[Cite as Sovereign Empire, L.L.C. v. Akron, 2023-Ohio-201.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

SOVEREIGN EMPIRE, LLC

Appellant

v.

CITY OF AKRON

Appellee

C.A. No. 30186

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT

ENTERED IN THE

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO

CASE No. CV-2020-10-2848

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 25, 2023

TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Sovereign Empire, LLC, (“Sovereign Empire”) appeals the judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of the City of 

Akron. We affirm.

I.

{¶2} Sovereign Empire is the owner of two properties in the City of Akron, one located 

on Manchester Road and the other on Lake Street. The City of Akron provided water service to 

both properties and billed Sovereign Empire, as owner of the properties, for both accounts. In July 

2018, water service was discontinued at the Lake Street property at the request of Sovereign 

Empire, and billing statements were issued for the past due balance on the account. In July 2019, 

the City of Akron transferred the unpaid balance to Sovereign Empire’s Manchester Road account, 

which also held a past due balance. The City of Akron notified Sovereign Empire that the past 
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due balance and fees would be certified to the Summit County Fiscal Officer to be added to the 

tax roll for the property.

{¶3} In August 2019, because of the City of Akron’s action in transferring the Lake 

Street balance and combining it with the Manchester Road account, Sovereign Empire filed a claim 

with the City of Akron Claims Commission to dispute the Manchester Road account balance. In 

November 2019, Sovereign Empire filed a complaint against the City of Akron in the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas, but voluntarily dismissed the complaint in September 2020. The 

filing of the complaint terminated the claims process with the City of Akron Claims Commission. 

Sovereign Empire refiled its complaint in October 2020, stating multiple claims based upon the 

allegation that the City of Akron was without authority to combine the two accounts and that in so

doing, it violated stated policies and ordinances, as well as violating Sovereign Empire’s due 

process rights. 

{¶4} In November 2021, upon motion from the City of Akron, the trial court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the City. Sovereign Empire now appeals raising two assignments 

of error.

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF THE CITY WITHOUT THOROUGHLY EXAMINING ALL 

MATERIALS SOVEREIGN FILED IN SUPPORT.

{¶5} In its first assignment of error, Sovereign Empire argues the trial court erred 

because it did not thoroughly examine the materials Sovereign Empire filed in support of its 

opposition to summary judgment. We do not agree.
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{¶6} Appellate review of an award of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio 

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 

when: (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the 

nonmoving party, reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse 

to the nonmoving party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R. 

56(C). A court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must 

resolve any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 

358–359 (1992). A trial court does not have the liberty to choose among reasonable inferences in 

the context of summary judgment, and all competing inferences and questions of credibility must 

be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio 

St.3d 215, 218 (1988).

{¶7} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the nature of this burden-shifting 

paradigm:

[A] party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party 

cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the 

basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the 

nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden 

under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party 

has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to 

specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which 

affirmatively demonstrates that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the 

motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has 

satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden 

outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 

issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, shall be entered against the nonmoving party.

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996).
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{¶8} Sovereign Empire’s contention that the trial court did not thoroughly review the 

affidavit and exhibits attached to its opposition brief is unsupported by the record. In its analysis, 

the trial court stated “the Affidavit of Andre Jackson, Sovereign’s owner, contains mostly 

unsupported legal conclusions and opinions. * * * The court finds that Mr. Jackson’s affidavit does 

not bring any material facts into dispute.” Sovereign Empire does not point to any evidence 

contradicting this statement, presenting only conjecture that the trial court did not thoroughly 

review the affidavit and exhibits because the trial court’s order failed to mention the 66 pages of 

exhibits attached to the affidavit. “[A]bsent an affirmative demonstration on the record that the 

trial court failed to review all of the summary judgment materials before it, an appellate court will 

presume that it did.” B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., 9th Dist. Summit No. 20936, 

2002-Ohio-5033, ¶ 42. Furthermore, Sovereign Empire has failed to demonstrate how it was 

prejudiced. See App.R. 16(A)(7); State v. Mastice, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 06CA0050, 2007–Ohio–

4107, ¶ 7 (“An appellant has the burden of demonstrating error on appeal.”). Based upon the 

record, this Court presumes that the trial court reviewed Sovereign Empire’s brief and exhibits.

{¶9} Sovereign Empire’s first assignment of error is therefore overruled.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN GRANTING 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY WHERE THE CITY 

ACTED IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER III, SECTION 307, OF AKRON 

PUBLIC UTILITIES BUREAU RULES AND REGULATIONS BY 

COMBINING WATER BILLS FROM TWO DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS.

{¶10} In its second assignment of error, Sovereign Empire argues the trial court erred in 

granting summary judgment because it violated Chapter III, Section 307, of the Akron Public 

Utilities Bureau Rules and Regulations (“Section 307”). Specifically, Sovereign Empire contends 

that Section 307 provides that the City “must apply the debt to the taxes that acquired the debt” 
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and that “the certified amount or unpaid charges must be placed against the property served by 

the connection.” (Italics added.) We do not agree.

{¶11} Section 307 provides as follows:

307. Collection Procedures for Delinquent Bills

Owners of property are responsible for water used on premises they own.

When water/sewer/trash collection charges are not paid when due, the Director of 

Public Service or designate may do either or both of the following:

(A) Certify them, together with any penalties, to the County Auditor, who shall 

place the certified amount on the real property tax list and duplicate against the 

property served by the connection if the County Auditor also receives from the 

Director or other official or body additional certification that the unpaid rents or 

charges have arisen pursuant to a service contract made with the owner of the 

property that is served by the connection. The amount placed on the tax list and 

duplicate shall be a lien from the date placed on the list and duplicate and shall be 

collected in the same manner as other taxes, except that, nothwithstanding Section 

323.15 of the Ohio Revised Code, the County Treasurer shall accept partial 

payment for the full amount of such unpaid water rents or charges and associated 

penalties. The lien shall be released immediately upon payment in full of the 

certified amount. The County Treasurer shall place any amounts collected pursuant 

to certification under this division in the distinct fund established by Section 743.06 

of the Ohio Revised Code. Unless the Director or designate determines that a 

transfer of the property is about to occur, the Director or designate may only make 

a certification under this rule if the rents or charges have been due and unpaid for 

at least sixty days and the Director or designate has provided the owner of the 

property with written notice of the impending certification. However, no 

certification may be made directly with the owner of the property served.

(B) Collect them by action at law, in the name of the City from an owner or any 

other person who is liable for these charges.

At any time before certification as provided above, the Director or designate shall 

accept any partial payment of unpaid water rents or charges in the amount of ten 

dollars ($10.00) or more. account [sic] shall be charged for the use of water from 

the recorded date of the turning-off of the service.

Any account subject to certification will be charged twenty-five dollars ($25.00) 

for additional collection efforts and handling.
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{¶12} “In statutory construction, the word ‘may’ shall be construed as permissive * * * 

unless there appears a clear and unequivocal legislative intent that they receive a construction other 

than their ordinary usage.” Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio St.2d 102 (1971), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “The statutory use of the word ‘may’ is generally construed to make 

the provision in which it is contained optional, permissive, or discretionary, at least where there is 

nothing in the language or in the sense or policy of the provision to require an unusual 

interpretation.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 107. 

{¶13} Section 307 states that “[w]hen water/sewer/trash collection charges are not paid 

when due, the Director of Public Service or designate may do either or both of the following:” (A) 

place the certified amount due on the real property tax list; or (B) collect them by action of law. 

(Emphasis added.). Because there appears no intent that the word “may” should receive a 

construction other than its ordinary usage, the use of “may” is construed as permissive; there is 

nothing to suggest that the City must pursue the debt in either manner. We further note Sovereign 

Empire has failed to develop or preserve any other argument that would show the City did not have 

discretion to transfer the balance from one account to the other.

{¶14} Sovereign Empire’s second assignment of error is overruled.

III.

{¶15} Sovereign Empire’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

THOMAS A. TEODOSIO

FOR THE COURT

HENSAL, J.

CALLAHAN, J.

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JAY E. KRASOVEC and BETSY L. B. HARTSCHUH, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.

EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and JOHN CHRISTOPHER REECE and VONSHEAY 

V. BROWN, Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellee.