Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023 Page 1 of 8

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael Roth

Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

APPELLEE PRO SE

Kathryn Gillette

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Imad Shawa, M.D.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Kathryn Gillette,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

May 10, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CT-1667

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Gary L. Miller, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D03-1902-CT-7323

Opinion by Judge Weissmann

Judges Bailey and Brown concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023 Page 2 of 8

Weissmann, Judge.

[1] Kathryn Gillette sued the “physician on duty-St. Francis” Hospital for battery. 

Nearly three years after her claim arose, Gillette amended her complaint

alleging that Dr. Imad Shawa was the physician who touched her arm without 

her permission. Dr. Shawa moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 

Gillette’s amendment did not meet the two-year statute of limitations for 

battery claims. The trial court disagreed, relying on Indiana Trial Rule 17(F),

which allows for “unknown” parties to be substituted into a complaint at any 

time. We reverse and grant Dr. Shawa’s motion for summary judgment, finding 

he was not unknown to Gillette.

Facts

[2] In late February 2017, Gillette’s mother, Joyce, was admitted to St. Francis 

Hospital’s intensive care unit. Joyce suffered from several medical 

complications and had a living will with a “do not resuscitate” order. 

Nevertheless, hospital staff briefly placed Joyce on a ventilator, allegedly with 

the family’s permission. Distraught that her mother’s wishes were not being 

followed, Gillette presented a copy of the living will to hospital staff the next 

day and urged them to follow its instructions. Still, a heated argument arose 

between Gillette and hospital staff over Joyce’s care.

[3] Gillette later returned to the hospital with a written request for an emergency 

hearing to force the attending physician to honor Joyce’s living will. When 

Gillette found the proper physician, Dr. Shawa, Gillette threatened to sue both 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1667 | May 10, 2023 Page 3 of 8

him and the hospital “for a lot of money.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 123. 

Concerned over Gillette’s “emotional and aggressive” state, Dr. Shawa led 

Gillette by the arm to a nearby room to discuss her mother’s care. Id. Gillette 

objected to being touched, and Dr. Shawa left the room.

[4] That same night, Gillette and her husband discussed that she had a potential 

claim for civil battery against the physician who touched her arm. But despite 

knowing certain identifying details about the physician—the hospital where and 

department in which he worked, what he looked like, and the approximate time 

the alleged battery occurred—Gillette did not remember the physician’s name.

Although Gillette tried to find the name by searching the hospital website, she 

did not discover that Dr. Shawa was the physician who touched her.

[5] Gillette filed her battery claim just a few days before the two-year statute of 

limitations expired.

1 As Gillette still had not learned the physician’s name, her 

complaint named the defendant as “physician on duty-St. Francis.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II, p. 24. Nearly a year later, while going through Joyce’s medical 

records obtained through discovery, Gillette learned that the proper defendant 

was Dr. Shawa. At this point, with the trial court’s permission, Gillette 

amended her complaint to substitute Dr. Shawa for the anonymous physician 

on duty.

1

In her complaint, Gillette also sued Franciscan Alliance, Inc., and various hospital employees for a variety 

of claims. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 24. This appeal only concerns the battery claim against Dr. Shawa. 
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[6] Dr. Shawa moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Gillette should not be 

allowed to amend her complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations 

because his identity was not “unknown” during that two-year period. The trial 

court at first granted Dr. Shawa’s motion and dismissed the case. But after 

Gillette successfully moved to reconsider, the court reinstated the case. 

Following additional discovery, Dr. Shawa moved for summary judgment on 

the statute of limitations issue, arguing that Gillette’s deposition testimony

proved she reasonably should have known his identity before the statute of 

limitations expired. The trial court denied Dr. Shawa’s motion, and he now 

appeals that decision. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[7] We apply the same standard as the trial court when reviewing summary 

judgment rulings. Fox v. Barker, 170 N.E.3d 662, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). The 

moving party bears the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of 

material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Cases 

involving a statute of limitations defense are “particularly suitable” for 

resolution on summary judgment. Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1276 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2016). When the moving party establishes a violation of the applicable 

statute of limitations, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish an issue of 

material fact negating the defense. Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc., 730 N.E.2d 

692, 695 (Ind. 2000). Lastly, we note that while Gillette represents herself in 

this appeal, “[i]t is well settled that pro se litigants are held to the same legal 
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standards as licensed attorneys.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2016). 

II. Statute of Limitations

[8] In Indiana, the statute of limitations for battery is two years from the date on 

which the claim arose. Ind. Code § 34-11-2-4. Neither party contests when the 

clock started on Gillette’s claim or that she filed her complaint within the twoyear period. Instead, the parties dispute whether Dr. Shawa was “unknown” to 

Gillette before she amended her complaint to name Dr. Shawa as a defendant

under Indiana Trial Rule 17(F). 

[9] Although Trial Rule 17 generally requires that lawsuits “be prosecuted in the 

name of the real party in interest,” Ind. Trial Rule 17(A), Section F provides:

Unknown persons. When the name or existence of a person is 

unknown, he may be named as an unknown party, and when his 

true name is discovered his name may be inserted by amendment at 

any time.

Ind. Trial Rule 17(F) (emphasis added). This ability to insert an unknown 

defendant into a lawsuit at any time creates obvious tension with the rationale

underlying statutes of limitations—that they “afford[] security against stale 

claims.” Shideler v. Dwyer, 417 N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. 1981); see also Craven v. 

Craven, 103 N.E. 333, 335 (Ind. 1913) (stating that statutes of limitations “rest 

upon sound public policy,” “tend to the peace and welfare of society” and are 

“essential to the general welfare and wholesome administration of justice”).

Recognizing this tension, our Supreme Court has “decline[d] to expansively 
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interpret and apply ‘unknown’ as used in” Rule 17(F) to prevent this otherwise 

“unlimited extension of the statute of limitations.” Miller v. Danz, 36 N.E.3d 

455, 459 (Ind. 2015).

[10] We find this case controlled by Miller v. Danz, in which our Supreme Court 

rejected an attempted amendment based on Rule 17(F). Id. at 459. The plaintiff 

in Miller lost a job opportunity with the Indianapolis Mayor’s Office and filed 

claims against various people connected to the incident, with some defendants 

named anonymously. Before the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff 

knew the name of the unknown defendant’s husband, where she worked, and 

how she connected to his claim. Despite knowing this information, the plaintiff 

waited until after the statute of limitations expired to amend the complaint 

under Rule 17(F) to include the defendant’s name, claiming to have recently 

discovered the name during a deposition. Although the plain language of Rule 

17(F) allows for the amendment of unknown defendants “at any time,” our 

Supreme Court rejected the amendment after considering “the circumstances of 

[the] plaintiff’s probable knowledge of th[e] defendant’s identity.” Id. In effect, 

because the defendant knew specific facts that had the potential to identify the 

unknown defendant before the statute of limitations expired, the defendant was 

not “unknown” under Rule 17(F). The same situation exists here.

[11] When Gillette’s claim arose, she knew multiple identifying details about Dr. 

Shawa, including where he worked, the specific department he worked in, 

when he had been working on a specific day, and even what he looked like. 

Despite possessing this knowledge from the moment her claim accrued, 
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Gillette’s search for Dr. Shawa amounted solely to scanning the website of St. 

Francis Hospital—a website that included Dr. Shawa’s name and photograph. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 126.

[12] Gillette highlights that the hospital website lists Dr. Shawa as “Independent—

Not Employed by Franciscan Health,” a potentially confusing label. But the 

website was not the only way Gillette could have identified Dr. Shawa. Many

alternative methods of identification existed. At any point, Gillette could have 

returned to the hospital, for example, and located Dr. Shawa using any of the 

several identifying details she possessed. Her failure to do so undermines the 

protection against “litigation of stale claims” that statutes of limitation afford 

both courts and defendants. V. Ganz Builders & Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Lumber, Inc., 

59 N.E.3d 1025, 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Russo v. S. Dev., Inc., 868 

N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). 

[13] Much like the plaintiff in Miller, Gillette contends that she diligently searched

for Dr. Shawa’s existence and quickly moved to amend her complaint after 

learning his name through discovery. But the record shows otherwise. Gillette’s 

main argument is that she could not have reasonably found Dr. Shawa’s name 

through her mother’s medical records earlier because they are voluminous and 

complex.2 Yet, accepting that as true for the purpose of summary judgment, it 

2 Although we recognize the difficulty Gillette asserts to have had as a pro se litigant in examining the 

evidence in this case, we can afford her no more leeway in conducting discovery than we would a licensed 

attorney. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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does not excuse Gillette’s failure to take any action aimed at identifying Dr. 

Shawa other than scanning the hospital’s website—which did, in fact, identify

him.

[14] Thus, under these circumstances, we find that Gillette’s failure to use her 

“probable knowledge” of Dr. Shawa’s identity “preclude[s] operation of [Trial 

Rule 17(F)’s] unlimited extension of the statute of limitations.” Miller, 36 

N.E.3d at 459. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to 

enter summary judgment for Dr. Shawa.

Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.