Filed 6/1/23 In re Luke S. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LUKE S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B311414

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 20CCJP00148A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAGDALENA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 SECOND ORDER 

 MODIFYING

 OPINION

 (No change in the 

 appellate judgment) 

THE COURT: 

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 30, 2023 

is modified as follows: 
2

On page 1, the Los Angeles Superior Court case number, 

which appears as 21CCJP00148A, is changed to 

20CCJP00148A.

The modification order filed on May 31, 2023 is vacated. 

This order does not change the appellate judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

PERLUSS, P. J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
Filed 5/31/23 In re Luke S. CA2/7 (first modification)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LUKE S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B311414

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 

 20CCJP00148A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAGDALENA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION

 (No change in the 

 appellate judgment) 

THE COURT: 

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 30, 2023 

is modified as follows: 

On page 1, the Los Angeles Superior Court case number, 

which appears as 21CCJP00148A, is changed to 

20CCJP001481A.
2

This order does not change the appellate judgment. 

____________________________________________________________

PERLUSS, P. J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.
Filed 5/30/23 In re Luke S. CA2/7 (unmodified opinion)

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re LUKE S., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B311414

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No.

 21CCJP00148A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAGDALENA S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee. 

Dismissed as moot. 
2

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva and Dawyn R. Harrison, County 

Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Sally Son, 

Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

_________________________

Magdalena S., the mother of then 14-year-old Luke S., 

appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition 

order declaring Luke a dependent child of the court and releasing 

him to Magdalena under the supervision of the Los Angeles 

County Department of Children and Family Services. While 

Magdalena’s appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated 

its jurisdiction and issued a juvenile court custody order granting 

Magdalena sole legal and physical custody of Luke. At the 

request of the Department, we dismissed the appeal as moot.

The Supreme Court granted Magdalena’s petition for 

review and subsequently transferred the matter to us with 

directions to vacate our prior order and reconsider the cause in 

light of In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266. (In re Luke S. (Apr. 19, 

2023, S273262.) We have done so. Because we can provide no 

effective relief to Magdalena—that is, relief that “‘can have a 

practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status’”

(In re D.P., at p. 277)—her appeal is moot. And after considering

the factors identified in In re D.P., we decline to exercise our

discretion to consider a moot appeal. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The juvenile court on August 21, 2020 sustained an

amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm inflicted 

nonaccidentally) and (b)(1) (failure to protect), alleging Luke was 
3

at substantial risk of serious physical harm based on 

Magdalena’s physical abuse of her wife’s two children and 

emotional abuse of one of those children.

1 At the disposition 

hearing on March 16, 2021 the court declared Luke a dependent 

child of the court, released him to Magdalena under the 

supervision of the Department and ordered family maintenance 

services for Magdalena, including parenting classes and conjoint 

counseling.

Magdalena appealed the jurisdiction findings and 

disposition order. In her opening brief filed October 8, 2021

Magdalena argued the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings were 

not supported by substantial evidence and its disposition order

constituted an abuse of discretion. Explaining that Earle S., who 

was found to be Luke’s presumed father, had reported he had 

Choctaw ancestry and was a registered member of the tribe, 

Magdalena also argued the Department’s notices to the Choctaw 

tribes had numerous errors and omissions and, accordingly, the 

juvenile court had erred by prematurely finding there was no 

reason to know Luke was an Indian child within the meaning of 

the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 

§ 1901 et seq.).

At a review hearing held the same day as Magdalena filed

her opening appellate brief, the juvenile court terminated its 

jurisdiction and issued a juvenile court custody order granting 

Magdalena sole legal and physical custody of Luke with 

monitored visitation for Earle. Magdalena did not appeal the 

October 8, 2021 orders.

1 The original dependency petition was filed in early January 

2020.
4

On December 20, 2021 the Department moved to dismiss 

Magdalena’s appeal as moot in light of the orders terminating 

dependency jurisdiction and awarding Magdalena sole legal and 

physical custody of Luke. The Department argued, under the 

circumstances, this court could not provide Magdalena any 

effective relief. 

On December 27, 2021 Magdalena filed an opposition to the 

motion to dismiss, contending the stigma and potential collateral 

consequences of adverse jurisdictional findings, which she argued

“forever falsely besmirch a parent’s reputation,” created a 

justiciable controversy notwithstanding the termination of 

dependency jurisdiction. Her opposition did not address the fact 

the disposition orders were no longer in effect or that, because 

Luke had been returned to Magdalena and dependency 

jurisdiction terminated, any error in a premature ICWA finding 

was of no significance.

Neither Magdalena nor the Department filed a 

supplemental brief, as permitted by California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.200(b), following the Supreme Court’s transfer of the case 

to us for reconsideration in light of In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 

266.

