2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

2-24-2004 

# S el kr id ge v . Unit ed O m ah a Li fe

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

D ocke t N o . 03-1146

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al work s at : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. It h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2004 D e c i sion s b y a n author i z e d a dmini s tr at or of V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al Re posit or y

. F or mor e infor m at ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min

. C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du

. Re c omme nde d C it at ion

" S e l kr id g e v

. U nit e d Om ah a L i fe " (2004). 2004 D e cisio n s
. P ape r 942. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/942PRECE DENTI AL

UNITED STA TES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

NOS. 03-1146 and 03-1147

MARGARI TA SEL KRI DGE

Appellant

v.

UNITED O F OMA HA LIFE INS URANCE COMP ANY

On Ap peal F rom the D istrict Co urt of the Virgin Islands (D.C. Civi l Action No. 01-cv-00143) District Judge: H on. Tho mas K . Moo re

Argued December 8, 2003

BEFO RE: NYG AAR D, BECK ER and ST AP LE TO N, Circuit

Judges
(Opinion Fi led Februar

y 24, 2004)

Lee J. Rohn K. Glenda Cameron (Argued) 1101 King Street , Suit e 2 Christ ianst ed, St. Croix, USVI 00820 and Terry M. H alpern Suite 314 900 3 H aven sight M all Cha rl otte Amal ie , S t. Tho mas , U SVI 00802 Attorney s for Appell ant

Charles E. Engeman Simone R.D. Franci s (Argued) Ogletree , Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewa rt 1336 Beltj en Road, Suit e 202 Cha rl otte Amal ie , S t. Tho mas , U SVI 00802 Attorney s for Appell ee

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

ST AP LE TO N, Circuit

Judge :

M argarita Selkri dge (“Selkridge”) file d
a la wsu it against

United of Omaha Life Insuranc e Company (“Omaha”) on several stat e-law theorie s allegin g t hat she had been wro ngf

ully denied benefi ts under her disability plan. (“ Selkridge I .”) After the Distri ct Court grant ed summary j udgment
on all of those t

heories in fav or of

the so le defe ndan t, Selkridge chose n ot to appe al that decisi on. Ins tead, she fil ed a ne w laws uit that ass erte d a clai m “arisi ng under” th e E m pl oye e Ret ir ement I nco me Secu rityAct (“ERISA”) for the wrongful denial of b enefits. (“ Selkridge II .”) The Distri ct Court grant ed summary j udgment
on re s judica ta grounds. Selkridge also
even tually file d a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)2

motion seeking to ame nd th e judg men t in Selkridge I

to indicate that the gra n t of
summ ary judgment was without prejudi ce to filing a new lawsuit. The District Cou rt deniedthe Rule 6 0(b ) mo tion be caus e it sought to utilize tha t Rule as a su bstitute for an appe al.

Selkri dge appe als the grant of sum mary judgmentand the deni al of her Rule 60(b)

m otionin Selkridge I

and th e gran t o f
summ ary j udgm ent in Selkridge II

. We determi ne that

we are without j urisdi ction to hearan appeal of t

he grantof sum mary judgmentin Selkridge I because an appeal
was not ti mely t aken. While we conclude th a t Judge Moore should have r ecused hims elf before ent ering t

he order gr anting
summ ary judgment i n Selkridge II and the orderdenying Selkridge’s R ule 60(b)

m o tionin Selkridge I

, we hold that our recognition of his failure to do so as plain
error and our indepe ndent, plenary review of those or ders make furt her remedial acti on unnecessar

y. Accordingly , give n that our in depe nden t p len ary review convinces us that the results reach ed w ere requir ed as a mat

te r o f l aw, we will affirm both Decem ber 23, 2002, orders.

I. Background

Selkri dge was enrol led in a group insurance plan w it h O maha during the p eriodin w hich s he w as em ployed b y th e Virg in Islands Telephone Co mp any and its
successors. In December 1996, Selkridge file d an applic ation f

or lon g-term disab ility bene fits w ith Omaha. Omaha denied the claim initia lly and , fol low ing an appe al, Selkri dge then file d Selkridge I, a dive rsity acti on in the D istrict Co urt of th e V irgin Islands against

Omaha alleging br each of
con t ract, bad fait

h, fraud, intentional infli ctionof em otiona l distr es s, and neglige nt inflict ion of emotional distress.

Omaha move d for summary judgment
on all c laims Selkridge had alleged against it. The motion conte nded that all of Selkridge’s clai ms arose “un der the
comm on law of

the Territory” and w ere therefore “e xp re ss ly preem pte d b y ER ISA .” JA at 61

.
In her opposition to Omaha’s m o tion, Selkri dge argued t hat summary judgment should be deni ed but went on to make the following requ est: “[i]f th is Co urt w ere to find th atth e cl ai ms are pree mpted and must be converted to federal claims, Plaintiff respect fully

requ ests that s he be given the opport

unity to amend he r Complaintaccordi ng ly to mo re clea rly state her cla ims as feder al viol at ion o f ER ISA claim s.” JA at 15 6-5 7.

The Distric t Cou rt held th at all o f Se l kridge’s clai ms were preempted by ERISA and that

Omaha w a s entitled to
summar y j udg me nt o n all c oun ts. See Selkridge v. United of Omah a Life Ins. Co. , 221 F . Supp. 2d 579 (D .V.I. 2002). It did not menti on the applic ation for leav e to
am end found only

in Selkridge’s brief. The Court’s Febr

uary 22, 2002, order read: “i t i s he re byORD ERE D that defendants’ motion for s um mary j udgment

. . . i s GRAN TED. . . . ” JA at 364. The orderdid n ot exp ressly reserv e to3

Selkri dge a rig ht to pursue ERISA-based claim s in a new actio n.

On April 23, 2002, Selkridge f i led a
new actio n, Selkridge II , in t he Distr ict Co urt. The compl ain t asse rted t hat Sel kr idge’s claim “aris es u nde r ER ISA .” JA at 39 0.

Omah a moved for su mm ary judgm ent in Selkridge II

on Sep tember 2 3, 2002, arguing t hat Selkri dge’s cl aim “under ERI SA” w as ba rre d b y res jud icata be c ause it arose out of t he same set of circumst ances at is s ue in Selkridge I and could have been litigate d i n Selkridge I

. On October 30, 2002, eight mont hs after the order gr anting s um mary jud gm ent in Selkridge I, Sel krid ge filed a Fed . R

. Civ. P. 60(b) moti on in Selkridge I . T h at motion requ ested th at th e District Cou rt “c lar ify” its Febr uary 22 , 2002 , order to state that Selkridge’s clai ms in Selkridge I
we re “co nver ted to federa l claims ” and to grantSelkri dg e “leave t o amend to plead cl ai ms und er

ERI SA” wi t h resp ect to Selkridge I . JA at 719, 726.

On De cem ber 2 3, 200 2, th e Di stri ct C ourt gran ted su mm ary judgm ent i n Selkridge II

on res jud icata grounds and deniedthe Ru le 60(b) moti on in Selkridge I on the ground that it was a n impe rmissib le attem pt to u tilize that R ule
as a su bstitu te fo r an app eal. See Selkr idge

v. Un ited of O ma ha L if e Ins. Co. , 237 F. Su pp. 2 d 60 0 (D .V.I . 200 2).

Just before the summar y j udgment motion in Selkridge I

I and the Rule 60(b) mo tion in Selkridge I were fil ed, one of Selkridge’s attorne ys wrote a lett er-t o-theeditor of an on-li ne public ation c rit ical of the Distri ct Judge presi ding over t he Sel kridge matter s. The cont ent of the lett er w as no t d ire ctl y rel ated t o eithe r Selkridge matter, but the l ette r prompted a seri es of even ts th at will b e discu ssed in Part III of

this opinion r ela ting t o the prop riety of the Distr ict Judge’s co ntinui ng to pres ide over t

he Selkridge matters.

On January

9, 200 3, Selkri dge fil ed a notice of appeal i n Selkri dge I seek ing to appeal the Februar

y 22, 20 02 , grant

of
summ ary judgment i n Selkridge I, t he December 23, 20 02, de nial of her R ule 60 (b) motion, and “the Court ’s rec usal of itself from this case and its s ubsequent reinstate men t, sua s

pon te .” SA

. On t he
sa me day, Selkri dge fil ed a noti ce of appeal seek ing to appeal t he December 23, 2002, grant of s ummary judgmen t in Selkridge II

. 1

1 The se no tices of

appe al we re not include d in the a

ppendi x file d by Selkri dge. Inste ad, the appendix i ncluded two additi onal noti ces of appealfor Selkridge I

and Selkridge II, both of which
were filed on Ja nuary 13, 2003. The January 13, 20 03, no tice of appe al f

o r Selkridge I

was the same as t

he January

9, 2003, notice of ap peal for Selkridge I

. The Ja n uary 13, 2003, notice of appealfor Selkridge II, however, differe d fro m the January 9, 2003, notice of appeal for Selkridge II, and fai l ed to speci fy any orderbeing appeal ed from in Selkridge II

.4

II. Jurisdiction t

o Hear an Appeal from the G rant o

f Sum ma ry Ju dgm ent in Selkri dge I

Selkri dge insi sts t

hat we have juri s dicti on to review th e summ ary jud gment order ent ered in Selkridge I under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which authori zes appe als from finaldecisi ons of the Dist rict Co urt. W e ca nno t agr ee. “A final order i s one that ‘ends the litigati on on the merits and leaves nothing for the court

to d o but execut e the judgm ent.’” Welc h v. Fo ls om , 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991) (quot ing Coopers & Lybrand v. Li vesay , 437 U.S

. 463, 467 (1978) (int ernal quot ations omitt ed)). For purposes of ap pe al un der 28 U .S.C . § 12 91, “A summary judgment that f ul l y disposes of

all c laims among all parties is fina l.” 15B Charles Alan Wright , Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Pr ac. & Proc.: Juris

. 2d § 3914.28 (2d ed. 19 92), at 202 ; see Hampton v. Borough of Tint on Falls Polic e D ept. , 98 F .3d 1 07, 1 11 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The di stri ct court granted
s umm ary judgment for the defendants as t o all counts of plaintiffs’ com plain t. . . . The district court’s grant of

summary j udgment is a finalorder t

hat disposed of all clai ms, and this cou rt th eref

ore has j urisdi ction
over this ap pea l pu rsua nt to 28 U .S.C . § 1291.”). The Distri ct Court’ s February 22, 2002, ordergranted s ummary judgment in favorof Omaha on all of Sel kr idge ’s cl ai ms on the ground s that the claims w ere expr essly preemptedby ERISA. Beca use it dispo sed o f all claim s with respe ct to all parties, 2 that order was a final o rder w ithin Selkri dge has made a m otion to correct the appendi x with res pect t o the f actthat the January

9, 2003, notices o f appeal were not

include d in the appendix. Under Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)( 2), “[p] arts of the record may

be reli ed on by t

he court or the parti es even though not include d in the app end ix.” Whi le we need not n ecess arily correct the appe ndix , Selkrid ge’s m otion is unopposed an d we will, by sep arate order, grant t he motion. Sel k ridge conced es that the Janu ary 13, 2003, noti ce of appeal in Selkridge II “does not corr ectl y i dentif y t he Distr ict Cou rt Order from which an appealwas taken in that

case.” Motion at 3. W e w ill consider the January

13, 2003, Selkridge II notice of appeal as one merely expan din g that wh ich S elkridg e sou ght to a ppea l in Selkridge II

–and not one intended as a subs titute for the earli e r noti ce of appeal–because it provides n o indication that i t was int ended to change t he content of the ea rlier notic e of a ppea l. Therefore,
as co nstr ued by this Co urt, Selkridge’s notice s of appeal i n Selkridge I I seek to
a ppeal the De cemb er 23, 200 2, ord e r gra ntin g su mm ary jud gm ent to Om aha

. 2 That order also met t

he procedur a l requ ireme nts of Fed . R. Civ. P. 58 for an order that c ommences the runni ng of the ti me for appe al. See Local Union No. 1992 of the I

nt’l Brotherhood of

Electr ical Workers v. The Okonite Co. , F. 3d , 2004 WL 113150, *5 (3d Cir. 2004) (order sat is fies Rule 58’s se parate document requir ement wh ere it ( 1) is s elf-c ontaine d5

the meaning of 28 U.S. C. § 1291.

Fed. R. App. P. 4( a) (1 )( A) requir es that
a notice of appeal be file d “with the district clerk wit

hi n 30 days after

the judg ment or ord er app ealed from is ente red ,” id. , unle ss cert ain exc eptions inapp licable her e ap ply. Sel kridge fi led her noti ce o f appeal i n Selkridge I on January 9, 2 0 03–over ten months after
summ ary judgment had been gra nted in that matte r. It is a w ell-estab lished r ule that “[t]he time l imit s for fi ling a notice of appeal ar e ‘m and ator y and juris dicti ona l.’ ” In re Ra shid , 210 F.3d 20 1, 204 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoti ng Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, I nc. , 141 F.3 d 490, 495 (3d C ir. 1998 )); see, e. g. , Browder v. Director, De

pt. of C orrec tions o

f Ill in ois , 434 U.S. 257, 264 ( 1978) (same) ; U.S. v. Vas tola , 989 F .2d 1318 , 1321 (3d Cir. 1993) (same). We thus lack ju risdiction to
r eview the summary

judgment i n Selkridg e I

.
Selkri dge firs t argues that s he “did not seek reconsi derati on or appeal the dis tri ct
c ourt’s decisio n bec ause she re ason ably belie ved that t

he dist rict c ourt had overlooked

her req uest fo r autom atic
conve rs ion of [plai ntiff

’s] cl aims and leav e to amend. . . .” Appellant ’s Reply Brief at 8-9 (foo tnote o mitte d). We ar e unpersuaded. If Selkr idge’s counsel thoughtthat t he Distr ict Court

had “overlooke d” her req uest fo r autom atic conversi on of h er state la w c laims in to ERISA claims, and had also “overlooke d” Selkridge’s request

for leave t o amend, we fa il to understand how this wou ld excuse
c ounsel from seeking r econsider ationb y the Distri ct Court or

appeali ng the Dist

rict Court’s de cisi on.

A lte rn ati ve ly, Selkri dge argues that he r counsel reaso nably vie we d the Feb ruary 22, 20 02, o rder as a partial sum mary judgmentand, accor ding ly, not as a final order. While it

is true that

a grant of “parti al sum maryju dgme nt ” un der Fed . R. Civ. P. 56(d) is not

a “final ” judgment with in the m ean ing of 2 8 U .S.C

. § 1291 b ecause it i s an adjudi cati on of les s tha n the entir e ac tion , see 10B Charles Alan Wr ight, Arth u r R. Mill er & Mary Kay Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civi l 3d § 2737 (1 998) , at 322-25, there i s simpl y no record basis for co nstruin g the Febru ary 22, 200 2, ord er as a g rant of partia l
summar y j udgment. Omaha moved for
summ ary judgment on al l cla ims on the grounds that t

he c la ims w ere ex pressly preemptedby ER ISA

. Al though Omaha request ed that, in the a lter native , it

be granted parti al summary

judgment on Selkridge’s state la w cl ai ms should “Count I [be] deemed to c onsti tute a clai m for bene fits und er ER ISA ,” JA at 4 8, th e February 22, 2002, orde r in exp li ci t t erms grants summary judgment on all claims. 3
and s epa rate fro m the opin ion, (2) s ets forth the rel ief granted, and (3) omit s the Distri ct Co urt’s rea sons for d isposin g of the parties’ motion s as it did). 3 We also rej ectSelkri dge’s ar gument that the fi ling of

her Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)6

We thus conclude that we l a ck juri sdict ion to review th e District Cou rt’s February 22, 2002, order in Selkridge I

.
III. Summary Judgment in Selkridge II and the Rule 60(

b) Motion in Selkridge I: The Recusal Issue
Selkri dge insi sts t

hat the summ ary judg m ent order i n Selkridge II and the refusalto vacat e the j udgment in Selkridge I must be vaca ted becau se Judge Mo ore’s impa rtialitywhen he render ed those decisi ons w ou ld be qu es tio ne d b y a reaso nable person aware o f the re levant facts.
A. Background

On September 3, 2002, Lee J. Rohn,
one of S el kridge’ s att orney s, wrot e a lett er-t o-the- edi tor of an onlin e publica tion, the S t. Croi x Source , regardi ng Un ited St ates Dis tri ct Judge Thomas K. Moo re ’s per for ma nce of h is offici al duties and the fact th at Judge Mo ore was not being r eappoint ed 4 b y Preside nt Geor ge W . Bush. 5 Attorney mo ti on and her subse quent timely a ppeal of the denial of that

mo tion en titles her to
a review of the underlying grant of
summ ary judgment on February 22, 2002. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A) provides a limi tedexce ption to the tim e limits f or filing a notic e of appeal outli ned in FedR. Ap p. P . 4(a )(1)( A)

. If a party timel y fi les i n the dis tri ct court any

of t he following motions under the Federal Rul es of Civi l Procedu r e, the time to fil e an appeal runs for all p arti es from the entryof the orderdisposi ng of the la st such re maining
mo tion: . . . (vi) for r elie f under Ru le 60 if

the m otion is file d no late r than 10 day s after the judgment

is ent ered. Id. Th is pro visio n of Fed

. R. A pp. P. 4 (a )(4)(A), clarifying the rela tionsh ip between the time limit s forfiling a Fed . R. Civ. P. 60 m otion and an appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4, makes clear the limited circumst ances under which an appealfrom
a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) moti on may address the und erlying jud gm ent. See United States v . Fiore lli , 337 F.3 d 28 2, 28 8 n.3 (3d Cir. 200 3). Selk ridge filed he r Ru le 60(b) moti on eight mont hs after summ ary judgmentwas e ntered on Febr uary 22, 2002. That motion di d not tollthe time for appeal of that

order because it

was not f iled wit hi n t en d ay s a ft ersum ma r y jud gm ent w as e nter ed. 4 Judges si tting in the Dis tri ct Court of th e Virgin I slands are appoint ed for10

- year terms pur suant t o th e Re vised Org anic Ac t of 1 954

. See 48 U .S.C. 1614 (a).

