Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A05-1503-PL-00131 | December 10, 2015 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Samuel L. Bolinger 

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Patrick L. Proctor 

Fort Wayne, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Auto Liquidation Center, Inc., 

and Majid Zojaji (a/k/a Mike 

Zojaji), Individually 

Appellants-Defendants, 

v. 

Jorge Chiqui Chaca, 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

December 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No. 

02A05-1503-PL-00131 

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Stanley Levine, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

02D01-1204-PL-000131 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 

Case Summary 

[1] Auto Liquidation Center (ALC), whose owner is Majid “Mike” Zojaji, 

repossessed a Dodge Charger that it sold on credit to Jorge Chiqui Chaca. 

Initially the car was repossessed because Zojaji erroneously believed that Jorge 

was behind in payments. After Jorge proved he was current in his payments, 
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Zojaji refused to return the car to Jorge, claiming instead that he confiscated the 

car because Jorge had disconnected the GPS—a GPS that Zojaji had used to 

disable Jorge’s car for alleged non-payment. Ultimately, Zojaji never returned 

the car or its contents to Jorge and sold it at auction. A jury found that ALC 

and Zojaji converted Jorge’s car and awarded damages and treble damages 

under Indiana Code section 34-24-3-1. ALC and Zojaji appeal the judgment 

arguing that there is insufficient evidence to show that they had the intent to 

exert unauthorized control over Jorge’s property. They also complain that the 

damages awarded were excessive. We find sufficient evidence of intent, affirm 

the damage award, and order the case remanded to the trial court to award 

reasonable appellate attorney’s fees to Jorge. We also warn that self-help is a 

perilous and potentially expensive path. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On November 25, 2011, Jorge bought a 2008 Dodge Charger from Auto 

Liquidation Center, Inc. (ALC), which is owned and operated by Zojaji and 

located in New Haven, Indiana. Jorge agreed to purchase the car for $14,500. 

Jorge paid $4000 as a down payment at the time of purchase, and agreed to pay 

ALC the remaining balance through forty-eight, twice-monthly installment 

payments: forty-seven payments of $250 and one payment of $435.35. The 

payments were to begin on December 10, 2011. 

[3] As a condition of the deal, Jorge agreed to the car being equipped with a GPS 

device. Jorge signed a document entitled “Disclosure Statement and 
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Agreement for Installation,” providing that installing and maintaining a GPS 

device in the car was a material condition for ALC to finance the loan secured 

by the vehicle; that tampering with, altering, disconnecting, or removing the 

device was grounds for default under the agreement; and that any default 

entitled ALC to take “any and all actions, including but not limited to, 

repossession and sale, as may be allowed under the terms of the Contract.” Ex. 

5. ALC uses GPS devices for three purposes: (1) to track the location of cars it 

has sold; (2) to send a warning signal to customers who are late on payments; 

and (3) to send an electronic signal that disables a car’s starter system to aid in 

the repossession of a car. See Tr. p. 228-32, 368-71. A GPS was installed in the 

car.1

 

[4] Jorge timely made his first payment to ALC on December 10 by handdelivering his check to ALC. Each of his payments was made in this manner. 

ALC staff entered Jorge’s payments in a computer and handwrote each 

payment in a black ledger book, which acts as a back-up to the computer 

system. See Tr. p. 219. The black book is a “fail-safe” against computer errors, 

and the best way to double-check whether a payment was missed. See id. at 

220. 

 

1 On three separate occasions—twice in December 2011 and once in March 2012—ALC sent commands to 

the GPS device installed on Jorge’s car to locate the car and test the GPS device. See Ex. 28. 
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[5] Jorge’s first payment in December was a double payment of $500. His next 

payment on January 10, 2012, was a single payment of $250, followed by a 

double payment of $500 on January 30 and another double payment on 

February 27. But ALC erroneously entered the February 27 payment as a 

single payment, which didn’t “push his due date out properly,” even though the 

amount entered in the computer and Jorge’s receipt clearly state the payment 

amount was $500. See Ex. 22; Tr. p. 221. As of February 27, approximately 90 

days after the sale, Jorge had made $1750 in car payments in addition to the 

initial $4000 down payment. 

[6] In mid-March, when Jorge’s next payment would have been due if he had not 

made a double-payment at the end of February, ALC’s computer system 

generated a report that was given to Zojaji, which stated that Jorge had missed 

a payment on March 10. Without double-checking the black ledger book to see 

whether Jorge had, in fact, missed a payment, Zojaji ordered Jorge’s car 

repossessed, and on March 13 at 8:28 p.m., according to the “IMETRIK” 

report, a “starter disable” command was sent via the GPS device. See Ex. 28 

(the IMETRIK report).2

 

[7] On March 15 Jorge’s wife took the car to Jesse’s Auto Repair, complaining that 

the check-engine light was on, there was a “dinging” noise coming from the 

 

2

 IMETRIK is described on its website as an “end-to-end car tracking solution” that enables the user to 

“interact in real-time with a vehicle in which a telematics device is installed.” See

http://www.imetrik.com/en/solutions#vehicle-finance-telematics (last visited Nov. 18, 2015). 
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dashboard, and she was unable to shift into the lower gears of her transmission. 

