alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 70, Number 178 (Thursday, September 15, 2005)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54566-54567]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 05-18361]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection


Notice of Cancellation of Customs Broker Permit

AGENCY: Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security.

ACTION: General notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to section 641 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 
(19 U.S.C. 1641) and the Customs Regulations (19 CFR 111.51), the 
following Customs broker permits are cancelled without prejudice.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Name                   Permit             Issuing port
------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Brokerage Services,    H34               Miami.
 Inc..

[[Page 54567]]

 
General Brokerage Services,    99-00537          Washington, DC.
 Inc..
MarketMakers, Inc............  WW6               Miami.
Oscar H. Vildosola...........  26-02-ALW         Nogales.
Menlo Worldwide Trade          26-02-001         Nogales.
 Services, Inc..
Mary Fong....................  20016             Los Angeles.
Hanshin Air Cargo............  98013             Los Angeles.
Menlo Worldwide Trade          52-03-225         Miami.
 Services, Inc..
Mark Leverett................  WYT               Miami.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Dated: September 8, 2005.
Jayson P. Ahern,
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations.
[FR Doc. 05-18361 Filed 9-14-05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-06-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE>                                            9
<MULTIPLIER>                                      1000

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                              25,725
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               3,451
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                         0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                         0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                         54,599
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                             267,777
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                               268,047
<LOANS>                                            317,855
<ALLOWANCE>                                          1,989
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     640,746
<DEPOSITS>                                         460,847
<SHORT-TERM>                                             0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                 10,313
<LONG-TERM>                                         98,359
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                               529
<OTHER-SE>                                          70,698
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                     640,746
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                     12,413
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                    9,334
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                       534
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                    22,281
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                   9,320
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  12,250
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                               10,031
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                          180
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                     188
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                      6,726
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      4,003
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           4,003
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                         2,429
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                          .63
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          .61
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                        3.23
<LOANS-NON>                                              0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         1,933
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                         0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                          0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     1,806
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                            3
<RECOVERIES>                                             0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    1,983
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 1,983
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              1,983



</TABLE>
**CMF** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19
- 0733 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. TOBY CARL McADAM ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee’s late motion for a 6
- day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to and including May 11 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 11 2020

05/11/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0733
#### Reginald Lee NICHOLAS, Appellant Pro Se, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 61628.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

July 15, 2003.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to Supreme Court Denied Sept. 2, 2003.

Reginald Lee Nicholas, Jefferson City, pro se.

Anne E. Edgington, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before ELLIS, C.J., BRECKENRIDGE and NEWTON, JJ.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

Reginald Lee Nicholas appeals from the motion court’s dismissal of his Rule 74.06(d) motion. Since a published opinion would have no precedential value, a memorandum has been provided to the parties.

The judgment of the motion court is affirmed. Rule 84.16(b).
Exhibit 21.1
Subsidiaries of the Registrant
 Company
    
    Ownership
    
    State of IncorporationThe State Bank
    
    
    100
    %
    
    MichiganDavison State Bank
    
    
    100
    %
    
    MichiganCommunity Bank Services, Inc.
    
    100% by The State Bank
    
    MichiganFentura Mortgage Company
    
    100% by The State Bank
    
    MichiganWest Michigan Community Bank
    
    
    100
    %
    
    MichiganWest Michigan Mortgage, LLC
    
    99.5% by West Michigan
    
    MichiganCommunity Bank0.5% by Community InsuranceServices, Inc.Community Insurance Services, Inc.
    
    100% by West MichiganCommunity Bank
    
    Michigan
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-7481

JORGE GEVARA, 

Plaintiff – Appellant, 

v. 

F. B. HUBBARD, Superintendent; CRUTCHFIELD, Assist. 

Superintendent of Programs; DEBRA DUNCAN, R.N. - Medical 

Administrator; C. FIELDS, Correctional Officer; DAVID 

OSTORNE, Asst. Director Prisons; PAULA Y. SMITH, Medical 

Director of Prisons; THEODIS BECK, Secretary of Prisons; D. 

JONES MURPHY, Nurse; AMY S. MACKEY; PETER KEYSER; MR. 

PERRITT, Unit Manager; T. JONES, Asst. Unit Manager; P. 

BETHEA, Correctional Officer; PURCEL, Correctional Officer; 

QUICK, Sergeant; MILLER, Sergeant; ASHE HARRIS, Notary 

Public; DIRECTOR OF PRISONS BOYD BENNETT, 

Defendants – Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, 

Jr., District Judge. (1:09-cv-00681-WO-LPA) 

Submitted: January 13, 2011 Decided: January 21, 2011

Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. 

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Jorge Gevara, Appellant Pro Se. Lisa Yvette Harper, Assistant 

Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. 
2

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
3

PER CURIAM: 

Jorge Gevara seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge to 

deny Gevara’s “Motion to Amend an Order to Show Cause and for an 

Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order and Appointment of 

Counsel as a Support of Any Error and Objections to the 

Magistrate’s Opinion & Order.” This court may exercise 

jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), 

and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. 

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949). The order Gevara seeks 

to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable 

interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we deny 

Gevara’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately 

presented in the materials before the court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JORGE HUMBERTO ZARAGOZA 

FUENTES,

 Appellant,

v.

PEDRO ZARAGOZA FUENTES, 

RANCHO PRODUCTOR DE LECHE,

ZARAGOZA HERMANOS, S.A. DE 

C.V., & ZARGEO INC.,

 Appellees.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-16-00289-CV

Appeal from the

448th District Court 

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 2012-DCV04174) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a motion filed by Appellant, Jorge Humberto Zaragoza 

Fuentes, to dismiss his appeal pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(1). We grant the motion and 

dismiss the appeal. Costs of the appeal are taxed against Appellant. See TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(d).

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

July 18, 2018

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
SCWC-28958

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

_________________________________________________________________
C

. B R E W E R A N D C O M P A N Y , L T D

. , R e s p o n d e n t / P l a i n t i f f

- A p p e l l a n t ,

v s
.

MA R I N E I N D E M N I T Y I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y O F A M E R I C A ,

P e t i t i o n e r / D e f e n d a n t

- A p p e l l e e ,

a n d

I N D U S T R I A L I N D E M N I T Y C O M P A N Y ; I N D U S T R I A L I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y O F H A W A I I , L T D

. ; N A T I O N A L U N I O N F I R E I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y O F P I T T S B U R G H ; U N I T E D S T A T E S F I R E I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; L I B E R T Y M U T U A L I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; T I G I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; C O L U M B I A C A S U A L T Y C O M P A N Y ; J A M E S R I V E R I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; T H E H O M E I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; R E L I A N C E I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; L E X I N G T O N I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; C I G N A P R O P E R T Y A N D C A S U A L T Y I N S U R A N C E C O

. ; P A C I F I C E M P L O Y E R S I N S U R A N C E C O

. , I N C

. ; S C O T T S D A L E I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; F I R E MA N ’ S F U N D I N S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y ; F I R S T S T A T E I N S U R A N C E C O

. ; K I L A U E A I R R I G A T I O N C O

. , I N C

. ; K E H A L A N I H O L D I N G S C O

. , I N C

. ; S T A T E O F H A W A I # I ; H A W A I I I N S U R A N C E G U A R A N T Y A S S O C I A T I O N ,

R e s p o n d e n t s / D e f e n d a n t s
- A p p e l l e e s , e t a l

.

_______________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (ICA NO. 28958; CIV. NO. 06-1-0140)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

( B y : McKenna, J.)
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellant C. Brewer and Company,

Ltd.’s “Motion for Extension of Time in Which to File Responses Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-28958 24-DEC-2013 02:00 PMto Applications for Writ of Certiorari” filed on December 20,

2013, is hereby denied.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, December 24, 2013.

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Associate Justice

Kenneth R. Kupchak, Tred R. Eyerly, and Mark M. Murakami, for respondent/ plaintiff-appellant
**Exhibit 32.1**

**Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

I,Michael V. Mecca, as President and Chief Executive Officer of BH/RE, L.L.C.(the “Company”), certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, asadopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to myknowledge:

(A)  the accompanying Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2006, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission (the “Report”) fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

(B)  the information in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

Dated: November14, 2006

 
|        | /s/ Michael V. Mecca                                                 |
|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | Michael V. Mecca                                                     |
|   | President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal  Executive Officer) |

 

----
STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher N. LAFORTUNA

No. COA16-1000

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: June 20, 2017

NO ERROR.
ORDER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(First Chamber)

4 November 2008

Case F-87/07

**Luigi Marcuccio**

**v**

**Commission of the European Communities**

(Civil service – Officials – Action for damages – Allegedly unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission’s Medical Service – Inadmissibility – Failure to comply with a reasonable period for lodging a claim for compensation)

**Application:**brought under Articles 236 EC and 152 EA, in which Mr Marcuccio primarily seeks compensation for the damage allegedly suffered
by reason of the unlawful conduct of the Commission’s Medical Service in dealing with three medical certificates produced
by the applicant in the summer of 2001.

