United States Department of Labor 

Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

__________________________________________ 

W.W., Appellant 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL 

CENTER, Philadelphia, PA, Employer 

__________________________________________ 

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Docket No. 15-0678 

Issued: August 13, 2015 

Appearances: Case Submitted on the Record

Appellant, pro se 

Office of Solicitor, for the Director 

DECISION AND ORDER 

Before: 

PATRICIA H. FITZGERALD, Deputy Chief Judge 

ALEC J. KOROMILAS, Alternate Judge 

JAMES A. HAYNES, Alternate Judge 

JURISDICTION 

On February 9, 2015 appellant filed a timely appeal from an October 30, 2014 merit 

decision of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP). Pursuant to the Federal 

Employees’ Compensation Act1

 (FECA) and 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c) and 501.3, the Board has 

jurisdiction over the merits of this case. 

ISSUE 

The issue is whether appellant has met his burden of proof to establish that he sustained 

an emotional condition in the performance of duty. 

FACTUAL HISTORY 

On June 26, 2014 appellant, was a 54-year-old instrument mechanic. On that date he 

filed a traumatic injury claim alleging that on April 18, 2014 he suffered an anxiety attack 

 1

 5 U.S.C. § 8101 et seq.
2

resulting from stress created by his management. Appellant stopped work and returned on 

April 21, 2014. 

In a letter dated July 2, 2014, OWCP advised appellant that no evidence had been 

submitted to establish his claim. It requested additional evidence to demonstrate that the 

April 18, 2014 incident occurred as described and to establish that he sustained a diagnosed 

emotional condition as a result of the incident. 

In an April 21, 2014 report, Dr. Mitchel A. Kling, a Board-certified psychiatrist and 

neurologist, stated that he examined appellant in the emergency room after appellant experienced 

acute symptoms after arriving at work. He recommended that appellant not work for the next 

three days. Dr. Kling advised appellant to report to the employee health unit on April 24, 2014 

so that he could determine whether appellant could return to work. He also provided discharge 

instructions. 

Appellant also sought medical treatment from Dr. K. Ryan Connolly, a Board-certified 

psychiatrist and neurologist, on April 24, 2014. Dr. Connolly stated that he examined appellant 

in urgent care for an exacerbation of his service-connected illness. He recommended that 

appellant stay off work until April 28, 2014 and recommended he see a private provider as soon 

as possible. 

In a decision dated August 8, 2014, OWCP denied appellant’s claim finding insufficient 

evidence to establish fact of injury. It found that the April 18, 2014 incident was not proved and 

that he had not shown he sustained a diagnosed condition as a result of any incident. 

On September 25, 2014 OWCP received appellant’s request for reconsideration. 

Appellant stated that on April 18, 2014 around 2:00 p.m. he was confronted by his supervisor 

and general foreman about changing his shift to seven days rotating. He explained that this shift 

change would cause him excessive anxiety and he was extremely unhappy about it. 

Appellant reported that he had tried for three years to have his shift changed from a 

7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule to a 5:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. compressed schedule (every other 

Tuesday off), but his requests were repeatedly turned down. He explained that his commute to 

the employing establishment during peak rush hour was taking up to two hours each way and 

that his psychiatrist had provided several letters to support his reasonable requests for a shift 

change accommodation. Appellant stated that when he was ordered to go to seven days rotating 

he had an anxiety attack and was extremely agitated. He left work. Appellant stated that when 

he returned to work on Monday morning he was locked out of his office and his computer was 

gone. He then experienced an extreme panic attack and became very ill. 

Appellant went to the employee health department which referred him to the emergency 

room. He related that after a heart attack was ruled out he was sent home and ordered not to 

return to work until April 28, 2014. Appellant reported that he was charged with five sick days 

even though his absence had been caused by a work-related issue. He argued that he should not 

be charged for the time missed. 

Appellant also provided a September 19, 2014 report by Dr. Connolly who reported that 

on April 21, 2014 appellant experienced an exacerbation of a traumatic brain disease-related 
3

anxiety while at work. Dr. Connolly related that appellant was subjected to an unfair 

confrontation with his supervisor at work which led to a verbal altercation. He opined that the 

“events of [April 21, 2014] while at work led to symptoms of panic, irritability, agitation, and 

increased intensity of his service-connected symptoms to such a degree that he felt he was unable 

to work safely.” Dr. Connolly noted that he had recommended that appellant take time off from 

work until his medications could be adjusted. 

In a decision dated October 30, 2014, OWCP affirmed the August 8, 2014 denial 

decision, as modified. It found that while appellant had established that the alleged incident 

occurred as alleged, he had not established that it occurred in the performance of duty or that a 

medical condition was diagnosed in connection with the incident. 

LEGAL PRECEDENT 

An employee seeking benefits under FECA2 has the burden of proof to establish the 

essential elements of his or her claim by the weight of the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence3

 including that he sustained an injury in the performance of duty and that any specific 

condition or disability for work for which he or she claims compensation is causally related to 

that employment injury.4 To establish that he or she sustained an emotional condition in the 

performance of duty, a claimant must submit: (1) factual evidence identifying employment 

factors or incidents alleged to have caused or contributed to his condition; (2) medical evidence 

establishing that he has an emotional or psychiatric disorder; and (3) rationalized medical 

opinion evidence establishing that the identified compensable employment factors are causally 

related to his emotional condition.5

Workers’ compensation law does not apply to each and every injury or illness that is 

somehow related to an employee’s employment. There are situations where an injury or illness 

has some connection with the employment but, nevertheless does not come within the concept or 

coverage of workers’ compensation. Where the disability results from an employee’s emotional 

reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the 

employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA.6

 On the other hand, the 

disability is not covered where it results from such factors as an employee’s fear of a reductionin-force or his or her frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or 

to hold a particular position.7

Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee’s 

employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially 

 2 Id. 

3 J.P., 59 ECAB 178 (2007); Joseph M. Whelan, 20 ECAB 55, 58 (1968). 

4 G.T., 59 ECAB 447 (2008); Elaine Pendleton, 40 ECAB 1143, 1145 (1989). 

5 See Donna Faye Cardwell, 41 ECAB 730 (1990). 

6

 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193; Trudy A. Scott, 52 ECAB 309 (2001); Lillian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976). 

7 Gregorio E. Conde, 52 ECAB 410 (2001). 
4

assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.8 However, the Board 

has held that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing 

establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.9

 

In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will 

examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted 

reasonably.10

In cases involving emotional conditions, the Board has held that, when working 

conditions are alleged as factors in causing a condition or disability, OWCP, as part of its 

adjudicatory function, must make findings of fact regarding which working conditions are 

deemed compensable factors of employment and are to be considered by a physician when 

providing an opinion on causal relationship and which conditions are not deemed factors of 

employment and may not be considered.11 If a claimant does implicate a factor of employment, 

OWCP should then determine whether the evidence of record substantiates that factor. When the 

matter asserted is a compensable factor of employment and the evidence of record establishes the 

truth of the matter asserted, OWCP must base its decision on an analysis of the medical 

evidence.12

ANALYSIS 

Appellant alleged that he suffered an anxiety attack due to stress from management. The 

initial question presented is whether the alleged injury occurred in the performance of duty.13 

The Board notes that appellant’s allegations do not pertain to his regularly or specially assigned 

duties under Cutler.14 Instead, appellant has alleged unfair treatment or error by his supervisors 

in administrative matters. He reported that on April 18, 2014 his supervisor and general foreman 

informed him that his shift would change to seven days rotating. Appellant stated that after he 

was ordered to change his shift he had an anxiety attack and was extremely agitated. He also 

stated that his requests to have his shift changed to a compressed schedule were repeatedly 

turned down. The Board must decide whether these incidents are employment factors under 

FECA. 

Appellant’s contentions that his supervisor’s actions caused him stress and mental 

anxiety are administrative matters. The Board has found that the manner in which a supervisor 

 8 See Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421 (2001); Thomas D. McEuen, 41 ECAB 387 (1990); reaff’d on recon., 42 

ECAB 556 (1991). 

9 See William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998). 

10 Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994). 

11 Dennis J. Balogh, 52 ECAB 232 (2001). 

12 Id. 

13 See M.J., Docket No. 12-1189 (issued December 14, 2012). 

14 Supra note 6. 
5

exercises his or her discretion falls outside of FECA’s coverage.15 However, the Board has held 

that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment in 

what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.16 In determining 

whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board must examine the 

factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.17

Appellant alleged that for several years he requested to have his shift changed from a 

7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule to a 5:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. compressed schedule, but his 

supervisors repeatedly denied his requests. He further contended that on April 18, 2014 he 

suffered mental stress and anxiety when his supervisor and foreman advised him that his shift 

would be changed to seven days rotating. The Board has found that matters involving reasonable 

accommodation18 and shift time changes19 are generally related to the employment and 

considered administrative functions of the employing establishment, and not a duty of the 

employee. The Board notes that a supervisor must be allowed to manage and at times employees 

will disagree with their supervisor’s actions.20 Mere disagreement or dislike of a supervisory or 

managerial action will not be compensable absent evidence of error or abuse.21 The Board notes 

that appellant did not shown any error or abuse by the employing establishment. Because 

appellant has not established that his supervisors acted unreasonably or that there was error or 

abuse by the employing establishment in denying his shift change requests or changing his shift 

schedule, he has failed to identify a compensable work factor with regard to these administrative 

matters.22 

On appeal, appellant contends that he was given specific instructions by the physician in 

the emergency room not to work for one week due to the work-related injury. He noted that he 

provided documentation that he was charged sick leave. The Board finds that appellant has not 

established such a compensable factor of employment in this case and the Board need not 

address the medical evidence.23

Appellant may submit new evidence or argument with a written request for 

reconsideration to OWCP within one year of this merit decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8128(a) 

and 20 C.F.R. §§ 10.605 through 10.607. 

 15 C.O., Docket No. 14-516 (issued June 5, 2014). 

16 See William H. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998). 

17 Ruth S. Johnson, 46 ECAB 237 (1994). 

18 Lori A. Facey, 55 ECAB 217 (2004); James P. Guinan, 51 ECAB 604 (2000). 

19 See D.P., Docket No. 13-769 (issued September 10, 2014). 

20 Linda Edwards-Delgado, 55 ECAB 401 (2004). 

21 A.K., Docket No. 14-437 (issued June 9, 2014). 

22 Supra note 5. 

23 See Margaret S. Krzycki, 43 ECAB 496 (1992). 
6

CONCLUSION 

The Board finds that appellant has not met his burden of proof to establish that he 

sustained an emotional condition in the performance of duty. 

ORDER 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the October 30, 2014 merit decision of the Office 

of Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed. 

Issued: August 13, 2015 

Washington, DC 

 

 Patricia H. Fitzgerald, Deputy Chief Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 Alec J. Koromilas, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board 

 

 James A. Haynes, Alternate Judge 

 Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board