NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

OMARI TAHIR, AKA James C. Garrett, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARGARET DELANY, individually and in 

her official capacity as Managing Director of 

Midtown Center, LLC.; MIDTOWN 

CENTER LLC, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17-35718 

D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02017-JCC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 15, 2018**

Before: FARRIS, BYBEE, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

Omari Tahir, AKA James C. Garrett, appeals pro se from the district court’s 

summary judgment and dismissal order in his action alleging race discrimination 

under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”). We have jurisdiction 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

AUG 23 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-35718 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. 

Food & Drug Admin., 836 F.3d 987, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (summary 

judgment); Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tahir’s Title VI 

claim because Tahir failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

defendants were receiving federal financial assistance at the time the alleged 

discrimination occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting race, color, or 

national origin discrimination “under any program or activity receiving Federal 

financial assistance”); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 

(9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth pleading requirements for a Title VI claim), overruled 

on other grounds by Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Tahir’s state law claims after dismissing his federal 

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ motion 

for reconsideration of the order denying defendants’ motion to expunge Tahir’s lis 

pendens because the remaining claims did not affect title to the real property in this 
3 17-35718 

action. See Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.325; Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. 

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of 

review and grounds for reconsideration).

We lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(d) (an order remanding a case to the state court from which it was 

removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is not reviewable on appeal).

We reject as without merit Tahir’s contentions that the district court applied 

the wrong standards on summary judgment, or that the district court gave 

defendants legal advice.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.