5 We take judic ial notice of t h e exist ence of a letter- to-t he-editor by Attorney Rohn published in the St. Cro ix Source

. See, e. g. , Ieradiv. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. , 230 F.3 d 59 4, 59 8 n.2 ( 3d Cir. 2000) (appell ate court may t ake jud icia l notice of the exi stence of a newspaper article); P eters v. Delaware7

Rohn suggeste d that “ [t]he fail ure of Judge Tom M oore to be r ecommended for
re appointment

has m uch le ss to do with politics and more to do with the alle gations of inappropriate behavior wh ile he was on the bench.” See L ee J . Rohn , Lawyer: Judge’s Non-Reappoi ntment Not Poli tics , St. Croix Source ( Sept . 3, 2002). 6 Attorney Roh n then listed in a cu rsory fashion seve ral allega t i o n s o f “inap prop riate beha vior” by Judge Moore. 7 On Sep tember 9 , 2002, Judg e M oore

began issui ng sua s

pon te recus al orde rs in
numerous cases i nv olvingAttorney Rohn. 8 A totalof 19 recusalorde rs were issue d b etween September 9, 2002, and October 7, 2002, in Judge Moore cases involving

River Port Auth ority of P enns ylvan ia and New Jersey , 16 F.3d 1346, 1356 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994 ) (same).

6 The full t ext of the letter can be found in United

States v. Roebuck , 289 F. Supp. 2d 678 , 684-85 (D .V.I. 2003) (ap pendix).

7 Wrote Attorne y Rohn: Judge M oore ’s prob lems lie i n the alle g ations of ina ppropri at e behavi or while he was on the ben ch. These include, but are no t li mited to , repea tedly bein g revers ed by t

he Third Cir cui t [Cou rt of Appe als], repe ate d di sa gr eeme nt s with the j udges of the Third Cir cuit, rude behavi or toward att or ne ys p racticing befo re hi m, including, but no t li mited t o, refusi ng to grant

a tri al cont inuance to a seven months pre gnant attor ney desp ite a me dica l
ne ce ss ity; orderi ng attor neys to be in his court des pite t

he fact t hat they were also s upposed to be before th e ThirdCir cui t at t he s ame time; com plaints by juror s that they were coer ce d and harass ed and

subject ed to ex parte inst ru ctions and conversations byJudge M oore wh ile in jury deliberations; juro r s com plaints of

being casti gated aft er reachi ng a verdic t because it was contrary to w hat J u dge M oore wo uld have decide d; keeping the court hous e open late t o acco mm odate the fi ling of a petition to keep poor housing out of
a ne ighborho od that Judg e M oore lived in, and then granting t he motion despit e a confli ct that requ ir ed rec usal; repeat edl y imposing sanc ti o ns without notice and a proper abi lit

y t o respond; [and] bein g vindictive against litigants who took a p os iti on con trary to his. Id. (alterations in original).

8 We take judic i al notice of the exis tence of the judicia l order s set fo rth infr a in which Judge Moore rec used hims elf from a l arg e number of Attor ney Roh n’s cases, and in which Judge Brot man indicatedthat ne arly

all of Attorney Roh n’s cases were being reassi gned to him for “med iati on and/or s ettl emen t discuss ions. ”8

Attorney Rohn. 9 Virtual ly all of the se cases w ere the n reassi gned to Judge Brot man for purposes of mediat ion and settlement negotiat ions. 10

9 See Antonie, et al. v. VI Port Authorit y, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 200 1-6 3 (recus al order dat ed Sep t. 9 , 2002); Bolinger v. Vir

gin Isl ands Telephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2002-49 (recus al orde r dated Sep t. 9, 200 2); Gore, et al. v. Pr osser , et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001- 003 (recusal order d ated Sep t. 9, 2002); Hendricks v. Belar

do , V.I. Civ. No. 1999- 033 (recusal order d ated Sep t. 9, 2002); Jones v. Dail

y News Publishi ng Co. , et al., V.I. Civ . N o . 1999-138 ( recusalorder datedSe pt. 9, 200 2); Lang v. Unite d States , V.I . Civ . N o. 2 000-100 (re cusal orderdated Sep t. 9, 200 2); Ma the son v. Virg in Is la nds Commu nity Ban k, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2000-80 (recusalorder dat ed Sep t. 9, 200 2); Nyfi eld v. Vi rgi n Islands Telephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-53 (Sep t. 9, 200 2); Sweeney v. Virg in Islands Tel eph one Co rp., etal. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001 -53 (recus al order dated Sept . 9, 2002); Williams v. Kmart Corp. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999-102 (re cusal or der dated Sept . 9, 2002); Ch apa rro v. Inno vativ e Comm unicati on s Corp. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999-1 90 (recus al order dated Sept . 10, 2002); Island Management Group v. Bank of No va Sc otia, et a l. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999- 104 (recusal order d ated Sep t. 10, 2002); Martin v. Virg in Islands Tel eph one Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999-202 (recusal orde r d ated S ept. 10 , 2002 ); Trantham v. Ford, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 1998 -14 0 (recus al order dated Sept. 10, 20 02); VECC, et al. v. Th e Ba nk of N ova S cotia , V.I. Civ. No. 2002-72 (recusalorder dat ed Sep t. 10, 20 02); Souder v. Withers , Civ No. 2000-91 (recus al order datedSept. 20, 2002); Anderson v. Government of the Vi rgin Island s, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001- 149 (recusal order d ated Sep t. 26, 2002); Airo v. Sug ar Bay Club , et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2000-134 (re cusal orde r dated Oc t. 1, 2002 ); Derr v . BCM

/CH I French men ’s Ree f, Inc. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-148 (re cusal order dated Oct. 7, 200 2).

10 See Antonie, et al. v. VI Port Authorit y, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 20 01-63 (reas signmentnotice dated Dec. 3, 20 02); Bolinger v. Vir

gin Isl ands Telephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2002-49 (reas signmentnotice dated Dec. 3, 2002); Gore, et al. v. P rosse r, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-003 (reas signment notice dated Dec. 3, 200 2); Jones v. Dail

y News Publishi ng Co. , et al ., V. I. Civ. No. 1999-138 (reas signmentnotice dated Dec. 3, 2002); Lang v. United

States , V.I. Civ. No. 2000- 100 (re assignment

notice dated Dec. 3, 2002); M

ath eso n v. V

irgi n Islands Co mm unity Ban k, et al. , V.I . Civ . N o

. 2000-80 (reas signment notice dat ed Dec. 3, 200 2); Ny

fi eld v. Virgin I

slands Telephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-53 (reas signment notice dat ed Dec. 3, 200 2); Swe eney v. Vi rgin Is lands Telephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-53 (reas signment notice dat ed Dec. 3, 2002) ; Chaparro v. I nn ovativ e C ommunications Corp. , V.I . Civ . N o

. 1999-190 (reas signment notice dated Dec.9

In additio n, at leas t twe lve othe r Judge Mo ore cases i nvolving Att orney Ro hn
were reass igne d to Judge Brot man for sett lementpurposes 11 al though no sua spon te recusal orders w ere issued by Judge Moor e in t hese cases. 12 It is in this last

3, 200 2); Airo v. SugarBay Clu b, et al. , V.I

. Civ. No. 2000-134 (reassi gnment notice dated Dec. 5, 2002) ; A nderson v. G overnment

of the Virgin Isla nds, e t a l. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-149 (rea ssignment notice datedDe c. 5, 20 02); Derr v. BCM/ CHI Frenc hme n’s Reef, In c. , V.I. Ci v. No. 2001-148 (re assignment notice datedDec. 5, 20 0 2); VECC , et al. v . The Bankof No va Sc otia , V.I . Ci v. No. 2002- 72 (reas signment no ti ce dated Dec. 5, 2002); Martin v. Virgin I slands Tel

ephone Co rp., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999-202 ( reassi gnment notice dated D ec. 12, 200 2); Souderv. Withers , Civ. No. 2000-91 (rea s signmentnotice dated D ec. 20, 200 2);

see also Trantham v. Ford, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 1998 -14 0 (ord er fro m M agistrate Judg e Je ffrey

L. Resnick dat ed Dec. 4, 2002, directin g th e parties t o discuss settlement w ith Judge B rotman).

11 See Donastorg, Jr. v. Innovative Comm unicati on s Corp. , V.I. Civ. No. 2002-97 (reas signment notice dat ed Dec. 3, 200 2); Da brow ski v . Emerald Beach Corp. , V.I. Civ. No. 2001-12 1 (reas signmentnotice datedDec. 5, 20 02); Greene v. Hond a M oto r C o., L td. , et al., V.I. Civ. No. 2002-159 (reas sig nment notice dated De c. 5, 20 02); Ko nik off v. Peninsular

a nd Oriental

Steam Navigati on Co
., et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 1999-224 (reas signment notice dat ed Dec. 5, 2002); Mahoney v. Bu lhof, et a l. , V.I. Civ. N o. 2001-154 (reas signment notice dated Dec. 5, 200 2); Selkridge v. U nited O ma ha L ife Ins. Co. , V.I. Civ. N o. 2002-7 3 (reas signmentnotice dated Dec. 5, 20 02); Sexton, et al. v. EquivestSt. Tho ma s, et al. , V

. I. Civ. No. 2002-96 (reassi gnment notice d ate d D ec. 5, 2 002 ); Collins v. Ca stle Acq uisiti on s , V.I. Civ. No. 99-212 (reas signmentnotice dated D e c. 20, 2002 ); Domino Oil v. Phoenix AssuranceCo. of New York , V .I. Civ. No. 1996-99 (reas signmentnotice dated Dec. 20 , 2002); Soltau v. CTF St. Thomas Corp. , V.I. Civ. No. 1998-143 (re assignment notice dated Dec. 20, 20 02); Sm ith v. Elia s, et a l. , V.I. Civ. No. 02-14 (sche dulin g order fo r a stat us hearing and s ett lement di scussi ons datedDe c. 23, 2 002 ); Khan v. Soleiman, et al. , V.I. Civ. No. 2000-223 (re assignment notice dated Ja n. 14, 2003 ).

12 Selk ridge in clude d in h er app endix
an “Affidavit

of Lee J. Rohn in Support of Motion for Judi cial Recusal. ” S A at 31- 33. A ccord ing to th e A ffida vit: M agistrate Judge Barn ard sa id that Jud ge M oore wa s ups et with
me for having writ

ten the lett er criticizin g his jud icia l performance and te mp eram ent. M agistrate Judge Barnard furt her stat ed that he had been inst ructed Judge Barna rd [sic] to prepare
rec u sal Ord ers fo r every ca se in which I was att orney

of record. SA at 32. The affidavi t does not make clear as to who inst ru cted M agistrate10

group of matter s, wher e n o recusalorder by Judge Moore had been iss ued but the
case had n oneth eless b een re assign ed to Judge Brotman for se ttle me nt negotiati ons, that Selkridge II

landed. 13

Selkri dge was notifi ed on December 9, 2002, by Judge B rotman tha t her ma tter had been reass igned to J udge Brotman for sett lementnegotiations. 14 In an or d er datedDecember 23, 2002, and file d on December 27, 2002, J ud ge Brotman scheduled

a conference f

or a “ s tatus he ar ing and sett lement di scussi ons” for Selkridge II . JA at 76 4. Ap paren tly unbeknow nst to Judge Brot man, by wayof
a memorandum opinion and orde rs dat ed Dece mb e r 20, 2002, and file d on De cem ber 23, 2002, J udge Moore had alrea dygr ant ed s ummar yju dgme n t in Selkridge II

on all c laims in favor of Omaha, and had d enie d Se l kridg e’s R ule 60(b) moti on in Selkridge I

.
Also on D ecem ber 2 3, 200 2, M agistrate Judge Ge of

fr ey W. Barna rd wrote to Judge Brotman by letter, a c opy of which was sentto the parti es. The l ette r read, in part: “Th is is t o confirm our di scussi on earli er re garding the above-referenced cases. These case s were inadver tently categorize d
as cases fr om which Judge Moore recused himself. However, Judge M oo re has confirmedthat he will continue to pr eside
over these ca s es. ” JA at 766. Judge Brotman then n otified the pa rties that h is previous scheduli ng order was vaca ted, in light of Judge Moore’s December 20, 2002, opini on.

Two publis hed opinions from the Distri ct Court of the Virgin Islands, writ ten after

the order s being appea led fr om i n this ca se w ere filed , purp ort to address Judge Moore’s rec usals ( or withholding of rec u sals) w ith resp ect to Attorney Ro hn’ s ca ses. See United St ates
v. Roebuck , 271 F. S upp. 2d 7 12 (D .V.I. 2003); United Stat

es v. Roe buc k , 289 F. Supp . 2d 678 (D .V.I. 2003). 15 Judge Barn ard to p repare recus al orde rs in all of Attorney Rohn’s cases. In any case, we cannot con side r the af fidavi t, whic h purp orts to have b een p repared for the Un it e d States v. Roebuck , V.I. Crim. No. 02-171 case. T he affid avit is out side of the record fo r Selkridge I and Selkridge II , a nd Selkri dge suggest s no theor y und e r wh ich w e ma y consid er the a ffida vit.

13 Neither a rec usal order no r a reassi gnment noti c e w as issue d w ith respect to Selkridge I . The c ase was not
reas signedfor settlement pu rposes becaus e final judg men t h ad been entere d and only
a F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion w a s pending.

14 See Selkridge v. U nited O ma ha L ife Ins. Co. , V.I. Civ. No. 2002 -7 3 (reassignm ent notice dated Dec. 5, 20 02). 15 “[W]e recognize that we have t he power to take j udicia l noti ce of subsequent deve lopm ents in relat ed proceedi ngs since the appeal i n ea ch c ase wa s file d.” Federa lIns. Co. v. Ric hard I. Rubin & Co
., Inc. , 12 F.3d 1 270, 128 4 (3d C ir.11 In Un it ed States v. Roebuck , 271 F. Supp. 2d 712 (D.V.I. 2003), Judg e Brotman, presi ding over a mot ion to quash subpoenas to compel t

he test imony of f

our federaljudges at

an evident iary

hearing on
a motion t o recus e Judge Moore from presid ing o ver tha t case, n oted th at:

Shortl y aft er Judge Mo or e had recusedhims elf fro m all of Attorney Roh n’s cases, he w ithdrew his
re cusal in some cases , inc luding t h e matters o f Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life I

nsurance Company , V.I. Civil Action Nos. 2001-143 and 2002-73, without gi ving a rea son for this dec ision . ( See Selkr idge v. United of O ma ha L ife In s. Co. , 237 F. Su pp. 2d 600 (D.V.I . Dec. 20, 200 2) (M oor e, J.)).

