United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

S.S., Appellant 

and 

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, POST OFFICE, 

Louisville, KY, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 15-1472 

Issued: November 23, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

CHRISTOPHER J. GODFREY, Chief Judge 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On June 29, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal of a February 18, 2015 merit decision 

and a May 6, 2015 nonmerit decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs 

(OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of the case.2

ISSUES 

The issues are: (1) whether appellant has met her burden of proof to establish that she 

sustained a traumatic injury on January 11, 2014 in the performance of duty; and (2) whether the 

Branch of Hearings and Review properly denied appellant’s request for a review of the written 

record following her oral hearing. 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.

2

 Following this decision by an OWCP hearing representative, appellant submitted additional new evidence. As 

OWCP did not review this evidence in reaching a final decision, the Board may not consider it for the first time on 

appeal. 20 C.F.R. § 501.2(c). 
2

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On February 27, 2014 appellant, then a 39-year-old rural carrier, filed a traumatic injury 

claim (Form CA-1) alleging that she sustained torn muscles in the upper back and a bulging disc 

in her neck on January 11, 2014 in a motor vehicle accident. She stated that she was stopped at a 

mailbox and her vehicle was struck from behind by another vehicle. 

Donna Isfort, an advanced practice registered nurse, completed a note on 

January 15, 2014 removing appellant from postal work. Dr. Paula Robinson, a Board-certified 

family practitioner, completed a note dated January 30, 2014 and provided appellant with 

restrictions of no prolonged standing, no lifting over eight pounds, no repetitive lifting, and no 

climbing, crawling, kneeling, stooping, pushing, or pulling. She further stated that appellant 

must be able to change positions at liberty to relieve pain. Dr. Michael R. Heilig, a Boardcertified orthopedic surgeon, examined appellant on February 14, 2014 and noted that she 

required light duty. 

OWCP requested additional factual and medical evidence in support of appellant’s claim 

by letter dated March 12, 2014. It afforded her 30 days for a response. On March 19, 2014 

appellant submitted a narrative statement alleging that while she was stopped in her vehicle 

delivering mail another vehicle struck her car at a high rate of speed totaling her vehicle. She 

stated that her car was pushed forward 20 feet. Appellant stated that the employing 

establishment did not have light-duty work available for her, but that she was able to work at her 

concurrent employment as it was within her restrictions of no lifting or twisting. 

Kurt Schlenther, a physician assistant, completed a CA-17 form report dated 

March 17, 2014, indicating work restrictions and a recommendation to continue physical 

therapy. 

By decision dated April 14, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding that she failed 

to submit sufficient medical evidence to establish that a diagnosed condition resulted from her 

accepted employment incident. 

Dr. Heilig examined appellant on May 5, 2014 and found that test results revealed mild 

bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome with no definitive cervical radiculopathy. He diagnosed 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, particularly at C5-6, mild degenerative disc 

disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral hip trochanteric bursitis and sciatica, bilateral upper 

extremity radiculopathy, and bilateral cervical trapezial trigger points with pain. 

In a report dated May 13, 2014, Dr. Heilig noted that he treated appellant for cervical and 

lumbar pain as well as occasional symptoms in her upper extremities including numbness, 

tingling, and a burning sensation in her hands. He opined that appellant’s conditions were due to 

a motor vehicle accident on January 11, 2014 during which appellant, while working for the 

employing establishment, was rear ended by another vehicle. 

Appellant requested an oral hearing from OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review 

through a form received by OWCP on May 19, 2014. She also submitted a third-party complaint 

against the driver of the other vehicle. Appellant testified at the oral hearing which was held on 

December 9, 2014. She stated that on January 11, 2014 she was delivering mail in her vehicle 
3

when it was struck from behind by another car. Appellant was transported by ambulance to a 

local hospital and was dismissed based on negative x-rays. After a few days, she developed pain 

and sought medical treatment from Dr. Heilig. 

Dr. Heilig submitted a note dated January 22, 2015 and diagnosed degenerative disc 

disease of the cervical spine, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral hip bursitis 

and sciatica, bilateral upper extremity radiculopathy, and bilateral cervical trapezial pain. He 

noted that appellant had occasional symptoms in her upper extremities including numbness, 

tingling, and a burning sensation in her hands. Dr. Heilig noted, “This is due to a motor vehicle 

accident that occurred on January 11, 2014, while working for the [employing establishment], 

and was rear ended by another vehicle.” 

Dr. Ryan Carter Cassidy, a Board-certified orthopedic surgeon, examined appellant on 

November 10, 2014 and described her January 11, 2014 employment incident. He noted that 

appellant was working two jobs, for the employing establishment and at a social services office. 

Dr. Cassidy found significant muscle spasms and tightness in her paraspinal musculature as well 

as tenderness to light palpation in her cervical spine and lumbar paraspinal musculature. He 

reviewed appellant’s cervical magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan and found disc protrusion 

at C5-6. Dr. Cassidy noted that appellant had a significant injury while delivering mail. He 

opined that it was not unusual to have significant long-lasting pain after rear collision-type 

injuries. 

Appellant underwent an electroneuromyography (EMG) test on April 29, 2014 which 

demonstrated neuropathies at the bilateral ulnar nerves at the elbows. A cervical MRI scan 

report dated November 4, 2014 demonstrated disc degeneration throughout the cervical spine 

and mild central canal stenosis at C5-6. 

By decision dated February 18, 2015, an OWCP’s hearing representative found that 

appellant had not submitted sufficient medical opinion evidence to establish a diagnosed 

condition resulting from her accepted employment incident. He noted that no physician had 

provided an explanation of how any diagnosed condition, rather than appellant’s symptomology, 

was causally related to her motor vehicle accident. 

Appellant requested a review of the written record from OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and 

Review through a form dated March 20, 2015 and received by OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and 

Review on April 7, 2015. 

By decision dated May 6, 2015, OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review denied 

appellant’s request for a review of the written record as she had previously received an oral 

hearing on February 18, 2015. The Branch of Hearings and Review noted that appellant was not, 

as a matter of right, entitled to another review by OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review on 

the same issue. The Branch of Hearings and Review reviewed appellant’s claim in its discretion 

and determined that the case could equally well be addressed through the reconsideration 

process. 
4

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 1 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA3 has the burden of establishing the essential 

elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, 

including the fact that the individual is an “employee of the United States” within the meaning of 

FECA and that the claim was timely filed within the applicable time limitation period of FECA, 

that an injury was sustained in the performance of duty as alleged, and that any disability or 

specific condition for which compensation is claimed is causally related to the employment 

injury.4 These are the essential elements of each and every compensation claim regardless of 

whether the claim is predicated upon a traumatic injury or an occupational disease.5

OWCP defines a traumatic injury as, “[A] condition of the body caused by a specific 

event or incident, or series of events or incidents, within a single workday or shift. Such 

condition must be caused by external force, including stress or strain which is identifiable as to 

time and place of occurrence and member or function of the body affected.”6 To determine 

whether a federal employee has sustained a traumatic injury in the performance of duty, it must 

first be determined whether a “fact of injury” has been established. First, the employee must 

submit sufficient evidence to establish that she actually experienced the employment incident at 

the time, place, and in the manner alleged.7 Second, the employee must submit sufficient 

evidence, generally only in the form of medical evidence, to establish that the employment 

incident caused a personal injury.8

A medical report is of limited probative value on a given medical question if it is 

unsupported by medical rationale.9 Medical rationale includes a physician’s detailed opinion on 

the issue of whether there is a causal relationship between the claimant’s diagnosed condition 

and the implicated employment activity. The opinion of the physician must be based on a 

complete factual and medical background of the claim, must be one of reasonable medical 

certainty, and must be supported by medical rationale explaining the nature of the relationship 

between the diagnosed condition and specific employment activity or factors identified by the 

claimant.10

 3

 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193. 

4 Kathryn Haggerty, 45 ECAB 383, 388 (1994); Elaine Pendleton, 41 ECAB 1143 (1989). 

5 Victor J. Woodhams, 41 ECAB 345 (1989). 

6

 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(ee). 

7 John J. Carlone, 41 ECAB 354 (1989). 

8 J.Z., 58 ECAB 529 (2007). 

9 T.F., 58 ECAB 128 (2006). 

10 A.D., 58 ECAB 149 (2006). 
5

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 1 

The Board finds that appellant has not submitted sufficient medical opinion evidence to 

establish that her diagnosed conditions were causally related to her January 11, 2014 

employment incident. 

Appellant has established that she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 

January 11, 2014 while in the performance of duty. In support of her claim, she submitted a 

series of reports from various physicians. Dr. Heilig examined appellant on May 5, 2014 and 

diagnosed degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, more severe at C5-6, mild 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, bilateral hip trochanteric bursitis and sciatica, 

bilateral upper extremity radiculopathy, and bilateral cervical trapezial trigger points with pain. 

He repeated his diagnoses on January 22, 2015 and noted that these conditions were due to her 

January 11, 2014 employment injury. The Board finds that Dr. Heilig’s reports are insufficient 

to meet appellant’s burden of proof as he did not provide any medical reasoning explaining how 

or why the diagnosed degenerative conditions would be caused or aggravated by appellant’s 

motor vehicle accident. Without any medical reasoning explaining the causal relationship, 

whether direct causation or aggravation, between the conditions of degenerative disc disease, hip 

bursitis, radiculopathy, and cervical trigger pain, appellant has not met her burden of proof in 

establishing a traumatic injury claim. 

