UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-4425

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

VINCENT EDWARD LARKIN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston,

District Judge. (5:05-cr-00221-1)

Submitted: August 11, 2008 Decided: September 23, 2008

Before MICHAEL, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,

Appellate Counsel, Christian M. Capece, Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T.

Miller, United States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong, Assistant United

States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Vincent Edward Larkin appeals the district court’s order

revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twelve months

of imprisonment. He argues that the sentence is plainly

unreasonable because it does not further the purposes of supervised

release. We affirm.

This court will affirm a sentence imposed after

revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We

first assess the sentence for reasonableness, “follow[ing]

generally the procedural and substantive considerations that we

employ in our review of original sentences, . . . with some

necessary modifications to take into account the unique nature of

supervised release revocation sentences.” Id. at 438-39; see

United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 294 (4th Cir. 2008) (“In

applying the ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, we first determine,

using the instructions given in Gall [v. United States, 128 S. Ct.

586, 597 (2007)], whether a sentence is ‘unreasonable.’”). Only if

a sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable will

we “decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.; see

Finley, 531 F.3d at 294. Although the district court must consider

the Chapter 7 policy statements and the requirements of 18 U.S.C.A.

§§ 3553(a), 3583 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008), “the [district] court
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ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and

impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.”

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Larkin does not challenge the procedural aspects of his

sentence, or assert that it exceeds either the Guidelines range or

the statutory maximum. Rather, he argues that the district court’s

remarks about domestic violence indicate that the court failed to

adequately consider the purposes of supervised release in choosing

to impose imprisonment rather than home detention. “In determining

the reasonableness of a sentence, we ‘give due deference to the

district court’s decision.’” Finley, 531 F.3d at 297 (quoting

Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). Our review of the record leads us to

conclude that the sentence is not unreasonable.

Accordingly, we affirm Larkin’s sentence. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED