Docket No. 105212.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

JEROME JACKSON, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 17, 2008.

CHIEF JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the judgment of the

court, with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, Garman, Karmeier, and

Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

In two cases, defendant Jerome Jackson pleaded guilty to several

counts of aggravated battery. In each case during its admonishments

to the defendant, the trial court mentioned the possible sentences, as

well as the statutory requirement of mandatory supervised release

(MSR), but neither the written plea agreements nor the sentencing

orders referred to MSR. The defendant filed a postconviction petition,

alleging that he was deprived of due process because he was never

advised of MSR. The circuit court of Livingston County summarily

dismissed the petition as frivolous, and the appellate court affirmed.

No. 4–06–0706 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the defendant’s appeal as

moot.
-2-

BACKGROUND

In 1997, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, robbery and

was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. In 2000, while he was an

inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, the defendant was convicted

of aggravated battery and criminal damage to state property and was

sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, consecutive to his sentence

for robbery.

In February 2002, the defendant was charged with three counts of

aggravated battery after he attacked three corrections officers. The

parties presented to the trial court a written plea agreement, under

which the defendant would receive a sentence of three years’

imprisonment on each count. These sentences would run

concurrently, but consecutively to his existing sentence. The court

advised the defendant, “In all three cases, you are charged with the

offense of aggravated battery. That is a Class 3 felony. And the law

provides that you could get anywhere from two to ten years in prison

for those offenses, plus two years [MSR].” The trial court reviewed

the charges with the defendant, and the State summarized the

evidence against him. The court found the defendant’s guilty pleas

were voluntary and supported by a factual basis. Accordingly, the

court accepted his pleas, entered judgment on them, and sentenced the

defendant pursuant to the agreement. Neither the written plea

agreement nor the sentencing order mentioned MSR.

In August 2002, the defendant was charged with one count of

aggravated battery after he attacked another corrections officer. The

parties again presented to the trial court a written plea agreement,

under which the defendant would receive a sentence of three years’

imprisonment. That sentence would run concurrently to the sentences

for his earlier aggravated battery convictions, but consecutively to his

existing sentence. In the course of its general admonishments, the

court advised the defendant, “If this were handled by other than a plea

agreement, the law provides you could get anywhere from 2 to 10

years in prison plus 2 year[s’] [MSR].” The trial court found that the

defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and supported by a factual

basis. The court accepted his plea and sentenced him pursuant to the

agreement. Neither the written plea agreement nor the sentencing

order mentioned MSR.
 

1The language “by other than a plea agreement” comes from the trial

court’s admonishments in the August 2002 plea hearing. In the February

2002 plea hearing, the trial court did not use this language, and did not

couch its admonishment in what the defendant terms “a hypothetical.”

-3-

The defendant filed a postconviction petition, alleging that he was

deprived of due process because he was never admonished about the

mandatory MSR term appended to his negotiated sentences.

Consequently, the defendant contended, he received more severe

sentences than those to which he had agreed when he pleaded guilty.

The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the

trial court had sufficiently admonished him regarding MSR.

The appellate court affirmed. The appellate court, relying upon its

earlier decision in People v. Borst, 372 Ill. App. 3d 331 (2007), held

that the trial court’s general admonitions sufficiently apprized the

defendant of MSR. No. 4–06–0706 (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23). This court allowed the defendant’s petition

for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

The defendant argues the trial court violated due process in failing

to inform him that MSR terms would be added to his sentences for

aggravatedbattery. According to the defendant, the court admonished

him in two separate hearings that if his aggravated battery charges

were resolved “by other than a plea agreement,”1 he would face a

possible two years of MSR. The defendant insists that nothing in

these admonishments suggests that MSR terms would be added to the

defendant’s negotiated sentences. He asserts that this case is

controlled by People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 195 (2005), where

we stated that “due process is violated when a defendant pleads guilty

in exchange for a specific sentence and the trial court fails to advise

the defendant, prior to accepting his plea, that a mandatory supervised

release term will be added to that sentence.”

Here, the defendant was convicted of robbery in 1997 and

sentenced to four years’ imprisonment; he was later convicted of

aggravated battery and criminal damage to state property in 2000 and

sentenced to another four years’ imprisonment. While serving these
-4-

sentences, he was convicted of the four counts of aggravated battery

involved here in 2002 and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.

The defendant is no longer in prison. He was paroled, and began his

MSR term on May 15, 2007.

When a defendant receives consecutive sentences for multiple

felonies, these sentences are treated as a single term, and the

defendant serves the MSR term corresponding to the most serious

offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–4(e)(2) (West 2004). Robbery, a Class

2 felony, is a more serious offense than aggravated battery, a Class 3

felony. Thus, the MSR term that the defendant is serving corresponds

to his robbery conviction, and the MSR term that he is challenging

corresponds to his aggravated battery convictions. In short, the

defendant attacks an MSR term that never will be served. Because

this court cannot grant effective relief, this appeal is moot. See Felzak

v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392 (2007); see also In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d

338, 349-50 (2006) (“It is a basic tenet of justiciability that reviewing

courts will not decide moot or abstract questions”); In re Adoption of

Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999) (“The existence of a real

controversy is a prerequisite to the exercise of our jurisdiction”).

The defendant argues that we should still reach the merits of his

appeal. A reviewing court may examine an otherwise moot issue

when “the magnitude or immediacy of the interests involved

warrant[s] action by the court.” See People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96

Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1983). The so-called public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine requires (1) the existence of a question of public

importance; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for

the purpose of guiding public officers in the performance of their

duties; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur. In re

Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003). This exception is construed

narrowly and requires a clear showing of each element before it may

be applied. People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2004).

Whether trial courts should properly admonish defendants who

plead guilty regarding MSR is certainly a question of public

importance, but it is one we answered authoritatively in Whitfield. We

need not echo that holding in this case, or even apply it here. The

defendant is serving an MSR term that he does not challenge, and he

is challenging an MSR term that he will not serve. The defendant’s

situation is unlikely to recur, and he has no injury that can be
-5-

redressed by this court. This appeal is moot. Further, because the

defendant was paroled before the appellate court decided his case,

that appeal was also moot, and the appellate court’s judgment must

be vacated.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate

court is vacated and the defendant’s appeal is dismissed as moot.

Appellate court judgment vacated;

appeal dismissed.