NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 1 2

- 2284

___________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. ANTHONY DENNIS JACKSON; GROSSIE SMITH

- JACKSON; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR &

INDUSTRY; PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ANTHONY DENNIS JACKSON, Appellant

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No . 2:09

- cv - 01745) Distri ct Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr.

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 25, 2013 Before: FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges (Opinion filed : January 25, 2013 )

___________

OPINION

_________ __ PER CURIAM Anthony Dennis Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for2 reconsideration and motion for relief from final judgment purs uant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) . For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I. Because we write primarily for the parties, we need on ly recite the facts necessary for our discussion. In 1988, Jackson and his now ex

- wife purchased real property located
at 617 South Cob bs Creek Parkway in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In 1998, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) assessed tax liabilities for years 1992 through 1994 after Jackson did not file federal income tax returns for those years. Jackson filed untimely returns for t he years 1995 through 1998, and the IRS assessed the taxes due. By April 2009, Jackson’s outstanding tax liabilit y for the years 1992 through 1998, including penalties and interest, totaled $465,876.15

. In April 2009, the IRS referred Jackson’s
case to t he Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and requested that it file suit to reduce Jackson’s liability to judgment and to foreclose the federal tax liens on his property. On April 24, 2009, the Government filed a complaint against Jackson, seeking to reduce to ju dgment the tax assessments for years 1992 through 1998 , to foreclose the federal tax liens against Jackson’s property, and to have the property sold. The Government also named Jackson’s ex

- wife, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Department of Labor and I ndustry, Philadelphia Gas Works, and the City of Philadelphia

as defendants who may have claim ed an interest in or a lien on the property. Jackson failed to appear, and the Government moved for default judgment. On February 17, 2010, the District Court g ranted the Government’s motion for default judgment, entered judgment in favor of the Government for $469,323.11 plus statutory additions, and3 foreclosed the federal tax liens on Jackson’s property. The District Court also entered an order of sale for Jac kson’s property. Jackson did not appeal this judgment. In November 2011, almost two years after the District Court entered judgment, Jackson filed a motion to compel the Government to satisfy the judgment, alleging that he had paid all his tax liabilitie s with interest and penalties. In opposition, the Government stated that after judgment was entered, Jackson had submitted tax returns for years 1992 through 1994. Based on those forms, and without DOJ’s consent, the IRS erroneously made unauthorized aba tements of Jackson’s liabilities for those years. Around the same time, Jackson paid $22,921.58 towards his liability for 1992, $2,781.65 towards his liability for 1993, and $16,026.53 towards his liability for 1994. However, the IRS reversed the unautho rized abatements around the time when Jackson filed his motion. On December 12, 2011, the District Court denied Jackson’s motion to compel, noting that he had failed to establish that he had paid his taxes, penalties, and interest in full. Jackson filed a combined motion for reconsideration and motion for relief from final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) on December 22, 2011, asserting that his tax debt had been covered by the abatement and that the IRS had agreed to accept a lesser
amount to s ettle his balance owed. On April 2, 2012, the District Court denied Jackson’s motions. Jackson then timely filed his notice of appeal.
II. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review both the denial of a motion for reconsideration and a motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ.4 P. 60(b) for abuse of discretion. See Lazaridis v. Wehmer , 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ; Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White
III. , 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).

On appeal, Jackson ass erts that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and that the District Court denied him due process by not holding one. He also alleges that the IRS abated his tax liabilities and that his resulting liabilities have already been satisfied. Furthermore , Jackson argues that the District Court ignored applicable case law.
A. Motion for Relief from Judgment Jackson asserts that he was entitled to relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) because, according to him, all his tax liabilities were paid. Rule 60(b )(5) allows a district

c ourt to relieve a party from a final judgment if “the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged.” Here, Jackson neither dispute s the amount of the judgment entered against him nor argue s that he has paid the full amount o f the judgment

