COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Willis and Senior Judge Hodges 

 Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

DWIGHT ANTOINE BUSHNELL 

v. Record No. 1314-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA OCTOBER 24, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Richard J. Jamborsky, Judge 

 Jonathan Shapiro (Michael W. Lieberman; Jonathan 

 Shapiro & Associates, P.C. on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for 

 appellee. 

 

 Dwight Antoine Bushnell (appellant) was convicted of driving 

after having been adjudicated an habitual offender. On appeal, 

appellant contends that the police officer who stopped his car 

lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so, and that 

the trial court erred in refusing to suppress evidence obtained 

from the stop. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

 I. 

 On March 17, 1993, after midnight, Fairfax County Police 

Officer Michael Reser was traveling on Richmond Highway in 

Fairfax County. He saw appellant's Honda automobile. Appellant 

was driving and there was one passenger in the car. Reser 

checked the license tag number through the computer in his police 

car. He received the social security number of the car's 

registered owner. When Reser checked the social security number 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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in the computer, he learned that the car's registered owner had 

been adjudicated an habitual offender. 

 Reser also obtained a description of the registered owner, 

consisting of height, weight, age, and gender. With the 

assistance of his headlights, Reser could see into appellant's 

car. The driver appeared to match the description of the 

registered owner. Reser stopped the car, and upon confirming 

that appellant was the registered owner, arrested him for driving 

after having been adjudicated an habitual offender. 

 Appellant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the stop 

of his vehicle was constitutionally invalid because the officer 

lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The trial court 

denied the motion, finding that the officer had reasonable 

suspicion, "based on the vehicle's registration to an habitual 

offender, and a similarity in height, weight, and age of the 

driver to the habitual offender." 

 II. 

 On appeal, the burden is on the defendant to show that the 

trial court's denial of a suppression motion, "when the evidence 

is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted 

reversible error." Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 1010, 265 

S.E.2d 729, 731, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1017 (1980). "The trial 

court's ruling will be affirmed on appeal unless that decision is 

clearly erroneous." Hoye v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 132, 134, 

442 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1994). 

 "For evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless stop to 

be admissible, the officer who made the stop must articulate a 
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reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the motorist 

is subject to lawful seizure." Lee v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 

235, 238, 443 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1994). In stating his reasons for 

the stop, "the officer must prove only that a reasonable 

suspicion exists that criminal activity may be afoot." Id. at 

238, 443 S.E.2d at 182. The standard for reasonable suspicion 

"is less stringent than probable cause." Leeth v. Commonwealth, 

223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982). See Logan v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) 

(en banc). 

 In Hoye, upon facts nearly identical to this case, this 

Court upheld the trial court's finding that the officer had 

articulated a reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. In 

Hoye, the officer believed that Hoye's license plate had expired, 

although actually it had not. The officer, upon checking the 

license plate number through the Department of Motor Vehicles 

data base in the computer in her police car, learned the social 

security number of the registered owner. Upon checking that 

number, the officer learned that the owner was an habitual 

offender. The officer also obtained a description of the owner 

which included age, gender, weight, height, hair color, and eye 

color. The officer testified that the driver appeared to be the 

same gender and approximate age, and to have the same weight and 

hair color as the owner. Upon those facts, she stopped Hoye's 

car. Hoye, 18 Va. App. at 133-34, 442 S.E.2d at 405-06. 

Hoye controls our decision in this case. We hold that upon 

the facts in this case, the trial court did not err in finding 
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that Officer Reser had a reasonable suspicion, based on specific 

and articulated facts, that the driver of the vehicle was an 

habitual offender. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's 

conviction. 

 Affirmed.