Id. at 715. Thus, t

here is a publis hed op ini on of the Dist

rict Court repr esenti ng that Judg e M oore recus ed him self in Selkridge I

an d S elkridge II, and then “w ithdrew ” that re cusa l.
Judge M oore , in la t er pro ceed ings in Roebuck , indicatedthat he “never re cused [himself ] fr om Selkridge ” and commented
on his re ason for r ecusing hi mself in many of Attorney Rohn’s cases:
First, I enter ed no blanket or de r of recusalfrom all of

Lee Rohn’s cases 1993). We take judi cial notice of these publis hed opinions to the ext ent that they discuss Selkridge I

and Selkridge II , andto the ex tentthey

discuss whether Judge M oore recused hi mself from Att or ne y Roh n’s cases. With respec t to United S tates v. Roebuck , 289 F. S upp

. 2d 67 8 (D.V .I. 2003) (Moore, J. ), we take judici al notice of the pub lic statem ents mad e by Jud ge M oor e in th at op inio n. We recogniz e that

“[ a ] court

may take judici al noti ce of an adjudic ative fact if that f act i s not subj ect t o reasonabl e disp ute” and “[a] j udicia lly notice d fact must ei th er

be ge ne ra lly kno wn within t he juri sdict ion of the trial cou rt, or be c apab le of accurat e and ready determi nation by resort to sou r ces whose accurac y cannot
re as onab lybe questi oned.” Werner v. Werner , 267 F .3d 288, 29 5 (3d C ir. 2001). With respe ct to both publ ished Roebuck opinions , we do not take judici al notice for “the trut

h of t he facts r ecit ed therein, but f

or the exi stence of

the opinion, which is not

subje ct to rea sona ble dispu te over it s authen ti city .” Southern Cross Overseas A ge ncies, Inc. v. Wah Kwon g Shipping Group Ltd. , 181 F.3d 4 10, 426 (3d Cir. 1999). For example, t o the extent

Judge Moore expresse d that he
wa s “initially upse t at t he vici ousness of the lett er [by

Attorney

Rohn ],” Roebuck , 289 F. Supp. 2d at 682, we do not purpo rt to be taki ng judici al noti ce of the fac t that J udge M oore wa s actua lly upset a t Attorney Ro hn. W e take j udicia l noti ce for th e mo re limit ed purpose o f recogniz ing that J

udg e Moore made a pub lic sta tem ent indi cati ng that he was “initially upse t at t he v icious ness” of Attorney Ro hn’s letter.12

. . . . Second, I ent ered rec usal orders in on ly some, b ut no t a ll, of Attorney Rohn’s then-pending cases. Third, I have not made any ruli ngs in anyof those ca ses from which I have recusedmysel f. The Selkridge matter is one of those in which I have never entere d an order of recusal. Thus, At torney Roh n’s claim that I delibe rately “unrecused” myself just to be able to rule against her client is paten tly false. Altho u gh th e mag istrate judg e inad verte ntl y include d Selkridge among those
cases sent t o the judge who had been desi g natedto overs ee the Rohn
rec usal cases for sett lemen t
n e gotiations, the fa ct rem ains tha t I
neverrecusedmyself

fr om Selkridge

. I ruled o n the facts an d law th at I belie ve govern e d the deci sion of t he
cas e. I underst and my rul ings ar e o n appe al, and, as alwa ys, the Court of Ap peals wil l h av e the la st wo r d if it disagr ees with my

decisi on.

I did recus e mysel f fr om so me of Attorney Rohn’s then- pending case s because her pers onal attack i n the St. Thomas Sou rce stung when I first read it. I rei terat e that

these r ecusal orders had absolut ely

nothi n g to do with any antipathy or p rej udice against any of her client s o r any concern t hat I coul d not be fai r and imparti al in ha ndling their cases. Several mont hs have now gone by and although Iwas init ially upse t at the vicious ness of the lett er, t he pass age of tim e has allow ed m e to reflec t, and, as th e s ay in g go es , time heals all wounds. I have concluded that this w as ju s t Lee Rohn being Lee Rohn and doing what Lee Rohn thinks she must do t o win.

United States v. Roebuck , 289 F. Supp. 2d 678, 681-82 (D

. V.I. 2003) (footnot es omitted). Thus, w hile Judge M oore charact erize d the group o f case s refe rred to Judge Bro tman as th e “Ro h n recusal
cas es,” there were some of these cases, including Selkridge II , in whic h Judge Mo ore main ta i ns that he did not recuse himself.

B. Standar d of Review

Wh ere a mo ti on for dis qualif icat ion was made in the Distri ct Court, we review the denial of su ch a m otio n f or abuse of discr etion

. See, e.g., General M otors Corp. v. New A.C. C hevro let , Inc. , 263 F.3d 296, 336 n.25 (3d C ir. 2001); Se cu ra co mm Co nsu lting , I nc. v

. Securacom Inc. , 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 200 0). H ow eve r, Selk ridge made no motion in the Dis tri ct Court f or Judge Mo ore’s re cus al fr om Selk ridge I or Selkridge II

at any t ime after

the event s at issu e he re to ok p lace

.
Wh ere a party

has not r equested

that t he district judg e recu se him self or herse lf during proc eedin gs in the distric t court, we review a recusalargument made on appeal13

for plain error. 16 See, e.g. , Osei- Afriyi e by Os ei- Afriyie v. Medical College of Pen nsylva nia , 937 F .2d 876, 88 1 (3d C ir. 1991); United Stat

es v. Dalfonso , 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d C ir. 1983 ); United Stat es v. Schreiber , 599 F .2d 534, 53 5 (3d C ir. 1979). 17

16 We recog niz e that

the Second Circu it has, i n the ci vil cont ext, reviewed a party ’s argument

made for

th e firs t t ime
on appeal–t

hat the tri al judge should have
re cused himself or h ersel f–unde r fundamental error analysi s. See Taylor v. Vermont Dept. of

Educ. , 313 F.3d 768, 795 (2d Cir. 20 02) (“ In the c ivil con text, how ever, we revers e only if there ha s been fundamental error. Funda mental erro r i s more egregious than the plain e rror t hat
can excuse a proc edu ral d efault in a cri minal tri al, and is so s erious an d flagrant that it goes t o the very integrity of the proceeding.”) (int ernal quotations, citati ons, and alter ation s om itted ). As Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (b), up on which plai n error analysis is ba sed , d oes no t apply in the civil sett ing , Taylor su ggests t ha t fun damental error

analy sis s hould be applie d. No neth eles s, t his Court has applie d plain e rror an alysis, in the c ivil conte xt, to a part

y’ s argumentfor the first ti me on appe al that the trial judg e sho uld have recused himse lf

or h erse lf. See Ose i-Afriyie by O sei-A friyie v. M e dical College of Pe nnsy lvania , 937 F.2d 876, 881 (3d Cir . 199 1). Acc ordingly, we are b ound to apply pl ain error analy sis. 17 Selkri dge maintai ns that her counsel had no fair oppor

tunit y t o move for recus al in t he D istrict Court. Coun sel was aw are that Judg e M oore had r ecus ed him self in 19 of hercases and t

hat he had t

ransfer red these cases and ano ther grou p of cases in which no recusa l orders had been issued to Judge Brotman forsettl ement discussions. Counsel m ay wel l have expect ed Judge Mo ore to recus e in thi s ot her group of
cases (as he had do ne w ith t he other 19 cases) i f they did not settle. Mo reover, based on Judge Brot man ’s De cem ber 9 th order, counsel may

well have anticip ated that, at a m inim um, Judg e M oore wo uld take no further action in these cases unless and unt il sett lement di scussi ons proved unf ruitful. Judge Moore’s December23rd final judg men t, a ccordingly, may have
come as a surprise. Finally, when the final judgmentwa s rec eive d, i t was apparent from the sur

rounding ci rcu mstances t hat Judg e Moore must have conside red the recusalissue. A t that po int, co unsel may
we ll hav e consider ed a motion i n the Distri ct Cour t t o be point le ss . A n argumentin favor of a

pply ing an abuse of discre ti on st and ar d of

re vi ew ha s s ome appeal in th is co ntex t. See United St ates v. Antar , 53 F.3d 568, 573 n.6 (3d C ir. 1995) (expres sing dou bt as to w hethe r the pla in
error st an da rdof

re vi ew appli es wh ere stat ement at is sue was made by d istrict judge after

convict ion, and counsel may have reasonably t

hought th at making a recusalmotion was pointless; nonetheless, plain error

standar d of revie w applied14

Under the pla in er ror st andard of
re vi ew, a District Cou rt’s order may be
revers ed o n ly

when “[t]here [was] an ‘error’ t hat is ‘plai n’ and that ‘affect[s] substantial righ ts.’ ” Antar , 53 F.3dat 573 (quoti ng United Stat

es v. Olano , 507 U. S. 725, 7 3 2 (1993 )) (alterations in original). N or m all y, the requirem ent that the err o r “affect substantial rights ” is not sat is fied
a bsentan affirma tive sho win g “tha t th e er ror[was] prej udicia l. I t must hav e affected the outc ome o f th e district court pro cee din gs.” Olano , 507 U.S . at 734. There is at

least one sit uation, how ever, in which prejudi ce may be presumed without affirmat ive evidence t

hat the alle ged error af fecte d the ou tcom e. As we held in United States v. Antar , 53 F.3d 568, 573- 79 (3d Cir. 1995) (appl yi ng plain e rror review where a trial judge’s failu re to
recuse was f

irst raised on appe al), prejudi ce will be presu med and p lain error review is appr opriat e where a dist rict judge alle gedly

fail ed to recuse despit e an appear ance of parti alit y. Because “the touchst one of

recus al is the int egrit

y of t he jud iciar y . . . prejudi ce is pr esumed” once

“ the ap pe ar an ce of

pa rt ia li ty

is sh own

. ” Id. at 573 n. 7.