DISCUSSION

1. In re D.P.: Moot Dependency Appeals and Our 

Discretion To Decide Them

The Supreme Court in In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266

explained the mootness doctrine and confirmed it applied to 

dependency appeals: “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide 

actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into 

effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract 

propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot 
5

affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A 

case becomes moot when events ‘“render[] it impossible for [a] 

court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant 

him any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’

two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must 

complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be 

redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the 

plaintiff seeks.” (Id. at p. 276.)

In In re D.P., the juvenile court had terminated its 

jurisdiction without issuing any order that continued to impact 

the parents. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) In that 

context, the Court held, “relief is effective when it ‘can have a

practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ 

[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the

plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from

a change in legal status. Although a jurisdictional finding that a

parent engaged in abuse or neglect of a child is generally

stigmatizing, complaining of ‘stigma’ alone is insufficient to

sustain an appeal. The stigma must be paired with some effect

on the plaintiff’s legal status that is capable of being redressed by

a favorable court decision.” (Ibid.) The Court gave as examples

of nonmoot challenges to jurisdiction findings cases in which a

jurisdiction finding affected parental custody rights, curtailed a

parent’s contact with his or her child or resulted in disposition

orders that continued to adversely affect a parent. (Id. at

pp. 277-278.) The Court expressly held, disapproving contrary

case law, that “speculative future harm” is not sufficient to avoid

mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)2

2 Specifically addressing the appellant father’s argument 

that the challenged jurisdiction finding of neglect could result in
6

Despite its reaffirmation of the applicability of the 

mootness doctrine to dependency appeals, the Supreme Court 

emphasized that, even when a case is moot, courts may exercise

their “inherent discretion” to reach the merits of the dispute. 

(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) That discretion, the 

Court explained, is generally exercised only when the case 

presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, 

when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the 

parties or when a material question remains for the court’s 

determination. (Ibid.) 

Nevertheless, because features of dependency proceedings

tend to make appeals prone to mootness problems, the Court,

without intending to be exhaustive, identified several additional 

factors for the courts of appeal to evaluate when deciding 

whether discretionary review of a moot case may be warranted 

outside of those instances. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at 

pp. 284-286.) First, a court may analyze whether the challenged 

jurisdiction finding could potentially impact the current or future 

dependency proceedings, for example, by influencing the child

his inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI) 

(Pen. Code, § 11170), which carries several legal consequences, 

the Supreme Court noted that, when a child protective agency 

forwards a substantiated report of abuse or neglect to the 

California Department of Justice for inclusion in CACI, it must 

provide written notice to the person whose conduct was reported. 

(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 279.) Absent evidence in the 

record that any such report had been submitted or a showing that 

the type of neglect allegation at issue in the case (“general 

neglect,” rather than “severe neglect”) was even reportable, the 

Court held, “Father’s CACI claim is too speculative to survive a 

mootness challenge.” (Id. at p. 280.)
7

protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency petition or 

the juvenile court’s determination about further reunification 

services. (Id. at p. 285.) Second, a court may take into account 

the nature of the allegations against the parent: “The more 

egregious the findings against the parent, the greater the 

parent’s interest in challenging such findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) 

Third, a court may consider whether the case became moot due to 

prompt compliance by parents with their case plan: “It would

perversely incentivize noncompliance if mootness doctrine

resulted in the availability of appeals from jurisdictional findings

only for parents who are less compliant or for whom the court has

issued additional orders.” (Ibid.)

2. Discretionary Review of This Moot Appeal Is Not 

Warranted

As discussed, when opposing the Department’s motion to 

dismiss the appeal, Magdalena focused primarily on the stigma

she asserted accompanied the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 

findings—a factor the Supreme Court held was insufficient to 

sustain an appeal. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277.) 

Magdalena also generally described several potentially negative

consequences that might flow from adverse jurisdiction findings, 

the type of speculative future harm the Court also held was

insufficient to avoid mootness. (Id. at p. 278.)

Exercise of our discretionary authority to consider the 

merits of Magdalena’s moot appeal is not warranted. Although 

the misconduct in this case involved the nonaccidental infliction 

of physical harm (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (a)), not only a 

failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), the findings involving 

Magdalena were not egregious; and Magdalena will be able to 

explain in any future dependency or family law proceedings that 
8

the juvenile court released Luke to her care at the disposition 

hearing, reflecting the judgment that Magdalena did not pose a 

continuing risk to her child. 

No other factor justifies reaching the merits of this moot 

appeal. (See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“no single 

factor is necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise 

discretionary review of a moot appeal”].) Nearly two years

elapsed between the filing of the original petition and the court’s

order terminating jurisdiction. This was not a case that became

moot because of the parent’s prompt compliance with a case plan.

Nor does Magdalena’s fact-specific appeal present an issue of

broad public interest. (See In re Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th

156, 159 [fact-specific question whether the mother’s current 

circumstances created a substantial risk of serious physical harm 

to her young son is the type of issue presented to appellate courts 

multiple times every year]; In re M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 

784, 802 [same].)

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as moot.

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

FEUER, J.