Counsel of Record are listed at final pages. 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court 

No. 49S02-0712-CV-596 

TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY 

COMPANY, ET AL., 

Appellants (Defendants below), 

v. 

UNITED STATES FILTER CORPORATION N/K/A 

WATER APPLICATIONS & SYSTEMS 

CORPORATION, U.S. FILTER SURFACE 

PREPARATION GROUP INC. N/K/A 

INTERNATIONAL SURFACE PREPARATION 

GROUP, INC., WHEELABRATOR 

TECHNOLOGIES INC., WASTE MANAGEMENT 

HOLDINGS, INC. AND RESCO HOLDINGS, 

L.L.C., 

Appellees (Plaintiffs below). 

Interlocutory Appeal from the Marion Superior Court No. 1, No. 49D01-0409-PL-1745 

The Honorable Cale Bradford, Judge 

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0604-CV-289 

October 15, 2008 

Shepard, Chief Justice.

 Five corporations seek insurance coverage from insurers who issued liability policies for 

their predecessors. The underlying litigation involves bodily injury claims relating to the 

operation of an industrial blast machine. The corporations say that coverage rights passed to 

them through the same corporate transactions that brought them the blast machine assets. The 

trial court agreed and granted summary judgment to the current holder of the assets. 
 Each of the implicated insurance policies contains a provision that bars assignment of the 

policy without the consent of the insurer. We hold that consent is required for any assignment of 

policy rights, unless the assignment occurs after an identifiable loss, in which case the right to 

receive payment on that claim may be transferred without consent. Because the corporations 

neither obtained consent nor made a post-loss assignment, we direct judgment for the insurers. 

Facts and Procedural History 

 On June 18, 2004, appellees United States Filter Corp. and United States Filter Surface 

Preparation Group, Inc. (collectively “U.S. Filter”) filed a complaint against numerous insurance 

companies (collectively “Insurers”), most of which remain as appellants, seeking defense and 

indemnification for underlying product liability claims. The underlying claims involve bodily 

injuries allegedly caused by the claimants’ exposure to silica from working near the 

Wheelabrator blast machine.1 U.S. Filter sought coverage under several occurrence-based 

comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies issued to its predecessors-in-interest. 

Appellees Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc., Resco Holdings, L.L.C., and Waste 

Management Holdings, Inc. (collectively “Waste Management”), intervened on October 22, 

2004, seeking defense and indemnity coverage for their own underlying Wheelabrator injury 

claims. U.S. Filter and Waste Management then jointly filed two amended complaints. The trial 

court and parties agreed to bifurcate the proceedings, limiting the initial phase to “determining 

whether the Plaintiffs have a right to seek insurance coverage or proceeds under each of the 

defendants’ insurance policies” and deferring all other issues until a later phase of the litigation. 

(Waste Mgmt. App. at 1-2.) 

 

1

 The Wheelabrator blast machine 

is an airless blast machine, developed to mechanically clean pieces of metal in a way that, relative 

to traditional sandblasting methods, dramatically reduces the use of manpower and the release of 

silica into the work environment. The machine operates by use of a wheel with flanges that hurls 

‘shot’ at the molded metal. The shot removes sand – and in other applications removes rust, 

scaling or other material – that has adhered to the metal. 

(Jt. App. at 272-73.) 

2
 A brief period of discovery revealed that the Wheelabrator blast machine corporate assets 

have a complex ownership history spanning nearly a hundred years. By January 1986, 

Wheelabrator Corp. (“Wheelabrator III” 2), a subsidiary of Signal Applied Technologies, Inc. 

(“SAT”), owned the Wheelabrator machine assets and liabilities. SAT merged into Allied Corp. 

on January 16, 1986, making Wheelabrator III a subsidiary of Allied. On February 26, 1986, 

Allied-Signal, Inc., the parent of Allied, agreed to spin-off several assets, including Wheelabrator 

III, to The Henley Group, Inc. (“Henley”), another subsidiary of Allied-Signal. The spin-off was 

accomplished on May 21, 1986, when Allied assigned its stock in Wheelabrator III to Newco 

(Allied), Inc., a subsidiary of Henley. 

As a result of name changes, Henley became Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. (“WTI”) 

in 1989. On September 7, 1990, Waste Management, Inc. acquired majority ownership in WTI.3

 

Five years later, Wheelabrator III merged with another WTI subsidiary to become Wheelabrator 

Water Technologies, Inc. The former Wheelabrator III assets became the Wheelabrator 

Corporation Division of the newly formed subsidiary. On September 14, 1996, WTI agreed to 

sell the assets of the Wheelabrator Corporation Division to United States Filter Corp. 