Even wh ere the error is p lain an d affects substantial right s, t

he decisi on t o “correc t th e forfeit ed error [is] within t

he soun d disc ret ion of the court of appeal s, and t he court should not

exerci se that

discr etion unless the erro r seriou sly affect[s ] the f airn ess, integrity

or publi c reputation of judici al proceedi ngs.” Olano , 507 U.S. at 732 (second al teration in origi nal and internal quotations o mitted).

C. The Law of Recusal

Section455(a ) of T itl e 28, Unit ed State s Co de, req uires th at:
Any justic e, ju dge, o r mag istrate ju d ge of the Un ited Sta tes sha ll disqual ify

hims elf in any pr oceeding in wh ich his im partiality mi ght reasonably be ques tioned.

28 U.S .C. § 4 55(a ); see Alexander v. Pri merica Holdings, Inc. , 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Whenev e r a judge’s impa rtiali ty ‘m ig ht re as on ab ly b e questi oned’ in a p roc eed ing , 28 U .S.C . § 455(a) comm a nds the j udge to dis qualif y hims elf sua s

pon te in th at pr oce edin g.”)

.
“A party seeking recusalneed notshow actualbias on t

he part of

the co urt, only the possibi lit

y of bias

. . . . Und er § 455 (a), if a reaso nab le ma n, w ere he to kn ow all the circumst an ces, w ould harb or do ubts about the jud ge’s im partia li ty under the applic able standar d, the n the judg e must
recu se.” In re Prude ntial Ins. Co. of America Sales P rac tices Liti gation , 148 F.3d 2 83, 343 (3d Cir. 1998) (i nternal quotati ons omitted); see M assa chus etts School of La w a t Andover, Inc. v. whe re parti es both conce ded it wo uld apply ). Nevert

heless , si nce it

is cl ear that
we ma y review for pl ain err or and si nce we belie ve that

standar d is satisfi ed h ere, we proceed h erea fter wit h plain e rror re vi ew.15

American Bar A ss’n , 107 F.3d 1026, 1042 (3d Cir. 1997 ) (“The stan dard for re cu sal is whet her an objec tiv e observe r reaso nably might qu estion the judge ’s imparti alit

y. ”)

Ge ne ra lly, “beli efs or opi nions whi c h merit recusalmust invol ve an extra judici al fac tor.” Antar , 53 F. 3d at 574. “[O]pinions fo rm ed by th e judge on the basis of fa cts introd uced or ev ents occurri ng in the course of t he current pr oceedings, or o f pr ior p roc eed ing s, d o not cons titute a ba sis for a bias o r partiality motion unless t

hey di splay

a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment imposs i ble. ” Litekyv. United Stat

es , 510 U .S. 540, 555 (1994).

There is no di spute her e that the sour ce of Judge Moore’s al leged bi as involved an extraj udicia l factor . The bas is f or Selkridge’s concern that Judge Moore had bec ome bi as edag ai ns t h er wa s a letter writt en by her

cou nse l to a l ocal newspaper de cry ing Jud ge Moore’ s performanc e as a judge, and Judge Moore’ s reactio ns to th at l ette r

. Acco rd in gl y, a signi ficant extraj udicia l factor is prese nt a nd w e review Judge Mo ore’s lack of r ecusal und er t he object ive standar d of whether a “reas onab le man , were he to k now all t h e circumstances, would harbordoubts about the judge’s imparti alit

y” under § 455 (a)

. Antar , 53 F.3d at 574 (quo ting In re Larson , 43 F.3d 410, 415 ( 8th Cir

. 1994) (quoti ng Potashnick v. Port City Const r

. Co. , 609 F.2 d 1 101, 111 1 (5th C ir. 1980))). If it were the case that J

udge Moore had recusedhimself in Selkridge I and Selkridge II

and t hen unrecused hi mself,
our task would be an easy one. “Once a judge has d isqua lif

ie d himself, he or she
ma y ente r no furt

her order s in t

he case. His power is l imit ed t o p erforming minist erialduties nece ssary to trans fer the
case to anothe r judge ( including the entering of ‘house ke epin g’ o rde rs).” Moody v. Si mmons , 858 F.2d137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988) (cit ations omitt ed). But the dock ets in these cases d o no t refle ct that such a recusal order was e n tered in eithe r of them, and we willanalyze the r ecusal issue on the assump tion that there w ere no such recusals. 18

D. S ection 455 (a) A nalysis

We agree with Omaha that the f act that
one of S elkridg e’s attorn eys wro te a letterto-t he-editor of a newsp a per regar ding Judg e Moo re is , al one, of l ittle probative value with respe ct to w hethe r a reas onab le perso n, kno win g all of the circumstances,
wo uld ques tion J udge Moore’ s im pa rtia lity. As the Court of Appeal s for the Seco nd C ircuit ex plain ed with regard to a letter s ent bya litigant to a judge that questi oned the judge’s motivat ions and intentions , “[t]his le tter ma y very we ll establish[the l iti gan t] ’s feelings tow ard

18 As w e note here afte r, t his does not
mea n th at t he ex ist en ce of am bi gu ity o n the public r ecord regarding whether
recus als occurred i s irr elevant to our analy sis of t

he recusalissue.16

[the judge], but has n o tendency to show the latter ’s feel ings toward [the litiga nt]. .

. .” King v. United States , 576 F.2d 432, 437 (2 d Cir. 19 78); see United St ates v. Wolfson , 558 F

. 2d 59, 61 -62 (2d C ir. 1977) (li tigant ’s le tter to newspaper (which was n ever pub lished), copied t o the judge, which accusedthe judge of partic i pating in a “sche me to frame” the litigant, “only establish[ed] [the litigant]’s feeli ngs toward s [the judge ], no t the reverse”); see also United States v. Helmsley , 760 F. Su pp. 338, 342 (S.D .N

. Y. 1991) (“Where the issue is not hostility displ ayed by the judge , but hostility displ ayed to wa r d the judge , the Second Circu it has fo und that ho stile atta cks even by a crim inal de fend ant, much l es s by the defend ant's lawyer, are not a su ffic ient b asis for re cus al.”).

We re the rule oth erw ise, “tho se litigan ts fortun ate enou gh to have easy acc ess to the med ia could mak e cha rges a gains t a judge’s impa rtialitythat wo uld effectiv ely
ve to the ass ignment of judges

. Judge-shop pin g would then become an additi onal and p otent ta ctical w eapo n in the skilled pract itioner’ s ars enal. ” In re DrexelBurnha m Lamb ert Inc. , 861 F.2d 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 19 88) . We there fore agree with Judge Mo ore’s view of recusal law, expresse d in United Stat es v. Roebuck , 289 F . Supp. 2d 678 (D .V.I. 2003), th at “ an att or ne y [m ay not ] be al lo we d t o use her cal culat ed personal atta ck on a sitting j udg e as a te chniq ue to preventthat j udge from presi ding over any of her c ases.

. . . ” Id. at 682 . If the o nly basis for Selkridg e’s arg ument that Judge Mo ore should have r ecused himsel f w a s

the let ter wri tten by

Selkri dge’s counse l taking issue with Judge Moore’ s performance, there w ould be little basis f or arguing t hat he should have r ecused. It is his react ion to couns el’s lett er that rais es the dif ficul t is sues here present ed.

We fir s t addres s the ci rcumstance s
u nder which the December 23, 200 2 , orders we re en tered by Jud ge M oor e. A lett er writt en b y Att orney Rohn and di rectly chall enging the competence o f Judge Moore had b ee n publis hed on September3rd. C om m en cin g s ix da ys later, and conti nuing over a pe riod of a month, Judge M oore recus ed him self in 19
cases involving Attorney Rohn. Al most all of these c ases w ere rea ssigne d to Judge Brotman, a v is iting judge, for settlement discuss ions only , pres um ably so that permanent reassi gnment wo uld be r equired in only thos e that d id no t sett le. These
recus als and reass ignments were made sua spon te and wit hou t exp lana tion . I n additi on , prior to December 23rd, at least twe lve more ca ses of Jud ge M oore ’ s involving Attorney

Rohn were transfer

red from Judge Moore to Judge Brot man for sett lement negotia tion s, raising th e poss ibilit y that J udge Moore w a s considering recusalin such of thes e cases as did not settle. Ag ain, the r eassig nm ents
came sua spon te and without e xplanat ion.