Dr. Cassidy examined appellant on November 10, 2014 and described her employment 

incident. He found disc protrusion at C5-6 on the MRI scan and noted that appellant had a 

significant injury while delivering mail. Dr. Cassidy opined that it was not unusual to have 

significant long-lasting pain after rear collision-type injuries. He did not clearly opine whether 

appellant’s disc protrusion at C5-6 was caused or aggravated by her accepted employment injury, 

nor did he describe how this injury occurred. Dr. Cassidy also diagnosed pain as a result of the 

motor vehicle accident. The Board has held that the mere diagnosis of “pain” does not constitute 

the basis for payment of compensation.11 For these reasons, the Board finds that Dr. Cassidy’s 

report is insufficient to meet appellant’s burden of proof and establish a traumatic injury claim. 

Appellant also submitted a note from Dr. Robinson which failed to provide a diagnosis of 

any condition and cannot meet her burden of proof to establish an injury resulting from the 

January 11, 2014 employment-related motor vehicle accident. She submitted reports from 

Ms. Isfort, an advanced practice registered nurse, and Mr. Schlenther, a physician’s assistant, in 

support of her claim. As neither registered nurses,12 nor physicians’ assistants,13 are considered 

physicians under FECA, these reports do not constitute medical evidence and lack the necessary 

probative value to establish appellant’s traumatic injury claim.14

 11 Robert Broome, 55 ECAB 339 (2004). 

12 C.B., Docket No. 15-0746 (issued May 20, 2015). 

13 D.S., Docket No. 15-0821 (issued July 2, 2015). 

14 5 U.S.C. § 8101(2) of FECA provides as follows: physicians includes surgeons, podiatrists, dentists, clinical 

psychologists, optometrists, chiropractors, and osteopathic practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined 

by State law. See also Roy L. Humphrey, 57 ECAB 238 (2005). 
6

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT -- ISSUE 2 

Section 8124(b)(1) of FECA provides that before review under section 8128(a) of this 

title, a claimant for compensation not satisfied with a decision of the Secretary is entitled, on 

request made within 30 days after the date of the issuance of the decision, to a hearing on his or 

her claim before a representative of the Secretary.15 Section 10.615 of the federal regulations 

implementing this section of FECA provides that a claimant shall be afforded a choice of an oral 

hearing or a review of the written record.16 OWCP regulations provide that the request must be 

sent within 30 days of the date of the decision for which a hearing is sought and also that the 

claimant must not have previously submitted a reconsideration request (whether or not it was 

granted) on the same decision.17 

The Board has held that OWCP, in its broad discretionary authority in the administration 

of FECA,18 has the power to hold hearings and reviews of the written record in certain 

circumstances where no legal provision was made for such reviews and that OWCP must 

exercise this discretionary authority in deciding whether to grant a hearing or review of the 

written record.19 OWCP procedures, which require OWCP to exercise its discretion to grant or 

deny a hearing or review of the written record when the request is untimely or made after 

reconsideration, are a proper interpretation of FECA and Board precedent.20 This includes the 

situation where a claimant requests a second hearing on an issue. There is no provision in FECA 

for more than one hearing on the same issue.21 If a request for a second hearing is made, 

appellant is not entitled to a hearing as a matter of right, but OWCP must exercise its discretion 

in determining whether to grant a hearing. 

ANALYSIS -- ISSUE 2 

On March 20, 2015 appellant requested a review of the written record hearing on the 

April 14, 2014 decision denying her traumatic injury claim. However, she had previously 

requested and received a telephonic hearing on December 9, 2014, regarding the April 14, 2014 

decision. This resulted in the hearing representative’s February 18, 2015 decision. As appellant 

previously received a telephonic hearing, she is not entitled to another hearing or review of the 

 15 5 U.S.C. § 8124(b)(1). 

16 20 C.F.R. § 10.615. 

17 Id. at § 10.616(a). 

18 Supra note 3. 

19 Marilyn F. Wilson, 52 ECAB 347 (2001). 

20 Teresa M. Valle, 57 ECAB 542 (2006). 

21 See J.S., Docket No. 14-1636 (issued December 9, 2014); R.F., Docket No. 13-892 (issued July 5, 2013); 

John S. Baldwin, 35 ECAB 1161 (1984). 
7

written record as a matter of right. There is no provision in FECA for more than one hearing or 

review of the written record on the same issue.22 

When a claimant has previously requested reconsideration or requests a second hearing or 

review of the written records on the same issue, OWCP must exercise its discretionary authority 

to grant or deny the request. It has considered the same issue in its April 14, 2014 decision and 

found that the matter could be equally well addressed by submitting new and relevant evidence 

with an application for reconsideration. The Board finds that OWCP properly exercised its 

discretion in denying appellant’s request for a review of the written record.23

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met her burden of proof to establish that she 

sustained a traumatic injury on January 11, 2014 in the performance of duty. The Board further 

finds that OWCP’s Branch of Hearings and Review properly denied appellant’s request for a 

review of the written record following her oral hearing. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the May 6 and February 18, 2015 decisions of the 

Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs are affirmed. 

Issued: November 23, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Christopher J. Godfrey, Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 22 Id.

23 Id.