IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

September 9, 2008 Session

EDDIE LEE DOUGLAS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hardeman County

No. 06-01-0266 J. Weber McCraw, Judge

No. W2008-00395-CCA-R3-PC - Filed October 21, 2008

The petitioner, Eddie Lee Douglas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from

his second degree murder conviction, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

and that his guilty plea was therefore unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm

the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ALAN E.GLENN,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which NORMA MCGEE OGLE and CAMILLE

R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Gary F. Antrican, District Public Defender, and Jeff Lee, Assistant Public Defender, for the

appellant, Eddie Lee Douglas.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney General; D.

Michael Dunavant, District Attorney General; and Joe L. VanDyke, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS

On August 16, 2006, the petitioner pled guilty in the Hardeman County Circuit Court to

second degree murder for the stabbing death of the victim, Roger Spencer. The prosecutor recited

the following factual basis for the plea:

Your Honor, if this matter had gone to trial, the State would have introduced

proof that on or about the 19th day of May, 2006, officers from Whiteville Police

Department were dispatched to 138 Simmon Street there at Whiteville in Hardeman

County regarding a stabbing. Officer Smalley was the first on the scene, observed
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a black male subject identified as Roger Spencer lying on the floor in the living

room; observed that Mr. Spencer was bleeding severely from multiple wounds. 

The victim was breathing at that point in time. . . . He was pronounced dead

later that evening. 

Other officers responded and got statements from people on the scene. . . .

[T]he witnesses told the investigators that the victim . . . and the [petitioner] . . . had

gotten into an argument and a fight ensued. That fight broke up and they sat down.

It seemed at some point [the petitioner] went into the kitchen and retrieved a knife.

Later in the evening, a fight between them broke out again and the [petitioner] . . .

stabbed [the victim] numerous times. 

The [petitioner] was picked up. He subsequently showed law enforcement

where he disposed of the weapon that was used. He gave a statement to law

enforcement that night. As they were preparing to transport [the petitioner] to the

Hardeman County Jail, they told him, “We have to put handcuffs on you” and his

statement was, “ Yeah, you better put handcuffs on me ‘cause they’d get mad if you

brought a murderer into the jail not cuffed.”

At the conclusion ofthe sentencing hearing, the trial courtsentenced the petitionerto twentyone years at 100 percent in the Department of Correction. The petitioner subsequently filed a pro

se petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel

and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following the appointment of postconviction counsel, he filed an amended petition in which he alleged that counsel was ineffective

for, among other things, failing to adequately investigate the case and failing to effectively or

adequately communicate with the petitioner. Specifically, he alleged that counsel’s investigation

“was lackadaisical,” causing her to ignore or overlook evidence and potential beneficial witnesses,

including those whose names had been provided by the petitioner. He further alleged that counsel,

having met with him only one time outside the courtroom, rushed him into entry of his plea without

fully informing him of his choices, the elements of the offenses, or the full ramifications of his plea.

At the January 30, 2008, evidentiary hearing, trial counsel, who was retained by the

petitioner, testified that she spent approximately an hour interviewing him in the jail and then met

with him for about an hour and a half on the day he entered his plea. The petitioner provided her

with the nicknames for some witnesses, such as “Eat ‘Em Up,” but did not give her any full names

or addresses. The police, however, had collected statements from the eyewitnesses, and counsel

reviewed those statements, as well as the police reports and other information she received in

discovery, with the petitioner before he entered his plea. She did not interview any of the witnesses

herself and did not recall the name Eric Tisdale. 
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Trial counsel testified that she explained to the petitioner that he faced a choice of accepting

the State’s offer of pleading guilty to second degree murder with the sentence to be determined by

the trial court or being indicted for first degree premeditated murder and proceeding to trial: 

That’s the day we went over all the discovery that I was given, all the statements of

the witnesses, the officers’ reports, and that day I told him that the offer was he could

do the criminal information to second degree murder, if he did not take that, then he

was going to be indicted on first degree murder, and the death penalty had been

mentioned. 

Trial counsel testified that she explained the elements of first and second degree murder, the

differences in sentencing, and the potential enhancement factors that could be applied. She also

explained that the State would use the petitioner’s retrieval of the knife and the fact that he stabbed

the victim fourteen times as proof of premeditation. She said she discussed the possibility of moving

to suppress the petitioner’s statement, given his drug and alcohol use at the time, but the prosecutor

informed her that he would seek an indictment for first degree murder if she filed a motion to

suppress. According to her agreement with the prosecutor, the petitioner had to plead guilty by

information prior to the first Thursday in September, the day that indictments were presented to the

grand jury. Therefore, time was of the essence in the petitioner’s acceptance of the plea agreement.

Though unhappy, the petitioner understood the choices he faced: 

He was upset, of course, because this was his friend but he understood that he could

either go to trial on first degree murder where the death penalty or life without

possibility of parole or life imprisonment was at issue, or second degree murder

where he could be sentenced between 15 and 25 years at 100 percent.

Trial counsel believed the differences in the penalties associated with convictions for first and

second degree murder played a large role in the petitioner’s decision to plead guilty. She said she

did not recall the petitioner’s having had any problems with a toothache. 

On redirect examination, trial counsel testified that she believed she discussed with the

petitioner how voluntary intoxication can affect premeditation but could not specifically recall the

conversation. She also could not recall the specific language she used when explaining to him the

differences between first and second degree murder. On recross-examination, she agreed that the

petitioner’s intoxication had not prevented him from summoning help for the victim, walking to the

police station to turn himself in, or showing officers where he had disposed of the weapon. 

Eric Glenn Tisdale, Sr., who said he had been a friend of both the victim and the petitioner,

testified that the second fight between the men began when the group was listening to music and the

victim suddenly dove on top of the petitioner. He said he saw the petitioner punching at the victim

but never saw him with a knife. Tisdale testified that he did not make any statement to the police

and that trial counsel never contacted him. 
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The petitioner testified that he “had the knife from the first fight” but had forgotten he had

it. He said that when he got up to leave, the victim jumped on him and began choking him. He

warned the victim that he had a knife and asked him to let him go, but the victim continued his

chokehold. Finally, he “just got weak or tired” and began stabbing the victim. The petitioner

insisted that he never planned to kill the victim but instead was “just trying to get him off . . . to

survive.” 

The petitioner testified that he gave both the police and trial counsel the names of twelve or

thirteen eyewitnesses to the fight. He did not know if trial counsel ever talked to those individuals

but knew that she never spoke to Eric Tisdale, despite his having given her his name. He said that

trial counsel came to see him only once in the jail, for thirty or forty minutes, and never explained

the elements of second degree murder. On the day that he entered his plea he thought that he was

going to the dentist to have his teeth extracted and was surprised when he arrived at court. He said

he wanted to go to trial, but trial counsel convinced him that he would be better off taking the plea

offer. He stated, however, that he felt rushed into accepting the plea. 

The petitioner testified that when he filled out the paperwork for the plea, trial counsel told

him that sentencing at 30 percent release eligibility “was out” but that he might get 45 or 65 percent.

He said she never discussed enhancement factors with him, and he was “never worried” that he

would be sentenced at 100 percent. Had he understood the plea agreement, he would never have

accepted it but instead would have gone to trial. 

On February 6, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying the petition for postconviction relief. Accrediting the testimony of trial counsel and noting the overwhelming evidence

against the petitioner, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel was not deficient in her

representation and had likely negotiated the best possible deal under the circumstances. The court

further found that the petitioner fully understood the nature and consequences of the plea agreement.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the petitioner failed to show that he was denied the effective

assistance of counsel or that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. 

ANALYSIS

I. Post-Conviction Standard of Review

Post-conviction relief “shall be granted when the conviction or sentence is void or voidable

because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the

Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103 (2006). The petitioner bears the

burden of proving factual allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f). When

an evidentiary hearing is held in the post-conviction setting, the findings of fact made by the court

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Wiley v. State, 183

S.W.3d 317, 325 (Tenn. 2006). When reviewing factual issues, the appellate court will not reweigh

the evidence and will instead defer to the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses or

the weight of their testimony. Id. However, review of a trial court’s application of the law to the
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facts of the case is de novo, with no presumption of correctness. See Ruff v. State, 978 S.W.2d 95,

96 (Tenn. 1998). The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, which presents mixed questions of

fact and law, is reviewed de novo, with a presumption of correctness given only to the

post-conviction court’s findings of fact. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001);

Burns v. State, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999).

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner has the burden to show

both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 2064 (1984); see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that

same standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel that is applied in federal cases also

applies in Tennessee). The Strickland standard is a two-prong test:

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 

466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

The deficient performance prong of the test is satisfied by showing that “counsel’s acts or

omissions were so serious as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975)). The prejudice prong

ofthe test issatisfied by showing a reasonable probability, i.e., a “probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome,” that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In the context of a

guilty plea, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that were it not for the deficiencies in

counsel’s representation, he would not have pled guilty but would instead have insisted on

proceeding to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985); House v. State,

44 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tenn. 2001).

On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead

guilty to second degree murder when he “could have refuted the first degree mens rea through

witnesses, self-defense, and voluntary intoxication.” The petitioner argues that, had counsel

informed him that voluntary intoxication can negate a premeditated and intentional killing and

interviewed Tisdale, who could have provided testimony in support of a theory of self-defense, he

would not have pled guilty but instead would have gone to trial with the “likelihood that further

witnesses and voluntary intoxication would have provided a defense.” The State argues that the
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post-conviction court properly found that the petitioner failed to prove his claims by clear and

convincing evidence. We agree with the State. 