Because th ese extraordinary act ivities in Judge Moore’s cases involving Att orney Rohn follow ed alm ost im med iately on the heels of su ch a c ritical p ublic ation and because no alte rnati ve explanat ion w as17

given for the m, w e belie ve the y wou ld suggest to a rea sonable per son that Judge Mo ore wa s sufficiently upset by the le tter that he consider ed himself unable t o be object ive in hercases. Moreover, in t he absence of an alte r native explanat ion suggesting a c ont

rary co nc lu si on, we belie ve a reaso nable perso n w ould questi on Judge M oore’s a bili ty to be object ive at that point

in ti me in al lof Attorney Rohn’s cases.
Further, beca use th e ultim ate issue here is whether the pub lic can have confide nce in the integri ty of t

he court’s judgments,
we are cal ledto consi der st atements of the court following December 23, 2002, to t he extent they bear upon that issu e. In United States v. Antar , 53 F.3d 5 68 (3d C ir. 1995), the defendant cha ll enged the validity of h is con vic ti on on the ground t hat the trial jud ge w as bias ed an d sho uld not have presi ded ov er his tri al. The principal basis f

or the char ge of bias was a stat ement made by the judge at the conclusi on of the trial . We t here rejec ted the idea that we should l ook o n ly at the appe aranc e of m atters at th e time of trial:

We rejec t the implicat ions of t h e g overnm ent’s argum ent–tha t becaus e the statem ent oc curred after th e trial, it cannot for

m the b as is of an alle gationof bias dur ing the trial. Suppos e, for ins tance, that at sentencing the district

ju dge in for

ms
a defe ndan t that thro ugh out the tri al his object

had been to se e the defendant behind bars. A reaso nable obse rve r in suc h a sc enario wo uld have seri ous reason to quest ion whetherprior

ruli ng s in the case
were b ased on im partia l consider ations or on th e ju dg e's stat ed goal. The fact t

hat the judge’s

m otivation came to li ght only af te r the conclusi on of the trialwould be of n o m om ent.

Antar , 53 F.3d at576. Based on Antar , w e c o nclude that we must c onside r deve lopm ents between Dece mb er 23, 2002, and the submis sion of this direct appe al.

This conclusion is, of course, important because Judge Moore, after December 23, 2002 , had occasi on to comment on th e extraordin ary activity in Attorney Rohn’s
cases prior to that d ate. Writing 14 mont hs aft er the publication o f Roh n’s letter a n d 11 months afte r December 23, 2002, Judge Mo ore acknowledged that he had “enter ed

r ecu sal orders in . . . some, but not all, of Attorney Rohn’s . . . pending cases” because he was “stung” by “her pers onal atta ck ” and “upset at

the vic iousness ” of her “scurr ilous arti cle. ” He reporte d, how ever, that “ the pass age o f time [had] allowed[him] to r efl ect, and . . . [had] heal[ed] all wounds. ” R oebuck , 289 F. Supp. 2dat

68 2. J ud ge Mo o re thus confirmedthat he was suffici ently upset with Attorney

Rohn in the F all of

2002 that he recused in so me of her cases. Wh ile he insi stedthat he did not rec use in all of Attorney

Rohn’s cases, he offeredno explanat ion fo r wh y he be lieved he co uld be obj ectiv e i n so me of her cases even though he could not be in others. As a18

result, we b elieve that Judg e M oore’s opinionserve d to reinfor ce the conclusion that a reasonabl e p erson would have reachedviewing matt ers as of December 23rd – tha t t

he re wa s rea son to “har bor doub ts ab ou t th e ju dg e’ s im pa rtia lity” when he was delibe rati ng over the motions pending in Selkridge I

and Selkridge II

and writi ng his December 23, 2002, opini on.

Nor is the appearance of i mpr opriety assuaged by t he co nflict in th e subs eque ntly dev elo ped record ove r whetherJudge Moore did at one point
recuse in the Selkr idg e cases. We accept for present

purposes t

ha t Judge Brotman
was mistaken in his bel ief that Judge Mo ore had rec used himself in all of Attorney Rohn’s c ase s. Nevertheless, there is a confl ict in the pub lic record t hat the litigants have no means of res olving and that c onflic t cast s a shadow on Judge Mo ore’s imp ar tial ity

in the Selkridge
cases.

Vi ewing the rec ord as a whole, given the appear an ce that Judg e M oore’s impa rtiality was compr omised, w e conclude that i t was err or for Judg e M oore to enter t h e D ecem ber 2 3rd o rders in Selkridge I

and Selkridge I

I, and th at this
error was plain. Further , because this error compromised the int egr it y of th e proceedings, “ prejud ice is pre sum ed.” Antar , 53 F.3d at57 3. F in all y, we exercise
our discre tion to re view this claim of error because it “s erious ly

affect[e d] th e . . . integrity [and] publi c reputation of j udicia l pro cee din gs.” Olano , 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotations o mitted). E. Holding
Judge M oore ’s reac ti o n to Attor ney Roh n’s intem perate pub lic criticism is certain lyunderst andable. Moreove r , his sensitiv it y t o the possible impact of that react ion on his abi lit

y t o judge fai rly

cases in which she was counsel i s commendable. We further

agree with Judge Moore that the passage of t ime does, indeed, heal wound s, and we do no t mean to suggest that it is no t prese ntly appro priate for him to sit on cases i nvolving Att orney Rohn. 19

We do hold, however, that a tri al judge
ca nno t, with out ex plana tio n, recuse hims elf in a subst antia l number of cas es and, atsub st antia ll yth e s ame time, decli ne to recuse himself in another group of cases that appears i ndist inguis habl e for p urposes of recusal . From an appe arance perspect ive, that is p rec isel y what Judge Mo ore did here, and he c om mit ted pla in
error in doing s o. F. The Remedy
“Although § 455 defines the circumst ances that mandat e d isqual ific ationof fe deral ju dges, it neithe r prescr ibes nor prohi bits an y p arti cular remedyfor a viol ation of th at d ut y. [R athe r,] Co ngre ss has wise lydelegat ed to

19 In particular , we, of course, express
no opini on on the propriety of Judge Mo ore’s refusalto recus e hi m self in United States v. Roebuck , 289 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D .V.I. 2003).19

the ju dic iary

the ta sk of fashi oning remedies that wil l best

serve t he pu r pose of th e legi slat ion.” Liljebe rg v. H ealth Services Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 862 (19 88).

In Liljeberg , the Suprem e Cou rt appr oved th e va cat

urof afi nalju dgme n t entere d by a district ju dge w ho sh ould have disqual ifie d himself. It expl a ined, how ever, that this re med y wou ld no t b e requ ir ed in allsuch cases . It suggeste d that, in deci ding whethe r to vacate s uch a final judgment, a court s hould “consi der the risk of

injus tice to the parti es in t h e parti cular

case, the ri sk that

the deni al of reli ef will pr oduce injusti ce in other cases, and the risk of un dermining the public’s confidenc e in the judi cial process. ” Id . at 864. With respe ct to the second factor , the C ourt concluded tha t vacat ing the judgmentwo uld h elp pre vent injus tice in other cases “b y e ncouraging a judge or litigant to mo re care fully exam ine po ssible grounds for d isqua lification and to prom ptly disc lose them wh en d isco ver ed.” Id. at 86 8.

The Li ljeberg Co urt expr essly noted that “[a]s in o ther area s of

the la w, th ere is

. . . room for harmle ss err or” in § 4 55(a) analysi s, id. at 862, and we h ave hereto fore read that c ase as approving harmless error analy sis when applie d w ith sens itivity not only to the interes ts of t

he parties, but also to the int erest s of other

litigants and to the pub lic ’s inter est i n the int egrit y of t he court system

. See In re School Asbest o s Liti gation , 977 F .2d 764, 78 5-88 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Patterso n v . Mo bil O il Co rp. , 335 F. 3d 4 76, 485 -8 6 ( 5th Ci r

. 2003); In re Continental Ai rli nes Corp. , 901 F.2d 12 59, 1263 (5 th Cir. 1990 ); Parkerv. Connors Steel Co. , 855 F.2d 151 0, 15 25- 27 ( 11t h C ir. 19 88)

. Compared with si tuati ons li ke the one before us in I

n re School Asbest

os Liti gation , det ermi n ing the appr opriate remedyis not

a complex matt er. The l ette r came lat e in the litigati on, and onl y t he final decisi ons curre n t ly before us on d irect appeal coul d possibly have be e n affe cted. Moreov er, both of those decisi ons are subj ect t o plenary review by this court, one be cause it is a summa ry judgmentand the other because it i s based
on the Dist

rict Court’s r esolut ion of a pure is su e o f l aw.

In th is context, we have two choices: (1) we can vaca te the order s before us and remand with instructi ons that t he cases be assigne d t o a n ew distr ict j udge for
res oluti on of the pendi ng motions an d poss ible further proceedings; or (2) we can independen t lyreview the record and determi ne whe ther th e res jud icata and Ru le 60(b) i ssues were cor re ctly decided
as a matter

of law an d re mand only in the eventthey

were not, r eason in g that, if impartial decision m akers of this cour t, in additi on to finding a

violation of § 455(a), indep ende ntly approve the orders at is sue, anye r ror is ha rmles s and Om aha is fairly entitledto i t s judgments . Where, as here, it appears c learthat the failure to recuse did no t a ffect t

he dispositions of the plaint iff’ s clai ms and a remand , ac co rd in gl y, wo uld o nly prolo ng the20

liti gations, we conc lu d e that the second approach i s the appr opriat e one.

As we explain her eafter , any tri al judge present ed with thi s recor d would be req uiredas a matt er of law to ent e r summ ary judgment i n Selkridge II and to decli ne to vaca te the judgment in Selkridge I

. As a resu lt, we perce ive no unfairnes s to Selkri dge from decli ni ng to vacat e the judg men ts against

her, and i t s eems apparent to us that a contrar

y deci sion
wo uld se rv e o nl y to impos e a n un ne ce ss ar y, additi onal li tigation burden
on Om aha a nd th e D istr i ct Co urt. Mo reover, in these ci rc ums tanc es , w e belie ve our d eterm ination that a violation of § 455(a) occu rred w ill prov ide virtu ally the same encouragement to other judges
an d litigants as would a remand. Fina lly , we conclud e (1 ) that

our independe nt review and deter

minati on of the re levant legal issues will pr ovide as much legitimacyto these particu lar fin a l judg men ts as they w ould have foll owing a remand, reexamination by another Dis tri ct Judge, and a sub sequ ent a ppella te aff irmance; and (2) t

hat our finding of plain error on Jud ge M oore’s part consti tutes a correc tive process suffi cient to assure c o nti nuing confi dence in t he judicial pr ocess. 20 IV

. Sum ma ry Ju dgm ent in Selkridge II: The Merits

The Distri ct Cou rt granted sum mary judgmentfor Omaha in Selkridge II based
on clai m preclusi on. Forclaim preclus ion to apply, there must have been“[1] a fi nal judgmenton th e m erits in [2 ] a prio r suit involving the same parties or their pri vies, and [3] a subse quent sui t based on t he
sa me cause of act ion.” GeneralElec. Co.

v. Deut z AG , 270 F .3d 144, 15 8 (3d C ir. 2001). “If the se thre e fac tors are prese nt,
a clai m thatwas or could have be en rais ed prev iously mu st b e dismis sed a s pr ecl ude d.” CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Hu ls America, Inc

. , 176 F.3d187, 194 (3d Cir. 1999). Sel kridge argues only that the ERISA claim in Selkridge II is not subject to claim preclus ion beca use th e dec ision in Se lkri dge I

was neither

final nor on the

20 Our use o f “ha rmles s error” analysis in d eterminin g the a ppro priate re med y is not in t e nsion with the C ourt’s h olding in Antarthat pr ejudic e is pre sumed once an ap pearance of impart iality is shown. Under Antar , an effect on t he proceedings before t h e compromised judge is pre sumed

for the purpos e of deter mining whether appe llate revi e w is permiss ible in the absence of a motion t o r ec use. I f a contrary resul t had been r eached in Antar , there would have been no appel late review
an d the D istrict Co urt’s jud gm ent w ould have rema ined in place despit e the fact that its integri t y had be en im paired , a result that no ap pellate c ourt co uld sa nction in good cons cie n ce. Our “ harmless erro r” analysi s, on the ot her hand, a ccepts t he presumpti on of prejudi ce atthe trial lev el, but take s in to acc oun t the fa ct that p lain
error rev iew ma kes fur ther , cur ative proceedi ngs p ossibl e in the Court of Appeals.21

merits.

Selkri dge assert ed only state law cl ai ms in her complai nt in Selkridge I, andOmaha
asse rte d an aff

irmati ve defe nse of ERI SA preempti on as to al l of thos e clai ms. The Distri ct Co urt susta ined that de fense and entere d a fina l ju dgm ent on every cla im
asse rted

. That final judgment det ermined that there c ould be no rec overy on any cl ai m.

As Selkri dge stre sses, an argument can be mad e that th e D istrict Cou rt abus ed its discr etionby fai ling t o provide an opp ortun ityto amend. 21 But that is an argumentthat s hould have been advanced in a timely a

ppeal and does not render t he D ist rict Court’s s ummary judgmen t anyt hing other t

han a final judgment on the merits. Stewartv. U.S. Bancorp , 297 F.3d 953, 959 ( 9th Cir. 200 2) (wher e defe ndan ts bro ugh t motion to dismiss base d up on all of

plaintiffs’ clai ms being preemptedby ER ISA , “[p]la in tiff s were o n notice that the ir cl ai ms were preempted by ERISA , and they did n ot seek leave to
amen d or dism iss ‘without prejud ice.’ .

. . Absent a request from plai ntiff s to amend, the dist rict court had no ot

her alt ernative but to dism iss th e c ase, fin ding the on ly cla ims pla inti ffs prese nted wer e preemp ted.”).

A cc or di ng ly, the Dist

rict Court had no choice but to dismiss Selkridge II because the clai m in that

lawsui t coul d have been rais ed in Selkridge I

.
V. The Rule 60(b) M otion in Selkridge I:

The Merits
Rule 60(b) provides:

On motion an d upon such ter ms as are just, the co urt ma y relieve a p arty
or a party’s legal repres entat ive from
a fina l jud gm ent, o rde r, o r proc eedin g for the fo llow in g reasons: (1) m is t ake, i nadverte nce, surp ris e, or excusabl e neglect ; (2)
new lydiscover ed evidence which by due di li gence could not have been discover ed in time to move for a new t rialunder R ule 59(b); (3) fra u d (whetherheretof

ore denominat ed i n tri n s i c or extr insi c ) , misrepr esentat ion, or o the r misconduct

of an adverse party ; (4) t he j udgment is voi d; (5) the judgment h as be en sa ti sfied , relea sed, or discharged, or a prior judgmentupon which it i s based has been reversed o r otherw ise vacated,
or it i s no l onger equita ble that the ju d gment should have pr ospecti ve applic atio n; or (6) any ot her reas on just ify ing reli ef fr om the operat ion of the ju dgm ent.

Selkri dge ur ges that the D istrict Court 21 But see Ram sgate Court Townh ouse Ass’n v. West Chester Boro ugh , 313 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2002 ) (District Court did not ab use i ts discre tion in failing to address a request

for permissi on to amend the complaint

contai ned in a bri ef but
never m ade the sub ject of a mo tion).22

committed

revers ible e rr or by failin g to
vaca te the su mm ary judgm ent in Selkridge I pursuant to the r esidualprovisi on of Ru le 60(b)(6). Her argument i s that the Dist rict Cou rt committed l ega l error in ente ring that sum ma ry judg me nt. Even if that were true, however, it would not, as a matter of law, justify relief under R ule 60(b)(6).
As we held in Martinez

- McBean v. Government of Virgin I sla nds , 562 F.2d, 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1977), “[L] egal e rror do es not by

its elf warrant

the appl icat ion of Ru le 60 (b). T he correc tion of l egal
errors comm itted by the d istrict cou rts is the function of the Courts of Appea ls. Since lega l e rror c an usually be cor recte d
on appeal, tha t f

actor wit hout more does not justify the g ranting of relie f un der R ule 60(b)(6). We know of

no au thority to the
con trary.” See also Morris v. Horn , 1 8 7 F.3d 333, 34 3-44 (3d Cir. 1999) (“What [A ppella nt] is attem pting to raise as a Ru le 60 (b) mo tion is in fact w hat he shou ld have b rought as a n appe al.”).

VI

. Conclusion
For the fo rego ing rea sons , we w ill dismiss the appea l fro m the Februar y 22, 2002, gr ant

of s umma r y judgm ent in Selkridge I, No. 03-1146, for lac k of j urisdi ctionand w ill affirm the D istric t Cou rt’s orders e ntered on Dec embe r 23, 2002, in Selkridge I

(No. 03-1146) and Selkridge II

(No. 03 -1147).