ve hicle. When Officer Fowler reached the vehicle, it had exited the parking lot. Outsid e the parking lot, the officer measured the vehicle’s speed with radar at 29 mph. O fficer Fowler stopped the vehicle for speeding through the parking lot. Th e driver, appellant Theron Dean Ibarra, admitted that his driver’s license was revoked and that he did not have proof of insurance. Officer Fowler cited Ibarra for driving after revocati on and no proof of insurance. Officer Fowler observed that Ibarra’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, and he detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage while speaking with Ibarra. Officer Fowler ran a probation check and learned that Ibarra wa s on probation, which required him to refrain from consuming alcoholic bevera ges. Ibarra submitted to a preliminary breath test, which indicated 0.097 alcohol c oncentration (AC). The office r placed Ibarra under arrest for driving while impaired (DWI). At the ja il, Ibarra submitted to a breath test, which indicated 0.09 AC. Ibarra was charged with fourth-degree DWI and having an AC of 0.08 or greater within tw o hours of driving.3 Ibarra moved to suppress evidence and di smiss the DWI charges, claiming that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to stop his vehicle based on the officer’s belief that Ib arra was speeding throug h the parking lot. The district court denied Iba rra’s motion to dismiss, and th e parties submitted stipulated facts, pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3. The parties stipulated that (1) Officer Fowler saw a vehicle that he suspected was violating the speed-zone ordinance, (2) the officer stopped the vehicle, (3) the officer fo rmed suspicion that Ibarra was violating DWI laws, and (4) Ibarra’s AC measured 0.09 within two hour s of driving a vehicle. The district court found Ibarra guilty of tw o counts of DWI. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N Traffic stop Ibarra argues that the district court e rred by concluding that Officer Fowler had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of crimin al activity justifying the stop. “When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress ev idence, we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 846-47 (Minn. 2011). A police officer may initiate a limited inve stigatory stop without a warrant if he has reasonable, articulable susp icion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20- 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 ( 1968). “The reasonable-suspic ion standard is not high.”4 Diede , 795 N.W.2d at 843 (quotatio n omitted). The stop must be based on “more than an inchoate and unparticulari zed suspicion or hunch.” State v. Timberlake , 744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quotations omitted). In determining whet her the reasonable-suspicion standard has been met, courts “should cons ider the totality of the circumstances and should remember that trained law-enforcement officers are pe rmitted to make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Kvam , 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (quotation omitted). A traffic violation, no matter how insignificant, generally provides a basis for a stop. State v. Anderson , 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 20 04). An objective basis for a stop exists when an officer be lieves a driver is speeding. Sazenski v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety , 368 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Minn. App. 1985). Here, the district court found that the officer observed Ibarra accelerate through the mall parking lot and estimated that his sp eed reached 30 mph, which radar measured at 29 mph. The district court concluded that Officer Fowler believed that he could stop Ibarra for traveling in excess of the 15 mph speed limit. While it appears that Officer Fowler had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop, Ibarra argues that because the mall parking lot was not marked in accordance with the city ordinance, the officer could not stop hi s vehicle based on a speeding violation. The relevant city ordinance provides: “[D]esignated parking lot” mean s any parking lot open to the public that has been posted with regulatory signs at each entrance thereto indicating that the parking lot is subject to the provisions of this Code relating to parking lots.5 (b) No person shall commit the following acts in a properly designated parking lot: (1) Fail to comply with a pplicable provisions of Minnesota Statutes chapter 169. (2) Fail to observe all traffic signs indicating speed, direction, caution, stopping, or parking, and all others posted for the control of motor vehicles. (3) Ride or drive a vehicle at a rate of speed exceeding fifteen (15) miles per hour

. Fairmont, Minn., Code of Ordi nances §16-3 (2015) (emphasis added). The district court found that although the city or dinance “requires that each entrance of a public parking lot indicate the speed limit,” “[t]he mall did not post speed limit signs at each entrance.” An officer’s reasonable mistake of fact do es not invalidate a search if the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Sanders , 339 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. 1983); see State v. Licari , 659 N.W.2d 243, 254 (Minn. 2003) (stating that “searches based on honest, reasonable mi stakes of fact are unobjectionable under the Fourth Amendment”). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, the factual determinations made by agents of the gover nment need not always be correct, but they must always be reasonable. Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990). Officer Fowler’s belief that all entrances we re marked with the posted speed limit was a reasonable mistake of fact, which does not invalidate the legality of the stop. Issue properly before this court Ibarra also argues that the district court erroneously allowed the state to prosecute Ibarra for charges that ste mmed from one traffic stop in tw o separate prosecutions. Officer Fowler issued Ibarra a citation fo r driving after revocation and no proof of6 insurance and then separately cited Ibarra for DWI. Ibarra moved to dismiss the DWI charges because they were charged separate ly but stemmed from the same behavioral incident as the driving-afte r-revocation and no-proof-of-insur ance charges, but ultimately withdrew this claim. The district court did no t consider this claim or issue a ruling, and, as such, this issue is not properly before this court and we dec line to address it. See Roby
v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Mi nn. 1996) (holding that an appellate court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court). Affirmed.