In denying relief on this claim, the post-conviction court specifically accredited the testimony

of trial counsel with respect to her preparation for the case and the information she communicated

with the petitioner. Conversely, the court found that Tisdale was not credible, noting that although

he testified that he witnessed the fight, he “incredibly did not see the victim get stabbed fourteen

times as the facts indicated.” The post-conviction court’s order states in pertinent part: 

The Court finds that [trial counsel] provided adequate assistance; she met

with petitioner and discussed the case, including possible sentences. [Trial counsel]

successfully fought a first degree murder indictment and conviction. Petitioner failed

to show any deficient performance by [trial counsel] or that [he] was prejudiced. The

entry of a plea of guilty to avoid the risk of a greater sentence does not make a plea

involuntary. 

The record fully supports the findings and conclusions of the post-conviction court. As the

post-conviction court observed, trial counsel was faced with a case in which there was overwhelming

evidence against the petitioner, including numerous eyewitnesses who observed the petitioner

retrieve the knife and stab the victim multiple times and the petitioner’s own statement to police in

which he admitted his responsibility for the killing. According to trial counsel, the petitioner never

provided her with Tisdale’s name as a potential witness. Even had she interviewed him, it is highly

doubtful that his testimony would have been sufficient for a jury to find that the petitioner acted in

self-defense or did not premeditate the killing given the other eyewitnesses’ testimony and the

undisputed fact that the victim sustained fourteen separate stab wounds. We conclude, therefore,

that the petitioner has not met his burden of showing that trial counsel was deficient in her

representation or that he was prejudiced as a result.

III. Voluntary and Knowing Guilty Plea

In an interrelated argument, the petitioner contends that he was precluded from entering a

knowing and voluntary guilty plea due to the inaccurate and incomplete advice of counsel, whose

failure to properly investigate the case caused her to ignore or overlook evidence of self-defense and

voluntary intoxication. 

When analyzing a guilty plea, we look to the federal standard announced in Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969), and the state standard set out in State v. Mackey, 553

S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977). State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999). In Boykin, the

United States Supreme Court held that there must be an affirmative showing in the trial court that

a guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly given before it can be accepted. 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.

Ct. at 1711. Similarly, our Tennessee Supreme Court in Mackey required an affirmative showing

of a voluntary and knowledgeable guilty plea, namely, that the defendant has been made aware of

the significant consequences of such a plea. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542.
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A plea is not “voluntary” if it results from ignorance, misunderstanding, coercion,

inducements, or threats. Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993). The trial court

must determine if the guilty plea is “knowing” by questioning the defendant to make sure he or she

fully understands the plea and its consequences. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d at 542; Blankenship, 858

S.W.2d at 904. Because the plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the

alternatives available to the defendant, the trial court may look at a number of circumstantial factors

in making this determination. Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. These factors include: (1) the

defendant’s relative intelligence; (2) his familiarity with criminal proceedings; (3) whether he was

represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about alternatives;

(4) the advice of counsel and the court about the charges against him and the penalty to be imposed;

and (5) the defendant’s reasons for pleading guilty, including the desire to avoid a greater penalty

in a jury trial. Id. at 904-05.

The record reveals that the forty-year-old petitioner, who reported that he dropped out of

school after the tenth grade but later obtained his GED, had a prior criminal history consisting of

several misdemeanor convictions, including two convictionsfor assault. Thus, he was familiar with

the criminal justice system at the time he entered his guilty plea. During the plea colloquy, the trial

court appropriately informed the petitioner of his constitutional rights and of the specific rights he

was waiving by pleading guilty. The petitioner assured the trial court that his counsel had thoroughly

discussed the plea agreement with him, that he fully understood its terms and the constitutional rights

he was waiving by entering his plea, and that he was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He

also informed the court that he believed trial counsel had adequately investigated the case and was

satisfied with her representation. 

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she reviewed with the petitioner the

evidence against him and informed him of the elements of first and second degree murder, along

with the range of penalties associated with the offenses. She also explained that if the petitioner did

not accept the plea offered by the State, the prosecutor intended to have him brought to trial on a first

degree murder indictment. Although the petitioner testified that he felt pressured into accepting the

plea, his evidentiary hearing testimony indicates that he nonetheless realized the choice was still his:

And I wanted some time to think about it but everything was rolling, you know, so

fast that they went down to Somerville and I asked her I didn’t have enough of time

and she told me it was a one deal time [sic], if I didn’t take it today, sign those

papers, it was going back up to first degree, and I couldn’t understand how it was

going to go back up to first degree when you got it down from first degree to second

degree. It was a lot of threats on me, just last minute, you know, I ain’t sure what I’m

doing. “It’s up to you. Take it today or don’t. It’s going back up to first degree.

You don’t want that.” Of course, you know, I didn’t want that. So I signed the

papers. 

We conclude, therefore, that the record fully supports the post-conviction court’s findings

that the petitioner’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. 
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CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we conclude that the petitioner has not met his burden of showing that

trial counsel was ineffective in her representation or that his guilty plea was unknowing and

involuntary. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief. 

___________________________________ 

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE