In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________

No. 03-3626

BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY

CO., CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, CSX

TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 01C7743—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.

____________

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2004—DECIDED MAY 4, 2004

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Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, COFFEY, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge. Six freight rail carriers brought this

action under the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) 45 U.S.C. § 151

et seq., seeking injunctive relief against threatened strikes

by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (“BLE”). The

BLE threatened to strike in response to the rail carriers’

decisions to adopt remote control technology and to employ

members of a rival union to operate the remote control
2 No. 03-3626

1 The rail carriers that are parties to this action are the

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company;

Consolidated Rail Corporation; CSX Transportation, Inc.; Kansas

City Southern Railway Company; Norfolk Southern Railway

Company; and the Union Pacific Railroad Company. 

devices. The district court concluded that the dispute was

a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under

§ 3 First of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i) and granted

a preliminary injunction to preserve the jurisdiction of the

special board of adjustment. The special board of adjustment resolved the dispute predominantly in favor of the rail

carriers. The BLE then moved to dismiss the rail carriers’

complaint. The district court agreed with the BLE that the

preliminary injunction was no longer necessary to maintain

the status quo pending resolution by the special board of

adjustment. The district court entered an order dissolving

the preliminary injunction and dismissing the action. The

rail carriers now appeal and we affirm the decision of the

district court.

I. Background

The Federal Railway Administration issued guidelines

in February 2001 regarding the operation of remote controlled locomotives. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff rail

carriers1

 announced their intentions to train remote control

operators (“RCOs”) and to implement remote control

operations pursuant to the Federal Railway Administration

guidelines. The rail carriers signed a letter of intent with

the United Transportation Union (“UTU”) in September

2001, indicating their plan to assign RCO positions to

conductors and trainmen represented by the UTU. In

October 2001, the BLE wrote to the rail carriers to communicate its belief that the BLE’s collective bargaining

agreements with the rail carriers entitled BLE-represented
No. 03-3626 3

locomotive engineers to the new RCO positions. The BLE

threatened to strike if its demands were not met. 

The rail carriers then filed an action in the district court

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Before the district

court, the BLE characterized the dispute as a “major” one

under the RLA, arguing that the rail carriers’ failure to

assign the RCO positions to BLE-affiliated locomotive

engineers worked a unilateral change to the existing collective bargaining agreement. The BLE contended that

the rail carriers’ unilateral actions entitled the members of

the BLE to respond with unilateral action in the form of a

strike if the parties were unable to resolve the dispute. The

district court was not persuaded by the BLE’s position. The

district court found that the rail carriers had presented an

arguable contractual justification for their assignment of

RCO positions to non-locomotive engineers. Therefore, the

dispute was “minor” under the RLA and subject to compulsory arbitration, the district court held. The district court

preliminarily enjoined the BLE from engaging in any

strikes or other “self-help against the plaintiffs over any

disputes concerning the plaintiffs’ use or plans to use

remote control technology . . . until a hearing is held and

final judgment entered on the complaint herein.”

Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry Co., et al. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, et al., No. 01 C 7743 (N.D. Il.

Jan. 14, 2002) (order granting preliminary injunction). 

Thereafter, the parties submitted the dispute to Special

Board of Adjustment #1114 (“SBA”). In January 2003, the

SBA concluded that the BLE’s collective bargaining agreements with the rail carriers did not require the assignment

of the RCO positions to locomotive engineers represented by

the BLE. The BLE did not violate the anti-strike injunction

during arbitration.

Upon learning of the adverse ruling by the SBA, the BLE

began to publicly oppose the use of remote control technol-
4 No. 03-3626

ogy, but it did not strike. The rail carriers allege that the

BLE has demonstrated its opposition to the award in the

following ways: (1) the BLE website announced the BLE’s

intention to set up “urgent meetings” with the Federal

Railroad Administration and National Carriers Conference

Committee to resolve the controversy created by the implementation of remote control technology; (2) an article in a

trade journal communicated the BLE’s belief that remote

control would continue to be controversial despite the SBA’s

award; (3) the BLE filed a request for clarification of the

arbitration award with the SBA; (4) the BLE’s New York

State Legislative Board informed the Superintendent of the

CSX Railroad that the BLE believed remote control to pose

an immediate threat to the safety of locomotive engineers,

and that the CSX Railroad must address the BLE’s safety

concerns or face the possibility of a strike by the BLE of the

CSX Railroad; (5) the BLE organized rallies to secure the

adoption of local ordinances banning remote control; (6) the

BLE encouraged its members to document the use of remote

control in particular circumstances and to take pictures of

accidents involving remote-controlled locomotives; and (7)

the BLE organized a national “informational picket” against

the use of remote control. 

Several weeks after the SBA entered its order, the BLE

submitted to the district court a motion to dismiss the rail

carriers’ complaint as moot. The BLE claimed that the SBA

had fully and finally resolved the dispute and that “there no

longer is any threat of a strike against any of the railroads.”

The rail carriers opposed the motion, arguing that remote

control “remains perhaps the most contentious issue in

labor relations in the railroads today.” The district court

reasoned that the sole purpose of the preliminary injunction

was to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the

dispute by the arbitrator and concluded that this purpose

was effectuated after the final arbitration award issued.

Additionally, the district court concluded that the sole
No. 03-3626 5

controversy presented by the complaint— whether the

dispute was major or minor for purposes of the RLA—had

been resolved. The district court dissolved the preliminary

injunction and dismissed the case on September 15, 2003.

II. Analysis 

On this appeal we are asked to review the decision of the

district court to dissolve the preliminary injunction barring

the BLE from engaging in economic self-help against the

rail carriers regarding the implementation of remote control

technology. This Court applies the same standard of review

to an order dissolving a preliminary injunction as to an

order granting or denying a preliminary injunction, Centurion Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Singer, 810 F.2d 140, 143 (7th

Cir. 1987), that is, the highly deferential abuse of discretion

standard. qad. inc. v. ALN Associates, Inc., 974 F.2d 834,

837 (7th Cir. 1992). No deference is due to a “decision to

deny a preliminary injunction that is premised on an error

of law.” United Air Lines, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinist and

Aerospace Workers, 243 F.3d 349, 361 (7th Cir. 2001). The

district court’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo

and its determinations of fact are reviewed for clear error.

Centurion Reinsurance, 810 F.2d at 143. 

The rail carriers argue that the district court applied an

inappropriate legal standard and abused its discretion in

dissolving the preliminary injunction. The district court’s

order states that the sole reason that it had granted the

preliminary injunction was to “maintain the status quo

until an arbitrator could resolve the dispute . . . . Because

the final arbitration award has been issued . . . the court

dissolves the preliminary injunction.” Burlington Northern

and Santa Fe Ry Co., et al. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive

Eng’rs, et al., No. 01 C 7743 (N.D. Il. Sept. 15, 2003) (order

dissolving preliminary injunction and dismissing the case)

(internal citation omitted). In the rail carriers’ view, the
6 No. 03-3626

district court’s order demonstrates that the district court

underestimated the scope of the federal court’s power to

enjoin strikes under the RLA. They submit that, because

the RLA prohibits a union from striking over a minor

dispute regardless of the status of arbitration, Brotherhood

of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co.,

373 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1963), the district court erred in concluding that the preliminary injunction had served its purpose merely because the SBA had issued an award. The rail

carriers urge that the preliminary injunction remains

appropriate notwithstanding the SBA’s award because the

BLE continues to describe the remote control issue as

“contentious” and to publicly criticize its implementation. 

We agree with the rail carriers that a strike by the BLE

over remote control—whether instigated before or after the

conclusion of arbitration—would frustrate the intention of

the RLA to avoid “any interruption to commerce or to the

operation of any carrier engaged therein” and to secure the

“prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out

of . . . the interpretation or application of agreements

covering . . . working conditions.” See 45 U.S.C. § 151(a).

But the existence of the minor dispute, alone, cannot justify

an injunction in perpetuity. A federal court may enjoin a

labor strike arising out of a minor dispute in order to assure

compliance with the mandatory arbitration procedures of

the RLA, notwithstanding the anti-injunction section of the

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-105, but “courts

should hesitate to fix upon the injunctive remedy for

breaches of duty owing under the labor laws unless that

remedy alone can effectively guard the plaintiff’s right.”

Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570,

582 (1971) (quotation omitted.) “This clearly implies that

where there are other effective means available to accomplish that end, injunctions should not issue.” United Air

Lines, 243 F.3d at 363. 
No. 03-3626 7

The district court did not err in concluding that the purposes of the RLA would not be effectuated by continuing the

anti-strike injunction against the BLE. The BLE has

complied with the arbitration award. It has not threatened

to strike or engage in other economic self-help over the remote control issue since it was enjoined from doing so in

January 2002. In light of the BLE’s withdrawal of strike

threats, this litigation is not analogous to Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, wherein the Supreme Court upheld

the issuance of an anti-strike injunction after the conclusion

of arbitration. In that case, the union announced a “definite

strike deadline” after arbitration had concluded. See

Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 373 U.S. at 35, 40-42.

Similarly, in Chicago & N. W. Transportation Co. v. Rwy.

Labor Executive’s Ass’n, 908 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1990), where

this Court upheld a permanent injunction against a strike

concerning a minor dispute, the union was actively threatening to strike.

None of the evidence that the rail carriers cite in order to

demonstrate BLE’s ongoing “bitterness and resistance to

remote control” convinces us that the BLE intends to violate

its statutory duty to refrain from engaging in economic selfhelp. To the contrary, all of the BLE’s actions of which the

rail carriers complain are outside the scope of the activities

previously enjoined by the district court. As the rail carriers

conceded at oral argument, the preliminary injunction did

not bar the BLE from lobbying the Federal Railroad

Administration or state and municipal regulatory bodies,

engaging in informational picketing, or negatively characterizing the arbitration award on its website. Further,

neither the BLE’s communication with the CSX Railroad

regarding actions that the BLE believed were inconsistent

with the arbitration award, nor the BLE’s encouragement

of documentation of remote control-related accidents and

injuries, demonstrates any intention to engage in economic

self-help. Finally, of the two alleged strike threats, one was
8 No. 03-3626

clarified by the BLE to be not a strike threat, while the

other was made without the imprimatur of the national

office of the BLE, and both were resolved peacefully. These

instances do not exhibit a current or anticipated breach of

the BLE’s contractual duties to the rail carriers or statutory

duty under the RLA to refrain from economic self-help.

Rather, the BLE’s post-arbitration actions demonstrate that

the BLE has abandoned hope of a contractual remedy, and

has adopted a new strategy for protecting the jobs of its

membership: the reduction or elimination of remote control

at the regulatory level. The RLA injunction power does not

extend to mere “labor strife” about industry practice.

Because the BLE has complied with the arbitration award

and has not threatened to strike, it is clear that a strike

injunction is not “the only practical, effective means of

enforcing the [union’s] duty to exert every reasonable effort

to make and maintain agreements.” Chicago & N. W. Ry.,

402 U.S. at 583.

The rail carriers also claim that the district court erred

because it failed to subject the BLE’s motion to dissolve the

preliminary injunction to sufficiently rigorous scrutiny. As

discussed above, the district court determined that there

was no longer any basis for the injunction because the

SBA’s jurisdiction had been preserved throughout its

resolution of the minor dispute. The rail carriers maintain

that the district court reached an erroneous result because

it did not apply the appropriate test. In their view, the district court should have evaluated whether the BLE had

demonstrated that the harm caused by the injunction outweighed the continuing need for it in light of changed

circumstances. Stewart v. General Motors, Corp., 756 F.2d

1285, 1291 (7th Cir. 1989). The BLE contends that this

analysis would have compelled a ruling in their favor

because there has been no change in circumstances, as

demonstrated by the ongoing contentiousness over remote

control, nor was the preliminary injunction causing the
No. 03-3626 9

BLE any hardship, since no strike in regards to the minor

dispute would be lawful under the RLA. 

We disagree. Despite the BLE’s continuing frustration

with the implementation of remote control technology, the

BLE’s withdrawal of strike threats and compliance with the

arbitration award represent legally significant changes in

the circumstances from those existing at the preliminary

injunction hearing. Further, the rail carriers have not

persuaded us that the BLE continues to perceive the minor

dispute as ongoing, despite its compliance with the SBA

award and withdrawal of strike threats. The BLE’s lobbying

efforts to eradicate remote control actually undermine the

rail carriers’ view that the BLE still perceives a contractual

right to the RCO positions: if the BLE were to prevail before

the regulatory agencies, the rail carriers would be forced to

abandon remote control, and the BLE would have no RCO

positions to gain for its membership. As the BLE is no

longer suggesting that it will violate its statutory duty to

refrain from striking over the implementation of remote

control technology, the Chicago River exception to the

Norris-LaGuardia Act’s prohibition of interference by the

federal courts no longer applies. “Judicial intervention in

labor disputes is not favored; and no order is needed to

compel what is already being done.” Chicago & N. W.

Transportation Co., 908 F.2d at 153.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
10 No. 03-3626

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-4-04