 As a result of the Wheelabrator’s long history, Insurers have issued over eighty policies 

that are potentially implicated by the underlying claims. The policies each contain a provision 

prohibiting assignment without the consent of the insurer. The provision takes two forms: (A) 

“Assignment. Assignment of interest under this policy shall not bind the [insurer] until its 

consent is endorsed hereon.” and (B) “TRANSFER OF YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER 

THIS POLICY. Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without our 

written consent except in the case of death of an individual named insured.” (Jt. App. at 1776-

79.) The parties’ efforts in Phase I of the litigation have focused on the significance of these 

provisions in relation to the Wheelabrator blast machine ownership history. 

 

2

 Two of the earlier corporate predecessors were also named Wheelabrator Corporation, and throughout this 

litigation they have been referred to as “Wheelabrator I” and “Wheelabrator II.” To avoid confusion, we use the 

same abbreviations. 

3

 Waste Management changed its name to WMX Technologies, Inc. in 1993, and then changed back to Waste 

Management, Inc. in 1997. (Nat’l Union App. at 3464.) 

3
 On October 21, 2005, U.S. Filter, Waste Management, and the Insurers each moved for 

summary judgment as to Phase I issues. The trial court heard arguments on the motions and later 

granted summary judgment to U.S. Filter but denied it to Waste Management. (Id. at 57-58.) 

The court explained: 

[T]he Waste Management Plaintiffs have transferred all insurance rights and 

liabilities associated with the now infamous machine at issue to Plaintiff United 

States Filter Corporation . . . . 

a. United States Filter Corporation has a right to seek insurance coverage or 

proceeds under the insurance policies still pending in this case. 

b. The clauses in the Insurance Policies pertaining to assignments do not apply 

as a matter of law or fact to the rights of Plaintiff United States Filter 

Corporation. 

(Id.) 

 The Insurers petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which the Court of Appeals allowed. 

Affirming the trial court as to U.S. Filter, but reversing as to Waste Management, the Court of 

Appeals held that a chose in action arose under the occurrence-based insurance policies at the 

moment of each loss – saying that the loss was each claimant’s initial exposure to silica. As 

freely transferable assets, the choses in action carrying coverage rights then passed to Waste 

Management and U.S. Filter via corporate transactions. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. U.S. Filter 

Corp., 870 N.E.2d 529, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), vacated. The Court of Appeals distinguished 

transfer of the rights under the insurance policies from the transfer of the policies themselves, 

only the latter implicating the consent-to-assignment provisions. In a footnote, the court also 

indicated an additional ground for its decision might be ambiguity in the consent-to-assignment 

provisions, which triggers the rule of strict construction against insurers. Id. at 545 n.14. We 

granted transfer and now reverse. 

Standard of Review 

 When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment, we apply 

the same standard as the trial court. Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind. 1999). 

4
We must decide whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary 

judgment and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. 

Trial Rule 56(C). We also construe the designated evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Havens v. Ritchey, 582 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. 1991). 

 Although the parties submitted an exhaustive record, we find no disputes of material fact 

respecting the Phase I issue, and we resolve the following questions as a matter of law. 

I. The Insurance Rights Did Not Transfer 

 The Insurers, led by Travelers, contend that the Wheelabrator’s previous owners did not 

transfer insurance rights through corporate transactions to reach Waste Management and U.S. 

Filter. (Travelers Appellants’ Br. at 18-21; Hartford Supplemental Appellants’ Br. at 6.) Waste 

Management and U.S. Filter take the opposite view, arguing that rights under the policies, as 

distinguished from the policies themselves, properly transferred down the line of corporate 

succession. (Waste Mgmt. Appellees’ Br. at 8-11, 16; U.S. Filter Appellees’ Br. at 2-7, 10.) 

A. The Complete Policies Were Not Assigned 

 As two amici curiae correctly observe, the free flow of capital and assets between 

business entities is important for the vitality of national and international markets. (Nat’l Solid 

Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n Br. at 2.) In the course of normal business, companies engage in a variety 

of transactions to exchange assets and liabilities. For example, mergers and consolidations 

generally result in the transfer of all of the participants’ assets and liabilities to the surviving 

corporation, including insurance coverage rights. See Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-40-6 (West 2007). 

Alternatively, asset sales transfer the assets and liabilities specifically designated by contract in 

exchange for money, shares, or other property. See id. ch. 23-1-41. An insurance policy, like 

other contracts generally, may be transferred between business entities as part of one of these 

structured transactions. 

5
 The preliminary question for our review is whether the predecessors-in-interest of the 

Wheelabrator blast machine attempted to transfer the insurance policies to each successive 

owner, and ultimately, to Waste Management and U.S. Filter. The answer to this question 

depends on the intent expressed in the written agreements governing each transaction. The 

parties focus on the impact of two specific transactions: the 1986 Henley spin-off and the 1996 

asset sale between Waste Management and U.S. Filter. 

Looking first at the 1986 transactions resulting in the Henley spin-off, it seems that 

Allied-Signal did not attempt to transfer the relevant insurance policies to Henley. Article I of 

the General Assignment provides: 

Assignor hereby sells, transfers, assigns, releases and sets over unto Assignee all 

of Assignor’s right, title and interest in and to all of the assets of Assignor 

identified in Annex I hereto (the “Assets”). 

To the extent that the assignment of any contract, agreement, license or 

authorization to be assigned to Assignee pursuant to the Distribution Agreement 

[of February 26, 1986] shall require the consent of any other party . . . this 

instrument shall not constitute a contract to assign the same if an attempted 

assignment would constitute a breach thereof . . . . The Assignor and Assignee 

shall use reasonable efforts to obtain consent to any such assignment. 

(Jt. App. at 1611-12.) Annex I lists Wheelabrator III but makes no mention of any insurance 

policies. (Id. at 1614-18.) 

 While it is clear that Allied-Signal transferred to Henley the entire Wheelabrator III 

business, including all of its individual assets and liabilities, that effort did not include all of the 

relevant insurance policies. When SAT merged into Allied, most of the policies covering the 

Wheelabrator blast machine previously held by SAT transferred to Allied automatically. 

Because Allied did not list the policies as an asset to be transferred to Henley in Annex I, or in 

any other document that is part of the record before us, we conclude that the parties did not 

transfer the insurance policies from Allied to Henley on May 21, 1986.4

 

4

 This seems to leave Allied holding title to all of the insurance policies written for its predecessors-in-interest to the 

Wheelabrator blast machine assets. 

6
 The parties to the 1996 transaction executed a more explicit contract. Waste 

Management, through WTI, agreed to transfer the Wheelabrator blast machine assets to U.S. 

Filter, pursuant to which they entered into an Insurance Agreement. The Agreement states: 

[T]he parties wish to assure that after the Closing Date, [U.S. Filter] possesses all 

the rights to insurance proceeds and/or insuring agreements which WTI possessed 

prior to the Closing Date concerning the Subsidiaries, Domestic Assets, Divisions 

and Liabilities to be transferred to [U.S. Filter] pursuant to the Purchase 

Agreement (together, the “Acquired Items”). 

. . . 

3. WTI and [Waste Management] hereby convey to [U.S. Filter] to the full extent 

permissible under the law and the relevant insurance policies any claim, chose in 

action, or other right WTI and/or [Waste Management] may have to insurance 

coverage under past and present insurance policies insuring WTI, [Waste 

Management] and/or any of either of their predecessors with respect to the 

Acquired Items to the extent such Acquired Items are assumed by or transferred 

to [U.S. Filter]. 

(Waste Mgmt. App. at 886-87.) By its plain language, the Insurance Agreement transfers to U.S. 

Filter all insurance policies and proceeds held by Waste Management covering the Wheelabrator 

blast assets. At most, this transaction appears to transfer all policies entered into after the May 

1986 Henley spin-off. 

Because of the intricacy of these transactions, we will assume for the sake of argument 

that the former owners of the Wheelabrator blast machine did attempt to transfer all relevant 

insurance policies at both of these moments. For the transfers to succeed, the predecessors must 

have complied with those policy provisions governing assignment. 

 The Insurers assert that all of the insurance policies contained the clauses requiring their 

consent to execute a valid assignment, with which Waste Management, U.S. Filter, and their 

predecessors did not comply. (Travelers Appellants’ Br. at 21-24; Nat’l Union Appellants’ Br. at 

12-14; Hartford Supplemental Appellants’ Br. at 12-14.) U.S. Filter and Waste Management do 

not contest these assertions but raise other arguments we will address shortly. 

7
Because the policies require insurer consent before a valid assignment can be made, and 

that consent was not given, we hold that the several insurance policies at issue here were not 

transferred in any of the corporate transactions involving the Wheelabrator blast machine assets. 

B. Specific Claims Were Not Assigned 

Even though the complete policies did not transfer, U.S. Filter and Waste Management 

argue that certain claims under the policies did transfer as choses in action, notwithstanding the 

consent-to-assignment provisions. (Waste Mgmt. Appellees’ Br. at 21-42; U.S. Filter Appellees’ 

Br. at 11-33.) The Insurers contend that the consent-to-assignment provisions apply to any 

assignment of rights under the policy and that no choses in action existed at the time of the 

corporate transactions. (Travelers Reply Br. at 3-11; Nat’l Union Reply Br. at 2-17.) 

Consent-to-assignment clauses are virtually boilerplate in most contracts of insurance. 

Insurance providers have a legitimate business interest in restraining assignment – these 

provisions protect them from a material increase in risk for which they did not bargain, 

specifically because of a change in the nature of the insured. See Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. 

v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 100 F.2d 441, 444-46 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 658 

(1939). Consequently, a consent-to-assignment clause is generally enforced against attempted 

transfers of the policy itself, as we demonstrated above. 17 Samuel Williston & Richard A. 

Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 49:126 (4th ed. 2000). 

Courts widely recognize an exception to the enforcement of consent-to-assignment 

clauses for assignments made after a loss has occurred. Conrad Bros. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 

640 N.W.2d 231 (Iowa 2001). See, e.g., New v. German Ins. Co. of Freeport, 5 Ind. App. 82, 85, 

31 N.E. 475, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1892) (“after a loss has occurred the policy becomes a chose in 

action, and is assignable as other choses in action are”). The post-loss exception is justified 

because 

once a loss occurs, an assignment of the policyholder’s rights regarding that loss 

in no way materially increases the risk to the insurer. After a loss occurs, the 

indemnity policy is no longer an executory contract of insurance. It is now a 

8
vested claim against the insurer and can be freely assigned or sold like any other 

chose in action or piece of property. 

Williston & Lord, supra, § 49:126 (footnotes omitted). 

 For example, in Conrad Bros., an insured’s mortgagee brought suit against the issuer of a 

casualty insurance policy to recover the replacement cost of the insured’s business property after 

a severe windstorm. 640 N.W.2d at 233-35. The Iowa Supreme Court held that because the 

assignment occurred after the loss, the right to seek replacement costs validly transferred to the 

mortgagee. Id. at 238. 

 What makes this case a little different is the nature of the losses insured. All of the 

policies at issue are occurrence-based CGL policies or excess policies deriving therefrom. 

Among other things, they provide the named insured indemnity coverage and a defense for the 

bodily injury or property damage claims of third parties resulting from the use of the insured’s 

products during the policy period. Even if injuries do not manifest themselves for years, they 

generally trigger coverage. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 471 (Ind. 

1985) (adopting the multiple trigger interpretation of occurrence-based insurance policies in the 

delayed manifestation context). 

Therein lies the rub. Unlike an instantly incurred loss, such as that resulting from 

windstorm or fire, the underlying third-party claims allege injuries that apparently occurred but 

went unreported, even unrealized, for years. None of the parties contend that anyone knew of 

the alleged injuries when the relevant transactions took place involving the Wheelabrator blast 

machine assets. The question then is whether such occurred but not yet reported losses can form 

the basis of choses in action that U.S. Filter and Waste Management say transferred to them 

through the Wheelabrator predecessors-in-interest. 

Some courts facing similar questions have not distinguished third-party losses in this 

way, and they continue to apply the rule allowing post-loss assignment of insurance claims. See, 

e.g., Northern Ins. Co. of New York v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(indemnity and defense rights for third-party claims held to follow transfer of liabilities in 

9
product-line successor liability jurisdictions); Egger v. Gulf Ins. Co., 903 A.2d 1219 (Pa. 2006) 

(insurer’s obligation to provide excess coverage arose on the date of the injury to the third party, 

regardless of whether assignment occurred before or after the jury verdict fixing the amount of 

liability); Gopher Oil Co. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. Ct. App. 

1999) (oil company could seek indemnity and defense from its predecessor’s liability insurer for 

environmental clean-up liabilities stemming from predecessor’s activities, even though 

contamination pre-dated environmental legislation). 

 Yet, cases have also gone the other way. One such decision comes from the California 

Supreme Court, Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003). 

Henkel acquired certain metallic chemical product assets through a stock sale and merger with 

another company that had acquired those assets by contract. Several years later, claims were 

filed against Henkel for bodily injuries allegedly caused by the metallic chemicals. Henkel 

settled and sought contribution from its own insurers and from the insurers of its predecessors-ininterest. Id. at 72. The California Supreme Court first determined that because Henkel assumed 

the tort liability by contract, any rights to its predecessors’ insurance would turn on interpretation 

of those contracts. Id. at 74. The contracts each contained consent-to-assignment provisions 

with which Henkel had not complied, yet Henkel argued that the policy benefits can be assigned 

post-loss without receiving consent. The Court disagreed and held that the claims had not 

become an assignable chose in action because they “had not been reduced to a sum of money due 

or to become due under the policy.” Id. at 75. 

 The Court also addressed Henkel’s argument that assignment without consent should be 

permitted because it would not place additional risk on the insurers. 

An additional burden may arise whenever the predecessor corporation still exists 

or can be revived because of the ubiquitous potential for disputes over the 

existence and scope of the assignment. If both assignor and assignee were to 

claim the right to defense, the insurer might effectively be forced to undertake the 

burden of defending both parties. 

Id. (citation omitted). Because of these potential risks to the insurers, the Court upheld their 

contractual right to accept or reject the assignment. 

10
The California Supreme Court’s logic in Henkel seems about right. At a minimum, for 

an insured loss to generate an assignable coverage benefit, the loss must be identifiable with 

some precision. It must be fixed, not speculative. See Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire 

Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 165, 172-73 (2nd Cir. 2006) (agreeing with district court judge who held fixed 

losses assignable and speculative losses not). We doubt that much, if any, authority exists for the 

proposition that an “unliquidated inchoate potential for coverage” can be freely transferred 

without the insurer’s consent. (Travelers Appellants’ Br. at 30.) 

This rule draws as much from the law on choses in action as from the law on insurance 

policies. A right not currently held is not a chose in action assignable at law. It follows that a 

chose in action only transfers in these circumstances if it is assigned at a moment when the 

policyholder could have brought its own action against the insurer for coverage. Under the 

liability policies implicated here, that moment does not arrive until a claim is made against the 

insured. Put another way, at a minimum the losses must have been reported to give rise to a 

chose in action. 

The potential for assignment to increase the risk to insurers is also a significant factor. 

The indemnity risk will remain largely the same regardless of who holds the policy rights – that 

is, the risk that a jury on some future date will assess damages for the bodily injuries caused by 

the Wheelabrator blast machine. On the other hand, the risk of being called to court to defend 

more than just the underlying claims seems substantial, as this dispute soundly demonstrates. 

Notwithstanding the post-loss exception, we read the consent-to-assignment provisions to 

apply to coverage transfers of any scope because it is hard to see the practical difference between 

assignment of the entire policy and assignment of a single claim.5

 If a claim was assigned in an 

asset sale, and the assignment encompassed indemnification and defense coverage, what does it 

not cover from the assignee’s perspective? The assignee is receiving everything under the policy 

the assignee could possibly want, especially since any claim receives the benefit of the full 

 

5

 Because we construe the consent provisions to the broadest extent possible, we need not address whether the 

language is ambiguous. 

11
policy limits. Moreover, the assignment of a pre-loss claim, or set of claims, can be just as risky 

for the insurer as assignment of an entire policy. 

 Corporate managers engaged in asset transactions that may involve occurred-but-not-yetreported losses have other means available to insure against the losses. For example, the asset 

purchaser could negotiate for indemnification of losses that have occurred up to the moment of 

exchange. If that strategy were followed over time, a distant successor could still benefit from 

the original policyholder’s liability insurance via indemnity claims made up the chain of 

corporate succession. Or, if the seller will not indemnify potential losses, the buyer can negotiate 

the price down to compensate for the increased risk of liability. 

 To the extent the alleged Wheelabrator blast machine injuries had occurred but had not 

yet been reported at the time of the relevant transactions, they did not constitute an assignable 

chose in action. Accordingly, U.S. Filter and Waste Management do not have a right to seek 

coverage under their predecessors’ CGL policies for these claims. 

II. Prior Participation Does Not Prevent Insurers from Denying Coverage Now 

 U.S. Filter and Waste Management argue for the reasonableness of their position by 

referring us to documentation from earlier, apparently unrelated claims in which at least 

Travelers participated in the defense. (U.S. Filter Appellees’ Br. at 28-30; Waste Mgmt. 

Appellees’ Br. at 29-32.) Travelers contends that it only participated in the defense of claims 

brought against its named insureds, not U.S. Filter and Waste Management, and that in any event 

it reserved its right to withdraw from the defense. (Travelers Reply Br. at 13-15.) 

 We find little worthy of pursuit regarding these contentions, except to say that even if 

Travelers or other Insurers participated in an earlier settlement of these sorts of claims, those 

agreements to defend appear to have included a valid reservation of the right to withdraw later. 

(See, e.g., U.S. Filter App. at 477-83.) And since U.S. Filter and Waste Management did not 

12
show some kind of detrimental reliance based on the defense agreements, they provide little help 

in demonstrating the existence of rights to the Wheelabrator predecessors’ insurance. 

Conclusion 

We reverse the trial court’s summary judgment determination and direct entry of 

judgment for the Insurers on the issues at contest in the present appeal. 

Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur. 

Boehm, J., not participating. 

13
Counsel of Record: 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS TRAVELERS CASUALTY 

AND SURETY COMPANY AND THE TRAVELERS 

INDEMNITY COMPANY

Richard A. Rocap 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Mary Massaron Ross 

Detroit, Michigan 

Charles W. Browning 

Stephen P. Brown 

Michael D. Almassian 

Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ALLSTATE INSURANCE 

COMPANY

Norman T. Funk 

Rori L. Goldman 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Robert R. Anderson III 

Allison G. Margolies 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT CERTAIN SOLVENT 

INSURANCE COMPANIES OF THE LLOYD’S OF LONDON 

MARKET COMPANIES

Donald G. Orzeske 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT 

LLOYD’S LONDON AND THE LLOYD’S OF LONDON 

MARKET COMPANIES

P. Russell Perdew 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS CONTINENTAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, ET AL. 

Mary K. Reeder 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

David E. Schoenfeld 

Irving C. Faber 

Sarah D. McTurnan 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT EMPLOYERS MUTUAL 

CASUALTY COMPANY

G. Ronald Heath 

Sean T. White 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Jan M. Michaels 

Scott M. Salerno 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES UNITED STATES FILTER 

CORPORATION N/K/A WATER APPLICATIONS & SYSTEMS 

CORPORATION, ET AL. 

Stanley C. Fickle 

Robert D. MacGill 

Charles P. Edwards 

T. Joseph Wendt 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Robert D. Chesler 

Roseland, New Jersey 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES WHEELABRATOR 

TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL. 

Fred R. Biesecker 

Brent W. Huber 

Brian E. Bailey 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE NATIONAL SOLID 

WASTES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION AND INDIANA 

PETROLEUM MARKETERS AND CONVENIENCE STORES 

ASSOCIATION

George M. Plews 

Christopher J. Braun 

Jeffrey D. Featherstun 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE UNITED 

POLICYHOLDERS, INDIANA MANUFACTURERS 

ASSOCIATION, AND DUKE ENERGY INDIANA, INC. 

Kevin M. Toner 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Charles M. Denton II 

Eric C. Fleetham 

Grand Rapids, Michigan 

Eric M. Cavanaugh 

Plainfield, Indiana 

William G. Passannante 

Cort T. Malone 

Brittany Hillman 

New York, New York 

Amy Bach 

Mill Valley, California 

14
Stephen A. Skardon 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT FEDERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY

Stephen J. Peters 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS HARTFORD ACCIDENT 

AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, ET AL. 

Donald B. Kite, Sr. 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

James P. Ruggeri 

Jeffrey D. Pariser 

Catherine E. Stetson 

Washington, D.C. 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT NATIONAL UNION FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

Adrian A. Allen 

C. Joseph Russell 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Samuel B. Isaacson 

Sonya D. Naar 

James D. Roberts 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT TIG INSURANCE COMPANY

David A. Temple 

Mathew J. Schafer 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Louis G. Corsi 

Joseph Tomaino 

New York, New York 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS WESTCHESTER FIRE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. 

Scott A. Harkness 

Bruce L. Kamplain 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

Lizbeth J. Lemke 

Chicago, Illinois 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ZURICH INTERNATIONAL 

(BERMUDA), LTD. 

David I. Rubin 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE COMPLEX INSURANCE 

CLAIMS LITIGATION ASSOCIATION

Laura A. Foggan 

Katherine L. Van Pelt 

15
16

Benjamin J. Theisman 

Washington, D.C. 

Michael B. Cracraft 

Philip B. McKiernan 

Joseph M. Hendel 

Indianapolis, Indiana