Ex. 29 (Affidavit of Mark Kapocius). The mechanic determined the GPS 

device was improperly installed in the car causing damage that ultimately 

would have resulted in irreparable damage to the transmission. Id. The 

mechanic, therefore, disconnected the offending GPS device, without notice to 

Jorge, until Jorge picked up the car at Jesse’s Auto Repair when it was about to 

close for the day. Jorge was told that the GPS could be reconnected the next 

day. But by the time Jorge awoke the next morning, ALC had repossessed the 

car at the direction of Zojaji. 

[8] Jorge called ALC and asked for an explanation. Zojaji told him the car was 

repossessed because Jorge “hadn’t paid.” Tr. p. 88. Jorge advised Zojaji that 

he was not behind on payments but one payment ahead, and that his receipts 

were in the repossessed car. Jorge then went to ALC to get the receipts out of 

the car; as he reached in the car to get the receipts, Zojaji inexplicably 

“slammed the door[,]” hitting Jorge. Id. at 90. Jorge nonetheless got the 

receipts out of the car and showed them to Zojaji, who was yelling and “very 

angry.” Id. at 92. Zojaji inspected the receipts and then claimed, “I took the 

car because you had disconnected a GPS.” Id. 

[9] Jorge explained to Zojaji that Jesse’s Auto Repair had removed the GPS device 

without Jorge’s permission because the mechanic had determined that it was 

improperly installed and damaging the car. Zojaji demanded to know the 

mechanic’s name and number, which Jorge provided. After speaking with 

Zojaji on the telephone, the mechanic accompanied Jorge to ALC with the 
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GPS device and the tools to connect it. But Zojaji would not allow him to 

reinstall the device, and made them leave the dealership. Upon Zojaji’s officemanager’s suggestion to have ALC’s “GPS guy” check out the car, it was 

confirmed that the GPS was improperly installed and each command ALC sent 

to Jorge’s GPS device was causing damage to the car. Id. at 238. 

[10] The office manager further recommended to Zojaji that ALC return the car to 

Jorge. Zojaji, who was “furious,” said he would not return the car because 

Jorge “had been a pain in the tush from day one.” Id. at 235, 236. In Zojaji’s 

words, Jorge was a “lay-away deal”—he had “basically zero credit,” and Zojaji 

“was banking on the fact that they were going to miss a payment here or there 

and he would get this car back.” Id. at 241. 

[11] At the time ALC repossessed Jorge’s car, Jorge had certain personal items 

inside the car—some clothing, music CDs, electronic cables, and his minor 

daughter’s school project—all worth between $543 and $690. Through his 

attorney, Zojaji promised to return the personal items to Jorge, but never did. 

[12] On April 25, 2012, Jorge filed his original complaint against Zojaji and ALC. 

Approximately eight months later, in December of 2012, Zojaji sold the car at 

auction for $10,400 using one of two blank limited-power-of-attorney forms 

Jorge had signed at the time of the initial sale. In order to obtain clear title to 

the car, Zojaji had filled out the form and engaged a notary to falsely certify 

that Jorge had signed the form on April 27, 2012—two days after Jorge had 

filed his first complaint. 
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[13] Jorge alleged in his complaint and amended complaint criminal conversion, 

assault, and general damages; and a violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 

U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (TILA). A jury returned a verdict for Jorge on all counts, 

awarding damages in the amount of $45,883.86 for the conversion claim. The 

trial court entered a final judgment for Jorge in the amount of $121,069.66, 

which included prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees.3

 ALC and Zojaji now 

appeal. 

Discussion and Decision 

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Criminal Conversion 

[14] On appeal, ALC and Zojaji challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the jury’s verdict against them on the criminal conversion claim. Our standard 

of review of sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is the same in civil cases as 

in criminal cases. Indian Trucking v. Harber, 752 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. This Court will affirm the 

verdict unless we conclude that it is against the great weight of the evidence. Id. 

 

3

 In the order or judgment of the court, the trial court also imposed post-judgment interest and court costs. 

See Appellee’s App. p. 1. 
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[15] In order to prove that ALC and Zojaji criminally converted Jorge’s car and 

other personal property inside the car, Jorge had to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that ALC and Zojaji “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] 

unauthorized control” over his property. See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3; see also 

Larson v. Karagan, 979 N.E.2d 655, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (providing that in a 

criminal conversion action, criminal intent must be proven by a preponderance 

of the evidence). The mens rea requirement differentiates criminal conversion 

from the more innocent breach of contract or failure to pay a debt—situations 

the criminal conversion statute was not intended to cover. Larson, 979 N.E.2d 

at 661. “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the 

conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A 

person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is 

aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). To “‘exert 

control over property’ means to obtain, take, carry, drive, lead away, conceal, 

abandon, sell, convey, encumber, or possess property, or to secure, transfer, or 

extend a right to property.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-1(a). And a person’s control 

over property of another person is “unauthorized” if it is exerted without the 

other person’s consent. I.C. § 35-43-4-1(b)(1). 

[16] Here, the evidence shows that ALC/Zojaji repossessed Jorge’s car because he 

erroneously believed that Jorge had missed a payment.4

 Only after Jorge 

 

4

 The appellants argue in their reply brief that “Extra payments by Jorge did not excuse him from making his 

March payment by the 10th of the month.” Appellants’ Reply Br. p. 6. First, we find this argument is 

waived because “[n]o new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.” See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C). And in 
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showed Zojaji receipts proving that he was current on his payments, did Zojaji 

claim to have repossessed the car because Jorge had disconnected the GPS 

device. Even after Zojaji learned that the GPS was disconnected because of the 

irreparable damage it was causing to the car and that Jorge’s mechanic would 

reinstall the device, Zojaji refused to give Jorge either his car or his personal 

belongings. We find the evidence supports the conclusion that Zojaji 

knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Jorge’s 

property—namely, the car and the personal items contained therein. See Palmer 

Dodge v. Long, 791 N.E.2d 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there was 

sufficient evidence to support criminal-conversion finding against dealership 

where the dealership had possession of the buyer’s purchased car but refused to 

give back the buyer’s trade-in car). In this case, even if Zojaji initially 

repossessed the car due to a genuine misunderstanding as to the allegedly 

missed payment or the removal of the GPS device, once those 

misunderstandings were clarified, Zojaji simply had no reason—contractual or 

otherwise—to keep Jorge’s car.5

 

 

any event, we find the argument has no merit because the evidence shows that Jorge had on two prior 

occasions—on December 10, 2011, and January 30, 2012—made one monthly payment of $500 (rather than 

two $250 payments), and ALC/Zojaji had not objected to this or asserted that Jorge was in default. 

5

 In their brief, Appellants assert that Jorge had “several opportunities to get the car back and the personality 

[sic] therein[,]” but the evidence shows that Jorge could only get the car back by paying the promissory note 

in full or paying money beyond what Jorge owed under the contract. See Appellants’ Br. p. 27. As to the 

personal property, it appears that initially Zojaji said he would give it to his attorney but then allegedly lost 

the property. See Appellee’s Br. p. 17. 
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[17] ALC and Zojaji maintain, however, that Zojaji “firmly believed that he had a 

legal contractual right to repossess the car due to [Jorge]’s removal of the GPS 

device.” Appellants’ Br. p. 22. And, the argument continues, “Appellant 

cannot be guilty of conversion because his control over the vehicle was not 

‘unauthorized.’ He had no ‘mens rea.’” Id. This argument is nothing more 

than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. To support 

their contention, however, ALC and Zojaji cite to French-Tex Cleaners, Inc. v. 

Cafaro Co., 893 N.E.2d 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In that case, a commercial 

tenant was appealing from a summary judgment in favor of the landlord after 

the tenant alleged that the landlord had committed conversion by overcharging 

the tenant for its share of real estate taxes due under the lease. The trial court 

found—and this Court agreed—that the tenant’s claim constituted a bona fide 

contract dispute and not a claim for conversion. See id. at 1166-67. 

[18] But French-Tex is distinguishable from this case, for at least two reasons. First, 

there was sufficient evidence here for the jury to find that this was never a bona 

fide contract dispute. Even if the jury believed that Zojaji had initially acted on 

a mistaken belief that Jorge missed a payment, the evidence supports that the 

misunderstanding morphed into an intentional, unauthorized taking of Jorge’s 

property. In other words, when Zojaji realized Jorge was not behind in his 

payments and that he, Zojaji, had wrongfully disabled Jorge’s car via the GPS 

device, which resulted in Jorge’s mechanic needing to disconnect the GPS to 

prevent further damage to the car, the jury could very well have concluded that 

Zojaji’s continued possession of the car constituted conversion. As to the 
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second distinction, in French-Tex the tenant was appealing from a negative 

judgment, whereas here Jorge prevailed in the trial court; thus, we must decline 

the appellants’ ongoing invitation to reweigh the evidence of Zojaji’s intent. 

Our standard of review requires us to consider only the evidence most favorable 

to the verdict unless we conclude that it is against the great weight of the 

evidence. See Indian Trucking, 752 N.E.2d at 172. Because we cannot say that 

is the case here, we affirm the finding of criminal conversion. 

