## NO. 12

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- 00 062

- C R

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

THE STATE OF TEXAS , § APPEAL FROM THE 114TH APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

SPENCER EUGENE STOKES , APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

PER CURIAM ORDER Appellant, the State of Texas, filed a motion for rehearing after this court affirmed the trial court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress. State v. Stokes , No. 12

- 12

- 00062

- CR, 2013
W L 3487055, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Tyler July 10, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The motion included a copy of the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, which had been filed in this court one day earlier in a suppl emental clerk’s record.
A trial c ourt’s ruling on a suppression issue includes two types of rulings: (1) historical factual findings, often based on credibility determinations (reviewed for abuse of discretion), and (2) ultimate legal rulings that de termine whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed (reviewed de novo). State v. Mendoza , 365 S.W.3d 666, 66 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

. The trial court’s rulings on suppression issues are often memorialized in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. See i

d. at 673. But when those findings do not include credibility determinations and include ambiguous factual findings, the appella te court must abate the appeal to the trial court for more explicit findings. See id. Here, the State presented uncontroverted testimony from Deputy Joseph Durr and photographs of the interior of the vehicle that Appellee was driving. In its findings, the trial court states that “digital scales [were] in the plain view of Deputy Durr.” Deputy Durr testified that, based on his training and experience, scales are used for weighing narcotics. On cross

- examination, he2

confirmed that the search of Appellee ’s vehicle “was a search for the drugs,” even though he did not see any drugs in plain view. On redirect, Deputy Durr confirmed that the area in which Appellee was stopped was a known drug area, that he had stopped Appellee before, that Appellee had a rep utation of being a drug dealer or user, and that in addition to searching for drugs, Deputy Durr was “also trying to figure out if [the vehicle] was stolen[.]” The trial court’s findings do not state whether the court fully believed the testimony of Deput y Durr. Additionally, t he trial court ma de no specific findings regarding (1) whether Deputy Durr reasonably believed that the vehicle was stolen; (2) whether Appellee was stopped in a known drug area; (3) whether Deputy Durr had prior interaction with Ap pellee; and (4) whether Appellee had a reputation for being a drug dealer or user. Nor did the trial court make any findings as to whether, based on the aforementioned facts, Deputy Durr reasonably believed that drugs were inside the
vehicle. We cannot d etermine whether these findings were omitted because the trial court did not find Deputy Durr credible or because the court concluded that such findings were unnecessary to its determination of the suppression issue. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s findings of fact are ambiguous. The court of criminal appeals has recently held that “reviewing courts should not make implied findings of fact and credibility determinations that are contrary to the trial judge’s ultimate ruling.” See id . at 667

. Therefore, we further conclude that more specific findings are necessary for our consideration of the State’s motion for rehearing. See id. at 673. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal be abated and remanded to the district court
with instructi ons that the court prepare findings regarding (1) whether Deputy Joseph Durr reasonably believed the vehicle was stolen and (2) whether the testimony of Deputy Durr was fully credible. If the trial court finds that Deputy Durr’s testimony was not fully cr edible, the court should also prepare findings regarding (1) whether Appellee was stopped in a known drug area, (2) whether Deputy Durr had prior interaction with Appellee, (3) whether Appellee had a reputation for being a drug dealer or user, and (4) whet her Deputy Durr reasonably believed that contraband was inside Appellee’s vehicle. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a supplemental record containing the trial court’s findings of fact and any appropriate order(s) attendant thereto be certi fied to this court on or before twenty (20) days after the date of this order. Order issued October 16, 2013. Panel consisted of Worthen, C .J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.