**Held:**The action is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs.

**Summary**

1.      *Officials – Actions – Time-limits – Claim for compensation addressed to an institution – Duty to act within a reasonable time*

*(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46; Staff Regulations, Art. 90)*

2.      *Officials – Actions – Action for damages – Subject-matter – Ruling – Manifest inadmissibility*

*(Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)*

1.      The onus is on officials or other staff to submit a claim for compensation from the Community for loss alleged to be attributable
to the Community within a reasonable period from the time when they became aware of the situation of which they complain.
The reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular,
the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties.

Account must also be taken of the point of reference provided by the limitation period of five years laid down for actions
in non-contractual liability by Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. However, the five year period does not
constitute a rigid and intangible limit below which any claim is admissible regardless of the time taken by the applicant
to submit his claim to the administration and of the circumstances of the case.

(see paras 27-30)

See:

9/75 *Meyer-Burckhardt* v *Commission* [1975] ECR 1171, paras 7, 10 and 11

T-144/02 *Eagle and Others* v *Commission* [2004] ECR II‐3381, paras 65, 66 and 71

F-125/05 *Tsarnavas* v *Commission* [2007] ECR-SC I‐A‐1‐0000 and II‐A‐1‐0000, paras 71, 76 and 77

2.      In an action for compensation brought by an official, claims which seek, in reality, a declaration by the Community judicature
that certain arguments put forward in support of the claim for compensation are well founded are manifestly inadmissible because
it is not for the court to make statements of law. That is true of claims that the Community judicature should make a declaration
establishing the reality of the actions and conduct complained of and declare them unlawful.

(see para. 36)

See:

108/88 *Jaenicke Cendoya* v *Commission* [1989] ECR 2711, paras 8 and 9
EXHIBIT 10.14


 


TRADEMARK ASSIGNMENT


 


This TRADEMARK ASSIGNMENT,
by and between Ran KOHEN, an individual having an address at 20735 NE 32 PL, Aventura,
FL 33180 (hereinafter “Assignor”), and SAFETY QUICK LIGHTING & FANS CORP., a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, having a place of business at 3245 Peachtree Parkway, Suite D310 Suwanee,
GA 30024 (hereinafter “Assignee”).


 


WHEREAS, Assignor
is the owner of the trademark “QUICK LAMPS” (word mark) in U.S. Registration No. 3,607,071 (“the Mark”),
together with the goodwill of the business symbolized by the Mark;


 


WHEREAS, the parties
desire to enter into this Assignment for the purpose of transferring all right, title, and interest in and to said Mark, together
with the goodwill of the business symbolized by the Mark;


 


NOW, THEREFORE, in
consideration of good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Assignor does hereby
assign, sell, transfer and set over to Assignee, its successors and assigns, all rights, title, and interest in and to the Mark,
together with the goodwill of the business symbolized by said Mark, in the United States, its territories and possessions,
and all foreign countries throughout the world, as well as all rights of action and recovery for past, present, and future infringements
thereof for the full term and all subsequent terms of the registrations as fully and entirely as the same would have been held
and enjoyed by the Assignor had this Assignment not been made.




    	 



    

 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the parties have executed this ASSIGNMENT as of the last date below.


 


ASSIGNOR:


 


RAN KOHEN


 


Signature:/s/ Ran Kohen


 


Date: November 14, 2013


 


 


 


ASSIGNEE:


 


SAFETY QUICK LIGHTING & FANS CORP.


 


By:/s/ Rani Kohen


 


Name: Rani Kohen


 


Title:Chairman


 


Date:November 14, 2013


 


SAFETY QUICK LIGHTING & FANS CORP.


 


By:/s/ James R. Hills


 


Name: James R. Hills


 


Title:CEO


 


Date:November 14, 2013


 


 





	Signature:	 	/s/ Angella Larson-Coone	 	Date:	 	November 14, 2013
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Signature:	 	/s/ Dinah Fuentes	 	Date:	 	November 14, 2013
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 






    	2
State of North Carolina v. Kendra Potts Smith, Defendant.

No. COA16-236

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 18, 2016

NO ERROR.
STATE of North Carolina v. Maceo Lamont GARDNER, Defendant.

No. COA 16-1089

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Filed: October 3, 2017

AFFIRMED.
___________ No. 96-1368

___________ Matthew Joseph Sikora, Jr., * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Robert Houston, Warden, Lincoln * District of Nebraska. Correctional Center; John Does, * [Unpublished] * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: March 22, 1996 Filed: April 19, 1996

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Matthew Sikora, a Nebraska inmate, a ppeals from the district court's 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging priso n officials and prison medical staff violated his constitutional rights. We reverse and remand. The magistrate provisionally granted Sikora leave to proceed informa pauperis (IFP) pending receipt of Sikora's trust account statements. Upon review of the statements, the magistrate ordered Sikora to pay a partial fil ing fee. The magistrate also granted Sikora leave to amend hi s complain t to explain how claims in this particular action were no t duplicative of claims raised by Sikora in two other suits pending before the court. Sikora paid the fee and filed an amended complaint.

### -2- Aft er reviewing the amended complaint, the magistrate recommende d dismissal pursuant to section 1915(d). Without mentioning Sikora's paymen t of the partial filing fee, the magistrate conclu ded that, as the claims in Sikora's amended complaint were frivolous and du plicative, his provisional IFP status should be revoked and his action dism issed. The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation.
The distr ict court acted improperly in ordering Sikora to pay a partial filing fee before determining whether hi s complaint was frivolous; after Sikora paid the court-ordered filing fee his complaint had to b e treated as if it were a paid complaint. See In re: Funkhouser , 873 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (a court may not require plaintiff to first pay fee and then later dismiss complaint as frivolous). Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
STATE v. Ricky D. WAGONER

326P17-1

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

November 1, 2017

Ricky D. Wagoner, for Wagoner, Ricky D.

Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, Tom Horner, District Attorney, for State of North Carolina.

The following order has been entered on the motion filed on the 2nd of October 2017 by Defendant for Petition for Discretionary Review:

*490"Motion Denied by order of the Court in conference, this the 1st of November 2017."
1536.

#### HUBBARD *v.*THE STATE.

One of the jurors who rendered the verdict being related to the prosecutor within the ninth degree, which fact was unknown to the defendant or his counsel,- it was error to refuse a new trial, in the absence of any counter-showing.

Accusation of unlawful sale of liquor, from city court of Hart-well — Judge Hodges. October 13, 1908.

Argued January 14,

Decided February 9, 1909.

*A. G. & Julian McGurry,*for plaintiff in error.

*James II. Shelton, solicitor,*contra.

Russell, J.

Among other grounds in his motion, the plaintiff in error asked a new trial upon the ground that T. H. Brown, one of the jurors who rendered the verdict finding him guilty, was. related by affinity in the third degree to George T. Cleveland, the prosecutor, which made him incompetent as a juror. In support of this ground of the motion, affidavits were presented, showing that the defendant and his counsel were wholly ignorant, until after the trial, that there was any relationship between the prosecutor and the juror. The affidavit of H. S. Sanders as to the relationship was not disputed by any counter-showing. Sanders’ affidavit showed that one Elias Sanders was the great-grandfather of the prosecutor, and also of Mrs. Leila Brown, who was the juror’s wife. The prosecutor and the juror were, therefore, third cousins, by marriage. This evidence, that they were thus related within the ninth degree, being undisputed, the verdict finding the defendant guilty was not a legal verdict, and should have been set aside.. The ease is controlled by the decision of this court in *Smith*v. *State, 2 Ga. App.*574 (59 S. E. 311). Although the evidence in behalf of the State in this case authorized the verdict of guilty,, a new trial should have been granted. As we ruled in the *Smith*case, a new trial is demanded where there is no doubt as to the disqualification of a juror, and where such disqualification is not waived by knowledge of that fact; for the reason that the verdict, is illegal and void. To this effect is the ruling in *Georgia R. Co.*v. *Cole,*73 *Ga.*713. *Judgment reversed.*