United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 05-2256

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

DEREK CAPOZZI,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Selya, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Lynch, Circuit Judge.

Terrance J. McCarthy on brief for appellant.

Timothy Q. Feeley, Assistant United States Attorney, Michael

J. Sullivan, United States Attorney, Christopher F. Bator,and

Ernest S. Dinisco, Assistant United States Attorneys, on brief for

appellee.

May 23, 2007
A short while before scheduled oral argument of this case, 1

Capozzi moved on several occasions to have his appointed counsel

disqualified, to have counsel's brief stricken from the record, and

to preclude his counsel from presenting oral argument. After this

court denied Capozzi's various motions, his counsel moved to

withdraw. We granted that motion on November 9, 2006 and, having

determined that the decisional process would not be significantly

aided by oral argument, we directed that the case be submitted on

the existing briefs. Capozzi subsequently filed several motions

directing our attention to portions of the record; our decision

today is based on a thorough review of the record on appeal. He

additionally filed a further motion to reconsider striking his

counsel's brief, arguing, inter alia, that counsel had inaccurately

argued his first point on appeal. We denied that motion. To the

extent Capozzi sought in the motion to make a different argument

related to his first claim on appeal here, we have considered that

argument below in addition to the arguments presented in the

appellant's brief. See note 2, infra.

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CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. Defendant Derek Capozzi

appeals from his convictions in the United States District Court

for the District of Massachusetts for Hobbs Act conspiracy, witness

tampering conspiracy, and being an accessory after the fact to

witness tampering killing. Capozzi makes three major contentions 1

on appeal: (1) that the government's concession that the evidence

was insufficient to establish two of the three objects of a multiobject conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the witness

tampering statute, warrants a new trial; (2) that the district

court erred in denying Capozzi the right to confront a government

cooperating witness with the theory that his reward in exchange for

testifying included avoidance of the death penalty; and (3) that

his Hobbs Act conspiracy conviction must be vacated because there

was insufficient evidence before both the grand jury and the petit
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jury. After a careful review of the trial record, we affirm

Capozzi's convictions.

Background and Facts

Capozzi was a member of a drug organization led by codefendant Paul A. DeCologero (known as the "DeCologero Crew" and

sometimes referred to herein as the "crew"). Along with

distributing drugs, the crew used force to gain control of Boston's

drug trade and murdered a nineteen-year-old woman, Aislin Silva,

when crew members thought she might betray them.

In October 2001, DeCologero and six associates, including

the defendant here, were charged in a 23-count indictment with

criminal racketeering in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000);

conspiracy to violate RICO, id. § 1962(d); and a number of related

crimes. In addition to the RICO counts, the indictment specified

a number of federal crimes charged in separate counts involving

drugs, guns, robberies, and, in the case of Silva, murder for the

purposes of witness tampering. See generally United States v.

DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of

DeCologero's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and

reversing district court's order removing several racketeering acts

from the trial of the RICO case).

Capozzi was charged in Counts 1 and 2 (RICO conspiracy

and substantive charges, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and
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(d)); Count 3 (witness tampering conspiracy, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 371); Count 4 (witness tampering, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1951(a)); Count 7 (accessory after the fact to witness

tampering killing); Count 8 (Hobbs Act conspiracy, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)); Count 9 (Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)); Count 10 (possession of marijuana with intent

to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A)); Count 11

(using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); and Count 19 (felon-in-possession

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

One of Capozzi's co-defendants, John P. DeCologero, Sr.,

pled guilty to a RICO offense on February 28, 2003. On July 20,

2004, Capozzi moved to disqualify the counsel for three of his codefendants on the grounds that they had conflicts of interest. As

a result, counsel for co-defendants Paul A. Decologero, John P.

DeCologero, Jr., and Paul J. DeCologero withdrew from the case and

were replaced by successor counsel. Because of the amount of time

new counsel would need to prepare for trial, the government moved

to sever Capozzi from his co-defendants, sever trial of the RICO

charges and substantive witness tampering charge for a later date,

and try Capozzi on the remaining charges beginning on September 24,

2004, the date on which the RICO trial had been scheduled to begin.

The court granted the motion and on September 27, 2004 began trial

against Capozzi on the Hobbs Act conspiracy, robbery, drug and
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firearms counts, with another trial to follow on the witnesstampering and murder-related counts. Capozzi elected to represent

himself at trial (and throughout most of the pretrial proceedings),

with standby counsel appointed by the court.

The counts before the jury in the first trial were Count

8 (Hobbs Act conspiracy), Count 9 (Hobbs Act robbery of a drug

dealer, Michael Stevens), Count 10 (possession of marijuana with

the intent to distribute), Count 11 (using a firearm during and in

relation to the Stevens robbery), and Count 19 (felon-in-possession

of a firearm). On October 13, 2004, the jury convicted Capozzi of

the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge (Count 8) and acquitted him on the

felon-in-possession of a firearm charge (Count 19). The jury

failed to reach a unanimous verdict on the Stevens robbery and

related charges (Counts 9, 10, and 11), and the court declared a

mistrial as to those counts.

Capozzi's second trial, on the witness tampering and

murder-related counts, began on April 25, 2005, with Capozzi still

representing himself, again with standby counsel. Before the jury

were Count 3 (witness tampering conspiracy), Count 4 (witness

tampering by misleading conduct), and Count 7 (accessory after the

fact to witness tampering killing). On May 10, 2004, the jury

convicted Capozzi of witness tampering conspiracy (Count 3) and

accessory after the fact to witness tampering murder (Count 7), and
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acquitted him on the witness tampering by misleading conduct charge

(Count 4).

On August 12, 2005, Capozzi was sentenced on the three

counts of conviction to a total of 23 years' imprisonment. Upon

imposition of the sentence, the government dismissed the RICO

counts (Counts 1 and 2), and the counts related to the Stevens

robbery on which the first jury had deadlocked (Counts 9, 10, and

11). Capozzi timely appealed from his convictions in both trials

on August 16, 2005.

Evidence at Trial

The evidence at both trials showed that Paul A.

DeCologero ("Paul A.") headed the DeCologero crew in 1995 and 1996.

The crew, consisting mostly of his relatives and their close

friends, dealt in cocaine and marijuana and stole from competing

drug dealers. Cooperating witnesses for the government Thomas

Regan and Stephen DiCenso testified to having themselves been

members of the crew. They also identified as members Paul A. and

co-defendants John P. DeCologero ("John Sr."), John P. DeCologero,

Jr. ("John Jr."), Paul J. DeCologero ("Paul J."), Kevin Meuse

("Meuse"), and Capozzi. John Sr. and Paul A. are brothers, and

John Jr. and Paul J. are John Sr.'s sons and Paul A.'s nephews.

Meuse joined the crew in September 1996. Capozzi, a friend of

Meuse, joined the crew at Meuse's invitation in October 1996.
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i. First Trial

At the first trial, the evidence showed that when Meuse

and Capozzi joined the crew in the fall of 1996, the other crew

members were already engaged in a conspiracy to rob area drug

dealers of drugs, money, and weapons. DiCenso testified about a

spring 1996 robbery of a local marijuana dealer, Jeff North, which

DiCenso had helped to plan with the approval of Paul A., and which

two others committed on Paul A.'s orders. DiCenso also testified

that North had at least one drug customer in Maine who later became

DiCenso's customer. Regan testified to having committed robberies

and an attempted robbery of area drug dealers in the company of

John Jr., Paul J., and Paul A., on orders from Paul A. in 1995 and

1996. 

Both Regan and DiCenso admitted robbing Michael Stevens

on Halloween night, 1996, on the orders of Paul A. Stevens was a

high volume marijuana dealer in Tewksbury who was known by members

of the crew to be a supplier for North. Regan and DiCenso

testified that they committed the armed robbery at Stevens'

residence with Meuse and Capozzi, and that they took money,

marijuana, and a handgun. The victims of the robbery -- Stevens,

his girlfriend, and a friend who came to the house during the

robbery -- testified about the robbery and said that the masked

robbers beat and threatened Stevens and bound all of their arms and

legs and covered their eyes with duct tape. All three victims were
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aware of only three robbers. DiCenso testified that he waited in

the car while the other three robbers entered Stevens' townhouse

and then joined them a few minutes later.

Capozzi asserted pro se in closing argument that Regan

and DiCenso were lying about his own participation in the Stevens

robbery, and that the victims correctly reported only three robbers

that night (Regan, DiCenso, and Meuse). Additionally, he argued

that the robbery of a local drug dealer did not "affect commerce,"

a required element of the crime. He finally argued there was

insufficient evidence that the marijuana Stevens sold either came

from or was sold outside Massachusetts. The jury did not reach a

verdict for Capozzi on the Stevens-related counts (Counts 9, 10 and

11) but convicted him of Hobbs Act conspiracy to rob drug dealers

along with other members of the DeCologero crew (Count 8).

ii. Second Trial

At the second trial, along with much of the same robbery

evidence admitted at the first trial, Regan and DiCenso testified

to a late October 1996 burglary of dealer North's apartment that

they committed with Paul J. on Paul A.'s orders. They took money,

marijuana, and a small arsenal of weapons and ammunition. Paul A.

divided the money but told DiCenso to store some of the weapons and

ammunition at the Medford apartment of a young woman, Aislin Silva,

where Paul A. had recently been housing cocaine. About a week

after the October robbery, Medford police heard that Silva had a
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collection of weapons in her apartment. On November 5, 1996, local

police and ATF Special Agent John Mercer went to Silva's apartment,

obtained her consent to search her apartment for weapons, and found

a duffle bag of weapons under her bed. Inside the bag were an

automatic machine pistol, a .357 magnum revolver, and an AR-15

semiautomatic assault rifle, along with several hundred rounds of

ammunition and two non-functioning hand grenades. During the

search, DiCenso and Paul J. arrived at Silva's apartment, were

identified by police, and were then allowed to leave.

According to DiCenso, the night the weapons were seized,

Paul A. gathered some of the crew together and had DiCenso take

Silva to a local hotel so they could find out what she had told the

police. Paul A. concluded he needed more time to think through the

situation, so he had DiCenso stay with Silva and gave him orders to

keep her away from police. After two days, Paul A. sent DiCenso

and Silva to New York City for a long weekend and again gave

DiCenso orders to keep Silva away from law enforcement and tell her

that she needed to stay away until lawyers could handle the

situation.

The crew gathered again when DiCenso and Silva returned

to Boston on November 12, and Paul A. decided to kill Silva.

DiCenso contributed to the final decision by telling Paul A. he did

not think she would remain "solid." Paul A. sent Paul J. to Lowell

to buy high-grade heroin, planning to make Silva overdose. Paul A.
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gave the heroin to Meuse, and Meuse and DiCenso tried to get Silva

to take an overdose quantity by telling her it was cocaine. The

attempted overdose failed, and DiCenso and Silva stayed the night

of November 12 at DiCenso's apartment. The next morning, Meuse

arrived and sent DiCenso to the hardware store to buy a hacksaw and

cutting shears. When DiCenso returned to the apartment, Silva was

dead, and Meuse admitted he had broken her neck.

Meuse left the apartment and came back with Capozzi. The

three dismembered Silva's body in the apartment's bathtub, stuffed

the body parts into plastic garbage bags and then into duffle bags,

and carried her remains to Capozzi's rental car. They drove to a

Home Depot, where Capozzi and Meuse bought a shovel and lime and

then drove to a location on the North Shore chosen by Capozzi,

where they buried Silva's remains. They then drove to a car wash

in Danvers to dispose of evidence and clean the car used to

transport Silva's body. DiCenso went to a nearby Ann & Hope store

and bought three pairs of sneakers to replace the ones worn during

the burial of Silva's remains.

Physical evidence introduced at trial lent significant

support to DiCenso's testimony. The day after Silva was killed,

bloody plastic bags, duffle bags, and four empty lime bags, among

other evidence, were found in and around a trash dumpster at the

Danvers car wash in question. Meuse's fingerprint was found on one

item. The blood, hair and tissue found on and in the plastic bags
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were determined through DNA testing to belong to Silva. A Home

Depot security video showed Capozzi pushing a shopping cart out of

the store containing what looked like four bags of lime and Meuse

leaving the store with a shovel. A receipt from the Danvers Ann &

Hope found in DiCenso's wallet two days later showed that he

purchased an iced tea at the store at about 9 p.m. on the night

Silva was killed. Another Ann & Hope receipt showed that he

purchased three pairs of sneakers and three sweat suits at about

the same time.

As noted above, on May 10, 2004, the jury convicted

Capozzi of Counts 3 and 7: witness tampering conspiracy and

accessory after the fact to witness tampering murder, and acquitted

him on Count 4, the witness tampering by misleading conduct charge.

Discussion

Capozzi argues on appeal that the court erred in

upholding his witness tampering conspiracy conviction (Count 3 in

the second trial) after the government conceded there was

insufficient evidence as to two of the three possible objects of

the conspiracy. Second, he argues that he should have been

permitted to cross-examine DiCenso regarding the benefit DiCenso

allegedly received of not being subject to the federal death

penalty. Finally, Capozzi asserts that his Hobbs Act conspiracy

conviction should be vacated because (1) there were defects in the

indictment; (2) the government failed to sustain its burden of
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proof relative to the interstate nexus requirement; and (3) the

district court erred in refusing to unseal the grand jury

transcript. We find no merit in any of these contentions.

A. Witness Tampering Conspiracy

Capozzi appeals from his conviction in the second trial

on Count 3, the multi-object witness tampering conspiracy. He

argues that the government's concession that two of the three

asserted objects of the conspiracy (conspiring to attempt to kill

Silva and engaging in misleading conduct towards her, as opposed to

conspiring to kill her) were insufficiently supported by the

evidence, combined with the general verdict returned by the jury,

necessarily means he is entitled to a new trial on Count 3.

Count 3 charged Capozzi and four co-defendants with a

violation of the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. It

alleged a multi-object conspiracy to violate various provisions of

18 U.S.C. § 1512, the federal witness tampering statute. The

charging language of Count 3, as it went to the jury, included in

relevant part the following:

the defendants herein, and co-conspirator Kevin Meuse

[now deceased] did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully

combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with one

another and with others known and unknown to the grand

jury, to commit offenses against the United States; that

is, to kill and attempt to kill another person and to

engage in misleading conduct toward another person, with

intent to hinder, delay, and prevent the communication to

a law enforcement officer of the United States relating

to the commission or possible commission of federal

offense, . . . in violation of Title 18 United States

Code, Sections 1512(a)(1)(c), 1512(b)(3), and 2.
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The indictment followed the usual practice of using the conjunction

"and" in reference to the planned offenses, but guilt can be

established by adequate proof on any one of the three charged

grounds. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 51, 59-60

(1991) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require a

general guilty verdict on a multi-prong conspiracy be set aside if

the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the

objects).

The district court properly instructed the jury that

guilt must be based upon proof of an agreement to commit any one of

the three objects of the conspiracy and that the jury had to be

unanimous as to which if any of the three objects were proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Before the case went to the jury,

Capozzi requested a special verdict on Count 3, arguing that a

special verdict was needed in order to clarify sentencing issues,

specifically the application of the advisory sentencing guidelines.

The court denied the request. Capozzi did not then assert that a

special verdict was needed to evaluate the sufficiency of the

evidence as to each object of the conspiracy, nor did he claim in

a post-verdict Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for acquittal that the

conviction needed to be set aside because the government had failed

to prove one or more of the three objects. He argued only that

there was insufficient evidence to support each of the three

objects of the witness tampering conspiracy, not that a general
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verdict prevented a determination of which prong of the conspiracy

the jury really focused on in convicting him. 

In response to Capozzi's motion for acquittal, the

government conceded there was insufficient evidence offered at

trial to establish that Capozzi agreed to the commission of witness

tampering by misleading conduct or by the heroin overdose attempted

killing of Silva. But the government contended there was ample

evidence to support the first charged object of the alleged witness

tampering conspiracy, to wit, the successful killing of Silva.

This being so, the Count 3 conviction fell within the wellestablished principle repeated by this court in United States v.

Murray: "When a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment

charging several acts in the conjunctive, the verdict stands if the

evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts

charged." 621 F.2d 1163, 1171 n.10. See Griffin v. United States,

502 U.S. 46, 51, 59-60; see also Turner v. United States, 396 U.S.

398, 420 (1970); United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 298 (1st

Cir. 1979).

As a preliminary matter, the government argues that

Capozzi forfeited his claim on this issue by failing to raise it at

the district court level. See United States v. Lilly, 13 F.3d 15,

17-18 (1st Cir. 1994) ("arguments not seasonably addressed to the

trial court may not be raised for the first time in an appellate

venue"). Because he did not preserve the particular claim related
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to the general verdict issue, we review his arguments only for

plain error. No matter the standard, however, Capozzi's claim

fails. 

On appeal Capozzi no longer argues, as he did below, that

there was insufficient evidence as to all three objects of the

conspiracy. In fact, in his appellate brief he writes, "[i]t is

apparent that the verdict in this matter is required to be set

aside because it is un-supportable on two ground[s], but not

another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury

selected" (emphasis supplied). He thus effectively concedes that

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that he joined a conspiracy to engage in witness

tampering by killing Silva. Capozzi instead relies on Yates v.

United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), for his argument that the

general verdict does not demonstrate whether the jury convicted on

a reasonably supported basis.

The Supreme Court distinguished Yates in its later

decision in Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56. The issue in Griffin was

"whether, in a federal prosecution, a general guilty verdict on a

multiple-object conspiracy charge must be set aside if the evidence

is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects." Id.

at 47 (emphasis supplied). The Griffin Court distinguished Yates

and its prior decision in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 39

(1931), as dealing with general verdicts in which there were legal
As noted, after the completion of appellate briefing, Capozzi 2

filed a renewed motion to strike his counsel's legal brief on the

ground that counsel made an improper legal argument on Count 3 by

focusing on evidentiary sufficiency instead of legal error in the

indictment. Capozzi urges us now to consider an argument he

previously made pro se to the district court in a belated new trial

motion in which he cited, besides Yates, our decision in United

States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996) (a legal error in the

substantive crime charged required reversal on the conspiracy

charge, following Yates). We have consistently held that arguments

not raised in the initial appellate legal brief are considered

waived. See United States v. Pizarro-Berrios, 448 F.3d 1, 5 (1st

Cir. 2006). And it is also very doubtful whether the argument

Capozzi now seeks to make pro se was preserved below. But even

were we to reach the substance of Capozzi's pro se argument, it

fails. Capozzi appears to argue that the indictment was legally

flawed because it is impossible to charge a conspiracy both to

attempt to kill and to kill. But especially where, as here, the

government charged a conspiracy to attempt to kill Silva and a

distinct, successful killing after the heroin overdose attempt had

failed, there is no reason the attempt crime and the substantive

offense could not both be charged in the indictment. There was no

legal error in the charge.

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or constitutional (but not merely evidentiary) defects in one of

several charged means that may have supported the jury's verdict.

Griffin, 502 U.S. at 536-56. The Griffin Court relied on its postYates holding in Turner that "when a jury returns a guilty verdict

on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as

Turner's indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is

sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged." Griffin,

502 U.S. at 56-7 (citing Turner, 396 U.S. at 420). Here, where the

evidence was sufficient as to one prong of the three-pronged

charged conspiracy (and Capozzi does not argue otherwise on

appeal), Griffin makes clear that the district court did not err in

upholding Capozzi's conviction on Count 3.2
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B. Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation

Capozzi next challenges a restriction placed by the

district court on his cross-examination of DiCenso in both trials.

He argues that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation by preventing him from seeking to establish that

DiCenso benefitted from his plea agreement with the government by

not being prosecuted under the federal death penalty statute. We

hold that such restriction as was placed on the cross-examination

of DiCenso did not violate Capozzi's Sixth Amendment rights and was

within the court's discretion to impose.

i. Background

As a result of statements Silva made to friends before

weapons were found in her apartment, and some other evidence,

DiCenso was charged by criminal complaint in February 1997 with

being a felon in possession of the recovered guns. Because of

health problems stemming from a November 1996 heroin overdose and

following his motion for a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. §

4241 et seq., DiCenso was examined by mental health professionals

and found incompetent to stand trial. The government thus

dismissed the complaint on June 27, 1997.

Following dismissal of the firearms complaint, DiCenso

lived at his mother's home and spent a great deal of time in

internet chat rooms. ATF agent Mercer, acting in an undercover

capacity and using a female identity, "Julie," engaged in a lengthy
Direct use immunity allows the government to use information 3

derived from a witness's statements but forbids the use of the

information in those statements against the witness in subsequent

prosecution. See United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799, 803 (9th

Cir. 1991).

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online "relationship" with DiCenso. More than 400 pages of chats

and emails were preserved by Mercer and provided to a psychiatrist

for an evaluation of DiCenso's competency during that period. On

June 30, 1999, the government filed a second felon-in-possession

complaint against DiCenso. After lengthy competency proceedings,

DiCenso was found competent for trial.

The government then began to discuss with DiCenso his

possible cooperation. On October 12, 2000, the parties signed a

proffer agreement, and lengthy debriefings (or "proffers")

followed. The proffers, protected by direct use immunity,3

included DiCenso's admissions of his own involvement in the murder,

dismemberment, and burial of Silva. On October 6, 2001, DiCenso

signed a plea and cooperation agreement with the government.

DiCenso then pled guilty to a one-count information charging him

with a substantive violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The

racketeering activity charged in the RICO information included

conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, and aiding and abetting

murder, as well as Hobbs Act conspiracy, Hobbs Act robbery and

related offenses stemming from the robberies of Michael Stevens,

Alfred Sapochetti, and Jeffrey North, and marijuana and cocaine

conspiracies. The maximum punishment for a RICO violation is 20
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years' imprisonment, increased to life "if the violation is based

on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes

life imprisonment." 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). In DiCenso's case,

aiding and abetting state law murder and federal witness tampering

killing, both charged as racketeering acts in the information, are

punishable by life imprisonment. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 1; id.

ch. 274, § 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(3)(A), and 2.

DiCenso's plea agreement stated that he faced a minimum

and maximum punishment of life imprisonment under the information.

The then-mandatory sentencing guidelines called for a guideline

sentencing range of life. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (first degree murder).

The plea and cooperation agreement also provided for a departure

motion to be made by the government for substantial assistance,

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and a departure motion to be made by

DiCenso based on his physical impairments, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

5H1.4.

As noted earlier, Capozzi's first trial focused on the

robbery, drug and firearms charges because the district court

severed the trial of these counts from the witness

tampering/murder-related counts in order to avoid possible

prejudice to Capozzi because of the time needed by co-defendants'

newly retained counsel to prepare. Because at the time of the

first trial, DiCenso stood convicted (by his guilty plea) of a RICO

offense and would be subject to impeachment on that basis, and the
The government successfully argued that under Fed. R. Evid. 4

609(a)(1), Capozzi was not permitted to cross-examine Dicenso on

the underlying facts of his conviction, only on the conviction for

the RICO offense itself. See, e.g., Cummings v. Malone, 995 F.2d

817, 826 (8th Cir. 1993) ("The ability to introduce the specific

crime is not a license to flaunt its details, however; crossexaminers are limited to eliciting the name, date and disposition

of the felony committed").

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facts of the murder would not be otherwise admissible in the first

trial, the government moved in limine to preclude cross- 4

examination about the specific racketeering acts in the information

and the offense conduct underlying those acts. The court ruled

that Capozzi could elicit the specific racketeering acts during his

cross-examination of DiCenso but could not go into the underlying

offense conduct relating to the murder of Silva. During the

discussion about Capozzi's planned cross-examination, Capozzi

informed the court that he intended to establish that DiCenso was

charged with a death eligible offense and that he was benefitting

under his plea agreement because the government did not seek the

death penalty.

A lengthy discussion followed. Capozzi claimed the

maximum penalty for RICO was based on the underlying racketeering

activity, and if the underlying racketeering activity (here,

witness tampering killing) was punishable by death, then RICO was

punishable by death. There is, however, no provision for a death

penalty sentence for a RICO conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a).

Capozzi further argued that if the government had elected not to
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pursue the death penalty on the RICO offense charged against

DiCenso, that was a benefit that DiCenso received from his

cooperation, and Capozzi should be able to establish it before the

jury. In response, the government argued that DiCenso had never

been vulnerable to the death penalty, and that the government's

evidence that DiCenso had aided and abetted in Silva's murder came

from his protected proffer statements, which the government could

not use against him without his consent. Capozzi argued that

information from another defendant, Jason Stone, showed DiCenso's

involvement in the murder, but the government responded that

Stone's testimony would not "enlighten the court as to who it was

that actually killed Ms. Silva."

During the discussion about death penalty eligibility,

counsel for DiCenso, George Gormley, entered the courtroom, and the

district court inquired whether DiCenso and his counsel thought

that DiCenso was death eligible at the time of the plea and

cooperation agreement. DiCenso's counsel responded that DiCenso

was never thought to be vulnerable to the death penalty, that the

death penalty was never discussed during plea negotiations, and the

absence of a death eligible offense in the information was not, in

his view, a benefit received by DiCenso in consideration for his

cooperation with the government.

The court ruled, "Mr Capozzi may go into the predicate

acts, he may not go into the conduct under the predicate acts. Do
-22-

you understand? Just what they were charged, what the predicate

acts are, which include conspiracy to murder, attempt to murder,

and a bunch of others." The court also had the following colloquy

with Capozzi:

The court: You can ask him about racketeering acts 1

through 8 and what the benefit is he gets from having

pled to those and to one life sentence, to the maximum of

one life sentence, which of course, is likely to be

reduced when he's actually asked.

Capozzi: The maximum is the death penalty.

The court: Life.

Capozzi: The statute says death. That's misleading to

the jury.

The court: Well, I mean you can ask about that if you

want. But I'm going to tell the jury that, as best as I

understand it, it is life imprisonment.

. . . .

Capozzi: We don't know what [punishment] Mr. DiCenso

thought he was exposed to.

The court: But that's what you're entitled to ask him

about.

Capozzi: Exactly. But I'm prevented now from asking him

questions is my issue.

The court: No. You're entitled to ask him what he

thought his exposure was. But we know from his counsel

that his exposure, he thought, was not death.

Capozzi: But because I opened with this and now I'm

being prevented from going into it, I would ask this

court--I would now move for a mistrial.

The court: That's denied. And you're not being

prevented from getting into it. You may not have the

precise question that you want to ask.
-23-

Capozzi's cross-examination of DiCenso at the first trial

established that DiCenso had pled guilty to what he believed was a

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, with the expectation that

he could get a lower sentence based on his cooperation with the

government, and that he hoped to receive a sentence of time served

when his cooperation was complete. Capozzi also elicited testimony

that DiCenso expected the pending firearms indictment related to

the discovery of the guns from Silva's apartment would be dismissed

based upon his cooperation. DiCenso further admitted having

informed the government of substantial uncharged conduct, including

drug dealing (marijuana and cocaine), robbing a drug associate of

$100,000, and conspiring to kill a Mafia-related individual with a

car bomb. DiCenso also admitted that he had pled guilty (in his

RICO information) to the underlying racketeering activity of

conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, and aiding and abetting

murder, conspiracy to rob numerous individuals, robbing Michael

Stevens, kidnaping Stevens and his friends, possessing marijuana

with intent to distribute, robbing Al Sapochetti, aiding and

abetting the kidnaping of Sapochetti and his friends, robbing

Jeffrey North, and dealing cocaine.

Before the second trial, Capozzi filed a motion in limine

related to DiCenso's alleged susceptibility to the death penalty.

In addition to repeating the incorrect argument that the maximum

penalty under the RICO statute was death, he argued that DiCenso
-24-

could have been charged, as was Paul A., with the substantive

offense of witness tampering killing, a death eligible offense when

the killing consists of murder as it did here. 18 U.S.C. §

1512(a)(3)(A). The government opposed the motion in a written

submission. It contended, as previously, that the government could

not have so charged DiCenso because DiCenso's proffer statements to

the government, as well as his expected testimony at trial, could

not be used by the government in any criminal prosecution of

DiCenso given the direct use immunity granted DiCenso. Without

DiCenso's protected statements, the government argued it did not

have a chargeable case against DiCenso for aiding and abetting

witness tampering murder. The district court denied Capozzi's

motion without written opinion.

At the second trial, DiCenso's plea agreement was

introduced into evidence. DiCenso testified that he committed each

of the charged racketeering acts, and understood that his sentence

would be life imprisonment unless it was reduced as a result of his

cooperation with the government or his own physical impairments.

He also acknowledged that whether he received a reduction for his

cooperation was dependent upon the government's determining that

his testimony was truthful. 

ii. Analysis

The Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to preclude a defendant
-25-

entirely from all cross-examination about an event that a jury

might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for

favoring the prosecution. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,

679 (1986). But the Court also noted that:

[i]t does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation

Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from

imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the

potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the

contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as

the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose

reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on

concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety,

or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally

relevant.

Id. 

We "review de novo the district court's conclusion that,

even though cross-examination was limited, the defendant was

afforded 'sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably complete

picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation.'" United

States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting United

States v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000)). If

we determine that "the defendant's 'opportunity to impeach adverse

witnesses' met or exceeded this constitutionally guaranteed

'threshold,' we review for abuse of discretion the district court's

decision to '"impose reasonable limits" on cross-examination in

order to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of

marginally relevant material.'" Byrne, 435 F.3d at 21 (quoting
-26-

Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219 F.3d at 45 (quoting United States v. Twomey,

806 F.2d 1136, 1139 (1st Cir. 1986))).

At the first trial, the district court plainly had

discretion to prevent Capozzi from questioning DiCenso about the

death penalty in the context of the RICO statute, which simply does

not provide for it. Capozzi asked the court to allow him to

establish that the RICO charge in the information to which DiCenso

pleaded was potentially punishable by the death penalty and that

DiCenso had avoided that possibility by cooperating with the

government. But the maximum punishment provided for under the RICO

statute is life imprisonment, not death. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a). It

is not a Sixth Amendment violation to keep a defendant from

pursuing a line of cross-examination based on a mistaken view of

the law.

At the second trial, the district court prevented Capozzi

from inquiring about an uncharged offense carrying a possible death

penalty, witness tampering murder, with which, Capozzi argues,

DiCenso could have been charged. There was no evidence the

government had ever threatened or said it meant to charge DiCenso

with this offense, but Capozzi says he had a right to inquire

whether avoidance of being charged with this potential death

penalty offense formed a part of DiCenso's motive in cooperating

with the government.
-27-

In responding to this argument, both here and below, the

government insists that it never could have so charged DiCenso as

it lacked the admissible evidence to make out a case of witness

tampering murder. While DiCenso's own immunized testimony might

have supported the charge, that testimony was not available to the

government after the granting of use immunity. See Kastigar v.

United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (use immunity is coextensive

with the scope of the privilege against self incrimination; any

subsequent prosecution must prove that evidence proposed to be used

derives from a legitimate source wholly independent from the

compelled testimony). 

Capozzi responds that the government had ample

independent evidence to have charged DiCenso without his proffer,

based on an affidavit prepared by Special Agent Mercer in 1999 and

2000, and trial testimony by a government informant, Jason Stone,

implicating DiCenso in the murder. The government replies that

while Stone's account of two conversations he had with Capozzi in

1997 and 1998 when Capozzi confessed to being an accessory after

the fact to Silva's murder and implicated DiCenso was clearly

admissible against Capozzi, it was not so clearly admissible

against DiCenso. The district court excluded that "confession"

evidence in the severed RICO trial of Capozzi's co-defendants.

Moreover, Capozzi's "confession" to Stone implicated DiCenso only

in post-murder conduct, not in the actual killing itself.
-28-

Regardless of the possible additional evidence against DiCenso, the

fact remains that he was at no time charged with a death eligible

offense, nor is there evidence that the government contemplated

such a charge or threatened DiCenso with it.

We conclude that the district court did not commit

constitutional error when it declined to allow Capozzi to inquire

into the subject of DiCenso's avoidance of the potential death

penalty attached to this uncharged crime which DiCenso had

supposedly avoided by cooperating with the government. See Brown

v. Powell, 975 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992). Moreover, without

referring to the questionable, uncharged death eligible offense,

Capozzi had considerable ammunition from the RICO offense actually

charged from which to demonstrate that DiCenso had a powerful

motive to testify in a manner supportive of the government. Knight

v. Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 13 (1st Cir. 2006) (to establish prejudice,

first question is whether absent limit on cross-examination, "would

the jury have received a significantly different impression of the

witness's credibility?").

Utilizing the available evidence, Capozzi was able to

explore thoroughly the implications of DiCenso's plea agreement at

both trials. He demonstrated during his cross-examination that

DiCenso had pled guilty to a crime punishable by life imprisonment,

and that DiCenso's cooperation allowed him to be sentenced to a

much lower sentence. DiCenso was shown to have had a powerful
-29-

motive -- avoidance of a life sentence and possibly of prison

altogether -- to cooperate with the government and to testify

falsely if necessary. Whether he faced life imprisonment alone or

an additional charge that could include the possibility of the

death penalty, DiCenso plainly had a strong incentive to seek the

deal with the government that he made, and to testify in support of

the government's theory of the case. See Brown, 975 F.2d at 4 (not

a Sixth Amendment violation where jury not told that first degree

murder carried a sentence of life without parole but otherwise "had

more than sufficient information to conclude that [the witness] had

a strong incentive to lie in order to receive a lesser sentence").

Thus we find no Sixth Amendment violation in the court's

limitation.

Nor did the court's decision to bar the questioning

constitute an abuse of its general discretion. See Byrne, 435 F.3d

at 22. We have "long . . . recognized that trial courts retain

'"wide latitude to impose reasonable limits" on cross examination

in order to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of

marginally relevant material.'" Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Vazquez, 219

F.3d at 45 (quoting Twomey, 806 F.2d at 1139)). Any risk that

DiCenso would have been charged with the death penalty offense was

at best, for reasons already discussed, wholly speculative. On the
 Capozzi makes an abortive argument that the government 5

violated the requirement of United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150

(1972), that the government disclose all material evidence to the

jury by "failing to disclose the alleged promise made to its key

witness that he would not be subject to death penalty prosecution

if he testified for the government." There are at least three

problems with this argument. First, it was not raised at the

district court. Second, no such promise seems to have been made,

as questioning of DiCenso at trial and the plea agreement offered

into evidence established. Finally, the fact that DiCenso was not

charged with a death eligible offense does not constitute Giglio

material. See United States v. Bender, 304 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir.

2002) ("Brady applies to material that was known to the prosecution

but unknown to the defense."). The absence of a death eligible

offense charge would be apparent to anyone reading the information

and was not information withheld by the government.

-30-

record before us, the district court did not abuse its discretion

in closing off the line of questioning on the death penalty.5

C. Hobbs Act Conspiracy

Capozzi challenges his conviction from the first trial on

Count 8, the Hobbs Act conspiracy charge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

1951(a). Capozzi's main argument, which was rejected by the

district court when it denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal,

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the "affects

commerce" requirement of the statute. He additionally challenges

the district court's denial of pretrial motions which sought

dismissal of the Hobbs Act charge based on a claimed lack of

evidence presented to the grand jury. Finally, he argues that the

district court erred in denying his post-conviction motion to

unseal grand jury minutes so that he could attack the sufficiency
-31-

of the government's presentation of evidence to the grand jury. We

find all three arguments to be lacking in merit.

i. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Capozzi preserved his sufficiency of the evidence claim

on Count 8, so we review the issue de novo. United States v.

McCormack, 371 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S.

1098 (2005). "The issue is whether a rational factfinder,

considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that [the Hobbs

Act conspiracy] 'in any way or degree obstruct[ed], delay[ed] or

affect[ed] commerce.'" Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and United

States v. Boulerice, 325 F.3d 75, 79 (1st Cir. 2003) (standard of

review for denials of Rule 29 motions)). We take a hard look at

the record and "reject only those evidentiary interpretations and

illations that are unreasonable, unsupportable, or overly

speculative." United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir.

1995).

Count 8 charged Capozzi with conspiring to affect

commerce by means of robberies, including but not limited to the

robberies of nine named individuals. Capozzi contends that the

evidence was insufficient to establish the "affects commerce" prong
The text of the statute reads: "Whoever in any way or degree 6

obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any

article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or

attempts or conspires to do so, or commits or threatens physical

violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or

purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined

under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."

18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).

-32-

of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), arguing the government failed to prove 6

that the drug dealers robbed were dealing interstate.

We have regularly held that commerce is "affected" for

the purposes of the Hobbs Act if there is a "realistic probability

of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce." United States v.

McKenna, 889 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (1st Cir. 1989). The government's

required showing is "not onerous." United States v. DiGregorio,

605 F.2d 1184, 1191 (1st Cir. 1979). Even potential future effects

may be the basis for interstate commerce jurisdiction under the

Hobbs Act. McKenna, 889 F.2d at 1172 n.5.

"One common method for the government to establish the

required 'de minimis effect' on interstate commerce is to show that

the defendant's activity 'minimally depletes the assets of an

entity doing business in interstate commerce.'" United States v.

Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 337 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States

v. Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir. 2001)). 

The government's evidence at Capozzi's first trial, which

included Count 8, showed that each victim of an actual robbery was

involved in the distribution of drugs from his residence. Each
-33-

robbery or attempted robbery was designed to obtain illegal drugs

and/or drug proceeds (and possibly firearms) from the victim. The

evidence also established that the crew specifically targeted each

robbery and attempted robbery victim because he was involved in the

distribution of drugs in the crew's territory. 

As conceded by Capozzi, Jeffrey North, one of the named

victims in the conspiracy charge, was a high-volume marijuana

dealer selling repeatedly to customers in both Maine and New

Hampshire. Stevens testified about the quantities of marijuana he

sold to North, and DiCenso and Stephen Butler, who drove North to

Maine and New Hampshire to sell to his marijuana customers,

testified about North's out-of-state marijuana business. Thus,

without more, the conspiracy to rob drug dealers, at least one of

whom had a substantial out-of-state marijuana business, had the

possibility or potential of an effect on interstate commerce by

depleting the assets of that interstate drug business. There was

sufficient evidence here for the jury to find a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1951(a), including the "affects commerce" prong.

ii. Grand Jury Sufficiency

Capozzi also argues that the district court erred in

failing to order the release of the grand jury transcripts. Prior

to trial, Capozzi moved to dismiss Count 8 (Hobbs Act conspiracy)

and Count 9 (Hobbs Act robbery of Michael Stevens). He argued that

the government had failed to present sufficient evidence to the
-34-

grand jury to establish the "affects commerce" element of the Hobbs

Act charges. He did not then, and does not now, claim that the

Hobbs Act charges were not properly pled in the indictment under

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The district court denied Capozzi's

motion, stating that "The allegations are sufficient. The

sufficiency of the evidence is for trial and the court should not

inquire as to the sufficiency of the evidence before the grand

jury." 

A court called upon to determine whether grand jury

transcripts should be released has substantial discretion. United

States v. McMahon, 938 F.2d 1501, 1504 (1st Cir. 1991). It is

"well settled that '[a]n indictment returned by a legally

constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is

enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.'" United

States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Costello

v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)). As we stated in

Maceo, "A court should not inquire into the sufficiency of the

evidence before the indicting grand jury, because the grand jury

proceeding is a preliminary phase of the criminal justice process

and all constitutional protections will be afforded during trial."

Id. at 3. The government rightly argues that since Capozzi has

never challenged the facial validity of Count 8, the district court
Capozzi claims the alleged failure of the government to 7

present to the grand jury an interstate commerce connection

deprived the district court of jurisdiction and required the court

to dismiss the Hobbs Act charges prior to trial. This argument,

however, "confuses the constitutional limits on Congress' power

with the jurisdiction of the federal courts: whether the facts of

a given case present a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to

be regulated by Congress is not an issue of the federal court's

subject matter jurisdiction." United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 357

F.3d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2004). The district court correctly

understood the issue to be one of sufficiency of the evidence

before the grand jury.

-35-

correctly rejected his attempt to attack the sufficiency of the

evidence presented to the grand jury.7

iii. Post-Trial Request for Grand Jury Transcripts

After both of his trials had ended, Capozzi filed motions

to unseal the grand jury transcripts in the case. The district

court denied both motions. Capozzi argued he needed the entire

presentation to the grand jury in order to show that "no evidence,"

as opposed to "insufficient evidence," was presented to support the

"affecting commerce" element of the Hobbs Act charges. On appeal,

he again frames his attack on the grand jury proceedings in the

language of subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, see

note 7, supra. But his brief makes clear that he wishes to attack

the sufficiency of the presentation to the grand jury. There is no

reason, and Capozzi suggests none, why our holding in Maceo, supra,

does not apply equally to a post-conviction attack on the

sufficiency of a presentation to the grand jury. The trial went

forward, Capozzi was afforded all constitutional protections, and
-36-

a petit jury found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Hobbs

Act conspiracy after sound legal instruction. The "'indispensable

secrecy of grand jury proceedings' must not be broken except where

there is a compelling necessity." United States v. Procter &

Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958). The burden of showing

particularized need rests squarely on the defendant. Pittsburgh

Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959). Here

Capozzi claims he needs the grand jury transcripts to present an

appeal to this court of a non-justiciable issue: his incorrect

claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, more

generally, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before

the grand jury. The district court properly denied his motion for

the transcripts. 

For the reasons discussed above, Capozzi's convictions

are affirmed. All pending motions are denied as moot.