. Instead, Jackson alleges that the three payments totaling $41,729.76 made towards his tax liability for 1992 through 1994 satisfied his total liability. Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that Jackson had not satisfied th e outstanding judgment. Jackson’s argument that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and that the District Court denied him due process by not holding one is without merit. A district court has “substantial discretion in determining whether to condu ct an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 60(b) motion.” United States v. 8136 S. Dobson St. , 125 F.3d 1076, 1086 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Atkinson v. Prudential Prop. Co. , 43 F.3d 367, 374 (8th Cir. 1994). Here, the relevant facts were not in dispute because , again, Jackson did not5 dispute that he had not paid the full amount of the judgment entered against him, that abatements were entered after his case was referred to the DOJ, or that the IRS reversed the erroneous abatements. Therefore, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Jackson’s main contention is that the IRS abated his tax liabilities. Under 26 U.S.C. § 7122 (a) , the IRS “may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws prior to reference to the [DO J] for prosecution and defense; and the Attorney General or his delegate may compromise any such case after reference to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense.” However, “[o]nce a tax matter is referred t o the [DOJ], only the Attorney General or a person to whom authority has been delegated by the Attorney General may settle the matter.” United States v. Forma , 784 F. Supp. 1132, 1139 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also Slovacek v. United States , 40 Fed. Cl. 828 , 8 33 ( 1998) (agreeing with Forma ) ; Int’l Paper Co. v. United States , 36 Fed. Cl. 313, 321 (1996) (agreeing with Forma ); Brubaker v. United States , 342 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1965) (determining that excess tax “liabilities cannot be compromised by the Attorn ey General or the [DOJ] unless and until the Commissioner refers [the matter] to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense”); cf. Bergh v. Dep’t of Transp.

The IRS lost its authority to compromise Jackson’s tax liabilities in April 2009 when it referred Jackson’s case to the DOJ for prosecution. Accordingly, the abatements made in 2011 were void because they were made without aut horization from the DOJ. , 794 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that a compromise is “within the discretion of the a gency c onducting the litigation ” ).6 See IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC

- 2011

- 020, 2011 WL 4402105 (Sept. 15, 2011) (“ Abatement of tax for a tax period referred to [the DOJ] that is made without the approval of [the DOJ] is invalid and may be reversed, because the Servic e lacks the authority to take such action on the taxpayer’s account without Justice approval.” ); cf. In re Bugge , 99 F.3d 740, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (clerical error doctrine provides authority for reversal of abatement of original assessment in limited circu mstances). Furthermore, the DOJ retains authority to compromise even if a judgment has been obtained and the case has been returned to the IRS for collection. See IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC

- 2011, 020, 2011 WL 4402105. Accordingly, the original assessme nts remained valid because the abatements made by the IRS were void. See id.

Finally, Jackson’s assertion that the District Court ignored applicable case law is meritless. As a n initial matter, Jackson does not cite any particular authority to support his allegation. However, it appears that he is referring to the unpublished order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma in (reassessment not necessary because the post

- referral abatements were void).

United States v.
Poun d , No. CIV

- 07

- 427

- RAW, 2010 WL 2803 918 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2010), which he attached to his motions

. In Pound , the district court concluded that the taxpayer was entitled to post

- judgment relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) & (6) after the IRS erroneousl y abated his liabilities. However, the District Court did not err in not following Pound because it had , at most, persuasive value. Furthermore, in 2011, after Pound was decided, t he IRS specifically disagreed with Pound and determined that a “post

- refer ral abatement made without approval by Justice is void and the abatement should be7 reversed and the Service’s transcript records corrected.” IRS Chief Counsel Notice CC

2011

- 020, 2011 WL 4402105. Accordingly, the District Court correctly did not follow
P ound
B. Motion for Reconsideration .

A motion for reconsideration “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest inj ustice.” Lazaridis

IV. , 591 F.3d at 669. Jackson did not identify any of these grounds in his motion; instead, his motion for reconsideration relied upon the same arguments as his Rule 60(b) motion. As discussed above, Jackson’s arguments have no merit, and so we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of Jackson’s motion.

For the reasons stated herein, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Jackson’s motions for reconsid erati on and relief from judgment.