FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2022-2988

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JORDAN CAYNE HUTCHINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellees.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.

Timothy Register, Judge.

September 18, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges his sentence following his convictions for 

attempted second-degree murder, shooting into an occupied 

vehicle, and aggravated assault with a firearm. He argues that 

the trial court erroneously did not consider a sentence under the 

Florida Youthful Offender Act based on what he claims was the 

State’s incorrect statement at sentencing that Appellant was not 

eligible for a youthful offender sentence. See § 958.04(1)(b), Fla. 

Stat. (2018). He also challenges certain discretionary costs and the 

discretionary fine imposed as part of his sentence because the trial 

court did not orally pronounce each of these monetary penalties 

individually at sentencing. We reverse certain costs imposed and 

remand for entry of a corrected sentence. We otherwise affirm.
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Appellant was born in August 2000 and committed the 

offenses here in July 2019. Following a jury trial, Appellant was 

convicted in August 2022. At sentencing, the State argued that 

Appellant did not qualify for youthful offender sentencing since 

under one version of section 958.04(1)(b), Appellant had to be 

“under the age of 21 at the time of sentencing.” On appeal, 

Appellant contends that the version of section 958.04(1)(b) 

applicable to his sentencing and currently in effect allows a court 

to consider a youthful offender sentence if, among other 

requirements, “such crime was committed before the defendant 

turned 21 years of age.” Since Appellant was eighteen years old 

when he committed the crimes, he claims that the trial court erred 

in not considering youthful offender sentencing. 

Appellant is incorrect about the applicable version of section 

958.04(1)(b). The State was right to argue at sentencing that 

Appellant had to be “under the age of 21” for the trial court to 

consider youthful offender sentencing. Id. Section 958.04(1)(b) 

was amended in chapter 2019-167, section 67, Laws of Florida. 

Chapter 2019-167 had multiple sections dealing with the 

administration of justice. Although certain sections of chapter 

2019-167 contained earlier effective dates, section 67 at issue here 

did not. Therefore, section 156 of chapter 2019-167 made the 

amendment to section 958.04(1)(b) effective October 1, 2019. Since 

this was after Appellant committed the crimes for which he was 

sentenced, the earlier version of section 958.04(1)(b) applied to 

Appellant. See Sheaffers v. State, 243 So. 3d 518, 520 (Fla. 1st 

DCA 2018) (“[I]t is the date of the commission of the crime, not the 

date the sentence becomes final, that dictates which punishment 

statute applies.”). 

Although the Legislature could have made the amendment to 

section 958.04(1)(b) retroactive, they did not do so. See Pappas v. 

State, 346 So. 3d 1200, 1203 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (holding that for 

an amendment to a criminal statute to be retroactive the 

Legislature must expressly provide for retroactivity). Appellant 

was 22 at the time of sentencing, so Appellant’s argument that he 

qualified for youthful offender sentencing under the applicable 

version of section 958.04(1)(b) fails. 
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Additionally, even if the new version of section 958.04(1)(b) 

applied to Appellant, the transcript of the sentencing hearing 

establishes that the trial court would have declined to exercise 

discretion to impose a youthful offender sentence. The court 

referred to its consideration of the evidence at trial and the serious 

nature of the offenses in stating “I don’t think youthful offender is 

appropriate, based on my review.” Appellant fails to demonstrate 

that, even if the trial court could have imposed a youthful offender 

sanction, it abused its discretion in declining to sentence him as a 

youthful offender. Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 1985) (holding that the “application of the Youthful Offender 

Act to any particular defendant is discretionary with the trial 

judge”). 

Turning to costs, the State concedes error on the imposition of 

the $3 cost under section 318.13(11)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, and 

the $2 cost under section 938.15, Florida Statutes. 

Considering Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary fine of 

$200 under section 775.083(1), Florida Statutes; the accompanying

$10 surcharge under section 938.04, Florida Statutes; and the 

discretionary public defender fee of $150 under section 938.29(5), 

Florida Statutes; there was no question that the trial court did not 

individually orally pronounce these discretionary monetary 

penalties at sentencing. But Appellant did not object to the total 

fines and costs as announced by the trial court, and he and his 

counsel signed the written waiver of the required oral 

pronouncement located at the bottom of the court costs order. 

Appellant’s motions to correct sentence under rule 3.800(b)(2), 

Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, did not challenge the validity 

of this written waiver. Rather, Appellant challenged the validity 

and effect of the written waiver of oral pronouncement for the first 

time in his reply to the State’s answer brief on appeal. We decline 

to address the validity and efficacy of the written waiver because 

an issue not raised in the trial court and raised for the first time 

in an appellate reply is not preserved for review. Pasha v. State, 

225 So. 3d 688, 705 (Fla. 2017); Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 

1144 (Fla. 2006). 

The sentence is therefore REVERSED as to the $3 cost under 

section 318.13(11)(b)(2), Florida Statutes, and the $2 cost under 
4

section 938.15, Florida Statutes, and REMANDED with instructions 

to the trial court to correct the sentence by striking these improper 

costs. The sentence is otherwise AFFIRMED. 

BILBREY and KELSEY, JJ., concur; ROWE, J., concurs in result.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Michael Ufferman of Michael Ufferman Law Firm, P.A., 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Miranda L. Butson,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.