The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Court 1

Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

 The Honorable David D. Noce, United States Magistrate Judge 2

for the Eastern District of Missouri.

 Barry does not appeal his conviction for possession of

3

methamphetamine.

___________

No. 96-1941

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Paul Richard Barry, *

* 

Defendant-Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: September 13, 1996

 Filed: October 17, 1996

___________

Before FAGG, LAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Paul Richard Barry was convicted of various drug and firearm offenses

under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 844, and

26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871. Prior to trial, the district court, based 1

on the magistrate judge's recommendation, denied Barry's motion to dismiss 2

the indictment and to suppress certain evidence. The district court

entered judgment pursuant to the jury verdict and sentenced Barry to

imprisonment for an aggregate term of 190 months. Barry appeals his

conviction as it relates to all but one count. We affirm. 3
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FACTS

Counts I and II stem from a traffic stop occurring on March 15, 1995,

after a Leadington, Missouri police officer observed Barry’s vehicle

violate a red light. The officer arrested Barry for operating with a

suspended driver's license, and arranged to have Barry's vehicle impounded.

The officer performed a pat-down search of Barry, uncovering .05 gram of

methamphetamine, and he performed an inventory search of Barry's vehicle,

uncovering a loaded .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol under the front seat

armrest. Barry was a previously convicted felon at the time of the arrest.

Counts III through VII arise from a traffic stop occurring at three

o'clock in the morning on May 5, 1995, after a different Leadington police

officer observed Barry's vehicle operating erratically. 

Officer Darrell Bennett recognized Barry from a prior court

appearance for driving with a suspended license, and asked Barry to present

his driver’s license. While Barry fumbled for his license, Officer Bennett

noticed three packets containing white powder in Barry's wallet. Barry

admitted he had been drinking, and complied with Officer Bennett's

directive to exit the vehicle to perform sobriety tests. Barry failed four

sobriety tests. 

After Barry failed the tests, Officer Bennett examined Barry’s wallet

more closely. Officer Bennett testified that on prior occasions he had

seen packets of white powder similar to those in Barry's wallet, and that

on those occasions the powder turned out to be methamphetamine or cocaine.

Officer Bennett arrested Barry for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and

possession of illegal drugs.

Officer Bennett then performed an inventory search of Barry's
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vehicle as part of his department’s customary impoundment procedure.

Bennett found two vials of cocaine and a loaded, unregistered, sawed-off

shotgun in the unlocked glove compartment. The officer also found scales,

containers of marijuana and cocaine, spoons, a pipe, a hypodermic needle,

and a mirror with white, powdery residue. The cumulative weight of the

cocaine in Barry’s vehicle was 459 grams and the weight of marijuana was

about 710 grams. The packets in Barry’s wallet contained 1.05 grams of

cocaine. Officer Bennett transported Barry to the Leadington Police

Department, where Barry provided a breath sample revealing that his blood

alcohol content was .022%.

At various points in the proceedings below, Barry moved the district

court to suppress evidence seized during the May 5 inventory search of his

vehicle, to dismiss the charges of possession as a felon, and for judgment

of acquittal as to carrying a firearm in relation to drug trafficking. 

SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE

Barry challenges the district court’s failure to suppress the

evidence seized after the May 5 traffic stop, asserting the stop and

subsequent arrest were merely a pretext for the vehicle search. We review

de novo whether an officer's stop is based upon reasonable suspicion and

whether the arrest is based upon probable cause. Ornelas v. United States,

116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996). We review the district court's findings

concerning the underlying historical facts under the clearly erroneous

standard. Id. 

 

It is undisputed that Officer Bennett observed Barry operating his

vehicle erratically and crossing the centerline at three o'clock in the

morning on May 5. Officer Bennett's uncontradicted testimony at the

suppression hearing amply supports the magistrate
 Officer Bennett testified in relevant part as follows: 4

I noticed him coming off the highway, he was a little

wobbly, but I couldn't see how he was driving so, I

couldn't make any judgments right there. So, I went

ahead and stayed in my position, he came on around on

Highway 32, headed west, passed me; the one lane turns

into divided lanes; he crossed the center line a couple

of times, went ahead, was gonna make a right turn, made

it a little early, hit the shoulder and proceeded on. 

Tr. of Evidentiary Hr'g, at 31.

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judge's finding. 

4

Failing to operate one’s vehicle within a single lane violates

Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.015. Driving while intoxicated also

violates Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.010.1. Officer Bennett

witnessed Barry violate the former and had reasonable suspicion based on

Barry’s driving to believe Barry may also have been violating the latter.

We recently observed "[i]t is well established that a traffic violation--

however minor--creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle."

United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993); see also

United States v. Rehkop, No. 95-3446, 1996 WL 526239, at *4 (8th Cir. Sept.

18, 1996) (holding officer had reasonable belief that a driver was

intoxicated where the driver remained at a traffic light through three

rotations and weaved several times within his own lane). We conclude that

Officer Bennett lawfully stopped Barry's vehicle. 

Barry contends his DWI arrest was mere pretext to allow Officer

Bennett to search his vehicle without a warrant. This argument fails.

While pretextual traffic stops or arrests may violate the Fourth Amendment,

as long as a police officer does no more than he or she is legally

permitted and objectively authorized to do, the officer’s stop or arrest

is constitutional. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 (1991). 
 That Barry's breath test after the arrest at the police

5

department revealed a blood alcohol content of only .022% is

inapposite to whether there was probable cause immediately before

the arrest to conclude Barry was driving while intoxicated. 

Additionally, intoxication with drugs other than alcohol, or

a combination of drugs and alcohol, also would support conviction

under Missouri's DWI law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.001.2. ("[A]

person is in an 'intoxicated condition' when he is under the

influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug, or any

combination thereof."). In this vein Barry supports his pretext

argument by asserting that officers "neglected or declined to

obtain a blood sample" to establish whether any other drug was in

his system. Appellant's Br., at 22. However, the court notes with

disfavor Barry's failure also to disclose Officer Bennett's

uncontested testimony that Barry was several times offered, but

refused, a urine test, which also would have established whether he

had ingested other drugs. See Tr. of Evidentiary Hr'g, at 43-44;

Tr. of Trial, vol. I, at 105. 

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The question then turns on whether probable cause existed for Barry's

arrest. "In determining whether probable cause exists to make a

warrantless arrest, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances

to see whether a prudent person would believe the individual had committed

or was committing a crime." United States v. Segars, 31 F.3d 655, 659 (8th

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 772 (1995). Here, Barry drove

erratically, admitted to Officer Bennett he had been drinking, and failed

multiple sobriety tests. A reasonable person could conclude Barry was

driving while intoxicated; under the circumstances, we find Officer Bennett

lawfully arrested Barry. Because we conclude there was probable cause to 5

arrest Barry for DWI without regard to any cocaine in Barry's wallet, we

need not reach Barry's argument that the magistrate judge should have

discredited Officer Bennett's testimony that Bennett observed the cocaine

packets in Barry's wallet before arresting him. 

A police officer may conduct a warrantless inventory search of a

vehicle the officer is lawfully impounding. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.

367, 370-74 (1987). Officer Bennett conducted such a search of Barry's

vehicle and in doing so discovered the shotgun
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and drugs. We find no error in the district court's denial of Barry's

motion to suppress this evidence. 

CARRYING FIREARM IN RELATION TO DRUG TRAFFICKING

Barry challenges his conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

based on the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 116 S.Ct.

501 (1995). Reviewing de novo the district court's conclusion that Bailey

affords Barry no relief, we agree Bailey is inapplicable here. 

Bailey narrowly defines "use" under § 924(c)(1) as requiring proof

that the defendant "actively employed the firearm during and in relation

to the predicate crime." 116 S.Ct. at 509. However, Barry was indicted for

carrying a firearm, not for using a firearm, and Bailey did not address the

alternate "carry" prong of § 924(c)(1). Barry nevertheless contends that

because he did not have the shotgun on his person, he did not "carry" the

shotgun. We disagree.

Before Bailey, we recognized that "the common usage of 'carries'

include[s] 'carries in a vehicle.'" United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d

383, 387 (8th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding Barry's argument, Bailey does

not require us to abandon Freisinger. Indeed, after the parties submitted

their arguments in this matter, we decided United States v. Willis, 89 F.3d

1371 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 96-5793, 1996 WL 514275 (1996). Willis

held the Freisinger standard survived Bailey. Id. at 1379. Barry's

transportation of the shotgun in his glove compartment satisfies the

"carry" prong of § 924(c)(1). 

Barry also challenges the district court's denial of his motion for

acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether he carried

the firearm "in relation to" drug trafficking. We will narrowly review a

district court's denial of a motion for
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acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

and giving the government the benefit of reasonable inferences drawn from

the evidence. United States v. Cunningham, 83 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir.

1996). 

The phrase "in relation to" in § 924 (c)(1) is "expansive," requiring

that the firearm have some purpose or effect regarding drug trafficking and

that it facilitate or have the potential to facilitate drug trafficking,

as opposed to being present merely as the result of accident or

coincidence. Smith v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2058-59 (1993). 

Here, the jury could reasonably infer that Barry's sawed-off shotgun

had the potential to facilitate Barry's possession and intended sale of

cocaine and marijuana. The shotgun was loaded, unregistered, and concealed

with two vials of cocaine in Barry's unlocked glove compartment. He

transported the shotgun in the same passenger compartment in which he

transported nearly $50,000 in illegal drugs. There was ample evidence

supporting the jury's verdict that Barry carried the shotgun "in relation

to" drug dealing. 

COMMERCE CLAUSE

Finally, Barry assigns error to the district court's denial of his

motion to dismiss the two counts of possession of a firearm as a felon

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He relies on United States v. Lopez, 115

S.Ct. 1624 (1995), for the proposition that the Commerce Clause precludes

application of § 922(g)(1) to his firearm possession. We reject Barry's

argument. In United States v. Bates, we held that § 922(g)(1) was

constitutionally applied to a defendant who possessed a shotgun

that had traveled in interstate commerce. 77 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir.),

cert. denied, No. 96-5184, 1996 WL 411183 (1996). Here, the

parties stipulated that the firearms at issue traveled in

interstate commerce. For the reasons
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articulated in Bates, "we find the application of section 922(g)(1)

to [Barry's] conduct eminently constitutional." Id. at 1104.

We affirm the district court's judgment against Barry.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.