2. Damages Award 

[19] Next ALC and Zojaji allege that the damages awarded by the jury were 

excessive. The jury has broad discretion in determining an award of damages, 

and when the evidence is conflicting, the jury is in the best position to assess the 

damages. Cox v. Matthews, 901 N.E.2d 14, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’d denied,

trans. denied. Therefore, when reviewing a jury verdict containing a damage 

award claimed to be excessive or inadequate, this Court applies a strict 

standard. Ritter v. Stanton, 745 N.E.2d 828, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We 

consider only the evidence that supports the award along with the reasonable 

inferences therefrom, and a damage award will be upheld if it falls within the 

bounds of the evidence. Id. If there is any evidence to support the amount of 

the award, even if it is conflicting, this Court will not reverse that award. Id. 

Where the damage award is so outrageous as to indicate the jury was motivated 

by passion, prejudice, partiality, or consideration of improper evidence, we will 

find the award excessive. Id. at 844. But the jury’s damage award will not be 
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deemed the result of improper considerations if the size of the award can be 

explained on any reasonable ground. Id. 

[20] In this case, Jorge’s conversion claim arises under Section 34-24-3-1, which 

provides for—among other things—treble damages to a person who has 

suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of certain crimes, including criminal 

conversion. The record reflects that the jury’s damage award was based on the 

value of the car and the personal property contained in the car. In his appellate 

brief, Jorge discusses the range of reasonable damage awards based on the 

evidence that was before the jury, based on the car being priced somewhere 

between $10,400 (the price for which the car was sold at auction in December 

2012) and $18,900 (the original sale price listed on the internet in November 

2011), plus the personal property contained therein valued somewhere between 

$543 and $690, resulting in a range of between $10,943 and $19,590. When 

these amounts are trebled, as authorized by the statute, the range is between 

$32,829 and $58,770. Therefore, the jury’s award of $45,883.86 is clearly 

within the range supported by the evidence. See Appellee’s Br. p. 19. Further, 

ALC/Zojaji offer no evidence that the jury’s damage award was motivated by 

passion, prejudice, partiality, or consideration of improper evidence. See Ritter, 

745 N.E.2d at 844. Thus, ALC/Zojaji does not meet the strict standard we 
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apply when reviewing jury-awarded damages, and we will not reverse the 

damage award on these grounds.6

3. Appellate Attorney’s Fees 

[21] Finally, Jorge contends that he is entitled to an award of additional attorney’s 

fees for this appeal, basing this contention on Section 34-24-3-1, which allows 

for the recovery of attorney’s fees. Specifically, the statute provides in relevant 

part that “a person [who] suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation of IC 

35-43 . . . may bring a civil action against the person who caused the loss for . . . 

a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1. The trial court 

appropriately assessed “fair and reasonable” attorney’s fees against ALC and 

Zojaji in the amount of $66,715. See Appellee’s App. p. 1. The appellants do 

not challenge this award. 

[22] This Court has consistently found that an award of attorney fees includes 

appellate attorney’s fees—at least, as here, when the party seeking appellate fees 

has been successful on appeal. See e.g., Benge v. Miller, 855 N.E.2d 716, 722 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Patricia Ann Brown, C.P.A. v. Brown, 776 N.E.2d 

394, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (“While there are many cases holding that an 

award of attorneys’ fees under Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1 should include 

 

6

 Appellants frame their argument as a challenge to the jury verdict, but the trial court specifically did not 

enter judgment on that verdict. Instead, the trial court added 8% prejudgment interest to the jury award of 

$45,883.96, plus “fair and reasonable” attorney’s fees in the amount of $66,715 (pursuant to both the TILA 

and conversion claims), for a total of $121,069.66, plus 8% post-judgment interest from January 21, 2015—

the date of the trial court’s order—and court costs. See Appellee’s App. p. 1. 
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appellate attorneys’ fees . . . our review of such cases finds that to be the 

situation only where the party seeking appellate fees has been successful on 

appeal.”), trans. denied. Because we affirm the finding of criminal conversion, 

we affirm the trial court’s judgment of $121,069.66 plus costs and postjudgment interest and remand for a determination of the appropriate amount of 

appellate attorney’s fees and costs to be awarded to Jorge. 

[23] As a final note: justice is better dispensed in a courtroom and not in one’s own 

hands. Self-help remedies are perilous and potentially expensive. When selfhelp is attempted, a jury or judge decides the appropriateness or 

inappropriateness of the actions regardless of how justified the actor may have 

thought his actions were. As we see here, the risks of paying damages, treble 

damages, pre-judgment interest, attorney’s fees, appellate attorney’s fees, and 

costs are not worth the possible benefits of sidestepping the court system. 

[24] Affirmed and remanded for a determination of reasonable appellate attorney’s 

fees. 

Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur.