COURT OF APPEALS 

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

FORT WORTH 

NO. 02-15-00244-CV 

DAVID K. NORVELLE, SYLVIA 

NORVELLE, AND/OR ALL 

OCCUPANTS 

 APPELLANTS

V. 

BEAULY, LLC APPELLEE

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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY 

TRIAL COURT NO. 2015-000732-1 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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David K. and Sylvia Norvelle appeal from the trial court’s judgment against 

them in this forcible detainer suit. We affirm. 

In their first issue, the Norvelles contend that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to render judgment because Beauly, LLC’s pleading was not properly 

 1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4. 
2 

verified as required by rule of civil procedure 510.3(a). Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(a). 

The petition was sworn to by one of Beauly’s attorneys. This court has recently 

held––in a prior appeal brought by the Norvelles involving a different appellee 

and a different property––that (1) a lack of a proper verification does not deprive 

a county court of jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer suit and (2) a party’s 

attorney may verify a petition in a forcible detainer action as that party’s agent. 

Norvelle v. PNC Mortg., 472 S.W.3d 444, 447–49 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2015, 

no pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 500.2(s), (u), 500.4(b), 502.1); see Randle v. 

Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 05-14-01439-CV, 2016 WL 308711, at *5–7 

(Tex. App.––Dallas Jan. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (discussing and citing 

Norvelle with approval). Therefore, we overrule the Norvelles’ first issue. 

In their second issue, the Norvelles argue that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to render judgment because Beauly lacked standing to bring the 

forcible detainer suit. According to the Norvelles, they showed that Beauly could 

not have claimed ownership via a 2014 special warranty deed from LaSalle Bank 

National Association as Trustee for Merrill Lynch First Franklin Mortgage Loan 

Trust 2007-H, Mortgage Loan Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-H1 

(LaSalle) because LaSalle had “ceased to exist” before the execution date of the 

special warranty deed.2

 2The Norvelles cited Conditional Approval #885 of the Comptroller of the 

Currency, which states in a footnote that “BANA [Bank of America, National 

Association] merged with LaSalle Bank N.A. and LaSalle Bank Midwest N.A. on 

October 17, 2008.” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Conditional 
3 

The Norvelles raised this complaint in a plea in abatement in the trial court, 

but they did not attach any evidence in support of it. Because they failed to 

provide any evidence in support of their claim that Beauly lacked valid title, they 

failed to raise the existence of a title dispute sufficient to show that the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction over the forcible detainer suit. See Jaimes v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. 

Ass’n, No. 03-13-00290-CV, 2013 WL 7809741, at *5 (Tex. App.––Austin Dec. 4, 

2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Kaldis v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 01-09-

00270-CV, 2010 WL 2545614, at *3 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] June 24, 

2010, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (holding that plaintiff in forcible detainer suit 

who purchased property via nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not required to prove a 

clear chain of title to it in order to prove its superior right to possession vis à vis 

the defendant). Beauly presented as evidence (1) a deed of trust from the 

Norvelles to Matthew Haddock as trustee for the benefit of First Franklin 

Financial Corp. as lender that included a provision that upon a nonjudicial 

foreclosure sale, the Norvelles would become tenants at sufferance if they did 

not surrender possession to the buyer, (2) a substitute trustee’s deed reciting that 

the property secured by the deed of trust was conveyed via nonjudicial 

 

Approval #885, 2008 WL 7137076, at *1 n.1 (Nov. 6, 2008), 

http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/dec08/ca885.pdf. 

However, this statement, standing alone and without any additional 

information regarding the terms of the merger, does not constitute evidence that 

LaSalle as an entity “ceased to exist” for purposes of conveying title, as argued 

by the Norvelles. 
4 

foreclosure sale to LaSalle and conveying the property to LaSalle, (3) a special 

warranty deed from LaSalle to Beauly recorded in the Tarrant County property 

records, and (4) evidence of the notice to vacate sent to the Norvelles by Beauly. 

The Norvelles did not present any evidence. Thus, Beauly’s evidence was 

sufficient to support a judgment in its favor on the issue of possession. See Tex. 

Prop. Code Ann. §§ 24.002, 24.005(b) (West 2014 & Supp. 2015). We overrule 

the Norvelles’ second issue. 

In their third issue, the Norvelles challenge Beauly’s right to rely on the 

tenant-at-sufferance provision of the deed of trust because they claim that Beauly 

was not in privity of contract with them. The Norvelles failed to raise this 

complaint in the trial court; therefore, they failed to preserve it for our review on 

appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Sawyer v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 

Co., No. 05-10-01634-CV, 2011 WL 5085629, at *2 (Tex. App.––Dallas Oct. 27, 

2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). We overrule their third issue. 

Having overruled the Norvelles’ three issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

/s/ Terrie Livingston 

TERRIE LIVINGSTON 

CHIEF JUSTICE 

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GABRIEL, J., and CHARLES BLEIL (Senior 

Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment). 

DELIVERED: June 23, 2016