*

 The appellees were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. After an examination of the appellant’s brief and the

record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is

submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted May 19, 2006*

Decided May 26, 2006

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

No. 05-3388

WADE R. MEISBERGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ZETTIE COTTON, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

 District Court for the

 Southern District of Indiana,

 Indianapolis Division

No. 1:05-cv-858-RLY-TAB

Richard L. Young, Judge.

O R D E R

Wade Meisberger brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that officers

of the Indiana Department of Correction (“IDOC”) violated his rights under the

Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments by transferring him to another prison. At

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3388 Page 2

screening, the district court concluded that his allegations were insufficient to state a

claim and dismissed the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). Meisberger then filed a

motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

The district court denied the motion, and Meisberger appeals. We affirm.

We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under § 1915A,

accepting as true Meisberger’s factual allegations and drawing all reasonable

inferences in his favor. See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 574 (7th Cir. 2005).

Meisberger alleged that IDOC transferred him from Pendleton Correctional Facility

to Wabash Valley Correctional Facility as a disciplinary sanction for “refusing a bed

move.” The Conduct Adjustment Board later dismissed the bed-move charge, but

Meisberger says IDOC did not return him to Pendleton which he argues was mandated

by an IDOC regulation. The regulation provides that a prisoner “shall be returned to

the previous assignment eligibility status as soon as possible” if his disciplinary charge

is dismissed. See Ind. Dep’t of Corr. Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders, 02-04-

101(VII)(E)(6)(d)(2004). Meisberger contends that as a result of his transfer from

Pendleton, he was unable to attend Ball State College, lost $1,880 in college “grant

money,” and could not get a job. 

Meisberger argues that he stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim because his

transfer—and the resulting loss of college funds, and education and employment

opportunities—occurred without procedural due process. But Meisberger was not

entitled to any process preceding the transfer unless he had a liberty or property

interest in remaining at Pendleton or the benefits available to him there. See Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Pugel v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 378 F.3d

659, 662 (7th Cir. 2004). Meisberger believes that the IDOC regulation requiring that

he be returned to his “previous assignment eligibility status” created a liberty interest

in returning to Pendleton. But transfers from one prison to another with a more

adverse condition of confinement do not affect a recognized liberty interest, see

Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225

(1976). This is so even if the transfer makes a prisoner ineligible to participate in

education or work programs which could have earned him good-time credits. See

Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568, 571-72 (7th Cir. 2000) (prisoner’s transfer to

facility that did not offer vocational training did not implicate a liberty interest even

though transfer resulted in a loss of an opportunity to earn good-time credits);

Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (denial of access

to educational program providing opportunity to earn good-time credits did not

implicate liberty interest because there was no guarantee that prisoner would

successfully complete program); Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 244 (7th Cir. 1991)

(inmates have no right to any job at all).
No. 05-3388 Page 3

Likewise, Meisberger was not unconstitutionally deprived of a property interest

in the college grant money without due process. He does not allege that IDOC officers

intended to deprive him of the grant money. Without a general allegation of intent, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir. 1998), state-caused

losses of property are not actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels

v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th

Cir. 2001).

Meisberger next argues that his transfer, loss of college funds, opportunity to go

to college and get a job violated the Eighth Amendment. But none of these occurrences

deprived Meisberger of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” such as

adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or safety. Higgason, 83 F.3d at 809

(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Meisberger’s postjudgment motion because he did not “bring the court’s attention to

newly discovered evidence or to a manifest error of law or fact.” Neal v. Newspaper

Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.