MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-10-00048-CV

Antonio REYES-VIDAL,

Appellant

v.

COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE,

Appellee

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI-04181

The Honorable Dan Beck, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 3, 2010

AFFIRMED

Appellant, Antonio Reyes-Vidal, appeals from a final judgment of disbarment. We 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2003, Border Patrol agents arrested and detained Misdael Lopez-Bonilla

for entering the United States without inspection. On March 21, 2003, Lopez-Bonilla’s brother 

Edgar, a United States resident, hired appellant to represent Lopez-Bonilla in removal 
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proceedings. Edgar paid appellant $750 for his initial retainer, and appellant successfully 

obtained reduction of Lopez-Bonilla’s bond to $5000. Edgar then wired $5000 to appellant for 

payment of the bond, and appellant used the money to pay the bond on April 3, 2003, identifying 

himself as obligor. At the same time, Edgar wired appellant an additional $700: $200 for LopezBonilla’s post-release travel to Edgar’s residence in Massachusetts, and $500 to compensate 

appellant for his appearance at the bond reduction hearing. 

Lopez-Bonilla was immediately released from detention upon payment of the bond. 

Appellant testified he and his sometimes-employee Eddiberto Medina picked Lopez-Bonilla up 

from the San Antonio detention facility and drove him to the Greyhound station to board a bus to 

Massachusetts. Lopez-Bonilla, however, testified Medina was not present that day. Appellant 

claimed that when they arrived at the Greyhound station, Lopez-Bonilla stated he did not wish to 

return to San Antonio for his scheduled removal hearing and asked appellant if the hearing could 

be transferred to Massachusetts. Appellant testified he then handwrote a contract, which he and 

Lopez-Bonilla signed. Per the purported contract, appellant would attempt to have the removal 

hearing transferred and he would retain the $5000 bond refund as his fee for doing so. LopezBonilla disputes that such a contract was ever formed or signed. The parties do agree that 

Lopez-Bonilla signed a handwritten receipt stating appellant gave him $200 in cash for the bus 

ticket to Massachusetts. However, Lopez-Bonilla testified appellant never actually gave him 

cash, but rather purchased the bus ticket with part of the $200 from Edgar and did not give him

the balance. 

Appellant successfully obtained a transfer of Lopez-Bonilla’s removal hearing to 

Massachusetts, where another attorney represented him. The immigration court in Boston 

granted Lopez-Bonilla asylum. Thereafter, the $5000 bond was released to appellant as obligor. 
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Lopez-Bonilla and Edgar subsequently contacted appellant requesting return of the $5000 to 

Edgar. Edgar testified appellant told him he had mistakenly spent the $5000 and would repay it 

in installments over the course of three months. In contrast, appellant testified he told Edgar he 

would not return the money pursuant to the contract he and Lopez-Bonilla signed at the 

Greyhound station. This purported contract forms the basis of the current disciplinary 

proceeding. 

On March 15, 2007, Lopez-Bonilla filed his first grievance against appellant. Appellant 

responded with a copy of the purported contract and alleged Lopez-Bonilla agreed he could keep 

the bond refund as additional compensation. Based on the contract, the first grievance was 

dismissed. Upon learning of the contract’s alleged fabrication, the Office of Chief Disciplinary 

Counsel (appellee) advised Lopez-Bonilla to file a second grievance, which he did. Appellee 

then filed a disciplinary action against appellant in the district court. 

At trial, appellant testified the contract was genuine but admitted Lopez-Bonilla’s 

signature was forged. Medina testified that after appellant and Lopez-Bonilla signed the 

purported contract, appellant told Medina to take the contract and the receipt for $200 back to 

appellant’s office to photocopy. Medina claimed that, unbeknownst to appellant, he forged 

Lopez-Bonilla’s signature on the purported contract after accidentally getting the document wet 

and smudging the original signature while attempting to photocopy it. He stated he copied and 

pasted Lopez-Bonilla’s signature from the receipt for $200 onto the contract and photocopied it 

to conceal the alteration because he was afraid appellant would yell at him if he admitted his 

mistake. Appellant asserted he did not discover the alleged forgery until after he submitted his 

response to the first grievance. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment of 

disbarment.
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LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in favor of 

disbarment. We review the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s findings in a bench 

trial in the same manner as the jury’s findings in a jury trial. Brown v. Comm’n for Lawyer 

Discipline, 980 S.W.2d 675, 679 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). When reviewing a 

legal sufficiency or no-evidence challenge, we must determine whether a reasonable and fairminded person could reach the verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial. City of Keller v. 

Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could and disregarding 

contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id. When reviewing a factual 

sufficiency challenge, we consider and weigh all the evidence both supporting and contradicting 

the finding. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989). We will set 

aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the verdict is so against the great weight 

and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.1

Here, upon appellant’s request, the trial court issued findings of fact stating, in pertinent 

part: 

 Dow Chem. Co. v. 

Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). Because this court is not the fact finder, we will not 

pass upon witnesses’ credibility or substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge, even if the 

evidence would clearly support a different result. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 

402, 407 (Tex. 1998).

[Appellant] knowingly made one or more false statements of material fact in 

connection with a disciplinary matter[;] . . . falsely represented to [appellee] that 

 1 Appellant argues the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings should be raised from a preponderance of the 

evidence, as provided by Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.08(c), to clear and convincing evidence. Authority 

to amend the existing rules rests exclusively with the Supreme Court of Texas, and this court is without power to 

change the standard as appellant requests. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.072 (West 2005). 
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[Lopez-Bonilla] had signed and agreed to the contents of [the contract;] . . . kept 

for himself $5000 in released-bond funds which he was not entitled to keep[; and] 

. . . engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentation.

On appeal, appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that 

he knowingly made a false statement of material fact when he submitted a copy of the purported 

contract in his response to Lopez-Bonilla’s first grievance for two reasons. First, because 

Medina testified he forged Lopez-Bonilla’s signature on the purported contract without 

appellant’s knowledge or permission and, second, because appellant testified he was unaware of 

the purported forgery when he responded to the first grievance. Essentially, appellant contends 

the trial court erred in concluding appellant knew Lopez-Bonilla’s signature, as opposed to the 

entire contract, was falsified when he replied to the first grievance. But appellant’s argument 

focuses too narrowly on the forged signature and ignores the trial court’s finding that appellant 

knowingly submitted a wholly fabricated document in connection with a disciplinary proceeding. 

Our review focuses on whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.

In addition to Lopez-Bonilla’s testimony that there was never a contract formed or an 

agreement made allowing appellant to retain the $5000 bond refund, the trial court also had the 

following evidence to consider. Appellant’s response to Lopez-Bonilla’s first grievance stated 

Lopez-Bonilla was released from detention on April 3, 2003, he stayed the night at a boarding 

house in San Antonio, and he departed San Antonio on a Greyhound on April 4. In support of 

his response to the first grievance, appellant attached a copy of the purported contract, which was 

dated April 3. The contract charged Lopez-Bonilla $800 of the $5000 bond refund, in part, for 

his overnight stay at the boarding house. Appellant also attached a copy of the travel letter, 

dated April 4, which he prepared for Lopez-Bonilla in the event that Border Patrol might stop 

him during his travel and request immigration documents. 
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At trial, appellant admitted Lopez-Bonilla actually departed San Antonio on April 3, the 

same day he was released from detention, and he did not spend the night at the boarding house. 

Appellant testified the inaccuracy in his response to the grievance was the result of his lapsed 

memory after the passage of four years from the date of Lopez-Bonilla’s release from detention 

(April 3, 2003) and the date of appellant’s response (April 27, 2007). He claimed he assumed 

that because Lopez-Bonilla was released on April 3 and departed, according to the travel letter, 

on April 4, he must have stayed at the boarding house appellant’s clients routinely used. The 

incorrect date on the travel letter, appellant testified, was the result of appellant’s mistaken belief 

at the time the letter was drafted on April 3 that Lopez-Bonilla would not depart until the next 

day. Appellant could not explain, however, why the purported contract charged Lopez-Bonilla 

for his stay at the boarding house he never stayed at, even though the contract was allegedly 

drafted at the Greyhound station just as he was about to depart. 

In contrast to appellant’s testimony, Lopez-Bonilla denied that appellant ever asked to 

retain the $5000 bond refund. He testified he never agreed appellant could keep the money, nor 

would he have agreed had the issue ever come up. Lopez-Bonilla also asserted he never met 

Medina, who was not present when appellant picked him up from detention and drove him to the 

Greyhound station. Edgar testified that when he contacted appellant and requested return of his 

$5000, appellant told him he was unsure where the money came from when he received it and 

had already spent it. Edgar claimed appellant promised to repay the money within three months, 

but when over three months went by without a payment, appellant stopped answering Edgar’s 

phone calls. It was only after Edgar made over twenty-five unanswered calls to appellant that 

Lopez-Bonilla filed his first grievance.
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Because the inconsistencies between appellant’s response to the first grievance and his 

testimony at trial tend to corroborate Lopez-Bonilla’s testimony that no contract was ever created 

or signed, the trial court could reasonably find appellant and Medina were not credible and 

disregard their testimony. As this court will not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial 

judge on matters of witness credibility, we find the trial court’s verdict not against the great 

weight and preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the evidence was both legally and 

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s verdict. We overrule appellant’s issue. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE PLEADINGS

 

The trial court’s fourth finding of fact states: “[Appellant] kept for himself $5000 in 

released-bond funds which he was not entitled to keep.” Appellant argues the disciplinary

petition does not aver wrongful retention of the $5000 as a ground for discipline, thereby 

precluding disbarment on this basis. We disagree.

Appellee’s petition precisely adhered to the requirements set forth in the rules of 

disciplinary procedure, which provide:

The petition must contain: . . . A description of the acts and conduct that gave rise 

to the alleged [p]rofessional [m]isconduct in detail sufficient to give fair notice to 

[r]espondent of the claims made, which factual allegations may be grouped in one 

or more counts[; . . .] A listing of the specific rules of the Texas Disciplinary 

Rules of Professional Conduct allegedly violated by the acts or conduct, or other 

grounds for seeking [s]anctions[; and . . .] A demand for judgment that the 

[r]espondent be disciplined as warranted by the facts and for any other appropriate

relief.

TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY PROC. 3.01(d)–(f). In a brief statement of facts, the disciplinary petition 

charges: 

In March of 2007, Misdael Lopez-Bonilla filed a complaint against [appellant], 

complaining that [appellant] failed to return money that had been used for his 

bond in the immigration case. In his response to the complaint, [appellant] 

provided the State Bar of Texas with a purported contract dated April 3, 2003, 

which supposedly had been signed by the Complainant Lopez-Bonilla and 
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[appellant]. This document stated that the Complainant Lopez-Bonilla agreed to 

allow [appellant] to keep the bond money as compensation. . . . The purported 

contract was a fabrication which the Complainant Lopez-Bonilla had never agreed 

to nor been asked to agree to. 

[Emphasis added.] Next, in the section specifying which disciplinary rules were violated, the 

petition states: 

The factual circumstances exemplified above constitute violations of the 

following Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 8.01(a) . . . a 

lawyer in connection with a disciplinary matter shall not knowingly make false 

statements of material fact; Rule 8.01(b) . . . a lawyer in connection with a 

disciplinary matter, shall not fail to correct a misapprehension known by the 

person to have arisen in the matter . . . Rule 8.04(a)(3) . . . A lawyer shall not 

engage in conduct involving dishonesty, . . . deceit or misrepresentation.

[Emphasis added.] 

The language of the disciplinary petition makes it clear that appellant’s wrongful 

retention of the $5000 bond and subsequent efforts to conceal it by fabricating the contract form 

the crux of the complaint. Had appellant not misappropriated the bond refund, there would be no 

need to fabricate a contract purporting to give appellant the right to keep it. And, had the trial 

court accepted the authenticity of the alleged contract, there would be no question that the $5000 

was legitimately retained. Thus, the disciplinary petition adequately pleaded facts sufficient to 

support the trial court’s judgment of disbarment on the basis that appellant wrongfully retained 

the $5000. 

CLERICAL ERROR

Appellant claims the judgment of disbarment is fatally flawed because of an erroneous 

reference to “Respondent Rosas.” The original judgment, signed on December 7, 2009, was lost 

in the mail and replaced by a duplicate judgment signed on December 18, 2009. The original 

judgment contained two erroneous references to “Respondent Rosas.” The second judgment was 

apparently corrected to omit one mention of “Respondent Rosas,” but one reference to 
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“Respondent Rosas” remained. In pertinent part, the second judgment reads: “[T]he Court finds 

for each of the violations established that the proper discipline of Respondent Rosas is 

DISBARMENT. It is, therefore, ORDERED AND DECREED that[] ANTONIO REYESVIDAL . . . is hereby immediately disbarred . . . .” [Emphasis added]. Appellant argues this 

erroneous reference is not merely a clerical error and, accordingly, requires reversal of the trial 

court’s ruling. We disagree.

A clerical error is a typographical mistake that “does not result from judicial reasoning or 

determination.” Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986). Alternatively, a judicial 

error “occurs in the rendering as opposed to the entering of a judgment.” Escobar v. Escobar, 

711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986). In other words, a judge commits judicial error by 

misapplying the facts or the law to reach an erroneous verdict. A judge commits clerical error by 

mistakenly issuing a verdict that, because of a typographical error, does not accurately reflect the 

judgment actually rendered. In determining whether an error is clerical or judicial, the court of 

appeals must “look to the judgment actually rendered, not the judgment that should or might 

have been rendered.” Id. Whether an error is clerical or judicial is a question of law, but what 

judgment the trial court actually rendered is a question of fact for the trial court. Thompson v. 

Tex. Dep’t of Human Res., 859 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no writ). A 

trial court may use the nunc pro tunc procedure to correct a clerical error, but it may not correct a 

judicial error. Id. 

Here, there is no question of fact regarding whether the trial court actually rendered a 

judgment of disbarment against appellant. Also, there is no one named “Rosas” mentioned 

anywhere else in these proceedings. Appellant was correctly charged in the Original 

Disciplinary Petition as “Antonio Reyes-Vidal,” the trial court’s findings of fact refer exclusively 
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to “Antonio Reyes-Vidal,” the caption of the trial court’s final judgment lists “Antonio ReyesVidal” as the sole respondent, and the final judgment orders “Antonio Reyes-Vidal” immediately 

disbarred. Based on these facts, there is no question that appellant and no one else was 

disbarred, and the erroneous reference to “Respondent Rosas” in the findings portion of the 

judgment was nothing more than a mere clerical error. Therefore, the trial court was authorized 

to correct the error using the nunc pro tunc procedure, which it did on August 25, 2010. 

CONCLUSION

We overrule appellant’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice