1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO No. 42614
SAFARIS UNLIMITED, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company,

Plaintiff

- Respondent,

v.
MIKE VON JONES,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Twin Falls, June 2015 Term
2015 Opinion No. 70

Filed: July 17, 2017
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Randy J. Stoker, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs on appeal, but not attorney’s fees, are awarded to appell ant.
Jeffrey E. Rolig P.C., Twin Falls, attorney for appellant.
Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC, Twin Falls, attorneys for respondent. Louis V. Spiker argued.

______________________________________ W. JONES, Justice
I. N ATURE OF THE C ASE Appellant Mike Von Jones arranged to hunt big game in Zimbabwe , Africa, with HHK Safaris (Pvt) Ltd ( “ HHK ” )

. Jones went on the hunt and received an invoice for $26,040.00 from Respondent Safaris Unlimited L LC (“Safaris Unlimited”) . Jones then refused to pay Safaris
Unlimited for the hunt. As a result, Safaris Unlimited filed a suit for breach of contract. Jones responded that he arrange d and engaged in the hunt with HHK , not Safaris Unlimited, and
therefore he had no contractual relationship with Safaris Unl imited for payment. He further alleged that he was entitled to offse t any amount owed for the hunt w ith the value of certain trophy items from the hunt and an earlier hunt . Safaris Unlimited mo ved for summary judgment.2 The district court granted its motion and entered judgment in favor of Safaris Unlimited

. Jones appeals to this Court

. We vacate and remand.
II. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND Safaris Unlimited is a Georgia limited liability company. HHK is a private limited corporation organized under the laws of Zimbabwe. The chain of ownership is as follows: (1) Safaris Unlimited is owned entirely by C. Martin Wood, III; (2) Wood owns fifty percent of Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited (also a private limited corporation organized under
the laws of Zimbabwe); and (3) Bulawayo Trading Company owns f orty percent of HHK. Jennifer Ryan is the general manager of Safaris Unlimited, and Graham Hingeston is one of the
owners and the day

- to

- day manager of HHK. Safaris Unlimited operates as a broker o r booking agent for HHK. Other than the actual hunting services provided by HHK, Safaris Unlimited coordinates and assists on all details of the hunt, such as accommodations, transportation, and permits. According to Hingeston, HHK requires that the client pay Safaris Unlimited for the services provided by HHK in all instances. In exchange for the client’s agreement to pay Safaris Unlimited, HHK provides the hunting services. HHK does not provide hunting services except with Safaris Unlimited, and Safaris
U nlimited on ly conducts business with HHK. As explained by Ryan, “In the normal course of business, Safaris Unlimited is entitled to the difference between HHK’s c ost to provide safari and big game hunting services and the price charged the client by Safari s Unlimited.” Ryan attached to her affidavit the service agreement between Safaris Unlimited and HHK. Particularly relevant here, the financial management agreement of the parties provides: Whereas HHK is in the hunting safari business and agrees to engage SU [Safaris Unlimited] as a financial service agent for the sole purpose of coordinating safari bookings and payments from booking agents, companies and individual s worldwide. . . . SU shall be fully responsible for collection of all deposits, remai ning balances and trophy fees. Deposits shall be collected for confirmation of a safari. Remaining balances of daily rates shall be collected prior to commencement of the safari and trophy fees shall be collected within 10 days of the completion of the saf ari. All funds collected on behalf of HHK shall be forwarded timely on request. From November 22, 2012, to December 1, 2012, Jones engaged in a safari and hunt of big game with HHK in Zimbabwe

. According to Jones ’s interrogatory responses , he shot a

tro p hy elephant, a tuskless elephant
, and a buffalo on th e 2012 hunt. Jones has engaged in two3 earlier hunts with HHK , one in 2010 and one in 2011. For both of these earlier hunts, Jones paid
Safaris Unlimited with a cashier’s check after receiving an invoice from Safaris Unlimited

. To arrange the 2012 hunt, Jones directly contacted Hingeston with HHK

. Jones t estified
, “Yes, I was aware that [HHK] used [ Safaris Unlimited ] for a booking agent . . . previously. But
not on the 2012 hun t.” In his deposition, Jones explained that the 2012 hunt was “ different” than
the two earlier hunts because he “had no contact with [ Safaris Unlimited] whatsoever.” In the
two earlier hunts , Jones identified his contact with Safaris Unlimited as his payme nt to Safaris
Unlimited for the hunts with HHK and p ossibly some contact with Ryan. Although Jones could not remember “for sure,” he testified in his deposition that Hingeston had him contact Ryan on at least one of the two previous hunts. According to Jon es, t his contact was probably an email about
the invoice for the hunt.
After the 2012 hunt, on December 6, 2012, Ryan emailed Jones an invoice in the amount of $26,550.00. In response via email, Jones disputed a charge on the invoice (for a cameraman)
and also informed Ryan that he had “some serious issues with the quality of service” on the 2012 hunt. Ryan then emailed Jones a new invoice for $26,040.00, removing the disputed charge. Over the next two months, Ryan sent Jones four emails asking him to pay the amount owed for the hunt. In Ryan’s last email, she informed Jones that she would be turning over his account to Safaris Unlimited’s attorneys for collection. Jones did not respond to these four emails. On May 1, 2013, counsel for Safaris Unlimited sen t a demand letter to Jones for payment. On June 28, 2013, Safaris Unlimited filed a complaint against Jones for breach of contract and sought $26,040.00 in damages plus interest

. On January 6, 2014, Jones answered. Jones admitted that Safaris Unlimited sent an invoice

. He also admitted that he had not paid the invoice. He denied , however, that he owed the
invoiced amount to Safaris Unlimited

. He alleged that Safaris Unlimited was not the real party in
interest and that Safaris Unlimited was acting as the collection agency for the real party in interest, HHK, in violation of the Idaho Collection Agency Act (ICAA)

. As an affirmative defense, h e asserted that he was entitled to offset the amount owed with (1) the value of trophy

sized elephant tusks and a buffalo trophy from the 2012 hunt and (2) trophy animals and tusks
from the earlier hunt in 2010 . A ccording to Jones, he did not receive these trophy items after the
hunt s

.4 On July 14, 2014, Safaris Unli mited moved for summary judgment. Along with other evidence, as discussed above, Safaris Unlimited presented another invoice for the 2012 hunt.
This second invoice wa s issued by Safaris Unlimited for a to tal amount of $26,040.00
, and it had a signature on the bottom from “M. Von Jones.” A licensed professional hunter employed by
HHK stated in an affidavit that he presented Jones with this invoice at the end of the 2012 hunt.
He also claimed that Jones signed the invoice in his presence. Relying on this invoice
, Safaris Unlimited argued that Jones was contractually obligated to pay Safaris Unlimited for the hunt

. Safaris Unlimited contended that HHK, as a third party, provided the consideration for Jones’s obligation to pay Safaris Unlimited . Safaris Unli mited also argued that it was not subject to the
ICAA , but, eve n if it was, Safaris Unlimited qualified for an exemption

. Finally, Safaris Unlimited argued that Jones was not entitled to any offset for the value of certain trophy items
because federal and international regulations prohibited the use of the trophy items for commercial purposes. On August 18, 2014, Jones responded in opposition to Safaris Unlimited’s motion. Jones argued that he had a contract with HHK , not Safaris Unlimited. Citing to his d eposition testimony , Jones denied that he viewed or signed the second invoice. He claimed that the second invoice did not create any contractual relationship with Safaris Unlimited. He also argued that Safaris Unlimited was acting as a collection a gency an d was not subject to an exemption to the
ICAA

. Lastly, Jones argued that he was entitled to substantial offsets. He contended that he was entitled to an offset for the 2012 hunt for the following reason: Unfortunately, contrary to what had been agreed, [J ones] was forced to share the camp with nine South Africans, who were extremely noisy, drunk and overbearing most of the time. The South Africans consumed all the food and drank all the Cokes and other drinks. The camp also ran out of diesel fuel. [Jones] left the site early. 1

1 An email exchange between Hingeston and Jones indicate s that Hingeston informed him: “Also just to let you know we have some South African s that are scheduled to hunt 23

– 29 there for Buff.” Jones responded: “I’m ok with South Africans as long as they are not a bunch of loud, arroga [sic] jackasses as I have unfortunately on occa sion encountered in the past.” According Jones’s deposition, Jones verified with Hingeston either through email or on the phone that there would be two “decent” South Africa ns on the hunt for three days. Also a ccording to Jones, “these South Africans have a reputation for being drunks and total a

- holes if you’re in a camp with them.” On the hunt, Jones stated that the nine South Africans “were loud,” “took videos all day,” “got drunk at night ,” and “consumed all the food.” Jones stated: I complained fro m day one. I said, what the hell is going on here? I was supposed to have two South Africans here, and we’ve got nine. And we’re up all night. I can’t sleep. I can’t do anything. I said, what’s going on? Well, somehow they found out that these guys were go ing to be there for5 Jones also contended that “he has not received tens of thousands of dollars worth [sic] of ivory
from the 2010 and 2012 hunts.” He argued that whether Safa ris Unlimited or HHK could sell the trophies was irrelevant because he was deprived of the value and benefit of those items. On September 2, 2014, the district court heard oral argument on Safaris Unlimited’s motion for summary judgment. The district court then pronounced its deci sio n on the record

. The
district court summarily found that the facts were undisputed. The district court then determined: Safari is owned by Mr. Wood, and Safari owns 50 percent of the Bulawayo Company, which owns 40 percent of the HHK Company, clearly r elated entities in this case, which I think satisfy the criteria under the Idaho Collection [ ] [Agency] Act which allows Safaris to bring this lawsuit in their name, albeit the hunting party, if you will, was HHK. In short, the district court ruled that Safaris Unlim ited did not violate the ICA A by seeking payment from Jones for the hunting services provided by HHK

. Next, the district court determined the amount owed by Jones : There seems to be no dispute as to the value of the hunt: The 26,000 and som e odd dollars are set forth in the invoice. I come to that conclusion for two reasons. Number one, though I agree that the mere presentation of an invoice to a party with their responding signature doesn’t, in and itself, establish a contract, in this

case that establishes a, I think, an acknowledgment that that is a reasonable and fair billing. And when you couple that with the emails that took place later between Mr. Jones and Ms. Ryan, the only dispute that Mr. Jones raises over that invoice really relat es to the offset claims that he’s making. So I find that the $26,000 obligation is owed subj ect to any offset claim which I’ m going to talk about here in a second. Thus, the district court determined that Jones was obligated to pay $26,040 .00 for the hunt

. Finally, t he distr ict court turned to the offset allegations

. With regard to an offset for
Jones’ s dissatisfaction due to South Africans at the camp, the district court d etermined that there

was no legal basis for that offset. The district court reasone d: “T here’s no representation made in the record by Safaris or HHK or anybody else that this would be a quiet camp or that it would be a camp free of any of th e things he’s complaining about . . . . ” With regard to 2012 trophy items, the district court determined that Jones failed to raise an obligation on behalf of Safaris
Unlimited or HHK to transport the trophy items. Specifically, the district court recognized that there was no affirmative allega tion that Jones was promised shipment as a part of the invoice.

like seven days. And that is not what [Hingeston] indicated to me. So it was a miserable hunt. I got the animal. But it was a miserable hunt. Absolutely the worst hunt I’ve been on in my life.6 The district court acknowledged that it did not know whether there was a separate contract for shipment, but it concluded that the burden was on Jones to present evidence for this affirmative
defense. The district court clarified: [I]f I had before me a contractual provision or agreement that said Safari o r HHK is obligated to ship these tusks back at their cost, and that didn’ t occur, I would agree that that would certainly amount to a n offse t in this case. But that’ s a separate contractual relationship, I think, beyond the offset. I think it’ s a counterclaim issue. Similarly, with regard to the 2010 trophy items, the district court stated: [T]here is no counterclaim before the Court, there’ s no third party claim before the Court. If there is a contractual dispute there, it’s just not raised in this case, and I have to decide this matter based upon the record that I have today. I find that there is no merit to that argument.
In sum mary, the district court rejected Jones’ s attempts to offset the amount he owed to Safaris
Unlimited. The district court then ora lly granted summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited on all
issues.
On Octobe r 27, 2014, the district court entered an amended judgment pr oviding that
Safaris Unlim ited would recover $26,040.00 p lus interest and $20,285.99 in attorney’s fees for a total judgment of $52,005.37. Jones appeals to this Court.
III. I SSUES ON A PPEAL 1. Whether the district court erred by granting Safaris Unlimited ’s motion for summary judgment.
2. Whether either party is entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.
IV. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW “On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on th e motion.” Arregui v. Gallegos

- Main , 153 Idaho 801, 804, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genui ne issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c). “When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party .” Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. , 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). “If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of mate rial fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.” Lapham v. Stewart , 137 Idaho 582, 585, 51 P.3d 396, 399 (2002). Conner v. Hodges , 157 Idaho 19, 23, 333 P.3d 130, 134 (2014).7 V. A NALYSIS A. The district court imp roperly granted summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited. Jones contends that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Safaris
Unlimited. He submits three arguments in support of his position

. First, Jones argues that he had
a contract with HH K , not Safaris Unlimited. Second, Jones argues that the district court erroneously determined that he was not entitled to offset any amount owed with the value of trophy items from the 2010 and 2012 hunt s . Third, Jones argues that Safaris Unlimited is acti ng as a debt collection agency subject to the ICAA. In response to Jones’s first argument, Safaris Unlimited contends that the invoice presented by the professional hunter and signed by Jones establishes a contract between Jones
and Safaris Unlimited

. In response to Jones’s second argument, Safaris Unlimited contends that Jones failed to properly assert his offset claims because he failed to establish any obligation on behalf of Safaris Unlimited to deliver the trophy items

. Finally, i n response to Jones’ s third argument, Safaris Unlimited asserts that it is not attempting to collect the debt of another and, even if it was, it qualifie s for an exemption to the ICAA. “The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b ) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages.” Mosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co. , 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013). Here,
Safaris Unlimited’ s complaint unequivocally stated that it had a n express or implied contract with Jones for the 2012 hunt. Safaris Unlimited made similar assertions in its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. Neither the complaint nor summary judgment
memorandum alleged that Safaris Unlimited had an agreement with HHK or an assignment of
debt to enforce a contract between Jones and HHK . Instead, Safaris Unlimited contended throughout th e se proceedings that it sought payment for the 2012 hunt because it had an
enforceable co ntract with Jones.
The existence of a contract is a genuine issue of material fact. “ As to contract disputes at summary judgment, ‘ [w]hen the existence of a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to decide w hether a contract in
fact exists. ’ ” Nix v. Elmore Cnty.
, 158 Idaho 310, 314
, 346 P.3d 1045 , 1049 ( 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp. , 106 Idaho 363 , 368, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984)). “ ‘ Formation of a valid contract require s that there be a meeting of the minds as8 evidenced by a manifestation of mutual intent to contract. ’ Whet her a contract has been formed

‘ is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. ’ ” Bettwieser v. N .Y. Irrigation Dist. , 154 Idaho 317 , 323, 297 P.3d 1134, 1140 (2013) (quoting Thomas v. Thomas , 150 Idaho 636, 645, 249 P.3d 829, 838 (2011) ). In this case, contrary to Safaris Unlimited’s argument on appeal, the purported signature of Jones at the bottom of an invoice is not sufficient to show any kind of
contract between Jones and Safaris Unlimited for the 2012 hunt. Based upon the record at the time of summary judgment , Safaris Unlimited failed to prove the existence of a contract with
Jones for the 2012 hunt. Due to the lack of evidence in the record , t he dis trict court erred by granting summary judgment to Safaris Unlimited for its breach of contract claim. The district court also erred by granting Safaris Unlimited’s motion for summary judgment as to Jones’s
offset claims for the trophy items from the 2010 and 2012 hunts. An offset does not need to be pled as a counterclaim. We vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Safaris
Unlimited and remand for further proceedings

. B. We decline to award attorney’s fees o n appeal at this time. Both parties request attorney’s fees on appeal . Jones contends that he is entitled to attorney’s fees under Idaho Code section 12

- 120(3)

. Safaris Unlimited contends that it is entitled to attorney’s fees under Idaho Code sections 12

- 120(1) and 12

- 120(3). Idaho Code section s 12

- 120(1 ) and 12

- 120(3) both mandate an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing & Collections, Inc. , 157 Idaho 395, 401, 336 P.3d 802, 808 (2014); Pinnacle Eng’ rs, Inc. v. Heron Brook, LLC , 139 Idaho 756 , 761, 86 P.3d 470, 475 (2004). In this case, a ny determination of the prevailing party is “premature” because the Court does “not yet know who will prevail in this action.” Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitab le Inv., LLC , 148 Idaho 616, 621, 226 P.3d 1263 , 1268 ( 2010 )

. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s award of attorney’s fees to Safaris Unlimited

. At the conclusion of this litigation in district court, the court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to the eventual prevailing party and may consider, to the extent it deems proper in its discretion, an award attorney’s fees for this appeal.
VI. C ONCLUSION We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings

. Costs,
but not attorney’s fees, to Jones on appeal

.9 Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and HORTON
CONCUR.