Filed 6/1/22; certified for publication 7/1/22 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELINA S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B313483

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02830A)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Stacy Wiese, Judge. Reversed with directions. 

Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Melina S.

Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Francisco G.

Dawyn Harrison, Acting County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Melina S. (Mother) and Francisco G. (Father) challenge the 

juvenile court’s June 3, 2021, order terminating parental rights 

for their son M.G. (born 2017). They contend the juvenile court 

did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship 

analysis as set out in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 

(Caden C.) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems 

improper. They urge us to reverse the order terminating 

parental rights and remand the matter for a new hearing under 

Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.261 using only the 

correct Caden C. factors. We reverse. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Now four-year-old M.G. is fed through a G-tube due to his 

diagnoses of esophageal reflux, generalized intestinal dysmotility, 

and laryngomalacia. He is also eligible for Regional Center 

Services due to developmental disability. Both parents are 

Regional Center consumers due to their developmental 

disabilities and former foster children. Because their ability to 

care for M.G. is impaired, Vilma L., Father’s longtime childhood 

In Home Support Specialist from the Regional Center, was 

initially M.G.’s primary caregiver.

On December 7, 2017, it was reported to the Los Angeles 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that Mother 

hit Vilma with a closed fist while Vilma was placing the child in 

his car seat. At the time of the referral, parents were receiving 

voluntary family maintenance services through DCFS. Vilma 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.
3

later explained problems occurred when the parents did not take 

their medications and Mother was impatient, angry, worried, 

afraid and aggressive that day while they were waiting for 

Father to be treated at a local clinic for a medical problem.

On December 19, 2017, the parents brought M.G. to UCLA 

Medical Center for a G-tube procedure as he was not thriving. 

The hospital social worker perceived the parents as children 

themselves due to their cognitive delays. The parents did not 

know M.G.’s feeding schedule and told the treating physician 

they were aggressive and hit each other. Vilma was no longer 

willing to care for M.G. and worried about parents’ ability to care 

for him without help. The physician was concerned that M.G. 

would fail to thrive under their care. Consequently, on December 

26, 2017, when M.G. was ready for discharge from the hospital, a 

protective custody warrant was secured placing him on a hospital 

hold. The parents were informed that the child would be 

temporarily placed in a medical foster home. He was so placed.

On December 29, 2017, DCFS filed a petition under section

300, subdivisions (a) and (b), alleging that on December 6, 2017, 

Mother and Father engaged in a violent altercation in the child’s 

presence when Mother struck Father and Vilma. The petition 

also alleged Mother is diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar 

disorder, ADHD and anger management problems and Father 

suffers from depression and anger management problems. These 

conditions allegedly rendered them incapable of providing M.G. 

with regular care.

At the detention hearing on January 2, 2018, the juvenile 

court detained M.G. and parents were permitted monitored 

visitation of at least three hours or three times a week.
4

By the time of the adjudication hearing two months later 

on March 19, 2018, Mother had reported she was taking her 

medication and did not hit Father anymore. Father confirmed 

that and stated he was taking his medication as well. Both 

parents admitted they needed help with the G-tube. Vilma 

offered to allow them to live with her as they could not take care 

of the child on their own. Regional Center staff familiar with the 

parents reported Father was compliant with his meds, needed 

support and independent living skills assistance, and would 

“freak out” if M.G. started to cry. Mother suffered from autism, 

mild intellectual disability, mood swings and agitation. Both 

parents took psychotropic medication for their mood swings, 

angry outbursts, and hallucinations. Both parents participated 

in monitored visitation.

Mother pleaded no contest to the petition which the court 

sustained as to both parents under section 300, subdivision (b) 

(failure to protect). The sustained (b) count alleged mother and 

father have violent altercations and mental and emotional 

problems and developmental delays rendering them incapable of 

caring for M.G. The juvenile court ordered M.G. removed from 

the custody of his parents, and ordered reunification services and 

monitored visitation for both parents.

At the six-month review on September 17, 2018, M.G. was 

reported to be thriving in foster care. He was eligible for 

Regional Center services and received occupational therapy and 

early intervention services. Mother was in compliance with her 

case plan, which included anger management, domestic violence 

and parent education classes. Father was dismissed from anger

management classes after four absences, but was in a new 

program. Both parents were renting a bedroom from a third 
5

party and were scheduled to receive medical training for G-tube 

feedings. Visitation was regular, appropriate, and ongoing.

There was another domestic violence incident in January 

2019 when Father jumped on mother and was choking her. The 

parents had to move out of their residence because of their 

domestic violence. Father’s previous life skills coach reported the 

relationship was toxic. Father had said on numerous occasions, 

including in his anger management classes, he did not want M.G. 

back. Both parents required redirection and had to be prompted 

on how to interact with M.G. during visitation. But their visits 

were regular and appropriate.

Although discharged from anger intervention services due 

to aggressive behavior after he had completed 22 of 26 sessions, 

Father enrolled in a new anger management and domestic 

violence program and also completed a 12-week parenting class. 

Mother continued to be in compliance.

At the 12-month review on April 25, 2019, the court 

considered returning M.G. to his parents. The court heard 

witness testimony from both parents and Natalia S., Mother’s 

Supportive Living Coach employed with the Regional Center. 

Natalia S. testified Mother played games with M.G., engaged him 

and taught him how to stack items. Mother did not, however, 

operate the feeding tube during visits. At the hearing, both 

parents denied the January 25, 2019, domestic violence incident. 

The juvenile court found it premature to return M.G. to his 

parents, expressing concern about their ability to manage the Gtube and their domestic violence. It also found that the January 

25, 2019 choking incident did occur. The court found both 

parents had substantially complied with their programs. DCFS 
6

was ordered to ensure the parents lived apart and were trained 

on managing the G-Tube.

Father completed anger management, domestic violence, 

and parenting programs by May 2019. From February through 

June, 2019, a human services aide had observed 29 weekly visits 

during which both parents appropriately played with, redirected 

and soothed M.G, who was responsive to them. Both parents 

were visiting two hours twice a week without the help of their 

respective life coaches. They still needed some assistance in how 

to interact with M.G. and manage the G-tube.

At the same time, the caregivers were reporting that M.G. 

was showing a strong attachment to them and did not respond 

well when they were not present. During the summer of 2019, 

M.G.’s foster mother became concerned about his aggression. He 

would bite himself, hit his head, jump wildly on the bed and rock 

back and forth. He was referred for an autism evaluation.

Between September and December, 2019, parents received 

more training on operating the G-tube, but each was still 

experiencing difficulty with it.

At the next hearings on January 6 and 15, 2020, the 

juvenile court made several findings. First, it found parents 

“mostly compliant” with the case plan. “But the really critical 

issue is can the parent apply what they learned so the child can 

be returned to a safe home.” The court recounted all efforts 

extended to train parents on operating the G-tube, characterized 

those efforts as “reasonable,” and found “there is a very strong 

indicator that the parents have not, and unfortunately will not be 

able to master the handling of the G-tube.” The court also noted 

the parties were at the 24-month mark in reunification services 

and the court did not have discretion to extend services beyond 
7

that date. “I don’t see that the parents can safely master this Gtube handling. There is no definite time period that I can see if I 

gave this extra amount of time that the parents would be able to 

master his G-tube handling.” The court found parents’ progress 

toward alleviating the causes of dependency insubstantial, 

terminated reunification services over the objections of both 

parents, and ordered a section 366.26 permanent placement 

hearing. At parents’ request, the court also appointed an expert 

under Evidence Code section 730 to evaluate the bond between 

M.G. and his parents.

Although reunification services were terminated in 

January 2020, parents continued to visit M.G. consistently at 

least twice a week, resorting to video chats during the pandemic 

as his pediatrician allowed no visitors due to M.G.’s medically 

fragile condition. Engaging three-year-old M.G. over video was 

difficult for parents due to his hyperactivity and lack of attention.

One year elapsed from the termination of reunification 

services. Visitation continued by video. By January 2021, M.G.’s 

caregivers wanted to adopt him as he had been in their care since 

2018 and they had a strong bond to each other.

By May 20, 2021, the bonding study by psychologist 

Geraldo D. Canul, Ph.D., was completed over a year after it was 

ordered and after one year of physical separation due to the 

pandemic. On May 14, 2021, Dr. Canul interviewed the parents, 

and on May 17, 2021, he observed the parents and M.G. over 

video during their weekly video visit. Dr. Canul found the 

parents and M.G. to be comfortable with one another. The 

parents were attentive, eager, and encouraging. M.G. appeared 

distracted and disinterested in interacting with his parents. He 

needed to be redirected frequently. Dr. Canul concluded there 
8

was “minimally positive emotional interdependence” between the 

minor and the parents. “The nature and quality of their 

relationship is minimally positive.” He reported, “In order for the 

child to more fully develop physically, socially, and 

psychologically [M.G.] will need to live in a stable and consistent 

home and with caregiver(s) who are able to be responsive to his 

numerous developmental, psychological, and medical needs.”

At the 366.26 permanent placement hearing on June 3, 

2021, the juvenile court found the minor adoptable. Both parents 

asserted the beneficial relationship exception. The court noted 

that the bonding study “[b]asically indicated that there was not 

really a bond between the parents and the child.” The juvenile 

court found: “They do want to continue being in his life, but they 

have not acted in a parental role” and “[t]hey have not 

established a bond with the child such that the parental rol[e] 

can be viewed by this court in a positive ma[nn]er.” The court 

terminated all parental rights and set the matter for a 

permanency planning hearing on December 2, 2021.

Both Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal from 

the order terminating parental rights.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law 

At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court has 

already found the child cannot be returned home within the time 

limits set by the statute, the court then determines by clear and 

convincing evidence whether the child is likely to be adopted. If 

the court so finds, the court is statutorily required to terminate 

parental rights unless there is a compelling reason to find that 

termination of parental rights would be detrimental under one of 
9

the six exceptions enumerated in section 366.26, subdivision 

(c)(1)(B). (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206–207). 

The burden of establishing an exception to termination rests with 

the party claiming the exception. (Id. at p. 207.)

One of the six exceptions is the parental-benefit exception 

in section 366.26 (c)(1)(B)(i), which applies where a parent has 

maintained regular visitation and contact, has established a 

positive emotional bond with the child, and the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship to such a degree that the 

child would be greatly harmed by termination. (In re S.B. (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.) 

Caden C. recently clarified how the trial court must view 

elements of the beneficial relationship exception. The question 

presented there was “whether a parent must show progress in 

addressing issues such as drug abuse that led to the child’s 

dependency in order to establish the exception.” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629.) In Caden C., the court of appeal had 

found no parental-benefit exception because the parent continued 

to struggle with substance abuse and mental health issues which 

were the cause of the minor’s dependency. The court treated the 

lack of progress in addressing these issues as a categorical bar to 

establishing the exception. The Caden C. Court found 

consideration of these issues mistaken and reversed. (Id. at 

pp. 625–626.)

Caden C. began with a summary of the purpose of a 

placement hearing under section 366.26. It noted that when a 

court orders such a hearing, reunification services have been 

terminated and the assumption is that the problems that led to 

the court taking jurisdiction have not been resolved. The 

question before the court is decidedly not whether the parent may 
10

resume custody of the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

pp. 629–630.) Instead, the goal is to select and implement a 

permanent plan for the child; the hearing determines only the 

type of permanent home. The first decision the court must make 

at the hearing is whether the child is adoptable, and if so, to 

terminate parental rights. (Id. at p. 630.)

This is when the parental-benefit exception comes to bear. 

Three elements must be satisfied to establish the parentalbenefit exception: 1) regular visitation and contact, taking into 

account the extent of visitation permitted; 2) a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of 

attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing 

the relationship; and 3) a showing that terminating the 

attachment would be detrimental to the child even when 

balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive 

home. When the parent has met that burden, the parentalbenefit exception applies such that it would not be in the best 

interest of the child to terminate parental rights. In that case the 

court must select a permanent plan other than adoption. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.) In assessing 

whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must 

decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship 

with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in 

a new adoptive home. (Id. at p. 632; In re Autumn H. (1994) 

27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)

The exception preserves a child’s right to a relationship 

with the parents even when parent and child cannot safely live 

together. It also does not allow “a judgment about the parent’s 

problems to deprive a child of the chance to continue a 

substantial, positive relationship with the parent.” (Caden C., 
11

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 643.) In determining whether a positive 

emotional relationship has formed, the focus is on the child’s age 

and particular needs, the length of time the child has spent in 

parental custody and the positive and negative effects of 

interactions between parent and child. The court must consider 

how the child speaks about, interacts with, or feels about his 

parents. (Id. at p. 632.)

As to the third element of detriment, the court needs to 

determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental 

relationship— in effect what life would be like for the child in an 

adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “When the relationship with a 

parent is so important to the child that the security and stability 

of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be 

‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship 

with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633–634.)

Significantly, the Caden C. Court noted “the court is not 

comparing the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative 

to those of any potential adoptive parent(s). Nothing that 

happens at the section 366.26 hearing allows the child to return 

to live with the parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) 

“Even where it may never make sense to permit the child to live 

with the parent, termination may be detrimental.” (Ibid.)

The Court also noted the exception becomes relevant only 

when the parent has not made sufficient progress in addressing 

the problems that led to dependency. That lack of progress, then, 

cannot categorically be used against the parent to deny the 

parental-benefit exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 637.) In that vein, whether the parent is or is not ready for the 
12

child’s return to parental custody is not, by itself, relevant to the 

application of the parental-benefit exception. (Id. at p. 638.)

It is unnecessary to show that the parent occupies a 

parental role in the child’s life because a child can have a 

psychologically or emotionally significant relationship with the 

parents even if they do not occupy a parental role. (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th. at pp. 632–633.) The focus, again, is on the 

child. That a child may have more than one person who stands in 

the role of parents does not defeat the exception; a strong 

relationship with one parental figure does not negate the harm 

the child would experience if the child were to lose a significant 

and positive relationship with the parents. (In re S.B., supra,

164 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.)

B. Standard of Review

We review the juvenile court’s findings using a hybrid 

approach. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–641.) For the 

first two elements which require factual findings (parental 

visitation and the child’s emotional attachment), we use “ ‘the 

substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if 

reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s 

order. [Citations.] We must uphold the court’s orders and 

findings if any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted, supports them, and we resolve all conflicts in 

favor of affirmance.’ ” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 565; 

In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) We review the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s 

findings and draw all reasonable inferences in support of those 

findings. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 774.)
13

For the legal question of how the court weighed the relative 

harms and benefits of terminating parental rights, which reflects 

“a delicate balancing of these determinations,” we use the abuse 

of discretion standard. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) A 

court abuses its discretion when it “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of 

legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.” ’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 

295, 318.) It is also an abuse of discretion to rest a disposition on 

an error of law. (In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145, 159.)

C. Analysis

We examine the trial court’s order in light of three 

elements of the beneficial relationship exception.

1. Element 1: Regular Visitation

As to regular visitation, the trial court found Mother and 

Father had maintained regular, appropriate, and affectionate 

visits throughout the proceedings. This finding is unchallenged.

2. Element 2: M.G.’s Emotional Attachment to His 

Parents

For this element, the juvenile court relied on the bonding 

study prepared by Dr. Canul. Dr. Canul interviewed the parents 

together for 90 minutes and then observed by video a weekly 

video visit between them and their son. Dr. Canul concluded that 

Mother “significantly underestimates the deficits and needs the 

minor has socially, in speech/language, and psychologically.” As 

to Father, Dr. Canul found Father also “significantly 

underestimates the minor’s deficits and needs in the areas [of] 

social development, language/speech skills, and psychologically.” 

When Father promptly admonished M.G. several times for not 
14

being attentive during the play session, M.G. “did not seem to 

understand that he was being admonished.”

As to the interactions between parents and M.G., Dr. Canul 

wrote: “The minor’s behaviors, developmental levels 

(psychological, emotional, social) are significantly below his 

expected age levels. The minor appears to have minimally 

developed social skills and verbal skills. He was minimally 

cooperative or responsive to the parents during the observation 

activities. Both parents were eager to interact with the minor, 

but the minor reciprocated minimally to the parents prompts 

during the play session. The minor required ongoing redirection 

in order to remain minimally interactive during the session.” He 

found “there is evidence to indicate the presence of a minimally 

positive emotional interdependence between the minor and the 

parents that has been developing.” Immediately after this 

finding, Dr. Canul concludes: “The minor’s history, 

developmental-behavioral challenges, and medical diagnoses are 

significant. The minor needs several medical, developmental -

behavioral intervention, and mental health support in order to

continue to develop.”

In his final section entitled, “Recommendations,” Dr. Canul 

stated: “The minor and the parents’ relationship are minimally 

interactive and minimally reciprocal in a positive manner. The 

parents have a significant low awareness of the minor’s overall 

psychological, developmental, and emotional challenges and need 

for ongoing interventions. [¶] The nature and quality of their 

relationship is minimally positive. [¶] In order for the child to 

more fully develop physically, socially, and psychologically the 

minor will need to live in a stable and consistent home and with 
15

caregiver(s) who are able to be responsive to his numerous 

developmental, psychological, and medical needs.”

The juvenile court characterized this evaluation as finding 

“no bond” between parents and M.G. On that basis, it declined to 

apply the parental-benefit exception.

The proper factors the study, at a minimum, should have 

considered, recognizing that rarely do parent-child relationships 

conform to an entirely consistent pattern, are set out in Caden: 

1) the age of the child; 2) the portion of the child’s life spent in the 

parent’s custody; 3) the positive or negative effect of interaction 

between the parent and the child; and (4) the child’s particular 

needs. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) To that we add 

the child’s and parents’ particular abilities in expressing and 

establishing bonds. The bonding study upon which the juvenile 

court relied did not analytically address these factors.

We find the bonding evaluation inexplicably terse and 

analytically uninformative, given the disabilities of all members 

of the family, M.G.’s tender age and inability to verbalize, and the 

constraints of one year of video-only contact and communication. 

The study offered minimal if any information about the nature of 

the child’s relationship with his parents in the context of their 

developmental disabilities. Indeed, we do not know how, if at all, 

the evaluator accounted for the family’s disabilities when he 

observed them and found only a “minimally positive” bond. The 

study simply summarizes his observations of a hyperactive threeyear-old with developmental and expressive language delays 

interacting over a video chat. There was no information in the 

reports informatively analyzing the parent-child interactions, a 

fatal lack of information. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833 

863–864.)
16

We understand that evaluating a parent-child bond with a 

three-year-old, non-verbal, below-age level developmentally 

disabled child visiting his developmentally disabled parents by 

video may be very difficult. But even a description of 

observations of M.G.’s interactions with his regular caregivers 

might have shed light on M.G.’s ability, if any, to interact and to 

express his emotions. The evaluation does not address this issue 

whatsoever.

Moreover, the close juxtaposition of Dr. Canul’s 

observations about the interaction between parents and M.G. and 

his oft-expressed concern about M.G.’s developmental-behavioral 

needs leads us to question whether Dr. Canul actually evaluated 

the parties’ emotional bonds, taking into consideration the 

pervasive developmental disabilities affecting all three, as 

opposed to opining only about the parents’ ability to manage 

M.G.’s medical and developmental needs. Dr. Canul’s comments 

lead us to the conclusion that he was, in essence, comparing 

caregivers, an improper consideration. (Caden C., supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 634 [the section 366.36 hearing decidedly is “not 

a contest of who would be the better custodial caregiver.”].)

Comparing a parent’s attributes as a custodial caregiver 

relative to those of any potential adoptive parents is an improper 

factor because nothing that happens at the section 366.26 

hearing allows the child to return to live with the parent. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) The quality of the 

minor’s attachment to his parents must be evaluated in the 

context of the contact they were permitted to have with him 

during the course of the dependency proceeding. In order to show 

they had a beneficial relationship with M.G., the parents did not 
17

have to compete with the foster mother as to who would provide 

the minor with more appropriate care.

Given Dr. Canul’s repeated concerns about M.G.’s other, 

non-emotional issues, we find there is no substantial evidence 

presented to support a determination that the parents and M.G. 

lack a positive, emotional relationship with each other. We arrive 

at this conclusion gingerly, as we are not in the business of reweighing the evidence or substituting our own findings for those 

of the trial court. We simply hold that this report, which focuses 

on the necessity of caregivers savvy enough to provide for M.G.’s 

necessary medical, behavioral, and social interventions, does not 

provide substantial evidence to support a ruling that no 

emotional bond exists between parents and M.G.

3. Element 3: Balancing Termination with the Benefit 

of Adoption

This element requires the court to determine “ ‘how the 

child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in 

effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home 

without the parent in the child’s life.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 640; In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1225.) If 

severing the natural parent-child relationship exception would 

deprive a child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment 

such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for 

adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not 

terminated. (In re B.D., at pp. 1225–1226.)

Given our ruling that substantial evidence does not support 

the finding of “no bond,” it is unnecessary for us to review the 

trial court’s findings as to the third element. We do note, as set 

out above, that the trial court’s comments focus on the parents’ 

inability to assume parental roles as if that is a determining 
18

factor in deciding whether M.G. would be harmed if the 

relationship with his parent were terminated. The focus is not on 

whether M.G.’s parents can assume their parental roles; as 

Caden C. reminded us, that ship sailed when reunification 

services were terminated and the 366.26 hearing was set. The 

focus with the third element is on whether to break the emotional 

bond, if the court finds, on remand based on sufficient evidence, 

that there is a positive, emotional attachment that the child 

would benefit from continuing. (In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 

261, 271 [the court’s “express findings that father did not act like 

a parent demonstrate it considered facts which Caden C. has 

explained are inappropriate in determining whether the 

parental-benefit exception applies.”].) When a juvenile court 

bases its decision to terminate parental rights on improper 

factors, the trial court abuses its discretion. (In re Charlisse C.,

supra, (2008) 45 Cal.4th at p. 159; In re D.M., at p. 271.) On 

remand, whether the parents can fulfill parental roles is not a 

factor for the juvenile court to consider.
19

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is reversed. The 

matter is remanded for the juvenile court to conduct a new 

366.26 hearing in conformance with the principles articulated in 

In re Caden C.

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

GRIMES, J.

HARUTUNIAN, J.

 Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.
Filed 7/1/22

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

______________________________

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MELINA S. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

B313483

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 17CCJP02830A)

ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION 

FOR PUBLICATION

[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 1, 2022, was not 

certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now 

appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.

[There is no change in the judgment.]

__________________________________________________________________

STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J. HARUTUNIAN, J.

 Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.